alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
AUUTIi.-. %-KXA~ %?#vPl 

ClL4W’I’OHlD CT. PlAlvr1S 

.&TX-OHNSSSV OICNICHAIJanuary 12, 1967 

Honorable Wallace Shropshire Opinion No. M-5 

County At,torney 

Travis County Courthouse Re: Does evidence obt~ained 

Austin, Texas by an arresting officer 

become lnadmlsslble by 

reason of the arrested 

person being taken 

before a magistrate by 

an officer other than 

Dear Mr. Shropshire: the arresting officer? 

In your opinion request you state: 

“A request is made for an opinion from your 

office concerning the Interpretation of Article 

14.06 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which 

states as follows: 

“In each case enumerated in this Code, the 

person making the arrests shall immediately take 

the’ person arrested before the magistrate who 

may have ordered the arrest or before some maglstrate of the county where the arrest was made 

without an order. The magistrate shall Immediately 

perform the duties described in Article 15.17 of 

this Code. 

“This opinion is requested because of the 

following facts: The Sheriff’s Department of 

Travis County and the Police Department of the 

City of Austin during the night shift of their 

personnel have the occasion to make arrest of an 

accused during a period of time In which there 

is no magistrate available in the morning, but 

because the night, shift goes off duty prior to 

the availability of the magistrate, an accused 

is taken before a magistrate by an officer other 

than the arresting officer.” 

Your specific questions read as follows: 

“( 1) Under the above circumstances, as 

outlined, is the State in any way prejudiced 

in the criminal proceeding against the accused? 

- 18 - 
Honorable Wallace Shropshlre, page 2 (M-5) 

“(2) Under the above circumstances, as 

outlined, would any physical evidence acquired 

by the arresting officer become inadmissable 

by reason of the fact that the arresting officer 

is not the one who takes the accused before the 

magistrate?” 

Article 14.06, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and 

Rule 5A, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, are similar in 

purpose and wording. This office found no construction by the 

courts of either of these statutes regarding the exact questions 

which you propounded, It Is the opinion of this office, however 

that under the circumstances set forth in your letter, an office 

other than the arresting officer may take an accused before the 

magistrate if otherwise done in compliance with said Article 

14.06. We therefore answer both of your questions in the negative. 

SUMMARY 

An officer other than the arresting officer may 

take an arrested person before the magistrate, if 

otherwise done in compliance with the provisions of 

Article 14.06, when a magistrate is not available at 

the time of the arrest and prior to the time a magistrate becomes available, the arresting officer goes 

off duty. 

very/ 

REO’,lk 

Prepared by Robert E. Owen 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEI? 

Hawthorne Phillips, Chairman 

W. V. Geppert, Co-Chairman 

R. L. Lattimore 

Robert Norris 

Lonny Zwiener 

John Banks 

Staff Legal Assistant 

A. J. Carubbi, Jr. 

- 19 -
#### Michael W. OXLEY, Respondent, v. STATE of Missouri, DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, Appellant.

No. 68965.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

May 7, 1996.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Rodney P. Massman, Special Asst. Atty. General, Missouri Department of Revenue, Jefferson City, for Appellant.

Jeffrey L. Ringling, St. Ann, for Respondent.

KAROHL; Judge.

The Director of Revenue (DOR) attempts to appeal an order reinstating Michael W. Oxley’s driving privileges pursuant to § 302.500 et seq. RSMo 1994.1

Oxley’s driving license was suspended as a result of allegedly driving under the influence with a blood alcohol level of .10. He requested an administrative hearing under § 302.505, which sustained the suspension. He petitioned for a trial de novo hearing under § 302.535. The case was assigned to a traffic court commissioner. The traffic court commissioner heard the case and found Ox-ley’s driving privileges should be reinstated. The traffic court commissioner found the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest Oxley, but he did not have a blood alcohol concentration of .10 or more.

Before addressing the issues on appeal, we have an affirmative duty to determine whether we have jurisdiction. *Webster v. City of Cool Valley,*838 S.W.2d 520 (Mo.App.E.D.1992).

We find the order is without legal effect. Section 302.500 et seq. provides a comprehensive procedure to review a suspension or revocation of a driver’s license. Un*957der § 302.535.1, the petition for trial de novo shall be filed in the circuit court, heard and decided by a circuit judge or an associate circuit judge, not a traffic court commissioner. *State of Missouri ex rel. Coyle v. O’Toole,*914 S.W.2d 871 (Mo.App.E.D.1996). Also, a traffic court commissioner is not authorized by § 479.500 to hear a driver’s license suspension or revocation trial de novo. *Id.*

Oxley’s petition remains pending in the circuit court. We remand for a hearing.

REINHARD, P.J., and GRIMM, J., concur.

1

. All statutory references are to RSMo 1994.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

Woodside Square Limited 

Partnership, individually and on

behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff, No. 09-13541

v. Hon. Nancy G. Edmunds

City of Romulus, a municipal corporation,

 

Defendant.

___________________________________/

ORDER REMANDING PLAINTIFF'S STATE LAW CLAIMS

Plaintiff Woodside Square Limited Partnership, individually and on behalf of all

others similarly situated, filed suit against Defendant City of Romulus, a municipal

corporation, in the Circuit Court for the County of Wayne. Defendant filed a notice of

removal to this Court on September 8, 2009. Defendant’s notice for removal is timely

under 28 U.S.C. § 1446.

While alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the U.S. Constitution are

cognizable in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343, Plaintiff's complaint also

presents claims based on state law. Since the parties to this matter are nondiverse,

this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the latter claims so as

to avoid jury confusion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715 (1966); Padilla v. City of Saginaw, 867 F. Supp. 1309 (E.D. Mich. 1994).

Thus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), all of plaintiff's state law claims including,

without limitation, claims of violation of the Michigan Constitution (Count I), and claims

2:09-cv-13541-NGE-MJH Doc # 2 Filed 09/17/09 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 20
for restitution/assumpsit (Count II) are hereby REMANDED to Wayne County Circuit

Court.

SO ORDERED.

s/Nancy G. Edmunds 

Nancy G. Edmunds

United States District Judge

Dated: September 17, 2009

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties

and/or counsel of record on September 17, 2009, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Carol A. Hemeyer 

Case Manager

2:09-cv-13541-NGE-MJH Doc # 2 Filed 09/17/09 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 21
232 So.2d 700

#### Ex parte William T. Hutchens. In re William T. HUTCHENS v. STATE.

8 Div. 392.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 5, 1970.

G. Wade Green, Huntsville, for petitioner.

MacDonald Gallion, Atty. Gen, for the State.

MERRILL, Justice.

Petition of William T. Hutchens for Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals to review and revise the judgment and decision in Hutchens v. State, 45 Ala.App. 507, 232 So.2d 687 (8 Div. 29).

Writ denied.

LIVINGSTON, C. J, and SIMPSON, COLEMAN, HARWOOD, MADDOX and McCALL, JJ, concur.
Exhibit 32.2

Certifications of CEO and CFO Pursuant to  18 U.S.C. Section 1350,  as Adopted Pursuant to  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Samsonite Corporation (the "Company") for the fiscal year ended January 31, 2005 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Richard H. Wiley, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:



|/s/RICHARD H. WILEY |  |                                                 
|------------------- |  | ------------------------------------------------
|                    |  |                                                 
|Name:               |  | Richard H. Wiley                                
|Title:              |  | Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Secretary

Date: April 29, 2005

A
signed original of this written statement required by § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

This
certification accompanies the Report pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of § 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

---



QuickLinks
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

VIRGIL MITCHELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES

and DR. ZAKIUDDIN A. KHAN,

Defendants.

/

Case No. 09-11467

HONORABLE AVERN COHN

JUDGMENT

For the reasons stated in the Memorandum and Order entered on August 08, 2012,

judgment is entered in favor of defendant Correctional Medical Services only and against

plaintiff.

DAVID WEAVER

Dated: August 8, 2012 By: s/Julie Owens 

 Deputy Clerk

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to the attorneys of

record on this date, August 8, 2012, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

S/Julie Owens 

Case Manager, (313) 234-5160 

2:09-cv-11467-AC-PTM Doc # 113 Filed 08/08/12 Pg 1 of 1 Pg ID 783
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-7519

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

REYMUNDO MONGE RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, 

District Judge. (1:06-cr-00004-MR-1; 1:16-cv-00228-MR)

Submitted: February 23, 2017 Decided: February 28, 2017

Before SHEDD and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit

Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Reymundo Monge Rodriguez, Appellant Pro Se. Jill Westmoreland 

Rose, United States Attorney, Michael E. Savage, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina; Amy Elizabeth 

Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Reymundo Monge Rodriguez seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) 

motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or 

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Rodriguez has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Jose Antonio DE LA CRUZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 13-92-609-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi.

Feb. 25, 1993.

Abel Toscano, Jr., Arturo H. Saenz, Law Offices of Abel Toscano, Jr., Harlingen, for appellant.

Theodore C. Hake, Edinburg, for State.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Appellant has filed a motion for extension of time to file his brief. In his motion, appellant states that additional time is needed because he desires to file a bill of exception and needs the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on his now-asserted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant requests that we direct the trial court to conduct the evidentiary hearing necessary so that he may perfect a bill of exception.

We will grant appellant additional time to file his brief, but we will not direct the trial court to conduct any additional hearings in this case. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure govern the time for filing bills of exception. *See*Tex.R.App. 52(c)(ll). Unlike former law, the current rules do not permit extensions of time for the filing of bills of exception by either the trial court or the appellate court. *Goodin v. State,*750 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, pet. ref’d). A bill of exception must be filed within 60 days of the date the defendant is sentenced in open *910court, or within 90 days of that date if a motion for new trial is filed. Tex.R.App.P. 52(c)(ll). Untimely filed bills of exception preserve nothing for appellate review. *Price v. State,*840 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref’d).

Appellant has not complied with the applicable deadline for filing a bill of exception, and an extension may not be granted. Accordingly, we deny appellant’s request that we direct the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing for purposes of making a bill of exception. Appellant’s motion to extend the time for filing the brief is granted. The brief is due by March 20, 1993.
#### Fulton County Gas and Electric Company v. Hudson River Telephone Company.

Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals granted, and questions certified as follows: *First.*Does it appear on the face of the complaint that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action? *Second.*Does it appear on the face of the counterclaim set forth in paragraph numbered 17 of the defendant’s amended answer (1) that said counterclaim is not of the character specified in section 501 of the Code of Civil Procedure; (3) that said counterclaim does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action? *Third.*Does it appear on the face of the counterclaim set forth in paragraph numbered 18 of the defendant’s amended answer (1) that said counterclaim is not of the character specified in section 501 of the Code of Civil Procedure; (3) that said counterclaim does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action? *Fourth.*Is the interlocutory judgment in this case, overruling the demurrer to the plaintiff’s complaint on the ground of insufficiency, the law of the case as to the sufficiency of the complaint?
#### Czarnikow Macdougal Company v. George S. Baxter and Others.

#### Motion denied.
I

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 4343

To prohibit the Secretary of Defense from making American communities

non-competitive by using shipping cost differentials attributable to the

application of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 3, 1996

Mr. UNDERWOOD introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on National Security

A BILL

To prohibit the Secretary of Defense from making American

communities non-competitive by using shipping cost differentials attributable to the application of the Merchant

Marine Act, 1920.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON MAKING COMPARISONS

4 UNDER THE JONES ACT.

5 The Secretary of Defense, when making cost analysis

6 or business comparisons between United States and for7 eign bases for the supply of United States Navy activities,

8 may not use shipping cost differentials that are attrib-
2

•HR 4343 IH

1 utable to the application of the Merchant Marine Act,

2 1920 (46 U.S.C. App. 861 et seq.) to the United States

3 bases.

Æ
#### Lillian Seville, Respondent, v. Interborough Rapid Transit Company, Appellant.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. No opinion.
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 155 (Monday, August 11, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 46625]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-18407]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION


Notice of Agency Meeting

    Pursuant to the provisions of the ``Government in the Sunshine 
Act'' (5 U.S.C. 552b), notice is hereby given that at 10:03 a.m. on 
Tuesday, August 5, 2008, the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation met in closed session to consider matters 
relating to the Corporation's resolution activities.
    In calling the meeting, the Board determined, on motion of Vice 
Chairman Martin J. Gruenberg, seconded by Mr. Scott Polakoff, acting in 
the place and stead of Director John M. Reich (Director, Office of 
Thrift Supervision), concurred in by Director Thomas J. Curry 
(Appointive), Chairman Sheila C. Bair, and Director John C. Dugan 
(Director, Comptroller of the Currency), that Corporation business 
required its consideration of the matters on less than seven days' 
notice to the public; that no earlier notice of the meeting was 
practicable; that the public interest did not require consideration of 
the matters in a meeting open to public observation; and that the 
matters could be considered in a closed meeting by authority of 
subsections (c)(4), (c)(6), (c)(8), (c)(9)(A)(ii) and (c)(9)(B) of the 
``Government in the Sunshine Act'' (5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(4), (c)(6), 
(c)(8), (c)(9)(A)(ii), and (c)(9)(B)).
    The meeting was held in the Board Room of the FDIC Building located 
at 550-17th Street, NW., Washington, DC.

    Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

    Dated: August 5, 2008.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8-18407 Filed 8-8-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6714-01-P
#### William H. Rowell, Respondent, v. Arthur R. Peck, Appellant, Impleaded, etc.

Judgment of County Court and of Justice’s Court reversed, with costs in this court and the courts below to appellant. Held, that the evidence fails to show any negligence of the defendant Peck. All concurred, except Williams, J., who dissented.
#### Lincoln Trust Company, appellee, v. Electa McDowell et al., appellants.

17 N. W. 2d 349

Filed January 23, 1945.

No. 31867.

*R. E. Harris,*for appellant.

*Evans & Lee, contra.*

Heard before Simmons, C. J., Paine, Carter, Messmore, Yeager, Chappell and Wenke, JJ.

Simmons, C. J.

Defendant, Electa McDowell, appeals from an order confirming a sale in a real estate mortgage foreclosure, on the basis that the sale price was far below the actual value of the land.

The rule is: “An order confirming a judicial sale under a decree foreclosing a mortgage on real estate will not be reversed on appeal for inadequacy of price, when there was no fraud or shocking discrepancy between the value and *474the sale price, and where there is no satisfactory evidence that a higher bid could be obtained in the event of another sale.” *Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Zakrzewski,*143 Neb. 878, 11 N. W. 2d 496.

The decree of foreclosure was entered May 9, 1932. The land was sold to the plaintiff under the decree on June 19, 1933, for $17,061.33, being $74.65 less than the amount of principal, interest and costs then due. Moratoriums then were had under State and United States statutes. March 20, 1944, on objection to confirmation by defendant, the 1933 sale was set aside and a new sale ordered. The land was sold on April 24, 1944, to plaintiff -for $13,000. Defendant objected to the confirmation of this sale and plaintiff in open court raised its bid to $15,000, which bid the trial court accepted and confirmed the sale. •

The property consisted of 461 acres of farm and pasture land, improved by a “nice house”, a good chicken house, barn and garage, trees and fencing. Plaintiff’s witnesses fixed the value of the land at amounts ranging from $8,640 to $13,000. Defendant’s witness fixed the value at amounts ranging from $16,000 to $18,440. There is no showing that a higher bid could be obtained in the event of another sale.

Defendant’s theory seems to be that since plaintiff bid over $17,000 in 1933, it shows that its present bid of $15,000 is inadequate. Defendant, however, on objection to the confirmation of the first sale offered evidence that the value' in 1933 was approximately one-third of the plaintiff’s bid.

Under the above-established rule, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Mary H. Cunningham and Another, Respondents, v. James L. Wells and Others, as Commissioners of Taxes and Assessments of the City of New York, Appellants. (Taxes of 1902.)

Motion denied, without costs. Present — Hirschherg, P. J., Woodward, Jenks, Gaynor and Miller, JJ.
#### Roy L. Urban v. State

No. 25495.

November 21, 1951.

Hon. A. A. Dawson, Judge Presiding.

*Hughes & Monroe*by *Ted Monroe*and *Curt Stiles,*all of Dallas, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

WOODLEY, Judge.

The conviction is for fraudulently receiving and concealing stolen property of the value of $50 or more; the punishment, *2*years in the penitentiary.

The indictment alleges that certain guns, including “1 double barrel Springfield 16 gauge shot gun, 1 .22 Winchester automatic rifle, 1 .22 Hi-Standard automatic pistol, 1 9 M.M.- ‘Chec’ automatic pistol, and 1 6.35 M.M. Belgian automatic pistol” owned by Marvin Fogelman and acquired from him by theft *471were fraudulently received by appellant from Jimmie Lee Broyles with knowledge that the guns had been so acquired.

Mr. M. M. Fogleman testified that his store in Kaufman had been burglarized, and that 16 or 18 guns were stolen; that he recovered among other of these stolen guns “1 double barrel Springfield 16 gauge shot gun (the same description as appears in the indictment), 1 .22 Winchester automatic (not described as being a rifle), 1 High Standard automatic pistol (no caliber mentioned), 1 9 MM *Czech*automatic pistol, and 1 *635*MM Belgian automatic *pearl handle*pistol.”

Officer J. H. Sawyer testified that he recovered from appellant seven guns. His description of five of these guns is the same as the foregoing description given by Mr. Fogleman.

Broyles testified that he was serving time in the penitentiary for burglary; that following the burglary, where he got the guns, he contacted appellant at his place of business in Dallas and sold him 6 or 7 of the guns.

It is not shown that the burglary referred to by Broyles or of which he was convicted, was the burglary of premises owned by Fogleman.

It may be observed that there is nothing in the description of the guns sold to appellant which might distinguish them from other guns of the same make, caliber and class, nor to identify them as belonging to Mr. Fogleman.

No witness testified that the guns sold to appellant by Broyles belonged to Marvin Fogleman, nor were the guns found in appellant’s possession identified as being the guns received from Broyles after having been stolen from Mr. Fogleman.

It is further noted that in the indictment1 the owner of the property is alleged to be Marvin Fogleman, while the witness who testified that he owned the burglarized premises and the guns is M. M. Fogleman.

It follows that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

Opinion approved by the court.