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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 

Docket No. 34639

STATE OF IDAHO, 

 

 Plaintiff-Respondent,

 

v. 

 

TOREY MICHAEL ADAMCIK, 

 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Pocatello, September 2010

2010 Opinion No. 121

Filed: November 29, 2011

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bannock County. Honorable Peter D. McDermott, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder is affirmed. 

Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, Boise, for appellant. Dennis A. Benjamin 

argued. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. John C. 

McKinney, Deputy Attorney General argued.

__________________________________

J. JONES, Justice.

Torey Michael Adamcik (Adamcik) appeals from his convictions for first-degree murder 

and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Adamcik raises the following issues on appeal: 

(1) whether there was constitutionally sufficient evidence for a jury to find beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Adamcik stabbed the victim, Cassie Jo Stoddart (Stoddart), causing her death; (2) 

whether the district court erred in denying Adamcik’s motion to suppress statements he made 

while in custody; (3) whether the jury was properly instructed; (4) whether the State committed 

fundamental error in its closing argument; (5) whether the cumulative error doctrine necessitates 

a reversal; (6) whether the district court abused its discretion in sentencing Adamcik; and (7) 

whether the sentences imposed are unreasonable, or cruel and unusual, due to Adamcik’s status 

as a minor at the time the crimes occurred. Adamcik also appeals the district court’s denial of his 

post-trial motion for reduction in sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. We affirm.
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I. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 8, 2007, a jury convicted Adamcik for the first-degree murder of Cassie Jo 

Stoddart and for entering into a conspiracy with his co-defendant Brian Draper (Draper) to 

commit first-degree murder. Subsequently, Adamcik was sentenced to indeterminate life with 

thirty years fixed for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and fixed life for first-degree 

murder.

On September 22, 2006, Stoddart was spending the night at her cousin’s house, the 

Whispering Cliffs residence, performing house-sitting duties. Matt Beckham (Beckham), 

Stoddart’s boyfriend, stated that he and Stoddart had invited Adamcik to the Whispering Cliffs 

residence that evening to “hang out.” Adamcik and Draper arrived at the Whispering Cliffs 

residence at approximately 6:30 or 7:00 PM. After spending approximately two hours at the 

Whispering Cliffs residence, Draper informed Stoddart and Beckham that he needed to leave and 

shortly thereafter Draper and Adamcik departed. 

Approximately fifteen minutes after Adamcik and Draper departed, the power at the 

Whispering Cliffs residence went out. Beckham called his mother to ask for permission to stay 

the night, but such permission was denied. After speaking with his mother, Beckham phoned 

Adamcik to inform him that Beckham would be going home for the night. Beckham later said

that during their conversation Adamcik spoke in a whisper and claimed to be at a movie. 

Beckham and Adamcik spent the following day together. Beckham tried repeatedly to call

Stoddart throughout the day but was unable to get an answer.

On September 24, 2006, it was discovered that Stoddart had been killed at the 

Whispering Cliffs residence. Police officer Hatch responded to the scene and noted large 

amounts of blood on the victim’s body, as well as deep lacerations and stab wounds. Shortly 

after responding, police and paramedics confirmed that Stoddart was dead. Detectives 

conducting the preliminary investigation determined that Adamcik and Draper had been among

the last people to see Stoddart alive.

Detectives Thomas and Ganske went to the Adamcik home and interviewed Adamcik on 

September 24, 2006. Adamcik’s father, Sean Adamcik (Sean), was present. This interview was 

the first of two interviews that detectives Thomas and Ganske conducted with Adamcik. During 

the course of the first interview, Adamcik informed the detectives that he and Draper had gone to 
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the Whispering Cliffs residence at approximately 8:30 PM on September 22, 2006, for a party. 

Adamcik stated that when it became apparent that a party was not going to take place, he and 

Draper decided to go and see a movie in Pocatello. When the detectives questioned Adamcik 

regarding the movie he had reportedly seen, Adamcik was unable to describe what the movie had 

been about. Adamcik told detectives that following the movie he and Draper had gone to spend 

the night at Adamcik’s home.

On September 27, 2006, after Adamcik’s first interview, but before the second, Draper 

led law enforcement agents to a stash of evidence buried in the Black Rock Canyon area (BRC 

site). The evidence uncovered by law enforcement at the BRC site included:

1. Two dagger-style knives with sheaths.

2. A silver-and-black-handled knife with a smooth and non-serrated blade.

3. A folding knife with a silver blade and black handle, which is similar to a survival 

knife. The portion of the blade nearest to the hilt is serrated. 

4. A homemade Sony videotape (BRC tape).

5. A box of stick matches.

6. A melted brown bottle of hydrogen peroxide.

7. Partially burned notebook paper.

8. A partially melted multi-colored mask.

9. A red and white mask.

10. A pair of black boots.

11. A single black glove.

12. A pair of black “Puma” gloves.

13. A pair of blue latex gloves.

14. A pair of fingerless black “Athletic Works” gloves.

15. A black “Calvin Klein” dress shirt.

16. A black “Hagger” shirt.

Adamcik conceded that his handwriting was present on the notebook paper found along 

with the other evidence at the BRC site. The BRC tape contained footage of Adamcik and 

Draper planning Stoddart’s murder, and later reacting to having killed Stoddart. The BRC tape 

skips around and is not recorded in chronological order. The following relevant portions of the 
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BRC tape have been rearranged according to the time and date stamps that appear on the BRC 

tape.1

1. September 21, 2006, at 8:05:23 PM [Adamcik and Draper are in a car, Adamcik is driving 

and Draper is filming from the passenger seat]

Draper: We’re going for a high death count

Adamcik: Plus, we’re not going to get caught Brian, if we’re going for guns, we’re just 

gonna end it. We’re just gonna grab the guns and get outta there and kill everybody and 

leave.

Draper: We’re going to make history. . . . We’re gonna make history.

Adamcik: For all you FBI agents watching this—

Draper: (laughing)

Adamcik: Uh . . . you weren’t quick enough. (laughing)

Draper: You weren’t quick enough, and you weren’t s-s-smart enough. And we’re going 

over to [Jane Doe 1’s] house, we-we-we’re going to snoop around over there and try to see if 

she’s home alone or not, and if she’s home alone, SPLAT! . . . She dead.

Adamcik: Don’t put your humor into this Brian.

Draper: Uh, I’m not putting any humor into it. . . . Yep, people will die, and m-m-memories 

will fade.

Adamcik: Memories will fade. . . . I, hmm, I wonder what movie you got that from Brian?

Draper: Myself!

Adamcik: (laughing)

Draper: That was from myself.

Adamcik: No wonder it was so lame.

Draper:—kay, we’re on our way, and I’m gonna, I’ll let you stay tuned, we’re almost there.

2. September 21, 2006, at 8:08:12 PM [Adamcik and Draper are in a car, Draper is filming 

Adamcik with the camera light on]

Draper: We’re at [Jane Doe 1’s] house. It’s clear out there in the pasture. We’ve already 

snooped around her house a couple times, Uh, and sh-sh-she’s not at home so we’re gonna go 

to that church over there and we’re gonna call a girl and a guy named Cassie and Matt. 

They’re our-our friends but we have to make sacrifices. So um I feel tonight i-i-it is the night 

and I feel really weird . . . and stuff. I feel like I want to kill somebody. Uh, I know that’s 

not normal but what the hell.

Adamcik: I feel we need to break away from normal life. 

Draper: How bright is this light? [Draper has turned the camera light directly onto 

Adamcik]

Adamcik: Because . . . let’s put it this way . . . parents, along with their parents, along with 

their parents, and so on—

Draper: Uh-huh

Adamcik:—taught them about God, Jesus, the whole bullshit—

Draper: (laughing)

Adamcik: —line. I’m sure you guys believe in God as well. I realized when I was in 

seventh grade . . . along, you don’t believe in Santa Claus or—

 1 Where the names of uninvolved third-parties are used by Draper and Adamcik these have been altered to protect 

the identity of these individuals. The entire video has not been transcribed here.
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Draper: (laughing)

Adamcik:—vampires, or werewolves, they’re used to metaphor, not let—they teach their 

kids back in the 1800s, I learned this in English class, about telling their kids that they can’t 

go outside or a vampire will get you—just to make their kids stay and do what they want to

do. God is basically—

Draper: That’s what God’s for right?

Adamcik:—the same way—

Draper: Yep.

Adamcik:—tryin’ to get people to do good, or else “so-called” [air quoting] you go to hell.

Draper: And we’re obviously going to hell if it’s real, but who gives a shit?

Adamcik: And why would you say it’s real?

Draper: [talking over Adamcik] Yeah, but it’s not real. It’s not real, cuz it’s so blatantly 

obvious that it’s not real, but (laughing)

Adamcik: People believe it because their parents teach them, and so it’s so hard for them to 

let go of it because they’ve been taught their whole life.

Draper: Yeah, I know.

Adamcik: But, fuckin—

Draper: What?

Adamcik:—the point I’m makin’ is . . . we are also taught that things like killing people and 

other things is wrong. The only thing that is wrong about is because it’s breaking the law 

and the law is only wrong (mumbling, searching for words)—

Draper: Natural selection, dude. Natural selection, that’s all I’ve gotta say.

Adamcik: There should be no law against killing people. I know it’s a wrong thing, but . . . 

Draper: Natural selection—

Adamcik:—Hell, hell, you restrict somebody from it, they’re just gonna want it more.

Draper: Exactly. Goodbye camera.

3. September 21, 2006, at 8:15:39 PM [Adamcik and Draper are in a car, Adamcik is driving

and Draper is filming from the passenger seat]

Draper:—home. My friend’s too pussy to go investigate—turn here

Adamcik: Too smart—

Draper: Why aren’t you turning there dude?

Adamcik: Cuz it’s faster this way

Draper: Now we’re going to go over to Cassie and Matt’s house. If they’re home alone, 

we’re gonna...

Adamcik: It’s Cassie’s house. Matt is there. 

Draper: Matt is there. Sorry. We’re gonna ga—we’re gonna knock on the door. We’ll see 

who is there. We’ll, we’ll see, we’ll see-see if their parents are home or not. If they’re home 

alone we will leave our way and then we will come back in about ten minutes. We’ll sneak 

in through the door because chances are they’re probably in Cassie’s room. S-s-s-so we will 

sneak in the front door, we’ll make a noise outside. 

Adamcik: And Matt will come out to investigate.

Draper: We’ll kill him. And we’ll scare the shit out of Cassie . . . okay?

Adamcik: Sounds like fun. 

Draper: Well stay tuned.
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4. September 21, 2006, at 8:36:46 PM [Adamcik and Draper are in a car, Adamcik is driving 

and Draper is filming from the passenger seat]

Draper: We found our victim and sad as it may be she’s our friend but you know what? We 

all have to make sacrifices. Our first victim is going to be Cassie Stoddart and her friends . . .

Adamcik: [directed at passing car] God, turn your brights off asshole!

Draper: We’ll let you . . . (laughs) we’ll find out if she has friends over, if she’s going to be 

alone in a big dark house out in the middle of nowhere (laughs). How perfect can you get? I, 

I mean like holy shit dude. 

Adamcik: I’m horny just thinking about it.

Draper: Hell yeah. So we’re gonna fuckin’ kill her and her friends and we’re gonna keep 

moving on. I heard some news about [Jane Doe 2], she’s gonna be home alone from six to 

seven so we might kill her and drive over to Cassie’s thing and scare the shit out of them and 

kill them one by fucking one. Hell yeah. 

Adamcik: Why one by one? Why can’t it be a slaughterhouse?

Draper: Two by two and three by three. Cause we’ve got to keep it classy.

Adamcik: Keep it classy.

Draper: So yeah. It’s going to be extra fun.

Adamcik: You’re evil (laughs).

Draper: Yes, I am. So are you dude. Evil. Evil.

Adamcik: No. Evil is an expression of God. That was another test you failed. 

Draper: Evil is not an expression of God. 

Adamcik: Yes, it is.

Draper: That is bullshit and you know it. 

Adamcik: Evil of origin is a follower of fucking Satan.

Draper: There is no Satan.

Adamcik: Is Satan real? Then shut up. 

Draper: Then how are we supposed to express ourselves?

Adamcik: Good and Bad.

Draper: We’re, we’re bad. 

Adamcik: We are bad.

Draper: That sounds so shitty. 

Adamcik: We’re evil. That sounds even shittier.

Draper: Hey, we’re not, okay. Then we are sick psychopaths who get their pleasure off

killing other people. 

Adamcik: That sounds good baby.

Draper: We’re gonna go down in history. We’re gonna be just like Scream except real life 

terms. 

Adamcik: That sounds good baby.

Draper: We’re gonna be murderers. Like, let’s see, Ted Bundy, like the Hillside Strangler.

Adamcik: No.

Draper: The Zodiac Killer.

Adamcik: Those people were more amateurs compared to what we are going to be, we’re 

gonna be more of higher sources of Ed gl . . .

Draper: Gein

Adamcik: Gein

Draper: (laughs) Well let’s say we’re that sick and that twisted—
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Adamcik: Oh, you know what Ed Gein’s words were?

Draper: What?

Adamcik: He saw a girl walkin’ down the street, right?

Draper: Yeah.

Adamcik: Two questions came to his head. Hmm, I could take her out and have a nice time 

with her—

Draper:—and then kill her? Skin her alive?

Adamcik:—charm the pants off her. Or, I wonder what her head would look like on a stick?

(laughs)

Draper: (laughs) Holy shit!

Adamcik: It’s creepy huh?

Draper: Kick ass.

Adamcik & Draper: (laughing)

Draper: Murder is power, murder is freedom, goodbye.

Adamcik: Umm—

5. September 22, 2006, at 12:10:58 PM [Adamcik and Draper are sitting at a table with the 

camera facing them]

Draper: Alright, cool.

Adamcik: [looking down and writing in a notebook] I was planning to kill him.

Draper: September 22, 2006, we’re skipping our fourth hour class. We’re writing our plan 

right now for tonight. It’s gonna be cool. 

Adamcik: We? Torey and Brian . . . [writing] . . . we’re making our death list right now, for 

when, for actually tonight . . .

Draper: (whispering) she’s watching us . . . 

Adamcik: (unintelligible)

Draper: She’s still watching us . . .

Adamcik: (mumbling, unintelligible)

Draper: [loudly] Number 2 is what?

[long gap where Adamcik and Draper are both concerned a teacher is going to see them, are 

whispering various things related to this and trying to make themselves less visible]

Adamcik: [writing again] Then . . . (unintelligible)

Draper: Yeah, if you’re watching this we’re probably deceased

. . . 

Draper: Hopefully this will go smoothly and we can get our first kill done and then keep 

going.

Adamcik: For you future serial killers watching this tape

Adamcik & Draper: (laughing)

Adamcik: I don’t know what to say.

Draper: It-It’s—

Adamcik:—good luck with that.

Draper: Good luck.

Adamcik: Hopefully you don’t have like 8 or 9 failures like we have.

Draper: Yeah, we’ve probably tried maybe 10 times, but they’ve never been home alone 

so—

Adamcik: Or when they have, their parents show up.
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Draper: As long as you’re patient you know, and we were patient and now we’re getting 

paid off, cuz our victim’s home alone, so we got er, our plan all worked out now. . . . I’m 

sorry. I’m sorry Cassie’s family, but she had to be the one. We have to stick with the plan 

. . . and she’s perfect, so she’s gonna die (laughs)

. . .

6. September 22, 2006, at 9:53:20 PM [It is dark and Draper and Adamcik are sitting in a car.]

Draper: We’re here in his car. The time is 9:50, September 22nd, 2006. Um . . . 

unfortunately we have the grueling task of killing our two friends and they are right in—in

that house just down the street.

Adamcik: We just talked to them. We were there for an hour, but . . . 

Draper: We checked out the whole house. We know there’s lots of doors. There, there’s 

lots of places to hide. Um, I unlocked the back doors. It’s all unlocked. Now we just got to 

wait and um . . . yep, we’re, we’re really nervous right now but, you know, we’re ready. 

Adamcik: We’re listening to the greatest rock band ever.

Draper: We’ve waited for this for a long time.

Adamcik: Pink Floyd. Before we commit the ultimate crime of murder.

Draper: We’ve waited for this for a long time.

Adamcik: A long time.

Draper: We—well stay tuned.

7. September 22, 2006, at 11:31:56 PM [Adamcik and Draper are in a car driving.]

Draper: —just killed Cassie! We just left her house. This is not a fucking joke. 

Adamcik: I’m shaking. 

Draper: I stabbed her in the throat, and I saw her lifeless body. 

It just disappeared. Dude, I just killed Cassie! 

Adamcik: Oh my God!

Draper: Oh, oh fuck. That felt like it wasn’t even real. I mean it went by so fast. 

Adamcik: Shut the fuck up. We gotta get our act straight. 

Draper: It’s okay. Okay? We—we’ll just buy movie tickets now.

Adamcik: Okay

Draper: (Unintelligible)

Adamcik: No. 

Draper: Okay. Bye. 

On September 27, 2006, after the BRC site evidence was found, detectives Ganske and 

Thomas conducted a second interview with Adamcik at the Pocatello Police Department in the 

presence of Adamcik’s parents. Detective Ganske read Adamcik his Miranda2 rights at the 

beginning of the interview and Adamcik signed a waiver-of-rights form. During the course of the 

interview, Adamcik informed detectives Ganske and Thomas that he and Draper had arrived at 

the Whispering Cliffs residence at 8:00 or 8:30, got a tour of the home, watched a portion of the 

film Kill Bill Vol. 2, departed from the Whispering Cliffs residence at approximately 10:00 PM, 

 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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and began attempting to break into cars. Adamcik stated that during the course of their attempted 

burglaries he made multiple calls to Beckham and during the final call Beckham informed 

Adamcik that his mother was coming to get him from the Whispering Cliffs residence. 

Adamcik stated that he and Draper returned to Adamcik’s house at around 11:30 PM and 

did not leave for the remainder of the night. However, when Ganske informed Adamcik that 

witnesses had seen him at the convenience store, Common Cents, Adamcik stated that he and 

Draper had gone to the store so that Draper could buy matches for Draper’s cigarettes. Adamcik 

eventually admitted that he and Draper had gone to Black Rock Canyon. At the close of 

Adamcik’s second interview, the detectives informed Adamcik of the evidence that they had 

discovered at the BRC site and pressured Adamcik to tell the truth. Adamcik responded by 

asking “Can I talk to an attorney?” The detectives stopped questioning Adamcik immediately, 

and exited the room, allowing Adamcik and his father, Sean, to converse in private in a different 

room. Following this private meeting, Adamcik, Sean and the detectives reconvened in the 

interview room where detectives proceeded to tell Adamcik that he was going to be arrested and 

informed Adamcik of the evidence they had gathered. In response to intervening questions from

Sean, Adamcik made both verbal and nonverbal replies.

At trial, the jury heard extensive forensic testimony documenting and analyzing 

Stoddart’s wounds. The medical examiner, Dr. Steve Skoumal, performed the autopsy on 

Stoddart on September 25, 2006. Dr. Skoumal determined that the cause of Stoddart’s death was 

stab wounds to the trunk. In all, Dr. Skoumal documented thirty knife-related wounds on 

Stoddart’s body, twelve of which were potentially fatal. The State also had forensic pathologist 

Dr. Charles Garrison examine Stoddart’s body. Dr. Garrison testified “It’s my opinion that there 

were at least two knives used, one of which was a non-serrated blade, and one of which was a 

serrated blade.” In general, the majority of the potentially fatal wounds that Dr. Skoumal listed 

were inflicted with the serrated blade, however, wound number 1, which struck the right 

ventricle of Stoddart’s heart, was inflicted by a non-serrated blade—consistent with Dr. 

Garrison’s testimony—and was potentially fatal.

On June 8, 2007, the jury found Adamcik guilty of both conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder and first-degree murder. On September 26, 2007, Adamcik filed his notice of 

appeal with this Court.
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II. 

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether sufficient evidence was submitted to support the jury’s verdict that Adamcik 

was guilty of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt?

2. Whether Adamcik’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the district 

court’s denial of Adamcik’s motion to suppress statements he made to detectives after 

Adamcik’s parents purportedly invoked Adamcik’s right to counsel?

3. Whether the district court erred by giving Jury Instruction number twelve, providing that 

Adamcik could be found guilty of first-degree murder if he “engaged in conduct which 

caused the death” of Stoddart?

4. Whether the district court erred in failing to provide the jury with a unanimity instruction 

requiring the jury to find that Adamcik committed the same specific act that caused 

Stoddart’s death?

5. Whether the jury instruction regarding malice was a misstatement of the law which 

lowered the State’s burden of proof?

6. Whether the district court erred by instructing the jury on a lying-in-wait theory of firstdegree murder after the State had abandoned that allegation?

7. Whether the prosecutor’s closing argument amounted to fundamental error?

8. Whether the cumulative error doctrine necessitates a reversal?

9. Whether the district court abused its discretion in sentencing Adamcik?

10. Whether the sentences imposed on Adamcik were unreasonable or cruel and unusual 

under the Idaho Constitution?

11. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Adamcik’s Rule 35 motion?

III. 

ANALYSIS

A. Sufficient evidence was submitted to support the jury’s determination that Adamcik was 

guilty of first-degree murder, beyond a reasonable doubt.

In this case, the State charged Adamcik as a perpetrator of first-degree murder. Adamick 

argues that the State did not produce sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could 

conclude that he was guilty of first-degree murder because the State failed to prove that he 

actually inflicted a fatal stab wound. Adamcik argues: (1) that the State failed to prove which of 

the wounds were fatal, as the State’s expert witness, Dr. Skoumal, only offered testimony that 

twelve of the wounds were “potentially fatal;” (2) that the State failed to present any evidence 

tying him to either of the knives and, therefore, failed to prove that he inflicted a fatal stab 
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wound;

3 and (3) that the expert testimony of his own forensic pathologist, Dr. Leis, negated the 

testimony of the State’s expert forensic pathologist, Dr. Garrison.

4

 

The State responds that the testimony and autopsy report offered by Dr. Skoumal reveal 

that one of the twelve potentially fatal wounds was inflicted by the non-serrated knife blade 

while the remaining eleven were made with a serrated blade. The State argues that Dr. Garrison 

established the use of two knives—one with a serrated blade and the other with a non-serrated 

blade. Therefore, the State argues that the cumulative evidence of both experts demonstrates that 

two knives caused potentially fatal wounds. 

1. Standard of Review.

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right to due 

process, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that as a part of that due process, “no person shall 

be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof—defined as 

evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of 

every element of the offense.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). The relevant 

inquiry is not whether this Court would find the defendant to be guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt, but whether “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id. at 319 (emphasis in original). 

Thus, when determining whether Adamcik’s conviction as a perpetrator of first-degree 

murder should be upheld, the only inquiry for this Court is whether there is substantial evidence

upon which a reasonable jury could have found that the State met its burden of proving the 

essential elements of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 

75, 80, 175 P.3d 764, 769 (2007). In conducting this analysis, the Court is required to consider 

 3 Although Adamcik concedes that Dr. Skoumal testified that one of the potentially fatal wounds (identified as 

wound number 1) may have been inflicted by the non-serrated knife, he argues that Dr. Skoumal’s testimony does 

not constitute sufficient evidence. Additionally, Adamcik argues that Dr. Garrison did not specifically testify that 

wound number 1 was caused by the non-serrated knife. 4 Dr. Garrison testified that wounds identified as wound number 2 and wound number 22 were caused by the same 

stab (one through the hand that also went into the trunk), and that the knife used in these wounds was serrated. Dr. 

Leis testified that it was actually wound number 1 that was inflicted at the same time as wound number 22, not 

wound number 2. Consequently, Adamcik argues that Dr. Garrison’s own testimony establishes that wound number 

1 must have been inflicted by a serrated knife. Although Dr. Leis’ testimony sought to call into question that of Dr. 

Garrison, the inquiry is whether the State provided sufficient evidence to support the conviction. If such evidence 

was presented, the Court does not second-guess the jury by reweighing the evidence. See State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 

772, 787, 948 P.2d 127, 142 (1997) (“This Court simply reviews the evidence presented at trial and will not reweigh 

the evidence.”). Therefore, this analysis does not address Adamcik’s argument that his own expert, Dr. Leis,

contradicted Dr. Garrison’s testimony.
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the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and we do not substitute our judgment for 

that of the jury on issues of witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or reasonable inferences 

to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d 387, 389 (2007). 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there is substantial evidence in the 

record to support Adamcik’s conviction for first-degree murder. 

2. There is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conviction of Adamcik for firstdegree murder.

Contrary to Adamcik’s argument, there is substantial evidence in the record upon which a 

jury could reasonably conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Adamcik was guilty of firstdegree murder. Dr. Skoumal, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Stoddart, 

testified that Stoddart died from multiple stab wounds to the trunk. Dr. Skoumal also testified 

that twelve of the thirty knife-related wounds on Stoddart’s body had the potential to be fatal. Of 

those twelve, Dr. Skoumal was unable to identify the specific wounds that caused Stoddart’s 

death, but it is clear from his testimony that she died as a result of more than one of those twelve 

stab wounds. According to Dr. Skoumal, one of those wounds, referred to as wound number 1, 

was inflicted by a knife with a non-serrated blade, while the remainder were caused by a knife 

with a serrated blade. 

Dr. Skoumal testified that wound number 1: 

was located in Stoddart’s mid, upper chest. . . . 

The tissues that it penetrated included the skin, muscle, soft tissue, right rib 

number three, the mediastinum—which is in the middle of the chest—the 

pericardial sac—which is the sac overlining the heart—the right ventricle—which 

is a part of the heart. And there were two cups of blood in the pericardial sac 

surrounding the heart.

It’s my opinion that the vital structures were injured, and it had the potential to be 

fatal.

In response to a subsequent question from the prosecutor, as to whether wound number 1 was 

“potentially fatal,” Dr. Skoumal answered in the affirmative.

Dr. Skoumal’s testimony is consistent with the testimony of the State’s expert, Dr. 

Garrison, who testified that at least two knives were used in the murder of Stoddart, one with a 

serrated blade, and another with a non-serrated blade. Dr. Garrison based this conclusion on the 

fact that some of the wounds contained excoriations and tears around their edges, which is 
13

consistent with the use of a knife with a serrated blade, while other wounds contained no such 

excoriations or tears, which is consistent with the use of a knife with a non-serrated blade. Dr. 

Garrison further testified that wound number 1 did not contain any irregular cuts, which would 

be expected if wound number 1 was inflicted by a knife with a non-serrated blade. In other 

words, Dr. Garrison’s testimony supports Dr. Skoumal’s testimony that wound number 1, which 

was a potentially fatal wound, was inflicted by a knife with a non-serrated blade. Therefore, 

based on the testimony of Dr. Skoumal and Dr. Garrison, the jury could have reasonably 

concluded that two knives were used during the attack on Stoddart, and that both knives inflicted 

wounds that could have caused Stoddart’s death.

5

Adamcik’s friend, Joe Lucero, testified that he bought four knives for Adamcik and 

Draper. Lucero said that he used $45 to pay for the knives—$40 from Draper and $5 from 

Adamcik. Lucero identified four of the State’s exhibits as the knives he bought. One of the 

knives had a serrated blade; the other three knives were non-serrated. Police found all four 

knives at the BRC site. Lucero testified that Draper made a point to claim ownership of the 

serrated knife. 

The jury was presented with evidence that two knives inflicted potentially fatal wounds, 

and that Adamcik and Draper collaborated in the murder. This collaboration is supported by the 

BRC tape wherein Draper and Adamcik discuss their joint plan to kill Stoddart. The jury was 

also provided with evidence suggesting that Adamcik and Draper were together immediately 

after Stoddart’s murder, and jointly attempted to hide weapons and clothing used during the 

commission of the murder. The jury watched the video of police interviewing Adamcik, during 

which Adamcik made verbal and nonverbal assertions that can reasonably be construed as his 

confessing to stabbing Stoddart. This evidence, coupled with the testimony provided by the 

State’s experts, is sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that: (1) two knives were used to 

murder Stoddart; (2) both knives inflicted potentially fatal wounds; (3) Draper favored the knife 

with the serrated blade which inflicted most of the potentially fatal wounds; and (4) the other

knife was used by Adamcik to inflict the other stab wound that injured Stoddart’s vital structures 

 5 Dr. Garrison did not address the issue of whether wound number 1 caused Stoddart’s death. He did, however, state 

that some of the twelve potentially fatal wounds “were inflicted after circulation had ceased, and those were a less 

concern simply because they would not have been fatal at this point.” In other words, if a wound did not produce 

significant bleeding, it may have been inflicted after Stoddart’s heart stopped pumping. Dr. Garrison did not rule out 

wound number 1 as a potentially fatal wound, nor did he address Dr. Skoumal’s testimony which associated wound 

number 1 with two cups of blood in the pericardial sac surrounding the heart.
14

and which had the potential to be fatal. No evidence was introduced that would contradict such 

conclusions.

Adamcik nevertheless contends that his murder conviction must be vacated because “the 

State has not provided substantial evidence that Torey Adamcik actually killed Cassie Stoddart 

by putting a knife into her.” In support of his contention, Adamcik asserts that the amended 

information charges him with actually killing Cassie, rather than participating as an accomplice. 

The relevant part of the amended information is described in J.I. 10, as follows:

MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE

That the said TOREY MICHAEL ADAMCIK, in the County of Bannock, 

State of Idaho, on or between the 22nd and 23rd days of September, 2006, did 

willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, with premeditation and with malice 

aforethought, kill and murder Cassie Stoddart, a human being, by purchasing 

knives and stabbing Cassie Stoddart from which the victim died in Bannock 

County, Idaho.

He claims that in order to convict him of murder, the State was required to prove that he actually 

inflicted the fatal stab wound that resulted in Stoddart’s death. 

To be found guilty of murder, it was not necessary for Adamcik to have inflicted the fatal 

wound. It was only necessary to show that he aided and abetted in its commission. As this Court 

stated six decades ago:

The common law distinction between classes of parties to criminal offenses is 

abolished. All persons concerned in the commission of a crime are principals, 

and one who aids and abets another in the commission of a crime is a principal.

No reference to accused as an accessory is necessary.

Nor is it necessary that facts be set out showing whether the accused was an 

accessory or a principal.

An accessory to a crime, or a participant therein may be charged as a principal, 

and the information need not allege facts different from those required to be 

alleged against the principal.

State v. So, 71 Idaho 324, 331, 231 P.2d 734, 738 (1951) (citations omitted). More recently we 

stated, “In Idaho there is no distinction between principals and aiders and abettors, and it is 

unnecessary [that] the charging document allege any facts other than what is necessary to convict

a principal.” State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 976, 188 P.3d 912, 918 (2008). 
15

Since 1864, Idaho has had a statute providing that a charging document alleging that a 

defendant committed a crime as a principal is sufficient to also charge the defendant with being 

an accessory before the fact. As currently codified, it states:

The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal and between 

principals in the first and second degree, in cases of felony, is abrogated; and all 

persons concerned in the commission of a felony, whether they directly commit 

the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, though not 

present, shall hereafter be prosecuted, tried, and punished as principals, and no 

other facts need be alleged in any indictment against such an accessory than are 

required in an indictment against his principal. 

I.C. § 19-1430 (emphasis added). Under this statute, an information charging a defendant with 

committing a crime as a principal also charges the defendant with aiding and abetting its 

commission. The defendant is also presumed to know that the charge includes both committing 

the crime as the principal and acting as an accessory before the fact. Furthermore, “All persons 

concerned in the commission of a crime . . . whether they directly commit the act constituting the 

offense or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its 

commission . . . are principals in any crime so committed.” I.C. § 18-204 (emphasis added). So, 

“[t]ogether, I.C. § 18-204 and I.C. § 19-1430 show a legislative intent to consider defendants as 

principals whether they directly committed the crime or aided and abetted in the commission of 

the crime.” State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916. 

In this case, there certainly was sufficient evidence to convict Adamcik under an aiding 

and abetting theory. There is evidence that both Draper and Adamcik were in the Whispering

Cliffs house, lying in wait for Stoddart. Two knives were used in the murder, both of which 

potentially caused Stoddart’s death. There is no evidence that a single person, holding both 

knives, inflicted all of the stab wounds. It is therefore both reasonable and likely for a jury to 

infer that Draper and Adamcik both stabbed Stoddart until she died. Furthermore, the video 

footage taken immediately before and after the murder demonstrates Adamcik’s preparation for, 

and involvement in, the murder, as do the sets of clothing and masks found at Black Rock 

Canyon. The sufficiency of the evidence to convict Adamcik on an accomplice theory, 

therefore, cannot reasonably be questioned.

Adamcik argues that without sufficient evidence to convict him as a principal, this Court 

cannot affirm the conviction on aiding and abetting grounds without violating his right to a jury 

trial and his right to due process. Adamcik also argues that any error resulting from the lack of 
16

an aiding and abetting instruction is not harmless because the sentencing court made its 

determination based on Adamcik’s guilt as a principal, rather than as an accomplice. Aiding and 

abetting, however, is not treated as a separate offense with different elements, so affirming 

Adamcik’s conviction here would not violate his right to due process. In fact, we have 

previously affirmed convictions on an aiding and abetting theory even when the State failed to 

expressly charge the defendant as an accomplice. In State v. Ayres, for example, Ayres 

contended that he was denied a fair trial when the information charged him as a principal, but a 

State’s witness suggested he could be an accomplice. 70 Idaho 18, 25–26, 211 P.2d 142, 145 

(1949). In that case, Ayres and his passenger, Trautman, were involved in a collision with 

another vehicle, which killed Trautman and four of the five passengers in the other vehicle. Id.

at 23, 211 P.2d at 144. The information charged Ayres with involuntary manslaughter, alleging 

that Ayres was driving at the time of the crash. Id. at 24–25, 211 P.2d at 145. We held the 

information was sufficient to put Ayres on trial under either a principal or accomplice theory, 

even though it only charged him as a principal. Id. at 25, 211 P.2d at 145. So, when the State 

subsequently presented an aiding and abetting theory in rebuttal to Ayres’s testimony that 

Trautman was driving at the time of the crash, this Court determined there was no fatal variance 

from the information and Ayres was not denied a fair trial. Rather, we held that Ayres “was fully 

advised of the acts he was charged to have committed, and he is presumed to know that he would 

be a principal and guilty as such whether he directly committed the acts charged or aided and 

abetted in their commission by another.” Id. at 27–28, 211 P.2d at 147. The information 

charging Adamcik with killing Stoddart by purchasing knives and stabbing her, as set out in J.I. 

10, was therefore sufficient to put him on notice that he could be found guilty as an accomplice 

in Stoddart’s murder.

It was simply unnecessary for the State to prove Adamcik inflicted the fatal wound. In 

State v. Owen, William Owen and Kenneth Hastings, each armed with a gun, entered a market 

intending to commit a robbery. When one of the proprietors grabbed a meat cleaver and started 

around the meat counter, Owen fired a warning shot trying to scare the proprietor into stopping. 

73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 (1953). The proprietor kept advancing, and Owen, as he was 

backing towards the door, fired a second warning shot and yelled, “Let’s get out of here.” Id. at 

400, 253 P.2d at 206. Hastings made it out the door, and as Owen reached the door with the 

proprietor close behind, Owen fired a third shot, killing the proprietor. On appeal, this Court
17

held that under I.C. § 19-1430, “Hastings was properly charged, tried and convicted as a 

principal. . . . He was equal in guilt with Owen.” Id. at 419, 253 P.2d at 218. Defendants acting 

in concert are thus equally guilty of the crime charged. Accordingly, Adamcik, whether a 

principal or an accomplice in Stoddart’s murder, is liable as a principal; he is liable as if he and 

he alone inflicted each of the wounds that ultimately killed Stoddart. 

We have also determined that it is unnecessary to instruct a jury on a unanimity 

requirement as to which theory—principal or accomplice—the jury used in making its 

determination. “[I]t is unnecessary to instruct the jury that it must be unanimous as to the 

theoretical basis for committing the offense (aider and abettor or principal) because aiding and 

abetting is not a separate offense from the substantive crime.” State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho at 978, 

188 P.3d at 920. Because both principal and accomplice theories are just different means of 

proving the underlying charge—e.g., murder—there are no additional elements the State must 

prove and it is unnecessary to provide a unanimity instruction. See id.

Ayres, Owen, and Johnson demonstrate the extent to which this Court treats principals 

and accomplices as one and the same. In other words, when the State has initially advanced a 

theory of principal liability but not accomplice liability, it may nonetheless seek to convict the 

defendant as an accomplice without violating due process. In this case, J.I. 12 instructed the jury 

that if it found that Adamcik “engaged in conduct that caused the death of Cassie Jo Stoddart,” 

then it must find him guilty. That instruction incorporates the concept of aiding and abetting. It is 

written so that the wording covers both someone who personally inflicted the fatal wound and 

someone who aided and abetted the killing. Both of them—the principal and the accomplice—

would have engaged in conduct that caused the death of the victim.

“‘[A]iding and abetting’ requires some proof that the accused either participated in or 

assisted, encouraged, solicited, or counseled the crime. Mere knowledge of a crime and assent to 

or acquiescence in its commission does not give rise to accomplice liability.” State v. Randles, 

117 Idaho 344, 347, 787 P.2d 1152, 1155 (1990) overruled on other grounds by State v. 

Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 660–62, 8 P.3d 652, 655-57. Here, the jury was instructed that to 

find Adamcik guilty, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he “acted without justification 

or excuse,” and that he acted “with malice aforethought.” To find that he acted with malice 

aforethought, the jury was instructed that the State must prove either that he “deliberately 

intended to kill another human being without legal justification or excuse” or that he 
18

“intentionally engaged in conduct dangerous to another under circumstances which demonstrated 

an extreme indifference to the value of human life.”6 There is no contention that Adamcik 

merely had knowledge of the crime and assented to or acquiesced in its commission, and under 

this instruction, the jury could not have found him guilty of murder had that been true.

The jury was not asked to find that Adamcik personally inflicted the fatal wound, nor was 

such a finding required for him to be guilty of murder. There is no contention that the jury may 

have concluded that he was guilty of murder based upon conduct that was merely negligent. The 

jury found that he acted “with malice aforethought” when he engaged in conduct that caused 

Cassie Jo’s death.

The jury also found, with respect to Adamcik’s intent, that he was guilty of conspiracy to 

commit murder in the first degree. The jury found that on or between September 22 and 23, 

2006, Adamcik and Brian Lee Draper agreed to commit the murder, that Adamcik intended that 

the murder be committed, and that he did at least one of four listed acts for the purpose of 

carrying out the agreement. There is no contention that the jury was improperly instructed 

regarding the conspiracy charge, nor is there any contention that the evidence was insufficient to 

support a verdict of guilty on that charge. There is no contention that Adamcik withdrew from 

that conspiracy before Cassie Jo Stoddart was murdered, nor was there any evidence so 

indicating. There is no contention that he was not present at her murder, and the undisputed 

evidence showed that he was. There is no contention that the evidence was insufficient to show 

that he aided and abetted her murder, and there is no factual dispute on that issue.

Even assuming Adamcik had been able to establish the existence of error, it would be 

harmless. Adamcik argues that the failure to give an aiding and abetting instruction was not 

harmless for three reasons. First, he asserts that “the state should not be shielded from the 

consequences of its own strategic choices. . . . It did not seek a jury instruction on that theory.” 

Adamcik does not explain how he was prejudiced by the State’s failure to request an instruction 

on aiding and abetting, nor does he explain how the instruction given would not cover conduct 

that constituted aiding and abetting even though those precise words were not used. 

 6 The malice instruction included a third manner of proving malice, which was, “The defendant deliberately 

intended to kill as a result of provocation which the jury determines would not have caused a reasonable person to 

have lost his self-control and reason.” There was no evidence that Adamcik reacted to any provocation by Stoddart. 

But “[t]he absence or presence of provocation is a pertinent fact which must be considered with all the other 

circumstantial evidence relevant to the appellant’s actions.” State v. Beason, 95 Idaho 267, 276, 506 P.2d 1340, 

1349 (1973). The absence of considerable provocation was relevant to show that Adamcik acted with malice as 

otherwise defined.
19

Second, he contends that the failure to instruct on aiding and abetting was not harmless 

because it “is inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.” He argues, “Here no 

jury has ever been presented with the question of whether Torey is guilty under an accomplice 

liability theory.” When instructing the jury on reasonable doubt, we have not required any 

particular form of words as long as the instructions, taken as a whole, correctly convey the 

concept of reasonable doubt. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 273, 77 P.3d 956, 962 (2003); 

accord State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998). We have likewise not 

required any particular wording when instructing the jury regarding liability as an accomplice. 

See State v. Ehrmantrout, 100 Idaho 202, 595 P.2d 1097 (1979). Adamcik states that the jury 

instruction defining murder “allowed the jury to find Torey guilty of Murder even if the jury 

found he did not inflict the fatal wound or even stab Cassie so long as he engaged in some 

conduct which caused Cassie's death.” He does not argue, however, that the concept of 

accomplice liability is not covered by the wording of the jury instruction that he “engaged in 

conduct which caused the death of Cassie Jo Stoddart,” that he “acted without justification or

excuse,” and that he acted “with malice aforethought.” 

Finally, he alleges, “If the conviction is affirmed under an aiding and abetting theory, 

Torey’s due process right to be only convicted of the charge actually lodged against him would 

be violated.” One hundred years ago, this Court stated, with respect to Idaho Code section 19-

1430, that the statute “specifically abrogates all distinctions heretofore existing between 

accessories and principals, and so under the statute of this state an accessory is now prosecuted 

as a principal.” State v. Cramer, 20 Idaho 639, 659, 119 P. 30, 36-37 (1911). Over six decades 

ago this Court held:

The prosecuting attorney, in drawing up an information is not bound to elect 

between charging a defendant as a principal or as an accessory before the fact. 

Under the terms of the statute [Idaho Code section 19-1420] he may ask for a 

verdict of guilty if the evidence is sufficient to satisfy the jury upon either theory.

State v. Ayres, 70 Idaho 18, 26-27, 211 P.2d 142, 146 (1949). As we stated in Ayres, the 

defendant “is presumed to know that he would be a principal and guilty as such whether he 

directly committed the acts charged or aided and abetted in their commission by another.” Id. at 

27-28, 211 P.2d at 147 (emphasis added). Thus, the amended information charged Adamcik as 

aiding and abetting in the killing of Cassie Jo Stoddart. As we stated in State v. Johnson, 145 

Idaho at 976, 188 P.3d at 918, “In Idaho there is no distinction between principals and aiders and 
20

abettors, and it is unnecessary the charging document allege any facts other than what is 

necessary to convict a principal.” An information charging a defendant with a crime also 

charges the defendant with aiding and abetting the commission of that crime. Therefore, 

“because Idaho has abolished the distinction between principals and aiders and abettors, and 

because it is well-established in Idaho that it is unnecessary to charge the defendant with aiding 

and abetting, we hold there was no variance, constructive amendment, or due process violation.” 

Id. at 977, 188 P.3d at 919.

Adamcik cites several United States Court of Appeals and Supreme Court cases that 

suggest the failure to affirm a conviction pursuant to the same charge, and under the same law 

and acts underlying the conviction, violate due process. This case, however, is readily 

distinguishable. Adamcik cites McCormick v. U.S., in which the U.S. Supreme Court said,

This Court has never held that the right to a jury trial is satisfied when an 

appellate court retries a case on appeal under different instruction and on a 

different theory than was ever presented to the jury. Appellate courts are not 

permitted to affirm convictions on any theory they please simply because the facts 

necessary to support the theory were presented to the jury.

500 U.S. 257, 270 n.8 (1991).

Adamcik also cites Dunn v. U.S., 442 U.S. 100, 106 (1979) for the proposition that it is a 

violation of due process to convict the defendant based on facts substantially different from those 

alleged in the charging document. In Dunn, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a Court of Appeals 

decision that affirmed a perjury conviction based on testimony the jury did not consider in 

rendering its guilty verdict. Id. In reaching its decision, the Court wrote: “appellate courts are 

not free to revise the basis on which a defendant is convicted simply because the same result 

would likely obtain on retrial.” Id. at 107. “To uphold a conviction,” said the Court, “on a charge 

that was neither alleged in an indictment nor presented to a jury at trial offends the most basic 

notions of due process.” Id. at 106. Central to the Court’s analysis was a discrepancy in dates of 

the defendant’s testimony, which was material evidence in the Government’s perjury case: “the 

jury was instructed to rest its decision on Dunn’s September statement, the Tenth Circuit 

predicated its affirmance on petitioner’s October testimony.” Id. The Court of Appeals thus 

upheld a conviction on evidence not before the jury. But, where the State has charged the 

defendant in a general indictment, and an appellate court can affirm a defendant’s conviction 

under the same law as the trial court, there is no due process issue. See Santellan v. Cockrell, 
21

271 F.3d 190, 197 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Because of the general nature of the indictment and the jury 

charge, and because the [appellate court] affirmed on the basis of the same law and the same 

ultimate acts that underlay the conviction in the trial court, neither Dunn nor McCormick is 

applicable to [the defendant’s] case.”). 

Here, unlike Dunn and McCormick, there are not multiple charges or distinct facts the 

jury did not consider; the information charged Adamcik with murder and the jury considered all 

the evidence we now discuss. There is no distinction between principals and accomplices in 

Idaho, so the information charging murder put Adamcik on notice of both theories. The jury 

need not find separate facts, nor consider distinct elements of a crime to convict for murder as a 

principal or as an accomplice because both theories support the crime. So, unlike McCormick, 

we are not making an independent finding of fact. And, unlike Dunn, this case involved a 

generalized information, supporting either the principal or accomplice theory. We therefore 

affirm Adamcik’s first degree murder conviction.

B. The district court did not err in denying Adamcik’s motion to suppress statements that 

he made to detectives after his parents had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.

On September 27, 2006, the police requested that Adamcik come to the police station for 

an interrogation. Adamcik’s parents, Sean and Shannon Adamcik, repeatedly requested that the 

interrogation be delayed until the next day, when an attorney that they had consulted with would 

be available to assist. However, the Adamciks eventually acquiesced to the detectives’ request 

and the interrogation took place that night. The interrogation was videotaped. Sean and Shannon 

were present when the detectives read Adamcik his Miranda rights, and when Adamcik signed a 

waiver form. Midway through the interrogation Shannon left in order to pick up another child 

from a school function, but Sean remained present throughout. 

After approximately one hour and twenty minutes of interrogation, Adamcik invoked his 

right to counsel. At that point, the interrogation was terminated and Adamcik and Sean were 

taken to a separate room where they held a private and unrecorded conversation for 

approximately ten minutes. After that private conversation, Adamcik and Sean again met with 

detectives in the interrogation room. At this point the following exchange took place:

Detective Thomas: Dad, I think we owe it to you at this point to find out what 

we know at this point. There’s just no easy way to tell you this. We do know that 

Sean, excuse me Torey and . . . um 

Detective Ganske: Brian
22

Detective Thomas: . . . Brian had gone back into the house. Okay? We do know 

that the two of them murdered, we do know that they murdered Cassie. Okay? 

We’ve got the evidence at this point to prove that, also—

Detective Ganske:—We found the evidence

Detective Thomas: We also have some overwhelming evidence . . . uh, trace 

evidence, that type of stuff that is going to prove that they did it as well. It’s not 

just hearsay. It’s not just somebody saying it. And then we do have a confession 

from another person giving full disclosure.

Sean: [to Adamcik] So is that why you want to talk to a lawyer?

Detective Ganske: And here’s the deal with you [looking and gesturing at Sean]. 

What I would like to do is maybe when your wife comes back, sit down and talk 

to you all, and get you up to speed. [turning and looking at Adamcik and 

gesturing at Adamcik] You know what you need to do. You know exactly what 

happened and you know what you need to do. So unfortunately, you are not 

going anywhere tonight. You’re going to be placed in custody tonight. Okay? 

I’m sorry that’s the way it goes, but . . .

Detective Thomas: You are going to be charged with First Degree Murder. 

Okay?

Detective Ganske: Okay? But like I said before, before you say anything, I 

encourage you, you want to talk to an attorney, you should do that. I am not 

pullin’ punches here . . . still, your full cooperation can do nothing but help you at 

this point in time.

Sean: Understand that Torey? 

Detective Ganske: Okay?

Sean: I know you need a lawyer, or whatever, you want to talk to a lawyer. I 

understand that’s the advice they—

Detective Ganske:—or—

Sean: —gave you today and you, and then whatever you and the lawyer work out, 

they want you to cooperate [the last five words of this sentence were difficult to 

make out as Detective Ganske began talking over Sean]

Detective Ganske: [facing Adamcik]—We know the details. We’ve got the 

knife that you used, we got the masks that you used, we’ve got the videotape. 

We’ve got it. There’s a tape up in there that you buried. Okay? You tried to 

catch it on fire. All that stuff. You know what I’m talking about, I don’t need to 

tell you that.

Sean: This is right, Torey . . .

Adamcik: Yeah.

Sean: What they are saying is true?

Adamcik: [nodding yes]
23

There was continued interaction following this point, but the district court granted Adamcik’s 

motion to suppress as to the remainder of the recorded interaction. 

Adamcik argues that: (1) his parents invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel,

7 as 

applied to Idaho by the Fourteenth Amendment, prior to the September 27, 2006, interrogation; 

(2) Adamcik was questioned after his parents had invoked his right to counsel and before he had 

been provided with access to an attorney; and (3) even if the initial interrogation was not a 

violation of his rights, the continuing statements following Adamcik’s unequivocal invocation of 

his right to counsel were designed to elicit a response from him. Adamcik concludes that the 

entire interrogation should have been suppressed or, alternatively, that the exchange which took 

place subsequent to his invocation of his right to counsel should be suppressed.

The State argues that: (1) Adamcik’s parents could not invoke his right to counsel on his 

behalf; (2) even if Adamcik’s parents could have invoked his right to counsel, they failed to 

unequivocally do so; (3) if Adamcik’s parents did unequivocally invoke his right to counsel, they 

subsequently and voluntarily acquiesced to the interrogation proceeding; (4) Adamcik himself 

executed a waiver of his Miranda rights in his parents’ presence, and that waiver was knowing, 

voluntary and intelligent; and (5) the statement and nonverbal response made by Adamcik,

following his invocation of his right to counsel, was in response to Sean’s questioning and Sean 

was not a State actor. The State argues that the district court correctly denied Adamcik’s motion 

for suppression of evidence as to these portions of the video-taped interrogation. The district 

court assumed arguendo that Adamcik’s parents had unequivocally invoked his Fifth 

Amendment right to counsel. 

We shall first consider whether a parent may invoke the right to counsel on behalf of a 

minor child. Second, assuming Adamcik’s parents did invoke the right to counsel on his behalf, 

whether that invocation was scrupulously honored by the detectives until it was subsequently 

waived. Finally, whether Adamcik’s verbal and nonverbal responses to Sean’s questions, after 

the invocation of his right to counsel, should have been suppressed.

1. Standard of Review

“When we review an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, we accept the trial 

court’s factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous.” State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 

 7 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 456-57 (1994) (noting that although the Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel only attaches at the initiation of adversarial criminal proceedings, a suspect subjected to custodial 

interrogation has the right to counsel to protect his Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination).
24

P.3d 306, 309 (2004). “However, free review is exercised over a trial court’s determination as to 

whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found.” State v. Doe, 

137 Idaho 519, 522, 50 P.3d 1014, 1017 (2002) (quoting State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 470, 20 

P.3d 5, 6 (2001)). “A district court’s conclusion that a defendant made a knowing and voluntary 

waiver of his Miranda rights will only be disturbed on appeal if the conclusion is not supported 

by substantial and competent evidence.” State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 558, 199 P.3d 123, 133 

(2008).

In determining whether a defendant has voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived 

his Miranda rights, this Court must consider the totality of the circumstances. Doe, 137 Idaho at 

523, 50 P.3d at 1018; Payne, 146 Idaho at 559, 199 P.3d at 134. The factors the Court must 

consider include: “(1) Whether Miranda warnings were given; (2) The youth of the accused; (3) 

The accused’s level of education or low intelligence; (4) The length of detention; (5) The 

repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and (6) Deprivation of food or sleep.” Doe, 

137 Idaho at 523, 50 P.3d at 1018. “Any waiver of Miranda warnings must be knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary.” Id. 

2. Adamcik’s parents could invoke his right to counsel.

In Doe, we said “[a] minor’s parents may invoke the right to counsel for the child, but 

that request must also be clear and unambiguous.” 137 Idaho at 525, 50 P.3d at 1020. See also

United States v. Doe, 60 F.3d 544, 546 (9th Cir. 1995) (examining whether minor’s parent had 

unequivocally invoked his right to counsel, thus implying that the parent could do so). In Doe, 

the Appellant (a minor) argued that an interview he had with detectives should have been 

suppressed because his mother had invoked his right to counsel. 137 Idaho at 524, 50 P.3d at 

1019. The Doe Court recognized that the mother could have done so, but concluded that the 

mother’s conduct—in asking the police whether she needed an attorney for her son, and what to 

do since she could not afford one—did not amount to a clear and unambiguous request for 

counsel. Id. at 525, 50 P.3d at 1020. 

The State argues that this Court’s statement in Doe should be considered obiter dictum, 

as this Court ultimately concluded that the Appellant’s mother had not invoked his right to 

counsel. However, the Doe Court did not indicate that it was assuming arguendo that a parent 

could invoke their minor child’s right to counsel, but then make a finding that the parent had not 
25

done so. Rather, the Court clearly stated that a parent could do so, and then applied the proper 

standard to determine whether it had been done under the facts at hand.8 

In Idaho, a parent may invoke the right to counsel on behalf of a minor child. The 

reasoning for this principle of law was aptly stated by the Court of Appeals of New York in 

People v. Mitchell:

Children of tender years lack an adult’s knowledge of the probable cause of their 

acts or omissions and are least likely to understand the scope of their rights and 

how to protect their own interests. They may not appreciate the ramifications of 

their decisions or realize all the implications of the importance of counsel.

Indeed, the need for counsel “has been recognized as all the more vital with 

respect to the unsophisticated, who are often uneducated in the ways of the 

criminal justice system and unaware of the role counsel can play in protecting 

their interests.”

810 N.E.2d 879, 882 (N.Y. 2004) (quoting People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 614 (N.Y. 1978)).

3. Assuming arguendo that Adamcik’s parents did invoke his right to counsel, 

Adamcik’s Miranda rights were not violated. 

A suspect must unambiguously request counsel in order to invoke his Fifth Amendment 

right to counsel—“he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a 

reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for 

an attorney.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S 452, 459 (1994). Where an individual asserts his 

right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until counsel has been made available to him, or 

until he himself “initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” 

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981).

The district court below did not make a factual finding as to whether or not Adamcik’s 

mother, Shannon, had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The court did not feel 

compelled to weigh the credibility of statements offered by Sean and Shannon against those 

offered by the three detectives, finding that even if Shannon had invoked Adamcik’s right to 

counsel, that right was subsequently waived.

Where an individual has invoked his right to counsel, the police may not continue to 

interrogate him until he has either been provided with access to an attorney or until he himself 

 8 The State cites to People v. Young, 850 N.E.2d 284, 298–99 (Ill. App. 2006), in support of its argument that the

Court’s statement in Doe was dicta; however, the views of the Illinois Court of Appeals are neither binding nor 

instructive to this Court in its interpretation of Idaho law.
26

reinitiates communication with the police, as was noted in Edwards. 451 U.S. at 485. Where a 

parent has invoked the right to counsel on behalf of a minor child, and the police continue to 

request that the parent waive that right, there is no violation—as the child is not being questioned 

by the police. See, e.g., State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 795, 69 P.3d 1052, 1056 (2003) (noting 

that Miranda rights apply where a person is subject to custodial interrogation). Furthermore, 

even if the parent agrees to waive Miranda rights, the minor himself will still have to agree to 

such a waiver, removing at least part of the rationale for the rule established in Edwards. See 

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994) (explaining that the rationale behind 

prohibiting the police from attempting to reinitiate communications with a suspect after he 

invokes his right to counsel was to prevent the defendant from being badgered into waiving his 

rights).

This Court applies the same standard in determining whether the police have violated a 

minor’s Miranda rights—where that minor’s parents are persuaded to waive the right to counsel, 

after previously invoking it—as is applied in determining whether an adult individual has freely 

waived their Miranda rights. Specifically, the standard is whether, under the totality of the 

circumstances, the court finds that the minor’s parents have been coerced and intimidated in such 

a way that their will has been overborne. State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 523, 50 P.3d 1014, 1018 

(2002).

Adamcik argues that after Shannon invoked his right to counsel, the detectives became 

angry and demanding, leaving Shannon and Sean with the impression that Adamcik would be 

taken into custody if the interview did not take place that night. The detectives denied this, 

testifying that they remained calm and sympathetic, as they wanted to gain Adamcik’s 

cooperation. The district court made no factual finding concerning the respective credibility of 

the affidavits and testimony before it on this issue, assuming arguendo that the detectives had 

acted in the manner that Sean and Shannon asserted that they did. The district court stated:

Even if the Detectives’ alleged impatience with Sean and Shannon escalated into 

a frustrated or heated state, and the threat of their son’s detention provoked Sean 

and Shannon into agreeing to go forward with the interview, the Court does not 

find either tactic to be one that would overbear their ability to voluntarily agree to 

allow the Detectives to question Torey without the presence of an attorney.

As noted above, where substantial and competent evidence supports the district court’s 

finding that a suspect knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, this 
27

Court shall not disturb that finding on appeal. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 558, 199 P.3d 123, 

133 (2008). 

Where the district court fails to make a determination on the credibility of competing 

testimony, instead assuming arguendo for purposes of answering a question of law that the 

version of events offered by one party is true, this Court will do likewise on appeal. Assuming 

the veracity of Shannon and Sean’s affidavits, we find that the district court had substantial and 

competent evidence to support its finding that the conduct the detectives engaged in was not such 

that it would overbear Shannon and Sean’s ability to voluntarily agree to waive Adamcik’s right 

to counsel. 

4. Adamcik’s verbal and nonverbal responses to Sean’s questions, subsequent to 

invoking his right to counsel, were not the result of the functional equivalent of an 

interrogation by a State agent.

After detectives informed Adamcik that they did not believe the story he had told them, 

Adamcik requested an attorney. At that point, all questioning ceased and Adamcik and Sean 

conversed privately in another room. After approximately ten minutes, Adamcik and Sean 

returned and the exchange, transcribed above, occurred. 

Adamcik argues that his verbal and nonverbal responses to Sean’s questioning should be 

suppressed as the detectives engaged in conduct which was the functional equivalent of express 

questioning and reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The State argues that the 

district court correctly determined that the statements made by detectives, after Adamcik invoked 

his right to counsel, were “not the functional equivalent of an interrogation. Rather, the 

statements are an objective presentation of the evidence they had gathered against [Adamcik].”

The United States Supreme Court has stated that Miranda safeguards protect against 

express questions, as well as words or actions, by the police that are likely to elicit an 

incriminating response. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). In Rhode Island 

v. Innis, the Court stated that:

the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected 

to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term 

“interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to 

any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant 

to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 

incriminating response from the suspect.

Id. (footnotes omitted). 
28

The record in this case clearly demonstrates that Adamcik’s verbal and nonverbal 

responses were in response to Sean’s questions, not statements made by the detectives. 

As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in United States v. LaPierre:

In determining whether a suspect was being interrogated, the critical inquiry is 

whether “[i]n light of both the context of the questioning and the content of the 

question,” United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir. 1986), the 

statements made by the officers were of the sort that “the police should know 

[are] reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response. . . .” Rhode Island v. 

Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1690, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). We will 

reverse the district court’s determination that [the appellant] was not being 

interrogated only if the determination is clearly erroneous. United States v. 

Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir.1981).

998 F.2d 1460, 1466 (9th Cir. 1993) (first alteration in the original).

Here, the district court found that the statements the detectives directed at Sean were 

reasonable and appropriate to inform Sean of the reason why Adamcik was being arrested. The 

court found that the statements directed at Adamcik himself were in line with a recitation of the 

evidence gathered against him, rather than an interrogational line of questioning reasonably 

likely to evoke an incrimination response. The court went on to note that, although the statement 

that Detective Ganske directed toward Adamcik of “you know what you need to do” and 

Detective Thomas’s statements about the evidence that had been gathered were “coated with a 

layer of precariousness,” they still “do not rise to the level in which an objective observer would 

conclude [they] were designed to invite comment from [Adamcik].”

In reaching this conclusion, the district court compared the facts at hand to those present 

in cases from both the Idaho Court of Appeals (See State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 47 P.3d 763 

(Ct. App. 2001); State v. Person, 140 Idaho 934, 104 P.3d 976 (Ct. App. 2004)) and the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals (See United States v. Hsu, 852 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1988); United States 

v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Olof, 527 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1975)). 

Based upon this comparison, the district court determined that under an objective examination of 

the circumstances, it could not be said that the detectives said anything that was the functional 

equivalent of an interrogation, or likely to evoke an incriminating response. 

Furthermore, as the district court noted:

Even if the Court did find that the Detectives’ statements explaining the nature of 

the charge to Torey were designed to elicit a response from Torey, they certainly 

were not designed to elicit a response from Sean. Detectives Ganske and Thomas 

were facing Torey and speaking directly to Torey when they made the statements.
29

Adamcik did not respond to the detectives’ statements, he responded to Sean’s 

questioning. Although Adamcik argues that Sean had become an unwitting agent of the State, 

citing to one case from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Alexander v. Connecticut, 917 F.2d

747 (2d Cir. 1990), this argument is without merit. Adamcik contends that “[b]y manipulating 

Shawn’s [sic] shock and the parental relationship, the detectives made Shawn [sic] an unwitting 

agent of [the] state by engaging in conduct they should have know [sic] was reasonably likely to 

cause an exchange between father and son that would produce an incriminating response.” The 

appellant in Alexander admitted to his friend Papagolas that he had murdered a man named 

Cook. Id. at 749. The police had been transporting Papagolas to and from prison for his meetings 

with the appellant, and the Court noted that it had previously held that Papagolas had been acting 

as an agent of the government at the time of the appellant’s confession. Id. at 750. However, the 

Court reversed that previous determination, finding that “[t]he confessions, freely made to 

Papagolas, show that [the appellant] had no reason to believe Papagolas was cooperating with 

the authorities.” Id. The Court held that, in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in 

Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), a custodial interrogation—for purposes of Miranda—

occurs when: (1) the suspect is in police custody and (2) the suspect is aware that he is being 

interrogated by a government authority or representative. Alexander, 917 F.2d at 750-51. There 

is no plausible argument that Adamcik was under the impression that Sean was acting as a 

government representative when he questioned his son. Therefore, under the reasoning of the 

Court in Alexander, Adamcik’s statements were not made in response to a custodial 

interrogation.

The district court correctly denied, in relevant part, Adamcik’s motion to suppress, as his 

verbal and nonverbal responses to Sean’s questioning were not the product of a custodial 

interrogation by a State actor, or the functional equivalent of the same.

C. Nothing in the Jury Instructions Amounted to Reversible Error.

1. Standard of Review

As this Court stated in State v. Zichko:

The issue of whether a particular jury instruction is necessary and whether the 

jury has been properly instructed is a matter of law over which this Court 

exercises free review. This Court reviews jury instructions to ascertain whether, 

when considered as a whole, they fairly and adequately present the issues and 

state the applicable law.
30

129 Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996) (internal citations omitted). We review jury 

instructions as a whole because “[i]t is well established that [an] instruction ‘may not be judged 

in artificial isolation,’ but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the 

trial record.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 

141, 147 (1973)). 

“No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the 

party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the 

instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.” Idaho Crim. R. 30(b). 

When a defendant has objected to an instruction, we will apply the harmless error test articulated 

in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). Typically, under the harmless 

error test, once the defendant shows that a constitutional violation occurred, the State has the 

burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation did not contribute to the 

jury’s verdict. Id. If the jury reached its verdict based on an erroneous instruction, we will 

generally vacate and remand for a new trial. Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. However, where the jury 

received proper instruction on all but one element of an offense, and where the Court “concludes 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by 

overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, 

the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless.” Id. (quoting State v. Lovelace, 140 

Idaho 73, 79, 90 P.3d 298, 304 (2004)). 

When a defendant fails to object to a jury instruction, we will still review the jury 

instruction for fundamental error. State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 977, 188 P.3d 912, 919 

(2008); see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976 (“If the alleged error was not 

followed by a contemporaneous objection, it shall only be reviewed . . . under Idaho’s 

fundamental error doctrine.”). Before we consider whether there was fundamental error, we 

must first determine whether the trial court erred at all. Johnson, 145 Idaho at 977, 188 P.3d at 

919. The Perry fundamental error test requires the defendant to show three things: (1) the alleged 

error violated an unwaived constitutional right; (2) the alleged error plainly exists; and (3) the 

alleged error was not harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 

2. When viewed in the context of all other instructions, Jury Instruction 12 fairly and 

adequately presented the issues and the state of applicable law to the jury.

Adamcik objected to the wording of Jury Instruction (J.I.) 12 at trial, and argues that J.I.

12 allowed the jury to convict him of first-degree murder even if it did not find that he actually 
31

stabbed Stoddart, causing her death. The State argues that J.I. 12 comports with Idaho Criminal 

Jury Instruction (ICJI) 704, which was approved by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. 

Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 44 P.3d 1180 (Ct. App. 2002). J.I. 12 reads as follows:

In order for the Defendant to be guilty of Murder, the State must prove 

each of the following:

1. On or between the 22nd and 23rd days of September, 2006,

2. in the State of Idaho

3. the Defendant, TOREY MICHAEL ADAMCIK, engaged in 

conduct which caused the death of Cassie Jo Stoddart,

4. the Defendant acted without justification or excuse, and

5. with malice aforethought.

If you find that the State has failed to prove any of the above, then you 

must find the Defendant not guilty of Murder. If you find that all of the above 

have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant 

guilty of Murder, and then determine if the Defendant is guilty of First or Second 

Degree Murder.

In Butcher, the appellant argued that where he had been charged with murder under both 

principal and aiding and abetting theories, the term “engaged in conduct” confused the jury. 137 

Idaho at 135, 44 P.3d at 1190. The Court of Appeals noted that “the term ‘engaged in conduct’ 

refers to the specific criminal acts addressed in subsequent instructions on the specific homicide 

offense charged and any lesser-included offenses,” and found that the instruction was neither 

confusing nor in need of clarification. Id. The court in Butcher noted that under the 

circumstances of that case, as it had been presented to the jury, the phrase “engaged in conduct” 

referred to both the actual killing of the victim and any act constituting aiding and abetting. Id.

The Butcher holding is sound and proper for application in this case. 

Here, as Adamcik points out, the State never expressly presented an aiding and abetting 

theory of first-degree murder to the jury, and the jury was never instructed on it. The only 

conduct that the jury was instructed on regarding first-degree murder may be found in J.I. 10, 

which reads, in relevant part, as follows:

COUNT 1

MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE

That the said TOREY MICHAEL ADAMCIK, in the County of Bannock, 

State of Idaho, on or between the 22nd and 23rd days of September, 2006, did 

willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, with premeditation and with malice 

aforethought, kill and murder Cassie Stoddart, a human being, by purchasing 

knives and stabbing Cassie Stoddart from which the victim died in Bannock 

County, Idaho.
32

The specific conduct mentioned in J.I. 10 is “kill[ing] and murder[ing] Cassie Stoddart, a human 

being, by purchasing knives and stabbing Cassie Stoddart.”

“[W]here the language of the indictment or information goes beyond alleging elements of 

the crime, it is mere surplusage that need not be proved. However, the inclusion of surplusage 

must not be allowed to prejudice a defendant in the context of his case.” Butcher, 137 Idaho at 

134, 44 P.3d at 1189 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the inclusion of the words 

“purchasing knives” was mere surplusage. Reading J.I. 10 as a whole, it is clear that the jury 

could not reasonably have concluded that it could convict Adamcik of first-degree murder 

merely on a finding that Adamcik had purchased knives. Not only is it readily apparent to any 

reasonable jury that one cannot “kill and murder” through the mere purchase of weaponry, but 

the language concerning the purchasing of the knives is phrased in the conjunctive with the 

language concerning the fatal stabbing itself. Furthermore, and as discussed at length in Part 

III.A.2, the State need not prove Adamcik inflicted the fatal wound, or any wound, so long as it 

proved he was an accomplice in Stoddart’s killing.

For this same reason, J.I. 12 was not misleading to the jury and did not allow the 

prosecution to obtain a conviction without demonstrating that Adamcik killed or assisted in 

killing Stoddart. J.I. 12 required the State to prove that Adamcik engaged in conduct causing 

Stoddart’s death. Further, J.I. 10 required that such conduct consist of killing with malice 

aforethought. Although J.I. 10 could have been better worded so as to clarify that the State need 

not demonstrate that Adamcik inflicted the fatal blow, we find that J.I. 10, in conjunction with 

J.I. 12, can be reasonably interpreted to require that the State prove that Adamcik murdered, or 

helped Draper murder, Stoddart. 

Certainly, the jury in this case understood the State’s theory that Adamcik and Draper 

acted in concert to murder Stoddart: that Adamcik planned the murder; that he lay in wait with 

Draper to help carry out the murder; and that he inflicted at least one stab wound that could have 

killed Stoddart. These theories of first-degree murder are adequately described in the jury 

instructions provided in this case by requiring that the jury find that Adamcik engaged in conduct 

which caused Stoddart’s death. Thus, the trial court did not err in giving these instructions.

3. The district court did not err in failing to provide the jury with a unanimity instruction 

requiring that each member of the jury agree on a specific act that Adamcik committed 

which caused Stoddart’s death.
33

Adamcik argues, for the first time on appeal, that the district court erred in not providing 

the jury with a specific unanimity instruction. While conceding that in a typical case a general 

unanimity instruction (such as those provided in J.I. 26 and J.I. 27 here) suffices, Adamcik 

argues that here there is a genuine possibility that the jury may have been confused and that 

different jurors may have concluded that Adamcik committed different acts. Adamcik 

acknowledges that he did not raise this argument before the district court but contends that this 

Court should nevertheless consider it under the fundamental error doctrine, as it violates 

Adamcik’s right to a unanimous jury. The basis for Adamcik’s claim is that the murder charge 

in J.I. 10 listed two acts, “purchasing knives” and “stabbing Cassie Stoddart,” and the conspiracy 

charge in J.I. 17 listed four acts which could have been found to have caused Stoddart’s death. 

Adamcik also contends that this Court’s decision in State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 981 P.2d 738 

(1999), was based on an erroneous reading of precedent and should be overruled.

The State argues that Adamcik was only charged with killing Stoddart in one way, by 

stabbing her with a knife, and it would be unreasonable to read the jury instructions in any other 

manner. In addition, the State argues that, in accordance with State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 

215 P.3d 414 (2009), the unanimity requirement does not extend to a murder victim’s cause of 

death. 

Idaho law requires a trial court to instruct a jury that, in order to convict a defendant, it 

must unanimously agree on the defendant’s guilt. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 711, 215 

P.3d 414, 431 (2009). “An instruction that the jury must unanimously agree on the facts giving 

rise to the offense, however, is generally not required.” Id. There is an important exception to 

this general principle “when a defendant commits several acts, each of which would 

independently support a conviction for the crime charged.” Id. Adamcik contends the exception 

applies here. 

In support of his contention that he was entitled to a unanimity instruction, Adamcik cites 

Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 268, 16 P.3d 937, 944 (Ct. App. 2000). That case involved 

charges of sexual misconduct between the defendant and a young girl. Id. at 264, 16 P.3d at 940. 

There, the State could have properly charged the defendant with six specific instances of sexual 

misconduct. Id. at 261, 16 P.3d at 944. “The court reasoned that [a unanimity] instruction was 

proper because each instance in which the [sexual misconduct] took place was ‘a separate 

incident—a distinct union of mens rea and actus reas separated by a discrete period of time and 
34

circumstance from any other such similar incident.” Severson, 147 Idaho at 711, 215 P.3d at 431 

(quoting Miller, 135 Idaho at 268, 16 P.3d at 944).

In Severson, the defendant was not entitled to a unanimity instruction. In that case, the 

defendant was charged with a single count of first-degree murder and a count of poisoning food 

and/or medicine. Id. at 701, 215 P.3d at 421. The defendant argued that the jury could have 

found him guilty of murder for killing his wife with sleeping pills, or suffocating her, or both. 

Id. at 710, 215 P.3d at 430. We concluded that “[a]lthough the evidence at trial showed that 

Severson could have murdered his wife by either overdosing her or suffocating her, it did not 

indicate that separate incidents involving distinct unions of mens rea and actus reas occurred.” 

Id. at 712, 215 P.3d at 432. Our analysis highlighted an obvious characteristic of murder: it is a 

crime that cannot be perpetrated on the same victim twice. See id. We thus held that absent any 

evidence that Severson engaged in the charged conduct—i.e., murdering his wife—on more than 

one occasion, “the jury was not required to unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the 

offense.” Id. 

In this case, Adamcik was charged with a single murder. There was no evidence that 

Adamcik engaged in the charged conduct on multiple occasions; indeed, “[t]he very nature of the 

crime of murder eliminates this possibility.” Id. Thus, Adamcik was not entitled to a unanimity 

instruction under existing precedent. 

Furthermore, Adamcik’s argument that some members of the jury may have convicted

him of murder for the act of “purchasing knives” as that phrase is included in J.I. 10, is

unavailing. This claim has been dealt with above. Not only is the phrase in question properly 

viewed as surplusage, but even if the jury did not recognize it as such, it is phrased in the 

conjunctive with “and stabbing Cassie Stoddart.” Therefore, there is no genuine possibility that 

the jury was confused as to whether they could convict Adamcik of first-degree murder solely by 

finding that he purchased knives.

Adamcik’s other argument, that some “jurors could have found that he engaged in 

conduct resulting [in] the death of [Stoddart] by finding that he committed any of the other 

alleged overt acts done in the furtherance of the conspiracy,” also fails. The jury was specifically 

instructed in J.I. 20, that:

Each count charges a separate and distinct offense. You must decide each count 

separately on the evidence and the law that applies to it, uninfluenced by your 
35

decision as to any other count. The defendant may be found guilty or not guilty 

on none, some, or all of the offenses charged.

Adamcik does not explain why the jury would have disregarded this express instruction and 

considered the conduct alleged in Count 2 (conspiracy) when reaching a decision on Count 1 

(first-degree murder). Because Adamcik fails to support his position on this issue, we must 

conclude there is no genuine possibility that the jury was confused as to whether they could 

convict Adamcik of first-degree murder based on the conduct alleged under Count 2. See State 

v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 19, 981 P.2d 738, 744 (1999) (noting that where the jury was instructed 

to consider each count separately, this Court presumes that instruction was followed). Thus, the 

trial court’s lack of a unanimity instruction was not in error and therefore could not amount to 

fundamental error.

4. The district court’s jury instructions regarding malice did not misstate the law nor 

lower the State’s burden of proof. 

The district court provided the jury with four instructions regarding malice, J.I. 13-A, J.I.

13-B, J.I. 14 and J.I. 15. J.I. 13-A reads:

Any unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought is 

murder. If nothing further characterizes the killing, the murder is of the second 

degree. To constitute the higher offense of murder in the first degree, there must 

be willfulness, deliberation and premeditation in addition to malice aforethought.

Willfulness means that there was manifested a clear intent to take life.

Deliberation and premeditation means done with reflection and conceived 

beforehand and not done upon a sudden heat of passion or other condition 

precluding the idea of deliberation.

J.I. 13-B provides that “[m]alice is the state of mind manifested by the doing of an unlawful and 

felonious act intentionally, deliberately, and without legal cause or excuse.” J.I. 14 states that 

“[m]alice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate 

intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied when no considerable 

provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and 

malignant heart.” Finally, J.I. 15 states:

Malice aforethought exists when:

1. The evidence shows that the defendant deliberately intended to kill 

another human being without legal justification or excuse; or

2. The defendant intentionally engaged in conduct dangerous to another 

under circumstances which demonstrated an extreme indifference to the value of 

human life; or
36

3. The defendant deliberately intended to kill as a result of provocation 

which the jury determines would not have caused a reasonable person to have lost 

his self-control and reason.

Malice as used in these instructions does not require any ill will or hatred 

toward the person killed.

Adamcik argues that J.I. 14 and J.I. 15 are inconsistent with Idaho Criminal Jury 

Instruction 7029 and, when read as a whole, misinstructed the jury as to an essential element of 

the offense. Adamcik concedes that he did not object to the jury instructions on this ground at 

trial, but argues that the defective instructions amount to fundamental error. The State argues 

that the doctrine of invited error precludes Adamcik from raising any objection to the jury 

instructions regarding malice, as Adamcik acquiesced to that instruction being given (though he 

objected to J.I. 14 and J.I. 15 on other grounds). 

i. The doctrine of invited error does not bar Adamcik from challenging J.I. 14 

and J.I. 15 on appeal.

“The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who caused or played an 

important role in prompting a trial court to give or not give an instruction from later challenging 

that decision on appeal.” State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999). In Blake, 

the district court provided the appellant with the proposed jury instructions, and his counsel 

stated “[y]our honor, we would concur. We have nothing to say on the record at this time.” Id. 

The State argued that this statement caused or prompted the district court to give the disputed 

instructions and that, therefore, the invited error doctrine should preclude the appellant from 

challenging these instructions on appeal. Id. This Court disagreed, finding that the district court 

was merely giving the parties the opportunity to object to the instructions on the record, after 

having already decided which instructions to provide, and that the appellant had, therefore, not 

invited any error by failing to object. Id.

 9 ICJI 702 reads as follows:

Malice may be express or implied.

Malice is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to kill a human being.

Malice is implied when:

1. The killing resulted from an intentional act,

2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and

3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious 

disregard for, human life.

When it is shown that a killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act with express or implied malice,

no other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state of malice aforethought. The mental state 

constituting malice aforethought does not necessarily require any ill will or hatred of the person killed.

The word “aforethought” does not imply deliberation or the lapse of time. It only means that the malice 

must precede rather than follow the act.
37

In State v. Caudill, the appellant, Caudill, argued that testimony offered by a detective 

regarding a conversation the detective had previously had with the Caudill’s codefendant 

violated Caudill’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. 109 Idaho 222, 225, 706 P.2d 456, 

459 (1985). This Court found that, although the testimony in question would have constituted a 

violation of Caudill’s right to confrontation, the testimony had been brought out by the question 

of Caudill’s counsel, not the State. Id. at 226, 706 P.2d at 460. Therefore, the doctrine of invited 

error precluded reversal on those grounds. Id.

Here, Adamcik’s counsel did object to the proposed jury instructions as they pertained to 

malice, though not on the grounds raised here. This was not identical to the situation in Blake, as 

some minor alterations were made to the jury instructions as a result of Adamcik’s objections, so 

it cannot be said that the trial court had already reached an absolute determination as to the exact 

instructions that would be offered. However, unlike the appellant in Blake, Adamcik did not 

state that he concurred with the Court’s proposed instructions, nor did he himself request the 

instructions, so this case is not analogous to Caudill. Thus, we hold that Adamcik is not 

precluded by the invited error doctrine from raising this issue on appeal, as he did not encourage 

the district court to offer the specific malice instructions given, but merely failed to object.

ii. The trial court’s instructions in J.I. 14 and J.I. 15 did not constitute 

fundamental error. 

Adamcik argues that the trial court erred in referencing “provocation” in J.I. 14 and 15, as 

it was not at issue under the facts of this case, is not part of ICJI 702, and could only serve to 

confuse the jury here. The State argues that it is nearly impossible to see how an issue so plainly 

inapplicable to the facts of this case would have been considered seriously enough to have 

confused the jury. Adamcik offers no explanation as to why any reference to provocation is 

likely to have created sufficient jury confusion to constitute error, much less fundamental error,

acknowledging that provocation was not at issue in this case. The references to provocation were 

plainly inapplicable to the facts at hand and there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would 

have found otherwise.

Adamcik next argues that the use of the phrase “abandoned and malignant heart” in J.I. 

14 is vague and confusing, and the phrase is not contained in ICJI 702. The State argues that any 

initial confusion that the phrase may have caused would have been resolved in J.I. 15, paragraph 

2, which states that malice aforethought exists where “[t]he defendant intentionally engaged in 
38

conduct dangerous to another under circumstances which demonstrated an extreme indifference 

to the value of human life.” 

I.C. § 18-4002 is titled “Express and implied malice” and provides that “[s]uch malice

may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention 

unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied when no considerable 

provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and 

malignant heart.” It is not an error to give jury instructions that mirror the language of the statute 

related to a crime. Holland v. Peterson, 95 Idaho 728, 518 P.2d 1190 (1974). Therefore, the 

reference to an “abandoned and malignant heart” did not constitute error.

Adamcik contends that J.I. 15 is inconsistent with ICJI 702 in a way which decreases the 

State’s burden of proof. ICJI 702 states that malice may be implied where the “consequences of 

the act are dangerous to human life” and that act “was deliberately performed with knowledge of 

the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life.” (emphasis added). In contrast, J.I. 

15 states that malice aforethought may be found to exist where “the defendant intentionally 

engaged in conduct dangerous to another under circumstances which demonstrated an extreme 

indifference to the value of human life.” (emphasis added).

Adamcik asserts that by requiring merely that an act be “dangerous to another,” rather 

than “dangerous to human life,” as required in ICJI 702, the court allowed the jury to find 

implied malice because Adamcik had committed an act dangerous to only the health of Stoddart, 

even where it did not constitute a danger to her life. The State argues that the only conduct 

Adamcik is alleged to have committed which would constitute murder under the theory advanced 

was the stabbing of Stoddart, which the jury could not reasonably have found to be dangerous to 

Stoddart’s health but not her life. Adamcik responds that, under the arguments he has advanced, 

the jury could have found that Adamcik committed an act dangerous to Stoddart’s health in 

purchasing knives or lying in wait. Since the jury could only have convicted Adamcik of firstdegree murder by concluding that he actually stabbed Stoddart, and because it would be 

unreasonable to consider that conduct to be dangerous to Stoddart’s health and not her life, the 

deviation from ICJI on this point was not an error. 

Adamcik next contends that the State’s burden was lowered where J.I. 15 requires only 

that the circumstances of the act in question demonstrated an “extreme indifference to the value 

of human life,” whereas ICJI 702 requires that the act be performed “with knowledge of the 
39

danger to, and with conscious disregard for human life.” The State responds that there is no 

meaningful difference between these two articulations as, in order to demonstrate extreme 

indifference, a defendant must necessarily appreciate the danger to human life; one cannot be 

indifferent to something without being aware of it.

In People v. Estrada, the California Supreme Court examined the plain meaning of the 

phrase “reckless indifference to human life.” 904 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1995). The Estrada Court 

wrote:

We . . . find that, when considered in its entirety — as the phrase is 

presented to the jury —“reckless indifference to human life” is commonly 

understood to mean that the defendant was subjectively aware that his or her 

participation in the felony involved a grave risk of death. The common meaning 

of the term “indifference,” referring to “the state of being indifferent,” is that 

which is “regarded as being of no significant importance or value.” (Webster's 

New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 1981) p. 1151, col. 1.) To regard something, even to 

regard it as worthless, is to be aware of it. (See id. at p. 1911, col. 1 [“regard” is 

synonymous with “consider, evaluate, judge”].)

Although the term “reckless” — standing alone — may arguably be 

understood in common parlance to mean simply neglectful, heedless, or rash (see 

Webster's New Internat. Dict., supra, at p. 1896, col. 1), when the word is placed 

in context within the statutory phrase “indifference to human life,” what is 

conveyed to the jury is more than mere negligence.

Id. at 1202 (bracketed alterations in the original). The phrase “extreme indifference to the value 

of human life” is functionally equivalent to the phrase “reckless indifference to human life.” We 

are therefore persuaded by the analysis of the California Supreme Court in Estrada and hold that 

in order to find that Adamcik had acted with “extreme indifference to the value of human life” he 

necessarily acted with “conscious disregard for human life” as required under ICJI 702. 

We hold that the district court did not err in instructing the jury regarding malice, and the 

State’s burden of proof was not lowered through such instruction. 

5. The district court did not commit fundamental error by instructing the jury on a lyingin-wait theory of first-degree murder after the State had abandoned that theory.

Article I, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution states in relevant part that, “No person shall 

be held to answer for any felony or criminal offense of any grade, unless on presentment or 

indictment of a grand jury or on information of the public prosecutor . . . .” Where the charging 

terms of the Information or charging document have been altered, literally or in effect, a 

constructive amendment has occurred. State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 973, 188 P.3d 912, 915 

(2008) (citing United States v. Dipentino, 242 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2001)). A variance 
40

requires a reversal only where “it deprives the defendant of his right to fair notice or leaves him 

open to the risk of double jeopardy.” State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 417-18, 716 P.2d 1182, 

1189-90 (1985). “Whether there is a variance or constructive amendment is a question of law 

over which this Court exercises free review.” Id. at 972, 188 P.3d at 915. 

Adamcik argues that the amended information in this case did not include a lying-in-wait 

alternative theory for finding Adamcik guilty of first-degree murder, yet J.I. 13 still retained such 

language. Adamcik again concedes that he did not object to J.I. 13 before the trial court, but that 

this Court should nevertheless consider this error as it constitutes fundamental error. The State 

acknowledges that the amended information did not allege that Adamcik had committed firstdegree murder by lying in wait, but argues that there was no variance because lying in wait is 

merely a form of premeditation. 

J.I. 13 reads:

In order for the Defendant to be guilty of First Degree Murder, the State 

must prove that the murder:

was perpetrated by lying in wait; or

was willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. Premeditation means to 

consider beforehand whether to kill or not to kill, and then to decide to kill. There 

does not have to be any appreciable period of time during which the decision to 

kill was considered, as long as it was reflected upon before the decision was 

made. A mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent 

to kill, is not premeditation.

If you unanimously agree that the State has proven any of the above 

special circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 

Defendant guilty of First Degree Murder. If you unanimously agree that none of 

the special circumstances have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must

may find the defendant guilty of Second Degree Murder.

All other murder is murder of the second degree.

(strikethrough in the original).

Prior to 1977, I.C. § 18-4003 read, in part, “DEGREES OF MURDER. All murder 

which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, 

deliberate and premeditated killing is murder of the first degree.” S.L. 1977, ch. 154, §2. 

Adamcik concedes that before 1977, lying in wait was merely listed as a specific example of the 

type of conduct that would constitute a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. Adamcik 

argues that the change made in 1977 to I.C. § 18-4003 (now I.C. § 18-4003(a)) altered the 

meaning behind the inclusion of the term “lying in wait” because the word “other” was deleted 

from the phrase “or by any other kind of willful.” Whether or not this interpretation is correct, it 
41

is not reasonably likely that the jury found Adamcik guilty of lying in wait without also finding 

him guilty of killing in a willful, deliberate and premeditated fashion. As noted above, this Court 

considers the jury instructions as a whole in determining whether they fairly and accurately 

represent applicable law. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996).

J.I. 13-A reads as follows:

Any unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought is 

murder. If nothing further characterizes the killing, the murder is of the second 

degree. To constitute the higher offense of murder in the first degree, there must 

be willfulness, deliberation and premeditation in addition to malice aforethought. 

Willfulness means that there was manifested a clear intent to take life.

Deliberation and premeditation means done with reflection and conceived 

beforehand and not done upon a sudden heat of passion or other condition 

precluding the idea of deliberation.

(emphasis added). Any confusion which may have been created by J.I. 13 is remedied in J.I. 13-

A, where the jury is unequivocally informed that they must find willfulness, deliberation and 

premeditation in order to convict Adamcik of first-degree murder. Any error committed in 

including the instruction on lying in wait is harmless and, therefore, necessarily not fundamental.

D. Closing Arguments.

1. Standard of Review

Where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to during trial, this Court may only 

reverse when that misconduct constitutes a fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 

227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). A defendant’s right to a fair trial, under the Fourteenth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution, is violated where a prosecutor attempts to “have a 

jury reach its decision on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the 

evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that 

evidence.” Id. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error is determined by the threepart Perry test set out above.

2. The State did not commit fundamental error during closing arguments.

Adamcik argues that the State committed the following errors at closing argument: (1) 

appealing to the sympathy of the jurors toward the victim and her family; (2) misstating the law 

and evidence; (3) shifting the burden of proof and improperly vouching for its experts; and (4) 

quoting the biblical commandment that “thou shalt not kill” in an attempt to inflame the jury. 

These arguments shall be examined in turn.
42

i. The State improperly appealed to the jury’s sympathy for Stoddart and her 

family, but this did not constitute fundamental error.

During closing arguments, one of the prosecutors said the following:

Cassie Jo Stoddart was born December 21st, 1989. On September 22nd, 

2006, this defendant brutally and viciously murdered her. She was sixteen years 

old, ladies and gentlemen. Sixteen years old.

Pictures such as this and fading memories are all that her family has left of 

her. They’ll never see her graduate. They’ll never see her get married. They’ll 

never see her have children. They’ll never see her grow old. They will never see 

her reach any of the great milestones—any of the great achievements that she may 

have achieved throughout her life.

Why? One reason. This defendant and Brian Draper wanted to be 

famous. They wanted to be famous, ladies and gentlemen. . . .

Adamcik argues that this appeal to the jurors’ sympathy for Stoddart’s family was an 

impermissible and inflammatory tactic, seeking to influence the jury to reach its decision through 

emotion rather than reason. See, e.g., State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. 

App. 2007) (noting that “appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of 

inflammatory tactics are impermissible”). 

In State v. Severson, this Court noted that:

It is generally recognized that a prosecutor may not comment on the 

victim’s family during closing argument in order to appeal to the sympathies of 

the jury. Such extraneous statements are considered improper because their only 

purpose is to encourage the jury to identify with the victim. Whether such 

comments constitute fundamental error, however, must be considered in the 

context of the entire trial. 

147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009) (internal citations omitted). In Severson, the 

prosecutor offered the following statements in closing rebuttal: “Mary Severson isn’t a decedent. 

Mary Severson was the 35-year-old mother of two boys. Mary Severson was the daughter of 

Carol Diaz. Mary Severson was the sister of Maria Gray. Mary Severson’s life had purpose, and 

it had meaning. Your duty today is to give her death justice.” Id. The prosecutor additionally 

made reference to Severson having spent her last Christmas with her family. Id. The Severson 

Court found that these statements by the prosecution, although arguably improper, did not 

amount to fundamental error for several reasons: (1) the statements were not dwelled upon or 

made in support of an argument that the defendant receive a harsher sentence; (2) the statements 

merely reiterated evidence offered previously during the trial; and (3) the district court had 

instructed the jury on several occasions that the prosecutor’s closing statements were not to be 
43

regarded as evidence. Id. This Court found that for these reasons the statements did not impact 

the fairness of the trial or deprive the defendant of due process. Id. 

Here, like in Severson, the statements in question were not made or dwelled upon in 

support of a harsher punishment. Nor was any new evidence presented to the jury. Although the 

district court had not repeatedly emphasized to the jury that it should not consider the 

prosecutors’ closing statements to constitute evidence, it had stated this once and included it in 

the jury instructions.10 Looking at the evidence presented as a whole, it cannot be said that 

Adamcik has shown that there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have differed had 

this error not occurred. If the evidence presented did not convince the jury, it is highly unlikely 

that the jury’s sympathy for Stoddart and her family would have changed its mind. Therefore, 

we find that the prosecutors’ appeal to the jurors’ sympathy for Stoddart’s family was harmless 

and, thus, did not constitute fundamental error. 

ii. The State did not misstate the law and evidence.

During closing arguments the prosecution made reference to the BRC tape and quoted 

Draper as having said, “We just killed Cassie.” Adamcik argues that this is a misstatement and 

misrepresentation of the evidence presented, as the BRC tape cuts in midway through Draper’s 

sentence and only states “—just killed Cassie.” The State responds that both Detective Thomas 

and Detective Hamilton testified at trial that, in watching the BRC tape, they heard Draper say, 

“We just killed Cassie.” The State argues that, as this evidence had been presented during trial, 

it was not erroneous for the prosecution to repeat it during closing argument. 

“It is plainly improper for a prosecutor to mischaracterize the evidence adduced at trial.” 

State v. Contreras-Gonzales, 146 Idaho 41, 49, 190 P.3d 197, 205 (Ct. App. 2008). The first 

word that can be heard on the relevant portion of the DVD copy of the BRC tape that has been 

provided to this Court is “just.” Detectives Thomas and Hamilton testified that they heard 

Draper say “we just killed Cassie” based on their viewing of the original tape. It appears from 

watching the DVD copy that the prosecutor may have misstated what Draper said on the BRC 

tape. However, even if this were the case, it would not amount to fundamental error.

The jury was provided with the actual BRC tape during its deliberations, and it was 

played during trial. In addition, the jury heard Adamcik’s attorney, during closing argument, 

 10 Jury Instruction 2 stated, in relevant part, that “[t]he arguments and remarks of the attorneys involved in this case 

are intended to help you in understanding the evidence and applying the instructions, but they are not themselves 

evidence.”
44

offer his opinion that Draper only said “just killed Cassie” and counsel strongly encouraged the 

jury to carefully listen to the BRC tape. Where the closing statement was consistent with 

testimony offered during the trial, and where the jury was provided with the actual exhibit in 

question, it cannot be said that Adamcik has demonstrated a reasonable possibility that any error 

here affected the outcome of the trial. Therefore, even if an error occurred here, it was harmless.

iii. The State did not improperly vouch for its experts or attempt to shift the 

burden of proof.

Adamcik first argues that the prosecution improperly vouched for its experts in telling the 

jury that “the investigators did the best job they could.” In State v. Porter, this Court noted that 

“a prosecutor should avoid expressing a personal belief as to the credibility of a witness unless 

the comment is based solely on inferences from evidence presented at trial.” 130 Idaho 772, 

786, 948 P.2d 127, 141 (1997). Here the prosecution stated its opinion, based on the evidence in 

the record, that the investigators in the case had conducted the best investigation that they could 

under the circumstances. The prosecutor did not offer an opinion as to the credibility of any 

witness. As this statement is not vouching testimony, we find no error here.

Adamcik next argues that the prosecution attempted to shift the burden of proof to the 

defense by arguing that the defense experts could have tested various pieces of evidence, which

implicitly suggests that the burden was on the defense to do so. During closing, in the context of 

discussing the expert testimony offered by Adamcik’s experts, the prosecution stated that:

all of these items, including the photos Mr. Rammell showed you, of the 

droppings in the hallway were available to the defense to be tested the same as 

they were to the State. We felt that it wasn’t important enough to present that sort 

of evidence to you.

They could have tested Cassie’s clothes. They could have tested those 

blood drops in the hallway. They could have tested the other knives that are in 

evidence. They could have tested the other shirt, the other pair of gloves, and all 

of the other items that were in evidence. And they chose not to do that.

Adamcik contends that these statements suggested that Adamcik had the burden of proof to 

demonstrate his innocence by testing the evidence and, therefore, was a misstatement of the law. 

In United States v. Vaandering, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, so long as 

the prosecution does not draw attention to the defendant’s failure to testify, it may comment on 

the defendant’s failure to present exculpatory evidence. 50 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1995). 

“Furthermore, comments intended to highlight the weaknesses of a defendant’s case do not shift 

the burden of proof to the defendant where the prosecutor does not argue that a failure to explain 
45

them adequately requires a guilty verdict and reiterates that the burden of proof is on the 

government.” Id. at 701–02.

Here, the prosecution never stated that Adamcik had the responsibility to test evidence 

and bring forth the results, nor did it draw attention to his failure to testify, it merely responded 

to statements made in closing by Adamcik’s counsel regarding the State’s failure to test certain 

evidence. In fact, later in rebuttal the prosecutor reminded the jury that the State had the burden 

of proving each element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. As Adamcik’s 

counsel broached the subject of the State’s failure to forensically test some of the evidence, it is 

fair advocacy for the State to note that the defense also failed to test such evidence. Therefore, 

no error occurred here.

iv. The State’s reference to the Bible did not constitute fundamental error.

Adamcik contends that the prosecutor impermissibly tried to inflame the jury by quoting 

the biblical commandment, “Thou shalt not kill.” The BRC tape was played by the State at trial,

and on the tape Adamcik made comments to the effect that evil is a societal construct and murder 

is only wrong because it is against the law. Defense counsel questioned Shannon Adamcik about 

this videotape, and asked her whether Adamcik was an atheist; Shannon replied that he was not. 

When asked how she knew that Adamcik was not an atheist Shannon answered “because we do 

have Bible studies. We have done that with the kids ever since we were—we say prayers. We 

bless our food and go to church. He’s just not an atheist.” The State argues that defense counsel 

opened the door to the discussion of religion both through this exchange and through the 

following statements made by defense counsel during closing:

Even the atheism comment on there, listen to it. That’s probably as 

disturbing as anything to me when I first saw it because, frankly, think about it. If 

you can believe that someone doesn’t believe in God and they don’t have any 

morals in that sense, then they can do something horrible like that—but you heard 

Shannon Adamcik testify. Did you believe her on that? Do you believe that they 

had a Bible study? Do you believe they do those things and pray? They do.

In the context of his surrounding remarks, it is clear that defense counsel was attempting to 

support his theory that Adamcik believed he was only making a movie, and that his statements 

were merely following Draper’s lead. In rebuttal, the prosecution stated:

Mr. Pearson talked to you about that little tirade that the defendant went 

on about whether or not Murder should be legal or illegal, and it shouldn’t be 

against the law, and the only reason it is, is to prevent people from doing things, 

but it makes people want to do it even more if you try to prohibit them.
46

In our system, in our society, Murder is wrong. It’s ethically wrong, it’s 

morally wrong, and it’s against the law. Torey Adamcik may have been smart—

and he was—he did a lot of things to try and cover up this crime and to try and 

prevent the police from finding out it was him that did it, but he wasn’t smart 

enough to remember one simple phrase, and that is, “Thou shalt not kill.”

A guilty verdict on both of these counts for Torey Adamcik will tell him 

that—“Thou shalt not kill.”

The prosecution’s closing rebuttal began by referencing Adamcik’s remarks on the 

videotape, but arguably went beyond the scope of an appropriate response. Nonetheless, the 

remark was made in the context of defense counsel’s reference to Adamcik’s Bible study and to 

the BRC tape. When viewed in context, the prosecutor’s comments cannot reasonably be 

construed as having been made principally to inflame the jurors, and we therefore decline to find 

them in error. 

E. The cumulative error doctrine does not necessitate a reversal.

Adamcik contends that the cumulative error doctrine applies here, necessitating a reversal 

of his convictions. “Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of 

themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. However, a necessary predicate 

to the application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 

245 P.3d at 982. Adamcik cites six alleged errors that, when aggregated, acted to deprive him of 

a fair trial. Five of the alleged errors—failure to suppress the entirety of his interview and four 

instructional errors—have been determined by this Court not to have been in error. The sixth 

claim of error relates to the prosecutor’s closing argument. Although the appeal to the jury’s 

sympathy is of concern, Adamcik has failed to demonstrate at least two errors, a necessary 

predicate to the application of our cumulative error doctrine.

F. The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Adamcik to a fixed life 

sentence for first-degree murder and a unified life sentence with thirty years fixed for 

conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, nor did the district court abuse its discretion in 

denying Adamcik’s Rule 35 motion for a sentence reduction.

1. Standard of Review

As this Court provided in State v. Stevens:

The Court, when conducting its review of a defendant’s sentence, considers the 

entire length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard to determine its 

reasonableness. Where a sentence is within the statutory limits, the appellant 

bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. In 

examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent 

review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on 
47

the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of 

the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment 

or retribution for wrongdoing. “Reasonableness” of a sentence “implies that a 

term of confinement should be tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is 

imposed.” State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145, 814 P.2d 401, 405 (1991), 

overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 394, 825 P.2d 482, 

491 (1992). In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view 

of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ. To show an abuse 

of discretion, the defendant must show that the sentence, in light of the governing 

criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.

146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008) (internal citations omitted). However, the 

imposition of a fixed life sentence “requires a high degree of certainty that the perpetrator could 

never be safely released back into society or that the nature of the offense requires that the 

individual spend the rest of his life behind bars.” Id. at 149, 191 P.3d 227 (quoting State v. 

Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 672, 978 P.2d 227, 232 (1999)).

2. Adamcik has not shown a clear abuse of discretion by the district court.

Adamcik argues that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him to fixed life 

for first-degree murder and unified life with 30 years fixed for conspiracy to commit first-degree 

murder. Adamcik argues that the sentence imposed by the district court was an abuse of 

discretion for three reasons: (1) it is impossible to tell that a juvenile is so lacking in 

rehabilitative potential that imprisonment until death is the only way to protect society; (2) 

imposing fixed life solely based on the nature of the offense, without consideration of the nature 

of the offense and the character of the offender, violates established sentencing principles; and 

(3) the egregiousness of Adamcik’s offense is lessened by his immaturity and diminished 

capacity.

The State points out that the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Eubank stated that “a 

fixed life sentence may be deemed reasonable if the offense is so egregious that it demands an 

exceptionally severe measure of retribution and deterrence, or if the offender so utterly lacks 

rehabilitative potential that imprisonment until death is the only feasible means of protecting 

society.” 114 Idaho 635, 638, 759 P.2d 926, 929 (Ct. App. 1988). In other words, even if the 

district court were uncertain about Adamcik’s rehabilitative potential, it could nevertheless 

impose a sentence of fixed life if it found the offense sufficiently egregious.

The district court provided a clear articulation for the reasons it decided to sentence 

Adamcik to an indeterminate life sentence, with 30 years fixed, for conspiracy to commit first-
48

degree murder, and fixed life for first-degree murder. The court discussed the seriousness of the 

offense, stating “the nature of the offense here you’ve both committed is, of course, the most 

serious we have in our society.” The district court considered the evidence Adamcik’s experts 

offered as to his mental capacity and potential for rehabilitation, but ultimately concluded 

beyond a reasonable doubt, after reviewing all the evidence, that Adamcik would kill again if 

released. 

In State v. Windom, this Court recently upheld the determinate life sentence of a minor, 

based solely upon the nature and gravity of the offense. 150 Idaho 873, 253 P.3d 310, 314 

(2011). Windom was a 16-year-old who had been convicted and sentenced to fixed life for the 

second-degree murder of his mother. Id. at 875,253 P.3d at 312. On appeal, the Court considered 

whether the district court had abused its discretion in sentencing Windom to fixed life and

concluded that the severe and egregious nature of the crime was sufficient on its own to justify 

the fixed life sentence. Id. at 880-84, 253 P.3d at 317-18.

The circumstances of the case at hand share commonalities with those present in 

Windom. Both Adamcik and Windom were approximately the same age at the time they 

committed their crimes. Both shared an unhealthy obsession with fictionalized violent serial 

killers. Both brutally murdered people close to them without the slightest provocation. In light 

of the excessively heinous nature of the crime committed here, the premeditated and calculated 

stabbing of a friend for the apparent purpose of gaining fame as a serial killer, this Court finds

that Adamcik has failed to demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion by the district court. It is 

unnecessary for this Court to examine Adamcik’s potential for rehabilitation. 

3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Adamcik’s Rule 35 motion.

As this Court stated in State v. Farwell:

Rule 35 is a narrow rule which allows a trial court to correct an illegal 

sentence or to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. Generally, 

whether a sentence is illegal or whether it was imposed in an illegal manner is a 

question of law, over which we exercise free review. However, if the basis for the 

illegality of the sentence is that the sentence is excessive, and the sentence is 

within the statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a 

plea for leniency, and this Court will then review a denial or grant of the motion 

for an abuse of discretion. “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant 

must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information 

subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion. An 

appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to renew 

the underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information.”
49

144 Idaho 732, 735, 170 P.3d 397, 400 (2007) (internal citations omitted) (quoting State v. 

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007)).

Adamcik presented no new information pertaining to his sentence for either offense so as 

to invoke Rule 35. He argues that he presented additional evidence in the form of an audiotape 

where Draper allegedly takes responsibility for the “Black River Story.” Adamcik argues that 

because the district court took into consideration his belief that Adamcik was involved in writing 

the Black River Story in determining that a fixed life sentence was appropriate, this new 

information should change that determination. However, even if we accept Adamcik’s argument, 

we still cannot find an abuse of discretion by the district court in denying his Rule 35 motion. 

G. Adamcik’s life sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under 

Article I, section 6 of the Idaho Constitution.

1. Standard of Review

Our standard of review for claims of cruel and unusual punishment under Article I, 

section 6 of the Idaho Constitution was concisely summarized by this Court in State v. Grazian

as follows:

When reviewing a claim of cruel and unusual punishment the Court uses a 

proportionality analysis limited to cases which are out of proportion to the gravity 

of the offense committed. The Court compares the crime committed and the 

sentence imposed to determine whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate. 

This gross disproportionality test is equivalent to the standard under the Idaho 

Constitution which focuses on whether the punishment is so out of proportion to 

the gravity of the offense to shock the conscience of reasonable people. An intraand inter-jurisdictional analysis is appropriate only in the rare case where the 

sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime committed.

144 Idaho 510, 517, 164 P.3d 790, 797 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

“Where reasonable minds might differ as to the sufficiency of time of confinement, the 

discretion vested in the sentencing court in imposing sentence will be respected.” State v.

Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145, 814 P.2d 401, 405 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State 

v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992). 

2. Adamcik’s fixed life sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in 

light of his conviction for first-degree murder.

Adamcik argues that his fixed life sentence shocks the conscience of reasonable people, 

and is thus cruel and unusual punishment under Article I, section 6 of Idaho’s Constitution. 

Adamcik argues that the cruel and unusual nature of his sentence is demonstrated by: (1) the 

international rejection of fixed life sentences for juvenile offenders; and (2) the 
50

disproportionality between his fixed life sentence, on the one hand, and the lesser sentences 

given to other juveniles convicted of first-degree murder in Idaho, on the other. In support of his 

disproportionality claim, Adamcik incorrectly states that Idaho has never upheld a fixed life 

sentence for a juvenile offender. However, as noted above, a fixed life sentence for a minor was 

just recently upheld in State v. Windom. 

Conversely, the State argues that Adamcik’s sentence does not constitute cruel and 

unusual punishment because Adamcik has failed to show that a gross disproportionality exists 

between his sentence and his crimes. The State adheres to the notion that a fixed life sentence is 

appropriate for an offender convicted of first-degree murder. The State does not address whether 

Adamcik’s status as a juvenile is relevant in determining whether a gross disproportionality 

exists. 

In State v. Brown, this Court adopted the cruel and unusual punishment test proposed by 

Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 

concurring), requiring courts to “make a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the 

sentence imposed to determine whether the sentence leads to an inference of gross 

disproportionality,” thus rendering it unconstitutional. 121 Idaho 385, 394, 825 P.2d 482, 

491 (1992). 

To determine whether a sentence is cruel and unusual, this Court engages in a two-part 

inquiry. First, this Court must “make a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the 

sentence imposed to determine whether the sentence leads to an inference of gross 

disproportionality.” Brown, 121 Idaho at 394, 825 P.2d at 491. Where no inference of a gross 

disproportionality can be made, “there is no necessity to make any further proportionality 

review.” Id. at 394, 825 P.2d at 491. However, “[i]f an inference of such disproportionality is 

found, [the Court] must conduct a proportionality analysis comparing [the defendant’s] sentence 

to those imposed on other defendants for similar offenses.” State v. Olivera, 131 Idaho 628, 632, 

962 P.2d 399, 403 (Ct. App. 1998).

In State v. Thomas, the defendant was sentenced to fixed life after she pled guilty to the 

murder of her ailing boyfriend, as well as illegally collecting money from his social security and 

pension funds for eleven years following the murder. 133 Idaho 682, 685-88, 991 P.2d 870, 873-

76 (Ct. App. 1999). While analyzing Thomas’s cruel and unusual punishment claim, the Idaho 

Court of Appeals found that because “Thomas and her son premeditated the heartless and greed-
51

motivated murder of her ailing seventy-three year old boyfriend . . . [her] sentence [was] not 

grossly disproportionate to her crime and does not shock the conscience of reasonable people.” 

Id. at 687, 991 P.2d at 875. Consequently, the court found that it was “not necessary to conduct 

any further proportionality review” because no disproportionality existed. Id. 

Likewise, in State v. Brown, where the defendant “forced a female employee into a back 

room, beat her on the head with a brick, raped her, stabbed her twice in the chest with a knife, 

and cut her throat,” this Court upheld Brown’s fixed life sentence even though the victim 

survived the incident. 121 Idaho 385, 394, 825 P.2d 482, 491 (1992). Addressing Brown’s cruel 

and unusual punishment claim, this Court stated that “[t]he gravity of the offense in this case was 

very great. Brown not only raped the victim but almost killed her.” Id. at 394, 825 P.2d at 491. 

This court went on to “conclude that Brown’s sentence is not out of all proportion to the gravity 

of the offense, nor is the sentence so severe as to shock the conscience of reasonable people.” Id. 

Thus, in Brown “there [was] no necessity to make any further proportionality review.” Id.

Similarly, in State v. Shanahan, the court found that concurrent unified life sentences for 

a juvenile appellant who perpetrated a “premeditated and cold-blooded” murder were not out of 

proportion to the gravity of the offense committed such as to shock the conscience of reasonable 

people. 133 Idaho 896, 900, 994 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellant in Shanahan

entered a convenience store and snuck down the aisles until he stood behind the clerk; he then 

raised his gun and fired, killing the clerk. Id. at 898, 994 P.2d at 1061. Shanahan then removed 

money from the cash register and left. Id. The court found that a proportionality review was not 

necessary given that no inference of a gross disproportionality existed. Id. at 900, 994 P.2d at 

1063.

Adamcik’s fixed life sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under 

Article I, section 6 of Idaho’s Constitution because no gross disproportionality exists in this case. 

Adamcik conspired, carefully planned and executed the cold-blooded stabbing death of his 

fellow high school student, Stoddart, based solely on his desire to achieve fame as a serial killer. 

Like the heinous crimes committed by the defendants in Thomas and Brown, whose fixed life 

sentences were upheld on appeal, the gravity of the first-degree murder that Adamcik committed 

supports the severity of his fixed life sentence. Furthermore, the fact that Adamcik’s fixed life 

sentence falls within the sentencing parameters set out in I.C. § 18-4004 (entitled “Punishment 
52

for murder”) indicates that no disparity exists between the sentence imposed by the trial court 

and the gravity of Adamcik’s crime. 

Because we do not find the existence of a gross disproportionality, we decline to consider 

any of Adamcik’s proportionality arguments because “intra and inter-jurisdictional” analysis is 

only proper where the Court makes an initial finding that a gross disproportionality exists. State 

v. Matteson, 123 Idaho 622, 626, 851 P.2d 336, 340 (1993). Adamcik’s argument that this Court 

should find his sentence to be cruel and unusual due to Adamcik’s minority and the growing 

international rejection of life imprisonment for minor offenders is without merit. This Court has 

never held that extra-jurisdictional international conventions shall be considered in any way in 

interpreting and applying the Idaho Constitution. Adamcik’s sentence comports with Article I, 

section 6 of Idaho’s Constitution and is not cruel and unusual. 

IV. 

CONCLUSION

We hold that: (1) the jury was provided with sufficient evidence from which it could 

reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that Adamcik was guilty of murder in the first degree;

(2) the district court did not err in denying, in part, Adamcik’s motion to suppress; (3) even if

errors were committed in providing jury instructions, those errors were harmless; (4) the 

prosecution committed no fundamental error in closing arguments; (5) the doctrine of cumulative 

error does not necessitate a reversal; (6) the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

sentencing Adamcik; (7) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Adamcik’s Rule 

35 motion; and (8) Adamcik’s sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under 

the Idaho Constitution. Adamcik’s convictions and sentences are therefore affirmed.

Justices EISMANN CONCURS. 

Justice W. JONES, specially concurring:

I concur in the Court’s Opinion, but write separately in order to reconcile my dissent in 

State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 253 P.3d 310 (2011), with the Court’s holding here in Section 

III.F.2 affirming Adamcik’s fixed-life sentence. In Windom, I stated that the district court 

abused its discretion when it imposed a fixed-life sentence on a sixteen-year-old with a severe 

mental illness because an offender’s individual characteristics are relevant to the reprehensibility 

of a crime, contrary to the majority’s holding that these individual characteristics need not be 
53

taken into consideration in determining reprehensibility. 150 Idaho at 884–85, 253 P.3d at 321–

22. As I explained there, “[a] crime is less reprehensible—and therefore potentially less 

deserving of severe retribution—if the criminal has personally mitigating circumstances.” Id. at 

884, 321. The Court here analogizes this case to Windom and holds, consistent with the majority 

in Windom, that the nature of the crime alone is sufficient to support the fixed-life sentence. 

Under the facts of this particular case, I agree with the Court’s conclusion affirming the fixed-life 

sentence, but not its rationale. 

The district court’s imposition of a fixed-life sentence here is consistent with my dissent 

in Windom because, given Adamcik’s individual characteristics, the reprehensibility of this crime 

fully supports the fixed-life sentence. There are substantial and important differences between 

the facts of Windom and this case. The one main similarity between the two cases is that both 

Adamcik and Windom were 16 years old and committed murder in a particularly heinous way: 

Adamcik by stabbing a friend to death with a knife and Windom by beating his mother to death 

with a dumbbell. However, other than their respective ages at the time the crimes were 

committed, I do not find parallels in their individual characteristics such that I believe the district 

court abused its discretion in imposing a fixed-life sentence on Adamcik. Windom, on the other 

hand, had a psychotic disorder, paranoid schizophrenia, which caused him to kill his mother. Id.

at 885–86, 322–23. Adamcik had no such psychotic disorder. The only evidence here relates to 

personality disorders, not psychosis. The record indicates that Adamcik was “immature” and 

that he may have had Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder and a learning disability, but there 

was no suggestion this caused him in any way to murder Stoddart. Adamcik’s doctor testified 

that Adamcik did not have any “pathological drive or pathological desire that he would

personally harbor, that would have led him to these offenses,” and that there was no evidence of 

sociopathy. 

Rather, as shown in Adamcik and Draper’s video tape, the evidence shows that Adamcik 

murdered Stoddart in an attempt to achieve fame in the same manner as the Columbine killers. 

While it is true that Windom had a similar obsession with serial killers and violence, as I wrote 

in that case, “[t]here is no indication that Ethan’s offensive actions, remorselessness, and 

grandiose statements were anything but his psychosis manifesting itself.” Id. at 886, 323. The 

facts here simply do not indicate that a serious mental illness caused Adamcik to kill.
54

Also, in contrast to Adamcik, Windom reported his homicidal thoughts to authority 

figures and continually sought help weeks before the murder for his mental illness which was 

driving him toward violence and homicide. Id. at 886–87, 323–24. Adamcik on the other hand 

secretly plotted and planned the murder days before the killing, which was to be a tune-up or 

practice before other intended killings. 

Because I believe that the reprehensibility of the crime fully supports the fixed-life 

sentence imposed here, I agree with the Court that there is no need to consider rehabilitation in 

this case, and that Adamcik’s sentence was not an abuse of discretion and should be affirmed. 

BURDICK, C.J., dissenting as to Part III.A.2 and concurring with Justice Horton’s 

dissent on Part III.C. 2. I agree with the remainder of the majority opinion. My heart goes out to

the Stoddart family, friends and the Pocatello community for having to deal with this especially 

senseless, horrible act, but I feel I must dissent.

Although I have no doubt that Adamcik could have been convicted of first-degree murder 

under either a felony-murder or aiding-and-abetting theory, had they been presented to the jury, I 

am unable to concur with the majority’s finding that sufficient evidence was presented to the jury 

to support Adamcik’s conviction of first degree murder based upon an aiding and abetting 

theory. Therefore, I respectfully dissent as to Part III.A.2 of the majority’s opinion and with its 

decision affirming Adamcik’s conviction for first-degree murder. 

The jury was presented with no evidence as to the ordering of the stab wounds, nor the 

timeline over which they took place. Based upon the instructions given, when applied to the 

evidence presented, I cannot find that the jury reached its verdict, that Adamcik committed firstdegree murder, upon substantial and competent evidence.

1. The State presented insufficient evidence to support a jury conviction that Adamcik was the 

direct perpetrator of first-degree murder.

The majority finds that there was sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that: (1) 

two knives were used to murder Stoddart; (2) both knives inflicted potentially fatal wounds; and 

(3) one of the knives was used by Adamcik to inflict a potentially fatal stab wound. It is 

questionable whether sufficient evidence is in the record to support a finding that Adamcik

actually stabbed Stoddart, but assuming there was, these findings are insufficient to uphold the 

verdict entered. 
55

Dr. Skoumal performed the autopsy in this case and testified that Stoddart’s cause of 

death was “stab wounds to the trunk”. The majority interprets that finding as necessarily 

indicating that multiple stab wounds caused Stoddart’s death. However, in light of Dr. 

Skoumal’s testimony as a whole, I find that Dr. Skoumal was testifying that he could not 

determine which particular wound(s) caused her death. On cross examination, Dr. Skoumal 

stated that the “cause of death is stab wound to the trunk” and then “[t]he cause of death was 

stabbing to the trunk; that’s how it was done.” This interpretation is consistent with Dr. 

Skoumal’s overall testimony, in which he never identifies specifics about the manner of death, 

and only identifies certain wounds as “potentially fatal”. Thus, Dr. Skoumal’s testimony does 

not support a finding that Stoddart necessarily died of more than one stab wound but, rather, that 

one or more stab wounds caused her death.

There was no evidence presented supporting a conclusion that Adamcik inflicted a wound 

which caused, contributed to, or accelerated Stoddart’s death. If Adamcik did not inflict a 

wound while Stoddart was still alive his conviction would be barred by the doctrine of legal 

impossibility. See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The common law 

distinguishes between two types of impossibility—legal and factual—and provides that the 

former is a defense while the latter is not. . . . For example, legal impossibility occurs when A 

shoots a corpse believing it to be alive and intending to commit murder; the attempt does not 

amount to murder even if completed.”). Where Dr. Skoumal, who performed the autopsy on 

Stoddart, could not determine which wound was fatal, or how many wounds caused her death, I 

cannot find that there was substantial evidence supporting a jury finding that Adamcik inflicted a 

stab wound from which Stoddart died. Some wounds are described as “potentially fatal,” each 

could have been fatal on its own, but Dr. Skoumal could not determine when each wound was 

inflicted. Furthermore, during cross-examination, the State’s expert Dr. Garrison testified that, 

in his opinion, some of the wounds were inflicted post-mortem. Dr. Garrison noted that some of 

the wounds “would be potentially fatal, but it was my opinion the person was no longer viable 

and so, therefore, it would not have been a fatal wound under the circumstances. If you stab a 

person in the heart but if they’re already dead, it’s not a fatal wound.” 

2. The jury could not have found Adamcik guilty of first-degree murder under an aiding-andabetting theory where the State failed to argue that theory and the jury was not instructed on it.
56

Additionally, I wish to address the State’s argument that Adamcik’s conviction could be 

affirmed under an aiding-and-abetting theory of commission even though the jury was not 

instructed on that theory.

Idaho Code § 18-204 defines “principals” as:

All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or 

misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense or 

aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and 

encouraged its commission . . . are principals in any crime so committed.

Idaho Code § 18-205 states:

All persons are accessories who, having knowledge that a felony has been 

committed: (1) Willfully withhold or conceal it from a peace officer, judge, 

magistrate, grand jury or trial jury; or (2) Harbor and protect a person who 

committed such felony or who has been charged with or convicted thereof.

Idaho Code § 19-1430 abolishes the distinction between principals and accessories before the 

fact, providing:

The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal and between 

principals in the first[

11] and second[12] degree, in cases of felony, is abrogated; 

and all persons concerned in the commission of a felony, whether they directly 

commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, though 

not present, shall hereafter be prosecuted, tried, and punished as principals, and no 

other facts need be alleged in any indictment against such an accessory than are 

required in an indictment against his principal.

In State v. Johnson, this Court noted that “Idaho, consistent with many other jurisdictions, has 

abolished the distinction between principals and aiders and abettors, and instead treats aiding and 

abetting as a theory under which first-degree murder can be proved and not as a separate offense 

or a crime of a different nature.” 145 Idaho 970, 973, 188 P.3d 912, 915 (2008).

The State argues that even if the evidence submitted was only sufficient to convict 

Adamcik under aiding-and-abetting (or accomplice) liability, he has failed to show that the 

district court’s failure to instruct the jury on accomplice liability was fundamentally unfair. The 

State contends that, as Idaho has abolished the distinction between direct perpetrators and 

accessories, Adamcik’s right to a fair trial could not have been violated where the evidence at 

trial was sufficient to support his conviction, regardless of the theory argued. Adamcik argues 

that the State did not contend at trial that Adamcik was guilty of first-degree murder by aiding 

 11 A principal in the first degree is “[t]he perpetrator of a crime.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1312 (9th ed. 2009). 12 A principal in the second degree is “[o]ne who helped the perpetrator at the time of the crime.” Black’s Law 

Dictionary 1312 (9th ed. 2009).
57

and abetting, nor was the jury instructed on this theory and, therefore, the jury could not have 

convicted Adamcik for aiding and abetting, but only for actually killing Stoddart. 

The State argues that Adamcik never requested that the district court instruct the jury on 

aiding and abetting and has failed to show that the district court’s failure to so instruct 

constituted fundamental error. The State’s argument is misguided. It was the State’s duty to 

request that the jury be instructed regarding a theory of aiding and abetting if the State wished 

the jury to consider that theory in its deliberations. The district court’s failure to instruct the jury 

on aiding and abetting was neither fundamental error nor harmless error; it was no error at all. 

The State made a tactical decision to try Adamcik as a direct perpetrator of first-degree murder 

and not under an aiding-and-abetting theory. The jury heard no argument on an aiding-andabetting theory and was not instructed on an aiding-and-abetting theory; therefore, it necessarily 

must have convicted Adamcik of committing first-degree murder as a direct perpetrator.

It is the most fundamental tenet of a fair trial that a defendant may only be convicted for 

the crimes with which he is charged, this Court may not affirm a conviction on a theory that was 

never presented to the jury. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 270 n.8 (1991). As the 

United States Supreme Court stated in McCormick:

This Court has never held that the right to a jury trial is satisfied when an 

appellate court retries a case on appeal under different instructions and on a 

different theory than was ever presented to the jury. Appellate courts are not 

permitted to affirm convictions on any theory they please simply because the facts 

necessary to support the theory were presented to the jury.

Id. See also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937) (“Conviction upon a charge not 

made would be sheer denial of due process.”) Therefore, we could not affirm Adamcik’s 

conviction for first-degree murder on a theory of aiding and abetting.

Had the State charged Adamcik with attempted first-degree murder, first-degree murder 

under an aiding-and-abetting theory, or even felony murder, there is no doubt that substantial and 

competent evidence was presented that would have supported the jury’s verdict. Recognizing 

that State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974, 188 P.3d 912, 916 (2008), had not been released at the 

time of Adamcik’s trial, under the reasoning of that decision the State could have requested 

aiding-and-abetting instructions at the close of its evidence, even though the Information against 

Adamcik did not allege a theory of aiding and abetting. However, by charging Adamcik solely 

with first-degree murder and failing to offer any direct or circumstantial evidence to support the 

jury’s verdict that Adamcik actually inflicted a fatal stab wound, the State failed to present 
58

sufficient evidence to support a finding that each element of first-degree murder as charged had 

been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. I must respectfully dissent as well as join Justice 

Horton’s dissent. I agree with the remainder of the majority’s opinion.

HORTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join in Chief Justice Burdick’s dissent from Part III.A.2 of the Court’s opinion. I also 

dissent from Part III.C.2. Although I would vacate Adamcik’s sentence for first degree murder, 

I agree with the reasoning advanced in the remainder of the Court’s opinion.

I will approach the two sections of the opinion from which I dissent in a different 

sequence than did the majority. I do so because the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence 

presented at trial to support the verdict is defined by the question presented to the jury for its 

determination. My disagreement with the majority flows from my conviction that this Court 

may not evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial on a theory upon which the 

jury was not instructed. 

The majority’s opinion does not contain an explicit statement of the premises upon which 

it rests. A careful reading of the majority’s decision regarding the sufficiency of the evidence 

and the discussion relating to J.I. 10 and J.I. 12 reveals that the decision ultimately rests upon 

the following premises: (1) a jury need not be “expressly” instructed as to the law of principal 

liability based upon a theory of aiding and abetting another in the commission of a crime; and (2) 

this Court may disregard the instructions that the jury was provided which articulate the theory 

upon which the defendant was charged and view the sufficiency of the evidence as to a theory 

upon which the defendant may have been charged and for which jury instructions would have 

been appropriate. In accepting these premises, I believe that the majority has overstepped its 

appellate role and assumed the duties of the trier of fact. For that reason, I believe that my 

fellow dissenter has properly quoted Justice White’s statement in McCormick v. United States, 

500 U.S. 257 (1991):

This Court has never held that the right to a jury trial is satisfied when an 

appellate court retries a case on appeal under different instructions and on a 

different theory than was ever presented to the jury. Appellate courts are not 

permitted to affirm convictions on any theory they please simply because the facts 

necessary to support the theory were presented to the jury.

Id. at 270 n. 8. 
59

Part III.C.2 

I agree with the proposition advanced by the majority that a prosecutor’s information 

does not have to allege that a defendant aided and abetted another in the commission of a crime. 

Indeed, this is a proposition that this Court has consistently accepted for more than sixty years, 

beginning with the decision in State v. Ayres, 70 Idaho 18, 27-28, 211 P.2d 142, 147 (1949) (“he 

is presumed to know that he would be a principal and guilty as such whether he directly 

committed the acts charged or aided and abetted in the commission by another”) through our 

most recent decision on the subject in State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, ___, 247 P.3d 582, 

605-06 (2010) (rejecting defendant’s claim of error in giving aiding abetting instruction due to 

absence of allegation in indictment that defendant aided and abetted another). 

However, I do not view the critical issue presented in this appeal (at least as it relates to 

the conviction for first degree murder) as whether Adamcik’s due process rights were implicated. 

Rather, the related questions are (1) What charge did the jury receive? and (2) Does the 

majority’s holding violate Adamcik’s right to trial by jury?

 The majority concludes Part III.C.2 with the following statement:

Certainly, the jury in this case understood the State’s theory that Adamcik 

and Draper acted in concert to murder Stoddart: that Adamcik planned the 

murder; that he lay in wait with Draper to help carry out the murder; and that he 

inflicted at least one stab wound that could have killed Stoddart. These theories 

of first-degree murder are adequately described in the jury instruction provided in 

this case by requiring that the jury find that Adamcik engaged in conduct which 

caused Stoddart’s death. 

I do not agree that the instructions may reasonably be interpreted as instructing the jury 

as to the State’s theory that “Adamcik planned the murder; that he lay in wait with Draper to help 

carry out the murder; and that he inflicted at least one stab wound that could have killed 

Stoddart.” Rather, as the majority recognizes, “[t]he only conduct that the jury was instructed on 

regarding first-degree murder” is found in J.I. 10, which set forth the charging language of the 

information. 

J.I. 10 alleged that Adamcik murdered Stoddart “by purchasing knives and stabbing 

Cassie Stoddart from which the victim died in Bannock County, Idaho.” I agree with the 

majority’s conclusion that the reference to “purchasing knives” is mere surplusage. Thus, the 

only theory of murder upon which the jury was instructed is that Adamcik engaged in the 

conduct of “stabbing Cassie Stoddart from which the victim died.” Although the jury 
60

undoubtedly understood that the State’s evidence showed that “Adamcik planned the murder; 

that he lay in wait with Draper to help carry out the murder; and that he inflicted at least one stab 

wound that could have killed Stoddart,” the jury was simply not instructed on these theories of 

liability. 

The charge of first degree murder set forth in the Information did not allege that Adamcik 

planned the murder, nor did it allege that he lay in wait with Draper to help carry out the murder, 

nor did it allege that Adamcik inflicted at least one stab wound that could have killed Stoddart. 

Rather, the State elected to charge Adamcik as the person who slayed Cassie Jo Stoddart, 

alleging that he murdered Stoddart by “stabbing Cassie Stoddart from which the victim died.”13 

The instructions given by the district court reflected the theory upon which the State elected to 

charge Adamick with first degree murder. For that reason, I am deeply troubled by the 

majority’s certainty that “the jury in this case understood the State’s theory that Adamcik and 

Draper acted in concert in the commission of this murder. . . .” Although the jury may well have 

intuited that one who participates in a killing may be accountable for that act, it is undisputed 

that the district court did not instruct them as to the law governing the principal liability of an 

aider-and-abettor. The majority’s statement appears to disregard this Court’s oft-stated 

presumption that a jury follows the instructions they have received. See e.g. Phillips v. Erhart, 

151 Idaho 100, ___, 254 P.3d 1, 10 (2011). Instead, the majority appears to presume that the 

jury disregarded the instructions they were given in order to reach “the right result” based upon 

the evidence presented at trial. 

The majority, when discussing the adequacy of the jury instructions, states: “[A]s 

discussed at length in Part III.A.2, the State need not prove Adamcik inflicted the fatal wound, or 

any wound, so long as it proved he was an accomplice in Stoddart’s killing.” This statement 

ignores the fact that the only “conduct which caused the death of Cassie Jo Stoddart” which was 

the subject of instruction is that contained in the Information. 

 13 The State’s election to charge Adamcik as the individual who stabbed Stoddart to death is inexplicable, inasmuch 

as the State had previously persuaded a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Brian Draper murdered Stoddart by 

“stabbing Cassie Stoddart from which the victim died.” (Although it is not part of the record in this appeal, before 

Adamcik’s trial, Brian Draper was convicted of first degree murder for his role in Stoddart’s slaying. The language 

in the information setting forth the charge of first degree murder in that case was identical to that used in this case, 

save for the identity of Stoddart’s alleged killer.) I take it as a given that a person may be murdered only one time. 

Thus, I am utterly baffled by the State’s decision not to request an instruction relating to Adamcik’s liability as a 

principal for aiding and abetting Draper in the commission of the murder. 
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Although the majority relies on Ayres and State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 

(1953), in its discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence that Adamcik aided and abetted in 

Stoddart’s killing (which is incorporated into its analysis of the jury instructions in Part III.C.2), 

neither of these cases stands as precedent for the proposition that the jury charge need not 

articulate the grounds upon which a defendant may be found liable as a principal for the criminal 

acts of another.

In Ayres, this Court upheld a conviction for involuntary manslaughter in a case where the 

jury found that another, Arthur Trautman, was the driver at the time of a head-on collision which 

killed five people, including Trautman. This Court found that sufficient evidence supported the 

defendant’s conviction as a principal on a theory of aiding and abetting, 70 Idaho at 27-28, 211 

P.2d at 147, although the information charged that Ayres “did wilfully, unlawfully, and 

feloniously drive and operate said motor vehicle....” Id. at 24, 211 P.2d at 144-45. However, it 

is significant that the jury was explicitly charged in the jury instructions as to the legal theory 

upon which Ayres could be found guilty of the charge, even if he were not the driver.14 

In Owen, two defendants (Owen and Hastings) appealed their convictions and sentences 

for first degree murder, arising from the shooting death of Bert McCurry, the owner and operator 

of a grocery store, in the course of a robbery. 73 Idaho at 400, 253 P.2d at 205-06. The majority 

quotes a small portion of the Owen decision and concludes that “Defendants acting in concert are 

thus equally guilty of the crime charged.” The majority fails to note that the jury was 

 14 A review of the record in the Ayres case reveals that the jury received the following instruction: 

Secondly, I instruct you that if the owner of a dangerous instrumentality like an 

automobile knowingly puts that instrumentality into the immediate control of a careless and 

reckless driver, and sits by his side, without protesting, while such driver violates a statute or 

statues [sic] governing the driving of automobiles on the highways of this state, such owner is 

equally responsible with the driver if the latter’s violation of the law is the cause of the death of 

another.

Therefore, if in this case you find from the evidence that Trautman at and just prior to the 

collision of the two automobiles herein involved, was the driver of the defendant’s automobile, 

and that, whether you find that said Trautman was or was not under the influence of intoxicating 

liquor, but you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he drove said automobile at an 

excessive rate of speed and in such manner as to endanger the life and limb of any person upon 

said highway, or that he drove the same upon the wrong side of the said highway at a time and 

place when and where he was not confronted by any necessity for driving on such wrong side of 

the highway in order to avoid a sudden emergency, as by me explained in Instruction No. 11, 

herein, then, in such case, the defendant is guilty equally with the said Trautman of the violation 

of the law, and if such violation of law was the proximate cause of the death of the persons in the 

[other] car, the defendant is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, and you should so find by your 

verdict.
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specifically instructed that principals to a robbery are equally responsible for a killing committed 

in the course of the robbery, irrespective of which participant in the robbery actually committed 

the killing.15

Nor do I find the support the majority perceives in State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 44 

P.3d 1180 (Ct. App. 2002). Although I agree with the majority that the rule pronounced by the 

Court of Appeals in that case is sound, it simply has no application to this case. In Butcher, the 

district court instructed the jury as to the law of principal liability as an aider-and-abettor. This 

did not happen in this case, as the majority properly recognizes. 

For these reasons, I do not subscribe to the majority’s view that the sufficiency of the 

evidence should be judged to determine whether substantial, competent evidence exists to 

support a finding that Adamcik engaged in conduct that caused Stoddart’s death by aiding and 

abetting Draper in killing Stoddart. Consistent with Justice White’s statement in McCormick, I 

believe that the majority’s decision usurps the role of the jury and deprives Adamcik of his right 

to a jury trial, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 

I, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution.

Accordingly, I believe that the sole inquiry is that demanded by the district court’s 

instructions: did the State produce sufficient evidence to permit the jury to conclude beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Adamcik stabbed Stoddart, causing her death?16 This leads me to Part 

III.A. of the Court’s decision.

 15 Instruction No. 20 charged the Owen jury as follows: 

All persons concerned in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery, whether 

they directly commit the act constituting the offense or aid and abet in its commission, are equally 

guilty of all acts done by any of them in furtherance of the criminal offense.

If you find from the evidence in this case that the defendants, acting together an in 

concern and with the common design and purpose, went to the store of Bert McCurry to rob him 

and in attempting to accomplish such robbery one of the defendants shot and killed the said Bert 

McCurry with a pistol, then each defendant is equally guilty of said killing, even though such 

homicide was not the result intended or within the contemplation of the parties as part of their 

original design.

This charge is consistent with the allegation that Owen and Hastings acted in concert in the killing. The information 

alleged, in pertinent part, as follows:

And that the said defendants, William Lawrence Owen and Kenneth Raymond Hastings, did 

wilfully, unlawfully, knowingly and feloniously aid, encourage, propose, advise, counsel and abet 

each other in the unlawful commission of said crime. 

16 I have also considered the possibility that the omission of an aiding and abetting instruction was harmless error 

under the holding in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). In Neder, the Supreme Court stated: “Unlike such 

defects as the complete deprivation of counsel or trial before a biased judge, an instruction that omits an element of 

the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining 

guilt or innocence.” Id. at 9 (emphasis original). The court concluded that “where a reviewing court concludes 
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Part III.A

I join in Chief Justice Burdick’s dissent, as I do not believe that the State produced 

sufficient evidence to support a finding that Adamcik personally inflicted the stab wound that 

killed Stoddart. I would have no hesitation whatsoever in upholding a conviction if the jury had 

been instructed on a principal theory of criminal liability for aiding and abetting the slaying, 

However, I do not view myself as being free to weigh the evidence and determine that Adamcik 

is guilty of Stoddart’s murder on a theory not presented to the jury by way of instruction. That 

determination could only have been made by a properly instructed jury. As jeopardy has 

attached, the conviction cannot be vacated and the matter remanded for new trial. If my premise 

is correct that there was insufficient evidence produced at trial to support a finding that Adamcik 

inflicted a fatal stab wound, this Court can only reverse the conviction. For that reason, I 

respectfully dissent from the Court’s opinion affirming Adamcik’s conviction and sentence for 

first degree murder. 

 beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such 

that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be 

harmless.” Id. at 17. 

In my view, this case is not like Neder, in which there was an element of the offense which was 

uncontroverted and unchallenged. To the contrary, the defense focused on the charge which had been made and 

upon which the jury had been instructed, and argued for an acquittal based upon the absence of evidence that 

Adamcik directly participated in the killing. In closing argument, Adamcik’s attorney stated:

Some of these instructions can get a little bit confusing, but this is what it says – this is 

what the State must prove. They have to prove the charge. And look under Count I, Murder in the 

First Degree, that the said Torey Michael Adamcik, in the County of Bannock, State of Idaho, on 

or between the 22nd, 23rd days of September, 2006, did willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, and 

with premeditation, malice – and aforethought, kill and murder Cassie Stoddart, a human being, 

by purchasing knives and stabbing Cassie Stoddart, from which the victim died in Bannock 

County, Idaho.

Did they prove that? Did Dr. Skoumal establish that Torey Adamcik put a knife in Cassie 

Stoddart? They have to prove that or they have not met their burden. 

Defense counsel then returned to the lack of physical evidence to support the charge that Adamcik actually 

killed Stoddart:

What happens is you see the videotape and you start assuming stuff. You start assuming 

that is the end of the story – but it’s not. And it’s real hard to believe, isn’t it, it’s hard to believe –

that that Cassie is dead – that he didn’t do it. But all of the physical evidence proves that he didn’t 

do it.

There is not one single piece of evidence that ties Torey Adamcik to ever touching Cassie 

Stoddart. Not one. Not one. Out of all the things they have.

Given the defense focus on the charging language contained in the information, and the absence of 

evidence to support the charge, I cannot conclude that the omission of an aiding and abetting instruction was 

harmless. 
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