C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS AL FREDO B ETANCOURT, Ap pe lla nt,
v. TH E STA TE OF TE XA S, Appellee
. § § § § § § No
. 08 -0 7- 00 25 5- CR

Appea l from the 210th District Court of El Paso County , Texas (TC#20060D01940)

O P I N I O N Alfre do Be tancour

t was convicted of ag g ravated s exual assault of a c hild. After pr esentation of the State’s c ase- in-chief , the trial court g rante d a direc ted verdic t a s to Count I -A of the indictment (vag inal penetr ation). Count I I -A of the indictment charg ed that Appe llant intentionally and knowing ly

cause d the pene tration of the anus of L .S. The State chose to a bandon Count I I -B of the indictment (ana l contact) . Count I - B char g ed that Appellant int entionally and knowing ly

cause d the sexual orga

n of L .S., a child y oung er that fourtee n y ear s of ag e, to contact his sexual orga n. He wa s found guilty , and the jury

assessed punishment at ten y ear s’ conf inement. Appellant wa s found not g uilty of Count I I -A (a

nal pene tration).

STA TEM EN T OF F AC TS L .S
. wa s t we l v e y ear s old and in the fifth g rade at the time of trial. B eca use she ha d been experiencingday

time enure sis, she consulted with Dr. Akin about the problem. Dr. Akin pe rfor med
a fu ll g e nit o- ur ina

ry e xam. Duri ngthe c ours e of the e xam, L .S. tol d Dr. Aki n th at her c ou sin (A pp e lla nt) wa s d oin g ba d stuf

f that wa s not right. L .S. ind ic a te d that the se inc ide nts oc c ur re d in the Appellant’ s house, and that she was six or seven at the time.2

L .S. te sti fi e d to thr e e inc ide nts . I n th e fi rst in c ide nt, L .S. ha d b e e n in a ro om n e xt to Appellant’s. Appellant told her they wer e g oing to play

an new g ame c alled “mom and da d.” Appellant pulled her pa

nts down to her knee s or shoes, took his “thing ” out of his pants, and the n tried to put it in her bottom. S he cla rified that he r bottom was wher e y o u “do number 2.” Appellant wa s unable to pene trate the child, but he did touc h his pe nis to her bottom. L .S. indicated that she wa s scar ed, but s he did not tell any one bec ause she was not sure if what ha d happene d was g ood or bad. I n the sec ond incident, L .S. was sitting on the cor ner of the bed, wea

ring her top but not her pants. She was s i t t i n g i n a split and facingAppellant. Appe llant was on his knees. A ppellant attempted to put his “thing” inside her, but she did not let him. I n response to the p rosecutor’s question, L .S. ex plained that he ha d tried to pe netrate her front private par t. Whi le no pene tration
occur red, A ppellant did touch her with his penis. On cross-e x amination, L .S. clarified how she wa s sitti ng on the bed. She wa s leaningback, he r knee s were apar t, and her fee t were a little bit together
. She also testified that Appe llant touched her on her “ bottom.” Def

ense counsel t ried to show that penetr ation or conta ct was impossible based on the child’s testimony about her position. The third incident also occur red in A ppellant’s bedroom. L .S. was in the middle of the bed, layingon he r “ fr on t pa

rt .” He r l e g s w e re ha

ng ing of f t he be d a nd Ap pe lla nt w a s o n h is k

ne e s. Th is time penetration did occur . L .S. testified t hat i t hurt and she w as cr ying. She obse rved A

ppellant
ro lli nga wh ite c ir c le on

his “ thi ng .” Th e c hil d d

re w a nd de sc ri be d App e lla

nt’ s p e nis
. Dr. Akin a lso te stified at trial. He descr ibed his examination of L .S. and explained that the child beca

me ver y tear ful, ag itated, and f

ear ful duringthe exam. This behavior wa s a re d flagthat
cause d him concer

n. The ex am reveale d that L .S. had a rathe r widene d vag inal orifice and that the3

hy me na l e dg e s se e me d th inn e r t ha n u su a l f or a g ir l of he r a g e . Th e re wa s no t e no ug h e vid e nc e to ind ic a te tr a

uma , but e no ug h to ra ise his c ur ios ity
. Af te r a fu ll e xami natio n, Dr
. Ak in sp ok e wi th b oth L .S. and her mother . The mother indicated that L .S. had become tear ful, cling y , and anx ious. Then Dr. Akin a sked L .S. if anyone had ever hurt her be fore . The c hild beg an to wee p profuse ly , and she
a dmi tte d h e r c ou sin

ha d p ut h is “ thi ng y ” in h e r “ pe e pe e .” Th e c hil d c ou ld n ot r e me mbe r e xac tly when it ha d happene d, but it had been g oing on for some time. There was no evidence o f a nal trauma a nd no acute sign of

vag inal penetr ation. Duringthe p u nishment phase, Appe llant took the stand to testify on his own behalf in the prese nce of

the jury . The trial c ourt, su a s po nte , remove d the jury

from the c ourtroom, and outside the pre sence of the jury , admonished Appe llant reg arding his F ifth Amendment rig ht a g ainst selfinc ri min a tio n. De fe ns e c ouns e l th e n r e qu e sted a reces s and up on re tur n, Ap pe lla

nt c ho se no t to t e s t i f y. SUF F ICIENCY OF THE E VIDENCE I n his f irst issue for revie w, Appellant challeng es both le g al and fac tual sufficie ncy o f t he evidenc e. We beg in with the pertinent standar ds of re view. Stand ards of Review I n revie wing the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence , we a

re c onstrained to view the evidenc e in the light most fa

vorable to the judgme nt to deter mine whether any rational trier of fac t could find t h e e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s o f t h e o f f e n s e , a s a l l e g e d i n th e a

p p l i c a t i o n p ar a g r a

p h o f th e c h ar g e t o th e j u r

y, beyond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.C t. 2781 (1979). More particula rly , sufficie ncy

of t h e ev idence should be measur ed by the eleme nts of the offe nse, as define d by t h e hy

pothetically -cor

rec t jury char g e for

the ca se. Ma lik

v . S tate , 953 S.W .2d 234,4

23 9- 40 (T e x.Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ). Our ro le is n ot t o a sc e rt a in whe the r t he e vid e nc e e sta

bli sh e s guil t beyond a re asonable doubt. Dw y e r v . S tate , 8 36 S.W. 2d

70 0, 70 2 ( Te x.Ap p. –E l Pa so 19 92 , p e t. ref ’d). We do not r esolve any conflict in f act, weig h any evidenc e, or evaluate the cre dibilit y of any witnesses, so the fa ct-findingresults of a c riminal jury trial are g iven g reat defe renc e. Menc haca v. Sta te , 90 1 S.W. 2d 64 0, 65 0- 52 (T e x.Ap p. –E l Pa so 19 95 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; Ad e lm an v . S

tate , 828 S.W .2d 41 8, 42 1 ( Te x.Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ); Ma tso n v . S tate , 819 S.W .2d 839, 843 (Tex
. C rim.App. 1991); Le y v a v . S tate , 8 40 S.W. 2d

75 7, 75 9 ( Te x.Ap p. –E l Pa so 19 92 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; B e n n e tt v . Stat e , 831 S. W
. 2 d 2 0 , 2 2 (Tex .App.–El Paso 1992, no pet.). Instead, our only duty is to determine whe ther both the expli cit and implicit findings of the trier of fac t are rational by

viewingall the evidenc e admitted at t rial i n the light most favor able to the ve rdict. Adelman , 82 8 S.W. 2d a t 42 1- 22
. I n s o doing, w e resolve any inconsistencies in the evidenc e in favor of the ve rdict. Matson , 819 S.W .2d at 8 4 3 (q u o t i n g Mo re no v . S tate , 755 S.W .2d 866, 867 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988)). The trier of fa ct, not the appe llate cour

t, is free to a cce pt or reje ct all or any portion of any

witness’s testimony
. Belton
v . S tate , 900 S.W .2d 886, 897 (Tex.App.–El Paso 1995, pet. ref ’d). Whe n c on du c tin g a fa c tua l suf fi c ie nc y re vie w, we vie w al l of the e vid e nc e in a

ne utr a l li g ht. Cai n v . S tate , 958 S.W .2d 404, 408 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). We w ill set the verdic t a side only if (1) the e vid e nc e is s o w e ak that the ve rd ic t is c le arl y wr on g and manif e stl y un jus t, o r ( 2) the ve rd ic t is ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce o f t h e ev i d en ce. J

oh ns on v . S

tate , 23 S.W .3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Under the first prongof Johnson, we c ann ot s ay tha t a c on vic tio n is “ c le arl y wrong ” or “manifestly unjust” simply beca use, on the quantum of evidence a dmitted, we would have
v o t ed t o acquit, had w e bee n on the jury
. W ats on v . S tate , 2 0 4 S. W. 3 d

4 0 4 , 4 1 7 ( T e x. Cr im
. Ap p. 2006). Under

the sec ond prongof Johnson , we cannot declare that a conf lict in the evidence justifies5

a new trial simply

beca use we disag ree with the jury ’s re solution of that conflict. Id
. Be fore finding that the evidenc e is fac tually insufficient to support a verdict under the second pr ong of Johnson , we must be able to say , with some objective ba sis in the recor d, that the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of t he evidence c ontradicts the jury ’s ver dict. Id
. I n conductingour fa ctual suff iciency revie w, we
mus t a lso dis c us s th e e vid e nc e wh ic h App ellan t c la ims is t he mos t im

po rt ant i n a lle g e dly undermining the finding
. Sim s v . S tate , 99 S.W .3d 600, 603 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) . We defe r to the fac t finder’ s determination of w itnesses’ cr edibility and of the weig ht give n to the evidenc e. Cle v e lan d v . S

tate , 177 S.W .3d 37 4 , 388 (Tex.App.–Houston [1s t Dist.] 2005, pet. re f’d) , c e rt. denied , 547 U.S. 1073 (2006). Ana lys is Wit h reg ard to leg al suffic iency , the re cord r evea ls the following e x chang e: Di re c t E xami natio n o f L .S. Q. What did [ Appellant] do to y ou? A. He tr ied to put his thi ng inside me. Q. Where? A. Right he re. Q. I n your f

ro nt p ri vate pa

rt ? A. Yes. Q. Did he put it in y ou? A. No. Q. Di d h e tou c h you

wi th i t? A. Ye s.6

Q. Di d it g o in y ou a t a ll? A. No. Cross-Examination of L .S. Q. Where did he touch y ou? A. J ust here. Q. J ust here? A. Her e (indicating)
. Q. On y our b ott om? A. Yes. Def ense c ounsel then attempted to show, by demonstration, that org an-to-or g an conta ct was impossibl e base d on the chid’s testimony reg ardingher position on Appellant’s be d: Cr os s- Examin a tio n o f L .S. Q. T h i s i s h o w y o uwe re s i t t i n g? A. No. Q. T el l m e, h o w w er e y o us i t t i n g? A. I was kind of lea

ning ba ck. Q. Yo u w e re kin d o f l e anin g -- lik e thi s? A. Ye s. Q. An d w a s th a t th e e xtent of it? A. Ye s. Q. Okay . And what doe s he do? A. He’ s pulling his pants down.7

Q. Okay . And then what happene d? A. He tr ied to put his thi ng inside of me. Q. Ok ay . B ut you ’r e sittin g do wn , r ig ht? A. Rig ht Q. An d th is i s h owy ou ’r e sittin g , r ig ht? A. Rig ht. Q. Are y our knee s toge ther? A. No. Q. Th e y ’r e a

pa rt ? A. Ye s. Q. Ho w f ar a pa rt ? A. L ike -- lik e that. Q. L ike thi s? A. Yes, but my

fee t were a little bit together
. Fr om this t es timony , the jury could have found Appe llant guilty of all the e lements of the
c ha rg e d c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. F ir st, L .S. te sti fi e d th a t App e lla nt t ou c he d h e r g e nit a lia wi th h is g e nit a lia . T his is d ir e c t e vid e nc e to s up po rt a fi nd ingof

g ui lt. Te sti mony

of a c hil d is sufficie nt to support conviction for ag g ravated assault, and c hild witnesses are not expected to testify with the same clar ity as adults. Jon es v. State , 8 17 S.W. 2d 85 4, 85 6- 57 (T e x.Ap p. –H ou sto n [1s t Di st. ] 1 99 1, no pe t.) ; Vi lla lon v . S tate , 791 S.W .2d 130, 134 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). I t is the jury ’s
so le job to w e ig h th e e vid e nc e and c re dib ili ty

of the wi tne ss. Menc haca , 9 0 1 S.W .2d at 650-52; Adelman , 8 28 S.W. 2d

a t 42 1; Matson , 8 19 S.W. 2d a t 84 3; Leyva , 84 0 S.W. 2d a t 75 9; Be nn e tt , 8318

S.W. 2d a t 22 . M or e ov e r, we re so lve any inc on sis ten c ie s in

the e vid e nc e in f

avo r o f t he ve rd ic t. Matson , 819 S.W .2d at 843. The c hild’s testimony is further suppor

ted by Dr. Akin’s te stimony
re g ard ingthe c hil d’ s o utc ry . T hu s, the e vid e nc e is l e g a lly su ff ic ie nt. Our re v i ew of the re cord f urther r evea ls that the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e does not c ontradict the jury ’s finding . We have two state ments from t he victim to support the c on vic tio n–

he r out c ry and he r tr ia l tes tim ony . Whil e so me c on tr a dic tio n doe s exist, we de fe r t o the fa ct finder ’s deter

mination of witnesses’ c redibility and of t h e we ight g iven to the evidenc e. Cleveland , 1 77 S.W. 3d

a t 38 8. Th e jur

y wa s in a be tte r p os iti on to sy

nth e size the dir e c t and

c ro ssexamination testimony of t he child. The jury was a lso in a better position to determine how muc h weig ht to give to the Appellant’s demonstration. Be cause the jury could have rea sonably conclude d t h at Ap p el l an twa s gu i l t y o f t h e c h ar gedo ff

en s e, an d th ei r d et erm i n at i o nwa s n o tcl ea rl y wr o n g,
un jus t, o r a g a ins t the g re a t we ig ht of the e vid e nc e , the e vid e nc e is f a c tua lly su ff ic ie nt. We o ve rr

ule I ssue One. F IF TH AMENDMENT ADM ONISHMENT I n h is s e c on d is su e , App e lla nt c on te nd s th a t hi s f

un dame nta l ri g ht to te sti fy on his ow n b e ha lf was violated wh en t h e t ri al cour t admonished him of his Fifth Amendment r ight a g ainst selfincrimination. Appellant intended to te stify during the punishment pha se. After removingthe jury fr om t he c ourt ro om, the jud g e pr oc e e de d to a dmo nis h h im. Am on g o th er t hin g s, the jud g e tol d Ap pe lla nt t hat ( 1) the jur

y c ou ld n ot h old it a g a ins t hi m if he did no t te sti fy ; ( 2) the State c ou ld qu e sti on him a bo ut t he c a se and

wo uld no t be lim ite d in

wh a t it a sk e d; ( 3) any

thi nghe sa id whil e
o nt h e s t an d

co u l d b e u s edaga i n s th i mi nth e a s s es s m en to f p un i s h m en t ; (4 ) o n ce h e b ega nt es t i fy i n g, he could not ther eaf

ter invoke his F ifth Amendment rig ht w ithout having all the testimony stricken;9

and (5 ) t e sti fy

ingmig ht b e de tr ime nta l. A ft e r the a dmo nis hme nt, Ap pe lla nt f re e ly and vo luntari ly waived his rig ht to remain silent. At this point , defe nse counse l asked to speak with his client and
a p p ar e n t l y p e r s u a d e d

h i mn o tt o t e s t i f

y. Ap pe lla nt c on te nd s th a t be c a

us e a dmo nis hme nt i s n ot r e qu ir e d whe n a de fe nd ant i s
r e p r e s e n te d

b y c o u n s e l, th e tr ia l c o u rt v io late d h is rig hts an d

c o mm itte d

r e v e r s ib le e r

r o r . We dis a g re e . T he re c or d is c le ar t hat a ft e r t

he a dmo nis hme nt, Ap pe lla nt w a ive d h is r ig ht a

nd sti ll wished to testify . Appellant did not chang e his mind until afte r speaking w ith his attorney
. See Ma rin v . S

tate , 851 S.W .2d 275, 280 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993) (“Waivable r ights, on the othe r hand, do not vanish so easily
. Although a litigant might g ive them up and, indeed, has a r ight to do so, he is never deeme d to ha

ve done so in f

act unless he say s so plainly , fre ely , and intellige ntly , sometimes in wri tin g and

a lw ay s o n th e re c or d. ” ); Str inge r v . S tate , 241 S.W .3d 52, 56 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). Ap pe lla nt a c tua lly

did so . M or e ov e r, Ap pe lla

nt’ s right to b e he ard

un de r t he Du e Pr oc e ss C la

us e of the Four

teenth Amendme nt and his rig ht to make a pe rsonal def ense unde r the Six th Amendment
wer e n o t v i olated, bec ause nothingin the rec ord supports the conc lusion that the judge ’s admonishment actua lly

led to Appellant’s de cision not to testify . We overrule I ssue Two a nd aff irm the jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt .

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, J ustice April 30, 2009 B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l u r e , a n d R i v e r a , JJ. (Do Not Publish)