UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

KEITH THOMPSON,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIE SMITH,

Respondent. 

/

Case Number: 2:09-CV-11609

HON. NANCY G. EDMUNDS

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner Keith Thompson has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. At the

time he filed his petition, Petitioner was incarcerated at the Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility

in Ionia, Michigan. He has since been unconditionally discharged from confinement. 

Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the unconditional discharge renders the

petition moot. 

I.

Petitioner was convicted of manslaughter in Wayne County Circuit Court. On September

19, 1995, he was sentenced to ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment. 

In 2006, Petitioner pleaded guilty in Arenac County Circuit Court to aggravated assault

of a prison employee. On January 9, 2007, he was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, to be

served consecutively to his manslaughter sentence. 

Petitioner filed the pending habeas petition on April 29, 2009. He raises the following

claim:
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Should the District Court direct or order immediate release from unlawful

imprisonment in custody in the Michigan Department of Corrections agency of

false imprisonment in accordance with their own policy “03.01.135

Discharge/Termination of Sentence” after discharging from state prison sentence

and award monetary damage for physical and mental and emotional stress for

each and every day held beyond discharge date in the agency?

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss. Petitioner has filed a response to the motion to

dismiss. 

II.

Petitioner does not attack the validity of his conviction in his petition. Instead, he argues

that he is being incarcerated beyond the expiration of his sentence. He seeks immediate release

and monetary damages. In his motion to dismiss, Respondent argues that, because Petitioner has

been unconditionally released from his sentence, his petition is now moot. 

Article III, § 2, of the Constitution requires the existence of a case or controversy through

all stages of federal judicial proceedings. This case or controversy requirement means that,

throughout the litigation, the plaintiff “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury

traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Lewis v.

Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). 

“[A] prisoner's ‘challenge to the validity of his conviction always satisfies the

case-or-controversy requirement, because the incarceration (or the restriction imposed by the

terms of the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by

invalidation of the conviction.’” Demis v. Sniezek, 558 F.3d 508, 513 (6th Cir. 2009), quoting

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). Once a prisoner's sentence has expired, however, “some

concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole – some

‘collateral consequence’ of the conviction – must exist if the suit is to be maintained.” Id. A
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habeas petition challenging a conviction is not mooted by the petitioner's release from prison

prior to the court's determination, because the petitioner could still face “significant collateral

consequences flow[ing] from a criminal conviction.” Gentry v. Deuth, 456 F.3d 687, 694 (6th

Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). Collateral consequences of a conviction are presumed. Id. In

contrast, a habeas petition challenging only a sentence is mooted by the petitioner’s release from

prison unless a petitioner can show sufficient “collateral effects.” Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S.

624, 631 (1982). Collateral consequences are not presumed when a petitioner challenges only an

expired sentence. Id. “Nullification of a conviction may have important benefits for a defendant

. . . but urging in a habeas corpus proceeding the correction of a sentence already served is

another matter.” North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 248 (1971). In this case, Petitioner

challenges only the sentence imposed and that sentence has expired. He has not alleged any

collateral effects of the sentence itself. Therefore, his unconditional release moots the petition. 

Accord Bomasuto v. Perlman, --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 2010 WL 271262, * 7-8 (W.D. N.Y. Jan 19,

2010) (dismissing habeas petition as moot where petitioner challenged only an expired sentence

and not the conviction itself). 

Moreover, money damages also are not available through a habeas petition. See Preiser

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973) (“If a state prisoner is seeking damages, he is attacking

something other than immediate or more speedy release – the traditional purpose of habeas

corpus. In the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal

remedy.”) 
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III.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not proceed unless a

certificate of appealability (COA) is issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Rule 11 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings now requires that the Court “must issue or deny a

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” 

A COA may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The substantial showing threshold is satisfied

when a petitioner demonstrates “that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment

of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

In this case, the Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not debate the Court’s

conclusion that the petition is moot. Therefore, the Court denies a certificate of appealability.

IV.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss [dkt. #8] is

GRANTED and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus [dkt # 1] is DISMISSED. 

It is further ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED. 

s/Nancy G. Edmunds 

Nancy G. Edmunds

United States District Judge

Dated: February 18, 2010

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on

February 18, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Carol A. Hemeyer 

Case Manager