NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of: 

CELINA WILLIAMSON,

Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

THEODORE R. WILLIAMSON, 

Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 19-0325 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County

No. S1400DO200901511

The Honorable John P. Plante, Judge Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Vida A Florez-Warner Attorney at Law, Yuma

By Vida Z. Florez-Warner

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Torok Law Office, PLLC, Yuma

By Gregory T. Torok

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

FILED 6-16-2020
WILLIAMSON v. WILLIAMSON

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 On June 7, 2011, the superior court dissolved the marriage of 

Theodore R. Williamson ("Theodore") and Celina Williamson ("Celina")

pursuant to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Theodore appeals the 

family court's denial of his motion to vacate that decree, arguing that the 

family court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the marriage at issue 

was void. For the reasons herein, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On November 12, 2009, Celina filed a petition for dissolution 

of the marriage. Over a year later, in January 2011, Theodore moved to 

dismiss Celina's petition, arguing that the marriage was void because 

Celina was still married to her former husband and her marriage to 

Theodore was bigamous. Subsequently, Theodore and Celina entered into 

an agreement under Rule 69,

1 Theodore withdrew his petition to dismiss,

and the court entered the decree of dissolution. Theodore's counsel

expressly informed the family court that counsel "explained to [Theodore] 

that if he withdraws that petition that [the] matter will be moot and the 

divorce will go forward." 

¶3 In August 2011, shortly after the decree was entered, Celina 

filed a petition to enforce the decree of dissolution, arguing that Theodore 

was not complying with its terms. In response, Theodore filed a petition to 

vacate the decree of dissolution, again arguing that his marriage to Celina 

was void because she was already married to another person when she 

married Theodore. Eventually the parties resolved their dispute with

another Rule 69 agreement, and the court dismissed "[a]ll post-decree 

actions" with prejudice, including Theodore's post-decree petition to vacate 

the decree of dissolution.

1 Throughout this decision, "Rule" refers to the Arizona Rules of 

Family Law Procedure.
WILLIAMSON v. WILLIAMSON

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 The court resolved still more post-decree petitions to enforce 

the dissolution decree and entered a judgment against Theodore on April 

6, 2016. On October 6, 2016, Theodore moved to vacate the June 2011 decree 

of dissolution, the April 6, 2016 judgment, and all other orders in the case.

Theodore repeated his earlier argument that the family court lacked 

subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the decree of dissolution because his 

putative marriage to Celina was bigamous.

¶5 The court held a hearing on the motion. Despite "considerable 

evidence" supporting Theodore's claim that his marriage to Celina was 

bigamous, the court ruled the argument had "been waived more than once,"

and found no good cause to set aside the decree of dissolution or the other

orders. Theodore timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. 

§ 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Theodore argues that the family court erred in denying his 

motion to vacate the decree of dissolution because it lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Theodore 

also argues that all post-decree orders, including the April 2016 judgment,

are void because the family court lacked authority to enter the decree. We 

first address the threshold issue of subject-matter jurisdiction.

¶7 We review challenges to the family court's subject-matter 

jurisdiction de novo. Duckstein v. Wolf, 230 Ariz. 227, 231, ¶ 8 (App. 2012). 

Subject-matter jurisdiction is "the power to hear and determine cases of the 

general class to which the particular proceedings belong[.]" Glover v. Glover, 

231 Ariz. 1, 5, ¶ 18 (App. 2012) (citation omitted). Subject-matter 

jurisdiction is "conferred by our constitution or statutes" and "cannot be 

vested in a court solely by waiver or estoppel." Id. at 5-6, ¶ 18.

¶8 We may affirm the family court for any reason supported by 

the record. Pettit v. Pettit, 218 Ariz. 529, 531, ¶ 4 (App. 2008). While subjectmatter jurisdiction cannot be waived, Glover, 231 Ariz. at 5-6, ¶ 18, the 

family court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this case even if 

Theodore's marriage to Celina was bigamous. 

¶9 Theodore incorrectly argues that the family court lacks any 

authority over a void marriage. Arizona law specifically vests superior 

courts with the jurisdiction to "adjudge a marriage to be null and void when 

the cause alleged constitutes an impediment rendering the marriage void." 

A.R.S. § 25-301. "The jurisdictional requirements and procedure for 

obtaining an annulment shall be the same as if the matter were one for 
WILLIAMSON v. WILLIAMSON

Decision of the Court

4

dissolution of marriage." A.R.S. § 25-302(A). As outlined in these statutory 

provisions, the family court has jurisdiction to dissolve or annul putative 

marriages even assuming that the marriage is void ab initio. The family 

court also has the authority to divide property between the parties and 

establish rights regarding children even when annulling a void marriage. 

A.R.S. § 25-302(B). Accordingly, even if Theodore's claim was proven, the 

family court retained subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. 

¶10 More substantively, Theodore argues that the decree of 

dissolution was wrongly entered as a result of Celina's allegedly fraudulent 

divorce documentation. Though Theodore cites no Rule in either his

motion or his briefing on appeal, we presume his motion to vacate the 

decree was made under Rule 85(b)(3), which allows a party to move for 

relief from a final judgment on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation. 

Motions for relief from judgment due to a party's alleged fraud or 

misrepresentation must be made "no more than 6 months after the entry of 

the judgment[.]" Rule 85(c)(1). The family court properly denied 

Theodore's motion to vacate the decree because it was filed nearly five years 

after the entry of the divorce decree. See Quijada v. Quijada, 246 Ariz. 217, 

220, ¶ 7 n.4 (App. 2019) (noting that Rule 85 motions based on mistake, 

newly discovered evidence, or fraud are time-barred if brought more than 

six months after judgment).

¶11 Finally, even if Theodore's motion were timely, his argument 

has been waived. Theodore was informed by his counsel that the decision 

to withdraw his original petition to dismiss would "moot" the argument he 

now attempts to forward. Theodore later consented to a Rule 69 order 

which dismissed this argument with prejudice. Theodore claims waiver 

does not apply to challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction. But, as noted 

above, the family court had subject-matter jurisdiction. 

¶12 Theodore also appeals the family court's denial of his motion

to vacate certain post-decree orders, including the April 2016 judgment. He

argues these orders should be set aside because the decree of dissolution is 

void. Because these arguments are contingent on Theodore's untimely 

challenge to the underlying decree, we also reject them.
WILLIAMSON v. WILLIAMSON

Decision of the Court

5

CONCLUSION

¶13 We affirm the family court's orders in all respects. We deny 

Celina's request for reasonable attorney fees because she cites no

supporting authority. See In re Marriage of Kassa, 231 Ariz. 592, 594, ¶ 7 

(App. 2013).