1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

Carol A. Kennedy,

Plaintiff,

v. Honorable Sean F. Cox

Global Engine Manufacturing Case No. 09-13585

Alliance LLC, a Michigan corporation,

Defendant.

_______________________________________/

OPINION & ORDER

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AS TO PLAINTIFF’S GENDER DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

In this employment discrimination action, Plaintiff Carol Kennedy (“Plaintiff” or

“Kennedy”) alleges that her former employer unlawfully terminated her based upon her gender. 

The matter is currently before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The

parties have fully briefed the issues and oral argument was heard on December 16, 2010. As

explained below, the Court shall DENY the motion because Plaintiff has: 1) established a prima

facie case of gender discrimination; and 2) submitted sufficient evidence from which a

reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant’s proffered reason for terminating Plaintiff was a

pretext for unlawful gender discrimination. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Global Engine Manufacturing Alliance, LLC and

Chrysler Group LLC on September 10, 2009. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserts the

following counts against Defendants: “Age Discrimination in Violation of the Age
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Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.” (Count I); “Age Discrimination in

Violation of the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. 37.2101 et seq.” (Count II);

“Sex Discrimination in Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §

2000(e) et seq.” (Count III); “Gender Discrimination in Violation of the Michigan Elliott- Larsen

Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. 37.2101 et seq.” (Count IV); “Retaliation in Violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq.” (Count V); and “Retaliation in

Violation of the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. 37.2101 et seq.” (Count VI). 

Plaintiff later dismissed her claims against Chrysler. (Docket Entry No. 8). In

responding to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff agrees that her age

discrimination and retaliation claims should be dismissed. (See Docket Entry No. 23 at 1). 

Thus, only her gender discrimination claims (Counts III and IV) remain.

This Court’s practice guidelines for motions for summary judgment provide, in pertinent

part, that:

a. The moving party’s papers shall include a separate document entitled

Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute. The statement shall list in separately

numbered paragraphs concise statements of each undisputed material fact,

supported by appropriate citations to the record. . .

b. In response, the opposing party shall file a separate document entitled

Counter-Statement of Disputed Facts. The counter-statement shall list in

separately numbered paragraphs following the order or the movant’s statement,

whether each of the facts asserted by the moving party is admitted or denied and

shall also be supported by appropriate citations to the record. The CounterStatement shall also include, in a separate section, a list of each issue of material

fact as to which it is contended there is a genuine issue for trial.

c. All material facts as set forth in the Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute

shall be deemed admitted unless controverted in the Counter-Statement of

Disputed Facts.

Both parties complied with the Court’s practice guidelines for motions for summary judgment
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such that: 1) Defendant filed a Statement of Material Facts (“Def.’s Stmt.”) and 2) Plaintiff filed

a Counter-Statement (“Pl.’s Stmt.”).

Summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. In deciding

a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In keeping with this standard, below is a summary of the

evidence submitted by the parties, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmoving party.

Defendant Global Engine Manufacturing Alliance, LLC (“GEMA”) was a joint venture

between Chrysler LLC (“Old CarCo”), Mitsubishi, and Hyundai. (Def.’s Stmt. at ¶ 1; Pl.’s Stmt.

at ¶ 1).

Plaintiff was employed by GEMA as its Human Resources Director. (Def.’s Stmt. at ¶ 4;

Kennedy Dep. at 111). 

Plaintiff initially began working at GEMA in June 2008 as a contract employee through

HR Management. (Def.’s Stmt. at ¶ 5; Kennedy Dep. at 99-100). Plaintiff was told that she

would be brought on as an employee of GEMA if her performance during her first 90 days of

employment was satisfactory. (Kennedy Dep. at 99-100).

Bruce Baumbach (“Baumbach”) was the GEMA Plant Manager and was Plaintiff’s direct

supervisor. (Def.’s Stmt. at ¶ 11; Kennedy Dep. at 115-16 & 120).

Plaintiff testified that on September 15, 1008, Baumbach informed her that her work

performance was superior and that she would be made a full-time employee. (Kennedy Dep. at
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221-22). GEMA hired Plaintiff as a direct employee on September 15, 2008. (Def.’s Stmt. at ¶

6; Kennedy Dep. at 111). Plaintiff testified that she was told that she was being hired as a

GEMA employee, that she “was told specifically that [she] would report as a GEMA employee”

and that she would report to Baumbach. (Kennedy Dep. at 115-16).

Fred Castelvetere (“Castelvetere”) was an employee of Old CarCo, whose job title was

Senior HR Manager. He was responsible for helping launch the GEMA facility and on behalf of

GEMA he negotiated the collective bargaining agreement with the UAW. (Def.’s Stmt. at ¶ 18;

Pl.’s Stmt. at ¶ 18).

In January of 2009, Plaintiff met Castelvetere for the first time. Plaintiff testified that, at

that meeting, Castelvetere told Plaintiff that she reported to him. (Kennedy Dep. at 115-16 &

151). She testified as follows:

A. . . . I introduced myself and then we sat down and within a minute or so he

said, let’s get something clear, and he stuck his finger right in my face,

and he said, you report to me now. And I said, no, I don’t. So we had a

dialogue around that.

. . . .

Q. Okay. Where did the conversation go from there? 

A. The conversation – I said, I don’t report to you. I report to Bruce

Baumbach. And he said, yes, you do. And he said, all the HR

managers report in to me. And I told him I’m not an HR manager. 

I’m an HR director. And I’m a GEMA employee. And – so the

conversation continued in the vain. I was uncomfortable with the

conversation. This is the first time I had met him. And all I

wanted to do was just ease the tension at that point.

Q. Do you recall any – anything else being discussed at this meeting?

A. Yes. He said he was not comfortable with women working in

manufacturing.

Q. Now, this is – this is a senior HR manager who you’re saying said to you

he’s not comfortable with women working in manufacturing?

A. Yes. He said women do not belong in manufacturing.

Q. All right. And did anybody overhear that statement?

A. That was made in his office behind closed doors.

Q. Okay. You realize how ludicrous that sounds. That somebody with 30
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years with a company who’s in human resource management, who has

promoted a number of women over the years, who knows what a protected

classification is going to be, you’re still contending that he made the

statement, women don’t belong in manufacturing?

MR. FETT: Object to form and foundation.

Q. You can answer.

A. Imagine how ludicrous it sounded hearing that.

Q. So you’re standing by it, that he made that statement?

A. I am absolutely standing by that statement.

(Kennedy Dep. at 124-26) (emphasis added).

Plaintiff testified that when she later questioned Baumbach about Castelvetere’s assertion

that she reported to him, Baumbach said “no, you don’t report to Fred, you report to me.” (Id.). 

Plaintiff testified that at no time did Baumbach ever tell her that she had a “dual reporting

relationship” or that she reported to Castelvetere. (Kennedy Dep. at 117).

On January 23, 2009, Baumbach sent Plaintiff a letter enclosing a bonus check and

stating “[t]his bonus award reflects your excellent performance in quality, delivery, costs, and

morale business metrics for this past year.” (Ex. B to Pl.’s Br.).

On February 10, 2009, Baumbach sent Plaintiff an e-mail stating, “I have revised your

2008 appraisal.” (Ex. C to Pl.’s Br.). Attached to that e-mail was a “Goal Agreement 2008" that

listed various team goals and indicated “Metrics are met” next to each goal listed.

Plaintiff testified that during April of 2009, she spoke with Castelvetere on the telephone

and he made additional derogatory comments about women working in manufacturing:

A. Yes. Fred called me on the telephone and was very angered and was

yelling at me and using profanity on the phone, telling me that I was

mishandling Union relations, wasn’t specific, he had to clean up my mess. 

He also told me this is exactly why women shouldn’t be in

manufacturing. He was very inappropriate and unprofessional on the

phone. . . 

Q. And his is in the April 2009 time period?

A. Yes.
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Q. Now, you said Fred used profanity. What was the profanity that he used?

A. He used the word fuck. He used the word you’re messed this damn thing

up. He’s used multiple words like that.

Q. Well, in what context – in what context did he use the word “fuck”?

A. He said, you have fucked this up. He was tired of cleaning up my damn

mess.

Q. Now, you said this is when he said, this is why women shouldn’t be in

manufacturing?

A. Correct.

. . . .

Q. Okay. Did he explain why he was making that comment to you?

A. He told me that I was fucking things up and he was not happy. That’s

what he said.

Q. Well, did he say, “And this is why women should not be in

manufacturing”?

A. He said, and this is why women should not be in manufacturing.

(Kennedy Dep. at 24-27) (emphasis added).

Plaintiff testified that she reported Castelvetere’s inappropriate comments about women

to Baumbach and others at GEMA. (Kennedy Dep. at 126-27, 148-151).

Castelvetere testified that he first talked to Baumbach about terminating Plaintiff in late

April or early May. (Castelvetere. Dep. at 40). Baumbach testified that about six weeks before

Plaintiff’s termination he received a call from Castelvetere, who “basically said that – that things

weren’t working out.” (Baumbach Dep. at 23). Baumbach testified:

A. . . . I asked him, you know, what are you talking about and he said, well, I

think we need to get rid of Carol because she just isn’t right for the job. 

And he said, I’m – you know, what do you think and I said, well – I said,

Fred, from my perspective which is a different perspective than his

perspective, she’s doing what I need her to do. Do I see as much

movement on litigation, on grievances, you know, as I’d like, no. Is it

moving in a better direction? I think it is. Is she doing the things that I

expect from her? Coming to work every day, getting her group to help us

with suggestions, getting her group to help us with communications, is she

doing that stuff? She’s doing that stuff. So I don’t see everything you do.

Q. Okay.

A. I said, Fred, if we need to move forward then I need more facts. You need to give

me more information. You need to tell me what is going wrong. And he said,
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well, he said, I just wanted to let you know I think we need to move in that

direction. I’m still getting all of my facts together.

(Baumbach Dep. at 23).

Castelvetere terminated Plaintiff on June 9, 2009. Plaintiff testified that Baumbach came

to see her earlier that morning, before she was terminated. (Kennedy Dep. at 60). She testified

that Baumbach told her that Castelvetere was going to terminate her and that he did not support

that decision:

Q. What did that conversation consist of?

A. He came to me early in the morning and he said that had been contacted

by Fred, and Fred was coming down that day to terminate my

employment. Bruce was extremely upset about it. He didn’t support it. 

He said he had had conversations with Fred Gettel and he was going to

make additional phone calls. But he didn’t feel comfortable with the

termination. He was very unhappy about the situation. And he was also

contacting his attorney because he didn’t want to be considered a party to

this, and he was protecting his interest as well.

(Kennedy Dep. at 60).

After terminating Plaintiff, Castelvetere drafted a “Memo To File” regarding Plaintiff’s

termination. (Ex. M to Pl.’s Br.). The memo stated that “Carol inquired why she wasn’t put on a

30, 60, 90 day review,” and that Castelvetere “explained that the job simply was not a good fit. 

Also, she never accepted the reporting relationship up through the Corporate Office . . .” 

Anna Barringer (“Barringer”) is a GEMA employee who worked in HR and reported to

Plaintiff. Barringer testified that Baumbach told her that he “didn’t have a part in the decision of

letting Carol go.” (Barringer Dep. at 20). 

ANALYSIS

A. Are Plaintiff’s Gender Claims Time-Barred?

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment asserts that Plaintiff’s claims are time-
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barred, based upon a contractual six-month limitations period.

When Plaintiff applied for employment with GEMA she signed and submitted a written

“Application for Employment.” (Ex. E to Def.’s Motion). Above the line for her signature, that

Application for Employment stated, in pertinent part:

In consideration of [GEMA’s] review of my application, I agree that any lawsuit

arising out of my employment with, or my application for employment with,

[GEMA] or any of its subsidiaries must be filed no more than six (6) months after

the date of the employment action that is the subject of the lawsuit.

(Id.).

Plaintiff’s only remaining claims in this action are her gender discrimination claims,

which are based upon her termination. Plaintiff was terminated on June 9, 2009, and filed this

action on September 10, 2009. Thus, Plaintiff filed this action within six months of the

employment action that is the subject of this lawsuit. 

B. Can GEMA Be Held Liable For Discrimination By Castelvetere?

Without citation to any authority, Defendant claims that Plaintiff’s discrimination claims

must be dismissed because the individual she claims discriminated against her (i.e., Castelvetere)

was an employee “of a non-party, bankrupt Chrysler LLC” rather than an employee of GEMA, 

(Def.’s Br. at 3).

As Plaintiff correctly notes, both Title VII and Michigan’s Elliott Larsen Civil Rights Act

expressly define the term employer to include the employer’s agent. M.C.L. § 37.2201(a)

(defining employer as “a person who has 1 or more employees, and includes an agent of that

person.”); U.S.C. §2000e(b) (defining employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting

commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a person.”).

Although the term agent is not defined in Title VII or the ELCRA, it has been interpreted
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by courts as an individual who exercises significant control over the plaintiff’s hiring, firing, or

conditions of employment. Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 803 (6th Cir.

1994); Odigbo v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 8 F.Supp.2d 660, 663-65 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Jenkins

v. Southeastern Mich. Chapter, American Red Cross, 141 Mich.App. 785, 799-800 (1985).

Here, it is undisputed that Castelvetere made the decision to terminate Plaintiff and that

he personally terminated Plaintiff on June 9, 2009. (See Def.’s Statement of Material Facts at

30 & 31.). Thus, for purposes of liability under both Title VII and the ELCRA, Castelvetere was

GEMA’s agent. 

C. Can Plaintiff Proceed With Her Gender Discrimination Claims?

At the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff must adduce either direct or circumstantial

evidence to prevail on her discrimination claim. DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir.

2004). Here, Plaintiff contends that she can meet her burden under the circumstantial evidence

approach.

Under the circumstantial evidence approach, a plaintiff must show the existence of facts

which create an inference of discrimination under the familiar McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Both

parties acknowledge that the McDonnell Douglas framework is applied to gender discrimination

claims brought under Title VII and the ELCRA and that Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing

a prima facie case. 

Once a plaintiff establishes such a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the

employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the Plaintiff’s discharge. If the

employer articulates such a reason, then the Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the
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articulated reason is in reality a pretext to mask discrimination. Skrjanc v. Great Lkakes Power

Service Co., 272 F.3d 309 (6th Cir. 2001).

1. Can Plaintiff Establish A Prima Facie Case Of Gender Discrimination?

To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, Plaintiff must show that: 1) she

is a member of a protected group; 2) she was subjected to an adverse employment decision; 3)

she was qualified for the position; and 4) she was replaced by a person outside the protected

class, or similarly situated non-protected employees were treated more favorably. Peltier v.

United States, 388 F.2d 984, 987 (6th Cir. 2004).

In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was replaced by a male. (Am.

Compl. at ¶ 90).

In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant challenges only the fourth element of

Plaintiff’s prima facie case. (See Def.’s motion at 12). Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot

establish the fourth element because she has not presented evidence “that Defendant treated her

differently than similarly situated male employees.” (Id.). Defendant’s motion does not

challenge her ability to meet the final element by showing she was replaced by a male. Rather, it

simply ignores that method of meeting the final element.

In response, Plaintiff notes that she can establish the fourth element of a prima facie case

by establishing that she was replaced by a male. She then asserts: “Here, Plaintiff was replaced

by a male and therefore has made her prima facie case.” (Pl.’s Response at 15). 

The Court agrees. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was replaced by Len Sennish, who is a

male. (Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts at ¶ 54; see also Docket Entry No. 21, personal

data sheet showing that Len Sennish is a male). Thus, Plaintiff has established a prima facie
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case of gender discrimination.

2. Can Plaintiff Demonstrate Pretext?

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s discharge. Once a defendant

articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action, the plaintiff bears the burden to

prove that the proffered explanation was a pretext for discrimination. Ercegovich v. Goodyear

Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 354 (6th Cir. 1998). In order to do so, the “plaintiff must

produce sufficient evidence from which the jury may reasonably reject the employer’s

explanation.” Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th Cir.

1994). A plaintiff can refute the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason that an employer offers to

justify an adverse employment action by showing that the proffered reason 1) had no basis in

fact, 2) did not actually motivate the defendant’s challenged conduct, or 3) was insufficient to

warrant the challenged conduct. Wexler v. White Fine Furniture, 317 F.3d 564, 576 (6th Cir.

2003); Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084. The first type of showing consists of evidence that the

proffered bases for the termination never happened (i.e., that they are factually false). With

respect to the second kind of showing, “the plaintiff argues that the sheer weight of the

circumstantial evidence of discrimination makes it ‘more likely than not’ that the employer’s

explanation is a pretext, or coverup.” Id. The third showing consists of evidence that other

employees, particularly those not in the protected class, were not fired even though they engaged

in similar conduct. Id.

Here, Defendant offers the following as its legitimate non-discriminatory reason for

Plaintiff’s discharge: “Kennedy was a short term employee who GEMA terminated because of
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her leadership skills, not being a fit for the job, because she fostered poor union relations and

because of insubordination, since she refused to recognize her reporting obligations to Fred

Castelvetere.” (Def.’s Br. at 15).

Plaintiff’s response seeks to show pretext in all three of the permissible manners and

asserts that a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant’s justification for her termination

was a pretext for discrimination.

First, Plaintiff contends that a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant’s stated

reasons for her termination are false and that discrimination actually motivated her termination. 

As to Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff was terminated for her leadership skills and not

being a good fit for the job, Plaintiff directs the Court to the following evidence to establish the

stated reason is untrue: 1) Baumbach’s January 23, 2009 letter to her, enclosing a bonus check

and stating “[t]his bonus award reflects your excellent performance in quality, delivery, costs,

and morale business metrics for this past year.” (Ex. B to Pl.’s Br.); and Baumbach’s February

10, 2009 e-mail to her, stating, “I have revised your 2008 appraisal” and attaching a “Goal

Agreement 2008" that listed various team goals and indicated “Metrics are met” next to each

goal listed. (Ex. C to Pl.’s Br.). Plaintiff also directs the Court to Baumbach’s testimony

regarding his response when Castelvetere first mentioned terminating Plaintiff. Baumbach

testified that about six weeks before Plaintiff’s termination he received a call from Castelvetere,

who “basically said that – that things weren’t working out.” (Baumbach Dep. at 23). Baumbach

testified:

A. . . . I asked him, you know, what are you talking about and he said, well, I

think we need to get rid of Carol because she just isn’t right for the job. 

And he said, I’m – you know, what do you think and I said, well – I said,

Fred, from my perspective which is a different perspective than his
13

perspective, she’s doing what I need her to do. Do I see as much

movement on litigation, on grievances, you know, as I’d like, no. Is it

moving in a better direction? I think it is. Is she doing the things that I

expect from her? Coming to work every day, getting her group to help us

with suggestions, getting her group to help us with communications, is she

doing that stuff? She’s doing that stuff. So I don’t see everything you do.

Q. Okay.

A. I said, Fred, if we need to move forward then I need more facts. You need to give

me more information. You need to tell me what is going wrong. And he said,

well, he said, I just wanted to let you know I think we need to move in that

direction. I’m still getting all of my facts together.

(Baumbach Dep. at 23).

Plaintiff also contends that Defendant’s stated reason of poor union relations is untrue. 

In support of that position, Plaintiff notes that Baumbach, her direct supervisor, testified that she

did not have a problem with union relations when compared with others:

Q. Did you think she had a problem relating with the union officials?

A. I think everybody has a problem with relating to union officials. Did she

have more a problem than anyone else? No, I don’t think she had more of

a problem. I think it’s a matter of – it’s a matter of comfort level. She

didn’t come from the automotive industry so she dealt with union before

but she’s never dealt with the UAW. So did she have difficulty with the

amount of respect that they wanted from individuals? She may have, yes.

Q. Did you ever get the impression they were jacking her around because she

was a female?

A. No. Do they jack around everybody? Yes, they do. Do we jack them

around? Yes, we do.

(Baumbach Dep. at 32-33).

Plaintiff also contends that Defendant’s stated reason of insubordination, for having

failed to recognize a reporting obligation to Castelvetere, is without factual support. Plaintiff

directs the Court to the portion of her own deposition testimony, wherein she testified that she

was told that she was being hired as a GEMA employee, that she “was told specifically that [she]

would report as a GEMA employee” and that she would report to Baumbach. (Kennedy Dep. at
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115-16). Plaintiff also testified that when she questioned Baumbach about Castelvetere’s

statement that she reported to him, Baumbach said “no, you don’t report to Fred, you report to

me.” (Id.). Plaintiff further testified that at no time did Baumbach ever tell her that she had a

“dual reporting relationship” or that she reported to Castelvetere. (Kennedy Dep. at 117).

Second, Plaintiff also relies on circumstantial evidence of gender discrimination to show

prextext, including Plaintiff’s testimony that Castelvetere made derogatory comments about

women working in manufacturing. Plaintiff testified as follows:

Q. Do you recall any – anything else being discussed at this meeting?

A. Yes. He said he was not comfortable with women working in

manufacturing.

Q. Now, this is – this is a senior HR manager who you’re saying said to you

he’s not comfortable with women working in manufacturing?

A. Yes. He said women do not belong in manufacturing.

Q. All right. And did anybody overhear that statement?

A. That was made in his office behind closed doors.

Q. Okay. You realize how ludicrous that sounds. That somebody with 30

years with a company who’s in human resource management, who has

promoted a number of women over the years, who knows what a protected

classification is going to be, you’re still contending that he made the

statement, women don’t belong in manufacturing?

MR. FETT: Object to form and foundation.

Q. You can answer.

A. Imagine how ludicrous it sounded hearing that.

Q. So you’re standing by it, that he made that statement?

A. I am absolutely standing by that statement.

(Kennedy Dep. at 124-26) (emphasis added). Plaintiff further testified that during April of 2009,

she spoke with Castelvetere on the telephone and he made additional derogatory comments about

women working in manufacturing:

A. Yes. Fred called me on the telephone and was very angered and was

yelling at me and using profanity on the phone, telling me that I was

mishandling Union relations, wasn’t specific, he had to clean up my mess. 

He also told me this is exactly why women shouldn’t be in

manufacturing. He was very inappropriate and unprofessional on the
15

phone. . . 

Q. And his is in the April 2009 time period?

A. Yes.

. . . .

Q. Okay. Did he explain why he was making that comment to you?

A. He told me that I was fucking things up and he was not happy. That’s

what he said.

Q. Well, did he say, “And this is why women should not be in

manufacturing”?

A. He said, and this is why women should not be in manufacturing.

(Kennedy Dep. at 24-27) (emphasis added).

Third, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s proffered reasons were insufficient to warrant

termination. Plaintiff contends that she was not afforded notice and an opportunity to improve,

through a performance plan or other similar measure, as were other salaried employees.

Castelvetere testified that “we put people on a 30, 60, 90, if people aren’t performing

their jobs, at least let them know what they’re doing wrong or what they’re not doing or what

they’re supposed to do.” (Castelvetere Dep. at 46). He testified that GEMA had the same

process. (Id.) 

Plaintiff notes that when a male GEMA management employee (Peter Heider) was not

meeting performance expectations, Castelvetere “advocated that Heider be placed on a 30-60-90

review so that goals could be set, observed and performance documented.” (Def.’s Answer to

Am. Compl. at ¶ 54). Unlike Heider, Plaintiff was not placed on a 30-60-90 review or given an

opportunity to improve her performance. At Plaintiff’s termination meeting she “inquired why

she wasn’t put on a 30, 60, 90 day review,” to which Castelvetere responded “I explained that

the job simply was not a good fit. Also, she never accepted the reporting relationship up through

the Corporate Office . . .” (Ex. M to Pl.’s Br.).

Viewing the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court
16

finds that Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could

conclude that the employer’s proffered reason for terminating Plaintiff was a pretext for unlawful

gender discrimination. Accordingly, the Court shall deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment.

CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s age discrimination and

retaliation claims (Counts I, II, V, and VI of Plaintiff’s Complaint) are hereby DISMISSED. 

(See Docket Entry No. 23 at 1; 12/16/10 Hrg. Tr.).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, as to

Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claims (Counts III and IV), is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/Sean F. Cox 

Sean F. Cox

United States District Judge

Dated: December 28, 2010

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on

December 28, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

S/Jennifer Hernandez 

Case Manager