alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
230 So.2d 234

#### JIM WALTER CORPORATION, a Corp., et al. v. George W. GREEN.

6 Div. 483.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Jan. 8, 1970.

R. A. Norred, Birmingham, Capell, Howard, Knabe & Cobbs, Montgomery, for appellants.

Bill Fite, Hamilton, for appellee.

COLEMAN, Justice.

On a prior appeal in this case, we reversed the decree from which the appeal had been taken and remanded the cause to-the trial court. Jim Walter Corporation v. Green, 280 Ala. 272, 192 So.2d 724, decided December 8, 1966.

After remandment, further proceedings, were had in the trial court where another decree was rendered on February 15, 1967. The instant appeal is taken from the 1967' decree, rendition of which is assigned as, error.

During pendency of the instant appeal, appellant applied to this court for mandamus to require the trial judge to vacate the decree rendered February 15,. *1771967. This court granted the petition for peremptory writ and ordered the trial judge to vacate the decree rendered February 15, 1967. -Ex parte Jim Walter Corporation, 283 Ala. 295, 216 So.2d 183.

The decision in 283 Ala. 295, 216 So.2d 183 disposes of the issue presented by this appeal, and the question for decision has become moot.

The general rule in this state, as well as elsewhere, is that if, pending an appeal, an event occurs which makes determination of it unnecessary, or renders it clearly impossible to grant effective relief, the appeal will be dismissed. Coleman v. Mange, 238 Ala. 141, 143, 189 So. 749. Nor will this court render judgment on an appeal which has become moot merely for the purpose of ascertaining who is liable for the costs. Campbell v. Shelby County, 147 Ala. 703, 41 So. 407.

Appeal dismissed.

LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON, BLOODWORTH and McCALL, JJ., concur.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 156 (Tuesday, August 12, 2008)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 46818]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-18501]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Defense Acquisition Regulations System

48 CFR Part 225

RIN 0750-AF89


Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Trade 
Agreements--New Thresholds (DFARS Case 2007-D023)

AGENCY: Defense Acquisition Regulations System, Department of Defense 
(DoD).

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: DoD has adopted as final, without change, an interim rule 
amending the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 
to incorporate increased dollar thresholds for application of the World 
Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement and the Free Trade 
Agreements, as determined by the United States Trade Representative.

DATES: Effective Date: August 12, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Amy Williams, Defense Acquisition 
Regulations System, OUSD (AT&L) DPAP (DARS), IMD 3D139, 3062 Defense 
Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-3062. Telephone 703-602-0328; facsimile 
703-602-7887. Please cite DFARS Case 2007-D023.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

A. Background

    DoD published an interim DFARS rule at 73 FR 4115 on January 24, 
2008, to reflect increased dollar thresholds for application of the 
trade agreements. Every two years, the trade agreement thresholds are 
escalated according to a pre-determined formula set forth in the 
agreements.
    DoD received no comments on the interim rule. Therefore, DoD has 
adopted the interim rule as a final rule without change.
    This rule was not subject to Office of Management and Budget review 
under Executive Order 12866, dated September 30, 1993.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    DoD certifies that this final rule will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities within the 
meaning of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601, et seq., 
because the trade agreement threshold changes are designed to keep pace 
with inflation and thus maintain the status quo.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

    This rule affects the certification and information collection 
requirements in the provisions at DFARS 252.225-7020 and 252.225-7035, 
currently approved under Office of Management and Budget Control Number 
0704-0229. The impact, however, is negligible. The dollar threshold 
changes are in line with inflation and maintain the status quo.

List of Subjects in 48 CFR Part 225

    Government procurement.

Michele P. Peterson,
Editor, Defense Acquisition Regulations System.

Interim Rule Adopted as Final Without Change

0
Accordingly, the interim rule amending 48 CFR part 225, which was 
published at 73 FR 4115 on January 24, 2008, is adopted as a final rule 
without change.

[FR Doc. E8-18501 Filed 8-11-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-08-P
EXHIBIT 21.1
------------



SUBSIDIARIES OF THE COMPANY


                                                                  COMPANY'S 
                                                 JURISDICTION     PERCENTAGE
NAME OF SUBSIDIARY                             OF INCORPORATION   OWNERSHIP 
------------------                             ----------------   ----------

AMLI Residential Properties, L.P.. . . . . . .     Delaware           85%
  A.   AMLI Residential Construction, Inc. . .     Delaware           95%
  B.   AMLI Institutional Advisors, Inc. . . .     Illinois           95%
  C.   AMLI Management Company . . . . . . . .     Delaware           95%
  D.   Laurel Park Venture . . . . . . . . . .     Georgia           100%
  E.   Pleasant Hill Joint Venture . . . . . .     Georgia            40%
  F.   AMLI Foundation Co-Investors, L.P.  . .     Delaware           25%
  G.   AMLI Foundation Co-Investors-II,
         L. P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     Delaware           15%
  H.   AMLI at Champions, L.P. . . . . . . . .     Texas              15%
  I.   AMLI at Windbrooke, L.P.  . . . . . . .     Illinois           15%
  J.   AMLI at Willeo Creek, L.P.  . . . . . .     Georgia            30%
  K.   Barrett Lakes, L.L.C. . . . . . . . . .     Delaware           35%
  L.   AMLI at Chevy Chase, L.P. . . . . . . .     Illinois           33%
  M.   AMLI at Willowbrook, L.P. . . . . . . .     Illinois           40%
  N.   AMLI at River Exchange, L.L.C.. . . . .     Delaware           40%
  O.   Acquiport/Aurora Crossing, L.P. . . . .     Delaware           25%
  P.   Acquiport/Fossil Creek, L.P.. . . . . .     Delaware           25%
  Q.   AMLI at Danada, L.L.C.. . . . . . . . .     Illinois           10%
  R.   AMLI at Verandah, L.P.. . . . . . . . .     Delaware           35%
  S.   Gardner Drive Limited Liability 
       Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     Delaware           35%
  T.   AMLI at Regents Crest, L.P. . . . . . .     Delaware           25%
  U.   Park Creek-Gainsville, L.L.C. . . . . .     Georgia           100%
  V.   Timberglen, L.P.. . . . . . . . . . . .     Delaware           40%
  W.   AMLI Partners Ltd. 85-IV. . . . . . . .     Illinois            1%
  X.   AMLI Towne Creek Crossing L.P.. . . . .     Georgia             1%
  Y.   Lantana Apartments, Ltd.. . . . . . . .     Texas             100%
  Z.   Windsor Plano Partners, Ltd.. . . . . .     Texas             100%
  AA.  AMLI at Conner Farms, L.P.. . . . . . .     Delaware          100%
  AB.  Clairmont, L.P. . . . . . . . . . . . .     Delaware          100%
  AC.  Wells Oakhurst, L.P.. . . . . . . . . .     Delaware           25%
  AD.  AMLI Parkway, L.P.. . . . . . . . . . .     Texas              25%
  AE.  AMLI Castle Creek, L.P. . . . . . . . .     Delaware           40%
  AF.  Acquiport/Clearwater, L.P.. . . . . . .     Delaware           25%
  AG.  AMLI Creekside, L.P.. . . . . . . . . .     Delaware           25%
  AH.  AMLI Deerfield, L.P.. . . . . . . . . .     Texas              25%
  AI.  Acquiport/Wynnewood, L.P. . . . . . . .     Delaware           25%
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

 

RONALD DUANE DIEBEL

Plaintiff,

Case No. 09-CV-13741

vs.

HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH

DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Defendant.

________________________________/

ORDER DISMISSING SHOW CAUSE [DOC. 3]

The court issued an Order to Show Cause on March 19, 2010 ordering plaintiff to

show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The show

cause order was later held in abeyance, extending the time for plaintiff to effectuate service

of process on defendant through April 13, 2010 [Doc. 5]. Plaintiff has submitted proof to

the court that he served defendant, via a process server, on April 7, 2010. A return of

service was filed on April 13, 2010. Plaintiff having satisfied the court’s Order to Show

Cause, now therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Order to Show Cause be dismissed. 

Dated: April 15, 2010

S/George Caram Steeh 

GEORGE CARAM STEEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on

April 15, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Marcia Beauchemin

Deputy Clerk
**Exhibit31**

 

**EXCHANGE ACT RULE 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Takuya Watanabe, certify that:

 

I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K, andall reports on Form 8-K containing distribution or servicing reports filed inrespect of periods included in the year covered by this annual report, ofYamaha Motor Receivables Corporation (Depositor with respect to the YamahaMotor Master Trust) on behalf of the Yamaha Motor Master Trust (collectively,the “Reports”);

 

Based on my knowledge, the information in the Reports,taken as a whole, does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in lightof the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading asof the last day of the period covered by this annual report;

 

Based on my knowledge, the distribution or servicinginformation required to be provided to the trustee by the servicer under theAmended and Restated Master Pooling and Servicing Agreement for inclusion inthe Reports is included in the Reports;

 

Based on my knowledge and upon the Annual Servicer’sCertificate appearing as Exhibit 99.2 to this annual report on Form 10-K andthe Annual Subservicer’s Certificate of GE Commercial Distribution Finance Corporationappearing as Exhibit 99.4 to this annual report on Form 10-K, and except asdisclosed in the Reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under theAmended and Restated Master Pooling and Servicing Agreement; and

 

The Reports****disclose all significant deficienciesrelated to the servicer’s compliance with the minimum servicing standards basedupon the report provided by an independent public accountant, after conductinga review in compliance with the Uniform Single Attestation Program for MortgageBankers or similar procedure, as set forth in the Amended and Restated MasterPooling and Servicing Agreement, that is included in the Reports.

 

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonablyrelied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliatedparties:  the subservicer (GE CommercialDistribution Finance Corporation).

 

 
| Date:  June  14, 2004 |   |
|----------------------------|--------|
|                       |   |
|                       |   |
|                       | By:    |    /s/ TAKUYA WATANABE |   |
|                       |   | Takuya Watanabe |
|                       |   | Secretary Treasurer of Yamaha Motor  Receivables Corporation (Depositor with  respect to the Yamaha Motor Master Trust) |

 

----
Exhibit
99.4
   **Consent
of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**
 
 The
Board of Directors
 Call-Net
Enterprises Inc.
 
 We
consent to the use of our audit report dated February 21, 2005 on the
consolidated balance sheet of Call-Net Enterprises Inc. and subsidiaries as at
December 31, 2004 and the related consolidated statements of operations and
deficit and cash flows for the year ended December 31, 2004 included in this
annual report on Form 40-F.
 
 Our
report refers to our audit of the adjustments that were applied to revise the
2003 and 2002 consolidated financial statements, as more fully described in note
2 to the consolidated financial statements, in respect of the Company’s
retroactive adoption of changes in accounting principles relating to stock-based
compensation and other stock-based payments and asset retirement obligations.
However, we were not engaged to audit, review, or apply any procedures to the
2003 and 2002 consolidated financial statements other than with respect to such
adjustments.
 
 
 /s/
KPMG LLP
  Toronto,
Canada
 February
21, 2005
#### LEON v. KLEIN.

No. 13847.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Jan. 11, 1932.

Elias Bowsky, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Matthew A. Grace, of New Orleans, for ap-pellee.

JANVIER, J.

,Leon sues for $300 which he alleges is the value of certain articles which he left with Klein f«r safe-keeping in November, 1928. The articles consisted of an automobile battery recharger, certain shop equipment, and four very old automobiles.

Klein admits that he received the articles enumerated, but maintains that the battery recharger was sold by him, with plaintiff’s authorization, for the sum of $100, and that the four automobiles were removed by employees of plaintiff about a month after they were left with him. He also asserts that all of the property over which this suit results, had very little value.

Defendant contends that when the battery recharger was sold plaintiff knew that it brought only $100; that only $50 of the said amount was paid in cash, and that the said $50 was paid over to plaintiff by check, which check bore on its face a statement to the effect that it was to be received in full settlement for the battery recharger. *

There was introduced in evidence the check referred to and it is for the sum of $50 and it bears on its face the words, “In full settlement of recharger:” This check was indorsed and cashed by plaintiff, but he testified that when he cashed it the words above quoted were not on it

There is evidence, which was apparently believed by the trial judge, and which is corroborative of plaintiff’s testimony, and we cannot say that the-judgment based on this evidence is manifestly erroneous. In fact, we ourselves are still convinced from the evidence that the words which we have quoted and which now appear on the check were not there when the check was presented to plaintiff.'

The value of the property is doubtful, but since it was fixed by his honor below, we feel that the ends of justice will be best served by not interfering on a question of amount where the amount as fixed by the trial court is not manifestly erroneous.

Only questions of fact are. involved, and since the judgment appealed from is not patently incorrect, it is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
#### Hedda Helene SCHOELER, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 374, Docket 27414.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued June 13, 1962.

Decided July 23, 1962.

Edward L. Dubroff, Brooklyn, N. Y. (Albert J. Geduldig, New York City, on the brief), for petitioner.

Roy Babitt, Sp. Asst. U. S. Atty., New York City (Robert M. Morgenthau, U. S. Atty., on the brief), for respondent.

Before FRIENDLY, KAUFMAN and HAYS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner voluntarily admitted that she engaged in sexual relations for hire approximately fifteen times in a two month period and the hearing examiner was justified in crediting her admission rather than her subsequent denials. No significance is to be attached to the fact that petitioner was originally approached by an INS investigator in the anteroom of the New York City Magistrate’s Court where she was awaiting trial on a solicitation charge. See 8 U.S. C.A. § 1357(a) (1). The testimony of the arresting officer on the criminal charge to the effect that petitioner had offered to commit an act of prostitution with him was admissible to rebut petitioner’s defenses.

On the basis of the evidence before him, the hearing officer could reasonably have concluded that petitioner’s conduct was “a pattern of behavior or deliberate course of conduct entered into primarily for financial gain” rather than “a casual or isolated act.” 22 C.F.R. § 4191(a) (12) (Supp. 1960). See 8 U.S. C.A. §§ 1251(a) (12), 1182(a) (12). Any doubts we may have about the wisdom of proceeding against a fifty-three year old war refugee, since married to an American citizen, on the basis of a few acts of prostitution during a brief period of unemployment cannot justify setting aside a lawful administrative determination.

Dismissed.
NO. 07-04-0272-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TE XAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL B JUNE 3, 2004

______________________________ IN RE: DO NNIE L. F OX, RELA TOR

_________________________________ Before JOHNSON, C.J., and QUINN and CAMPBELL, JJ. MEMORAND UM OPINION Relator Donnie L. Fox seeks mandamus directed to respondent Eddi e A. Pigg, Jr ., Warden of the Marshall Formby Unit of the Texas Dep artment of Corrections, requiring responden t and his agents to stop interfering with relator’s correspondence with his common-law wife a nd to r efrain from taking actions in the future to prevent relator from seeking redress o f complai nts. Relator’s a pplication for writ of mandamus doe s not seek to invoke this court’s a p pellatejurisdiction. Nor does it assert that mandamus should issue (1) to protect the court’s jurisdiction, or (2) against a judge of or acting withi n the area comprising the seventh judicial appellate dist rict. Thus, we do not have jurisdiction to issue mandamus-2-

directed to respon dent. See T EX . C ONST . art. V, § 6; T EX . G OV ’ T . C ODE A NN . § 22.22 1(a), (b) (Verno n 1988 a nd Supp. 2004). We dismis s for wan t of jurisd iction.

Phil Johnson Chief Justice
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DAVID WILLIAM SLEETS,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 140 MAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 30th day of July, 2019

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. James B. CRISMON, Appellant.

No. 67976.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Southern Division.

Nov. 28, 1996.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Feb. 7, 1996.

Charles M. Shaw, Clayton, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Penney R. Rector, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before REINHARD, P.J., and GRIMM and AHRENS, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Defendant James Crismon appeals the judgment entered upon his convictions by a jury for two counts of possession of a vehicle with a defaced vehicle identification number, § 301.390, RSMo 1994. He was sentenced, in accordance with the jury’s assessment, to two consecutive one year terms of imprisonment and two $5,000 fines.

No jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum opinion for their information only, set*805ting forth the facts and reasons for this order.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 30.25(b).
Exhibit 32
 Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and
 2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of Corporate Property Associates 17  Global
Incorporated.
  /s/ Gordon F. DuGanGordon F. DuGan
Chief Executive Officer  /s/ Mark J. DeCesarisMark J. DeCesaris
Acting Chief Financial Officer
#### SCOTT et al. v. DAUBERT et al.

No. 16006.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Feb. 4, 1935.

Hugh M. Wilkinson and A. Miles Coe, both of New Orleans, for appellant Mrs. Edna Mitchell.

Rittenberg & Rittenberg, of New Orleans for appellant Wm. Daubert.

M. O. Seharff. of New Orleans, for appel-lees.

PER CURIAM.

Mrs. Edna Mitchell, codefendant with William Daubert, through her attorneys, filed a motion to dismiss, the appeal of William Daubert upon the ground that it was filed in this court too late.

Defendant obtained an order for a devolu-tive appeal on December 7, 1934, from a judgment rendered in the civil district court on October 23, 1934, and in that order the return day was fixed as the 4th day of January, 1935. No order of extension was obtained and the transcript of appeal was not filed in this court until January 19, 1935. It is apparent, therefore, that the appeal must be considered as having been abandoned because filed too late. Roussel v. Guiterrez, 12 La. App. 701, 127 So. 1; Hotard v. Consolidated Companies, Inc., 14 La. App. 670, 130 So. 662; Schenck v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 15 La. App. 19, 130 So. 873.

For the reasons assigned, it is ordered that the motion to dismiss the appeal be sustained and the appeal dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

March 23, 2009 

0316 

Order 

 

March 23, 2009 

138035 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 138035 

 COA: 288078 

Saginaw CC: 05-026815-FC 

CHRISTOPHER BEAU STEUDLE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 13, 2008 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Exhibit 32.1 

 

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

**PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, David Sikora, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of Pervasive Software Inc. on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2003 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Pervasive Software Inc. 

 

By: /s/ DavidSikora
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1466

ANTHONY T. WATSON,

 Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., as Successor by Merger to BAC Home 

Loans Servicing L.P. formerly known as Countrywide Home 

Loans Servicing, L.P.,

 Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District 

Judge. (8:14-cv-01335-PJM)

Submitted: September 24, 2015 Decided: October 23, 2015

Before SHEDD, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Anthony T. Watson, Appellant Pro Se. Craig Robert Haughton, 

MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Anthony T. Watson appeals the district court’s order 

dismissing his civil complaint for failure to state a claim. We 

have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. 

Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district 

court. Watson v. Bank of Am., No. 8:14-cv-01335-PJM (D. Md., 

Mar. 30, 2015). We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED