UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PRESIDENTIAL FACILITY, LLC, 

 Plaintiff, 

 Case No. 09-12346 

v. Hon. Lawrence P. Zatkoff 

 

CHRISTOPHER J. DEBBAS and 

JAMES R. GRIFFITHS, 

 Defendants, 

and 

GREGORY S. CAMPBELL and 

ROBERT PINKAS, 

 Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs, 

v. 

PETER SINATRA, EMERALD PARTNERS V, LP, 

and JETDIRECT AVIATION HOLDINGS, LLC, 

 

Third-Party Defendants. 

____________________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER 

AT A SESSION of said Court, held in the United States Courthouse, 

in the City of Port Huron, State of Michigan, on January 9, 2014 

PRESENT: THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion For Post-Judgment Relief Against 

Gregory Campbell, Diane Campbell, Chester County Aviation Holdings, LLC and CDV Capital, LLC 

[dkt 210]. The motion has been fully briefed. The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are 

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adequately presented in the parties’ papers such that the decision process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Therefore, pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2), it is hereby ORDERED that the 

motion be resolved on the briefs submitted. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. 

II. BACKGROUND 

 On May 16, 2012, the Court issued an opinion and order entering judgment of $9,500,000.00 in 

favor of Plaintiff against Defendants Robert Pinkas, Gregory Campbell, Christopher Debbas and James 

Griffiths based on a guaranty agreement between the parties. On July 3, 2012, the Court certified that 

judgment as final. Attempting to collect on the judgment, Plaintiff filed two post-judgment motions with 

the Court: (1) Motion for Charging Order against Defendant Campbell [dkt 196]; and (2) Motion for 

Post-Judgment Relief against Defendant Campbell and non-parties Diane Campbell, Chester County 

Aviation Holdings, LLC and CDV Capital, LLC [dkt 193]. 

 Plaintiff’s motion for a charging order sought to encumber any interests in limited partnerships or 

limited liability companies which Defendant Campbell had or may subsequently acquire. After this 

motion was filed but before the Court issued its opinion resolving the motion, the Court entered a 

stipulated order whereby the parties agreed that Defendant Campbell’s only identifiable interest in a 

limited liability company would be subjected to a charging order. Thus, the Court only had to decide 

whether Plaintiff was entitled to a blanket charging order on any interests in which Defendant Campbell 

may acquire in the future. The Court determined Plaintiff’s request to be improper, and instead advised 

Plaintiff to re-file a similar motion should additional interests materialize at a later date. 

 Plaintiff’s second post-judgment motion sought relief against Defendant Campbell and other nonparties to this action. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Campbell engaged in fraudulent transfers to avoid 

paying his guaranty obligation to Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff requested that the Court order (1) Diane 

Campbell, Chester County Aviation Holdings, LLC (“Chester County Aviation”), and CDV Capital, 

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LLC (“CDV Capital”) (the non-parties) be joined as defendants in this proceeding, and (2) in partial 

satisfaction of Plaintiff’s judgment, that Diane Campbell’s stock interest in Chester Aviation and her 

membership interest in CDV Capital—which she allegedly acquired via fraudulent transfers from 

Defendant Campbell—both be transferred to Plaintiff. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion because it 

was unclear whether the Court could entertain personal jurisdiction over the non-parties. In doing so, the 

Court afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to file a renewed motion establishing that the Court has personal 

jurisdiction over those parties. That renewed motion is presently before the Court. 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff’s motion for post-judgment relief against Defendant Campbell and the non-parties was 

previously denied due to Plaintiff’s failure to establish that this Court has personal jurisdiction over those 

non-parties. The Court’s order provided Plaintiff the following opportunity: “IT IS FURTHER 

ORDERED THAT if Plaintiff desires to file a renewed motion, which among other things alleges with 

specific facts that this Court has personal jurisdiction over the above-named non-parties, such motion 

must be filed within 21 days from entry of this Order.” Dkt. # 210, p. 3 (emphasis added). Plaintiff did 

comply with the time-limit imposed by filing the renewed motion within the 21-day period; however, the 

Court will again deny Plaintiff’s motion because it suffers from similar deficiencies, as explained below. 

Plaintiff first argues that CDV Capital is the “mere alter ego or instrumentality of [D]efendant 

Campbell.” According to Plaintiff, Defendant Campbell and his wife—Diane Campbell—created CDV 

Capital for the “express purpose of avoiding the claims of creditors.” CDV Capital allegedly operates the 

same business as its predecessor, CDV Capital Partners—an entity in which Defendant Campbell 

formerly had an ownership interest. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Diane Campbell—the sole owner 

of the new entity, CDV Capital—“possesses absolutely no wherewithal or experience to run the 

business” and, the argument continues, Defendant Campbell is in fact the one running the operation. 

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Parallel to its argument regarding CDV Capital, Plaintiff posits that Chester County Aviation is also the 

“alter ego or instrumentality” of Defendant Campbell, purportedly based on Defendant Campbell 

transferring his interest in Chester County Aviation to Diane Campbell for nominal consideration.1

 

Under Michigan law, to prove a corporate entity is an alter ego of another entity or individual, the 

following three elements must be established: “First, the corporate entity must be a mere instrumentality 

of another entity or individual. Second, the corporate entity must be used to commit a fraud or wrong. 

Third, there must have been an unjust loss or injury to the plaintiff.” Nogueras v. Maisel & Assocs. of 

Michigan, 142 Mich. App. 71, 86 (1985). Factors considered to determine whether a corporate entity is 

used as a mere instrumentality include “undercapitalization of the corporation, the maintenance of 

separate books, the separation of corporate and individual finances, the use of the corporation to support 

fraud or illegality, the honoring of corporate formalities, and whether the corporation is merely a sham.” 

Laborers’ Pension Trust Fund v. Sidney Weinberger Homes, Inc., 872 F.2d 702, 704–05 (6th Cir. 1988). 

Despite given a second chance, Plaintiff’s briefs fall considerably short in alleging specific facts 

establishing this Court’s personal jurisdiction over CDV Capital and Chester County Aviation. Most—if 

not all—of Plaintiff’s arguments surrounding its “alter ego or instrumentality” theory are conclusory and, 

importantly, fail to address the key factors identified above. Plaintiff, for example, does not offer facts 

that CDV Capital or Chester County Aviation are undercapitalized, fail to maintain proper financial 

books, that Defendant Campbell and the two entities commingle finances, or whether both entities fail to 

respect corporate formalities. While it may be true that Plaintiff alleges both CDV Capital and Chester 

County Aviation are at least minimally involved in fraudulent transfers, such an isolated allegation is not 

nearly enough evidence to prove that these two entities are mere instrumentalities of Defendant 

Campbell. Because Plaintiff has not carried its burden to show that CDV Capital and Chester County 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s argument with respect to Chester County Aviation is confusing. Defendant Campbell’s purported fraudulent transfer

of his interest in Chester County Aviation to Diane Campbell would have no bearing on whether or not Chester County Aviation 

is an alter ego or instrumentality of Defendant Campbell. 

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Aviation are alter egos or instrumentalities of Defendant Campbell, the Court declines to exercise 

personal jurisdiction over both entities. 

Notwithstanding that finding, one of Plaintiff’s arguments in favor of this Court purportedly 

having personal jurisdiction over Diane Campbell is, at first glance, a closer call.2

 Plaintiff advances that 

Diane Campbell “directly and knowingly participating in fraudulent activities, knowing that the precise 

purpose of her activities would be to cause harm to creditor [Plaintiff], which is based in Michigan and . . . 

suffered legal harm in Michigan.” These fraudulent activities include: (1) creating a new entity—CDV 

Capital—identical to the entity in which Defendant Campbell formerly had an interest—CDV Capital 

Partners—for the purpose of absconding the claims of Defendant Campbell’s creditors; and (2) receiving 

the fraudulent transfer of Defendant Campbell’s stock interest in Chester County Aviation so that 

Defendant Campbell could likewise avoid looming creditors. 

In diversity cases such as this one, this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Diane 

Campbell “must be both (1) authorized by the law of the state in which it sits, and (2) in accordance with 

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 

F.3d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 2002). The Michigan long-arm statute governing limited personal jurisdiction 

over individuals—Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.705—has been interpreted as conferring upon Michigan 

courts the “maximum scope of personal jurisdiction permitted by the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment.” Brink v. Ecologic, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 958, 961 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

If Michigan’s long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction over Diane Campbell, Plaintiff 

must also present a prima facie case that this Court’s jurisdiction would not offend due process. 

CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff must therefore establish 

 

2

 While allegedly causing fraudulent conduct that has an effect in Michigan lends support to exercising personal jurisdiction over 

Diane Campbell, Plaintiff only makes conclusory statements and, as explained below, fails to engage in analysis of Michigan’s 

long-arm statute and the due process standard. 

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with reasonable particularity sufficient “minimum contacts” with Michigan so that the exercise of 

jurisdiction over Diane Campbell would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.” Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The Sixth Circuit has adopted a three-part 

test for determining whether this due process standard is met: 

First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of 

acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. 

Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities 

there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences must have a 

substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise 

of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. 

 

LAK, Inc. v. Deer Creek Enters., 885 F.2d 1293, 1299 (6th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff offers no argument that Michigan’s long-arm statute—Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.705—

or due process allows Diane Campbell to fall within the purview of the Court’s personal jurisdiction. In 

fact, Plaintiff fails to even cite which section of the long-arm statute would apply, nor does it perform the 

constitutional due process analysis recounted above. Plaintiff instead only states in conclusory fashion 

that Diane Campbell effectuated fraudulent transfers with Defendant Campbell, and that such transfers 

caused harm to a Michigan creditor—Plaintiff—who suffered harm in Michigan. Plaintiff’s litigation 

conduct is troubling, given the Court has already afforded Plaintiff a second opportunity to establish that 

the Court enjoys personal jurisdiction over Diane Campbell (and the other non-parties). The Court is not 

in the business of crafting arguments on behalf of litigants and, for that reason, Plaintiff’s motion is again 

denied. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Renewed 

Motion Post-Judgment Relief Against Gregory Campbell, Diane Campbell, Chester County Aviation 

Holdings, LLC and CDV Capital, LLC [dkt 210] is DENIED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 Date: January 9, 2014 s/Lawrence P. Zatkoff 

 Hon. Lawrence P. Zatkoff 

 U.S. District Judge 

 

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