CASE NO. 03-15-00416-CV

________________________________________ 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN TEXAS 

________________________________________ 

OAK MORTGAGE GROUP, INC., MICHAEL H. NASSERFAR, 

MICHAEL E. TASK, AND TYCORD R. GOSNAY 

Appellants 

V.

AMERIPRO FUNDING, INC.

Appellee 

Appeal from the 345th Judicial District Court 

of Travis County Texas 

________________________________________ 

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF 

________________________________________ 

Wm. Charles Bundren, Esq. 

Attorney-in-Charge 

State Bar No. 03343200 

 2591 Dallas Parkway 

Suite 300 

Frisco, Texas 75034 

Telephone:214.808.3555 

NOVEMBER 2, 2015 ORAL ARGUMENT REQUETSED 

ACCEPTED

03-15-00416-CV

7644704

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

11/2/2015 3:35:32 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 11/2/2015 3:35:32 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 3

REPLY STATEMENT OF FACTS 6

SUMMARY OF THE REPLY ARGUMENT 6

NO DISAGREEMENT REGARDING STANDARD OF REVIEW 12

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 12

I. AMERIPRO FAILS TO OFFER JUSTIFICATION FOR 

THE TEMPORARY INJUNCTION ORDER WHICH IS VOID 

BECAUSE IT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS

OF RULE 683 AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 

TO SUPPORT THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO OBTAIN A 

TEMPORARY INJUNCTION. 12

II. REPLY TO AMERIPRO ARGUMENT APPLYING 

THE NON-SOLICITATION PROVISIONS OF THE 

CONTRACTS TO REAL ESTATE HOMEBUILDERS 

AND CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPERS, REAL ESTATE

SALES AGENTS, AND OTHER REAL ESTATE 

PROFESSIONALS INVOLVED IN THE REAL ESTATE 

INDUSTRY BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT "CUSTOMERS"

OF AMERIPRO 20

III. REPLY TO AMERIPRO ARGUMENT THAT APPELLANTS 

CAN BE BARRED FROM SOLICITING AMEREIPRO 

CUSTOMERS FOR A COMPETITOR IN BREACH OF 

FIDUCIARY DUTIE 24

IV. REPLY TO AMERIPRO BRIEF PART IV. 27

V. REPLY TO AMERIPRO BRIEF PART V. 30
2

VI. REPLY TO AMERIPRO ARGUMENT THAT THE 

TEMPORARY INJUNCTION IS NOT OVERBROAD 

AND THAT THERE IS A DIRECT NEXUS BETWEEN 

THE ENJOINED CONDUCT AND IMMINENT AND 

IRREPARABLE INJURY TO AMERIPRO. 34

PRAYER 37

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 37

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COMPLIANCE 38
3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

CASES

Adust Video v. Nueces County, 

996 S.W.2d 245(Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.) 13

Amalgamated Acme Affiliates, Inc. v Minton,

33 S.W.3d 387 (Tex. App. -- Austin 2000, no pet) 19

Conley v DSC Commun. Corp., 199 WL 89955 *5 

(Tex. App. -- Dallas February 24, 1999, no pet.) 18

Correa v. Houston Surg. Asst. Serv., Inc. , 2013 WL 3958499 

(Tex App. -- Houston [14th Dist.] July 30, 2013, no pet.) 35

ERI Consult. Engrs., Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867 

(Tex. 2010) 24

Flake v. EGl Eagle Global Logistics, L.P., 2002 WL 31008136 *4 

(Tex. App. -- Houston [14th Dist. ] September 2, 2002, no pet.) 32

Frequent Flyer Depot, Inc. v American Airlines, Inc. 281 S.W.3d 215 

(Tex. App. -- Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) 32

Garth v Staktek Corp., 876 S.W.2d 545 

(Tex. App. -- Austin 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.) 31

Hill v. McLane Co., Inc. 2011 WL 56061 *5 

(Tex. App. -- Austin January 5, 2011, no pet) 18

Hunter v. Bldgs. & Mfg. LP v. MBI Global, LLC, 436 S.W.3d 9 

(Tex. App. -- Houston [14th Dist] 2014, pet. denied) 25

Inex Indus., Inc. v. Alpar resources, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 685 

(Tex. App. -- Amarillo 1986, no writ) 19
4

IAC, Ltd. v. Bell Helicoptor Textron, Inc. 160 S.W.3d 191 

(Tex. App.-- Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) 17

Miller Paper Co. v. Roberts Paper Co., 901 S.W.2d 593 

(Tex. App. -- Amarillo 1995, no pet.) 30

Rugen v Interactive Business Systems, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 548 

(Tex. App. -- Dallas 1993, no pet.) 18

Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center v. Rao,

105 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. App. -- Amarillo 2003, pet. dismissed) 19

Tranter, Inc. v. Liss, 

2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3398, 2014 WL 1257278 at *7

(Tex. App. -- Fort Worth, March 27, 2014 no pet.) 18

Walling v. Metcalfe, 

863 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1993) 32

STATUTES

TEXAS FINANCE CODE, Title 3, Chapter 180 (2015)

(Residential Mortgage Loan Originators) 32

TRUTH IN LENDING ACT, 15 U.S.C. §1601, et seq. 32

THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM 

AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) 32

THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT, 15 U.S.C. 1691 et. seq. 32

THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1861, et seq. 32

THE S.A.F.E. MORTGAGE LICENSING ACT, 12 U.S.C. § 5101, et seq. 32

THE REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT (RESPA), 

12 U.S.C. § 2601, et. seq. 32

Rules

TEX. R. CIV. P. 683 Passim
5

OTHER AUTHORITIES

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 348 (5th ed. 1979) 22
6

REPLY STATEMENT OF FACTS

There is no evidence in the record that Nasserfar, Task or Gosnay "secretly 

solicited customers on behalf of Oak Mortgage." (See, Ameripro Brief (hereinafter 

referred to as "A. Brief") at 3). There is no evidence that homebuilders, residential 

developers or residential real estate agents are "customers" as that term is defined 

in the employment agreements. There is no evidence that Brohn Home, Clark 

Wilson builders or Seaholm Residences were ever "customers" of Ameripro as 

explained in the employment agreements. There is also no evidence that 

Appellants possessed any information of Ameripro after May 15, 2015 and that by 

the time of the temporary injunction hearing on May 26, 2015 all information of

Ameripro was returned. 

II.

SUMMARY OF THE REPLY ARGUMENT

The cornerstone to Ameripro's application for temporary injunction, 

arguments in its brief, and the validity of the temporary injunction is Ameripro's 

erroneous factual argument that Appellants destroyed property of Ameripro and it 

was imminent that Appellants would continue to destroy additional property of 

Ameripro if the temporary injunction was not granted thus causing Ameripro 

irreparable injury because the property would be forever lost. This factual 

argument is without merit. There is no evidence from the temporary injunction 
7

record that any property of Ameripro that was ever destroyed by Appellants or that 

any property of Ameripro was in danger of being destroyed by Appellants if the 

district court did not grant the temporary injunction. Although challenged to cite 

to such evidence, Ameripro's Brief fails to do so. Not one place in the record is 

there any evidence that Ameripro lost any property or electronic files except from 

Ameripro's own spoliation of the electronic files from the computer turned into 

Ameripro by Nasserfar. The complete absence of any evidence of destruction or 

imminent future destruction of Ameripro's property by Appellants speaks loudly of 

the complete absence of the clearly established legal requirement that the 

temporary injunction be entered because of imminent and irreparable injury to the 

applicant.

Ameripro fallaciously turns backed up copies of electronic files from 

computers (done so pursuant to the policies and procedures of Ameripro) to 

external backup files into a theory of destruction of property and imminent future 

destruction of property. Not so. At best, the evidence only supports the conclusion 

that Appellants, as they were required to do by Ameripro's policy, backed up and 

copied electronic files from their Ameripro computers onto external drives owned 

by Nasserfar and Task, and then failed to remove the backed up copies of the 

electronic files from their personal external drives after they ceased being 

employed by Ameripro. However, prior to the temporary injunction hearing which 
8

began on May 26, 2015, Appellants returned all backed up copies of the electronic 

files from their personal external drives, and then, as required by the May 12, 2015 

temporary restraining order, deleted the backed up copies of the electronic files 

from their personal electronic storage devices. Nothing was destroyed. Ameripro's 

arguments have no merit.

Past conduct is irrelevant to imminent and irreparable future injury.. For 

purposes of the temporary injunction, the only relevance is the prevention of future 

imminent and irreparable injury. Consequently, Ameripro's Brief and its 

arguments miss the mark. They do not address the evidence in the record 

necessary to establish future imminent and irreparable injury and the nexus 

between the specific actions that are enjoined in the order and the evidence of 

probable future imminent and irreparable injury. Instead, as it did at the temporary 

injunction hearing, Ameripro focuses only on past conduct -- not imminent future 

and irreparable actions. Ameripro does not address its failure to offer evidence at 

the temporary injunction hearing of any imminent injury that would cause 

Ameripro irreparable injury. 

Ameripro fails to rebut the fact that Ameripro swore that it was entitled to 

recover nearly $2 million in damages for various claims against Appellants. And, 

does not dispute that Texas law does not permit a temporary injunction to enforce a 

contract where the applicant for the injunction has an adequate remedy at law to 
9

recover damages. Ameripro simply cannot identify evidence from the record that 

there is probable imminent and irreparable injury that will occur if the injunction is 

not granted, Ameripro mischaracterizes the past conduct and offers no argument, 

evidence or explanation of any imminent future conduct of Appellants that is likely 

to cause Ameripro irreparable injury.

Ameripro's Brief fails to sustain its burden of establishing imminent and 

irreparable injury which would probably occur and would necessitate the entry of a 

temporary injunction. And, Ameripro completely fails to respond to or rebut the 

failure of the temporary injunction order and the record to establish any nexus 

between any imminent or irreparable injury, and the specific acts of the order that 

are enjoined. What imminent and irreparable injury would Ameripro suffer if the 

temporary injunction order was not entered? Where in the record is there any 

evidence establishing a nexus between imminent and irreparable injury and the 

specific actions enjoined by the district court?

Ameripro failed to rebut Texas law which requires that the temporary 

injunction order explain why the injunction is necessary in order to prohibit 

imminent and irreparable injury to Ameripro. Ameripro merely restates the 

applicable legal standard from the Texas rules and statutes but fails to provide any

reasoning or justification for the injunctive relief and why the injunctive relief is 

necessary to prevent imminent and irreparable injury. Texas law clearly requires 
10

that the temporary injunction order must state specifically why the specifically 

enjoined acts are necessary in order to prevent imminent and irreparable injury, 

and Ameripro's brief fails to address the connection between the evidence in the 

record and the need to prevent imminent or irreparable injury.

Neither the temporary injunction order, nor the evidence in the record, nor 

Ameripro's Brief identifies the elusive "trade secret" which forms the basis of

Ameripro's trade secret misappropriation claim. What is the trade secret? 

Ameripro cannot articulate the secret and has never stated what the information is 

within the alleged trade secret that is the basis for the trade secret protection claim. 

Ameripro offers no argument or legal authorities to rebut the clear evidence that 

the identity and contact information of publicly known residential builders and 

developers, and residential real estate brokers can never be a trade secret and, 

therefore, as a matter of law, the district court erred in finding that public 

information is a trade secret and in enjoining the use of public information.. Since 

the trade secret is never identified by the district court or Ameripro, and Ameripro 

does not identify the trade secret in its brief, the district court erred in referencing 

any trade secrets in the injunction order and in finding a likelihood of recovery on 

a trade secret that does not exist.

Ameripro offers no rebuttal argument regarding the failure of the contract to 

define the term "customer", and agrees that Ameripro's President admitted that 
11

Ameripro provides loans to residential borrowers and that the residential borrowers 

are the "customers" of the Ameripro. Ameripro offers no rebuttal to the testimony

or argument disputing its President's testimony that Ameripro has no contracts, 

agreements or business relationships with residential homebuilders and developers. 

Ameripro's only rebuttal is that one of the loan officers might construe the contract 

to refer to "referral sources." That is insufficient. Although given the opportunity 

to do so in its response brief, Ameripro failed to offer valid arguments and law to 

support the district court's erroneous conclusion that public information regarding 

residential builders, developers, real estate agents and referral sources are the 

equivalent of "customers" of Ameripro. And, consequently, the district court 

abused its discretion in restraining Appellants from soliciting the homebuilders.

Ameripro offered no valid arguments why the temporary injunction order is 

not overbroad. Ameripro posits no arguments and no evidence establishing a 

nexus between the acts restricted in the temporary injunction order and the need to 

protect Ameripro from imminent and irreparable injury. There must be a nexus 

and Ameripro offers none.

Ameripro offers no valid argument or evidence why the temporary 

injunction order is not erroneous because it fails to limit the restrictions on 

solicitation to one (1) year after the termination of the employment contracts --

January 19, 2016. Ameripro offers no argument or response, and no evidence from 
12

the record to establish a nexus between imminent and irreparable harm probable to 

occur and the injunction order compelling Appellants to turn over there forensic 

images of their electronic devices and to cease and desist from using their 

electronic devices including cell phones, hard drives and laptops which they had 

used in their ordinary and daily business practices. 

NO DISAGREEMENT REGARDING STANDARD OF REVIEW

Ameripro does not dispute that a trial court abuses its discretion when it acts 

arbitrarily and unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or principles, or 

misapplies the law to the established facts of the case and that there is no particular 

deference to legal conclusions of the trial court and a de novo standard of review 

applies when the issue turns on a pure question of law. Ameripro does not dispute 

that a trial court abuses its discretion by entering an overly-broad' injunction which 

grants 'more relief' than a plaintiff is entitled to by enjoining a defendant from 

conducting lawful activities or from exercising legal rights. 1

REPLY ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

I.

AMERIPRO FAILS TO OFFER JUSTIFICATION FOR THE 

TEMPORARY INJUNCTION ORDER WHICH IS VOID BECAUSE IT 

DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 683 AND 

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE 

ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO OBTAIN A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION.

 

1

 See authorities cited in Appellants' Opening Brief at 20-21.
13

In response to Appellants' argument that the temporary injunction order is 

void because it does not comply with the strict requirements of Rule 683 of the 

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure which requires that every order granting an 

injunction must "set forth the reasons for its issuance" and "be specific in its terms" 

and must provide a "detailed explanation of the reason for the injunction's 

issuance", see e.g., Adust Video v. Nueces County, 996 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 

App.--Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.), Ameripro refers to mere conclusions in the 

temporary injunction order to claimed "destruction" of Ameripro's documents and 

past "taking" of information belonging to Ameripro from "Ameripro's computer 

network "(Ameripro Brief at 22-23); but, Ameripro fails to explain or establish 

from the language of the order why any of these references in the order provide 

any nexus to the specific future acts enjoined by the order, or why these 

conclusions satisfied the requirements of Texas law. Merely restating the legal 

standard for a temporary injunction does not provide the detailed explanation and 

reasons for the necessity of the extraordinary relief of an injunction. There is no 

evidence from the record that Appellants' "permanently destroy[ed]" any Ameripro 

"documents", and Ameripro cites no reference in the record to support that 

conclusion. There no evidence that at the time of the temporary injunction hearing 

on May 26, 2015 Appellants' had in their possession of any "documents" or 

"confidential and proprietary information belonging to" Ameripro. Ameripro cites 
14

none. If Appellants, at the time of the temporary injunction hearing on May 26, 

2015, did not have the Ameripro documents in their possession, then how can they 

destroy something they did not possess? Ameripro cites no reference in the record 

to support the conclusion from the temporary injunction order that Appellants 

"permanently destroy[ed]" any Ameripro "documents" in the past or that they were 

likely to do so in the future. ( RR Vol. 3 at 10-15; 19- 22; 24-27; 129)

The best that the record shows is that old Ameripro borrower electronic files 

(from "Ameripro's computer network") were copied and backed up on external 

drives owned by Nasserfar and Task (as authorized and required by Ameripro 

policies and procedures) and intermingled with their electronic personal files. (See,

RR at Vol. 3 116; ). The record conclusively establishes -- without rebuttal from 

Ameripro -- that all of the copied electronic files (from "Ameripro's computer 

network") on the external hard drives owned by Nasserfar and Task were returned 

to Ameripro prior to the temporary injunction hearing, and no such copied 

electronic files (or paper files of any kind) were retained by Appellants at the time 

of the temporary injunction hearing. (See, RR at Vol. 3 at 116; 122-123; 129; 

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 34 at RR Vol.4; RR at Vol.3 at 73 and 85.) 

Thus, there is no evidence that Appellants "permanently destroyed Ameripro 

documents" because the only evidence is that electronic files were copied and 

backed up on external storage devices, and then returned to Ameripro and not 
15

retained. Additionally, there is no evidence from the record that Ameripro did not 

have in its electronic storage systems the same electronic files that were copied and 

backed up on external storage devices of Nasserfar and Task. Where are the 

citations to the record of any evidence to support what Ameripro claims is the 

legally necessary foundation to the temporary injunction order -- the attempts by 

Appellants to "permanently destroy Ameripro documents"? The absence of this 

evidence, which Ameripro claims is the cornerstone to the "reasons for issuance" 

of the temporary injunction (Ameripro Brief at 22 -23), confirms the invalidity of 

the injunction order.

In addition, the Temporary Restraining Order entered by the district court on 

May 12, 2015 (14 days prior to the temporary injunction hearing), ordered 

Appellants within three (3) days of May 12, 2015 to "return" the copied electronic 

files of Ameripro from the external drives and after returning the copied electronic 

files to Ameripro "not to retain any copies" -- in other words to destroy

("destruct") the copied electronic files from Appellants' electronic storage devices.

(CR at 95-98.). Before the temporary injunction hearing (which began on May 26, 

2015) and in compliance with the Temporary Restraining Order, Appellants did as 

the Temporary Restraining Order ordered them to do. All copied electronic files 

potentially being the property of Ameripro were returned to Ameripro by Lee 

Whitfield of Digital Discovery and after returning the copied electronic files, the 
16

copied electronic files on the electronic devices of Appellants' were destroyed ("not 

retained") by Lee Whitfield -- all as ordered by the district court in the Temporary 

Restraining Order. (See, RR at Vol. 2 at 241-247). There was no finding in the 

Temporary Injunction Order that Appellants had violated the Temporary 

Restraining Order.

There is no evidence in the record that any copied electronic files (or paper files 

or other information) belonging to Ameripro were retained by Appellants by the 

time of the temporary injunction hearing beginning on May 26, 2015. Ameripro

demanded that the district court order Appellants to return the copied electronic 

files and to destroy the copied electronic files after their return to Ameripro. Any 

destruction of the copied electronic files from the electronic devices of Appellants'

was at the demand of, and in compliance with the district court Temporary 

Restraining Order entered on May 12, 2015. Ameripro failed to cite to any 

evidence in the record that Appellants, at any time, destroyed or attempted to 

destroy documents or files on "Ameripro's computer network." Now, Ameripro

posits the justification for the Temporary Injunction based on Appellants' 

compliance with the Temporary Restraining Order. Ameripro's argument is 

invalid. 

The only evidence of destruction of files was the destruction of the electronic 

files on the laptop hard drive of Nasserfar by Ameripro after Nasserfar turned in his 
17

laptop computer to Ameripro on January 16, 2015. (See, RR Vol. 3 at 27-30 ). In 

addition, there is no evidence that Appellants possess any of the copied electronic 

files (or paper files) of Ameripro after May 15, 2015 and no evidence was admitted 

at the temporary injunction hearing that Appellants continued to possess any

copied electronic files or paper files of Ameripro as of May 26, 2015 because 

everything had been returned prior to the beginning of the temporary injunction 

hearing on May 26, 2015 (RR Vol. 2 at 115-117; 122-123; PX 34; Vol. 3 at 74-78; 

82-83;85-86; 148-149). The "possession" and the alleged "destruction" of the files

of Ameripro by Appellants is the foundation to the arguments in Ameripro's 

response brief to substantiate the reasons for the imminent and irreparable injury 

justifying the temporary injunction order. The foundation fails for the reasons and 

evidence explained in this section of the Reply Brief.

Ameripro's efforts to redeem the void temporary injunction order fail. Ameripro 

relies on IAC, Ltd. v. Bell Helicoptor Textron, Inc. 160 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. App.--

Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (Brief at 24) but, in that case the evidence was clear that 

the defendant "possessed trade secrets" of the plaintiff and threatened to disclose 

the plaintiff's trade secrets publicly. Those facts do not exist here. The elusive 

trade secrets have never been identified by Ameripro or the district court. And 

there is no evidence that Appellants possessed any documents, records or files of 

Ameripro or trade secrets, if any, as of the date of the beginning of the temporary 
18

injunction hearing on May 26, 2015. Again, the critical element of possession and 

threat to disclose are completely absent. This authority is inapposite. For the same 

reasons, Rugen v Interactive Business Systems, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App. --

Dallas 1993, no pet.) (Ameripro Brief at 24) is inapposite because the evidence 

was clear that the "former employee possesses confidential information." Not only 

is there no evidence of any possession by Appellants of trade secrets or 

confidential and proprietary information allegedly belonging to Ameripro as of the 

date of the beginning of the temporary injunction hearing - May 26, 2015 -; but, 

additionally, the temporary injunction order does not find that Appellants had in 

their possession as of May 26, 2015 any trade secrets or confidential and 

proprietary information belonging to Ameripro. Everything had been returned and 

not retained as ordered by the temporary restraining order dated May 12, 2015. 

And, Tranter, Inc. v. Liss, 2014 WL 1257278*9 (Tex. App. -- Fort Worth March 

27, 2014, no pet.) (Ameripro Brief at 25) involved breaches of non-competes 

covenants, which do not exist in this case.

Possession of trade secrets is the constant theme of the additional authorities 

relied upon by Ameripro to attempt to justify the reasons for the temporary 

injunction. Hill v. McLane Co., Inc. 2011 WL 56061 *5 (Tex. App. -- Austin 

January 5, 2011, no pet), and Conley v DSC Commun. Corp., 199 WL 89955 *5 

(Tex. App. -- Dallas February 24, 1999, no pet.) (Ameripro Brief at 26), again 
19

involve actual possession of trade secrets or confidential and proprietary 

information by the defendants. No such evidence exists here and, therefore, these 

cases are inapposite to support the issuance of the injunctive order.

The remaining authorities relied upon by Ameripro to revive the invalid 

temporary injunction order did not involve cases for alleged misappropriation of 

trade secrets, alleged possession of confidential and proprietary information, or 

claims of "destruction" of documents. Amalgamated Acme affiliates, Inc. v Minton,

33 S.W.3d 387 (Tex. App. -- Austin 2000, no pet) involved claimed 

misrepresentations concerning commercial speech which caused deception and 

confusion among customers. It is inapposite. Inex Indus., Inc. v. Alpar resources, 

Inc., 717 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App. -- Amarillo 1986, no writ) involved an injunction 

to prohibit appellant from reworking all and gas wells leased by the appellee. It is 

inapposite. Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center v. Rao, 105 S.W.3d 763 

(Tex. App. -- Amarillo 2003, pet. dismissed) involved an injunction to reinstate a 

medical student expelled for engaging in protected free speech on a matter of 

public interest concerning an autopsy that he witnessed. It too is inapposite. 

It is not disputed that the temporary injunction order failed to find that 

Appellants possessed Ameripro trade secrets and confidential and proprietary 

information when the temporary injunction hearing began on May 26, 2015 and it 

is not disputed that there is no evidence in the record that Appellants possessed 
20

Ameripro trade secrets and confidential and proprietary information after May 15, 

2015. The lack of any finding of possession and the lack of any evidence of 

possession of any trade secrets or confidential and proprietary information dooms 

any reasoning for granting the temporary injunction because, on his face, the 

temporary injunction order does not explain why anything is imminent and why 

failure to grant the temporary injunction is likely to cause irreparable injury to 

Ameripro since there is no evidence that Appellants ever destroyed Ameripro's 

documents, electronic files, or information. For this reason, the temporary 

injunction should be declared invalid.

II.

REPLY TO AMERIPRO ARGUMENT APPLYING THE NONSOLICITATION PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACTS TO REAL ESTATE 

HOMEBUILDERS AND CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPERS, REAL ESTATE 

SALES AGENTS, AND OTHER REAL ESTATE PROFESSIONALS 

INVOLVED IN THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY BECAUSE THEY ARE 

NOT "CUSTOMERS" OF AMERIPRO.

Ameripro sidesteps the reading and construction of its employment 

agreements with Nasserfar and Task. It's brief fails to address the actual language 

of the contract and how the contract, on its face, should be interpreted. 

Additionally, Ameripro sidesteps the explicit one-year limitation on the solicitation 

of "customers" and does not address the unlimited duration of the injunction order 

prohibiting solicitation. Ameripro does not explain or argue how the contract can 

be interpreted in any way except that customers are the borrowers because of the 
21

explicit language in the contract which provides "any customer of Employee that 

existed prior to employment with the Company, provided the customer and their 

loan is not being serviced by the Company." (Emphasis added). Ameripro gives no 

rebuttal for the definition of the customer as being a customer who has a "loan" 

with Ameripro. Ameripro's failure to offer a reasonable explanation regarding this 

language speaks loudly concerning the improper construction of the contract by the 

district court. ( RR Vol. 3 at 145-147).

Ameripro also does not offer any rebuttal or explanation rebutting the 

essence of its business which is to loan money to borrowers who are its customers. 

(RR Vol. 2 at 109-111; 115, L9-21). Ameripro offers no rebuttal, explanation or 

argument regarding the language on the face of the employment contract language 

which refers to the term "customer" as residential loan borrowers, not 

homebuilders or residential developers. Ameripro refuses to engage in or offer 

arguments from the face of the contract which would explain the district court error 

in concluding that the term "customer" applies to residential homebuilders, 

residential condominium developers, and other real estate professionals such as 

real estate sales agents, and in granting a temporary injunction prohibiting 

solicitation of "Brohn Homes, Seaholm Residences and Clark Wilson Builders" 

(See, App. 1 at 4). On the face of the contract and the language of the contract, in 

the absence of rebuttal argument from Ameripro, it is clear that the construction of 
22

the contract by the district court is erroneous and is contrary to the explicit 

language and intent of the agreement. 

. Ameripro does not respond to the Texas authorities cited in Appellants' Brief 

regarding the latent ambiguity of the contract created by collateral matters, such as 

the application of the non-solicitation provisions to entities that are not customers 

of Ameripro. 2 Ameripro did not dispute that the temporary injunction record 

provides no evidence that either Michael Nasserfar or Michael Task ever solicited 

loans from any residential loan borrowers of Ameripro or from Brohn Homes, 

Seaholm Residences, and Clark Wilson Builders. 

Ameripro did not reply to or argue that a "customer" is not generally defined 

as "one who regularly or repeatedly makes purchases of, or has business dealings 

with, a tradesman or business." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 348 (5th ed. 

1979) or not "one who regularly or repeatedly makes purchases of, or has business 

dealings with a tradesman or business house; one who customarily has dealings 

with a business establishment." Ameripro did not dispute that it confessed at the 

temporary injunction hearing that it does not have any direct business dealings 

with and does not loan money to residential homebuilders, residential real estate 

agents or residential developers. (RR at Vol. 2 at 109-111). Ameripro offered no 

legal authority, statutory or case law, which would define the term "customer" in 

 

2

See authorities cited in Appellants' Opening Brief at 30.
23

any other manner than one who, in response to Ameripro's offer of a residential 

mortgage, does business with Ameripro and purchases the product offered by

Ameripro -- a residential mortgage, and such person can be none other than a 

borrower who has purchased a residential mortgage.

Instead of addressing the legal arguments regarding the interpretation of the 

employment contract on the face of the language from the contract and the legal 

arguments regarding the definition of the term "customer," Ameripro relies upon 

inapposite references to statements made by Nasserfar and Task. No matter what 

their statements are, their statements cannot redefine or reformulate the definition 

of the term "customer" which on its face in the employment contract is defined as 

one who has a "loan" with Ameripro. The contract language controls, not the 

parole statements of the parties. And, Ameripro has offered no legal authorities or 

even any legal arguments that would interpret, from the face of the contract, the 

term "customer" to mean anything other than a borrower who has a "loan" with

Ameripro. There is no other plausible explanation, from the wording of the 

contract, than that the term "customer" is a reference to a mortgage loan 

"borrower" who customarily does business with Ameripro -- a company, without 

question, that has as its sole purpose to originate residential loan mortgages for 

borrowers. For these reasons, as a matter of law, the district court erred in defining 
24

the term "customer" to mean any one, person or entity other than a residential 

mortgage borrower.

III.

REPLY TO AMERIPRO ARGUMENT THAT APPELLANTS CAN BE 

BARRED FROM SOLICITING AMEREIPRO CUSTOMERS FOR A

COMPETITOR IN BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES.

The title of paragraph III. of Ameripro's brief is disjointed with the 

arguments following the title. (Ameripro Brief at 35). Ameripro erroneously 

asserts that the district court's findings of potential violations of causes of action 

"warrant injunctive relief" without analysis of legal authorities to support the 

imminent and irreparable injury requirements of Rule 683. Nowhere in this section 

of the brief does Ameripro argue or explain the imminent and irreparable harm 

requirements as applied to any alleged causes of action. Simply because a party is 

alleged to have breached a contract does not, by that fact alone, justified the 

issuance of the extraordinary remedy of a temporary injunction which is limited to 

orders that are necessary to prevent imminent and irreparable injury. Likewise, 

interference with contract, conversion, and misappropriation, do not, as simply 

stated as conclusions, provide the necessary imminent and irreparable injury 

requirement to justify the issuance of a temporary injunction. The authorities relied 

upon by Ameripro are inapposite. ERI Consult. Engrs., Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 

S.W.3d 867 (Tex. 2010) did not involve a review of a temporary injunction order 
25

rather it involved a review of a final judgment on damages. Additionally, the 

central question in the case was a non-compete provision in a buyout agreement. 

There is no non-compete provision in the employment contracts under review here. 

This case is inapposite. In Hunter v. Bldgs. & Mfg. LP v. MBI Global, LLC, 436 

S.W.3d 9 (Tex. App. -- Houston [14th Dist] 2014, pet. denied) the court found that 

the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the misappropriation of trade 

secrets proximately caused lost profits. It was not an injunction case. It is 

inapposite to the issues before this court.

Ameripro refers to RR 66-68, 70-71, 81-82, 89-91, 99, and 143 in support of 

its argument regarding trade secrets and misappropriation by Appellants (Brief at 

36); however, none of this testimony even remotely suggests that Appellants had 

any of the information referred to in this testimony in their possession on May 26, 

2015 when the temporary injunction hearing began. While some of this 

information may have been included in the external storage device backups that 

were required to be copied as part of the policy of Ameripro, these references to 

the record do not support the argument asserted by Ameripro that Appellants 

possessed any of this information at the time that the temporary injunction order 

was entered and, thus, there is a complete lack of evidence to support the necessity

for the temporary injunction order in order to prohibit imminent and irreparable 
26

injury. Ameripro's arguments in this section of the brief go to the merits of its 

claim for damages; not injunctive relief.

In part B., of III, at 37, Ameripro argues about alleged past conduct of 

Appellants which might be relevant to Ameripro's damage claims but have no 

relevance at all to the basis, justification and reasons for the temporary injunction 

which concerns future conduct, not past conduct. Once again, Ameripro provides 

no evidence from the record of any imminent conduct of Appellants that could 

possibly cause irreparable injury to Ameripro. The arguments in this section of the 

brief have no applicability to the question of the validity of the temporary 

injunction order and go only to the question of damages, after trial. (See Ameripro 

Brief at 37 - 40). It is unnecessary to address questions of past conduct that 

provide no basis for any future actions or imminent irreparable injury.

Reply to Part C.

Although there is discussion of Texas cases in this section of the Ameripro 

Brief, Ameripro, once again, fails to cite to evidence that any trade secrets exist or 

were misappropriated by Appellants. Even if there were trade secrets and even if 

there was a misappropriation, which is denied, Ameripro fails to provide any 

evidence that any alleged trade secrets were still in the possession of Appellants as 

of the date of the temporary injunction hearing on May 26, 2015 because all 

possible information of Ameripro was returned to Ameripro by May 15, 2015 and 
27

non was retained by Appellants. Ameripro, once again, fails to cite to evidence in 

the temporary injunction record that Appellants possessed any trade secrets or

confidential or proprietary information of Ameripro as of the first day of the 

temporary injunction hearing on May 26, 2015. This appeal is not about damages. 

This is an appeal about an erroneous temporary injunction. Arguments concerning 

past conduct which allegedly proximately caused damages -- lost profits -- to 

Ameripro are inapplicable to this appeal. They need not be addressed by the court 

in this appeal and there is no need to respond to such arguments in Appellants 

Reply Brief.

Reply to part IV.

In part IV. of the Ameripro brief, Ameripro contends that Appellants' 

argument that they returned all of the confidential information of Ameripro prior to 

the May 26, 2015 hearing is "false"; but, Ameripro offers no evidence from the 

hearing record that Appellants continued to possess any confidential information of

Ameripro on May 26, 2015. Ameripro's argument is confusing and strained. It 

misconstrues the language of the temporary restraining order dated May 12, 2015. 

(CR 95-98). The temporary restraining order states that Appellants are ordered to 

"return to Ameripro all confidential documents and information they removed from

Ameripro, in whatever medium such documents and information exists, and do not 

retain copies." (Emphasis added) (Except for counsel who can retain copies as 
28

attorneys eyes only.). This order does not require that all laptops, external drives, 

cell phones, and all other electronic storage devices ("medium") on which there 

exist any confidential documents and information of Ameripro must be turned over 

to Ameripro. It only requires that the documents and files be turned over, not the 

computer drives, laptops, cell phones and all other electronic storage devices. 

Ameripro misconstrues the temporary restraining order to require that Appellants 

surrender to Ameripro all of their electronic storage devices -- laptops, external 

storage devices, cell phones, etc. This misconstruction of the temporary restraining 

order is the sole basis for Ameripro claiming that "Appellants did not return all of 

the confidential information they downloaded from Ameripro's computers." It is an 

erroneous claim. 

The record is clear that Appellants returned all of the alleged confidential 

and proprietary information of Ameripro prior to the May 26, 2015 hearing and did 

not retain any copies. (RR at Vol.3 at 122: Plaintiffs' Exhibit 34 at RR Vol. 4; RR 

at Vol. 3 at 73-78, and 85-86). Ameripro offered no conflicting evidence that the 

information ordered to be returned was not returned or that the information ordered

to be returned was retained by Appellants. As of May 26, 2015, the evidence was 

clear and concise that all information was returned to Ameripro and was not 

retained by Appellants. Id. and RR Vol. 3, 74-71 and 85-86.
29

Next, Ameripro falsely contends that Appellants "destroyed documents" 

after the "TRO commanded their return." See, Part B of Ameripro Brief at 44. This 

contention is based on "140" folders that were deleted from a drive labeled "CO"

and reviewed by Roy Rector. (RR Vol. 3 at 10-15; 19- 22; 24-27; 129). However,

Ameripro never offered any evidence that the "CO" drive was ever in the 

possession of Appellants, and never offered any evidence of the chain of custody 

of the "CO" drive. Id. There is no evidence that the drive was a "USB device" as 

contended by Ameripro and no evidence that the external drive was labeled 

"Nasserfar External Drive." Id. Ameripro's contentions regarding the possession 

by the Appellants as of May 26 2015 of any information and the deletion or 

destruction of any information are unfounded and without support in the record.

Next, Ameripro argued that Appellants "used" the confidential information. 

See Ameripro Brief at 46. This argument is immaterial to the question of the 

validity of the temporary injunction. This appeal is not about damages arising 

from the improper "use" of someone else's property. Whether the confidential 

information was "used" or not "used" or "infringed" is a question of fact for the 

jury and has no relevance to the validity of the temporary injunction order. This 

argument is also irrelevant since there is no evidence that Appellants had 

possession of any of the confidential information at the beginning of the temporary 

injunction hearing on May 26, 2015. Where is the evidence from the temporary 
30

injunction hearing record that Appellants had possession of any of the confidential 

information as of May 26, 2015 -- the date that the temporary injunction hearing 

began? 

Reply to part V.

In part V. of Ameripro's Brief at 47, once again, Ameripro relies upon past 

alleged wrongful conduct of the Appellants as the sole support for an injunction 

which is prospective in nature and is to be designed to prevent future imminent and 

irreparable harm. Past conduct does not matter. What matters is whether there is 

evidence of imminent and irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted. Here 

there is none. Nothing in this section of the Ameripro brief supports the district 

court's temporary injunction. Hill and Miller Paper Co. v. Roberts Paper Co., 901 

S.W.2d 593 (Tex. App. -- Amarillo 1995, no pet.), relied upon by Ameripro at 49 

of its Brief, are inapplicable because in Hill it was undisputed that the defendants 

had possession of trade secrets at the time that the injunction was issued and in 

Miller the defendants had possession of confidential information and were actively 

using the confidential information to compete at the time that the injunction was 

issued. Here, there is no evidence of Appellants' use of any trade secret or 

confidential information and no evidence that Appellants possessed any trade 

secret or confidential information of Ameripro at the time of the temporary 

injunction hearing in May 2015. Ameripro presented no evidence of any 
31

solicitation, and no evidence of any competition using trade secrets or confidential 

information, and no evidence that Appellants even possessed trade secrets or 

confidential information when the temporary injunction was heard and issued. (RR 

Vol. 3 133- 135).

Reply to part A. -C at 49 - 53.

In part A. - C. of IV. at 49 -53 of Ameripro's Brief, Ameripro urges that the 

court ignore the damages which Ameripro is seeking as an inadequate remedy. In 

Garth v Staktek Corp., 876 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. App. -- Austin 1994, writ dism'd 

w.o.j.), there was clear and sufficient evidence that a trade secret existed and that 

the defendant was using the trade secret to compete against the plaintiff. In this 

case, there is no evidence of a trade secret, no evidence of any use of any trade 

secret by Appellants and no evidence that Appellants even possessed a trade secret 

of Ameripro at the time of the temporary injunction. Additionally, Garth involved 

a technology product which was not generally available in a narrow marketplace 

and there was no question regarding the trade secrets for developing the 

technology product. Here, there are no trade secrets because the process and 

methods and means of obtaining the origination of a residential mortgage is a 

highly regulated industry and the methods and means of obtaining the origination 
32

of a residential mortgage is public information and regulated by state and federal 

law. 3 Garth is inapplicable.

Flake v. EGl Eagle Global Logistics, L.P., 2002 WL 31008136 *4 (Tex. 

App. -- Houston [14th Dist. ] September 2, 2002, no pet.) is inapplicable because 

defendant admitted to possessing trade secrets and confidential information at the 

time of the temporary injunction hearing and defendant admitted that he was using 

trade secrets and confidential information to compete against his former employer 

and would continue to do so unless he was enjoined by the court. There was also 

no adequate remedy in damages for the former employer. In Frequent Flyer Depot, 

Inc. v American Airlines, Inc. 281 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App. -- Fort Worth 2009, pet. 

denied), did not involve trade secrets or confidential information. It involved the 

defendants direct interference between a contract between the defendant and its 

members of its frequent flyer program. On its facts, and law, it is not applicable. 

There would be no damage claim that American Airlines could substantiate caused 

by the brokering a frequent flyer miles. This case is inapplicable to the present 

case. In Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1993) the dispute centered on a 

contract to purchase a business and the Supreme Court held that an injunction to 

prohibit the sale of the business would maintain the status quo until the merits of 

 

3

 See, e.g., TEXAS FINANCE CODE, Title 3, Chapter 180 (2015)(Residential Mortgage Loan Originators); 

TRUTH IN LENDING ACT, 15 U.S.C. §1601, et seq.; THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND 

CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); THE S.A.F.E. MORTGAGE LICENSING ACT, 12 

U.S.C. § 5101, et seq.; THE REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et. 

seq.; THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT, 15 U.S.C. 1691 et. seq.; and, THE FAIR CREDIT 

REPORTING ACT (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1861, et seq.
33

the contract dispute can be determined. On its facts, it is inapplicable to the issues 

in this case. Topheavy, cited at 52, is an applicable because here there is no 

evidence of any future harm to Ameripro that could not be compensated by 

damages whereas in that case the question was the unlawful distribution sale of 

games. 

Ameripro next makes the other meritorious argument that it's sworn 

interrogatories seeking over $1.9 million in damages cannot be considered by the 

court as evidence of an adequate remedy at law. Ameripro Brief at 53. The 

evidence that America was seeking millions of dollars in damages and has sworn 

in answers to interrogatories that is entitled to seek millions of dollars in damages 

is part of the record. The clerk's record was supplemented and is part of the

appellate record in this case. The credibility of Ameripro is called into question 

when its president testifies at the hearing that he cannot calculate damages and yet 

Ameripro swears in and answers to interrogatories after the hearing that it is 

entitled to recover over $1.9 million in damages. It is clear from the record 

including the supplemental clerk's record that Ameripro has an adequate remedy in 

damages that it is seeking from Appellants and, consequently, there is no 

irreparable injury for which a temporary injunction is necessary to prohibit. 

Ameripro has not been irreparably injured and there will be no irreparable injury if 

the temporary injunction is quashed.
34

VI.

REPLY TO AMERIPRO ARGUMENT THAT THE TEMPORARY 

INJUNCTION IS NOT OVERBROAD AND THAT THERE IS A DIRECT 

NEXUS BETWEEN THE ENJOINED CONDUCT AND IMMINENT AND 

IRREPARABLE INJURY TO AMERIPRO.

Ameripro does not dispute that a district court abuses its discretion when it 

misapplies the law to established facts or when it concludes that a temporary 

injunction should be granted and such conclusion is not reasonably supported by 

the evidence or that the entry of a temporary injunction that enjoins lawful as well 

as unlawful acts is overbroad and constitutes abuse of discretion.4

Part VI. of the Brief of Ameripro sidestepped any argument regarding the 

nexus between the imminent and irreparable injury and the specifics of the conduct 

that is enjoined. Nowhere in the Ameripro Brief is there an argument or even an 

attempt to connect the enjoined actions with reasons for imminent and irreparable 

injury. For this reason, the temporary injunction order is overbroad.

There is no bases, and Ameripro provides no argument or legal authorities 

for justifying the AEO quarantine of all of the "media" -- electronic devices of 

Nasserfar, Task and Gosnay -- that may have, at one time, contained a file of 

Ameripro. No evidence was presented at the May 26, 2015 temporary injunction 

hearing that any of the "media" of Nasserfar, Task and Gosnay still contained any 

information of Ameripro, and the brief of Ameripro does not address the absence 

 

4

See, authorities cited in Appellants' Opening Brief at 54-55.
35

of evidence to substantiate that the electronic devices of the Austin loan officers 

still contains information of Ameripro. There is no evidence that the information 

of Ameripro was in danger of being destroyed if the electronic devices of the 

Austin loan officers was not placed in AEO quarantine because there is no 

evidence that the electronic devices of the loan officers was the only source of 

information of Ameripro. No evidence was ever offered at the temporary 

injunction hearing that the copied electronic file backed up information was the 

only source of information of Ameripro. For this reason, the temporary injunction 

order, in this respect, is overbroad. 

Ameripro's reliance on Correa v. Houston Surg. Asst. Serv., Inc. , 2013 WL 

3958499 (Tex App. -- Houston [14th Dist.] July 30, 2013, no pet.) is misplaced 

because Correa was enforcement of a non-compete clause in a contract. The 

contracts here do not contain non-compete provisions. Therefore, clause (iii) of 

the temporary restraining order unreasonably restrains "Oak Mortgage, [and] 

employees of Oak Mortgage" from "directly or indirectly, soliciting business from 

Brohn Homes, Seaholm Residences and Clark Wilson Builders." There is no 

contract or fiduciary relationship between Oak Mortgage and Ameripro and, thus, 

no legal justification for enjoining all loan officers and employees of Oak 

Mortgage from soliciting business from publicly known homebuilders. The 

temporary injunction order does not set forth an explanation of why Ameripro will 
36

be imminently and irreparably injured if loan officers and employees of Oak 

Mortgage -- other than Nasserfar, Task and Gosnay -- solicit business from 

publicly known homebuilders -- such as Brohn Homes, Seaholm Residences, and 

Clark Wilson Builders -- and there is no evidence of imminent or irreparable injury 

that will occur to Ameripro if such actions are not enjoined. Ameripro failed to 

address this argument. The injunction should be modified to, if at all, only restrain 

solicitation if in direct concert with Nasserfar, Task or Gosnay. Prohibiting 

solicitation by Oak Mortgage and its other employees and officers, who have no 

contract with Ameripro is overly broad.

Ameripro's response to Appellants' argument that clause (iii) of the 

temporary restraining order is unreasonable and overbroad because it does not 

restrict the prohibition on solicitation to the one (1) year term as set forth in the 

employment agreements. (App. 6; RR Vol. 4 Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3) is inapposite to 

the argument. Ameripro sidesteps the argument and refuses to address the limited 

duration of the contractual non-solicitation provisions to one year. The restriction 

on solicitation, if properly applied and applicable at all, is limited to one year from 

the date that Nasserfar, Task and Gosnay terminated their employment relationship 

with Ameripro. Ameripro has no response to this argument. For these reasons, the 

temporary injunction order is overbroad in many specific respects
37

PRAYER

For these reasons, Appellants pray that the court dissolve the temporary 

injunction.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Charles Bundren

WM. CHARLES BUNDREN & ASSOCIATES 

LAW GROUP, PLLC

Wm. Charles Bundren, Esq.

Attorney-in Charge

State Bar No. 03343200

2591 Dallas Parkway, Suite 300

Frisco, Texas 75034

(214) 808-3555 Telephone

(972) 624-5340 Facsimile

e-mail: charles@bundrenlaw.net

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on this 2nd day of November, 2015, all 

counsel of record were served with a copy of this document by serving the 

following: 

Susan Burton, Esq.

State Bar No. 03479350

GRAVES DOUGHTERY HEARON & MOODY 

P.C.

401 Congress., Suite 2200

Austin, Texas 78701

Telephone: (512) 480-5600 

Telecopier: (512) 480-5862 (facsimile)

E-mail: sburton@gdhm.com

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
38

__X__by the electronic filing manager pursuant to TRAP 6.3, 9.2 (c)(2), 9.5 (a), 

9.5 (b) (1), 9.5(c) (4)and 9.5(e),

____ by certified mail return receipt requested deposited with the United States 

Postal Service on the date indicated above pursuant to TRAP 6.3, 9.2 (c)(2), 9.5 

(a), 9.5 (b) (1), 9.5(c) (4)and 9.5(e),

__X__ by email at the email address indicated above pursuant to TRAP 6.3, 9.2 

(c)(2), 9.5 (a), 9.5 (b) (1), 9.5(c) (4)and 9.5(e),

____ by commercial delivery service deposited with ___________________ on the 

date indicated above pursuant to TRAP 6.3, 9.2 (c)(2), 9.5 (a), 9.5 (b) (1), 9.5(c) 

(4)and 9.5(e),

and/or

____ by fax at the fax number indicated above pursuant to.

TRAP 6.3, 9.2 (c)(2), 9.5 (a), 9.5 (b) (1), 9.5(c) (4)and 9.5(e),

/s/ Charles Bundren

Wm. Charles Bundren, Esq.

ATTORNEY FOR:

APPELLANTS

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this document was produced on a computer using Microsoft 

Word and contains 7.430 words, as determined by the computer software's wordcount function, excluding the sections of the document listed in Texas rule of 

appellate procedure 9.4(i)(1).

/s/ Charles Bundren

WM. CHARLES BUNDREN & ASSOCIATES 

LAW GROUP, PLLC
39

Wm. Charles Bundren, Esq.

Attorney-in Charge

State Bar No. 03343200

2591 Dallas Parkway, Suite 300

Frisco, Texas 75034

(214) 808-3555 Telephone

(972) 624-5340 Facsimile

e-mail: charles@bundrenlaw.net

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS