REVISED 03/09/2023

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 22-60276

Robert Ward, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

versus

Wilkinson County School District, 

Defendant—Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 5:20-CV-206

Before Jones, Dennis, and Willett, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Plaintiff Robert Ward (“Ward”) sued Wilkinson County School 

District (the “School District”), asserting that he was not given adequate 

time to review and sign his employment contract, in violation of due process 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court entered summary judgment 

in favor of the School District. Ward appeals. 

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED 

March 7, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 22-60276 Document: 00516671000 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/09/2023
No. 22-60276

2

I. Facts and Procedural History

From 2019 to 2020, Ward worked part-time as a Lead Teacher for the 

School District. His contract stated that his employment began on August 5, 

2019, and ended on May 13, 2020. When the School District decided to make 

the Lead Teacher position a full-time role, Ward expressed interest in the 

position, and on June 10, 2020, the School Board approved offering Ward the 

full-time Lead Teacher position. 

With regard to employment contracts, Mississippi law provides in 

relevant part: 

If any superintendent, other than those elected, principal, 

licensed employee or person recommended for a licensed 

position who has been elected and approved shall not execute 

and return the contract within ten (10) days after same has been 

tendered to him for execution, then, at the option of the school 

board, the election of the licensed employee and the contract 

tendered to him shall be void and of no effect. 

Miss. Code § 37-9-23 (2018). The statute has also been adopted by the 

School District, almost in its entirety, as part of the District Policies. 

On June 22, 2020, Ward was informed that his contract for the 2020–

21 school year was ready to be signed. On June 29, 2020, Ward was reminded 

that his contract was ready to be reviewed and needed to be signed by July 1, 

2020; Ward was out of town but stated that he would come in as soon as he 

was able. On July 6, 2020, Ward went to the school office and reviewed the 

contract; he was told that he needed to sign the contract that day, because 

the relevant ten-day period had expired. Ward felt that he did not have 

enough time to consider the contract, and did not sign it before leaving that 

day. On July 8, 2020, the School Board voided Ward’s contract. Ward filed 

suit against the School District, arguing that the School District violated the 

due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On dueling motions for 

Case: 22-60276 Document: 00516671000 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/09/2023
No. 22-60276

3

summary judgment, the district court entered judgment in favor of the 

School District. 

II. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de 

novo. See Smith v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 827 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2016). 

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute as to a material fact is 

‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 

for the nonmoving party.” Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 

(5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 

1994) (en banc) (per curiam)). 

III. Discussion

The threshold inquiry in a due process challenge is “whether the 

plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in property or liberty.” 

Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. 

Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999)). “To have a property interest in 

a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for 

it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, 

have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 

564, 576 (1972). 

On appeal, Ward argues that the district court erred in granting 

summary judgment on his due process claim, because he had a protected 

property interest in the position of full-time Lead Teacher that was offered 

to him. Ward argues that a public employee’s entitlement may be shown 

through reference to a statute, written contract, or mutually explicit 

understanding enforceable as an implied contract. See King v. Newton Cnty. 

Bd. Of Sup’rs, 144 F. App’x 381, 384 (5th Cir. 2005). Specifically, however, 

Case: 22-60276 Document: 00516671000 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/09/2023
No. 22-60276

4

we have held that “a public employee has a property interest in her continued

employment if she can prove a claim of entitlement to such a property 

interest by reference to a (1) statute; (2) written contract; or (3) mutually 

explicit understanding enforceable as an implied contract.” Id. (citing

Johnson v. Southwest Mississippi Regional Medical Center, 878 F.2d 856, 858 

(5th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added)). Ward fails to cite any case, however, that 

recognizes a property interest in prospective employment under Mississippi 

law. And as the district court recognized, Ward’s previous part-time 

contract with the School District ended on May 13, 2020, and he was not 

employed by the School District when the School Board approved offering 

him the full-time position (June 10, 2020), when he was notified that his 

contract was ready to be reviewed and signed (June 22, 2020), or when he 

reviewed the contract (July 6, 2020). He therefore had no protectable

property interest in continued employment with the School District after his 

previous contract ended.

1 See Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D., 980 F.2d 1514, 1529-

30 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that Texas teachers employed under fixed term 

contracts did not have a property interest in continued employment beyond 

the terms of their contracts). 

Ward also argues that Mississippi Code Section 37-9-23 gives him “a 

property right to consider and enter into an employment contract with the 

school district.” But “[b]efore a property interest would exist, [the statute] 

1 Ward also argues that because “Mississippi teachers have a due process right to 

appeal hearings when they are terminated, they also have a due process right to have 

reasonable time to consider their contracts for employment per state statute.” But this is 

merely another attempt to construe his case as one of continuing employment rather than

of prospective employment. At the time when Ward was considering the full-time Lead 

Teacher contract, he was not employed by the School District, and he therefore had no 

protectable property right to continued employment. The existence of a protected property 

right to continued employment does not impliedly create a protected property right to 

consider prospective employment contracts. 

Case: 22-60276 Document: 00516671000 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/09/2023
No. 22-60276

5

would have to constrain the [School Board] in a meaningful way.” Stem v. 

Gomez, 813 F.3d 205, 212 (5th Cir. 2016). The statute Ward cites to establish 

a property right provides the following: 

If any superintendent, other than those elected, principal, 

licensed employee or person recommended for a licensed 

position who has been elected and approved shall not execute 

and return the contract within ten (10) days after same has been 

tendered to him for execution, then, at the option of the school 

board, the election of the licensed employee and the contract 

tendered to him shall be void and of no effect. 

Miss. Code § 37-9-23 (2018). Although the statute permits the School Board 

to rescind the contract after ten days, it does not forbid the Board from 

rescinding it before ten days have passed. The statute therefore does not 

constrain the School Board’s discretion so as to create a protected property 

interest in a ten-day firm offer. 

In sum, Ward has failed to demonstrate that he had a protected 

property interest in prospective public employment with the School District. 

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district 

court. 

Case: 22-60276 Document: 00516671000 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/09/2023