AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed April 11, 2022 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-20-00211-CR CYZE RODGERS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TE XAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1875588-R MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Molberg, Nowell, and Goldstein Opinion by Justice Goldstein Appellant appeals his convic tion of attempted arson. See T EX
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. §§ 15.01, 28.02. In three issues, appellant contends: (1) the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of his probation file , (2) his counsel’s failure to request a continuance constituted ineff ective assistance, and (3) the judgment of conviction should be modified to reflect that ther e was no plea bargain agreement. The State concedes the third issue. We modify the judgment and affirm as modified.
BACKGROUND Appellant was indicted for attempted ar son in June 2018. With the assistance of court-appointed counsel, appellant judici ally confessed to th e charge and entered–2– into a plea agreement with the State. At a hearing on November 13, 2018, the trial court accepted the plea ag reement and entered an orde r of deferred adjudication conditioned on his compliance w ith certain terms of comm unity supervision. Among other things, the terms included that appe llant must report to the Dallas County Community Supervision and Corrections De partment (CSCD) when directed and “participate in a domestic violence treatme nt program (BIPP)” within sixty days from referral. 1 On May 3, 2019, the State filed a mo tion to revoke pr obation and proceed with an adjudication of guilt. In the motion, the State alleged that appellant failed to comply with several conditio ns of his community superv ision. The State amended the motion on July 22, 2019, adding severa l new allegations of non-compliance. Relevant here, the amended motion alleged, in paragraphs (7) and (12), that: 7. [Appellant] failed to report to the Supervision Officer as directed for the months/weeks of 12/6/18, 1/23/19, 1/31/19, 2/27/19, 3/1/19, 3/4/19, 3/13/19, 3/27/19, 4/23/19; and any month thereafter[; and]

. . . . 12. [Appellant] failed to participate in a Domestic Violence Treatment program (BIPP) through a court-approved resource[.] Appellant pled not true to the allegations . On February 11, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. For the purpose s of the hearing, the State withdrew all

1 BIPP stands for “Battering Intervention and Preven tion Program,” and is a program “designed to help prevent domestic violence.” In Interest of J.W.M. , 153 S.W.3d 541, 545–46 and n. 2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, pet. denied).–3– but the allegations in paragraphs 7 and 12. The State called one witness: Chastity Bonner, a CSCD probation offi cer. Bonner testified that, according to department records, appellant failed to report as direct ed on each of the dates listed in paragraph 7. Bonner further testified that appellant failed to pr ovide the department with documentation showing he completed the domestic violence treatment program. At the end of the hearing, the trial court found that appellant violated the terms of his community supervision, adjudicated him guilty, and orally sentenced him to two years’ confinement. The same day, the trial court ente red its judgment adjudicating guilt. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. J UDICIAL N OTICE In his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of his probation file over his objecti on. He argues the facts in the probation file were neither generally known within the trial court’ s territorial jurisdiction nor accurately and readily determ inable and were therefore not subject to judicial notice
See T EX
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. 201. The State responds that this issue was not properly preserved because appellant’s grounds for objecting at trial did not comport with his argument on appeal. We agree with the State. A timely, specific objection and ruling by th e trial court, or refusal to rule, is generally required in orde r to preserve a complain t for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 (a)(2); Mendez v. State , 138 S.W.3d 334, 341 (Tex. Crim. App.–4– 2004). “The two main purposes of requiring a specific objection are to inform the trial judge of the basis of the objection so that he has an opportunity to rule on it and to allow opposing counsel to remedy the error.” Clark v. State , 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). To pr eserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely reques t, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the desired ruling if th ey are not apparent from the context. See
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. P. 33.1(a)(1). The party’s complaint in the trial court must comport with its complaint on appeal. Clark , 365 S.W.3d at 339; see also, e.g. , Swain v. State , 181 S.W.3d 359, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (e n banc) (error not preserved where appellant’s trial objection on grounds that offered evidence was fruit of illegal arrest did not comport with his complaint on appeal that the evidence was fruit of violation of his right to counsel). If an issue has not been preserved fo r appeal, nothing is presented for appellate review, and we should not address it. Clark , 365 S.W.3d at 339; see also Sterling v. State , 800 S.W.2d 513, 521 (Tex . Crim. App. 1990) (“Generally, error must be pr esented at trial with a time ly and specific objection, and any objection at trial which differs from th e complaint on appeal preserves nothing for review.”). Here, appellant’s trial counsel objected to the trial court taking judicial notice of appellant’s probation file but did not argue that the facts in the file were not in the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction or readily determinable from sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonabl y questioned. We must th erefore determine whether–5– these arguments were apparent from the context. See T EX
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. P. 33.1(a)(1). During Bonner’s testimony, the State aske d whether CSCD keeps a file on each individual probationer, whether the records ar e kept in the normal course of business, and whether the entries are made by someone with knowledge of an event at or near the time the event occurs. B onner answered “yes” to all three questions. The State then requested that the trial court take judi cial notice of appellant’s probation file. In response, appellant requested to take Bonner on voir di re, which the trial court granted. The following constitutes the en tirety of the voir dire examination: Q. Ms. Bonner, so basically what you’re attesting to is that these are records not kept personally by you, correct? A. Correct. Q. And, in fact, they’re kept pers onally by another probation officer, correct? A. Correct, up until May of this year -- Q. Up until May? A. -- of last year. Q. Okay. 2019. Okay. And you understand that these allegations are up until April 23rd, 2019, nonreporting, for instance, correct? A. Correct. Q. And the BIPP -- not partic ipating in BIPP, correct? A. Correct. Q. And that being said, you would not have personal knowledge of whether or not he attended the B IPP program or whether or not he reported, correct? A. I would only know what’s in the record.–6– Q. Okay. And so that means you ha ve no personal knowledge, correct? A. Correct. Q. Okay. Thank you. Appellant then lodged his objection as “to any additional notice of the contents of the file and reporting.” While the context is not clear, we dis cern a challenge to a lack of personal knowledge of the proffered custodian of r ecords and tangentially a hearsay objection relative to the predicate for records of a regularly conducted activity. Initially, the State’s questions to Bonner sought to esta blish that the probation file constituted records of a regularly conducted activity. See T EX
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. 803(6) (providing that records of an event are excepted from the hearsay rule if a custodian or other qualified witness testifies the records were made at or n ear the time of the event by a person with knowledge and ke pt in the course of a regularly conducted business activity). Appellant’s questions during the voir dire examination were directed at Bonner’s personal knowledge and status as custodian of the records in 2018 and 2019 when the entries were made of appellant ’s failure to report to CSCD. On this record, we conclude that appellant’s ar guments on appeal (based on requirements for judicial notice) do not comport with hi s trial objection (based on additional notice of the contents of the file and reporting, or hearsay) and was therefore not properly–7– preserved. See T EX
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. P. 33.1(a); Clark , 365 S.W.3d at 339; Swain , 181 S.W.3d
at 367. 2
We overrule the first issue.
II. I NEFFECTIVE A SSISTANCE In his second issue, appellant complains that his counsel’s failure to request a continuance deprived him of his cons titutional right to effective counsel. See Lopez
v. State , 343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing U.S. C ONST
. amend. VI). The proper standard for determining cl aims of ineffective assistance under the Sixth Amendment is the two-pronged st andard adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland

. Jackson v. State , 877 S.W.2d 768, 770–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (citing Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). The two prongs are “deficient perform ance” and “sufficient prejudice.” Thompson v. State , 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Failu re to satisfy either prong under Strickland is fatal to an ineffective-assistance claim. Perez v. State , 310 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under the performance prong, the defe ndant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel was ineffective. Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 813. We examine the totality of representation to determine whether the defendant received effective assistance. Id. Our review of counsel’s repres entation is highly deferential;

2 We further note that even if preserved, there is no error as appellants faile d to challenge Bonner’s testimony on the contents of the file.–8– we presume that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable representation. Villa v. State , 417 S.W.3d 455, 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Under the sufficient-prejudice prong, the defendant must show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Jackson , 877 S.W.2d at 771. To meet this burden, the defendant must show that ther e is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional erro rs, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. “A reasonable probability is a pr obability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. At the time of the hearing below, appe llant had a criminal case pending in federal court. Appellant argues that the failu re to request a continuance deprived him of the opportunity to testify on his own behalf because his testimony could have incriminated him in the fede ral case. The State responds that counsel’s failure to request a continuance was not unreasonable because th e case had already been continued several times and th e hearing was being held at the trial court’s insistence. The State argues that these facts also show the trial court was unlikely to grant a continuance and therefore appe llant was not prejudiced. We conclude the record here is insufficient to show deficient performance. In reviewing an ineffective-a ssistance claim, we do not judge counsel’s strategic decisions in hindsight, and we str ongly presume counsel’s competence. Prine v.
State , 537 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017 ). We will not speculate to find defense counsel ineffective. Id. We will inquire into couns el’s trial techniques only–9– when there appears to be no plausible basis in strate gy or tactics for counsel’s actions. Villa , 417 S.W.3d at 463. If there is no reco rd of trial counsel’s explanation for the conduct in question, we “assume a strategic motive if a ny can be imagined and find counsel’s performance deficient only if the conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney woul d have engaged in it.” Andrews v. State , 159 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). For this reason, a direct appeal—where the record is generally undeveloped on these issues—r arely provides the proper vehicle for asserting a Strickland claim, which must be firmly grounded in and affirmatively demonstrated by the record. Prine , 537 S.W.3d at 117; Goodspeed v. State , 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Here, the record contains no evidence of counsel’s reasons for not requesting a continuance. Further, in light of the tr ial court’s statement that the hearing was proceeding at the court’s own insistence, we cannot conclude that no competent attorney would have failed to request a continuance. See Andrews , 159 S.W.3d at 101. We therefore conclude th at appellant has fa iled to satisfy the performance prong of Strickland . We do not reach the prejudice prong. See Okonkwo v. State , 398 S.W.3d 689, 693 n.3 (Tex. Crim . App. 2013) (declining to address prejudice prong where disposition of appeal was based on deficient performance). We overrule appellant’s second issue.–10– III. M ODIFICATION OF THE J UDGMENT In his third issue, appellant asks that we reform the judgment to reflect that there was no plea bargain agre ement. The State agrees. Th is Court “has the power to correct and reform the judgment of the court below to make the record speak the truth when it has the necessary da ta and information to do so.” Asberry v. State , 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—D allas 1991, pet. ref’d); accord Bigley v. State , 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Abron v. State , 997 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, pet. ref’d); see also T EX
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. P. 43.2(b) (court of appeals may “modify the trial court’s j udgment and affirm it as modified”). The trial court entered its judgment adjudicating guilt on February 11, 2020. Under the heading “Terms of Plea Bar gain,” the judgment states: “2 YEARS INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, TDCJ.” Those were the terms of the parties’ agreement immediately prior to the trial court’s order of deferred adjudication. However, after the State file d its motion to adjudicate guilt, the parties did not enter into a second plea bargain agreement. We th erefore sustain appellant’s third issue, strike the above plea-bargain langua ge, and replace it with “N/A.” We also note that bill of costs in this case reflects a fine of $500 assessed against appellant. The record reflects the deferred adjudi cation order assessed a $500 fine. But the trial court did not orally pronounce any fine when it adjudicated appellant guilty, and the judgment adjudica ting guilt states “NO FINE” in the space included for the amount of the fine.–11– A defendant’s sentence must be pr onounced orally in his presence. Taylor v.
State , 131 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing T EX
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. art. 42.03, § 1(a)). “The judgment, in cluding the sentence assessed, is just the written declaration and embodiment of that oral pronouncement.” Id. When a trial court adjudicates a defendant guilty after a prior order of deferre d adjudication, the trial court must “continue as if the ad judication of guilt had not been deferred.” See
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. art. 42A.110(a). In deferred adjudication cases, therefore, the requirement of orally pronouncing the defendant’s punishment, including any fine, must be met when the defendant’s guilt is adjudicated. See Taylor , 131 S.W.3d at 502. A fine orally pron ounced at prior deferred adjudication hearing does not satisfy the requirement because an order adjudicating guilt necessarily “sets aside the order deferring adjudication, including the previously imposed fine.” See id. ; see also McCoy v. State , 81 S.W.3d 917, 920 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2002, pet. ref’d) (del eting $500 fine from judgment where trial court found defendant violated terms of community superv ision but did not orally restate the fine it had previously ordered). Neither party raised this issue, but we have a duty to m odify an erroneous judgment, “and such duty is not depende nt upon a request by either party.” See Asberry , 813 S.W.2d at 531. Furthermore, “we are authorized on direct appeal to order a modification of a bill of costs inde pendent of finding an error in the trial court’s judgment.” See Bryant v. State , No. 10-18-00352-CR, 2021 WL 3191937, at–12– *2 (Tex. App.—Waco July 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (removing unautho rized fee from bill of cost s even though the judgment did not include the fee). On our own motion, therefore, we modify the bill of costs to remove the $500 fine.
CONCLUSION We modify the trial court’s judgment to indicate there was no plea bargain agreement. We modify the bill of costs to remove the $500 fine. In all other respects, we affirm the tria l court’s judgment.

Do Not Publish T EX
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. P. 47.2(b) 200211F.U05 /Bonnie Lee Goldstein / BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN JUSTICE–13– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT CYZE RODGERS, Appellant
No. 05-20-00211-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1875588-R. Opinion delivered by Justice Goldstein. Justices Molberg and Nowell participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this da te, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows: 1. In the trial court’s Judgment Ad judicating Guilt, under the heading “Terms of Plea Bargain,” we REMOVE the words “2 YEARS INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, TDCJ” and INSERT “N/A” in their place; and 2. In the trial court’s bill of cost s, under the entries for “FINE,” we REMOVE the amount “500.00” and INSERT “0.00” in their place. As REFORMED , the judgment is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered April 11, 2022