Filed 4/20/21 Khosravan v. Exxon Mobil Corp. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

MALEKEH KHOSRAVAN

,

Plaintiff and Appellant

,

v.

EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION
et al.,

Defendants and Respondents. B 304346

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19STCV20678 )

APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Maurice A. Leiter , Judge. Affirmed.
Weitz & Luxen berg, Benno Ashrafi and Josiah Parker for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Dentons US

, Jayme C. Long, Justin Reade Sarno,
Alexander B. Giraldo; Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher

, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Joshua S. Lipshutz and Joseph R. Rose for
Defendant s and Respondent s Exxon Mobil Corporation and ExxonMobil Oil Corporation

.2 King & Spa ld ing, Peter A. Strotz and Anne M. Voigts for
Defendant s and Respondent s Chevron Corporation, Chevron
U.S.A. Inc.

, and Texaco

, Inc

.

________________________ __

Malekeh Khosravan 1 appeal s from a judgment entered after the trial court granted the motions for summary judgment filed by defendants Chevron Corporation, Chevron U.S.A. Inc.

, and Texaco

, Inc . (Chevron defendants)

, and Exxon Mobil Corporation and ExxonMobil Oil Corporation (Exxon defendants).
Malekeh and her husband Gholam Khosravan brought claims for negligence, premises liability, and loss of consortium, alleg ing
Khosravan contracted mesothelioma caused by exposure to
asbestos wh ile he was an Iranian citizen working for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) from the late 1950s to 19 80 in
facilities controlled by defendants

. 2 The trial court concluded the
Chevron and Exxon defendants did not owe a duty of care to Khosravan

. On appeal

, Malekeh contends the Chevron and Exxon
defendants owed Khosravan a duty of care base d on their predecessors’ control over the Abadan refiner y in which
Khosravan worked and a 1954 contractual agreement between

1 During the pendency of this appeal, Gholam Khosravan died. On June 10 , 2020 we granted Malekeh Khosravan ’s motion
to be substituted in place of Gholam Khosravan as his successor in interest. To avoid confusion, w e refer to Gholam Khosravan as Khosravan and Malekeh by her first name.

2 It is undisputed that m esothelioma is a cancer associated with exposure to asbestos.3

the Iranian government and a consortium of international oil companies

, including defendants’ predecessors (the Agreement)

. Malekeh also asserts the Chevron and Exxon defendants

, through their predecessor s, owed a duty to protect refinery
workers like Khosravan from asbestos exposure based on a special relationship between the predecessor companies and the refinery workers arising from the Agreement . Alternatively,
Malekeh contends the Chevron and Exxon defendants owed refinery workers a duty of c are arising from a special relationship
betw een defendants’ predecessors and the Iranian companies that operated the refinery

. During the pendency of th is appeal, we decided Sabetian v. Exxon Mobil Corporation (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1054 , 1075 ( Sabetian )

, in which we held defendants’ predecessors 3 did not owe a duty of care to protect refinery workers from asbestos
hazards at the Abadan refinery . ( Id. at p. 1075. ) We concluded
neither the Agreement nor the plaintiffs’ evidence was sufficient

t o create a triable issue of fact that defendants’ predecessors
exercised direct control over day

- to

- day refinery operations

. ( Id. at p p. 1072

- 1075.) We invited the parties in this cas e to file supplemental letter briefs addressing the significance of our decision in Sabetian , which they have done

. We conclude the Chevron and Exxon defendants did not owe a duty of care to Khosravan, and we affirm.

3 Sabetian involved the same defendants who are parties to this action ; the plaintiffs were a former Iranian refinery worker at the Abadan refinery who later contracted mesothelioma and his wife. ( Sabetian, supra

, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1060 .)4 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Agreement 4
In 1951 the government of Iran nationalized its oil assets
, assuming control from the Anglo

- Iranian Oil Company , which was majority

- owned by the government of Great Britain

. In 1952
Iran formed NIOC to own and supervise all of Iran’s oil assets.
To afford access to global oil markets and avoid possible i n fluence
from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics , the United
States “ devised a plan in which it ‘enlisted’ American oil companies as its ‘instruments of foreign policy’ to help get the Iranian oil industry back on its feet.” 5
In 1954 American oil companies Gulf Oil Corporation, Socony

- Vacuum Oil Company, Inc., Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Standard Oil Company of California, and the Texas Company, and European oil companies Anglo

- Iranian Oil Company, Ltd., N.V. de Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij, and Compagnie Francaise des P é troles (collectively, the consortium members) entered into the Agreement with Iran and NIOC.
Defendant s Chevron Corporation and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. are

successor s in interest to Standard Oil Company of California and Gulf Oil Corporation. Defendant Texaco, Inc.

, is the successor of the Texas Company. The Exxon defendants are successors in

4 This discussion is based on undisputed facts taken from evidence submitted in connection with the summary judgment motions.

5 It is undisputed the Agreement principally covered the Abadan refinery. Consistent with the practice of the parties, we use “Abadan refinery” to refer generally to the facilities covered by the Agreement.5

interest to Socony

- Vacuum Oil Company, Inc.

, and Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. The Agreement consists of two parts, the first among the
consortium members , Iran, and NIOC and the second among Iran, NIOC, and the Anglo

- Iranian Oil Company, L td. Only p art I is at issue in this case. The recitals for part I provide d

, “WHEREAS, both th e Government of Iran and [NIOC] desire to increase the production and sale of Iranian oil, and thereby to increase the benefits flowing to the Iranian nation

. . . , but additional capital, experienced management, and technical skills are required in order to produce, refine, transport and market

. . . oil in quantities sufficient to effect this increase in a substantial

amount

. . . [¶] WHEREAS, the international oil [consortium members] are in a position and are willing to supply such capital,

managemen t and skills; and [ ¶ ]

. . . are in a position to market substantial quantities of Iranian oil

. . . throughout a large part
of the world over a considerable period of time, to the mutual
benefit of the Iranian nation and themselves

. . . [¶]

. . . the Parties are agreed that said companies should undertake the operation and management of certain of the oil properties

. . . of the Government of Iran and [NIOC]

, including the Abadan refinery, as hereinafter set forth

. . . [¶] [¶]

. . . n egotiation s have been amicably carried out with the object of assuring to the Government of Iran and [NIOC], on the one hand, a subs tantial export market for Iranian oil and a means of increasing the
material benefits to and prosperity of the Iranian people, and to the companies, on the other hand, the degree of security and the prospect of reasonable rewards necessary to justify the
commitment of their resources and facilities to the reactivation of the Iranian oil industry .”6 Article 3, section A of t he A greement pr ovided that to carry out the “ functions of exploration, producing, refining, transportation and the other functions specified in ” the Agreement , the consortium members incorporat ed t he “ Operating Companies ” under the laws of the Netherlands

. The Agreement
define d the Operating Companies as t he Iranian Oil Exploration and Producing Company (IOEPC) and Iranian Oil Refining Company (IORC)

. The consortium members incorporated a holding company

, Iranian Oil Participants Ltd. (IOP), which wholly owned IOEPC and IORC

. Each consortium member formed at least one wholly owned subsidiary

, each of which purchased 7 to 8 percent of IOP ’s shares

. In a rticle 3 , section A of the Agreement, the consortium members “jointly and severally guarantee[d] the due performance by the Operating Companies of their respective obligations under this Agreement.” Article 4 of the Agreement listed and “strictly limited” the “rights, powers and obligations of the Operating Companies as
well as the nature and extent of the su pervision to be exercised by Iran and NIOC

. . . to what is clearly stated in this Article.” (Art

. 4, § J.) Section A , paragraph (1) provide d IOEPC the right

to explore, drill for, produce, extract, process, store, transport, and ship crude oil and natur al gas. Section A , paragraph ( 2 ) provide d for IORC to have the right to refine and process crude oil and natural gas produced by IOEPC

. Article 4, section F set s forth “[t]he obligations of the Operating Companies to Iran and NIOC.” T hese obligations
in c luded the duty “to conform with good oil industry practice and sound engineering principles applicable and appropriate to operations under similar conditions in conserving the deposits of hydrocarbons, in operating the oilfields and refinery and in7

conduct ing development operations

. ” (Agreement, a rt

. 4, § F

, ¶ (1).) The O perating C ompanies were obligated “to carry on such exploration operations as are economically justifiable with a view to providing sufficient reserves to support the rate of production of oil ” ( id ., § F

, ¶ ( 2 )) ; “ to maintain full records ” and

“ accounts ” of their activities ( id ., § F

, ¶ (3)) ; “to minimize the employment of foreign personnel” ( id

., § F

, ¶ ( 4 )) ; and “to prepare in consultation with NIOC plans and programs for industrial and technical training and education and to cooperate in their
execution

. . . to replace foreign personnel as soon as reasonably practicable” ( id ., § F

, ¶ ( 5)). Article 4

, section I further provided, “[T]he Operating Companies shall determine and have full and effective management and control of all their operations,” subject to supervision of their operations by Iran and NIOC as set forth
in sections F and G

. Article 5 , section A of the Agreement stated, “Iran and
NIOC undertake that neither o f them, and no person other than the Operating Companies, shall at any time

. . . carry out

. . . any of the functions specified in [p]aragaphs (1) and (2) of Section A of Article 4 of this Agreement” ( defining the rights of IOEPC and
IORC to exploration, production, and refining )

. Article 7 of the Agreement granted the O perating C ompanies the right to “exclusive use” of certain lands owned by NIOC and Iran for “their operations under [the] Agreement.” 6 Under A rticle 17 of the Agreement, NIOC retained authority over all “non

- basic

6 It is undisputed NIOC owned and operated the Abadan refinery prior to execution of the Agreement, and t he Agreement’s grant of authority to the Operating Companies constituted a transfer of control over the functions in article 4 from NIOC to the Operating Companies.8

operations

, ” including medical and health services, industrial and technical training and education, and housing.
Article 18 provided consortium members “shall” purchase
crude oil and “may” purchase natural gas from N IOC for resale in Iran for export

. Consortium members were permitted to assign
their rights and obligations to purchase crude oil and natural gas

to their subsidiar ies , referred to as “ T rading C ompanies.” Under

a rticle 20 of the Agreement, the consortium members guaranteed certain oil production and export quantities on an annual basis. The Agreement contemplated a 25

- year lifespan , but in
1973 Iran assumed operations from IORC and IOEPC. IORC’s employees were transferred to a new entity formed by NIOC

, Oil Services Company of Iran

, which assumed operation of the Abadan refinery

.

B. The Complaint
Khosravan and Malekeh filed this action on June 13, 2019 against the Chevron and Exxon defendants and others , alleging causes of action for negligence, strict liability, premises liability, negligent joint venture, alter ego, fraud, and loss of consortium.
The complaint alleged the Chevron and Exxon defendants are the

successors in interest to consortium member s that were signatories t o the Agreement. The complaint alleged further
Khosravan was exposed to products containing asbestos while he
worked at the Abadan refinery and other Iranian facilities from approximately the 19 4 0s to the late 1970s

. In March 2019
Khosravan was diagnosed with mesothelioma caused by his exposure to asbestos at the se facilities

. The complaint alleged
the predecessors to the Chevron and Exxon defendants , as consortium members, contributed “capital, management and9

skills in the operation and management of the oil properties of [NIOC] , specifically the

. . . oil refinery in Abadan, Iran .” Further, the predecessor companies had “full and effective control
of the [Abadan] refinery

. . . in order to operate that refinery in conformity with good oil industry practice and sound engineering principles applicable to that industry.”

C. The Chevron and Exxon Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment The Chevron and Exxon defendants separately move d for summary judgment. They argued they owed no duty of care to Khosravan because they did not own, possess, or control the
facilities in which Khosravan alleged he was exposed to asbestos.
The Chevron d efendants filed a declaration of Frank G.
Soler , th e s enior s ubsidiary g overnance l iaison for Chevron Corporation, who stat ed the Chevron defendants’ predecessors “did not ever own, lease, maintain, manage, control, or supervise” the Abadan refinery. Soler averred a separate corporate entity
facilitated r equests from the Operating Companies to the
consortium members “for skilled personnel

. ” E mployees of the
consortium members sent to work at the Abadan refinery were “seconded

, ” meaning “their employment with the [consortium member] oil company terminated and such employees were then formally employed by IORC and/or IOEPC

. ”
The Chevron defendants also filed a declaration of former
Texaco , Inc.

, employee Carter B. Conlin, in which Conlin averred
he work ed at the Abadan refinery from 1958 to 1963. At the refinery, Conlin supervised approximately 20 engineers

,10

including “seconded employees” from other oil companies. 7
Conlin and the other second ed employees he supervised were “employed and paid by IORC for all work performed at the Abadan [r]efinery.” Conlin and the employees Conlin supervised did not take direction or payment from “their past oil company employer s or any oil company subsidiaries.” The Chevron
defendants filed excerpts from deposition testimony from Conlin
in Alkhas v. A.W. Chesterton Company (Super

. Ct. L

. A

. County, 2014, No. BC473745) , in which he testified employees loaned by
consortium members to IORC were thereafter treated as employees of IORC

. 8

D. The Khosravan s ’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment
The Khosravans opposed the Chevron and Exxon
defendants ’ motions, arguing the A greement and defendants’ control over operations at the Abadan refinery created a duty of

care owed by the Chevron and Ex xon defendants to Khosravan to protect him from asbestos exposure. 9 T he Khosravans filed

7 From 1958 to 1960, Conlin held the position of section head of the oil conversion process es section of the process engineering department for IORC at the Abadan refinery . From 1960 to 1963, he held the position of technical advisor for catalytic reforming in the refining operations department for IORC at the Abadan refinery

.

8 The Exxon defen dants also relied on the Soler declaration and the Conlin deposition transcript filed by the Chevron defendants.

9 The Khosravans abandoned their strict liability , negligent joint venture, and alter ego claims during the summary judgment11

multiple declarations and excerpts of deposition testimony with their opposition s

. Dr. Neill Weaver stated in his deposition in Altimore v

. Quigley Company, Inc. (District Ct. G alveston County, Texas, 2013, No. 03CV0588 ) he worked from 1951 to 1973 as a physician for Esso Standard Oil Company, an Exxon predecessor. 10
Dr. Weaver identifi ed a 1937 document entitled “Dust Producing Operations in the Production of Petroleum Products and Associated Activities,” which made suggestions for control and suppression of asbestos dust. When asked about Esso’s asbestos practices, Dr

. Weaver testified that when he began working in
Esso’s Baton Rouge , Louisiana refinery in 1951, “measures were in effect for the control of exposures throughout the refinery and the medical surveillance program for the workers potentially exposed to asbestos was in operation and had been in operation
for decades.” Bruce Larson, who testifi ed as Exxon Mobil Corporation ’s
person most qualified in Shahabi v. A.W. Chesterton Company ( Super

. Ct. L

. A

. County, 2012, No. BC421531)

, was asked, “Do you agree that Exxon and M obil had employees in high level

proceedings by fai ling to oppose summary adjudication of those claims. The Khosravans did not dispute IOP, IORC, and IOEPC “observed their corporate form and were adequately capitalized,” “each held regular meetings, maintained independent records, and had their own office rs and directors,” and each “maintained separate accounting records, officer s , and bank account s. ”

10 Weaver testified he worked for Esso Standard Oil Co., which later became Exxon. The Exxon defendants acknowledge previously doing business under the name Esso. It is not clear from the record which consortium member Esso succeeded.12

management at the Abadan refinery between 1955 and 1968?” He responded, “I think that’s probably correct, yes.” Larson also
testified it was “certainly possible” that a person with management responsibility could cause wo rk practices to be
followed at the refinery , but he clarified that the Abadan refinery “had a patchwork of various jobs represented by Iranian nationals, various jobs represented by people from the participating companies, and

. . . I don’t really know how control
was exercised in a situation like that.” Larson testified he believed Exxon employees who worked at the Abadan refinery
would be paid by the “holding company

, ” not Exxon, and he was
not aware of Exxon or Mobil “ exercis[ing] any direct control ove r anybody” working at the Abadan refinery. Testifying as Exxon Mobil Corporation’s person most qualified in Enayati v. A.W. Chesterton Company (Super

. Ct. L

. A

. County, 2009, No. BC400729) , Larson testified he had no direct knowledge of the health and safety practices of the Abadan refinery during the period from 1954 to the 1980s. But he stated it had “always been at least the policy of Exxon and Mobil
that

. . . the same rules and regulations that apply domestically apply to overseas facilities. So I’m assuming that

— and this is an assumption

. . . [¶]

. . . that comparable safety procedures and programs would be in place at [the Abadan] refinery as they
would have been elsewhere.” Larson affirmed he based his

ass umption on his experience with the standard operating procedures of the company. Daniel Agopsowicz testified as the person most qualified for
the Exxon defendants in his deposition in Sabetian v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 20 18
, No. BC699945 )

. When asked whether the Exxon defendants13

agreed “[i]t is part of good oil industry practice to ensure that the people on the refinery floor are kept safe,” Agopsowicz replied,
“Yes.” When asked whether the Exxon defendants’ predecessors “believe[d] at the time of signing [the Agreement] that [they] had an obligation to ensure that the Abadan [r]efinery was operated appropriately,” Agopsowicz replied, “If they signed [the Agreement], then they would agree with this, yes.” 11
Soler testifie d as the person most qualified for the Chevron
defendants in Sabetian v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2018, No. BC699945). Soler was asked in his deposition whether the statement made by Standard Oil of
California ( the predecessor of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. ) in its 1964 annual report was true that “ [t] he Iranian oil consortium has operated Iran’s principal oil [] producing, refining, and transport ation facilities for the past ten years

. ” Soler responded

, “It’s a statement th at was made by the company to stockholders.”
The Khosravans also attached a copy of a booklet entitled “Working with the Operating Companies in Iran 1958 ” (Iran booklet) issued by Socony Mobil Oil Company, Inc. ( an affiliate of
consortium member Socony

- Vac uum Oil Company, Inc.

, the predecessor in interest to the Exxon defendants ) to Socony’s employee Charles Schroeder

. Schroeder was transferred to Iran to work for the operating companies from 1958 to 1960

. Th e booklet explained IORC and IOEPC had conducted “production and refining of oil in Southern Iran in accord ance with the Agreement

. . . . [¶] The join t Head Office of these two Operating

11 It appears from the question and answer that this testimony was in the context of questions about the Agreement. However, the record does not contain the prior page of t he deposition transcript.14

Companies is located in Teh e ran, from which all activities of the Companies are direct ed. ” A section entitled “Terms and Conditions of Employment” stated, “Employees on loan assignment from a Member Company will remain employed by such Member Company but will be subject to these conditions for the period of their Company Service, unless ot herwise provided in
these conditions.” The booklet further stated the operating companies would pay the salaries of “loan employees

, ” with monthly deductions from the total salary paid for “Iranian
income ta x and electricity tax or for services provided b y the [operating companies] ,” unless alternative arrangements were made between the Operating Companies and the consortium
member or its affiliated company

. With regard to “operational requirements,” the booklet stated, “Whether he is directly engaged by the [ Operating Companies ] or on loan assignment from a Member Company, the employee shall give his whole time
services to the [ Operating Companies ]

. . . , in accordance with
the orders and directions from time t o time given to him by the [ Operating Companies ]

. . . , and will work and reside in such places as the [ Operating Companies ] may from time to time require, and will abide by all applicable rules, regulations and other practices of the [ O perating C ompanies ]

. . . from time to
time in effect.”
The Khosravans attached excerpts of Conlin’s deposition

tes t imony in Sarooie v. Asbestos Corporation Limited (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2015 , No. BC 529503 )

. Conlin was asked

, based on
the Iran booklet ’s statement that loan employees “will remain employed” by the consortium member or affiliate company while
on loan to the O perating C ompanies

, whether Conlin wa s employed by Texaco when he worked for IORC at the Abadan15

refinery

. Conlin responded , “It appears so, according to this definition.” When asked whether this “was the same definition you were working under when you were in Iran,” Conlin responded, “Yeah. The main two stipulations were that we would have the right to come back to a job of equal status, and that our benefit plans would remain in effect.” The Khosravans did not dispute the fact s set forth in t he
Exxon defendants ’ undisputed material facts that Khosravan was

“ employed by ” NIOC or IORC

, and not by the Exxon defendants or their predecessors

. 12 Nor did the Khosravans dispute “IORC conducted the ‘basic’ refining functions” at the Abadan r efinery. Likewise, the Khosravans did not dispute that the predecessors
to the Chevron defendants did not “select, procure, manufacture, distribute, sell, or ins tall any asbestos

- containing products or equipment” at the Iranian facilities. The Khosravans also did not dispute that IOP did not operate any Iranian oil facilit ies

.

E. The Trial Court’s Ruling and Entry of Judgment
On December 6 , 2019 t he trial court gra nted the Chevron and Exxon defendants’ motions for summary judgment. In its written ruling, the court found the Khosravans failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding “whether [d] efendants owned or

12 The Khosravans disputed whether Khosravan was ever supervised or directed by an employee of the Exxon defendants or their predecessors, but they did not cite to any evidence that supported their contention other than the Agreem ent. Further, i n response to the Exxon defendants’ separate statement, the Khosravans contended the seconded employees “remained employed by the [c]onsortium member,” citing to the testimony of Agopsowic z and Conlin, as well as the Iran booklet.16

controlled the Abadan oil refinery, or any other Iranian site

, where [Khosravan] claims that he was exposed to asbestos ”;

“ whether [ Khosravan ] was an intended beneficiary under the Government Agreement; whether the Government Agreement

c reated a special relationship between [d] efendants, and/or their predecessors, and [ Khosravan ] ; and whether [d] efendants negligently performed their obligations under the Government Agreement .” 13
On December 24 , 20 20 the trial court entered a judgment of
dismissal in favor of the Chevron and Exxon defendants

. The
Khosravans timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review on Summary Judgment Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no
triable issues of mater ial fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018)

4 Cal.5th 607, 618 ( Regents ); Delgadillo v. Television Center, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App. 5th 1078, 1085.) “‘“‘“We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers except that to which objections were
made and sustained.”’ [Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”’”

13 In ruli ng on the motions for summary judgment, the trial
court appears to have overruled all evidentiary objections made by the parties. The parties do not renew their objections on appeal, and we do not consider them.17

( Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 347; accord, Valdez v. Seidner

- Miller, Inc. (2019) 33 Cal.App. 5th 600,
607 ( Valdez ) .) A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of presenting evidence that a cause of action lacks merit because the plaintiff cannot establish an element of the cause of
action or the re is a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853; Valdez , supra , 33 Cal.App. 5th at p

. 607 .) If the defendant satisfies this initial burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff t o present evidence demonstrating there is a triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar , at p. 850; Valdez , at p

. 607 .)

B. Principles of Contract Interpretation

“ ‘ The rules governing the role of the court in interpreting a written instrument are well established. The interpretation of a contract is a judicial function. [Citation.] In engaging in this function, the trial court “ give[s] effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed ” at the time the contract was executed. [Citation.] Ordinarily, the objective intent of the contracting parties is a legal question determined solely by reference to the
contract’s terms. [Citation s .] ’ ” ( Brown v. Goldstein (2019)
34 Cal.App. 5th 418, 43 2 ; accord, State of California v.
Continental Ins. Co

. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 186, 195 ; Sabetian, supra

, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1069 .) “‘ Extrinsic evidence is admissible, however, to interpret an agreement when a material term is ambiguous. [Citations.] ’ ” ( Brow n , at p. 432; accord, Sabetian

, at

p

. 1069 .)18 “ The law has long distinguished between a ‘ covenant ’ which creates legal rights and obligations, and a ‘ mere recital ’ which a party inserts for his or her own reasons into a contractual
instrument. Recitals are given limited effect even as between the parties .” ( Emeryville Redevelopment Agency v. Harcros Pigments,
Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App. 4th 1083, 1101 ; accord, Hunt v. United
Bank & Trust Co. (1930) 210 Cal.108, 115 [ “ Recitals or preambles prefixed to an agreement may or may not have binding force. If they form part of the operative covenants of the instrument in such a way as to show it was designed and intended that they should form part of it, they will be so construed. ” ] ; O ’ Sullivan v. Griffith (1908) 153 Cal. 502, 506 [ “ A covenant or warranty is never implied from a mere recital.”]; Sabetian, supra

, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1069 .) However, “[i] f the operative words of a grant are doubtful, recourse may be had to its recitals to assist
the construction. ” ( Civ. Code, § 1068 ; 14 see Sabetian , at p. 1069; Golden West Baseball Co

. v. City of Anaheim (1994)
25 Cal.App. 4th 11, 38 [language labeled “recital” was actual ly covenant because it contained operative promise and recourse to language was necessary to identify real property subject to the agreement].)

14 All further undesignated statutory refere nces are to the Civil Code.19

C. The Khosravans Failed To Raise a Triable Issue of Fact as

to Their Negligence and Premises Liability Claims 15

1. Duty of c are

“ The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability
claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury. ” ( Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158 ( Kesner ) ; accord, Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App. 4th 994, 998 .) “ Recovery in a negligence action depends as a threshold matter on whether the
defendant had ‘ “ a duty to use due care toward an interest of [the plaintiff’s] that enjoys legal protection a gainst unintentional
invasion. ” ’” ( Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019)
7 Cal.5th 391, 397 ; accord, Sabetian , supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at

p. 1070 .)

15 The Chevron and Exxon defendants argue we should not reach the merits of Malekeh’s arguments on appeal because the law of the case doctrine applies to bar relitigation of the issues in light of the Court of Appeal ’s unpublish ed decision in Malek v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (Nov. 14, 2 0 1 9 , B2709 57 ) [nonpub. opn.] 2019 WL 6001030, noting the Malek case and this case were coordinated as part of LAOSD Asbestos Cases. (Nov. 14, 2019, B270957) [nonpub. opn.] 2019 WL 6001030

. “‘ “ The doctrine of

‘ law of the case ’ deals with the effect of the first appellate decision on the subsequent retrial or appeal : The decision of an appellate court, stating a rule of law necessary to the decision of the case, conclusively establishes that rule and makes it determinative of the rights of the same parties in any subsequent retrial or appeal in the same case. ”’” ( Leider v. Lewis (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1121, 1127 .) Khosravan was not a party to the Malek appeal and

, therefore

, we d o not apply the l a w of the case doctrine.20 “In general, each person has a duty to act with reasonable care under the circumstances.” ( Regents , supra , 4 Cal.5th at

p. 619; accord, Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1077, 1083 ( Vasilenko ) .) As section 1714 provides, “ Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasion ed to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself. ” “ ‘ [I] n the absence of a sta tutory provision establishing an exception to the general rule of

. . . section 1714, courts should create one only
where “ clearly supported by public policy. ” ’” ( Kesner , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p

. 1143 ; accord, Regents, supra

, 4 Cal.5th a t p. 628 [“The court may depart from the general rule of duty

. . . if other policy considerations clearly require an exception.”]; Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 771 ( Cabral ) .) In determining whether a n exception to section 1714 applies, courts cons ider “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury,
the closeness of the connection between the defendant ’ s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
defendant ’ s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk inv olved.” ( Rowland v. Christian (1968)
69 Cal.2d 108, 113 ( Rowland ) ; accord

, Kesner, supra

, 1 Cal.5th at

p. 1143 .)
A defendant’s control o ver property is sufficient to create a duty of care owed to persons using the property. ( Alcaraz v. Vece21

(1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1162, 116 6 [ affirming reversal of summary judgment because there were triable issues of fact as to landlord’s control of strip of city land where landlord had

“ maintained the lawn

. . . and, subsequent to the incident at issue, constructed a fence sur round ing the entire lawn”] ; Sabetian , supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071; Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App. 4th 32, 37 [trial court should have allowed plaintiff to plead that defendant restaurant failed to warn patrons leaving the restaurant that only a right turn could safely be made from its parking lot although accident occurred on adjacent roadway].)

“ Premi ses liability ‘ “ is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises” ’ ; accordingly, ‘ “ mere possession with its attendant right to control conditions on the premises is a sufficient basis for the impositi on of an affirmative duty to act. ” ’” ( Kesner , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 1158 ; accord, Taylor v. Trimble (2017)
13 Cal.App. 5th 934, 943

- 944 [“l andowners are required ‘to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition’ [citation s ] , and to use due care to eliminate dangerous conditions on their property” ] .) However, “ [a] defendant cannot be held liable for the defective or dangerous condition of property which it did not own, possess, or control. Where the absence of ownership, po ssession, or control has been unequivocally established, summary judgment is proper. ” ( Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital ( 1985) 38 Cal.3d 112, 134 ; accord, Sabetian

, supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071; Seaber v. Hotel Del Coronado (1991) 1 Cal.App. 4th 481 [ hotel did not owe duty to patron who
was struck and killed in a marked crosswalk outside hotel ’ s
entrance ] ; cf. Vasilenko, supra , 3 Cal.5th at p

. 1085 [church had22

duty toward invitees who crossed public street to get to parking
lot across the street because the church increas ed the invitees’
exposure to the dangers of the street by placing and maintaining
the parking lot on the other side of the street] .)

“ [S] ection 1714 does not

. . . impose a presumptive duty of care to guard against any conceivable harm that a negligent act might cause. ” ( Southern California Gas Leak Cases , supra , 7 Cal.5th at p

. 399 ; accord

, Sabetian, supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at

p. 1071; Dekens v. Underwriters Laboratories Inc. (2003)
107 Cal.App. 4th 1177, 1187

- 1188 [ p laintiffs failed to raise a
triable issue of material fact whether defendant “ undertook the responsibility to guarantee [decedent’s] safety from cancer

causing asbestos through its process of testing and certifying small appliances as safe from inj ury due to fire, electrical shock, or injuries from sharp protruding objects ” ] .)

2. The Khosravans failed to raise a triable issue of f a ct as to the Chevron and Exxon d efendants’ ownership,

p ossession, or c ontrol of the Iranian f acilities
Malekeh acknowledges the central question is whether the
Chevron and Exxon defendants (as successors to the consortium members) had active supervisory and management control over the Abadan refinery premise s

. Malekeh does not dispute NIOC, and later Iran, not th e consortium members, owned the facilities where Khosravan was exposed to asbestos

. However, s he
contend s the consortium members controlled the sources of
asbestos at the Abadan refinery where Khosravan was exposed.
She also argues the Agreement created a duty of care by providing for the consortium members to create the Operating Companies, to ensure the Operating Companies would use “good23

oil industry practice [s] ,” and to promise to purchase oil for export, and guarantee the production and exportation o f specified quantities of oil.
As we concluded in Sabetian

, “ [T] he Chevron and Exxon
defendants ’ commitments in the Agreement do not demonstrate
their control over the Abadan refinery

. ” ( Sabetian , supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1072 .) W e observed

, “ Article 1 of the Agreement defined ‘ Operating Companies ’ by express reference only to IOEPC (the exploration and production company) and IORC (the refining company), to the exclusion of the separately
defined term of ‘ [c]onsortium members. ’ The Agreement gave Iran and NIOC supervisorial authority over the Operating Companies , with IORC and NIOC sharing control of the Abadan refinery

. As discussed, IORC controlled the refining and processing of the crude oil and natural gas at the refinery ( a rt

. 4, § A, ¶ (2)) and NIOC controlled the ‘ non

- basic operations, ’ including housing, medical and health services, and industrial and technical training and education ( a rt

. 17, §§ A, ¶ (1), B). ” Contrary to [plaintiff] ’s assertion the Chevron and Exxon
defendant s’ predecessors had effective control over the Abadan
refiner y , the Agreement expressly stated “ ‘ no person other than the Operating Companies, shall at any time

. . . carry out

. . . any of the functions ’ ” of exploration, production, and refining , and the

‘ nature and extent of the foregoing rights, powers and obligations of the Operating Companies as well as the nature and extent of the supervision to be exercised by Iran and NIOC shall be strictly limited to what is clearly stated in [ a rticle 4]. ’ ” ( Sabet ian

, at

p. 1072.)
We concluded that the consortium members ’ or their
subsidiaries ’ owne rship of 7 to 8 percent of the shares of IOP

,24

which in turn owned IOEPC and IORC, was “ not sufficient to create a duty o f care as to refinery workers employed by the
O perating C ompanies,

. . . absent evidence supporting the piercing of the corporate veil based on the alter ego doctrine

. ” ( Sabetian , supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at p . 1072
, citing Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 300 [to pierce the corporate veil, a plaintiff must show “ ‘ (1) that there be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist and (2) that, if the

acts are trea ted as those of the corporation alone, an inequitable
result will follow ’ ” ] and Curci Investments, LLC v. Baldwin (2017)

14 Cal.App. 5th 214, 220 [“Ordinarily a corporation is considered a separate legal entity, distinct from its stockholders, officers and directors, with separate and distinct liabilities and obligations. ” ] .) Further, as in Sabetian

, to the extent the consortium
members controlled IOP, which owned the Operating Companies,
the Khosravans never presented evidence to support liability of
I O P as the parent corporation. ( See Sabetian , supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1073
, citing Waste Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App. 4th 105, 110 [“[A] parent corporation is not liable for injuries of a subsidiary ’ s employee in the absence of evidence establishing a duty owed by the parent corporation to the employee .”].) Here

, as in Sabetian

, the
Khosravans abandoned their alter ego claims during the

s ummary judgment proceedings.
In Sabetian we also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the consortium members had the ability to intervene in refinery management to meet the ir obligations under the Agreement
based on the consortium members ’ incorporation of the Operating Companies ; their joint and several guarantee of the due25

performance of the Operating Companies to Iran and NIOC, including the commitment “ ‘ to conform with good oil industry

pr a c tice ’ ” ; and their guarantee to Iran and NIOC of the productio n and exportation of certain quantities of oil

. ( Sabetian,

supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1073

. ) Instead, t he consortium
members would satisf y their commitments under the Agreement by their creation of independent corporate entities (the Operating Companies) to provide the necessary day

- to

- day management and control of the Abadan refinery because “ the Agreement tasked IORC and NIOC, not the consortium members , with refinery operations

. ” ( Ibid. ) Further, “IORC’s commitment to conform with good indu stry practice was explicitly stated in the Agreement as an obligation to Iran and NIOC

, as were the consortium members’ guarantees

. ” ( Ibid. ) 16
W e also reviewed the deposition testimony submitted by the plaintiffs in Sabetian (also relied on by the Khosrav ans) and
concluded , “ The testimony of Larson, testifying as Exxon Mobil Corporation’s person most qualified , that ‘ there may have been

some ’ Exxon or Mobil employees in high level management positions at the Abadan refinery is consistent with defendants’
evidence that employees of consortium members who worked at

16 We also rejected the argument “defendants’ control over the Abadan refinery is demonstrated by the recital language in the Agreement ,” concluding “the recital language referring to the willingness of the consortium members to provide their management abilities and their agreement to undertake the operation and management of the oil facilities was by its own terms limited by the specific provisions of th e Agreement that vested responsibility for operation and control in the Operating Companies and NIOC.” ( Sabetian, supra

, 57 Cal.App.5th at
p p. 1073

- 1074. )26

the Abadan refinery were loaned to the refinery and under the
control of and paid by IORC. For example, Soler , the senior subsidiary governance liaison for Chevron Corporation, declared
that consortium members sometimes provided ‘ skilled personnel ’ to the Abadan refinery in response to requests from the Operating Companies

, but these workers were then ‘ formally employed ’ by the Operating Companies, not their former consortium member employer. Similarly , Conlin , who in 1958

was an assistant chief design engineer employed by Texaco, Inc.,
testified that from 1958 to 1963 he was seconded to work at the Abadan refinery, at which time he was employed and paid by
IORC and took direction from IORC, not Texaco , Inc.

, or other American oil companies

. Further, Larson testified he was not
aware of Exxon or Mobil ‘ exercis[ing] any direct control over anybody ’ working at the Abadan refinery. ” ( Sabetian, supra,
57 Cal.App.5th at p. 25.) Contrary to Malekeh’s contention in her supplemental brief, the additional evi dence relied on by the Khosravans did not
create a triable issue of fact that the consortium members had control over operations at the Abadan refiner y

. Malekeh
contends the Iran booklet establishes that employees loaned by
the consortium members or their affiliates remained employees of the foreign company while working for the Operating Companies
in Iran , distinguish ing this case from Sabetian . Malekeh also relies on Conlin’s deposition testimony in which he acknowledged
that while he worked for IORC in Iran

, he remained an employee
of Texaco , as defined by the Iran booklet, explaining the “ main two stipulations were that we would have the right to come back to a job of equal status, and that our benefit plans would remain
in effect.” However, the booklet also dictate d the loan ed27

employee would work “ in accordance with the orders and directions from time to time given to him by the [Operating Companies]

. . . and will abide by all applicable rules, regulations and other practices of the [Operating C ompanies]

. . . from time
to time in effect.” This provision is consistent with Conlin ’s testimony that workers in the Iranian refinery did not take direction from “their past oil company employers or any oil company subsidiaries.” Further, n either the b ooklet n or Conlin’s testimony show s that employees of the consortium members who were seconded to the Abadan refinery as management employees were paid by the consortium members or their work was directed
or controlled by the consortium members. 17

17 Malekeh also relies on Agopowicz’s testimony in which he agreed that the Exxon defendants’ predecessors “believe[d] at the time of signing [the Agreement] that [they] had an obligation to ensure that the Abadan [r]efinery was operated appropriately

. ” But as we c oncluded in Sabetian

, “ [T] he consortium members’ guarantees were to Iran and NIOC and fall short of evidence defendants exercised direct control of day

- to

- day operations at the refinery. Further, although Agopowicz was designated as the person most qualif

ied for the Exxon defendants, his testimony was not based on personal knowledge of the consortium members’ intent in entering into the Agreement, but his reading of the Agreement. ” ( Sabetian , supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075, fn. 16 .) We similar ly reject Malekeh’s reliance on the statement of Chevron’s predecessor to stockholders in its 1964 annual report that “ [t] he Iranian oil consortium has operated Iran’s principal oil[] producing, refining, and transportation facilities for the past ten years
, ” and her reliance on the Exxon defendants ’ admission in their separate statement of facts that the consortium members “were to play a role in the operation and management of the Abadan refinery to ensure availability of ‘sufficient oil products’28 Malekeh ’ s reliance on the holding in Kesne r , supra , 1 Cal.5th 1132 is misplaced

. In Kesner

, the Supreme Court held
that employers and premises owners ha ve a duty to protect family members of on

- site workers from secondary exposure to
asbestos carried home on the bodies and clothing of the workers

. ( Id. at p. 11 40 .) The Kesner court started from the premise that
under section 1714
, “ ‘ the general duty to take ordinary care in
the conduct of one ’ s activities ’ applies to the use of asbestos on an

owner ’ s premise s or in an employer ’ s manufacturing processes ” ( Kesner , at p. 1144 ), but it considered the Rowland factors to
determine “ ‘ whether a categorical exception to that general rule
should be made ’ exempting property owners and employers from potential liability to individuals who were exposed to asbestos by way of employees carrying it on their clothes or person. ” ( Id . at

p. 1145 , quoting Cabral, supra , 51 Cal.4th at p

. 774 .) The Kesner

c ourt con cluded it was “entirely foreseeable” that workers would bring asbestos dust home at the end of the day if adequate precautions were not taken, and

, therefore

, “[t]he foreseeability factors weigh in favor of finding a duty.” ( Kesner , at p

. 1149

. )
Unlike the allegations in Kesner , there is no evidence the Chevron and Exxon defendants operated or controlled the Abadan refinery or the sources of asbestos at the refinery

, thereby imposing on them a duty under section 1714 to protect

‘to marke t substantial quantities of Iranian oil

. . . . ’ ” In context, both statements refer to the consortium members’ creation of the Operating Companies to operate and manage the Abadan refinery, their provision of seconded employees to the Operating Companies, and their ownership interest in IOP . This evidence also fall s short of evidence showing defendants exercised direct control of the day

- to

- day operati ons at the refinery.29

refinery workers li ke Khosravan from exposure to asbestos. ( See Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital, supra , 38 Cal.3d at

p

. 134.) Khosravan was employed by NIOC and IORC on premises operated by NIOC and I OR C. This is in contrast to the allegations at issue in Kesner th at the defendant’s predecessors

were “ engaged in active supervisory control and management of
asbestos sources ” at the workplace

. ( Kesner

, supra , 1 Cal.5th at

p

. 1161 .)

3. Malekeh f

ailed t o raise a triable issue of fact the
A greement c reated a s

pecial r elationship between defendants’ p redecessors and Khosravan
Malekeh contends the Chevron and Exxon defendants (through their predecessor companies) owed a duty to protect refinery workers like Khosravan from asbestos exposure based on a special relationship between the consortium members and the refinery workers arising from the consortium members’ guarantee in the Agreement of the Operating Companies’ “due performance” under the Agreement, rely ing on Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647 ( Biakanja ) and J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799 ( J’Aire ). Under Malekeh ’s argument, the Chevron and Exxon defendants owed a duty to the refinery workers because injury to refinery workers from asb estos exposure was reasonably foreseeable under the Agreement. Further, Malekeh points to the Operating Companies’ obligation to conform to “good oil industry practice and sound engineering principles.” We rejected th is argument in Sabetian , holding the
J’Aire factors d id not support imposition of liability on the
Chevron and Exxon d efendants. ( Sabetian , supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075.)30 “A duty running from a defendant to a plaintiff may arise from contract, even though the plaintiff and the defendant are not in privity. [Citations.] Under these circumstances, the
existence of a duty is not the general rule, but may be found based on public policy considerations.” ( Lichtman v. Siemens Industry Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App. 5th 914, 921 ( Lichtman ) [company responsible for maintaining battery backup system for traffic signals owed duty of care to plaintiffs who were injured in traffic collision during power outage in which traffic signal stopped functioning] ; J’Aire, supra , 24 Cal.3d at pp. 802, 804

- 805 [lessee who operated a restaurant alleged sufficient facts to state
a cause of action for negligence to recover lost income from dilatory performance by contractor hired by owner of building to renovate restaurant] ; Biakanja, supra

, 49 Cal.2d 647
, 651 [ notary public who drafted a will for the decedent owed a duty of care to

an estate beneficiary who was not in contractual privity with the notary public ] ; see generally Aas v. Superior Court (2000)

24 Cal.4th 627, 637

- 645 ( Aas ) [detailing evolving case law]

, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Rosen v.
State Farm General Ins. Co. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1070, 1079

- 1080 .)
Under the balancing test articulated in Biakanja and
J’Aire , in determining whether a duty of care arises from a contract in favor of a noncontracting party, the Supreme Court considered “[ ( 1 ) ] ‘ the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, ’ [ ( 2 ) ] ‘ the foreseeability of harm to [ him ]

, ’ [ ( 3 ) ] ‘ the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, ’ [ ( 4 ) ] ‘ the closeness of the connection between the
defendant’s conduct a nd the injury suffered, ’ [ ( 5 ) ] ‘ the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, ’ and [ ( 6 ) ] ‘ the policy of preventing future harm. ’ ” ( Southern California Gas Leak Cases,31

supra , 7 Cal.5th at p. 401 , citing J’Aire, supra , 24 Cal.3d at

p. 804 ; accord, Go onewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817,
838 ( Goonewardene ) ; 18 Aas, supra , 24 Cal.4th at p. 644; Stewart,

supra , 55 Cal.2d at p. 863 ; see Biakanja, supra

, 49 Cal.2d at

p. 650 .)
As we concluded in Sabetian

, “ the J’Aire factors do not support imposition of liability on the Chevron and Exxon defendants by virtue of the consortium members’ guarantee in

a rticle 3 of the Operating Companies’ performance of their obligations under the Agreement. Most significantly, under the first factor, the Agreement was not intended to affect

. . . refinery workers, but rather, it was intended to accelerate Iranian oil production and exportation to the global market. Indeed, the obligations of the Operating Companies most relevant to prote ction of the refinery workers

— to conform with good industry practice and prepare plans and programs for industrial and technical training and education

— were specifically owed under the Agreement ‘ to Iran and NIOC. ’ [Khosravan] is unlike the plaintiff in J ’Aire , a lessee whose restaurant business was

18 In Goonewardene , supra , 6 Cal.5th at p age 838 , the Supreme Court observed additional “policy considerations that may appropriately be considered in determining whether a tort duty of care should be recognized or imposed in the absenc e of privity of contract” included whether recognition of the duty of

care “ would (1) impose liability out of proportion to fault, (2) be unnecessary in light of the prospect of private ordering [of a product or service] , and (3) would likely have an adver se effect on the availability of [a defendant’s] services .” Because Malekeh has not argued that consideration of these additional factors supports finding a duty of care, we focus on the factors in the Biakanja and J’Aire balancing tests as briefed by the parties.32

interrupted by a contractor’s renovations to improve the
restaurant, or the plaintiff in Biakanja , the sole beneficiary of a will the notary public negligently failed properly to attest

. ” ( Sabetian , supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1078, citing J’Aire, supra

, 24 Cal.3d at p

. 804 and Biakanja, supra , 49 Cal.2d at pp

. 648, 651.)
We reasoned in Sabetian , “ Typically, as in J’Aire and
Stewart , the first two J’Aire factors operate in tandem

— because the underlying contr act was intended to affect the plaintiffs, the harm to the plaintiffs as a result of the defendants’ negligence
was a fortiori foreseeable. ” ( Sabetian , supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at

p. 1078. ) But we noted that “ where a plaintiff is not entitled to
maintain a breach of contract action based on the third party beneficiary doctrine, ‘ it would clearly be anomalous to impose tort liability, with its increased potential damages [citation] , upon [the defendant] based upon its alleged failure to perform its obligations under its contract with plaintiff’s employer. ’ ” ( Id. at

p. 1079 , quoting Goonewardene , supra , 6 Cal.5th at p. 8 40.) Here, as in Sabetian , Khosravan “ was not a third part y beneficiary of the Agreement because on e of the three required
element s is missing

— that the ‘ motivating purpose of the contracting parties was to provide a benefit to the third party

. ’ ” ( Sabetian

, at p. 1079 , quoting Goonewardene

, at p

. 830 .)
We reasoned t he foreseeability of harm to refinery workers as a result of the consortium members’ failure to protect refinery
workers did not favor liability , because the Agreement vested exclusive power to control day

- to

- day refinery operations in IORC
and IOEPC

. ( Sa betian , supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1079.) “ The fact the consortium members committed to ensure the Operating Companies performed their obligations under the Agreement33

does not mean the consortium members had the power to control the day

- to

- day activities of the refineries. This is unlike the
situation in J’Aire , in which the contractor had the ability to control the extent to which the tenant was harmed by the contractor’s conduct under the agreement with the property owner. ( J’Aire, supra , 24 Cal.3d at p. 804.)

. ” ( Sabetian , at

p. 1079.) As to the third factor, as in Sabetian

, there is a high degree of certainty that Khosravan suffered injury due to his exposure to asbestos at the Abadan refinery. 19 ( Sabetian , supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1080.) “ But the fourth factor, the closeness
of the connection between consortium members’ conduct and [Khosravan] ’s injury, is attenuated because IORC and NIOC, not the consortium members, controlled day

- to

- day refinery operations. Likewise, the fifth factor, the moral blame attached to the consortium members’ conduct, is weak

, ” absent evidence of the consortium members’ negligence in the execution of their
contractual duties or that they had control over the operations
that caused the harm. ( Ibid. )

“ The sixth factor, the policy of preventing future harm, similarly does not favor [Malekeh] . Because the consortium members were not in a position to control the day

- to

- day operations of the Abadan refinery, they were not in the best

p osition to prevent future harm at the refinery. Further, the Agreement acknowledged the consortium members were separate corporate entities from the Operating Companies, including

19 On appeal, defendants do not contend Malekeh failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether Khosravan’s mesothelioma was caused by asbestos exposure at the Abadan refinery.34

IORC. We recognize the important public policy to require employers to pro vide a safe and secure workplace, but there is also a public policy recognizing the benefits of allowing companies to limit their business risks through the creation of a separate corporate entity. ” ( Sabetian , supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at

p. 1080.) Here, the consortium members limited their risk by creating the Operating Companies. Further, a s noted, the
Khosravans abandoned their argument in the trial court the
consortium members were the alter ego s of IOP or the Operating Companies. Finally, Malekeh’s reli ance on Seo v. All

- Makes Overhead
Doors (2002) 97 Cal.App. 4th 1193, 1197 ( Seo ) is misplaced

. There, a commercial subtenant was injured when he reached his arm through an electronic sliding gate to activate a switch to close the gate. ( Id. at p

. 1198.) The Court of Appeal concluded the defendant company that had repaired the gate for the property owner owed no duty of care to the subtenant to warn of design defects unrelated to the repairs performed by the defendant. ( Id . at pp

. 1198

- 1199.) The Seo court observed, however, that an independent contractor may owe a duty to a third party where it negligently performs a repair, fails to make a requested repair, or assumes the owner’s duty to inspect and maintain the equipment and negligently fails t o perform, leading to injury to the third party. ( Id . at p

. 1206.) Here

, Malekeh has

not presented evidence showing defendants perform ed repairs, inspections, or maintenance or assumed the responsibility35

assigned to IORC and NIOC under the Agreement t o i nspect or maintain the Abadan refinery. 20

4. Malekeh f

ailed t o raise a triable issue of fact defendants’ p redecessors had a duty to protect
Khosravan based on a s pecial r elationship between defendants’ p redecessors and the Operating Companies
Malekeh contends the predecessors to the Chevron and Exxon defendants owed a duty to Khosravan based on a special relationship the defendants had with the Operating Companies

20 Mace v. United States (N.D. Cal., Mar. 23, 2017, No. 15

- CV

04060

- LB) 2017 WL 1102736 , relied on by Malekeh , is distinguishable for the same reason

. In Mace

, the National Park Service hired the defendant tree services company on two occasions to remove visible large seed pods from the park’s trees

. ( Id. at p p. * 1

- 2.) Nineteen months a fter the tree services

company completed its second seed pod removal, a park patron was injured by a falling pod

. ( Ibid. ) The tree services company moved for summary judgment , arguing it owed no duty beyond its contractual co mmitments to remove the seed pods

. ( Id. at
p. * 6.) The district court denied the motion

, finding triable issues whether t he tree service company had breached a duty of care to warn the National Park Service about the dangers of selectively pruning seed p ods and to recommend safe pruning measures

. ( Id. at p. *10.) U nlike the tree services company in Mace , there is no evidence the predecessor companies perform e d any work for NIOC or the Operating Companies that gave rise to Khosravan’s asbestos

- related injury. U nder the Agreement, it was IO RC and NIOC that assumed the duty to control refinery operations. Malekeh has provided no authority for the proposition a party that guarantees the performance of another assumes a duty to prevent harm to third parties caused by the performance

.36

to protect Khosravan from the intentional misconduct of third parties. Th is contention lacks merit.

“ A duty to control, warn, or protect may be based on the defendant’s relationship with ‘ either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or [with]

. . . the foreseeable victim of that
conduct. ’ ” ( Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 619 [“ a duty to control may arise if the defendant has a special relationship with the foreseeably dangerous person that entails an ability to control that person’s conduct” ] ; accord, Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235 [“A defendant may owe an affirmative duty to protect another from the conduct of third parties if he or she has a ‘special relationship’ with the other person.”].) “ A special relationship between the defendant and the victim is one
that ‘ gives the victim a right to expect ’ pro tection from the defendant, while a special relationship between the defendant and the dangerous third party is one that ‘ entails an ability to control [the third party's] conduct. ’

. . . The existence of such a special relationship puts the defendant in a unique position to protect the plaintiff from injury. The law requires the defendant to use this position accordingly . [Citation.] [¶] Where the defendant has neither performed an act that increases the risk of injury to the plaintiff nor sits in a r elation to the parties that creates an affirmative duty to protect the plaintiff from harm

. . . the defendant owes no legal duty to the plaintiff. ” ( Brown v. USA
Taekwondo (Apr. 1, 2021, S259216) __ Cal.5th __ [ 2021
WL 1218492, at pp. *5

- *6]; accord, Reg ents , at p. 621

. )
In Regents , the Supreme Court considered the “common features” of a special relationship

. ( Regents, supra , 4 Cal.5th at

p. 620.) The Supreme Court observe d, “ G enerally, the relationship has an aspect of dependency in which one party37

relies to some degree on the other for protection.

. . . [¶]

. . . T he corollary of dependence in a special relationship is control. Whereas one party is dependent, the other has superior control over the means of protection. ‘ [ A] typical setting for the recognition of a special relationship is where “ the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the defendant who, correspondingly, has some control over the plaintiff’s welfare.”’ ” ( Regents, supra , 4 Cal.5th at p p

. 620

- 621 .) Further

, “ [s]pecial relationships also have defined boundaries. They create a duty of care owed to a limited community, not the public at large. ” ( Id. at p. 621.) Finally, the court noted that “ although relationships often have advantages for both participants , many special relationships especially benefit the party charged with a duty of

care, ” identifying retail stores and hotels as examples. ( Ibid. )
The Regents court concluded a college has a sp ecial relationship with its students

, observing that college students are “dependent on their college communities to provide structure, guidance, and a safe learning environment” and “have superior control over the environment and the ability to protect students.” ( Regents, supra , 4 Cal.5th at p. 625.) However, the court limited the college’s duty of care to “activities that are tied to the school’s curriculum but not to student behavior over which the university has no significant degree of control,” explaining the college would be expected to retain a “measure of control” over the classroom environment. ( Id . at p. 627.) Here, as discussed , Malekeh failed to raise a triable issue
the Chevron and Exxon defendants retained any measure of direct control over the Operating Companies

. As we observed in
Sabetian in the context of our analysis of the J’Aire factors, the
consortium members were not in the best position to prevent38

future harm at the refinery

. ( Sabetian , supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at

p. 1080. ) In the absence of a showing of defendants’ authority to exercise control, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Khosravans. (See Barenborg v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 70, 75, 81 [national fraternity did not have special relationsh ip with its local chapter and therefore had no duty to protect student who was injured at party held by local chapter, despite national fraternity’s adoption of policies governing local chapter and ability to discipline chapter for policy violations becaus e it had no ability to prevent injury].)
Malekeh’s reliance on our opinion in Brown v. USA
Taekwondo (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1077 ( Brown )

, affd

. (Apr. 1, 2021, S259216) __ Cal.5th __ [ 2021 WL 1218492 ], is misplaced. There, we concluded the plaintiffs had alleged facts sufficient to support a special relationship between the defendant t aekwondo
association and its registered taekwondo coach , and on that basis
we concluded the taekwondo association had a duty to protect
student athletes fr om sexual abuse by the coach

. ( Brown, supra

, at p. 1094 .) 21 We reason ed that because the taekwondo
association had control over the coach through its policies and procedures establishing requirements for coaches

, it “ was therefore ‘“‘ in the best position to protect against the risk of
harm ’”’ and ‘ “ meaningfully reduce the risk of the harm that

21 The Supreme Court in affirming our decision “express[ed] no view on the merits of the Court of Appeal’s application of the special relationship test to either USAT or USOC. These fact

dependent issues fall outside the scope of the only question presented for our review.” ( Brown v. USA Taekwondo , supra,

__ Cal.5th

__ [ 2021 WL 1218492 ] , at p. *4, fn. 4.)39

actually occurred. ” ’” ( Ibid. ) Further , we found the Rowland factors support ed “ recognition of [the taekwondo association’s] duty to use reasonable care to protect taekwondo youth athletes from foreseeable sexual abuse by their coaches. ” ( Brown , at

p. 1101. ) However, we concluded the plaintiffs had not alleged
facts sufficient to establish that the defendant O lympic
C ommittee had a special relationship with the coach because the allegations did not establish the committee had the ability to
control the coach’s conduct or was in the best position to protect plaintiffs from the coach’s sexual abuse . ( Id. at p. 1102 .) Here, t he record does not contain any policies and procedures or other evidence showing t he predecessors to the
Chevron and Exxon defendants had the ability to control the day

to

- day conduct of the Operating Companies in running the Abadan refinery

, nor has Malekeh presented evide nce showing defendants’ predecessors had the ability to control the asbestos products used at the Abadan refinery or were in the best position to protect Khosravan from asbestos exposure. As discussed, it

was NIOC that owned the refinery and IORC that operated the refinery , without any direct control by the predecessor companies

.40 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed . Respondents are entitled to recover their costs on appeal.

FEUER, J.

We concur :

PERLUSS, P. J.

Mc CORMICK , J. *

* Judge of the Orang e County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.