UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT CRICKET D. KNEECE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 96-1977 SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District Judge. (CA-94-2309) Submitted: March 18, 1997 Decided: June 2, 1997 Before WILKINS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________ Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL Mary J. Wiesen-Kosinski, Aiken, South Carolina, for Appellant. Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, J. Rene Josey, United States Attorney, Mary Ann Sloan, Acting Chief Counsel, Region IV, Mack A. Davis, Acting Deputy Chief Counsel, Ronald L. Paxton,Assistant Regional Counsel, Renata Turner, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of General Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee.Unpublished opinions are not binding pr ecedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________ OPINION PER CURIAM: Cricket D. Kneece filed an application for S upplemental Security Income in March 1992, alleging disability due to a mental condition commencing in 1971, the year she was born. After a hearing, theAdministrative Law Judge (ALJ) decided that Kneece was not disabled under the Social Security Act b ecause she is able to perform her past relevant work and has the functional capacity to perform at least some repetitive and routine work. The Appeals Council denied Kneece's request for review. The ALJ's decision then became the Secretary's final decision. Kneece filed a complaint in the district court challenging the finaldecision of the Secretary. The magistrate judge recommended affirming the Secretary's determination and the district court adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation. Kneece appealed. We review the Secretary's final decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied. See42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West Supp. 1996); Hays v. Sullivan , 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Kn eece claims thatsubstantial evidence does not support the ALJ's finding that her psychological problems are not disabling. There was evidence in the record suggesting that Kneece suffers psychological problems which have made it difficult for her to hold a job. However, there was also evidence that Kneece functioned well in a gr oup home for unwed mothers, that she had some work experience, and that she believed she could care for an infant child. The ALJ thoroughly evaluated the evidence and gave specific reasons for her determination. See Hammond v. Heckler , 765 F.2d 424, 426 (4th Cir. 1985). B ecause weconclude that the Secretary's decision is supported by substantial evidence and was based on the correct legal standards, we will not disturb that decision. Hays , 907 F.2d at 1456.
2Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. We dispensewith oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED 3