## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 19

- 00033

- CR

___________________________

On App eal from the 297th Dist rict Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 15237 49D
Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel 

### M ICHAEL 

### H ARVEY 

### D EH ARDE 

### , Appellant

V


### . T H E 

### S TATE OF 

### T EXAS2 MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction A jury found Appellant Michael Ha rvey De H arde guilty of th e offense of possession of a controlle d substan ce of less than one gram , and the trial court

senten ced him to eight years ’ confinement. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(b)

. In si x points, Appellant argues that the trial court abuse d its discretion

an d vi olated his Confrontation Clause rights by overruling h is objectio ns to the responding officer ’ s testimony about receiving the address to which he reported from
the dispatch er and by overruling his objections to the nonconsensual search of his
vehicle and h is wal let

. Because the record demonstrates that the officer ’ s te stimon y about being dispatched to the scene was not admitted for the truth of the matter
asserted , that the Confrontation Clause was thus not imp licated, and that the s earch
of Appel l ant ’ s v eh ic le an d wallet were justified under the warrant exception for a

searc h incident to arrest , we affirm. II. Factual Background 1
Officer Brau cht with the North Richland Hills Police Departme nt testified that

o n December 2, 2017 , he had responded t o 6723 Manor Drive based on a call that “ a couple of people were digging into a veh icle

. . . [j]ust past 11:30 p.m. ” Based on that information, Officer B raucht be lieved that the crime o f burglary of a motor ve hicle

1 Beca u se Appellant does not challenge t he sufficie ncy of the evidence to support his conviction, we set forth only a brief factua l background.3 might be in progress . Whe n Officer B raucht arrived, he found a vehic le , which

matc h ed the des cri pti on that had been p rovided , parked in the driveway associated
with 6723 Ma nor Drive

. 2 H e made contact with the two peop le who were inside the
vehic le and as ked for their identifi cation

. The d river retrieved his id entification from his wallet, which was in a sm all , op en com partment below the radio in the vehic l e ; the
identification revealed that Appellant was t he driver

. The passe n g er ’ s ide ntification
revealed that s he was J ack ie Johnson.
When Officer Br aucht checked for outstanding warr ants, he lea rned that John son had an active war rant for h er arrest. The assisting officer the n asked Johnson t o exit the vehi cle , performed a pat down , and located possib le illegal
substances in her p ocket. Officer Braucht testified that b ased on the contraband found in Johnson ’ s poc k e t, h e proceeded to “ conduct a probable [

- ] cause sear ch [of]
the vehi cle ” because Jo hnson had been sitting in the vehicle immediat ely before the illegal substances we r e found in her pocket. Before Officer Braucht searche d the vehicle, he asked Appella nt t o exit the vehicle and frisked him to search for any
weapons for officer saf ety
. Officer Braucht then told App ellant to sit on the curb

w hile he s e arched the vehicle

.

2 T he test i mony at trial demo nstrate d that Appellant was at that a ddress to pick up c leaning supplie s from Gayla McClendon , who lived at that address and employed Appellant to clean rental houses

.4 During the search of Appellant ’ s vehicle , 3 Officer Braucht found a white crystalline su bstanc e, which he belie ved to be meth am pheta mine

. The substance was
found in a folde d

- up paper driver ’ s license that was in the wallet that Appellant had previously remov ed his identificati o n from and had placed back in the small open compartment below th e rad io

. Officer Braucht then arrested Appel lant

. III
. Standard of Review for Evidentiary R u lings 4
A trial court ’ s decision to adm it evidence is reviewed under an abuse

- of

discretion st andard. Wall v. State , 184 S.W. 3d 730, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006 ).
I V
. He a rsay and Confrontation Clause Chal lenges
In h is first, third, and fifth points, Appellant argues t hat the trial court ab used its discretion by overruling his hearsay and Confront ation C lause o bje ctions to
Offic er Brau cht ’ s test imony

. A. Standard o f Rev iew and Applicable Law
I f the admission of evidence involves a constitutional legal ruling, such as
whether a statement is testimonial or nontest imonial, the ap pellate court giv es almost
total deference to the trial court ’ s determination of historical fact s but reviews
de n ovo the trial court ’ s application of the law to those facts. See Langham v. State , 305

3 The record demonstr ate s that th e ve hicle was registered to Appel lant

.
4 Each of Appellan t ’ s points c hallenge the trial court ’ s rulings on evidentiary objections that he made at trial. We therefore set fo rth the standard of review regarding the admission of evidence only on ce .5 S.W.3d 568, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Wall , 184 S.W. 3d at 742 (applyi ng hybrid
stand ard of review to issue of wheth er statement w as testimonial ).
Th e Confrontation Cl ause of the Sixth Amendmen t to the United Stat es Const itution, applicable to the states thr ough the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[i]n all criminal pros ecutions, the a ccused shall enjoy the right .

. . to be
conf ronted with th e wit nesses against him .” Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 42,
1 24 S. Ct . 1354, 1359 (2004); Langham , 3 05 S.W.3d at 575 (citing U.S. C onst
. a mend

. VI). T he Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay. See Davis v.
Wa shington , 547 U.S. 8 1 3, 8 21, 126 S. C t. 2266 , 2273 (2006) ; Lang ham , 30 5 S.W.3d at
5 76. Once a defendant raises a Confrontation Clause objection, the burden shifts to
the State to prove eithe r (1) that the propo sed statement doe s not contain testimonial
he arsay and thus does not i mplicate the Confrontation Clause or ( 2) t hat the

statemen t does contain testimonial hearsay but is nevertheless admissible. See De la Paz v. State , 273 S.W.3d 671, 680

– 8 1 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 2008) (citing Crawford , 541 U.S. at 68, 1 24 S. Ct. at 1 374).
State ments that a re properly offered and ad mitted not to prove the truth of the matter, but rather for a nonhearsay purpose , do not implicate Confrontation Cla use rights and ar e admissible un der Crawford

. See Langham , 305 S.W.3d at 576 ( “ [A]n out

of

- court stat ement, even one that falls within [the ] definition of ‘ test imonial ’

statements , is not objectionable under the Confr ontation Clause to the extent that it is6 offered for so me evidentia ry purpose other than the truth of the matter as serted. ” )

. As furth er no ted by the c ourt in Langh am , When the relevance of an out

- o f

- court statement derives solely from the fact that it was made, and not from the content of th e assertion it
co ntains, there i s no constitutional imperative that the accus ed b e permitte d to c onfro nt the decla rant. In this context, th e one who bears “witn ess against” the accused is not the out

- of

- court declarant but the one who testifies that the s tatement was made , and it satisf ies the Confrontation Clause that the accused is able to co nfront and cross

examin e him.
305 S.W

. 3d at 576

– 77

. F o r example, when a statement is “ offered to show the reason
for th e [police officer ’ s] act ions, ” and not fo r the truth of the matter asserted, it is not hearsay. See Kimball v. Sta te , 24 S.W.3d 555, 564

– 65 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2000, n o pet.)

. Moreover, “ t esti mony by an officer that he went to a certain place or performed a certain act in respons e to generalized ‘ information re ceived ’ is normally not considered hearsay be cause the witn ess should be allowed t o giv e som e expla nation of
his behavior. ” Poin d exter v. State , 153 S.W.3d 402, 408 n.21 (Tex. C rim. App. 2005), overruled in part on other gr oun d s by Robinson v. State , 466 S.W.3d 166, 173 & n.32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)

. B
. Anal ys is In his fifth poi nt, A ppell ant a rgues that the trial court abused its disc retion by overruling his Co nfrontation Clause objec tions w he n the State question ed Officer
Brau cht as follows: Q

. And on the 2 nd day of December 2017, did you get a call a t 6723 Manor D rive?7 [DEFENSE COUNSE L]: We ’ d object, Your Hon or . It ’ s hearsay and den ial of con f r ontation.
THE COURT: R esponse? [PROS ECUTOR]: Judge, it’s a location he we nt to, so he woul d have personal knowl edge of where it is.
THE COURT: Ask him that. Q. [BY [P ROSECUT OR ] ] Did you respon d to 6723 Manor Drive? [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: We object, Your Honor

. Again, it ’ s i nvolving hearsay and involves a denial of con f ro ntation of t he wi tnesses

-- TH E COURT: He ’ s asking if he responded. T h at ’ s not a hearsa y. Overruled.
Go a he ad. You c an answer that

. A. Yes , sir, I respon ded to 6723 Manor. [ 5 ] Appellant argu es th at he was denied his right to con fron t the witnesses a gainst him

“ bec ause the person givin g the information is not present and [becaus e] the perso n to whom the infor mation was sent was the person [testifying about] the information. ” As set forth above, case law permits an of ficer to testif y that he went to a certain place in response to informatio n r eceived. See id. O fficer Braucht ’ s

5 Although Appellant ’ s fifth point references “ ( R., Vol. 3, p . 16
– 1 9, 25) , ” his anal ysis sets f orth only the a bove

- quoted por tion of the record from page s 16 and 17 and makes no refer ence to or a r guments about the testimony on the other referenced pages d u ri ng which he continued to raise the same object ions t o other quest ions

. We th erefo re limit our analysis to t he above

- quoted portion of the r ecord.8 testimony

— th at he resp onded to 672 3 Manor Drive because that was the location
tha t he was dispatched to

— explains why he went to that address

. The location provided by the caller and c onveyed by the dispatcher was not o ffere d for the truth of
the matter asserted and thus is not hearsay. See Kimb all , 24 S.W.3d at 564

– 65 (concluding that officer ’s testimony as to out

- of

- cou rt conversation s betwee n officer and police dispat cher regarding conversation between unknown motori s t and 911
operator rega rding possible DWI was nonhearsay ) ; see also Dink ins v . State , 894 S.W.2d 330, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 95) (holding that evidence was not hearsay because th e State tendered it “ to sho w how appellant became a suspect in the investigat ion ” );
Vercher v. State , No. 03

- 13

- 00799

- CR , 20 15 WL 5919933, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Austin
O ct. 7, 2015 , no pet. ) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that Crime Stopper testimony was not hearsay or a violation of the Confrontation Clause because
it was not offered for the truth of the mat ter asserted )

. A nd beca use Office r Brau cht ’ s testimony about the location that he was dispatched to was not hearsay, his testimony d id not violate the Confront ation Clause. See Crawford , 541 U.S. at 59 n.9,
124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9 (“The [Confrontation] Clause .

. . does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” (ci ti ng Tennessee v. S treet , 4 71 U.S. 409, 41 4, 10 5 S. Ct. 207 8, 2081

– 82 (198 5) ) ) ; McIntyre v. S tate , No. 14

- 13

- 00407

- CR , 2014 WL 6602420, at *14 (Tex

. App.

— Hou ston [14th Dist.] Nov. 20, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op. , not designated for public ation ) ( “ If the trial court cor re ctly determined that Wate rs ’ [s] testimon y was not9 hear say, then her testimony did not violate the Confr ontation Clause. ” ) ; Kimball , 24
S.W.3d at 564

– 65 (concluding that officer ’s testimony about conversation s with police dispatcher w as nonhear say and tha t its admission did not vio late the C onfro ntation
Clause ). We hold that the tr ial c ourt did not abuse its di scretion by overruling Appel lant ’ s Con frontation Clause objections , which are set forth above , and we overrule Appella nt ’ s fifth po i nt. In his firs t and third point s , Appella nt argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by overr uling his hearsay and Co nfrontation Clause objec t ions to th e State ’ s questioning Officer Braucht “ about receiv ing a call about the vehicle ” because

“ [t]here was no one to testify as regards to a telephone call. ” The body o f Appell ant ’ s
arg ument references “ (R., Vol. 3, p. 20

– 21)

. ” 6 T he questio n the Sta te asked O fficer
Braucht was as follows : “ When you get called to a call fo r service in this manner like
y ou described, with people digging in a c ar late at night, residential a rea, a re you th inking there could be a cr ime happening? ” 7 Appellant argues tha t “ the all eged caller

6 We note that in the portion of Ap pellant ’ s brief where he sets forth the statement of his first point , he ci tes “ (R., Vol. 3 , entire record )

. ” Because Ap pellant focuse s his a nalysis so lely on pa ges 20 and 21, we sim ilarly limit ou r an alysis to only th ose pages.

7 Appellant does not set forth the exact question that he is challenging, but th e only other Confro n ta tion Clause objection that he made on page 21 came after Officer Brau cht had answered a question about ident ifying the peop le in the vehicle. Beca use this objection was late, i t did not preserve anything for our review. See Tex. R . A p p. P. 33. 1 (a )(1); Saldano v. State , 70 S.W.3d 873, 88 9 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 2002) (“We ha ve c onsistently held that the failu re to object in a timely and specific manner du ring10 was never identifi ed, never questioned, and n ever appeared for court ” and t hat “ [t]his
is clear ly a violation of th e [C]onfrontation [C]lau se. ” Broadly construing the challenged question as dir ected at Appellant ’ s inab ility to questi on the dis patcher and the unidentified per son who called 911 , our analysis
woul d be the same as that set forth above with Appellant ’ s fifth point: O fficer
Br aucht ’ s testimony

— th at he resp onded to 6723 Manor Dr ive because that was the
location tha t he wa s dis patched to

— was not off ered for the t r uth of the mat ter asserted and thus was n ot hearsay

. See Kimball , 24 S.W.3d at 564

– 65 ; see also Dinkins , 894 S.W.2d a t 347 ; Vercher , 2015 WL 5919933, at *2

. Accordingly , we h old that the
trial court did not abuse i ts discret ion by overrul ing Appellant ’ s hearsay and Confrontation Clause object io ns, and we o verrule Appellant ’ s first and third point s . V. Challeng e of Alle ged Te rry Stop App ellant ’ s fourth point is cou ched as another challenge to the trial court ’ s

overr uling of h is hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections, but he sets forth no

re cord refere nces . His three

- sentence a rgument is as follows : The St ate was allo wed to present evidence of the questioning of the Appellant regarding things independent of the reason for the stop. The alleged call to the police was regard in g som eone r emoving something from one vehicle to anoth er vehicle. T here is n othing illegal abo ut this activity on behalf of the Defendant [that] could justify a [ Terry ] stop. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 [, 88 S. Ct. 1868 ] ( 1968).

trial forfeits complaints about the admissibility of evidence. This is true even though the e rr or may concern a constitutional ri ght of the defendant .” (citations omitt ed))

.11 To the ex t ent that A ppellant ’ s fourth point re

- ur g e s his argume nt about his i nabili ty to
que stion the dispatcher and the unidentified calle r , we have a ddressed th at argu ment abo ve and overrule that portion of his fo urt h point. With regard to the remainder of App el l ant ’ s fourth point regarding an allege d Terr y stop, 8 the evidence supports
O fficer Brau cht ’ s ac tions.
Law enfo rcement officers may, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion , approach individuals to requ est identi fication and information. See Stat e v. Castleberry , 332 S.W.3 d 460 , 466 (Te x. Cri m. App. 2011 ). Su ch encounters do not require an y justifi cation o n the officers’ part. See United States v. Mendenhall , 446 U.S. 544, 55 4 , 100
S. Ct. 1870, 187 7 ( 1980); Sta te v. Woodard , 341 S.W.3d 404, 41 1 (T ex. Crim. App. 2011) ; State v. Larue , 2 8 S.W. 3d 549, 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 200 0)

. A police offic e r is as
free a s any other citizen to app roach citizens on the street and ask for information.
Woodard , 3 41 S.W. 3d at 411 ; State v. Garcia

- Cantu , 253 S.W.3d 23 6, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)

. Such interactions may involve inconvenien ce o r embarrassment, bu t they
do not i nvolve official coer cion. Garcia

- Cantu , 253 S.W.3d at 243. An officer may conduct a brief inves tigative d etention, or “ Terry stop,” when he
ha s a reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is involved in cri mina l activity.
Balenti n e v. State , 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Terry , 392 U.S. at

8 Appellant p reserved this arg ument in the tr ial court when he objected to S t ate ’ s Exhibit 11, the dash cam era video, on the basis that “ [ Officer Bra ucht] has intentionally st o pp ed a motor vehicle without p robable c ause . ” The trial court overruled th e objection.12 21 , 88 S. Ct . at 1880 ); C armouc he v. Stat e , 10 S.W.3d 323, 329 (T ex. Crim. A pp . 2000)

. The reasonableness of a temporary detention must be examined in ter ms of the totality of the circumst ances and will be justified when the detaining officer has specific articulable facts, which, take n together with rational infe rences from thos e facts, lead him to conclude that the person detained actually is, has bee n, o r soon will be enga ged in criminal activity. Balentine , 71 S. W.3d at 768; Woods v. State , 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 1997). Here, we note at the outset of our analysi s that Officer B raucht did not initiate a stop of Appellant ’ s v ehicle. The rec or d demonstrates th at Appellant ’ s vehicle was parked in the driveway at 6723 Manor Drive when Officer Braucht approached it and
asked the occupa nts

— Appellant and Johnson

— for ide nt ification . A police officer approaching a parked v ehicle does not consti tute a se izure and need not be support ed by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See Basinger v. S t ate , No. 05

- 12

- 00518

- CR,
2013 WL 44 00528, at * 3 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Aug. 16, 201 3, pet. ref ’ d

) ( op. on reh ’ g ,
not designated for publ ication) ; see a lso Cas tleb er ry , 332 S.W.3 d at 466

. Accordin gly, we
hold that Officer Braucht ’ s initial interaction with Appellant

— during which Officer
Braucht asked Appe llant for identification and aske d questions about what Appellant was doing

— constituted a consensual or volu n tar y encounter , not a Terry stop
. S e e Merideth v. State , 603 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (holding that
interactio n was an e ncounter when officer saw man and woman sitti ng in parked truck in parking lot, approached truck, and knocked on driver ’ s si de window)

.13 Accord ingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Appellan t ’ s objection to th e alleg ed stop , and w e ov errule the remainder of App el lant ’ s fourth point.
V I . Challenges Regarding the Search of the Vehicle
In h is second 9 and sixt h points, Appel lant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it overruled his objection t o the sear ch and s eizure of the ve hicle and
his wall et
. 10 A p p ellant contends that the police must have probable ca us e o r consent in o rder to conduc t a search of a vehicle and tha t when Officer B rau cht found Appellant ’s wallet inside the vehicle, Appellant “h ad alrea dy told the officer he co ul d
not search the vehicle. ”
The Fourth Amendment to t he United States Co nstitution proh ibits the government from violating the pe ople ’ s right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasona ble search es and seizures.” U.S. C onst . amend.
IV. As the text suggests, the touchstone o f the Fourth Amen dment is
“reaso nableness.” Riley v. California , 573 U.S. 373, 382 , 134 S. Ct. 2473, 24 82 (2014).

9 As pointed out by the State , “ [t]hou gh the heading of Appellant ’ s second point of error complains about the trial court [ ’ s] overruling an obj ec tion t o the State [ ’ s] l ea ding its witness, this is li kely a clerica l error, a s t he body of t he comp laint dea ls with the Fo u rth Amendment. ”

10 Appellant filed a motion to suppress on the first day of trial , and the trial court “ carr [ ied ] i t with trial

. ” During the trial when the S tate offered the dash cam er a video, A ppellant objected th a t “ [ Officer Bra uch t] has intentionally stopped a motor vehicle without p robable c ause, without any a ctions on the p arts of the

-- the indiv iduals th at would justify a detention and search. And beca use of that, the entire
sea rch is illegal. ” The trial co ur t overruled the o bjection.14 When the government undertakes a search for the p urpose of fu rthering a criminal investigation, “reasonableness generally requires the obt ai ning of a judicia l warrant.”
Id

. , 134 S. Ct. at 24 82

. A search undertaken without a warrant is reasonable only if it falls within one of the specific and well

- defi ned except i on s to the warrant requirement. State v. Villarreal , 475 S.W.3d 784, 795 (Tex. C rim. App. 2014). The exception r elevant here is for a search incident to arrest. Thi s exception permits a warrantless search if it is “substantially contemporaneou s” to an a r re st and
“confined to the area within the immediate control of the arrestee.” Id

. at 807; see Sta te v. Granville , 423 S.W.3d 399, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The Unit ed States Supreme Court has construed the phrase “area within the immediate c ontrol” as th e “area from within which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or
d estructible evide nce.” Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 339 , 129 S. Ct. 1 7 10 , 1716 (2009)

. The S u pr eme Court ’ s construction ensures that the scope of a search incid ent

to arres t is commensurate w ith the justifi cations for permitting it: ensuring the safety of the arresting officer and the need to preserve evid ence from destruction. Granville , 423 S

. W. 3d at 410. “If there is no possibility that an arrestee could re ach into the a rea that law enfo rcement officer s seek to search, both justifications for the search

incident

- to

- arrest exception are absent and the rul e does not apply.” Gant , 556 U.S. at
3 39 , 12 9 S. C t. at 1716

. However, the Court recognized an exception for cases w he re it is “reasona ble to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in15 the vehicle.” Id. at 343, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (citing Thornton v. United States , 54 1 U .S. 615, 632 , 124 S. Ct. 21 27, 2137 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurrin g ) ). Here, t he police d id not n eed Appellant ’ s consent to search his vehicle because the search of the vehicle was triggered by Johnson ’ s arrest. The following series of events ju stified t he warrantl ess search of Appellant ’ s vehicle and his wallet :

• Johnso n had an out standing warrant , s o police were j ustified in

c onducting a warrantless search of her person incident to arrest

. See
United States v. Robinson , 414 U.S. 218, 22 4 , 94 S. Ct. 467 , 4 7 1 (1973) ( “ It
is w ell settled that a search inc ident to a lawful arrest is a traditional
except ion to the warr ant req uirement of the Fourth Amendment. ” )

.

• Du ring the pat

- do wn search of Johnson , the police discovered drugs on her person . Th e discovery o f drugs on Johnson ’ s person, after she was

ar reste d on an outstandin g warrant, supplied a new bas is for arrest t hat justified a search

— incident to arrest

— of t he vehicle that she had been a passenger in immediately prio r to her arrest. See , e.g. , State v. S anche z , No.
13

- 15

- 00288

- CR, 2018 WL 1633571, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Corpu s Chri sti

– Edinburg Apr. 5, 2 0 18, no pet. ) (m em. op. on remand, not designated for public ation) ( “ [T]he

. . . drugs on Sanche z ’ s person , after he was
arrested on traffic warrants but before his Je ep was searched, supplied a16 new basis for arrest that justifi ed a search inci dent to arrest o f h is Jeep. ” ).

• B ecause Johnson had been sitting in Appellant ’ s vehicle immediately
pr ior to her arrest, it was rea sonable for police “ to believe [that] evid enc e relevant to the crime of arrest [i.e., possession of a susp ecte d c ontrolled

s ubstance] might be found in the ve hicle.” See Gant , 556 U.S. at 3 43 , 12 9
S. C t. at 171 9

. The police were the refore justified in searching the vehicle and its contents , inclu d in g Appellant ’ s wallet that was in an ope n area under the ra dio , be cause additi onal drugs
like tho se found o n Joh nson ’ s person could be concealed ther e. See id. at 344 , 129
S

. Ct. at 1719 (stating that the offense of arrest

— such as an arrest fo r possessi on of drugs

— can supply a basis for searching the passenger compartme n t of a n arrestee ’s vehicle and any containers t herein ) ; Dahlem v. S t ate , 3 2 2 S.W.3d 685, 690 (Tex. App.

— F o rt Worth 2010, pet. ref ’ d) ( “ We hold that App ellant ’ s wallet was a cont ai ner on t he boat capable of concealing the additi onal marihuana Warden Benge s ought to locate[.] ” ) . Officer Bra u cht ’ s discov er y of methamphetamine in Appellant ’ s wa llet that was in an open compartment in his vehicle was th us the re sult of a l awful

warran tl ess sear ch. See Dahlem , 3 22 S.W.3d at 690 (holding that warden ’ s discovery of cocaine in appellant ’ s wallet , which wa s in glove comp artment, was the result of a
lawful search because the w ar de n was aut horized to search the boat for more
marihuana after seizing a pi pe and mar i h uana ).17 Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did n ot abuse its discreti on by

ov erruling Ap pellant ’ s objec tion to “ the entire search. ” We therefore overrule Ap pellant ’ s second and sixth points.
V I I . Conclusion Having overruled each of A ppellant ’ s s ix points, we affirm the trial court ’ s judgment. /s/ Dab ney Bassel Dabney Bassel Justice
Do No t Publish Tex. R. A pp. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered : January 16, 2020