T h e par en t al r i g h t s of A. D
. P. ’ s f

at h er w er e al s o t er mi n at ed. 1 C O U R T O F A P P E A LS

EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS

I N THE I NTEREST OF A.D.P., A CHI L D. § § § § § § No . 0 8- 06 -0 02 45 -C V

Appea l from 143rd District Court of Ward County , Texas ( T C # 0 6
- 0 3
- 2 1 1 7 9
- CV W)
O P I N I O N I da Ma e Parm e r a

nd Jaim e e Col lin s a

pp e a l f ro m an o rd e r a

pp ointin gTammi e L ob ste in
and Al le n M or

ton a s th e so le mana g ingc on se rv ator s o f A .D .P. F ind ingno e rr or , w e a ff ir m. F ACTUAL SUMMA RY Mary Anna Par mer is the biolog ical mother of I da Mae Parmer. I da Mae Parmer is the biologica l mother of Jaimee Collins . I da Mae ’s par ental rig hts to J aimee w ere terminated a nd J aimee w as adopte d by

her grandmother , Mary

Anna. A.D .P. was born to J aimee on O ctober 18, 19 99 . In 2 00 1, Jaim e e ’s pa re nta l r ig hts to A .D .P. we re te rm inate d and he wa s a do pte d b y

his 1
mate rn a l g re at- g ra

ndmot he r, Mary Anna Parm e r. B y

vir tue of the se te rm inatio ns and

a do pti on s, I da Ma e and Jaim e e are A. D. P.’ s si ste rs . A. D. P. r e sid e d in

War d Co un ty

wi th M ary

Anna fr om t he date of his bir th u nti l he r d e ath on Dec ember

25, 2005. Mary

Anna be g an re ceivingcanc er tre atment in J une 2005. I da Mae pla c e d h e r i n a

nurs ingho me in L ime sto ne County wh e re sh e re ma ine d unti l he r d e ath. Du e toA f or mer par en t wh os e pa r en t - ch i l d re l at i on s h i p wi t h t h e c h i l d ha s bee n t er mi n at ed by c ou r t or der doe s n ot 2 h a v e sta n d ing to fi le a n o rig ina l suit un d e r C h a p te r 1 0 2 o f t h e F a m ily C o d e un le ss the p a re n t ha s a c o n tinu ing rig h t t o p o ss ess i o n o f o r access t o t he chi l d und er an exi st i ng co urt o rder o r has t he co nsent o f t he chi l d ’ s m anagi ng co nser vat o r, Mary Anna’ s illness, I da Mae withdrew A .D.P. from the Pecos- Ba rstow-Toyah Independe nt School District in early

November

2005 and took him to her home in L imestone County . In her will, Mary

Anna lef t her e ntire estate to A.D.P. and appointed Jaimee to be the guardia n of the person a nd estate of

A.D.P. if he wa s a minor at the time of he r death. Alternatively , she
a pp ointe d I da

L ou Ha llm ark

in t he e ve nt Ja ime e fa ile d o r c e a se d to a c t a s gua rd ian. Th e wi ll
a uth or ize d th e e xec uto r, I da Ma e , to dis tr ibute the wh ole or any pa rt of the e state to A .D .P. or

to his gua rdian, or to the pe rson or pe rsons with whom A.D.P. resided. F oll ow ingMary

Anna ’s de ath, I da

Ma e pla c e d A .D .P. in t

he c are of Tammi e L ob ste in and Allen Morton who a

re not re lated to him. Tammie enrolled the child in school in W ard County on J anuar

y 23, 2006. On Marc h 6, I da Mae notified Tammie of he r intent to remove A.D.P. from Ward County . Tammie and A llen immediately filed an a pplication for tempor ary gu ar d i an s h i p i nth e W ar d C o un ty C o urt(t h e c o un ty

co urt ), an d

o nM ar ch 9 , th e c o un ty

j u d ge appointing the m as temporar y g uardia ns until May

8. The same day , Tammie and A llen filed a
su it a ff e c tin gthe pa

re nt- c hil d r e latio ns hip (S APC R) se e kin gto b e a pp ointe d th e no n- pa

re nt s ole manag ing c onservators of A.D.P. The 143r d District Court (the district court) issued a tempora ry restra ining or der pr ohibiting I da Mae , actingdirec tly or in conc ert with others, f rom removing the child from the c ourt’s jurisdiction or visiting the c hild at school without the advanc e knowledg e and pe rmission of Tammie and Allen. O n Marc h 12 or 13, Jaimee tried to pick the
c h i l d u p f r o ms c h o o l i nW ar d

C o un ty. On Ap ri l 28 , I da

Ma e and Jaim e e fi le d a

c ounte r- pe tit ion

se e kin gto b e a

pp ointe d th e so le manag ing c onservators of A.D.P. and a motion to transfe r venue of the SAPCR t o L imestone 2g u a rd ia n , o r le g a l c u sto d ia n to b rin g su it. T EX .F AM .C O D E A NN . § 1 0 2
. 0 0 6 (a)( 1 ), (b)(1)(2)(V ernon P am p hl et 20 0 8 ). B ut

t he l i mi t at i ons i mp ose d by Sect i o n 1 0 2 .006 d o not appl y t o an a dul t s i bl i ng of t he chi l d i f

t he adul t s i bl i ng f

i l es an ori gi nal s ui t or a s ui t f

or m od i f i cat i on reques t i ng m ana gi ng co ns er vat ors hi p of t he ch i l d not l at er t han t he 90 t h day af t er t h e dat e t h e pa r en t - ch i l d re l at i on s h i p bet we en t h e c h i l d an d t h e pa r en t i s t er mi n at ed i n a s u i t f i l ed by t h e D epa r t men t of F a m ily a n d P ro te c tive S e rv ic e s. T EX .F AM .C O D E A NN . § 1 0 2
. 0 0 6 (c).

Se ct i o n 60 9 of t he P rob at e C o d e aut ho ri zes t he t rans f er of a co nt est ed guardi anshi p t o a co urt of co m p et ent 3 ju risd ic tio n in w h ic h a su it a ff e c ti n g t h e p a re n t-ch ild re la tio n sh ip is p e n d ing . T EX .P R OB .C O D E A NN . § 609 ( V er n on 2 0 0 3 ). Ap pel l ant s al l ege i n t hei r bri ef t hat t he gu ar di ans hi p proceedi ng was di s mi s s ed but t her e i s no di s mi s s al order 4 in th e c le rk ’s re c o rd
. County beca use the c hild resided ther e. The y also filed a motion in the county court to transf

er the c on te ste d gua

rd ians hip to t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

and a mot ion to t ra ns fe r v e nu e of

the g ua rd ians hip proce edingto L imestone County . Finally , they filed an a pplication to be appointed the te mporary g ua rd ians of A. D. P. O n Apr il 2 8, the c ounty c ourt e xten de d th e te mpo ra

ry g ua rd ians hip un til J une 26 or until entry

of an or der e stablishing conse rvatorship in the district cour t, whicheve r
occur red f irst. The county

court e ntere d an orde r on May 1 transfe rringthe conteste d g ua rd ians hip pr oc e e din gto t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

wh ic h in tur n f ile d th e g ua

rd ians hip pr oc e e din gin the SAPCRcause . 3 Followinga hea

ringon J une 1, the district cour t denied the motion to transfe r venue of the guardia

nship procee ding to L imestone County beca use at the time of Ma

ry Anna’ s death, he r
re sid e nc e and

the re sid e nc e of

A. D. P. w a s Ward

County . T he tr ia l c ourt

a lso fo un d th at T ammi e
an d A l l e nh a d

s t a n d i n gt o f i l e th e i r a p p l i c at i o nf

o r a p p o i n t m e n ta s t e mp o r ar

y g u ar d i an s . It appointed Tammie and Allen as the sole manag ing c onservators of A.D.P. and grante d I da Mae ’s reque st for re asonable acc ess. B y its own terms, the temporar y g uardia nship ex pired upon the
e ntr y of the or de r e sta

bli sh ingthe c on se rv ator sh ip. I da Ma e and Jaim e e (A

pp e lla nts ) t ime ly 4 filed notice of

appea l. THE GUARDIA NSHIP P ROCEEDING In their first issue for

revie w, Appellants ra ise multipl e issues per taining to theg uardia

nship procee ding a

nd the tempora

ry g uardia nship order. F irst, they

complain that the county court did not have authority to appoint Tammie and Allen a s temporar y g uardia ns of A.D.P. beca

use venue was prope r in L imestone County . Second, they argue that Tammie and Allen’s application for appointment as guardia ns did not meet the requir ements of Sec tion 875 of the Probate Code. T hird, Appellants conte nd that the district court e rre d by failingto hear

the g ua rd ians hip pe tit ion s b e fo re ru lin gon the SAP CR. Venue Appellants cla im that the county court lac ked author ity

to appoint Appellees a s temporar y g uardia ns beca use the prope r venue of the guardia nship procee ding w as in L imestone County
. Th e y a lso c ha lle ng e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of the ir mot ion to t ra ns fe r t he g ua rd ians hip proce edingto L imestone County . Reg ardle ss of whethe r venue was prope r in Ward County , the county court did not lack jurisdiction of the guardia nship procee ding. Acounty court ha s the g ener al jurisdiction of a proba te cour t and as a probate court, it has the a uthority to appoint g uardia ns of minors. T EX .P R OB .C ODE ANN . § 605 (Ve rnon 2003). Sec tion 610 gove rns venue for a ppointment of a guardia

n. T EX .P R OB .C ODE ANN . § 61 0. Th e jur isd ic tio n o f t he c ourt is invoked by

filing a n application which a lleg es the minor to be a resident of

the county

of suit. To the extent Appellants assert that the c ounty court lac ked jurisdiction, their ar g ument is without
me ri t. We no w a dd

re ss whe the r t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d b y re fu sin gto t

ra ns fe r t he g ua rd ians hip p r o c e e d i n gt o L i m e s t o n e C o un ty. When consideringa motion to transfer venue, the trial court must assume the a lleg ations
are true a nd rule ba sed upon the plea dings a nd aff idavits submit ted by

the par ties. T EX .R.C IV .P. 87. Venue questions are to be dec ided base d on the “f acts e x isting at the time the c ause of action that is the basis of the suit acc rued.” T EX .C IV .P R AC .&R EM .C ODE ANN . § 15.006 (Ve rnon 2002).On appe al, we must conduc t an independe nt reviewof the e ntire re cord to de termine whe ther a ny probative e vidence supports the trial cour t’s decision. Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc
. , 868 S.W .2d 752, 758 (Tex. 1993). We review the evidentiar

y rec ord in the lig ht most favorable to the venue ruling , but we ac cord no de fer ence to the trial court’ s application of the la w. Id . I f there is any probative e vidence supporting ve nue in the county wher e judg ment was re ndere d, the judg ment must be aff

irmed. Id .; Bo nh am Sta teBa nk v . B e ad le , 907 S.W .2d 465, 471 (Tex. 1995). I f no such evide nce e x ists, the cause must be r ever sed. T EX .C IV .P R AC .&R EM .C ODE ANN . § 15.063; Ru iz , 8 68 S.W. 2d

at 75 8; Eddins v. Parke r , 6 3 S. W.3 d 1 5, 18 (T e x. Ap p. -- El Pa so 20 01 , p e t. denied)
. Se c tio n 6 10 (b ) o f t

he Pr ob ate Cod e pr ov ide s: (b) A pr ocee ding f

or the a ppointment of a guardia

n for the pe rson or e state, or bo th, of a min or may be br ou g ht: (1) in the c ounty

in which both the minor’s par ents reside ; (2) if the pare nts do not reside in the same c ounty , in the county in which the pa re nt who is the so le mana g ingc on se rv ator of the min or

re sid e s, or

in the c ounty

in whic h th e pa

re nt who is t

he joi nt m ana g ingc on se rv ator wi th the g reater pe riod of phy sical possession of and a cce ss to the minor re sid e s; (3 ) i f o nly

on e pa re nt i s li vin gand

the pa re nt h a s c us tod

y of the min or , in the c ounty

in whic h th at pa

re nt r e sid e s; (4) if both pa

rents ar e dea d but the minor was in the custody of a de cea sed pare nt, in the county

in which the last survivingpare nt havingcustody resided; or (5) if both pa

rents of a minor child have die d in a common disaster a nd there is no evidence that the par ents died other tha n simult aneously , in the c ounty in whic h b oth

de c e a se d p are nts re sid e d at th e tim e of the ir s i mu l t an e o u s d e ath s i f

th e y r e s i d e d

i n th e s am e c o un ty. Ap pe lla nts c on te nd

that ve nu e wa s p ro pe r i n L ime sto ne County un de r S e c tio n 6 10 (b )( 4) be c a us eA.D.P. was in Mar y Anna’ s custody

and she r esided in L imestone County at the time of he r de ath. Th e tr ia l c ourt

ma de the fo llo wi ngre le va nt f ind ing s o f f

a c t: 3. The c hild resided in B arstow, Ward County , Texas with his adopted mot he r f ro m th e date of

his bir th u nti l th e de ath o f M ary

Anna Parm e r i n L imestone County , Texas on Dece mber 25, 2005.

. . . 5. In ear ly

November , 2005, beca

use of the illness of Ma

ry Anna Par mer, the child’s biolog ical g randmother , Respondent I da Mae Parmer, w ithdrew the child from the Pec os-B arstow- Toy ah Independe nt School District and too k th e c hil d to he r r e sid e nc e in L ime sto ne County , T e xas. 6. In late Nove mber, 2005, be cause of the illness of Mar y Anna Par mer, Re sp on de nt I da

Ma e Parm e r p la c e d M ary Anna Parm e r i n a

nurs ingho me in M e xia, L ime sto ne County , T e xas. 7. Followingthe Dec ember 25, 2005 death of

Mary Anna Par mer, Pe tit ion e rs pic ke d u

p th e c hil d f

ro m Re sp on de nt I da

Ma e Parm e r i n Janu ary , 2 00 6; a

nd the c hil d h a s r e sid e d in

War d Co un ty , T e xas w ith Petitioners from that time to the prese nt date. 8. I da Mae Parmer’ s removal of the child from his re sidence in Ward County to L imestone County

from Nove mber, 2005 to January , 2006 was a tempora ry remova l occa sioned by

the illness of his adopted mother, Mary Anna Par mer. 9. I da Ma e Parm e r’ s r e mov a l of Ma ry Anna Parm e r f ro m he r r e sid e nc e in War d Co un ty , T e xas t o L ime sto ne County fr om l ate No ve mbe r, 20 05 un til he r d e ath w a s a

te mpo ra ry re mov a l oc c a sio ne d b y

he r i lln e ss. 10. At the time of her

death, Ma

ry Anna Par mer owne d rea l and per sonal proper ty , including he r home, fur niture and pe rsonal ef

fec ts, in W ard C o un ty, T e x a s ; s h e h a d

o n l y a f e wp e r s o n a l e f

f e c t s i nL i m e s t o n e C o un ty, Te xas.11. At the time of the de ath of Mar y Anna Par mer, she r emained a re sid e nt o f Wa

rd County , T e xas. 12. At the time of the de ath of Mar y Anna Par mer, the c hild remained a resident of

Ward County , Texas. The pa rties agree that Section 610(b)( 4) is the re levant venue statute. The only question, then, is whether

there is probative evide nce suppor ting the tr ial court’s f

inding that at the time of her de ath, Mary

Anna r esided in Ward County . The Probate Code does not def ine re sidency

of a pa re nt f or purp os e s o f e sta

bli sh ingve nu e un de r S e c tio n 6 10 (b )( 4) . In d e te rm ini ngthe e le me nts of re sidence , we look for

g uidance to case s construingresidenc y in various contexts. In re Salgado , 53 S.W .3d 752, 762 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2001, orig . proce eding ). The Supre me Court has ar ticulated the e lements of re sidency under the g ener al civil venue statute: (1) a f ix ed plac e of a bo de wi thi n th e po sse ssi on of the pa rt y ; ( 2) oc c up ie d o r i nte nd e d to be oc c up ie d c on sis te ntl y
over a substantial period of time; (3) which is permane nt rather than tempora

ry . Sn y de r v . P itt

s , 150 Tex. 407, 241 S .W.2d 136, 140 (1951). An eleme nt of perma nency is nece ssary

befor e a party can be considere d a re sident of a pa rticular c ounty . Salgado , 5 3 S. W.3 d at 76 2. Th e se elements have bee n applied in deter mining venue in gua

rdianship proc eeding s. See P etty v. Pe tty , 592 S.W .2d 423, 427 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1979, no wr it). Th e e vid e nc e de mon str ate d th at Ma ry Anna ha d r e sid e d in

War d Co un ty

sin c e at le a st 1999 until she was moved by her da ug hter to a nur sing home in late Novembe r 2005. He r move to the nursinghome was ne cessitated by illness. At the time of her de ath, Mary Anna owne d rea l and per sonal proper

ty in Ward County . She had only a fe w per sonal eff

ects in L imestone County . T his e vid e nc e e sta bli sh e d th at he r r e loc atio n to L ime sto ne County wa s te mpo ra

ry and in response to her illness. Her fix ed and pe rmane nt place of abode w as Ward County . Be cause the trial court c orre ctly

deter mined that Ward County

was he r re sidence for pur poses of e stablishingvenue unde r Section 610(b) (4), de nial of the motion to transfer venue w as prope r. Proc e du ra l D e

fe c ts We turn now to Appellants’ sec ond and third ar g uments argument raisingalleg ed proce dural de fec ts in the gua rdianship proc eeding . They contend that Ta

mmie and Allen’s
a pp lic atio n f

or g ua rd ians hip did

no t c omp ly

wi th S e c tio n 8 75 (c )( 2) and (c )( 4) of the Pr ob ate Code which re quire that the a pplication for tempor ary

g uardia nship state the dang er to the pe rson or prope rty

alleg ed to be imminent and the f acts a nd rea sons supporting the a lleg ations and reque sts. T EX .P R OB .C ODE ANN . § 8 7 5 ( c ) ( 2 ) , ( 4 ) ( V e r n o nP amp h l e t2 0 0 8 )
. A d d i t i o n a l l y, Appellants ar g ue that the a pplication did not meet the re quirements of Sec tion 875(d) and ( e). Ap pe lla nts a lso ma int a in t

hat th e a pp ointme nt o f A

pp e lle e s a s te mpo ra

ry g ua rd ians of A. D. P. violates Section 676(c) of the Probate Code. We find that Appellants did not prese rve a ny of the se argume nts . As a pre requisite to pre senting a complaint for appellate revie w, the re cord must show that the complaint was ma de to the trial c ourt by a timely reque st, objection, or motion that stated the g rounds for the ruling that the complainingparty soug ht from the trial c ourt with sufficient specific ity

to make the tria l court aw are of the c omplaint, unless the specific grounds wer e appar ent from the c ontext . T EX .R.A PP .P. 33.1(a)( 1). F urther, the rec ord must refle ct that the trial court r

uled on the re quest, objection, or motion. T EX .R.A PP .P. 33.1(a)( 2)(A)
. Ap pe lla nts ra ise d th e argume nt r e late d to Se c tio n 8 75 (c )( 2) and (c )( 4) of the Pr ob ate Code in their motion to abate filed in the Ward County Court. The Ward County Court did not rule on the motion to abate as the c ase w as transf err ed to the 143rd D istrict Court. On J une 1, 20 06 , th e 14 3r d D ist

ri c t Co ur t he ard the mot ion

to t ra ns fe r a nd the mot ion

to a bate imm e diate ly pr ior to t he tr ia l on

the me ri ts. At

the c on c lus ion

of the e vid e nc e on

the se mot ion s, Ap pe lla

ntsprese nted ar g ument related to the venue issue but did not address their c omplaint about the defe ct

in the pleading s. Findingthat venue w as prope r in Ward County and that Tammie and Allen had standing to bring the SAPCR , the cour t orally denied both motions and the ca se proc eede d to trial on the guardia

nship petitions and the SAPC R. The trial cour t later e ntere d a wr itten order on the mot ion s to tr ans fe r a

nd a bate , s tatin gthat: The Motion to Abate wa s predicated upon an a ffirmative finding that proper venue of this cause wa s L imestone County and upon lac k of standingof the Tempora ry Guar dians. I t is therefor e ORDERED that the Motion to Abate be, and the same is here by , overr uled. Thus, the trial cour

t did not address or r

ule upon the complaint that the guardia nship application did not comply

with Section 875 of the Probate Code . By failingto obtain an adve rse r uling on this specific objec tion, Appellants waived it. See T EX .R.A PP .P. 33.1(a)( 2)(A)
. Even if it ca

n be said that Appe llants sufficiently broug ht this obj ection to the trial c ourt’s
atte nti on and the tr ia l c ourt

ru le d u po n it , th e argume nt i s w ith out me ri t. T he da ng e r i de nti fi e d in the application is t hat Appellee s believed I da Mae intended to re turn A.D.P. to J aimee e ven though he r par ental rig hts had bee n terminated a nd she had not ha d contac t with the child. Acc ordingto the application, Appe llees made the alleg ation based upon “ information and be lie f. ” Th e se a lle g atio ns c omp ly wi th s ub se c tio ns (c )( 2) but do no t st ate su ff ic ie nt f a c ts supporting the alleg ation as re quired by subsection (c )(4) . Howeve r, both the county court a nd the dis tr ic t c ourt

ha d in fo rm atio n in

the re c or d p ro vid e d b y

Ap pe lla nts wh ic h s up po rt

a
c on c lus ion

that I da Ma e int e nd e d f

or Jaim e e to b e dir e c tly

inv olv e d in

the c are of

A. D. P. F ir st, I da Mae and Jaimee filed a joint application to be appointed the tempora ry g uardia ns of the child. Attache d to the orig inal application is the af fidavit of I da Mae in which she a lleg ed that on Marc h 12, 2006, J aimee tr avele d to Ward County to pick up the child but Tammie would notallow her

to do so. Additionally , I da Mae and Jaimee filed a joint petition seekingto be appointed the mana g ing c onservators of the c hild even thoug h J aimee’ s pare ntal rig hts had previously

been te rminated. While Appellee s’ orig inal application did not meet the tec hnical
re qu ir e me nts of

su bs e c tio n ( c )( 4) , th e tr ia l c ourt ha d in fo rm atio n b e fo re it whic h te nd e d to support the alleg ations. Appellants’s conte ntions pertainingto Section 875(c)( 2) and ( c)( 4) ar e wi tho ut m e ri t. Appellants did not raise a ny argument or objec tion in the trial court per taining to Sec tion 87 5( d) and

(e ) o f t he Pr ob ate Cod e . T he re fo re , th e a rgume nt r e late d to the se su bs e c tio ns is waived. SeeT EX .R.A PP .P. 33.1(a)( 1).

Fa ilu reto H

e ar theGu ar dia ns hip Proc e e dings Fi rst Ap pe lla nts a lso ma int a in t

hat th e dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d b y fa ili ngto h e ar t

he g ua rd ians hip proce eding s first. Appellants re ason that if the district cour t had hea rd and r uled on the g uardia nship petitions before r

uling on the SAPCR, the court would have been r equire d by Section 676(c) (3) of

the Probate Code to a

ppoint I da Mae or Jaimee as the guardia n of A.D.P. as they are his sibli ng s, and there fore , Tammie and A llen would have la cked sta nding to pur sue the SAP CR. Ap pe lla

nts did no t r e qu e st that th e dis tr ic t c ourt he ar a nd ru le up on

the g ua rd ians hip petitions before ruling on the SAPCR . To the contra ry , counsel for

Tammie and A llen stated at the beg inning of

trial that the par

ties had agree d they

would prese nt all of the evide nce a nd the trial court would then r

ule upon all of the matters bef ore it. Appe llants did not di sag ree with or object to this statement. The district cour t determined that it was require d to first rule on the motions t o transfe r and a

bate. Onc e the district cour t determined that venue wa s proper in Ward County , it considered the SAPC R and guardia nship in the same hea

ring . Appellants did not object to the trial c ourt hea ringthese matter s toge ther or othe rwise indicate that they wished forthe cour

t to hear the g uardia

nship first. We therefor e find that Appe llants waived their c omplaint
re g ard ingthe dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fa ilure to h e ar t he g ua rd ians hip pe tit ion s f

ir st. F or a ll o f t he se
rea sons, we over

rule I ssue One. THE S AP CR In I ssue Two, Appe llants contend that Appe llees, as tempor ary g uardia ns, lacke d standing t o s e e k m an a g i n gc o n s e r

v at o r s h i p o f

A
. D
. P
. un d e r

S e c t i o n1 0 2
. 0 0 3 ( a ) ( 4 ) o f th e F am i l y

C o d e . In the context of this same issue, Appellants also conte nd that Ward County was not the prope r
ve nu e fo r t

he SAP CR. We w ill a dd re ss t he sta nd ingargume nt f

ir st. Standing Se c tio n 1 02 .0 03 of

the Te xas F amil y

Cod e outli ne s th e g e ne ra l st and ingre qu ir e me nts to file suit. T EX .F AM .C ODE ANN . § 102.003 (Ve rnon Pamphlet 2008). Subsection (a )(4) provides that an orig inal suit may

be filed at any

time by a guardia n of the pe rson or of the estate of the child. T EX .F AM .C ODE ANN . § 102.003(a) (4). Whether a tempora

ry g uardia n has standingunder Section 102.003(a) (4) to file a SAPC R is an issue of first impression. When construinga statute, we must consider the statute a s a whole r ather than its isolated provisions. Helena Che mical Co. v. W ilkins , 47 S.W .3d 486, 493 (Tex. 2001). One pr ovision should not be g iven meaningout of harmony or inconsistent with other provisions. Id . Words and phra ses that have acquir ed a te chnica l or particula r mea ning, whether

by leg islative definition or otherw ise, shall be construe d acc ording ly . T EX .G OV ’ T C ODE ANN . § 31 1. 01 1( b) (V e rn on

20 05 ); see Tijerina v. City of Tyler , 8 4 6 S. W. 2 d 8 2 5 , 8 2 7 ( T e x. 19 92 )( statut or

y de fi nit ion s mu st b e g ive n e ff e c t) . In th e Pr ob ate Cod e , th e te rm “ g ua rd ian” is define d to mean a pe rson who is appointed guardia n under Sec tion 693 of the Probate Code, or a temporar y or succ essor guardia

n. T EX .P R OB .C ODE ANN . § 60 1( 11 ). Th e te rm “ g ua rd ian” inSe c tio n 1 02 .0 03 (a )( 4) of the F amil y

Cod e mus t be c on str

ue d in a c c or da nc e wi th t he Pr ob ate Code’s def

inition of “g uardia

n.” We thus conclude that Appellee s, as the tempora ry g uardia ns of A. D. P., ha d s tand ingto f

ile the SAP CR. Venue Finally , Appellants ar gue that Ward County was not the prope r venue for the SAPCR as the child re sided in L imestone County . Section 103.001 of the F amily Code provides that a

n orig inal suit shall be filed in the county wher e the c hild resides unless anothe r cour t has continuing e x clusive jurisdiction under Chapte r 155 or ve nue is fixed in a suit for dissolut ion of a marria g e. T EX .F AM .C ODE ANN . § 103.001 (Ve rnon 2002). A c hild resides in the county wher e the child’s par ent or pa

rents re side, except that if a guardia n of the pe rson has be en appointed by
or de r o f a c ounty or pr ob ate c ourt

and a mana g ingc on se rv ator

ha s n ot b e e n a

pp ointe d, the c hil d resides in the c ounty

wher e the guardia

n of the pe rson re sides. T EX .F AM .C ODE ANN . § 103.001(c) (1). The evidenc e supports the trial c ourt’s conc lusion that A.D.P. resided in Ward County with his sole parent, Mar y Anna Par mer, until her de ath and that he has re sided in Ward County with Appellees since J anuar y 2006. At the time the SAPCRwas filed, A ppellees ha d been a ppointed his temporary

g uardia ns. We conclude that the trial court c orre ctly deter mined th at W ar d Co un ty w a s th e p r o p e r

v e nu e f o r th e SA PC R un d e r

Se c ti o n1 0 3
. 0 0 1 ( c ) ( 1 )
. We
ov e rr ule I ssu e Tw o a

nd a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt . October 23, 2008 ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, J ustice B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l ur e , a n d C ar r , JJ.