J-S04038-19

2019 PA Super 69

____________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JALANI DUPREE MARTIN 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1150 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 29, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-21-CR-0004116-2017

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 07, 2019

Appellant Jalani Dupree Martin appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County on May 29, 

2018, after he pled guilty to one count of indecent assault without consent,

graded as a second-degree misdemeanor.1 Appellant claims that his fifteenyear registration requirement under the Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification Act (SORNA)2is illegal. Appellant argues the trial court could not 

order registration in excess of the maximum possible incarceration period of 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(1). Appellant also had been charged with 

aggravated indecent assault without consent, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3125(a)(1); aggravated indecent assault where complainant is unconscious or 

unaware that penetration is occurring, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A.§ 3125(a)(4);

and indecent assault where the person is unconscious, pursuant to 18 

Pa.C.S.A.§ 3126(a)(4). The Affidavit of Probable Cause indicates the offenses 

occurred on June 13, 2017. 

2 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.10 et seq. 
J-S04038-19

- 2 -

two years for a misdemeanor of the second degree as codified at 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 1104(2). As this Court recently has rejected that legal theory, we affirm.3 

Because our disposition concerns questions of law, a lengthy recitation 

of the factual history is not necessary to our disposition. Following his guilty 

plea, Appellant was sentenced to thirty (30) days to six (6) months in prison

and received 161 days credit for time served. Appellant also received a 

consecutive term of eighteen (18) months of supervised probation and was 

ordered to comply with SORNA’s reporting and registration requirements. 

On June 1, 2018, Appellant filed a timely Motion to Modify Sentence

wherein he argued his sex offender designation and the resulting reporting 

and registration requirements pursuant to SORNA are unconstitutional 

punishments under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in 

Commonwealth v. Muniz, 640 Pa. 699, 164 A.3d 1189 (2017). The 

____________________________________________

3 Relying on two other decisions of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland 

County, CP-21-CR-3113-2016 and CP-21-CR339-2017, trial court found no 

merit to Appellant’s claims. The court stressed that the holding in 

Commonwealth v. Muniz, 640 Pa. 699, 164 A.3d 1189 (2017) is irrelevant 

herein as Appellant’s offense was committed after the most recent enactment 

of SORNA and reasoned that the reporting requirements were more akin to 

probation than to incarceration; thus, double jeopardy concerns were not 

implicated. Trial Court Opinion, 9/6/18, at 3-4. “[A]n appellate court is not 

bound by the rationale of the trial court and may affirm on any basis if the 

record supports it.” Commonwealth v. Diaz, 183 A.3d 417, 421 (Pa.Super. 

2018). 
J-S04038-19

- 3 -

Commonwealth filed its Answer on July 2, 2018, and in its Order entered on 

July 5, 2018, the trial court denied the Motion. 

On July 13, 2018, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On July 16, 

2018, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal, and Appellant complied on July 26, 2018, wherein 

he raised seven (7) issues. In his appellate brief, Appellant presents the 

following Statement of the Questions Involved: 

I. Is [Appellant’s] sentence of fifteen (15) years of punishment 

pursuant to SORNA illegal since SORNA is not a sentencing 

alternative authorized by Section 9721 of the Judicial Code[4] and 

the trial court therefore lacked authority to impose such a 

sentence?

____________________________________________

4 Pertaining to sentencing, this statute reads, in relevant part, as follows: 

§ 9721. Sentencing generally

(a) General rule.--In determining the sentence to be imposed 

the court shall, except as provided in subsection (a.1), 

consider and select one or more of the following 

alternatives, and may impose them consecutively or 

concurrently:

(1) An order of probation.

(2) A determination of guilt without further penalty.

(3) Partial confinement.

(4) Total confinement.

(5) A fine.

(6) County intermediate punishment.

(7) State intermediate punishment.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a).
J-S04038-19

- 4 -

II. Is [Appellant’s] sentence of fifteen (15) years of punishment 

pursuant to SORNA illegal since the statutory maximum for a 

misdemeanor of the second degree as codified in Section 1104 of 

the Criminal Code[5]is two (2) years?

III. Is [Appellant’s] sentence of fifteen (15) years of punishment 

pursuant to SORNA a violation of both the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution as the penalty 

imposed was increased beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 

based upon the General Assembly’s factual determination that 

[Appellant] “pose[s] a high risk of committing additional sexual 

offenses,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(a)(4), a fact that was not 

submitted to the jury nor proven beyond a reasonable doubt as 

required by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)?[6]

____________________________________________

5 Found at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1104, this statute reads as follows: 

§ 1104. Sentence of imprisonment for misdemeanors

A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be 

sentenced to imprisonment for a definite term which shall be fixed 

by the court and shall be not more than:

 (1) Five years in the case of a misdemeanor of the first degree.

 (2) Two years in the case of a misdemeanor of the second 

 degree.

 (3) One year in the case of a misdemeanor of the third degree.

6

In Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212, 1216–17 (Pa.Super. 2017), 

reargument denied (Jan. 3, 2018), appeal granted, 190 A.3d 581 (Pa. 2018), 

this Court recently reiterated: 

In Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 

L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) ], the Supreme Court of the United States 

held that other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 

maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Stated another way, it is unconstitutional for a 

legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that 

increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal 
J-S04038-19

- 5 -

Brief for Appellant at 6. As these issues are interrelated, we will consider them 

together and in doing so are mindful that they present pure questions of law; 

therefore, this Court's standard of review is de novo and our scope of review 

is plenary. Muniz, 640 Pa. at 709, 164 A.3d at 1195.

Appellant reasons that no mention of SORNA as a sentencing option is 

made in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721, and the mandatory nature of the statute coupled 

with its inclusion of an exception as subsection a.1 which does not reference 

SORNA “indicates that the alternatives listed, in conjunction with the 

exception, are exhaustive.” Brief for Appellant at 10-11. Appellant posits that 

Appellant was sentenced to a term of fifteen (15) years of registration and 

reporting pursuant to SORNA making his maximum sentence exceed the 

maximum sentence of two (2) years for a misdemeanor of the second degree 

set for the in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1104(2). Id. at 12, 16. 

Appellant contends this Court’s conclusion in Commonwealth v. 

Strafford, 194 A.3d 168 (Pa.Super. 2018) that SORNA’s registration 

provisions are not constrained by Section 1103 but rather constitute an 

authorized punitive measure separate and apart from an appellant’s term of 

incarceration was in error. Id. at 12-14. Appellant concludes that his 

sentence violates both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution pursuant to Apprendi because that sentence was imposed 

____________________________________________

defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be 

established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
J-S04038-19

- 6 -

as a result of the General Assembly’s factual determination that Appellant 

poses a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses.” Id. at 16-17. 

In setting forth his arguments, Appellant fails to cite this Court’s recent 

decision in Commonwealth v. Bricker, 198 A.3d 371 (Pa.Super. 2018)

wherein we reiterated our prior holding in Strafford that a sentencing 

requirement for a defendant to register as a sexual offender for a period of 

time exceeding the lawful statutory maximum for his offense is not illegal. As 

this analysis is dispositive herein, we quote it in detail below: 

With regard to Appellant's assertion that Muniz held 

SORNA's registration requirements constituted punishment, and, 

therefore, Subsection H cannot be imposed upon him as [it] 

exceeds the lawful statutory maximum for his offense which is 

seven (7) years, we observe that this Court recently held that 

SORNA's registration requirements are not governed by the 

statutory maximum sentences set forth in Chapter 11 of the 

Crimes Code. See Commonwealth v. Strafford, 194 A.3d 168, 

172-73, 2018 WL 3717081 at *3 (Pa.Super. filed Aug. 6, 2018). 

Observing this issue appeared to be one of first impression postMuniz, we reasoned as follows:

Appellant correctly observes that the Muniz Court found 

that the registration requirement mandated by SORNA 

is punitive. See Muniz, supra at 1218,[.] We, thus, 

begin our analysis of Appellant's challenge with a review 

of various statutes and legal principles relating to 

punishments.

 Our Supreme Court has explained the well-settled 

principle that the General Assembly “has the exclusive 

power to pronounce which acts are crimes, to define 

crimes, and to fix the punishment for all crimes. The 

legislature also has the sole power to classify crimes[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 626 Pa. 512, 98 A.3d 

1268, 1283 (2014) (citation and quotation omitted).

 Our General Assembly has authorized courts to 

impose specific punishments when fashioning a 

sentence, and specified maximum terms and amounts of 
J-S04038-19

- 7 -

those punishments. These categories of punishment 

include (1) partial or total confinement, (2) probation, 

(3) state or county intermediate punishment, (4) a 

determination of guilt without further penalty, and (5) a 

fine. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721.

 With respect to the punishment of incarceration, 18 

Pa.C.S. § 1103 governs the maximum authorized 

sentence of imprisonment for felony convictions. By a 

separate statute, these maximum allowable terms also 

apply to probationary sentences, a different category of 

punishment authorized by the General Assembly. In 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9754(a), the legislature directed that “[i]n 

imposing an order of probation the court shall specify at 

the time of sentencing the length of any term during 

which the defendant is to be supervised, which term 

may not exceed the maximum term for which the 

defendant could be confined, and the authority that 

shall conduct the supervision.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Thus, the legislature explicitly connected the authorized 

punishments of incarceration and probation by statute.

 However, most sentencing alternatives are not tied 

to the maximum authorized term of incarceration. For 

example, the legislature has authorized courts to include 

in sentences the requirement that a defendant pay a fine 

or restitution. These categories of punishment are not 

limited by the maximum period of incarceration; rather, 

the legislature set different maximum authorized 

amounts of punishment a court may impose as part of 

its sentence. See, e.g., 18 Pa.C.S. § 1101 (defining 

maximum fines); 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106 (providing statutory 

scheme for restitution for injuries to person or property).

 In SORNA the legislature authorized courts to include 

periods of registration as part of a sentence. Similar to 

the treatment of the payment of fines or restitution, the 

legislature did not tie the period of registration to the 

length of incarceration. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14 

(“Sexual offenses and tier system”); 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9799.15 (“Period of registration”). SORNA's registration 

provisions are not constrained by Section 1103. Rather, 

SORNA's registration requirements are an authorized 

punitive measure separate and apart from Appellant's 

term of incarceration. The legislature did not limit the 

authority of a court to impose registration requirements 

only within the maximum allowable term of 
J-S04038-19

- 8 -

incarceration; in fact, the legislature mandated the 

opposite and required courts to impose registration 

requirements in excess of the maximum allowable term 

of incarceration.

Id. at *2-3 (emphasis in original).

Commonwealth v. Bricker, 198 A.3d 371, 376-77 (Pa.Super. 2018). In 

Bricker, this Court ultimately concluded the appellant’s twenty-five year 

registration requirement authorized by Subchapter H of the recent 

amendments to SORNA, which was enacted on February 21, 2018, and applies 

where one’s offense occurred on or after December 20, 2012, did not 

constitute an illegal sentence. 

It is axiomatic that “[t]his Court is bound by existing precedent under 

the doctrine of stare decisis and continues to follow controlling precedent as 

long as the decision has not been overturned by our Supreme Court.” 

Commonwealth v. Reed, 107 A.3d 137, 143 (Pa.Super. 2014). Based on 

our decisions in Strafford and Bricker, we conclude that Appellant’s fifteenyear registration requirement authorized by SORNA does not constitute an 

illegal sentence; therefore, Appellant’s arguments on appeal fail. 

With regard to Appellant’s constitutional challenge under Apprendi, to 

which he devotes three paragraphs of argument in his appellate brief, we note 

that the facts of the instant matter are distinguishable from those presented 

therein. Unlike the defendant in Apprendi, Appellant pled guilty to a single 

count of Indecent Assault and was advised of the resulting registration and 

reporting requirements under SORNA. The trial court at no time made a 
J-S04038-19

- 9 -

factual finding that increased Appellant’s sentence which was the result of his 

guilty plea to the qualifying crime. As such, this claim also lacks merit. 

 Judgment of Sentence Affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/07/2019