Filed 10/22/20 P. v. Flores CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ERIC LUIS FLORES,

Defendant and Appellant.

B304177

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. YA098533)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Hector M. Guzman, Judge. Affirmed.

Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Eric Luis Flores

of pandering, in violation of Penal Code section 266i, subdivision 

(a)(6).1 We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Facts

In 2018, the Torrance Police Department Vice and 

Narcotics Unit maintained an Instagram social media account in 

the name of “Jacklyn Snow,” as part of undercover operations 

targeting pimping and prostitution. The profile picture for the 

Snow account was of a buxom blonde woman. The account also

displayed various photographs, a video, and several emojis, 

including a money bag and two feet with a downward-pointing 

arrow. According to Torrance Police Detective Andrew Lee, who 

testified as an expert, the feet and arrow emojis stood for “ten 

toes down,” which was a coded reference to prostitution, 

indicating the prostitute was working by walking a “blade.” A 

“blade” is slang for an area where prostitutes walk up and down

the street, seeking clients.

On May 21, 2018, Flores, using an Instagram account 

named “Floezy_ytk,” sent a friend request and a message to the 

Snow account. It stated, “Thanks for adding choose-up, little 

babe, what state you in?” In street vernacular commonly 

associated with prostitution and pimping, a “choose-up” is a fee 

required to be paid by a prostitute when she selects a pimp.

On May 24, 2018, Flores sent a message to the Snow 

account stating, “Send da fee, bitch.” Lee, posing as Snow, 

replied, “Ha, what the fee like?” and “What I get for that?” Flores 

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Penal Code.
3

replied, “3K. Win.” “Snow” then asked, “You got me a wifey?” 

and “You got that stable?” Flores replied affirmatively to both 

questions. In street slang associated with prostitution, a “wifey” 

is a co-prostitute who acts as a friend and companion to another 

prostitute. A “stable” is a group of prostitutes managed by the 

pimp. “Snow” then asked whether Flores was “gonna come scoop 

me up?” and if she would “need to walk some dusty-ass blade off 

Fig.” Figueroa Street in Los Angeles, according to Lee, was 

known for prostitution activities. Flores replied, “Hell, no, we 

high class in O.C., baby.” “Snow” replied, “What’s in O.C.?” 

Flores answered, “Team Floezy, Main Street, Beach Boulevard, 

money on every block.” According to Lee, Beach Boulevard in 

Orange County is known for prostitution. Flores added, “I have 

some tricks lined up.” “Tricks,” in street slang, refers to a 

prostitute’s customers. Flores said, “I’ll blend in, trust Daddy.” 

Prostitutes commonly call their pimps their “Daddies.” 

During subsequent Instagram message conversations, 

“Snow” pretended to be in various locations in the Los Angeles 

area and Northern California, and discussed meeting with Flores. 

During one such conversation, “Snow” asked Flores how much 

she should charge when a customer wanted to bring a friend to 

participate in a sexual liaison, and when another customer 

wished to engage in “Greek,” a slang term for anal sex. Flores 

suggested that “Snow” triple the price and charge “500 and up” in 

regard to the first scenario, although he was not sure; in regard 

to the second, he agreed “Snow” should “charge more.” Flores 

stated that he could arrange for a photographer to take pictures 

of “Snow.” In a message sent on June 9, 2018, “Snow” stated she 

had “$2,000 of the choose-up.” Flores told her to send that money 

to him through MoneyGram. When “Snow” expressed hesitation 
4

about sending money to someone she had never met, Flores said 

to forget about sending the money and suggested they meet and 

have a meal together. Flores and “Snow” did not further discuss 

the terms of a potential pimp-prostitute arrangement between 

them.

On June 11, 2018, Detective Erin Velarde, posing as Snow, 

spoke with Flores in a recorded telephone call, portions of which 

were played for the jury. Velarde said she was still in Northern 

California and could not make it to the Los Angeles area as 

planned. Flores told Velarde to go a Walmart store and send him 

a MoneyGram. When she protested she did not know how to 

make such a transaction, Flores called her a bitch, told her to 

“shut the fuck up,” and explained the process. He stated that she 

needed to give him the MoneyGram confirmation number after 

making the transaction. When she asked questions, he said, 

“You talkin too mother fuckin much for me, bitch. I said do what 

the fuck I said. Do it. I didn’t ask you all that extra shit, did I?” 

He admonished her to be sure to send the money, saying: “Bitch, 

don’t play with me. Go do that shit like right the fuck now. You 

hear me?” and “you better be doing that shit ASAP.” Flores told 

her to send the money to “Eric Flores.” He also stated, “I’m tryin 

to get you situated,” and “I got . . . all type of shit lined up for you 

when you get down here, so.” The officers did not send the 

MoneyGram. 

On July 3, 2018, “Snow” messaged Flores, telling him she 

was in Torrance. Detective Lee, posing as Snow, arranged that 

Flores would come pick Snow up at a Howard Johnson’s hotel in 

Torrance. Flores indicated, in another Instagram message, that 

he was on his way. Officers were waiting at the hotel, and 

arrested him when he arrived. Detective Lee recognized Flores
5

by the photo on the “Floezy” Instagram account, and by his voice. 

The hat Flores wore was the same one depicted in his Instagram 

account.

2. Procedure

On November 27, 2018, Flores was charged by information 

with pandering in violation of section 266i, subdivision (a)(6), by 

attempting to procure “Jane Doe” for the purpose of prostitution. 

The information also alleged that Flores had suffered a prior 

“strike” conviction for robbery. (§§ 211, 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, 

subd. (b).)

Jury trial commenced in November 2019. In pretrial 

motions, the trial court granted the defense request to bifurcate 

the prior conviction allegations and denied the defense motion to 

preclude impeachment of Flores with the prior robbery 

conviction, should he choose to testify. Prior to trial, on 

September 12 and October 22, 2019, the trial court denied 

Flores’s two Marsden motions.2

The jury convicted Flores of pandering by agreeing to 

receive money or something of value, for attempting to persuade 

or procure “Jane Doe” for the purpose of prostitution, in violation 

of section 266i, subdivision (a)(6). Thereafter, in a bifurcated 

trial, the jury found Flores had suffered a prior conviction for 

robbery.

The trial court granted Flores’s Romero motion3and 

sentenced him to the low term of three years in prison. It 

imposed a $300 restitution fine, a suspended parole revocation 

restitution fine in the same amount, a $30 court facilities 

2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

3 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
6

assessment, and a $40 court operations assessment. Defense 

counsel objected on the ground that Flores “ha[d] no ability to 

pay.” The trial court offered to conduct an ability-to-pay hearing, 

but counsel declined.

Flores timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

After review of the record, Flores’s court-appointed counsel

filed an opening brief that raised no issues and requested that 

this court conduct an independent review of the record pursuant 

to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Appellant was advised 

that he had 30 days to submit by brief or letter any contentions 

or argument he wished this court to consider. 

On August 4, 2020, Flores submitted a supplemental brief. 

Therein, he makes a variety of assertions, none of which 

demonstrates any legal or reversible error. He mentions, without 

further explanation, Strauder v. West Virginia (1879) 100 U.S. 

303, Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, Brady v. Maryland

(1963) 373 U.S. 83, and “veteran statutes.” By citing Strauder 

and Batson, Flores presumably intends to raise a claim relating 

to racial or ethnic discrimination in jury selection. But Flores 

does not aver that any Batson motion was made and denied at 

trial, nor does he otherwise explain the basis for his claim or offer 

argument or authority to support it. Consequently, this 

contention fails. (See People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 

919, 929 [failure to provide argument or cite authority for it 

forfeits the issue on appeal].)

Brady v. Maryland requires that the prosecution disclose to 

the defense all exculpatory, material evidence known to the 

prosecution team. (People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 

668.) Flores fails to explain the basis for his Brady claim, and 
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the record reflects no Brady violation. As to the vague reference 

to “veteran statutes,” this contention is so nonspecific as to defy 

review. (See People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1049–1050.) 

The same is true as to Flores’s contentions that his First 

Amendment rights were violated, and that his trial was “unfair” 

and “unconstitutional.” 

Flores next lists “absense of probable cause—absense of 

intent is unlawful” [sic] as an issue he wishes to raise. To the 

extent he intends to assert that the evidence presented at the 

preliminary hearing failed to demonstrate probable cause, the 

record does not reflect that he brought any challenge to the 

preliminary hearing prior to trial. Therefore, any such 

contention is waived. (People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 628; 

People v. Shaw (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 682, 684.) In any event, 

our review of the preliminary hearing reveals no evidentiary 

deficiency. It is unclear what Flores means by his reference to 

“absen[c]e of intent,” but the court and parties agreed the 

charged offense was a specific intent crime, and the jury was so 

instructed.

Flores asserts that he is innocent, and requests that this 

court “file a motion to drop all charges” against him or order 

“a reexamination of evidence by honest investigation.” He also 

asserts that the evidence was unreliable and unpersuasive. We 

interpret these assertions as a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence. 

When determining whether the evidence was sufficient to

sustain a criminal conviction, “ ‘ “we review the entire record

in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether

it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is

reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable
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trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063,

1104.) The same standard of review applies when the

prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Salazar

(2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 242.) “ ‘ “Although it is the duty of

the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial

evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which

suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury,

not the appellate court which must be convinced of the

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v.

Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 504.) Unless physically impossible

or inherently improbable, the testimony of a single witness is

sufficient to support a verdict. (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th

899, 963.) 

Flores’s conviction is supported by substantial evidence. 

The evidence showed Flores agreed to receive money from a 

person he believed to be Jacklyn Snow, a prostitute, as a fee for 

him to become her pimp, with the understanding he would 

facilitate her work as a prostitute by finding her customers and 

showing her a lucrative area in which to ply her trade. He 

promised that he had “tricks” lined up for her, and that the area 

she would work for him was “high class,” with “money on every 

block.” A person may violate section 266i, subdivision (a), even if 

the targeted person is already an active prostitute or is an 

undercover police officer. (People v. Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 

965, 970, 981.) Thus, the evidence was sufficient to prove Flores 

agreed to receive money in exchange for attempting to procure 

“Jane Doe” for the purpose of prostitution. (§ 266i, subd. (a)(6); 

People v. Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 484 [“Pandering is 

‘the business of recruiting a prostitute, finding a place of business 
9

for a prostitute, or soliciting customers for a prostitute,’ ” and 

comprises a broad range of conduct]; see People v. Almodovar 

(1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 732, 740–741.)

Finally, Flores complains that his trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance by hiding and withholding “key mitigating 

evidence that could prove [his] innocence,” “incriminate[ing]” him 

during closing argument, and failing to inform the jury that he 

was a Navy veteran. To establish ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a defendant must show counsel’s representation fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing 

professional norms, and there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different. (People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 125.) 

Flores fails to meet this burden here. Counsel did not 

provide ineffective assistance by failing to inform the jury that 

Flores was a Navy veteran, as such evidence was irrelevant to 

any issue at trial. (See Evid. Code, §§ 210, 350.) We have 

reviewed counsel’s closing argument, and counsel did not say 

anything that can be construed as improperly “incriminating” 

Flores. Counsel’s argument that the evidence supported an 

alternate conclusion—that Flores was not really attempting to 

recruit “Snow” as a prostitute, but instead sought a sexual liaison 

with her or hoped to induce her to send him money—was a 

reasonable tactical choice, given the evidence counsel had to work 

with. We accord great deference to counsel’s tactical decisions 

and presume that counsel’s actions fell within the broad range of 

reasonableness and can be explained as a matter of sound trial 

strategy. (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198; People v.

Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 125; People v. Gamache (2010) 48 
10

Cal.4th 347, 392–393 [sensible concessions during argument are 

an acceptable and often necessary tactic].)

Flores’s contentions that counsel hid or withheld evidence 

turn on matters outside the record, and therefore must be raised 

in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (People v. Duong (2020) 

10 Cal.5th 36, 56 [“Any claim of ineffective assistance based on 

evidence not in the trial record must be made in a habeas corpus 

petition”]; People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 172.)

We have examined the record, and are satisfied no arguable 

issues exist and Flores’s attorney has fully complied with the 

responsibilities of counsel. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 

125–126; People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441–442.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

EGERTON, J.