UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMAL A. SAEED,

Plaintiff, CASE NO. 09-13270

v. HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

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OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jamal Saeed brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), challenging

the final decision of the Commissioner denying his application for disability insurance

benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. and

Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1381 et seq. Plaintiff filed his claims on January 25, 2006, alleging disability due to

discogenic and degenerative disorders since May 15, 2006. After Plaintiff’s claim was

denied, he requested a hearing. Administrative Law Judge Ethel Revels (“ALJ”) presided

over the November 12, 2008, hearing. Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. In a

decision dated December 23, 2008, the ALJ denied benefits. 

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision on

August 6, 2009. Plaintiff timely filed this action for judicial review of the Commissioner's

decision. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder pursuant to 28
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U.S.C. § 636. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In his Report and

Recommendation (R&R), Magistrate Judge Binder recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment be denied and that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be

granted.

Plaintiff timely filed objections to the R & R. For the reasons stated below, the Court

adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment and grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In cases where a magistrate judge has submitted a report and recommendation and

a party has properly filed objections to it, the district court must conduct a de novo review

of those parts of the report and recommendation to which the party objects. 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). Review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to determining whether the

findings are supported by substantial evidence, and whether the Commissioner employed

proper legal standards in reaching his conclusion. Brainard v. Sec’y of HHS, 889 F.2d 679,

681 (6th Cir. 1989). “Substantial evidence exists when a reasonable mind could accept the

evidence as adequate to support the challenged conclusion, even if that evidence could

support a decision the other way.” Casey v. Sec’y of HHS, 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir.

1993). A decision that is supported by substantial evidence is not subject to reversal, even

if the reviewing court might arrive at a different conclusion. Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535,

545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (internal quotation omitted); Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d

1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983). 
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When determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence, the

court must take into consideration the entire record, including “whatever in the record fairly

detracts from its weight.” Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545. When the Appeals Council declines to

review the ALJ’s decision, the court’s review is limited to the record and evidence before

the ALJ. Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 696 (6th Cir. 1993). The court may not review the

evidence de novo, make determinations of credibility or weigh the evidence. Brainard, 889

F.2d at 681. Credibility determinations by the ALJ should be accorded deference by the

reviewing court. Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545 (internal quotation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

To establish a compensable disability under the Social Security Act, a claimant must

show that he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months. 42 U.S.C. §1382(a)(3)(A). The claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing

a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Casey, 987 F.2d at 1233.

Disability claims are evaluated through a five-step sequential process. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520. See also Kirk v. Sec’y of HHS, 667 F.2d 524, 529 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,

461 U.S. 957 (1983). The burden of proof to show a disability is on the claimant through

the first four steps of the process. If a claimant meets this burden, the fifth step shifts the

burden to the Commissioner. Preslar v. Sec’y of HHS, 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994).
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The first step of the process examines whether the claimant is currently engaged in

substantial gainful activity. If the claimant is so engaged, he is not disabled under the

guidelines. The second step examines whether the claimant has a severe impairment

which significantly limits his ability to perform work-related functions. Id. If a severe

impairment is found, the third step requires comparison of the impairment to those

impairments listed in Appendix I, 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, to determine if, on the medical

evidence alone, the claimant is disabled. Id. If the claimant is not disabled under the third

step, the fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant can perform relevant

past work. If claimant cannot perform relevant past work, the fifth step shifts the burden

to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant has transferable skills which enable him

to perform other work in the national economy. Id.

Here, Plaintiff objects to the ALJ’s conclusion that given Saeed’s age, education,

work experience, and residual functional capacity, Plaintiff could perform a significant

number of jobs existing in the national economy. The vocational expert testified that

Plaintiff could work as a bench assembler, inspector, checker or sorter, and that those jobs

allowed for a sit/stand option. Saeed challenges the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical

opinion offered by Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Lerner. Specifically, he asserts that the

ALJ disregarded substantial evidence offered by Dr. Lerner, concerning Plaintiff’s

limitations and complaints, and instead credited the medical opinions of nontreating

physicians. In addition, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s improperly discounted Plaintiff’s

credibility. The merits of the objections are discussed below.
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A. Treating physician’s opinion

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s assessment of the opinion of Dr. Lerner relative to

Plaintiff’s limitations. According to Saeed, the ALJ’s reliance on the medical opinions of

Drs. DeSantis and Rotter in concluding there is substantial evidence in the record to deny

Plaintiff benefits is misplaced. Those doctors saw Plaintiff at the initial stages of Plaintiff’s

disability in contrast to Dr. Lerner, who had a longitudinal view of Plaintiff’s medical

condition. Moreover, Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s failure to articulate what weight,

if any, she accorded their opinions relative to all of the factors identified in 20 C.F.R. §

416.927(d). The Court finds this objection lacks merit. Because the ALJ did not

characterize either DeSantis or Rotter as a treating physician, there was no requirement

to discuss § 416.927(d). 

The treating physician doctrine recognizes that medical professionals who have a

long history of caring for a claimant and his maladies generally possess significant insight

into his medical condition. See See SSR 96-2p; Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d

541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004); Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994). Accordingly,

the medical opinions and diagnoses of treating physicians are given substantial deference,

and if such opinions and diagnoses are uncontradicted, complete deference is appropriate.

See King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 973 (6th Cir. 1984). Deference is not the standard,

however, unless the particular opinion “is based upon sufficient medical data.” Miller v.

Sec'y of HHS, 1991 WL 229979 at *2 (6th Cir., Nov.7, 1991) (citing Shavers v. Sec'y of

HHS, 839 F.2d 232, 235 n. 1 (6th Cir.1987)). Consequently, an ALJ may reject the opinion

of a treating physician where it is unsupported by the medical record, merely states a
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conclusion, or is contradicted by substantial medical evidence. See Cohen v. Sec’y of HHS,

964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992).

In this case, Saeed maintains the ALJ did not defer to the opinion of Plaintiff’s

treating physician, but instead deferred to the opinions of the nontreating physicians.

The Court rejects this characterization. Here, the ALJ, acknowledged Dr. Lerner’s

status as a treating physician. The ALJ assessed the medical opinion in light of the

length, frequency, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, and also assessed

the supportability and consistency of the Dr. Lerner’s conclusions. See 20 C.F.R. §

416.927(d); Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 242 (6th Cir. 2007). 

For the most part, the ALJ adopted the limitations articulated by Dr. Lerner in

conjunction with Saeed’s workers compensation claim. Specifically, the ALJ concluded

that Plaintiff must avoid lifting greater than five pounds, avoid excessive bending,

twisting, turning, and avoid prolonged sitting, standing and walking, and included this

limitations in his question to the vocational expert. See Tr. at 23, 424-426. The ALJ

expressly rejected Dr. Lerner’s opinion to the extent that Dr. Lerner stated that Plaintiff

had to lie down at times during the day. Tr. at 23. The ALJ noted that “[t]here was no

evidence to support the conclusion regarding the need to lie down. Claimant states he

watches television, reads and sometimes drive[s].” Id. The genesis of this limitation is

unclear. It was unaccompanied by any objective medical assessment, and inconsistent

with Plaintiff’s own testimony. Thus, the ALJ provided “good reasons” for discounting

the opinion. See Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242 (quoting SSR 96-2p). 
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B. Credibility determination

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in discounting his credibility relative to “the

intensity, persistence and limiting effects” of his symptoms. Tr. at 22. This Circuit is

clear that credibility determinations require that the ALJ do more than make a single,

conclusory statement regarding an individual's credibility. See Rogers v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that credibility determination must be

reasonable and supported by substantial evidence). That is not what happened here. 

The ALJ noted that the testimony was inconsistent with the residual functional

capacity assessment. Further, other therapists and physicians believed Plaintiff

suffered impairments best treated through physical therapy. See Tr. 172, 179-80, 383. 

Saeed’s physical therapist noted that Plaintiff displayed “over reactive pain.” Tr. at 149. 

Also, Plaintiff failed to complete the recommended course of physical therapy.

The ALJ properly considered the entire record, including that which detracts from

Saeed’s argument, in assessing his credibility. The ALJ relied on the fact that despite

Plaintiff’s testimony that his condition was disabling, he did not comply with treatment. 

During the same time, he did engage in daily activities including watching television,

caring for his four young children, helping them with homework, and driving them to

school. According there is ample evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s conclusion

that Plaintiff’s credibility was impinged.
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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and

DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Marianne O. Battani 

HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATE: August 24, 2010

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Opinion and Order were mailed to counsel of record on this date

by e-filing and/or ordinary mail.

s/Bernadette M. Thebolt

Case Manager