alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 23.1

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We  hereby  consent  to the  incorporation  by  reference  in  the  Registration
Statements  on Form  S-8 (No.  333-68801,  No.  333-62767,  No.  333-85556,  No.
333-07409,  No. 333-13887 and No. 333-62767) and in the Registration  Statements
on Form S-3 (no. 333-63991,  No. 333-11391,  No. 333-23317 and No. 333-63891) of
Oryx  Technology  Corp.  of our report  dated  April 28,  2000  relating  to the
financial statements, which appears in this Form 10-KSB.



/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
San Jose, California

May 26, 2000
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SEIU HEALTHCARE MICHIGAN

f/k/a SEIU Local 79,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 09-13215

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

ST. MARY’S ACQUISITION CO.,

INC., d/b/a ST. MARY’S NURSING HOME,

Defendant.

____________________________/

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff SEIU Healthcare Michigan (“SEIU”) filed this action pursuant to Section

301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), seeking to confirm an

arbitration award that overturned the dismissal of SEIU member Angelia McCurrie from

her employment with Defendant St. Mary’s Acquisition Company, Inc., doing business as

St. Mary’s Nursing Home (collectively “St. Mary’s”). The parties subsequently filed

cross-motions for summary judgment. In an Opinion and Order entered on this date, the

Court denied SEIU’s motion for confirmation of the arbitration award and granted the

motion filed by St. Mary’s to vacate the arbitration award.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the Complaint is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and JUDGMENT is entered in favor of St. Mary’s

and against SEIU.

DATE: May 27, 2010 s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Meagan Dolleris, Esq.

Karen B. Berkery, Esq.

Teri L. Dennings, Esq.
#### George Kizer and Daniel Kizer, plaintiffs in error, *vs.*Michael Kennedy, defendant in error.

*Brror-'to- Bureau.*

3Ielcl, "that a plea wKch avers, m answer to an action of trespass, that the landlord entered ’ on the premises on the last day of the term, and distrained the property, for rent due three-months previously, is good.

This was an action of trespass *de bonis*asportatisbrought' by the plaintiffs against the defendant in error, in the Bureau-Circuit Court. The declaration alleged that the defendant, on. the 15th day of March, 1847, took and carried away goods and chattels, &c., the property of the plaintiffs, of the value of one-thousand dollars, &c.

The defendant pleaded not guilty, and a special plea, which-is substantially set out in the opinion of the Court. To the special plea, the plaintiffs filed.a demurrer. The Court, T. L.. Dickey, Judge, overruled the demurrer, and the plaintiffs electing to stand by their demurrer, bring the cause to this Court,, and assign the overruling of the demurrer to-the special plea as. error.

G. Peters and E. N. Powell, for plaintiffs in error-

Glover & Cook, for defendant in error-

*573Opinion by Treat, C. J.:

The overruling of a demurrer to the second plea is assigned for error. The plea pursues the form laid down in 3d Chitty’s Pleadings, 1094, and is not, we think, obnoxious to the objections taken to it. It is insisted that the plea fails to show that the distress was made during the continuance of the tenancy. It sets forth a demise of the premises, and an occupancy thereunder, from the 25th of November, 1845, to the first of March, 1847, reserving a rent of $ 400, payable on the first of December, 1846, and $ 200, in improvements, to he made on the premises ; and then avers, that “ on the day and year last aforesaid”—referring to the first of December, 1846—“ a large sum of money, to wit, the sum of three hundred and twenty-seven dollars and seventy cents of the rent aforesaid, for one year of said term, ending on the first day of March, 1847, and then last elapsed, became due and was due and payable to the said defendant, and at the said time when, &c., was in arrear and unpaid; wherefore the said defendant, in his own right, did, on the said first day, when, &c., enter upon said premises, and seize, take and distrain,” &c. The *u*said first day ” must be understood as referring to the first of March, 1847, immediately before stated. If so, the distress was made on the last day of the tenancy, and for the rent due, by the terms of the demise, three months previously. The plea clearly shows that the property was dis-trained subsequent to the day the rent became due, and before the determination of the tenancy.

Affirm the judgment, with costs.

*Judgment affirmed.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This Schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
financial statements of Orxy Technology Corp. for the 12 months ended February
28, 1997 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial
statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                                          0000915355    
<NAME>                                         Oryx Technology Corp.   
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. DOLLARS    
       
<S>                                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                               FEB-28-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                  MAR-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                    FEB-28-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                 1.00
<CASH>                                          3,080
<SECURITIES>                                    0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   3,554
<ALLOWANCES>                                    97
<INVENTORY>                                     4,795
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                1,306
<PP&E>                                          4,084
<DEPRECIATION>                                  1,410
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  15,312
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           5,878
<BONDS>                                         0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           637
<PREFERRED>                                     107
<COMMON>                                        13
<OTHER-SE>                                      8,677
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    15,312
<SALES>                                         26,860
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                26,860
<CGS>                                           18,475
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                10,310
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,925)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    40
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,965)
<DISCONTINUED>                                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                 0
<CHANGES>                                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (2,012)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (.19)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   0
        


</TABLE>
#### Charles Lincoln Smith v. The People, for use of the Illinois State Board of Health.

The court recites a finding of facts in this case in accordance with the remanding order of the Supreme Court, 199 Ill. 20.

Debt, for a penalty. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Leslie D. Puterbaugh, Judge presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1903.

Reversed with a finding of facts.

Opinion filed April 21, 1903.

I. C. Pinkney, attorney for appellant.

John L. Lanning and Whitmore, Barnes *&*Boulware, attorneys for appellees.

Opinion

per Curiam.

The facts of this case and our views concerning it appear *500in 92 Ill. App. 22, where we reversed the judgment of the court below. Our judgment was reversed in The People, for use, etc., v. Smith, 199 Ill. 20, for lack of such a finding of facts as the statute requires, and the cause was remanded to this court with directions to recite a sufficient finding of facts upon which we base our judgment. For the reasons stated in our former opinion the judgment of the court below is reversed, and we direct the following finding of facts to be recited in the judgment:

Finding of Facts.—We find that appellant was engaged in the business of traveling optician; that he went from place to place in this state, including Peoria, where the acts in question were performed; that he fitted spectacles to persons of defective sight, first ascertaining by tests the kind of lens required by his customers, then procuring glasses to be ground accordingly and placed in a frame and delivered to his customers, and receiving payment therefor; that he advertised himself in the public press as “ the famous Chicago eye expert;” and in such advertisements he invited persons afflicted with blurring, dizziness, neuralgia, headaches, spots before the eyes, inflammation, granulation, winking, trembling spells, cataract, burning and smarting of the eyes, and various nervous brain affections, to call upon him; that these advertisements stated he did not give medical or surgical treatment; that in these advertisements he stated that his glasses, fitted and ground by his method, benefited his patrons, and had cured headaches, blurring, itching and burning of the eyes, etc. We find that appellant’s glasses relieved such troubles while they were used, but did not cure them. We find that appellant had no license from the state board of health. We find that appellant did not practice medicine or surgery. We further find that appellant did not treat or profess to treat, operate on or prescribe for, any physical ailment or any physical injury to, or deformity of, another, except in the manner and to the extent above stated. We find that the foregoing were the acts for which appellee sought to recover and recovered from appellant in this cause the penalty pre*501scribed by the act entitled "An act to regulate the practice of medicine in the State of Illinois, and to repeal an act therein named,” in force July 1, 1899. We hold that these facts did not give appellee a cause of action against appellant.
Exhibit 23.1

                       CONSENT OF ROBERT C. OLIVIERI, JR.
                      INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTS

The  undersigned independent certified public accounting firm hereby consents to
the  inclusion  of  its  report  on  the  financial  statements  of  Log  Point
Technologies, Inc, for the year ending June 30, 2000, and to the reference to it
as  experts in accounting and auditing relating to said financial statements, in
the  Form 10-KSB filed with the securities and Exchange Commission for Log Point
Technologies,  Inc.,  dated  September  26,  2000.

/s/Robert  C.  Olivieri,  Jr.
-----------------------------
ROBERT  C.  OLIVIERI,  JR.
Certified  Public  Accounts
A  Professional  Corporation
2040  Street  Road,  Suite  8
Bensalem,  Pennsylvania
September  26,  2000


<PAGE>
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 434

To amend title 39, United States Code, to prevent the United States Postal

Service from disclosing the names or addresses of any postal patrons

or other persons, except under certain conditions.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 9, 1995

Mr. CONDIT introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

A BILL

To amend title 39, United States Code, to prevent the United

States Postal Service from disclosing the names or addresses of any postal patrons or other persons, except

under certain conditions.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Postal Privacy Act of

5 1995’’.
2

•HR 434 IH

1 SEC. 2. CONDITIONS FOR DISCLOSURE OF NAMES OR AD2 DRESSES.

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 412 of title 39, United

4 States Code, is amended to read as follows:

5 ‘‘§ 412. Conditions for disclosure of names or

6 addresses

7 ‘‘(a) No officer or employee of the Postal Service may

8 make available to the public by any means or for any pur9 pose any names or addresses (past or present) of postal

10 patrons or other persons, except as provided under sub11 section (b) or as otherwise specifically provided by law.

12 ‘‘(b) The Postal Service shall prescribe such regula13 tions as may be necessary to carry out this section. Under

14 the regulations, no disclosure described in subsection (a)

15 shall be allowable except if, or to the extent that—

16 ‘‘(1) the disclosure consists of information

17 which—

18 ‘‘(A) relates to a change of address; and

19 ‘‘(B) was obtained from a person in ac20 cordance with subsection (c);

21 ‘‘(2) permission to disclose has not been denied

22 under subsection (c)(2); and

23 ‘‘(3) the disclosure would contribute to the effi24 ciency of postal operations.
3

•HR 434 IH

1 ‘‘(c) Any form used by the Postal Service to obtain

2 information from a person relating to a change of address

3 shall include—

4 ‘‘(1) notice of the Postal Service’s information

5 practices under this section, including how, and to

6 whom, any information furnished on such form may

7 be disclosed; and

8 ‘‘(2) a means for such person to deny permis9 sion for the Postal Service to disclose any informa10 tion furnished on such form.’’.

11 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The table of sec12 tions for chapter 4 of title 39, United States Code, is

13 amended by striking the item relating to section 412 and

14 inserting the following:

‘‘412. Conditions for disclosure of names or addresses.’’.

Æ
EXHIBIT 31.1
CERTIFICATIONS
I, Lance Wilson, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of First Fortis Life Insurance Company;
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;
(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and
(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and
(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
Date: March 29, 2005    /s/ Lance Wilson     Lance Wilson President and Chief Executive Officer
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 154 (Friday, August 8, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 46337]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-18317]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION


Notice of Permits Issued Under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 
1978

AGENCY: National Science Foundation.

ACTION: Notice of permits issued under the Antarctic Conservation of 
1978, Public Law 95-541.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The National Science Foundation (NSF) is required to publish 
notice of permits issued under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978. 
This is the required notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nadene G. Kennedy, Permit Office, 
Office of Polar Programs, Rm. 755, National Science Foundation, 4201 
Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On July 2, 2008, the National Science 
Foundation published a notice in the Federal Register of permit 
applications received. A permit was issued on August 5, 2008 to: 
Kristin M. O'Brien, Permit No. 2009-011.

Nadene G. Kennedy,
Permit Officer.
[FR Doc. E8-18317 Filed 8-7-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7555-01-P
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 21.7


                      SUBSIDIARIES OF CROWN NORTHCORP, INC.

Crown Revenue Services, Inc., an Ohio corporation, is wholly owned subsidiary of
Crown NorthCorp, Inc.

Crown Properties, Inc., an Ohio corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Crown Revenue Services, Inc.

CRSBP Holdings Corp., a Delaware corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Crown Revenue Services, Inc.

CNC Holding Corp., a Delaware corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Crown
NorthCorp, Inc.

Eastern Realty, L.L.C., a Virginia limited company, with 99% of the membership
interests owned by CNC Holding Corp., and 1% owned by Crown Revenue Services,
Inc.

Eastern Realty Corporation, a Virginia corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary
of CNC Holding Corp.

Eastern Baltimore, Inc., a Virginia corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary of
CNC Holding Corp.

CNC Services, LLC, a Delaware limited liability corporation, is 50% owned by CNC
Holding Corp.
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of FLM Minerals Inc.(the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended February 28, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date here of (the "report"), I, Jianxing Qian, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) 	The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) 	The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Dated this 20th day of April, 2007.



| | JIANXING QIAN          
| | -----------------------
| | Jianxing Qian          
| | Chief Financial Officer













---
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION




PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Report of
Acquired Sales Corp. a Nevada corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the
period ending December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the “Report”) I, Gerard M. Jacobs, Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer) hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that, to my
knowledge:





a.
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d));
      and





b.
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.








/s/ Gerard M.
Jacobs


Gerard M.
Jacobs, Chief Financial Officer


(Principal
Financial Officer)





Dated
February 15, 2009
|   | (1)      the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Extreme Home Staging,      Inc.  for the quarter ended March 31, 2010 as filed with the      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, fully complies with      the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | (2)      the information contained in the such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of      Extreme Home Staging, Inc.  for the quarter ended March 31,      2010  fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial      condition and results of operations of Extreme Home Staging,      Inc.                                   |

|                                 |                                                          |                       |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|
|                                 | EXTREME      HOME STAGING, INC.                               |
|                                 |                                                          |                       |
| Date:  April      25, 2010 | By:                                                           | /s/ Milka      Fixler |
|                                 | Milka      Fixler                                             |
|                                 | Chief      Executive Officer                                  |
|                                 | (principal      executive officer and duly authorizedofficer) |
#### Edith Rose SUDDARD, as Executrix of the Estate of Thomas W. Suddard, Deceased, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent. George S. HAMILTON, Petitioner, v. SAME. Edward P. HAMILTON, Petitioner, v. SAME.

Nos. 5802-5804.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

April 7, 1938.

A. L. Nash, of Manitowoc, Wis., for petitioner.

James W. Morris, Department of Justice,'and James P. Wenchel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Washington, D. G, for respondent.

Before SPARKS and TREANOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

On petition of counsel for respondent to reverse and remand this cause, counsel for petitioner consenting thereto, it is ordered and adjudged by this court that the said petition to reverse and remand be granted, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed and remanded to the United States Board of Tax Appeals for a computation of the tax pursuant to the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Helvering v. H. C. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 58 S.Ct. 154, 82 L.Ed. —, decided December 6, 1937, rehearing denied, 58 S.Ct. 478, 82 L.Ed. —, January 17, 1938.