SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1814-19T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STACY D. JACKSON,

Defendant-Respondent.

________________________

Submitted June 3, 2020 – Decided July 1, 2020

Before Judges Koblitz, Whipple and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Criminal Part, Morris County, Complaint No. 

S-2018-0355-1436.

Matthew W. Kelly, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the 

cause for appellant (Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County 

Prosecutor, attorney; Matthew W. Kelly, on the brief).

Sara B. Liebman argued the cause for respondent

(Caruso Smith Picini PC, attorneys; Timothy R. Smith, 

of counsel; Sara B. Liebman, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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On leave to appeal granted, the State seeks a reversal of the trial court's 

January 3, 2020 order dismissing the charge of obstruction of justice, N.J.S.A. 

2C:29-1(a), as de minimis pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11. Defendant was charged 

after he refused to lower his car window and exit his vehicle when ordered to do so 

during a motor vehicle stop. Assignment Judge Stuart A. Minkowitz found that 

defendant's behavior did not "rise to the level of obstructive conduct that the statute 

was intended to prevent." The court found defendant's actions to be trivial and noted 

that "convicting him would do more harm than good." We affirm substantially for 

the reasons expressed in Judge Minkowitz's thorough written reasons attached to his 

order. We add the following brief discussion.

I.

Following a motor vehicle stop, defendant was charged with obstruction of 

justice and issued motor vehicle summonses for careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97, 

and failure to observe a stop sign, N.J.S.A. 39:4-144. The police investigation report

reveals the following.

On December 17, 2018, Officer Matthew Hill of the Roxbury Township 

Police Department was on patrol when he observed a dark-colored Ford Edge, later 

identified as being driven by defendant, fail to stop at a stop sign and cut in front of 
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another car. Hill turned on his overhead lights and defendant eventually stopped in 

the center of a parking lot. 

Hill approached the passenger side of defendant's car, rather than the driver's 

side, because the rear windows of the Ford were tinted and he was unable to 

determine how many people were in the car. After looking in the rear passenger side 

window, Hill determined that defendant was the only person in the car. Hill then 

knocked on the closed passenger side window instructing defendant to lower the 

window. Defendant refused to lower the window and demanded that Hill speak with 

him on the driver's side of the car. Hill asked defendant to lower the window a 

second time, to which defendant responded, "you can come to this side and fucking 

talk to me." Hill requested assistance from additional patrol units. After waiting a 

few minutes, Hill knocked again and asked defendant to lower the passenger 

window. Defendant again refused to comply, and asked Hill to come to the driver's 

side to speak with him. 

Hill proceeded to the driver's side and asked defendant to exit the car twice. 

Defendant refused, stating, "I'm not getting out of this car you fucking racist." Hill 

then informed defendant that if he did not comply, he would be arrested. Defendant 

responded, "fine, then fucking arrest me." At this point, Hill told defendant he would 
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be placed under arrest, opened the driver's side door, grabbed defendant's right wrist 

and directed him to the side of the car where he was handcuffed. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11 "vests the assignment judge with discretion to dismiss 

certain charges to avoid an absurd application of the penal laws." State v. Evans, 

340 N.J. Super. 244, 248 (App. Div. 2001). As the decision to dismiss on de minimis 

grounds is discretionary, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See ibid. 

Our review of the trial court's legal conclusions is de novo. Manalapan Realty, L.P. 

v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

II.

The obstruction statute provides:

A person commits an offense if he [or she] purposely 

obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or 

other governmental function or prevents or attempts to 

prevent a public servant from lawfully performing an 

official function by means of flight, intimidation, force, 

violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by means 

of any independently unlawful act. This section does not 

apply to failure to perform a legal duty other than an 

official duty, or any other means of avoiding compliance 

with law without affirmative interference with 

governmental functions.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a).]
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Our Supreme Court has recently held that "to find criminal liability under N.J.S.A. 

2C:29-1 requires an affirmative act or some affirmative interference." State v. Fede, 

237 N.J. 138, 149 (2019).

In Fede, the Court reversed the defendant's conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-

1(a) for refusing to unchain the lock on his door to permit police entry into his home. 

237 N.J. at 149. The Court determined that Fede's "refusal to remove the alreadyfastened chain lock required no physical effort; it was not an act." Ibid. The plain 

meaning of "affirmative" requires effort. Ibid. In its analysis, the Court focused on 

the difference between an affirmative act and the failure to act. Id. at 149-50. The 

Court stated:

By the structure and the terms of the obstruction statute, 

the attempt to create an obstacle is distinct from a failure 

to act. Here, Fede did not undertake an affirmative act. 

He did not learn of the officers' need to enter his home and 

then attempt to prevent that entry. His use of the ordinary 

door-chain-lock was his standard practice, not a 

circumstantial reaction to the officers' knock. . . . Although 

Fede's refusal to remove the lock to allow the officers to 

perform their necessary, lawful, and focused search is not 

an advisable course of action and could have escalated the 

situation, it was not criminal.

[Id. at 150.]

The State takes issue with the trial court's reliance on Fede because, unlike 

Fede, who was in his home, defendant was subject to a lawful motor vehicle stop. 
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The Court, however, did not rely on the sanctity of the home in determining that 

Fede did not obstruct justice. Defendant refused to lower his window just as Fede

refused to remove the chain lock on his door. Officer Hill then opened the driver's 

side door, removed defendant by grabbing his right wrist and placed him in 

handcuffs. The police report does not state that defendant tried to prevent Hill from 

opening the door, or that defendant resisted arrest once he was removed from the 

car. The Fede Court distinguished a previous case where the defendant's attempt to 

slam and lock the door on officers after announcing their reason for entry constituted 

obstruction because it was an attempt to "prevent the officers' entry 'by means of

. . . physical interference or obstacle.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 

172 (2015)). The Court concluded that Fede "did not try to prevent the officers from 

breaking the chain, offering no physical resistance once the officers broke the chain" 

and "complied with instructions to wait outside his home while the search was 

conducted." Ibid.

Applying the Court's reasoning in Fede, Judge Minkowitz reasonably found 

that defendant's use of coarse language and his refusal to lower the window or exit 

the car were not affirmative acts or an interference that would result in criminal 

liability under the obstruction statute.
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III.

The statute governing de minimis motions states:

The assignment judge may dismiss a prosecution if, 

having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to 

constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant 

circumstances, it finds that the defendant's conduct:

a. Was within a customary license or tolerance, neither 

expressly negated by the person whose interest was 

infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law 

defining the offense;

b. Did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil 

sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense 

or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the 

condemnation of conviction; or

c. Presents such other extenuations that it cannot 

reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the Legislature 

in forbidding the offense. The assignment judge shall 

not dismiss a prosecution under this section without 

giving the prosecutor notice and an opportunity to be 

heard. The prosecutor shall have a right to appeal any 

such dismissal.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11.]

In deciding a de minimis motion, the court must accept the factual allegations 

as true and focus on "not whether the defendant is innocent or guilty of the offense 

charged, but whether 'the nature of the conduct charged and the attendant 

circumstances' indicate that the offense was too trivial to warrant prosecution." 

Evans, 340 N.J. Super. at 249 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11). When determining 
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triviality, the court should consider all relevant circumstances and the most 

important is "the risk of harm to society of defendant's conduct." Id. at 253. 

The State argues that the court abused its discretion when it failed to consider 

all the relevant factors and instead considered irrelevant and inappropriate factors, 

such as defendant's embarrassment caused by a public arrest and the risk of losing 

his job. The State contends that the court failed to consider the most important 

factor, the risk of harm to society of defendant's conduct, and asserts that defendant's 

actions pose a high risk to the public, in particular police officers. The State warns 

of the danger of setting a precedent that allows citizens to disobey lawful police 

orders during a motor vehicle stop. 

Officer safety is of great concern during motor vehicle stops and officers have 

the authority to order the driver out of the car. State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 610 

(1994). The trial court has the discretion, however, to dismiss a prosecution if it 

finds it too trivial to warrant prosecution. If the defendant's conduct "[d]id not 

actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining 

the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of 

conviction" then the judge may dismiss the prosecution. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11(b).

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) describes means of obstruction as "flight, intimidation, 

force, violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by means of any 
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independently unlawful act." The court found that defendant's "demeanor did not 

affirmatively prevent Hill from effecting the traffic stop or communicating with 

[d]efendant, nor did [d]efendant resist once Hill announced that he would be 

arrested." The court properly concluded that defendant's conduct "does not rise to 

the level of obstructive conduct that the statute was intended to prevent." 

The court analyzed defendant's conduct under the obstruction statute and 

considered defendant's two prior convictions, the most recent occurring in 2006, the 

risk of losing his job as a result of a new conviction, and the financial support he 

provides for his two daughters. After weighing these factors, Judge Minkowitz

granted defendant's motion to dismiss as de minimis. This decision was well within 

the assignment judge's discretion.

Affirmed.