1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, Case No. 09-cr-20317

v.

HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

PATRICK ALAN STARK,

Defendant.

 /

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND EVIDENCE (docket no. 11)

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Patrick Stark was indicted on July 31, 2009 for possession of child

pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5). Stark was questioned in his driveway

by law enforcement on July 31, 2008. He made some incriminating statements which

formed the basis of a search warrant that lead police to Stark’s personal computer, in which

was found child pornography.

Stark seeks suppression of the statements he made based on the fact that he was

not given the Miranda1 warnings before being questioned. He also requests that the Court

suppress the computer seized pursuant to the warrant which was supported by his

unwarned statements.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On or about May 3, 2005, Stark was sentenced on four counts of felony

eavesdropping in violation of Michigan law. Specifically, he had secretly videotaped

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2 The Court’s following recitation of the facts come from a summary by the

government in its brief of a hearing that apparently took place on December 11, 2008 in

the case of State of Michigan v. Patrick Alan Stark, Oakland County Circuit Court, No.

08-222304-FH. Stark’s brief does not contain a detailed recitation of the facts. For

purposes of this motion the Court relies on the summary provided by the government,

with which Stark’s counsel did not quibble at the hearing held in this matter. 

2

females, through their home windows, while undressing. When released from jail, he was

placed on parole and given an 11:00 pm curfew. On July 27, 2008, at 11:15 pm, police

observed Stark riding his bike.2 When questioned by the officer, Stark responded he was

riding for exercise. The officer filed a report about Stark’s suspicious behavior. This report

led to a subsequent surveillance of Stark by six officers for possible parole violations and

other criminal activity. On July 29 and July 31, 2009 Stark was observed leaving his home

on a bike. Stark’s further suspicious behavior prompted three of the surveilling officers to

plan to intercept Stark upon arriving home for the evening.

When Stark arrived at 2:00 am the next morning, detectives met him and identified

themselves. Stark admitted he was in violation of his curfew and parole. One minute later,

the three other surveilling officers arrived at Stark’s driveway. When Stark was questioned

about his suspicious activity, he told a story apparently inconsistent with what the officers

had earlier observed. The officers advised that they had followed Stark earlier in the night

and knew he was lying. Stark consented to a search of a pouch attached to his bike, which

included a camera. He consented to the officers’ search of the camera, which contained

seven pictures and seven videos of women and girls undressing. When asked if he had

access to a computer, Stark responded in the affirmative. When asked whether the

computer would contain pictures of unwitting persons in states of undress, Stark answered

“probably.” Stark also provided the password to his computer. He was later arrested for

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prowling and eavesdropping.

Later that morning, the detectives obtained a search warrant for Stark’s bedroom.

In the warrant, the detectives used Stark’s statements to establish probable cause for the

warrant. Stark’s computer was subsequently seized. In addition to pictures of women

undressing, the forensic examiner found images of child pornography which formed the

factual basis for the indictment.

DISCUSSION

Stark argues concisely that the police interrogated him without providing him the

Miranda warnings. Accordingly, he argues, his statements should be suppressed.

Additionally, Stark argues, since these illegal statements formed the basis for probable

cause (and the search warrant) for seizure of his computer, the computer, and all materials

found on it, are the fruit of the poisonous tree and should also be suppressed. Stark cites

United States v. Langley, 466 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1972) for support. The government

disagrees that the statements were made in violation of Miranda, but even if they were, it

submits, the physical evidence seized as a result should not be suppressed. 

A. Miranda Violation

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution says that an individual may not be

“compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V.

To the ends of protecting this right, Miranda requires police officers to give warnings,

including the right to remain silent, before engaging in “custodial interrogation.” United

States v. Panak, 552 F.3d 462, 465 (6th Cir. 2009). In order for police to violate the

Miranda requirements, the defendant must establish he was “in custody,” and so while, was

“interrogated.” The defendant must also establish that the interplay between being “in

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custody” and being “interrogated” was in the nature of an incommunicado interrogation in

a police-dominated atmosphere, such as would trigger the Miranda warnings. Illinois v.

Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating by a

preponderance of the evidence that the interview was a custodial interrogation. See United

States v. Smith, 783 F.2d 648, 650 (6th Cir.1986)

In order for the Court to conclusively decide whether Stark was in fact subject to

custodial interrogation when questioned by police in his driveway, a fuller exploration into

the incidents of the facts would be necessary. At this point, all the Court has before it is the

summary of the hearing in state court provided in the government’s brief. As counsel for

the government has noted, the parties’ understanding about what happened comes solely

from this transcript, which is apparently difficult to understand and lacks a logical

progression. 

Based on the facts the Court has before it, however, it appears that Stark was

subject to custodial interrogation in his driveway, thereby necessitating the Miranda

warnings prior to questioning. It appears clear that, although there was no formal arrest

prior to the questioning, Stark was not free to leave and there was restraint on his freedom

of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. See Panak, 552 F.3d at 465.

The government’s attempt to characterize Stark’s encounter with police as something other

than custodial is unavailing. A reasonable person in Stark’s position, surrounded by six

police officers at 2:00 in the morning, would not feel free to terminate the encounter.

Additionally, Stark was expressly questioned, which meets the definition “interrogation.”

See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). Finally, the Court finds that this

situation was one in which the interplay between police interrogation and police custody

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implicate the concerns in Miranda of subjecting a defendant to “incommunicado

interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.” Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296

(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445). Accordingly, since Stark was subject to custodial

interrogation and made statements prior to being given the Miranda warnings, his

statements are prohibited from being introduced in the government’s case-in-chief.

B. Exclusion of Non-Testimonial Evidence Later Obtained 

Stark argues that if his statements are suppressed, so also should be the evidence

seized pursuant to the warrant predicated on his statements. Stark relies on the fruit of the

poisonous tree doctrine, applicable primarily in the context of illegal searches and seizures

in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and attempts to extend the doctrine to the Miranda

context. 

Stark’s argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United

States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004). In that case, the Supreme Court, in a three-Justice

plurality with two Justices concurring held that non-testimonial, i.e., physical, evidence

obtained as a result of incriminating statements made in violation of Miranda, are

admissible in the prosecution’s case, provided the statements were made voluntarily, and

were not the result of coercion. Id. at 634.

In the instant case, the evidence obtained as a result of the unwarned statements

was non-testimonial – Stark’s personal computer and the incriminating photographs found

therein. There have been no allegations that Stark’s statements were anything but

voluntarily made. Accordingly, applying the holding of Patane, this non-testimonial

evidence is not excludable under Miranda and its progeny. In other words, although the

physical evidence obtained by police would technically the fruit of the poisonous tree, this

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conclusion does not warrant suppression of the evidence, because the fruit doctrine does

not apply to physical evidence seized as a result of a Miranda violation. See United States

v. Bradley, 163 Fed. Appx. 353, 357 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (citing Patane, 542 U.S.

630) (“In any event, the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine does not apply to physical

evidence seized as a result of a Miranda violation); Ewing v. Ludwick, 134 Fed. Appx. 907,

911 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (citing Patane, 542 U.S. 630) (“Furthermore, the failure

to give the Miranda warning does not require the suppression of physical evidence, such

as a photograph.”).

Stark argues that this conclusion may be called into doubt by the Supreme Court’s

decision in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), in which the Court held that

the requirements under Miranda constituted a “constitutional rule.” Patane, however, was

decided four years after Dickerson, and the purpose of the Court’s grant of certiorari was

to resolve a split in the circuit courts about the applicability of the fruit doctrine in the

Miranda context in the wake of Dickerson. Patane, 542 U.S. at 636. The Court’s decision

in Patane unambiguously held that nothing in its decision in Dickerson, including its

characterization of Miranda as a “constitutional rule,” prevents the introduction of the nontestimonial fruits of a voluntary statement, into evidence. Id. at 643.

Stark also argues that there is a dearth of case law about whether unwarned

statements may be used to later obtain access to physical evidence. But notwithstanding

the Court’s decision in Patane, as discussed above, the Sixth Circuit, even before Patane

was decided, found that “where police simply fail to administer Miranda warnings, the

admissibility of nontestimonial physical evidence derived from the uncounseled statements

should turn on whether the statements were voluntary within the meaning of the fifth

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amendment.” United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1518 (6th Cir. 1988);

see also United States v. Crowder, 62 F.3d 782, 786 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing SanginetoMiranda, 859 F.2d 1501); Marsack v. Howes, 300 F. Supp. 2d 483, 495 (E.D. Mich. 2004)

(same).

Finally, Stark argues that the Supreme Court’s per curiam decision in Massachusetts

v. White, 439 U.S. 280 (1978) is instructive on the question and supports his position.

There, an equally divided (4-4) Court affirmed, in a one-line order, the Massachusetts

Supreme Court’s suppression of evidence obtained as a result of a search warrant

predicated on the defendant’s unwarned statements. Id. The Court declines to give weight

to the decision given that it was not decided by a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, there

was no analysis, and the more recent decisions from the Supreme Court and the Sixth

Circuit foreclose its result. Other circuits have followed this instant route, even before the

Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Patane. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson,

812 F.2d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Our decision in United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d

467 (9th Cir.1977), however, dictates a contrary result in this circuit.”).

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court finds, based on the facts before it, that Stark’s statements were provided

in violation of Miranda. Stark was subject to custodial interrogation when he was

questioned by the six police officers in front of his home at 2:00 in the morning. The failure

to provide him with his Miranda warnings prior to questioning was unlawful and results

suppression of all of his statements that night. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS that portion

of Stark’s motion to dismiss. With respect to suppression of physical evidence seized as

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a result of his statements, however, the Court finds the Supreme Court’s decision in Patane

controlling and DENIES Stark’s motion to suppress this physical evidence. 

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Stark’s Motion to Suppress Statements

and Evidence (docket no. 11) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART:

• Stark’s statements given officers on July 31, 2008 are prohibited from being

used in the government’s case-in-chief; and 

• Physical evidence obtained as a result of Stark’s statements, including

Stark’s personal computer and any material found on the computer’s hard

drive, are not suppressed.

SO ORDERED. 

s/Stephen J. Murphy, III 

STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

United States District Judge

Dated: November 2, 2009

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or

counsel of record on November 2, 2009, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Alissa Greer 

Case Manager

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