alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 531

AN ACT

To designate the Great Western Scenic Trail as a study

trail under the National Trails System Act, and for

other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. POTENTIAL ADDITION OF GREAT WESTERN

4 SCENIC TRAIL TO NATIONAL TRAIL SYSTEM

5 GREAT WESTERN TRAIL.

6 Section 5(c) of the National Trails System Act (16

7 U.S.C. 1244(c)) is amended by adding at the end the fol8 lowing new paragraph:
2

HR 531 EH

1 ‘‘(38) The Great Western Scenic Trail, a system of

2 trails to accommodate a variety of travel users in a cor3 ridor of approximately 3,100 miles in length extending

4 from the Arizona-Mexico border to the Idaho-Montana5 Canada border, following the approximate route depicted

6 on the map identified as ‘Great Western Trail Corridor,

7 1988’, which shall be on file and available for public in8 spection in the Office of the Chief of the Forest Service,

9 United States Department of Agriculture. The trail study

10 shall be conducted by the Secretary of Agriculture, in con11 sultation with the Secretary of the Interior, in accordance

12 with subsection (b) and shall include—

13 ‘‘(A) the current status of land ownership and

14 current and potential use along the designated route;

15 ‘‘(B) the estimated cost of acquisition of lands

16 or interests in lands, if any; and

17 ‘‘(C) an examination of the appropriateness of

18 motorized trial use along the trail.’’.

Passed the House of Representatives March 14,

1995.

Attest:

Clerk.

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 531

AN ACT

To designate the Great Western Scenic Trail as a

and for other purposes.study trail under the National Trails System Act,
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Export-Import Bank of the United States

# ACTION:

Notice of a Partially Open Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States.

*Time and Place:*                     Thursday, August 14, 2008 at 9:30 a.m. The meeting will be held at Ex-Im Bank in Room 1143, 811 Vermont Avenue,  NW., Washington, DC 20571.                

*Open Agenda Item:*                     Environmental Guidelines.                

*Public Participation:*                     The meeting will be open to public participation for Item No. 1 only.                

*Further Information:*                     For further information, contact: Office of the Secretary, 811 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20571 (Telephone 202-565-3957).                

Kamil Cook,

Deputy General Counsel.

[FR Doc. E8-18655 Filed 8-14-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6690-01-M
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

RICHARD JOHN HAHN and

PAUL RICHARD HAHN, 

Plaintiffs, 

Case No. 09-13551

v. Hon. Lawrence P. Zatkoff

Mag. Virginia M. Morgan

GULF STREAM COACH, INC. and 

GENERAL RV CENTER, INC.,

Defendants. 

 /

ORDER REMANDING PLAINTIFFS’ STATE LAW CLAIMS

Defendants filed their notice of removal to this Court on September 9, 2009, alleging

federal subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of a federal question, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges the following eight counts:

Count I Breach of express warranty.

Count II Breach of implied warranty of merchantability. 

Count III Revocation of acceptance and rescission. 

Count IV Breach of written warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15

U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.

Count V Breach of implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15

U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.

Count VI Violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act, Mich.Comp.Laws.

445.901 et seq.

Count VII Breach of contract.

2:09-cv-13551-LPZ-VMM Doc # 5 Filed 09/17/09 Pg 1 of 3 Pg ID 43
Count VIII Rescission.

A civil action brought in a state court, of which the federal district courts have original

jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or defendants to a federal district court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(a). Federal district courts have original subject-matter jurisdiction over cases arising under

federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Count IV and Count

V because they arise under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Counts I, II, III, VI, VII, and VIII,

however, are based on state law. Although the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over state-law

claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

if there are “compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” Id. § 1367(c)(4). The Court declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims in this matter. The Court finds

that the contemporaneous presentation of Plaintiffs’ parallel state claims for relief will result in the

undue confusion of the jury. See id. See also Padilla v. City of Saginaw, 867 F. Supp. 1309, 1315

(E.D. Mich. 1994). 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ state-law claims (Counts I, II, III, VI, VII and

VIII) are hereby REMANDED to the Wayne County Circuit Court. The Court retains jurisdiction

over Plaintiffs’ federal claims (Count IV and Count V).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/Lawrence P. Zatkoff 

LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: September 17, 2009

2:09-cv-13551-LPZ-VMM Doc # 5 Filed 09/17/09 Pg 2 of 3 Pg ID 44
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this Order was served upon the attorneys of

record by electronic or U.S. mail on September 17, 2009.

S/Marie E. Verlinde 

Case Manager

(810) 984-3290

2

2:09-cv-13551-LPZ-VMM Doc # 5 Filed 09/17/09 Pg 3 of 3 Pg ID 45
UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

COOK, TELLITOCCI, and HAIGHT 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private E1 DEANDRE P. ANDERSON 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20121145 

Headquarters, Fort Carson 

Timothy Grammel, Military Judge 

Colonel John S.T. Irgens, Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial and recommendation) 

Lieutenant Colonel Stephanie D. Sanderson, Staff Judge Advocate (addendum) 

For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Peter Kageleiry, Jr., JA; Captain Patrick J. 

Scudieri, JA (on brief). 

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel James L. Varley, JA (on brief). 

8 October 2014 

--------------------------------- 

SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

--------------------------------- 

Per Curiam: 

A military judge sitting as a special court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of three specifications of unauthorized absence, failure to obey 

a lawful order, five specifications of wrongful use of marijuana, and larceny, in 

violation of Articles 86, 92, 112a, and 121, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 

U.S.C. §§ 886, 892, 912a, and 921 [hereinafter UCMJ]. The convening authority 

approved the adjudged sentence of a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for eight 

months, and forfeiture of $994.00 pay per month for eight months and credited 

appellant with 104 days of confinement against the sentence to confinement. 

This case is before us pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. Appellate defense 

counsel submitted this case on its merits, and appellant personally raised issues 

pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), one of which 

merits discussion and relief. 
ANDERSON—ARMY 20121145 

2 

Appellant complains he suffered undue post-trial delay. This one-day, guiltyplea court-martial was held on 14 December 2012. After the appropriate 

transcription, processing, submissions, and reviews, the convening authority took 

action on appellant’s case on 5 September 2013. Then, this court did not receive the 

record of trial for docketing until 13 January 2014. Despite an absence of a showing 

of prejudice in this case, we find more than four months to send a record to the 

service court is too long and will grant relief. See United States v. Collazo, 53 M.J. 

721 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2000); see also United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 142 

(C.A.A.F. 2006) (government failure to docket record of trial with respective 

Service Court of Criminal Appeals within 30 days of convening authority’s action 

creates presumption of unreasonable delay). 

 The findings of guilty are AFFIRMED. After considering the entire record, 

the court AFFIRMS only so much of the sentence as provides for a bad-conduct 

discharge and confinement for seven months. All rights, privileges, and property, of 

which appellant has been deprived by virtue of that portion of the sentence set aside 

by this decision are ordered restored. See UCMJ arts. 58b(c) and 75(a). 

 

 FOR THE COURT: 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

 Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT:
---

|CERTIFICATION OF                                                 
|-----------------------------------------------------------------
|PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL
      OFFICER
|PURSUANT TO                                                      
|18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,                                          
|AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO                                           
|SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002                    

I, Richard W. Donaldson, the Principal Executive Officer and
Principal Financial Officer of Pengram Corporation (the Company), hereby
certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

| | (i)  | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company, for the
      fiscal quarter ended May 31, 2009, and to which this certification is
      attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the Report) fully complies with the
      requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
      1934, as amended; and
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
| | (ii) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of the Company.                                                                                                                                                      

| | By:    | /s/ Richard W. Donaldson       
| | ------ | -------------------------------
| |        |                                
| | Name:  | RICHARD W. DONALDSON           
| |        |                                
| | Title: | Principal Executive Officer and
| |        | Principal Financial Officer    
| |        |                                
| | Date:  | July 15, 2009                  
| |        |                                

A signed original of this written statement required by
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company
and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.

This certification accompanies the Form 10-Q to which it
relates, is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is
not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (whether made
before or after the date of the Form 10-Q), irrespective of any general
incorporation language contained in such filing.

---
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

This certification is provided pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 and accompanies this Annual Report of Telular Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended September 30, 2003 (the "Report").

I, Kenneth E. Millard, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and
I, Jeffrey L.Herrmann, Executive Vice President, Chief Operating Officer and
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the
best of my knowledge:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

/s/ Kenneth E. Millard
Kenneth E. Millard
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
December 19, 2003

/s/ Jeffrey L. Herrmann
Jeffrey L. Herrmann
Executive Vice President, Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer
December 19, 2003


                                       49
**Exhibit 32.2**

**WABCO HOLDINGS INC.**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED**

**PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of WABCO Holdings Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2009 as filedwith the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Ulrich Michel, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

(i) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the periods covered in the Report. 

 

Dated: August 5, 2009
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-40880

Summary Calendar

 

ROBERT CHARLES CEASER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CARL R. GRIFFITH, JR., Sheriff; 

UP HEMMINGWAITE, Officer, 

Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department; 

UP HENDERSON, Officer, 

Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:94-CV-25

- - - - - - - - - -

March 23, 1999

Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY, and DUHE’, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Robert Charles Ceaser appeals the partial dismissal as

frivolous of his civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

the district court’s denial of his motion for judgment as a

matter of law. He asserts that the district court abused its

discretion by dismissing Sheriff Griffith as a defendant in the 
No. 97-40880 

-2-

action and by dismissing all claims except for the use of

excessive force against Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department

Officers Hemmenway (sued as Officer Hemmingwaite) and Henderson. 

He also argues that the district court erred in denying judgment

as a matter of law on a due process claim stemming from his

transfer from the Jefferson County Detention Center to an older

correctional facility in Beaumont, Texas. 

Ceaser has not shown that the district court abused its

discretion in dismissing Sheriff Griffith as a defendant, or in

dismissing all causes of action except for excessive force

against Officers Hemmenway and Henderson. See Smith v.

Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1998); Mendoza v.

Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1993); Jacquez v. Procunier,

801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1986). Likewise, he has not shown

that the district court erred in dismissing his motion for

judgment as a matter of law. See Baltazor v. Holmes, 162 F.3d

368, 373 (5th Cir. 1998). 

AFFIRMED.
#### Thorne v. Ornauer.

1. Before the repeal of section 395 of the code notice of all motions set for hearing in a county court, except those made during the progress of a trial, was required to be given to the opposite party.

2. An application for a rule commanding a plaintiff to refund a docket fee, or in default to submit to a dismissal of his appeal, was an application for an order and hence a motion requiring notice.

3. Written pleadings are only required to be filed in causes originally begun in courts of record.

*Error to County Court of Lake County.*

Messrs. Haynes and Parks, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Henry 0. Dillon, for defendant in error.

*354Per Curiam.

Upon perfection of the appeal from the judgment rendered by the justice, this cause was pending before the county court for a trial *de novo.*Thereafter the procedure was governed by the practice prescribed for the trial of causes in that court. As the law then stood, by section 389 of the Civil Code, notice of all motions set for hearing in that court, except those made during the progress of a trial, was required to be given the opposite party. This notice of motion, when made in *term time,*was served by entering the same in a book kept for the purpose, called the “ motion book; ” the motion to be for hearing at the end of twenty-four hours after the record of such notice.

This statutory requirement was not complied with in the case at bar. The application for a rule commanding plaintiff to refund the docket fee, or, in default thereof, submit to a dismissal of his appeal, was an application for an order, and hence it was a motion. Code, § 397, formerly § 888. No notice of this motion, either actual, or constructive by entry in the motion book according to law, was ever given. We must therefore hold that the court’s action in dismissing the appeal and rendering a judgment for costs was erroneous.

Counsel’s argument concerning the filing of written pleadings in such case is inapplicable. Written pleadings are only required to be filed in causes *originally begun*in courts of record; and while cases appealed from justices of the peace are pending for trial *de novo*they are not governed by the code provisions relating to written pleadings; moreover, such pleadings are expressly dispensed with by statute. Sec. 1987, Gen. Stat. There is, in our judgment, no repeal, either expressed or implied, of the latter statutory provision.

It is not necessary for us to pass upon the other questions argued by counsel. It appears that the transcript from the justice does affirmatively show the *amount sued for.*And the defect from a failure to record in his *355docket *the nature of the cause of action*may be cured in the future proceedings by proofs *aliunde*establishing the justice’s jurisdiction. *Liss v. Wilcoxen,*2 Colo. 85.

The judgment will be reversed, and the cause, remanded for further proceedings.

*Reversed.*
[No. 28971.

Department One.

February 4, 1943.]

#### *In the Matter of the Petition of*Edward J. Collins *for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.*
      *1*

*Edward J. Collins, pro se.*

*The Attorney General, Harold A. Pebbles,*and *R. A. Moen, Assistants,*and *Lloyd L. Wiehl,*for respondent.

Reported in 133 P. (2d) 811.

Per Curiam.

— Edward J. Collins has applied to this court for a writ of *habeas corpus.*He alleges in his petition that he is being unlawfully imprisoned, in the Washington state penitentiary. The facts relative to his incarceration are these:

June 4, 1936, the prosecuting attorney of Yakima county filed an information charging the petitioner with the crime of the ownership and possession of a short firearm, he having been previously convicted of the crime of burglary. After trial the jury, January 4, 1937, returned a verdict of guilty. The prosecuting attorney then charged the petitioner with being an habitual criminal, and upon trial he was found guilty. Thereafter, based upon the verdict in the habitual criminal case, the court sentenced petitioner to life imprisonment for the crime of “being an habitual criminal.”

The controlling opinion in cases of this nature is *In re Towne,*14 Wn. (2d) 633, 129 P. (2d) 230. In accordance with the law laid down in that case, we order and direct as follows: The superintendent of the state penitentiary shall deliver the petitioner into the custody of the sheriff of Yakima county for a resentence by the superior court of that county, taking into consideration the habitual criminal conviction. If, at the expiration of thirty days from the time of his delivery into the custody of the sheriff, the petitioner shall not have been resentenced, he may have the right to apply to this court for final judgment upon his petition herein.
**Exhibit 32**

** **

**SECTION 906 CERTIFICATIONSOF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER ANDCHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OFBOISE INC.**

 

**We are providing this Certificate pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C., Section 1350. Itaccompanies Boise Inc.’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterended March 31, 2009 (the Report).**

 

----

 

**I, Alexander Toeldte, Boise Inc.’s chief executive officer,certify that:**

** **

(i)            The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)); and

 

(ii)           The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, Boise Inc.’s financialcondition and results of operations.

 

 
|   | /s/ Alexander  Toeldte   |
|--------|--------------------------|
|   | Alexander  Toeldte       |
|   | Chief Executive  Officer |

 

 

I,Robert M. McNutt, Boise Inc.’s chief financial officer, certify that:

 

(i)            The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)); and

 

(ii)           The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, Boise Inc.’s financialcondition and results of operations.

 

 
|   | /s/ Robert M.  McNutt    |
|--------|--------------------------|
|   | Robert M. McNutt         |
|   | Chief Financial  Officer |

 

Date: May 5, 2009

 

**A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906will be retained by Boise Inc. and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.**

** **

----