IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

ZANE MICHAEL FLOYD, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; 

AND THE HONORABLE MICHAEL 

VILLANI, DISTRICT JUDGE, 

Respondents, 

and 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Real Party in Interest. 

No. 83225 

FILED 

FEB 2 4 2022 

ELIZABETH A. BROWN 

CLERIC 3 sppmAE COURT 

BY - 

DEPUTY CLERK 

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

This original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition 

challenges the district court's order identifying Ely State Prison as the place 

where petitioner Zane Floyd will be executed. 

"A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of 

an act which the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust or 

station, or to control a manifest abuse or an arbitrary or capricious exercise 

of discretion." Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 39, 175 

P.3d 906, 907-08 (2008) (internal quotation marks, footnote, and alterations 

omitted); see also NRS 34.160. The petition presents a pure legal issue. And 

it does not appear that Floyd has another adequate remedy to challenge the 

district court's designation of Ely State Prison as the place of execution. We 

therefore elect to exercise our discretion to consider the merits of Floyd's 

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petition for a writ of mandamus.' See Walker v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 

136 Nev., Adv. Op. 80, 476 P.3d 1194 (2020). 

Floyd contends that the plain language and legislative history 

of NRS 176.355(3) require executions take place only at the Nevada State 

Prison in Carson City. We review questions of statutory interpretation de 

novo, beginning with the text of the statutes. Gathrite v. Eighth Judicial 

Dist. Court, 135 Nev. 405, 408, 451. P.3d 891, 894 (2019). NRS 176.355 

addresses various aspects of an execution, including how and where the 

sentence is carried out. Subsection 3 provides that "Nhe execution must 

take place at the state prison." Based on the plain language of that statute, 

we disagree with Floyd's position. See State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 

P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011) C[W]hen a statute is clear on its face, a court can 

not go beyond the statute in determining legislative intent." (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). 

First, "state prison" is not capitalized in NRS 176.355(3), thus 

indicating the Legislature used it as a non-specific, or common, noun. See 

Briggs & Stratton Power Prod. Grp., LLC v. Generac Power Sys., Inc., 796 

N.W.2d 234, 238 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2011) ("[A] proper noun is a noun that 

designates a particular being or thing, and is usually capitalized in English. 

When a noun is not capitalized in an English sentence, the reference is to a 

non-specific noun. . . When a noun is capitalized in an English sentence, it 

refers to a specific noun." (internal quotation marks, footnote, and 

'Floyd alternatively seeks a writ of prohibition. However, "[a] writ of 

prohibition . . . will not issue if the court sought to be restrained had 

jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter under consideration. 

Goicoechea v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 96 Nev. 287, 289, 607 P.2d 1140, 

1141 (1980). As the district court had jurisdiction over Floyd's case, a writ 

of prohibition is not appropriate. 

2 
alterations omitted)); see also Baez v. Disabled Am_ Veterans Serv. Found., 

119 F. Supp. 490, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (providing that "[p]roper nouns and 

proper adjectives are capitalize& and a "proper name or noun" means "[a] 

name distinguishing some individual person . . . place . . . or thing" as 

"opposed to [a] common noun," which is "[a] noun or name denoting any one 

of a class [or] . . denoting a class or aggregate (citing the Merriam-Webster 

Dictionary) (emphasis added)). As a common noun, the term denotes any 

one of the state prisons and not a specific prison as posited by Floyd. 

Second, we recognize that the use of a definite article (the) can 

limit the scope of the noun following it. See Poole v. Nev. Auto Dealership 

Inv., LLC, 135 Nev. 280, 291 n.5, 449 P.3d 479, 488 n.5 (Ct. App. 2019). 

However, given that there was more than one state prison when the statute 

was enacted (as Floyd concedes in his petition) and that the statute does not 

say "the Nevada State Prison," context does not dictate a specific state 

prison where executions must take place. See Wyers u. Am. Med. Response 

Nw., Inc., 377 P.3d 570, 578 (Or. 2016) (recognizing that "the use of the 

definite article is not always, so to speak, definitive and that "[i]ts use in 

context may reveal an intention to encompass less categorically specific 

referents"). 

Lastly, Floyd's interpretation is unreasonable because it would 

frustrate the purpose of NRS 176.355—to establish a procedure for carrying 

out a death sentence. See Sparks v. State, 121 Nev. 107, 110-11, 110 P.3d 

486, 488 (2005) ("Where legislative intent can be clearly discerned from the 

plain language of the statute, it is the duty of this court to give effect to that 

intent and to effectuate, rather than nullify, the legislative purpose."); see 

also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of 

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3 
Parraguirre 

86j111541.7erga' ' • • 

Hardesty 

Al4C: J. 

Stiglich 

Cadish Silver 

, J , J. 

Pickering Herndon 

gekki (59 

Legal Texts 63 ("A textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather 

than obstructs the document's purpose should be favored."). 

Having considered Floyd's argument and concluded it is 

without merit, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 

cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge 

Federal Public Defender/Las Vegas 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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