1 Texas h as an ab undan ce of authority

dea l i n g w i thsi

mi la r questions as

applie d to oil

and gas co nve yan ce s, bu t we ha ve fo un d n o au t ho r it y wh ich co nfr o nt s t he se qu es t io ns di r ec t ly. 

### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN
NO. 03-01-00243-CV
Wilder ness C ove, Ltd., Appel

lant
v. Cold Spring Gr anite Company, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF BURNET COUNTY, 33RD JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. 20299, H ONORABLE GUILFORD L. JONES III, JUDGE PRESIDING

Wi lderness Co ve , Lt d. ( “Wild er ne ss Co ve ”) ap pe als t he j udgm en t of the tria l court dec l ar ingt hat Co ld Sp ring G ra nite C omp any (“Co ld Sp ring” ) ho lds an u ndivided int er est in the gr an i te on the propert y tha

t is the sub je ct of t his lawsuit , a nd

th at C ol d S pri

n g m ay en ter th at prop er

ty to quarry an

d remove i

ts grani te. The iss

ues presen

ted by thi s a ppe al are : (1 ) di

d the acq ui si ti on of t he gr anite by

Co ld Sp ring’s pr ede ces so r g iveit a sev erabl e estate in l

and, i.e. , t he gr an it e d ep o sit in pla ce, an d if so, (2 ) i s th

e s ev erab l e g ra n i te est at e t he do minant es t at e? Th es e a ppe ar to b e i ss

ue s of fi rst im press ion. 1 T he t rial co ur t answ er ed bo t h que st ions in t he affirmat ive. We w ill affirm the j udgm en t of th e tr i al cou rt.2 The actual convey ance covered f

ar more land than

is at is sue here. The de ed descri bes a s eries of ni ne tracts wh ose com posi te si ze a pproach es 1 500 acres . Some of

the tracts were

convey ed i n f ee si mpl e. In some

of the tracts only

the grani te was convey

ed, as was the case here. The 300-acre tract of l and i nv olv ed i n th i s ca se w as l

i sted i n the dee d astract nu

m ber sev en . 3 We wil l f oll ow the p arti es’ nom

enclature a

nd r ef er to the 18 90 de ed as

the “Gran

i te Dee d.” 2 BACKGROUND The contro versy

between W

il derness C ove and Cold Sprin g f ocuses o n an ap pr o ximat ely

300 -ac re trac t of l and i n B urnet Coun

ty (th e “Property

”). Ow n er sh i p of th e P rop er

ty
o r igin ally pa ss ed f rom th e state to pr iva t e in div idu als in 1 84 5. By 1 89 0, t it le t o t he Pr o pe r t y wa s he ld in fee by G
. W. La cy a nd fo ur o t he r s a s t en an t s in c o mmo n. I n 1 89 0, La cy a nd t wo o f his cote n an ts convey ed the i r i nte res t i n th e gran i te l oca ted on t he Pr op er t y to t he Te xas Ca pit ol Gr anite Co mpany (“Texas Gran i te”). 2 The deed conveyed “al l of our in

terest in and to the Gr an

i teon t he .
. . land t og et her wit h t he nec essa ry right of w ay to t he ext ent of o ur inter est in the sam e for constructing a Ra il Road a nd f

or quarry i ng a nd h andli ng th e sa i d Gran i te.” 3 The cr ux o f this ap pea l involves t he le gal im pli cations of this convey ance. At th e ti me of th e c on v ey an ce , L acy an d th e tw o oth er gr an t o r s o wn ed a o ne - ha lf undi vi ded i n terest i n th e P rop er

ty in fee. The rema

in der of the Propert y was hel d in fee b y two ot her parties wh

o di d n ot j oi n i n th e g ra n i te conv ey ance. T he r efo r e, t he Gr an it e D ee d c o nve yed a o ne - ha lf undi vi ded inter est in the g ra nite t o T exas Gr anite . H ow ever , t he r emainder of t he inte re st in the gr an i te co nt inu ed t o be he ld

by the two non-join

in g cotenants. Lacy

la ter acquired al

l of hi s origi nal cot enants’ remai

ni ng i nterest s in

the Pro pert y, resulti

ng i n his ownership of the Proper ty in fee, l ess o nly the one-hal

f un div ide d in terest in the gran

ite that had be en conv ey ed to Tex as G

ran i te. Al though4 As wi ll be di scussed l

ater, however, foll

owing the 1890 convey

ance L acy ’s origi

nal undi vi ded o ne - ha lf in terest in the surf

ace estate becam

e bur dened wi thth e l eg al ef f ec t of th e g ra n i te convey ance. 5 Te st imony in the r eco rd re vealed t hat Lacy pu rc hase d his und ivided o ne- half fee inte re st in the Pro pe rty f or a ppr oximat ely $0. 50 p er acr e in 188 1. The app ellant p oint s o ut , ho weve r, t hat t he origi nal 189 0 c onv

ey an cei nv ol ve d s ome d egree

of sel f-deal in g si nce La cy was the f ounder of Texas Grani te. As a resul

t, t he appel

la nt questions wh

ether $200,000 was an

acc ur at e mark et pr ice for t he gr an i te in 1890. Ho wever, at least one subsequent t ransaction for granite depo sits, in cludi ng those located o n t he Pr o pe r t y, yie lde d a sa le pr ice o f $10 0, 000 which, at t he t ur n o f t he T we nt iet h C en t ur y, wa s a su bst an t ial s um. 3 t he Pr op er t y has been t he subj ect of num erous complic ated tr ansactions and conv ey ances s in ce 1890, t he pa rties sti pul ate th at tod ay W i l dernes s C ov e h

ol dsti tl e to th e s ur f ac e e sta te 4 and a one-h al f undi vi ded in terest in the gran

ite an d Cold Spri

ng hol ds title to an un sp ec ified fr ac t io na l int er es t in t he ot her one-hal

f of the grani te. Thi s di spute arose prim

aril y b ecause the Property’s ch aracter has ch

anged since t he gr an i te was co nveyed in 18 90. Appr oximat ely 30 ac re s no w fro nt s o n Lak e LBJ , mak ing t he Pro perty more a ttracti ve f or re si de nti al orre cr eat ional us e. In fac t , Wilder ness C ove pur chas ed t he pr operty on J ul y 12, 200 0, wi

th th e i nte nt to s ub di vi dean d de ve l op the 3 0-a

cre l akef ron t pa rce l f or resi dentia l use. Ho wever, in 1890, the Pro pert y was m ost val ued for its granite reserves because t he

“ n ew ” state

ca pi tol b ui l di n g w as b ei n g c on str uc ted i n A us ti n wi th “Texas red grani

te” from Burn

et Co un t y. The demand f

orgr an i te w as so h i gh at th at ti me th at th e c on si dera ti on pai d f or th e g ra n i te estate was $200,000, or approxim ately $30 per acre. 5 However, the grani te was not t hen , and has
never been , quarried.6 A l

th oug h we qu ote p orti

on s of th e l ette r ru l i n g, we ack

n owl ed ge th at i t h as n o l eg al ef f ec t. 7 Moser v. United States Steel Corp. , 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984)
. 8 Byrom v. Pendley , 717 S.W .2d 602(Tex . 1986)
. 4 T his dis pute erupt ed once Wil

der ne ss Cov e b eg an pre pa ri ng the Prop erty f or dev el opm en t. Co ld Sp ring so ught a r est ra ining or der pr ohibit ing Wildernes s Co ve from dril li ng hol es orpl ac i n g e x pl osi v e ch arge s i

n to th e g ra n i te. In th e en su i n g l i ti ga ti on , b oth parties sough

t decl aratory and in jun ctive reli ef as to th ei

r re sp ec ti v e ri gh ts i n th e P rop er

ty . W i l dernes s C ov e a

l so s oug h t to pa rti ti on the Prop erty. The tri

al cou rt se ve red the ac ti on f or decl aratory rel i ef , l ea vi ng the pa rti ti on qu es t io n t o be r es o lve d fo llo win g t he co nc lus io n o f t his a pp ea l.

The tri al cou r t , a fte r he ar ing t he evide nce, issued a let t er ru ling which set s o ut t he
re aso ns for its d ecisio n. 6 By al l c urrent test s, grani

te is a m in eral. The “ordin ary an d natural m

eani ng”tes t of Moser

7 wo uld imply t his resu

l t. Rega rdless of that test, wh

i ch i s un ne ces sary because we ha ve a s pe cific con

ve yan cean d a re n ot i nte rpreti ng i nte nt of the am orphous “other mi nerals” phr ase , t he gr anite co nveyed t o C old Sp ring’s pr ede ces so rs in t itle was cle ar ly ent itled t o s t at us a s t he domi nan t estat e at the tim

e of the origi

nal convey ance. Wi thout t he r igh t t o ex plo it t he grani te the severanc e by

convey ance h as no m eani ng. The part ies are, without dispute, cot enants. Si m pl y as cote n an ts i n gr an i te, th er e a pp ea rsto be n ei ther leg al p r ec ed en t no rlo gic t ha t wo uld prevent one of them f rom de ve l opi ng the gra ni te w i thou t the con sent of the othe r. Under Byrom 8 t he o ne co t enant clear ly i s pe rmitt ed t o p ro cee d wit hou t co nsent of t he oth er cote n an t.9 Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co. , 147 S.W . 330 (Tex. C i v. A pp.—Sa n A ntoni o 1912), aff’d , 195 S.W. 1 139 (Tex. 19 17). 5 T he fugit ive subst ance ra t ionale w hich or iginat ed in Burnham 9 is sup po rt iveof th e re sult in Burnham and in Byrom ; but Those cases just happen to be oil and gas cases—a natural circum stance since m

ost of t he mineral law in T exas has a risen in t hat co nt ext ; and The pr imar y pr inc iple in t ho se ca se s mu st , in the vi ew of t his Co ur t , be ro ot ed in t he ba sic rul es o f c o t en an cy. (Foot notes adde d.) The tri al courtthen i ssued a decl

arator y judgme

nt and i ssued f

in din gs of fac t and
co nclusio ns o f law co nsist ent wit h t he letter r uli ng. From this j udgment, Wilderness Cove appeal s. DISCUSSI ON Our prim ary duty in in terpr et ing t he Gr anite Dee d is t o a sce rt ain the intent of t he parties. Altman v. Blake , 7 12 S .W. 2d 1 17, 118 (T ex. 1986). The 1890 Granite Deed evidences a cl ear int en t by t he La cy g r an t o r s t o co nve y t he de po sit of grani te in situ . Neither party

chal le nges t he validity o f the Gr anite Dee d, but t hey disag re e as t o t he effect of t he co nveyance . C old Sp ring cla ims a s ev

er ed m i n eral estate i n th e g ra n i te while Wil

der ness C ove contends that the Grani te Deed merely co nveyed t he gr anite , w hich is a building st one and n ot a m i n eral, a n d add ed Te x as Gr an i te and i ts successors as a cotenant i n that specifi

c port ion of

the surfac e estate.6 The Granite

Estate It is wel l settled that landowners, o n w ho se pr o pe r t y miner als have be en o r may be fou nd, may ret ain the fee o r a lesser est at e in the sur face a nd co nvey sever able and dis tinct estates in the m i neral s to thi

rd parti es. See, e.g., Benavi des v. Hunt , 15 S.W. 396 (Tex. 1891). In 1890, Lacy possessed an

estate in l

and wh ic h was s omethi

ng less than

a fee si mpl e absolute. He chose to
co nve y a si mi la r estate in the gran

ite to Texas Grani

te, whil e retaini ng hi s i nterests in

the remai nder of t he Pr op er t y. The clear intent of t he co nveyance is to sell the gran i te i n pl ace . Whi le W il derness Co ve recogniz es tha

t i t sh are s i ts ow ne rs hi p of the gra ni te w i th C ol d Spri

ng , i t doe s n ot re gar d t he gr an it e a s a miner al.

In supp o r t o f it s po sitio n, Wilder ness C ove dire ct s t his Co ur t t o c ase s whe re t he mi neral est at e has been s ever ed fr om t he su rfac e es t at e by the use of g ener al te rms. In Heinatz v. Allen , 217 S.W.2d 994 (Tex. 1949), by the terms of a wi

ll , real estate was seve re d by devising “t he surfac e rights excl

usiv e of the mi

neral ri ghts” to one h

ei r a n d “ th e m i n eral ri gh ts” to ano t her . T he he ir who obtain

ed the m in eral ri ghts entered

t he propert y a

nd be gan to quarry l

im estone. The surfac e owner o bje ct ed an d file d s uit , cla iming t ha t limes t o ne co uld not be co nsider ed a mineral for t he purpose of the devi se and, theref ore, it bel onged to t he surf ace estate. In de term i ni ng whether l

i mes ton e was i

n f act a m i neral , the Texa s Suprem

e Court lo o ke d a t t he ch ar ac t er o f t he limes t o ne an d t he pr o ce ss by w hic h it co uld be sev ered and rem

oved f rom th e g rou n d. Th e c our

t n oted th at th e limes t o ne lay fa irly c lo se t o t he su r fac e a nd in out croppings

and tha t itsrem oval requi red quarry

i ng. Th e court also dis cuss ed the evi

dence that10 In fur t her discu ssio n, t he T exas Su pr eme Co ur t re ferr ed t o a dec ision by the Penns ylvania

Su pr eme Court dis cussi

ng what was reserved to the mi neral owner in a reservati on of “coal

and other m i neral s.”The Penn

sy lv ani a court also focused

on the va l ueof the su bs tan cean d s ai d that a ve i n of fine ma rble or pure white quartz sand, va lua ble for m aki ng gl ass, would b e i

ncl uded ina general miner al r es er va t io n. T he T ex as Su pr eme Courtre co gnized t hat t he fo cus of t hat dispu t e wa s sand t ha t , lik e t he lime st o ne in it s c as e, wa s o f r ela t ive ly p o o rqu alit y. How ever, i

t i s w orth noti ng tha t the Tex asSuprem

e C ourt q uote d the Pe

nn sy l va ni a c ourt f or t he p ro po sitio n t hat included in a mineral re ser vat ion “ if near enough a market to have a value , wo uld be gr an it e o rlimes t o ne o ro t he rbu ilding mat er ial . . . .” Heinatz v. Allen , 217 S.W.2d 994, 999 (Tex. 1949) (e m

ph as i s a dd ed b y th e T ex as Su pr em e C our t) (q uo t ing Hendler v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. , 58 A . 486, 48 7 (Pa. 1 904)). 7 showed m uc h of th e l i meston e w as

n ot m erch an tab l e b ec au se

i ts com pos i ti on wa s s uc h th at th e c ost s of qua rr ying

it would ex

ceed the reven

ue realiz ed

fr o m it s s ale
. I n d et er mining wh et he ra d ep o sit is part o f a s evered m

in eral e state, t he court stressed the im port ance of

comm ercia l v al ue:
In our o pin ion s ubstances such as sand, gra ve l an d l i mes tone are not miner als wit hin t he ordinary

and n atural m eani ng of the word unless they are rare and exceptional in character or pos

sess a peculiar

property giving them spec ial value , as fo rex amp le sand that is v

al uabl e for m aki ng gl ass an d li me stone of such qual

ity that it may pr o fit ab ly be man uf acture d i nto cem en t. Such sub stan ces , wh en they areusef ul o nly f orbui l di ng a nd r oad-m aki ng p urpose s, are

no t r eg ar de d a s mine r als in the ordi na ry and gen eral l y acc epted m

ean i ng of the w ord. Heinatz, 217 S.W .2d at 99 7 (em phasi s ad ded). Bec aus e the

li mestone wasnot rare

or o f ex ceptional character, t he co ur t he ld t ha t it did no t fall w it hin t he o r din ar y and na t ur al me an ing o f a min er al. 10 Theref ore, t he court hel

d that t he l

im estone was not a mi

neral and that i

t belonge d to the surfac e estate.8 As addi ti ona l su ppor t f ort he pr op os itio n t hat st one is not a mineral, Wildernes s Co ve ci tes a line o f ca se s inv o lving dis pu t es co nc er ning t he “o t he rminer als ” c lau se in r es er va t io ns o f “o il, gas and other mi

neral s.” See Moser

v. United States Steel Corp. , 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984) ; Reed
v. Wylie , 5 97 S .W. 2d 7 43 ( Te x. 1980)(Reed I I ); Reed v. Wylie , 554 S.W .2d 169(Tex . 1977)(Reed I ); Acker v. Guinn , 46 4 S .W .2d 34 8 ( Te x . 19 71 ). In

th ese ca se s, th e s

up re me c our

t str ug gl ed to det er mine wh et he rce r t ain un sp ec ified de po sit s o f mat er ials we r e in t en de d t o fall w it hin t he mi neral
orsurfac e estates. Eventuall y, as Wildernes s Co ve no t es, t he su pr eme co ur t held t hat building st one bel ongs to the

su rf ac e e sta te a s a matte r of l aw. See Moser , 67 6 S. W .2d at 1 02. How ever, each

of these cases, i

ncl udin g Heinatz, invo lves a g ener al and ambiguo us d evise, re ser vat ion, or co nve ya nce of the mi neral es tate . M osto f the cases i nvol ve a purported convey

ance b y i mpl ic ation of an undescri bed mi neral referred to withi

n the reservation cl

ause as an “other mi neral .” Ac co r din gly, t his line of c ase s i s disti

ngu i shab l e f rom our cas e b eca use we ar e confronted with an express convey ance of a n in situdeposit of grani te. Further, even

appl yi ng the Heinatz

tes t to the se

un i que f ac ts, th e g ran i te l oca ted on t he Pro pert y does p osse ss ra re and e xcep t ional cha ra ct er istics t hat give it spe cial value. The
ex traordi na ry prices pai d for the grani

te interest i

n the 1890 s demo nst r at e it s va lue be ca us e o nly Bur net Co unt y, Te xas, re d gr anite was use d in building t he ca pit ol bu ilding in Austin.

Fin ally, Col

d S pri n g p rov i de s a ddi ti on al au th ori ty t ha t dis cu ss es a s pe cific convey ance whi ch severed the m

in eral and surf ace estates . See Sch w

artz v . State , 703 S.W .2d 187(Tex . 1986)
. The dispu t e in Schw

artz f ocu se d on whether th e L eg i sl

atu rei n ten de d to res er

v e th e c oal an d l i gn i te under a tract o f l

and wh en i t deeded the surface

estate but ret ai

ned al l m in erals . The TexasSu pr eme9

Courtrecogniz ed that it had prev iousl y h el d that near surfac e coal an d li gni te bel onged to t he surf

ace estate as a matter of l

aw. See Reed II

, 59 7 S. W .2d

at 7 48. How ev er, t he co ur t dist inguished t he si tua ti on in Schw artz beca use t he gr ant was expr ess r at her t han ge ner al in its inte nt . Using t he
co nt ro lli ng rule s o f co nst ruc t io n, t he co ur t wa s a ble t o as ce r t ain t he Le gis l at ur e’s s pec ifi c inte nt behind t he r ese rva t ion o f mi

ne r als expressl

y s peci fi ed i n the convey

ance. The s

upreme c ourt then hel d that t he properinter pr et at ion o f the co nveyance was t hat t he st at e meant t o w ithho ld all of t he coal an d l i gn i te l oc ate d un de r th e surfa

ce of the l

and that was granted, regardle ss of wh ether
ex tracti ng th ese m i neral s woul

d destroy the su

rf ace estate. The court recogn ized th at “w hen there is an ex press conve

ya nce of a specifi c substance,” the rules

of presum

ed i ntent ann ounced i n earl ie r casesdo not app l

y be caus e the

y aremerely ru les for co nst ru ing ambiguo us a nd generic convey

ances. Schw artz , 703 S.W.2d at 189. In exam i ni ng a d ee d c onta

i ni ng a spe cif i c c onv ey an ceof a m i n eral i n terest, c our

ts must st rive to giv

e ef f ect to the i

nten tions ex pres sed i n the docum

en t its elf
. Plai nsman Tradi ng Co. v. Cr ews , 898 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex . 19 95 ). Th e G ra n i te Dee d sp ecifically conveys t he gr anite on t he Propert y. We hav

e previously

recog ni zed that , with respect t o o il and gas, Texas adheres to th e “o wn er ship in

pla ce” doctrine an

d, it is w ell establ

is hed un der this doctr in e that a severan

ce creates
a sep arate c orporeal

estate i n the m i neral s. Bagby v. B redthauer , 6 27 S .W. 2d 1 90, 194 (T ex. Ap p. —A us t in

1981, n o wri t). We are persuade d that t hi s rule should appl

y to speci fi

c convey ances of minerals o t her t han o il and gas . H er e, t he clea r int ent expr esse d in t he Grani te Deedwas to co nve

y the in situgrani

te deposit as a seve

rable estate. Ac co r din gly, we ho ld that t he speci

fi c convey ance of the in situgrani

te deposit created a severabl e m in eral e state.10 The Dominant Est

ate The la wregards a m

in eral e state as do minant, meaning t he mineral o wner has t he r ight to ma ke neces sary

and reasonable

use of the surf

ace to rem ove t he

m i neral s. Plainsman , 898 S.W.2d at 788. Th

i s i s an i m perati ve ru l e o f mi

ner al law bec aus e wit hou t t he r ight t o r eac h and ext ra ct t he minerals, a mineral es t at e wo uld be wort hless. Moser , 67 6 S
. W. 2d at 10 3. T hu s, Co ld Sp ring pu ts f orth the argumen

t t hat, as a mineral es t at e, t he gr anite est at e must be do minant. The basic r ule o f mi

ner al law su ppo rt s Co ld Sp ring’s po sitio n. However, Wi lderness Cove asserts that t he issue is more complex because the situation here in volves a cote n an cy i n th e g ra n i te e sta te wi th
a nonconsen

ting cotenan

t at t he tim

e of the creation of

that granite estate. We note ini

tial ly that Lacy a

nd hi s f el low grantors in

tended to c on

v ey th ei r gra n i te in terest in t he Pr o pe r t y, t he r eb y bu r de ning t he ir remai ni ng surf ace estate . Th

e l an gu ag e i n th e G ra n i te Deed expresse s thi s i

ntent. Furthermore, we also m ust as su me t ha t La cy u nd er st o o d t ha t t he r es ult of hi s convey

ance m igh t destro y a

port ion of

the surfac e estate and that he accepted reas onab le consideration i

n return for the conve

ya nce.
It i s r ea son

ab l e to a ss

um e a gra ntor wh o ex pr es sly

con ve y s a m i ne ral wh i ch may or must be r emove d by des t ro ying a po rt ion o f the surfac e estate antici pates hi s surf

ace estate wil l b e di sm in is hed [si c] when the mi neral is removed. It is also pr oba ble the gra ntor hasca lcu lat ed t he va lue o f t he diminu t io n o f his su rf ac e i n th e c om pe ns ati on recei ved f or t he conv

ey ance.

Moser , 6 76 S .W. 2d a t 103 . T he langua ge in t he Grani te Deed provides un

equi vocal evi dence that the parties un

derstoo d the convey

ance to establis

h a dom in ant grani te estat e.11 Howev er, our i nqu i ry does n ot end h ere. W i l dernes s C ov e c on ten dsth at th e G ra n i te Deed was i nef fecti ve i n creatin g a domi nan t estat e becaus e, as a c o t en an t in t he P r o pe r t y, La cy c o uld not gr ant Te xas G ra nite t he r ight s t o e nt er t he Pro perty an d d estroy th e s ur f ac e e sta te wit hou t t he
co nsent of al

l of the cotenants. Wilde

rness C ove further contends tha t t he Gran

ite Deed f ai le d t o convey a v al i d e as em en t b ec au se La cy di d n ot ex ercise h i s r i gh t to pa rti ti on th e P rop er

ty pri or to making t he 18 90 co nve yanc e. As a r es ult , Wilde rne ss Co ve ar gu es t ha t Co ld Spring owns an i

nterest in the grani te, but it has n o l eg al

ri gh t of en try to access it. Wilderness Cove claims Cold Spring’s
o nly ri gh t i s to r ec eiv e a po r t io n o f t he pr o ce ed s if Wild er ne ss Co ve ev er ch o o se s t o qu ar ry and se ll the granite. Wil

derness Cove cites no autho rity support in g its position and we reject its thesis
. A de ed by one cotena nt, wi thou t the con sent or

pa rti ci pa ti on of ot her cotenants, m

ay only convey such in terest as the m

aker of the deed p osse sse s. Thomas v. Southw estern Settlement & Dev. Co. , 123 S.W.2d 290, 297 (Tex. 1939). Ho wever, the law does not require a coten ant to pa rti ti on t he pr o pe r t y

prior t o a c o nve yanc e; t he no np ar t icip at ing co t en an t s s imply retain their i

nterest un t il such ti me as they convey it or seek parti tion
. See id. The right to partiti on i s i nc i den t to every tenancy in commo n; t his right may be exer cised by anyone ho lding an o w ner ship inte re st in the property . Tex . Prop. Code A nn . § 23.00 1 (West 200 0). La cy di d n ot ch oos e to par t itio n prior

to
co nveying

h i s i n terest i n th e P rop er

ty to Texas Granite, but because Lacy only convey ed what he h

ad, t he convey

ance wasval

id. La cy ’s right to partition an

d hi s righ ts to the burdened

su rf ac e e sta te passed to his grantee and ass ign

s. We rej ect Wilde

rness C ove’s argum

ent that the Granite Deed was an i nva li d transfer ab sent a partiti on prior to t he origi nal convey ance.12 Wi lderness C ove

correc tl y as serts th

at on e c oten an t may not g ran t an ea semen t or de di ca te an y portion of the proper

ty to a th i rd party wi thout the c onse

nt of his coten an ts. Elliott v. Elliott , 597 S.W.2d

795, 80 2 (Tex . Ci

v. A pp.—C orpus Christi

1980, n o wri t). However, th e G

ra n i te Deed di d n o t gr an t an ea se men t o ve rt he P r o pe r t y; it mer ely burdened the grantors’ undi

vi dedonehal f i nterest with a sev

ered grani te estat e. Theref ore, app lyi

ng these pri

nci ple s to the convey

ance i n questi on, we concl

ude that Co ld Spri ng’ s se verab l e gran

i te estate i s the dom i na nt estate. We affir m t he j udgme nt of the trial
cou rt.

Mack Ki dd, Justice Be f ore J us ti ce s K i dd, Ye akel

an d Pa tters on Af fi rmed File d: Novem

ber 15, 2001 Publish