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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

KRISTINA GUTHRIE,

Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

July 25, 2017

v No. 332199

Macomb Circuit Court

AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, LC No. 2014-003950-NF

Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee.

Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This matter concerns the imposition of attorney fees and interest under the no-fault act, 

MCL 500.3101 et seq. After conducting a bench trial, the trial court awarded $80,625 in 

attorney fees and $51,768.93 in interest to plaintiff, Kristina Guthrie. In its appeal, defendant, 

Auto-Owners Insurance Company, contends that no attorney fees or interest could be imposed 

under the applicable statues, MCL 500.3142 and MCL 500.3148. In a cross-appeal, Guthrie 

argues that she was entitled to additional fees and interest. We affirm the trial court’s decision to 

award attorney fees and penalty interest, but remand for the calculation and imposition of 

additional fees related to the time spent by Guthrie’s lawyer conducting the trial held in this 

matter.

I. BASIC FACTS

In 1996, when Guthrie was 14 years old she was severely injured in an automobile 

accident. There is no dispute that she requires housing accommodations and that Auto-Owners

is liable to pay benefits due to Guthrie arising from her injuries.

After the accident, Guthrie lived in a home that Auto-Owners paid to have modified to 

suit her needs. However, the home was lost to foreclosure in 2010, and Guthrie and her mother 

moved to a mobile home that cannot be modified to suit Guthrie’s needs. At least throughout 

2012 and 2013, Guthrie and Auto-Owners worked together with the goal of purchasing a home 

that, if not already suited for Guthrie’s needs, could be modified, at Auto-Owners’ expense. The 

parties came close to purchasing at least two homes, but ultimately, were unable to complete 

either sale. Then, in July 2013, Auto-Owners sent a letter to Guthrie explaining that due to AutoOwners’ interpretation of a then-recent decision of our Supreme Court, Admire v Auto-Owners 

Ins Co, 494 Mich 10; 831 NW2d 849 (2013), Auto-Owners no longer believed it was responsible 
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for purchasing a home for Guthrie. Rather, Auto-Owners believed that its duty was to modify a 

home owned or rented by Guthrie. Auto-Owners explained that while it would no longer 

consider purchasing a home for Guthrie, it would “consider the cost of the modification of Ms. 

Guthrie’s current home or another home that Ms. Guthrie elects to rent or purchase.”

In January, 2014, Guthrie purchased a home located on L’Anse Creuse Street in Harrison 

Township for $54,000. An occupational therapist, originally hired by Auto-Owners, evaluated 

the home and made recommendations regarding what renovations would be required to suit 

Guthrie’s needs, and Guthrie hired an architect to design plans for these renovations. After the 

architect created the plans, Guthrie received an estimate from a contractor, Bath For All (BFA), 

of $289,000. Guthrie was provided a document titled “Estimate,” which detailed the costs of 

various aspects of the project. The document contained signature lines. Guthrie signed the 

document on August 19, 2014, and a representative for BFA signed it on September 12, 2014. 

The document was submitted to Auto-Owners as proof of a covered loss. Auto-Owners, 

however, did not pay.

Thereafter, Guthrie filed suit, alleging that Auto-Owners had unreasonably refused to pay 

benefits under the no-fault act. Guthrie sought payment of the benefits, attorney fees, and 

interest under the no-fault act. While the matter was pending, a second renovation plan, one that 

involved building a new home rather than renovating the existing home on the L’Anse Creuse 

property was provided to Auto-Owners. The cost of this plan was $286,819.17. Shortly after 

receiving this estimate, the parties agreed to settle the matter—at least in terms of what benefits 

were due to Guthrie—with Auto-Owners paying Guthrie $289,349.17. The parties did not, 

however, agree to settle the question of Guthrie’s entitlement to attorney fees and interest. After 

a bench trial on those issues, the trial court awarded Guthrie $80,625 in attorney fees and 

$51,768.93 in interest.

II. AUTO-OWNERS’ CLAIM

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Auto-Owners’ main contention is that the trial court erred when it concluded that Guthrie 

had incurred an expense when she and BFA signed the estimate. Auto-Owners also contends 

that the trial court erred by awarding attorney fees and interest. “This Court reviews a trial 

court’s findings of fact in a bench trial for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.” Alan 

Custom Homes, Inc v Krol, 256 Mich App 505, 512; 667 NW2d 379 (2003). The right to 

attorney fees under the no-fault act is statutory, see MCL 500.3148, as is the right to penalty 

interest, see MCL 500.3142. “Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.” Ross v 

Auto Club Grp, 481 Mich 1, 6; 748 NW2d 552 (2008). With regard to attorney fees under the 

no-fault act, our Supreme Court has explained:

The no-fault act provides for attorney fees when an insurance carrier 

unreasonably withholds benefits. The trial court’s decision about whether the 

insurer acted reasonably involves a mixed question of law and fact. What 

constitutes reasonableness is a question of law, but whether the defendant’s denial 

of benefits is reasonable under the particular facts of the case is a question of fact.
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Whereas questions of law are reviewed de novo, a trial court’s findings of 

fact are reviewed for clear error. A decision is clearly erroneous when the 

reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

made. [Id. at 7 (quotation marks omitted).]

“Whether a contract exists is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” AFT Mich v 

Michigan, 303 Mich App 651, 659; 846 NW2d 583 (2014).

B. ANALYSIS

Under the no-fault act, an insurer may become obligated to pay attorney fees pursuant to 

MCL 500.3148(1). In addition, insurance companies that fail to timely pay benefits are required 

to pay interest pursuant to MCL 500.3142. Under both MCL 500.3148 and MCL 500.3142, the 

claimant must be entitled to the claimed benefits before receiving either attorney fees or penalty 

interest. MCL 500.3107(1)(a) provides that personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits are 

payable for “all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and 

accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” “In order for a nofault insurer to be responsible for a particular expense, three requirements must be satisfied: (1) 

the expense must have been incurred by the insured, (2) the expense must have been for a 

product, service, or accommodation reasonably necessary for the injured person’s care, recovery, 

or rehabilitation, and (3) the amount of the expense must have been reasonable.” Hamilton v 

AAA Mich, 248 Mich App 535, 543; 639 NW2d 837 (2001).

Auto-Owners asserts that Guthrie did not incur any expense for the renovation of the 

L’Anse Creuse home. In Proudfoot v State Farm Mut Ins Co, 469 Mich 476; 673 NW2d 739 

(2003), our Supreme Court explained that “ ‘incur’ means ‘to become liable or subject to, 

especially because of one’s own actions.’ ” Id. at 484, quoting Webster’s II New College 

Dictionary (2001) (brackets omitted). The Court explained, “An insured could be liable for costs 

by various means, including paying for costs out of pocket or signing a contract for products or 

services.” Id. at 484 n 4.

“A valid contract requires five elements: (1) parties competent to contract, (2) a proper 

subject matter, (3) legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of 

obligation.” Innovation Ventures v Liquid Mfg, 499 Mich 491, 508; 885 NW2d 861 (2016) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). The fourth element is the only element at issue in this 

case. “Mutuality of agreement” refers to a meeting of the minds on all material terms of a 

contract. Sanchez v Eagle Alloy Inc, 254 Mich App 651, 665; 658 NW2d 510 (2003). In this 

regard, a contract is formed when an offer is accepted. Kloian v Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 273 Mich 

App 449, 452-454; 733 NW2d 766 (2006). “An offer is defined as the manifestation of 

willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his 

assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.” Id. at 453 (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). “An acceptance sufficient to create a contract arises where the individual to whom an 

offer is extended manifests an intent to be bound by the offer, and all legal consequences flowing 

from the offer, through voluntarily undertaking some unequivocal act sufficient for that 

purpose.” Id. at 453-454 (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). “A meeting of the 

minds is judged by an objective standard, looking to the express words of the parties and their 
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visible acts, not their subjective states of mind.” Id. at 454 (quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

The trial court found these considerations satisfied by the estimate provided to Guthrie by 

BFA. Although simply titled “Estimate,” the document details all major aspects of the project to 

modify the home and the cost to do so. The document indicates that the total price stated, 

$289,000, is “[v]alid for 30 days.” The document also contained two signature lines, the first for 

the offeree, Guthrie, and the second for the offeror, BFA. Guthrie signed the document on 

August 19, 2014, while a representative for BFA signed the document on September 12, 2014. 

The document demonstrates BFA’s intent to extend an offer to perform the construction project. 

BFA also expressed the price of its services. The phrase, “valid for 30 days,” clearly indicates 

the existence of an offer that could be accepted by the offeree. In turn, Guthrie’s signature, 

which was affixed to the bottom of the document, indicated her unequivocal acceptance of the 

terms of the agreement. Accordingly, the document was an executed contract, obligating BFA to 

renovate the home, and obligating Guthrie to pay for the renovations. Therefore, the expense 

was incurred within the meaning of MCL 500.3107(1)(a).

Auto-Owners explains that BFA “did not purchase materials, obtain permits, retain any 

subcontractors, pound a nail, tear down the uninhabitable building, or take any steps consistent 

with a building contract.” Although accurate, those facts are irrelevant in this case because that 

only shows that the contract was not ultimately performed, not that no contract existed in the first 

instance. Auto-Owners also contends that the document was an estimate and nothing more. But 

if this were true, there was no purpose in having Guthrie and BFA sign it. The fact that the 

document invited Guthrie to affix her signature to it clearly indicates that it was intended to be an 

offer, and her signature demonstrates her acceptance. Auto-Owners’ contention that the 

document was a “sham” used only to “seek a settlement” is simply Auto-Owners’ interpretation 

of events; there is no basis in evidence for these claims. Auto-Owners also notes that while the 

document stated it was valid for 30 days, Guthrie signed it more than 30 days after the document 

was created. This is also irrelevant. BFA, by signing the document, demonstrated its approval 

of the belated acceptance of its offer.1 Auto-Owners next argues that the estimate was not a bill 

to be paid, and that Auto-Owners could not be expected to pay $289,000 up front to Guthrie. 

Auto-Owners explains that a $50,000 deposit would have been required before work began.2 

Thus, according to Auto-Owners, if Guthrie had truly reached an agreement with BFA, AutoOwners should have been given a bill for $50,000. However, “[s]hould the insured present a 

contract for products or services rather than a paid bill, the insurance company may, in order to 

protect itself, make its check payable to the insured and the contractor.” Proudfoot, 469 Mich at 

 1 Auto-Owners compares the document to another, virtually identical document, prepared by 

BFA for Guthrie, in conjunction with a potential project at a different address in 2013. The 2013 

document was not admitted as evidence at trial. Thus, Auto-Owners’ argument is an 

inappropriate attempt to expand the record on appeal. See Sherman v Sea Ray Boats, Inc, 251 

Mich App 41, 56; 649 NW2d 783 (2002).

2 BFA’s owner testified that he would have required a $50,000 down payment on a project of this 

magnitude.
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484 n 4. Similarly here, when presented with the signed contract for the full amount of the 

renovations, Auto-Owners could have protected itself by working with BFA to establish a 

payment schedule and method of payment. The fact that Auto-Owners chose not to do so does 

not mean that Guthrie did not incur an obligation. Furthermore, Auto-Owners argues that 

Guthrie never incurred the architect’s expense of approximately $896 because neither Guthrie

nor her mother received a bill for this amount because the architect sent the bill directly to AutoOwners. However, the mere fact that the bill was not sent to Guthrie does not negate her 

obligation to pay the architect.

Auto-Owners also suggests that it should not have to pay attorney fees and interests 

because the expense of the renovation was not reasonable. “[T]he question whether expenses are 

reasonable and reasonably necessary is generally one of fact . . . .” Nasser v Auto Club Ins 

Ass’n, 435 Mich 33, 55; 457 NW2d 637 (1990). At trial, Auto-Owners’ representative, Michael 

Maher, agreed that due to Guthrie’s injuries, she required modifications to her home. Maher also 

testified that the proposed modifications were ultimately derived from recommendations from an 

occupational therapist. Maher agreed that these recommendations were reasonable, and that he 

had no opinion from anyone else indicating otherwise. Further, Auto-Owners never presented 

any evidence showing that the price quoted by BFA for performing these renovations was 

unreasonable. Therefore, the record supports the trial court’s finding that the expenses were 

reasonable and reasonably necessary.

Nevertheless, Auto-Owners argues that the renovation plan could not be implemented 

because the home had not been inspected and approved for occupancy. Although the home had 

not passed inspections and an occupancy permit was not issued, it is likely that these problems 

would be cured once the renovations were complete. It was the implementation of the plan itself 

that would lead to Guthrie’s occupancy of the home, not vice-versa. In addition, Auto-Owners 

asserts that it was legally impossible to perform any work at the home. However, while it is true 

that the home could not be occupied in its current state, there is no evidence indicating that 

Guthrie would be legally prohibited from renovating the property. As the trial court explained, 

Auto-Owners’ belief that the home could not be modified or become habitable was “unfounded 

and unsupported by any other professional.” Rather, and as the trial court recognized, Guthrie’s 

“architect and builder indicated that the structure could be modified and habitable and suitable 

for [her] needs . . . .” Auto-Owners fails to demonstrate that this finding is clearly erroneous.3

 3 In a somewhat related argument, Auto-Owners contends that Guthrie failed to mitigate 

damages. Auto-Owners fails, however, to cite any authority from which the argument derives. 

“An appellant may not state a position without citing authority and expect this Court to search 

for grounds to support the claim.” Prentis Family Foundation v Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer 

Institute, 266 Mich App 39, 56; 698 NW2d 900 (2005). Nor does Auto-Owners’ position have 

any evidentiary support. Auto-Owners believes that Guthrie purchased the L’Anse Creuse home, 

knowing it would have to be torn down, in an effort to force Auto-Owners to build her a new 

home at considerable expense. There is, however, no evidentiary support for this theory. Rather, 

as the trial court found, Auto-Owners essentially left Guthrie to her own devices and instructed 

her to purchase or rent a house. Guthrie did so “with the resources available to her. . . . [S]he
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The trial court also did not err in concluding that Guthrie is entitled to penalty interest

and attorney fees. “Penalty interest must be assessed against a no-fault insurer if the insurer 

refused to pay benefits and is later determined to be liable, irrespective of the insurer’s good faith 

in not promptly paying the benefits.” Williams v AAA Mich, 250 Mich App 249, 265; 646 NW2d 

476 (2002). “No-fault penalty interest is intended to penalize an insurer that is dilatory in paying 

a claim.” Id. For the reasons discussed, Guthrie indeed incurred a reasonably necessary 

expense, which Auto-Owners refused to pay. Thus, the trial court properly awarded penalty 

interest under MCL 500.3142.

The right to attorney fees similarly exists where an insurer fails to pay benefits that are 

overdue. MCL 500.3148(1). Attorney fees are only permitted under the no-fault act where an 

insurer “unreasonably refused to pay the claim or unreasonably delayed in making proper 

payment.” MCL 500.3148(1). As our Supreme Court has explained:

The purpose of the no-fault act’s attorney-fee penalty provision is to 

ensure prompt payment to the insured. Accordingly, an insurer’s refusal or delay 

places a burden on the insurer to justify its refusal or delay. The insurer can meet 

this burden by showing that the refusal or delay is the product of a legitimate 

question of statutory construction, constitutional law, or factual uncertainty. 

[Ross, 481 Mich at 11.]

“The determinative factor in [the] inquiry is not whether the insurer ultimately is held 

responsible for benefits, but whether its initial refusal to pay was unreasonable.” Id.

With regard to attorney fees, Auto-Owners contends that its refusal to pay benefits was 

reasonable. The trial court concluded otherwise, and we find no error in this determination. The 

evidence admitted at trial established that after Auto-Owners received the BFA estimate, AutoOwners reported to the Michigan Catastrophic Claims Association (MCCA) that it was procuring 

other estimates for the renovation project before deciding whether to pay the claim. However, 

Maher admitted that this was untrue. While Auto-Owners had retained an expert to review the 

plans, that expert was never asked to provide an opinion. Furthermore, at trial, Maher confirmed 

that from the time Guthrie provided Auto-Owners with the signed document from BFA until the 

matter eventually reached partial settlement, Auto-Owners did nothing to consider whether to 

pay for the modifications. This testimony supports the trial court’s finding that Auto-Owners’ 

refusal to pay the claim was unreasonable. It is essentially an admission that Auto-Owners 

decided to await litigation rather than investigate the claim. Therefore, this cannot be considered 

a reasonable denial of benefits.

Auto-Owners argues that it was “absolutely reasonable for [it] to determine that it did not 

have reasonable proof of [Guthrie’s] alleged incurred expense” because it “never received a bill 

from BFA, but rather received a document labeled ‘Estimate.’ ” There is no evidence that such a 

determination was actually made by Auto-Owners. Rather, the evidence seems to indicate the 

opposite; at trial, Maher acknowledged that Auto-Owners never sent any correspondence to 

bought what she could afford and signed a contract for the purchase.” Auto-Owners fails to 

demonstrate that this factual finding is clearly erroneous.
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Guthrie indicating that her claim for renovation expenses was denied because she did not incur 

the expense. Consequently, the trial court did not clearly err when it concluded that AutoOwners’ conduct was not reasonable.

Finally, Auto-Owners contends that even if attorney fees and interest are warranted, 

damages should be calculated based on the amount BFA would have required as a deposit, 

$50,000, not the entire $289,000 price of the estimate. Auto-Owners reasons that the only 

expense that would have been incurred by plaintiff is this deposit, at least until the project was 

completed. However, Guthrie incurred the entire expense of the project by signing an agreement 

to that effect. Accordingly, Auto-Owners fails to demonstrate error requiring reversal.

III. GUTHRIE’S CROSS-APPEAL

In her cross-appeal, Guthrie asserts that she was entitled to additional attorney and 

interest. We agree that plaintiff was entitled to additional attorney fees for the time her lawyer

spent at trial. In all other respects, we find no errors warranting relief.

With regard to the award of attorney fees, it is undisputed that the action filed by Guthrie

sought PIP benefits “which are overdue.” MCL 500.3148(1). This action was not finally 

resolved until the bench trial was concluded. As such, the time Guthrie’s lawyer spent at trial is 

a compensable expense under MCL 500.3148(1). See Bloemsma v Auto Club Ins Ass’n (After 

Remand), 190 Mich App 686, 689-691; 476 NW2d 487 (1991) (concluding that under MCL 

500.3148(1), attorney fees were available to a plaintiff “for the services rendered on this matter 

up to and including trial[,]” as well as on appeal).

Nevertheless, Auto-Owners argues that no attorney fees incurred after either November 

24, 2015, the date the settlement agreement was executed, or November 30, 2015, the date the 

order of partial dismissal was entered, are recoverable. Auto-Owners posits that once either of 

these events occurred, the action was no longer one for overdue PIP benefits. While the 

settlement took away the dispute over the amount of benefits due to Guthrie, it did not resolve 

the entire case. By its express terms, the settlement did not resolve the question whether Guthrie 

was entitled to attorney fees or penalty interest. The key dispute with regard to whether attorney 

fees would be imposed was whether Auto-Owners had unreasonably delayed paying benefits that 

were overdue. The case retained the essential character of the type of disputes at issue in MCL 

500.3148(1), i.e., a dispute over whether an insurer unreasonably refused or delayed paying 

benefits that were due. Pursuant to MCL 500.3148(1), Guthrie is entitled to reasonable attorney 

fees incurred in the entire action, and the trial court erred by not awarding attorney fees for the 

time Guthrie’s lawyer spent during trial.

Next, the trial court found that the date the agreement with BFA was fully executed was 

the date the expense was incurred, and thus, the date attorney fees became recoverable. Guthrie

now argues that Auto-Owners’ unreasonable conduct began much earlier, and involved AutoOwners’ actions related to other home sales that were not completed in 2012 and 2013. Guthrie, 

therefore, asserts that it would be appropriate to award attorney fees incurred on or after June 25, 

2013, the day after an earlier lawsuit between the parties settled. We, however, conclude that 

due to the conduct of Guthrie’s lawyer at trial, she cannot now claim the error raised on appeal. 

Until the present appeal, Guthrie never suggested that it would be appropriate to include all fees 
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incurred on or after June 25, 2013. Instead, Guthrie’s lawyer first requested fees of over 

$117,000, which included fees going back to 2011, and, then as an alternative, offered a second 

calculation for $80,625 at the conclusion of trial, which included only those fees incurred on or 

after September 12, 2014. “It is settled that error requiring reversal may only be predicated on 

the trial court’s actions and not upon alleged error to which the aggrieved party contributed by 

plan or negligence.” Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 210; 670 NW2d 675 (2003). Here, 

Guthrie’s lawyer provided the trial court with two options. He advocated for the first, and in the 

alternative, requested the second. Any error in failing to consider a third option, one never 

suggested to the court, falls on Guthrie’s lawyer. As Guthrie’s lawyer caused the alleged error, 

Guthrie cannot now seek relief stemming from that purported error in this Court.4

Finally, Guthrie contends that she was entitled to additional interest under MCL 

500.3142. She asserts that interest should have been calculated using a start date of May 9,

2012, or alternatively, May 31, 2013. At trial, Guthrie’s lawyer provided the trial court with 

three interest calculations. One calculation began on May 9, 2012, and was for approximately 

$128,000. Another began on May 31, 2013, and was for approximately $105,000. The 

calculation accepted by the trial court began on September 12, 2014, and was for $51,768.93. In 

his closing argument, with regard to these calculations, Guthrie’s lawyer explained:

And, your Honor, I’m going to submit to the Court, I’m not trying to tell you you 

should award [$]105[,000] or $128,000.00 in interest. I’m not here to tell you 

that. In this closing I’m telling you the safest thing[] for the Court to do is to go 

with the unquestionable absolute date of September 12, 2014 for interest, $51,000 

and change.

Guthrie’s lawyer then explained that the purpose of including these alternative calculations was 

to demonstrate that Auto-Owners had saved a substantial sum “by not paying, by delaying, by 

dragging their feet, by doing nothing . . . .” As a result, Guthrie’s “position on appeal is 

untenable because it is contrary to the position [s]he took in the lower court. A party may not 

take a position in the trial court and subsequently seek redress in an appellate court that is based 

on a position contrary to that taken in the trial court.” Kloian, 273 Mich App at 455 n 1 (citation 

and quotation marks omitted).

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 4 Guthrie’s argument also lacks merit. Guthrie’s basis for seeking fees predating her agreement 

with BFA is that Auto-Owners acted unreasonably with regard to the failed attempts to purchase 

other homes in 2012 and 2013. But no contract was ever signed by Guthrie obligating her to 

purchase these other homes. Thus, she never incurred an expense related to those homes. See 

Proudfoot, 469 Mich at 484 n 4. It would be error to allow Guthrie to recover attorney fees 

related to an expense that was never incurred. See id. at 484-485.

5 In its response to Guthrie’s cross-appeal, Auto-Owners contends that the trial court’s award of 

attorney fees and interest should be reduced for various reasons. We find Auto-Owners’ attempt 

to raise these arguments only in response to the cross-appeal improper. Auto-Owners raises the 

issues only in its posture as an appellee. An appellee, however, is not permitted to raise issues
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The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. However, we remand for the trial court to 

determine the proper amount of attorney fees to be awarded to Guthrie for the time her lawyer 

spend conducting the trial in this case. We do not retain jurisdiction. Because neither party

prevailed in full we award no costs under MCR 7.219(A).

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro

not appealed by the appellant. Turcheck v Amerifund Fin, Inc, 272 Mich App 341, 351; 725 

NW2d 684 (2006). Nor may an appellee obtain relief more favorable than that granted by the 

trial court absent filing its own appeal. Id. If Auto-Owners wished to argue for a reduction of 

the trial court’s award, it should have raised the issues in its own appeal, not in response to the 

cross-appeal. See id. Accordingly, we decline to consider defendant’s arguments requesting that 

this Court reduce the amount of the trial court’s attorney fee and interest award.