alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE  CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL  INFORMATION  EXTRACTED FROM THE ANNUAL
REPORT ON FORM 10-KSB FOR THE YEAR ENDED  DECEMBER  31, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>          1

<S>                                       <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                 12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                              DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                      1,473,962
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                      1,093,405
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                    0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                              539,500
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                12,957,772
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                              0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                0
<LOANS>                                    67,720,263
<ALLOWANCE>                                   354,631
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             86,102,060
<DEPOSITS>                                 60,410,997
<SHORT-TERM>                                9,500,000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                         1,021,206
<LONG-TERM>                                         0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          11,241
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                            0
<OTHER-SE>                                 15,158,616
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             86,102,060
<INTEREST-LOAN>                             4,949,491
<INTEREST-INVEST>                           1,007,827
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                    0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                            5,957,318
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                          2,760,774
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          2,955,205
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                       3,002,113
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                       0
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                            126,922
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                             2,856,477
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               656,439
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                    656,439
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                  442,153
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    0.43
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    0.43
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                   3.97
<LOANS-NON>                                   305,000
<LOANS-PAST>                                        0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                    0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                     0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                              359,535
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                  (4,954)
<RECOVERIES>                                       50
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                             354,631
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                          354,631
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                 0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                             0


</TABLE>
Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC17-1281

____________

NORBERTO PIETRI, 

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Appellee.

[February 2, 2018]

PER CURIAM.

We have for review Norberto Pietri’s appeal of the circuit court’s order 

denying Pietri’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 

3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 

Pietri’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s 

decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and our decision on remand in 

Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 

(2017). This Court stayed Pietri’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. 

State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017). After this 
- 2 -

Court decided Hitchcock, Pietri responded to this Court’s order to show cause 

arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Pietri’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the 

State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Pietri is not entitled to relief. Pietri

was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of 

eight to four. Pietri v. State, 644 So. 2d 1347, 1349 (Fla. 1994). Pietri’s sentence 

of death became final in 1995. Pietri v. Florida, 515 U.S. 1147 (1995). Thus, 

Hurst does not apply retroactively to Pietri’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock, 

226 So. 3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Pietri’s motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Pietri, we 

caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so 

ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result.

PARIENTE, J., concurring in result.

I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock 

v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017), is now 

final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting 

opinion in Hitchcock.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Palm Beach County, 

John S. Kastrenakes, Judge - Case No. 501988CF011366AXXXMB
- 3 -

Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, William M. Hennis, III, 

Litigation Director, and Marta Jaszczolt, Staff Attorney, Capital Collateral 

Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,

for Appellant

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Leslie T. Campbell, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,

for Appellee
Exhibit
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the annual report of Veracity Management Global, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the six months ended December 31, 2009 (the
“Report”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof, I, Gregory L. Paige, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1. The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





2. The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/
Gregory L. Paige





Gregory
L. Paige


Chief
Executive Officer


Dated:
February 19,
2010





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Veracity Management Global, Inc. and will be retained by the Company and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
EXHIBIT 32.2
   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
   Ran Daniel, Chief Financial Officer and Director of Suspect Detection Systems, Inc. (the “Registrant”), certifies, under the standards set forth and solely for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to his knowledge, the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A of the Registrant for the quarter ended September 30, 2010 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in that Form 10-Q/A fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
  
 Date: February 3, 2011

By: /s/ Ran DanielName: Ran Daniel

Title: Chief Financial Officer
 
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Homer Grady v. State.

No. 25,911.

October 22, 1952.

Hon. E. Harold Beck, Judge Presiding.

*601
      *Marvin H. Miller,*New Boston, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

This is a conviction for assault with intent to murder, the punishment assessed being two years in the penitentiary.

Under a charge submitting assault with intent to murder with and without malice, and aggravated assault, the jury returned the following verdict:

> “We the jury find the defendant guilty of assault with intent to murder and assess his punishment at confinement in the State penitentiary for two years.”

The verdict is assailed as being indefinite and uncertain in that it cannot be ascertained therefrom whether the conviction was for the offense of assault with intent to murder with or without malice, thereby rendering impossible an application of the indeterminate sentence law.

The authorities of Brooks v. State, 147 Tex. Cr. R. 98, 178 S. W. 2d 865, and Jordan v. State, 140 Tex. Cr. R. 238, 144 S. W. 2d 274, which are cited by appellant, and Harrell v. State, 153 Tex. Cr. R. 141, 218 S. W. 2d 466, sustain his contention. However, in the case of Ex parte James Byrd, No. 25,808, decided June 18, 1952, (Page 595, this volume), 251 S. W. (2d) 537, 538, the doctrine upon which the Harrell, Brooks and Jordan cases rested — that is, that assault with intent to murder with malice and assault with intent to murder without malice are separate and distinct offenses — was expressly overruled. Therefore, the cases mentioned and all others were overruled in so far as they may be inconsistent with that holding.

It is apparent, then, under the holding in the Byrd case, that the verdict here is not vague or indefinite. Accordingly, the sentence is reformed so as to read “not less than one nor more than two years” in the penitentiary.

Where the jury’s verdict is silent on the question of malice, we will construe such verdict as a finding of guilty of assault with *602intent to murder without malice, if the punishment is less than three years.

As so reformed, the conviction is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the court.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ASHER DANIEL JONES,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D19-1596

[November 27, 2019]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Martin County; Steven J. Levin, Judge; 

L.T. Case No. 43-2002-CF-000867.

Charles G. White of Charles G. White, P.A., Miami, for appellant.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

GROSS, CIKLIN and CONNER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner,

MISC. NO. 09-mc-50527

-vsHON. ROBERT H. CLELAND

PATRICK H. COLEMAN, Owner,

SOULFUL CONCEPTS, INC.,

d/b/a BEANS AND CORNBREAD,

Respondent.

_____________________________________/

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION TO 

ENFORCE IRS SUMMONS

Petitioner having advised the Court that it wishes to dismiss without prejudice the

Petition to Enforce IRS Summons filed against Patrick H. Coleman, Owner, Soulful

Concepts, Inc., d/b/a Beans and Cornbread;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition to Enforce IRS Summons brought

against respondent, Patrick H. Coleman, Owner, Soulful Concepts, Inc., d/b/a Beans and

Cornbread, by the petitioner is hereby dismissed without prejudice and without costs.

 S/Robert H. Cleland 

ROBERT H. CLELAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: October 29, 2010
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record on

this date, October 29, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

 S/Lisa Wagner 

Case Manager and Deputy Clerk

(313) 234-5522
#### In the Matter of the Judicial Settlement of the Accounts of Eugene W. Parker, as Administrator, etc., of Delia Parker, Deceased, Appellant. Eugene F. Livermore, Respondent.

Decree affirmed, with costs and disbursements to the respondent payable out of the estate of Delia Parker. All concurred.
discretion, Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818

P.2d 849, 851 (1991), and a petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is warranted, Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004).

Gazlay argues that the State failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury and that unrelated and irrelevant testimony was introduced at the grand jury proceeding. "Dismissal of an indictment on the basis of governmental misconduct is an extreme sanction that should be utilized infrequently." Lay v. State, 110 Nev. 1189, 1198, 886 P.2d 448, 454 (1994). The defendant must show substantial prejudice, or a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different absent the misconduct, in order to warrant dismissal of an indictment. Id.; see also Sheriff v. Keeney, 106 Nev. 213, 216, 791 P.2d 55, 57 (1990).

We conclude that extraordinary relief is not warranted. Gazlay fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the grand jury would not have found probable cause existed to indict him had the letter been introduced or had the unrelated testimony been omitted. Therefore, Gazlay fails to demonstrate that the district court manifestly abused its discretion by denying his pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Rugamas v. Eighth Judicial Din. Court, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 46, 30 P.3d 887, 895-96 (2013) (a district court manifestly abuses its discretion by denying a pretrial habeas petition when there is no legal evidence to

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2
(0) 1947APairaguirre 

# u-k

satisfy the elements of the charged offenses in a challenged indictment). Accordingly, we

ORDER the petition DENIED.

Cherry 

### fACS Douglas

cc: Hon. Elizabeth Goff Gonzalez, District Judge Steven Christopher Gazlay Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA 3
(0) 1947A .0
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Patrick Jermaine Edwards v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01-16-00081-CR

Trial court case number: 1432930

Trial court: 185th District Court of Harris County

A jury convicted appellant, Patrick Jermaine Edwards, of the felony offense of 

burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft, and the trial court assessed his 

punishment at confinement for forty years. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. The 

State has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. We deny the 

motion.

The State first contends that the case should be dismissed because “appellant

executed a valid waiver of the right to appeal pursuant to an agreement that the State 

would recommend a 40-year sentence.” However, the trial court has executed a 

certification of appellant’s right to appeal stating that this case “is not a plea-bargain case, 

and the defendant has the right of appeal for guilt/innocence only.” Accordingly, the trial 

court has given appellant permission to appeal. See Jones v. State, No. 01-09-00267-CR, 

2010 WL 5395682, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 30, 2010, no pet.) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication) (citing Willis v. State, 121 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2003)).

The State next contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction because appellant did not 

timely file his notice of appeal. Appellant’s notice of appeal was due to be filed no later 

than January 9, 2016. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1. Appellant filed his notice of appeal in the 

trial court on January 19, 2016, and a motion for extension of time to file his notice of 

appeal in this Court on January 22, 2016. See id. 26.3. On February 18, 2016, we granted 

the motion and extended the time to file appellant’s notice of appeal to January 22, 2016.
Accordingly, the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction is 

denied.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Russell Lloyd

  Acting individually 

Date: September 8, 2016
Exhibit 10.2

 



 

COCA-COLA PLAZA

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

 

April 24, 2014

 

Larry Mark

Atlanta, Georgia

 

Dear Larry,

 

We are delighted to confirm your new position as Vice President and Controller, job grade 18, with an effective date of April 24, 2014.  You will report to me.  The information contained in this letter provides details of your new position.

 

·                  Your principal place of assignment will continue to be Atlanta, Georgia.

 

·                  Your annual base salary will be $390,000.

 

·                  You will continue to be eligible to participate in the annual Performance Incentive Plan.  The target annual incentive for a job grade 18 is 65% of annual base salary.  The actual amount of an incentive award may vary and is based on individual performance and the financial performance of the Company. The plan may be modified from time to time.

 

·                  You will continue to be eligible to participate in The Coca-Cola Company’s Long-Term Incentive program.  Awards are made at the discretion of the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors based upon recommendations by Senior Management.  You will be eligible to receive equity awards within guidelines for the job grade assigned to your position and based upon your personal performance, Company performance, and leadership potential to add value to the Company in the future.  Currently, the award is delivered 60% stock options and 40% Performance Share Units. As a discretionary program, the award timing, frequency, size and distribution between stock options and PSUs are variable.

 

·                  You will be expected to acquire and maintain share ownership at a level equal to two times your base salary.  As part of the Company’s ownership expectations, you will have five years, or until December 31, 2019 to achieve this level of ownership.  You will be asked to provide information in December each year on your progress 

 











 

toward your ownership goal, and that information will be reviewed with the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors the following February.

 

·                  You will be eligible for the Company’s Financial Planning and Counseling program which provides reimbursement of certain financial planning and counseling services, up to $7,500 annually, subject to taxes and withholding.

 

·                  You will be eligible for the Emory Executive Health benefit which includes a comprehensive physical exam and one-on-one medical and lifestyle management consultation.

 

·                  This letter is provided as information and does not constitute an employment contract.

 

Larry, I feel certain that you will continue to find challenge, satisfaction and opportunity in this new role and as we continue our journey toward the 2020 Vision.

 

 

Sincerely,

 

	
/s/ Kathy N. Waller
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
Kathy N. Waller
    	
 
    


 

c:                                      Ceree Eberly

Shane Smith

Executive Compensation

GBS Executive Services

 

2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               12,199,494
<ALLOWANCES>                                   193,015
<INVENTORY>                                  9,927,849
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            25,841,825
<PP&E>                                      43,538,367
<DEPRECIATION>                              15,921,909
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              57,356,492
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       15,272,926
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        49,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  26,098,909
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                57,356,492
<SALES>                                     87,166,468
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            87,166,468
<CGS>                                       69,763,754
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               78,789,782
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,319,957
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              7,056,729
<INCOME-TAX>                                 2,544,874
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          4,511,855
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 4,511,855
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.92
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.92
        

</TABLE>
#### Trisha Leann BOYD, Appellant, v. Trent RASMUSSEN, Respondent.

No. WD 52135.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Jan. 21, 1997.

C. John Forge, Jr., Independence, for appellant.

Dennis B. Bosch, Independence, for respondent.

Before LOWENSTEIN, P.J., and BERREY and EDWIN H. SMITH, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM:

Appeal from trial court order granting primary physical custody to respondent.

Affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 539

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide a tax exemption

for health risk pools.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 17, 1995

Mr. PARKER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide

a tax exemption for health risk pools.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That (a) subsection (c) of section 501 of the Internal Rev4 enue Code of 1986 (relating to list of exempt organiza5 tions) is amended by adding at the end thereof the follow6 ing new paragraph:

7 ‘‘(26) Any corporation, association, or similar

8 legal entity which is created by any State or political

9 subdivision thereof to establish a risk pool to provide

10 health insurance coverage to any person unable to
2

•HR 539 IH

1 obtain health insurance coverage in the private in2 surance market because of health conditions and no

3 part of the net earnings of which inures to the bene4 fit of any private shareholder, member, or individ5 ual.’’

6 (b) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall

7 apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1989.

Æ