UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CRICKET D. KNEECE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 96-1977

SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville.

Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-94-2309)

Submitted: March 18, 1997

Decided: June 2, 1997

Before WILKINS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Mary J. Wiesen-Kosinski, Aiken, South Carolina, for Appellant.

Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, J. Rene Josey, United

States Attorney, Mary Ann Sloan, Acting Chief Counsel, Region IV,

Mack A. Davis, Acting Deputy Chief Counsel, Ronald L. Paxton,

Assistant Regional Counsel, Renata Turner, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of General Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Cricket D. Kneece filed an application for Supplemental Security

Income in March 1992, alleging disability due to a mental condition

commencing in 1971, the year she was born. After a hearing, the

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decided that Kneece was not disabled under the Social Security Act because she is able to perform her

past relevant work and has the functional capacity to perform at least

some repetitive and routine work. The Appeals Council denied

Kneece's request for review. The ALJ's decision then became the

Secretary's final decision.

Kneece filed a complaint in the district court challenging the final

decision of the Secretary. The magistrate judge recommended affirming the Secretary's determination and the district court adopted the

magistrate's report and recommendation. Kneece appealed.

We review the Secretary's final decision to determine whether it is

supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was

applied. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West Supp. 1996); Hays v.

Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Kneece claims that

substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's finding that her psychological problems are not disabling. There was evidence in the

record suggesting that Kneece suffers psychological problems which

have made it difficult for her to hold a job. However, there was also

evidence that Kneece functioned well in a group home for unwed

mothers, that she had some work experience, and that she believed

she could care for an infant child. The ALJ thoroughly evaluated the

evidence and gave specific reasons for her determination. See

Hammond v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 424, 426 (4th Cir. 1985). Because we

conclude that the Secretary's decision is supported by substantial evidence and was based on the correct legal standards, we will not disturb that decision. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456.

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Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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