1

 For this reason, the Court denies Plaintiff’s ex parte motion for oral argument. 

Additionally, since the Court granted Plaintiff’s ex parte motion to submit a 30-page response

brief to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request to submit a sur-reply.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PULTE HOMES, INC.,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 09-13638

vs. Hon. Lawrence P. Zatkoff

LABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA,

TERENCE M. O’SULLIVAN, and

RANDY MAYHEW,

Defendants. 

_____________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER

AT A SESSION of said Court, held in the United States Courthouse, 

in the City of Port Huron, State of Michigan, on May 12, 2010

PRESENT: THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss [dkt 29] and Plaintiff’s ex

parte motion for oral argument and/or leave to file a sur-reply to Defendants’ motion to dismiss [dkt

36]. The parties have fully briefed Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court finds that the facts

and legal arguments are adequately presented in the parties’ papers such that the decision process

would not be significantly aided by oral argument.1

 Therefore, pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(e)(2),

it is hereby ORDERED that the motion to dismiss be resolved on the briefs submitted. For the

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reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [dkt 29] is GRANTED. 

II. BACKGROUND

Pulte Homes, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) is the largest new home builder in the United States. Its

corporate headquarters are located in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, and it operates in many other

states, including Arizona, Texas, California, and Nevada. Defendant Laborers’ International Union

of North America (“LiUNA”) is a labor organization that represents workers in construction and

other industries. Defendants Terence O’Sullivan and Randy Mayhew are employed, respectively,

as LiUNA’s Vice President and National Director. LiUNA does not represent any of Plaintiff’s

employees. However, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have attempted for the past two years to

force Plaintiff’s subcontractors to enter into agreements with LiUNA. 

This action arises out of Defendants’ alleged response to the termination of one of Plaintiff’s

employees and the alleged termination of seven other individuals employed by Plaintiff. On

September 4, 2009, Pulte Building Systems, a division of Pulte Homes Inc., terminated Roberto

Baltierra (“Baltierra”), who had previously worked as a crew lead. Plaintiff maintains that Baltierra

was terminated for various behavioral and performance problems, including failure to comply with

safety procedures, failure to follow the legitimate directions of his supervisors, and allowing

undocumented laborers to work. Defendants aver that Baltierra was fired for wearing a t-shirt that

expressed support for LiUNA. Defendants also claim that seven other individuals employed by

Plaintiff were fired for similarly expressing support for LiUNA. Plaintiff disputes that these

individuals were terminated, and contends that they remained free to return to work.

Plaintiff asserts that, on September 9, 2009, Defendants began a targeted effort to sabotage

and interrupt Plaintiff’s business operations and negatively affect Plaintiff’s relationships with the

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public, its employees, and potential customers. Plaintiff believes Defendants have encouraged

LiUNA supporters to inundate Plaintiff with mass quantities of phone calls and e-mails in an attempt

to inhibit Plaintiff’s ability to conduct its day-to-day business activities and to intimidate Plaintiff’s

employees. LiUNA’s website featured a “call to action,” which provided a pre-typed e-mail voicing

opposition to Plaintiff’s alleged termination of employees for supporting the union. This e-mail was

pre-addressed to Plaintiff and allowed users to send it to Plaintiff with the click of a few buttons.

LiUNA also distributed flyers to the same effect, i.e., encouraging supporters to call Plaintiff and

express their dissatisfaction. 

According to Plaintiff, its e-mail system is set up such that each user is permitted only a

certain number of e-mails in his or her inbox at one time. Similarly, a limited number of phone calls

can be received at any given time, and voice-mail inboxes can only hold a limited number of voicemails. Plaintiff claims that the high volume of calls and e-mails forced some of its employees to

shut down their voice-mail and e-mail inboxes. On September 13, 2009, Plaintiff mailed a letter to

Defendants, demanding them to cease their activities. Plaintiff filed this action on September 15,

2009, after the telephone calls continued. On September 24, 2009, the Court entered an order

denying Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction on the basis that the Court lacked jurisdiction

to issue an injunction in an ongoing labor dispute under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101

et seq.

As a result of the numerous telephone calls, voice-mails, and e-mails, Plaintiff seeks damages

pursuant to alleged violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act , 18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq.,

violations of Nevada’s Computer Crime laws, N.R.S. § 205.473, et seq., trespass to chattels, tortious

interference with business relationships and expectancies, and civil conspiracy. Plaintiff also

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requests that the Court enjoin Defendants from encouraging LiUNA supporters to make such

telephone calls and e-mails so that Plaintiff can maintain its day-to-day business operations

uninterrupted. In Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6), Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state claims upon which relief can be

granted as to each of its claims. Furthermore, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are preempted

by federal labor law.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted tests the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court must accept as true

all factual allegations in the pleadings, and any ambiguities must be resolved in Plaintiff’s favor.

See Jackson v. Richards Med. Co., 961 F.2d 575, 577–78 (6th Cir. 1992). While this standard is

decidedly liberal, it requires more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. See Advocacy Org.

for Patients & Providers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 176 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 1999). Thus, a

plaintiff must make “a showing, rather than a blanket assertion of entitlement to relief” and

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” so that

the claim is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007).

See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009). 

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), this Court may only

consider “the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by

reference in the pleadings, and matters of which the [Court] may take judicial notice.” 2 James Wm.

Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 12.34[2] (3d ed. 2000). If, in deciding the motion, the

Court considers matters outside the pleadings, the motion will be treated as one for summary

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judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT 

Plaintiff’s only claims arising under federal law allege violations of the Computer Fraud and

Abuse Act (“CFAA”), a criminal statute with a private right of action for injured parties. 18 U.S.C.

§ 1030 et seq. Briefly, the CFAA provides a remedy for damages caused by unauthorized access

or transmissions to a computer program operating in interstate business. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (“Any

person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation [of section 1030] may maintain a civil

action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable

relief.”). Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ alleged transmissions of telephone calls and e-mails to

Plaintiff constitute unlawful transmissions to Plaintiff’s computers under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)

and unauthorized access to Plaintiff’s computers under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(B) and (C). 

1. Unlawful Transmissions

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A), it is unlawful to “knowingly cause[] the transmission of

a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally cause[]

damage without authorization, to a protected computer.” See Thurmond v. Compaq Computer

Corp., 171 F. Supp. 2d 667, 675 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (stating that a claim under Section 1030(a)(5)(A)

contains three elements: “(1) the knowing ‘transmission’ of a ‘program, information, code, or

command; (2) the transmission is ‘to a protected computer;’ and (3) the transmission causes

intentional ‘damage without authorization.’”). In its amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants violated this statute by inundating Plaintiff with a massive number of e-mail messages,

telephone calls, and voice-mail messages. In support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue

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that Plaintiff has not alleged facts supporting the claim that Defendants knowingly caused a

transmission, intentionally caused damage to Plaintiff’s computers, or that the transmissions were

made without authorization. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s factual allegations are insufficient to render its claim under

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) plausible on its face. Under the plain language of the statute, Plaintiff

must prove that Defendants “intentionally cause[d] damage” to Plaintiff’s computers. Here, there

is no allegation in the amended complaint that Defendants did so. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants encouraged the sending of telephone calls and e-mails for the purpose of intimidating

and harassing Plaintiff’s employees, as well as preventing Plaintiff, in general, from conducting its

normal business operations. Although Plaintiff argues in its response brief that Defendants

intentionally caused damage to Plaintiff’s computers by continuing to send e-mails and telephone

calls after Plaintiff asked Defendants to stop, Plaintiff did not inform Defendants that their conduct

was harmful to any of Plaintiff’s computer systems. Plaintiff’s letter to Defendants only complained

about false allegations related to the termination of Plaintiff’s employees, Defendants’ encouraging

LiUNA members to further disseminate such allegations, and that the e-mails and voice messages

were filling mailboxes and distracting Plaintiff’s employees from their work. See Thurmond, 171

F. Supp. 2d at 676 (“Plaintiff[] must make a sufficient showing of all three elements under section

1030(a)(5)(A).”). Absent a plausible allegation that Defendants intentionally caused damage to

Plaintiff’s computer systems, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1030(a)(5)(A) for which relief can be granted.

2. Unauthorized Access

Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(B) and (C), it is unlawful to “intentionally access[] a

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protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly cause[]

damage; or . . . cause damage and loss.” According to Defendants, Plaintiff’s claims under Sections

1030(a)(5)(B) and (C) fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted because Defendants did

not access Plaintiff’s computers merely by sending e-mails and leaving voice-mails. Additionally,

Defendants contend that they did not access Plaintiff’s computers intentionally, and that the calls

and e-mails were not unauthorized. Plaintiff responds that the calls and e-mails were unauthorized,

but Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants’ claim that they did not access Plaintiff’s computers. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s factual allegations are insufficient to render plausible its

claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(B) and (C). As Defendants contend, the term “access” has

been defined under the CFAA as “to gain access to” and “the freedom and ability to make use of

something.” America Online, Inc. v. Natl. Health Care Discount, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1272-

73 (N.D. Iowa 1990). See also Role Models America, Inc. v. Jones, 305 F. Supp. 2d 564, 567 (D.

Md. 2004) (stating that “the word ‘access’ . . . is an active verb”). In America Online, Inc., the court

found access under the CFAA where bulk e-mail senders sent e-mail messages to targeted computers

through the use of intermediary computers. America Online, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1272-73. In

other words, the senders were reaching their targets by making use of third-party computers. Here,

Plaintiff alleges a violation of the CFAA as a result of Defendants’ direct use of e-mail and voicemail. Plaintiff offers no authority supporting its contention that one accesses another’s computer

under the CFAA merely by leaving a voice-mail or sending an e-mail. Plaintiff’s amended

complaint contains no allegations that by sending e-mails and leaving voice-mails, Defendants

exercised the freedom or ability to make use of Plaintiff’s computers. Therefore, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has failed to state claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(B) and (C) for which relief can be

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 Accordingly, as all counts in Plaintiff’s amended complaint are hereby dismissed, the

Court need not consider Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by federal

labor law. 

8

granted.

C. STATE LAW CLAIMS

Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists on the

basis of federal questions under the CFAA. Plaintiff asks the Court to invoke supplemental

jurisdiction over its remaining claims. Since Plaintiff’s federal claims under the CFAA fail to state

claims upon which relief can be granted, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims based on state law.

See Widgren v. Maple Grove Tp., 429 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Musson Theatrical,

Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (6th Cir. 1996) (“When all federal claims are

dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations will usually point to dismissing the state law

claims . . . .”). Thus, Counts II-V are dismissed.2

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the above reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion

to dismiss [dkt 29] is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s ex parte motion for oral argument and/or leave

to file a sur-reply to Defendants’ motion to dismiss [dkt 36] is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

S/Lawrence P. Zatkoff 

LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: May 12, 2010

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this Order was served upon the attorneys of record

by electronic or U.S. mail on May 12, 2010.

S/Marie E. Verlinde 

Case Manager

(810) 984-3290

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