UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

 

CAREER AGENTS NETWORK, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 09-CV-12269-DT

careeragentsnetwork.biz,

careeragentnetwork.biz,

LAWRENCE R. WHITE, and

AEROMEDIA MARKETING, INC.,

Defendants.

 /

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the court are cross-motions for summary judgment. Having reviewed the

briefs, the court concludes a hearing is unnecessary. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(e)(2). 

Plaintiff, having recently established itself a promoter and organizer, of sorts, of

recruiting entities, acquired the assets of an existing recruiting entity with which

Defendant White had earlier engaged in a business relationship. White found himself

dissatisfied with the relationship and the business practices of the entity, now affiliated

with Plaintiff, and proceeded to establish and maintain websites the domain names of

which incorporated Plaintiff’s name but which did no more than showcase criticism

–attempting, in essence, only to poison Plaintiff’s well. There is no evidence that

Defendants used these “gripe” websites for commercial gain to themselves, and the

statutes under which Plaintiff proceeds, given the facts presented here, do not prohibit
1

 The parties agree that the material facts of this case are undisputed. 

2

the speech involved in the websites’ existence. For these reasons, as explained below,

the court will grant Defendants’ motion and deny Plaintiff’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff Career Agents Network (“CAN”) was formed in late 2008, on or around

December 9, 2008. (Pl.’s Resp. at 3; Defs.’ Ex. A.) CAN applied for registration of its

alleged trademark “CAREER AGENTS NETWORK” shortly thereafter on February 9,

2009. (Am. Compl. ¶ 10.) In Plaintiff’s response brief, Plaintiff explains that CAN is “an

international consortium of independently owned recruiting companies from an

assortment of high-growth industries. CAN provides support for recruiting

entrepreneurs. The Member recruiting companies collaborate with one another to place

candidates in the right positions. CAN agents share recruitment fees when they

collaborate to place a client.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 3 (citing Byndas Dep. at 1-16, 40, Pl.’s Ex.

3).) 

After CAN was formed, it purchased the assets of a Missouri company called

Health Career Agents, Inc. (“HCA”). (Id.) According to Plaintiff, “HCA is also a

consortium of agents.” (Id.) 

About a year earlier, in January 2008, Defendant Lawrence White executed a

Purchase Agreement with HCA. Pursuant to the agreement, Defendant White states

that he “purchased a business opportunity to be an ‘owner/operator’ of his own

personnel recruiting business.” (Defs.’ Mot. Br. at 2.) “This so-called ‘business in a box’

would include training, software and support services and access to a network of other
3

owner/operators and development as well as training to twenty (20) other consultants

who the owner/operator (Defendant White) may hire.” (Id. at 2-3.) Defendant White

paid $49,000 to HCA for this business opportunity. (Id. at 3.) Defendant White avers

that he “soon discovered that the ‘business opportunity’ was not as lucrative as

represented.” (White Aff. at ¶ 6, Defs.’ Ex. B.) He also learned, in late 2008, that HCA

would be “transitioning” its assets to CAN. (Id. ¶ 7.)

Plaintiff contends that after CAN purchased the assets of HCA, “agents who were

already under contract with HCA were given the option of contracting with CAN.” (Pl.’s

Resp. at 3.) Plaintiff further contends that, despite Defendant White’s assertion that he

has no connection with CAN, “[i]f White makes an employee placement with the aid of

HCA, he must split the placement fee with HCA, whose assets are now owned by CAN.” 

(Id. (citing Byndas Dep. at 40, 143, Pl.’s Ex. 3).)

Defendant White is the majority stockholder of Defendant AeroMedia Marketing,

Inc. (“AeroMedia”). (White Aff. ¶ 2, Defs.’ Ex. B.) Defendant White, as an agent for

AeroMedia, registered the two domain names at issue in this litigation:

careeragentsnetwork.biz and careeragentnetwork.biz (the “Domain Names”). (Id. ¶ 3.) 

The two Domain Names were registered on January 21, 2009 and January 22, 2009

with DIRECTI, a commercial registrar of domain names. (Id. ¶ 12.) 

In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants assert that when AeroMedia

registered the Domain Names with DIRECTI, “AeroMedia opted for the free service of

Privacy Protect. Privacy Protect is a commonly used service that keeps the names of

the registrant of the domain names from direct public access to limit the amount of
2

For support of this proposition, Defendants cite to pages 19-20 of Defendant

White’s deposition. (Defs.’ Br. at 3, n.4 & 5.) However, these pages were not included

in the submission provided to the court. Nonetheless, it does not appear to be

contested that Defendants signed up for privacy protection when establishing their

websites. 

3

In their briefs and accompanying exhibits, the parties refer to Defendants’

“website” (singular) or “websites” (plural) interchangeably and apparently without

distinction. For the sake of consistency, the court will refer to Defendants’ websites

(plural), although whether Defendants established one or two websites does not affect

the analysis in this opinion.

4

spam, junk mail, and unsolicited contact.”2 (Defs.’ Br. at 3.) “Under Privacy Protect, if a

third party seeks to discover the identity of the registrant, the registrant is provided the

relevant contact information from Privacy Protect.” (Id. at 3-4.) “[H]owever, there is no

direct contact provided to the person seeking the registrant’s identity.” (Id. at 4.) 

After registering the names, Defendant AeroMedia established website hosting

accounts with hosting providers. (White Aff. ¶ 13, Defs.’ Ex. B) Defendant AeroMedia

was then able to upload its hypertext markup language (html) files for publication and

viewing on the Internet. (Id. ¶ 14.) The websites3 consisted of a single page of text,

which stated in its entirety:

WARNING

If you are considering investing in 

this “opportunity”, be aware that it is

highly improbable that you will earn

enough to cover your investment. If

you proceed with this company you

have been warned by those that 

know and have lost $20,000-$150,000

by trusting them and their “plan”

(Id. ¶ 15; Defs.’ Ex. E.) After posting the website, Defendants employed a search

engine optimizer (“SEO”) to assist in raising the website presence in search engines
5

such as Google, Yahoo, MSN, and other search tools. (White Aff. ¶ 17, Defs.’ Ex. B)

The effect of utilizing the SEO is that when a search term was entered with the string of

keywords, “career agents,” “career agents network,” or other similar words, Defendants’

website would be listed among the top search results. (Id.) 

According to Defendant White, at the time Defendant registered the Domain

Names, “Plaintiff had no substantive online presence. A Domain Name

‘www.careeragentsnetwork.com’ existed but, [sic] the website consisted of only the

words ‘Career Agents Network’ in black type on a white background and contained no

links and no information.” (Id. ¶ 19).

Defendant avers that “[t]he sole intent in creating the websites was to express an

opinion about the business practices of Plaintiff.” (White Aff. ¶ 21, Defs.’ Ex. B)

Defendant also contends that neither he nor AeroMedia ever attempted or offered to sell

the Domain Names to Plaintiff or anyone else. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 22.) Defendant White states

that at no time did he make or seek to make a profit as a result of the operation of the

websites, nor is he aware of any customers that have confused the websites with that of

Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 23.)

Plaintiff asserts that “[t]hough CAN is a relatively new company, it has spent

hundreds of thousands of dollars marketing and advertising of the CAN Mark, and

announced the asset purchase agreement with HCA publicly.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 4.) 

Joshua Decker, the manager of marketing services at CAN, avers that “[t]he annual

budget for marketing and advertising at CAN is more than $100,000.” (Decker Decl. ¶

3.) Decker also asserts that “CAN uses the Internet extensively for advertising and

marketing.” (Id.)
6

II. STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper when

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “In deciding a motion for summary

judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Sagan v. United

States, 342 F.3d 493, 497 (6th Cir. 2003). “Where the moving party has carried its

burden of showing that the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

admissions and affidavits in the record, construed favorably to the non-moving party, do

not raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial, entry of summary judgment is

appropriate.” Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1536 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)).

The court does not weigh the evidence to determine the truth of the matter, but

rather, to determine if the evidence produced creates a genuine issue for trial. Sagan,

342 F.3d at 497 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). 

The moving party discharges its burden by “‘showing’ –that is, pointing out to the district

court– that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”

Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d 906, 909 (2004) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). The

burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who “must do more than simply show that

there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The non-moving party must put forth

enough evidence to show that there exists “a genuine issue for trial.” Horton, 369 F.3d

at 909 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (1986)). Summary judgment is not
7

appropriate when “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint asserts two counts against Defendants:

cybersquatting under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §

1125(d) (“ACPA”) and trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §

1125(a).

A. Cybersquatting

The ACPA provides, in relevant part:

(1)(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark,

including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this

section, if, without regard to the goods or services of the parties, that

person

(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark . . . and 

(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that-- 

(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of

registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly

similar to that mark; [or]

(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of

registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly

similar to or dilutive of that mark; . . . 

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A).

In order to establish a “cybersquatting” claim under the ACPA, Plaintiff must

establish: (1) it has a valid trademark entitled to protection; (2) its mark is distinctive or

famous; (3) Defendants’ Domain Names are identical or confusingly similar to, or in the

case of famous marks, dilutive of, Plaintiff’s mark; and (4) Defendants used, registered,
8

or trafficked in the domain name (5) with a bad faith intent to profit. DaimlerChrysler v.

The Net Inc., 388 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Catalanotte,

342 F.3d 543, 546 (6th Cir. 2003)). Here, Plaintiff’s case must fail because it has

provided no evidence that Defendants used the Domain Names with a bad faith intent to

profit. 

The ACPA lists several factors a court may consider in determining whether a

person has a bad faith intent, including: 

(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if any,

in the domain name; 

(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of the

person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person; 

(III) the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with

the bona fide offering of any goods or services; 

(IV) the person’s bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site

accessible under the domain name; 

(V) the person’s intent to divert consumers from the mark owner’s online

location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the

goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the

intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of

confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the

site; 

(VI) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain

name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having

used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering

of any goods or services, or the person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern

of such conduct; 

(VII) the person’s provision of material and misleading false contact

information when applying for the registration of the domain name, the

person’s intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the

person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; 

(VIII) the person’s registration or acquisition of multiple domain names

which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of
9

others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain

names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time of

registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or

services of the parties; and 

(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person’s domain

name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of

subsection (c) of this section. 

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B). Courts “are not limited to considering just the listed factors

when making [the] determination of whether the statutory criterion has been met. The

factors are, instead, expressly described as indicia that ‘may’ be considered along with

other facts.” Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 498 (2d

Cir. 2000) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)). “The role of the reviewing court is not

simply to add factors and place them in particular categories, without making some

sense of what motivates the conduct at issue. The factors are given to courts as a

guide, not as a substitute for careful thinking about whether the conduct at issue is

motivated by a bad faith intent to profit.” Lucas Nursery and Landscaping, Inc. v.

Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 811 (6th Cir. 2004).

In Lucas Nursery, the defendant, who was dissatisfied with the services provided

by the plaintiff’s landscaping business, registered the domain name “lucasnursery.com”

to complain about the plaintiff’s company. The Sixth Circuit balanced the relevant “bad

faith intent” factors listed above and found:

None of these factors militates against Grosse. There is no dispute that

Lucas Nursery did not have an online location, and hence Grosse’s

creation of a web site to complain about Lucas Nursery’s services could

not have been intended “to divert consumers from the mark owners’s

online location.” Nor is there any evidence that Grosse ever sought to

mislead consumers with regard to the site’s sponsorship. The web site

explicitly stated that the site was established by Grosse for the purposes

of relaying her experience with Lucas Nursery. Moreover, Grosse never
4

While Defendants have registered other domain names to criticize organizations,

they do not incorporate trademarks nor have they attempted to sell the domain names.

10

offered to sell the site to Lucas Nursery. She also did not provide

misleading contact information when she registered the domain name.

Finally, she has not acquired any additional domain names, which would

be indicative of either an intent to sell such names to those entities whose

trademarks were identical or similar, or exploit them for other uses.

Id. at 810. A similar balancing in this case results in the same conclusion. Specifically,

the court finds that as in Lucas Nursery, no reasonable jury could find a “bad faith intent

to profit” under the circumstances of this case. It is undisputed that Defendants set up

websites using Plaintiff’s alleged mark, that Defendants had never previously used the

mark, and that Defendants themselves had no intellectual property rights in the “Career

Agents Network” mark. Defendants specifically admit that they set up the sites in order

to refer to Plaintiff’s business, and to negatively comment on CAN. However, it is also

undisputed that Defendants never attempted to sell the Domain Names to Plaintiff and

that Defendants have not registered or attempted to sell other domain names

incorporating other alleged marks.4

 Further, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, there is no

evidence that Defendants provided “false or misleading” contact information in

registering the Domain Names. The record indicates that Defendants provided accurate

contact information, but that they utilized a privacy protection service so as to not make

their contact information readily available to the general public. Use of the privacy

protection service is not the same thing as providing false or misleading contact

information. Nor is there any evidence that Defendants created a “a likelihood of

confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site.” 15
5

This is true despite the fact that Defendants’ websites did not include a

disclaimer indicating that the sites were not sponsored by CAN. The Sixth Circuit has

found the presence of disclaimers as supportive of a finding of no bad faith, Taubman v.

Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 2003), but this does not necessarily mean that the

absence of disclaimers mandates a finding of bad faith. Further, disclaimers are more

important in cases such as Taubman, where the content of the website could have

created confusion as to the source of the website. Id. Here, given the highly critical

content of the website, no such confusion exists. 

11

U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(V). Given the content of the sites, criticizing CAN, there can be

no issue of fact that anyone viewing Defendants’ sites would believe that CAN had

sponsored, created, endorsed or was in any way affiliated with the sites.5

 

The Sixth Circuit has stated that “cybersquatting” under the ACPA occurs when

someone “other than the trademark holder registers the domain name of a well known

trademark and then attempts to profit from this by either ransoming the domain name

back to the trademark holder or by using the domain name to divert business from the

trademark holder to the domain name holder.” DaimlerChrysler, 388 F.3d at 204 (citing

Sporty’s Farm, 202 F.3d at 493). This is not what happened in this case. Plaintiff

attempts to cast this case as one in which Defendants were “caught red-handed

attempting to damage Plaintiff’s business and thereby divert clients and bolster [their]

own competing business.” (Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 1 (emphasis added).) It is true that there

is evidence that Defendants attempted to damage Plaintiff’s business, but there is no

evidence that Defendants attempted to “divert” Plaintiff’s clients to bolster their own

business. Instead, the undisputed evidence reveals that Defendants established a

“gripe site,” in which they expressed their strong dissatisfaction with Plaintiff’s “business

in a box,” or investment opportunity. 
12

Plaintiff argues that Defendant White “is a recruiter in the same business as is

CAN” and that he has a commercial interest in “diverting potential customers from CAN

[because] he makes more money if CAN agents are not involved in his employee

placements.” (Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 9.) There are, however, several problems with

Plaintiff’s argument. First, there is some question as to whether Plaintiff has presented

sufficient evidence that the parties are competitors of one another. The parties disagree

on this point. Plaintiff asserts that they are both in the employment recruiting business

and thus competitors, while Defendants claim that Plaintiff merely sells recruiting

businesses, rather than operating them itself. 

Charlotte Byndas, the owner of Career Agents Network, testified that she runs a

business that “launches people into recruiting firms, and so that’s my job now is to help

entrepreneurs start up recruiting businesses.” (Byndas Dep. at 8, Pl.’s Ex. 3 (emphasis

added).) Defendant White, however, does not “help entrepreneurs start up recruiting

businesses,” but instead himself operates such a recruiting business. (White Aff. at ¶ 5,

Defs.’ Ex. B.) Thus, while the parties are generally in the same field of the “recruiting

industry,” conceptually they operate at different levels. Indeed, it can even be argued

they operate in different fields, because Defendant White and HCA deal solely with the

placement of health care professionals, whereas CAN deals with other professions

beyond the health care industry. (Byndas Dep. at 13-14.) 

To the extent that Defendant White, in operating his placement business

competes with the member companies of CAN, Byndas testified that, anytime that

White makes a placement through use of HCA’s member network (which is how HCA

and CAN are designed to operate) White owes a fee to HCA which in turn is paid to
13

CAN because it owns the assets of HCA. (Byndas dep. at 40.) Thus, to some extent,

Defendants’ success benefits, not harms, Plaintiff. (Id. at 40.)

Byndas herself testified that CAN has no competitors, and that no other recruiting

firms offers services the same way CAN does. (Byndas Dep. at 44-45, Defs.’ Ex. H.) 

She testified that the closest thing to a competitor would be a franchise organization,

rather than an organization, like CAN, which offers a “business-in-a-box.” (Id. at 45.)

When asked at her deposition how Defendants could be competing with Plaintiff

when Plaintiff does not have “any competition,” Byndas offered that people “looking at

entering into the recruiting space” have multiple options. (Id.) “They can purchase a

franchise, they could purchase a membership with us and we could help them launch

that business, or they could join an ongoing entity.” (Id.) The court is not persuaded

that a business offering an opportunity to own a franchise is in competition with a

franchise. The services offered are different, and draw interest from different clients. 

Further, even if the court accepted Plaintiff’s theory of competition, it has not

offered any evidence to suggest that Defendant White was competing or attempting to

divert customers away from Plaintiff. Byndas testified that her “feeling” is that

Defendant’s firm wanted to recruit people to join HCA, rather than have them join CAN. 

(Byndas Dep. at 39.) She bases this “feeling” on her belief that Defendant’s firm

recruited a large number of people. (Id.) And she bases this belief on correspondence

she received from White that states “Charlotte: Over the past fifteen months I’ve had to

terminate or had quit more than fifty consultants that are unable to earn a living, so I can

understand your disappointment in letting two go.” (Id. at 39-40.) Byndas testified that,

based on this correspondence, she deduced that “what he gained from [registering the
14

Domain Names and posting his websites] was that he wanted to encourage people to

join his firm rather than joining as owner/operators of [CAN].” (Id. at 40.) Plaintiff’s

suppositions about Defendants’ intent are not evidence that Defendants were actually

trying to divert potential owners/operators away from CAN. The “fact” provided by

Defendant White, in what appears to be a sarcastic tone, that he had to let go fifty

consultants, does not support Plaintiff’s “belief” that these consultants were individuals

who Defendant White lured away from Plaintiff at all, let alone through use of the

Domain Names. There is no evidence as to when these consultants were first hired by

Defendant, no evidence as to whether these are consultants who initially were

interested in joining CAN as an owner/operator or in any other capacity, no evidence

that these consultants knew about or saw Defendant’s website, and no evidence as to

how they might have then stumbled upon Defendant’s company even if they had seen

Defendant’s website. Nor is there any evidence, other than Plaintiff’s mere conjecture,

that Defendants intended to divert these consultants away from Plaintiff. 

Indeed, the court cannot imagine how Defendants may have intended to profit

from their use of Plaintiff’s alleged marks in their Domain Names. There were no links

or contact information posted on the websites which would “divert” customers from

Plaintiff to Defendants. Any viewer of Defendants’ websiteswould have no way of

knowing even of the option of joining Defendants’ business. Plaintiff has not presented

any evidence that there were only two options available to its potential customers and,

by disparaging Plaintiff’s business as one option, customers were necessarily diverted

to the only remaining option of joining Defendants’ company. Plaintiff’s “belief” that

Defendant was trying to divert customers by criticizing Plaintiff is simply too attenuated
6

This is not the same inquiry as finding a “commercial use” by Defendants. 

There, are perhaps, situations in which a defendant could make a “noncommercial use”

of a mark with a bad faith intent to profit. For example, in Bosley Medical Institute, Inc.

v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that, unlike a trademark

infringement claim, an ACPA cybersquatting claim was not subject to a commercial use

requirement. The court nonetheless held that the plaintiff must show a bad faith intent

to profit. Id. at 681. The Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court to allow discovery

on whether the defendant registered the domain names in bad faith and, specifically,

whether he had sent letters to the plaintiff offering to sell the domain name. Thus, this

court’s inquiry, focused on whether Plaintiff can show Defendants had a bad faith intent

to profit is not the same inquiry as whether they may have made a commercial use of

the mark. 

15

to be more than, at most, a scintilla of evidence in support of its position, and is certainly

not enough to withstand Defendants’ summary judgment motion. 

Fundamentally, Plaintiff seems to argue that because the facts show that

Defendants attempted to harm Plaintiff, Plaintiff can show a bad faith intent to profit. 

For example, it is irrelevant to the bad faith inquiry that Defendants utilized an SEO to

increase the number of “hits” on its website. As stated above, Plaintiff must show more

than Defendants’ attempt to harm Plaintiff’s business. Plaintiff must show that

Defendants had a bad faith intent to profit from their use of the Domain Names.6

DaimlerChrysler, 388 F.3d at 204. Toward that end, as stated above, the court agrees

with Defendants that this case is controlled by the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Lucas

Nursery, 359 F.3d 806. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit’s observation in Lucas Nursery is

equally appropriate in this case:

Perhaps most important to our conclusion are, [the defendant’s] actions,

which seem to have been undertaken in the spirit of informing fellow

consumers about the practices of a landscaping company that she

believed had performed inferior work on her yard. One of the ACPA’s

main objectives is the protection of consumers from slick internet peddlers

who trade on the names and reputations of established brands. The
16

practice of informing fellow consumers of one’s experience with a

particular service provider is surely not inconsistent with this ideal.

Id. at 811. Similarly, Defendants’ use of Plaintiff’s alleged mark in the Domain Names

registered to criticize Plaintiff’s business is not “inconsistent with,” nor in violation of, the

ACPA. Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants had a bad faith intent to profit, and

summary judgment will thus be granted to Defendants on this count.

B. Trademark Infringement

Plaintiff’s complaint also asserts a cause of action for trademark infringement

under the Lanham Act. The Lanham Act provides:

(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or

any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,

symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of

origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading

representation of fact, which--

(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to

deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of

such person with another person, or as to the origin,

sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or

commercial activities by another person, or 

(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents

the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of

his or her or another person’s goods, services, or

commercial activities, 

shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is

or is likely to be damaged by such act.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).

“The Lanham Act is constitutional because it only regulates commercial speech,

which is entitled to reduced protections under the First Amendment.” Taubman Co. v.

Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
17

v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)). The Sixth Circuit has

therefore held that the first inquiry under the Lanham Act is whether the defendant’s

“use is commercial and therefore within the jurisdiction of the Lanham Act, worthy of

lesser First Amendment protections.” Id. If the defendant’s use “is commercial, then,

and only then, do we analyze his use for a likelihood of confusion. If [the defendant’s]

use is also confusing, then it is misleading commercial speech, and outside the First

Amendment.” Id. at 774-75. “Hence, as per the language of the Lanham Act, any

expression embodying the use of a mark not ‘in connection with the sale . . . or

advertising of any goods or services,’ and not likely to cause confusion, is outside the

jurisdiction of the Lanham Act and necessarily protected by the First Amendment.”

Id. at 775; see also Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 676-77 (9th

Cir. 2005) (“The Supreme Court has made it clear that trademark infringement law

prevents only unauthorized uses of a trademark in connection with a commercial

transaction in which the trademark is being used to confuse potential consumers.”).

Thus, the court first focuses on whether Defendants’ use of the Domain Names

was a “commercial use.” Despite the court’s conclusion that Defendants’ use was

undisputedly not commercial, the court will also briefly address whether Defendants’

use is likely to cause confusion.

1. Whether Defendants’ Use of the Domain Names Constitute Noncommercial

Speech Protected by the First Amendment

Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ registration and use of the Domain Names

constituted commercial use because Defendant White operates an employment

recruiting company which is in competition with Plaintiff’s business. Thus, Plaintiff
18

intimates that Defendants’ attempt to disparage Plaintiff’s business was necessarily a

commercial use because it harmed Plaintiff’s business. As the court is unconvinced

that Plaintiff’s theory evinces Defendants’ “bad faith intent to profit,” so the court is also

unconvinced that Plaintiff’s theory evinces a commercial use. First, as discussed

above, the court is not persuaded that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence that it

is a competitor of Defendants. While they operate in the same general recruiting

industry, they do so in different ways and aim at different types of customers. Further,

even if the parties are competitors, Defendants’ actions in posting a critical commentary

of Plaintiff’s business is not a “commercial use” under the facts of this case. 

In so holding, the court finds persuasive the reasoning set forth by the Ninth

Circuit in Bosley, 403 F.3d 672. In Bosley, the facts were similar to the facts of this

case. As summarized by the Ninth Circuit: 

Defendant Michael Kremer was dissatisfied with the hair restoration

services provided to him by the Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. In a

bald-faced effort to get even, Kremer started a website at

www.BosleyMedical.com, which, to put it mildly, was uncomplimentary of

the Bosley Medical Institute. The problem is that “Bosley Medical” is the

registered trademark of the Bosley Medical Institute, Inc., which brought

suit against Kremer for trademark infringement and like claims. Kremer

argues that noncommercial use of the mark is not actionable as

infringement under the Lanham Act. Bosley responds that Kremer is

splitting hairs.

Id. at 674. The court held that “the noncommercial use of a trademark as the domain

name of a website-the subject of which is consumer commentary about the products

and services represented by the mark-does not constitute infringement under the 

Lanham Act.” Id. In concluding that the defendant’s use was noncommercial, the court

found relevant that the defendant’s site did not contain any commercial links but rather 
19

contained links to a discussion group, which in turn contained advertising. Id. at 678. 

The court stated that “[t]his roundabout path to the advertising of others is too

attenuated to render Kremer’s site commercial. At no time did Kremer’s

BosleyMedical.com site offer for sale any product or service or contain paid

advertisements from any other commercial entity.” Id.

Likewise, the court rejects Plaintiff’s theory that solely because Defendants are

competitors then their use of the Domain Names is commercial. As more fully

discussed above, it strains credulity that Defendants set up these Domain Names as a

means of generating business. The websites did not contain links to Defendants’

website, or even mention Defendants’ business as an alternative to Plaintiff. Under

Plaintiff’s theory, the court would have to accept that it is a viable commercial use of

Plaintiff’s Domain Names for Defendants to criticize Plainitff in the hopes that the

Internet surfer would then somehow fortuitously find his way to Defendants’ website,

which offers a different service than does Plaintiff’s company, and decide to use

Defendants’ service instead. This “roundabout path” is extremely unlikely and does not

support a finding of commercial use. 

Moreover, that Defendants were attempting to harm Plaintiff’s business is not

sufficient to translate criticism into commercial use. The Ninth Circuit rejected a similar

argument as “over-expansive”, finding that it would “place most critical, otherwise

protected consumer commentary under the restrictions of the Lanham Act,” and “would

encompass almost all uses of a registered trademark, even when the mark is merely

being used to identify the object of consumer criticism.” Id. at 679.
20

This broad view of the Lanham Act is supported by neither the text of the

statute nor the history of trademark laws in this country. “[T]rademark

laws are intended to protect” consumers from purchasing the products of

an infringer “under the mistaken assumption that they are buying a

product produced or sponsored by [the trademark holder].” Beneficial

Corp. v. Beneficial Capital Corp., 529 F.Supp. 445, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 

Limiting the Lanham Act to cases where a defendant is trying to profit from

a plaintiff’s trademark is consistent with the Supreme Court’s view that “[a

trademark’s] function is simply to designate the goods as the product of a

particular trader and to protect his good will against the sale of another’s

product as his.” United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90,

97, 39 S.Ct. 48, 63 L.Ed. 141 (1918); see also 1 McCarthy on Trademarks

and Unfair Competition § 2:7 (4th ed. 2004).

Id. Merely because Defendants’ use of the Plaintiff’s alleged mark excoriated certain

commercial practices does not mean that Defendants’ use of the Domain Names was in

turn “commercial.” Defendants did not use the alleged mark in any connection

whatsoever with their own business or website, nor did they attempt to sell or advertise

anything at all in connection with the Domain Names.

The court also rejects Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants’ use of the Domain

Names necessarily constitutes a trademark violation because the Domain Names are

verbatim recitations of Plaintiff’s alleged mark. Plaintiff cites district court cases from

other circuits for his proposition, which are not only non-binding, but distinguishable. 

For example, Plaintiff cites to OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176,

186 (W.D.N.Y. 2000), which held that “the national, and even international, nature of the

Internet itself makes defendants’ use of plaintiffs’ trademark as a domain name a use in

commerce’ for purposes of the Lanham Act.” The court disagrees with this non-binding

holding, but also notes that OBH is distinguishable because the defendant’s website in

OBH contained links to the defendant’s on-line business which was operated for a

commercial purpose. Id. 
21

Plaintiff also cites to Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 308 (D.N.J.

1998), where the court found commercial use, in part because:

the Defendant has done more than merely register a domain name. He

has created, in his words, a “bogus ‘Jews for Jesus’ “ site intended to

intercept, through the use of deceit and trickery, the audience sought by

the Plaintiff Organization. Moreover, the Defendant Internet site uses the

Mark and the Name of the Plaintiff Organization as its address, conveying

the impression to Internet users that the Plaintiff Organization is the

sponsor of the Defendant Internet site.

Id. (footnote omitted). In Jews for Jesus, however, the challenged website also

contained a hyperlink to a commercial website. Id. 

Plaintiff also relies on Jews for Jesus, for the proposition that 

The conduct of the Defendant also constitutes a commercial use of the

Mark and the Name of the Plaintiff Organization because it is designed to

harm the Plaintiff Organization commercially by disparaging it and

preventing the Plaintiff Organization from exploiting the Mark and the

Name of the Plaintiff Organization. See Panavision, 945 F.Supp. at 1303.

In addition, the Defendant Internet site has and will continue to inhibit the

efforts of Internet users to locate the Plaintiff Organization Internet site.

See id.

Id. at 308. This court, however, rejected the reasoning of Jews for Jesus nine years

ago in Ford Motor Company v. 2600 Enterprises, 177 F.Supp. 2d 661 (E.D. Mich.

2001)). In that case, the court held that:

First, Defendants’ use of the FORD mark in their programming code,

unlike the unauthorized use of a trademark as a domain name, does not

inhibit Internet users from reaching the websites that are most likely to be

associated with the mark holder. Second, where, as here, the

unauthorized use in no way competes with the mark owner’s offering of

goods or services, the “in connection with goods or services” requirement

is not satisfied simply because a prospective user of the Internet may face

some difficulty in finding the home page he is seeking.

[T]rademark law requires reasonableness on the part of

consumers. Although the need to search for a mark holder’s

site may rise to the level of inconvenience, this
22

inconvenience is not cognizable. An Internet user who

intends to access either party’s products or services, but

who has not done so before, may go to a search engine, or

on America Online, to Keyword. Any inconvenience to an

Internet user searching for Plaintiff’s web site is trivial.

Searches for Plaintiff’s web page on popular internet search

engines, including google.com, goto.com, and lycos.com, list

Plaintiff’s web site as their first or second “hits.” 

Id. at 665-66 (citing Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F.Supp. 2d 372, 379-80 (E.D. Pa.

2001) and Hasbro Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F.Supp.2d 117, 124-25 (D. Mass.

1999). 

Plaintiff points out that in Ford Motor Company the court stated the defendant’s

use was in a programming code, “unlike the unauthorized use of a trademark as a

domain name.” Id. at 665. Plaintiff thus extrapolates that because this case involves

the use of a trademark as a domain name then necessarily the reasoning of this court in

Ford Motor Company does not apply. Nonetheless, the language on which Plaintiff

relies was dicta and is not determinative to the conclusion in this case. Further, the

language on which Plaintiff relies was only a portion of the first of two alternative bases

on which to reject the reasoning of Jews for Jesus and Plaintiff’s theory in this case. 

Most importantly, however, in the intervening years since Ford Motor Company was

decided, the Sixth Circuit has implicitly rejected the theory that the use of a trademark in

a domain name necessarily constitutes trademark infringement.

In Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 2003), the Sixth Circuit

found that the use of the website “shopsatwillowbend.com,” which was an informational

website with a map of a shopping center and a list of the tenant stores did not infringe

on the registered mark, “The Shops at Willow Bend,” so long as it did not contain links
23

or advertisements to other businesses. Id. at 775-76. Thus, the fact that the Domain

Names were identical to Plaintiff’s alleged mark does not automatically establish

trademark infringement or evince a commercial use of the Domain Names. 

In Bosley, the court stated:

The Second Circuit held in United We Stand America, Inc. v. United We

Stand, America New York, Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir.1997), that the

“use in connection with the sale of goods and services” requirement of the

Lanham Act does not require any actual sale of goods and services. 

Thus, the appropriate inquiry is whether Kremer offers competing services

to the public. Kremer is not Bosley’s competitor; he is their critic. His use

of the Bosley mark is not in connection with a sale of goods or services-it

is in connection with the expression of his opinion about Bosley’s goods

and services.

Bosley Medical Institute, Inc., 403 F.3d at 679. Although Plaintiff argues that

Defendants are its competitors, there is no triable issue that in using the Domain

Names, Defendants were not offering competing services or otherwise using Plaintiff’s

mark in connection with the sale of goods or services. As in Bosley, they were using

the Domain Names solely in connection with the expression of an opinion. Accordingly,

[t]he dangers that the Lanham Act was designed to address are simply not

at issue in this case. The Lanham Act, expressly enacted to be applied in

commercial contexts, does not prohibit all unauthorized uses of a

trademark. Kremer’s use of the Bosley Medical mark simply cannot

mislead consumers into buying a competing product-no customer will

mistakenly purchase a hair replacement service from Kremer under the

belief that the service is being offered by Bosley. Neither is Kremer

capitalizing on the good will Bosley has created in its mark. Any harm to

Bosley arises not from a competitor’s sale of a similar product under

Bosley’s mark, but from Kremer’s criticism of their services. Bosley

cannot use the Lanham Act either as a shield from Kremer’s criticism, or

as a sword to shut Kremer up.

Id. at 679 -680. The court finds that Plaintiff has failed to proffer sufficient evidence to

create a triable issue as to Defendants’ noncommercial use of the Domain Names. As
24

such, Plaintiff cannot show a violation of the Lanham Act, and Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment.

2. Likelihood of Confusion

Further, the court finds that even if Plaintiff could show that Defendants’ use of

the Domain Names was commercial, and within the jurisdiction of the Lanham Act,

Defendants are still entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff cannot show that

Defendants use created a likelihood of confusion among customers. As the Second

Circuit has held:

The Lanham Act seeks to prevent consumer confusion that enables a

seller to pass “off his goods as the goods of another.” Programmed Tax

Systems, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 439 F.Supp. 1128, 1132 (S.D.N.Y.1977)

(quoting Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861,

863 (S.D.N.Y.1962), aff’d, 312 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1963). In Programmed

Tax Systems, the court explained that the relevant confusion is that which

affects “the purchasing and selling of the goods or services in question.”

Id. The Restatement concurs, citing to Judge Lasker’s opinion in

Beneficial Corp. v. Beneficial Capital Corp., 529 F.Supp. 445, 450

(S.D.N.Y. 1982), for the proposition that “trademark infringement protects

only against mistaken purchasing decisions and not against confusion

generally.” Restatement, supra, § 20 reporter’s note at 179.

Lang v. Retirement Living Pub. Co., Inc., 949 F.2d 576, 582-83 (2d Cir. 1991). 

Under the undisputed facts before the court no rational fact-finder could find that

Defendants’ use of the Domain Names created the likelihood of confusion between their

products and services and Plaintiff’s. As stated multiple times above, there is no

mention of Defendants’ business on the challenged websites. Nor could any rational

fact-finder find that Defendants attempted to create confusion between the parties’

services, as the subject websites stood alone, i.e., sans links, and as such they plainly

accomplished nothing more than to criticize Plaintiff’s business practices. There is no
25

triable issue that Defendants were attempting to pass off their services as Plaintiff’s.

The Sixth Circuit has held that “the only important question is whether there is a

likelihood of confusion between the parties’ goods or services.” Taubman, 319 F.3d at

776 (emphasis in original) (citing Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 877 (6th Cir .2002)). 

Thus, “[u]nder Lanham Act jurisprudence, it is irrelevant whether customers would be

confused as to the origin of the websites, unless there is confusion as to the origin of

the respective products.” Id. (citing Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, 109 F.3d at 280)). 

The court further elaborated:

We find that Mishkoff’s use of Taubman’s mark in the domain name

“taubmansucks.com” is purely an exhibition of Free Speech, and the

Lanham Act is not invoked. And although economic damage might be an

intended effect of Mishkoff’s expression, the First Amendment protects

critical commentary when there is no confusion as to source, even when it

involves the criticism of a business. Such use is not subject to scrutiny

under the Lanham Act. In fact, Taubman concedes that Mishkoff is “free

to shout ‘Taubman Sucks!’ from the rooftops . . . .” Brief for Respondent,

at 58. Essentially, this is what he has done in his domain name. The

rooftops of our past have evolved into the internet domain names of our

present. We find that the domain name is a type of public expression, no

different in scope than a billboard or a pulpit, and Mishkoff has a First

Amendment right to express his opinion about Taubman, and as long as

his speech is not commercially misleading, the Lanham Act cannot be

summoned to prevent it.

Id. at 778. Here, as in Taubman, Defendants’ use of the Domain Names was not

commercially misleading. Plaintiff can therefore not invoke the Lanham Act to protect

itself from unwanted critical commentary. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

will be granted.
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IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Dkt. # 43] is

GRANTED and Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Dkt. # 55] is DENIED. A

separate judgment will issue.

 S/Robert H. Cleland 

ROBERT H. CLELAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: February 26, 2010

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record

on this date, February 26, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

 S/Lisa Wagner 

Case Manager and Deputy Clerk

(313) 234-5522

S:\Cleland\JUDGE'S DESK\C3 ORDERS\09-12269.CAREERAGENTS.Trademark.Cybersquatting.2.wpd