This opinion is subject to revision before final

p ublication in the Pacific Reporter

201 8 UT 11

IN THE



## S UPREME 

## C OURT OF THE 

## S TATE OF 

## U TAH

S TATE OF U TAH
, Appellee

,

v.

M ICHAEL B INKS
, Appellant

.

No. 20160235

Filed March 6 , 2018

On Direct Appeal

Fourth District, Provo

The Honorable Claudia Laycock

No. 141401875

Attorneys:

Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., Karen A. Klucznik

, Asst. Solic. Gen.

, Julia

Thomas, Salt Lake City, for appellee

Douglas J. Thompson, Margaret P. Lindsay, Provo, for appellant

A SSOCIATE C HIEF J USTICE L EE authored the opinion of the Court, in

which C HIEF J USTICE D URRANT
, J USTICE H IMONAS
, J USTICE P EARCE
,

and J USTICE P ETERSEN joined.

A SSOCIATE C HIEF J USTICE L EE , opinion of the Court:

¶1 Michael Binks was convicted of possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. In this appeal he challenges the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence that formed the basis for his conviction. We

affirm.

¶2 When officers stopped Binks’s vehicle, they had at least reasonable suspicion to investigate two traffic violations and possible drug possession. And when the officers approached the vehicle they gained reasonable suspicion of a nother offense

— driving

under the influence. The o fficers were entitled under Terry v. Ohio

,S TATE v. B INKS

Opinion of the Court

2 392 U.S. 1 (1968) , to detain Binks for a reasonable time while they investigated the se offenses. We affirm on that basis without reaching the other two grounds asserted by the State for defending the

search

— that p olice were justified in searching Binks based on the

warrant for the apartment Binks had ju st visited and that Binks was within the vicinity of the residence covered by the search warrant and thus a proper subject of the warrant under Bailey v. United Stat es , 568 U.S. 186 (2013).

I

¶3 On June 26, 2014, the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force executed a search warrant on an apartment in American Fork, Utah.

Officer s with the ta sk force had obtained a warrant to search the

listed apartment for “narcotics, paraph ernalia,” and “other items associated with the use/distribution of controlled subs tances .” The warrant also authorized police to search (1) any “person at the location or attempting to leave the location at the time of warrant service” and (2) “[a]ny vehic le parked at the location or attempting

to leave the location dur ing the time of service.”

¶4 Shortly before 8:00 a.m. on June 26, Detective Phillip

Crawford began surveilling the apartment from a position in the parking lot behind the apartment. Two other officers, Sergeant Jones and Deputy Robinson, had set up surveillance a few blocks away

. Just before Detective Crawford could leave his vehicle and serve the
warrant, he saw two men arrive in a silver SUV. One or both men then entered the apartment, staye d for two or thre e minutes, and left

in the SUV.

¶5 As the SUV left the premises, Detective Crawford radioed

orders to Sergeant Jones and Deputy Robinson to stop the car. Detective Crawford also reported that the SUV had failed to signal when exiting the park ing lot. Crawford believed that the vehicle was
covered within the terms of the warrant, but noted the traffic

violation as “kind of a double safety.”

¶6 Immediately after radioing to Sergeant Jones and Deputy
Robinson, Detective Crawford and other officers s erved the warrant

on the apartment identified in the warrant . Detective Crawford testified that the elapsed time between radioing a description of the

car and serving the warrant on the apartment was just “long enough

to walk .

. . the distance from our ve hicle to wh ere the residence is.”Cite as: 201 8 UT 11

Opinion of the Court

3 ¶7 Sergeant Jones received the order from Detective Crawford and almost immediately spotted the silver SUV. While tailing the

car, Jones saw the driver commit yet another traffic violation

— stopping beyond the pain ted line at a stop sign. The officers

activated their lights and stopped the car at 8:01 a.m.

¶8 When Deputy Robinson approached the vehicle, he noticed that Michael Binks, the driver, had glossy and bloodshot eyes and

that the vehicle smelled of alcohol. The officer als o noted that Binks seemed “very nervous”

— “actually shaki ng, he was that nervous.” Deputy Robinson suspected that Binks was under the influence of drugs or alcohol and promptly performed several field sobriety t ests. Binks passed those tests.

¶9 Deputy Robinso n then returned to his pat rol car and ran

Binks’s license , the passenger’s license, and the SUV’s license plate

number. S e rge a nt Jones stayed with Binks and checked for signs and symptoms of drug use. The recor d checks were completed between

8:16 a.m. and 8:17 a.m.

¶10 While Sergeant Jones and Deputy Robinson questioned Binks,

Detective Crawford searched the apartment. The occupant s of the
apartment confirmed that the two men who had visited the apartment while police were surveilling had purchased $30 wort h o f methamphetamine. The detective began trying to contact Sergeant
J ones, but reception was spotty.

¶11 Sergeant Jones testified that he received word from Detective

Crawford at 8:22 a.m. that Binks had bought methamphetamine. Deputy Robinson immediately search ed Binks and found a baggie with half a gram of methamphet amine inside a pocket. The officers arrested Binks, and he was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possessio n of drug paraphernalia.

II

¶12 Binks challenges all three of the State’s gr ounds for defending the search at issue in this case. He says that that the length of his detention was too prolonged to be justified under Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968); that the search was not authorized by the terms of the warrant; and that the scope of the warrant cannot be extended to encompass him within the standard set forth in Bailey v. United

States , 568 U.S. 186 (2013).S TATE v. B INKS

Opinion of the Court

4 ¶13 We affirm on the first ground without reaching the other two.

We hold that Binks’s detention was valid under Terry because t he

officers had at least reasonable suspicion of several separate

offenses

— two traffic violations, driving under the influence, and drug possession

— and officers did not prolong the stop longer than

was reasonably necessary to investigate each offense

. ¶14 Bink s’s detention was reasonable under the standard set forth

in the Terry case

. Terry authorizes a brief detention of a person by police based on reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. See Terry , 392 U.S. at 21; U.S. C ONST . amend. IV. A Terry
stop survives Fourth Amendment scrutiny if it is (1) “lawful at its inception” and (2) “otherwise executed in a reasonable manner.”

Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005).

¶15 Binks concedes that the stop was lawful at its inception

because an of ficer has reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle after observing a traffic viol ation

. See Rodrig uez v. United States , 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015). He even seems to acknowledge that Deputy

Robinson acquired reasonable suspicion during the stop to investigate him for driving under the influ ence. But he argues that the stop became unreasonable when officers finished investigating

him for those offenses and continued to detain him while investigating h im for drug possession.

¶16 Binks contends that the officers’ testimony and radio logs show that by 8:16 a.m. they had completed their sobriety tests and had completed all their record c hecks on him

. He argues then that

the officers should have issued him a ci t ation or allowed him to leave by 8:16 a.m. because they had concluded “the only mission they [were] justified in pursuing, namely the traffic citation.”

¶17 But Binks ’s argument ignores the fact that the officers had at

least reasonable suspicion to begin inv estigating another criminal

act

— possession of a controlled substance. M inutes before Binks’s

d etention , Detective Crawford saw him enter an apartment for

which police had a warrant to search for drug distribution. A nd

, consistent with a drug buy

, Binks had stayed in the apartment for only two or three minutes

. Binks also had glossy and bloodshot eyes when Deputy Robinson approached Binks’s vehicle. This arguablyCite as: 201 8 UT 11

Opinion of the Court

5 gave officers probable cause to search Binks immediately ; 1 it undoubtedly gave them reasonable suspicion to investigate the matter further and to detain Binks in the process.

¶18 So when Sergeant Jones and Deputy Robinson had completed the traffic stop and had determined that Binks was not under the

influence o f alcohol

— the point in time when Binks argu es they should have let him go

— they were still entitled to continue their investigation into drug possession. And this included trying to

deduce si gns and symptoms of drug use as well as waiting for word

from Detect ive Crawford regarding the results of his search of the
apartment.

¶19 We affirm on these grounds. We conclude that officers detained Binks “no longer than [was] necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” State v. Baker , 2010 UT 18, ¶ 17, 229 P.3d 650 (citation omitted) . Detective Crawford relayed information to the officers from his parallel investigation in a reasonable amount of
time, and Sergeant Jones and Deputy Robinson worked diligently to wrap up their investigation into drug possession.

III

¶20 Bin ks has raised important legal questions regarding the proper scope of the warrant at issue under the standard set forth in Bailey v. United States , 568 U.S. 186 (2013), and whether police were justified in relying on the warrant to stop and search him. We do not reach these questions, however, because we conclude that the officers conducted a proper search under Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

_____________________________________________________________

1 The State has argued only that the officers conducted a reasonable Terry stop, so we do not decide whether these circumst ances amount to probable cause.