alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO RULE 13A-14(a) OR RULE 15d-14(a) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of HeartWare Limited;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations
and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to
the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and
procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andc)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth
fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably
likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit
committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
 a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal
control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants
ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a
significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
  /s/ Douglas GodshallDouglas GodshallChief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)
Order entered August 15, 2019

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

No. 05-19-00870-CV

IN RE ROBERT JOSEPH SCHMITT, Relator

On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 296-81160-00



### ORDER Before Justices Bridges, Osborne, and Carlyle

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS for want of jurisdiction relator’s

July 22, 2019 petition for writ of mandamus.

/s/ DAVID L. BRIDGES
JUSTICE
#### George L. VERNOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. 68429.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

June 25, 1996.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Aug. 15, 1996.

Dave Hemingway, Asst. Public Defender, St. Louis, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., David C. Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

KAROHL, Judge.

. Movant appeals motion court’s denial of Rule 24.035 relief from sentences on guilty pleas to charges of assault and armed criminal action without an evidentiary hearing. He argues he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to allow proof his pleas were not voluntary because he was informed and mistakenly believed he would receive 400 days jail time credit, rather than 370 days. We affirm.

Movant previously appealed the same issue. *Vernor v. State,*894 S.W.2d 209 (Mo.App. E.D.1995). In *Vernor I*we reversed and remanded. *Id.*at 211. We ordered an “evidentiary hearing on the issue of movant’s alleged mistaken belief alone.” *Id.*On remand the motion court held a conference with attorneys for movant and for the state. The conference was held on the appointed day for the evidentiary hearing. Movant and the state were represented by counsel. The state offered an exhibit which was received in evidence. The court announced it would take the matter as submitted and issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. This announcement was approved by counsel for both sides when they executed a memorandum consistent with the announcement. On April 10, 1995, the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied relief. The first finding of fact included, “On March 30, 1995, the court held a hearing on the issue of movant’s sentence.”

The issue with regard to movant’s sentence was discussed in *Vernor I.*The *686question was whether movant was entitled to receive 400 days credit on his sentences in exchange for his guilty pleas or 370 days credit, beginning on the date of arrest and followed by continuous confinement to the date of sentencing. During the plea hearing, the response of movant’s counsel to the state’s recommendation included a confirmation that defendant was “receiving credit for all of his jail time from the date of arrest where he has been continuously in custody since the date of the incident.” The court imposed sentences in accord with the plea bargain and said, “The defendant shall receive credit for jail time since his confinement. Is that on September 30th, 1992?” The response by movant’s counsel was, “May 30th, Your Honor.” To this the court responded, “All right. May 30th.” The exhibit filed by the state on March 30, 1995, confirmed the accuracy of the dates recorded at the plea hearing and incorporated in the sentence.

On these facts we find no error. Rule 24.035(k). The order denying relief is affirmed.

REINHARD, P.J., and GRIMM, J., concur.
#### Morgan B. Garlock, as Receiver of the Holbrook Insole Company, Respondent, v. Fire Association of Philadelphia, Appellant.

Judgment and order reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event, unless the plaintiff within twenty days stipulates to reduce the verdict to the sum of $1,630, with interest from November 7, 1901, in which event the judgment is modified accordingly, and as so modified is, together with the order, affirmed, without costs of this appeal to either party. All concurred.
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-60923

Summary Calendar

Jude Kajoh Kayeh, 

Petitioner,

versus

Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General, 

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency No. A213 315 743

Before Wiener, Elrod, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Jude Kajoh Kayeh, a native and citizen of Cameroon, challenges the 

denial of his statutory motion to reopen, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), by the Board 

of Immigration Appeals (BIA). A denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed 

under “a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Ramos-Portillo v. 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 3, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 21-60923 Document: 00516417422 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/03/2022
No. 21-60923

2

Barr, 919 F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 2019). Motions to reopen are disfavored, 

and the movant bears a heavy burden. Gonzalez-Cantu v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 

302, 305 (5th Cir. 2017). 

On review, Kayeh failed to address the BIA’s finding that the evidence 

he submitted with his motion to reopen lacked authentication or other indicia 

of reliability, which it found especially troubling in light of the IJ and BIA’s 

prior adverse credibility finding. Additionally, he failed to establish that the 

BIA abused its discretion in holding that the new evidence proffered would 

not affect the outcome of his case. See Abubaker Abushagif v. Garland, 15 

F.4th 323, 330 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that the BIA may deny the motion to 

reopen if the movant has not introduced previously unavailable, material 

evidence); see also Qorane v. Barr, 919 F.3d 904, 912 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding 

that “material evidence” within § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) means “likely to 

change the result of the alien’s underlying claim for relief”). 

Accordingly, Kayeh’s petition is DENIED. 

Case: 21-60923 Document: 00516417422 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/03/2022
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 598 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 598

    To guarantee the ability of licensed pharmacists to conduct the 
   practice of pharmacy compounding and to ensure their right to the 
necessary supply of bulk drug products, subject to applicable State and 
                             Federal laws.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 20, 1995

    Mr. Brewster  (for himself, Mr. DeLay, and Mr. Fields of Texas) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                                Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To guarantee the ability of licensed pharmacists to conduct the 
   practice of pharmacy compounding and to ensure their right to the 
necessary supply of bulk drug products, subject to applicable State and 
                             Federal laws.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Pharmacy Compounding Preservation 
Act of 1994.''

SEC. 2. APPLICATIONS OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW TO THE PRACTICE OF 
              PHARMACY COMPOUNDING.

    Amend section 210(gg) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 
321(gg): ``Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the provisions 
of this Act do not apply to licensed retail pharmacies that compound 
drugs in conformance with applicable local laws regulating the practice 
of pharmacy and medicine. The provisions of this Act do not apply to 
bulk drug products that are intended to be used by pharmacies for 
compounding, except to the extent that such provisions relate directly 
to the purity and quality of such bulk drug products.''.
                                 <all>
```
CL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 21-0551

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

STEPHEN ROSS BENNETT,

Defendant and Appellant.

GRANT OF EXTENSION

Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for a 30-day extension of time, 

and good cause appearing therefor, Appellee is granted an extension of time to

and including August 27, 2023, within which to prepare, serve, and file the State’s

response brief.

Electronically signed by:

Bowen Greenwood

Clerk of the Supreme Court

July 25 2023

07/25/2023

Case Number: DA 21-0551
#### Graham *v.*Canton & Waynesburg R. R. Co.

Bail on appeal in foreign attachment will not be fixed at double the amount of the bonds attached, where the amount of the bonds attached exceeds the debt sought to be recovered.

March 15, 1890.

Rule to fix bail at double the value of the bonds attached, in Appeal, No. 328, Jan. T., 1890, from C. P. No 3, Phila. Co., in an action of assumpsit and foreign attachment, to .Dec. T., 1889, No. 16. Before a full bench.

The affidavit for the rule was filed Feb. 18, 1890, the affiant stating that he was “ in the law office of Thomas Learning, counsel for the appellee,” and reciting the issuing of a writ of foreign attachment on Jan. 30, 1889, which was dissolved Oct. 26, 1882, upon which day, without discontinuing the prior suit, another similar action was issued, wherein $125,000 of first mortgage bonds of the appellee were attached in the hands of the Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. Both attachments were dissolved : 25 W. N. C. 65, and 26 W. N. C. 203. This appeal was taken in the second writ. The plaintiff’s claim was for $5,650 and the bond on appeal $10,000. Appellee excepted to the sufficiency of the bail.

The affidavit proceeded : “ Deponent is informed by a letter received to-day from the president of the railroad appellee, and therefore believes, he has just effected a sale of the bonds in New York for $112,509, and that immediate delivery of them all is essential to consummate the sale.”

*774March 17, 1890.

The affidavit further averred a good defence upon the merits of the action; that the appellee was without property or credit in the jurisdiction wherewith to enter bail, that the appeal could not be heard until January, 1891 ; and that appellee’s damages by the delay would probably amount to the whole value of the bonds attached.

*Thomas Learning,*for rule; *Charles A. Chase,*contra.

Per Curiam,

The rule to show cause why appellant’s bail should not be fixed at double the value of the bonds attached is discharged. H. J. L.
#### RODI v. SIZELER.*

No. 14312.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Dec. 19, 1932.

Daniel Wendling, of New Orleans, for appellant. '

J. A. Woodville and O. E. Torjusen, both of .New Orleans, for appellee.

*

Rehearing denied January 16, 1933.

WESTERFIELD, J.

Plaintiff sues for damages for false arrest. There was judgment in her favor for $125 and ■defendant has appealed.

Plaintiff, the mother of defendant’s deceased wife, became involved in a controversy with defendant over the succession of her daughter, which reached acrimonious proportions. Each blamed the other for the trouble and defendant charged his mother-in-law in the recorder’s court with insult and abuse, disturbing the peace, and using obscene language. He failed to prove the charge to the satisfaction of the recorder and she was discharged, whereupon this suit was filed.

There are no questions of law in controversy, the issue being one of fact, namely: Was defendant in good faith in his charge against his mother-in-law, or was he actuated by anger or malice? No one testified to the alleged profanity and abuse charged to plaintiff, except defendant, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that plaintiff, who is a woman 53 years of age and apparently quite respectable, is given to the use of profane or obscene language. On the other hand defendant is shown to have been guilty of using profane language on several occasions. Wei are convinced that defendant was the aggressor in the quarrel ,with his mother-in-law and that he, and not she, was guilty of the abuse and profanity with which she was charged. This evidently was the view of the trial court and we find ourselves in agreement.

The quantum, $125, seems little enough, though there are some authorities which would suggest its reduction. We have concluded, however, to let it stand.

For the reasons assigned the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 581 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 581

  To amend the Clean Air Act to permit areas not contributing to more 
 than 35 percent of ozone concentrations to comply with Marginal Area 
           requirements for purposes of ozone nonattainment.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 19, 1995

Mr. Hoekstra (for himself, Mr. Ehlers, Mr. Upton, Mr. Knollenberg, Mr. 
 Barcia, Mr. Smith of Michigan, Mr. Camp, and Mr. Chrysler) introduced 
  the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Clean Air Act to permit areas not contributing to more 
 than 35 percent of ozone concentrations to comply with Marginal Area 
           requirements for purposes of ozone nonattainment.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. RURAL TRANSPORT AREAS.

    Section 182(h) of the Clean Air Act is amended by adding the 
following new paragraph at the end thereof:
    ``(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of section 181 or this 
section, a rural or non rural area shall be treated by operation of law 
as satisfying the requirements of this section if the State makes the 
submissions required under subsection (a) of this section (relating to 
Marginal Areas) for the area and if sources of VOC (and where the 
Administrator determines relevant, NO<INF>x) emissions within the area 
do not contribute to more than 35 percent of the ozone concentrations 
measured in the area or in other areas.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Hattie HARRIS, Administratrix of Solomon McNeill, and J. D. McLean, Administrator of Caroline Ray, Appellees.

No. 4303.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

April 19, 1938.

Fendall Marbury, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen. (Julius C. Martin, Director, Bureau of War Risk Litigation, of Washington, D. C., Wilbur C. Pickett, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen., and J. O. Carr, U. S. Atty., of Wilmington, N. C., on the brief), for appellant.

Robert H. McNeill, of Washington, D. C. (J. E. Carpenter, of Lumberton, N. C., and Warren E. Miller, of Washington, D. G, on the brief), for appellees.

Before PARKER and NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judges, and HAYES, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

The judgment appealed from will be affirmed on the authority of United States v. Edwards, 4 Cir., 82 F.2d 1021, 1022, United States v. Townsend, 4 Cir., 81 F.2d 1013, and United States v. Huddleston, 7 Cir., 81 F.2d 593.

Affirmed.
#### John Thomas NEAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William SONDERVAN; Robert Rupee, Warden; Razaak Eniola, Doctor, Defendants-Appellees, and Unknown Healthcare Contractor, Defendant.

No. 02-6956.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 14, 2003.

Decided Aug. 20, 2003.

John Thomas Neal, Appellant pro se. Gloria Wilson Shelton, Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland; Joseph Barry Chazen, Gina Marie Smith, Meyers, Rodbell & Rosenbaum, P.A., Riverdale, Maryland, for Appellees.

Before WILLIAMS, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

*267PER CURIAM.

John Thomas Neal appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (2000) and his motions to reconsider. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. *See Neal v. Sondervan,*No. CA-01-2604t-JFM (D. Md. Mar. 25, 2002; Apr. 12, 2002; filed June 14, 2002 & entered June 17, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-02-00736-CV

Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, Appellant

v.

Duncan Roberts; Dolores Robertson, Individually and as next friend of

Danae R. Robertson, Appellees

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 53RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. GN200988, HONORABLE LORA J. LIVINGSTON, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company filed its notice of appeal on November 25, 

2002, and the clerk=s record was filed on January 16, 2003. On February 26, 2003, we sent appellant 

notice that its appellant=s brief was overdue and that its appeal would be subject to dismissal if a motion for 

extension of time was not filed by March 3, 2003. To date, appellant has not responded to this Court=s 

correspondence.

We therefore dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b).

__________________________________________

David Puryear, Justice

Before Chief Justice Law, Justices B. A. Smith and Puryear

Dismissed for Want of Prosecution
Filed: April 17, 2003`
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 468

To amend title 38, United States Code, to require the Secretary of Veterans

Affairs to furnish outpatient medical services for any disability of a

former prisoner of war.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 11, 1995

Mr. BILIRAKIS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Veterans’ Affairs

A BILL

To amend title 38, United States Code, to require the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to furnish outpatient medical

services for any disability of a former prisoner of war.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. ELIGIBILITY OF FORMER PRISONERS OF WAR

4 TO RECEIVE OUTPATIENT MEDICAL SERV5 ICES FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS

6 AFFAIRS.

7 Section 1712(a)(1) of title 38, United States Code,

8 is amended—
2

•HR 468 IH

1 (1) by striking out ‘‘and’’ at the end of sub2 paragraph (C);

3 (2) by striking out the period at the end of sub4 paragraph (D) and inserting in lieu thereof ‘‘; and’’;

5 and

6 (3) by adding at the end the following new sub7 paragraph:

8 ‘‘(E) to any former prisoner of war for any

9 disability.’’.

Æ
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-6519

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

CARLOS ALBERTO PEREZ-FULGENCIO,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District

Judge. (5:01-cr-30058-FFF; 7:05-cv-00235-sgw)

Submitted: June 16, 2006 Decided: June 26, 2006

Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Carlos Alberto Perez-Fulgencio, Appellant Pro Se. Ray B.

Fitzgerald, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Carlos Alberto Perez-Fulgencio seeks to appeal the

district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255

(2000) motion. The district court referred this case to a

magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2000). The

magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised

Perez-Fulgencio that the failure to file timely objections to this

recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court

order based upon the recommendation. Despite this warning, PerezFulgencio failed to object to the magistrate judge’s

recommendation.

The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate

judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of

the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been

warned of the consequences of noncompliance. Wright v. Collins,

766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474

U.S. 140 (1985). Perez-Fulgencio has waived appellate review by

failing to timely file specific objections after receiving proper

notice. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and

dismiss the appeal.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED