J-A16008-20

2020 PA Super 216

A.L.B.

v.

M.D.L. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1847 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered October 4, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Civil Division at No(s): 

17-17469

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 04, 2020

M.D.L. (“Father”) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas 

of Berks County awarding A.L.B. (“Mother”) sole legal custody and primary 

physical custody of their children pursuant to Father’s January 24, 2019 

petition to modify custody. We affirm. 

During their 20-year marriage, Father and Mother had four children, all 

boys: R.M.L., born in 2002, M.J.L., born in 2004, and twins D.M.L. and D.J.L., 

born in 2006. Father is a dentist with his own practice. Mother currently works 

as a nurse in the emergency department of a local hospital.

In June of 2017, Father discovered that Mother was having an affair with 

T.Z., a neighbor and a math teacher at the high school attended by R.M.L. 

and M.J.L. The parties filed for divorce, and a divorce decree was entered on 

January 9, 2018. Mother subsequently became engaged to T.Z. Their 

relationship has been a significant source of contention in this custody matter. 
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To that end, the trial court found that this relationship “was the catalyst for 

the parties[’] divorce [and] Father’s hostility and alienation of the children 

towards Mother,” Trial Court Decision and Order, 10/3/19, at 2, and caused 

“hostility between Father and T.Z., as well as the children and T.Z.” Id. at 3.

In September of 2017, the parties stipulated to a custody order whereby 

Mother and Father shared legal and physical custody of the four children, 

alternating physical custody on a week-by-week basis. Both parties filed 

petitions regarding custody in May of 2018. Father filed a petition to modify 

custody requesting, inter alia, that the trial court issue a no-contact order 

between the children and T.Z and that Father be awarded primary physical 

custody of R.M.L. Mother filed a petition for special relief, alleging, inter alia, 

that Father was alienating the children from her and requesting, inter alia, 

that Father be ordered to stop discussing her personal life and financial 

matters with the children.

By way of agreement of the parties, the court entered an order on June 

5, 2018. The order directed that there be no contact between the children and 

T.Z. for six months and that Father stop discussing Mother’s personal life, 

including T.Z., and financial matters with the children. Further, Mother and 

Father were to conduct all communications through the application Our Family 

Wizard. The order also appointed Dr. Stephen Lindenberg, Ph.D., to conduct 

a custody evaluation. 
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Dr. Lindenberg conducted the evaluation and submitted a 126-page 

report in December of 2018. In that report, Dr. Lindenberg discussed Parental 

Alienation Syndrome (“PAS”) and parental alienation at length, and concluded 

that Father was alienating the children from Mother at a moderate level of 

severity. See Custody Evaluation, 12/13/18, at 5, 95-108, 116. This, in turn, 

had led R.M.L. to alienate his siblings from Mother. Dr. Lindenberg also noted 

that R.M.L. had been diagnosed with, and prescribed medication for, anxiety 

and depression. The report recommended shared legal and physical custody, 

and also recommended reunification therapy for Mother and the children and 

that R.M.L. resume individual therapy.

Father filed a petition to modify custody on January 24, 2019 in which 

he requested primary physical custody of all four of the children. In March of 

2019, Mother filed a petition for special relief, contempt and emergency 

modification, alleging that Father continued to alienate the children from her 

and refused to comply with court orders. Mother asked that physical custody 

be transferred to her and that there be no contact between the children and 

Father. On May 1, 2019, the court issued an order denying Mother’s petition, 

but only as it related to contempt. The order also directed that the parties 

participate in reunification therapy and that R.M.L. return to counseling, with 

Father ensuring that R.M.L. attend the sessions.

The trial court scheduled a full custody hearing for July 18 and July 22, 

2019, and subsequently appointed Lauren Marks, Esquire to serve as guardian 
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ad litem (“GAL”). Marks conducted an evaluation and prepared a report. In 

her report, Marks found that Father was clearly alienating the children from 

Mother. The report also noted R.M.L.’s continuing issues with anxiety and 

depression and the toll the divorce was taking on him.1

Marks recommended that Mother have sole legal custody of the children. 

She also recommended that Mother have sole physical custody for 90 days, 

with Father having visitation only through supervised telephone calls or 

therapy sessions for those 90 days and then beginning to have incrementally 

increased periods of physical custody after that. Marks recommended that the 

no-contact order between T.Z. and the children be lifted and that Mother and 

the boys continue with intensive counseling.

The trial court also directed Dr. Lindenberg to produce an updated 

custody evaluation and report before the hearing, which Dr. Lindenberg did 

on July 15, 2019. In that updated report, Dr. Lindenberg noted Father’s 

escalating alienation tactics, stating that “Father is alienating his children from 

____________________________________________

1

 The report stated: 

[R.M.L.] is such a sad soul. He is intelligent and articulate. Every 

time I have a conversation with him, he spews Father’s agenda. 

But there is always a moment of weakness when he confides how 

much he loves Mother. I get the sense he is terrified of the 

outcome of [the] trial. If the no-contact is lifted, Father will put 

more pressure on him with the promise of a car, college and 

expensive sports activities. 

Report of the Guardian Ad Litem, undated, at 21. 
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[Mother] at a very high level of severity putting the children at risk for serious 

psychological harm.” Custody Evaluation Update, 7/15/19, at 54. This report 

once again noted concerns regarding R.M.L.’s mental health and specifically 

that R.M.L. was at risk for self-harm. See id. at 56-57. This updated report 

recommended that Mother be awarded primary physical custody and sole legal 

custody regarding the boys’ absences from school/activities for attendance at 

counseling appointments. It also recommended that R.M.L. undergo a 

comprehensive psychiatric assessment.

The trial court held a custody hearing on July 18, 2019, during which 

Dr. Lindenberg, Father and Marks testified. Following the close of the 

testimony for the day, the trial court entered an order awarding temporary 

sole physical and legal custody to Mother, and directing Father to have no 

contact with the children, until the hearing resumed on July 22, 2019. At the 

hearing on July 22, all four children testified in-camera. Mother also testified. 

However, the testimony was not complete by the end of the day on July 22, 

so a third day of testimony was scheduled for September 10, 2019.2

One day after the hearing concluded on September 10, the trial court 

entered an order lifting the no-contact order between T.Z. and the children. 

It then issued its custody decision and order on October 3, 2019, in which the 

____________________________________________

2

 Following the hearing on July 22, the trial court reverted the custody order 

back to the joint physical and legal custody order entered in September of 

2017.
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court conducted a full analysis of the factors statutorily required for it to 

consider when crafting a custody order. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). During 

that analysis, the court agreed that Father had clearly been alienating the 

children from Mother. To that end, the court stated:

Father, while claiming he would never inhibit contact between 

Mother and the children, does not allow R.M.L. to drive the car 

[Father bought for R.M.L.] to Mother’s house even though the 

parties only live approximately one mile apart. Father insists that 

R.M.L. park the car in his driveway each evening and then he must 

either walk, bike, or have transportation from Father’s house to 

Mother’s. Father does not include Mother in medical decisions, 

such as R.M.L.’s oral surgery [to have his wisdom teeth removed], 

and retrieves the children from Mother’s residence during Mother’s 

periods of custody without notice or authorization. Additionally, 

when Mother arrives at one of the children’s events, if Father is 

present, even if he is coaching one of the children’s teams, he will 

leave. Father continuously, even after court order and admonition 

by this Court, speaks with the children about financial matters,

including who is going to pay for their college education and Father 

uses his financial stronghold on the children and Mother to further 

alienate the children from Mother. Father has threatened Mother 

with pepper spray and doused her with a garden hose in front of 

R.M.L. when Mother came to talk to Father at his residence. Father 

also transferred R.M.L. to [a different high school] without 

Mother’s consent or authorization.

Trial Court Decision and Order, 10/3/19, at 7.

The court continued: 

[T]his Court finds that a drastic change to the current custody 

schedule is necessary and warranted. Father has engaged in a 

systematic and patterned course of conduct to alienate the 

children from Mother. There is no question that Mother’s hands 

are not clean in this matter and her extra-marital affair was the 

catalyst for the divorce and Father’s resulting resentment is 

understandable. However, ... Father is unable to set his 

resentment aside and move forward in a positive co-parenting 

relationship for the benefit of his children.
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Id. at 12. 

Accordingly, the court issued a final order directing that Mother have 

sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the boys, with Father 

having partial physical custody every other weekend. It also directed Mother 

and the four children to participate in intensive reunification therapy with 

Linda Gottleib and ordered Mother to secure a new individual counselor for all 

four of the children. 

Father filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. Father 

then filed a timely notice of appeal. He also filed an emergency petition for 

supersedeas and request for stay of the trial court order pending appeal. This 

Court granted the petition in part, entering an order staying that part of the 

trial court’s October 3, 2019 order requiring Mother and the four children to 

attend intensive reunification therapy with Gottleib pending the disposition of 

this appeal, which is now before us.

“Our standard of review over a custody order is for a gross abuse of 

discretion.” Yates v. Yates, 963 A.2d 535, 538 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted). Such an abuse of discretion will only be found if the “trial court, in 

reaching its conclusion, overrides or misapplies the law, or exercises judgment 

which is manifestly unreasonable, or reaches a conclusion that is the result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will as shown by the evidence of record.” Id.

Further, in reviewing a custody order:

We must accept findings of the trial court that are supported by 

competent evidence of record, as our role does not include making 
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independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to 

issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to 

the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses 

first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial court’s 

deductions or inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the 

test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as 

shown by the evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions 

of the trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are 

unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.

Klos v. Klos, 934 A.2d 724, 728 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). As with 

any custody matter, the paramount concern is the best interests of the 

children involved. See id.

Here, Father first argues that the trial court erred by denying the oral 

motion for a continuance he requested on the first day of the hearing. Father 

argues that a continuance was warranted because Dr. Lindenberg did not 

submit his updated custody report until the week of trial and in that report, 

Dr. Lindenberg upgraded the degree of Father’s alienation from moderate to 

severe and consequently changed his custody recommendation. According to 

Father, this left him without sufficient time to secure his own custody expert 

and evaluation to rebut Dr. Lindenberg’s findings regarding parental alienation 

and his recommendation for custody. This claim fails.

The grant or denial of a motion for continuance is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the 

trial court abused its discretion. See J.S. v. R.S.S., -- A.3d --, 2020 WL 

1861845 at *9 (Pa. Super. April 14, 2020); In the Interest of D.F., 165 A.3d 

960, 964-965 (Pa. Super. 2017). An abuse of discretion is not merely an error 
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of judgment. See In the Interest of D.F., 165 A.3d at 965. Rather, as our 

discussion regarding the review of custody orders makes clear, a trial court 

abuses its discretion only when it overrides or misapplies the law, or exercises 

judgment that is manifestly unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill-will. See id. 

Here, in rejecting Father’s claim that it erred in denying his motion for 

a continuance, the trial court stated:

This Court denied the continuance that Father requested on the 

morning of trial, as Father had ample time to secure his own 

expert should he have so chosen. The Custody Evaluator, Dr. 

Lindenberg, had previously concluded that Father alienated the 

children from Mother to a “moderate” degree, and his amended 

and updated report simply noted that the alienation had 

progressed from moderate to severe. Ultimately, this Court gave 

weight to Dr. Lindenberg’s opinion, as was supplemented by the 

recommendation of [the] [g]uardian ad [l]item, Lauren Marks, 

Esq.

While their opinions were helpful and well-considered, this Court 

did not need any expert to clearly see that Father has engaged in 

a campaign of impactful and purposeful alienation of Mother.

Trial Court Memorandum Opinion, 11/12/19, at 2-3. 

Father has simply not demonstrated that the trial court abused its 

discretion by denying a continuance in light of its conclusion that Father had 

ample time to secure his own expert regarding parental alienation. Once Dr. 

Lindenberg issued his initial report in December of 2018, Father was put on 

clear notice that it was Dr. Lindenberg’s opinion that Father was alienating the 

children from Mother. See Custody Evaluation, 12/13/18, at 121 (stating that 
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“[Father] has vindictively alienated the children from [Mother] and relentlessly 

continues to do so”).

Father now seems to assert that a continuance was warranted on the 

first morning of the hearing because Dr. Lindenberg improperly relied on PAS, 

which is not, according to Father, widely accepted in the scientific community. 

Father concedes, however, that the concept of PAS was introduced and 

discussed in the initial report Dr. Lindenberg submitted seven months prior to 

the hearing. See Father’s Brief at 15 (stating that “initial evaluation gave due 

consideration and discussion to Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS)”). 

Therefore, we fail to see how his current assertion challenging the general use 

of PAS lends any support to Father’s contention that he needed a continuance 

on the morning of the hearing to give him time to secure his own expert. 

Father was well aware that Dr. Lindenberg would be relying on PAS from the 

time of his initial evaluation, and he certainly could have obtained his own 

expert regarding PAS and parental alienation at that time.3

Moreover, Dr. Lindenberg testified on the first day of the custody 

hearing, July 18, 2019. In his testimony, Dr. Lindenberg clearly found that 

Father was alienating Mother from the children, see N.T. Hearing, 7/18/19, 

____________________________________________

3

 We also note that it is questionable whether Father even properly preserved 

his claim related to the acceptability of PAS in the scientific community. He 

does not point to any place in the record where he raised this issue before the 

trial court, either during his oral motion for a continuance or elsewhere. See

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that “issues not raised in the lower court are waived 

and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”). 
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at 18 (stating this is “one of the worst parental alienation cases that I have 

seen”), and recommended that Mother be awarded primary physical and sole 

legal custody of the children. After one more day of testimony, the hearing 

was continued until September 10, 2019, almost two months later. There is 

no evidence that Father tried to procure his own expert and a second custody 

evaluation during that almost two-month gap between his oral motion for a 

continuance and the September 10 hearing date. Based on all of these 

circumstances, Father has not established that the trial court abused its 

discretion by denying the motion for a continuance. No relief is due. 

Next, Father contends the trial court erred in “relying heavily” on the 

recommendations of Marks, the appointed GAL. Father’s Brief at 18. Father 

essentially contends that the trial court erred by giving weight to Marks’s 

“unqualified opinions” that Father was alienating the children from Mother and 

that reunification therapy was warranted. Id. at 20, 21. Of course, issues of 

credibility and weight of the evidence, such as the one Father presents here, 

are exclusively for the trial court as the fact-finder in custody matters. This 

claim fails for this reason alone. See Klos, 934 A.2d at 728 (when reviewing 

custody orders, appellate courts must defer to the trial court on issues of 

credibility and weight of the evidence, as the trial court had the opportunity 

to view and assess the witnesses first-hand).

Father, however, carries his argument one step further and accuses the 

trial court of delegating its judicial powers to Marks by “merely substituting 
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the guardian’s judgment for its own.” Father’s Brief at 22. Such substitution, 

Father maintains, created an “appearance of impropriety” which requires the 

granting of a new custody hearing. Id. This claim fails.

In support of his allegations, Father relies on C.W. v. K.A.W., 774 A.2d 

745 (Pa. Super. 2001). The circumstances in C.W., however, were far 

different from those in the instant case. In C.W., this Court found that the 

trial court had improperly delegated its judicial duties to the GAL where the 

trial court: declared that the GAL had “taught me my job”; repeatedly solicited 

the GAL’s advice on how to rule on certain objections during the custody 

hearing; stated that it gave great weight to the GAL’s recommendations; and 

then issued a custody order on the same date as the GAL submitted his 

recommendations which closely followed those recommendations. See id. at 

749-750. 

Here, unlike in C.W., there is no evidence whatsoever that the trial court 

asked Marks for her advice on how she would rule on any evidentiary 

questions, nor does Father point to any place in the record where he believes 

this to have occurred. Moreover, unlike the trial court in C.W., the trial court 

below described its reliance on the GAL report as follows:

While this court considered the recommendation of [Marks], it was 

clear, independent of her report, that a drastic change in custody 

was necessary in order to begin to rebuild the years of damaging 

alienation perpetrated by Father. ... [Marks’] recommendation was 

[but] one of many factors that were weighed in entering this 

Court’s final October 3, 2019 order. 

Trial Court Memorandum Opinion, 11/12/19, at 3. 
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Father has utterly failed to substantiate his claim that by considering 

Marks’s recommendations, the trial court created any appearance of 

impropriety, much less one akin to that which arose in C.W. This claim merits 

no relief.4

Father also asserts that the trial court once again abdicated its duties 

by simply “copying” Mother’s statement of facts “in lieu of applying the 

testimony/evidence at trial.” Father's Brief at 23. He maintains that this use 

of “unproven” facts led the trial court to misapply the custody factors outlined 

in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). We do not agree.

When ascertaining the best interests of a child in a custody matter, the 

court must conduct a case-by-case assessment of all the factors that may 

legitimately affect the physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual well-being of 

that child. Klos, 934 A.2d at 728. To that end, Section 5328(a) of the 

Pennsylvania Child Custody Act lists 16 factors a court is required to consider 

in order to determine the best interests of the child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

5328(a). 

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4

 Father also suggests that the trial court erred by appointing a GAL in the 

first instance. As Mother points out, this issue is waived. In the first place, it 

is not fairly encompassed by the statement of questions presented for our 

review. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (providing that “[n]o question will be 

considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly 

suggested thereby”). Moreover, Father does not point to any place in the 

record where he objected to the appointment of a GAL before doing so in his 

brief to this Court. See Pa. R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that “issues not raised in 

the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”).
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Here, the trial court addressed each one of these 16 factors in its 

custody decision and order, just as Section 5328(a) requires it to do. See Trial 

Court Decision and Order, 10/3/19, at 6-12. In discussing each factor, the 

trial court made a determination as to whether that factor weighed in favor of 

either party, and if it found that it did, it thoroughly explained its reasoning 

for reaching that conclusion. See id. 

Father claims, however, that the trial court did not conduct its own 

independent consideration of the statutory custody factors. Rather, Father 

maintains that, in evaluating the factors, the court blindly relied on the facts 

that were presented in Mother’s findings of fact but which were not, according 

to Father, supported by any testimony or other evidence in the record. 

Although Father maintains that “examples abound” of the trial court’s 

wholesale reliance on Mother’s rendition of the facts, he points to four specific 

instances where he complains this occurred.

First, Father asserts that the trial court improperly adopted Mother’s 

finding of fact that Father transferred R.M.L. to a different high school without 

Mother’s input when there is no support in the record for this finding. Contrary 

to Father’s assertion, however, there is record support for this finding of fact. 

Mother was specifically asked on cross-examination if she was involved in the 

decision to transfer R.M.L. to the different school, and in response, Mother 

stated that she “was not involved in the decision.” N.T. Hearing, 7/22/19, at 

345. The trial court was, of course, free to credit Mother’s testimony in this 
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regard. See Commonwealth v. Page, 59 A.3d 1118, 1130 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(stating that issues of credibility lie within the province of the fact-finder). See 

also Custody Evaluation, 12/13/20, at 45 (“[Father] had transferred R.M.L. 

to another school”).

In any event, the trial court was using this fact as one of many to 

support its conclusion that Father was making important decisions about the 

children’s education and health unilaterally and without the input of Mother. 

See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(13). There is ample support in the record for this 

conclusion. See e.g. N.T. Hearing, 7/18/20, at 212 (Marks testifying that 

Father was engaging in “solo parenting” regarding decision making); N.T. 

Hearing, 7/22/20, at 232-240 (Mother discussing not being consulted about 

the removal of R.M.L.’s wisdom teeth); Id. at 263 (Mother stating Father did 

not tell her he was drug testing R.M.L.); Id. at 303-307 (Mother discussing 

how she was not included in the decision to re-enroll R.M.L. in his original high 

school and how Father signed a school form overriding the school’s 

recommendation for R.M.L.’s math class placement without consulting 

Mother). As such, this claim merits no relief.

Next, Father asserts that the trial court took its finding of fact that Father 

discussed financial matters with the kids “verbatim” from Mother’s filing and 

argues, in essence, that the record does not substantiate this finding. Father’s 

Brief at 28. Father is apparently referring to the following finding of fact by 

the trial court:
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Father continuously, even after court order and admonition by this 

Court, speaks with the children about financial matters, including 

who is going to pay for their college education. Father uses his 

financial stronghold on the children and Mother to further alienate 

the children from Mother.

Trial Court Decision and Order, 10/3/2019, at 3.5

Contrary to Father’s assertions, there is evidence in the record to 

support this finding. In fact, Dr. Lindenberg specifically testified that there was 

evidence that Father was speaking to the children about financial issues that 

were more proper topics for a discussion between Mother and Father, such as 

who was paying for college and an SAT course in which Father had enrolled 

R.M.L. See N.T. Hearing, 7/18/2019, at 51. Dr. Lindenberg further testified 

that Father used his income, which was higher than Mother’s, as leverage with 

the children and as a means to alienate them from Mother. See id. at 28, 52. 

See also id. at 203 (Marks testifying that Father “absolutely” was talking to 

the kids about financial matters such as whether Mother was able to contribute 

to college costs); N.T. Hearing, 7/22/19, at 294-296 (Mother recounting 

instances of R.M.L. asking about Mother’s contribution to college costs at the 

request of Father). In light of this evidence, Father’s claim that there is no 

support in the record for the trial court’s finding that he was discussing 

financial matters with the children necessarily fails.

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5

 Notably, this finding of fact does not mirror Mother’s finding of fact 

“verbatim,” as Mother merely states in her filing that “Father discusses 

financial matters with the Children.” Mother’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions 

of Law at 10, 12.
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Father also asserts that the trial court erred by adopting Mother’s 

mischaracterization of the incident involving Father threatening Mother with 

pepper spray and spraying her with a garden hose as abuse perpetrated by 

Father. The trial court further erred, Father maintains, by using that single 

incident to find that “the second custody factor under 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] §5328 

favors Mother.” Father’s Brief at 29. It is Father who mischaracterizes what 

the trial court found. In discussing Section 5328(a)(2), related to abuse 

committed by a parent, the court stated:

This factor slightly favors Mother. There has been no reported 

abuse by either party, however, Father has threatened Mother 

with pepper spray and has soaked her with a garden hose in front 

of R.M.L. at Father’s residence [while] demanding that she leave 

his front yard. The Court believes that behavior to be simply mean 

and vindictive especially in front of the children.

Trial Court Decision and Order, 10/3/19, at 7-8 (emphasis added). 

Therefore, the trial court did not find that this incident “rose to the level 

of abuse,” as Father maintains. Father’s Brief at 29. In any event, Father does 

not dispute that the pepper spray/water hose incident, which is well 

documented throughout the record, occurred. Father instead appears to argue 

that the trial court should not have relied upon the incident because his actions 

were justified given that Mother was banging on his door and refusing to leave 

his property. However, Father testified to this effect at the hearing, see N.T. 

Hearing, 7/18/19, at 151-153, and the trial court clearly did not credit Father’s 

theory that these circumstances warranted his actions of threatening Mother 

with pepper spray and dousing her with a garden hose in front of her child. 
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Father has failed to show that the trial court erred in its consideration of this 

incident.

Lastly, Father contends that there is no support in the record for the 

trial court’s finding, in discussing Section 5328(a)(3)’s “parental duties 

performed by each parent on behalf of the child[ren],” that Father spent his 

time after work in “Dad’s room.” Father’s Brief at 30. This final claim warrants 

no relief.

With regard to the “parental duties” factor, the court stated:

This factor favors Mother. Mother was the primary caretaker for 

the children during the parties’ marriage. Father supported the 

family financially while Mother took care of the children. Even 

when Father did return from work in the evening, he would spend 

time in “Dad’s room,” a room reserved for Father to relax and not 

be bothered by the children. Mother, with little or no assistance 

from Father, handled the feeding, clothing, bathing, and 

scheduling of activities during the parties’ marriage and still solely 

manages M.J.L.’s food allergy medical appointments. During the 

parties’ marriage, Mother would vacation with the children during 

the summer while Father worked.

Father helped coach some of the children’s sports teams and has 

now assumed many of the parenting tasks as a result of and in 

pursuit of his alienation of Mother and increasing emotional 

separation. Presently, when Father and Mother attend the 

children’s sporting events, Father will petulantly leave the event 

so as to dramatically demonstrate his disdain for, and to 

embarrass Mother.

Trial Court Decision and Order, 10/3/19, at 8. 

As a threshold matter, Father is incorrect that the “Dad’s room” fact 

“appears nowhere in all of the testimony of record.” Father’s Brief at 30. To 

the contrary, Mother specifically testified as follows:
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Q So when you were living together, at nights or on the 

weekends, would dad remove himself from the family?

A Yep. It’s called Dad’s room. It’s the front room. He would sit 

there all the time and watch Fox news incessantly or sports, all 

day every day. They call it Dad’s room.

N.T. Hearing, 7/22/2019, at 289. Again, the court was free to credit this 

testimony, as it clearly did. See Page, 59 A.3d at 1130. 

Even assuming that Father was correct that the record was devoid of 

any support for the fact that he retreated to “Dad’s room,” the trial court’s 

use of this fact was clearly geared towards bolstering its conclusion that 

Mother was the primary caregiver for the children during the marriage. There 

is ample evidence in the record, even if we were to remove the “Dad’s room” 

fact from consideration, to support this conclusion. See N.T. Hearing, 

7/22/19, at 284-288 (Mother testifying about the parental duties she 

performed during the marriage and how she was the primary caregiver).

We find no merit to any of Father’s contentions that the trial court’s 

findings of fact were not supported by the record or that the court misapplied 

the factors enumerated in Section 5328(a). Rather, as the trial court stated, 

the court “considered all of the testimony, interviewed the Children, 

considered the custody factors as outlined in [Section 5328(a)], and after 

weighing those statutory factors” arrived at a custody order that it 

determined, in its discretion, to be in the best interests of R.M.L., M.J.L., 

D.M.L. and D.J.L. Trial Court Memorandum Opinion, 11/12/19, at 3-4. 
J-A16008-20

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We recognize that this order represents the “drastic change” the trial 

court found was called for in this case. However, we are mindful of our 

standard of review of custody orders, and Father has simply not shown, nor 

does our own review of the record disclose, any abuse of discretion on the 

part of the trial court in issuing this custody order. Despite this, we recognize 

that Mother has had primary physical and sole legal custody of the children 

for close to a year now and that Gottleib practices out of state. In light of this 

passage of time, as well as the travel limitations caused by the national 

pandemic we are enduring, we note that nothing in this Opinion is meant to 

preclude either party from petitioning the trial court to consider whether the 

intensive reunification counseling remains in the best interests of the children.

Order affirmed. The stay this Court granted regarding Mother’s and the 

four children’s participation in intensive reunification counseling with Gottleib 

pending this appeal is lifted. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/4/2020
J-A16008-20

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