[Cite as State v. Boyce , 2020-Ohio-3573.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee

v. RAMON A. BOYCE Defendant-Appellant : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case No. 2018-CA-77

Trial Court Case No. 2017-CR-761A (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 2nd day of July, 2020.

. . . . . . . . . . . JOHN M. LINTZ, Atty. Reg. No. 0097715, Clark County Prosecutor’ s Office, Appellate Division, 50 East Columbia Stree t, Suite 449, Springfield, Ohio 45502 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee CRAIG M. JAQUITH, Atty. Reg. No. 0052997, 250 East Broad Street , Suite 1400, Columbus, Ohio 43215 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . . FROELICH, J.-2-

{¶ 1} Ramon A. Boyce was found guilty after a jury trial in the ClarkCounty Court of Common Pleas of one count of engaging in a pattern of corrup t activity (a felony of the first degree), 18 counts of burglary (one felony of the second degree and 17 felonies of the third degree), and six counts of receiving stolen property (three felonies of the fifth degree and three misdemeanors of the first degree). The trial court imposed consecutive sentences totaling 70 years in prison, ordered Boyce to pay res titution of $3,049.94, and ordered the forfeiture of Boyce’s three vehicles. {¶ 2} Boyce appeals from his convictions. He claims that (1) the tri al court erred in denying his motion to suppress related to a traffic stop, (2 ) the trial court erred in allowing evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) at trial, (3) the trial court erred when it provided no limiting instruction prior to testimony about Boyce’s prior burglary conviction and when it later did not give a proper limiting instruction about that testimony, and (4) his sentence is clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be vacated as to the conviction on Count 19, and the matter will be remanded for the limited purpose of filing an amended judgme nt entry. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed. I. Facts and Procedural History {¶ 3} Boyce’s jury trial lasted 15 days, during which the State prese nted 85 witnesses and Boyce offered 12 witnesses. The pertinent facts underlying the present appeal are summarized as follows. 1

1 Boyce has not raised an assignment of error challenging the su fficiency of the State’s evidence or claiming that his convictions were against the mani fest weight of the evidence. (Boyce, who is represented by counsel on appeal, att empted to do so in a pro-3- {¶ 4} Boyce’s relevant criminal behavior began in 2005. In Clark C.P . No. 05-CR1114, Boyce was convicted of three counts of receiving stolen p roperty, all fifth-degree felonies; Boyce had an accomplice for those offenses. In Clark C.P. No. 08-CR-363, Boyce was convicted of another charge of receiving stolen prope rty, a fifth-degree felony; the stolen property was a television. Boyce was acquitted of o ther charges in that case. {¶ 5} In Case No. 08-CR-612, Boyce was convicted of burglary, a third -degree felony, and receiving stolen property, a fifth-degree felony. These charges arose from the burglary of the home of Charles and Jade Parsons on North L imestone Street in Springfield. The Parsons’ home was surrounded by woods and had a lengthy driveway with the mailboxes for the Parsons and their neighbors situated side-by-side on Limestone Street, a distance away from the houses. The Parsons ’ home had an alarm system. {¶ 6} In early June 2008, Jade Parsons and her husband were out of to wn, and they asked a friend to get their mail and newspapers from the m ailbox. Mrs. Parsons had left on Saturday morning, and the friend went to the home o n Sunday. The friend noticed something wrong and called the police. Upon her return , Mrs. Parsons noticed that every drawer was open and the house had been “ransacked.” The cable, telephone, and alarm system lines had been cut. Jewelry was missing from upstairs, but Mrs. Parsons’s costume jewelry was not taken. The couple’s safe in the basement had been pried and drilled open with the Parsons’ tools. The safe had c ontained some gold coins, cash, guns, and jewelry. Over time, Mrs. Parsons discovered th at additional items were

se brief, but we denied his motion for leave to file a pro se b rief.) Accordingly, our summary of the facts is not an exhaustive recitation of the evi dence at trial, and it provides an overview of the State’s evidence only.-4- missing. {¶ 7} Mail addressed to the Parsons and their neighbors was collected in a wooded area approximately 250 feet south of the main driveway of the P arsons’ home. Boyce’s fingerprints were found on the mail. On June 4, 2008, Boyce so ld jewelry taken from the burglary at Quick Cash Pawn, Inc., in Greendale, Indiana. Inve stigators later asked Mrs. Parsons to go to a pawnshop in Indiana to look at some property ; Mrs. Parsons identified three or four items as hers. Boyce was convicted of the burgla ry of the Parsons’ home and sentenced to prison. {¶ 8} While incarcerated, Boyce met and befriended Chris Burkhart. B urkhart testified that Boyce identified himself as “a master thief,” wh o knew how to break into safes and get around alarm systems. Boyce told Burkhart that h e (Boyce) made a lot of money from burglaries, and the two agreed “to go 50/50 on every thing that we did once

we were out.” {¶ 9} Boyce was released from prison on January 27, 2016, and went to stay at a Volunteers of America halfway house. On March 10, Boyce was pl aced on an electronic monitor. Boyce returned to the Volunteers of America facility on March 28, and his monitor was removed. In April 2016, the home of Kristy and Ste ven McCready on Bexley Avenue was burglarized. Boyce entered through a bedroom windowand stole jewelry, silver flatware, and watches. On May 6, Boyce was taken into c ustody for violating certain terms of his release, and he returned to prison, where he remained until the completion of his sentence on July 24, 2016. {¶ 10} Soon after Boyce’s release from prison, Boyce entered the homes of Tamara Compton (July 31-August 1) and of Donna and Steven Field (between August 21-5- and 25), who lived on Roscommon Drive. Jewelry and cash were s tolen. In September 2016, the home of Tracy and Kevi n Cochran on Signal Hill Road w as burglarized; Boyce took a television and jewelry, as well as an SD card with a hom emade personal video. Each of the homes’ occupants was out of town when the burglarie s occurred. {¶ 11} Three burglaries occurred in November 2016: the homes of Ross M cGregor & Cathy Crompton on Burrwood Drive, Nancy McGregor on Signal Hi ll Road, and Joy and David Galluch on Kilkenny Court. Ross McGregor testified t hat the burglar took jewelry, watches, silver flatware, and a .22 caliber gun. Nanc y McGregor (Ross’s aunt) testified that the burglar took many pieces of high-end jewelryvalued over $10,000, a Kruggerand necklace; her husband's coin collection, a family he irloom ring valued at $20,972, and cash. Joy Galluch indicated that a sorority charm , wedding band, engagement ring, and flatware were stolen. Again, the resident s were on vacation when the burglaries occurred; in each case, Boyce entered through a window. {¶ 12} On November 30, 2016, Burkhart was released to a halfway house in Dayton; Burkhart still planned to work with Boyce. Boyce visit ed Burkhart at the halfway house, and Burkhart met with Boyce when he received two weekend passes away from the halfway house, during which Burkhart was not monitored. Bu rkhart testified that Boyce did not have a legitimate job, but he (Burkhart) received a gift from Boyce of $400

and other items. {¶ 13} At the end of the December 2016, the home of Claire Perks was b urglarized

while Perks was on vacation in Alabama. Sometime between Decem ber 30, 2016 and April 2017, while Donna and Richard Dolbeer wintered in Florida , Boyce entered their home on Longford Close through a bedroom window and took jewelry, a coin collection,-6- a camera, and $2,000 in cash; Boyce broke into a safe in a gues t bedroom. {¶ 14} During the weekend of February 3, 2017, while Burkhart had a we ekend pass from the halfway house, Boyce and Burkhart broke into the home of Kay and Jerry Shell on Roscommon together. Burkhart testified that Boyce referred to it as “going to work.” Boyce drove Burkhart to a wooded residential area, park ed by a Kroger, put on gloves and a mask, and walked past a home with a privacy fence, through the golf course, and to the back of the Prestwick Village community. Boyce chec ked the mailboxes of residences along the way. While walking, Boyce pointed out a h ome where he had broken in and opened a safe. {¶ 15} Burkhart and Boyce first removed a floodlight on the Shells’ ho use and then entered the home through a window; Boyce gave Burkhart a laundry basket to stand on so he could get through. Boyce indicated to Burkhart that cert ain jewelry was costume jewelry; it was left behind. Boyce searched another part of th e house while Burkhart searched a bedroom and bathroom. Boyce instructed Burkhart to leave everything as it was so the homeowners would not know that they had been there. {¶ 16} The Shells had a small terrier, and they had a house/dog-sitter staying in the home while they were away. The house-sitter woke during th e early morning of February 4 and noticed things off in the house, including that the dog was in her bedroom, where the dog was not allowed. Burkhart testified that he hear d a dog bark in the house. Burkhart and Boyce left the Shells’ home after Boyce came back to the master bedroom and told Burkhart, “We gotta get out of here.” Burkhart testif ied that Boyce later paid him $400 for his participation in the burglary. {¶ 17} Burkhart was released from the halfway house on February 6, 201 7, and-7- was placed on an electronic ankle monitor. He did not particip ate in any criminal activities with Boyce while monitored. Burkhart testified that Boyce once came to visit him and showed him $20,000 that he (Boyce) had won at a casino. {¶ 18} Shortly before February 8, 2017, the home of Teresa and Donald Miller on Signal Hill Road was burglarized while the Millers were in Flor ida. Prior to leaving, the Millers had placed all of their va luables, including diamond ri ngs and necklaces, silverware, and gold jewelry, in a safe in the front hall close t. The safe was blown out

and all of the valuables taken. {¶ 19} At trial, Donald Miller testified that eight to ten days before he and his wife left for Florida, at around 8:30-9:30 a.m., he had observed fro m his home a black BMW driving very slowly along the private road that comes down the hill from his daughter’s

home and around the fr ont of his home. Miller indicated that t he car sat at the end of the driveway for 10 to 15 minutes; the driver was observing the are a, and the driver looked toward Miller. Miller described the BMW’s presence as “odd,” d ue to the time of day and the typically “very, very mild traffic” on the private drive. On March 7, after the burglary, Miller’s daughter emailed Miller a photo of Boyce. At trial, M iller identified Boyce as the man he had seen driving the BMW in January 2017, prior to the M illers’ trip to Florida. {¶ 20} At approximately 1:21 a.m. on February 17, 2017, the home of Bo b and Meredith Patton on Signal Hill Road was burglarized while they were at their cabin in Michigan. Boyce entered through an upstairs window using a woo den ladder. He activated an interior motion detector, and the Pattons were not ified by ADT, their alarm company. Sheriff’s deputies responded to the home, but did notfind anything amiss. At Bob Patton’s request, a neighbor checked the home again in t he morning and saw a-8- handmade wooden ladder that did not belong there. Upon returni ng, the Pattons discovered that jewelry had been taken. {¶ 21} On February 28, 2017, Springfield Police Officer Derrick Nichol s stopped Boyce’s vehicle for a traffic violation. During the stop, Nich ols’s canine partner, Gary, alerted to the presence of an odor of drugs. A search of Boyce ’s vehicle revealed two bags of marijuana, as well as money, a small bottle with loose diamonds, a metal testing kit, power tools, lawn lights, cellphones, a digital scale, an SD card, and other items. The

SD card was later determined to contain the Cochrans’ homemade personal video. {¶ 22} On March 3, 2017, Springfield Detective Michael Curtis obtained a search warrant for Boyce’s vehicle. Several items identified during t he traffic stop were retrieved from the vehicle, as well as a Garmin GPS unit, rings, a foreig n coin, a fork, earring pieces,

and a watch wristband. Detective Jerald Mitchell extracted inf ormation from the two cellphones and the Garmin device. The Garmin device was found to belong to Peter Freed; Freed testified that the device disappeared in April 201 6. After April 2016, the Garmin included locations associated with Boyce and his associa tes, as well as pawnshops and locations of Buckeye Gold Coin and Jewelry stores , a business that buys precious metals and diamonds. {¶ 23} Detective Fader of the Clark County Sheriff’s Office learned th at the Springfield Police Department had impounded Boyce’s BMW. 2 Detective F ader obt ained

2 Some of the burglarized residences, such as those on Roscommon Drive and in Prestwick Village, were located in the city of Springfield. Ot hers, such as those on Signal Hill Road, Burrwood Street, and Bexley Avenue, were located in Clark County. The Springfield Police Department investigated the burglaries withi n its jurisdiction, and the Clark County Sheriff’s Office investigated those outside of the city. The two departments shared information regarding their investigations.-9- a warrant to install a GPS tracker on Boyce’s BMW. {¶ 24} On March 7, 2017, Detective Jean Byrne, who worked in the prope rty crimes unit of the Columbus Police Department, received a report from a complainant that the complainant’s stolen Apple laptop was pinging at an ad dress on Hidden Acres Court (a townhouse apartment building) in Franklin County. Byr ne learned that one apartment was occupied by Boyce and Alyshia Cook and that a For d Explorer in the lot was registered to Cook. Byrne became aware of the Clark County investigation into Boyce and received access to the GPS device placed on Boyce’s B MW. In addition, Columbus police officers began to conduct physical surveillance of Boyce, including following Boyce to different locations that purchased gold and silver. {¶ 25} On approximately March 22, 2017, Boyce entered the home of Drs. Afshan and Ashfaq Ahmed on Burrwood Drive through a bathroom window; t he Ahmeds were out of town at the time, but Afshan Ahmed’s father-in-law was s taying at the house. Boyce took jewelry, watches, and items from a safe. {¶ 26} On March 31, 2017, a Springfield police officer pulled over a 2 002 Ford Explorer that Boyce was driving, because the plates were regist ered to a different vehicle. Boyce ultimately received a ticket and was allowed to leave. {¶ 27} Detective Byrne testified that she noticed a pattern to Boyce’s activities in the Beechwold neighborhood, where a home recently had been burg larized. She stated that Boyce would drive slowly through the neighborhood in the e vening and then return after 1:00 a.m., park behind a business, and enter the neighbor hood on foot. Boyce typically would leave between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. and return to the Hidden Acres apartment.-10- {¶ 28} In the early hours of April 3, Columbus police officers observe d Boyce as he entered the Beechwold neighborhood; Detective Byrne watched Boyce’s parked BMW as other officers in plain clothes surveilled inside the neighb orhood. After locating a home on West Royal Forest Boulevard inside which a person was w alking with a flashlight, Officers Jason Clark and Adam Hardwick saw Boyce ju mp out of a front window of the home carrying two bags and then run toward his car. Aro und 4:45 a.m., Detective Byrne saw Boyce run to his car, put two bags in the vehicle, an d drive off. Byrne followed in her vehicle and arranged for cruisers to intercept Boyce. H owever, Boyce saw a cruiser coming, sped up, and crashed his car; Boyce ran from th e vehicle toward his apartment. Byrne instructed the other officers to allow Boyce to return home. Byrne obtained an arrest warrant for Boyce and a search warrant for h is apartment. {¶ 29} Columbus officers executed the search warrant that day (April 3 ). Detective Byrne contacted Detective Fader, who came to the scen e and photographed potential stolen items. The Apple laptop reported by the Colum bus complainant was found almost immediately; officers also found an extensive coll ection of silverware, jewelry, coins, correspondence, stamps, and other items. The p roperty was collected and taken to the Columbus Police Department’s property room. Boyce was arrested for the April 3 burglary. The following day, Detective Byrne obtai ned a search warrant for the crashed BMW and recovered items stolen on April 3. {¶ 30} Boyce was released on bond, and Columbus police officers contin ued to watch Boyce’s movements. Boyce first drove a red Pontiac and l ater a silver Chrysler 300. According to Detective Byrne, Boyce resumed his prior beh avior, and in June, the Columbus police obtained a warrant to place a GPS tracker on Bo yce’s silver Chrysler-11- 300. {¶ 31} Burkhart’s electronic monitoring ended on May 25, 2017, and he resumed crimes with Boyce in Springfield/Clark County. Burkhart testif ied that they usually parked by a Tim Horton’s and ended up behind the Prestwick Village com munity. They checked mailboxes and garages as they went to check if mail were piling up and if people were home. Some nights they did not break into any houses. Burkhar t testified that Boyce pointed out a house where he (Boyce) had stolen a pair of diamo nd earrings worth $10,000, as well as other homes that he (Boyce) had burglarized

. {¶ 32} In late May, the home of John Koehler, who resided in a nursing home, was burglarized. The stolen items included a wedding band, an enga gement ring, jewelry with stones representing children and grandchildren, guns, and silver coins and bars. {¶ 33} In June 2017, Boyce and Burkhart burglarized several condominiu ms in the Prestwick Village community. B urkhart described one burglary w here he needed to use a bench to look in a window. He stated that, at another home ( the Haemmerles’), they unplugged the Christmas tree lights, entered through a window, and took jewelry and two guns. Burkhart stated that he wanted to take a BOSE stereo, bu t Boyce told him to put it back because it would be too noticeable; Boyce reset the clo ck on the stereo before leaving. {¶ 34} Burkhart described another burglary (the Timmons’s home) where they moved patio furniture, and Boyce used a screwdriver to open a w indow. Burkhart stated that they found a vase full of coins and, in a bedroom armoire, a sterling silver set and jewelry. They carried the items in a pillowcase. Upon leaving , Boyce put the patio furniture back into place.-12- {¶ 35} In the early morning hours of June 21, Boyce and Burkhart retur ned to Prestwick Village. Detective Brian Peabody of the Springfield Police Department, who had access to the GPS data on Boyce’s Chrysler 300, coordinated with the Clark County Sheriff’s Office to watch for Boyce. Officers saw two men walk ing in the neighborhood, but the officers could not confirm that a burglary occurred. B urkhart testified that when he and Boyce saw headlights, they ran back to their car. After the two entered the Chrysler, Detective Peabody pulled in front of it to stop it. However, Boyce put the car

in reverse and fled. {¶ 36} Burkhart testified that Boyce’s car “sputtered and died” in a n earby alley. Boyce and Burkhart grabbed their identification, and Boyce grab bed his phone and some items from the trunk, the license plates from the vehicle, the screwdriver, and gloves. The two ran from the vehicle. Burkhart stated that Boyce tripp ed and dropped his phone, and ultimately left without it. The two ended up hiding for se veral hours. Officers searched for Boyce and his accomplice, but did not locate them. {¶ 37} On the night of July 6-7, Boyce visited with Kayla Carter and l eft Carter’s residence at 12:49 a.m. Sometime later, Boyce and Burkhart ent ered the home of Joan and Peter Geil through a window on the back porch. They took s ilver flatware, jewelry, cash, and silver coins from a safe in the basement. Boyce and Burkhart wiped their footprints from the back porch before they left. Boyce returne d to Carter’s apartment while she was still in bed. After waking, Carter noticed a bag that had not previously been in her apartment. That afternoon, United States Marshals arrested Boyce at Carter’s home on an arrest warrant, and officers collected nume rous items from the apartment. The Geils identified most of the items collected fr om Carter’s residence as-13- theirs. {¶ 38} The State presented extensive evidence that Boyce kept stolen i tems at multiple residences, including his and Alysia Cook’s Columbus r esidence on Hidden Acres, his sister’s apartment in Columbus, and the apartment of Chelsea Quisenberry in Springfield. Burkhart testified that he had met Cook at the ap artment in Columbus and had met Quiana Boyce, Boyce’s sister, at her home. Burkhart re membered Boyce’s having stolen diamonds at his sister’s house. In addition, wit nesses testified that Boyce tested the stolen diamonds (to determine if they were real) and gold items (to determine carat) and dismantled jewelry p rior to selling the items. Both Burkhart and Victoria Nored testified that they had observed Boyce break jewelry apart; Bur khart stated that he saw Boyce separate diamonds from gold or silver with pliers. {¶ 39} There was substantial evidence that Boyce had other individuals sell stolen items at pawn shops or stores that purchased gold and silver. Kyle Smith, Shaqueeta Terrell, Quiana Boyce, and Kenia Lacey sold numerous items at v arious Buckeye Gold Coin and Jewelry locations. On seven different occasions, Terr ell, Lacey, Quiana Boyce, Nored, or Cook sold items at A llen’s Coin Shop in Westerville. At trial, Nored described the two times that Boyce drove her to Allen’s Coin Shop (May 31 , 2017 and June 19, 2017) to sell items for him; she stated that Boyce paid her $50 each time for her efforts. Burkhart also testified that Boyce said that he (Boyce) would d rive someone to various jewelry stores in Columbus to sell the items he stole. Burkhart stated that he once went with Boyce and Kyle to a jewelry store, where Kyle sold the ite ms and gave the receipt and $900 or $1,000 to Boyce; Boyce paid Kyle about $40 for sell ing the items for him. Burkhart once sold a Ziploc bag of small diamonds for Boyce at the jewelry store near-14- Burkhart’s home. {¶ 40} In 2017, many of the burglary victims were invited to look at p roperty that had been recovered during the Springfield/Clark County and Colu mbus investigations. Mrs. Parsons found a locket of hers containing her and her sist er’s baby photos and family correspondence that had belonged to her father; the locket and correspondenc e had been missing since the 2008 burglary. Many of the complainants from the 18 burglaries in 2016 and 2017 identified something that had been stolen from th eir homes. Some complainants were able to identify their property as property s old by Boyce’s associates to a pawn shop or a store that bought precious metals. {¶ 41} In December 2017, Prestwick Village residents Jim and Judy Roed iger received an email from Kay Shell in which Shell asked if anyone could identify a fraternity pin that the police had recovered. The Roedigers recognized th e pin as belonging to Mr. Roediger. At that juncture, the Roedigers realized that their home had previously been burglarized and that additional items, including silver dollars and jewelry, were missing. {¶ 42} In June 2017, Boyce was originally charged with 19 counts: one count of engaging in pattern of corrupt activity and numerous counts of burglary and receiving stolen property. See Clark C.P. No. 2017-CR-365A. The State charged Boyce with two additional counts of burglary and one additional count of recei ving stolen property in August 2017. See Clark C.P. No. 2017-CR-510. {¶ 43} In November 2017, as part of Case No. 2017-CR-365A, Boyce filed three motions to suppress evidence against him. The first motion to suppress challenged the lawfulness of the February 28, 2017 stop and search of his BMW, the March 2 search of the BMW pursuant to a search warrant, the March 3 search of thr ee cellphones and the-15- Garmin GPS device found in the vehicle, and sought to suppress any statements he made. The second motion sought to suppress any evidence obtain ed as a result of the April 5, 2017 search of the BMW, pursuant to a search warrant. The third motion sought to suppress the evidence seized from the execution of the April 3, 2017 search warrant at Alysia Cook’s residence on Hidden Acres Court in Columbus. {¶ 44} On December 4, 2017, Boyce was indicted in this case, Case No. 2017-CR761A, on fourteen counts of burglary as third-degree felonies; one count of burglary as a second-degree felony; six counts of receiving stolen property, three of which were fifthdegree felonies and three of which were misdemeanors of the fir st degree; and one count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, a first-degree fe lony. 3 The indictment also sought the forfeiture of three vehicles owned by Boyce. {¶ 45} Soon thereafter, the State filed a notice, pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B), that it intended to present evidence at trial regarding the facts under lying Boyce’s prior conviction for burglary in Case No. 2008-CR-612 (the Parsons bu rglary), which was listed as one of the predicate acts for the engaging in corrupt activi ty charge. {¶ 46} On December 19, 2017, the court ordered that the filings in the two prior cases to be incorporated into Clark C.P. No. 2017-CR-761A, and that the two prior cases

be dismissed. {¶ 47} In January 2018, in Case No. 2018-CR-55, the State charged Boyc e with three additional counts of burglary, one of which was a second- degree felony and two of

3 The indictment also included three additional charges of recei ving stolen property by co-defendants Kenia Lacey, Shaqueeta Terrell, and Quiana Boyce (Counts 17-19). Those co-defendants, as well as Alyshia Cook, were named with B oyce in Count 25, alleging engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity.-16- which were third-degree felonies. The trial court subsequentlyconsolidated Case No.

2018-CR-55 into Case No. 2017-CR-761A. {¶ 48} As a result of the various consolidations, Boyce faced 25 count s in this case: one count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity; 18 coun ts of burglary; and six counts of receiving stolen property. The charges are reflected in the following table.

Count Charge Statute Degree Complainant 4 1 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) F3 McCready 2 Receiving Stolen Property R.C. 2913.51(A) F5 McCready 3 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) F3 Compton 4 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) F3 Field 5 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) F3 Cochran 6 Receiving Stolen Property R.C. 2913.51(A) M1 Cochran 7 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) F3 R. McGregor 8 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) F3 N. McGregor 9 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) F3 Perks 10 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) F3 Dolbeer 11 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) F3 Miller 12 Receiving Stolen Property R.C. 2913.51(A) M1 Miller 13 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) F3 Patton 14 Receiving Stolen Property R.C. 2913.51(A) M1 Patton 15 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(1) F2 Ahmed 16 Receiving Stolen Property R.C. 2913.51(A) F5 Ahmed 20 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) F3 Koehler 21 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) F3 Haemmerle 22 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) F3 Timmons 23 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) F3 Geil 24 Receiving Stolen Property R.C. 2913.51(A) F5 Geil

25 Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) F1 N/A 26 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) F3 Galluch

4 The complainants were identified on the verdict forms, not in the indictment.-17- 27 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(1) F2 Shell 28 Burglary R.C. 2911.12(A)(3) F3 Roediger

{¶ 49} On January 8, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on Boyce’s m otions to suppress. The State presented the testimony of Officer Derrick Nichols regarding the February 28, 2017 traffic stop and the testimony of Detective J ean Byrne regarding search warrants obtained in Franklin County, along with eight e xhibits. Boyce testified on his own behalf. On January 24, 2019, the trial court overru led the motions, concluding that Officer Nichols lawfully stopped Boyce’s vehicle for the t raffic offense he witnessed, that the officer “was diligent in his investigation in the cour se of the lawful traffic stop,” that the dog sniff did not constitute a search, and that the do g’s alert provided probable cause to search Boyce’s vehicle. The court further found that the issuing judges had a substantial basis for concluding that the affidavits accompanyi ng the five search warrants at issue contained sufficient indicia of probable cause to sati sfy the Fourth Amendment. 5 {¶ 50} In March 2018, Boyce expressed to the trial court that he wishe d to fire his attorney and proceed pro se. After a hearing on the matter, th e trial court granted Boyce’s motion and Boyce signed a written waiver of counsel. B oyce’s prior defense counsel was appointed as stand-by counsel. {¶ 51} On April 19, 2018, at a pretrial conference, the court addresse d, among

5 The State also raised that Boyce had previously challenged the traffic stop in the Clark County Municipal Court (Clark M.C. Nos. 17-CRB-782 and 17-TR-24 62). The trial court decided against applying res judicata to the municipal court’s decision, because (1) Boyce, at that time, believed he was only defending himself aga inst traffic and misdemeanor offenses and therefore may not have thoroughly deve loped all issues potentially related to more serious offenses, and (2) Boyce had represented himself in the municipal court, but was represented by counsel in the common p leas court.-18- other matters, the State’s request to use Evid.R. 404(B) eviden ce at trial. The court concluded that the evidence was admissible for the limited purp oses presented by the State to show intent, identity, preparation, and plan. The tri al court further concluded that “the prejudicial effect upon the defendant is negligible s ince said conviction is listed as a predicate act under the engaging in a pattern of corrupt a ctivity offense and therefore it would have lawfully been presented and admitted irrespective of the 404(B) issue.” {¶ 52} The matter proceeded to a lengthy jury trial beginning on April 23, 2018. Boyce offered several witnesses and testified on his own behalf . Stated generally, he denied that he participated in any of the burglaries in 2016 an d 2017, and he asserted that his alleged accomplices sold only items that lawfully belo nged to them. Boyce claimed that the complainants were mistaken when they identifie d property as theirs. {¶ 53} After deliberations, the jury convicted Boyce of all counts, wi th the exception that one burglary charge (Count 15) was reduced from a second-d egree felony to a thirddegree felony. The jury found that all 15 of the alleged predi cate acts for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity were proven beyond a reasonable dou bt and that the three identified vehicles were subject to forfeiture to the State. {¶ 54} The court subsequently sentenced Boyce as follows: OFFENSE COUNT(S) DEGREE SENTENCE Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity 25 F1 11 years Burglary 27 F2 8 years Burglary 1, 3-5, 7-11, 13, 15, 20-23, 26, 28 F3 3 years Receiving Stolen Property 2, 16, (19 6 ), 24 F5 1 year

6 The trial court, orally and in its judgment, imposed a one-yea r sentence on Count 19,-19- Receiving Stolen Property 6, 12, 14 M1 6 months

The trial court ordered the sentences for burglary and engaging in a pattern of corrupt of activity to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of 70 years in prison. The trial court ordered that the sentences for felony receiving sto len property be served consecutively to each other, but that all of the sentences for receiving stolen property (felony and misdemeanor) be served concurrently with the senten ces for burglary and engaging in a pattern of corrupt of activity. The court notifi ed Boyce that five years of post-release control was mandatory in this case. {¶ 55} The trial court ordered Boyce to pay restitution of $3,049.94, to be satisfied from the money that had been seized from Boyce. The court furt her ordered that Boyce’s

three vehicles be forfeited to the State for law enforcement us e. {¶ 56} Boyce appeals, raising four assi gnments of error. We will addr ess them in a manner that facilitates our analysis. II. Motion to Suppress {¶ 57} In his third assignment of error, Boyce claims that the trial c ourt erred in denying the motion to suppress that challenged the warrantless search of his vehicle. Boyce argues that the police officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop by conducting

which concerned one of Boyce’s co-defendants, Quiana Boyce, onl y. The court ordered the sentences for felony receiving stolen property to be served consecutively, for a total of four years. On May 29, 2018, in an effort to correct the er ror, the trial court filed an amended judgment, striking the one-year sentence on Count 19 an d amending the first full paragraph on page five to read, “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED tha t all felony receiving stolen property offenses (Counts 2, 16, and 24) run consecutively to one another for a total of three (3) years OSP.” (Emphasis sic.) We will discus s the effect of the trial court’s amended judgment in our discussion of Boyce’s sentence below.-20- a free air sniff with the officer’s canine partner. Boyce had also challenged the validity of several search warrants in the trial court, but he does not claim on appeal that the trial court erred in overruling his motions to suppress as it related to the search warrants. {¶ 58} In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court “assumes the role of the trier of fact, and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.” State v. Retherford , 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 592, 639 N.E.2d 498 (2d Dist.1994); State v. Knisley, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22897, 2010-Ohio116, ¶ 30. Accordingly, when we review suppression decisions, we must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, cr edible evidence. Retherford at 592. “Accepting those facts as true, we must independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court’s conclusion, whether they meet the applicable legal standard.” Id

. {¶ 59} Springfield Police Officer Derrick Nichols testified on the beh alf of the

State. 7 According to his testimony, Officer Nichols had been an offic er with the Springfield Police Department for 11 years and had been a canin e officer for four years. Nichols’s canine partner was named Gary. Gary had three weeks of skills training, learning tracking, drug smells, and the like. Both Nichols and Gary went through specialized training with a master trainer in Fremont, Ohio, an d were certified through the State of Ohio and nationally. The two had continuing training together. {¶ 60} Shortly before 7:30 p.m. on February 28, 2017, Officer Nichols and Gary

7 The State also called Detective Jean Byrne of the Columbus Div ision of Police, who testified regarding search warrants and an arrest warrant for B oyce that were obtained in Franklin County. The detective’s testimony and the accompanyin g exhibits are not relevant to the issue before us.-21- were in a marked cruiser on East Pleasant Street at the interse ction with South Limestone Street in Clark County. Nichols testified that he was stopped at a red light behind a black BMW in the turn lane to go south on South Limestone. When the light turned green, the BMW proceeded straight through the intersection. Officer Nicho ls got behind the BMW and ran the license plate. The plate came back to Boyce. Nich ols was aware that Boyce was a suspect in some thefts and burglaries in Clark Coun ty. {¶ 61} At 7:32 p.m., Officer Nichols initiated a traffic stop for the lane violation. Nichols testified that he walked up to the BMW and recognized B oyce as the driver; Nichols also identified Boyce as the driver at the suppression hearing. There were no passengers. The officer talked with Boyce and obtained Boyce’s driver’s license and

insurance card. {¶ 62} Nichols returned to his cruiser and relayed Boyce’s information to dispatch. The dispatch log indicated that Boyce’s birthdate and Social Se curity number were provided or entered at 7:35 p.m. A minute later, dispatch indi cated that Boyce did not have any warrants, was a career criminal for aggravated robbery , and had a valid license. {¶ 63} About that time, Officer Freeman arrived, and Officer Nichols n otified dispatch that he was going to “run the dog around the car.” Th e officers had Boyce exit his vehicle, and Officer Nichols patted him down. Officer Free man stood with Boyce at the sidewalk while Officer Nichols got Gary from his cruiser. {¶ 64} Officer Nichols proceeded to walk Gary around the BMW, beginnin g at the rear passenger side of the vehicle, then along the passenger si de and around the front. Officer Nichols testified that Gary stopped at the driver’s win dow, hopped up and put his head inside briefly, and then sat down. Officer Nichols contin ued down the car, and Gary-22- “started positively indicating by pawing or scratching at the d river’s door.” Nichols testified that six minutes elapsed between the stop of the BMW and the positive indication by Gary. He stated that a typical traffic stop takes approxima tely 14 minutes. {¶ 65} Following Gary’s positive alert, Officers Freeman and Nichols s earched Boyce’s vehicle. They located scales and approximately 53 gram s of marijuana in the trunk of the vehicle. At 7:47 p.m., Officer Nichols indicated to dispatch that he had an individual in custody. Nichols stated that he arrested Boyce f or possession of and trafficking in marijuana. {¶ 66} Boyce testified on his own behalf. Boyce acknowledged that he was driving alone in his BMW on February 28, 2017, when he was stop ped by the police. Boyce stated that, when he was taken out of his vehicle, the of ficer “forced me to stand on the side of the sidewalk.” He was not handcuffed, but an of ficer was standing there with him. Boyce testified that 15 to 20 minutes elapsed betwee n the stop and when the dog approached his vehicle. {¶ 67} Boyce saw an officer begin to walk his canine around the passen ger side of Boyce’s vehicle, and Boyce moved around so that he could watch what was happening. Boyce claimed he did not see the dog go near the driver’s door of the vehicle or alert. Boyce testified that, when Officer Nichols was standing by the driver’s side headlight, Officer Nichols said that the dog had alerted. Boyce said that he never saw the dog near the driver’s door, nor did he see the dog scratch or paw at his car. On redirect examination, Boyce asserted that the dog acted differently duri ng another traffic stop on a later date. On re-cross examination, however, Boyce agreed t hat he was pulled over around that same time period by a different canine officer, Off icer Kevin Hoying; Boyce-23- did not know if Officer Hoying had the same dog. {¶ 68} After Officer Nichols indicated that his dog had alerted, Offic er Freeman told Boyce that the officers could search his vehicle. Boyce acknow ledged that the officers found marijuana during the search of his car. He also stated t hat he owned the cellphones, SD card, digital scale, jewelry, precious metals te sting kit, masks, sander, bag of small bottles, gold light box, and landscaping lights th at also were in the vehicle. Boyce stated that he was handcuffed after the search was comple ted. {¶ 69} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects

individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Under Terry , police officers may briefly stop and/or temporarily detain individuals in order to investigate possible criminal activity if the officers have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, including a

minor traffic violation. Id .; State v. Mays , 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 7-8. We determine the existence of reasonable s uspicion by evaluating the totality of the circumstances, considering those circumstan ces “through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they

unfold.” State v. Heard , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19323, 2003-Ohio-1047, ¶ 14, quoting

State v. Andrews , 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991). {¶ 70} Boyce does not claim that the initial stop of his vehicle was u nlawful. Nevertheless, the trial court found, and we agree, that Officer Nichols’s observation of Boyce’s driving straight through an intersection from a marked turn lane provided reasonable suspicion that Boyce had committed a traffic violati on, thus justifying the officer’s stop of the BMW.-24- {¶ 71} Law enforcement officers may detain the driver and any passenge rs only for the time necessary to complete the reason for the stop. Kettering v. Maston , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27567, 2018-Ohio-1948, ¶ 17. When a law enforce ment officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, the officer may detain the m otorist for a period of time sufficient to issue the motorist a citation and perform routine procedures, such as a computer check on the motorist’s driver’s license, registration and vehicle plates. Id ; State v. Thomas , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22833, 2009-Ohio-3520, ¶ 14, citing State v. Pryor , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20800, 2005-Ohio-2770, ¶ 15.

{¶ 72} “[A] police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against un reasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to compl ete th[e] mission’ of issuing

a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). Rodriguez made clear “that an officer may not prolong a traffic stop to perform a drug sniff even if the ‘overall duration of the st op remains reasonable in relation to the duration of other stops involving similar circu mstances.’ ” State v. Hall , 2017-Ohio-2682, 90 N.E.3d 276, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.), quoting Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at 357. {¶ 73} A police officer need not have a reasonable suspicion that a ve hicle contains contraband prior to summoning a canine drug unit or co nducting a canine free

air sniff. Thomas at ¶ 15. Furthermore, the use of a trained narcotics dog to s niff an

automobile does not constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amen dment. State v. Raslovksy , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2019-CA-55, 2020-Ohio-515, ¶ 14, citing Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). If a trai ned canine alerts to the-25- odor of drugs from a lawfully stopped and detained vehicle, an officer has probable cause

to search the vehicle for contraband. 8 Id ., citing Florida v. Harri s, 568 U.S. 237, 250, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 185 L.Ed.2d 61 (2013). {¶ 74} In this case, Boyce emphasizes that he was stopped by a canine officer, whose canine partner was in the cruiser. Boyce argues that Off icer Nichols should have been working on the traffic citation instead of walking his dog around Boyce’s vehicle and that the officer’s decision to walk his canine partner around B oyce’s vehicle unlawfully prolonged the stop. {¶ 75} We find Boyce’s circumstances to be similar to those in Maston , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27567, 2018-Ohio-1948. In that case, the vehicl e in which Maston was a passenger was stopped by Officer Maloney, a canine officer, d ue to a traffic violation. Upon stopping the vehicle, Maloney approached the vehicle and r ecognized the couple,

who had been involved in several domestic incidents that had re sulted in the arrest of Maston. The officer asked if he could search the vehicle, but he did not get a clear response. Officer Maloney called for back-up and then proceede d to look into the couple’s “criminal history” and “call history” on Justice Web a nd to begin writing a traffic ticket. Another officer, Officer Anderson, arrived seven minut es after the stop began,

8 We recognize that the passage of Ohio’s hemp legalization law and the legalization of medical marijuana in Ohio complicates whether an alert by a dog trained to detect marijuana provides probable cause to search a vehicle. However , neither the motion to suppress nor any argument at the suppression hearing raised whe ther Gary’s alert was sufficient to establish probable cause to search Boyce’s vehicl e. Accordingly, the issue is waived. See, e.g., State v. Matthews , 2d Dist. Miami No. 2014-CA-23, 2015-Ohio1750, ¶ 29 (defendant waived any argument regarding the dog’s o r handler’s qualifications for purposes of appeal by failing to raise these issues in his motion to suppress and failing to object at the suppression hearing to th e officer’s testimony about the use of the dog to establish probable cause to search the ve hicle).-26- while Office Maloney was still in the process of writing the tr affic ticket. At that juncture, the occupants were removed from the vehicle, and Officer Malone y walked his canine partner, Jax, around the vehicle. Jax alerted to the presence of illegal drugs. The officers subsequently searched the vehicle and located marijuan a and Xanax. {¶ 76} On review, we held that the traffic stop had not been unlawfull y prolonged by the search of the vehicle. We reasoned that “Officer Malone y’s testimony at the suppression hearing demonstrated that, as required by Rodriguez , he diligently performed the tasks necessary to complete the traffic stop unti l Officer Anderson arrived, at which time he conducted the free-air sniff by Jax.” Id . at ¶ 20. And, once Jax alerted on the vehicle, indicating the presence of illegal drugs, the o fficers had probable cause to

search the vehicle. Id

. {¶ 77} According to Officer Nichols’s testimony, which the trial court believed, Officer Nichols stopped Boyce’s vehicle at 7:32 p.m. and obtain ed Boyce’s driver’s license

and insurance card. The officer then returned to his cruiser a nd provided Boyce’s information to dispatch; Boyce’s birthdate and Social Security number were provided or entered into the dispatch log at 7:35 p.m. About a minute late r, another officer arrived, and dispatch also responded with information about Boyce. Afte r Officer Freeman’s arrival, Boyce was removed from his vehicle, and Officer Nichol s proceeded to walk Gary around Boyce’s BMW. {¶ 78} As with Maston , Officer Nichols diligently conduc ted the traffic investigatio n up to the time when the officers removed Boyce from his vehicle and Officer Nichols walked his canine partner around Boyce’s BMW. Officer Nichols spent the first four minutes performing the standard background investigation into B oyce through dispatch.-27- Officer Freeman arrived while Officer Nichols was conducting th at standard background investigation, and Officer Nichols proceeded with the free air dog sniff upon Officer Freeman’s arrival. Gary alerted to drugs six minutes after the stop began, and his alert provided probable cause for the officers’ search of the BMW. T he traffic stop of Boyce’s BMW was not unreasonably prolonged by Officer Nichols’s conduct ing a free air sniff by his canine partner. {¶ 79} Boyce’s third assignment of error is overruled. III. Admission of Boyce’s Prior 2008 Burglary Conviction {¶ 80} In his first assignment of error, Boyce claims that the “trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce evidence about specific facts regarding Mr. Boyce’s prior burglary conviction.” His second assignment of error claims th at the trial court erred when it failed to provide a limiting instruction about his prio r burglary conviction (the Parsons burglary), either prior to testimony concerning the cir cumstances giving rise to his prior burglary conviction or in its jury instructions at th e conclusion of the testimony. Boyce did not request a limiting instruction at trial prior to testimony about his burglary of

the Parsons’ home. {¶ 81} According to the parties’ stipulation, filed prior to trial, Bo yce was convicted in Case No. 2008-CR-612 of a burglary that occurred at the Pars ons’ residence on North Limestone Street in Springfield. In that case, mail addressed to the Parsons and their neighbors was collected in a wooded area approximately 250 feet south of the main driveway of the Parsons’ home. Boyce’s fingerprints were found on the mail. On June 4, 2008, Boyce sold jewelry taken from the burglary at Quick Ca sh Pawn, Inc., in Greendale, Indiana.-28- {¶ 82} Count 25 of the indictment filed in this case (Case No. 2017-CR -761A) alleged that Boyce and others engaged in a pattern of corrupt a ctivity. The charge alleged numerous predicate acts: 19 of the other counts alleged in the indictment, Boyce’s prior conviction in Case No. 2005-CR-1114 for receiving stolen property, Boyce’s prior conviction in Case No. 2008-CR-363 for receiving stolen propert y, Boyce’s prior convictions for burglary and receiving stolen property in Case No. 2008-CR-612, the April 3, 2017 burglary/receiving stolen property in Franklin County, and several other instances of receiving stolen property by Boyce and his accomplices in Fr anklin County in 2016 and

2017. {¶ 83} In December 2017, the State filed a notice, pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B), that it intended to introduce evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or a cts by Boyce at trial, specifically evidence regarding Boyce’s prior conviction for bu rglary in Case No. 2008- CR-612. The State noted that the conviction was an underlying predicate act for the count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. The State further stated: * * * In addition to the existence of the conviction, the State intends to present limited factual evidence from the charge set forth in c ase number 08-CR-612. Specifically, in the 08-CR-612 case, prior to burgl arizing the residence * * *, the Defendant took mail from the mailbox of th at residence in an attempt to determine whether the inhabitants of the resid ence were home. He dropped this mail in the woods near the house then br oke into the house and stole jewelry and other items. The Defendant’s f ingerprints were found on the mail recovered from the woods. [The Parsons residence] is within a mile of several of the houses burglarize d in the current-29- cases. These houses were burglarized under similar conditions to the Defendant’s prior conviction in 08-CR-612. Furthermore, in the case at hand, an invoice taken from the mailbox located [on] Burwood Dr ive was found in the woods during the burglary investigation of [the] r esidence located [on] Roscommon Drive. [Another property on] Burwood Dr ive was then later burglarized and is included in this indictment. Fin ally, a locket with family pictures was taken during the burglary of [the Pars ons residence] in case number 08-CR-612. That locket was recovered during the April 3, 2017 search warrant of the Defendant’s apartment in Columbus du ring this current investigation. The State argued that limited factual evidence related to Case No. 2008-CR-612 was relevant to demonstrate the planning and preparation that Boyce engaged in and that Boyce utilized the same scheme or plan in the current case as h e did in Case No. 2008-

CR-612. {¶ 84} The State’s Evid.R. 404(B) notice was discussed in a pretrial c onference on April 19, 2018. Boyce, representing himself, argued that Case No. 2008-CR-612 was dissimilar from the current charges, including that no mail was discovered on the ground in the current cases and his fingerprints were not present. Th e State responded that Case No. 2008-CR-612 was a predicate act, and the facts of that prior case demonstrated that Boyce was part of a criminal enterprise. The prosecutor c larified that the evidence would show that Boyce had “established houses or places that he can hold this property for long periods of time.” The prosecutor noted that Boyce had gone to prison for eight years, and yet the 2017 search warrant at his apartment yielded evidence fr om the 2008-30- burglaries. {¶ 85} The prosecutor further argued that Boyce had “a very specific M O. That MO includes scouting houses. * * * One of the methods he used w as to go through

mailboxes.” The State thus asserted that the 2008-CR-612 convi ction was “directly on point to show his common plan or scheme with how he scouts and that put him in the current case.” The prosecutor further argued that the evidence was admissible to show that Boyce had learned from his mistakes: he more recently wore gloves and masks. {¶ 86} The trial court orally ruled that evidence regarding Boyce’s co nviction in Case No. 2008-CR-612 was “admissible for those limited purposes under 404(B).” The court further stated: “More significantly, evidence of this pri or conviction is going to come in anyways because it’s listed as one of the predicate acts so any incremental prejudice

is nullified in the Court’s view * * *.” {¶ 87} The same day (April 19), the trial court filed a written entry memorializing the issues addressed at the April 19 pretrial conference. As t o the Evid.R. 404(B) issue,

the court summarized the matter as follows: The parties argued orally with respect to the written Evidentia ry Rule 404(B) Notice the State had filed. The Court ruled that the 404(B) ev idence the State intends to present by way of a prior conviction is admiss ible. Said evidence is relevant to show intent, identity, preparation, and plan, and the prejudicial effect upon the defendant is negligible since said conviction is listed as a predicate act under the engaging in a pattern of co rrupt activity offense and therefore it would have lawfully been presented and admitted irrespective of the 404(B) issue.-31- {¶ 88} Boyce and the State filed the stipulation regarding the basic u nderlying facts of Case No. 2008-CR-612 on April 20, 2019. {¶ 89} On the second day of trial, the State presented testimony from three witnesses regarding Case No. 2008-CR-612. Melissa Tuttle, the Clark County Clerk of Courts, testified that State’s Exhibits 124 and 124A were certi fied copies of Boyce’s convictions for two different counts (burglary, a third-degree felony, and receiving stolen property, a fifth-degree felony) in that case. Tuttle also tes tified that State’s Exhibit 124B was a certified copy of the warrant on the indictment in Case N o. 2008-CR-612, which showed Boyce’s birthdate and Social Security number. Chris Kin sler, a former Clark County prosecutor, identified Boyce as the defendant in Case No . 2008-CR-612, and

stated that Mr. and Mrs. Parsons were the victims in that case. {¶ 90} Jade Parsons described her home and stated that it was broken i nto in late May 2008, while she and her husband were out of town. She test ified that she found her home “ransacked” when she returned; the lines to her telephone, cable, and alarm system had been cut. Mrs. Parsons testified that jewelry was taken fr om upstairs and that the safe in her basement had been pried and drilled open with the P arsons’ tools; the safe had contained some gold coins, cash, guns, and jewelry. Mrs. P arsons stated that a shoebox with old letters belonging to her late father was also missing. Mrs. Parsons testified that she went to a pawnshop in Indiana at the request of investigators and identified three or four pieces that belonged to her. In 2017, she was invited to look at property that was recovered as part of a current investigation; Mrs. Parsons testified that

she saw letters to her father and other relatives and a locket that belonged to her. Mrs. Parsons’s testimony consisted of 37 pages of transcript.-32- {¶ 91} During closing argument, the prosecutor summarized the course o f Boyce’s numerous offenses, the connection of Boyce’s activities to thos e of his accomplices who stored and/or sold stolen items, and the course of the various law enforcement investigations into Boyce’s and his accomplices’ activities. T he prosecutor began with the Parsons’ burglary, describing how the 2008 burglary occurre d and how Boyce later adjusted his procedures to avoid leaving the kind of evidence t hat led to his conviction for that burglary, i.e., using gloves and having others sell the st olen goods. The prosecutor also stated that “the other reason the Parsons burglary is impo rtant is it shows the warehouse element.” The prosecutor reminded the jury that, in 2017, Jade Parsons identified old family letters and a locket with her photo; thos e items had been found in Boyce’s Columbus apartment during the April 3, 2017 execution o f the search warrant. The prosecution’s closing argument consisted of 114 pages of tr anscript, of which the discussion of the Parsons burglary took six pages. {¶ 92} After closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury. As to prior bad acts, the court stated, without objection from Boyce: * * * Sometimes evidence is admissible for only a limited purp ose. In these situations, Evidentiary Rule 105 requires the Court to restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. The law and fundamental fairness prohibit you from drawing an inference that other bad acts and/or crimes alleged to have bee n committed by the defendant make it more likely that he committed the offe nses for

which he is on trial. Accordingly, evidence that the defendant committed bad acts an d/or-33- crimes other than those charged in the indictment is typically not admissible. There are, however, some exceptions to this rule of law. One exception, which applies in this case, arises when the defendant is charged with engaging in a pattern of corrupt acti vity, requiring the State to prove a pattern of bad acts and/or crimes, some of which may

be criminal convictions. To that end, the State has presented evidence in this case tha t the defendant was previously convicted of burglary and receiving st olen property. Another exception to this rule of law arises when th e defendant takes the witness stand in his own defense giving the State the opportunity to impeach with prior convictions. If you find that the State has failed to prove these other bad acts and/or crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, you’re to disregard th em and not permit them to influence your deliberations. If you find that the State has proven them beyond a reasonable doubt, you may consider that evidence, but only for the limited purposes of determining whether it proves a pattern of corrupt activity and evaluating the defendant’s credibility as a witness. You may not consider it for purposes of drawing the aforementi oned

forbidden inference. {¶ 93} Upon review of the record, we find no error concerning the tria l court’s handling of Boyce’s conviction in Case No. 2008-CR-612. {¶ 94} Evid.R. 404(B) provides: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not-34- admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” The Ohio Supreme Court has discussed Evid.R. 404, s tating: Evid.R. 404 codifies the common law with respect to evidence o f other acts of wrongdoing. The rule contemplates acts that may o r may not

be similar to the crime at issue. If the other act is offered for some relevant purpose other than to show character and propensity to commit c rime, such as one of the purposes in the listing, the other act may be adm issible. Another consideration permitting the admission of certain other -acts evidence is whether the other acts “form part of the immediate background of the alleged act which forms the foundation of the crime char ged in the indictment” and are “inextricably related” to the crime. (Citations omitted.) State v. Morris , 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 13. {¶ 95} Courts employ a three-step analysis to determine whether to adm it otheracts evidence: The first step is to consider whether the other acts evidence i s relevant to making any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Ev id.R. 401. The next step is to consider whether evidence of the other crim es, wrongs, or acts is presented to prove the character of the accused in o rder to show activity in conformity therewith or whether the other acts evid ence is-35- presented for a legitimate purpose, such as those stated in Evi d.R. 404(B). The third step is to consider whether the probative value of th e other acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair pr ejudice. See

Evid.R 403.

State v. Hare , 2018-Ohio-765, 108 N.E.3d 172, ¶ 42 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Williams , 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 N.E.2d 1278, ¶ 20. {¶ 96} A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence , and its exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal abs ent an abuse of discretion.

State v. Norris , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26147, 2015-Ohio-624, ¶ 14. “A trial court

abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is unreason able, unconscionable, or arbitrary.” State v. Darmond , 135 Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 34. {¶ 97} We find no abuse of discretion here. Most significantly, the S tate had alleged in the indictment that the Case No. 2008-CR-612 burglary was a predicate act for the charge of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. Consi stent with the indictment, the State’s evidence at trial regarding the events underlying C ase No. 2008-CR-612, i.e., the burglary of the Parsons’ home, served to establish a patter n of corrupt activity by Boyce by demonstrating that Boyce’s more recent burglaries in 2 016 and 2017 were an extension of his prior conduct. The State’s evidence revealed commonalities in the methods used to commit the Parsons’ burglary and the recent bur glaries, as well as the improvements in Boyce’s procedures after his release from priso n in 2016. In addition,

the fact that items stolen from the Parsons in 2008 were in his continued possession almost a decade later, along with other recently stolen items, provided additional evidence that Boyce was engaged in an ongoing enterprise that stored sto len items in accomplices’-36- homes and used those and other accomplices to sell certain type s of stolen items. {¶ 98} Consequently, the evidence “was an integral part of the State’s proof of the charge of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, not ‘other acts’ evidence.” State v.

Rich , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27356, 2018-Ohio-1225, ¶ 31. See also State v. Saxton , 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 02CA8029, 02CA8030, 2003-Ohio-3158, ¶ 28, citing State v. Frato , 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 91CA005237, 91CA005238, 1992 WL 227955, * 4 (Sept. 16, 1992) (“When other acts testimony is relevant to prove a pattern of c orrupt activity pursuant to R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), it is not inadmissible under Evid.R. 404(B) .”). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to present evidenc e regarding the Parsons’ burglary at trial. {¶ 99} The trial court also appropriately addressed “prior bad act” ev idence in its jury instructions. The court informed the jury, without object ion from Boyce, that evidence of Boyce’s prior bad acts, including his prior convict ions, could be considered only in limited circumstances: to establish that Boyce was enga ged in a pattern of corrupt activity, as charged, or to impeach Boyce’s credibility as a wi tness. The court further made clear that, if the jury found that the State had failed to prove these other bad acts and/or crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury was to disreg ard them entirely and not

allow them to influence their deliberations. The trial court’s instructions reasonably guided the jury’s consideration of the 2008 burglary of the Par sons home. {¶ 100} Boyce’s first and second assignments of error are overruled. IV. Boyce’s Sentence {¶ 101} In his fourth assignment of error, Boyce claims that his senten ce is clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Boyce argues:-37- It is true that Mr. Boyce has past criminal convictions, and he was convicted of numerous felonies in the instant case. But given that no weapons were involved, the total amount of restitution ordered was just over $3,000, and no individual was physically harmed or threatened w ith physical harm, the minimum sanction necessary to punish Mr. Boyce and pr otect the public is not a 70-year sentence. {¶ 102} In reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts must apply the standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), rather than an abuse of discretion standard. See

State v. Marcum , 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 9. Unde r R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may increase, reduce, or modi fy a sentence, or it may vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing, only if it “cl early and convincingly” finds either (1) that the record does not support certain speci fied findings or (2) that the sentence imposed is contrary to law. State v. Huffman , 2d Dist. Miami No. 2016-CA-16, 2017-Ohio-4097, ¶ 6. {¶ 103} “The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence wit hin the authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to ma ke any findings or give its reasons for imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences.” State v. King , 2013- Ohio-2021, 992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). However, in exerci sing its discretion, a trial court must consider the statutory policies that apply to every felony offense, including

those set out in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. State v. Leopard , 194 Ohio App.3d 500, 2011-Ohio-3864, 957 N.E.2d 55, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Mathis , 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 38. {¶ 104} R.C. 2929.11 requires trial courts to be guided by the overridi ng purposes-38- of felony sentencing. Those purposes are “to protect the publi c from future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determi nes accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or loc al government resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). The court must “consider the nee d for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public , or both.” Id . R.C. 2929.11(B) further provides that “[a] sentence imposed for a fe lony shall be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony s entencing * * *, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the o ffender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences impos ed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.” {¶ 105} R.C. 2929.12(B) sets forth nine factors indicating that an offe nder’s

conduct is more serious than c onduct normally constituting the offense; R.C. 2929.12(C) sets forth four factors indicating that an offender’s conduct i s less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense. R.C. 2929.12(D) and (E) eac h lists five factors that trial courts are to consider regarding the offender’s likelihoo d of committing future crimes. Finally, R.C. 2929.12(F) requires the sentencing court to consi der the offender’s military service record, if any. {¶ 106} In general, it is presumed that prison terms will be served con currently. R.C. 2929.41(A); State v. Bonnell , 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 16, 23 (“judicial fact-finding is once again required to over come the statutory presumption in favor of concurrent sentences”). However, after determining the-39- sentence for a particular crime, a sentencing judge has discret ion to order an offender to serve individual counts of a sentence consecutively to each oth er or to sentences imposed by other courts. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) permits a trial co urt to impose consecutive sentences if it finds that (1) consecutive sentencing is necess ary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender, (2) consecutive sentenc es are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and (3) any of the following applies: (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense. (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as par t of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’ s conduct. (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates tha t consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the

offender. {¶ 107} The trial court did not order a presentence investigation prior to sentencing. At sentencing, the State requested maximum consecu tive sentences for Boyce. It emphasized Boyce’s lack of remorse, that the items t aken had significant economic and sentimental value, that Boyce was the boss of the criminal enterprise; that-40- the only way to protect the public was to impose maximum consec utive sentences, that Boyce committed the McCready burglary while at halfway house, a nd that he was out on bond when he committed the Koehler, Timmons, Haemmerle, and Gei l burglaries. The State argued that recidivism was likely. In response, Boyce pr oclaimed his innocence and argued that the judicial system had failed. The trial court imposed maximum consecutive sentences totaling 70 years in prison. {¶ 108} Boyce does not claim that his individual sentences were contrary to law, and we conclude that they are not. Each individual sentence is within the authorized statutory range, and the trial court indicated that it had cons idered the statutory principles and purposes of sentencing as well as the statutory seriousness and recidivism factors. In addition, the trial court made the appropriate findings unde r R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); the imposition of consecutive sentences also was not contrary to la w. The relevant question is whether Boyce’s aggregate 70-year sentence was clearly and c onvincingly unsupported by the record. {¶ 109} We addressed a lengthy sentence for a serial burglar in State v. Beverly

. Beverly, who was 23 years old, was convicted of engaging in a p attern of corrupt activity, burglary (eight counts), attempted burglary (two counts), recei ving stolen property (five counts), having weapons while under disability, and fleeing and eluding. The trial court imposed an aggregate 66.5-year sentence. On direct appeal, we held that the sentence was an abuse of discretion, reasoning: In outlining the reasons for the sentence it imposed, the trial court did not mention Beverly’s prior criminal history. Instead, the trial court noted the number of households victimized, the number of people whose-41- personal property was stolen or damaged, and the loss of a sens e of security by his victims, which was compromised as a result of B everly’s crimes. While these considerations were proper, the trial court also sought to justify Beverly’s lengthy sentence by noting that law enforc ement officers put in “hundreds[,] maybe even thousands[,] of hours of time an d effort” spent by law enforcement agencies in investigating and tracking down all of the property stolen, organizing it, and trying to return said p roperty to its rightful owners. We conclude that the amount of police work in volved should not have formed a basis to increase Beverly’s sentence. The police officers, detectives, and other law enforcement officials invol ved were performing their respective jobs conducting the investigation, cataloguing, and retrieving the items stolen by Beverly and Imber [Beverly’s codefendant]. Fortunately, none of the victims suffered any physical injury. Although the anger, fear, and disturbances experienced by the v ictims may properly be considered, there is nothing in the record to sugge st that these psychological injuries were qualitatively greater than those pr edictably experienced by any victim of a burglary, or that the victims ar e unlikely to overcome these effects within a reasonable period of time. We also note that the lack of a pre-sentence investigation report in a case of this nature

makes it harder to fashion a sentence consistent with the statu tory sentencing factors and guidelines found in R.C. 2929.11 and 292 9.12. We do not seek to minimize the criminality of Beverly’s actions and-42- the wrong done to his victims. Nevertheless, treating this cas e as if these crimes were the most serious forms of the offenses, and treatin g Beverly as if he were the most depraved of offenders, is not supported by the evidence in the record. The imposition of the 661⁄2-year sentence in this case deprecates the validity of similar harsh sentences in those cas es that truly merit them. As Justice Lanzinger has written, “[i]t is a rare victim who does not consider the crime committed by an offender to be undeservi ng of a maximum penalty. * * * It will take a courageous judge not to ‘ max and stack’ every sentence in multiple-count cases.” State v. Hairston , 118 Ohio St.3d 289, 2008-Ohio-2338, 888 N.E.2d 1073, at ¶ 31 (Lanzinger, J., c oncurring). Finally, Beverly argues that his co-defendant, Imber, who plead guilty, received a more lenient sentence. Specifically, Imber entered guilty pleas to ten fourth-degree felony offenses and received an aggr egate sentence of thirteen and one-half years in prison, less than a quarter of the sentence Beverly received. State v. Imber , 2d Dist. Clark No. 11 CA 0063, 2012-Ohio-372. Although there is no information in the record to indicate whether Imber had a prior record, the evidence in the record es tablished that Imber was equally culpable with Beverly regarding the char ged offenses. On this record, a disparity of over 50 years suggest s the appearance of a trial tax, whereby one reason for Beverly's muc h harsher sentence was that he exercised his right to a jury trial. State v. Beverly , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2011-CA-64, 2013-Ohio-1365, ¶ 55-58 (“ Beverly I ”), reversed on other grounds, 143 Ohio St.3d 258, 2015-Ohio-219, 37 N.E.3d 11.-43- {¶ 110} On remand, the trial court sentenced Beverly to an aggregate 50 -year sentence. We affirmed that sentence, initially noting that the abuse-of-discretion standard no longer applied and that we could vacate or modify B everly’s sentence only if we determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that the recor d did not support his sentence, including the trial court’s consecutive-sentence find ings, or that his sentence was contrary to law. State v. Beverly , 2016-Ohio-8078, 75 N.E.3d 847, ¶ 9-10 (2d Dist.) (“ Beverly II ”). {¶ 111} On review, we held that Beverly’s individual sentences were notcontrary to law, as they each fell within the sentencing range and the t rial court had considered the required statutory factors, and that the record amply suppo rted the imposition of a

maximum sentence for each offense. We further found that the t rial court had made the necessary findings for the imposition of consecutive sentences. Significantly for this case, we also concluded that the record did not clearly and con vincing fail to support the imposition of consecutive sentences. We stated: * * * After compiling an extensive juvenile record and receivin g a sixyear prison sentence for burglary, Beverly proceeded to engage in a months-long crime spree that included burglarizing eight houses and attempting to burglarize two more. At sentencing, the State re presented

that someone was home on at least one of these occasions. Beve rly and

his co-defendant used stolen vehicles to commit the crimes and were found in possession of stolen property including firearms. While ser ving time in prison following his convictions, Beverly’s behavior has been d eplorable. Due to the long-term nature of his criminal activity, the numbe r and nature-44- of his offenses, and his demonstrated inability or unwillingnes s to be rehabilitated, the trial court reas onably concluded that consec utive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crim e and to punish Beverly and that consecutive sentences were not dispropo rtionate to the seriousness of his conduct and to the danger he poses to the public. The record likewise supports the trial court’s finding under R. C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c) that Beverly’s history of criminal conduct dem onstrates the necessity of consecutive sentences to protect the public from f uture crime by him. In light of that determination, we need not address th e trial court’s additional alternative finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b), whi ch was

unnecessary. Although Beverly’s aggregate prison term is undeniably harsh — and likely harsher than this court would have imposed — we have no basis to conclude that the consecutive sentences the trial court imposed are clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record, which is the applic able standard of review. Under this “extremely deferential” standar d, we simply are not permitted to substitute our judgment for that of the tr ial court. (Citation omitted.) Beverly II at ¶ 18-19

. {¶ 112} Here, the record reflects that Boyce has been involved in burgl aries since 2005. Boyce was convicted in 2005 and twice in 2008, which res ulted in his imprisonment until early 2016. While in prison, Boyce presente d himself as a criminal mastermind and conspired with Burkhart to engage in burglaries together upon their release. After his release from prison, Boyce was returned to prison to complete his-45- sentence (May 6 to July 24, 2016). For the rest of 2016 and th e first half of 2017, Boyce engaged in a burglary spree, scouting homes for when the occupa nts would be absent (although the Shells’ house/dog-sitter apparently was present for that burglary), entering at night, and taking high-value items from the homes. As noted by the State, Boyce engaged in this behavior while residing at a halfway house afte r his release from a prior conviction and while on bond for the new charges out of Columbu s. The trial record further made clear that Boyce was the “boss” of the criminal en terprise, enlisting several others to sell the stolen items at various pawn shops and jewel ers. {¶ 113} Boyce notes that restitution in this case was “just over $3,000 .” This amount represented the amounts paid by the Ahmeds and the Koehl er to buy their respective items back out of pawn. {¶ 114} The trial record reveals, however, that the value of the proper ty stolen by Boyce well exceeded the restitution imposed. The 18 complainan ts for the 2016-2017 burglaries testified to theft of numerous pieces of gold jewelry, jewelry with gemstones, sterling silver flatware and other silver pieces, coin collecti ons, foreign currency, watches, and stamps; many items were unique and family heirlooms. Many victims noted that their “costume” jewelry was not taken and that the stolen items had high monetary values. Nancy McGregor, for example, testified that she had several pie ces valued over $10,000 that were stolen; she valued her husband’s grandmother’s ring, alone, at $20,972; Boyce also stole $3,000 to $4,000 in cash from her. Among her stolen items, Donna Field described a ring with a $2 gold piece, which she testified was rare and valuable; she

indicated that the total value of her stolen items was between $80,000 and $100,000. Tamara Compton testified to the theft of $8,200 cash, along wit h her valuable jewelry,-46- and Donna Dolbeer indicated that $2,000 in cash was stolen, alo ng with jewelry, a coin collection, and a camera. {¶ 115} The jury found that the State had established each of the predi cate acts alleged for Count 25 (engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity ). The jury thus found that:

 Alyshia Cook sold property in the amount of approximately $5,2 10.03 to Buckeye Gold between August 14 and December 13, 2016 (predicate act 10)

 Cook sold property in the amount of $6,702.03 to Dash to Cash Pawn S hop and Allen’s Coin between January 6 and March 30, 2017 (predicate ac t 11)

 Quiana Boyce sold $3,000 worth of property at Buckeye Gold on November 30, 2016 (predicate act 12)

 Shaqueeta Terrell sold approximately $4,155 of property to Buc keye Gold between August 29 and November 16, 2016 (predicate act 13)

 Terrell sold approximately $14,388.14 of property to Allen’s C oin between January 10 and March 22, 2017 (predicate act 14)

 Boyce took Nored to Allen’s Coin to sell approximately $3,104. 06 of property on June 19 2017 (predicate act 15) Those sales totaled more than $36,000. {¶ 116} Boyce denied culpability for any of the 2016 and 2017 burglarie s, and he expressed no remorse for his actions. {¶ 117} The trial court’s aggregate 70-year sentence is severe, amounti ng to a life sentence for Boyce, who was 33 years old at sentencing. Howeve r, with the record before us, the trial court’s sentence is not clearly and convin cingly unsupported by the record. Boyce had prior convictions relating to similar offens es and had previously-47- served prisons terms for that conduct. He continued to commit burglaries while he was out on bond. Through his conduct underlying this case, Boyce d emonstrated an unwillingness to be rehabilitated and a high likelihood of reci divism. Moreover, the offenses stemmed from the burglaries of 18 different homes betw een 2016 and July 2017, performed with almost systematic precision by Boyce, and the pr edicate acts for engaging in corrupt activity involved additional criminal activity. The re is little doubt that Boyce was the head of the alleged criminal enterprise. {¶ 118} On this record, Boyce’s challenge to his aggregate 70-year sent ence is without merit under Ohio’s current sentencing jurisprudence. {¶ 119} Although not specifically raised as an assignment of error, we conclude, however, that the trial court’s sentence on Count 19 was clearl y and convincingly unsupported by the record. {¶ 120} The trial court, orally and in its judgment, imposed a one-year sentence on Count 19, which concerned one of Boyce’s co-defendants, Quiana Boyce, only. The court ordered the sentences for felony receiving stolen propert y to be served consecutively, for a total of four years. On May 29, 2018, in an effort to correct the error, the trial court filed an amended judgment, striking the one-yea r sentence on Count 19 and amending the first full paragraph on page five to read, “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all felony receiving stolen property offenses (Counts 2, 16, and 24) run consecutively to one another for a total of three (3) years OSP.” (Emphasis sic.) {¶ 121} A trial court generally lacks jurisdiction to modify its own va lid final judgment in a criminal case. See, e.g., State v. Baker , 2d Dist. Greene No. 2017-CA-55, 2018-Ohio-1865, ¶ 21; State v. Plemons , 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 26434, 26435, 26436-48- & 26437, 2015-Ohio-2879, ¶ 21. Under Crim.R. 36, “[c]lerical m istakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record, and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission, may be corrected by the court at any time.” “ ‘Corre ctions are proper to make the record reflect what the court actually decided and not what the court might or should have decided or what the court intended to decide.’ ” (Citation s omitted.) Baker at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Burton , 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2013-09-071, 2014-Ohio-1692, ¶ 14. {¶ 122} In this case, the trial court’s inclusion of Count 19 in its se ntence did not constitute a “clerical error.” Nevertheless, we agree that its inclusion in Boyce’s sentence was improper. Boyce was not charged with or found gui lty of committing Count 19. Accordingly, the sentence for Count 19 will be vacated, an d the matter will be remanded for the limited purpose of the filing of an amended ju dgment entry. We note

that the trial court’s error as to Count 19 had no effect on Bo yce’s aggregate sentence.

V. Conclusion {¶ 123} The trial court’s sentence on Co unt 19 will be vacated, and the matter will be remanded for the filing of an amended judgment entry. In al l other respects, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

TUCKER, P.J. and HALL, J., concur.

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John M. Lintz Craig M. Jaquith Hon. Douglas M. Rastatter