alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit

NATIONAL WIRELESS HOLDINGS INC.
Computations of Earnings Per Share

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                          Year Ended        Year Ended   Year Ended
                                                          October 31,       October 31,  October 31,
                                                             1996              1995         1994
                                                          ------------    ------------   ------------
<S>                                                       <C>             <C>            <C>        
Net loss                                                  $ 1,016,824     $   640,081    $   450,644
                                                          ------------    ------------   ------------

Weighted average common shares outstanding:
   Primary:
      Shares of Common Stock outstanding                    3,253,000       3,222,863      2,407,794
      Dilutive effect of Convertible Preferred Stock
      Dilutive effect of stock options
                                                          ------------    ------------   ------------
                                                            3,253,000       3,222,863      2,407,794
                                                          ------------    ------------   ------------

   Fully diluted:
      Shares of Common Stock outstanding                    3,253,000       3,222,863      2,407,794
      Dilutive effect of Convertible Preferred Stock
      Dilutive effect of stock options
                                                          ------------    ------------   ------------
                                                          $ 3,253,000     $ 3,222,863    $ 2,407,794
                                                          ============    ============   ============

Loss per share - primary                                  $   0.31        $   0.20       $   0.19
Loss per share - fully diluted                            $   0.31        $   0.20       $   0.19
</TABLE>

Net Loss Per Share Data:

Net loss per share is computed on the basis of the loss for the period divided
by the weighted average number of common shares and common share equivalents
outstanding during the period.
EXHIBIT 23.2






      INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT



The Board of Directors
CAI Wireless Systems, Inc.

We   consent  to  the  incorporation   by
reference  in  the registration statement
(No. 0-22888) on Form S-8 of CAI Wireless
Systems, Inc. of  our  report dated March
21,  1997,  relating to the  consolidated
balance sheet  of  CS  Wireless  Systems,
Inc. and subsidiaries as of December  31,
1996   and   the   related   consolidated
statements  of  operations, stockholders'
equity and cash flows  for  the year then
ended, which report appears in  the March
31,  1997  Annual Report on Form 10-K  of
CAI Wireless Systems, Inc.



                                    KPMG
Peat Marwick LLP


Dallas, Texas
June 26, 1997
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">502 West 152nd Street, LLC, -Appellant, <br><br>against<br><br>Mohammed Soumahoro, Respondent-Tenant-Respondent.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Landlord appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (Sabrina B. Kraus, J.), dated August 3, 2016, which vacated a prior order denying tenant's motion to vacate his default in complying with a stipulation of settlement, and restored him to possession of the subject premises in a holdover summary proceeding.</p><p>Per Curiam.</p><p>Order (Sabrina B. Kraus, J.), dated August 3, 2016, reversed, without costs, and tenant's motion denied. Execution of the warrant shall be stayed for 30 days from the service of a copy of this order with notice of entry.</p><p>Civil Court erred in concluding that tenant was unlawfully evicted. The record establishes that tenant was legally evicted after repeatedly failing to comply with the unambiguous "time is of the essence" payment provision of the stipulation executed in settlement of the underlying chronic rent delinquency holdover proceeding (<i>see Henry Hudson Gardens, L.L.C. v Bareda</i>, 25 AD3d 466 [2006]). "Strict enforcement of the parties' stipulation ... is warranted based upon the principle that the parties to a civil dispute are free to chart their own litigation course" (<i>Mill Rock Plaza Assoc. v Lively</i>, 224 AD2d 301 [1996]). We also note that the marshal's notice was re-served after the Court's June 30, 2016 denial of tenant's prior motion to vacate his default under the stipulation.</p><p>THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.</p><br>I concur I concur I concur<br>Decision Date: March 12, 2018<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_1_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
**Exhibit
        32.2**
  **CERTIFICATION
        PURSUANT TO**
 **18
        U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**
 **AS
        ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**
 **SECTION
        906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
 
 In
        connection with the Quarterly Report of BLS Media, Inc. a Nevada corporation
        (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2007, as
        filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
        "Report"), Gary Prager, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certifies
        to the
        best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to
§ 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 (1)
              The
                  Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
                  15(d) of
                  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                  and
 
 (2)
              The
                  information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                  respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
                  Company.
 
 A
        signed
        original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
        to
        BLS Media, Inc., and will be retained by BLS Media, Inc. and furnished to
        the
        Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
  /s/
                    Gary
                    PragerGary
                    PragerChief
                    Financial Officer
 November
          2, 2007
#### In the Interest of J.E.D., R.J.D., et al., Respondent. JUVENILE OFFICER, Respondent, v. O.D.—Natural Father, Appellant, R.D.—Natural Mother, Respondent.

No. WD 50725.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

March 5, 1996.

*887Chris Nelson, Hallsville, for appellant.

Leslie Ann Schneider, Guardian Ad Litem.

Elizabeth K. Magee, Columbia, for Juvenile Officer.

Thomas M. Harrison, Columbia, for R.D., Natural Mother.

Before ELLIS, P.J., and ULRICH and LAURA DENVIR STITH, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM:

Natural father, O.L.D., appeals the termination of his parental rights to his five minor children pursuant to § 211.447 RSMo 1994. He asserts the juvenile officer failed to produce clear, cogent and convincing evidence to support abandonment.

The judgment is affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
#### Darious Golemon v. State.

No. 24746.

May 24, 1950.

State’s Motion for Rehearing Denied June 21, 1950.

*J. H. Letts, Pliny V. Myers, Brann Fuller,*(on appeal only) all of Houston, for appellant.

*Thomas J. Hightower,*District Attorney, of Liberty, *R. A. Richardson,*County Attorney, and *H. A. Coe,*Special Prosecutor, all of *Kountze,*and *George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

*82GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was assessed the death penalty for the murder with malice of Cloyce Eloise Twitchell.

This is a companion case to our No. 24,688, Alex Leviness v. State, this day decided, (Page 85 of this volume) and is subject to the same objection relative to the grand jury that found the indictment in that instance.

The appellant was indicted on July 5, 1949, by a grand jury that had been originally drawn for a term of court superseded by the statute, as shown in House Bill No. 780 of the 51st Legislature, Regular Session, (1949), such new statute taking effect on May 12, 1949, and by its terms making this grand jury operative for the new term beginning on the first Monday in September, 1949. At the time of the finding of this indictment, the grand jury provided for the September term was sitting as the grand jury for a term called on May 14, 1949, as the grand jury for such session.

After careful consideration, we held in our No. 24,688, Alex Leviness v. State, that this was not a valid grand jury. The holding is the same herein.

Therefore, this judgment is reversed and the prosecution ordered dismissed.

ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

For the reason stated in the companion case of Leviness v. State, No. 24,688, (Page 85 of this volume) this day decided, the state’s motion for rehearing is overruled.

Opinion approved by the court.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

July 31, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 130396 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 130396 

 COA: 265920 

Eaton CC: 04-020276-FH 

RONALD JAMES HARRIS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 1, 2005 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

d0724 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

July 31, 2006 

 Clerk
#### Salvador GONZALES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. T. O. LANG, Sheriff of Travis County, Texas, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 72-2276.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 24, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1973.

*1076Dean Hester, El Paso, Tex. (Court appointed), for petitioner-appellant.

Joseph Latting, Austin, Tex. (Court appointed), for Perales.

Shannon Ratliff, Austin, Tex. (Court appointed), for Arechiga.

Crawford Martin, Atty. Gen., Roland D. Green, III, Sarah E. Phillips, Asst. Attys. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellee.

Before DYER, SIMPSON and MORGAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Gonzales was convicted in a Texas state court of unlawfully possessing heroin. On this habeas appeal petitioner contends that the prosecution knowingly acquiesced in the use of false testimony and that the trial court erroneously refused to allow defense counsel to impeach the principal prosecution witness. On oral argument before this court Gonzales’ case was consolidated with four other cases involving similar factual situations. It was undisputed that our disposition of the above two issues in any one of the cases would of necessity control the same issues in the other cases. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in Corpus v. Beto, 5 Cir. 1972, 469 F.2d 953, we hold that these two contentions are without merit.

Gonzales additionally contends that he was denied due process of law because the state trial judge allowed into evidence testimony concerning several prior instances where Gonzales had used or sold narcotics. We have carefully reviewed the record and we hold that any error in admitting this evidence, if indeed it was error at all, does not rise to constitutional dimensions. There is therefore no basis for the issuance of the writ. Gephart v. Beto, 5 Cir. 1971, 441 F.2d 319; United States ex rel. Gueldner v. Heyd, 5 Cir. 1970, 434 F.2d 1307; Hackworth v. Beto, 5 Cir. 1970, 434 F.2d 852.

The district court’s denial of the petition is

Affirmed.
**Exhibit
32.1**
 
 **CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO**
 **18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**
 **AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**
 **SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
 
 In
connection with the Amendment Number 1 to the Annual Report of Largo Vista
Group, Ltd (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31,
2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), the
undersigned, Deng Shan, Interim Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certifies to the best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 (1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 Date: May
11, 2005
 
 /s/ Deng
Shan
 -----------------------------------------
 Deng
Shan, Principal Executive Officer
 
 This
certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended.
#### Errol Douglass FULFORD-EL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lloyd L. WATERS, Warden; James Yonker; Jacquelen Shank; Captain Sotalmyer; J. Lynch; James Peguess, Warden; Sargeant Myers; K.O. Williams, Lieutenant; Clark Jenty, Correctional Officer Ii; Correctional Officer Cooper; Sargeant Hancock; Gary Foreman, Lieutenant; William W. Sondervan; Marvin N. Robbins, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 03-6785.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 14, 2003.

Decided Aug. 21, 2003.

Errol Douglass Fulford-El, Appellant Pro Se.

Before WILLIAMS, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM.

Errol Douglass Fulford-El appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint without prejudice. The district court dismissed the complaint because Fulford-El did not comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, requiring a short and plain statement of his claims. Because Fulford-El may cure this defect by amending his complaint, the dismissal without prejudice is not a final, appealable order. *See Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392,*10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir.1993). We therefore dismiss the appeal.* We deny Fulford-El’s motion for transfer to another institution. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before *286the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*

*

 To the extent Fulford-El attempts to appeal orders from *Fulford-El v. Robbins,*No. CA-03-1200-1, this appeal was separately docketed, and Fulford-El filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted. Therefore, we do not consider those orders.
47926 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 159 / Friday, August 15, 2008 / Notices 

[FR Doc. E8–18652 Filed 8–14–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–C 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Office of the Secretary 

[Transmittal Nos. 08–35] 

36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification 

AGENCY: Department of Defense, Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is 

publishing the unclassified text of a 

section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. 

This is published to fulfill the 

requirements of section 155 of Public 

Law 104–164 dated 21 July 1996. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. 

B. English, DSCA/DBO/CFM, (703) 601–

3740. 

The following is a copy of a letter to 

the Speaker of the House of 

Representatives, Transmittals 08–35 

with attached transmittal, policy 

justification, and Sensitivity of 

Technology. 

Dated: August 5, 2008. 

Patricia L. Toppings, 

OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, 

Department of Defense. 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–M 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICES

Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 159 / Friday, August 15, 2008 / Notices 47927 


mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICESEN15AU08.013</GPH>
47928 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 159 / Friday, August 15, 2008 / Notices 


mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICESEN15AU08.014</GPH>
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 159 / Friday, August 15, 2008 / Notices 47929 


mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICESEN15AU08.015</GPH>
47930 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 159 / Friday, August 15, 2008 / Notices 


mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICESEN15AU08.016</GPH>
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 159 / Friday, August 15, 2008 / Notices 47931 

[FR Doc. E8–18653 Filed 8–14–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–C 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Office of the Secretary 

[Transmittal Nos. 08–98] 

36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification 

AGENCY: Department of Defense, Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is 

publishing the unclassified text of a 

section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. 

This is published to fulfill the 

requirements of section 155 of Public 

Law 104–164 dated 21 July 1996. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. 

B. English, DSCAIDBO/CFM, (703) 601–

3740. 

The following is a copy of a letter to 

the Speaker of the House of 

Representatives, Transmittals 08–98 

with attached transmittal, policy 

justification, and Sensitivity of 

Technology. 

Dated: August 5, 2008. 

Patricia L. Toppings, 

OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, 

Department of Defense. 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–M 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with NOTICES
#### THOMAS v. ROBERTS.

No. 14230.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Oct. 31, 1932.

H. L. Hammett, of New Orleans, for appellant.

F. B. Freeland, of New Orleans, for appel-lee.

JANVIER, J.

Plaintiff claims of defendant $235, alleging that his automobile, while driven by his son, was run into by a truck belonging to defendant and negligently operated by an employee, and that damage amounting to that sum resulted.

The accident occurred at the comer of St. Charles and Louisiana avenues in New Orleans. . Plaintiff’s automobile was proceeding up St. Charles avenue. Just before it reached the corner of Louisiana avenue, plaintiff’s son noticed that the traffic signal light was against him and that two other automobiles were stopped waiting for the light to change. One of them was immediately next to the St. Charles avenue neutral ground; the second was alongside the first, and therefore plaintiff’s son drove to the right of the second car so that there were then three abreast. He stopped, and all waited for the light to turn. When the light changed, plaintiff’s son drove his car into the roadway of Louisiana avenue, and, when he had reached a point some eight or ten feet beyond that at which he had been *71previously stopped, lie was struck on the left side by the truck of defendant, which was approaching at a rapid rate of speed.

 There seems to be no doubt that the truck was proceeding at an excessive speed and that it entered the intersection after the traffic, light facing it had turned to red. The driver was therefore negligent, both in the matter of speed and because of his violation of the ordinance, which requires that vehicles shall come to a stop at intersections guarded by lights when the lights showing towards them are red.

It is very evident, however, that plaintiff’s son did not look for the approach of any other vehicles in the roadway crossing his path, and that had he done so he would have seen the on-coming truck and would- not have driven his car in front of it Counsel for plaintiff has interestingly and mathematically shown that the truck of defendant entered the intersection after the light was “against” him, but all his ingenuity is unable to convince us that the accident could not have been averted had plaintiff’s son exercised reasonable care. True enough he had no re-ason to presume that any one else was acting in vio-. lation of a safety ordinance. Still he was at fault in -relying entirely on the drivers in the cars to the left of him to see if the roadway was clear. His desire to pass them and to lead them up the avenue was the proximate cause of the collision. The drivers of both cars to his left saw the truck coming, and the driver of a third car, which was behind his car, also saw the truck, and we are of -the opinion that the action of plaintiff’s son was plainly negligent.

The judge of the trial court felt that both drivers -were at fault, and dismissed plaintiff’s suit, and we think that he was correct.

'The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Affirmed.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

October 31, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

128644 Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 128644 

 COA: 259694 

Oakland CC: 2003-188764-FH 

ROBERT JAMES BLACK, JR., 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 12, 2005 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded 

that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

d1024 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

October 31, 2005 

Clerk
#### Joshua J. Moore, plaintiff in error, *vs.*George W. Little, *et al.,*administrators of the estate of Robert E. Little, deceased, defendants in error.

*Error to Peoria.*

It is erroneous to proceed to the trial of issues of fact, while questions of law, arising upon a demurrer, remain undetermined»

This was an action of assumpsit, heard before Mr. Justice Catón and a jury, at June term, 1848, of the Peoria Circuit Court, and judgment was rendered for defendants in error for the sum of *$*131 04. The defendant below brings the case to this Court, and assigns for error that the Circuit Court erred in rendering judgment while there was an issue of law pending in said cause.

J. Manning, for plaintiff in error.

O. Peters, for defendants in error.

Opinion by Treat, C. J.:

The record discloses this state of case. The declaration was on a promissory note. The defendant filed six pleas, on five of which issues of fact were formed. There was a demurrer and *550joinder in demurrer to a replication to the other plea. The issues of fact were then submitted to a jury, and the trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs. It does not appear that any disposition was ever made of the demurrer. On this showing of the record, the judgment cannot be sustained. The questions of law arising on the demurrer should have been decided before proceeding to a trial of the issues of fact. This principle has been settled by numerous decisions of this Court. Nye *vs.*Wright, 2 Scammon, 222; Bradshaw *vs.*Hoblett, 4 ibid, 53; Steelman *vs.*Watson, 5 Gilman, 249. There is nothing on the face of the record to authorize the conclusion that the defendant abandoned his plea, or waived his right to a decision of the demurrer.

Let the judgment of the Circuit Court be reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

*Judgment reversed.*