alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(No. 24477.

#### The Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Petitioner, *vs.*Ethel McClary, Admx., Respondent.

*Announced orally December 14, 1937.*

Gower, Gray and Gower, (W. H. Dyer, of counsel,) for petitioner.

Frank J. Burns, and James T. Burns, for respondent.

Mr. Justice Orr

announced the decision of the court:

The order of the Appellate Court for the Second District in this case affirming the judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee county was entered on September 9, 1937. *415Neither a notice of intention to apply for rehearing nor a petition for rehearing was filed in the Appellate Court within the fifteen-day period prescribed by its rule 19. As a result, under the provisions of section 75 of the Civil Practice act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap, no, par. 199) the judgment of the Appellate Court became final upon the expiration of the fifteen-day period — namely upon September 24, 1937. To obtain further review, petitioner was required, within forty days of the date upon which the judgment of the Appellate Court became final, to file its petition for leave to appeal in this court under the provisions of section 75, as well as make proof of service of three copies of the petition upon the respondent or her attorney as required by rule 32 of this court. The petition in this case was not filed until November n, 1937, yet the forty-day period prescribed by the statute and rules expired on November 3, 1937. For this reason the motion of respondent to dismiss the petition for leave to appeal is granted and the petition is hereby dismissed.

*Petition for leave to appeal dismissed.*
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

METHODE ELECTRONICS, INC.,

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, Civil Action No. 09-CV-13078

District Judge Paul D. Borman

Magistrate Judge Virginia M. Morgan

v.

DPH-DAS LLC, f/k/a DELPHI 

AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS LLC,

Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff,

and

MARIAN, INC., 

Defendant 

__________________________________/

DPH-DAS LLC, f/k/a DELPHI 

AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS LLC,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 09-14303

v.

METHODE ELECTRONICS, INC.,

Defendant. 

__________________________________/

ORDER

(1) Adjourning Claim Construction hearing set for February 17, 2011.

(2) Invoking Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(a): Proposing appointment of Special Master; providing

parties an opportunity to be heard and/or suggesting that parties agree on a specific Special

Master within two weeks. If the parties cannot agree on a Special Master, the Court will receive 

2:09-cv-13078-PDB-MKM Doc # 98 Filed 02/15/11 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 3184
2

suggestions from the parties, and propose suggestions to the parties.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 15, 2011 S/Paul D. Borman

PAUL D. BORMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served on the attorneys of record by electronic means or U.S.

Mail on February 15, 2011.

S/Denise Goodine

Case Manager

2:09-cv-13078-PDB-MKM Doc # 98 Filed 02/15/11 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 3185
182 La. 532

#### STATE v. GUILBEAUX.

No. 33414.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 27, 1935.

Edwards *&*Greene, of Abbeville, for appellant.

Gaston L. Porterie, Atty. Gen., James O’Connor, Asst. Atty. Gen., James Gremil-lion, Dist. Atty., of Crowley, Edward Meaux, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Lafayette, and *67Lessley P. Gardiner, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen., for the State. ■

LAND, Justice.

Defendant is indicted for having carnal knowledge of an unmarried female between the ages of 12 and 18. He was tried by a jury of five, and found “guilty as charged,” and was sentenced to be incarcerated in the state penitentiary at hard labor for a term of not less than one year and not more than 3 years from the date of his incarceration.

After verdict and before sentence, defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment on the ground: “That the verdict rendered in writing and signed by the foreman of the Jury is null and void and is meaningless being as follows: ‘Guilly as charged with the mercy of Court, J. C. Bernard, Foreman.’”

The same ground was assigned in a motion for new trial, and both the motion in arrest and motion for new trial were overruled by the trial judge.

Defendant has appealed from the conviction and sentence to this court, and renews here the same objection to the verdict.

The original indictment with the verdict written thereon has been brought up in the transcript by consent of counsel.

In the per curiam to bill No. 1, reserved by counsel for defendant to the overruling of the motion in arrest of judgment, it is stated by the trial judge:

“The fifth letter in the word guilty, obviously intended for a ‘t,’ may be taken for the letter T or for an uncrossed ‘t.’

“The verdict as a whole clearly exhibits the intention of the jury to return a verdict of:

“ ‘Guilty as charged with the mercy of court, J. C. Bernard, Foreman.’

“The Clerk read the verdict to the jury as follows, as the court minutes show:

“ ‘Guilty as charged with mercy of court, J. C. Bernard, Foreman.’

“And the jury was asked by the Clerk if such was their verdict, to which the jurors answered ‘yes.’

“The jury was then polled with respect to the verdict as thus announced by the Clerk, with the result that each of the jurors declared it to be his verdict.

“See: State v. Hightower, 136 La. 309, 67 So. 13; Marr’s Crim. Juris. (2d Ed.) pages 1072, 1073, 1074.”

We have examined the original verdict returned by the jury in this case, and we agree with the trial judge that the fifth letter in the word “guilty,” although it may be taken for the letter “1,” or for an uncrossed “t,” was manifestly intended for a “t”; and that the verdict as a whole clearly shows the intention of the jury to return a verdict of “Guilty as charged with the mercy of the court.”

The intention of the jury being obvious in this case, but imperfectly expressed, the verdict was perfected by the polling of the jury. State v. Hightower, 136 La. 309, 67 So. 13; State v. Blue, 134 La. 561, 64 So. 411.

The sentence and conviction appealed from are affirmed.
#### Commonwealth *v.*Myers.

A hearing on an application to be admitted to bail will not be granted by the supreme court until a copy of the record, bills of exceptions and assignments of error, are filed in the court.

Jan. 19, 1890.

Jan. 19, 1890.

Application of James Edward Myers to be admitted to bail, pending an appeal from the O. & T. Co. Before a full bench.

Per Curiam,

The application for a hearing upon this motion is denied, with leave, however, to renew the motion when we are furnished with a copy of the record, bills of exceptions and assignments of error.
Exhibit 32.2  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report of China Vitup Health Care Holdings, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September  30, 2010 (the Report), I, Chunxiang Li, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 1) The Report fully complies with the requirement of Section 13(a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the Company's financial position and results of operations.  November 15, 2010 /s/ Chunxiang Li, Chief Financial Officer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1127

OSWEN FITZHERBERT CAMERON,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals.

Submitted: August 28, 2014 Decided: September 4, 2014

Before KING, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dev A. Kayal, WKC LAW, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Petitioner. 

Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Emily Anne 

Radford, Assistant Director, Kohsei Ugumori, Senior Litigation 

Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Oswen Fitzherbert Cameron, a native and citizen of 

Guyana, petitions for review of an order of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeal from the 

Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision ordering him removed from the 

United States. We have thoroughly reviewed the record and 

conclude that the evidence does not compel a ruling contrary to 

any of the administrative findings of fact, see 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012), and that substantial evidence supports 

the Board’s decision upholding the IJ’s order of removal. See

INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Accordingly, 

we deny the petition for review for the reasons stated by the 

Board. See In re: Cameron (B.I.A. Jan. 13, 2014). We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
NO. 07-02-0529-CV

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

	FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL E

	JANUARY10, 2003

	______________________________

	IN RE RAYMUNDO LEYVA, RELATOR

	_______________________________

Before QUINN and REAVIS, JJ. and BOYD, S.J.*

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	By this original proceeding, relator Raymundo Leyva, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Honorable Jack R. Miller, Judge of the 64th District Court of Hale County, to dismiss the complaint against him for violating his right to a speedy trial.  For the reasons expressed herein, the petition for writ of mandamus must be denied.

	By his unverified factual assertions,2 relator claims that he was charged with escaping from the Hale County Jail and although he gave a bond, has been incarcerated since 1998 without proceeding to trial.  Relator further contends that he has requested the trial court to dismiss the complaint for violation of his right to a speedy trial.  However, his petition does not contain a certified or sworn copy of any document showing the matter complained of as required by Rule 52.3(j)(1)(A) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.  Asserting that the relief requested is a ministerial act, he urges this Court to dismiss the charge against him and grant him any further relief he may be entitled to.

	Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only in limited circumstances involving manifest and urgent necessity and not for grievances that may be addressed by other remedies.  Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992).  A relator is eligible for mandamus relief only when he can establish two prerequisites:  (1) he has no other adequate remedy at law, and (2) under the relevant law and facts, the act he seeks to compel is ministerial.  Stotts v. Wisser, 894 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex.Cr.App. 1995).  

	In Pope v. Ferguson, 445 S.W.2d 950, 955-56 (Tex. 1969), the Court held that a defendant seeking dismissal of an indictment on speedy trial grounds was not eligible for mandamus relief because he had an adequate remedy at law, to-wit:  he could file a motion to set aside the indictment for violations of his right to a speedy trial pursuant to article 27.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.  Further, if the trial court erroneously denied the motion, he could appeal from any conviction that resulted.  Id.; see also Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 646 (Tex.Cr.App. 2002) (holding that a four-year delay denied the defendant his right to a speedy trial).  More recently, in Smith v. Gohmert, 962 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998), the Court reiterated that a defendant seeking to compel dismissal of an indictment on speedy trial grounds had an adequate remedy at law and thus, was not entitled to mandamus relief.

	Accordingly, relator’s petition for writ of mandamus is denied.

						Don H. Reavis

						    Justice
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND

, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Ruben Green, * From the 441st District Court

of Midland County

Trial Court No. CR48792

.

Vs. No. 11

- 1 8

- 00 132

- CR * June 13, 2019

The Sta te of Texas, * Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

(Panel consists of: Bailey, C. J.,

Stretcher , J. , and Wright, S.C.J., sitting

by assignment )

(Willson, J., not participating)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there

is no error in the judgment s below. Therefore, in accordance with this court ’ s

opinion, the judgment s of the trial court are in all things affirmed.
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###### Department of State

          - [Public Notice 6315] 

# SUMMARY:

                        Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 (79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 of March 27, 1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 2681,                         *et seq.*; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note,                         *et seq.*), Delegation of Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority No. 236 of October 19, 1999, as amended, and Delegation of Authority No. 257 of April 15, 2003 [68 FR 19875], I hereby determine that the objects in the exhibition: “Alexander Roslin and the Comtesse d'Egmont Pignatelli,” imported from abroad for temporary exhibition within the United States, are of cultural significance. The objects are imported pursuant to loan agreements with the foreign owners or custodians. I also determine that the exhibition or display of the exhibit objects at the Minneapolis Institute of Arts, Minneapolis, MN, from on or about August 29, 2008, until on or about November 30, 2008, and at possible additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, is in the national interest. Public Notice of these Determinations is ordered to be published in the                         **Federal Register**                        .                     

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

For further information, including a list of the exhibit objects, contact Julie Simpson, Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: (202-453-8050). The address is U.S. Department of State, SA-44, 301 4th Street, SW., Room 700, Washington, DC 20547-0001. 

Dated: August 6, 2008. 

C. Miller Crouch, 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.

[FR Doc. E8-18743 Filed 8-12-08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION OF CFO

**Exhibit 31.2**

**Certification of Principal Financial Officer**

**Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350**

**(Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)**

I, Trupti Mehta, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of PRINCETON SECURITY TECHNOLGOIES, INC.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have;

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this quarterly report (the “Evaluation Date”); and

(c) Presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant’s auditors, any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal controls; and

6. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have indicated in this quarterly report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

| Date: November 12, 2007 | /s/ Trupti Mehta |
|-------------------------|------------------|

Trupti Mehta, Chief Accounting Officer
I

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 4341

To establish felony violations for the failure to pay legal child support

obligations, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 3, 1996

Mr. SCHUMER (for himself and Mr. CONYERS) introduced the following bill;

which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To establish felony violations for the failure to pay legal

child support obligations, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Child Support Recov5 ery Amendments Act of 1996’’.

6 SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF FELONY VIOLATIONS.

7 Section 228 of title 18, United States Code, is

8 amended to read as follows:

9 ‘‘§ 228. Failure to pay legal child support obligations

10 ‘‘(a) OFFENSE.—Whoever—
2

•HR 4341 IH

1 ‘‘(1) willfully fails to pay a support obligation

2 with respect to a child who resides in another State,

3 if such obligation has remained unpaid for a period

4 longer than 1 year, or is greater than $5,000;

5 ‘‘(2) travels in interstate or foreign commerce

6 with the intent to evade a support obligation, if such

7 obligation has remained unpaid for a period longer

8 than 1 year, or is greater than $5,000; or

9 ‘‘(3) willfully fails to pay a support obligation

10 with respect to a child who resides in another State,

11 if such obligation has remained unpaid for a period

12 longer than 2 years, or is greater than $10,000;

13 shall be punished as provided in subsection (c).

14 ‘‘(b) PRESUMPTION.—The existence of a support ob15 ligation that was in effect for the time period charged in

16 the indictment or information creates a rebuttable pre17 sumption that the obligor has the ability to pay the sup18 port obligation for that time period.

19 ‘‘(c) PUNISHMENT.—The punishment for an offense

20 under this section is—

21 ‘‘(1) in the case of a first offense under sub22 section (a)(1), a fine under this title, imprisonment

23 for not more than 6 months, or both; and

24 ‘‘(2) in the case of an offense under subsection

25 (a)(2) or (a)(3), or a second or subsequent offense
3

•HR 4341 IH

1 under subsection (a)(1), a fine under this title, im2 prisonment for not more than 2 years, or both.

3 ‘‘(d) MANDATORY RESTITUTION.—Upon a conviction

4 under this section, the court shall order restitution under

5 section 3663A in an amount equal to the total unpaid sup6 port obligation as it exists at the time of sentencing.

7 ‘‘(e) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section—

8 ‘‘(1) the term ‘support obligation’ means any

9 amount determined under a court order or an order

10 of an administrative process pursuant to the law of

11 a State to be due from a person for the support and

12 maintenance of a child or of a child and the parent

13 with whom the child is living; and

14 ‘‘(2) the term ‘State’ includes any State of the

15 United States, the District of Columbia, and any

16 commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United

17 States.

Æ
191 La. 557

#### Alexandre P. FONTENOT v. Emile LUDEAU et al.

No. 34876.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 28, 1938.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 1939.

Philo Coco, of Marksville, and Chester *Codo,*of Ville Platte, for appellant.

McCoy, King & Jones, of Lake Charles, and Atlee P. Steckler and Roland B. Reed, both of Ville Platte, for appellees.

O’NIELL, Chief Justice.

The issue in this case is the same as in the case of Mrs. Emma Rosa Tate Fontenot v. Emile Ludeau et al., La.Sup., 186 So. 21. For the reasons given in the opinion rendered in that case, the judgment appealed from in this case is annulled, and the case is ordered remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion referred to. The defendants are to pay the costs of this appeal. The liability for all other court costs is to abide the final disposition of the case.