1 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 

## I nthe 2 

# U ni t e d S t at es Cour tofA p pe al s 3 

## For the Secon d Circu it 4 5 6 August Term 2018 7 8 No. 17-3481-cv; 17-3918-cv 9 10 TWEED-NEW HAVEN AIRPORT AUTHORITY, 11 12 Plaintiff-Appellant, 13 C ITY OF NEW HAVEN, 14 15 Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellant, 16 17 v. 18 19 WILLIAM TONG, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of 20 Connecticut, 21 22 Defendant-Appellee.* 23 24 25 Appealfrom the Uni ted States Di stri c tC ourt 26 fo r the Di stri ct of C onnecti cut 27 No. 15 C i v. 1731 (RAR), Robert A. Ri chardson, Magi strate Judge, Presi di ng. 28 ( Argued: December 12, 2018; Deci ded: Jul y 9, 2019) 29 30 Before: SAC K, PARKER, and C HIN, Circuit Judges. 31

____________ 32 * The Cl erk o f Co urt i s respectful l y di rected to a mend the o ffi ci a l ca pti o n a s i n di ca t ed ab ov e. 11 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 Pl ai nti ff-Appel l a nt Tweed-New Haven Ai rport Authori ty (“Tweed”), 2 seeki ng to expand i ts pri mary runway, sued to i nval i date a C onnecti cut statute 3 that had l i mi ted the runway’s l ength. S eeC onn. Gen. Stat. § 15-120j(c)

. Tweed 4 contended that the statute was preempted by the Federal Avi ati on Act, 49 U.S.C

. 5 § 40101 et seq . The Uni ted States Di stri ct C ourt for the Di stri ct of C onnecti cut 6 (Ri chardson, Magistrate Judge ), concl uded that (1) Tweed l acked standi ng; and (2) 7 assumi ng Tweed had standi ng, the Federal Avi ati on Act di d not preempt the 8 statute. We di sagree. Accordi ngl y, we reverse and remand for entry of judgment 9 i n favor of Tweed. 10 11 RE VE RSE D and R E MANDE D

. 12 13 Hugh I. Manke, John C . King, C hri stopher 14 A. Kl epps, Updi ke, Kel l y & Spel l a cy, P.C ., 15 Hartford, C t., for plaintiff-appellant Tweed16 New Haven Airport Authority. 17 18 John Rose, Jr., C orporati on C ounsel, 19 New Haven Offi ce of the C orporati on 20 C o unsel, New Haven, C t., for intervenor 21 plaintiff-appellant Tweed-New Haven Airport 22 Authority. 23 24 Drew S. Graham, Assi stant Attorney 25 General, Hartford, C t., for defendant-appellee 26 William Tong, Attorney General of the State of 27 Connecticut. 28 29 30 31 32 21 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judge : 2 Tweed-New Haven Ai rport i s l ocated i n the Town of East Haven and the 3 C i ty of New Haven, C onnecti cut. The Ai rport i s owned by the C i ty of New 4 Haven and l eased to and operated by Tweed-New Haven Ai rport Authori ty 5 (“Tweed”). 1 Tweed sued the then C onnecti cut Attorney General George Jepsen i n 6 hi s offi ci alcapaci ty 2(the “State”), seeki ng a decl aratory judgment that a 7 C onnecti cut statute (the “Runway Statute” or “Statute”) that l i mi ts the Ai rport’s 8 runway to i ts current l ength of 5,600 feet was i nval i d. SeeC onn. Gen. Stat. § 15- 9 120j(c). Tweed cl ai med that the Statute was preempted by federal l aws governi ng

1 Tweed i s “a body pol i ti c and corporate” created through l egi sl ati on by the state of C onnecti cut. See C onn. Gen. Stat. § 15-120i ( a). Whi l e i ts ori gi nati ng statute describes Tweed as a “publ i c i nstrumental i ty and pol i ti c alsubdi vi si on” of C onnecti cut, i t “shal lnot be construed to be a department, i nsti tuti on or agency of the state.” Id. It has a fi fteen-member board of di rectors, compri sed of persons appoi nted by the mayor of New Haven, the mayor of East Haven, and the South C entralRegi onalC o unci lof Governments. Id . § 15-120i (b). If Tweed i s termi nated, i ts ri ghts and property pass to the C i ty of New Haven. Id . § 15- 120i (e).

2 Si nce the i ncepti on of the sui t, the i denti ty of the C onnecti cut Attorney General has changed from George Jepsen to Wi l l i a m Tong. Thi s change i s refl ected i n the case capti on. 31 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 the regul ati on of ai r transportati on, i ncl uding the Federal Avi ati on Act 2 (“FAAct”), see 49 U.S.C . § 40101 et seq . 3 Fol l owi ng a bench tri ali n the Uni ted States Di stri ct C ourt for the Di stri c t of 4 C onnecti cut (Ri chardson, M.J. ), 3the court concl u ded that Tweed l acked standi ng 5 to sue because i t s i njury was not caused by the Statute and that, assumi ng Tweed 6 coul d establ i sh standi ng, the Runway Statute was not preempted by the federal 7 l aws to whi ch Tweed ci ted. Because we concl ude that Tweed has standi ng and 8 that the Runway Statute i s preempted by the FAAct, we reverse. 4 9 BACKGROUND 10 The Ai rport serves the New Haven area. It has a catchment area—the area 11 from whi ch an ai rport expects to draw commerci alai r servi ce passengers—i n 12 excess of 1,000,000 peopl e. The Ai rport’s pri mary runway, Runway 2/20, i s 13 currentl y 5,600 feet l ong. The runway i s one of the shortest commerci alai rport 14 runways i n the country, and i ti s the shortest runway for an ai rport wi th a

3 The parti es consented to proceed before a magi strate judge through the entry of fi naljudgment. See 28 U.S.C . § 636(c); Fed. R. C i v. P. 73.

4 The sal i ent facts are not i n di spute and have been sti pul ated to by the parti es. SeeJoi nt App’x 51-66. 41 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 catchment area as l a rge as Tweed’s area. The Ai rport’s catchment area i s the 2 l argest catchment area wi thout nonstop fl i ghts to Orl ando, and there are no 3 fl i ghts at the Ai rport to a number of East C oast ci ti es such as Boston, Washi ngton 4 D.C

. , and Atl anta. 5 In 2009, the C onnecti cut l egi sl ature, seeki ng to prevent the expansi on of 6 Runway 2/20, passed the Runway Statute, whi ch provi des that “Runway 2-20 of 7 the ai rport shal lnot exceed the exi sti ng paved runway l ength of fi ve thousand si x 8 hundred l i near feet.” C onn. Gen. Stat. § 15-120j(c). The Runway Statute prevents 9 Tweed from extendi ng Runway 2/20 past i t s current l ength. 10 The short l ength of the Ai rport’s runway has sharpl y l i m i t ed the 11 avai l abi l i ty of safe commerci alai r servi ce at Tweed. The l ength of a runway has a 12 di rect beari ng on the wei ght l o ad and passenger capaci ty that can be handl ed on 13 any gi ven fl i ght. For exampl e, at the ti me of tri al, Ameri c an Ai rl i nes, the one 14 commerci alai rl i ne provi di ng servi ce to and from the Ai rport, was unabl e to 15 safel y fi l li ts pl anes to capaci ty and was requ i red, dependi ng on the weather, to 16 l eave between four and ni ne seats empty.

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Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 Tweed has been unabl e to attract new ai rl i ne servi ces. Tweed has 2 contacted approxi matel y ten di fferent ai rl i nes and has been unabl e to convi nce 3 them to operate out of the Ai rport. One ai rl i ne, Al l egi ant Ai r, LLC , began an 4 economi canal ysi s of the feasibi l i ty of bri ngi ng addi ti onalfl i ghts to the Ai rport 5 but concl uded i t woul d be poi ntl ess to conti nue wi th the anal ysi s unl ess the 6 runway were extended. 7 Lengtheni ng the runway woul d al l ow for the safe use of l arger ai rcraft, 8 al l ow fl i ghts wi th no seati ng restri cti ons, al l ow more passengers on each 9 ai rpl ane, and al l ow servi c e to more desti nati ons. It woul d al so al l ow Tweed to 10 attract more carri ers and expand the avai l abi l i ty of safe ai r servi ce for i ts 11 customers. 12 As requi red by the Federal Avi ati on Admini strati o n (“FAA”), Tweed has 13 prepared a Master Pl an for upgradi ng i t s ai rport, whi ch i ncl udes extendi ng the 14 runway. 5In 2002, the Master Pl an—i ncl uding the runway expansi on—was

5 A Master Pl an i s requi red by the FAA for each commerci alai rport wi thi n i ts juri sdi cti on, such as Tweed, and represents a bl uepri nt for the l ong-term devel opment goal s of the ai rport’s faci l i ti es. 61 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 approved by the FAA and by the State of C o nnecti cut. However, i n 2009, the 2 State changed i ts posi ti on and passed the Runway Statute. 3 Tweed, seeki ng to l engthen the runway, sued for prospecti ve i njuncti ve 4 rel i ef, contendi ng that federal l aw i ncl u d i ng the FAAct preempted the Runway 5 Statute. The C i ty of New Haven i ntervened as an addi ti onalpl ai nti ff. The State 6 moved to di smi ss on several grounds, i ncl u d i ng that Tweed l acked Arti cl e III 7 standi ng, that, as a pol i ti calsubdi vi si on of the State of C onnecti cut, Tweed coul d 8 not sue the State, and that the Runway Statute was not preempted. The Di stri ct 9 C ourt deni ed the State’s moti on. 10 At tri al, the parti es l argel y rel i ed on a joi nt sti pul a ti on of facts. The Di stri ct 11 C ourt ul ti matel y concl uded that (1) Tweed l acked standi ng to sue because i t had 12 not shown an i njury-i n-fact and causati on attributabl e to the Statute; and (2) even 13 i f Tweed had standi ng, federall aw (i ncl uding the FAAct) di d not preempt the 14 Runway Statute. See generally Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Jepsen , No. 15-cv15 01731, 2017 WL 4400751, 2017 LEXIS 162356 (D. C onn. Oct. 3, 2017). 16 Tweed rai ses both these i ssues on appeal and the State contends, as i t di d 17 bel ow, that Tweed cannot sue C onnecti cu tbecause i t i s a pol i ti calsubdi vi si on of

71 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 the State. We revi ew each of these questi ons de novo

. Montesa v. Schwartz , 836 F.3d 2 176, 194 (2d C i r. 2016) (standi ng); N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Clarkstown , 612 3 F.3d 97, 103 (2d C i r. 2010) (per curi am) (preempti on). 4 DISCUSSION 5 I. 6 To establ i sh Arti c l e III standing, a pl ai nti ff must prove: “(1) i njury-i n-fact, 7 whi ch i s a ‘concrete and parti cul ari zed’ harm to a ‘l egal l y protected i nterest’; (2) 8 causati on i n the form of a ‘fai rl y traceabl e’ connecti on between the asserted 9 i njury-i n-fact and the al l eged acti ons of the defendant; and (3) redressabi l i ty, or a 10 non-specul ati ve l i kel ihood that the i njury can be remedi ed by the requested 11 rel i ef.” W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co. v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 549 F.3d 100, 106-107 12 (2d C i r. 2008) (emphasi s omi tted) (quoting L ujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 13 555, 560-61 (1992)). Each of these el ements “must be supported adequatel y by the 14 evi dence adduced at tri a l .” Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561 (i nternal quotati on marks and

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Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 ci t a ti on omi tted). Based on the facts at tri al, we concl ude that Tweed meets each 2 of these requi rements. 6 3 Fi rst, we have l i ttl e di ffi cul ty concl u d i ng that Tweed suffered an i njury-i n4 fact. Where, as here, “the pl ai nti ff i s hi msel f an object of the acti on (or forgone 5 acti on) at i ssue . . . , there i s ordi nari ly l i ttl e questi on that the acti on or i nacti on 6 has caused hi m injury, and that a judgment preventi ng or requi ring the acti on 7 wi l lredress i t.” Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561-62. The Runway Statute di rectl y targets 8 Tweed and prevents i t from extendi ng i ts runway. 9 In addi ti on, Tweed has establ i shed that i t i s i njured by the threatened 10 enforcement of the Statute shoul d Tweed attempt to extend the runway. The 11 State cl a i ms that standing i s not avai l abl e under thi s theory because C onnecti cut 12 has made no overt threat to enforce the Statute. C redi ting thi s argument woul d 13 run afoulof the Supreme C ourt’s admoni ti o n not to put “the chal l enger to the 14 choi ce between abandoni ng hi s ri ghts or ri ski ng prosecuti on.” MedImmune, Inc. v.

6 Onl y one party must have standi ng to seek each form of rel i ef. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc. , 137 S. C t. 1645, 1651 (2017). Because Tweed and the C i ty of New Haven seek the same rel i ef, we do not separatel y di scuss the standi ng of the C i ty. 91 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 Genentech, Inc. , 549 U.S. 118, 129 (2007) (i nternal quotati on marks omi tted). The 2 very purpose of the Decl aratory Judgment Act was to avoi d requi ri ng a l i ti gant to 3 confront thi s di l emma. Id. 4 When courts consi der whether the threatened enforcement of a l aw creates 5 an i njury for the purposes of standi ng, “an actual. . . enforcement acti o n i s not a 6 prerequi si te to chal l engi ng the l aw”; a pre-enforcement chal l enge i s suffi ci ent. 7 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus , 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014); see MedImmune, 549 8 U.S. at 128-29; see also M ilavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States , 559 U.S. 9 229, 234 (2010). Where a statute speci fi cal l y proscribes conduct, the l aw of 10 standi ng does “not pl ace the burden on the pl ai nti ff to show an i ntent by the 11 government to enforce the l aw against i t . Rather, i t [has] presumed such i ntent i n 12 the absence of a di savowalby the government or another reason to concl ude that 13 no such i ntent exi sted.” Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 197 (2d C i r. 2013). The 14 record i n thi s case shows no such di savowal

. 15 Second, Tweed has demonstrated that i t s i njury i s caused by the Runway 16 Statute. For standi ng purposes, a pl a i nti ff i s requi red onl yto show that the i njury 17 “i s fai rl y traceabl e to the chal l enged conduct of the defendant.” Spokeo, Inc. v. 101 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 Robins , 578 U.S. ___, 136 S. C t. 1540, 1547 (2016). Where, as here, a pl ai nti ff i s 2 threatened by the enforcement of a statute that speci fi c al l ytargets the pl a i nti ff, 3 the requ i rement i s met. Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561-62. The Runway Statute i s a sol i d 4 barri er to extensi o n of the Ai rport’s runway. Nothi ng can happen whi l e the 5 Statute i s i n pl ace. Tweed’s i njury i s, therefore, “fai rl y traceabl e” to the Statute. 6 The Di stri ct C ourt concl uded that, because other uncertai nti es stood i n the 7 way of the compl eti on of an extended runway, the causati on el ement was not 8 sati sfi ed. The Di stri ct C ourt reasoned that because Tweed woul d have to obtai n 9 addi ti onal fundi ng, secure approval s from vari o us regul ators, and obtai n 10 envi ronmentaland other permi ts, none of whi ch was assured, there di d “not 11 appear to be a di rect causal rel ati onshi p between the statute and the pl ai nti ff’s 12 al l eged i njury.” Tweed-New Haven , 2017 WL 4400751, at *8, 2017 LEXIS 162356, at 13 *22-23. 14 As an i ni ti al matter, the uncertai nti es sei zed upon by the Di stri ct C ourt 15 have no beari ng on Tweed’s fears of the Statute’s enforcement, whi ch i s an 16 i ndependent basi s for Arti c l e III standing. Further, we di sagree wi th the Di stri ct 17 C ourt’s anal y si s of the causati o n el ement of standi ng. A pl ai nti ff i s not requi red 111 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 to show that a statute i s the sol e or the but-for cause of an i njury. An i njury can 2 be “fai rl y traceabl e” even when future conti ngenci es of one ki nd or another 3 mi ght di srupt or derai la project. The fact that a project’s ul ti m ate compl eti on 4 may be uncertai n because a pl ai nti ff must undertake addi ti o nalsteps, such as 5 obtai ni ng fundi ng, envi ronmentalpermi ts, or addi ti onalcarri ers, does not defeat 6 standi ng. Nearl y every project of any compl exi ty invol ves conti ngenci es or 7 uncertai nti es of some sort. The poi nt of a standi ng i nqui ry i s not to fi gure out 8 whether a pl ai nti ff wi l ll i kel y achi eve a desi red resul t. The poi nt i s si m pl yto 9 ensure that a pl a i nti ff has a suffi ci ent nexus to the chal l enged acti on i n the form 10 of a personal stake i n the l i ti gati on so that the case or controversy req u i rements 11 of Arti cl e III are met. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger , 833 F.3d 74, 121 (2d C i r. 2016). 12 The Supreme C ourt has hel d that there i s standi ng where “the chal l enged 13 acti on of the [government] stands as an absol ute barri er” that wi l lbe removed “i f 14 [the pl ai nti ff] secures the . . . rel i ef i tseeks.” V ill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. 15 Hous. Development Corp. , 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977). There, a devel oper sought to 16 bui l d a cl uster of l ow- and moderate-i ncome townhouses i n the Vi l l age of 17 Arl i ngton Hei ghts. Id. at 254. The devel oper eventual l y sued the Vi l l a ge for 121 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 denyi ng i ts appl i c ati on for a zoni ng vari ance, al l eging raci aldi scri minati on and 2 vi ol a ti ons of the Fai r Housi ng Act of 1968. Id. The Vi l l age argued that there was 3 no i njury for standi ng purposes because conti ngenci es stood i n the way of fi nal 4 compl eti on of the project. Id. at 261 & n.7. 5 The Supreme C ourt, i n l anguage ful l y appl i cabl e here, rejected the vi ew 6 that the exi stence of conti ngenci es was a barri er to standi ng. Id. at 261. The C ourt 7 hel d that standing was not defeated because the devel oper “woul d sti l lhave to 8 secure fi nanci ng, qu al i fy for federal subsi di es, and carry through wi th 9 constructi on.” Id. (footnote omi tted). We are, the C ourt emphasi zed, “not 10 requi red to engage i n undue specul ati on as a predi cate for fi ndi ng that the 11 pl ai nti ff has the requi si te personal stake i n the controversy.” Id. at 261-62. 12 We have al so hel d that, for standi ng purposes, i t was enough that 13 pl ai nti ffs al l eged “di l i gent efforts” to secure fundi ng and had made progress on 14 the project i n questi on. NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 689 F.2d 391, 394 (2d. C i r. 15 1982). InTown of Huntington, a not-for-profi t housi ng group sought to construct a 16 l arge mul ti -fami l yhousi ng uni t. The group sued the town, al l egi ng that i ts 17 zoni ng regul a ti ons vi o l ated federal l aw. Id. at 393. Whi l e the sui t was pendi ng, 131 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 the funds appropri ated for the project l apsed and the town moved to di smi ss the 2 compl a i nt on the ground that the l ack of fundi ng woul d render the req u ested 3 rel i ef (i nval i dati o n of the ordi nance) meani ngl ess. We neverthel ess found 4 standi ng because the group had shown di l i gent efforts to secure fundi ng and had 5 shown “some reasonabl e prospect for future fi nanci ng” and obtai ni ng 6 governmental approval s i f the statute was i nval i dated, whi ch i s al lthat i s 7 requi red. Id. at 394. Tweed comfortabl y meets thi s test. It has shown more than 8 “di l i gent efforts” toward, and a reasonabl e prospect of, the project’s compl eti on. 9 Thi rd, as to redressabi l i ty, there i s no questi o n that a favorabl e deci si on 10 wi l ll i kel y redress Tweed’s fear of the Runway Statute’s enforcement. Cayuga 11 Nation v. Tanner

, 824 F.3d 321, 332 (2d C i r. 2016) (stati ng that redressabi l i ty 12 requi rement i s met where the court coul d prevent enforcement of a preempted 13 l aw). A favorabl e deci si on wi l lal so l i kel y redress Tweed’s current i nabi l i ty to 14 move forward wi th the runway extensi on and wi l lremove the absol ute barri er 15 the Statute i mposes. See W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 549 F.3d at 106-107; see also 16 Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560-61. Accordi ngl y, we hol d that Tweed has establ i shed 17 Arti cl e III standing. 141 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 II. 2 Next, the State contends that Tweed cannot bri ng sui t against C onnecti cu t 3 because i t i s a pol i ti calsubdi vi si on of C onnecti cut. As support for thi s 4 proposi ti on, the State rel i es on Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933), 5 and City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923). Williams invol ved a sui t 6 under the EqualProtecti on C l a use and Trenton invol ved a sui tunder the C ontract 7 C l ause and the Fourteenth Amendment. In both cases, the Supreme C ourt hel d 8 that sui ts under those provi si ons were not permi tted. Williams , 289 U.S. at 40; City 9 of Trenton , 262 U.S. at 188. 10 The vi ew that subdi vi si ons were broadl y prevented from sui ng a state was 11 put to rest i nGomillion v . Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). There, the Supreme C ourt 12 consi dered a chal l enge under the Fourteenth and Fi fteenth Amendments to 13 Al abama’s gerrymanderi ng of the boundari es of the C i ty of Tuskegee. Id . at 340. 14 The C ourt rejected Al abama’s asserti o n that a state’s power over i ts pol i ti cal 15 subdi vi si ons was unrestri cted by the C onsti tuti o n: “Legi sl ati ve control of 16 muni ci pal i ti es, no l ess than other state power, l i es wi thi n the scope of rel evant 17 l i mi t a ti ons i mposed by the Uni ted States C onsti tuti on.” Id. a t 344-45. The C ourt 151 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 emphasi zed that the “correct readi ng” of Williams and City of Trenton i s “that the 2 State’s authori ty i s unrestrai ned by the parti cul ar prohibi ti ons of the C onsti tuti o n 3 consi dered i n those cases.” Id. at 344. Si gni fi cantl y, none of those cases i nvol ved 4 the Supremacy C l ause, whi ch rai ses uni que federal i sm concerns. 5 Hundreds of federal l a ws appl y nati onwi de to states and thei r pol i ti cal 6 subdi vi si ons. They i mpose vari ous responsibi l i ti es and prohibi ti ons on states and 7 pol i ti calsubdi vi si ons that are i ntended by C ongress to appl y nati onwi de. If the 8 Supremacy C l ause means anythi ng, i t means that a state i s not free to enforce 9 wi thi n i ts boundari es l aws preempted by federal l aw. Lawsui ts i nvoki ng the 10 Supremacy C l ause are one of the mai n ways of ensuri ng that thi s does not occur. 11 In the years fol l owi ng Gomillion , the Supreme C ourt has repeatedl y 12 entertai ned sui t s agai nst a state by a subdi vi si on of the state, i ncl uding cases 13 under the Supremacy C l ause. See Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 14 U.S. 247, 252-53 (2011) (consi deri ng sui tby i ndependent state agency agai nst i ts 15 state for vi ol ati on of federal l aw al l eged to confl i ct wi th state l aw); Nixon v. Mo. 16 Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 130-31 (2004) (consi deri ng Supremacy C l ause 17 chal l enge by muni c i pal i ti es and uti l i ti es agai nst state statute); Lawrence Cty. v. 161 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. , 469 U.S. 256, 258 (1985) (consi deri ng Supremacy C l ause 2 chal l enge by county agai nst state statute); accord Bd. of Educ. v. Allen , 392 U.S. 236 3 (1968); see also Romer v. Evans , 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996) (state consti tuti onal 4 amendment preventi ng l ocalanti -di scri minati on ordi nances vi ol a ted the Equal 5 Protecti on C l ause); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 , 458 U.S. 457, 487 (1982) 6 (state statute prohibi ting a l ocalbusi ng desegregati on pl an vi o l ated the 7 Fourteenth Amendment). 7In l i ght of thi s authori ty, we hol d that a subdi v i si on 8 may sue i ts state under the Supremacy C l ause. In reachi ng thi s concl usi on we 9 join the Fi fth and Tenth C i rcui ts. R ogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057 (5th C i r. 1979); 10 Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer , 161 F.3d 619 (10th C i r. 1998). B ut see 11 Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank , 136 F.3d 1360 (9th C i r. 12 1998) (hol di ng a pol i ti calsubdi vi si on l acks standi ng to sue i ts own state under 13 the Supremacy C l ause).

7 We have hel d that a pol i ti calsubdi vi si on does not have standi ng to sue i ts state under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Ag uayo v. Richardson , 473 F.2d 1090, 1100 (2d C i r. 1973); City of New York v. Richardson , 473 F.2d 923, 929 (2d C i r. 1973). Those cases provi de no ai d to the State as Tweed i s not seeki ng to assert i t s own ri ghts under the Fourteenth Amendment, whi ch presents consi derati ons di fferent from those we consi der here. 171 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 III. 2 Tweed next contends that the Runway Statute i s preempted by the FAAct. 8 3 We agree. The FAAct “was enacted to create a uni form and excl usi ve system of 4 federal regul ati o n i n the fi el d of ai r safety . . . . [It] was passed by C ongress for 5 the purpose of central i zi ng i n a singl e authori ty . . . the power to frame rul es for 6 the safe and effi ci ent use of the nati on’s ai rspace.” Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. 7 Cuomo , 520 F.3d 218, 224-25 (2d C i r. 2008) (i nternal quotati on marks omi tted). 8 Wi th these objecti ves i n mind, we have hel d that the FAAct i mpl i edl y preempts 9 the enti re “fi el d of ai r safety.” Goodspeed Airport LLC v. E. Haddam Inland Wetlands 10 & Watercourses Comm’n, 634 F.3d 206, 210-11 (2d C i r. 2011). Accordi ngl y, “[s]tate 11 l aws that confl i ct wi th the FAA[ct] or suffi ci entl y i nterfere wi th federal regul ati on 12 of ai r safety are . . . preempted.” Fawemimo v. Am. Airlines, Inc

. , 751 F. App’x 16, 13 19 (2d C i r. 2018) (summary order). Our court has been cl ear as can be that FAAct

8Tweed al so contends that the Runway Statute i s preempted by the Ai rl i ne Deregul ati on Act and the Ai rport and Ai rway Improvement Act. Because we concl ude that the Runway Statute i s preempted by the FAAct, we make no determi nati on concerni ng preempti on under these other statutes. 181 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 preempti on appl i es to ai rport runways. Air Transp. Ass’n, 520 F.3d at 224-25 2 (FAAct preempti on “extends to grounded pl a nes and ai rport runways”). 3 Our next i nqui ry i s whether the Runway Statute fal l s wi thi n the scope of 4 that preempti o n. “The key questi on i s thus at what poi nt the state regul ati on 5 suffi ci entl y i nterferes wi th federal regul ati on that i t shoul d be deemed 6 pre-empted[.]” Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n , 505 U.S. 88, 107 (1992). We 7 strai ghtforwardl y concl ude that the Runway Statute fal l s wel lwi thi n the scope of 8 the FAAct’s preempti on because of i ts di rect i mpact on ai r safety. 9 The Ai rport has the 13th shortest runway out of the 348 ai rports where 10 commerci alservi ce i s provi ded. Furthermore, the State has conceded that “the 11 l ength of the runway has a di rect beari ng on the wei ght l oad and passenger 12 capaci ty that can be safel y handl ed on any gi v en fl i ght.” Joi nt App’x 55. Because 13 of the Statute, “[w]ei ght penal ti es are i mposed on [exi sti ng] ai rcraft [at the 14 Ai rport] for safety reasons.” Id . The Statute has l i mi ted the number of passengers 15 that can safel y occupy pl anes l eavi ng the Ai rport by preventi ng pl anes from 16 taking off at maxi mum capaci ty. For these safety reasons, carri ers are forced to 17 cut back on an ad-hoc basi s the number of passengers that can safel ybe carri ed, 191 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 the amount of baggage they can bri ng wi th them, and the totalwei ght of l uggage 2 that can be l oaded. 3 Addi ti onal l y, the Runway Statute has sharpl y l i mi ted the types of pl anes 4 that can use the runway. Modern jet passenger pl anes of the types used across 5 the country cannot safel y use the Ai rport. Thi s l ocal i zed, state-created l i mi tati on 6 i s i ncompatibl e wi th the FAAct’s objecti ve of establ i shi ng “a ‘uni form and 7 excl usi ve system of federal regul ati on’ i n the fi el d of ai r safety.” Air Transp. Ass’n , 8 520 F.3d at 224 (quoting City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc

. , 411 U.S. 624, 9 639 (1973)). If every state were free to control the l engths of runways wi thi n i ts boundari es, thi s C ongressi onalobjecti v e coul d never be achi eved. 10 The i nfl exibi l i ty of the ban i mposed by the Runway Statute al so counsel s i n 11 favor of preempti o n. The Runway Statute’s restri c ti on on runway devel opment i s 12 absol ute—i t i s a totalbarri er to i mprovements that coul d make Tweed safer and 13 more modern. C ourts i n thi s C i rcui t have hel d that the FAAct preempts 14 si gni fi c antl y l ess ri gi d statutes that merel y pl ace l i mi tati ons rather than total bans 15 on runway modi fi cati on. For exampl e, i n Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. 16 Town of East Haven (“ Tweed I” ) , the court hel d that a state regul ati o n that requi red 17 201 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong regul a tory approval before the runway safety areas coul d be constructed was 1 preempted. 582 F. Supp. 2d 261, 268-69 (D. C onn. 2008). Si mi l arl y, i n T own of 2 Stratford v. City of Bridgeport, the court hel d that a statute that requi red an ai rport 3 to obtai n approval of the town i n whi ch i ti s l o cated before i t can undertake a 4 federal l y mandated runway safety project was preempted. No. 10-cv-394, 2010 5 WL 11566477, at *6, 2010 LEXIS 65975, at *21-23 (D. C onn. June 18, 2010). Those 6 statutes merel y requi red state or ci ty approval for i mprovements to an ai rport’s 7 runway. Unl i ke those cases, the Runway Statute prohi bi ts runway expansi on 8 enti rel y. The Statute’s i nterference wi th the fi el d of ai r safety i s, therefore, even 9 greater than was the case wi th other statutes courts have hel d to be preempted by 10 the FAAct. 11 Fi nal l y, we have noted that FAAct preempti o n i s l ess l i kel y to appl y “to 12 smal l ai rports over whi ch the FAA has l i mi ted di rect oversi ght.” Goodspeed, 634 13 F.3d at 211-12. Tweed i s not such an ai rport. On the contrary, the FAA’s 14 i nvol v ement wi th Tweed and i ts runway project has been di rect and si gni fi cant. 15 The Ai rport i s federal l y regul a ted and exi sts wi thi n the Tweed-New Haven 16 Ai rport Layout Pl an (“ALP”), whi ch i s approved by the FAA. The FAA 17 211 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong maintai ns ful lcontrol over any modi fi cati on to the ALP, i ncl uding runway 1 l ength. The Ai rport i s cl assi fi ed by the FAA as a pri mary commerci alservi ce 2 ai rport and i s requ i red to hol d an operati ng certi fi cate under FAA regul ati on 14 3 C .F

. R. Part 139. A Master Pl an i s requi red of al lPart 139 ai rports, and Tweed’s 4 Master Pl an, whi ch i ncl u des extendi ng the l ength of the runway up to 7,200 feet, 5 was approved by the FAA as far back as 2002. Thi s l evelof federal i nterest and 6 i nvol v ement i s further i ndi cati on that the Runway Statute i s preempted. 7 8 In response to al lof thi s, the State mai ntai ns that i mpl i ed preempti o n i s not 9 warranted because the Runway Statute “does not prevent Tweed from compl yi ng 10 wi th any federal l y-mandated safety standards.” Appel l ee’s Br. at 56-57. But the 11 State confuses di fferent branches of i mpl i ed preempti on l aw: confl i c t preempti on 12 and fi el d preempti on. C onfl i ct preempti on exi sts when a state l aw “actual l y 13 confl i cts wi th federal l aw,” English v. Gen. Elec. Co. , 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990), i n other 14 words, where “state l aw stands as an obstacl e to the accompl i shment” of 15 C ongress’s i ntent, Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc ., 471 U.S. 707, 16 713 (1985). Thi s case i nvol ves fi el d preempti on, not confl i ct preempti on. Fi el d 17 preempti on exi sts where “C ongress i ntended the Federal Government to occupy 2 21 7 -3 48 1 -cv(L)

Tweed -New Hav en Airp ort Auth orityv . Tong 1 [a fi el d] excl usi vel y.” Air Transp. Ass’n , 520 F.3d at 220. And as we have seen, 2 C ongress i ntended the FAAct to occupy the enti re fi el d of ai r safety i ncl uding 3 runway l ength. 4 The State next asserts that the FAAct does not preempt the Runway Statute 5 because here, unl i ke i n Tweed I , no federal mandate requi res that Tweed extend i ts runway. See Appel l ee’s Br. at 58. Thi s characteri z ati on mi sses the poi nt. 6 Preempti on anal ysi s does not turn on whether the ai rl i ne safety acti v i ty i s 7 mandated by the federal government; 8 the di sposi ti ve questi on i s whether the 9 Runway Statute intrudes i nto the fi el d of ai r safety. We concl ude that i t does and 10 does so di rectl y. For these reasons, we hol d that the Runway Statute i s preempted 11 by the FAAct. 12 CONCL USION 13 The judgment of the l ower court i s RE VE RSE D and the case i s 14 RE M ANDE D for entry of judgment i n favor of Tweed.

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