J-S14021-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

KADIR JACKSON

Appellee No. 1898 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Order June 5, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001919-2011

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 09, 2014

The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered June 5, 2013, in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County suppressing Kadir 

Jackson’s statements to police officers.1 The Commonwealth claims the 

court erred by suppressing Jackson’s confession on the ground that there 

was no probable cause to arrest him. Based on the following, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the factual history as follows:

In the course of the investigation of the shooting death of 

Richard Curry on November 17, 2010, Detective Holmes received 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 In compliance with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311(d), the 

Commonwealth certified in its July 1, 2013, notice of appeal that the trial 

court’s order terminates or substantially handicaps its prosecution of this 

case. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
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a note from Detective Fetters that Curry’s girlfriend, Felicia, had 

information about Jackson’s potential involvement in Curry’s 

murder.... Detective Holmes spoke to Felicia, who told him that 

Jackson had been having problems with Curry and that there 

had been an ongoing dispute between two neighborhood groups 

– 76th Avenue and Sharpnack Street. Felicia knew Jackson’s 

family and was familiar with the individuals associated with the 

two groups. She also stated that she had seen Jackson rapping 

in a YouTube video, the content of which was unclear on the 

record.2 Felicia also told Detective Holmes that she had heard 

from friends of friends that Jackson was bragging about the 

Curry shooting, but the context of the bragging is unclear on the 

record.

2

 The content of the rap captured in the video may have 

been about a shooting or may have been about the 

ongoing conflict between 76th Avenue and Sharpnack 

Street.

Based upon this information from Felicia and without a 

warrant, Detective Holmes went to Jackson’s home on November 

22, 2010 to question him about the murder of Richard Curry. 

Detective Holmes spoke with Jackson’s mother in the front door 

area while other officers stayed in the alley behind the home. 

Upon informing Jackson’s mother that he wished to speak with 

Jackson, Jackson’s mother called Jackson, and Detective Holmes 

spoke with Jackson by phone. Jackson told the detective that he 

was at his girlfriend’s house and would speak with detectives in 

ten minutes at a local Walgreens. Immediately after the phone 

conversation with Detective Holmes, Jackson exited the house 

from the back door. There was conflicting evidence as to 

whether Jackson exited the house with another person. It is 

unclear to this court whether Jackson was actually fleeing, as he 

had lied to police about his whereabouts, but his exit from the 

home could be seen either as an attempt to avoid speaking with 

police or as his attempt to go to the Walgreens as arranged. 

Jackson was detained and handcuffed by officers and 

subsequently transported to the homicide unit at approximately 

1:00 p.m. Detective Holmes stated that he put Jackson in 

custody because Jackson had lied about being at his girlfriend’s 

house, he had attempted to flee from his home, and he was a 

“person of interest” for the homicide.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/2013, 2-3 (footnote omitted).
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After Jackson was handcuffed, he was transported down to the police 

station and was given his Miranda2 warnings. Jackson originally denied any 

involvement in the shooting, but eventually confessed to shooting Curry with 

a 9 mm pistol, stating: “I heard that [Curry] was looking for me, and on my 

way home I ran into him in the driveway of 76th Avenue. [Curry] said to 

me, ‘Let me holla at you.’ [Curry] then pulled out a gun, and I pulled mine 

and shot him. I ran across the street to the other driveway and went 

home.’” N.T., 4/5/2013, at 91-92.

Jackson was charged with murder, criminal conspiracy, and other 

related offenses. On November 29, 2012, he filed a pretrial motion to 

suppress his statement made to police because it was “obtained illegally and 

unconstitutionally and there was no knowing, intelligent and voluntary 

waiver of [his] constitutional right to counsel and his constitutional right to 

remain silent and be free from self-incrimination[.]” Jackson’s Pretrial 

Motion to Suppress Statement, 11/29/2012, at 1. On April 5, 2013, the 

court held a hearing on the matter. At that time, Jackson also argued the 

police lacked probable cause to arrest him and, therefore, his statements to 

police were inadmissible as the fruit of an illegal arrest. N.T., 4/5/2013, at 

5-6. Following the hearing, the Commonwealth filed a responsive letter brief 

on May 2, 2013. 

____________________________________________

2

 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Subsequently, on June 5, 2013, the trial court entered an order, and 

corresponding opinion, granting Jackson’s motion to suppress because it 

found the police did not have probable cause to arrest him.3 The 

Commonwealth filed this timely appeal.4

In the Commonwealth’s sole issue, it claims the trial court erred by 

suppressing Jackson’s confession. Commonwealth’s Brief at 11. 

Specifically, the Commonwealth asserts probable cause did exist to support 

Jackson’s arrest based on the following: (1) the victim’s girlfriend, “Felicia,” 

was a “reliable” informant who knew Jackson from the neighborhood and 

gave police information linking Jackson to the murder, including a YouTube 

video where Jackson “rapped” about his dispute with the victim, and Felicia 

had heard from mutual friends that Jackson was observed bragging about 

the killing; (2) when police went to Jackson’s home to interview him, he lied 

about his whereabouts, stating that he was at his girlfriend’s house when he 

was really in the basement of the house; and (3) Jackson fled the house, 

running from the basement door into a back alley. Id. at 12-15. The 

____________________________________________

3

 On June 20, 2013, the court entered a second order, stating that while it 

found Jackson’s statements at issue were voluntary, the confession was the 

fruit of a poisonous tree.

4

 The court did not order the Commonwealth to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Nevertheless, it 

filed a concise statement on July 1, 2013. On October 8, 2013, the trial 

court issued an opinion under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), which was substantially 

similar to its June 5, 2013, opinion.
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Commonwealth contends Jackson’s “ruse to avoid contact with the police --

with regard to specific matter under investigation -- was a compelling sign of 

his consciousness of guilt.” Id. at 15 (citations omitted). Moreover, it 

states the court improperly minimized the probative value of the information 

Felicia provided to police and erred by finding her unreliable. Id. at 17-19. 

Lastly, the Commonwealth argues the court erred by failing to contribute 

any evidentiary significance to Jackson’s alleged “flight” from the home 

because one could not reasonably infer he was merely “hurrying along in 

order to meet the police at Walgreens as arranged” as the trial court opined 

in its determination. Id. at 19. Based on the totality of the circumstances, 

the Commonwealth concludes Jackson “had already demonstrated by his 

conduct that he was intent on evading [the police], rather than deal with the 

matter forthrightly[,]” and taking him into custody was necessary to arrive 

“at the truth while he was available to face the consequences.” Id. at 20.

In reviewing an order granting a defendant’s motion to suppress

evidence,

[w]e are bound by that court’s factual findings to the extent that 

they are supported by the record, and we consider only the 

evidence offered by the defendant, as well as any portion of the 

Commonwealth’s evidence which remains uncontradicted, when 

read in the context of the entire record. Our review of the legal 

conclusions which have been drawn from such evidence, 

however, is de novo, and, consequently, we are not bound by 

the legal conclusions of the lower courts.

Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419, 421 (Pa. Super. 2012), quoting

Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1048 (Pa. 2012).
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In addition, “[i]t is within the suppression court’s sole province 

as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight to be given their testimony.” Commonwealth v. 

Elmobdy, 2003 PA Super 158, 823 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 

2003). The suppression court is also entitled “to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v. 

Benton, 440 Pa. Super. 441, 655 A.2d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 

1995). Finally, at a suppression hearing, the Commonwealth 

has the burden of “establish[ing] by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the evidence was properly obtained.” 

Commonwealth v. Culp, 378 Pa. Super. 213, 548 A.2d 578, 

581 (Pa. Super. 1988).

Commonwealth v. Galendez, 27 A.3d 1042, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2011).

With respect to the existence of probable cause for an arrest, we are 

guided by the following principles:

Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and 

circumstances within the police officer’s knowledge and of 

which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information 

are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of 

reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been 

committed by the person to be arrested. Probable cause 

justifying a warrantless arrest is determined by the totality 

of the circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 2008 PA Super 6, 941 A.2d 14, 

27 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

. . . . It is the facts and circumstances within the personal 

knowledge of the police officer that frames the determination of 

the existence of probable cause. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 

Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 27, 309 A.2d 391, 394 (1973) (“Probable 

cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer 

warrant a prudent man in believing that an offense has been 

committed.”).

Galendez, 27 A.3d at 1046.
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After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Linda 

Carpenter, we conclude the Commonwealth’s sole issue on appeal merits no 

relief. The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly 

disposes of the question presented. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/2013, at 

4-8 (finding the police lacked probable cause based on the following: (1) 

with respect to the Commonwealth’s allegation regarding Felicia’s 

statements to police that Jackson had been bragging to people in the 

neighborhood that he had murdered the victim, this contention was not 

supported by the record as Detective Holmes testified Felicia informed him 

that “[Jackson] was in the area bragging about the shooting of Mr. Ricky 

Curry,”5 but to whom Jackson was bragging was unclear, and the detective’s 

testimony does not indicate if Jackson stated he was involved in the shooting 

or merely talking about the incident; (2) the police lacked sufficient objective 

facts and independent corroboration where (a) the specificity of Felicia’s 

information was insufficient as it did not reflect a special familiarity with 

Jackson’s affairs because the video was on a public website and the rivalry 

between Jackson’s and the victim’s neighborhood groups was likely known 

by community members, (b) Felicia’s background information was not 

provided to the court nor did the Commonwealth present evidence as to how 

____________________________________________

5

 N.T., 4/5/2013, at 38.
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Felicia came upon this information, (c) the Commonwealth did not introduce 

the YouTube video or any testimony that a police officer or detective saw the 

video, and (d) there was no police follow-up on Felicia’s information about 

Jackson’s bragging, as to whom Jackson had been bragging or as to the 

specific content of the bragging; (3) while Jackson did lie about his 

whereabouts to police which is indicative of consciousness of guilt, there was 

inconclusive evidence of flight because it was unclear whether he was 

actually attempting to flee from police; and (4) the court was not presented 

with any other factors to consider along with the perceived flight, other than 

Felicia’s uncorroborated information).

We agree with the court’s analysis and we reiterate the sentiment that 

we “are bound by that court’s factual findings to the extent that they are 

supported by the record.” Busser, 56 A.3d at 421. Here, the record 

substantiates the trial court’s findings, particularly where Detective Holmes 

testified that he had a conversation with Felicia regarding the acrimonious 

relationship between Jackson and the defendant, but he did not formally 

interview her. N.T., 4/5/2013, at 36. Moreover, other than stating that 

Felicia told him the two men had an ongoing dispute and that Jackson was in 

the area “bragging about the shooting,” Detective Holmes did not testify that 

Felicia provided him with any details regarding Jackson’s involvement in the 

shooting. Id. at 38. As such, there was no demonstrably reliable

information that Jackson committed the murder.
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Furthermore, the record indicates that Detective Holmes went to 

“make contact” with Jackson because “based on information [he] received 

from the decedent’s girlfriend, [he] wasn’t going to just take that as a 

whole. [He] just wanted to make contact with Mr. Jackson to see was there 

a problem and did he know anything about this incident.” Id. at 38-39. 

After the detective arranged to meet with Jackson at another location to 

question him, Jackson was observed “exit[ing] the rear door [of his home] in 

haste.” Id. at 13. As found by the trial court, there was inconclusive 

evidence to establish whether Jackson had absconded, or whether he was 

going to meet the police at the designated location. Based on these facts 

and circumstances, the police only had a falsehood from Jackson with 

respect to his actual whereabouts. Accordingly, one cannot reasonably infer 

there was sufficient information to warrant a belief that an offense had been 

committed by Jackson, supporting probable cause for his arrest. Therefore, 

because we conclude the trial court, in its opinion, thoroughly discussed and 

properly disposed of the only issue raised by the Commonwealth on appeal, 

we rest on its well-reasoned basis.

Order affirmed.

Judge Shogan joins this memorandum.

Judge Platt files a dissenting memorandum.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/9/2014
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