PD No. 

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

AT AUSTIN, TEXAS

ISRAEL JOE IBARRA, §

Appellant §

§ CAUSE NO. 11-13-00325-CR

V. §

§ TRIAL COURT NO. 6680

THE STATE OF TEXAS, §

Appellee §

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVEW 

FROM THE ELEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS 

AT EASTLAND, TEXAS

CHIEF JUSTICE JIM WRIGHT, PRESIDING

PETITION OF PETITIONER (APPELLANT)

COPELAND LAW FIRM 

PO Box 399

Cedar Park, Texas 78613 

Tel. 512-897-8196

Fax. 512-215-8144

TIM COPELAND

State Bar No. 04801500 

Attorney for Appellant

PD-1419-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 11/4/2015 9:53:23 AM

Accepted 11/5/2015 1:56:48 PM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Contents 

Index of Authorities

I. Identity of Trial Court and Parties 1

II. Statement Regarding Oral Argument 2

III. Statement of the Case 3

IV. Statement of the Procedural History of the Case 4

V. Ground for Review 4

The Court of Appeals erred when, after its review of 

the facts concerning Mr. Ibarra’s motion to suppress, it 

determined that there was sufficient evidence supporting 

the trial court’s decision first, that a confidential informant 

was reliable and, second, that under the totality of 

circumstances, based upon corroboration of the 

informant’s tip, an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop 

and detain a vehicle in which Mr. Ibarra was a passenger. 

See Smith v. State, 58 S.W.3d 784 (Tex. App. – Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d, and Brother v. State, 166 

S.W.3d 255, 259, n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); R.R. 2

(transcript of Ibarra’s motion to suppress hearing, pp. 10-

20).

VI. Summary of the Argument 4

VII. Background and Statement of Pertinent Evidence 5

VIII. Court of Appeals’ Decision 8
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS, continued

Page

IX. Argument 9

A. The Court of Appeals deviated from the norm in such 

a manner that a review of its opinion is required.

(1) The information from an informant on 

which Sheriff Stephens partially based his reasonable 

suspicion to stop a vehicle in which Ibarra was a 

passenger was, contrary to the Court of Appeals’ 

holding, unreliable.

(a) There was no evidence that the 

informant’s prior collaboration with the Sheriff 

involved criminal matters, or whether the information 

he had previously provided had resulted in criminal 

prosecutions, much less felony convictions.

(b) The informant did not provide any 

information concerning specifics of illegal drug 

activities or his familiarity with drug usage, 

manufacture or sale which would justify reliance on 

his information concerning same.

(2) The Sheriff failed to corroborate the 

information provided by his informant, in any 

meaningful way so the Court of Appeals could hardly 

rely on that corroboration to justify “reasonable 

suspicion” under a totality of the circumstancestest.

(a) The Sheriff’s “surveillance” of 

suspected illegal drug activity was woefully 

inadequate.
3

TABLE OF CONTENTS, continued

Page

(b) The surveillance was did not 

corroborate any of the informant’s information 

in any meaningful way such that a reviewing 

court could find under a totality of the 

circumstances test, that the Sheriff had acted 

upon reasonable suspicion in stopping the 

suspect’s car.

X. Prayer 12

XI. Certificate of Service and Compliance with Rule 9 13
4

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Page

United States Supreme Court cases

Alabama v. White 12

496 U.S. 325 (1990)

Terry v. Ohio 9

392 U.S. 1 (1968)

United States v. Cortez 8

449 U.S. 411 (1981)

Texas Courts of Criminal Appeal cases

Arguellez v. State 8

955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)

Brother v. State 4, 12

166 S.W.3d 255 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)

Texas Courts of Appeal cases

Smith v. State 4,8

58 S.W.3d 784 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.ref’d

Statutes

TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY §481.112(a), (d)(West 2010) 3

United States Constitution

Fourth Amendment 8,12
Petition for Discretionary Review 

Israel Joe Ibarra v. The State of Texas 

No. 11-13-00325-CR

1

I. IDENTITY OF TRIAL COURT AND PARTIES 

TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:

NOW COMES Israel Joe Ibarra, appellant, who would show the Court that 

the trial court and interested parties herein are asfollows:

HON. SHANE HADAWAY, Judge Presiding, 39th Judicial District Court,

Haskell County, Texas.

ISRAEL JOE IBARRA, appellant, TDCJ No. 01539473, Beto Unit, 1391

FM 3328, Tennessee Colony, Texas 75880.

LYNN INGALSBE, trial attorney for appellant, 11065 S. 3rd St., Abilene, 

Texas 79602.

TIM COPELAND, appellate attorney for appellant, P.O. Box 399, Cedar 

Park, Texas 78613.

MICHAEL FOUTS, Haskell County District Attorney, trial and appellate 

attorney for appellee, the State of Texas, P.O. Box 193, Haskell, Texas 79521.
Petition for Discretionary Review 

Israel Joe Ibarra v. The State of Texas 

No. 11-13-00325-CR

2

II. STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Appellant believes the clarity of the issue in this case is such that oral 

argument would add nothing.
Petition for Discretionary Review 

Israel Joe Ibarra v. The State of Texas 

No. 11-13-00325-CR

3

PD No.

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

AT AUSTIN, TEXAS

ISRAEL JOE IBARRA, §

Appellant §

§ CAUSE NO. 11-13-00325-CR

V. §

§ TRIAL COURT NO. 6680

THE STATE OF TEXAS, §

Appellee §

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVEW 

FROM THE ELEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS 

AT EASTLAND, TEXAS

CHIEF JUSTICE JIM WRIGHT, PRESIDING

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OFTEXAS:

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A jury found Israel Joe Ibarra guilty of possession of more than four grams 

but less than 200 grams of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. See TEX. 

HEALTH & SAFETY §481.112(a), (d)(West 2010). The trial court assessed his 

punishment at confinement for life in the Institutional Division of the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice for a term of sixty (60) years.
Petition for Discretionary Review 

Israel Joe Ibarra v. The State of Texas 

No. 11-13-00325-CR

4

IV. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE

The Eleventh Court of Appeals at Eastland, Texas, by Opinion dated October 

29, 2015, affirmed Ibarra’s conviction and sentence. A copy of that opinion is hereto 

attached as if fully incorporated herein at length.

V. GROUND FOR REVIEW

The Court of Appeals erred when, after its review of the facts concerning Mr. 

Ibarra’s motion to suppress, it determined that there was sufficient evidence 

supporting the trial court’s decision first, that a confidential informant was reliable 

and, second, that under the totality of circumstances, based upon corroboration of 

the informant’s tip, an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain a vehicle 

in which Mr. Ibarra was a passenger. See Smith v. State, 58 S.W.3d 784 (Tex.App.

– Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d, and Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 259,

n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); R.R. 2 (transcript of Ibarra’s motion to suppress hearing, 

pp. 10-20).

VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

When Sheriff Stephens stopped a vehicle in which Ibarra was a passenger, he 

did so lacking reasonable suspicion. Stephens testified that his stop was based solely 

on information provided by a confidential informant. Stephens did not, for example, 

observe any traffic violations; neither did he corroborate the informant’s initial tip 

in any meaningful way. Because the informant was not shown to be reliable to any
Petition for Discretionary Review 

Israel Joe Ibarra v. The State of Texas 

No. 11-13-00325-CR

5

degree of reasonable certainty, and because Stephens’ corroboration was inadequate, 

under the totality of the circumstances, it follows that the stop was not justified. The 

trial court erred in holding otherwise after Ibarra’s hearing on a motion to suppress. 

The Court of Appeals then compounded that error when it upheld the trial court’s 

decision though there was a dearth of any meaningful testimony cited by the 

appellate court in its review.

VII. BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF PERTINENTEVIDENCE

In a suppression hearing held prior to trial, the trial court heard evidence that 

about a month prior to Ibarra’s arrest a confidential informant alerted then Sheriff 

David Haliburton that Jason Mendez was involved in narcotics trafficking in Haskell 

County. Haliburton passed that information to then Deputy Sheriff Winston 

Stephens who began sporadic surveillance of a house where Mendez stayed with his 

in-laws. (R.R. 2, pp. 11-12). Stephens said that his “surveillance” consisted of 

“some drive-ups” to Mendez’s house, and he also testified that he “(sat) off at a 

distance somewhere and watch(ed) with binoculars.” (R.R. 2, p. 12). Stephens 

testified that he was looking for “activities of what a normal drug house would be. 

You know, any vehicles leaving there, try to get a traffic stop in them.” (R.R. 2, p. 

12). He said that he “saw activity consistent with what his experience would be of 

narcotics” and that there was some “traffic going in and out.” (R.R. 2, p. 13). 

Vehicles would “pull up,stay for a little while and leave occasionally,” he said. (The
Petition for Discretionary Review 

Israel Joe Ibarra v. The State of Texas 

No. 11-13-00325-CR

6

activity) wasn’t “24/7.” (R.R. 2, p. 13). Stephens offered that he never got any 

concrete information based on his surveillance and, notably, he never mentioned that 

Ibarra was ever observed during the surveillance. (R.R. 2, p. 13). Stephens also 

testified that during the time that he had Mendez under surveillance he heard from 

his own informant that Mendez was dealing drugs. (R.R. 2, p. 13). Stephens testified 

that he had known his informant for over ten years and that he had provided reliable 

information regarding criminal activity in the past. (R.R. 2, p. 14). Stephens sent 

him to make a “buy” from Mendez on December 27, 2012, but the buy fell through 

when the informant reported back to Stephens that Mendez was “out of dope.” (R.R. 

2, p. 15). The informant told Stephens that Mendez had to go to Abilene to “re-up” 

(or get more dope) before he could make a buy. (R.R. 2, p. 15). He also told 

Stephens that Mendez was leaving about 8 o’clock that night for Abilene to get more 

narcotics to sell but that he would return to Haskell about 9:00 or 9:30. He also told 

Stephens that Mendez did not have a driver’s license. From surveillance of his 

house, Stephens said that he knew Mendez drove a small, silver Oldsmobile so he 

waited in his patrol car south of Haskell on Hwy. 277 that night for Mendez to make 

the trip. (R.R. 2, p. 16). Stephens said that he saw Mendez’s pass him heading 

toward Stamford and Abilene, but he did not follow. (R.R. 2, p. 16). Instead, he 

said, he waited for Mendez to return around 9:00 or 9:30 that night, the time his 

informant had told him Mendez would be back. Stephens said that he waited until
Petition for Discretionary Review 

Israel Joe Ibarra v. The State of Texas 

No. 11-13-00325-CR

7

about 9:15, and then he went to grab a sandwich. Ten to fifteen minutes later, when 

Stephens drove by Mendez’s house, Mendez’s car was already back at the residence. 

(R.R. 2, p. 17). Stephens said that he sent his informant back to Mendez for another 

dope buy the following day, December 28, but, again, the informant returned empty–

handed. He told Stephens that Mendez had, again, “run out of dope.” (R.R. 2, p. 

18). However, his informant told him, Mendez had just left his home for Abilene 

again to get more dope, and, again, according to the informant, he would be back 

about 9:00 or 9:30 p. m.. (R.R. 2, p. 18). Stephens again set up station south of 

Haskell to intercept Mendez on his return. His informant told him the drugs would 

either be on Mendez or in the vehicle, Stephens testified, but he did not know who 

was with Mendez when he left for Abilene other than his girlfriend, Santana 

Guzman. (R.R. 2, p. 18). Stephens said that around 9:30 he saw the car Mendez 

was driving coming north on Hwy. 277 from the direction of Stamford and Abilene, 

and he fell in behind the vehicle. He ran the car’s registration which came back to 

Adam Mendez, Jason’s brother. (R.R. 2, p. 18). Stephens said that he could not tell 

who was driving the car or even who was in it when it passed him, but he engaged 

his overhead red and blue lights to pull the vehicle over. After it stopped, Stephens 

said that he identified the driver, Jason Mendez, who admitted that he did not have 

a license. (R.R. 2, pp. 20-21). Santana Guzman was the vehicle’s front passenger; 

Ibarra was in the right back passenger’s seat, and Essie Alvarez was seated behind
Petition for Discretionary Review 

Israel Joe Ibarra v. The State of Texas 

No. 11-13-00325-CR

8

the driver. (R.R. 2, p. 21). After everyone was removed from the car, Stephens 

asked Mendez if he had any narcotics which Mendez denied, and then Mendez gave 

Stephens permission to search the car. (R.R. 4, p. 43). When the search revealed 

illegal narcotics but no one in the car claimed ownership, Stephens said that he 

arrested everybody in the vehicle. (R.R. 2, pp. 23-24).

Stephens testified that he stopped Mendez’s vehicle solely on the information 

provided by his confidential informant who had told him, “they would be hauling 

drugs back into Haskell.” (R.R. 2, p. 32). Stephens said that he had not known who 

would be in the vehicle when he stopped it, and he had not seen any traffic violations 

to justify a stop. (R.R. 2, p. 33). He testified that the vehicle had been stopped, 

purely and simply, on the basis of what his informant had told him. (R.R. 2, p. 35).

VIII. COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION

The Court of Appeals employed the correct standards for review of the trial 

court’s decision denying Ibarra’s motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation 

of the Fourth Amendment. See e.g., Slip op. at 9 citing Arguellez v. State, 955 

S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Similarly, in its analysis of the underlying 

circumstances of the search, the Court of Appeals correctly stated the basis for 

appellate assessment of an informant’s reliability as well as the requisite 

corroboration needed in cases such as these. Slip op. at 11, citing Smith v. State, 58

S.W.3d 784, 787 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) citing United
Petition for Discretionary Review 

Israel Joe Ibarra v. The State of Texas 

No. 11-13-00325-CR

9

States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)) and Brother v. State, 166 S.W. 3d 

255,259 n. 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Finally, the Court of Appeals correctly noted

that under Terry1and its progeny, for such a stop to be justified, the officer must have 

reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances to justify the stop. It 

correctly noted that reasonable suspicion exists only if the officer has specific, 

articulable facts that, when combined with their rational inferences, would lead the 

officer to reasonably conclude that a person is, has been, or will soon be engaged in 

criminal activity. Slip op. at 10.

IX. ARGUMENT

Here, Ibarra takes issue, not with the jurisprudence underlying the rational for 

the Court of Appeals’ decision, but with that court’s application of the established 

case law in reaching its decision. It is in the review of the evidence adduced from 

Ibarra’s motion to suppress hearing where the Court of Appeals deviated from the 

norm in such a manner that a review of its opinion isrequired.

The Court of Appeals noted, in determining that the trial court correctly ruled 

that Sheriff Stephens had a reliable informant, that the Sheriff had known the 

informant for twelve years. It also noted that the informant had given the Sheriff 

“reliable information related to criminal activity in the past.” (Slip op. at 11).

1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).
Petition for Discretionary Review 

Israel Joe Ibarra v. The State of Texas 

No. 11-13-00325-CR

10

However, that wasthe sum total of the evidence adduced asthe basis for the Sheriff’s 

reliance upon his informant. There was no evidence cited, for example, that the 

Sheriff had ever relied on his informant in the past to justify criminal arrest; certainly 

no evidence that any information the Sheriff had ever received from the informant 

had ever resulted in felony convictions. In fact, Sheriff Stephens did not testify what 

kind of “criminal” information the informant had provided in the past, and he did 

not testify that any information his informant had provided in the past had anything 

to do with illegal narcotics trafficking.

While Stephens said his informant told him Mendez (the driver of the vehicle 

in which Ibarra was a passenger when it was stopped) was dealing drugs, the 

informant did not provide any details supporting that accusation. Moreover, while 

Stephens testified that he had sent his informant into the home to buy narcotics from 

Mendez, the informant did not tell Stephens how, when or where he had witnessed 

Mendez dealing drugs nor did he offer any other evidence that supported his 

accusations that Mendez was a drug dealer. Neither does the record reflect that the 

informant had any knowledge about methamphetamine in general or even such 

familiarity with the drug that he would recognize it if he saw it. Stephens did not 

testify that his informant observed anyone in the home in possession of any illegal 

narcotic. Neither did the informant identify any participants of Mendez’s illegal 

drug operation, and he certainly did not say that Ibarra was part of any such
Petition for Discretionary Review 

Israel Joe Ibarra v. The State of Texas 

No. 11-13-00325-CR

11

operation. The record is also silent on whether the informant named anyone else in 

the home as a customer for the narcotic, and, finally, the informant did not observe 

any illegal drug use in the home. In sum, in the Court of Appeals’ review supporting 

the trial court’s findings, the Court fails to cite the kind of facts necessary to affirm 

that finding because those facts were absent from the record reviewed. (See Slipop. 

at 11).

Ignoring the Court of Appeals’ conclusion supporting the trial court’s finding 

that the informant’s tip was reliable, the Court’s review of the evidence concerning 

the Sheriff’s efforts to corroborate the tip was also inadequate. Evidence relied upon 

by the trial court and, in turn, by the appellate court in its review fell woefully short 

of that needed for corroboration. By his own testimony, the Sheriff’s efforts to 

corroborate the tip consisted of sporadic and cursory “surveillance” of the house 

where Mendez lived. (Sheriff Stephens said his surveillance basically consisted of 

watching the house from a distance a few times with binoculars). (R.R. 2, p. 12). 

Stephens said he observed “traffic going in and out” of the house, whatever that 

means. But, Stephens nevertheless concluded from his observations that the traffic 

was consistent with “what a normal drug house would be” without providing any 

details to support that conclusion. (R.R. 2, pp. 12-13). He admitted, for example, 

that he never got any concrete information based on his surveillance except for the 

type of car Mendez usually drove (which anyone familiar with Mendez in a small
Petition for Discretionary Review 

Israel Joe Ibarra v. The State of Texas 

No. 11-13-00325-CR

12

town such as Haskell, including an informant, could have known from even casual 

observation). (R.R. 2, p.13). The Court of Appeals’ opinion also relates, in 

supporting the trial court’s determination, that the informant also provided testimony 

on Mendez’s southbound travel routes and times when Mendez left his home to 

secure illegal drugs to sell. Again, that testimony, in context, does little to 

corroborate the informant’s initial tip. Evidence showed that Mendez’s had family 

members who lived south of the home Stephens had surveilled so there was another 

reasonable explanation for his southbound travel. Despite such inadequacies in the 

record the Court of Appeals determined, in its review, that the tip was nevertheless 

corroborated.

As correctly noted by the Court of Appeals at p. 12 of its opinion, “... 

corroboration refers to whether the police officer, in light of the circumstances, 

confirms enough facts to reasonably conclude that the information given to him is 

reliable and temporary detention is thus justified.” Brother v. State, 166 SW.3d 255, 

259, n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. – 2005) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330-31 

(1990)). Here, the trial court erred in finding that the informant was reliable or that 

there were sufficient facts to corroborate the unreliable informant’s tip. The Court 

of Appeals in its review of that decision then compounds that error when it finds 

support for the trial court despite the dearth of justifiable evidence to do so. In so 

doing, the Court of Appeals joins the trial court in its erroneous application of the
Petition for Discretionary Review 

Israel Joe Ibarra v. The State of Texas 

No. 11-13-00325-CR

13

pertinent case law employed to establish reliability of informants and sufficiencyof 

requisite corroboration of their tips. It is the Court of Appeals deviation from the 

norm in its review of the trial court’s decision that justifies this petition as well as 

the reversal of the appellate opinion itself.

X. PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Mr. Ibarra prays that this Court reverse the judgment of the 

appellate court and render a judgment of acquittal for violation of Ibarra’s Fourth 

Amendment guarantees, or, in the alternative, remand for such other and further 

relief to which he is entitled.

COPELAND LAW FIRM

P.O. Box 399

Cedar Park, TX 78613 

Mobil/Text: 512.897.8196

Fax: 512.215.8114

Email: tcopeland14@yahoo.com

By: /s/ Tim Copeland

Tim Copeland

State Bar No. 04801500 

Attorney for Appellant

XI. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND OF 

COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9

This is to certify that on November 3, 2015, a true and correct copy of the 

above and foregoing document was served on the State Prosecuting Attorney, PO 

Box 12405, Capitol Station, Austin, TX 78711, and on Michael Fouts, Haskell 

County District Attorney P.O. Box 193, Haskell, Texas 79521 in accordance with 

the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and that the Petition for Discretionary
Petition for Discretionary Review 

Israel Joe Ibarra v. The State of Texas 

No. 11-13-00325-CR

14

Review is in compliance with Rule 9 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and 

that portion which must be included under Rule 9.4(i)(1) contains 2846 words.

/s/ Tim Copeland 

Tim Copeland
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS 

JUDGMENT

IsraelJoe Iba1Ta, * From the 39th District

Court of Haskell County, 

Trial Court No. 6680.

Vs. No. 11-13-00325-CR * October 29, 2015

The State of Texas, * Opinion by Bailey, J.

(Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., 

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that 

there is no e1Tor in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this 

court's opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
Opinion filed October 29, 2015

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals,.

No. 11-13-00325-CR

ISRAEL JOE IBARRA, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee .

On Appeal from the 39th District Court 

Haskell County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 6680

O P IN I O N

The jury convicted Israel Joe Ibarra of possession of more than four grams but 

less than 200 grams of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. See TEX. HEALTH & 

SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(a), (d) (West 2010). The trial court assessed 

Appellant's punishment at confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice for a term of sixty years. Appellant challenges his 

conviction in three issues. We affirm.
Background Facts

Haskell County Sheriff Winston Stephens1 testified at both the suppression 

hearing and during trial that he received information from his predecessor, 

Sheriff David Halliburton, that a confidential informant told Sheriff Halliburton that 

Jason Mendez was dealing drugs in Haskell County. In response to Sheriff 

Halliburton's repo1i, Sheriff Stephens set up surveillance on Mendez's house for 

approximately a month. Sheriff Stephens then received information from his own 

confidential informant that Mendez was dealing drugs. Sheriff Stephens testified 

that he had known his confidential informant for approximately twelve years. The 

confidential informant had given Sheriff Stephens reliable information related to 

criminal activity in the past. Sheriff Stephens also testified· that the confidential 

info1mant had never given him information that was not reliable.

At Sheriff Stephens's request, the confidential informant attempted to buy

drugs from Mendez on December 27, 2012, but Mendez was out of drugs that day. 

The confidential informant told Sheriff Stephens that Mendez would be going to 

Abilene that evening to "re-up his dope." The confidential informant said that 

Mendez would be traveling northbound in a silver car with a Dallas Cowboys star 

on the back windshield.

Sheriff Stephens observed Mendez leaving for Abilene at the time that the 

confidential informant told him that Mendez would be leaving Haskell. Sheriff 

Stephens attempted to intercept Mendez on his return to Haskell on December 27, 

but he missed seeing Mendez's vehicle return that evening. Sheriff Stephens 

testified that the confidential informant told him that Mendez would be leaving for 

Abilene to purchase more drugs the next evening (December 28) and would return 

to Haskell between 9:00 p.m. and 9:30 p.m. The

1Sheriff Stephens was the chief deputy at the time of the incident.

2
confidential informant also told Sheriff Stephens that Santana Guzman would be in 

the vehicle with Mendez.

On the evening of December 28, Sheriff Stephens saw a silver Oldsmobile 

with a star on the back driving toward Haskell. Sheriff Stephens started driving 

behind the car. A check of the vehicle's registration information indicated that the 

car belonged to Mendez's brother. Sheriff Stephens activated his emergency lights 

and pulled the car over. Mendez was driving, Guzman was in the front passenger 

seat, Essie Alvarez was in the backseat behind the driver, and Appellant was in the 

backseat behind Guzman. Sheriff Stephens instructed Mendez to exit the vehicle 

and asked for his driver's license. Mendez replied that he did not have his license. 

Sheriff Stephens asked for permission to search the vehicle and Mendez

consented. All of the occupants then exited the vehicle.

Sheriff Stephens, along with another officer, searched the vehicle. Sheriff 

Stephens testified that the car smelled of burnt marihuana. Inside the vehicle, the 

officers found an open box that contained a small amount of marihuana, two 

marihuana pipes with marihuana residue, and rolling papers. They also found digital 

scales on the front floorboard. The officers found, on the front driver's side above 

the door, a small scooper that is used to bag drugs.

Sheriff Stephens spoke with Guzman separately from the group. Guzman 

admitted that she had contraband on her person and retrieved a small bag from 

inside

.her pants. Inside the bag were several baggies, a small blue flashlight, and a small 

container of marihuana. Inside the baggies was an off-white, crystal-type substance. 

This substance was later tested and determined to be a total of 1.01 grams of 

methamphetamine.

All ofthe occupants were arrested for drug possession. Appellant did not have 

any identification on him, and he gave a false name when he was arrested. The car 

was impounded and searched again the next day. In the subsequent search;

. I
Sheriff Stephens found a small, soft-sided bag wedged between the backseat and the 

body of the vehicle on the driver's side. Sheriff Stephens also found another portion 

of a marihuana clip. Inside the soft-sided bag were Ziploc baggies that contained 

more off-white, crystal-type substance. The contents were tested and determined to 

be a total of 3.09 grams of methamphetamine.

Analysis

We first address Appellant's sufficiency issues. Appellant challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence in his second and third issues. We review sufficiency of 

the evidence issues under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010);

Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288-89 (Tex. App. Eastland 2010, pet. ref'd). 

Under the Jackson standard, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the 

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; 

Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). When conducting a 

sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, .including pieces 

of evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 

763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder's role as the sole judge of the witnesses' 

credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 

899. This standard accounts for the factfinder' s duty to resolve conflicts in the 

testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts 

to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d. at 778. When the 

record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the 

conflicts in favor of the prosecution and defer to that determination. Jackson, 443

U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
In his second issue, Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to 

supp01i his conviction for possession with intent to deliver any of the 

methamphetamine. He contends that the State only showed that he was in close 

proximity to the drugs because they were located in a car in which he was a 

passenger. He also asserts that only an accomplice witness testified that he knew 

about the methamphetamine and its purpose. In this regard, Appellant contendsthat 

the accomplice's testimony was not corroborated by any independent evidence. In 

his third issue, Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove the 

amount of methamphetamine for which he was convicted. Appellant challenges the 

amount the State linked him to and argues that the evidence proven by the State 

amounts to less than four grams. Specifically, he asserts that there is insufficient 

evidence linking him to the methamphetamine recovered from Guzman's pants.

When, as in this case, the jury's verdict could have been based on the 

testimony of an accomplice, the sufficiency review must incorporate the accomplice 

witness rule stated in Article 38.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODE 

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.14 (West 2005). In order to support a conviction based 

upon the testimony of an accomplice, there must be corroborating evidence that 

tends to connect the accused with the offense. Id.; Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253, 

257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In reviewing the sufficiency of the corroborating

evidence, we eliminate the accomplice testimony from consideration and focus on ·

the remaining portions of the record to determine whether there is any evidence that

. - . ) '

tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. Solomon v. State,

49 S.W.3d 356, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 462-

63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The corroborating evidence may be direct or

circumstantial and need not be sufficient by itself to establish the defendant's guilt; · 

it is sufficient if the combined weight of the non-accomplice evidence tends to 

connect the defendant to the offense. Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 361; Gosch v. State,
6

829 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We review the c01Toborating 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Taylorv. State, 328 S.W.3d'574, 

578 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2010, pet. ref d). Once corroborated, testimony of an 

accomplice may be considered by the jury in the· same manner as any other 

competent evidence. See Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 632 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2002). ·

Non-accomplice testimony was introduced showing that Appellant was in the 

back passenger seat near the location of the methamphetamine, that the car smelled 

of burnt marihuana, that marihuana was in plain view in the vehicle, that digital 

scales and rolling papers were also found in plain view, that the vehicle matched the 

description given to Sheriff Stephens by the confidential informant, and that the 

confidential informant told Sheriff Stephens that the driver of the vehicle was 

bringing chugs back from Abilene. In this case, the jury could have rationally found 

that the corroborating evidence tended to connect Appellant to the possession of the 

methamphetamine. Malone, 253 S.W.3d at 258-59; Woodruff v. State, No. 11-09-

00171-CR, 2011 WL 2671926, at *2 (Tex. App.-Eastland July 7, 2011, no pet.) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication). Therefore, we consider the accomplice 

witness testimony in conducting our review of the sufficiency of the evidence.

In cases involving unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State 

must prove that the accused exercised care, custody, control, or management over 

the substance and that the accused knew that the matter possessed was contraband. 

Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Martin v. State, 753 

S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). When the accused is not shown to have had 

exclusive possession of the place where the contraband· was found, the evidence 

must link the accused to the contraband and establish that the accused's connection 

with the chug was more than fortuitous. Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 161-62 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Pollan v. State, 612 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1981). Alvarez, an accomplice, testified .that Appellant handed her a small bag 

that contained a portion of the methamphetamine and told her to "get lid of it." 

Alvarez then stuffed the bag behind her in the backseat of the vehicle. From this 

evidence, the jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Appellant exercised care, custody, control, or management over the 

methamphetamine found in the bag that Alvarez stuffed behind her in the backseat 

of the vehicle and that he knew the substance was contraband. See Woodruff, 2011 

WL 2671926, at *2.

We next address the methamphetamine found on Guzman. We consider 

several non-exclusive factors when determining whether there are affirmative links 

between the accused and the controlled substance: (1) the accused's presence when 

the search was executed; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the 

accused's proximity to and the accessibility of the contraband; (4) whether the 

accused was under the influence of a controlled substance when he was arrested;

(5) whether the accused possessed other contraband when he was arrested;

(6) whether the accused made incriminating statements; (7) whether the accused 

attempted to flee; (8) whether he made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an 

odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia was

present; (11) whether the accused owned or had the right to possess the place where

) .

the drugs were found; (12) whether the place the drugs were found was enclosed;

(13) whether the accused was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether 

the conduct of the accused indicated a consciousness of guilt. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 

162n.12.

Guzman admitted that she had contraband on her person and retrieved a small 

bag from inside her pants. Inside the bag were several baggies, a small blue 

flashlight, and a small container of marijuana. The back to the flashlight was found 

in the back floorboard, near where Appellant had been sitting. Furthermore, the

7
baggies retrieved from Guzman's person were similar in make and size to the 

baggies recovered from the bag stuffed in the backseat of the vehicle.

Intent to deliver may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Coutts have 

considered several factors in determining intent, including the quantity of drugs the 

defendant possessed, the manner of packaging of the drugs, and the presence or 

absence of drug paraphernalia for use or sale. See Brown v. State, 243 S.W.3d 141, 

149-50 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2007, pet. ref d); Jordan v. State, 139 S.W.3d 723, 

726 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). Here, Appellant was present when the 

drugs were found on Guzman, the packaging of the chugs found in the backseat was 

similar to the drugs found on Guzman, and there were baggies and scales in the car 

(which are indicative of intent to deliver). From this evidence, the jury could have 

determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant exercised care, custody, 

control, or management over the methamphetamine found on Guzman's person and 

that he knew the substance was contraband.

In conside1ing the factors listed above, we find that the evidence shows that 

Appellant was present when the search was executed, that he was in close proximity 

to and had access to the methamphetamine, that the place in which the drugs were 

found was enclosed, and that Appellant gave a false name when he was arrested. 

See Felder v. State, 848 S.W.2d 85, 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (giving false 

identification to a police officer indicates a consciousness of guilt). The jury, as the 

trier of fact, was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight 

to be given their testimony. CRIM. PROC. art. 36.13 (West 2007), 38.04 (West 1979). 

As such, the jury was entitled to accept or reject any oral) of the testimony of any 

witness. Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. C1inl. App. 1992). In 

addition, the jury was entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We have reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the verdict, and we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a

8
reasonable . doubt that Appellant intentionally or knowingly possessed 

methamphetamine in an amount of more than four grams. We ovenrule Appellant's 

second and third issues.

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his 

motion to suppress. Specifically, Appellant challenges Sheriff Stephens's basis for 

initiating the traffic stop. He contends that the warrantless stop and subsequent ·

search of the vehicle was not based on reasonable suspicion because the

"confidential informant's information which led to the stop and search was not 

reliable." Appellant also contends that Sheriff Stephens did not testify as to any 

details that support the informant's information that Mendez was "dealing drugs."

A trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. Arguellez v. State, 409 S.W.3d 657, 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We 

review a trial court's ruling under a bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 

221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Almost complete deference is given to its determination of 

historical facts, especially if those facts are based on an assessment of credibility

and demeanor. Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Amador, 

221 S.W.3d at 673 (citing Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89). We review de novo a trial

court's application of the law to the facts. Wadev. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2013); Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App 2010). 

Regardless of whether the trial court granted or denied the motion, appellate courts 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling. Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 

666; State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We will 

uphold the trial court's ruling if it is reasonably grounded in the record and correct 

on any theory of law applicable to the case. Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 667; Valtierra, 

310 S.W.3d at 447-48. When the trial court does not issue findings of fact, we imply

9
findings that support the trial court's ruling if the evidence supports those findings.

State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

There are three distinct types of police-citizen interactions: (I) consensual 

encounters that do not implicate the Fourth Amendment; (2) investigative detentions 

that are Fourth Amendment seizures of limited duration and scope, which must be. 

supp1ied by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) arrests that are 

reasonable only if supported by probable cause. Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 667; 

Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 410-11 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434

(1991); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,

111-12 (1975)). A detention occurs when a reasonable person, taking into account 

all circumstances, feels they are not at liberty to ignore the police and go about their 

business. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629 (2003) (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 

437). There is no dispute that Sheriff Stephens conducted an investigative detention 

for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when he stopped Mendez's car.

A police officer may briefly detain a person to investigate possible criminal 

activity, even if there is no probable cause, if the officer has reasonable suspicion to 

believe there is possible criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22; Ford v. State, 

158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The stop must be justified, and the

scope

must be reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop. Terry, 392 U.S.

•

at 20. A police officer has reasonable suspicion if he has specific, articulable facts

that, when combined with their rational inferences, would ·1ead the officer to 

reasonably conclude that a person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal 

activity. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492. This is an objective standard that ignores the 

subjective intent of the officer and looks at whether there is an objective reason for the 

detention. Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 668. Courts determine reasonable suspicion under 

the totality of the circumstances. Id. Individual circumstances may seem innocent 

enough in isolation, but if the circumstances combine to reasonably suggest

IO . .,
the imminence of criminal conduct, an investigative detention isjustified. Id.; Ford,

158 S.W:3d at492.

Appellant argues that Sheriff Stephens lacked reasonable suspicion when he 

stopped the vehicle. In this regard, Sheriff Stephens testified that he relied solelyon 

the information provided by his confidential informant in making the decision to 

stop the vehicle rather than observing any traffic violations. Appellant contends that 

the totality of the circumstances did not rise to a level of reasonable suspicion based

on the confidential informant's report and Sheriff Stephens's independent 

observations. We disagree.

Sheriff Stephens testified that he acted in response to his confidential 

inf01mant's information about Mendez trafficking drugs. As noted previously, the 

identity of the confidential informant was known to Sheriff Stephens. 

Sheriff Stephens testified that he had known the inf01mant for approximately twelve 

years, that he had given Sheriff Stephens reliable information related to criminal · 

activity in the past, and that he had never given him information that was not reliable.

In situations involving the police's use of an informant, we consider the 

informant's reliability in analyzing the totality of the circumstances. Smith v. State, 

58 S.W.3d 784, 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref d) (citing

United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). "A confidential informant can 

provide the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative detention so 

long as additional facts are present to demonstrate the informant's reliability." Id .

. at 790. Although an unverified tip might not provide enough support to justify an 

arrest or the issuance of a warrant, 1t will be sufficient to justify an investigative stop 

if it is made by a known informant who has provided information in the past. 

Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972) (explaining that information 

obtained from an informant who has been used before isstronger than an anonymous. 

tip).

11
12

The confidential informant contacted Sheriff Stephens and told him that· 

Mendez was dealing chugs from his Mendez's mother's residence. Sheriff Stephens 

witnessed several vehicles come and go from the residence, and he testified that the 

behavior was consistent with "what a normal drug house would be." Additionally, 

Sheriff Stephens had worked with the confidential informant in the past several 

years, and the confidential informant's information had proven reliable in the past. 

This testimony from Sheriff Stephens established the confidential informant's 

reliability.

Furthermore, the confidential informant provided Sheriff Stephens with 

information about Mendez leaving for Abilene to purchase more drugs the next 

evening and returning around 9:30 p.m. The confidential informant told 

Sheriff Stephens that Mendez would be traveling n01ihbound in a silver car. 

Sheriff Stephens stopped Mendez in a silver car, traveling northbound from Abilene, 

around 9:30 p.m. This testimony served to corroborate the veracity of the 

informant's information. Mendez arrived in the vehicle described by the informant, 

at the time and place provided by the informant. Corroboration does not mean that 

Sheriff Stephens must personally observe the conduct that caused him to 

reasonably suspect that a crime is being, has been, or is about to be committed. 

Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 259 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Adams, 

407 U.S. at 147). "Rather, corroboration refers to whether the police officer, in 

light of the circumstances, confirms enough facts to reasonably conclude that the 

information given to him is reliable and a temporary detention is thus justified." Id. 

(citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1990)).

Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that Sheriff Stephens had 

reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop ofthe vehicle. In light of the .

testimony presented during the suppression hearing, which · indicated that the 

confidential informant had a track record of providing reliable information in the
13

past, as well as the details of Mendez's conduct that Sheriff Stephens corroborated, 

we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's 

motion to suppress. See Smith, 58 S.W.3d at 790 (explaining that testimony 

regarding confidential informant's "track record" for "providing credible 

information in the past" can provide additional facts needed to establish reasonable 

suspicion through confidential informant's tip); see also Adams, 407 U.S. at 144-47 

(determining that sufficient indicia of reliability were present when officer knew 

informant and when informant had previously given officer reliable information). 

We overrule Appellant's first issue:

· This Court'sRuling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY 

JUSTICE

October 29, 2015

Publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., 

Wilson, J., and Bailey, J.