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Filed 5/14/21 P. v. Adams CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SHIRA JESSIE ADAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A160619

 (Mendocino County

 Super. Ct. No. SCUK CRCR 

 19-33183)

Shira Jessie Adams stabbed a pregnant girl in the neck with a knife 

and later pled no contest to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, 

subd. (a)(1)).1 The trial court denied Adams’s request for probation (§ 1203, 

subd. (e)(2)) and sentenced her to the midterm of three years in state prison.

Adams appeals. She contends the court erred in denying probation, 

and that it should have sentenced her to the low term. We disagree and 

affirm.

BACKGROUND

In November 2019, Adams was 18 years old. She carried a four- to sixinch fixed-blade knife in her purse. One afternoon, Adams got into an 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
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argument with her boyfriend’s 17-year-old sister, N.T., over a hair

straightener. N.T. was five months pregnant. She lunged at Adams. 

Scared, Adams retrieved the knife from her purse. She stabbed N.T. in the 

neck, just missing N.T.’s carotid artery. Police officers arrived and found 

N.T. bleeding from a one-inch wound near her esophagus. N.T. was 

airlifted to a hospital.

A.

Adams pled no contest to assault with a deadly weapon, rendering her 

presumptively ineligible for probation absent unusual circumstances where 

the interests of justice would be served by granting probation. (§§ 245, subd. 

(a)(1); 1203, subd. (e)(2).) The probation department’s initial report outlined 

the criteria affecting probation eligibility (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.414)2

and the aggravating and mitigating factors (rules 4.421, 4.423). Unsure 

whether an “unusual circumstance” warranted probation, the department 

suggested the court order a diagnostic evaluation and recommendation from 

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR, 

§ 1203.03). The court ordered the evaluation.

The evaluation described Adams’s chaotic and abusive childhood. It

also chronicled Adams’s significant substance abuse problem: she began 

using marijuana at age 12 and by age 17, she was frequently using 

methamphetamine, cocaine, and LSD. According to the evaluation, Adams 

suffered from amphetamine use disorder. Adams reported being diagnosed 

with bipolar disorder and suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. She 

claimed she was under the influence of methamphetamine and LSD during 

the incident and, as a result, was “ ‘not sure about anything that happened.’ ” 

Adams wanted to attend a residential drug treatment program.

2 “Rule” references are to the California Rules of Court. 
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The evaluation suggested Adams’s substance abuse problem might 

prevent her from performing well on probation. According to the evaluation, 

Adams used drugs in jail after the incident and when released on bail. The 

evaluation also noted Adams displayed a lack of remorse and minimized the 

severity of N.T.’s injury. Finally, the evaluation stated a prison commitment

would provide Adams with a “highly structured environment” and an 

opportunity for substance abuse treatment and therapy.

After considering the evaluation, the CDCR recommended denying 

probation and imposing a prison sentence. It deemed Adams an 

“unreasonable burden and or threat to the safety of the community.” The 

probation department agreed. It opined Adams was a threat to public safety 

based on the violent nature of the offense and Adams’s lack of remorse. The 

department concluded a prison term would protect the public and provide 

Adams with treatment and counseling; it recommended the midterm.

B.

Notwithstanding the evaluation and the CDCR’s recommendation, 

defense counsel urged the court to find unusual circumstances and grant 

probation. Counsel pointed to several mitigating factors, including: Adams’s 

youth; her drug addiction and mental illness; and the trauma from her 

childhood abuse. Adams asked the court to give her “a second chance” to 

allow her to “make up for” what she had done.

The prosecutor recommended denying probation. According to the 

prosecutor, Adams was a public safety threat because she could not control 

her anger; she was addicted to methamphetamine; and she was not 

remorseful. The prosecutor argued there were no “unusual circumstances 

rising to such a level that probation should be granted” and urged the court 

to impose an aggravated four-year prison term.
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C.

The court denied probation. It explained that it had read defense 

counsel’s sentencing memorandum, the probation reports, the CDCR 

evaluation, and the letters written by Adams and her mother. The court 

noted it had considered Adams’s age, and her mental health condition and 

drug addiction, and had weighed those factors against the seriousness and 

dangerousness of the offense. As the court observed, Adams stabbed a 

pregnant girl in the neck with a knife and could have killed the girl and her 

unborn child. It rejected Adams’s claim that she used the knife in selfdefense, noting Adams had “assaulted someone with a knife” before, and that 

“she carried that knife in her purse for the purpose of using” it.

The court determined Adams needed structure, treatment, and 

therapy. It decided “the best place for that to happen . . . given all the 

circumstances” was state prison. The court was skeptical the probation 

department could provide the structure Adams needed, in part because

Adams had missed appointments with her probation officer and had to be 

“remand[ed] to get [the] probation interview done.” The court also pointed 

out that Adams had not taken advantage of a previous opportunity to attend 

therapy.

After denying probation, the court announced its intention to impose 

the middle term. Defense counsel objected. Counsel reiterated the 

mitigating factors and urged the court to impose the low term. The 

prosecutor submitted to the midterm. The court balanced the aggravating 

and mitigating factors and sentenced Adams to the middle term. It explained 

it had considered Adams’s “age and the report that she was coming down 

from methamphetamine use, and the fact that she didn’t have any adult 

convictions.” Against those factors, the court noted Adams had stabbed a girl
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she knew was pregnant in the neck and that Adams had a history of carrying 

a knife and using it for assaultive purposes. The court concluded the 

midterm was the “appropriate sentence.”

 DISCUSSION

A. No abuse of discretion in denying probation

Adams acknowledges she was presumptively ineligible for probation

under section 1203, subdivision (e)(2), which states: “Except in unusual cases 

in which the interests of justice would best be served if the person is granted 

probation, probation shall not be granted to . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [a]ny person who 

used . . . a deadly weapon upon a human being” in perpetrating the crime. 

She argues this is an “unusual case” deserving of probation. The trial court 

was not persuaded, and neither are we.

A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant or 

deny probation. (People v. Superior Court (Du) (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 822, 

825.) In reviewing that determination, we do not “substitute our judgment 

for that of the trial court.” Instead, we “determine whether the trial court’s 

order . . . is arbitrary or capricious or exceeds the bounds of reason 

considering all the facts and circumstances.” (Ibid.) We will not reverse the 

court’s decision merely because reasonable people might disagree. (People v. 

Stuart (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 165, 179.)

Rule 4.413 enumerates factors the trial court should consider in 

determining whether to grant probation when a defendant is presumptively 

ineligible, including factors “relating to basis for [the] limitation on 

probation” and factors “limiting [the] defendant’s culpability.” (Rule 

4.413(c)(1), (c)(2).) Here, the relevant factors are: (1) the “circumstance 

giving rise to the limitation on probation is . . . substantially less serious than 

the circumstances typically present in other cases involving the same 
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probation limitation, and the defendant has no recent record of committing 

similar crimes or crimes of violence;” (2) the “defendant participated in the 

crime under circumstances of great provocation, . . . not amounting to a

defense, and the defendant has no recent record of committing crimes of 

violence;” (3) the “crime was committed because of a mental condition not 

amounting to a defense, and there is a high likelihood that the defendant 

would respond favorably to mental health care and treatment that would 

be required as a condition of probation;” and (4) the “defendant is 

youthful . . . and has no significant record of prior criminal offenses.” 

(Rule 4.413(c)(1)(A), (c)(2)(A)–(C).)3

But as Adams acknowledges, “ ‘mere suitability for probation does not 

overcome the presumptive bar . . . . [I]f the statutory limitations on probation 

are to have any substantial scope and effect, “unusual cases” and “interests of 

justice” must be narrowly construed,’ and rule 4.413 ‘limited to those matters 

in which the crime is either atypical or the offender’s moral blameworthiness 

is reduced.’ ” (People v. Stuart, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 178.) In denying 

probation and sentencing Adams to state prison, the trial court made an 

implied finding that her case “did not fall in the class of ‘unusual cases where 

the interest of justice demands a departure from the declared policy.’ ” 

(People v. Jones (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 228, 230 [record supported implied 

finding that defendant did not overcome statutory presumption against 

probation].)

3 If the court determines the statutory limitation on probation is 

overcome, it applies the criteria in rule 4.414—which lists facts relating to 

the crime and facts relating to the defendant—to decide whether to grant 

probation. (Rules 4.413(b), 4.414(a), (b).) Before denying probation, the court 

considered the criteria in rule 4.414, which were discussed at length in the

probation reports and in defense counsel’s sentencing memorandum.
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Ample evidence supports the court’s determination. Adams’s act of 

stabbing a girl she knew was pregnant in the neck was not substantially 

less serious than others for which the probation limitation applied. (Rule 

4.413(c)(1)(A).) To the contrary—and as the court observed—the offense was

life-threatening and “could have been charged more seriously.” Adams had 

also previously assaulted someone with a knife. (Ibid.) The court was not 

required to accept Adams’s version of the events, nor her contention that she 

had reduced moral culpability because of various circumstances, including 

her drug addiction. (People v. Stuart, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 179.) The 

court “carefully and sufficiently considered the specific circumstances of this 

case” and acted within its discretion by declining to grant probation. (Id. at 

pp. 187, 177.)

B. No abuse of discretion in imposing the midterm

Adams also challenges the court’s decision to sentence her to the 

midterm rather than the low term. We review that decision for abuse 

of discretion, reversing only if it “ ‘is so irrational or arbitrary that no 

reasonable person could agree with it.’ ” (People v. Sperling (2017) 

12 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1102.) Where—as here—the trial court balanced 

the aggravating and mitigating factors, the choice of the presumptive 

midterm sentence “need not be additionally justified.” (People v. Leung

(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 482, 508.)

There was no abuse of discretion. The court weighed the aggravating 

and mitigating factors and concluded neither outweighed the other. (People 

v. Roe (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 112, 119–120 [no abuse of discretion by 

imposing midterm after considering relevant factors and reaching a 

“reasonable assessment of their relative weight”]; People v. Sperling, supra,

12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1102–1103 [upholding imposition of middle term].) 
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Adams’s disagreement with the court’s decision to impose the middle term

does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Carmony (2004) 

33 Cal.4th 367, 377.)

We reject Adams’s claim that the court failed to “sufficiently weigh” 

several mitigating factors, including her mental health condition and her 

dysfunctional and traumatic childhood. Before sentencing Adams, the court 

read and considered defense counsel’s sentencing memorandum and the 

probation department’s reports, all of which discussed the mitigating factors. 

We presume the court considered all relevant mitigating circumstances even 

though “it did not expressly restate, recite, or otherwise refer to each one”

at sentencing. (People v. Weaver (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1318, 

disapproved on another ground as stated in People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 

922, 934–935; People v. Sperling, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1102 [rejecting 

similar claim that trial court failed to consider mitigating factors].) 

Additionally, the court was free to “ ‘minimize or even entirely disregard 

mitigating factors without stating its reasons.’ ” (People v. Lai (2006) 

138 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1258.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________

Rodriguez, J.*

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Simons, Acting P. J.

_________________________

Burns, J.

A160619

* Judge of the Superior Court of Alameda County, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.