rel: 06/20/2014

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter

. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions , Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229- 0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter

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# SUPRE ME CO URT O F ALA BAMA

OCTOB ER TE RM, 2 013-2 014

_____ _____ _____ _____ 11301 10

_____ _____ _____ _____ Ex pa rte I ntern ation al Re finin g & M anufa cturi ng Co . d/b /a IRMCO , et al.

PETIT ION F OR WR IT OF MAND AMUS
(In r e: Be ll Ca rr, J r., e t al.

v.
Arvin Indu strie s d/b /a Ar vin-M erito r, In c., e t al. )

(Faye tte C ircui t Cou rt, C V-03- 0142)

_____ _____ _____ _____ 11301 11

_____ _____ _____ _____ Ex pa rte G E Bet z, In c., e t al.

PETIT ION F OR WR IT OF MAND AMUS(In r e: Be ll Ca rr, J r., e t al.

v.
Arvin Indu strie s d/b /a Ar vin-M erito r, In c., e t al. )

(Faye tte C ircui t Cou rt, C V-03- 0142)

BRYAN , Jus tice.

Inter natio nal Refin ing & Manuf ac turin g Co. d/b/a IRMCO ,
among other s, and GE Betz, Inc., among other s, separ ately seek

manda mus relie f from the trial court 's denia l of a motio n for

a summa r y j udgme nt and a motio n to dismi ss. Altho ugh the
first nam e d petit ioner diffe rs in each petit ion, the petit ioner s in b o t h are the same. There fore, we will
herei nafte r ref er to the petit ioner s in case no. 1 13011 0 and

case no. 11301 11 colle ctive ly as "the new d e f e n d ants. " The 1

two petit ions were conso lidat ed for the purpo se of writi ng one opini on . W e d e ny the petit ion in case no. 11301 10, and in

case no . 1 1 3 0 1 1 1 we grant the petit ion in part, deny it in
part, and issue a writ of manda mus, direc ting the trial court
to di smiss any consp iracy clai ms ag ainst the new d efend ants.

Facts and Proce dural Hist ory

These parti es are refer red to as "the new defen dants " in 1 the two earli er opini ons in this Court invol ving these parti es becau se they were added as defen dants after the filin g of the origi nal c ompla int. See discu ssion of t hose cases , inf ra.
211301 10, 1 13011 1

This is the third t i m e this case has come befor e this

Court

. See Ex parte Int e r n a tiona l Refin ing & Mfg. Co., 972

So. 2d 784 (Ala. 2007) ("Int ernat ional Refin ing") , and Carr v.

Inter natio nal R efini ng & Mfg. Co., 13 So . 3d 947 ( Ala. 2009)
("Car r"). In Carr, we descr ibed the f a c t s and proce dural
histo ry as foll ows:

"'On Novem ber 13, 2003, Bell Carr, Jr., and appro ximat ely 320 other forme r emplo yees at a manuf actur ing plant opera ted by Arvin Indus tries d/b/a Arvin –Meri tor, I n c . ( h e r e i n a f t e r " t h e [ f o r m e r emplo yees] "), sued Arvin –Meri tor and six indiv idua l defen dants , also forme r emplo yees at the plant , where autom otive muffl ers were manuf actur ed. The compl aint alleg ed that up unt i l the closi ng of the plant in May 2002, the [ f o rmer emplo yees] suffe red harm f r o m "expo sure to toxic and dange rous chemi cals" that were flush ed from t h e manuf actur ing machi nes and event ually circu lated into a large pit , which the [form er e mploy ees] were respo nsibl e for drain ing and clean ing. In addi t ion to these seven defen dants , the origi nal compl aint ficti tious ly named 40 o t h er defen dants in the capti on and in the body of th e com plain t. "'On May 6, 2005, approxi matel y three years a f ter their last expos ure to the chemi cals, the [form er emplo yees] filed their first amend ed compl aint, seeki ng to add 64 new named defen dants , inclu ding the petit ioner s, in place of the ficti tious ly named defen dants ( herei nafte r "the new defen dants "), 113 new plain tiffs , as well

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a s a d d i t i o n a l f i c t i t i o u s l y n a m e d defen dants

. The [firs t] amend ed compl aint
reass erted the five claim s asser ted in the origi nal compl aint, but only again st the seven origi nal defen dants

. The first amend ed compl aint also alleg ed claim s of negli gence , wanto nness , liabi lity under the Alab a ma Exten ded Manuf actur er's Liabi lity Doctr ine, civil consp iracy , and the tort of outra ge, but only again st the new defen dants .'
"[Int ernat ional Refi ning, ] 972 So. 2d at 787. "Rega rding wanto nness , the form er emplo yees alleg ed in coun t 6 of the first amend ed compl aint that the new defen dants had 'want only engin eered , des igned , devel oped, confi gured , manuf actur ed, assem bled, distr ibute d, and/o r sold the chemi cals' and other produ cts that the forme r emp l o yees were expos ed to throu gh thei r work at Arvin

. The forme r emplo yees also alleg ed in count 13 that 5 of the new defen dants had 'want only engin eered , desig ned,

... manuf actur ed,

... sold, inspe cted or consu lted regar ding the desig n, engin eer i n g, manuf actur ing, produ ction , distr ibuti on and/o r warni ngs assoc iated with' the equip me nt used in Arvin 's manuf actur ing proce ss.
"'On June 14, 2005, the new defen dants remov ed the case to the Unite d St ates Distr ict Court for the North ern Distr ict of Alaba ma pursu ant to the Class Actio n Fairn ess Ac t ( "CAFA "), 28 U.S.C

. § 1453. The distr ict court reman ded the [clai ms] to the F ayett e Cir cuit Court

.... "'Upo n reman d, the n e w defen dants filed motio ns to dismi ss, or, in the alter nativ e, for a summa ry judgm ent, on the groun d that the claim s asser ted again st them in the am ended compl aint did not

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relat e back to the date o f the filin g of the origi nal compl aint and are thus barre d by the two-y ear statu te of limit ation s. See § 6–2–3 8(l), Ala. Code 1975. The trial court c o n d ucted a heari ng and denie d the motio ns. The new defen dants sough t a certi ficat ion to file a permi ssive appea l under Rule 5, Ala. R.App

. P., but the trial court denie d the reque st for the certi ficat ion. The [new defen dants ] then filed [a] petit ion for a writ of manda mus.'

"Inte rnati onal R e finin g, 972 So. 2d at 787–8 8 (foot note omitt ed).
"This Court grant ed the new defen dants ' petit ion and issue d the writ of manda mus. W e c o nclud ed in In terna tiona l Refin ing that the claim s the forme r emplo yees state d again st the new defen dan ts in the first a m ended compl aint did not relat e back to the claim s they state d again st the ficti tious ly named defen dants ident ified in their origi nal compl aint. 972 So. 2d at 791. Becau se the fir s t a m ended compl aint was filed i n May 2005, three years after the forme r emplo yees' last possi ble expos ure to the alleg edly toxic chemi cals, any new claim s state d in that compl aint, whi c h w ere subje ct to a two-y ear statu tory limit ation s perio d, see § 6–2–3 8(l), Ala. Code 1975, were time- barre d and due to be dismi ssed. 972 S o. 2d at 7 91.

"We noted in Inter natio nal Refin ing tha t the forme r emplo yee s argue d 'that some of their claim s nonet heles s survi ve, becau se, they say, those claim s fall withi n a six-y ear statu te of limit ation s.' 972 So. 2d at 791

. S ee § 6–2–3 4, Ala. Code 1975. Howev er, we decli ned to reach the quest ion wheth er a six-y ear statu te of limit ation s appli ed to any of the for m er emplo yees' claim s again st the new defen dants , sta ting:

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"'Tha t issue

... is n o t b e fore us; our manda mus revie w exten ds to revie wing the denia l of motio ns for a dismi ssal or for a summa ry judgm ent that asser ted a statu teof-li mitat ions defen se onl y as to ficti tious -part y pract ice. See [Ex parte ] Stove r, 663 So. 2d [948, ] 951– 5 2 [(Ala

. 1995) ]. The exten t to which the am e nded compl aint, filed withi n six yea r s of the event s made the basis of the actio n but not withi n two years there of, state s claim s not barre d by the two-y ear statu te of limit ation s is a que stion not befor e us. '
"972 So. 2d at 791. There f o r e , we 'reve rse[d ] the trial court 's order denyi ng the motio ns to dismi ss, or for a su m m a ry judgm ent, and we reman d[ed] the case for furth er proce eding s, inclu ding a deter minat ion of the exten t to which any claim s are timel y, witho ut the avail abili ty of th e relat ionback doctr ine.' 972 So. 2d at 791.

"On reman d, the new defen dants filed motio ns to dismi ss or, in t h e alter nativ e, for a summa ry judgm ent, on the groun d that all the claim s asser ted again st them were subje ct to t h e two-y ear limit ation s perio d state d in § 6–2–3 8(l), Ala. Code 1975, and were due to be dismi ssed pursu ant to this Court 's decis ion in Inter natio nal Refin ing. The forme r emplo yees respo nded, argui ng that their wanto nness claim s invol ved tresp ass to t he perso n and, under McKen zie v. Killi an, 887 So. 2d 861 (Ala. 2004) , were subj e c t to the six-y ear limit ation s perio d state d in § 6–2–3 4(1), A l a . Code 1975. The forme r emplo ye es conce ded that their other claim s again st the new defen dants were subje ct to the twoyear limit ation s perio d and, witho ut the avail abili ty of the relat ion-b ack doctr ine, were due to be dism issed

. "On Augus t 16, 2007, the forme r em p l o y ees amend ed their compl aint a secon d time. The s econd

611301 10, 1 13011 1

amend ed compl aint state d that it was 'i n t ended to clari fy the alleg at i ons conta ined in the Compl aint and the Fir s t A m ended Compl aint in the wake of [Inte rnati onal Refin ing]. ' It also state d that 'no new plain tiffs or defen dants [were ] added by way of [the] a m endme nt' and that 'all claim s state d [ther ein arose ] out of the condu ct, trans actio n, or occur rence s set forth in the First Amend ed Compl aint [and] no new cause s of actio n [ w e r e ] state d by way of [the] amend ment. ' The secon d amend ed compl a int
asser ted only a worke rs' compe nsati on claim again st Arvi n , a wanto nness claim again st the new defen dants , and a separ ate wanto nness claim again st five of the new defen dants who the forme r emplo yees alleg ed had provi ded the equip ment Arvin used in its manuf actur ing p roces s.
"The wanto nness claim ass e r t ed again st the new defen dants in the secon d amend ed compl ain t state d, in re levan t par t:
"'[Th e new defen dants ] ac t ed willf ully and/o r wanto nly, and commi tted tresp ass to the perso ns o f the forme r emplo yees, in that the said defen dants consc iousl y acted o r omitt ed to act, and in that th e y willf ully and wanto nly engin eered , d e s i g n e d , d e v e l o p e d , c o n f i g u r e d , manuf actur ed, assembl ed , di st ri bu te d and/o r sold [the chemi cals and other produ cts] that r e s ulted in physi cal impac t to the perso ns of the forme r emplo yees and injur ed the fo rmer emplo yees, and in that the defen dants acted or omitt ed a d uty, while knowi ng of the exist ing condi tions and being consc ious that, from doing or omitt ing to do an act, injur y would likel y or proba bly resul t to the forme r emplo yees, in reckl ess or consc ious disre gar d o f the right s or safet y of the forme r emplo yees. '

711301 10, 1 13011 1

"The wanto nness claim asser ted again st the five new defen dants who the forme r emplo yees all e g e d had provi ded equip ment to Arvin state d simil ar alleg ation s.
"The new defe n d ants moved to strik e the secon d amend ed compl aint. Howev er, the trial court did not rule on the motio n t o s t rike. Inste ad, the trial court concl uded in its event ual ruli n g on the new defen dants ' motio ns to dismi ss that, becau se the secon d amend e d compl aint purpo rted to state no new cause of actio n and to arise out of the same condu ct and occur renc es state d in the first amend ed compl aint, the claim s state d in the secon d amend ed compl aint were subje ct to the same analy sis as those in the first amend ed compl aint. The new defen dants argue d th a t the wanto nness claim s in the first and secon d amend ed compl aints were subje ct to a two-y ear limit ation s perio d b ecaus e, they said, the claim s were based on a produ cts-l iabil ity theor y. The new defen dants relie d on Malsc h v . B ell Helic opter Textr on, I n c . , 916 So. 2d 600, 601 (Ala. 2005) ; Boyce v. Casse se, 941 So. 2d 93 2 , 9 4 5–46 (Ala. 2006) ; Gilmore v. M & B Realt y Co., 895 So. 2d 200, 207–0 9 (Ala. 2004) ; and Smith v . Medtr onic, Inc., 607 S o . 2d 156, 159 (Ala. 1992)

. Based on this autho rity, on Febru ary 4, 2008, the trial court enter ed an order dismi ssing all the forme r e mploy ees' claim s again st the new defen dants

. The forme r emplo yees' claim s again st Arvin remai ned pendi ng; howev er, t h e t rial court certi fied its Febru ary 4 , 2008, order as final pursu ant to Rule 54(b) , Ala. R. C i v . P. The forme r emplo yees filed a tim ely n otice of a ppeal to t his C ourt. "
13 So . 3d at 94 9-52 (foot note omitt ed). In C arr, this Court

concl uded:

"We state d in McKen zie[ v. K i l l ian, 887 So. 2d 861 (Ala. 2004) ]: '[W]a nton condu ct is the equiv alent in law to inten tiona l condu ct. Such an alleg a t i on of

811301 10, 1 13011 1

inten t rende rs th e s i x-yea r statu tory perio d of limit ation s appli cable .' 887 So. 2d at 870. We also adopt ed Justi ce Jones 's concl usion that wanto n condu ct, '"res ultin g in injur y, is actio nable in tresp ass an d g o verne d by the six-y ear statu te of limit ation s."' Id. (quot ing Stroz ier[ v. March ich,] 380 So. 2 d [ 804,] 806 [(Ala

. 1980) ] (Jone s, J., disse nting ) (emph as i s added )). Based on the analy sis adopt ed in McKen zie, becau se the forme r emplo yees have a l l e ged wanto n condu ct by the new defen dants , which resul ted in injur y to them, their wanto nness claim s a r e subje ct to the six-y ear limit ation s per iod o f § 6 –2–34 (1)."
13 So . 3d at 95 4. T he Co urt w ent o n to hold:

"We find no ratio nal basis upon which to disti nguis h McKen zie so as to rende r its holdi ng inapp licab le. The forme r emplo yees can prove a set of circu mstan ces that would entit le them to relie f; there fore, the trial co urt erred in dismi ssing the forme r emplo yees' wanto nness claim s. We rever se its decis ion as to those claim s and remand the case for furth er pr oceed ings consi stent with this opin ion."

13 So . 3d at 95 5 (ci tatio n omi tted)

.
At a case- manag ement con f e rence in June 2010, the new
defen dants raise d conc e r n s that the forme r emplo yees were tryin g to alleg e consp iracy -base d and non-b odily -inju ry

wanto nness clai ms ag ainst them , whi ch, t hey a rgued , wer e not

a l l e g e d in the secon d amend ment compl aint and would be precl uded by this Court ' s d e c ision in Carr. The new
defen dants raise d those conce rns again in a motio n to "dism iss

all c onspi racy- based clai ms or clai ms fo r non -bodi ly-in jury,

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or in the alter nativ e, to precl ude [the forme r emplo yees] from

a s s e r t i ng any such claim s at trial ." The new defen dant s

argue d, among other thing s, that after Carr the only survi ving
claim s again st the new defen dants were wanto nness claim s based

on bo dily injur y.
While the case was still pendi ng on reman d, this Court
decid ed Ex parte Capst one Build ing Corp. , 96 So. 3d 77, 86
(Ala. 2012 ), in whic h we overr uled McKen zie, stati ng:

"We are clear to the concl usion that reckl essne ss and wanto nness are funda men t a lly diffe rent conce pts than inten t, and t h a t claim s alleg ing reckl ess or wanto n condu ct are disti nctiv ely diffe rent types of claim s than those alleg ing i n t entio nal harm to a plain tiff. We there f ore canno t place claim s of wanto nness withi n the gover nance of § 6-2-3 4(1), which we inter pret as impos ing a six-y ear statu te of l imita tions on the inten tiona l torts descr ibed there in, i.e., 'tres pass to perso n or liber ty, such as false impri sonme nt or assau lt and batte ry.' Conco mitan tl y, we concl ude that claim s alleg ing reckl ess and wanto n condu ct fall withi n the gover nance of the catch all provi sion in § 6-2-3 8(l) prov i d i n g a two-y ear limit ation s perio d for '[a]l l actio ns for any injur y t o t he perso n or right s o f anoth er not arisi ng from contr act and not speci fical ly enume rated in this secti on.'"

The Court went on to overr ule McKen zie but held that the
decis ion in Capst one shoul d apply prosp ectiv ely only. The

Court also stat ed:

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"This Court 's decis ion today is not based on the const ituti on, eithe r state or feder al, nor does it recog nize any 'cons titut io nal error ' in any prior d e cisio n. Our decis ion today is simpl y a matte r of statu tory const ructi on. We recog nize today that the statu tory inter preta tion advan ced in McKen zie was incor rect, and we suppl y t o d a y in its place a corre ct statu to r y inter preta tion. Contr ary to the sugge stion made by the invoc ation of the quote d passa ge from Justi ce Scali a's speci al concu rrenc e in Ameri can Truck ing Ass'n v. Smith , 496 U.S. 167, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 110 L.Ed. 2d 148 (1990 ), this Court did
n ot in McKen zie, nor do we in the prese nt case , engag e in some 'inte rpret ation of the Const ituti on'; rathe r, the analy sis provi d ed in both McKen zie and in the prese nt case refle cts merel y an e f f ort to disce rn corre ctly the legis lativ e inten t refle cted in th e lan guage of § § 6–2 –34(1 ) and 6–2– 38(l) ."
Capst one, 96 So . 3d at 92

.
In March 2012, the new defen dants m o v e d the trial court

for a summa ry judgm ent, argui ng that the wanto nness claim s of

certa in of the forme r emplo yees, whos e last expos ure to the
chemi cals was more than two years befor e McKen zie was decid ed,

were barre d by the two-y ear s t atute of limit ation s that was appli cable to w anton ness claim s bef ore t his C ourt issue d its opini on in McKen zie. After a heari ng, the trial court denie d

both the new defen dants ' summa ry-ju dgmen t motio n and t h e ir
motio n to dismi ss th e con spira cy-ba sed a nd no n-bod ily-i njury

wanto nness claim s. The new defen dants have petit ioned in two

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separ ate petit ions fo r manda mus relie f from the denia l of

those moti ons. Analy sis

"A writ of manda mus is an extra ordin a r y remed y avail able only when the petit ioner can demon strat e: '(1) a clear legal right to the order sough t; (2) an imper ative duty upon the re s p o n dent to perfo rm, accom panie d by a refus al to do so; (3) the lack of anoth er adequ ate re m e dy; and (4) the prope rly invok ed ju risdi ction of t he co urt.' "

E x p arte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala. 2003) (quot i n g E x parte BOC Grp., Inc. , 823 So. 2d 12 70, 1 272 ( Ala. 2001) ).

I. Ca se No . 113 0110

The new defen dants argue that manda mus is an appro priat e
remed y for seeki ng revie w of the trial court 's denia l of their

summa ry-ju dgmen t motio n becau se, they argue , "cert ain [of the

forme r emplo yees' ] claim s of wanto nness are gover ned by a twoyear statu te of limit ation s and are time- barre d becau se those
claim s do not relat e-bac k to the date of filin g of [the forme r emplo yees' ] ori ginal comp laint ." P etiti on (n o. 11 30110 ), at
6. The new defen dants note that , " [ a]lth ough denia l of a dispo sitiv e motio n is gener ally not consi dered appro priat e for
revie w by a petit ion for writ of manda mus, a well- estab lishe d

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excep tion exist s when the doctr ine of relat io n b a c k is impli cated ."
This Court recen t l y s t ated in Ex parte Hodge , [Ms.

11211 94, F ebrua ry 7, 2014 ] ___ So. 3d __ _, __ _ (Al a. 20 14):

"'The gener al rule is that "'a writ of manda mus will not issue to revie w th e merit s of an order denyi ng a motio n for a summa ry judgm ent.' " Ex parte Empir e Fire & Marin e Ins. Co., 720 So. 2d 893, 894 (Ala. 1998 ) (quot ing Ex parte Centr al Bank of the South , 675 So. 2d 403 (Ala. 1996)). In all but the most extra ordin ary cases , a n appea l is an adequ ate remed y; howev er, there a re excep tions –- for examp le, when the trial court denie s a motio n for a summa ry judgm ent that is b ased on an argum ent that gover nment al immun ity bars the plain tiff' s claim

. See, e.g., Ex parte Butts , 775 So. 2d 1 7 3 , 1 77–78 (Ala. 2000)

. In such a case, the defen dant may seek pretr ial appel late revie w by petit ionin g for permi ssion to appea l an inter lo c u t ory order in
accor danc e w ith Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., or by petit ionin g for a wr it of mand amus. See id.

"'In Ex parte South l a nd Bank, 514 So. 2d 954, 955 (Ala. 1987) , this Court state d that "[t]h e fact that a statu te of limit ation s defen se is appli cable is not a prope r basis for issui ng a writ of man d a m us, due to the avail abili ty of a remed y by appea l." 5 1 4 So. 2d at 955. Subje ct to a narro w excep tion, that state ment remai ns true. In a narro w class of cases invol ving ficti tious parti es and the relat ion-b ack doctr ine, this Court has revie wed the merit s of a trial cou r t ' s denia l of a summa ryjudgm ent motio n in which a defen dant argue d that the plain tiff' s claim was b a r r ed by the appli cable statu te of limi tatio ns.'"
(Quot ing E x par te Ja ckson , 780 So. 2d 68 1, 68 4 (Al a. 20 00).)

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The new defen dants argue that this case falls withi n the

"narr ow ex cepti on" m entio ned i n Ex parte Hodg e bec ause "[t]h e facts befor e this [C]ou rt show that this petit ion for [the] writ of manda mus: (1) is filed by [the new defen dants ] who were ficti tious ly named in
an origi nal com p laint and subse quent ly added after the two-y ear limit ation s perio d expir ed; (2) reque sts this Court for an order direc ting judgm ent in favor of [the new defen dants ] on t h e two-y ear wanto nness claim s of [the forme r emplo yees] that can only survi ve by appli c ation of the doctr ine of relat ion ba ck; and (3) fully estab lishe s that [the forme r emp loyee s'] c laims do n ot re late back. "
Petit ion ( no. 1 13011 0), a t 7.

Howev er, this Court has alrea dy resol ved the quest ion

wheth er the claim s again st the new defen dants relat ed back to

the origi nal compl aint. In Inter natio nal Refin ing, this Court

deter mined that none of the claim s raise d in the first amend ed compl aint, inclu ding the wanto nness claim s at issue i n the
motio n for a summa ry judgm ent here, relat ed back to the origi nal compl aint. The forme r emplo yees did not arg u e in

oppos it i o n t o the motio n for a summa ry judgm ent that the
claim s relat ed back, nor did the trial court , in its order denyi ng the motio n for summa ry judgm ent, find that the claim s
relat ed ba ck. Moreo ver, such a fin ding was n ot ne cessa ry to

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the trial court 's d e cisio n to deny the summa ry-ju dgmen t
motio n. 2

Altho ugh they state d in the summa ry-ju dgmen t motio n that

the forme r emplo yees' claim s did not relat e back to th e origi nal c ompla int, the c rux o f the new defen dants ' arg ument
in that motio n and to this Court is that "the two year statu te

of limit ation s for wanto nness appli cable to t h e s e [form er emplo yees' ] claim s expir ed befor e [this Court 's] ruli n g in

McKen zie. There fore, these [form er emplo yees] could not have
relie d on [this Court 's] rulin g in filin g their claim s becau se
these [form er emplo yees' ] claim s were alrea dy time- barre d when

McKen zie was relea sed." Petit ion (no. 1130 110), Exhib it 1, p.3. This argum ent does not fall withi n the narro w relat ionback excep tion for cases invol ving a denia l of a motio n for a

summa ry ju dgmen t bas ed on a st atute -of-l imita tions grou nd. 3

As will be shown herei nafte r, the trial court could have 2 deter mined that the six-y ea r s t atute of limit ation s in McKen zie appli ed t o the forme r emplo yees' wanto nness claim s again st th e new defe ndant s.
In Hodge this Court grant ed a petit ion for m a n d amus 3 relie f based on a statu te-of -limi tatio ns quest ion that did not invol v e ficti tious ly named parti es or the relat ion-b ack doctr ine. Howe ver, we no ted i n Hod ge th at

"the defen dants

... are faced with the extra ordin ary circu mstan ce of havin g to fu r t h e r litig ate this
1511301 10, 1 13011 1

The new defen dants also argue that "the writ of manda mus
shoul d issue becau se the trial court faile d to compl y with the
[Alab ama] Supre me Court 's manda te to dismi ss claim s barre d by

the two-y ear statu te of limit ation s." "A petit ion for a writ

of manda mus is the prope r metho d for bring ing befor e an appel late court the quest ion wheth er a tr i a l court , after

reman d, has compl ied with the manda te of this Court or of one
of our inter media te appel late court s." Ex parte Edwar ds, 727
So. 2 d 792 , 794 (Ala . 199 8). The n ew de fenda nts a rgue that,

in In terna tiona l Ref ining ,

matte r after havin g dem o n strat ed from the face of the plain tiff' s compl aint a clear l e g a l right to have the actio n again st them dismi ssed based on the four- year perio d of repos e found in § 6-5-4 82(a) [, Ala. Code 1975]

. Havin g concl uded that an app e a l pursu ant to Rule 5[, Ala. R. App. P.,] or an appeal from a final judgm ent follo wing furth er litig ation is not an adequ ate remed y in this case, we concl ude, based on the parti cular circu mstan ces of this case, tha t m andam us is neces sary in order to avoid the injus tice that would resul t from the unava ilabi lity of an y oth er ad equat e rem edy."

_ _ _ So. 3d at ___. Unlik e the defen dants in Hodge , the n e w defen dants do n ot ar gue a nd ha ve no t dem onstr ated that their clear l egal right to a statu te-of -limi tatio ns defen se is appar ent on the face of eithe r the first amend ed or the secon d amend ed compl aint. There fore, they have not demon strat ed that this case falls withi n the excep tion recog nize d in Hodge to the gener al rule again st revie w by mand a mus of the appli cabil ity o f a s tatut e-of- limit ation s def ense.
1611301 10, 1 13011 1

"[t]h is Court speci fical ly and unequ ivoca lly reman ded this case 'for furth er proce eding s, inclu ding a deter minat ion of the exten t to which any c laims are timel y, witho ut the avail abili ty of the relat ion-b ack doc t rine. ' [Inte rnati onal Refin ing,] 972 So. 2d at 791. This Court also expla ined that c l aims 'gove rned by a statu te of limit ation s that requi re the appli catio n of the doctr ine of relat ion back under ficti tious -part y pract ice to survi ve are due t o b e dismi ssed. ' Id. Thus, the trial court has defie d its duti e s u n der the manda te by its failu re to enter judgm ent again st certa in [ of the forme r emplo yees] who s e claim s would have only survi ved i f rel ation back appl ied."
Petit ion ( no. 1 13011 0), a t 12.

Howev er, on reman d from Inter natio nal Refin ing, the trial

court deter mined that all the claim s again st the new
defen dants were barre d by statu tes of limit ation s and
dismi ssed those claim s. The forme r emplo yees appea led, and
this Court rever sed that judgm ent as to the wanto nness claim s,
findi ng that the wanto nness claim s were subje ct to a six-y ear

statu te of limit ation s . S e e Carr, supra . Thus, the trial

court compl ied with this C o u r t ' s manda te in Inter natio nal
Refin ing. The new d efend ants have not p ointe d to any a spect

of this Court 's m a n d a te in Carr relat ed to this issue , with
which , the y arg ue, t he tr ial c ourt faile d to compl y. 4

The new defenda nts do argue that the trial court failed 4 to co mply with this Court 's ma ndate in C arr b y den ying their motio n to dismi ss any consp iracy -base d cla i ms or wanto nness
1711301 10, 1 13011 1

Moreo ver, this Court has state d:

"'"Re media l statu tes"

... opera te r e trosp ectiv ely, i n the absen ce of langu age clear ly show i n g a contr ary inte n t ion. A statu te of limit ation s has gener ally been viewe d as a remed ial statu te, and the sta t u t e of limit ation s in effec t at the time the suit is filed , as o p p o sed to one in effec t at the time of the accru al of the cause of actio n, has been held to apply unles s the later statu te cl e arly state s the contr ary. This is true wheth er the later statu te exten ds or limit s the time withi n w hich a cau s e of actio n may be broug ht, for it has frequ ently been held that t h e legis latur e can estab lish a new limit ation where none exist ed befor e and make it applica ble to a cause of actio n again st which the r e w as no such statu te when the right was cre a t e d , and it may also so chang e an exist ing statu te and short en perio ds of limit ation , provi ded a reaso nable time is allow ed for the a c t i o n to be broug ht.'"

Foste r v. Hacie nda N irvan a, In c., 3 2 So. 3d 1 256, 1260 (Ala.
2009) (quo ting Stree t v. City of An nisto n, 38 1 So. 2d 2 6, 29
(Ala. 1980 )). See a lso S choen v. G ulled ge, 4 81 So . 2d 1094,

1097 (Ala. 1985) (appl ying the statu te of limit ation s in place

at the time the actio n was f i l e d r a t her than the statu te of
limit ation s in place at the time the event s givin g rise to the

cause of actio n occur red); Jones v. Preui t & Mauld in, 876 F.2d
1480, 1484 (11t h Cir . 198 9) (" The g enera l rul e und er Al abama

claim s based on non-b odily i n j u ry. That argum ent will be addre ssed later in t he op inion

. 1811301 10, 1 13011 1

law i s tha t the stat ute o f lim itati ons i n eff ect a t the time

an ac tion is br ought appl ies." ).

Altho ugh a two-y ear statu te of limit ation s on wanto nness
claim s may have been in place at the time the forme r emplo yees' clai ms ar ose, the s ix-ye ar st atute of l imita tions adopt ed in McKen zie was i n place at the time the forme r emplo yees asser ted those claim s again st the new defen dants in

the fir s t a m e n ded compl aint. Thus, the new defen dants have 5

not demon strat ed that the trial court faile d to compl y w ith

any prior manda te of this Court , nor have they demon strat ed a
clear legal right to the dismi ssal of the wanto n ness claim s again st them by way of a summa ry judgm ent. There fore, the new
defen dants ' pet ition for manda mus r elief in c ase n o. 11 30110
is de nied. 6

The wanto nness claim s were not assert ed against the new 5 defen dants until the f irst amend ed compl aint was filed in 2005, and this Court n o t ed in Inter natio nal Refin ing that those claim s d o n ot relat e back to the 2003 origi nal compl aint. There fore, the forme r emplo yees' wanto nness claim s are gover ned by a six-y ear statu te of limit ation s in place at the t ime t he fi rst a mende d com plain t was file d. By recog nizin g that the forme r emplo yees' wanto nne ss 6 claim s again st the new defen dants are gover ned by the six-y ear statu te of limit ation s set forth i n McKen zie, which was in place at the time the claim s were alleg ed, and n o t t h e twoy e a r s tatut e of limit ation s in place at the time th e wanto nness clai ms ac crued , we prete rmit consi derat ion o f the
1911301 10, 1 13011 1

II. C ase N o. 11 30111

The new defen dants argue in case no. 11 3 0111 that the
writ of ma ndamu s sho uld i ssue becau se, t hey a rgue, the trial

court faile d to follo w this Court 's man d a te in Carr by

"allo w[ing ] [the forme r emplo yees] to p r oceed with a

consp iracy -base d claim and claim s for non - b odily injur y."
Petit ion (no. 11301 11), at 10. As noted prev i o u s l y, "[a] petit ion for a writ of manda mus is the prope r metho d for bring ing befor e an appel late court the quest ion wheth e r a
trial court , after reman d, has compl ied with the ma n date of
this Court or of one of our inter media te appel l a te court s."

Ex parte E dward s, 727 So. 2d at 794. "On reman d, a trial

court is not free to recon sider issue s final ly decid ed by the appel late court and must compl y wit h the appe llate mand ate."
Ex pa rte M obil Oil C orp., 613 So. 2 d 350 , 352 (Ala . 199 3).

In Carr, the forme r emplo yees appea led the trial court 's

Febru ary 4 , 200 8, or der d ismis sing all t he fo rmer emplo yees'
claim s again st the new defen dants

. The trial court certi fied

the order as a final judgm ent, pursu ant to Rule 54(b) , Ala. R.

issue wheth er this C ourt' s decis ion in McKen zie reviv ed other wise time- barre d cla ims o r whe ther such a rev ival would viola te th e new defe ndant s' co nstit ution al ri ghts.
2011301 10, 1 13011 1

Civ. P. Altho ugh the first amend ed compl aint had inc l u d ed
claim s again st the new defen da nts alleg ing "negl igenc e,

wanto nness , liabi lity under the Alaba ma Exten ded

Manuf actur er's Liabi lity Doctr ine, civil cons pirac y, an d the

tort of outra ge," the f o r m er emplo yees appea led only the
dismi ssal o f the wanto nness claim s, argui ng that the

wanto nness claim s were subje ct to the six-y ea r statu te of
limit ation s set forth in McKen zie. This Court a g r e e d, 7

concl uding that "the trial court [had] erred in dismi ssing the

forme r emplo yees ' wanto nness claim s. We rever se[d] its
decis ion as to those claim s and reman d[ed] the case for

furth er pr oceed ings consi stent with [tha t] op inion ." 1 3 So.
3d at 955.

After the reman d in Carr, the new defen dants moved the
trial court "to ente r a n order dismi ssing any and all (a)

consp iracy -base d claim s or ( b) claim s for non-b odily injur y
that [the forme r emplo yees] may seek to asser t, or, in the

alter nativ e, precl uding [the forme r emplo yees] from asser ting

In fa ct, as we noted in Carr, the forme r emplo yees had 7 "conc eded that their othe r cla ims a gains t the new defen dants were subje ct to the two-y ear l imita tions peri od an d, wi thout the avail abili ty of the relat ion-b ack doctr ine, were due to be dismi ssed. " Ca rr, 1 3 So. 3d a t 951

. 2111301 10, 1 13011 1

any such claim s herea fter and from argui ng any such claim s at

the trial of this case. " The trial court denie d that motio n,
and the new defen dan t s a rgue that, in doing so, it viola ted
this Court 's manda te in Carr by allow ing the forme r emplo yees

to proce ed with claim s other than those inclu ded in the reman d

order in Carr. With regar d to the consp iracy claim s, we

agree . 8

The forme r emplo yees' consp iracy claim s were al l e g ed as

sepa r a t e claim s in the first amend ed compl aint and were
dismi ss e d b y t he trial court along with the other claim s again st the new defen dants in its Febru ary 4, 2008, o r d e r,
which was certi fied as a f i n a l judgm ent pursu ant to Rule
54(b)

. As noted previ ously , the forme r emplo yees app e aled only the wanto nness claim s, and this Court rever sed the trial

I t is worth notin g that the forme r emplo yees hav e n o t 8 moved the trial court to amend the plead ings to asser t any new claim s alleg ing consp iracy or non - b o dily injur y. Inste ad, they argue that the consp iracy cl a i m s alleg ed in the first amend ed compl aint remai n intac t becau se, they say, those claim s "trav el with" and "proc e e d i n tande m" with the wanto nness claim s. Respo nse to petit ion (no. 11301 11), at 18. They also argue that their wanto nness claim s incor porat ed both claim s for bodil y and non-b odily injur ies. Thus, altho ugh the motio n to dismi ss was frame d in f u t u re terms (i.e. , claim s that "may be asser t e d " ), the forme r emplo yees appea r to consi der c onspi racy and n on-bo dily- injur y cla ims t o be among the c laims curr ently befo re th e tri al co urt i n thi s cas e.
2211301 10, 1 13011 1

court 's judgm ent only as to those claim s. See Carr, 13 So. 3d

at 955 ("[T] he trial cour t e r r ed in dismi ssing the forme r emplo yees' want onnes s cla ims. We r evers e its deci sion as to

those claim s an d r emand the case for furth er proce eding s
consi stent w i t h this opini on.")

. We did not, as the forme r emplo yees argue , "retu rn[] to t h e trial court all claim s

state d by the [form er emplo yees, ] which could be subje ct to a six-y ear statu te of limit ation s, clear ly regar ding all alleg ation s and damag es withi n the const ellat ion of [th e
forme r emplo yees' ] claim s as likew ise withi n the opera tion of

that manda te." Resp onse to pe titio n (no . 113 0111) , at 9.

The forme r emplo yees argue , howev er, that the consp iracy

c l aims "are wholl y deriv ative of and depen dent on th e i r

wanto nness claim s," respo nse to petit ion (no. 11301 11), at 9;

that "[the forme r emplo yees] plead ed facts and alleg ation s in

the first amend ed compl aint suffi cient to state claim s for

consp iracy that trav el wi th th e wan tonne ss cl aims" ; and that
"[t]h e alleg ation s o f civil consp iracy prese nt no separ ate, indep enden t cause of actio n subje ct to resol ution or dismi ssal
apart from wanto nness , and p r o c e e d in tande m with the

wanto nn ess claim s." Respo nse to petit ion (no. 11301 11), at

2311301 10, 1 13011 1

18. In suppo rt of these argum ents, the forme r emplo yees cite

cases indic ating that "[c ] o n s p iracy is not an indep enden t

cause of actio n; there fore, when alleg ing c o nspir acy, a plain tiff must have a viabl e unde r l ying cause of actio n,"

Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 619 So. 2d 1280, 1290
(Ala. 1993) , and that "a consp iracy claim must fail if the

under lying act itsel f would not suppo rt an actio n." Tripl e J

Cattl e, In c. v. Cham bers, 621 So. 2 d 122 1, 12 25 (A la. 1 993).

Altho ugh these cases demon strat e that a consp iracy clai m

canno t exi st in depen dentl y of a via ble c ause of ac tion, they

do no t ind icate that cons pirac y cla ims a utoma tical ly "t ravel
with" or "proc eed in tande m" with other cause s of actio n such
that, where both the consp iracy claim and the claim in the

under lying cause o f actio n have been dismi ssed, an appea l

chall engin g the claim in the un d erlyi ng cause of actio n is,

effec tivel y or impli citly , an appea l of the c onspi racy claim

as well. The forme r emplo yees h a ve cited no autho rity

suppo rting the latte r pro posit ion, and w e kno w of none.
The forme r emplo yees do cite DGB, LLC v. Hinds , 55 So. 3d

218 (Ala. 2 0 10), in which , they argue , "this Court rever sed
[the] dismi ssal of [the] plain tiffs ' consp iracy count when it

2411301 10, 1 13011 1

found the tort unde r l y i n g the consp iracy to have been

erron eousl y dismi ssed. " Howev er, unlik e the forme r emplo yees,
the appel lants in DGB had appea led the dis missa l of the

consp iracy claim s, as well as the dismi ssal of the under lying

tort claim s. T his C ourt rever sed t he tr ial c ourt' s jud gment

as to the under lying tort claim s and went on to state :
"Beca use the inves tors have alleg ed valid under lying cause s of
actio n ..., the inves tors have state d a claim of c i vil

consp iracy upon which relie f may be grant ed again st eac h of

these d e f e ndant s. Accor dingl y, the trial court erred in
dismi ssing this claim ." DGB, 55 So. 3d at 2 3 4

. Here,

howev er, the forme r emplo yees did not appea l the dismi ssal of

the c onspi racy claim s and , in fact, had "conc eded that their

other claim s again st the new defen dants [besi de s the

wanto nness claim s] were subje ct to the two-y ear limit ation s perio d and, witho ut the a v a i l abili ty of the relat ion-b ack

2511301 10, 1 13011 1

doctr ine, were due to be dismi ssed. " Carr, 13 So. 3d at 951. 9

DGB i s dis tingu ishab le on that basi s.
The forme r emplo yees also argue that, "[e]v e n if the
[form er emplo yees' ] alleg ation s of

... consp iracy were
dismi ssed, the trial court could consi der such alleg a t i o ns
withi n this Court 's manda te to the exten t Carr was not a final adjud icati on." Respo nse to petit ion (no. 11301 11), a t 19.

The forme r emplo yees cite Ex parte Insur ance Co. o f N o rth
Ameri ca, 523 So. 2d 1064, 1069 (Ala. 1988) , for the

propo sitio n tha t "a trial cour t [ha s an] inhe rent abili ty to

take up ne w cla ims, eithe r of its o wn vo litio n or on mo tion,

after reman d where there has been no final adjud icati on of the
claim s." Howev er, as the forme r emplo yees thems elves asser t,
their cons pirac y cla ims a re no t "ne w cla ims" but w ere r aised
initi ally in the first amend ed compl aint. Moreo ver, the trial

The forme r emplo yees now argue that the consp iracy claim s 9 relat ed to wanto nness are gover ned by the six-y ear statu te of limit ation s appli ca b l e to the wanto nness claim s. This argum ent w as no t rai sed d uring the appea l of the F ebrua ry 4, 2008, judgm ent , w h i ch dismi ssed all the forme r emplo yees' claim s, inclu din g the consp iracy claim s, as barre d by the appli cable statu te of limit ation s. Thus, that argum ent was waive d and will not be consi dered here. See Muham mad v. Ford, 986 S o. 2d 1158 , 116 5 (Al a. 20 07) ( "'An argum ent n ot ma de on appea l is aband oned or w a i v e d .'" (quot ing Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Heilm an, 876 So. 2d 1111, 1124 n.8 (Ala. 2003) )).
2611301 10, 1 13011 1

court 's Febru ary 4, 2008, judgm ent, which was m a d e final

pursu ant t o Rul e 54( b), d ismis sed a ll th e cla ims a gains t the

new defen dants , and t he forme r emplo yees did not appea l the
dismi ssal of any claim s excep t the wanto nness claim s. " In

cases where an appea l is taken with respe ct to o n l y a parti cular issue or issue s, there can be n o r e trial after

reman d of issue s previ ously tried and d e t e rmine d but not

appea led from. " Ex parte Army Aviat ion Ctr. Fe d

. C r e d it
Unio n , 4 77 So. 2d 379, 380-8 1 (Ala. 1985)

. Becau se the

consp iracy claim s were dismi ssed in the trial court 's Febru ary 4, 2008, judgm ent and becau se this Court 's deci s ion in Carr

rever sed that judgm ent as to the wanto nness claim s only, this

Court 's decis ion in Carr was a f i n a l a djudi catio n of the

consp iracy clai ms, a nd al lowin g tho se cl aims to pr oceed is a
viola tion of th is Co urt's deci sion in Ca rr.
The new defen dants also argue that the trial court erred by faili ng to dismi ss any wanto nness claim s for non-b o dily injur y. H oweve r, in reve rsing the trial cour t's j udgme nt as

to the want o n n e s s claim s, this Court in Carr did not
disti nguis h betwe en claim s based on bodil y injur y and those

based on non-b odily injur y. Inste ad, we held that "the trial

2711301 10, 1 13011 1

court erred in dismi ssing the forme r emplo yees' wanto n n e ss
claim s." 13 So. 3d at 95 5

. The wanto nness claim s as set

forth in the first and secon d amend ed comp l a i n ts liste d

"ment al angui sh, humil iatio n, and embar rassm ent" amon g t he injur ies alleg edly cause d by the new defen dants ' wanto nness . 1 0
Thus, the forme r emplo yees' wanto nness claim s inclu ded

alle g ation s of non-b odily as well as bodil y injur y, and the

t r i a l court did not viola te this Court 's manda te in Carr by

d e n ying the new defen dants ' motio n to dismi ss the forme r emplo yees' non- bodil y-inj ury w anton ness claim s.
Concl usion

For the foreg oing reaso ns, w e concl ude that the trial

c o urt erred by allow ing the forme r emplo yees to proc e e d again st th e new defe ndant s on the c onspi racy claim s, an d the

new defen dants are entit led to have any such claim s dismi ssed.

There fore, we g rant the p etiti on in case no. 11301 11 in part
and i ssue the w rit o f man damus , dir ectin g the tria l cou rt to
dismi ss all alleg ation s of consp iracy again st the new

The new defen dants argu e that the secon d amend ed 1 0 compl aint super seded the first amend ed and origi nal compl aints and "disp lace[ d]" the c l a i m s alleg ed in those compl aints

. Becau se the wanto nness claim s in b o t h the first and secon d amend ed co mplai nts i nclud ed cl aims for n on-bo dily injur y, we need not a ddres s thi s iss ue at this time

. 2811301 10, 1 13011 1

defen dants

. The petit ion in case no. 11301 11 is denie d in all

other resp ects. The peti tion in ca se no . 113 0110 is de nied.

11301 10 -- PETI TION DENIE D.

1 1 3 0 1 1 1 -- PETIT ION GRANT ED IN PART AND DENIE D IN PART ;

WRIT ISSUE D.

Moore , C.J., and S t u a r t, Bolin , Parke r, Murdo ck, Main,

and W ise, JJ., concu r. Shaw, J., concu rs in the resul t.

29