alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     1998 Textainer Equipment Income Fund V 10K
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000915194
<NAME>                        Textainer Equipment Income Fund V, LP
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
<CURRENCY>                                     US Dollars
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-1-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         1,009
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  3,586
<ALLOWANCES>                                   353
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               54
<PP&E>                                         79,566
<DEPRECIATION>                                 18,459
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 65,403
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          1,144
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     64,259
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   65,403
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               14,265
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  10,575
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (7)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                3,697
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   3,697
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0
        


</TABLE>
174 La. 198

#### STATE v. BERG et al.

No. 31589.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 1, 1932.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 29. 1932.

J. B. Crow and W. W. McDonald, both of Shreveport, for appellants.

Percy Saint, Atty. Gen., James U. Galloway, Dist. Atty., and Nash Johnson, Asst. Dist. Atty., both of Shreveport, and E. R. Sehówalter, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

ST. PAUL, J.

These appellants were charged in one indictment but in two separate counts with having robbed two different persons.

The indictment does not charge that the two robberies occurred at one time or as a single continuous occurrence, though it does charge that the two robberies occurred cm the same day.

The accused moved to quash the indictment on the ground of duplicity; and the motion to quash came in time, as it was made before the jury had been sworn. See Code of Criminal Procedure, article 221.

We think the motion should have been sustained.

Articles 217 and 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure forbid the charging of more than one crime in the same indictment unless they result from a single act or from one continuous unlawful transaction.

Hence an indictment which charges two distinct crimes, even in separate counts, is on its very face bad for duplicity unless it somewhere appears from the indictment itself that the two crimes resulted from a single act or from one continuous unlawful transaction; which this indictment does not set forth, as it sets forth ®nly that the two robberies occurred on the same day, but does not set forth that they occurred at the same hour or even at the same place.

We think the indictment should have been amended or quashed.

This view of the case dispenses with the necessity of passing on the other bills in the record.

Decree.

The sentence and verdict herein are therefore set aside, the indictment herein is quashed, and the discharge of the accused ordered.
- 1 - 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

FREDERICK O. OPIYO, 

 Plaintiff, 

 Case No. 09-13609 

vs. HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH 

 

DEPUTY H. BOEHM, 

DEPUTY J. DARLING, and 

DEPUTY WEDGE, 

 

 Defendants. 

_________________________/ 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (DOC. 62) 

 Plaintiff Frederick Opiyo moves for an injunction against defendants 

and their agents from subjecting him to threats of “physical violence, 

intimidation, and retaliation for pursuing this action pending permanent 

relief.” (Doc. 62 at PageID 597). Plaintiff’s case was closed on September 

16, 2010, when summary judgment was granted for defendants Boehm, 

Darling, and Wedge. (Doc. 26). Plaintiff thereafter filed three motions for 

relief from judgment, (Doc. 43, 54, 63); all of which were denied, (Doc. 44, 

55, 64). 

The decision of whether or not to issue a preliminary injunction or 
- 2 - 

temporary restraining order lies within the discretion of the court. CSX 

Transp., Inc. v. Tennessee State Bd. Of Equalization, 964 F.2d 548, 553 

(6th Cir. 1992); Beacon J. Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Blackwell, 389 F.3d 683, 684 

(6th Cir. 2004). In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction or 

temporary restraining order, the district court considers four factors: 

I. whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the 

merits; 

II. whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury if the court 

does not grant a preliminary injunction; 

III. whether a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm 

to others; and 

IV. whether a preliminary injunction would be in the public interest. 

G & V Lounge v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1076 (6th 

Cir. 1994) (citing Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n v. Norfolk S. Corp., 927 F.2d 

900, 903 (6th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 502 U.S. 813 (1991). 

 Here, plaintiff has zero likelihood of success on the merits. Summary 

judgment was granted for the defendants. The court thereafter denied 

plaintiff’s three motions for relief from judgment. Plaintiff does not make a 

showing on any of the remaining factors. It is not clear that plaintiff would 

suffer an irreparable injury without an injunction, what harm an injunction 
- 3 - 

would cause to others, nor whether an injunction would be in the public 

interest. For these reasons, plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 12, 2017 

 s/George Caram Steeh 

 GEORGE CARAM STEEH 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on 

July 12, 2017, by electronic and/or ordinary mail and also on 

Frederick Opiyo #39194039, FCI Bastrop, 

P. O. Box 1010, Bastrop, TX 78602. 

s/Barbara Radke 

Deputy Clerk
#### HARRIS v. LOUISIANA STATE NORMAL COLLEGE et al.

No. 3976.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit, Second Division.

Dec. 9, 1931.

*183For original opinion, see 134 So. 308.

Thornton, Gist & Richey, of Alexandria, for appellants.

M. L. Dismukes and W. Peyton Cunningham, both of Natchitoches, for appellee.

STEPHENS, J.

After further consideration of this case on rehearing, we are of the opinion that we were in error in holding that the judgment against the Southern Casualty Company should he reversed, for the reason that the district judge allowed amended petitions to be filed and the suit continued in effect against said company after having sustained two exceptions of no cause of action in its behalf. The judgments sustaining the exceptions and dismissing the suits were not signed and the correctness of the rulings of the trial judge in these respects are not properly reviewable by this court. However, the decree in our original opinion is not affected thereby, as clearly no judgment can be rendered against the Southern Casualty Company.

We held in the original opinion, and we think correctly, that the defendant the Louisiana State Normal College was not an incorporated public board, body, commission, or institution authorized by the laws of the state to hold property, or sue and be sued. Section 1 of Act No. 20 of 1914 therefore does not apply to the Louisiana State Normal College. As an action will not lie in favor of plaintiff and against the college, it necessarily follows that an action cannot be maintained in favor of plaintiff and against the insurer, the Southern Casualty Company.

It is therefore ordered that the decree with the reservations therein contained in our -original opinion be reinstated and made the .final judgment of this court.
**CERTIFICATION OF					CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER					AND					CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO					18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,					AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO					SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

I, Leah Balderson, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Reel Estate Services Inc. (the “Company”), hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

|               | (i)    | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the fiscal quarter ended January 31, 2007 (the “Quarterly Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|--------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|     |   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|               | (ii)   | the information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.                                                                                               |

|               | By:    | */s/ Leah Balderson*        |
|--------------------|--------|-----------------------------|
|     |   |                        |
|               | Name:  | Leah Balderson              |
|     |   |                        |
|               | Title: | Chief Executive Officer and |
|          |   | Chief Financial Officer     |
|     |   |                        |
|               | Date:  | March 16, 2007              |

----
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, January 17, 2020.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, January 17, 2020

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A20A0930. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. TAMMIE G. 

BAXTER et al.

Upon consideration of the APPELLANT'S motion FOR PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW 

THE APPEAL in the above styled case, it is ordered that the motion is hereby GRANTED.
EXHIBIT 32.2
                                                                    ------------


 STATEMENT FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002,
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


The undersigned, Daniel Poludniak, is the Chief Financial Officer of AMB
Financial Corp. (the "Company").

This statement is being furnished in connection with the filing by the Company
of the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003
(the "Report").

By execution of this statement, I certify that:

     1.   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or
          78o(d)) and

     2.   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company as of the dates and for the periods covered by the
          Report.

         This statement is authorized to be attached as an exhibit to the Report
so that this statement will accompany the Report at such time as the Report is
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350. It is not intended that this
statement be deemed to be filed for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended.



March 24, 2004                                          /s/ Daniel Poludniak
--------------                                          ------------------------
Dated                                                   Daniel Poludniak
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondent

v. TYRONE J GRAHAM, Petitioner : : : : : : : : : : : No. 146 EAL 2015 Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER PER CURIAM AND NOW , this 15th day of July, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED
.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350

I, Frank Slootman, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of Data
Domain, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2008, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Data Domain, Inc.



|                  |  |  |  |     |  |                    |  |                        
|----------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | ------------------ |  | -----------------------
|                  |  |  | 
|Date: May 8, 2008 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/ FRANK SLOOTMAN
|                  |  |  |  |     |  |                    |  | Frank Slootman         
|                  |  |  |  |     |  |                    |  | Chief Executive Officer
EXHIBIT 21


                         SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT


The following is a list of all subsidiaries of the Registrant.


        Name                                                     Jurisdiction of
                                                                  Incorporation
        -----------------------------------------------------------------------
        SBI Capital Trust                                         Delaware
        OKSB Statutory Trust I                                    Connecticut
        SBI Capital Trust II                                      Delaware
        Business Consulting Group, Inc.                           Oklahoma
        Healthcare Strategic Support, Inc.                        Oklahoma
        SNB Bank of Wichita                                       United States
        Stillwater National Bank & Trust Company                  United States
          Cash Source, Inc.*                                      Oklahoma
          CRK Properties, Inc.*                                   Oklahoma
          BNS, Inc.**                                             Oklahoma
          SNB Insurance Agency, Inc. *                            Oklahoma
          SNB Real Estate Holdings, Inc. *                        Delaware
          SNB REIT, Inc. ***                                      Delaware
          Stillwater National Building Corporation*               Oklahoma
          Stillwater Properties, Inc.*                            Oklahoma
          SWB, Inc. *                                             Oklahoma

*   Direct subsidiaries of Stillwater National Bank & Trust Company.
**  Direct subsidiary of CRK Properties, Inc.
*** Direct subsidiary of SNB Real Estate Holdings, Inc.
#### Samuel P. Bailey, *et*al., Appellants, *v.*J. E. Hardy, Appellee.

APPEAL EROM TAZEWELL.

In an application for a continuance on account of the absence of a witness, if the testimony sought is important only in connection with certain facts, those facts should be set forth or referred to in the affidavit, so that the materiality of the evidence may be apparent to the Court.

This was an action brought by appellee before a justice of the peace, and taken by appeal to the Circuit Court of Tazewell county. In the Circuit Court, Bailey applied for a continuance of the cause upon his affidavit; stating that he was not prepared for trial, for want of a witness, by whom he expected to prove, that the note sued on was in the hands and was the property of one Clement Turner, who held the said note by virtue of an assignment of Benjamin Prettyman, who delivered the same to one Thomas McGrew, since deceased, who delivered the same to the said Clement Turner; that no other witness could prove the same fact, &c., &c. This continuance was refused by the Court, exceptions were taken to the ruling of the Court.

Davis, Judge, at the same term, being September term, 1850, after overruling the motion for a continuance, proceeded to try the cause without the intervention of a jury, and gave judgment for appellee.

Merrimans & Johnson, for Appellants.

Champlin & Wallace, for Appellee,

cited 8 Wend., 600; Chitty on Bills, 215, 220; E. S., 885, §8.

Treat, C. J.

The application for a continuance was properly denied. It was not made to appear, that the testimony of the absent witness would be material on the trial. The defendants expected to prove by the witness, that the note sued on was, prior to the commencement of the action, the property of . Turner by virtue of an assignment from the payee. This fact of itself would not constitute any defense to the action. The note may once have belonged to Turner, and still have been the property of the plaintiff when this suit was brought.. It may have been returned to the payee, and by him transferred *460to the plaintiff. If the makers acquired any defense to the note while it was in the hands of Turner, that could be set up in this case, they should have so alleged in the affidavit. Where testh mony is important only in connection with certain facts, those facts should be set forth or referred to, so that the materiality of the evidence may be apparent to the Court. The Court is not to presume that a .state of case may arise, that may render the testimony important; but the party himself must affirmatively show, that he cannot safely proceed with the trial without the evidence. It is not necessary to inquire whether due diligence was used to procure the attendance of the witness.

The judgment is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*
**EXHIBIT
      32.2**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 USC, SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**


**OF
      THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**








In
      connection with the Quarterly Report
      of YaFarm Technologies, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the quarter
      ended September 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
      on or about the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Hong Zhao, Chief Financial
      Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted
      pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)           The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)           Information
      contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
      condition and results of operations of the Company.








Dated:  November
                16, 2007
            /s/  Hong
                ZhaoBy:  Hong
                ZhaoIts:  Chief
                Financial Officer








A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      YaFarm Technologies, Inc. and will be retained by YaFarm Technologies, Inc.
      and
      furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
      request.
Exhibit 32.1 - President/CFO Certification (Section 906)

                        CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                         18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                         AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
             SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I am the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Political
Calls, Inc., a Nevada corporation (the "Company").  I am delivering this
certificate in connection with the Form 10-QSB of the Company for the quarter
ended September 30, 2008 and filed with the U. S. Securities and Exchange
Commission ("Form 10-QSB").

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge,
the Form 10-QSB fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information
contained in the Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ David Gallagher
-------------------
    David Gallagher
    President/CFO


Date  November 7, 2008
      ----------------


<PAGE>
174 La. 510

#### STATE v. STINSON.

No. 31725.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 30, 1932.

Wayne Stovall, of Jonesboro, and Cas Moss, of Winnfield, for appellant.

Percy Saint, Atty. Gen., and Walter E. McBride, Dist. Atty., of Ruston (James O’Niell, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen.,' of counsel), for the State.

OYERTON, J.

Defendant, upon conviction, was sentenced to pay a fine of $301 for maliciously and wantonly injuring and defacing a church building. The record contains nine bills of exception, but they are of no value to defendant, even if they possessed merit, which they do not, for the reason that defendant has not placed himself in position to obtain relief by filing and pressing a motion for a new trial in the district court. This is defendant’s situation, because article 559 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that:

“No new trial can he granted on appeal unless a motion for same has been made and refused in the lower court; provided that an appeal may be taken from the sentence imposed by a City Court to the District Court, though neither a motion for a new trial nor in arrest of judgment had been filed in the lower court.”

The purpose of the article is to require the defendant to exhaust his recourses in the trial court by submitting for review the rulings there made, many of which, of necessity, were hastily made, before appealing to this court. It may be said, for what it is worth, that the record presents for review no motion in arrest' of judgment, which may be said logically to follow, rather than precede, a motion for a new trial, and hence it is unnecessary to determine whether, if the record’presented a motion in arrest for review, it could be passed upon, notwithstanding the failure to file and press a motion for a new trial.

As defendant Ras not placed Mmself in position to obtain a new trial on the bills presented, the appeal should be dismissed.

The appeal is dismissed.

O’NIELL, C. J., absent