### The Honorable Thomas M. Shanahan, United States Distric t 1 

### Judge for the District of Nebraska. ___________ No. 95-3735

___________ Celestine Brown, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Nebraska. Shirley S. Chater, * Commissioner of the Social * Security Administration, * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: April 8, 1996 Filed: June 20, 1996

___________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
Celestine Brown appeals t he district court's judgment affirming the 1 denial of her application for Social Security disability benefits. W e affirm.

I.

Celestine Brown is a forty-six-year-old woman with a high schoo l degree. After completing cosmetology school andtwo years of college, she worked as a preschool teacher and as a telephone operator. On December 15 , 1992, Brown filed applications for Social Securi ty disability benefits and Supplemental Security

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Income (SSI) benefits, alleging a disability onset date of October 20 , 1989. Brown claimed that she was unable to work due to headaches ; depression; fatigue; vision problems; muscle spasms; dizziness; swelling in her leg, ankle, feet, and hand; and pain in her neck, back, an d shoulde r. The Social Security Administration denied her application s initia lly and upon reconsideration. After conducting a hearing, th e Admin istrative Law Judge (ALJ), found that Brown did not suffer from a disab ility as defined in the Social Security Act. The Appeals Counci l denied Brown's request for review and the district court affirmed. In thi s appeal, Brown alleges that the ALJ improperly disregarded her subjective complaints of pain and failed to adequately develop the record.

II.
We will uphold the ALJ's decision to deny benefits if it is sup ported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Baumgarten v. Chater , 75 F.3d 366, 368 (8th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence is that which a rea sonable mind would find as adequate to support the ALJ's conclusion

. Id. The ALJ, after following the five-step process set out in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404 .1520 and 416.920, concluded that Brown did have medicall y determinable impairments including cervical and lumbar strains, dysthymia, major depression, anddependent personality disorder. He found, however, that the evidence failed to establish that the i mpairments were, singly or in combination, severe enough to constitute a disability under the Act

. The ALJ concluded tha t Brown would be incapable of performing occupations that require lifting of more than twenty pounds or those occupations that require frequent lifting and carrying of items weighing more than te n pounds. He found, however, that Brown could return to her past relevant work as a telephone operator. After reviewing the record, we find there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ's determinations.

### -3- Brown claims that her pain started after she fell down a flight o f stairs on July 9, 1988, and that it was compounded by several automobile acciden ts occurring between 1989 and 1992. There is little objectiv e medical evidence in the record that would support Brown's claim that her impairments are disabling. First, all of the tests conducted on Brown , including an arthrogram, X-rays of the neck and back, and a myelogram of the cervical and lumbar region, were normal.

In additi on, Dr. Michael O'Neil, who examined Brown on December 18, 1989, noted that Brown's "symptoms of left shoulder pain and left neck pai n are very generalized and not consistent with a cervical disc syndrome or
a sin gle nerve root injury or an injury to the soft tissues of the lef t shoulde r." Dr. O'Neil could find no explanation for Brown's physica l symptoms and believed that Brown would not have any permanent impairment as a result of the injury.
Diane Ratigan, a physical therapist, evaluated Brown on June 7, 1990. Ms. Ratigan believed that Brown was "capable of performing most aspects of her job," but noted that Brown's ability to perf orm her past work for more than 20 minu tes at one time was limited by her pain. Although Ms

. Ratigan's statement may lend support to a finding of disability, the ALJ
was permitted to discredit the statement because the conclusion appeared to rest solely on Brown's complaints of pain. See Woolf v. Shalala , 3 F.3 d 121 0, 1214 (8th Cir. 1993) (conclusory statement of disability based o n claima nt's subjective complaints of pain entitled to little weight whe n unsupported by objective medical evidence).
On June 28, 1990, Dr. James Rogers performed a vocational evalu ation. He noted the absence of functional restrictions placed upon Brown by her treating physicians. Based on Ms. Ratigan's report, however, Dr. Rogers did not believe that Brown could return to her former job at the time of the evaluation. Nevertheless, he

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stated that Brown could return to her previous work if she could get her pain under control.
In an examination performed following an automobile accident inMarch 1991 , Dr. R. Schuyler Gooding stated that "although this patient ma y continue to have some discomfort in her neck andin her lower back, she is employable, and capable of holding down a job." In further support of the ALJ's finding of no disability, Dr. Gooding concluded that Brown did not appear to be in any significant distress during an examination conducted on March 15, 1993. D r. Gooding "continue[d] to be of the impression that this patient can return to the work force." His report reflects that he "advis ed [Brown] that she will probably always experience some variabl e discomfort involving her neck and her lower back in view of the fact that she is not getting younger and that she is slightly overweight."

Moreover, Dr. William Johnson, who treated Brown from October 1 , 1988, through October 2, 1990, and from December 30, 1991, through August 3, 199 2, recommended conservative treatment for Brown's neck, arm, an d shoulder pain, including medication, exercise, and physical therapy. In Brown's final visit on August 3, 1992, Dr. Johnson concluded that Brown ha d intermittent symptoms in her neck, left shoulder, and back. According to Dr. Johnson, Brown's examination failed to reveal more than mild limitatio n of m otion and mild spasm. Finally, after performing a psychologica l evaluation of Brown o n July 17, 1993, Dr. Thomas England, a psychologist, found that Brown exhibited symptoms of mild depression but had no gros s mental problems.

Brown contends that the ALJ's decision to discount her subjectiv e complaints of pain is unsupported by the record. In applying the factors set forth in Polaski v. Heckler , 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984), to analyze a claimant's subjective complaints of pain, an ALJ is required to examine: (1) the

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claimant's daily acti vities; (2) the duration, frequency and intensity of pain; (3) dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; (4 ) preci pitating and aggravating factors; and (5) functional restrictions

. An AL J may discount a claimant's subjective complaints of pain only i f there are inconsistencies in the record as a who le. Smith v. Shalala , 987 F.2d 1371, 1374 (8th Cir. 1993).
Applyi ng the foregoing guidelines, the ALJ discounted Brown' s compla ints of disabling pain. Although the ALJ considered Brown' s impres sive work history in assessing her credibility, he found tha t "[s]tanding alone, it says nothing concerning the individual's impairments , their effect upon his or her ability to function, or any residual abilitie s that individual might have for work in the national economy." Next, the ALJ noted that the objective medical evidence failed to document an y disabling impairment. See Matthews v. Bowen , 879 F.2d 422, 425 (8th Cir. 1989) (medical evidence revealing only minor impairments was sufficien t basis to discount claimant's complaint of disabling pain). Consistent wit h the lack of objective medical evidence, Dr. Engl and reported that "[Brown] gave the appearance of trying to draw attention to her problems, or perhap s even exaggerate them." In addition, Ms. Ratigan 's notes following Brown's evaluation revealed that Brown applied inconsistent effort in performing a strength test.

In furthe r support of his decision, the ALJ noted the lack of an y signifi cant restrictions imposed by Brown's treating physicians. Se e Smith , 987 F.2d at 1374 (lack of significant medical restriction s inco nsistent with claimant's complaints of disabling pain). Moreover , duri ng Brown's evaluation in July 1993, Dr. England noted that Brow n advised him that she was no longer undergoing ac tive medical treatment for the pain in her shoulder and neck. See Johnson v. Bowen , 866 F.2d 274, 27 5 (8th C ir. 1989) (claimant's failure to comply with prescribed medica l treatment inconsistent with complaints of disabling condition). The ALJ also

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considered the testimony given by Brown's brother, Jack Matthews, regardin g Brown's alleged disabilities, but explicitly dis counted the testimony upon finding that it was suspect. See Brockman v. Sullivan , 987 F.2d 1344, 134 7 (8th Cir. 1993) (ALJ could discredit testimony given by claimant's roommat e due to suspect nature of testimony); Basinger v. Heckler , 725 F.2d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir. 1984) (ALJ was free to disbelieve testimony given b y claimant's witnesses).
Although it is true that Brown's daily activities demonstrate som e limit ations, the ALJ did not have to believe all of Brown's assertion s concerning those daily activities. See Benskin v. Bowen , 830 F.2d 878, 88 3 (8t h Cir. 1987). For example, the record shows that Brown's dail y activities consisted of taking medication, taking baths, lying down, eatin g crackers, listening to the radio, sleeping, occasional grocery shopping, going to church once a week, and dining at a rel ative's house on occasion. While these limitations, if accepted as credible, might have supported a disability finding, we will not substitute our opinion for that of the ALJ , who was i n a better position to assess Brown's credibility than are we

. Woolf , 3 F.3d at 1213.
Brown argues that the ALJ "ignored" Polaski by simply focusing on the factors that tended to support his findings and disregarding those factors that weighed in her f avor. Essentially, she claims that it was error for the ALJ to merely pic k and choose evidence from the record that supported his conclusions without discussing the evidence that favored her. Althoug h the A LJ did not explicitly discuss each Polaski factor in a methodica l fashion, he acknowledged and considered those factors before discounting Brown's subjective complaints of pain. What we said in an earlier case is applicable here: "Anarguable deficiency in opinion-writing technique is not a sufficient reas on for setting aside an administrative finding where

. . . the deficiency probably had no practical effect on the outcome of th e case." Benskin , 830 F.2d at

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883.

Brown next contends that the ALJ failed to adequately develop th e record. To the contrary, the record contains su bstantial documentation of Brown's medical history. Because the ALJ fulfil led his duty in developing
a reasonably complete record, see Clark v. Shalala , 28 F.3d 828, 830-31 (8th Cir. 1994), this contention is without merit.
The judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.