IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

PURVI GANDHI-KAPOOR,

Petitioner,

v.

HONE CAPITAL LLC AND CSC UPSHOT 

VENTURES I, L.P.,

Respondents.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

C.A. No. 2022-0881-JTL

OPINION HOLDING RESPONDENTS IN CONTEMPT

Date Submitted: May 26, 2023

Date Decided: July 19, 2023

Evan O. Williford, THE WILLIFORD FIRM LLC, Wilmington, Delaware; Ellen A. 

Cirangle, LUBIN OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI LLP, San Francisco, California; Attorneys 

for Petitioner Purvi Gandhi-Kapoor.

Ryan M. Ernst, David M. Klauder, Melissa M. Hartlipp, BIELLI & KLAUDER, LLC,

Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for Respondents Hone Capital LLC and CSC Upshot 

Ventures I, L.P.

LASTER, V.C.
Petitioner Purvi Gandhi-Kapoor asks the court to hold respondents Hone Capital 

LLC (“Hone”) and CSC Upshot Ventures I, L.P. (the “Upshot Fund,” and together with 

Hone, the “Companies”) in contempt for failing to comply with an order to advance

expenses (the “Advancement Order”).

1 The Companies contend that sanctions should not 

be imposed because the petitioner does not face irreparable harm. 

A threshold question exists about whether contempt sanctions can be used to enforce 

the Advancement Order. Contempt is not generally available to enforce a money judgment. 

Instead, the holder of the judgment must resort to collection mechanisms. The 

Advancement Order, however, is more than a money judgment. The right to advancement 

is a time-sensitive remedy designed to permit a covered person to defend underlying 

litigation. A lack of timely advancements prejudices the covered person’s ability to defend 

the underlying litigation, potentially resulting in irremediable consequences, such as an 

1 This decision uses the term “expenses” to refer collectively both to attorneys’ fees 

and amounts paid out of pocket that might more colloquially be called expenses. That is 

how Section 145 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “GCL”) deploys the term. 

See, e.g., 8 Del. C. § 145(a) (authorizing a corporation in a proceeding other than one 

brought by or in the right of the corporation to provide indemnification “against expenses 

(including attorneys’ fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement actually and 

reasonably incurred”); id. § 145(b) (authorizing a corporation in a proceeding brought by 

or in the right of the corporation to provide indemnification “against expenses including 

attorneys’ fees) actually and reasonably incurred”); id. § 145(c) (mandating that 

corporation indemnify a director or officer who was successful on the merits or otherwise 

in defending a proceeding “against expenses (including attorneys’ fees) actually and 

reasonably incurred”). The out-of-pocket expenses encompassed by Section 145 are 

broader than the restricted concept of “costs” in the statute that authorizes the recovery of 

court costs in the Court of Chancery. See 10 Del. C. § 5106; Scion Breckenridge Managing 

Member, LLC v. ASB Allegiance Real Est. Fund, 68 A.3d 665, 686–88 (Del. 2013).
2

adverse judgment or a conviction. An award of interest—the typical remedy for a delayed 

payment—cannot compensate for those consequences. And while those consequences are 

contingent, the present danger is real, because the risk of an adverse outcome increases as 

advancements go unpaid.

Because of the harm that a covered person faces, the holder of an advancement right 

is not relegated to collection mechanisms. The court could deploy coercive equitable 

remedies to enforce the advancement right. By the same token, the court can deploy 

coercive contempt sanctions. 

This decision imposes coercive relief in the form of a daily fine. The Companies 

will have one week from the date of this decision to comply with the Advancement Order. 

After that, for each day of non-compliance, the amount due will increase by $1,000. If that 

coercive sanction proves insufficient to compel compliance, then Gandhi may seek further 

relief. In addition, the Companies must bear all of the expenses that Gandhi incurred 

pursuing her motion for contempt. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts are drawn from the parties’ submissions in connection with the motion for 

contempt and from prior filings in the case. 

A. Litigation Against Gandhi

The Companies are indirect subsidiaries of China Science & Merchants Investment 

Management Group Co. Ltd. (“CSC Group”), a private equity fund. The Upshot Fund 

invests in technology companies. Hone is the general partner of the Upshot Fund. 
3

Gandhi is a member of Hone, served as its CFO, and had the title of Partner. At 

Hone, she reported to Bixuan Wu. Through their roles at Hone, Gandhi and Wu managed 

the Upshot Fund. Their compensation included a profit interest based on the performance 

of the Upshot Fund.

For disputed reasons, the CSC Group terminated Wu and Gandhi. In 2020, the CSC

Group caused Hone to file a lawsuit against Gandhi in California Superior Court. The 

complaint asserts that Gandhi breached her fiduciary duties and engaged in fraud. Hone’s 

claims revolve around the management of the Upshot Fund. Among other things, Hone 

seeks a declaratory judgment that Gandhi is not entitled to her profit interest. 

Gandhi and Wu responded by filing a lawsuit in which they sought to enforce their 

right to a profit interest. Hone filed counterclaims and raised defenses in that lawsuit based 

on the same theories that Hone had asserted its own case.

Hone moved to consolidate the two lawsuits. The California Superior Court granted 

the motion, resulting in a single consolidated action (the “Consolidated Action”).

Gandhi has incurred significant expenses defending the claims and pursuing her 

counterclaims in the Consolidated Action. As of August 2022, Gandhi’s expenses totaled 

$581,744. She represented that approximately $436,308, or 75%, of those expenses are 

attributable to defending the claims against her. 

B. The Advancement Order

On September 29, 2022, Gandhi sent a written demand to the Companies asking 

them to advance her expenses. The next day, Gandhi filed this action to enforce her right 

to advancement. 
4

On November 1, 2022, the court entered a stipulated order which established that 

Gandhi was entitled to (i) advancement of expenses reasonably incurred in defending the 

claims and counterclaims in the Consolidated Action and (ii) indemnification of expenses 

reasonably incurred in seeking advancement from Hone. On November 15, the court 

entered two stipulated orders establishing procedures by which Gandhi would submit her 

expenses to Hone, one for her initial demand and one for future demands.

The case took a sideways turn on November 23, 2022, when Hone moved to vacate 

the stipulated orders. Hone contended that its Delaware counsel mistakenly believed that 

Hone had authorized them when, in reality, Hone had not. The parties briefed the motion 

to vacate. Gandhi separately moved for summary judgment establishing her advancement 

rights. 

On April 5, 2023, the court granted Gandhi’s motion for summary judgment and

entered the Advancement Order. The court held that Gandhi is entitled to advancement 

from both Hone and the Upshot Fund for the claims in the Consolidated Action. The court 

also awarded pre- and post-judgment interest, compounded quarterly at the legal rate, on 

any unpaid advancements, calculated from the date when Gandhi first specified the amount 

of reimbursement demanded. The court also held that Gandhi was entitled to 

indemnification for the fees she incurred obtaining the Advancement Order.

In addition to ruling on Gandhi’s rights to advancement and indemnification, the 

court held that the entry of an advancement procedures order was warranted to govern 

future demands for advancement. Noting that the parties had already submitted such an 

order, which the court had approved, the court validated that order nunc pro tunc.
5

C. The Companies Fail To Comply With The Advancement Order.

When the court entered the Advancement Order, Gandhi had submitted a written 

demand for advancement to Hone on November 23, 2022, for $436,308 in advancements. 

Hone was obligated to pay any amounts to which it did not object to by December 17. Hone

did not object to any amounts and did not make any payments.

Beginning in December 2022, Gandhi submitted monthly advancement demands to 

Hone. Hone was obligated to pay any amounts to which it did not object by a designated 

date. Hone did not object to any amounts and did not make any payments. 

After this court entered the Advancement Order, Gandhi sent a written demand for 

advancements to the Upshot Fund on April 16, 2023. The Upshot Fund was obligated to 

pay any amounts to which it did not object by May 11. The Upshot Fund did not object to 

any amounts and did not make any payments.

As of May 11, 2023, Gandhi had demanded and was entitled to advancements in the 

amount of $946,445.16 from Hone and $849,264.76 from the Upshot Fund. Those amounts 

covered many of the same expenses, and thus Hone and the Upshot Fund were jointly and 

severally liable for overlapping amounts. Neither Hone nor the Upshot Fund has objected 

to any amounts or made any payments. 

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Court of Chancery Rule 70(b) authorizes the court to hold a party in contempt who 

“fail[s] to obey a restraining or injunctive order, or to obey or to perform any order.” Ct. 

Ch. R. 70(b). Gandhi has moved to hold the Companies in civil contempt for failing to 

comply with the Advancement Order. Gandhi asks the court to (i) appoint a limited purpose 
6

receiver for the Companies that will cause them to pay the amounts due, (ii) impose a 

coercive fine of $10,000 per day on each Company until they comply, and (iii) award 

Gandhi the fees and expenses incurred in pursuing contempt.

A. What Remedies Are Available To Enforce The Advancement Order?

A threshold question exists about what remedies are available to enforce the 

Advancement Order. In one sense, the Advancement Order merely entitles Gandhi to 

receive money. Generally speaking, when a party has obtained a money judgment, the party 

must resort to collection procedures by garnishing wages, levying on a bank account, or 

taking possession of and selling assets at a sheriff’s sale. A court will not intervene to 

deploy coercive remedies on the claimant’s behalf. 

There are, however, recognized exceptions to that rule. One involves a court’s 

ability to enforce an interim order entered in advance of a final judgment. More generally, 

a court of equity has the ability to deploy remedies where a monetary judgment would be 

inadequate. 

1. The General Rule

As a general rule, a party that holds a money judgment must resort to collection

mechanisms. Chancellor Allen addressed the issue when ruling on an application to enforce 

a final order directing payment of the plaintiff’s legal fees in the amount of $3,974.75.

Vanderzeyde v. RDIS Corp., 1996 WL 33167791, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 6, 1996). The 

defendant had failed to comply for over seven months, and the plaintiff sought to hold the 

defendant in contempt. Chancellor Allen denied the motion with the following explanation:
7

While I find it deplorable that defendant RDIS, Inc. has apparently failed to 

meet its obligations as established by the October order (no appeal was filed), 

I do not think that contempt of court is the appropriate remedy for failure to 

satisfy a judgement for money. The law supplies execution process for this 

purpose. For practical as well as theoretical reasons that is the appropriate 

way, in my opinion, for this matter to be resolved. 

Id. The plaintiff had obtained a final judgment that provided for monetary relief, and the 

plaintiff needed to use the collection mechanisms that the law supplied. 

Vice Chancellor Montgomery-Reeves, now serving on the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Third Circuit, reasoned similarly in two decisions. See Trascent Mgmt. 

Consulting, LLC v. Bouri, 2018 WL 6338996 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2018); In re Mobilactive 

Media, LLC, 2018 WL 5046282 (Del. Ch. June 28, 2018). In Mobilactive, the plaintiffs 

had obtained final judgments awarding them amounts due under certain indemnification 

agreements. The defendants failed to satisfy the judgments, and the plaintiffs moved to 

hold the defendants in contempt. The Vice Chancellor denied the application, reasoning 

that ordinary collection mechanisms were sufficient. Id. at *3.

Vice Chancellor Montgomery-Reeves reached the same conclusion in Trascent, 

where a party had obtained a money judgment as part of a sanctions ruling issued at the 

end of the case. 2018 WL 6338996, at *2. The plaintiff attempted to depict the sanctions 

ruling as an interim award that required enforcement through contempt, but the Vice 

Chancellor rejected that argument: “The sanctions were issued as part of the post-trial final 

resolution of the case. The post-trial opinion and implementing order resolved all 

outstanding issues in this case. Plaintiff's latest flurry of filings does not change that fact.” 
8

Id. She held that the plaintiff would have to enforce its judgment through collection 

mechanisms. 

2. Interim Awards

Collection mechanisms are the presumptive means of enforcing an order providing 

for the payment of money, but they are not exclusive. One situation when a court can 

deploy other remedies involves an interim award. The Delaware Supreme Court addressed 

the issue in the context of an interim award of alimony. Thomas v. Thomas, 102 A.3d 1138, 

1148 (Del. 2014). The husband fell behind in his payments of $2,018 per month, and the 

wife sought to enforce his obligation to pay a total of $10,126. The Delaware Family Court 

held that the husband was in contempt, directed him to pay the full amount due, and granted 

the wife a partial award of attorneys’ fees. The Delaware Family Court did not relegate the 

wife to collection mechanisms. In the appeal from the eventual final order, the husband 

challenged the contempt sanction. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the Delaware 

Family Court acted properly by using contempt “to compel him to obey the order, make 

the payments, and bring the account current.” Id. at 1150. The high court also affirmed the 

partial fee award. Id. at 1151; accord McMillion v. McMillion, 852 A.2d 908, 2004 WL 

153801, at *1 (Del. 2004) (ORDER) (affirming ruling holding wife in contempt for failing 

to pay alimony and awarding amount due plus attorneys’ fees).

The routine oversight of litigation often involves the issuance of interim monetary

awards, many of which are fee awards. “A trial court may grant interim fees for a variety 

of reasons, including as a consequence for discovery abuse, as a sanction for making 

frivolous legal arguments or engaging in bad-faith litigation tactics, as a remedy for 
9

contempt of an interlocutory court order, or under specific statutory authority.” In re Del 

Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 2011 WL 2535256, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2011); 

accord Kurz v. Holbrook, 2010 WL 3028003, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2010) (citing 

authorities). A contract provision also may support an interim fee award. Sparton Corp. v. 

O’Neil, 2018 WL 3025470, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 18, 2018). 

Rule 37 is one source of interim fee awards. That rule states that if a discovery 

motion is granted, or if the discovery requested is provided after the motion was filed, then 

the Court shall, after affording an opportunity to be heard, require the party 

or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney 

advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the 

reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including the attorney’s 

fees, unless the Court finds that the opposition to the motion was

substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 

unjust.

Ct. Ch. R. 37(a)(4)(A). Violations of court orders also can lead to interim awards, because

“[w]hen a party violates orders of the court—including scheduling orders that require the 

parties to file papers and make all their arguments at the required time—and rules of the 

court, and thereby exposes its adversary to unnecessary delay and expense, this court has 

the discretion to shift fees.” Wimbledon Fund LP–Absolute Return Fund Series v. SV 

Special Situations Fund LP, 2011 WL 6820362, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2011).

By their nature, interim fee awards must be paid before the end of the action, 

otherwise they lose much of their effect. Fee awards of this type are made to coerce 

compliance, to compensate the injured party, and to deter similar conduct in the future. See

In re Rinehardt, 57 A.2d 1079, 1082 (Del. 1990); Holt v. Holt, 472 A.2d 820, 824 (Del. 

1984); see also Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 81, 99 (D.N.J. 2006) (“[Rule 37’s]
10

purposes are to: (1) penalize the culpable party or attorney; (2) deter others from engaging 

in similar conduct; (3) compensate the court and other parties for the expense caused by 

the abusive conduct; and (4) compel discovery and disclosure.”). Contempt sanctions 

provide the mechanism for mid-case enforcement of interim awards. 

The alternative is unpalatable. If contempt sanctions were unavailable, then the only 

solution would be for the court to enter the award as a partial final judgment under Rule 

54(b). At that point, a party could pursue traditional enforcement mechanisms, but the party 

obligated to pay the award also could appeal the award as a matter of right. The result 

would be a flurry of appeals to the Delaware Supreme Court, often involving relatively 

minor amounts. The Delaware Supreme Court has made clear that piecemeal appeals are 

to be avoided. See Supr. Ct. R. 42. An interim sanctions order will rarely meet the 

requirements for an interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 42, and the Delaware 

Supreme Court has also rejected efforts to appeal mid-case monetary sanctions under the 

collateral doctrine. See TransPerfect Glob., Inc. v. Pincus, 224 A.3d 203, 2019 WL 

7369433, at *3 (Del. Dec. 31, 2019) (ORDER). Severing and entering mid-case awards of 

interim attorneys’ fees as Rule 54(b) orders would upset the final order doctrine. Instead, 

courts can use their contempt power to enforce interim monetary awards. 

3. When Collection Mechanisms Would Be Inadequate

A more general scenario where other remedies are available involves situations 

where relegating a party to collection mechanisms would be inadequate. The analysis here 

resembles the process that the Court of Chancery follows when determining whether a 
11

money judgment will provide an adequate remedy or whether some form of equitable relief 

is necessary. 

One familiar scenario involves a defendant who intends to transfer money or other 

assets outside of the court’s jurisdiction and thereby render a monetary judgment 

ineffective. See Mitsubishi Power Sys. Am., Inc. v. Babcock & Brown Infrastructure Gp. 

US, LLC, 2009 WL 1199588, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2009). The Delaware Fraudulent 

Transfer Act recognizes that threat and authorizes injunctive relief to stop a fraudulent 

transfer. See 6 Del. C. § 1307(a). The threat exists because a judgment against an insolvent 

defendant is worthless, and an award of interest that will never be received cannot provide 

compensation for an infinite delay in payment. Thus, provisional relief can be granted when 

there exists “[a] meaningful threat that a defendant may render relief meaningless by 

dissipating assets or removing them from the court’s jurisdiction.” Destra Targeted Income 

Unit Inv. Tr. v. Parmar, 2017 WL 373207, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2017) (granting 

preliminary injunction to prevent “defendants and parties acting in concert with them from 

distributing cash and other securities that they will receive in connection with the 

transactions governed by” a merger agreement alleged to be a fraudulent conveyance).

A second scenario involves a declaratory judgment that establishes a right to 

payment of a designated sum of money. See Epic/Freedom, LLC v. Aveanna Healthcare 

LLC, 2021 WL 1049469 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2021). In Epic/Freedom, a contract obligated 

the defendant to pay over a tax refund to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff filed suit in the Court 

of Chancery seeking a decree of specific performance. The defendant contended that the 

Court of Chancery lacked subject matter jurisdiction over what was effectively a claim for 
12

money damages. The plaintiff disagreed, noting that the defendant was obligated to turn 

over the refund within ten days of receipt and contending that only a decree of specific 

performance could enforce that requirement. Vice Chancellor Slights held that the 

Delaware Superior Court could both (i) declare the existence of a right to the tax refund 

and (ii) enforce the declaratory judgment through the exercise of its contempt powers. Id. 

at *4. He therefore dismissed the Chancery action for lack of jurisdiction. 

The Epic/Freedom case involved a situation where an attempt to resort to collection 

mechanisms likely would be inadequate, but equitable remedies were not needed. After a 

favorable decision from the Delaware Superior Court, the plaintiff would have a 

declaratory judgment establishing its right to a tax refund, not a monetary judgment for a 

liquidated amount. Collection mechanisms could not be used in that setting, but contempt 

sanctions would enable a court of law to enforce its order without needing to send the 

dispute back to the Court of Chancery. The case shows that in some settings, contempt 

functions as a substitute for equitable relief. 

4. The Answer For Advancements 

The overarching theme that unites these precedents is the question of whether 

collection mechanisms are adequate. If a party can obtain full relief by levying on a bank 

account, garnishing wages, or having the sheriff sell assets, then the party should be 

relegated to those remedies. But if something about the obligation to pay money would 

render the collection mechanisms inadequate, then a court can act.

In an ongoing advancement proceeding, resort to collection mechanisms is 

inadequate. “Rights to indemnification and advancement are deeply rooted in the public 
13

policy of Delaware corporate law in that they are viewed less as an individual benefit 

arising from a person’s employment and more as a desirable mechanism to manage risk in 

return for greater corporate benefits.” Kaung v. Cole Nat. Corp., 884 A.2d 500, 509 (Del. 

2005). Delaware law authorizes these mechanisms to “promote the desirable end that 

corporate officials will resist what they consider unjustified suits and claims, secure in the 

knowledge that their reasonable expenses will be borne by the [entity] they have served if 

they are vindicated.” Stifel Financial Corp. v. Cochran, 809 A.2d 555, 561 (Del. 2002) 

(cleaned up). 

Advancement is a summary proceeding distinct from indemnification. Kaung, 884 

A.2d at 509. “Advancement provides corporate officials with immediate interim relief from 

the personal out-of-pocket financial burden of paying the significant on-going expenses 

inevitably involved with investigations and legal proceedings.” Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen

(Tafeen III), 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005). The proceeding is summary because 

“immediate interim relief” must be provided in timely fashion to be effective:

[T]he immediate advancement of fees fulfills a real and legitimate need of 

those who serve as directors and officers of Delaware corporations when 

faced with significant costs of defending legal actions against them. Clearly, 

to be of any value to the executive or director, advancement must be made 

promptly, otherwise its benefit is forever lost because the failure to advance 

fees affects the counsel the director may choose and litigation strategy that 

the executive or director will be able to afford. 

Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc. (Tafeen I), 2005 WL 1314782, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2005), 

aff’d, 886 A.2d 502 (Del. 2005).

The need for timely relief in an advancement proceeding counsels against relegating 

the holder of an advancement right to collection mechanisms. A covered person would 
14

have to secure a ruling entering the advancement order as a partial final judgment, deal 

with any appeal, transfer the order to the Delaware Superior Court, conduct remedial 

discovery to locate assets, take steps to domesticate the judgment in a foreign jurisdiction 

if the assets were located elsewhere, then obtain the writs necessary to levy on the assets. 

Any non-cash assets would have to be converted into cash through a sheriff’s sale. Only 

then would the covered person receive the funds that the advancement right was supposed 

to deliver in the form of “immediate interim relief.” Tafeen III, 888 A.2d at 211. 

The advancement award is also an interim monetary award, akin to an interim award 

of alimony or an interim fee award. An advancement proceeding often involves a series of 

disputes over monthly or quarterly submissions. In that setting, enforcement through 

contempt is warranted, because each adjudication is interlocutory. See Kroenke Sports & 

Ent., LLC v. Salomon, 228 A.3d 409, 2020 WL 1951679, at *2 (Del. Apr. 23, 2020)

(ORDER). Precisely because an advancement order is an interim order and not yet final, 

the court must use other methods to enforce the order.2

Finally, resort to contempt authority is warranted because the covered person faces 

a threat of irreparable harm. A right to advancement enables a covered person to defend an 

2 As noted, a court can certify a ruling on a particular amount of advancements as a 

partial final judgment under Rule 54(b), but doing so risks fracturing a single advancement 

case into a series of separately appealable rulings. Sider v. Hertz Glob. Hldgs, Inc., 2019 

WL 2501481, at *3 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2019). This court has explained that absent 

exceptional circumstances, a ruling on a particular amount of advancements should not be 

certified under Rule 54(b). Rather, any appeal as of right should await the conclusion of 

the advancement action. The advancing party can also protect itself by seeking to recover 

improperly advanced amounts when determining the right to ultimate indemnification. Id.
15

underlying proceeding. Without advancement, a covered person could be convicted or held 

liable, potentially resulting in “a harm that could never be undone” and an outcome 

disproportionate to what an award of money damages plus interest could remedy. Tafeen

I, 2005 WL 1314782, at *2. Recognizing that the denial of an advancements can result in 

irreparable harm, this court has declined to stay a ruling establishing advancement rights 

pending appeal. Id. In a case where the company could not point to any countervailing 

equity other than the financial burden of compliance, the Delaware Supreme Court 

affirmed the denial of a stay pending appeal. Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 886 A.2d 502, 506 

(Del. 2005). The same reasoning supports using contempt authority to ensure that 

advancements are paid promptly. 

Unlike in a typical case involving the payment of money, a court can use coercive 

remedies to enforce a declaration regarding advancements and an obligation to pay specific 

amounts. Delaware entities are not required to provide advancement rights, but if an entity 

choses to do so, a court can enforce those commitments. The holder of the advancement 

right is not relegated to collection mechanisms. 

B. Are The Companies In Contempt?

Having concluded that the Advancement Order can be enforced by contempt, the 

next task is to determine whether the Companies are in contempt. “To establish civil 

contempt, [the movant] must demonstrate that the [opponent] violated an order of the court 

of which they had notice and by which they were bound.” Handels AG v. Johnston, 1997 

WL 589030, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 1997). “The standard of proof required in a civil 

contempt proceeding is a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Hurley, 257 A.3d 1012, 
16

1018 (Del. 2021); accord TransPerfect Glob., Inc. v. Pincus, 278 A.3d 630, 649 (Del. 

2022).

A trial court has discretion when determining whether to hold a party in contempt. 

Dickerson v. Castle, 1991 WL 208467, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 15, 1991). The violation “must 

not be a mere technical one, but must constitute a failure to obey the Court in a meaningful 

way.” Id. at *4 (cleaned up). “Even where there has been a violation, the Court will consider 

good faith efforts to comply with the order or to remedy the consequences of noncompliance.” Aveta, Inc. v. Bengoa, 986 A.2d 1166, 1181 (Del. Ch.2009).

The Companies failed to comply with the Advancement Order. The Companies 

knew about the orders and were bound by them. After the court entered the Advancement 

Order, the Companies could no longer have any doubt about their obligation to provide 

Gandhi with advancements. The Companies did not comply. In response to Gandhi’s 

motion, they make no effort to contend that they have complied or to otherwise defend 

their non-compliance. The Companies are therefore in contempt. 

C. What Is The Appropriate Remedy?

The court has broad discretion when formulating a remedy for contempt. 

Jagodzinski v. Silicon Valley Innovation Co., LLC, 2012 WL 593613, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 

14, 2012); Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y. v. First State Depository Co. LLC, 2012 WL 1021180, 

at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2012). Remedies can take the form of civil or criminal sanctions. 

DiSabatino v. Salicete, 671 A.2d 1344, 1348 (Del. 1996). If the primary purpose of the 

remedy is to coerce compliance with the court’s order, then the remedy is civil in character. 

City of Wilmington v. Gen. Teamsters Loc. Union 326, 321 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1974). If 
17

the primary purpose of the remedy is to punish for non-compliance, then the remedy is 

criminal in character. Id. 

When selecting a contempt sanction or combination of sanctions, “a court is 

obligated to use the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.” TR Invs., LLC v. 

Genger, 2009 WL 4696062, at *18 n.74 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2009) (quoting Am. Jur. 2d 

Contempt § 195). The sanctions imposed should be “just and reasonable.” Gallagher v. 

Long, 940 A.2d 945, 2007 WL 3262150, at *2 (Del. 2007).

1. A Limited-Purpose Receiver

Gandhi asks that the court appoint a limited purpose receiver for both Companies

with authority to cause them to satisfy their advancement obligations. The Companies

respond that the case law on which Gandhi relies pertains to corporations, not to alternative 

entities like the Companies. That is a meaningless distinction. 

The power to appoint a receiver rests in “the general equity powers of the court

sitting as a court of chancery.” Carson v. Allegany Window Glass Co., 189 F. 791, 795 

(C.C.D. Del. 1911); accord Brill v. Southerland, 14 A.2d 408, 413 (Del. 1940); Ross Hldg.

& Mgmt. Co. v. Advance Realty Gp., LLC, 2010 WL 3448227, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 2, 

2010). Article IV, Section 10 of the Delaware Constitution provides that this court “shall 

have all the jurisdiction and powers vested by the laws of this State in the Court of 

Chancery.” Del. Const. art. IV, § 10. The Delaware Supreme Court has held that this 

provision vested in the Court of Chancery “all the general equity jurisdiction of the High 

Court of Chancery of Great Britain as it existed prior to the separation of the colonies,” 

except “where a sufficient remedy exists at law.” DuPont v. DuPont, 85 A.2d 724, 727 
18

(Del.1951). In light of this provision, the high court held that the General Assembly cannot 

enact legislation that reduces this court’s jurisdiction below the constitutionally established 

minimum, unless there is an adequate remedy at law. Id. at 729. The Delaware Supreme 

Court explained that Article IV, Section 10 was

intended to establish for the benefit of the people of the state a tribunal to 

administer the remedies and principles of equity. They secured them for the 

relief of the people. This conclusion is in complete harmony with the 

underlying theory of written constitutions. Its result is to establish by the 

Judiciary Article of the Constitution the irreducible minimum of the judiciary. 

It secures for the protection of the people an adequate judicial system and 

removes it from the vagaries of legislative whim.

Id. This broad grant of jurisdiction necessarily includes the power to appoint receivers for 

entities. See, e.g., 4 John Norton Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1333(1) (Spencer W. 

Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941).

As the GCL illustrates, there are statutes which confirm the court’s authority to 

appoint a receiver in particular settings. E.g., 8 Del. C. §§ 226, 291, 352. Those statutes

supplement the court’s inherent authority, which exists independently. Cf. Ct. Ch. R. 148 

(listing rules applicable to cases in which receivers are appointed “whether such receivers 

or trustees are appointed pursuant to a statute . . . or pursuant to the inherent authority of 

the Court”).

As part of its inherent authority, a court can appoint a receiver to effect compliance 

with its orders. E.g., Rich v. Fuqi Int’l Inc., 2013 WL 2500815, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 12, 

2013). Section 322 of the GCL makes that authority express by providing as follows: 

“Whenever any corporation shall refuse, fail or neglect to obey any order or decree of any 

court of this State within the time fixed by the court for its observance, such refusal, failure 
19

or neglect shall be sufficient ground for the appointment of a receiver of the corporation 

by the Court of Chancery.” 8 Del. C. § 322. The powers that can be granted to and exercised 

by a receiver appointed under Section 322 are co-extensive with those powers that can be 

granted to and exercised by a receiver appointed under Section 291. See Esopus Creek 

Value LP v. Hauf, 913 A.2d 593, 606–07 (Del. Ch. 2006). Such a receiver may be appointed

to take charge of [the corporation’s] assets, estate, effects, business and 

affairs, and to collect the outstanding debts, claims, and property due and 

belonging to the corporation, with power to prosecute and defend, in the 

name of the corporation or otherwise, all claims or suits, to appoint an agent 

or agents under them, and to do all other acts which might be done by the 

corporation and which may be necessary or proper. The powers of the 

receivers shall be such and shall continue so long as the Court shall deem 

necessary.

8 Del. C. § 291.

Like the GCL, the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (the “LLC Act”) 

provides explicitly for the appointment of a receiver when a limited liability company is 

insolvent, has dissolved, or has had its certificate of formation canceled. See 6 Del. C. § 

18-112, 18-804, 18-805. As in the corporate realm, those explicit grants of authority do not 

occupy the field. The LLC Act provides that “[i]n any case not provided for in this chapter, 

the rules of law and equity, including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary duties 

and the law merchant, shall govern.” Id. § 18-1104. The court “has the inherent equitable 

power to appoint a receiver,” including for an LLC. Jagodzinski, 2012 WL 593613, at *2; 

accord Bruckel v. Tauc Hlgs., LLC, C.A. No. 2021-0579-MTZ, at 21 (Del. Ch. July 17, 

2023) (discussing appointment of receiver for LLC).
20

The real question at this juncture is whether the court should appoint a receiver. 

Appointing a receiver for a solvent entity is “is an extraordinary, a drastic and . . . an 

‘heroic’ remedy. It is not to be resorted to if milder measures will give the plaintiff, whether 

creditor or shareholder, adequate protection for his rights.” Maxwell v. Enter. Wall Paper 

Mfg. Co., 131 F.2d 400, 403 (3d Cir. 1942) A similar principle governs contempt sanctions 

in general: When selecting contempt sanctions, a court is obligated to use the least amount 

of power necessary to achieve the intended outcome. Aveta, 986 A.2d at 1188.

Gandhi’s original motion failed to show that a receiver is necessary. While this 

decision was under submission, Gandhi filed a supplemental letter stating that the 

Companies were exploring a sale of their assets that would render them insolvent. Gandhi 

may conduct expedited discovery into that issue. If the Companies continue to ignore the 

Advancement Order, and if Gandhi makes a more detailed factual showing, then a receiver 

could be warranted. 

2. The Daily Fine

Gandhi next requests a daily fine to coerce compliance. This court has previously 

used daily fines to coerce compliance with its orders.3

3 E.g., Bruckel, C.A. No. 2021-0579-MTZ, at 21 (daily fine of $10,000); In re 

Coinmint, LLC, 2020 WL 5912596, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2020) (daily fine of $5,000); 

Transperfect Glob., Inc. v. Elting, 2019 WL 5294531, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2019) (daily 

fine of $30,000 dollars); State of Del. v. Indem. Ins. Corp, RRG, C.A. No. 8601-VCL, D.I. 

161 ¶ 5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 25, 2013) (ORDER) (daily fine of $10,000); Israel Disc. Bank of 

N.Y., 2012 WL 1021180, at *3 (daily fine of $10,000); New Castle Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. 

New Castle Cnty. Educ. Ass’n, 1978 WL 8417, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 29, 1978) (referring 

to daily fine of $6,000).
21

To coerce compliance, the daily fee must exceed the benefits of non-compliance. 

Hone and the Upshot Fund are both venture capital funds based in the United States. 

According to the U.S. Venture Capital Index provided by Cambridge Associates, venture 

capital funds have generated average annual returns of 25.4% over a 25-year period ending 

on December 31, 2022.4 As of May 11, 2023, Gandhi had requested and was entitled to 

advancements amounting to $946,445.16. Using an average annual return of 25.4%, the 

Companies can earn approximately $658.62 per day by retaining the amounts owed to 

Gandhi. That figure provides a rough order of magnitude for a daily fine that is 

proportionate. To avoid any suggestion of mathematical precision and to provide an 

additional incentive for prompt compliance, this decision rounds up to $1,000. 

As a coercive sanction, Hone and the Upshot Fund are jointly and severally liable 

for a fine of $1,000 per day until they comply with the Advancement Order. So that the 

Companies can purge their contempt, the fine will start to accrue one week after the date 

of this decision. If the Companies satisfy their obligations under the Advancement Order, 

then the coercive fine will not accrue. If they persist in failing to comply notwithstanding 

the imposition of the daily fine, then Gandhi may seek additional relief. 

4 Cambridge Associates, LLC., US Venture Capital Benchmarks Q4 2022, at 4 

(2022), https://www.cambridgeassociates.com/private-investment-benchmarks/ (last 

visited July 14, 2023).
22

3. The Fees And Expenses Associated With This Motion

Gandhi has asked to recover the expenses she incurred pursuing her contempt 

motion. When a party has been held in contempt, the party injured by the contempt is 

entitled to an award of expenses for bringing the contempt motion as part of the remedy 

that is necessary to make that party whole.

5

Gandhi is entitled to the expenses she incurred pursuing this motion. The parties 

will determine the amount using the mechanism in the advancement procedures order, but 

the expenses will be tracked separately so that they are not treated as advancements.

III. CONCLUSION

The Companies are in contempt. As a sanction, the Companies are jointly and 

severally liable for a fine of $1,000 per day, beginning one week from the date of this 

opinion. The Companies must pay the expenses Gandhi incurred pursuing the motion. 

5 Miller v. Steller Enters., Inc., 1980 WL 6432, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 1980); 

accord Triton Constr. Co. v. E. Shore Elec. Servs., Inc., 2009 WL 1387115, at *7 (Del. Ch. 

May 18, 2009); Israel Disc. Bank, 2013 WL 2326875, at *28; Aveta, 986 A.2d at 1188.