alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Defense

###### Office of the Secretary 

          - [Transmittal Nos. 08-86] 

# AGENCY:

Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 

# ACTION:

Notice. 

# SUMMARY:

The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text of a section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. This is published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104-164 dated 21 July 1996. 

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ms. B. English, DSCA/DBO/CFM, (703) 601-3740. 

The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittals 08-86 with attached transmittal, and policy justification. 

Dated: August 1, 2008. 

Patricia L. Toppings, 

OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

      ( print page 46597)          ( print page 46598)          ( print page 46599)          ( print page 46600)    

BILLING CODE 5001-06-M

 [FR Doc. E8-18255 Filed 8-8-08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001-06-C
Exhibit 32.1 - President/CFO Certification (Section 906)

                        CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                         18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                         AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
             SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Political Calls, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2008 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report").
I, David Gallagher, President/CFO of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

               (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of
                     section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
                     of 1934; and

               (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
                     in all material respects, the financial condition and
                     result of operations of the Company.

/s/ David Gallagher
-------------------
    David Gallagher
    President/CFO


Date  April 30, 2008
      --------------


<PAGE>
Order entered December 9, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-01450-CV

PATRICK THOBE, Appellant

V.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER, Appellee

On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-12-14434

ORDER

Appellant Patrick Thobe’s December 8, 2015 motion to supplement his brief is 

GRANTED, and the supplemental brief attached as Exhibit A to appellant’s motion is 

ORDERED filed as of this date.

/s/ MOLLY FRANCIS 

PRESIDING JUSTICE
#### Russell K. MOSIER, Doing Business under the Name and Style of Mosier Radio Service, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, Hiram E. Meeker, as Receiver of the First National Bank in Mamaroneck, Defendants, Hiram E. Meeker, as Receiver of First National Bank in Mamaroneck, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 217.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

March 7, 1938.

Hurlbert McAndrew, of Larchmont, N. Y., for plaintiff-appellant.

Lynch & Cahn, of White Plains, N. Y. (Monroe J. Cahn and Harold M. Miller, both of White Plains, N. Y., of counsel), for defendant-appellee,

Before' L. HAND, SWAN, and CHASE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Decree affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 49 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 H. R. 49

    To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to prohibit 
   contributions by multicandidate political committees and to limit 
contributions in House of Representatives elections from persons other 
                  than individual in-State residents.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 1995

  Mr. Archer introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on House Oversight

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to prohibit 
   contributions by multicandidate political committees and to limit 
contributions in House of Representatives elections from persons other 
                  than individual in-State residents.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITION OF CONTRIBUTIONS BY MULTICANDIDATE POLITICAL 
              COMMITTEES.

    Section 315(a)(2) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 
U.S.C. 441a(a)(2)) is amended to read as follows:
    ``(2) No multicandidate political committee may make contributions 
with respect to any election for Federal office.''.

SEC. 2. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION LIMITATION ON CONTRIBUTIONS 
              FROM PERSONS OTHER THAN INDIVIDUAL IN-STATE RESIDENTS.

    Section 315 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 
441a) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(i)(1) A candidate for the office of Representative in, or 
Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress may not, with 
respect to an election for Federal office, accept contributions from 
persons other than individual in-State residents totaling more than 20 
percent of the total of contributions accepted from all sources.
    ``(2) As used in this subsection, the term `individual in-State 
resident' means an individual who resides in the State in which the 
congressional district involved is located.''.
                                 <all>
```
## United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________
No. 22

- 3576

___________________________
United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.
Anthony Davis, also known as Anthony Dawayne Randolph, also known as Anthony Latice Randolph, also known as John Duke

Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Ea stern

____________
Submitted: March 9 , 2023 Filed: March 14, 2023 [Unpublished]

____________ Before BENTON, SHEPHERD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.-2- Anthony Davis appeals the above

- Guidelines sentence the district c ourt 1 imposed upon revoking his supervised release. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

Davis’s counsel has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. This court concludes that the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence. See United States v. Miller , 557 F.3d 910, 915

- 18 (8th Cir. 2009) (substantive reasonableness of revocation sentenc e is reviewed
under deferential abuse

- of

- discretion standard); United States v. Feemster , 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“it will be the unusual case when we reverse a
district court sentence

-- whether within, above, or below the applicable Gu idelines

range

-- as substantively unreasonable”). The record reflects that the district court adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Larison

, 432 F.3d 921, 923 (8th Cir. 2006) (revocation sentence may be unreasonable i f court fails to consider relevant factor, gives significant weight to improper or irrelevant factor, or commits clear error of judgment). Additionally, the revocation sentence was within the statutory maximum. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e)(3) (maximum

revoca tion prison term is 5 years if underlying offense is Class A felony), (b)(1) (statutory maximum supervised release term for Class A offense of conviction is 5 years), (h) (length of new supervised

- release term shall not exceed term authorized by statute for offense of conviction, less revocation prison terms).

The judgment is affirmed, and counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.

______________________________

1 The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
#### Ida WELLS, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. DOUGLASS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.*

No. 14733.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

June 28, 1934.

Solomon S. Goldman, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Cameron C. McCann, of New Orleans, for appellee.

*

Rehearing denied 156 So. 591.

JANVIER, Judge.

The question involved here is identical with that discussed by us in the matter entitled Succession of Frank Watson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 156 So. 29, decided by us this day, except that in this case it is admitted that the paid-up value of the policy was tendered to plaintiff.

For the reasons given by us in that case, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment appealed from be and it is amended by reducing the amount thereof to $17.01, with interest at 6 per cent.

All costs to be paid by plaintiff.

Judgment amended.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF SEL-DRUM INTERNATIONAL, INC., FOR THIS TWELVE MONTH
PERIOD ENDED JULY 31, 1998, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-31-1998
<CASH>                                         285,750
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,866,665
<ALLOWANCES>                                    40,483
<INVENTORY>                                  3,457,466
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             5,832,304
<PP&E>                                       1,842,845
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,024,905
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               7,002,896
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,598,239
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  4,499,805
<COMMON>                                        76,425
<OTHER-SE>                                     520,790
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 7,002,896
<SALES>                                     14,331,572
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            14,331,572
<CGS>                                       10,155,831
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               10,155,831
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,168,780
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                34,533
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              57,986
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                868,132
<INCOME-TAX>                                   351,628
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   516,504
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .07
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .07
        

</TABLE>
#### Joseph Louis SCARPATI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Florida Division of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 72-2798

Summary Calendar.*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 28, 1972.

Joseph Louis Scarpati, pro se.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., J. Robert Olian, Miami, Fla., for respondent-appellee.

Before BELL, ’ DYER and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

*

 Rule 18, 5th Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Company of New York et al., 431 F.2d 409, Part I (5th Cir. 1970).

PER CURIAM:

Joseph Louis Scarpati sought habeas corpus relief from a conviction and 25 year sentence for robbery, asserting that evidence admitted at his robbery trial was obtained by an unconstitutional search of his home following his arrest. The district court denied the writ. We affirm.

Petitioner contends that the new search restrictions announced on June 23, 1969 in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, should be applied to this ease since on that date his conviction was still on direct appeal in the state courts of Florida.1 The Supreme Court in Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 91 S.Ct. 1148, 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971), decided that this new rule should not be applied retroactively to searches occurring prior to June 23, 1969. As this latter decision makes clear, it is the date of the *search,*not the date of the completion of direct appeal, which governs the applicability of *Chimel. See also*Lyon v. United States, 416 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 1023, 90 S.Ct. 597, 24 L.Ed.2d 516 (1970). Since Scarpati’s search occurred prior to *Chimel,*it does not affect his rights.

The district court held that Scarpati’s search was constitutional under the principles of United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950) and Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399*1155(1947). We find no error in this determination.

The denial of the writ of habeas corpus is

Affirmed.

1

. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, Third District of Florida, on June 17, 1969, Scarpati v. State, 224 So.2d 335 (Fla.App.1969), rehearing denied July 19, 1969. The Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari November 10, 1969.
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#### HUNTER v. RUDIDILL.

No. 4783.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.

June 4, 1934.

Polk & Robinson, of Alexandria, for appellant.

Frank H. Peterman, of Alexandria, for ap-pellee.

DREW, Judge.

This is a suit for rent due on 20.11 acres of farm land. A provisional seizure was issued and the cotton and corn in the field were seized. Plaintiff alleged that the rent contract, which was oral, was for defendant to pay $6 per acre rent, or a total of $120.66. He further alleged that defendant had harvested and sold part of the crop, had paid no part of the rent, and had refused to pay.

Defendant admits that he rented the land, but alleges he planted 7.91 acres of land in corn and 12.20 acres of land in cotton; that he agreed to pay $6 per acre for the land planted in corn and one-fourth of the quantity of the cotton raised, on the land planted in cotton. In his answer, defendant asked that the provisional seizure be dissolved and for $50 attorney’s fees for dissolving it.

In reconvention, defendant prays for damages in the sum of $250, alleging that on the third day after the seizure and within the ten days allowed him to bond the property, plaintiff sent a crowd of men on the property and picked and removed therefrom two and one-half bales of cotton, which plaintiff illegally retained in his possession. He alleges this act to- be illegal and that he is entitled to damages for said act.

The lower court awarded judgment fox-plaintiff as prayed for, sustained the writ of provisional seizure, and i-ejected defendant’s reeonventional demand. Defendant has devolutively appealed to this court.

The principal question in the case is, What was the rent contract?

The lower court found the rent contract to be as alleged by plaintiff and we cannot say its finding on this question is incorrect for the preponderance of the testimony is in favor of such a finding. This being true, plaintiff is entitled to judgment for the amount of rent sued for.

It is admitted that defendant picked, ginned, and sold one bale of cotton off this land and, while he offered to pay one-fourth *30of same to plaintiff, be refused to pay anything on the basis of '$6 per acre cash rent, and, further, kept all the money derived from the sale of the cotton. Plaintiff was therefore entitled to sue out a writ of provisional seizure and said writ was properly sustained.

The only remaining question is the claim for damages in the reconventional demand. The cotton was. picked by hands employed by the keeper appointed by the sheriff and under directions of the sheriff. It was the duty of the sheriff or keeper to have the crop gathered after it was seized, and we have been cited to no law, nor do we know of any, which required them to wait ten days to see if defendant was going to bond the property. Furthermore, there is no proof of any damage to defendant caused by this act.

We are therefore of the opinion that the judgment of the lower court is correct and it is affirmed, with costs.
#### John Earl Huskey v. State.

No. 25659.

January 23, 1952.

*605Hon. Lea Boothe, Judge Presiding.

No attorney for appellant of record on appeal.

*James Pearson,*County Attorney, Sweetwater, and *George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

This is a conviction for possessing intoxicating liquor for the purpose of sale in a dry area, with punishment assessed at a fine of $400.

Agents of the Texas Liquor Control Board went to the residence of appellant with a view of seeking permission to search it for intoxicating liquor. As to what then happened, we quote from the direct testimony of Agent Backues as follows :

> “When I went up to the door of John Earl Huskey’s residence in Sweetwater, Nolan County, Texas, his brother, Len Huskey, was there. I told Len Huskey, ‘Len, I don’t have a search warrant.’ He told us that we didn’t have to have a search warrant, to come on in and search the premises. Mrs. Huskey was in the front room after going through a little hall intrance way, she was there. We went on in the house and saw the whiskey and beer but we didn’t carry anything out and then John Earl Hus-key drove up and came in. I told John Earl we didn’t have a search warrant but Len said we could search it. John Earl said you didn’t have to have a search warrant any time to search his place. We picked up three pints of whiskey, nine pints of gin mixed up, and 268 twelve ounce cans of beer. I was going to file on Len but John said, ‘No, it’s my stuff and my place. Just file on me and I will take the consequences of it.’ ”

It is insisted that the testimony as to the finding of the liquor was inadmissible because of an illegal search, and that Len Huskey was without authority to waive warrant for the search of appellant’s residence.

It was not necessary to determine this question, because appellant’s admission of the ownership and possession of the liquor rendered untenable any objection to the search which did nothing -more than establish possession of the liquor in appellant.

*606Other bills of exception appearing have been examined and are overruled without discussion.

The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the court.
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