Present: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 

Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 

JOSEPH B. SWEENEY 

v. Record No. 991810 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 April 21, 2000 

WEST GROUP, INC. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Marcus D. Williams, Judge 

 In this appeal, we decide whether a lease provision 

requiring a lessee to give written notice of the lessee’s 

intent to vacate leased premises at the end of a fixed-term 

residential real estate lease can be enforced by a lessor. 

Because we conclude that the provision is, in effect, a 

statutorily proscribed waiver of the lessee’s rights under 

Code § 55-222, we will reverse the circuit court’s judgment 

in favor of the lessor. 

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

Joseph B. Sweeney signed a one-year, fixed-term lease 

agreement with West Gate1 on August 1, 1996, for an 

apartment (the premises) located in a complex known as the 

Commons of McLean. By its terms, that lease expired on 

July 31, 1997. It did not provide for an automatic renewal 

of the one-year term. 

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 West Gate is owned by the appellee West Group, Inc. 
The form lease agreement that Sweeney executed states 

that “Lessee shall render to the Lessor a written thirty 

(30) day notice to vacate said premises in the event this 

Lease is not extended, this notice to be filed with the 

Lessor thirty (30) days prior to the expiration of this 

Lease.” A lease rider, which Sweeney also executed, 

provides that the terms of the rider control in cases of 

conflict between the provisions of the lease and those of 

the rider. The rider also states that the rights and 

responsibilities of the lessee are governed by the Virginia 

Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (Act), Code §§ 55-248.2 

through –248.40, and that the Act, or other applicable 

state law, controls if any conflict exists between the 

terms of the lease and the provisions of the Act. 

In early June 1997, Sweeney visited the complex’s 

rental office and orally informed West Gate’s agent that he 

would not be extending his lease beyond its expiration on 

July 31, 1997. Sweeney did not give the lessor any written 

notice of his intent to vacate the premises at the end of 

the fixed term, but he vacated the premises on or before 

the last day of the term of his lease. 

 Almost one year later, West Group filed a warrant in 

debt in the Fairfax County General District Court against 

Sweeney and a co-signer of the lease, seeking damages in 

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the amount of $899.75 for unpaid rent and damages,2 plus 

interest, costs, and attorney’s fees. Sweeney answered, 

denying that he owed the amount sued for, and filed a 

counterclaim for $150 plus interest, which represented a 

portion of his security deposit that he contended West 

Group withheld from him. 

The general district court dismissed West Group’s 

warrant in debt with prejudice but granted Sweeney a 

judgment in the amount of $111.33 on his counterclaim. 

West Group appealed the general district court’s judgment 

to the circuit court. After a bench trial, the circuit 

court entered judgment against Sweeney in the amount of 

$730 plus costs.3 This appeal followed. 

ANALYSIS 

 The sole issue in this appeal is whether the provision 

of the lease agreement requiring Sweeney to give the lessor 

written notice of his intent to vacate the premises at the 

end of the fixed term can be enforced by West Group. 

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 West Group calculated its claim in the following 

manner: $1,049.75 for damages, utilities, and rent less 

Sweeney’s security deposit of $150, leaving an amount due 

of $899.75. Of that amount due, West Group included $880 

as additional rent because of Sweeney’s failure to give the 

written notice to vacate. 

3

 The circuit court’s final order does not specifically 

address Sweeney’s counterclaim. Neither party has assigned 

3
Enforcement of the provision would subject Sweeney to 

additional rental payments beyond the term of his lease if 

he failed to give the written notice. As stated in the 

rider to Sweeney’s lease, the Act governs Sweeney’s rights 

and responsibilities and thus applies to the present 

dispute. Pursuant to Code §§ 55-248.9(A)(1) and (2), a 

rental agreement subject to the Act may not contain a 

waiver of a tenant’s rights under, inter alia, the Act or 

Chapter 13 of Title 55 of the Code. Sweeney’s rights under 

Chapter 13 are at issue in this appeal. 

Code § 55-222, found in Chapter 13 of Title 55, 

addresses the necessity and type of notice required to 

terminate various kinds of tenancies. That section 

provides, in pertinent part, that notice is not “necessary 

from or to a tenant whose term is to end at a certain 

time.” The one-year, fixed term of Sweeney’s lease ended 

on July 31, 1997, which is “a certain time” within the 

meaning of Code § 55-222. 

Thus, the provision in Sweeney’s lease agreement 

requiring him to give written notice of his intent to 

vacate the premises was not only unnecessary but also 

contrary to the terms of Code § 55-222. The requirement of 

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error with respect to the disposition of the counterclaim. 

Thus, that issue is not before the Court in this appeal. 

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written notice is, in effect, a statutorily proscribed 

waiver of Sweeney’s rights under Code § 55-222. Such a 

waiver is not enforceable. Code § 55-248.9(B). 

For this reason, we will reverse the circuit court’s 

judgment and enter judgment for Sweeney on the warrant in 

debt.4

Reversed and final judgment. 

 4

 Because of our decision, we do not reach Sweeney’s 

other assignment of error. 

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