1

Plaintiff’s status as an invitee, rather than a licensee, is apparently not contested. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

NORTHERN DIVISION

RANDY KLUMP, 

Plaintiff,

 v. Case Number: 09-12189-BC

Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

O-N MINERALS COMPANY, CARMEUSE

LIME & STONE, INC., CARMEUSE LIME, INC.,

Defendants.

_______________________________________/

ORDER ADJOURNING HEARING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DIRECTING BRIEFING ON SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Plaintiff Randy Klump was riding his bicycle across a dock owned by the Defendants when

he slipped on loose gravel and fell, fracturing his clavicle. At the time of the fall, he was employed

as a cook aboard the M/V David Z. Norton, a vessel owned by a corporate affiliate of the

Defendants. The M/V David Z. Norton was moored at the Defendants’ dock in Rogers City,

Michigan, and Plaintiff was traversing the dock on his way back to the vessel following shore leave.

A suit against the owner of the vessel, filed pursuant to the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, is also

pending in this Court. Case No. 08-10120-BC. 

The complaint in this case contends that the Defendants, as owners of the dock, owed

Plaintiff a duty to maintain the dock in reasonably safe condition, inspect the dock for defects, and

warn him of dangerous conditions that the Defendants knew about, or reasonably should have

known about. Now before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which contends

that under Michigan tort law, the scope of the dock owners’ duty to business invitees1

 does not

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include a duty to protect Plaintiff from potential hazards that are “open and obvious.” Plaintiff

responds that the allegedly dangerous condition—loose, wet gravel—was not open or obvious, and

even if it were, “special aspects” of the condition mean it is still actionable. The hearing on

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, scheduled for February 4, 2010 at 2:00 p.m., will be

adjourned to permit additional briefing on whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over this

dispute. 

Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution establishes the outer limits of the federal

courts’ power to adjudicate cases and controversies. Congress, by statute, has established the

particular circumstances where federal jurisdiction is appropriate. In this case, the Plaintiff and at

least one Defendant are citizens of the State of Michigan, meaning there is no diversity of

citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Nor is there a federal question in this suit; the Jones Act and other

federal statutes governing liability in suits by seamen do not apply. 18 U.S.C. § 1331. According

to the complaint, jurisdiction over this matter is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), which grants

federal district courts original jurisdiction in “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction

. . . .” Tort claims are subject to federal admiralty jurisdiction if the incident occurred on a navigable

waterway, or if it occurred on land but was caused by a vessel on navigable waters, and the event

is connected to traditional maritime activity. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513

U.S. 527, 533 (1995). Even conceding that the events at issue in this case are connected to

traditional maritime activity, they did not occur on a navigable waterway, nor were they caused by

a vessel on navigable waters. See Martin v. West, 222 U.S. 191, 197 (1911) (holding that a bridge

is “essentially a land structure” because it is “maintained and used as an aid to commerce on land”),

superseded by 46 U.S.C. § 30101;Cleveland T. & V.R. Co. v. Cleveland S.S. Co., 208 U.S. 316, 319

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(1908) (noting that “bridges, shore docks, protection piling, piers, etc.” are not within admiralty

jurisdiction because they are connected to the shore and used for commerce on land), superseded

by 46 U.S.C. § 30101; The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 34 (1865) (holding that admiralty

jurisdiction applies only to torts committed “wholly” on navigable waters) superseded by 46 U.S.C.

§ 30101. 

Although the cases holding that a dock or pier is an extension of land have been superseded

by statute, the statute specifically extends admiralty jurisdiction to injuries occurring on land only

if they were caused by a vessel on navigable waters. 46 U.S.C. § 3101. For example, admiralty

jurisdiction now extends to injuries caused by a vessel negligently colliding with a dock. See

Cleveland T. & V.R. Co., 208 U.S. 316. In this case, it appears that the injuries occurred on land,

and that their cause, although disputed, was not a vessel on navigable waters. Consequently, it

appears this Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate this dispute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If

the court determines at any time that it lack subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the

action.”). 

Moreover, even if admiralty jurisdiction is applicable to this case, it is not clear why

Michigan tort law should govern rather than general maritime law. “With admiralty

jurisdiction . . . comes the application of substantive admiralty law.” Yamaha Motor Corp. v.

Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 206 (1996) (citation and quotations omitted). The parties have treated this

case as a Michigan tort case involving citizens of Michigan. If that is the case, this Court is without

jurisdiction. Additional briefing will be ordered on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction before

reaching the merits of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The briefing should focus on

whether this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction extends to this case, and if it does, whether Michigan

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premises liability law is applicable. 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff is DIRECTED to submit a supplemental brief

on or before February 25, 2010. The supplemental brief shall be no more than ten pages in length.

It is further ORDERED that Defendant is DIRECTED to submit a response on or before

March 11, 2010. The response brief shall be no more than ten pages in length. 

It is further ORDERED that the hearing scheduled for February 4, 2010 is ADJOURNED.

The hearing will be rescheduled, if necessary, after the parties supplemental briefing has been

received. 

s/Thomas L. Ludington 

THOMAS L. LUDINGTON

United States District Judge

Dated: February 3, 2010

PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served

upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first

class U.S. mail on February 3, 2010.

s/Tracy A. Jacobs 

TRACY A. JACOBS

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