alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Rachel Skiles, *et al.,*appellants, *vs.*Abraham G. Switzer, *et al.,*appellees.

*Appeal from Winnebago.*

All persons to "be affected by a decree in chancery, should be made parties to the proceeding»

This was a bill in chancery, filed by Switzer and others against the appellants, to set aside certain conveyances and mortgages, made, as is alleged, in fraud of creditors.

At the December term, 1849, of the Winnebago Circuit Court, the cause came on to be heard, before Henderson, Judge, who decreed in favor of the appellees, complainants against the appellants. The case was brought by appeal to this Court by the respondents to the bill; but as the case is decided upon a question not involving the merits of the case, it is not deemed necessary to give an extended statement of the case.

R. S. Blackwell and N. H. Purple, for the appellants.

Marsh & Wright, for the appellees.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Catón :

It is a fatal objection to this decree, that the infant heir of Udell was not a party. The legal title to the property in controversy descended to her, and although her father held it in trust, yet no decree, divesting her of that legal title, could be binding upon her, unless she was properly represented by a guardian appointed to protect her interest. The primary object of the decree was to divest her of the legal title, and as that was not legally done, the balance of the decree, which provides for the disposition of the proceeds of the property, must necessarily be reversed also, for there is nothing upon which it can operate. When an issue shall be formed between the complainants and the infant defendant, new or additional proofs may be taken; and as the evidence, when the suit is again brought to a hearing, may be very different upon the various questions which have been controverted here, it is manifest that it would be improper for us to proceed to examine and decide them, while it is possible they will not arise again, and which, at any rate, may not and prob*534ably will not be again presented in the precise form in which they are now before us. We might, it is true, lay down the rules which are to govern in the delivery of deeds, but that would be of but little use here, where the principal controversy is in relation to the facts.

The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, with costs, and the suit remanded for further proceedings.

*Decree reversed.*
#### BULLIS v. TOWN OF JACKSON.

No. 1494.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.

June 14, 1935.

For former opinion, see 157 So. 780.

G. P. Bullís, of Vidalia, in pro. per.

R. F. Walker, of Baton Rouge, and Chas. Kilbourne, of Clinton, for appellee.

DORE, Judge.

In our original decree, the facts are stated, save and except that it fails to take into consideration that on June 13, 1932, plaintiff herein desired further information relative to the election held on June 10, 1932, authorizing the issuance of the bonds; that on June 18, 1932, the mayor of defendant municipal corporation answered and advised plaintiff to draw and submit such bond ordinance and notice of sale of the bonds; that on June 24, 1932, plaintiff submitted to defendant the necessary ordinance, together with a proposed notice of offerance of the bonds for sale, with the request that any changes offered be submitted to him; that on August 17, 1932, defendant adopted a resolution calling upon plaintiff to complete the procedure for the adoption of the bonds and the sale thereof; that on August 20, 1932, plaintiff made reply to the effect that on June 24, 1932, he had submitted such ordinance and offerance of the bonds for sale, all to be advertised in accordance with such laws made and provided. The defendant municipal corporation failed to answer or acknowledge the receipt of the inclosures of June 24, 1932, nor to his letter of August 20, 1932.

It is the contention of defendant that plaintiff did not carry out his contract of employment.

It is our opinion that plaintiff did all which was humanly possible to do. The defendant municipal corporation did not prove that it did not use the ordinance and the proposed form of advertisement as given by plaintiff. In fact, defendant had both ordinance and proposed form, of advertisement for the floating and sale of the bonds, yet did not submit the same in evidence nor seek to show wherein th'e same were in accordance with law. The bonds were sold, and the natural gas furnished defendant. It matters not through what agency. Plaintiff's employment was no more than to see that all proceedings relative thereto were legal.

It is apparent, therefore, that our former decree is erroneous, and should be set aside.

We, however, fail to see wherein the plaintiff should recover more than the original fee fixed by his contract of employment.

It is for these reasons that our former decree affirming the lower court’s judgment be set aside, and it is therefore ordered *83and decreed that the judgment of the lower court be set aside, annulled, and reversed; and, accordingly, that there be judgment herein in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant, town of Jackson, in the full and just sum of $300, with legal interest thereon from judicial demand until paid, with-all costs in both courts.
**Exhibit 31.1**

          I,Scott C. Evans, certify that:

          1.I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of TIAA-CREF U.S. RealEstate Fund I, L.P.; 

          2.Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

          3.Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respectsthe financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrantas of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

          4.The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

          a)Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure thatmaterial information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared; 

          b)Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectivenessof the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period coveredby this report based on such evaluation; and 

          c)Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscalquarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

          5.The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

          a)All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and 

          b)Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

October 6, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

128315 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

WILLIAM D. NUMERICK, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 128315 

 COA: 249172 

Gd Traverse CC: 03-001891-DP 

HEATHER A. KRULL, a/k/a

HEATHER A. SMITH,

Defendant-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 15, 2005 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

CAVANAGH, J., would grant leave to appeal. 

p0929 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

October 6, 2005
 

Clerk
### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 11-20701 Conference Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v. DANIEL PEREZ NEGRON, also known as Daniel Perez, also known as Daniel Negron Perez, al s o known as Daniel Perez-Negron, also known as Raul Gonzales, Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:11-CR-328-1
Before SMITH, ELROD, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * The attorney appointed to represent Daniel Perez Negron has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 ( 1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 2 2 9 (5th Cir. 2011). Negron has not filed a response and has been removed from the United States. W e have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the r e c o r d U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D August 21, 20 12 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C IR
. R. 47.5 , the cour t has d ete rm inedt hat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t for th in 5 T H C IR
. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 11-20701 Document: 00511963944 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/21/2012No. 11-20701

reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents
no nonfrivolous issue for ap p e l l a t e review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excus e d f r o m f urth er responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED in part as frivolous, see 5 T H C I R
. R. 42.2, and in part as moot. See United States v. Rosenbaum-Alanis , 483 F.3d 381, 382-83 (5th Cir. 2007).

2 Case: 11-20701 Document: 00511963944 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/21/2012
Exhibit 21.1

TRISM, INC.

Subsidiaries of TRISM, Inc.





|Trism Secured Transportation, Inc. |                                       |                                              | Delaware  
|---------------------------------- | ------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------- | ----------
|                                   | Tri-State Motor Transit Co.           |                                              | Delaware  
|                                   |                                       | Aero Body and Truck Equipment Company, Inc., | Delaware  
|                                   | Diablo Systems Incorporated           |                                              |           
|                                   |                                       | d/b/a/ Diablo Transportation, Inc.           | California
|                                   | Trism Eastern, Inc.                   |                                              |           
|                                   |                                       | d/b/a/ C.I. Whitten Transfer                 | Delaware  
|Trism Heavy Haul, Inc.             |                                       |                                              | Delaware  
|                                   | Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc.      |                                              | Georgia   
|                                   |                                       | Trism Special Services, Inc.                 | Georgia   
|                                   | E.L. Powell & Sons Trucking Co., Inc. |                                              | Oklahoma  
|Trism Transport, Inc.              |                                       |                                              | Delaware  
|                                   | Trism Transport Services, Inc.        |                                              | Utah      
|TRISM Logistics, Inc.              |                                       |                                              | New Jersey
|Trism Equipment, Inc.              |                                       |                                              | Delaware
---

EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Juan Restrepo Gutierrez, hereby certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

|(1) | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Chancery
      Resources, Inc. for the period ended August 31, 2008 (the "Report") fully
      complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of Chancery Resources, Inc.                                                                    

Dated: October 15, 2008

| | /s/ Juan Restrepo Gutierrez                            
| | -------------------------------------------------------
| | Juan Restrepo Gutierrez                                
| | President, Treasurer and Director                      
| | (Principal Executive Officer, Principal
      Financial
| | Officer and Principal Accounting Officer)              
| | Chancery Resources, Inc.                               



A signed original of this written statement required by Section
906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Chancery
Resources, Inc. and will be retained by Chancery Resources, Inc. and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

ANDERSON LEE FERNANDERS,

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 09-12933

Judge John Feikens

Mag. Judge Donald Scheer 

v.

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 

COMMUNITY HEALTH,

Defendant. 

________________________________

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

I have before me, Magistrate Judge Donald A. Scheer’s Report and

Recommendation (“Report”) (Docket #31). In his Report, Magistrate Judge Scheer

recommends that I GRANT Defendant’s Motion as to Counts 1-5 of the Complaint and

as to the contract-based claim in Count 6 and DENY Defendant’s Motion as to the Title

VII race discrimination claim asserted in Count 6. The parties have filed Objections to

the Report, and the matter is fully briefed. Having considered the arguments set forth

by the parties, I find that Magistrate Judge Scheer has thoroughly and correctly

analyzed the issues and I agree with his recommendation. Therefore, I OVERRULE the

parties’ Objections, ADOPT Magistrate Judge Scheer’s Report and Recommendation,

GRANT Defendant’s Motion as to Counts 1-5 of the Complaint and as to the contractbased claim in Count 6, and DENY Defendant’s Motion as to the Title VII race
discrimination claim asserted in Count 6.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Date: May 10, 2010 s/ John Feikens 

John Feikens

United States District Judge

 

Proof of Service

I hereby certify that the foregoing order was served on

the attorneys/parties of record on May 10, 2010, by

U.S. first class mail or electronic means.

s/Carol Cohron 

Case Manager
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

--------------------------------------------------------------------

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Sloud, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Gene Sokolov, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)        The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(2)        The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



|Date:  November 12, 2009 | By:  /s/ Gene Sokolov
|------------------------ | ---------------------
|                        
|Gene Sokolov            
|Chief Financial Officer
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit 

No. 22-20029 

Summary Calendar 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Joel Villarreal-Medrano, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:21-CR-205-1 

Before Wiener, Elrod, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

The attorney appointed to represent Joel Villarreal-Medrano has 

moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders 

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 

(5th Cir. 2011). Villarreal-Medrano has not filed a response. We have 

*

 Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

October 24, 2022 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

Case: 22-20029 Document: 00516519243 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/24/2022
No. 22-20029 

2 

reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected 

therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no 

nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for 

leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further 

responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. 

R. 42.2. 

Case: 22-20029 Document: 00516519243 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/24/2022
#### Mallan v. Higenbotham et al.

Under Code Colorado, section 397, “ every direction of the court made in writing, and not included in a judgment, is an order, and an application for an order is a motion;” and under sections 398 and 899 notice must be given of all motions in a case. Therefore it is error for a court, after the statutory time for answering has expired, to allow a defendant, without notice to the plaintiff, to withdraw a demurrer previously filed, and to file an answer and cross-demand to the complaint.

*Error to District Court, Lake County.*

The case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Enos Miles, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. E. M. Hulbard, for defendants in error.

Stalloup, C.

The main question raised by the assignments of error, and discussed and fairly presented for the opinion of this court by the briefs of the respective counsel, is whether there was error in the following proceedings of the district court, to wit: *First.*Was it error for the court, after the statutory time for answering the plaintiff’s complaint had expired, and without notice to the plaintiff, to permit the defendants to withdraw their demurrer previously filed, and to file instead an answer to the complaint, accompanied by a cross-demand against the plaintiff? *Second.*Was it error for the court, on motion of the defendants, and without notice, to rule the plaintiff to reply to said answer and cross-demand within a stated time, and afterwards on like motion, and without notice, to enter the plaintiff’s default for failure to comply with the rule, and thereupon to give judgment for the defendants for the amount of their cross-demand?

Section 397 of the codeis as follows: “Every direction of the court made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment, is denominated an order; an *265application for an order is a motion;” and sections 398 and 399 require notice of all motions in a case, except those made during the progress of a trial, and provide how the same shall be given. We are not all of the opinion that an order and notice are necessary to authorize a party to withdraw his demurrer, and so dispose of it, and therefore do not determine the same. We are all of the opinion that after the withdrawal of a demurrer, after the expiration of the statutory time for answering, notice to the adverse party, as required by sections 398 and 399, is necessary to warrant the court in granting the motion for the order allowing the filing of an answer. It therefore follows that the order in this case granting the motion to file the answer and cross-demand was a necessary order, to be made upon motion therefor, and of which the plaintiff was entitled to notice as provided by sections 398 and 399, and the subsequent proceedings upon such answer and cross-demand, to and including the judgment against the plaintiff, were unwarranted, and therefore erroneous. *Cates v. Mack,*6 Colo. 401.

The judgment should be reversed and the case remanded.

We concur: Rising, 0.; Macon, 0.

Per Curiam.

For the reasons assigned in the foregoing opinion the judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

*Reversed.*
Exhibit 31

CERTIFICATION

I, Terrence S. Cassidy, as Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of NWH, certify that:

1.     I
have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of the registrant, NWH, Inc.;

2.     Based
on my knowledge, this Annual Report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this Annual Report;

3.     Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this Annual Report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this Annual Report;

4.     As
the sole certifying officer, I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and I have:



5.     As
the sole certifying officer, I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the
audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):



|Date: January 29, 2004 | By: | /s/ Terrence S. CassidyTerrence S. Cassidy
Principal Executive Officer and
Principal Financial Officer
|---------------------- | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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