COURT OF APPEALS 

DECISION 

DATED AND FILED

August 27, 2019 

Sheila T. Reiff 

Clerk of Court of Appeals 

 

NOTICE 

 This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2018AP669 Cir. Ct. No. 2017CV4572

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS 

DISTRICT I 

STATE OF WISCONSIN EX REL. RONALD L. COLLISON, 

 PETITIONER-APPELLANT, 

V. 

CITY OF MILWAUKEE BOARD OF REVIEW, 

 RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. 

 APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: 

GLENN H. YAMAHIRO, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Before Brash, P.J., Kessler and Brennan, JJ. 

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Ronald L. Collison, pro se, appeals the circuit 

court’s order affirming the Board of Review’s decision. The Board upheld the 
No. 2018AP669 

2 

City of Milwaukee’s $31,800 tax valuation of his property for 2016. This appeal 

is nearly identical in law and fact to Collison’s prior appeal of his 2012 property 

tax assessment. See State ex rel. Collison v. City of Milwaukee, No. 

2013AP2130, unpublished slip op. (WI App Sept. 9, 2014). Collison argues that 

the assessment of his property was improper because his property’s fair market 

value is zero dollars. He also argues that both the City of Milwaukee 

Environmental Contamination Standards (CMECS) and the Wisconsin Property 

Assessment Manual conflict with WIS. STAT. § 70.32 (2017-18).1 We affirm. 

¶2 On appeal, we review the decision of the Board, not the circuit court. 

See State ex rel. Stupar River LLC v. Town of Linwood, 2011 WI 82, ¶16, 336 

Wis. 2d 562, 800 N.W.2d 468. Our review is limited in scope to determining: 

(1) whether the Board acted within its jurisdiction; (2) whether the Board acted 

according to law; (3) whether the Board’s action was arbitrary, oppressive or 

unreasonable; and (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to allow the Board to 

reasonably make its decision. See id. “There is a presumption that the assessor’s 

valuation is correct.” Steenberg v. Town of Oakfield, 167 Wis. 2d 566, 571, 482 

N.W.2d 326 (1992) (citation omitted). “The burden of producing evidence to 

overcome this presumption is upon the person who seeks to attack the 

assessment.” Id. (citation omitted). 

¶3 Collison first argues that the Board’s assessment of his property was 

improper because no one wants to buy his property due to the fact that it contains 

environmental pollution, the extent of which is unknown. He contends that the 

 

1

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise 

noted. 
No. 2018AP669 

3 

market value of his property is therefore zero dollars. Collison’s argument is 

unavailing. 

¶4 WISCONSIN STAT. § 70.32(1) provides: “Real property shall be 

valued by the assessor in the manner specified in the Wisconsin [P]roperty 

[A]ssessment [M]anual provided under s. 73.03(2a) from actual view or from the 

best information that the assessor can practicably obtain, at the full value which 

could ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale.” The Wisconsin Property 

Assessment Manual explains that “market value can be derived by using the cost, 

income, or sales comparison approaches.” See Allright Props., Inc. v. City of 

Milwaukee, 2009 WI App 46, ¶19, 317 Wis. 2d 228, 767 N.W.2d 567 (citation 

omitted). “[R]eal estate must be valued at its highest and best use.” Id., ¶18. 

¶5 City of Milwaukee assessor Jim Wiegand used an income approach 

to determine the fair market value of Collison’s property because there were no 

recent sales of the property or similar properties. Wiegand testified that the 

income approach best reflected the value of the property because the property had 

previously been used as a parking lot and thus had, or could have, rental income. 

Wiegand testified that the assessor’s office was aware that the site had 

environmental contamination, but explained that he had no information about the 

extent of the problem or the possible cleanup costs, and therefore could not 

conclude that the property was worthless as Collison claimed. Wiegand further 

explained that, whether the property was contaminated or not, it could generate 

income as a parking lot and that the income approach was thus chosen because it 

represented the best use of the property. See id. (real estate should be valued at its 

highest and best use). 
No. 2018AP669 

4 

¶6 The assessor’s valuation is presumed to be correct. See WIS. STAT.

§ 70.47(8)(i). “The party challenging a property assessment must show why its 

method of valuation is more reliable or accurate than the assessor’s chosen 

method.” See ABKA Ltd. P’ship v. Board of Review, 231 Wis. 2d 328, 348, 603 

N.W.2d 217 (1999). Collison has not shown why his unsubstantiated claim that 

the property has a market value of zero dollars is more accurate than Wiegand’s 

decision to use an income approach to determine market value based on the best 

use of the property as a parking lot. Collison’s contention that he was previously 

unable to sell the property does not establish that the property is worthless, 

especially given its location in a prime downtown Milwaukee area that has been 

increasing in value. There could be a variety of reasons that the property did not 

previously sell.2 Collison provided no evidence about the extent of the 

environmental contamination and cost to clean it up to support his assertion that 

the property has a market value of zero. Therefore, Collison has not overcome the 

presumption that the assessor’s evaluation was correct. 

¶7 Collison next argues that the CMECS impermissibly allows the City 

to ignore WIS. STAT. § 70.32 unless the land owner obtains a Phase II 

environmental assessment. We agree with the circuit court’s analysis rejecting 

this argument: 

[Collison] challenges the legality of a provision of the 

CMECS, which states that without at least a Phase II Audit 

substantiating property contamination, the property must be 

 

2

 For example, Collison previously informed the Board that he gives all potential buyers 

a document explaining that “[a]ny party who chooses to conduct a Phase II [environmental] 

sampling on the property must enter into an indemnification agreement with [him] to pay, without 

qualification, for any remediation costs that result from the discovery of any contamination on the 

subject property.” See State ex rel. Collison v. City of Milwaukee, 2013AP2130, unpublished 

slip op. at ¶5 (WI App Sept. 9, 2014). 
No. 2018AP669 

5 

valued as if uncontaminated. [Collison] contends that this 

provision is contrary to the requirement of [WIS. STAT.]

§ 70.32(1m) that “the assessor shall consider the 

impairment of value of the property ... because of 

environmental pollution....” Although [Collison’s] 

arguments regarding the CMECS are intriguing and may be 

ripe for determination at some future date, his arguments 

fail because the assessor and the Board recognized the 

contamination even though [Collison] has not completed or 

sought a Phase II [A]udit. 

Because the assessor did not ignore the contamination of the property in valuing it, 

and the Board did not ignore the contamination in upholding that valuation, we 

reject Collison’s argument. 

¶8 Finally, Collison argues that the Wisconsin Property Assessment 

Manual conflicts with WIS. STAT. § 70.32(1m) because it allows properties to be 

valued using an income approach, which Collison contends does not reflect the 

amount his property would sell for on the open market, the measure Collison 

believes is correct under § 70.32(1m). Although the specific contours of this 

argument are difficult to discern, Collison is essentially restating his prior 

argument that his property assessment was incorrect because the assessor did not 

adequately consider the environmental contamination of his property in his 

valuation. As we previously explained, the assessor did consider the possible 

contamination and therefore used an income approach. This decision was

reasonable because, as the assessor testified, he did not have any information 

about the extent of the possible environment problem or the potential costs to 

remedy the problem. Therefore, Collison’s challenge to the valuation is 

unavailing. 

By the Court.—Order affirmed. 
No. 2018AP669 

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 This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.