abuse of discretion). The district court properly concluded that respondent 

had a good faith basis for the move, Jones v. Jones, 110 Nev. 1253, 1259- 

61, 885 P.2d 563, 568-69 (1994), and went through the Schwartz v. 

Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 383, 812 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1991), factors 

thoroughly. Specifically, there was extensive evidence that the move 

would improve the quality of life of both respondent and the children. 

Schwartz, 107 Nev. at 383, 812 P.2d at 1271. Additionally, the court 

concluded that respondent• was the parent more likely, to foster a 

relationship with the other parent and that appellant would have more 

visitation days throughout the year after the children relocated than he 

currently had. See Trent v. Trent, 111 Nev. 309, 315-16, 890 P.2d 1309, 

1313 (1995) (providing that once a custodial parent establishes a good 

faith basis for the move, the court should consider the Schwartz factors, 

"focusing on the availability of adequate, alternate visitation"). Thus, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in granting respondent's 

relocation motion.' 

Appellant also argues that his due process rights were violated 

by having to choose between his children's temporary relocation to 

1While the district court considered an email from respondent's 

employer that was inadmissible hearsay, because respondent testified 

extensively about the same subject and another document supported 

respondent's testimony, the admission of the email was harmless. See 

McMonigle v. McMonigle, 110 Nev. 1407, 1409, 887 P.2d 742, 744 (1994) 

(explaining that lilt is harmless error if a court incorrectly admits 

evidence which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties" and 

"where inadmissible evidence has been received by the court, sitting 

without a jury, and there is other substantial evidence upon which the 

court based its findings, the court will be presumed to have disregarded 

the improper evidence" (internal quotation omitted)), overruled on other 

grounds by Castle v. Simmons, 120 Nev. 98, 86 P.3d 1042 (2004). 

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California or submitting to an expedited evidentiary hearing without 

discovery. While we are concerned about the position the district court 

placed appellant in, the district court's actions do not rise to the level of a 

due process violation because appellant requested the expedited 

evidentiary hearing, he had notice of the hearing, and he had the 

opportunity to oppose appellant's motion at the hearing. Rico v. 

Rodriguez, 121 Nev. 695, 702, 120 P.3d 812, 817 (2005) ("This court 

reviews constitutional challenges de novo."); Collie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 

181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007) ("[P]rocedural due process requires 

notice and an opportunity to be heard." (internal quotations omitted)). 

Further, both parties agreed to forgo discovery in exchange for the 

expedited evidentiary hearing and the inability to conduct discovery 

applied equally to both of them. Additionally, it was within the district 

court's sound discretion to allow the temporary relocation, cf. In re 

Temporary Custody of Five Minor Children, 105 Nev. 441, 443, 777 P.2d 

901, 902 (1989) (recognizing that the district court has authority to enter a 

temporary order regarding custody), especially under circumstances like 

those present here where the parent with primary physical custody is 

starting a job in another state before the court would have time to conduct 

an evidentiary hearing. 

Lastly, in regard to appellant's argument that the district 

court abused its discretion in providing him with an offset to his child 

support obligation for the transportation costs associated with his 

visitation instead of requiring respondent to pay those costs directly, we 

conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion. NRS 

125B.080(9)(i) (providing that in adjusting child support, the court may 

consider "Mlle cost of transportation of the child to and from visitation" 

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after the child has relocated); Wallace, 112 Nev. at 1019, 922 P.2d at 543 

(providing that this court reviews a child support order for an abuse of 

discretion). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

J. 

Parraguirre 

iLA tify. Douglas 

CHERRY, J., dissenting: 

I disagree with my colleagues' decision to affirm the district 

court's order granting respondent's motion to relocate because the district 

court violated appellant's procedural due process rights by providing him 

with the Hobson's choice of either losing his children for a few months or 

forgoing both discovery and a full and fair evidentiary hearing. Rico v. 

Rodriguez, 121 Nev. 695, 702, 120 P.3d 812, 817 (2005) ("[t]his court 

reviews constitutional challenges de novo"). Placing appellant in this 

position deprived him of the opportunity to truly and fairly oppose 

respondent's motion to relocate. See Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 

160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007) (explaining that procedural due process requires 

an opportunity to be heard on the motion). Without conducting discovery, 

appellant was unable to ascertain the best arguments to present to the 

court in opposition to the motion. Thus, appellant should have had the 

opportunity to conduct discovery before losing his children. See Blanco v. 

Blanco, 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 77, 311 P.3d 1170, 1175 (2013) ("child custody 

decisions implicate due process rights because parents have a 

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fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their 

children"). 

Further, the district court cannot permit the children to 

relocate, even temporarily, until the court has considered the Schwartz v. 

Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 383, 812 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1991), factors. In 

Schwartz, this court held that prior to granting a motion to relocate, the 

district court must consider whether (1) the move will improve the quality 

of life for the custodial parent and the children, (2) the custodial parent's 

motives are honorable in requesting the move, (3) the custodial parent will 

comply with substitute visitation orders, (4) the noncustodial parent's 

motives are honorable in opposing the relocation, and (5) the noncustodial 

parent will be able to have visitation with the children that fosters and 

preserves the parental relationship. Id. The district court is precluded 

from permitting a parent to relocate with the children until the court has 

considered these factors. 

Although one could argue that the district court was merely 

maintaining the status quo by temporarily permitting the relocation 

because respondent had primary physical custody, respondent only has 

the right to primary physical custody of the children in the state of 

Nevada, and thus, the district court is not maintaining the status quo by 

allowing her to remove the children from the state without first 

considering the Schwartz factors. This is especially true because the move 

necessarily affected appellant's visitation rights and Schwartz requires the 

court to consider whether reasonable alternative visitation is available. 

Thus, the district court could not temporarily permit the children to 

relocate before considering reasonable alternative visitation. Because 

respondent is the party relocating, she cannot take the children with her 

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until the court has had the opportunity to thoroughly consider the 

Schwartz factors, and if there is a delay in the court's consideration so that 

the parties can conduct discovery, respondent has to wait to relocate or 

she can relocate without the children. Therefore, permitting the relocation 

of the children without considering the Schwartz factors, even temporarily 

pending an evidentiary hearing, was an abuse of discretion. 

By allowing the children to relocate prior to the court's 

consideration of the Schwartz factors and expediting the evidentiary 

hearing without allowing discovery, the district court violated appellant's 

procedural due process rights by diminishing his opportunity to be heard 

in opposition to respondent's motion. Thus, I would reverse and remand 

this matter to the district court so that the parties can conduct discovery 

before the district court holds an evidentiary hearing to consider the 

Schwartz factors. 

Cherry 

cc: Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Department T 

McDonald Carano Wilson LLP/Las Vegas 

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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