FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-3770

_____________________________

DAVID CHARLES SUSSMAN,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit for Leon County. 

Charles W. Dodson, Judge.

June 7, 2019

PER CURIAM.

Appellant David Charles Sussman has challenged a prison 

disciplinary report and an order of sanctions entered by the trial 

court. We affirm the trial court’s decision to deny his petition for 

writ of mandamus without comment. We agree with Mr. Sussman, 

however, that the record does not presently support the sanctions

order prohibiting him from all future pro se filings. 

During the course of litigating the petition for writ of 

mandamus, the Department of Corrections filed a motion for 

sanctions. The trial court issued an order requiring Appellant to 

show cause as to why he should not “be prohibited from filing 

future pro se pleadings in this case.” The rationale in the show 

cause order for considering sanctions was that Appellant had filed 
2

repetitious and frivolous pleadings. The order also noted that 

Appellant had filed fifteen causes of action, including ten during 

the last three years. The court attached a printout showing the list 

of cases Appellant had filed, four of which were still open cases. 

The printout did not indicate the nature of the closed cases, or how 

they had been resolved. 

In response to the show cause order, Appellant contended that 

his pleadings weren’t abusive, and that only three of the cases 

listed by the trial court had been decided adversely against him. 

After receiving Appellant’s response, the court concluded that the 

actions were repetitious and frivolous and prohibited him from pro 

se “commencing any actions in [the Circuit Court for Leon 

County],” except for bona fide habeas corpus petitions. 

Litigants “abuse[] the right to pro se access by filing 

repetitious and frivolous pleadings, thereby diminishing the 

ability of the courts to devote their finite resources to the 

consideration of legitimate claims.” State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47, 

48 (Fla. 1999). Accordingly, “[c]ourts may, upon a demonstration of 

egregious abuse of the judicial process, restrict parties from filing 

pro se pleadings with the court.” Spencer v. State, 717 So. 2d 95, 

96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (emphasis added). However, “a trial court’s 

exercise of its duty to limit abuses of court processes in order to 

preserve the access to courts for all litigants must be undertaken 

in consideration of the constitutional rights of the pro se litigant in 

each case.” Edwards v. State, 192 So. 3d 522, 524 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2016).

In this case, Appellant was prohibited from filing any new 

actions pro se, after the show cause order had warned of a more 

limited, case-specific sanction. With respect to Appellant’s 

litigation history, his response to the show cause order indicated

that most of the fifteen cases cited by the trial court either 

remained pending or were decided in his favor. Based on this 

limited record, we cannot conclude that the severe sanction of a 

total prohibition on pro se filings is supported by the record.

Accordingly, we reverse the order prohibiting Appellant from 

commencing pro se actions. On remand, the trial court may again 

consider sanctions, but must show how Appellant abused the 
3

judicial process by more than just reciting the number of cases he 

has filed. 

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

WOLF, OSTERHAUS, and JAY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

David Charles Sussman, Appellant, pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kristen J. Lonergan, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.