### IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

20 20 WY 9 8

APRIL TERM, A.D. 20 20

July 28, 2020

HB FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a Wyoming limited partnership; ROBBIN D. MOMMSEN, Trustee of the Robbin D. Mommsen Trust dated May 29, 2002, as amended; R EYNOLDS POM ER OY, II and BETTIE B. POMEROY, Trustees of the Pomeroy Revocable Trust dated November 15, 2017, as amended;

HOWARD G. HARDEMAN and ELIZABETH J. HARDEMAN, individually and as Trustees of the Elizabeth J. Hardeman Trust; THE

HARDEMAN RE VOCABLE TRUST

date d March 15, 2016, as amended, by Scott Hardeman and Stephanie Hardeman, Trustees; GAYLE HARDEMAN DECKER and DAVID R. DECKER; DEBORAH J. HARDEMAN; CHRISTINE M. COLEMAN, as Trustee of the Christine M. Coleman Wyoming QPRT II dated January 2 011 ; WILLIAM

M UR RAY; and MICHAEL N.

CHRISTODOLOU and KATHLEEN A. CHRISTODOLOU,

Appellants (Petitioners),

v.

TETON COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,

Appellee (Respondent), S

- 19

- 0208and

TETON RAPTOR CENTER,

Appellee (Intervenor).

Appeal fro m the Distr ic t Court of Teton County

The Honor ab le Timothy C. Day , Judge

Representing Appellant:

Matthew W. Kim

- Miller and Paula A. Fleck, Holland & Hart LLP, Jackson, Wyoming

.

Rep re senting Appellee: Erin E. Weisman, Teton County Attorney ’ s Office, Jack son, Wyomin g.

Representing Intervenor: Kim D. Cannon, Davis & Cannon, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming; Leah C. Schwartz, Ranck & Schwartz, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and F OX , KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subje ct to forma l revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of a n y typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before fin al publication in the permanent volume.1 GRAY , Justice.

[¶1] The Teton County Board of County Commissioners (Board) approved an application by the Teton Raptor Cente r ( Raptor Center) for an amended c onditional u se

p ermit (CUP) to expand the use of its propert y

. Nearb y landowners and other parties sought judicial review

. The district court affirmed and the petitioners appeal. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] The issues are:

1. Do the appellants have standing ?

2. Was the Board’s decision to grant the 2018 amendment to
the 2008 CUP arbi tra ry and capricious or contrary to law?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[¶3] The Hardeman family sold 137 acres in Teton County to the Jackson Hole Land

Trust ( JHLT ), which divided the property into several parcels. JHLT sold some of the

par cels to fin ance its purchase and associated preservation of a certain part of that property via a conservation easement

. S ix structures

, collectively referred to here as the

Hardeman Barns

, are located on a 26.45

- acre parcel relevant to this appeal

. A t time s , fo r clarity

, s ome of the Hard e man Barns are referred to individually , i.e., the North Barn, t he

South Barn

, and the Bull Barn

. The Hardeman Barns are historically designated and are considered icon ic s tructures in t he town of Wilson

.

[¶4] The Raptor Center le ased the 26. 4 5

- acre parcel, including the Hardeman Barns, beginning in 20 08. The Raptor Center developed a multi

- phase plan for operations and

u se of the pro perty. The Raptor Center is located o n the only developable area of the parcel consist ing of 2.85 acres

. U se of the property i s limited by the conservation

easement s and county zon ing regulat io n s

. The Raptor Center need ed variances and a

CUP before it could use the site.

A

. The Raptor Center’s Prior Variances, Conditional Use and Develo pment

Permit s

1. The 2008 Variances

[¶5] The si ze of the acreage and the location of the structures f ailed to conform with

Teton Co unty’s Land Dev elopment Regulation (LDR) requirement s of a minimum 35

-2 acre parcel for institutional use and 300

- foot setback s

. In addition, t he property floor area

ratio 1 of 0.014 (based on 15,566 square feet of existing structures ) was “nonconform ing”

under Teton County LDRs

, which al lowed a floor area ratio of only 0.007 (or 8,065 square feet).

[¶6] The Raptor Center applied for thr ee variances to add ress the se nonconformities. The first sough t approval of a floor area ra tio of 0.015, whi ch would allow the Raptor

Center to ta ke advantage of the existing square footage on the property and add additional square footage for a total of approximatel y 17,53 0 squ are feet of usable non

- residential

floor area. The second sought approval for a d eviat ion from the required m inimum 35

acres (where property is intended for institutional use ) to the available 26.45 acres

. T he

third sought per mission for a 58

- foot se tbac k inste ad of the required 300

- foot setb ack

. The Board g ranted all three variances in one perm it.

2. The 2008 Conditional Use Permit

[¶7] T he property was zoned as rural. U se as a r aptor c enter required a CUP

. The Raptor Center sought the CUP at the s ame t ime it applied for the variances. The Boar d granted the CUP (and an accompanying d evelopment permit), subject to conditions. 2

The 2008 CUP allowed the Raptor Center to operate its “non

- profit bird care and

education facility” a nd approved th e Raptor Cen ter to :

a. Have three employees on si te, working in the horse barn/house and machine shed;

b. Provide on

- site housing for one of the three employees in the horse barn/house;

c. Conduct classes and workshops, including f light

exhibitio ns, for less tha n 100 pe ople ;

d. House a small rap tor library;

e. H os t occasional special events for local residents and visitors, also for less than 100 people;

1 Floor are a ratio “is the ratio of tot al building floor area to the area of its zo ning lot. Each zoning district

has [ a floor area ratio] which, when m u ltiplied by the lot are a

. . . pro duces the ma ximum a moun t of floor

area allowable” on the lot. Wilson Advis ory Comm

. v. Bd. of C ty

. Comm’rs , 2012 WY 163, ¶ 33 , 292 P.3d 855, 86 4 n.3 ( Wyo. 2012)

. 2 Those conditions included the s ubmission of a landscapi n g plan, d esi gnation of p arkin g spa ces, designa tion of sch o ol b us parking, identification of off

- site parking and handicap parking, signage, b ear

resistant trash receptacles, and paved a ccess to the pathway to be installed along Hig hway 22.3 f. Remodel the “machine shed” into a raptor care facility, with cages, weathering yar ds, fligh t yard s, and a

veterin a ry care roo m.

3. The 2014 Variance and Development Permit

[¶8] Wyoming Game and Fish regulations required the Raptor Center to segregate resident raptors from wild raptors in rehabilitation. T o comply, the Raptor Center , in

20 14, sought permiss ion to build a n ew chamb ers facility along the western lot line

. This

necessitated an amended development permit and a new setback variance. The Board approved the amended developm ent permit a nd the new setback varia nce.

[¶9] An a me nded floor area ratio var iance was not re quired b ecau se the square footage was within the parameters previously approved in 2008. 3 According to t he P lanning

Commission s taff report

, “ [ t ] he square foo tage approved in 2008 could be used more efficiently

. . . if const ructed as a separate buil ding dedicated s olely to hou sing rehabilitating birds.” Further, the d evelopment p ermit recognizes, “596 square feet of

floor area will remain u nder the p reviously approved” 2008 variance. 4 Neither the 2014

v ari ance nor the 2014 d evelop ment p ermit were appealed.

3 Accordin g t o the P lann i ng Commission s taff report, “[ t] his square f oot ag e was prev io usly approved

under the 2008 v ariance to F loor A rea R atio.”

4 Additional Plannin g d epartment communic ations continued to confirm this understandin g of the Raptor

Center’s a vailable squ are footag e under its f loor a rea r atio c al cul ation

. For example , in 2017, the Raptor

Center submitted a “ Zoning Compliance Verification ” seeking a dete rmin ation of whether the property’s physical development, use, dev elopment options, or subd ivision com plied with t h e LDR s

. The Raptor

Center s p ec ifi cally reques ted ver ifica tion : Based on our understanding of the LDR , any reduction in existing floor

area r esulting from the removal or partial removal of buildin gs creates
additional flo or area t hat is available for new o r expanded buildings.

Plea se c on f irm, when ca lculati ng [f loor area ratio], any new or expanded buildings can incorporate an amount of floor area that is equal to the

amount of floor area removed f rom existing buildings.

In response, the Plannin g d irector confirmed:

The Fl oor Ar ea Rat io an d resulting maximum Floo r Area allowance, discussed above, are for nonresidential use on the entire proper t y. If

Floor Area is eliminated from an existin g structure, it can be incorpora te d into the remainder Fl o or Area a llowance for futur e deve lopmen t of the parcel. Also, i n con junction with a 2016 amendment to the property’s conservation easement p reviously

a pproved by the Board, the Planning s t aff issued a formal rep ort stati ng : “The approved [floor a rea ratio]

of 0.015 , pursua nt to the 2008 varianc e, wo uld allow fo r a max imum of 17,282 square feet” of building

space.4 B. Th e Raptor Cen ter’s Purchase of the Property

[¶10] On April 14, 2017, JHLT sold the property to t he Raptor Center

. I n conjunction with the sale, JHLT en cumbered the property with a re strictive covenant that r equired the Raptor Center to maintain the historic Nor th Barn. No other structures on the property are subject to the restrictive covenan t.

C. The 2018 Redevelopment

[¶11] I n 2017, the Raptor Center de cid ed to implement the final phase of its plan and expand its use of the site. T he expanded us e envisioned : ne w and re nova ted office space; a flight barn and new bird enclosu res; two accessory residential units (providing employee housing fo r four additional people); r estoration of the North Barn (which has

been unused for thirty years) ; use of the North Barn as a hub for rap tor conservation and education; and replacement of a deteriorated foundation under the North B arn. In total,

f

our of the six existing b arns would be preserved, and one barn would be relocated off

site.

[¶12] The Raptor Center applied to amen d its 2008 CUP

. E xtensi ve public comment

occu rred. Comments

, both positive a nd negative, were submitted in writing and offered at public hearings.

1. The 2018 Amendment to the 2008 Conditio nal Use Permit

[¶13] T he P lan ning C ommission staff recommended ap proval of th e CUP applic ation

con tingent on twelve conditions. The Board then voted 4

- 0 to approve the application

with additional conditions f or a total of fourteen conditi ons

. The amended C UP al lows the Raptor Center to const ruct new and renovated offic e spa ce, a flight barn

, new b ird enclosures, and two accessory residential units providing housing for four people. It requires th e removal of a temporary educational programming tent

. Finally , it requires

the restor ation ( in cluding replacement of the d eterio rated foundation) and pr eservation of

the North Barn

, and it allows the Raptor Center to use the barn f or raptor conservation

a nd education. Th e c onditions include :

1. The “[m] aximum occupancy on site at any one time is limited to 100 people, including visi tors, employees, v olunte ers, residents and any supplementary

staff ” ;

2. The maximum number of public visitors is 150 pe r day, apart from four d ays

per mo nth when a total of 200 visi tors will be allowed ;

3. A maximum of twelve employees are allowed on the prope rty at any one tim e;5 4. Pu blic event hours are limi ted to 9:00 a

. m

. – 9:00 p

. m

. f or indoor events and

9:00 a

. m

. – 7:00 p

. m

. for outd oor events;

5. Use is limite d to “ ch aritable, educational, adm inistrative and/or community functions consistent with conservation, r esearc h, education

, and wildlife rehabilitation and the pro vision of workforce hous ing ” ; non

- mission events including rental for private parties and even ts are p rohibited;

6. The Raptor Ce nter must submit a n annual impact monitoring report to the

c ounty and based upon that r eport, the CUP may be revoked ; and

7. Before obtaini ng a building permit for construction that would utilize the

square footage of the South Barn, the Sou th Barn must be relocate d off

- site

. 5

D. Subsequent Proceedings

[¶14] Petitioners, the appe llants here, appea led to the d istrict c ourt. The district court

concl uded that only four of the fourteen petitioners had standing and affi rmed the

Board’s decision. The petitioners appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Do the a ppellants have standing?

[¶15] The p etitioners / a ppell ants ar e ind ividu a ls, trusts and limited partnerships, that

either own property in the area or are members of t he H arde man family

. The Board argued in district court that none of the fourteen petitioners had standing. The dist rict

court conclude d R eynold s and Bett ie Pomer oy, as trustees of the P omeroy R evocable

Trust (the Pomeroy s)

, and Michael Christodolou and Kathleen Christodolou ( Michael and Kathleen together

, the Christodolous) had standing. It fo und the remaining petiti oners did not have stan ding. The appella nt s ( i n cluding those petitioners that the

d istrict court found lacked standing) did not appeal th e district court’s decision on standing

. However, the Board argu e s here that none of the appell ants have standing. 6

W e will consider standi ng onl y as it appl ies to t he Pomeroys a n d the Christodolou s

.

5 The remaining cond itions are: decommis sioning of the septic system and connection to the public se we r ; widening and paving a portion of the access driv e ; app roval of a signage plan; pl ace ment of bear

- resist ant

t rash and recycling in a structure shielding it from view; parki ng in designated are as; removal of a

temporary s easonal tent that had b een used fo r educational programmi n g; foundation repair an d upgr ade

of the North Barn ; and the pro hibit ion aga in st demolis hing the Bull Barn for two years

. 6 T he Bo ard did not cross

- appea l but

, instead

, a rgu ed the standing ques tion in its response brief. See, e.g.

, Zu pan v. Zupan , 2016 WY 78, ¶ 15, 377 P.3d 770, 776 (Wyo. 2016) (“The di st inction between arguing in

br ief and cross

- appealing generally is that a c ros s

- appeal is required to win a change in th e judgment,6 A. Stand ard of Review

[¶16] The existence of standing is a legal issue review ed de novo

. N. Laramie Range Found. v. Converse Cty. B d. of Cty. Comm ’ rs , 2012 WY 158, ¶ 22, 290 P.3d 1063, 107 3 (Wyo. 2012 ) ; Hal liburton Ene rgy Se rv s ., Inc. v. G unter

, 2007 WY 151, ¶ 10, 167 P.3d 645, 649 (Wyo. 2007). See also Northfork Citizens for Resp onsible Dev. v. Park C ty

. Bd. of C ty

. Comm ’ rs , 2008 WY 88, ¶ 6, 189 P.3d 260, 2 62 (Wyo. 2008).

B. Analysis

[¶17] The doctrine of standi ng is rooted in th e separation of powers: “It is the role of

courts to provide relief to claimants

. . . who have suffered

, or will imminently suffer,

actual har m

. . . . ” Allred v . Bebout

, 2018 WY 8

, ¶ 3 0 , 409 P.3d 260, 268 (Wyo. 2018) (citation om itted)

. “It is no t the fu nction of the [courts] to pass judgment on the genera l performance of other branch es of government.” Id. (c i tation omitted)

. The doctrine,

therefore

, incorpora tes three broad principl e s:

[T]he general prohibition on a litigant’ s rais ing another

person ’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudicati on of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a pl aintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by th e law invoked.

[ M atter of Ado ption of ] L

- MHB

, [2018 W Y 140 ,] ¶ 19, 431

P.3d [560

, ] 567 [(Wyo. 2018)] (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. , 572 U.S. 118, 126, 1 34 S.Ct. 1377, 1386, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014)).

Matter of Estate of St anford , 2019 WY 94 , ¶ 9, 448 P.3d 861, 864 (Wyo. 2019)

.

while arguments to support the judgment can be made w ithout a cross

- appeal.” ( quoting GOB, LLC v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc.

, 2008 WY 1 57, ¶ 10, 197 P.3d 1 269, 1271 (W yo. 2008) ( citi ng 18B Charles A.

Wri gh t e t al., Federal Prac tice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4478.6, at 831 ( 2d ed. 2 00 2 )) ) ). The Appellants r esponde d to the Board ’ s standing argument but d id not assert that standing should have been

raise d in a cross

- a ppea l. Without briefing, it is unclear wh eth er the Board ’ s ar gument that petitioners

lacked stand ing is an argument in “support of the judgment” (if th e Board prev ail s on the argument, the

district court ’ s decision is upheld) or whether the a rgume nt purpo rts to change the judgment (if the Board

p rev ails

, t he grounds for affirmance for the ju dgment would be changed)

. We address the issue here

because

, regardless

, the underlying judg ment remains the same

. Se e Sincl air Oil Corp. v. Wyo ming Pub.

S

er v . C o m m ’ n , 2 003 WY 22, 63 P.3d 887 (Wyo. 2003) (cons id eri ng standing when it was not raised in a

cross

- appeal).7 [¶18] Wyoming’s long

- established test for standi ng , first articulated in Brim mer v. Thomson

, was recently revisited in Allred :

First, a justiciable controvers y requires parties having existing and genuine , as d istingu ished from t heoretical, ri gh ts or
interests. Second, the controversy must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate, as distinguished from a debat e or argument evoking a p urely political, administrative, philosophica l or a cademic

conc lusion

. Third, it mu st b e a controversy the judicial

determination of which will have the force and effect of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the righ ts, status or other lega l relationships of one or more of the real

par ties i n interes t, or, wa n ting these qua liti es be of such great and overriding public moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of them. Finally, the proceedings must be

ge nuin ely adversary in charact e r and not a mere disputation,

but advanced wi th suf ficient mi li tancy t o engender a t horou gh research and analysis of the major issues. Any controversy lacking these elements becomes an exercise in academics and is not properly bef ore the courts for solut i on.

Allred

, ¶ 37, 409 P.3d at 270 (quoting B rimmer v. Thomson

, 521 P

. 2d 574, 578 (W yo. 1974)).

[¶19] We have drawn a distinction between “prudential” and “statutory” standing. Stanford

, ¶ 9, 448 P.3d at 864

. Both prudential and statu tory stan ding principles are “vital j urisprudential rules that assist courts in filterin g case s .” Matter of Ado ption of

L

- MHB

, 2018 W Y 140

, ¶ 2 4, 431 P.3d 560, 568 (Wyo. 2018)

. T he Brimmer test
evaluates prudential standing. Stanford

, ¶ 10 , 448 P.3d at 8 64

.

“ Statutory standing is a close cousin of prudential standing,

and lo oks to wheth er ‘ th is plaintiff has a cause of action under

the statute

. . . . ’ ” L

- MHB , ¶ 20, 431 P.3d at 567 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment , 523 U.S. 83,

9 7 n.2, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 10 1 3 n.2, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (emphasis in Steel Co. )). Whe re the que sti on is stat utory standing, prudential considerations do not play a role in the standing determination.

Stanf ord

, ¶ 11, 448 P .3d at 864 ( emphasis added)

. Sta tutory standing , therefo r e, looks to

whether a plaintiff has a cause of ac tion under t he sta tut e , not to whe ther the plaintiff8 satisfies the Brimmer test

. Stanford

, ¶ 11, 448 P .3d at 864 ; L

- MHB , ¶ 20, 431 P.3d at

56 7.

[¶20] In Stanford

, the Court considered whether the State had st a nding t o object to the appointment of an ad minist rator of an estate

. Stanford

, ¶ 2 , 448 P.3d at 86 2

. The probate code identifies those parti es who may object to the app ointment of an administrator. We

determined that the State w as not one of those part i es identified in the statute and lacke d

“st atutory” standing. Id. ¶ 1 3 , 448 P.3d at 865 ; se e also L

- MHB , ¶ 20, 431 P.3d at 56 7 (looking to whether the appellan ts had met the statutory grounds for filing an adoption petition to det ermine standing).

[¶21] Judi c ial review of administrative action is subj ect to the Wyoming Admin ist rative

Procedure Ac t, which provides:

Subject to the requirement that administrative reme dies be exhausted and in the absence of any statutory or common

- law

pro vision precluding or lim i ting judicial review, any person aggri eved or adv ersely affec ted in fa ct by a final decis ion of an agency in a contested case, or by other agency action or

inac tion, or any person affected in fact by a rule adopted by

an agency, is entitled to judicial re v iew

. . . .

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16

- 3

- 11 4 (a) ( Lexis Nexis 2019 ) (empha sis added)

. According ly, whether a pa rty has standing to seek judicial r eview of adm inistrat ive actions i s a question of statutory standing. S ee, e.g. , N. Laramie Range

, ¶¶ 22

– 26, 290 P. 3 d at 1073

– 74 ; Hok e v. Moyer

, 865 P.2d 624, 628 (W yo. 1993) (appeal of count y commi ssioners’ decision) ; Northfork

, ¶¶ 13

– 14, 189 P.3d at 263

– 6 4 (same) ; Co x v. Ci ty of Cheyenne

, 2003 WY 146, ¶ 14, 79 P.3d 500, 506 (Wyo. 2003) ( same )

.

An aggrieved or advers e ly affected person is one who has a

le gally recog nizable inte rest i n t hat which wi ll be affected by

the action. A potentia l litigant must show injury or potent ial injury by alleg [ ing ] a perceptible, rather than a speculative,

harm resulting from the agen c y action. The interest which

will sus tain a righ t to appeal must g ene rally be sub stantial, immediate, and pecuniary. A future , contingent, or merely

sp ec ulati ve interest is ordinarily not sufficient.

Wyodak Res. Dev. Corp. v. Wy oming Dep ’ t of Revenue

, 2 017 WY 6, ¶ 60 , 387 P.3d 725,

738 (Wyo . 201 7) (in ternal quota tion m ark s omitted) ( quoting Jacobs v. State ex rel. Wyo ming Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div.

, 2 004 W Y 136, ¶ 7, 100 P.3d 848, 85 0 (Wyo. 2004) ).9 [¶22] In the context of land use planning, to be “ aggriev e d or adversely affected

, ” one must hav e “ a legall y recognizab le int ere st that is o r will be affected by the action of the zoning authority in question. ” N. La r amie Range , ¶ 2 4 , 290 P.3d at 1073 ( quotin g Hoke

, 865 P.2d at 628 )

. Th e individual “ must have a definite interest exceeding the gener al

in terest in communit y good sh ared in common with all citizens. ” Id

. ( quot ing Hoke

, 865

P.2d at 628 )

.

[¶23] We have decided questions of standing in land use actions many times

. Most recently, i n Tayback

, we determined t he Tayba cks had standing to contest th e Tet on Cou nty Board of Count y Commissi oners ’ decision allowing Four Shadows to use its property as a construction staging site. T he Taybacks provided photographic proof that the staging site was in their viewshed

. T hey c laimed the dust and noise emana ting from

the site inter f ered with thei r enjoy ment of their property

. On appeal, we held t he alleged

harm was “not speculat ive as the staging site had been in actual operation” and that the Tayb acks had “an interest th a t is greater than the general p ublic ’s, giving th em standing

. . . as perso ns aggrieved and adversely affected in fact” by the Board’s decision

. Tayback v. Tet on Cty. B d. of Cty. Comm ’ rs , 20 17 WY 114, ¶ 19, 402 P.3d 984, 989 (Wyo. 2017)

.

[¶24] In N. Laramie R a ng e , ¶¶ 27

– 35, 290 P.3d at 1074

– 76

, we considered whether

se v eral di ff erent parties had s tan ding to challenge the Conver se County Board of County

Commissioner s ’ approval of a wind energy project

. The first party, White Creek Ranch,

had s tanding because it owned property bordering the p rojec t and the pro ject

“threa t en [ ed ] its sce ni c views and wildlife h abi tat and migration.” Id. ¶ 27, 290 P.3d at

1 074

. The second party, th e N orthern L aramie R ange A lliance , had standing because one

of its members

, Ms. Sarvey

, ow n ed prope rty “near” land lease d for the pro ject and sh e had concerns ab out the increased traffic and safety issues the project would cause

.

“ [C] oncerns about traffic, congestion and safety in the area of one ’ s property are percepti ble harms for a property owner tha t d istinguish [e d Ms. Sarvey] fr om the genera l public. ” 7 We c onclude d Ms. Sarvey had standing. Id. ¶ 3 3 , 290 P.3d at 107 5

. In

co ntrast, the third party, the N orthern L ara mie R ange F oundation (NLRF)

, lacked standing. The NLRF argued it had stan d ing because its “ program ming, mission and

purpose

. . . would be adv er sely affected by the destruction of the scenic views and

natural beau ty, and the degradation of the environment, nat ural habitat, wildlife and

7 We note d that the “ assertion that her property is ‘ near ’ the project does not precisely fall within our precedent finding sta nding when the litiga nt s asse rte d t heir property ‘a djoined ’ or was ‘ a dj ace nt ’ to the

area o f proposed action. ” N. Laramie Range

, ¶ 3 3 , 290 P.3d at 107 5 (citing Northfork

, ¶ 10, 189 P. 3d at 263; Hoke

, 865 P

. 2 d at 628 ). We also noted that Ms . Sarvey’s all ega tions concerning a gravel quarr y (whic h had “nothing t o do with the w ind energy project”) and he r complaint that the wind project will

“add to the Glenr ock area disaster with its 30 enormous towers and blinking lights” di d not establish

in dividual harm gre ater than the gener al public an d did n ot “aid her

. . . in establis hi ng standing.” Id. ¶ 3 1

– 32

, 290 P.3d at 107 5

.10 b iological resourc es.” Id. ¶ 3 5 , 290 P.3d at 107 6

. T he NLRF’s all egati ons did not

e stablish a c ausal relation sh ip between perceived threa ts and the project and failed t o show its “ programs would actually be harmed by the wind project. ” Id. We concluded

that the NLRF cou ld not dis tin guish itsel f fr om “the gener al publi c who enjoys the

N orthern Lar a mie Range” and t herefore it lacked standing. Id.

[¶25] In Hoke

, t he Te ton County Board of County Commissioners approved the development of a subdivision with a higher density than w a s permitted by its zoning

category. We determin ed th at Mr. Moyer

, a n adjacen t landowner, had standing to seek jud ici al revie w. We said th at “ [ d ] oubl ing the density of adjacent property raises a number of perceptible harms for a[n adjacent] property owne r which are different than the harm to the genera l pub lic

, such as in cr eased t r affic and congestion.” Hoke

, 865 P.2d

at 628 ; s ee also Hirsc hfield v. B d. of C ty

. Comm ’ rs of C ty

. of Teton

, 944 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Wyo. 1997) (“an adjoini ng landowner has standin g when the effect of the board’s

decision will be to d ouble the den si ty previo u sly permitted”)

.

[¶26] Si milarly, i n Northfork

, ¶¶ 13

– 1 6 , 189 P.3d at 263

– 65

, the Park County Board of County C ommissioners had approved plans for developmen t of a residential subdi v ision that, like the subdivision in Hoke , substa ntia l ly increased the permitt e d den sity. We

e xplained that the “ real lesson [of Hoke and Hirschf i eld ] is that adjoining landowners

have st anding to appeal land use decisions that res ult in a substantial inc r ease in the

allowed hous ing density.” Northfork

, ¶ 1 4, 189 P.3d a t 26 4. “D o ubling the density is but one example of a substantial increase sufficient to support standing

. ” Id. We held tha t

n eighboring landowners had st anding be cause there was a n alleg e d “substantial increase in the allowed housing d ensit y , ” i d. , and the i r inter e st “in preserving views from their

ho mes , and their interests in obs erving and enjoying wildlife on their own properties

, . . . exceed the general public ’s interest in community g ood

. ” Id. ¶ 1 6 , 189 P.3d at 26 4

.

[¶27] Finally, in Roe

, potential li tiga nts fai l ed to establish standing to contest the Campbell County Board of County Commiss ioners ’ approval of an application to

re subdivide a subdivision. Although the se litig ants alleged t he Board had deviat e d from the proper ad ministr ative process and they discus s ed general co ncerns about water rights and termination of water and sewer services, they d id not describe how they had been aggrieved by the B oard’s decision. Roe v. B d

. of C t y

. Comm’r s o f Campbell C ty

. , 997

P.2d 1021, 1023 (W yo. 2 000).

[¶28] Turnin g to the a p p ellants in th is case, we first consider whether the Pomeroys have standing. 8 The Pomeroys’ property is adjacent to the Raptor Center and they raise

8 In determini ng whether a l itigant has standing

, we generall y l ook to the allegations contained in the complaint. See, e.g

. , Allred

, ¶ 49, 409 P.3d at 274 (ex amining alle gations contained in th e amended

com pl ain t to determine standing)

. In Hoke

, we e xpla ined that “[t ]here are no ma gic words which must be11 concerns

— i ncreased noise

, additi ona l lighting, a n d more dogs

— directly attrib utabl e to
increase d residenti a l density. They express concerns about the effect of the se changes on th eir property

— disr u

pt ion of peace and quiet and d isruption of existing v iews. Finally, they complain about impacts to wildlife migration and use of neigh borin g meadows

. T he Pomeroy s ’ concerns about wi ldlife migrat ion and the mea dows are n ot distinguis hable from those of the general public and do not aid the ir standi ng claim. However, like the appellants in Northfork and Hoke , their concerns about increas ed de nsity from gr eater use

o f the neighborin g p roperty and t he effect of th at greate r use on their property exceed the interest of the general public. Acc ordingly, the Pomeroys are “aggrieved or adversely affected” and have established standing to appeal the Board’s decis ion.

[¶29] Next

, we consider the sta nding of the Christodolous. The Chr i stodol ous’ ho me is located 1300 feet from the Raptor Center

. They raised concerns about “construction noise, increased employee and resident population density, tr affic conge stion, p ark in g surface i m pac t , noise and light pollution, skyline blight, and the potential for impact on

the wildlif e population that resides in and migrates through our area.” T he

Christodolous ’ concerns about wildlife are not dis tinguishable from those of the ge ner al public. Neverthel e ss, they have esta blished standing because their other concerns go bey ond generalized grievances belonging to the community as a whole. The Pomeroys and the Christodolous were entitled to judicial review of the Boar d’s a ction by t he district

co u rt and ar e enti tled to judici al review by this Court. We refer to the Pomeroys and the

Christodolous as the A ppellants in the remainder of this opinion.

II. Was the Board ’ s decision to grant the 2018 amendment to the 2008 CUP

ar bitra ry and cap ric ious or con t rary to l a w?

[¶30] The A p pellant s argue that the Board should have required the Raptor Ce nter to
obtain a new variance

, and amend ing the CUP was in violation of the LDRs

. Th e Board

pled to est ablish standing; a party need not state ‘I am adversely affe cted or aggrieved because

. . . . ’ ”

Hok e , 865 P .2d at 628. While stan ding should b e all eged in the complaint (o r p etition for review i n an administ rative procee din g), our libera l pleading rules may require examination of the underlying record to

determine w hether a party has standing. Ind ee d, in case s where an appellan t had c hallenged bo ard actions regarding land use , we have looke d bey ond allegatio ns contained i n t he appeal to the record in support of standing. For example, in N. Laramie Range , w e examined the record to determine whether t he NLRA

ha d standing. We n ot ed the “record in di cat es NLRA is a limited liabil ity comp any

. . . [ and ] includes

information” reg arding its mem bers

. N. Laramie Range

, ¶ 3 0 , 290 P.3d at 1075

. We also looked to “an email sent to the county commissioners” t o discern fa cts underl yi ng the position of anoth er ap pel lan t with respect to the dev elopment at issue. Id. ¶ 31, 2 90 P.3d at 1075

. Again, in Northfork

, we exam ined the

record to determine the “ re lationship between Northfork and the people it purport[ed] to represent .” Northf ork

, ¶ 8, 189 P.3d at 262

. Her e, the district court exami ned the record to determine wheth er individual appellants ha d s tanding. W e , too, must look to the reco rd to determine whether the Pomeroys

or the Christo dolous have standing

.12 and the Raptor Cente r a rg ue that the only issue b e f or e the Cour t is whe ther the Bo a rd’s approval of the amended CUP was arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law.

[¶31] T he dispositive issue before the Court is whether the Board’s decision to is sue a n

a mended CUP was a r bitrary and capricious or co ntrary to la w. W e address t he question

o f whether th e Raptor Center should have sought a variance and not an amendment to its

CUP in the cont ext of whether the amended CUP viola ted the c ounty’s existing LD Rs

.

A. St andard of Rev i ew

[¶32] We review an agency’s decisio n as if it c ame directly to us

, and w e give no

deference to the district court’s decision. Hardy v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Workforce

Servs

. , Workers’ Comp. Div.

, 2017 W Y 4 2, ¶ 10, 394 P.3d 454, 457 ( Wyo. 2017)

.

[¶33] The proce e dings before the Board were infor mal , n ot a contested cas e adjudicat o ry hearing

. W e review the Board’s decision under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16

- 3

- 114(c)(ii)(A)

, which directs the C ourt to set aside an agenc y d ecision that is “[a]rbitra ry , caprici ous, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accor dance with law.” Wyo. Stat. A nn. § 16

- 3

- 114(c)(ii) ( A)

. See Tayback

, ¶ 13 , 402 P.3d at 98 8 ; Wilson Advis ory Comm

. v. Bd. of C ty

. Comm’rs , 2012 WY 163, ¶ 20, 292 P.3d 855, 861 ( Wyo. 2012)

.

Th e arbitrary and capricio u s test requires the reviewing cou rt

to revie w the entire record to d e termine whether the agenc y reasonably cou ld have made its finding and order based upon

all the e vid ence before i t. The arbitrar y and capricious

standard is more lenient and deferential t o the agency than the

substantial evide nce s tandard becau se it requi r es only that

there be a ra tional basis fo r the agency’s decision.

Tayback

, ¶ 13 , 402 P.3d at 98 8 (quoting Wilso n , ¶ 21, 292 P.3d at 86 1). An agency’s

conclusion s of law are reviewed de novo

. Id. ¶¶ 12

– 14, 402 P.3d at 987

– 88

.

B. An alysis

1. T eton County ’ s Land Development Regulations and Condit ional Use

Permits

[¶34] Teton County’s LDRs set forth three types of availab le land use permits. A basic

use permit “ ensure [s ] compliance with the st a ndards of these LDRs for uses tha t ar e

compa tible with th e character of the zone in which they are proposed. ” LDR § 8.4. 1 ( A )

. A CUP permits “ a use that is generally compatible with the character of a zone, but requires [ project ] s pecific conditions to li m it and mi tig ate ” potential advers e imp acts

. LDR § 8.4.2 ( A ) (emphas i s added)

. A special use permit is required when the13 “ intensity of a us e

. . . is inherently incompatible with the character of all zones, but [is]

essential to the community and therefore some provision mu st b e made for i ts e xiste nce and opera tion. ” LDR § 8.4.3 ( A )

. The use permit at issue here is a CUP

.

[¶35] The LDRs require the approval of a CUP application upon findin g the application :

1. Is compatible with the desired future character of the area;

2. Complies w ith the use speci fi c sta ndards of Div . 6.1

. and

t he zone ; 9

3. Minimizes adverse visual impacts;

4. Minimizes adverse environmental impacts;

5. Minimizes adverse impacts from nuisances;

6. Minimizes adverse impacts on public fa cilities ;

7. Complies with a ll other relevant sta ndar ds of th ese LDRs

and all other Coun t y Resolutions; and

8. Is in substantial conformance with all standards or conditions of any prior applicable permits or ap provals.

A mendments to existing CUPs underg o the same approval pro cess as new CUPs. When it approved the 2018 amendments t o the 20 08 C UP, the Board made all eight findings

and included an analys i s of e ach in its decision

.

[¶36] The A ppella nt s ’ argum e nts are d ire cted at the seventh a nd eighth finding s

. They

argue that county ordin ances do not allow existing variances to be used for n ew develop m ent; rather, the ordinances require new variances for new development , an d new vari anc es w ere not available under the LDRs

. 10 F inding number seven requires

9 Secti on 6. 1 .1 sets forth “the principal, acces so ry, an d te mporary uses allowed in each zone.” LDR § 6.1 .1.

10 Section 8.8.2 of th e current LDR s provides:

B. Appl ica bility

. A varianc e may be sought for any standard of these

LDRs unle ss the variance woul d : 1. In crea se maximum densi ty, [ f loor a rea r ati o] , o r ma ximu m scale of development;

2. A llow a prohibited sign;14 com pliance with C oun ty R esolutions

, and the Appellants assert that the C ounty

R esolutions re quired a va r iance and not an amended CUP. See supra ¶ ¶ 30

– 31, 35 ; infra ¶¶ 43

– 4 8

. The Appellants also argue th at th e 2018 CUP did not substantially conform to

conditions in the Raptor Center’s exi sti ng 2008 variances

, and therefore the Board co u ld

not make f inding numb e r eight which requires substantial conformance with ex isting permits

. See sup r a ¶ ¶ 30

– 31, 35.

2. Fi nding No. 7

[¶37] The LDRs required the Board to find that the proposed CUP “[c] om plies with all

other relevant standards of these LD R s and all oth er Cou nty R e solutions ” as a condition

o f approv al. LDR § 8.4.2 ( C ) (7)

. Th e Bo ard found the amended CUP :

7

. Complies with all other relevant sta ndards of these LDRs and all other County Resolutions; and

Can Be Made, as Condi tioned.

The ap p lication comp lies with a l l relevant LDRs a nd other County Resolutions, as c onditioned, pu rsua nt to review of the staff report prepared by the Planning Departme nt and dis cussion among the Board in public hearing. A condition requires that p rior to inst all a tion of any

s igna ge, a M a ste r Signage Pla n be approved by the Planning

Dire ctor. As a p rop erty in Conflict Priority Area 1, a condition of approval has also b een added requiring bear

proof trash and recycling containers.

( E mphasis added

. )

[¶38] The A ppe llants re l y on two LDR p r ovisions a ddressing variances in support of

th eir arg ument that the Raptor Center was required to seek a new variance for the

c hanges it sought in the amended CUP and that the Board ignored these pr ovisions when

3. Allow a prohibi ted use or allow additional expa nsi on of a

nonconfo rming use;

4. Reduce the requirements of a develop ment option (e.g. re qu ired

co nserv ation area, mini mum lot size, unit t yp e m ix) ;
5

. Reduce a requirement where an option for independent calculation

of th e requireme nt exists (e.g. housi ng, development exa ctions); or

6. Reduce the threshold for review of an application.

LDR § 8

. 8

. 2(B)

.15 it approved the CUP

. A v ari a nce is consid e r ed to be a form of “relief” from LDRs. LDR §§ 8 .8 ( B )

, 8 .8.2. The firs t provision th e A ppellants rely on is 8.2.13 ( A )

, whi ch states :

Application Type Cannot be Amended. The following permits or approva ls cannot be amended due to the n atur e o f the findings fo r approv a l: Formal Interpretations ; Zoning Complian ce Veri fications;

. . . all Relief from the LDRs

. . . . A change t o one of t hese approvals shall be achi eved through application for a new approva l

.

LDR § 8.2.13 ( A ) (emphasis added )

. 11 S e ction 8.8.2 ( D )

, t h e seco n d provision the

A ppellants rely on, provides:

Issuance of a vari ance shall not ensure the approval of any

other applicati on. A variance is unique to the special

circumstances identified in th e findings and does not create

prec ede nt. A variance appro v ed for a specific development

or use shall only apply to that d eve lopm ent or use.

LDR § 8.8.2 ( D )

. 12

[¶39] An agenc y is in the best position to determine whether a CUP is required

. Bonnie M. Qu inn Revocable Tr. v. SRW, Inc. , 200 4 WY 65, ¶ 17, 91 P.3d 1 4 6, 151 (Wyo. 2 0 04)

. At the same time, a n “ agency’s own rules and re gula tions have the force and effect of law, and a n admini strative agency must follow its own rules and regulations or face

rever sal of its action.” Wilson

, ¶ 22, 292 P.3d at 86 2 (citatio n an d internal q uotation

marks omi tted)

.

[¶40] We see n othing in the LDR provisions highlighted by the A ppellants that requi re s

a n ew variance here

. According to the LDRs

, v a riances and CUP s are used to a chieve

different ends

. The LDRs pr ovide t hat the “ purpose o f a varian c e is to allow a specif ic

11 Th e 1994 LD Rs, in effect at the time t he 2008 v ariance was a ppro ved, provided that “[a] Varia nce may be amended, varied or altered only pursuant to the standards and pr oce dures for the or iginal approval of a

Variance

. . . . ” 1994 LDR § 5160 ( F )

. 12 The 19 94 LDRs similarly provided:

The deve lo pme nt for whic h the Varia nce was granted shall not be carried out until the applicant has secured all other permits required by t hes e Land De velopment Regulations. A permit for a Variance sha ll not

ensure that t he de v elo pment approved as a Variance shal l rec eive subseq uent approva l for other applicati ons for development unless the

relev ant and applicable portions of the se Land Development Regu lati ons

are met. 1994 LDR § 5160 (E)

.16 deviation from these regulations that is not contrary to the desired future char a ct er for the site when, due to special circumstances of the land, strict applic ation of these regulations

would re sult in un d ue and unique hardship.” LDR § 8.8.2 ( A ) (emphas is added)

. 13 In contrast, the “ purpose of a conditional use permit is to individuall y an d pu blicly review the configuration, density, and intensity of a use that i s generally compatible

with the cha racter of a zone , but r e q uires add i tional, site

- specific c onditions to li mit and mitigate effects that may be adverse to the desire d character of the zone.” LDR § 8.4.2 ( A ) (emphasis added)

. 14

[¶41] Other authorities have explai ned the distinction between CUPs an d var ian c es similarly: “ T he purpo s e of a [ CUP ] is to bring flexibility to the rigid restrictions of a zoning ordinance while at the sa me time cont rol l ing troublesome or somewhat incompatible uses by establishing, in advan ce, standards that admit the use on ly un der

certain condi ti o ns and s t andards that must be met

. ” 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning § 256 , Westlaw ( database updated June 2020)

. A CUP “ is a separate and

dis t inct me chani sm from a ‘ variance. ’ ” Id. “[U] nlike a variance, which perm its a landowne r t o use h i s or h er property in a manner for bidden by an ordinance or statute

,

a [ CUP ] allows an owner to put his or her land to a us e e xpressly per mitted by

ordinance ” subject to “conditions necessary to pr otect the public health, safety,

co nvenience, and pr o perty v alues. ” Id. (emp h asis added)

.

[¶42] The 2018 CUP and the 2008 C UP both authorize the u se of the pr ope rty as a bird

rehabilitation and education center. The 201 8 CUP amended the 2008 CUP to estab lish

fourteen conditions by which the Raptor Center m ust a bide in its allowable u s e of the

property in view of proposed site imp rov e ments

. Se e supra ¶ 13

. The 20 08 variances

— approval of a floor area ratio of 0.015 , p ermission to deviate from the required 35 acres for institutio n al use to the available 26.4 5 a c res , and p erm ission for a nonconforming

setback (as amended in 2014)

— waive specific requ ir ements in the zoni ng ordinance. See

supra ¶ ¶ 6

, 8

. The Board found t hat t he proposed changes substantially comp ly with the previously a p proved 2008 variances

.

[¶43] C U P s have been granted in o ther cases where landowner s hav e sought to use property f or a conditioned purpose like the amended CUP sought by the Raptor Center

. See, e .g. , B d. of Cty. Comm ’ rs of Te t on Cty. v. Mackay Inv s

. , LL C , 2018 WY 34, ¶ 3

, 413

P.3d 1 120

, 1122 , 1122 n .2 (Wyo. 20 1 8) ( CUP was used to l imit l ength of stay in

campgrou nd to “less than 30 days” and to increase the number of trailers allowed at the

campgroun d); Laughter v. Bd. of C t y . Comm ’ rs for Sweetwater Cty. , 2 005 WY 54, ¶ 38,

13 The A pp ellants cite no spec if ic zoni ng or dinance that forbids the proposed ch an ges an d

, as a

consequence , woul d have r equired a variance not a CUP.

14 The A ppellants do not disp ute that the Raptor Center ’s institution al use of the prop ert y is “generally compatible wit h the characte r of a z one.”17 110 P.3d 87 5, 8 86 (Wyo. 2005 ) (recogniz i ng that the county co uld im pose conditions limiting the duration of use, hours of operation, site improve ments, building improvements, parkin g requirements, and sewe r and water requirements, among ot hers, when issuing a CUP) ; s ee a lso Burns Holdings, LLC v . Teton Cty. Bd. of C omm ’ rs , 272

P. 3d 412, 416 ( Idaho 2012) ( A CUP concerns the proposed us e of pr opert y and cannot be

used to obtain a waive r of zoning ordinance re q uirements such as the maximum hei ght of buildings .)

.

[¶44] “ A var ian c e approved fo r a specifi c develop ment or use shall o nly apply to th at development or use.” LDR § 8.8.2 ( D )

. T he fact tha t the Raptor Center sought to expand

its current use of the property doe s not equate to a change of use. Consequently, expanding i ts u se does not m ean that th e Raptor Cente r needed a varian ce. 15

[¶45] The Bo ard relied upon the Planning C ommission reports findi ng t hat an amendment to the CUP was the appropr iate method to address t h e Raptor Center’s proposed expans ion

. The Board ’s relianc e o n thos e report s , and its d ecision to a ppr ove the amendment to the CUP

, was reasonable and di d n o t violate the LDRs.

3

. Finding No . 8

[¶46] The LDRs required the Board to find that the use proposed in the CUP was “ in

substantial conformance with all standar ds o r conditi ons of any pri o r applicable per mit s or approvals ” before it could approve the amende d CU P. LDR § 8.4.2 ( C ) ( 8 ). The Board

found the amended CUP :

8. Is in substantial conformance with all standards or conditions of any pr ior applicab le permits or appro val s.

C an Be Made, as Conditioned.

Relevant condition s from the 2008 Conditional Use Permit

. . . have been added as c onditions of this approval to pro vide

consiste ncy with this amendment. [The 2018 amended CUP ]

is and remains in confo rma nce wi th t he relevant 2 008

Varianc e s

. . . . Since the 2008 Variances w ere issued in

association with the Teton Raptor Center’s institu t ional use and [the 2018 amended C UP ] is an amendment of that

15 The A ppellants also argue that the amen de d C UP is really a “use variance

, ” and u nder t he LDRs

, use variances would not be permitted. The LDRs do n ot define, provi de for

, or otherw ise recognize a dis tinct “use” category of vari a nces. Rather, “use s” of proper ties are addressed by use permits, d es cri bed above. Supra ¶ 34

.18 existing use, the variances were found to be established

,

o ng oing , e f fective, and in operati o n

. The Board reviewed the

terms and conditions of th e 2008 Variances and the plain language of the 2 0 08 Variance permits. The Board w as able

to find that thi s application is in substantial conformance

with the 2008 Co ndi tio nal Us e Permit and t he 2008

Var i an ce Permits and all other standards or conditions o f any prior applicable p ermits or approvals.

( E mphasis added

. ) The A pp ellants argue that the amended CUP is not in substantial

co nfo rman ce with the 2008 v ariance.

4

. Com pli a nce with the A llowances i n the 2008 Va r iance

[¶47] The 2008 v ariance allowed a 58

- foot setback, a 0.015 floor area ratio, and the

institutional use of a base sit e area of 26. 45 acres. See su pra ¶ 6

. The A ppellants argue

that the amended CUP di d not comply wi t h the floor a r ea ratio o f the 2008 v ar i ance because it applied square fo otage al located in that variance to different square footage in

its new d evelopment.

[¶48] The district cou rt held that because the sub stantive provisions of th e variance ha ve

gone un cha n ged over t i me and remain in effect, the Boar d’s finding of substantial

conformance with the material terms of the variance was c orrec t. We agr ee. The 2018

CUP did not change the allowances in the 2008 v ar iance. The setback, the floor area ratio, and th e base si te ar ea remain a s they were in 2008. 16

[¶49] The A ppellants argue that the amended CUP allow s the floor area to be used in a

manner that is dif ferent from the way it was use d in 2008, and this is a mat erial change. Consequen t ly, they argue the 20 18 C UP canno t be in substant i al compliance with the

2008 v ariance. 17

[¶50] The Planning s taff determined, and th e Board confirmed

, that the flo or area ratio

of 0 .015 in the 2008 v ariance yielded 17 ,524 s q uare feet of space for non

- reside ntial use.

The A ppellan ts c ontend that t he “2008 va r iances were granted to permit a 4,037 sq. ft.

16 Under the c ounty’s zoning laws, workf orce housing does not count toward s floor area ratio or increased density res trictions in th e LDRs. The two a dditional housing units for a tot al of f o ur employees do not

count in the flo or ar ea ratio calculation.

17 The A ppellants also argue that to change the allocation of the floor area r atio, the Raptor Center needed

t o o btain a new variance. This argument is, in p art, addressed in the pr eceding s ect ion where we conclude

that the Rapto r Cen ter was no t r equired to seek a new variance. Further, because, a s we explain here, t he

Board was rea sonable when it con cluded tha t the Raptor Center could re allocat e the floor a rea to different

structur es, a ne w va riance was not required.19 bird care and education facility

— full stop.” They argue that reg ardless of the floor are a ratio yield in the 2008 variance s, vacant squa re footage must re main vacant absent a new

v ari a nce.

[¶51] T o su pport their argument

, t he A ppellants cite cases from other jurisdictions in

which petitioners so ught to expand the scope of existing varia nces. Those case s are

un persuasive largely because they address questio ns where the language of the per m its

and local ordinances expressly limit the proposed development

. See CDK Rest. v

. Krucklin

, 50 0 N .Y.S. 2 d 3 3 9 ( App. Div. 1986) (af firming board’s decision to den y

c on struction of a deck where the existing variance provide d that the area be “left open

an d un e [ n ] cumber ed” by “res t aurant

. . . activity” ); L & G Assoc s ., Inc. v. Zonin g Bd. of Appeals of City of Danbury

, 673 A.2d 1146, 1148 ( Conn. App. Ct. 1996) ( develop ment of a “west parcel” was pro hib ited where the varian ce allowed no use of the west pa r cel );

DiGiova n ni v. Bd. o f Appeals of Rockport , 474 N.E.2d 198 , 204 (Mass. App. C t. 1985) (affirm ing boar d ’s rejection of construction that did not comply with the vari ance allowing “a ‘clu ster’ development of eighteen u nit s ”) ; O & G Indus.

, I nc. v . Br idg e port Zoning B d. of App ea l s , No. CV166059045S, 2017 WL 1311666

, at *1 (Conn. Super . Ct.

Mar

. 13, 2 017) ( af f

irming cease and desist order to prohibit concrete crushing pl ant
where the variance permitted a junk yard and stated “ [ t ] he development

. . . sha ll b e substantial ly in accor d w ith the plans submitted”); Clark C ty

. Bd. of Comm ’ rs v

. Tag gart
Cons t r . Co.

, 6 1 5 P.2d 965 , 968 (Nev. 1980) (expa nded uses were not within sco pe of the existing variance s because they were “not exp ressed” when the variance s w e re g ranted).

[¶52] Her e , the 1994 LDRs (in effect at the time the 2008 v ariance issued) p rovided “[a]ll c ondition s imposed upon any V ariance

. . . shall be expressly set forth in the granting” of the variance. 1994 LDR § 5160 ( C ) ( 2 )

. T he language of the 2008 v ari a nce imposed n o c onditi on s on the use of availab le floor area. Conjointly, the Boa rd, the Planning s t aff, a nd the Raptor Center have long in terpreted the unused floor ar ea ratio to

be included in the floor area availab l e for use

. See supra note 4

.

[¶53] T he c onclusion tha t the a mend e d CUP substantially confor ms with the 2008

v ariance , in cluding the f loor area r a tio, is supported by the record a nd the Board’s longstandin g interpretations of the Raptor Center ’ s floor area availa bility

.

5. Compliance with the “ Lim i tations and C onditio ns” L anguage in the 2008

Varian ce

[¶54] T he 2008 v ariance contai ned a “Limita tions and C o nditions” provision

. The

A ppella nts contend that the amend ed CUP does not substantially conform with th e

“ L imitation s and C onditions” provision

. T hei r argument hin ges on the i r interpretation of

the lan guage of that provision.20 [¶55] The provision states that the “[ v]ariance permits are asso ciated with the remodel of

the machine shed and use of the Hardem an Barn property, as approved in Development

Per mit DEV 08

- 0006 and C onditional U s e Permit CUP 08

- 0001.”

[¶56] R ules of statutory construction ar e applied to the language of zoning regulations and permits issued pursuant to those regulations

. See Bd. of Cty. Comm ’ rs of Teton Cty.

v. Crow , 2003 WY 40, ¶ 45, 65 P.3 d 720, 734 (Wy o. 20 03) ; S n ak e River Brewi ng Co.

, Inc. v. T o wn of Jackson , 2002 WY 11, ¶ 29, 39 P.3d 397, 408 (Wyo. 200 2) ; Hochstein v. Cedar Cty. Bd. of Adjustment

, 940 N.W.2d 251, 256 ( Neb. 2020) (“ When interpreting zoning regulations, an appellate court a pp lie s the sa me rules ut i lized in statutory
in terpretatio n .”); City of Colorado Springs v. Securcare Self Storage, In c. , 10 P.3d 1244, 1248 (Colo. 2000) ( rules of statutory co nstruction apply in the interpretation of statutes

and local government resolutio ns an d ord ina nces).

[Th e ] Court must endeavor to find th e reas onable

intent of the drafter s. We begin by examining the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed

acc ording to their arrangement and connection. When

a statute is sufficiently clear a nd unambig u ou s, we giv e ef fect to the plain and ordinar y meanin g of the

words and need no t invoke our longstanding rules of

statutory construction

.

Best [ v. Best ] , 2015 WY 133, ¶ 8, 357 P.3d [1149,] 1151

– 52 [(Wyo. 2015)] (citations omitted). “All statu te s m ust be

c onstrued in pari mat eria ; and in ascertainin g the meaning of a given law, all statu tes relating to the s ame subject or hav[ing] the same general purpose must be c onsidered and construed in harmony.” Thunderbasin Land, Livestock & Inv.

Co. v. Ct y. of Laram ie Cty. , 5 P .3d 774, 779 (Wyo. 20 0 0); see al

s o In re Estate of Meyer , 2016 WY 6 , ¶ 21, 367 P.3d [629,]

6 36 [(Wyo. 2016)] ; Wyo. Cmty. Coll. Comm’n [ v. Casper Cmty. Coll. Dist. ] , 2001 WY 86, ¶ 16, 31 P.3d 1242, 1249 (Wyo. 2001). “Moreover, we s tr ive to avoi d an interp r etation that produces an absurd r esult, or that renders a porti on of the

statut e meaningless .” Seherr

- Thoss v. Teton Cty. Bd. of Cty.

Comm’rs , 2014 W Y 82, ¶ 19, 329 P.3d 936, 945 (Wyo. 2014) (citations omitted); see also Powder Ri ve r B asin Res . Council

v

. Wyo. Oi l & Gas Conse rvation Com m ’n , 2014 WY 37, ¶ 42,

320 P.3d 22 2 , 234 (Wyo. 2 014).

City of Torrington v. Smith , 2 016 WY 126, ¶ 7, 386 P.3d 336, 33 9

– 40 (Wyo. 2016)

.21 [¶57] The Appellants contend that the “Limitations and Conditions” langu ag e i s unambi guous and i n extricab ly fixes the conditions c ontained in the 2008 CUP to the

2 0 08 v ariance. Therefore, the A ppellants argue, the 2018 amendments to the CUP cannot

su bstantially conform to the 2008 v ariance because they change the 2008 CUP. Under

t h is interpr etation

, an y amendme nt to the 200 8 CUP would fa il to conform to the 2008

varia nce

.

[¶58] Whi le the “ Limitations and C onditi ons ” provision could be read as suggested by

the Appellants, we decline to accept this interpretation

, because it w ould render th e L DR provi sio n al lowi n g for amendments to CUPs m ean ingless. “ We do not i nterpret statutes in a way whi ch would render any stat utor y language meaningless. ” Matter of Estate of

Britain , 2018 WY 101, ¶ 28, 425 P.3d 978, 987 (Wyo. 2018) ; Wyodak

, ¶ 26 , 3 87 P .3d at

732

.

[¶59] The “ Limi t ations and Cond itions ” language states that the 2008 variances “are

associated with the remodel of t he machine shed and use of the Hardeman Barn
property, as approved in [the 2008 Dev elopment Plan and CUP ]

. ” (Empha sis added .)

Th e p l ai n l a ngua ge of the p r ovision limits th e variance to the use of the property

. Its

reference to the 2008 CUP and the develo pment plan does no t tie the variances to the

2008 CUP but to the use allowed by the CUP

. Amending t h e c onditions attached to the

us e u nde r the LDRs allow i ng amendments to CUPs does not cr eate nonconformance with

the variance

. LDR § 8.4.2 ( C )

.

[¶60] The institutional use of the property rem ains the operation of the Raptor Center.

The Bo ard could reasonably c o nclud e t hat the amended CUP su bst antially complied w i th

t he r equirements of the 2008 v ariance

. T he 2008 v ariance continues to apply to the

R aptor Center ’ s institutional use of the prop erty.

CONCLUSION

[¶61] The Pomeroys and the Christodo lous have standing to appeal th e B oard’s deci s ion.

The Board r easonably c o nclu ded t hat the ame nded CUP complied with all other relevant

standards of these LDRs an d all other County Resolutions and that the amended CUP substantially complied with the requi reme nts of the 2008 v a riance. T his decision w as n ot

ar

bitrary and caprici o us a nd did no t violat e the law. We affirm.