1

Filed 9/28/21 In re M.G. CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re M.G., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

NAPA COUNTY HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A161940

 (Napa County Super Ct. 

 No. 20JD000060)

In re M.G., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

NAPA COUNTY HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.B.,

Appellant.

 A162302

 (Napa County Super. Ct. 

 No. 20JD000060)

M.G. (Father) is the presumed father of minor M.G., and J.B. is

godmother and first cousin twice removed to the minor. In this consolidated 

appeal, Father and J.B. appeal from the juvenile court’s order denying 
2

placement of the minor with J.B. under the “relative placement” provisions of

section 361.3 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.

1 We hold the juvenile 

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that M.G.’s placement with 

J.B. would not be in the child’s best interests.

Father also purports to appeal from the order sustaining the 

allegations in the juvenile dependency petition and the disposition order 

removing M.G. from his parents’ custody. However, we lack jurisdiction to 

review these issues, as Father’s notice of appeal clearly and unmistakably 

indicated his intent to appeal only from the order denying relative placement. 

But even if we were to consider such matters, we would conclude that Father 

forfeited his challenge to the disposition order by submitting to the 

recommendations of Napa County Health and Human Services, Child 

Welfare Services Department (Department),

2 and that substantial evidence 

supported the jurisdiction findings.

Finally, we conclude the Department did not sufficiently comply with 

the inquiry and notice requirements of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act 

of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). Accordingly, we conditionally 

reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the juvenile court to ensure 

the Department’s compliance with ICWA.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Section 300 Petition

On September 24, 2020, the Department filed a dependency petition 

alleging that newborn M.G. was at substantial risk of serious physical harm 

1 Further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code 

unless specified otherwise.

2 In so concluding, we note the January 27, 2021 minute order of the 

disposition hearing should be corrected to reflect that Father submitted on 

the Department’s recommended case plan. 
3

due to the inability of Father and A.Y. (Mother) to adequately supervise and 

protect him (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)) stemming from Mother’s untreated mental 

illness (bipolar disorder), developmental disability, and substance abuse;

Father’s “volatile impulsive behaviors” and past instances of intimate partner 

violence; and both parents’ extensive histories of homelessness.

As relevant here, paragraph b-4 of the petition alleges that on July 25, 

2020 and October 11, 2019, Father was “arrested for Intimate Partner 

Violence after threatening to kill [Mother] and their unborn child. [In] [t]he 

second incident [Father] pushed [Mother] to the ground and struck her three 

times in the chest. [Mother] was granted an [emergency protective order]; 

however, she failed to pursue a permanent restraining order and continued 

residing with [Father].” Paragraph b-5 alleges that Father had “expressed a 

threat to physically harm the child prior to his birth. The father has volatile 

impulsive behaviors that places [M.G.] at risk of serious harm or injury.” 

The petition further alleges that M.G. was left without any provision 

for support (§ 300, subd. (g)) due to Mother’s homelessness and Father’s lack 

of stable housing. Specifically, paragraph g-1 alleges that Father “was 

evicted from stable housing, the Rainbow House, because he engaged in a 

physical altercation with another resident. [Father’s] impulsive and 

explosive behaviors place[] the minor . . . at serious risk of harm or injury. 

[Mother] . . . is unable to provide adequate care, protection and shelter for the 

minor, . . . placing the newborn minor at serious risk of harm and without 

safe and adequate housing.” 

B. Detention Report and Hearing

The Department filed its detention report recommending that M.G. be 

detained in foster care. According to the report, Mother had been in and out 

of the home of her great-grandmother, C.H., for approximately 10 years and 
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struggled to maintain stable housing. Mother was “cognitively functioning at 

the level of a ten year old,” had an IQ in the 50’s or 60’s, and had been under 

limited conservatorship for approximately 10 years. 

The Department also reported on Father’s criminal history, his parole 

status for possession and sale of a controlled substance with gang and 

firearm enhancements, and statements from parole officers that Father was 

“very dangerous, extremely volatile and impulsive” and “non-compliant 

during his parole” with regard to alcohol consumption. 

The Department identified two individuals for assessment as relative

or “nonrelative extended family member” (NREFM) placements: J.B., the 

minor’s “Maternal cousin and Godmother,” and C.C., the minor’s “Maternal 

cousin.” Meanwhile, J.B. filed a relative information form (Judicial Council 

Forms, form JV-285) requesting that M.G. be placed with her in the event he 

was removed from his parents’ custody.3

At the detention hearing on September 25, 2020, both Mother and 

Father appeared, and Father was given alleged father status.4 J.B. also 

appeared, identifying herself as Mother’s cousin and M.G.’s godmother and 

claiming she had a “Certificate in Midwifery.”

Maternal grandfather, J.H., was present and told the juvenile court 

there was Cherokee ancestry on Mother’s side of the family through both 

himself and maternal grandmother, A.L. J.H. provided the court with his 

name and birthdate, the name and birthdate of his mother, C.B. (M.G.’s 

maternal great-grandmother), and the name of his father, R.H. (M.G.’s 

maternal great-grandfather). Mother provided the court with the name of 

3 J.B. filed additional relative information forms (JV-285) in November 

2020 and December 2020, along with supporting documents.

4 He was eventually elevated to presumed father status. 
5

her mother, A.L., and J.H. provided a partial birthdate for A.L. but said he 

was unsure of its accuracy. As to A.L.’s birthdate, the Department informed 

the court, “I believe we have that at the Department.”

The Department then informed the juvenile court that it was having 

difficulty getting Mother to sign a consent-to-treat form authorizing medical 

care for M.G. in foster care. The court asked Mother if she was willing to sign 

the form, and Mother responded, “Yeah, I will sign it.” However, J.B. told the 

court that M.G.’s parents were “hesitant to give a blanket permission to 

treat” and wanted to “be involved in the decisions regarding medical care.” 

J.B. raised concerns that M.G. was exposed in utero to Mother’s antiseizure 

medication and was born prematurely, and that he had “interrupted 

breastfeeding.” The court reassured J.B. that the Department’s social 

workers were careful in making sure that proper care was given. 

The juvenile court ordered M.G. placed in an approved Napa County 

Resource Family Home.

C. Initial ICWA Notice

Three days after the disposition hearing, the Department filed and 

served Judicial Council Forms, form ICWA-030, Notice of Child Custody 

Proceeding for Indian Child (hereafter ICWA notice) by certified mail to the 

Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior, the Sacramento 

Area Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and to representatives of the 

Cherokee Nation, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and the United 

Keetoowah Band of Cherokee. 

The ICWA notices included the following information regarding M.G. 

and his family: the child’s name, birthdate, and place of birth; Mother’s legal 

and maiden names and birthdate; Father’s name and birthdate; maternal 

grandmother A.L.’s name and the partial birthdate given by J.H. at the 
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detention hearing; the names and birthdates of maternal grandfather J.H.

and maternal great-grandmother C.B.; and the name of maternal greatgrandfather R.H.5 The spaces for information on M.G.’s other greatgrandparents (i.e., A.L.’s parents) were designated “Unknown.” Under 

“Other relative information,” the IWCA notices listed the names of maternal 

great aunt, Ad.L., and “second cousin[s]” J.B. and C.C. 

In October 2020, the Department filed ICWA compliance documents

showing that each recipient had received the ICWA notice. 

D. Jurisdiction Reports and Hearing

The juvenile court initially set a combined jurisdiction and disposition 

hearing for October 2020. The court later bifurcated the hearings and 

continued the jurisdiction hearing to November 2020. The court granted a 

further continuance of the jurisdiction hearing to December 16, 2020. 

1. Initial Jurisdiction Report

The Department filed its initial jurisdiction report in October 2020, 

recommending that the juvenile court establish jurisdiction over M.G. The 

report indicated that ICWA “does or may apply” and that Mother had 

reported “Cherokee ancestry through both the maternal grandfather [J.H.] 

and the maternal grandmother [A.L.].” Father reported no known Native 

American ancestry on his side of the family. 

The Department interviewed Mother’s cousin, C.C., who reported that 

Mother was born addicted to methamphetamine, and that Mother and Father 

were living in the garage of Mother’s great-grandmother, C.H., which was 

unsanitary and had “ ‘stuff piled up everywhere.’ ” C.C. told the Department 

that although she had spent many summers with Mother as children, she 

5 Notably, the spelling of J.H. and R.H.’s shared last name in the IWCA 

notices did not match the spelling that J.H. gave at the detention hearing. 
7

“never knew or interacted with maternal cousin, [J.B.], prior to” the 

dependency proceedings. C.C. expressed her desire to have Mother and 

great-grandmother C.H. relocate to Idaho where Mother had family. 

Maternal great aunt, Ad.L., told the Department she was concerned 

about Mother’s ability to care for M.G. in light of Mother’s developmental and 

cognitive delays. Ad.L. also expressed concerns that C.H. could be evicted for 

allowing Mother and Father to live in her garage. C.H. had once kicked the 

parents out of the house when she discovered that they had used her credit 

cards without her permission. The jurisdiction report included photographs 

showing that the parents’ sleeping area in the garage contained low hanging 

electrical cords, an exposed hot water heater, exposed garbage bins, and

items unsafely stacked in piles. 

Father was overseen by a parole officer since 2013, and his parole term 

had been repeatedly extended. The parole officer confirmed Father’s history 

of homelessness and told the Department that Father had no verifiable 

source of income. 

The jurisdiction report set forth Father’s extensive criminal history, 

including incidents of intimate partner violence against Mother. According to 

a Napa Police Department report, Mother called the police on October 11, 

2019, and reported that Father had “pushed her in the chest with two hands 

three separate times causing her to fall on the ground,” and after she got up 

and went after him, he “proceeded to hit her in the chest with an open right 

hand” before he “ran off.” Nevertheless, Mother told the police “she did not 

want [Father] arrested for the assault” and declined an emergency protective 

order. The police officer was not able to locate Father. 

In July 2020, Mother reported to the police that during an argument, 

Father damaged a door inside the residence and told Mother “he was going to 
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kill her and kill their unborn baby.” Mother requested and obtained an 

emergency protective order and told the police officer she wanted to press 

charges against Father for threats. The police officer later made contact with 

Father and served him with the emergency protective order. Thereafter, 

Mother did not come to the police department to press charges; nor did she 

return the police officer’s phone calls. According to C.C., after the incident in 

which Father threatened to kill Mother and the unborn baby, Mother called 

Ad.L. and asked her to bring her to Idaho; however, before they could make 

arrangements, Mother “ ‘disappeared again.’ ” 

In August 2020, the Napa Police Department reported Father’s 

altercation at the Rainbow House shelter where he and Mother had been 

living. According to the report, Father got into an argument with an 

individual who was with his girlfriend and their infant child. Father pushed 

the individual, caused a screen door to hit him, and later “said something to 

the effect of, you won’t be here later to protect your dumbass kid” before 

driving away. 

C.C. reported an incident two days before M.G.’s birth in which Father 

“charged towards [Mother’s] great-grandmother and threatened her.” 

Maternal grandfather J.H. had to intervene and called the police. 

In an interview with the Department, Father said he had never been 

arrested for domestic violence. He claimed that Mother “made a false 

allegation and [he] was detained in the county jail for one night . . . .” Father 

denied that their arguments turned physical or that he threatened their baby 

in utero. He claimed the garage where he and Mother lived was safe and 

clean, and he denied ever having been kicked out of C.H.’s home. 
9

2. October 23, 2020 Addendum Report

The Department presented the juvenile court with additional 

information regarding six emergency 911 calls made from the address where 

Mother and Father resided with C.H., including the following. In January 

2020, Mother reported that Father had assaulted her “ ‘over the last several 

days’ in the great-grandmother’s home and so she went to stay in Vallejo.” In 

June 2020, Mother called 911 and reported that Father, who had been 

drinking in violation of his parole conditions, had a stick and was threatening 

to hurt her. Mother, who was “ ‘crying’ ” and “ ‘frantic,’ ” told the dispatcher 

“she did not want the father to have contact with her and the unborn child 

due to being in fear of him.” In July 2020, a community member called to 

report that “the mother is pregnant and her baby’s father” had broken a door 

in the great-grandmother’s home, and that Mother was “ ‘afraid and scared’ ” 

of Father. In September 2020, a community member reported “screaming 

and yelling” and furniture possibly being thrown inside the home. 

3. November 25, 2020 Addendum Report

In an addendum report, the Department notified the juvenile court that 

it had denied J.B.’s request to be an emergency placement for M.G. 

In explaining its decision, the Department noted that J.B. had 

persisted in her claims that M.G. was at risk of developmental and cognitive 

delays and physical and emotional deficits despite the evaluations of his 

medical care providers concluding he was healthy. J.B. also raised concerns 

in her November 2020 relative information form (JV-285) that M.G. was 

diagnosed with a cephalohematoma and, in a letter to the Department and 

the parties’ counsel, made a “highly alarming” suggestion that the foster care 

provider was responsible for the cephalohematoma—even though it was 

explained to her that this was a common condition caused by pushing during 
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labor and delivery that did not require medical follow-up. In the 

Department’s view, J.B.’s “perseverance and insistence on the child having 

special medical needs makes it seem that she is either unwilling or unable to 

trust the department and [M.G.’s] medical care providers, and that ongoing 

positive interactions with these professionals would be challenging for her, 

due to her distrust.” Furthermore, the Department questioned why, despite 

her stated concerns for the health of M.G., J.B. discouraged Mother from 

signing the consent-to-treat form at the detention hearing. 

The Department also suggested that J.B. had violated a confidentiality 

agreement she signed at a child and family team meeting by sending a letter 

to several individuals, including an attorney who had not yet been appointed 

as Father’s counsel, detailing M.G.’s health issues. 

The decision to deny J.B.’s placement request was also based on 

concerns about her honesty. The Department noted its discovery that J.B. 

was not a certified nurse midwife as she had claimed. The Department 

further reported that J.B. acted in a “duplicitous manner” by attempting to 

arrange an in-person visit with M.G. through his foster caregiver despite 

having been told by the Department that in-person contact was not permitted 

due to the COVID-19 pandemic. J.B. had also made “false allegations in an 

effort to have [M.G.] moved from the foster home” by claiming that Mother 

had witnessed the foster caregiver doing drugs in the past. When asked 

about this allegation, Mother denied ever having witnessed the foster 

caregiver doing drugs. The Department further accused J.B. of falsely telling 

Mother that the Department intended to move M.G. to Idaho with her other 

relatives, causing Mother “to become emotionally distraught.” 

The Department concluded that J.B. was not capable of supporting a 

plan of family reunification because she had caused distress to the parents 
11

and distrust between them and the Department. According to the 

Department, J.B. was “ ‘harassing’ ” Mother and ignoring Mother’s wishes 

about breastfeeding M.G., as J.B. planned to breastfeed M.G. by taking 

lactation supplements, despite Mother’s discomfort with this. 

4. December 14, 2020 Addendum Report

The Department reported that Father had posted a video clip on social 

media of himself in the garage of C.H.’s home smoking a substance out of a 

clear glass pipe, in apparent violation of his parole restrictions. The video 

also showed multiple flammable items on top of an electric heater next to the 

bed. The Department further reported that Father had missed four visits in 

a row with M.G. claiming scheduling conflicts due to work, even though he 

acknowledged he was not working. 

5. Additional ICWA Notices

The Department gave additional ICWA notice of the continued 

jurisdiction hearing to the Cherokee Nation, the Eastern Band of Cherokee 

Indians, and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee. It appears the ICWA 

notices were unchanged from the prior notices. For maternal grandmother 

A.L., the ICWA notice still only provided a partial birthdate, and the spaces 

for information on M.G.’s great-grandparents/A.L.’s parents were still 

marked as “Unknown.” The Department filed ICWA compliance documents 

showing that the second set of ICWA notices had been received by 

representatives of the tribes. 

On November 4, 2020, the Department filed an ICWA compliance 

document attaching a letter from the Indian Child Welfare Advocate for the 

United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians. The letter stated, in relevant 

part, “Based on the information that has been provided to us, we are unable 

to establish Keetoowah heritage,” and accordingly, M.G. was ineligible to 
12

become a member and was not recognized as a member of the tribe. The 

letter went on to note, “This determination is based on the information that 

was exactly provided by you. All incorrect or omitted family information 

could invalidate this determination.” 

After the jurisdiction hearing was continued to December 2020, the 

Department gave notice of the continued hearing date to the Cherokee 

Nation and the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and later filed ICWA 

compliance documents showing receipt of the third set of ICWA notices. The 

ICWA notices contained mostly the same family information as before, except 

that the birthdate for maternal grandmother, A.L., was now designated 

“Unknown.” There was still no information on A.L.’s parents, and J.H. and 

R.H.’s last names were still spelled differently than as indicated at the 

detention hearing. 

The Department also filed an ICWA compliance document attaching a 

letter from the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians stating, “Our office has 

reviewed the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians’ tribal registry and, based on 

the information received from you, [M.G.] is neither registered nor eligible to 

register as a member of this tribe.” A further ICWA compliance document 

filed by the Department attached an email correspondence from the eligibility 

supervisor of the Cherokee Nation stating, “Neither parent nor child are 

registered as Cherokee Nation tribal members. [¶] The child is not an ‘Indian 

child’ in relation to the Cherokee Nation as defined in the Federal ICWA. . . . 

Any incorrect or omitted information could invalidate this determination. An 

official response letter has not been generated yet but will be once the 

received notice has been fully researched and processed.” 
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6. Jurisdiction Hearing

At the December 16, 2020, contested jurisdiction hearing, the court 

admitted the Department’s jurisdiction report and addendum reports without 

objection. The court heard testimony from Mother’s family friend, M.T.; 

Mother’s great-grandmother, C.H.; social worker Tawnya Stansell; Father; 

and Mother. As relevant here, C.H. denied that the arguments between 

Mother and Father turned physical. She further testified as to a “slight 

disagreement” she had with Father but claimed he never threatened or 

charged at her. Both M.T. and C.H. attested to Mother’s ability to care for 

young children. 

Social worker Stansell testified in relevant part that Father had spent 

one night in jail following one of the incidents of intimate partner violence 

alleged in paragraph b-4 of the petition. Stansell acknowledged that after 

Father threatened Mother with a stick, he was detained for public 

drunkenness, not domestic violence. The juvenile court clarified on the 

record that the Department was not claiming Father had a domestic violence 

conviction—only that Mother had claimed domestic violence by Father. 

Father disputed the Department’s allegations against him, claiming he 

never got into a physical altercation with Mother or pushed her in the chest, 

never threatened to harm their unborn child, and never had an arrest for 

domestic violence. He testified he got into “shouting matches” with Mother 

and admitted he was served with an emergency protective order in July 2020. 

He denied the police report that he was banging on the door with a stick, and 

he claimed he and Mother left the Rainbow House voluntarily because it was 

not a good environment for a newborn. 

Mother likewise denied that Father had threatened to harm her, the 

baby, and C.H., and that he had physically harmed her. She admitted she 
14

called the police and obtained an emergency protective order against Father 

in July 2020, but insisted she had made false claims against him because she 

was acting on past traumas and “thinking about something that happened in 

[her] past.” 

Finding both parents’ testimony lacking in credibility, the juvenile 

court concluded that the allegations of the petition were sustained by a 

preponderance of the evidence, and that M.G. was a child described by 

section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). The court found that Father “has 

expressed a threat to physically harm the child” and “is also engaged in 

intimate partner violence. It’s unhealthy for a child to be in a home that is 

volatile and violent, and I think that the child being placed with father puts 

the child at risk of . . . growing up in a home where domestic violence is a 

normal part of daily life[.]” 

The juvenile court also found that although there was initially reason 

to believe ICWA might apply, after inquiry and due diligence from the 

Department, “there is currently no reason to know this case involves an 

‘Indian Child’, [and] the court will proceed as if ICWA does not apply.” The 

court set the matter for a disposition hearing. 

E. Disposition Report and Hearing

In its disposition report, the Department recommended that the

juvenile court find M.G. to be a dependent, with a plan for family 

reunification. The case plan identified the goal that M.G. return home, with 

a projected completion date of July 13, 2021. The case plan required Father 

to, among other things, demonstrate that he could provide and maintain a 

safe home, stable income, and live in an environment free of drugs, drug 

paraphernalia, angry outbursts, domestic violence, and physical violence. He 

was also required to develop and demonstrate strategies for managing 
15

mental health symptoms; to participate in parenting education courses, 

individual therapy and drug and alcohol classes; and to submit to a 

psychological evaluation and random drug testing. 

The Department reported that ICWA “does not apply,” outlining the 

responses received from the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, 

the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and the Cherokee Nation, and the 

juvenile court’s ICWA ruling at the jurisdiction hearing. 

On January 19, 2021, the juvenile court called the matter for a 

disposition hearing. Mother’s counsel told the court that Mother was 

“prepared to submit on the recommendation” and “want[ed] to move forward 

with the case plan.” Father’s counsel, however, reported that Father “has 

sent me some email feedback about some parts that he’s not happy with. I’ve 

let him know his choices are to either submit on the report as written or to 

set a contest. I don’t know what he wants to do.” The court asked Father, 

“do you wish to contest this with a hearing or do you wish to submit?” Father 

responded that the case plan was “unclear” because “there’s some things in 

that I think should be more explained before, before I agree to something like 

this.” The court then set the matter for a contested disposition hearing on 

January 27, 2021. 

At the start of the January 27 hearing, Father’s counsel informed the 

juvenile court that Father had spoken to the social worker and was “now 

prepared to submit on the case plan.” On voir dire, Father testified that he 

“spoke with the social worker concerning one of the things I was concerned 

with. . . . And she made it clear to me what I would be agreeing to, and what 

classes I would be participating in. So she’s okay with the case plan that 

she’s giving me. And she seems to already be aware of what exactly she 

wants me to do. She’s okay with it. I’m fine with it. I’m fine with the case 
16

plan. I’m ready to move forward.” Father confirmed he had a copy of the 

case plan and had no further questions about it. When asked whether he was 

“prepare[d] to comply with the case plan, and have the court review this 

matter in six months,” Father replied, “Yes, of course.” 

The juvenile court ordered M.G. removed from his parents’ custody 

based on “the facts of the sustained petition, the social worker’s report and 

the evidence presented” and set the six-month review hearing for July 2021. 

The Department then raised the issue of J.B.’s placement request and argued 

that “pursuant to . . . section 361.3, the Court actually needs to make a 

finding on the record that . . . the placement has been denied, and state on 

the record the reasons that placement with the relative was denied. 

Accordingly, the juvenile court heard testimony from Father, J.B., and 

Mother on J.B.’s placement request. Father testified that the statements in 

the Department’s report about J.B. were false and that J.B. should be M.G.’s 

caregiver until the parents were able to regain custody. Mother likewise 

testified that it was her preference M.G. be placed with J.B. 

M.G.’s counsel argued that placement with J.B. was not in the minor’s

best interest. Counsel was “very, very concerned about the trust situation” 

between J.B. and the Department because “[i]t’s extremely important for a 

foster parent to be able to work closely with the Department, and follow all of 

the rules and regulations, some of which have to do with not getting overly 

involved in case issues, just providing care for the child.” M.G.’s counsel also 

raised concern for the minor’s welfare in that J.B. lived in Davis while the 

parents lived in Napa. 

J.B. was questioned extensively regarding the Department’s concerns. 

She denied disparaging M.G.’s foster caregiver and testified she believed the 

foster caregiver to be a good person, but was advised by the assistant director 
17

of social services to put the allegation of the foster caregiver’s drug use in 

writing. J.B. admitted she was not a certified nurse midwife but explained 

she had a “Certificate of Midwifery” from Mercy in Action College of 

Midwifery. She further testified that she was a lactation specialist, and that 

Mother had called her many times to ask about breastfeeding. J.B. continued 

to believe M.G. was at risk of developmental and cognitive delays and 

physical and emotional deficits based on “[t]he risk factors in his medical 

chart,” but she acknowledged that M.G. had no known developmental delays. 

She denied advising the parents not to sign the consent-to-treat form and 

claimed that Father had simply wished to speak to his attorney before 

signing it. J.B. expressed her commitment to working with the Department 

and providing for visitation between the parents and M.G. in Napa. 

After hearing further argument from counsel, the juvenile court denied 

placement with J.B., indicating it was in M.G.’s best interest to remain in his 

current placement “for the time being.” The court acknowledged it was “not 

an easy decision” but found that M.G. was “doing well in the current 

placement,” and that placement with J.B. was not suitable because she had

“contributed to a distrustful relationship between herself and the 

Department” and had demonstrated “boundary issues with the mother.” 

Moreover, the court found, J.B. had “made a lot of medical diagnoses” and 

was unwilling to trust the experts or the Department. In the court’s words, 

“There’s just been a level of distrust and advocacy that I think has caused 

damage, and will continue to create problems in working with the 

Department.” 

In its written disposition order, the juvenile court ruled, in relevant 

part: M.G. was not an Indian child and ICWA did not apply; M.G. was 

declared a dependent child and removed from his parents’ custody, with 
18

family reunification services and a return date goal of July 2021; the parents 

were granted supervised visitation; J.B.’s request for relative placement was 

denied; and a six-month review hearing was set for July 2021. 

Father and J.B. each appealed. The appeals were consolidated for 

purposes of briefing, oral argument (if any), and disposition.

DISCUSSION

I. Scope of Father’s Appeal

Dependency appeals are governed by section 395, which makes the 

disposition order the appealable judgment. Jurisdiction findings can be 

reviewed on appeal from the disposition order. (In re Tracy Z. (1987) 195 

Cal.App.3d 107, 112.) “A consequence of section 395 is that an unappealed 

disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be 

attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order.” (In re Meranda P.

(1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150.) Furthermore, “ ‘ “[o]ur jurisdiction on 

appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal and the judgment or order 

appealed from.” [Citation.] We have no jurisdiction over an order not 

mentioned in the notice of appeal.’ ” (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 75 

(J.F.).)

Father purports to appeal from the jurisdiction findings and disposition 

order, but his notice of appeal (Judicial Council Forms, form JV-800)

identifies only the juvenile court’s order denying relative placement. 

Specifically, in the area after the preprinted sentence “I appeal from the 

findings and orders of the court (specify date of order or describe order),” the 

notice states: “Denial of placement per parent’s request to [J.B.], Mother and 

Child’s relative.” On the following page, after the sentence, “The order 

appealed from was made under Welfare and Institutions Code (check all that 

apply),” the form lists various statutory sections with boxes that can be 
19

checked, but Father did not check the boxes in section 7(b) for “Section 360 

(declaration of dependency),” “Removal of custody from parent or guardian,” 

“Other orders,” or “with review of section 300 jurisdictional findings.” The 

only box checked was in section 7(f), “Other appealable orders relating to 

dependency (specify),” once again specifying “Denial of placement with 

relative at disposition per WIC 361.3” and identifying the hearing date as 

“1/27/21[.]”

Generally, we must liberally construe a notice of appeal in favor of its

sufficiency. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.100(a)(2), 8.405(a)(3).) However, 

“ ‘[t]he policy of liberally construing a notice of appeal in favor of its 

sufficiency [citation] does not apply if the notice is so specific it cannot be 

read as reaching a judgment or order not mentioned at all.’ [Citations.] ‘[I]t 

is well “beyond liberal construction” to view an appeal from one order as an 

appeal from a “further and different order.” [Citation.] “Despite the rule 

favoring liberal interpretation of notices of appeal, a notice of appeal will not 

be considered adequate if it completely omits any reference to the judgment 

being appealed.” [Citation.] . . . . Therefore, when a notice of appeal 

manifests a ‘ “clear and unmistakable” ’ intent to appeal only from one order, 

we cannot liberally construe the notice to apply to a different, omitted order.” 

(J.F., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 76.)

Here, the notice of appeal, prepared by Father’s appointed counsel, 

manifests Father’s clear and unmistakable intent to appeal only from the 

order denying relative placement. The notice twice describes that ruling—

and only that ruling—and cites only the specific statute regarding relative 

placements (§ 361.3), while leaving unchecked the boxes for appealing from 

other judgments and orders—including the removal order and the 

jurisdiction findings. Because the notice of appeal completely omits any 
20

reference to the jurisdiction findings and disposition order, we cannot 

liberally construe the notice to encompass the unmentioned rulings.6

We recognize that lack of prejudice to the respondent is a relevant 

consideration in applying the policy of liberal construction (In re Joshua S.

(2007) 41 Cal.4th 261, 272), and that the Department identifies no prejudice 

or confusion resulting from Father’s notice of appeal. Nonetheless, the policy 

of liberal construction is simply inapplicable where, as here, the notice of 

appeal manifests a clear and unmistakable intent to appeal only from a 

specified order. (J.F., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th p. 76.) Thus, the absence of 

prejudice is immaterial.

Father nevertheless contends that under In re Madison W. (2006) 141 

Cal.App.4th 1447 (Madison W.), we have discretion to construe his notice of 

appeal to encompass the unmentioned rulings. In Madison W., the Court of 

Appeal construed a notice of appeal citing only a parental rights termination

order under section 366.26 to encompass an order denying the parent’s 

section 388 petition issued three days prior, as the notice of appeal was 

timely as to both orders. (Madison W., at p. 1450.) The Madison W. court 

stated it “routinely” deemed a notice of appeal challenging the termination of 

parental rights to include an “eleventh-hour section 388 petition” that was 

filed on or before the termination order but within 60 days of when the notice 

of appeal was filed. (Madison W., at p. 1450.) Though not condoning the 

practice of drafting notices of appeal in this manner, Madison W. explained it 

was being “pragmatic” due to concerns of ineffective assistance of counsel 

6 We do, however, have jurisdiction to consider Father’s arguments 

regarding ICWA, which can be raised at any time. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 

Cal.5th 1, 9; In re Samuel P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1259, 1267–1268.)
21

claims, motions to dismiss, and the consumption of limited judicial resources 

reviewing such matters. (Id. at p. 1451.)

As J.F. observed, however, Madison W. failed “to recognize the wellsettled limits on the rule of liberal construction.” (J.F., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 78.) Furthermore, the discretionary rule announced in Madison W. was 

in response to frequent section 388 petitions filed at the “eleventh-hour” to 

avert termination of parental rights. (Madison W., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1450.) Those circumstances are absent here. We are not aware of any case 

applying Madison W. to a notice of appeal that clearly and unambiguously

specifies a narrow dependency ruling, such as the denial of relative 

placement. Nor does Father demonstrate that the situation presented here 

arises so frequently as to justify a pragmatic workaround as in Madison W.

In any event, even if we were to construe Father’s notice of appeal as

encompassing the jurisdiction and disposition rulings, we would conclude

that Father forfeited his challenge to the disposition order and that 

substantial evidence supported the jurisdiction findings.

a. Disposition Order

A parent in a dependency proceeding who submits to a county welfare 

department’s recommended findings and orders—as distinct from the 

department’s report—waives for appellate purposes any right to challenge 

the court’s issuance of its recommended findings and orders. (In re Richard 

K. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580, 590 (Richard K.).) Submission on the report 

simply means “the parent acquiesces as to the state of the evidence yet 

preserves the right to challenge it as insufficient to support a particular legal 

conclusion.” (Id. at p. 589.) By contrast, submission on the county welfare 

department’s recommendations waives the parent’s right to contest the 

juvenile court’s disposition if it coincides with the department’s 
22

recommendations, as a parent “who consents to an act is not wronged by it.” 

(Richard K., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 590.)

Father insists he did not forfeit his challenge to the disposition order, 

noting that the disposition hearing was “contested” and that the minute order

stated Father submitted “on the report.” In context, however, the record 

makes reasonably clear that Father submitted to the Department’s 

recommendations. At a hearing on January 19, 2021, the juvenile court set 

the matter for a “contested” hearing on January 27 based on representations

by Father’s counsel that Father was unhappy with the case plan and counsel 

did not “know what [Father] wants to do.” But at the start of the January 27 

hearing, Father’s counsel informed the court that Father had talked to the 

social worker and was “prepared to submit on the case plan.” (Italics added.) 

On voir dire, Father testified the social worker clarified “what [he] would be 

agreeing to, and what classes [he] would be participating in,” and therefore, 

he was “fine with the case plan.” Father also confirmed he was prepared to 

comply with the case plan and have the court review the matter in six 

months. Despite contrary language in the minute order, the reporter’s 

transcript confirms that Father was submitting on the recommended “case 

plan,” as opposed to the “report.” (People v. Stephenson (1974) 10 Cal.3d 652, 

656 [reporter’s transcript controls over discrepancies in minute order].)

That Father agreed to submit to the case plan after clarifying what he 

was “agreeing to” and what “classes” he had to take can only be understood 

as his acquiescence to the steps outlined by the Department for family 

reunification—that is, the Department’s recommendations. Furthermore, 

Father’s agreement that the juvenile court would review the matter in six 

months was consistent with the case plan’s goal of family reunification by 

July 2021. In sum, even if we were to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the 
23

disposition order, we would conclude Father forfeited his appeal from that 

order by submitting to the Department’s recommendations. (Richard K., 

supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 590.)

b. Jurisdiction Findings

Jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), requires proof, by 

preponderance of the evidence, that the “child has suffered, or there is a 

substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as 

a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to 

adequately supervise or protect the child . . . .” (§§ 300, subd. (b)(1), 355, 

subd. (a).) Although risk to the child must be shown to exist at the time of 

the jurisdiction findings (In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1435), the 

juvenile court need not wait until a child is seriously injured to assume 

jurisdiction if there is evidence that the child is at risk of future harm (In re 

N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 165).

“Physical violence between a child’s parents may support the exercise of 

jurisdiction under [section 300,] subdivision (b) but only if there is evidence

that the violence is ongoing or likely to continue and that it directly harmed 

the child physically or placed the child at risk of physical harm.” (In re Daisy 

H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 717 (Daisy H.).) While evidence of past 

conduct, without more, is insufficient to support a jurisdiction finding under 

section 300, it conduct may be probative of current conditions. (In re James 

R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135–136.) To establish a defined risk of harm 

at the time of the hearing, there “must be some reason beyond mere 

speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.” (Id. at p. 136.)

On appeal, we review jurisdiction findings for substantial evidence. 

(J.K., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433.) “ ‘[W]e view the record in the light 

most favorable to the juvenile court’s determinations, drawing all reasonable 
24

inferences from the evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings and 

orders. Issues of fact and credibility are the province of the juvenile court 

and we neither reweigh the evidence nor exercise our independent 

judgment.’ ” (In re Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537, 560.)

Here, substantial evidence supported dependency jurisdiction based on 

paragraph b-4 of the petition, which alleged that Father committed intimate 

partner violence against Mother on two occasions in October 2019 and July 

2020. The allegations of both incidents were supported by Napa Police 

Department reports. In the July 2020 incident, Mother reported that Father 

had threatened to kill her and their unborn baby and damaged a door, 

leading Mother to request and obtain an emergency protective order against 

him. Although Father’s acts of violence against Mother in October 2019 

occurred prior to M.G.’s conception, the trial court could permissibly conclude 

that this instance of violence—coupled with Father’s direct threat to kill the 

unborn baby eight months later—was probative of conditions existing at the 

time of the dependency to support a finding that Father’s violent tendencies 

were ongoing and that M.G. was at risk of future physical harm. That 

Mother never filed charges against Father and remained willing to stay with 

him supported the juvenile court’s conclusion that Mother was unable “to 

make wise choices to protect the safety of her child.” Notwithstanding both 

parents’ denials of the Department’s allegations, we defer to the juvenile 

court’s finding that their testimony was not credible in this respect.

Moreover, the juvenile court’s credibility findings were corroborated by 

the additional evidence of Mother’s 911 calls and other accounts of Father’s 

violent behavior in the year leading up to M.G.’s birth. The evidence included 

Mother’s “scared” and “frantic” 911 call in June 2020 in which she told the 

dispatcher that Father was threatening to hurt her and that she did not 
25

“want this man to have contact with her unborn child due to being in fear of 

him[.]” The Rainbow House incident, which occurred shortly before M.G.’s 

birth, involved not only Father’s violent and angry conduct but his threat 

against an infant child. Finally, Father’s angry “charge” toward Mother’s 

great-grandmother, which required intervention from J.H. and the police, 

occurred just two days before M.G.’s birth.

In sum, the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the juvenile 

court’s determination, supported a finding beyond mere speculation that 

Father’s violent tendencies were likely to continue and placed the child at 

substantial risk of future physical harm. (Daisy H., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 717.) Because the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a child 

will be upheld if substantial evidence supports any one of the statutory bases 

for jurisdiction enumerated in the petition, the true finding as to paragraph 

b-4 was sufficient to sustain dependency jurisdiction in this case. (In re M.R.

(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 896.)

7

II. Relative/NREFM Placement

Father and J.B. contend the juvenile court’s denial of relative 

placement was an abuse of discretion because the court failed to consider 

several of the statutory factors for relative placement determinations and 

gave undue weight to the “best interest” factor (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(1)). 

However, the Department contends, and Father and J.B. concede, that J.B. is 

7 Father requests our review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

paragraphs b-5 and g-1, arguing that the true findings on these paragraphs 

could have “substantially adverse collateral consequences” for him. We 

decline to exercise our discretion to do so. Father’s claim of future impact is 

speculative and conclusory, as he fails to provide any meaningful argument 

as to how the true findings could affect a future dependency, family law, or 

other proceeding. (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1494–1495.)
26

not a “relative” within the meaning of section 361.3, subdivision (c)(2), 

because she is not within the fifth degree of kinship to M.G.

Father and J.B. alternatively contend the juvenile court abused its 

discretion in denying placement because J.B. was an NREFM. We conclude 

this argument was forfeited and, in any event, lacks merit.

Where a child has been removed from a parent’s care under section 

361, and the child is not placed with a noncustodial parent or relative, the 

child may be placed in the approved home of an NREFM. (In re Joshua A.

(2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 208, 213–214 (Joshua A.).) We will not disturb a 

juvenile court’s placement decision “ ‘ “unless the trial court has exceeded the 

limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently 

absurd determination.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)

Section 362.7 defines an NREFM as “an adult caregiver who has an 

established familial relationship with a relative of the child, as defined in 

[section 361.3, subdivision (c)(2)], or a familial or mentoring relationship with 

the child. The county welfare department shall verify the existence of a 

relationship through interviews with the parent and child or with one or 

more third parties. The parties may include relatives of the child, teachers, 

medical professionals, clergy, neighbors, and family friends.” The statute 

further provides that “[w]hen the home of [an NREFM] is being considered 

for placement of a child, the home shall be evaluated, and approval of that 

home shall be granted or denied, pursuant to the same standards set forth in 

the regulations for the licensing of foster family homes that prescribe 

standards of safety and sanitation for the physical plant and standards for 

basic personal care, supervision, and services provided by the caregiver.” 

The issue of whether J.B. was a suitable NREFM placement for M.G. 

was never presented to the juvenile court below. Thus, any claim of error 
27

based on this contention is forfeited on appeal. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 

Cal.App.4th 212, 221–222.) In any case, Father and J.B. provide no analysis

or supporting authority for their assumption that J.B. satisfied the statutory 

definition of an NREFM as set forth above. (See § 362.7.) Although they 

emphasize that J.B. was M.G.’s godmother and Mother’s cousin, they provide 

no meaningful analysis for concluding that J.B.’s mere status as M.G.’s 

godmother demonstrates “a familial or mentoring relationship with the 

child,” or that her mere cousinship with Mother shows “an established 

familial relationship with a relative of” M.G. within the meaning of section 

362.7. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408–409 [claim of error lacking 

meaningful analysis is forfeited].)

Furthermore, Father and J.B. have pointed to no evidence in the record 

indicating that J.B.’s home was found to have met regulatory standards for 

the licensing of foster family homes. (§ 362.7.) Although the record contains 

various documents related to J.B.’s application to become a certified foster 

parent, including certificates of completion of foster care education courses, 

she indicated in her December 2020 relative information form (JV-285) that 

she was still “in the process of becoming fully approved as a resource parent 

in Yolo County.” At the disposition hearing in January 2021, the Department

told the juvenile court that it “was waiting” on the child welfare department 

of Yolo County to conduct a home study. 

Additionally, we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s 

conclusion that placement with J.B. would not have been in M.G.’s best 

interests. (Joshua A., supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 218 [placement under 

section 362.7 must be in child’s best interests]; Samantha T., supra, 197 

Cal.App.4th at p. 111 [same].) “ ‘ “The concept of a child’s best interest ‘is an 

elusive guideline that belies rigid definition. Its purpose is to maximize a 
28

child’s opportunity to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult.’ [Citation.]” ’ 

[Citation.] We review the juvenile court’s order for abuse of discretion. 

‘[R]eversal is warranted only if there is no reasonable basis upon which the 

trial court could conclude that its decision advanced the best interests of the 

child.’ ” (Joshua A., at p. 218.) “When the exercise of the court’s discretion 

depends on how it resolves questions of fact, we must defer to the court’s 

‘ “credibility determinations and findings on questions of historical fact if 

supported by substantial evidence.” ’ ” (Nissan Motor Acceptance Cases

(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 793, 817.)

Here, the juvenile court’s discretionary decision to deny placement with 

J.B. was based on its factual determinations that M.G. was doing well in his 

foster placement and that J.B. had “contributed to a distrustful relationship 

between herself and the Department,” demonstrated “boundary issues” with 

Mother, and was unwilling to trust in experts and the Department. Father 

and J.B. do not dispute that M.G. was doing well in foster care, and the 

record reflects that M.G. had no known developmental delays. Meanwhile, 

there was substantial evidence in the record of J.B. prioritizing her judgment 

over those of child welfare personnel and medical providers, making 

unfounded or untrue accusations against the foster caregiver, and being 

uncooperative with the Department. Although we do not doubt the sincerity 

of J.B.’s intentions or concerns for M.G. and his family, we conclude it was 

not unreasonable for the juvenile court to find that her conduct would not 

advance the child’s best interests during efforts to reunify the family. 

Father’s extensive arguments attempting to explain J.B.’s actions and 

blaming the Department for causing the distrust do not persuade us 

otherwise. On review for abuse of discretion, where two or more inferences 

can reasonably be deduced from the facts, we have no authority to substitute 
29

our decision for that of the lower court. (In re Emmanuel R. (2001) 94 

Cal.App.4th 452, 465.)

Father contends the juvenile court’s discretionary decisions may be 

reversed if improper criteria were applied or incorrect legal assumptions were 

made, but he fails to show that such errors occurred here. Instead, Father 

argues in conclusory fashion that the Department was “bias[ed]” against J.B., 

that its accusations were “disingenuous” and “self-serving,” and that the 

juvenile court “bowed to the Department’s decision” because it did not accept 

J.B.’s “perfectly reasonable explanations for the matters the Department 

used against her[.]” These arguments merit little discussion, as Father seeks 

to improperly relitigate factual determinations that were within the province 

of the juvenile court.

Similarly, Father’s oft-repeated claim that the juvenile court failed in 

its “critical ‘oversight role’ ” of placement decisions (In re R.T. (2015) 232 

Cal.App.4th 1284, 1306) is based on little more than the fact that the court’s

decision ultimately coincided with the Department’s. This circumstance does 

not evidence bias or an abuse of discretion. Moreover, the record shows the 

court did not rubber stamp the Department’s decision to deny placement with 

J.B. Rather, it reached its decision after receiving the Department’s reports, 

J.B.’s relative information forms and supporting documents, and testimony 

from both parents and J.B. at the disposition hearing. The court then 

explained the basis for its decision, which, as discussed, was not outside the 

bounds of reason and was based on factual findings supported by substantial 

evidence.

For all of these reasons, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying relative or NREFM placement with J.B.
30

III. ICWA Compliance

Father contends the juvenile court’s ICWA finding must be reversed 

because the Department did not adequately investigate M.G.’s possible 

Indian ancestry. We agree.

“ICWA protects the interests of Indian children and promotes the 

stability and security of Indian tribes by establishing minimum standards 

for, and permitting tribal participation in, dependency actions.” (In re A.G.

(2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1396.) “Indian child” is defined as “any 

unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an 

Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the 

biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 224.1, subds. (a), (b).)

“ICWA established minimum standards for state courts to follow before 

removing Indian children from their families and placing them in foster care 

or adoptive homes.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048 (D.S.).) As 

relevant here, “section 224.2 creates three distinct duties regarding ICWA in 

dependency proceedings.” (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1052.) After a 

child welfare department’s initial contact with the minor and his or her 

family, “the statute imposes a duty of inquiry to ask all involved persons 

whether the child may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b).) Second, if 

that initial inquiry creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child is an Indian child, 

then the [Department] ‘shall make further inquiry regarding the possible 

Indian status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ 

(Id., subd. (e).) Third, if that further inquiry results in a reason to know the 

child is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of section 224.3 

apply.” (D.S., at p. 1052.)
31

Juvenile courts and county welfare departments “have an affirmative 

and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under 

Section 300 . . . may be or has been filed, is or may be an Indian child.”

(§ 224.2, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a).) When there is reason 

to believe an Indian child is involved in a proceeding, “the court, social 

worker, or probation officer shall make further inquiry regarding the possible 

Indian status of the child . . . as soon as practicable. . . [¶] Further inquiry 

includes, but is not limited to, . . . [¶] [i]nterviewing the parents, Indian 

custodian, and extended family members to gather the information required 

in paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 224.3.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A).) 

If the juvenile court finds that the Department has conducted “proper 

and adequate further inquiry and due diligence” and that there is no reason 

to know whether the child is an Indian child, the court may make a finding 

that ICWA does not apply to the proceedings. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) 

However, the Department and the court have a continuing duty under ICWA, 

and the court “shall reverse its determination if it subsequently receives 

information providing reason to believe that the child is an Indian child and 

order the social worker or probation officer to conduct further inquiry[.]” 

(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); see D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1050.)

“[R]eason to know a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child”

exists when, among other things, “[a] person having an interest in the child, 

including . . . a member of the child’s extended family[,] informs the court 

that the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (d)(1); 25 C.F.R. § 23.107, 

subd. (c)(1).) “Under both ICWA and California law, ‘ “extended family 

member[s]” ’ include the child’s ‘grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, 

brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or 

stepparent.’ ” (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053.)
32

Where there is a reason to know a child is an Indian child, section 

224.3 requires that formal notice be given to the minor’s parents or legal 

guardian, Indian custodian, if any, and the child’s tribe regarding any 

hearings that may culminate in an order for foster care placement, 

termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement, or adoptive 

placement. (§ 224.3, subd. (a).) Section 224.3, subdivision (a)(5), sets forth 

the information that must be included in the notice, including “[a]ll names 

known of the Indian child’s biological parents, grandparents, and greatgrandparents, or Indian custodians, including maiden, married, and former 

names or aliases, as well as their current and former addresses, birth dates, 

places of birth and death, tribal enrollment information of other direct lineal 

ancestors of the child, and any other identifying information, if known.” 

(§ 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C).) The notice “must include enough information for 

the tribe to ‘conduct a meaningful review of its records to determine the 

child’s eligibility for membership’ [citation], including the identifying 

information for the child’s biological parents, grandparents, and greatgrandparents, to the extent known[.]” (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 1050; see § 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C).)

“On appeal, we review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings for 

substantial evidence. [Citations.] But where the facts are undisputed, we 

independently determine whether ICWA’s requirements have been satisfied.”

(D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1051.)

Here, the Department’s continuing duty of inquiry was unquestionably

triggered at the detention hearing when Mother and maternal grandfather 

J.H. informed the juvenile court of possible Native American ancestry on the 

maternal side of the family. Notably, the colloquy at the hearing revealed 

there was reason to believe the child might have Indian ancestry from both of 
33

Mother’s parents—J.H. and A.L.—which was acknowledged by the 

Department in its jurisdiction and disposition reports. While the Department 

and the court obtained basic information about J.H. and his parents, we see 

no indication in the record that the Department engaged in any further 

inquiry as to A.L.

As the child’s maternal grandmother, A.L. was an “extended family 

member” for purposes of the Department’s duty of further inquiry. (§ 224.2, 

subd. (e)(2)(A); D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053.) The record suggests 

A.L. was readily available to provide information to the Department, as she 

attended some of the hearings. It goes without saying that A.L. could have 

provided the Department with the names of her parents and her own full 

birthdate, as well as any former names and addresses, and it is possible she 

could have provided more detailed information about her parents such as 

their dates and places of birth. Although we agree with the Department that 

it was not required to interview the child’s great-grandparents in order to 

satisfy its duty of inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision (e)(1) (D.S., supra, 

46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053), it was at least required to interview A.L. in order 

to obtain the child’s great-grandparents’ information. (§§ 224.2, subd. 

(e)(2)(A), 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C).)

The Department contends it went beyond what was called for by 

“sending formal notices to each of [the tribal] entities and receiving 

confirmation from all three tribes that M.G. was not eligible for membership 

even though there was not ‘reason to know’ he was an Indian Child.” While 

we agree there was not yet reason to know that M.G. was an Indian child 

(and therefore the formal notice provisions of section 224.3 were not 

triggered), the Department’s early issuance of ICWA notices did not dispense 

with further inquiry and due diligence, and to the extent the notices were 
34

part of the Department’s inquiry efforts, it was incumbent on the Department 

to provide as much information as possible to assist the notice recipients in 

attempting to determine M.G.’s tribal membership or eligibility. (See § 224.2, 

subd. (e)(2)(B) [further inquiry includes contacting the U.S. Department of 

the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs; the State Department of Social 

Services; tribes; and any persons that may reasonably be expected to have 

information], (C) [contact with tribe shall include sharing information 

necessary for tribe to make membership or eligibility determination].) 

Without interviewing A.L to obtain basic information about herself and her 

parents, and having left the spaces for her parents’ information “Unknown” 

in all three rounds of ICWA notices, the Department gave the recipients little 

information from which to determine if there was tribal eligibility stemming 

from A.L.’s family history.

Likewise, to the extent the ICWA notices were intended as informationsharing with the tribes in furtherance of the Department’s duty of inquiry 

(§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C)), the spelling discrepancy regarding the surname of 

J.H. and R.H. may have hindered the tribes’ ability to conduct a meaningful 

review of their records. It is unclear why there was a discrepancy in the 

spellings between the ICWA notices and the statements made at the 

detention hearing, but on the record before us, we cannot ascertain whether 

the misspelling was in the ICWA notices themselves or in the reporter’s 

transcript of the detention hearing. Nor is there any indication that the 

Department or the juvenile court attempted to clarify this discrepancy.

We acknowledge the Department was not required to “cast about” for 

information or pursue unproductive investigative leads. (In re Levi U. (2000) 

78 Cal.App.4th 191, 199.) But given the Department’s acknowledgment that 

there was possible Indian ancestry stemming from A.L., as well as her 
35

apparent availability throughout the dependency proceedings, we cannot

conclude this was an unproductive avenue of inquiry. Even where 

“[a]dditional investigation may not develop further information establishing 

the need for ICWA notice, . . . it is essential to the enforcement of the court’s 

and [the Department’s] ‘affirmative and continuing duty to inquire’ to 

construe broadly the duty to make further inquiry.” (In re T.G. (2020) 58 

Cal.App.5th 275, 295.)

Based on the foregoing, we conclude substantial evidence was lacking 

to support the juvenile court’s findings that proper and adequate further 

inquiry and due diligence had been conducted and that ICWA does not apply. 

(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)8 We cannot conclude the error was harmless. The 

record does not show that the Department made any effort to interview A.L.

to obtain information on her and her parents, and the ICWA notices sent to 

the tribes as part of the Department’s duty of inquiry did not contain A.L.’s 

family history information and also may have misspelled the names of 

maternal grandfather J.H. and great-grandfather R.H. Meanwhile, the 

responses received from the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, United 

Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, and Cherokee Nation indicated that 

their determinations were based on the information provided and could 

change if the information they received was incorrect or incomplete. On this 

8 However, we reject Father’s remaining contentions that ICWA 

compliance was lacking due to incomplete information about M.G.’s birth 

certificate and Father’s parentage in the ICWA notices, and the Department’s 

failure to interview J.B., C.C., and C.H. about their Indian ancestry. (See 

D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053 [“extended family member” does not 

include great-grandparents]; In re Charlotte V. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 51, 58 

[no requirement under ICWA or California law that information about 

nonlineal ancestors be provided].)
36

record, we find the claim of ICWA error to be prejudicial and reversible. (In 

re N.G. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 474, 484.)

DISPOSITION

The disposition order of the juvenile court is conditionally reversed. (In 

re Francisco W. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695, 705–706.) The juvenile court is 

directed to order the Department to investigate and obtain complete and 

accurate information, if known, about M.G.’s maternal relatives (specifically 

A.L., her parents, J.H., and R.H.) and to provide corrected ICWA notices to 

the relevant tribes. If a tribe intervenes after receiving proper notice, the 

court shall proceed in accordance with ICWA. If no tribe intervenes or 

otherwise responds after receiving proper notice, the disposition order shall 

be reinstated.

Additionally, the juvenile court is directed to correct the January 27, 

2021 minute order of the disposition hearing to reflect that Father submitted 

on the Department’s recommended case plan. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 

Cal.4th 181, 188.)

In all other respects, the orders are affirmed.
37

_________________________

Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Tucher, P. J.

_________________________

Petrou, J.

A161940, A162302/Napa County Health and Human Services v. M.G., J.B.