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FILED

JUN 28 2018

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ORDERED PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP Nos. CC-17-1335-KuLS

) CC-17-1337-KuLS

YAVAUGHNIE RENEE WILKINS, ) CC-17-1346-KuLS

) (Related Appeals)

Debtor. )

______________________________) Bk. No. 2:16-bk-12328-SK

)

YAVAUGHNIE RENEE WILKINS, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) O P I N I O N

)

JOHN J. MENCHACA, Chapter 7 )

Trustee; SCHREIBER FAMILY )

TRUST dated March 22, 1989, )

)

Appellees. )

______________________________)

Argued and Submitted on May 24, 2018 at

Pasadena, California

Filed - June 28, 2018

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Honorable Sandra R. Klein, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

_____________________________________

Appearances: Andrew M. Wyatt of Wyatt Law argued for appellant

Yavaughnie Renee Wilkins; William J. Wall argued

for appellee Schreiber Family Trust.

______________________________________

Before: KURTZ, LAFFERTY, and SPRAKER, Bankruptcy Judges.
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KURTZ, Bankruptcy Judge:

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In these related appeals, chapter 71 debtor Ms. Yavaughnie

Wilkins appeals from the bankruptcy court’s (1) Order Granting

Trustee’s Motion For Conversion To Chapter 7 (Conversion Order)

and from the portion of the Order Denying Ms. Wilkins’ Motion

for Reconsideration related to the Conversion Order (BAP No.

CC-17-1335); (2) Order Granting Trustee’s Motion to Sell Real

Estate (Sale Order) and from the portion of the Order Denying

Ms. Wilkins’ Motion For Reconsideration related to Sale Order

(BAP No. CC-17-1337); and (3) Order Granting Turnover Order and

Writ of Possession (BAP No. CC-17-1346).

Ms. Wilkins filed a single notice of appeal which was

untimely filed as to all of the above-referenced orders. The

BAP Clerk’s office issued a notice of deficiency requesting the

parties to explain why these appeals should not be dismissed. 

Ms. Wilkins’ counsel responded by requesting an extension of

time to appeal under Rule 8002(d)(1)(B), claiming excusable

neglect. Appellee, John J. Menchaca, the chapter 7 trustee,

maintained that the standards for excusable neglect were not met

and therefore the appeals should be dismissed. Appellee,

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section 

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532,

Rule references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure, and FRAP references are to the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure.

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Schreiber Family Trust (SFT),2 responded similarly and also

contended that counsel’s request for an extension of time to

appeal was untimely under Rule 8002(d)(1)(B). Therefore, the

Panel was required to dismiss the appeals for lack of

jurisdiction. SFT subsequently filed a motion to dismiss these

appeals on these same grounds.

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamer v.

Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, 138 S.Ct. 13 (2017),

the Panel sua sponte requested further briefing on whether the

14-day time deadline for filing an appeal from a bankruptcy

court’s decision was jurisdictional, thereby requiring dismissal

of these appeals, or whether the time deadline was a mandatory

claim-processing rule subject to waiver or forfeiture.

Having reviewed the briefs from Ms. Wilkins and SFT and

considered the oral arguments of counsel, we conclude that the

14-day time deadline in Rule 8002(a) remains a mandatory and

jurisdictional requirement in this court as the Ninth Circuit

has held for decades. Accordingly, we dismiss these three

appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

II. JURISDICTION

We have jurisdiction to determine our own jurisdiction and

consider the issue de novo. Gugliuzza v. Fed. Trade Comm’n (In

re Gugliuzza, 852 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 2017). The Panel’s

2 SFT held a promissory note executed by Ms. Wilkins in the

original principal sum of $200,000. The note was secured by a

deed of trust on Ms. Wilkins’ personal residence in San Jose,

California. SFT successfully moved to convert Ms. Wilkins’ case

from chapter 13 to chapter 7. The chapter 7 trustee then sold

the property to a third party.

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first consideration on appeal is our jurisdiction. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Time Deadline For Appeal: The Jurisdictional/ClaimProcessing Rule Dichotomy

In Hamer, the Supreme Court considered whether the maximum

time a court may extend an appeal deadline in FRAP(4)(a)(5)(C),

in a case in which the appellant received timely notice of the

judgment or order appealed from, was a jurisdictional

requirement or a mandatory claim-processing rule that was

subject to waiver or forfeiture.

Section 2107 of title 28 and FRAP (4)(a)(1) state that in a

civil case, the notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days

after entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 

FRAP(4)(a)(5) addresses the time deadlines for extending the

30-day period by motion:

(5) Motion for Extension of Time.

(A) The district court may extend the time to file a

notice of appeal if:

(i) a party so moves no later than 30 days after the

time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires; and

(ii) regardless of whether its motion is filed before

or during the 30 days after the time prescribed by

this Rule 4(a) expires, that party shows excusable

neglect or good cause.

(B) A motion filed before the expiration of the time

prescribed in Rule 4(a)(1) or (3) may be ex parte

unless the court requires otherwise. If the motion is

filed after the expiration of the prescribed time,

notice must be given to the other parties in

accordance with local rules.

(C) No extension under this Rule 4(a)(5) may exceed

30 days after the prescribed time or 14 days after the

date when the order granting the motion is entered,

whichever is later.

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In a unanimous decision, the Hamer court held that

FRAP(4)(a)(5)(C), which limits the length of any extension, was

a mandatory claim-processing rule because the time limit arises

from a rule, in contrast to a non-waivable and non-forfeitable

jurisdictional requirement arising from a statute. The court

emphasized:

Only Congress may determine a lower federal court’s

subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, a provision

governing the time to appeal in a civil action

qualifies as jurisdictional only if Congress sets the

time. A time limit not prescribed by Congress ranks

as a mandatory claim-processing rule, serving to

promote the orderly progress of litigation by

requiring that the parties take certain procedural

steps at certain specified times.

138 S. Ct. at 17 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).

The court further noted that the distinction between a

jurisdictional rule and a claim-processing rule is “critical”

because “[f]ailure to comply with a jurisdictional time

prescription . . . deprives a court of adjudicatory authority

over the case, necessitating dismissal—a ‘drastic’ result.” Id. 

However, “[m]andatory claim-processing rules are less stern. If

properly invoked, mandatory claim-processing rules must be

enforced, but they may be waived or forfeited.” Id. at 17-18

(citing Manrique v. United States, 581 U.S. ––––, ––––, 137 S.

Ct. 1266, 1271–1272 (2017)). The Hamer court reserved the issue

whether mandatory claim-processing rules may be subject to

equitable exceptions. Id. at 18 n.3 (citing Kontrick v. Ryan,

540 U.S. 443, 457 (2004)).

Hamer follows a line of Supreme Court cases which have

considered anew the historical use of the term “jurisdictional”

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in connection with time deadlines set forth in statutes versus

procedural rules. The Supreme Court’s precedent, including

Hamer, shapes a rule of decision that is both clear and easy to

apply: “If a time prescription governing the transfer of

adjudicatory authority from one Article III court to another

appears in a statute, the limitation is jurisdictional;

otherwise the time specification fits within the claimprocessing category.” Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 20 (citations

omitted); cf. Kontrick, 540 U.S. 443 (finding Rule 4004 which

sets the time within which an objection to a debtor’s discharge

must be filed, is not a jurisdictional requirement despite its

“inflexible,” “unalterable” nature); Eberhart v. United States,

546 U.S. 12 (2005) (holding that the time limit and extension

requirements set forth in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 33

and 45 are claim-processing rules and nonjurisdictional).

In cases not involving the timebound transfer of

adjudicatory authority from one Article III court to another,

the Supreme Court has applied the clear-statement rule: “A rule

is jurisdictional ‘[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a

threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as

jurisdictional.’” Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 20 n.9 (citing Gonzalez

v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H

Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006)). Accordingly, we must examine

whether there is any clear indication that Congress wanted the

14-day time deadline to file a notice of appeal in Rule 8002(a)

to be jurisdictional. Although Congress’s intent must be clear,

it need not be explicit. Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 20 n.9 (citing

Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013). 

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When applying the clear statement rule, the Supreme Court

reminds us that “‘most [statutory] time bars are

nonjurisdictional.’” Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 20 n.9 (alteration in

original) (quoting United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S.

––––, ––––, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 (2015)).

In Henderson v. Shinseki, the Supreme Court also observed

that the statute/rule distinction is not quite that simple to

apply because Congress is free to attach the conditions that go

with the jurisdictional label to a deadline that the Court would

normally consider a claim-processing rule. 562 U.S. 428, 435

(2011) (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209-210 (2007)). 

The Court stated that in determining whether Congress intended a

particular provision to be jurisdictional, “[c]ontext, including

this Court’s interpretation of similar provisions in many years

past, is relevant. When a long line of this Court’s decisions

left undisturbed by Congress has treated a similar requirement

as jurisdictional, we will presume that Congress intended to

follow that course.” Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436 (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sebelius, 568 U.S.

at 153-154 (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S.

154, 168 (2010), for the same proposition).

B. Analysis

Mindful of these guidelines and the Supreme Court’s caution

against reckless use of the term “jurisdictional,” we turn to 28

U.S.C. § 158, which governs bankruptcy appeals. In that

statute, Congress gave jurisdiction to the district court in

subsection (a), and this Panel in subsection (b), to hear

appeals from bankruptcy court decisions. Embedded within these

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jurisdictional grants at subsection (c)(2), the statute

provides:

An appeal under subsections (a) and (b) of this

section shall be taken in the same manner as appeals

in civil proceedings generally are taken to the courts

of appeals from the district courts and in the time

provided by Rule 8002 of the Bankruptcy Rules.

Rule 8002(a), in turn, says that the notice of appeal must

be filed within 14 days after entry of the judgment, order, or

decree being appealed.

“To determine whether Congress has made the necessary clear

statement, we examine the text, context, and relevant historical

treatment of the provision at issue.” Duggan v. Comm’r of

Internal Revenue, 879 F.3d 1029, 1032 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing

Musacchio v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 709, 717

(2016)). Here, examination of these factors shows that the 14-

day time deadline in Rule 8002(a) which is incorporated into 28

U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) is a jurisdictional requirement.

First, the historical treatment of the taking of an appeal

indicates that the 14-day time limit is jurisdictional. The

Supreme Court has always said without exception that procedural

conditions for appealing a case from one Article III court to

another are jurisdictional. “When an appeal is ‘not taken

within the time prescribed by law,’ the ‘Court of Appeals [is]

without jurisdiction.’” Gonzalez, 565 U.S. at 159 (Scalia, J.,

dissenting) (citing George v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 293

U.S. 377, 379 (1934); United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220,

229–230 (1960)).

For decades, the Ninth Circuit has consistently construed

the time deadline in Rule 8002(a) for appeals from a

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non-Article III court in accordance with this precedent. The

district court in In re Melcher, No. 3:16-cv-05982-WHA, 2017 WL

1175590, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2017), briefly summarized

the history of the Ninth Circuit’s application of the time

deadline in Rule 8002(a):

As our court of appeals explained in [Gough v. Wells

Fargo Bank (In re Best Distribution Co.)], 576 F.2d

1360 (9th Cir. 1978), prior to 1938, petitions for

review from bankruptcy orders had to be filed within a

“reasonable time” unless local rules provided a

specific period. In 1938, however, Section 39(c) of

the Bankruptcy Act set forth a 10-day time limit for

the filing of such petitions “to provide a uniform

degree of finality to orders of bankruptcy judges.” 

Id. at 1362. In interpreting the 10-day time limit,

“the circuits divided on whether the limitation merely

restricted the right to file petitions for review, or

whether it also restricted the district courts’

discretionary power to entertain late petitions.” Id.

at 1362–63. In 1942, the Supreme Court held that

Congress had expressed no intention, by enacting

Section 39(c), to limit the traditional discretion of

district courts in this area. Id. at 1363 (citing

Pfister v. N. Ill. Fin. Corp., 317 U.S. 144, 152–53

(1942)). “Dissatisfied with the lack of finality that

accompanied the discretionary power to entertain late

petitions, Congress amended [Section 39(c)] in 1960

for the specific purpose of legislatively overruling

Pfister.” Ibid. (citing [Shannon v. Benefiel (In re

Benefiel)], 500 F.2d 1219, 1220–21 (9th Cir. 1974)). 

Subsequent decisions by our court of appeals therefore

“strictly construed and compulsorily applied” the

10-day limitation “to negate the discretion afforded

the reviewing court” under Pfister, holding that

untimely notice of appeal from the bankruptcy court

deprived the reviewing district court of jurisdiction. 

Id. at 1363–64.

In 1973, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 802

superseded Section 39(c). Id. at 1364; [Headlee v.

Ferrous Fin. Servs. (In re Butler’s Tire & Battery

Co., Inc.)], 592 F.2d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 1979). 

Although [Rule] 802 carried forward the 10-day time

limit from Section 39(c), it otherwise paralleled

[FRAP] 4(a).3 Butler’s Tire & Battery, 592 F.2d at

3 The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 8002(a) states that

(continued...)

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1031. Our court of appeals thus declined in Butler’s

Tire & Battery to rely on decisions construing Section

39(c), including [In re] Best Distribution, in

construing [Rule] 802. Id. at 1030–31. Nonetheless,

after applying [Rule] 802 with the guidance of case

law concerning FRAP 4(a) and its predecessor, Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 73(a), our court of appeals

again concluded that untimely notice of appeal from

the bankruptcy court deprived the district court of

jurisdiction. Id. at 1034. This conclusion comported

with well-established precedent holding that FRAP

4(a)’s time period for filing a notice of appeal is

also “mandatory and jurisdictional.” See, e.g., 

Pettibone v. Cupp, 666 F.2d 333, 334 (9th Cir. 1981)

(citing Browder v. Dir., Dept. of Corr. of Ill., 434

U.S. 257, 264 (1978), superseded in part by statute on

other grounds as recognized in Ukawabutu v. Morton,

997 F. Supp. 605, 608 (D.N.J. 1998)).

Although Butler's Tire & Battery recognized the

limited scope of past decisions construing Section

39(c), the underlying principle of those

decisions—that untimely filing of a notice of appeal

from the bankruptcy court is jurisdictional—remained

instructive to subsequent decisions applying [Rule]

802 and its successors. For example, [Ramsey v.

Ramsey (In re Ramsey)], 612 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1980),

which cited Butler’s Tire & Battery for the principle

that “untimely notice deprives the district court of

jurisdiction to review the bankruptcy court’s order or

judgment,” also cited Butler’s Tire & Battery, [In re]

Best Distribution, and other decisions dealing with

Section 39(c) for the proposition that our court of

appeals “has strictly construed and compulsorily

applied the ten-day requirement.” Id. at 1222. And

[Greene v. United States (In re Souza)], 795 F.2d 855

(9th Cir. 1986)—applying FRBP 8002, the “virtually

identical” successor to FRBP 802—in turn cited Ramsey

for the principle that “untimely filing of the notice

3(...continued)

the rule is an “adaptation of Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure.” This Note is admittedly the product of

the Advisory Committee and not Congress and thus would not meet

the clear statement requirement. Nonetheless, it helps explain

the historical treatment of the time deadline in Rule 8002(a) as

a mandatory and jurisdictional requirement in this Circuit. The

30-day time limit for taking an appeal contained in 28 U.S.C.

§ 2107 and FRAP 4(a) has always been held to be mandatory and

jurisdictional. Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corrs. of Ill., 434

U.S. 257, 264 (1978); U.S. v. Sadler, 480 F.3d 932, 937 (9th

Cir. 2007).

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of appeal is jurisdictional.” Id. at 857. In both

Ramsey and Souza, our court of appeals concluded that

untimely notice of appeal from the bankruptcy court

deprived the district court of jurisdiction.

In [Anderson v. Mouradick (In re Mouradick)], our

court of appeals cited both Ramsey and Souza, among

other decisions, for the same core principle that

“[t]he provisions of Bankruptcy Rule 8002 are

jurisdictional; the untimely filing of a notice of

appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to

review the bankruptcy court’s order.” 13 F.3d [326,

327 (9th Cir. 1994)]. But Mouradick also noted that

“[s]upport for this admittedly harsh result is found

in the cases interpreting [FRAP 4(a)], the analog to

[Rule 8002],” and reiterated that the provisions of

the former are “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Id. at

328. In short, whether by carrying forward the

approach of strict construction and compulsory

application from the days of Section 39(c) or by

analogy to FRAP 4(a), our court of appeals has

consistently held that the time limit for filing a

notice of appeal from the bankruptcy court is

mandatory and jurisdictional.

This strict construction, which had persevered through

the evolution from Section 39(c) to [Rule] 802 to

[Rule] 8002, also survived a 2009 amendment to [Rule]

8002 that changed the 10-day period to a 14-day

period. See Advisory Committee Notes to [Rule] 8002. 

Thus, in 2016, our court of appeals in Ozenne [v.

Chase Manhattan Bank (In re Ozenne)] cited Mouradick

for the proposition that the “mandatory and

jurisdictional” deadline to file an appeal “also

applies to federal bankruptcy appeals.” 841 F.3d

[810, 814 (9th Cir. 2016)].

In re Melcher, No. 3:16-cv-05982-WHA, 2017 WL 1175590, at *2-3

(N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2017) (emphasis added).

We are bound to follow the Ninth Circuit’s strict

construction and compulsory application of the time limit for

filing notices of bankruptcy appeals under Rule 8002(a) unless

and until its rulings are overruled by statute, the Ninth

Circuit sitting en banc, or by the Supreme Court. See United

States v. Gonzalez–Zotelo, 556 F.3d 736, 740–41 (9th Cir. 2009)

(“The district court, like this panel, was bound to follow the

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reasoning of [prior Ninth Circuit precedent] unless it had been

effectively overruled or was clearly irreconcilable with a case

from the relevant court of last resort.”). Further, the Supreme

Court has noted that “[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have

special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here,

. . . , the legislative power is implicated, and Congress

remains free to alter what we have done.” Hilton v. S. Carolina

Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991). Congress has had

decades to change the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the time

deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) and Rule 8002(a) as

jurisdictional and has not done so.4

In the end, there is nothing in Hamer that gives us a

reason to reexamine the Ninth Circuit’s longstanding

construction of the time deadline in Rule 8002(a). The Hamer

decision did not refer to 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) or Rule 8002(a). 

At issue in Hamer was FRAP 4(a)(5)(C), which involved the

district court’s extension of the deadline to file a notice of

appeal beyond the extension limitation set forth in the rule. 

In contrast, 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) involves the timing of the

filing of a notice of appeal traditionally viewed as an event of

jurisdictional significance. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer

Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (“The filing of a notice of

appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance—it confers

4 Our circuit is aligned with the holdings of the other

circuits which have also held that the 14-day time limit in 28

U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) and Rule 8002(a) is jurisdictional. In re

Jackson, __ B.R. __, 2018 WL 2172693, at *3 n.7 (6th Cir. BAP

May 11, 2018) (citing cases from the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th,

7th, 10th, and 11th circuits which have found the time deadline

in Rule 8002(a) jurisdictional).

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jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district

court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in

the appeal.”). Context thus confirms that the 14-day time

deadline imposes a jurisdictional limit.

Moreover, here, unlike Hamer, there is a statutory basis

for applying the 14-day time deadline in Rule 8002(a) to appeals

from a bankruptcy court’s decision to this Panel. The statutory

language in 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) directs us towards a

jurisdictional conclusion in a couple of ways.

First, a fair interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2)’s

language “in the time provided by Rule 8002(a)” is that Rule

8002(a) implements a congressionally mandated “built-in time

constraint” even though there is no specified time period in the

statute. In Kontrick, the Supreme Court placed significant

emphasis on the fact that certain statutory provisions governing

bankruptcy courts contain built-in time constraints, while

others do not. 540 U.S. at 453. As an example of a statute

with a built-in time contraint, the Supreme Court cited 28

U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) which addresses de novo district court review

of bankruptcy court findings and conclusions in noncore

proceedings. That provision confines review to “matters to

which any party has timely and specifically objected.” 540 U.S.

at 453. Although the statute did not spell out what was a

timely objection, the Supreme Court found this “timeliness

condition” was the sort of “built-in time constraint” that was

jurisdictional. Id.

Like 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) does not

specify a time limit for appealing to the district court or this

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Panel. Yet it does contain a timeliness condition by the

language “in the time provided by Rule 8002(a).” This is the

sort of “built-in time constraint” that makes the time deadline

contained in the rule jurisdictional. See Smith v. Gartley (In

re Berman–Smith), 737 F.3d 997, 1003 (5th Cir. 2013) (28 U.S.C.

§ 158 “expressly requires that the notice of appeal be filed

under the time limit provided in Rule 8002, [and] we conclude

that the time limit is jurisdictional”); In re Caterbone, 640

F.3d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[E]ven though it is a bankruptcy

rule that specifies the time within which an appeal must be

filed, the statutory incorporation of that rule renders its

requirement statutory and, hence, jurisdictional and

non-waivable.”); Emann v. Latture (In re Latture), 605 F.3d 830,

837 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Congress did explicitly include a

timeliness condition in 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2)—the requirement

that a notice of appeal be filed within the time provided by

Rule 8002(a)”); see also Hatch Jacobs, LLC v. Kingsley Capital,

Inc. (In re Kingsley Capital, Inc.), 423 B.R. 344, 351 (10th

Cir. BAP 2010) (“[A]bsent controlling precedent indicating that

the statute must specifically set the time parameters, this

[c]ourt will continue to treat the timely filing of a notice of

appeal pursuant to [28 U.S.C.] § 158(c)(2) and Rule 8002 to be a

jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived.”); but see In

re Shah, 546 B.R. 398 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2016) (Congress’s

reference to Rule 8002(a) shows that it implicitly delegated the

authority to set the appeal deadline in bankruptcy cases to the

Supreme Court, suggesting that the time deadline is a claimprocessing rule). Although many of the foregoing cases cited

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were issued before 2017, they apply the cases and rules of

interpretation used in Hamer.

Second, 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) plainly states that appeals

to the district court and this Panel “shall be taken in the same

manner as appeals in civil proceedings generally are taken to

the courts of appeals from the district courts.” The time for

taking an appeal in a civil case to the court of appeal from the

district court has long been understood to be jurisdictional. 

See Henderson, 562 U.S. at 438-39; see also In re Jackson,

__ B.R. __, 2018 WL 2172693, at *6-7. Therefore, a natural

reading of this language is consistent with the jurisdictional

conclusion embraced by the Ninth Circuit.

Finally, although public policy considerations do not hold

much weight in statutory construction endeavors, public policy

guides us toward a result which is consistent with what the

statutory construction of 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) dictates. A

strict construction of the 14-day time deadline for appeals from

a bankruptcy court is consistent with the broader policies

underlying the Bankruptcy Code. Time deadlines in bankruptcy

are abundant and require all parties in interest to move swiftly

so that estates can be administered and distributions can be

made within a reasonable time. A strict time deadline for

filing an appeal from a bankruptcy court’s decision advances the

interests of the parties by wrapping up the bankruptcy case in a

timely manner and giving finality to the entire process.

Accordingly, there is a legitimate policy interest embodied in a

strict time deadline for appeals from a bankruptcy court’s

decision. See generally In re Jackson, __ B.R __, 2018 WL

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2172693, at *7-8 (noting that the time-value of money and the

depreciation of assets are benefitted by the quick appeals

deadlines and the ability to make future financial decisions

based on the finality of court determinations).

In sum, applying the bright line rule for transfer of

adjudicatory authority between Article III courts articulated by

the Supreme Court in Hamer—statutory deadlines are

jurisdictional, non-statutory deadlines are not—suggests that

the 14-day time deadline specified in Rule 8002(a) is a

mandatory claim-processing rule subject to waiver. However, at

the end of the day, the time deadline is incorporated in 28

U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) by reference to “in the time provided by Rule

8002” and has been consistently construed by the Ninth Circuit

as a jurisdictional requirement. We thus conclude that the 14-

day time deadline in Rule 8002(a) is a jurisdictional

requirement that acts as an immutable constraint on our

authority to consider and hear appeals. See Bowles, 551 U.S. at

214 (noting that a court has no authority to create equitable

exceptions to jurisdictional requirements). Although

enforcement of the time deadline leads to a harsh result, we are

still obliged to enforce it.

C. Excusable Neglect

In her December 4, 2017, response to the Panel’s notice

regarding the timeliness of this appeal, Ms. Wilkins sought an

extension of time to appeal pursuant to Rule 8002(d)(1)(B). 

Rule 8002(d)(1) permits the bankruptcy court to extend the time

to file a notice of appeal upon a motion filed within 21 days

after the 14-day appeal deadline expired (or 35 days after the

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entry of the order being appealed) if the party shows excusable

neglect.

Ms. Wilkins’ request was made 42 days after entry of the

last orders she is seeking to appeal, beyond the deadline

established by Rule 8002(d)(1). Appellees promptly objected to

appellant’s excusable neglect request, the chapter 7 trustee

within two days and SFT within nine days. Regardless whether

the deadline to seek an extension for excusable neglect is a

jurisdictional time bar or a claim-processing rule, Ms. Wilkins

failed to comply with the requirements to seek such an extension

and SFT promptly objected to her attempt. Therefore, the

request for an extension of the deadline to appeal fails.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we DISMISS Ms. Wilkins’

untimely filed appeals in BAP Nos. CC-17-1335, CC-17-1337, and

CC-17-1346 for lack of jurisdiction.

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