* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit



## FILED

December 14, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-70015

JERMAINE HERRON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

DOUG DRETKE, DIRECTOR, TEXAS

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,

Respondent-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(04-CV-02)

--------------------

ORDER DENYING APPELLEE’S PETITION FOR A CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

Before WIENER, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Petitioner Jermaine Herron seeks a certificate of

appealability (“COA”) on eight issues that the district court

deemed unworthy of review. The district court denied Herron’s 28

U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition and, sua sponte

, denied any petition

for a COA. The district court held that clear, binding precedent1 489 U.S. 288 (1989). In T eague

, the Supreme Court held that

we may not premise habeas relief on a new rule of co nstitutional

law that is not clearly e stablished at the time petitioner’s

conviction became final. 489 U.S. at 310-12.

2 Miller-El v. Cockrell

, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (citing

Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 481 (2000)).

3 Id. at 336.

4 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(B)(2).

5 Miller-El

, 537 U.S. at 327 (citing Slack

, 529 U.S. at 484).

2 foreclosed review of Herron’s claims and that many of his claims

were barred by the doctrine in Teague v. Lane

. 1

We note at the outset of our review under the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) that, as a court of

appeals, our consideration is limited “to a threshold inquiry into

the underlying merit of [Petitioner’s] claims.” 2 We are to analyze

only “an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and [make]

a general assessment of their merits. ... This threshold inquiry

does not require full consideration of the factual or legal bases

adduced in support of the claims. In fact, the statute forbids

i t.” 3 After conducting such a limited review, we conclude that

Herron is not entitled to a COA on any issue because he has failed

to make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

r ight.” 4 He has not demonstrated “that jurists of reason could

disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional

claims or that

... the issues presented are adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.” 53

Here, the briefs, the record on appeal, and in particular the

district court’s well-articulated decision, support denial of a

COA. Although we typically issue more lengthy and detailed

opinions in death penalty cases, the district court here wrote a

thoroughly detailed and well-reasoned 56-page opinion a nd order

denying Herron’s petition for habeas relief and a COA. Were we to

write more extensively than we do, we would be exalting formalism

a nd scrupulosity over substance and judicial economy, adding

nothing but repetition and doing noth ing more than filling

innumerable pages with synonyms and paraphrases. In this

exceptional case, therefore, we decline to do so and simply deny

Herron’s petition for the reasons well and fully explicated in the

district court’s writing.

PETITION DENIED.