Filed 5/28/24 D.S. v. Superior Court CA2/2

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

D.S.,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

 Real Party in Interest.

 B335126

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP03402A)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING. Petition for extraordinary writ. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Cathy J. Ostiller, Judge. Petition 

denied.

Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Inc., Law Office of Amy 

Einstein, Dominika Campbell and Christina Curtis for Petitioner.

Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, Claudia Center 

and Kavya Parthiban for Disability Rights Education and Defense 
2

Fund, CripJustice, Disability Rights California, Legal Aid Association 

of California, Legal Aid at Work, and Public Counsel, as Amici Curiae 

on behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Office of the County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, County 

Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Stephen Watson, 

Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.

Children’s Law Center of California—CLCLA1, Daniel Szrom for 

Minor.

________________________________

D.S., the father of D.S.L., petitions for extraordinary relief 

pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452. He seeks review of 

an order terminating reunification services and setting a permanency 

planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1

We deny the petition.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

D.S.L. was born in Los Angeles County in December 2021.

Father and the mother of D.S.L., J.L. (Mother), lived together for a 

time prior to and after D.S.L.’s birth, including at Father’s home in 

Michigan. The two split up when D.S.L. was approximately five 

months old, however, and Mother returned with D.S.L. to her home in 

the Los Angeles area, while Father remained in Michigan.

Detention

The Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services 

(DCFS) filed a section 300 petition in August 2022. It alleged, in part, 

that then eight-month-old D.S.L. suffered a skull injury, with trauma 

to the brain. Bruising and abrasions on other parts of the body, 

including the child’s face and arm were also observed, as were bite 

1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code, unless otherwise noted.
3

marks to the body. D.S.L. was found limp and motionless and required 

emergency medical treatment. Mother’s claims that the injuries were 

accidental were not consistent with the type or extent of the injuries.

Mother’s new boyfriend was arrested for the injuries to D.S.L. 

Mother stated that she was in the bathroom when her boyfriend 

brought the motionless child to her, prompting the two of them to take 

D.S.L. to the emergency room.

The juvenile court ordered D.S.L. detained on August 31, 2022. 

Father was found to be the presumed father of the child.

Jurisdiction and disposition

Soon after learning of the injuries to D.S.L., Father, along with 

his own mother, traveled from Michigan to California. Father had no 

known criminal history, and no child welfare history as a parent. His 

mother, however, had an extensive child welfare history in Michigan, 

including numerous allegations of drug and alcohol abuse, neglect of 

Father as a minor and his minor siblings, failure to maintain her 

children’s hygiene, and housing them in a filthy environment. There 

were also repeated reports that Father was malnourished as a child 

and his mother failed to provide him with a functioning feeding tube 

necessary for his nourishment. Possible effects of father’s apparent 

malnourishment continued into adulthood, as at the time of these

proceedings in 2022, Father, who was born in 1999, weighed 

approximately 60 pounds with a height of 63 inches. Father’s slight 

stature could also potentially be explained by medical issues, including 

a diagnosis for Crohn’s disease. By his own admission, Father was 

lacking in physical strength.

When interviewed by a DCFS social worker, Father stated that 

he was ready and able to care for his son, and that he had a strong 

family support system, including his mother, who lived next door to 

him in Michigan. Father stated that he had a substantial income from 

being “famous” on social media, and that he and Mother had made 

additional money by posting pornographic videos of themselves on the 
4

Internet. Father and his mother both provided on demand drug tests. 

While Father tested negative, his mother tested positive for marijuana.

Father consistently visited with D.S.L. following the detention 

hearing. He held and played with the child and was observed to be 

“kind,” though he needed direction on how to provide care and 

struggled with holding the baby.

An amended section 300 petition was filed in October 2022. It 

alleged, with respect to Father, that he and Mother had a history of 

violent altercations, and that Father failed to take protective action 

even though he knew that Mother used drugs and that the child was in 

danger. It further alleged that Father was “unable to provide the child 

. . . with ongoing appropriate supervision due to the father being unable 

to understand nor being able to physically meet the high medical needs 

of his child who will require ongoing medical intervention. . . . Father 

lacks knowledge of basic child development and capacity to maintain 

physical safety for a medically fragile child.” Finally, the amended 

petition alleged that Father had created a dangerous home 

environment by keeping firearms that were not safely locked.

The amended allegations were based, in part, on an interview 

with Mother. Mother reported that she frequently had to repeat things 

to Father because he did not understand them, and that he did not help 

change D.S.L.’s diaper or help with other childcare tasks both because 

he did not want to and because he did not know how. Mother stated 

that Father’s apartment in Michigan was filthy, that numerous family 

members lived with him, including a registered sexual offender, and 

that Father relied on his mother to complete basic tasks for him, 

including cleaning himself. Father denied most, but not all, of Mother’s 

statements. Father stated that while he had a learning disability and 

did not progress past middle school, he had learned to spell from the 

Internet and could learn to take care of D.S.L. Father additionally 

stated that he was able to hold D.S.L., feed him, and change his diaper. 

According to Father, his mother is his “support.”
5

A DCFS Multi-disciplinary Assessment Team (MAT) assessor 

stated that she was concerned with the ability of Father to care for 

D.S.L. The assessor believed that Father had an inability to problem 

solve and needed step-by-step instruction. He “demonstrated an 

inability to safely care for a high risk and medical needs baby.” During 

a visit, Father left the baby unattended on the carpet for over five 

minutes, left him alone on the changing table without being strapped

in, did not display efforts to soothe the baby when he was crying, and 

requested that hospital staff hold and carry the baby. Father did show 

affection toward D.S.L., however, and fed and played with him.

Due to his severe, life-threatening injuries, D.S.L. was 

determined to be high-risk for significant delays in speech, cognition, 

motor development, and feeding. He was also diagnosed as high-risk 

for hemi-paretic cerebral palsy, and had exhibited decreased right-side 

arm and leg movements. D.S.L., who was a healthy baby prior to the 

injuries, was now likely to have permanent disabilities. He required 

extensive rehabilitation, including speech therapy, physical therapy, 

occupational therapy, and behavioral therapy.

In November 2022, Father’s aunt informed DCFS that she and 

her husband wished to become D.S.L.’s caregivers at their home in 

Michigan, with a concurrent plan of adoption. A home study was 

requested. D.S.L. continued to be placed in foster care in the Los 

Angeles area.

In January 2023, DCFS informed the juvenile court that Father’s 

visitations with D.S.L. had been consistent. Father still had difficulties 

in providing care to D.S.L., however. He attempted to have the child 

drink out of a sport top water bottle, which D.S.L. could not do, and 

attempted to feed the child Vienna sausages, which were too hard. 

DCFS was concerned with Father’s ability to comprehend the child’s 

limitations.

D.S.L. was diagnosed with hemiparetic cerebral palsy in 

February 2023, with the entire right-side of his body affected. He 
6

would potentially need lifetime therapeutic services. Father had 

attended about half of D.S.L.’s therapy sessions. The occupational 

therapist reported that Father was very polite and would do anything 

requested of him, but did not demonstrate any retention of the training 

provided him. Father had not attended any of D.S.L.’s physical therapy 

sessions and had only sporadically attended medical appointments. He 

did enroll in parenting classes, however. 

The adjudication hearing was held in March 2023. Per Father’s 

counsel’s request, certain allegations pertaining to Father were struck 

from the operative section 300 petition: that Father and Mother had 

engaged in violent altercations, that he failed to protect D.S.L. from 

physical abuse he might suffer with Mother, and that he was unable to 

care for D.S.L. due to his own limitations. The juvenile court sustained 

two counts pertaining to Father: that he failed to take action when he 

knew or should have known of Mother’s drug use, and that he created a 

detrimental home environment by keeping unsecured firearms in his 

home. Numerous counts were sustained as to Mother, including that 

D.S.L.’s injuries were a result of her deliberate, unreasonable, and 

neglectful acts, and that she abused drugs, rendering her incapable of 

providing D.S.L. with regular care and supervision.

Prior to the disposition hearing, DCFS reported that Father 

continued to consistently visit with D.S.L., and no concerns with the 

visitations were noted. Father told the social worker that he had begun 

giving his guns away to a friend with a license. He had still been 

sporadic in attending the child’s medical and therapeutic 

appointments, however. D.S.L.’s caregiver reported that Father 

struggled to keep a schedule and prioritize D.S.L.’s needs. The 

caregiver repeatedly provided Father with the dates and locations of 

appointments, but Father did not keep a calendar and relied on others 

to tell him what to do. The caregiver was also concerned with Father’s 

comprehension of D.S.L.’s ongoing risks and needs. Among other 
7

things, Father appeared to believe that D.S.L.’s cerebral palsy would 

not be a concern until he entered kindergarten.

At the close of the disposition hearing, on April 4, 2023, the 

juvenile court ordered D.S.L. removed from Father and Mother. Both

parents were ordered to be provided with reunification services.

Father’s reunification services were to include monitored visitation,

parenting classes for special needs children, and individual counseling. 

He was also ordered to attend and participate in all of D.S.L.’s medical 

and developmental appointments. Additionally, the court ordered that 

Father undergo psychological and neurological testing pursuant to 

Evidence Code section 730. The testing and the ensuing report were to 

address Father’s developmental and cognitive abilities, and “how that 

may affect care for a child with high medical needs.”

Post-disposition events

By June 2023, Father had completed one parenting program and 

had recently enrolled in another. His visits with D.S.L. continued to go 

well, with no recent concerns regarding their interactions, and with 

Father properly feeding, nurturing, and supervising the child. 

Additionally, Father’s attendance at D.S.L.’s appointments had 

improved.

As of September 2023, however, Father had still not enrolled in 

individual counseling. DCFS continued to express concerns regarding 

Father’s ability to care for a child with disabilities. Father was 

observed to be heavily reliant on his mother for support, as she 

appeared to provide him with assistance retaining and understanding 

information relating to D.S.L.

D.S.L. had shown improvement in his therapeutic sessions. By 

September 2023, his physical and occupational therapists reported that 

he was walking and might regain full motion in his legs. His right arm 

was still partially paralyzed, however. The chances of him regaining 

full use of his right arm were marginal. Both therapists stated that 
8

Father attended every session and was engaged, supportive, and 

receptive.

Toward the end of September 2023, however, D.S.L.’s 

pediatrician reported that Father did not understand the severity and 

extent of the child’s diagnosis and lifelong concerns. She stated that 

Father did not pay attention during medical visits and did not show 

concern or competency. The doctor believed that Father lacked the 

mental and physical capacity to care for D.S.L.

A DCFS social worker who observed a visit between Father and 

D.S.L. in October 2023 reported that Father acted appropriately during 

the visit. However, Father did not seem able to initiate play with 

D.S.L., and Father spoke to the social worker more than he interacted 

with the child. Father changed D.S.L.’s diaper during the visit, but left 

the diaper on the carpet for about 20 minutes before throwing it away.

Father underwent a neurological examination in November 2023. 

The report stated that Father had a history of failure to thrive

syndrome. It further stated: “Currently there seems to be no 

contraindication to his being a caretaker and he doesn’t seem to need 

further neurologic care.”

By the end of November, Father had begun individual counseling. 

Additionally, the home study of Father’s aunt and her husband in 

Michigan was approved. Father told the social worker that he agreed 

with D.S.L. being placed with the aunt if the child could not be 

returned to Father’s care.

D.S.L. continued to undergo further medical examination. His 

pediatrician reiterated that he would most likely need lifelong support 

and therapeutic services. In addition to his physical symptoms, D.S.L. 

had trouble controlling salivation and was diagnosed with “global 

developmental delay.” His vocabulary consisted of about 15 words, and 

he was unable to put two words together, which was unusual for a child 

of his age. A recent scan indicated that D.S.L. had sustained 

significant loss in brain volume due to brain bleeds caused by his 
9

traumatic injury. The pediatrician advised that D.S.L. would require 

further cranial surgery. Additionally, D.S.L.’s skull fracture had never 

properly healed and he was being fitted for a helmet. The pediatrician 

reported that, due to the injuries, D.S.L. was at risk for further, future 

medical, developmental, and behavioral problems, including moderate 

to severe intellectual disability, seizure disorder, and lack of motor skill 

strength. He was also at risk for developing mental health issues, such 

as major depressive disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and selfinjurious behavior.

The pediatrician additionally noted that D.S.L. was currently 

housed in a “unique” situation, since one of his foster parents was an 

occupational therapist, and he received constant care and supervision. 

The foster parents ensured that the child attended all of his many 

appointments. The pediatrician was concerned whether Father would 

be able to provide an adequate level of care and supervision.

The neurocognitive and psychological report of Father, ordered in 

April 2023, was finally completed in January 2024. The assigned 

psychologist reported that she had “grave concerns” with D.S.L. being 

placed with Father. Her report stated that Father “shows 

perseverance, understanding of basic language, ability to communicate 

his thoughts and wishes, and a slow but persistent wish to learn. 

While he can grasp concepts over time, he is remarkably slow to learn, 

and he becomes lost without a structured approach being provided.” 

When given a “structured, non-verbal reasoning task,” Father scored at 

the first percentile (one out of 100) in “learning to learn.” This “very 

low score” was “consistent with his limited capacity to use feedback to 

guide his performance on conceptual level tasks.” Father also scored 

poorly on a test to assess problem-solving and planning ability.

Additionally, his grip was tested, and his score showed “a significant 

moderate degree of impairment.” Father did better on a reading test, 

however, scoring at the “low average” level.
10

By late January 2024, the paternal great aunt and uncle in 

Michigan were having virtual visits with D.S.L., with plans to visit in 

person by spring 2024. These paternal relatives stated they had a 

dedicated commitment to adoption and were aware of D.S.L.’s unique 

needs and the high level of care required. DCFS recommended that 

family reunification services be terminated and that D.S.L. be moved to 

Michigan with the great aunt and uncle.

D.S.L.’s caregiver reported that, although Father had been 

consistent in attending occupational therapy sessions, he tended to 

remain somewhat withdrawn during the sessions, often focused on his 

phone rather than engaging in the sessions, and frequently 

relinquishing responsibility to the caregiver to practice interventions 

with the child. The occupational therapist further advised that Father 

had a difficult time understanding explanations of the therapy. As for 

Father’s mother, D.S.L.’s caregiver noted that, although she would at 

arrive at appointments with Father, she did not participate in them. 

DCFS advised against unmonitored visitation for Father, maintaining 

that it was not in the best interest of ensuring D.S.L.’s physical and 

emotional safety and wellbeing.

On February 7, 2024, DCFS reported that D.S.L. had been 

hospitalized since January 30, 2024. A mass on his scalp was 

discovered as were lesions on his skin, with high possibility for 

malignancy. He had undergone some diagnostic testing and would 

need numerous biopsies. The physician who met with Father in the 

hospital stated that he appeared confused throughout their 

conversation, and felt that Father was not able to understand the 

discussion regarding the child’s medical needs and the required

procedures. She expressed concerns regarding Father’s ability to care 

for a medically fragile child. Given these issues, the physician believed 

that it was not appropriate to try to obtain consent from Father (or 

Mother) for D.S.L.’s medical procedures. Instead, DCFS sought 
11

approval from the juvenile court, and on February 7, 2024, the court 

authorized the requested medical treatment.

The DCFS social worker spoke with Father’s individual therapist

in February 2024. Although the therapist confirmed that Father had 

been in counseling since November 2023, he believed that Father was 

not benefiting from the sessions. He stated that Father was guarded 

and did not share anything during the sessions. The therapist also 

expressed concerns regarding Father’s limited ability to understand 

D.S.L.’s health issues. He did not believe that Father was capable of 

caring for a child with high medical needs, as Father did not 

demonstrate an ability to process and understand relevant information. 

The therapist was concerned that, although Father may appear 

compliant with receiving services, an outcome of placing D.S.L. with 

Father would endanger the child’s safety and well-being.

Review hearing

The six-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (e)) was held on 

February 9, 2024.

D.S.L.’s pediatrician was called to testify. She noted that the 

child had just recently been diagnosed with Langerhans Cell 

Histiocytosis (LCH), a “type of reactive process in the body” that would 

need “about a year” of chemotherapy to treat. The condition would 

likely require weekly oncology appointments. Those appointments 

would be in addition to his speech therapy, physical therapy, 

occupational therapy, neurology, rehabilitation specialist, and 

orthopedic surgery appointments. The pediatrician acknowledged that 

D.S.L. could receive treatment for LCH in another state.

Due to the recent LCH diagnosis, D.S.L. was even more medically 

fragile than previously believed. There was a strong chance that D.S.L. 

would be affected by the chemotherapy, leaving him unable to tolerate 

food or liquids, and also prone to infections, requiring further 

hospitalization.
12

The pediatrician further testified how, due to his traumatic brain 

injury, D.S.L. was at risk for developing behavioral problems as he 

aged, including major depressive disorder or oppositional defiant 

disorder. He was also more at risk for seizures.

Following the completion of testimony, DCFS and minor’s counsel 

argued in favor of termination of reunification services, while counsel 

for each parent urged continuation of services. Father’s counsel 

additionally requested unmonitored visitation. Counsel stated that, 

because of family support, Father’s plan was to move to Michigan with 

D.S.L.

In ruling, the juvenile court noted that “this is not an easy case.” 

The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCFS provided 

or offered reasonable services. The court recognized that Father had 

made strong efforts, was in substantial compliance with his case plan,

and was very attentive to his son. The court emphasized, however, that 

medical professionals, Father’s own therapist, and others determined 

that Father was incapable of providing adequate care for D.S.L., with 

his “very, very severe medical needs.” On this basis, the court found,

by clear and convincing evidence, that there was no substantial 

probability that D.S.L. may be returned to Father within the next six 

months, and terminated his reunification services. The court, however, 

expressed a hope that D.S.L. would eventually be placed with relatives 

in Michigan, and that Father “will be able to be involved in that at 

some point.” Reunification services for Mother were also terminated.

At the close of the hearing, the court found that it was in the best 

interest of D.S.L. “to set a hearing to select a permanent plan of 

adoption, guardianship, or other planned permanent living 

arrangement with a relative or foster care provider pursuant to Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 366.26.”

Father timely filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition, and 

thereafter timely filed this petition for extraordinary writ. DCFS filed 

a brief opposing the petition, which minor’s counsel joined. Following 
13

receipt of these briefs, amici curiae filed a brief in support of Father’s 

petition, and DCFS and minor’s counsel both filed responses in 

opposition.

DISCUSSION

Father challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating 

reunification services and setting a section 366.26 permanency 

planning hearing. He makes two primary arguments in his petition. 

First, he contends that the juvenile court erred in finding there was no 

substantial probability that D.S.L. could be returned to his care within 

the next six months. Second, he argues that the juvenile court abused 

its discretion when it declined to liberalize his visits.

I. No substantial probability of return

A. The ruling is supported by substantial evidence.

Although nearly 18 months had elapsed since the initial filing of 

the section 300 petition in this matter, the hearing held in February 

2024 was the first review hearing held under section 366.21. At the 

initial six-month review hearing, “the court shall order the return of 

the child to the physical custody of their parent or legal guardian 

unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 

return of the child to their parent or legal guardian would create a 

substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or 

emotional well-being of the child. The social worker shall have the 

burden of establishing that detriment.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).)

If the juvenile court finds a substantial risk of detriment, as it did 

here, and if the child was under three years of age on the date of initial 

removal, as D.S.L. was, the court “shall continue the case to the 12-

month permanency hearing” if it “finds there is a substantial 

probability that the child . . . may be returned to their parent or legal 

guardian within six months or that reasonable services have not been 

provided.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3).) If reasonable services were 

provided—as found by the juvenile court here—and the court does not 

find a substantial probability of return, it may properly terminate 
14

reunification services. (Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 

836, 845.)

Father contends that the juvenile court erred in finding there 

was not a substantial probability that D.S.L. may be returned to him 

within the next six months, and thereby terminating reunification 

services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. We review the juvenile 

court’s finding of no substantial probability for substantial evidence. 

(Fabian L. v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1028; Kevin 

R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 688.) We do not 

reweigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses. (Kevin R. 

v. Superior Court, at p. 689; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 

212, 228.) All inferences from the evidence are drawn in favor of the 

juvenile court’s ruling, and the record is viewed in the light most 

favorable to the order below. (Kevin R. v. Superior Court, at pp. 688–

689.)

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that 

there was not a substantial probability that D.S.L. may be returned to 

Father within the next six months. Although the record shows that 

Father made admirable efforts to reunify, his substantial compliance 

with reunification services was not the sole factor for the juvenile court 

to consider in making its decision. (See M.V. v. Superior Court (2008) 

167 Cal.App.4th 166, 181 [“the court may take all of the evidence into 

consideration” in determining substantial probability of return].) 

Instead, the juvenile court properly considered a range of evidence, 

focusing on the issue of whether Father demonstrated a capability to 

provide adequate care for D.S.L. (See Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 

202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1424–1425 [parent’s “demonstrated ability to 

safely care for the child” is a proper consideration]; In re Luke M. (2003) 

107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425 [“[T]he purpose of any dependency hearing 

is to determine and protect the child’s best interests”].)

In the nearly 18 months since initial removal of D.S.L., Father 

never progressed beyond monitored visitation with D.S.L. The reasons 
15

for this were centered around D.S.L.’s safety and well-being. While 

Father was affectionate with D.S.L. and, at times, attentive, he never 

appeared to grasp the precariousness of D.S.L.’s health or the 

commitment necessary to care for him. In repeated reports, numerous 

individuals expressed concerns about Father’s lack of understanding 

regarding D.S.L.’s severe, life-long medical problems and the work 

required to parent an unusually fragile young child. Among other

examples, the MAT assessor reported that Father “demonstrated an 

inability to safely care for a high risk and medical needs baby”; D.S.L.’s 

caregiver reported that Father struggled to maintain a schedule of the 

child’s many appointments and did not engage in sessions, and was 

concerned that Father did not adequately comprehend D.S.L.’s health 

risks and needs; and the physician who communicated with Father 

when D.S.L. was hospitalized in early 2024 noted that Father appeared 

unable to understand D.S.L.’s medical needs and the recommended 

procedures.

These sentiments were echoed in the neurocognitive and 

psychological report prepared by the court-appointed psychologist, who

expressed “grave concerns” about placing D.S.L. with Father. In 

addition, D.S.L.’s pediatrician reported that Father did not pay 

attention or show concern during medical visits, and did not

understand the severity and extent of the child’s diagnosis and lifelong 

health issues. Furthermore, Father’s individual therapist did not 

believe that Father was capable of caring for a child with high medical 

needs, and believed that placing D.S.L. with Father would endanger 

the child’s safety and well-being. Given this wide-ranging evidence of 

Father’s inability to care for D.S.L., we cannot reasonably say that the 

juvenile court’s order was not supported by substantial evidence.

This conclusion is further compelled by the evidence presented at 

the six-month review hearing, showing that D.S.L.’s severe medical 

issues continued to compound. His pediatrician testified that, due to 

the recent diagnosis of LCH, D.S.L. was “even more medically fragile” 
16

than when he suffered only from the complications of traumatic brain 

injury. D.S.L.’s well-being was likely to be affected by the approximate 

one-year course of chemotherapy that he was to receive, and he could 

need further hospitalization. He would also require frequent oncology 

appointments, on top of the many appointments he already attended 

due to his brain injury. Thus, D.S.L.’s severe medical issues would 

require an even more stringent adherence to scheduling and 

attentiveness to medical issues than they previously had. Due to this 

unfortunate situation, the likelihood that Father could provide 

adequate care became even more remote.

We are also mindful of the fact that, by the time of the six-month 

review hearing, a substantial amount of time had elapsed. “For a child 

under three years of age at the time of removal, as [D.S.L.] was, 

reunification services are presumptively limited to six months.” (Tonya 

M. v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.4th 836, 843; see also § 361.5, subd. 

(a)(1)(B).) Given the delays in holding the six-month review hearing, 

Father was provided with nearly 18 months to demonstrate a sufficient 

capacity to provide adequate care for D.S.L. He was unable to do so.

In sum, although we recognize that Father made commendable 

efforts and has deep affection for D.S.L., those positives cannot be our 

sole consideration. The substantial weight of the evidence showed that 

Father was unable to safely care for such a medically fragile child as 

D.S.L. The determination that there was not a substantial probability 

that D.S.L. may be returned to Father within the next six months was 

thus supported by substantial evidence.

B. The ruling was not based on inappropriate factors.

1. Consideration of Father’s limitations

Father, joined by amici curiae, contends that the evidence 

regarding his ability to provide proper care for D.S.L. was based on 

inappropriate considerations.

Among other contentions, Father asserts that the evidence 

inappropriately contained considerations of Father’s physical condition, 
17

in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. (42 U.S.C. 

§ 12101 et seq.) Father additionally contends that consideration of 

Father’s limitations also violated well-established standards that “if a 

person has a physical handicap it is impermissible for the court simply 

to rely on that condition as prima facie evidence of the person’s 

unfitness as a parent or of probable detriment to the child.” (In re 

Marriage of Carney (1979) 24 Cal.3d 725, 736; see also § 300, subd. (j)

[“The Legislature further declares that a physical disability, such as 

blindness or deafness, is no bar to the raising of happy and welladjusted children and that a court’s determination pursuant to this 

section shall center upon whether a parent’s disability prevents the 

parent from exercising care and control”]; § 361.3, subd. (a)(8)(B).)

This argument focuses on the claim that D.S.L. was not returned 

to Father’s care because of concerns about Father’s physical frailty. We 

note that consideration of a parent’s disability is not per se improper in 

dependency proceedings, though the disability is viewed only “in light 

of the disabled parent’s response to services and demonstrated ability 

to safely care for the child.” (Tracy J. v. Superior Court, supra, 202 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1425.) Regardless, Father’s claim is not supported by 

the record. While reports by DCFS and others relating to Father’s 

ability to care for D.S.L. at times mentioned Father’s apparent lack of 

physical strength, physical limitation was not the primary issue. 

Rather, as noted above, in report after report, numerous individuals 

expressed concerns regarding Father’s lack of comprehension regarding 

D.S.L.’s unusually high medical needs and the lifelong medical care he 

would likely require.

Moreover, and more importantly, there is no indication that the 

juvenile court based its ruling on an inappropriate consideration of 

Father’s physical condition or other limitations. Instead, in making its 

ruling, the court stated, with regard to Father: “I am concerned about 

the medical professionals’ opinions and your own therapist’s opinion 

about what you are going to be capable of in connection with this child, 
18

who . . . has very, very severe medical needs, and I have to think about 

that in making my determination. . . . I feel I have to rely on what the 

medical professionals are telling me about this child’s medical care.” 

The court’s focus was on D.S.L.’s medical needs and care, and whether 

Father would be able to meet them. That focus was proper. (See In re 

Marriage of Carney, supra, 24 Cal.3d 725, 736 [the court should 

“carefully determine whether the parent’s condition will in fact have a 

substantial and lasting adverse effect on the best interest of the 

child”].)

Notably, neither amici curiae—who acknowledge that they have 

not reviewed the record in the matter, only the briefing—nor petitioner 

examine the situation as presented. D.S.L. is not a healthy child or 

even a child with merely challenging limitations. Instead, the evidence 

showed that D.S.L. is an unusually medically fragile child, requiring a 

much higher level of care than could normally be expected with a child 

his age. This unique situation was the crux of the juvenile court’s 

ruling, as it found that Father is “not able to care for the child with 

severe medical needs.”

Indeed, Father’s limitations were not viewed as a universal 

detriment, as if he were incapable of providing any parental role for

any child. Rather, his limitations were analyzed specifically with 

regard to his ability to provide sufficiently safe care for D.S.L. (See 

David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 788 [“[t]he 

issue” at the review hearing is whether placing the child in a parent’s 

care “represents some danger to [the child’s] physical or emotional wellbeing”].) As noted above, numerous individuals reported that Father 

lacked understanding of D.S.L.’s health issues and needs. These 

reports continued from initiation of the case up through the review 

hearing at issue. Despite the passage of 18 months, the evidence 

showed that Father’s comprehension of the level of care necessary to 

parent D.S.L. did not meaningfully improve over time. This lack of 

understanding was exacerbated by Father’s apparent disregard for 
19

attaining the necessary know-how, as shown by his failures to engage 

in D.S.L.’s treatment sessions or pay attention during medical visits.

While amici curiae raise compelling points regarding how 

disabled parents must be not be given a lesser opportunity to reunify,

the evidence in this case shows that Father was not placed at an unfair

disadvantage. Amici curiae’s arguments ultimately fail, as they do not

grapple with the unique situation presented here involving Father’s 

inability to safely parent such a medically fragile young child. The 

juvenile court, in contrast, properly focused on the specific 

circumstances of this case.

2. Alleged comparisons

Father’s next argument—that there was an improper comparison 

of the high level of care provided by D.S.L.’s current caregivers versus 

what could be provided by Father—fails for a similar reason as his 

previous one. It is not supported by the record.

Although D.S.L.’s pediatrician testified that the caregivers were 

providing “excellent” care, there is no indication that that observation 

formed a basis for the juvenile court’s ruling. Nor was there any

prejudicial impropriety with the court’s hypothetical statement near 

the end of the hearing: “I just believe that, at the end of the day, what 

is best for this child is to be with relatives in Michigan, potentially. 

And I am hoping . . . that [Father] will be able to be involved in that at 

some point.” The statement merely expressed a belief of what may be 

best for D.S.L. and a hope that Father could be involved. Again, it was 

not the basis for the juvenile court’s ruling.

3. Support system and services

Father additionally argues that his support system was not 

explored as a means to assist in D.S.L.’s safe return. Amici curiae take 

this argument a step further, asserting that Father was not provided 

with adequate reunification services tailored to his needs.

We note that Father did not object to the juvenile court’s finding 

that reasonable services were provided, or otherwise argue at the 
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subject hearing that possible supports were not adequately considered. 

We thus consider the issues forfeited. (See In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 

Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 [issue of inadequate reunification services 

waived by failure to object]; In re Kevin S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 

885 [asserted error in reasonable services finding waived by failure to 

object].) Amici curiae’s argument about inadequate services does 

nothing to change this conclusion. (See People v. Hannon (2016) 5 

Cal.App.5th 94, 105 [“Courts generally do not consider new issues 

raised in amicus curiae briefs”]; Crump v. Appellate Division of 

Superior Court (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 222, 251, fn. 11 [accord].)

Even if the issues were properly raised, however, we would find 

no grounds for reversal. A finding of reasonable services is reviewed for 

substantial evidence. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 

Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) The appellate court views the evidence and 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s

ruling. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) In analyzing a 

reasonable services finding, the court “recognize[s] that in most cases 

more services might have been provided, and the services which are 

provided are often imperfect. The standard is not whether the services 

provided were the best that might have been provided, but whether 

they were reasonable under the circumstances.” (Elijah R. v. Superior 

Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.)

The juvenile court’s finding of reasonable services was supported 

by substantial evidence. Father’s case plan included monitored 

visitation, parenting classes for special needs children, individual 

counseling, and attendance and participation in D.S.L.’s appointments. 

In concurrently ordering the psychological and neurological report, the 

court’s concern was how Father’s “developmental and cognitive” 

abilities “may affect care for a child with high medical needs.” The plan 

thus focused on services that would provide Father with the 

opportunity to learn to care for a fragile young child, and the record 

shows that these services were provided. In attending D.S.L.’s 
21

appointments, for example, and in conjunction with his other services,

Father had ample occasion to learn of D.S.L.’s medical needs and the 

level of care and attention required to best ensure his well-being. As 

already explained, however, after many months of attending 

appointments and receiving services, Father still demonstrated an 

inability to understand or provide an adequate level of care for D.S.L. 

Father does not show that the fault lay with the services.

Finally, Father, in his petition, contends that his mother was not 

considered as a potential support for him. The record demonstrates, 

however, that exploration of Father’s mother as support was conducted 

by DCFS, and that examination revealed that she had an extensive

child welfare history of her own. It is not realistic to assume that 

further exploration of Father’s support system would have resulted in a 

more favorable outcome.

II. Visitation ruling

Father’s last argument is that the juvenile court erred when it 

declined to liberalize his visits from monitored to unmonitored at the 

six-month review hearing. We review the juvenile court’s visitation 

order for an abuse of discretion. (In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 

1070.)

“Visitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the 

well-being of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Nevertheless, “[n]o 

visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. 

(a)(1)(B).)

Given the unique fragility of D.S.L.’s health, as well as the 

abundant evidence that Father was not able to adequately care for him, 

as discussed above, the juvenile court could reasonably find that 

unmonitored visitation would jeopardize D.S.L.’s safety. Father thus 

fails to show an abuse of discretion.
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DISPOSITION

The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. This opinion shall 

become final immediately upon filing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.490(b)(2)(A).)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.