UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4035

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

WENDY B. DAUBERMAN, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District 

Judge. (3:07-cr-00040-HEH-2) 

Submitted: December 29, 2008 Decided: January 16, 2009 

Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

I. Scott Pickus, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck 

Rosenberg, United States Attorney, Sara E. Chase, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Wendy B. Dauberman appeals her jury conviction and 

forty-eight month sentence for one count of conspiracy to commit 

theft of government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 

(2006); two counts of aiding and abetting the theft of 

government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 641 (2006); 

and three counts each of aiding and abetting: (i) making false 

statements affecting Social Security benefits; (ii) concealing 

and failing to disclose material facts for Social Security 

benefits; and (iii) representative payee misuse, in violation of 

42 U.S.C. §§ 408(a) (2000) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). Dauberman 

was convicted along with her son, Crist Dauberman, Jr. (“Crist, 

Jr.”), for their roles in a scheme to fraudulently obtain Social 

Security Administration (“SSA”) and Department of Veterans 

Affairs (“VA”) payments intended for Dauberman’s husband, Crist 

Dauberman, Sr. Finding no error, we affirm. 

 Dauberman first claims that the district court erred 

in denying her Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motions for judgment of 

acquittal. We review the denial of a Rule 29 motion de novo. 

See United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 693 (4th Cir. 2005). 

When a Rule 29 motion is based on a claim of insufficient 

evidence, the jury’s verdict must be sustained “if there is 

substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the 

Government, to support it.” United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 

2 
210, 244 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). This court “ha[s] defined ‘substantial evidence’ as 

evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as 

adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Alerre, 430 F.3d at 693 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

 We “must consider circumstantial as well as direct 

evidence, and allow the government the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences from the facts proven to those sought to be 

established.” United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 

(4th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). This court may not weigh 

the evidence or review the credibility of the witnesses. See

United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 185 (4th Cir. 2007). If 

the evidence “supports different, reasonable interpretations, 

the jury decides which interpretation to believe.” United 

States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir. 1994) (citations 

omitted). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence faces a heavy burden. See United States v. Beidler, 

110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997). 

 We have reviewed the record and find that the 

Government’s evidence was sufficient to establish that Dauberman 

conspired to convert and aided and abetted in the conversion of 

government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006). 

United States v. Gill, 193 F.3d 802, 804 n.1 (4th Cir. 1999) 

3 
(holding that the Government established the defendant intended 

to steal from the Government because she intercepted the SSA 

checks, endorsed them, and used the funds for her own benefit, 

“thus preventing the money from reaching . . . the Government’s 

intended beneficiary”). 

 We also find that Dauberman’s convictions for aiding 

and abetting the concealment of material facts for SSA benefits, 

aiding and abetting the making of false statements affecting SSA 

benefits, and aiding and abetting representative payee misuse 

did not result in her being convicted numerous times for the 

same crime. It is true that an indictment charging a single 

offense in several different counts is multiplicitous and 

subjects a defendant to a risk of multiple sentences for a 

single offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See

United States v. Goodine, 400 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2005). It 

is nonetheless well-established that a defendant may be 

convicted of separate offenses arising from a single act if each 

charge requires proof of a fact that the other does not. See

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); 

Manokey v. Waters, 390 F.3d 767, 771-73 (4th Cir. 2004). We 

find that although the different counts all stemmed from the 

same representative payee reports submitted to the SSA, the 

convictions about which Dauberman complains required different 

proof to establish different elements. 

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 Moreover, we reject Dauberman’s assertion that she 

could not have committed the crimes pertaining to the SSA 

benefits because only Crist, Jr. was a representative payee at 

the time of the acts alleged and, accordingly, only he had an 

obligation to be truthful to the SSA. As an aider and abettor, 

Dauberman could be guilty of the crimes with which she was 

charged regardless of whether she had an independent obligation 

to be truthful to the SSA. See United States v. Winstead, 

708 F.2d 925, 927 (4th Cir. 1983) (“To prove the crime of aiding 

and abetting the government must show that the defendant 

knowingly associated himself with and participated in the 

criminal venture.”). 

 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment and deny Dauberman’s requests to be appointed new 

appellate counsel, for an order directing her current attorney 

to return documents to her, and for an extension of time for new 

appellate counsel to file a reply brief. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED