alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Earl ALEXANDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Mrs. L. N. CAMPBELL, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 14036.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

Jan. 11, 1932.

W. W. Wright, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Prowell, McBride & Ray and W. P. Mouton, all of New Orleans, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

■ This matter is before us on motion to dismiss the appeal.

Judgment having been rendered in the court below in favor of defendant, plaintiff obtained an order for a suspensive appeal upon the furnishing of bond in the sum of $25. Thereafter a document purporting to be a bond was filed. The said document was not signed by a surety and on motion, made in the court below, a judgment was rendered after hearing in which judgment it was ordered, adjudged, and decreed “that the appeal bond * * * be and the same is hereby dismissed.”

The proceedings as a result of which the trial court set aside the order of appeal, which had been theretofore granted, appear to have been taken in strict conformity with the provisions of Act 112 of 1916. When the document purporting to be a bond was discovered to be defective, appellant was given proper opportunity to furnish a correct and sufficient bond but did not do'so.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged,' and .decreed that the inotion to dismiss this appeal be sustained, and accordingly the appeal is dismissed.

Motion to dismiss appeal sustained.
174 La. 470

#### PALMER CORPORATION OF LOUISIANA v. MILES et al.

No. 31171.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 29, 1932.

Rehearing Denied March 30, 1932.

Theus, Grisham, Davis & Leigh, of Monroe, for appellant.

Munholland & Munholland, of Monroe, for appellees.

ST. PAUL, J.

This is a suit to have declared “valid, legal, and subsisting,” a certain oil lease, and to restrain the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs in their further efforts to drill for oil.

The *term*of the lease is stated as follows:

“It is agreed that this lease shall remain in force for a period of three years from this date and as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, is produced from said land by the Lessee.”

Three years have elapsed and no oil has been found on the premises. But the plaintiff contends that the term of the lease has been extended beyond the three years, because on (practically) the last day of the three years it began the drilling of an oil well upon the premises. Its contention is based on a clause of the lease which provides, in substance, that if no well be commenced on said land within a year of the date of the lease the same shall terminate at once unless the lessee pay to lessor the sum of $400, “which shall operate as a rental and cover the privilege of deferring the commencement of a well for twelve months from said date”; and that this privilege may be extended in like manner from year to year.

This last clause the plaintiff interprets as giving him the right to extend the lease indefinitely by payments from year to year. We do not so understand it. The meaning of the clause relied upon by plaintiff is simply this: That the lease shall be for a period of three years (and as long thereafter as oil shall be produced), provided that plaintiff shall begin to drill for oil within a year from the date of the lease, but with privilege given the plaintiff to extend *the time within which to begin his drilling*from year to year on payment of the agreed rental. It does not, and cannot, mean that the lease may be continued indefinitely by mere payment of the rental from year to year, or even by the drilling of wells, *without productive results.*For in that case that clause of the lease first quot*32ed would be meaningless, and the lease would have no definite term, nor term capable of ascertainment.

“A lease which stipulates that it is to continue during the time that gas and oil are found in paying quantities is at an end when the time during which the lessee has a right to exploit the land has expired, and no gas and oil have been found.” Cooke v. Gulf Refining Co., 127 La. 592, 53 So. 874.

We think the trial judge properly held that plaintiff’s suit was without merit and dismissed it.

Decree.

For the reasons assigned the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 614

AN ACT

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey to the

State of Minnesota the New London National Fish

Hatchery production facility.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. CONVEYANCE OF NEW LONDON NATIONAL

4 FISH HATCHERY PRODUCTION FACILITY.

5 (a) CONVEYANCE AUTHORIZED.—Notwithstanding

6 any other provision of law and within 180 days after the

7 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the

8 Interior shall convey to the State of Minnesota without

9 reimbursement all right, title, and interest of the United

10 States in and to the property comprising the New London

11 National Fish Hatchery production facility, located out12 side of downtown New London, Minnesota, including—

13 (1) all easements and water rights relating to

14 that property, and

15 (2) all land, improvements, and related personal

16 property comprising that production facility.
2

•HR 614 EH

1 (b) USE OF PROPERTY.—All property and interests

2 conveyed under this section shall be used by the Minnesota

3 Department of Natural Resources for the Minnesota fish4 ery resources management program.

5 (c) USE AND REVERSIONARY INTEREST.—The prop6 erty conveyed to the State of Minnesota pursuant to this

7 section shall be used by the State for purposes of fishery

8 resources management, and if it is used for any other pur9 pose all right, title, and interest in and to all property

10 conveyed pursuant to this section shall revert to the Unit11 ed States. The State of Minnesota shall ensure that the

12 property reverting to the United States is in substantially

13 the same or better condition as at the time of transfer.

Passed the House of Representatives June 7, 1995.

Attest:

Clerk.
104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 614

AN ACT

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey to

Fish Hatchery production facility.the State of Minnesota the New London National
Exhibit
99.2
 
 CERTIFICATE
PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 In
connection with the Quarterly Report (the “Report”) on the Form 10-Q of Sona
Resources Inc. (the “Company”) for the nine months ended June 30, 2009 and for
period from January 18, 2007 (date of inception) to June 30, 2009, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Ajeeta Pinheiro,
Chief Executive Officer, President and Director, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:
 
 1.
                The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of
      the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
  and
 
 2.
                The
      information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the
      Company.
 
 
 August
11,
2009                                                                          AJEETA
PINHEIRO
 Ajeeta
Pinheiro
 Chief
Executive Officer,
 President
and Director
 
 
 
 -1-
#### John T. MARTIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Louis WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, etc., et al., Respondents-Appellees.

No. 72-1946

Summary Calendar.*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 17, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 17, 1973.

*1073John T. Martin, pro se.

Daniel S. Dearing, Chief Trial Counsel, Dept, of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, Fla., Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tampa, Fla., for respondents-appellees.

Before WISDOM, GODBOLD and RONEY, Circuit Judges.

*

 Rule 18, 5 Cir., Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Company, of New York et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from the district court’s dismissal of a Civil Rights action 1 filed by an inmate of the Florida state prison at Raiford, Florida. In his complaint the appellant contended that the prison officials were denying him adequate medical attention, and he sought an order directing them to place him in a hospital other than the prison’s clinic for treatment. After a response was filed which included exhibits of the appellant’s prison hospital records, the district court denied relief, finding that the appellant had failed to show that there had been any abuse of the prison officials’ wide latitude of discretion in treating him. It is from this ruling that the appellant seeks review.

We have concluded that this Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal because our examination of the record shows that the appellant failed to file a timely notice of appeal as required by Rule 4(a), F.R.A.P.

After the district court dismissed the complaint on October 19, 1971, the appellant manifested no dissatisfaction with the ruling until December 30, 1971, or some 72 days after entry of judgment, at which time he filed a petition for rehearing. The petition was subsequently denied.

The provisions of Rule 59(b), F.R.Civ.P., make it clear that such a motion for new trial or for reconsideration must be filed within ten days of the court’s judgment. The time requirement of Rule 59(b) is jurisdictional; for the court lacks authority to rule upon a motion filed beyond the statutory period. Albers v. Gant, 5th Cir. 1970, 435 F.2d 146. Moreover, an untimely motion will not toll the time for taking an appeal. Hulson v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 7th Cir. 1961, 289 F.2d 726, cert. denied 1961, 368 U.S. 835, 82 S.Ct. 61, 7 L.Ed.2d 36. Cf. Maryland Tuna Corp. v. MS Benares, 2nd Cir. 1970, 429 F.2d 307.

Since the record in this case affirmatively discloses that no document which might reasonably be construed as a notice of appeal was filed until twelve days beyond the maximum extended time limitation under Rule 4(a), F.R.A. P., the appeal must be • dismissed for want of jurisdiction. *See*Tribbitt v. Wainwright, 5th Cir. 1972, 462 F.2d 600, and cases cited therein.

Appeal dismissed.

1

. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A24A0265. LESHON STEWART v. U. S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR LS49 MASTER et al

In 2022, U. S. Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee for LS49 Master

Trust, and Fay Servicing, LLC (collectively, “Mortgagees”) began non-judicial

foreclosure proceedings on a parcel of real property located in Decatur. Before the

sale occurred, Leshon Stewart filed the current action against the Mortgagees and the

law firm representing them, asserting several claims related to the attempted

foreclosure. The Mortgagees and the law firm each moved to dismiss the complaint

for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement.

Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order dismissing Stewart’s claims

against all defendants. Stewart then filed this direct appeal. We lack jurisdiction.

“The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute requirement

to confer jurisdiction upon an appellate court.” Perlman v. Perlman, 318 Ga. App.

731, 739 (4) (734 SE2d 560) (2012) (punctuation omitted). And to be timely, a notice

of appeal must be filed within 30 days following entry of the judgment or trial court

order sought to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). Here, the trial court entered the

order of dismissal on July 6, 2023, and therefore Stewart was required to file her

notice of appeal no later than Monday, August 7. Stewart, however, did not file her

notice of appeal until August 8. 

November 28, 2023
Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal, which is hereby

DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

11/28/2023
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-11269 Conference Calendar

DAVID GONZALES, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus KEVIN MOORE, Riot Team Sergeant; NFN COMPTON, Disciplinary Captain; R. CHANDLER, Correctional Officer III; G. SARGENT, Correctional Officer III; D. ATNIP, Correctional Officer III; BEN BROWN, Regional Director; C.A. RAINS, Assistant Warden; P. DALTON, Riot Team Captain; R. DREWERY, Senior Warden; T. SULLIVAN, Riot Team Sergeant; R. CASTANEDA, Correctional Officer III; M. ROACH, Correctional Officer III; H. DAVILA, Correctional Officer III; J. COLLIVER, Correctional Officer III; NFN MCQUADE, Correctional Officer III; W. KNIGHT, Major of Internal Affairs Division; C. BENIVEDEZ, Correctional Officer III, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:00-CV-100

-------------------- June 13, 2001 Before WIENER, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judge. PER CURIAM: * We construe the appeal of David Gonzales (TDCJ # 869900) as a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal in order to challenge the district court’s certification that the appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor , 117 F.3dNo. 00-11269 - 2 - 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). We note that Gonzales did not timely appeal the district court’s order dismissing his complaint. His appeal was timely only with respect to the court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration. Gonzales has not shown that the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration was so unwarranted as to constitute an abuse of discretion. See Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi , 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, his appeal does not present a nonfrivolous issue, and the motion to proceed IFP is DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. See Baugh v. Taylor , 117 F.3d 197, 202 & n.24 (5th Cir. 1997); 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2. The dismissal of this appeal as frivolous counts as a “strike” for purposes of § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons , 103 F.3d 383, 385-87 (5th Cir. 1996). IFP DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS; STRIKE WARNING ISSUED.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7359

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

TROY NOLAN BAZILIO,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, District Judge.

(CR-93-41-F, CA-97-32-5-F)

Submitted: May 14, 1998 Decided: May 26, 1998

Before WIDENER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Troy Nolan Bazilio, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Edward Skiver, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* Although the district court modified the reasoning of its

prior order, it upheld the dismissal of Appellant's § 2255 motion.

2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's orders denying

his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998)

and granting in part his motion for reconsideration.* We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinions and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district

court. United States v. Bazilio, Nos. CR-93-41-F; CA-97-32-5-F

(E.D.N.C. June 3 & Aug. 19, 1997). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
I

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 4003

To provide for the temporary suspension of duty on certain plastic web

sheeting.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AUGUST 2, 1996

Mr. RAMSTAD introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To provide for the temporary suspension of duty on certain

plastic web sheeting.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. CERTAIN PLASTIC WEB SHEETING.

4 Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized Tar5 iff Schedule of the United States is amended—

6 (1) by adding at the end of the U.S. notes

7 thereto the following new note:

8 ‘‘13. For purposes of heading 9902.56.03, the term

9 ‘nonwoven fiber sheet’ means sheet comprising a

10 highly uniform and random array of polyester fibers
2

•HR 4003 IH

1 0.5 to 6.0 denier, thermally bonded, calendered into

2 a smooth surface web having—

3 ‘‘(a) a thickness of 2.0 to 5.0 mils;

4 ‘‘(b) a basis weight of 60 to 100 grams per sq.

5 meter;

6 ‘‘(c) a machine tensile strength of 4.0 kg. per 15

7 mm or greater;

8 ‘‘(d) a low cross-direction tensile strength of 1.0 kg.

9 per 15 mm or greater;

10 ‘‘(e) a Frazier air permeability of 0.5 to 20 cfm per

11 sq. ft.;

12 ‘‘(f) a roll width of no greater than 41 inches; and

13 ‘‘(g) a roll length of no greater than 2,200 meters.’’;

14 and

15 (2) by inserting in numerical sequence the fol16 lowing new heading:

‘‘ 9902.56.03 Nonwoven fiber

sheet (provided

for in subheading

5603.13.00) ....... Free No change No change On or before

12/31/98 ’’.

17 SEC. 2. APPLICABILITY.

18 The amendments made by section 1 apply to goods

19 entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption,

20 on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment

21 of this Act.

Æ
#### Wellington S. Pierson, Plaintiff, v. J. Emmet Clark, Respondent. McDermott-Bunger Dairy Company, Appellant.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. All concurred.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

MICHAEL RENNER,

Petitioner

v.

THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEHIGH COUNTY, COUNTY OF LEHIGH, JOHN J. SIKORA AND MARK SUROVY,

Respondents :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 851 MAL 2018

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 2 nd day of July, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

GRANTED . The issues, as stated by Petitioner, are:

(1) Did the Legislature intend for the Unified Judicial System to be within the definition of “employer” under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Law, and therefore abrogated its sovereign immunity as stated in the en banc

decision in County of Allegheny v. Wilcox , 465 A.2d 47 (Pa. Cmwth. 1983)[?]

(2) Does the application of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act to the Unified Judicial System violate separation of powers so long as the Human

Relations Commission neither investi gates nor adjudicates the complaint of discrimination, as this Court held in Ct. of Com. Pleas of Erie County (6 th Jud. Dist.), Juv. Probation Dept. v. Pennsylvania Human Rel. Commn. , 682 A.2d 1246 (Pa. 1996) and First Jud. Dist. of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania

Human Rel. Comm’n. , 727 A.2d 1110 (Pa. 1999)?
#### SHOLTZ et al. v. STATE ex rel. McMASTER.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 9, 1936.

Rehearing Denied May 21, 1936.

Extraordinary Petition for Rehearing Denied May 28, 1936.

Cary D. Landis, Atty. Gen., and H. E. Carter and James B. Watson, Asst. Attys. Gen., for plaintiffs in error.

Hope Strong, of Winter Park, and William K. Whitfield, of Tallahassee, for defendant in error. .

PER CURIAM.

This cause having heretofore been submitted to the court upon the transcript of the record of the judgment herein and briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties, and the record having been seen, and inspected, and the court being now advised of its judgment to be given in the premises, it seems to the court that there is no error in the said judgment. It is therefore considered, ordered, and adjudged by the court that the said judgment of the circuit court be, and the same is hereby, affirmed upon the authority' of the opinion and judgment of this court in the case of Sholtz v. State ex rel. Ben Hur Life Association, 165 So. 39.

Affirmed.

WHITFIELD, C. J., and ELLIS, TERRELL, BROWN, BUFORD, and DAVIS, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4022 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4022

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to reduce the Medicare 
 payment for general overhead costs of transplant centers in acquiring 
      organs for transplant from organ procurement organizations.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 4, 1996

  Mr. Stark introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to reduce the Medicare 
 payment for general overhead costs of transplant centers in acquiring 
      organs for transplant from organ procurement organizations.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REDUCTION IN MEDICARE PAYMENT TO TRANSPLANT CENTERS FOR 
              GENERAL OVERHEAD COSTS OTHERWISE ALLOCATED TO ORGAN 
              PROCUREMENT.

    (a) In General.--Section 1861(v)(1) of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 1395x(v)(1)) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subparagraph:
    ``(T) In determining such reasonable costs, of a hospital that is a 
transplant center, for the acquisition of organs for transplant 
purposes from an organ procurement organization, no administrative and 
general service costs of the hospital (other than overhead directly 
attributable to acquiring such organs) may be allocated to the cost 
center for the costs of acquiring such organs.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to cost reporting periods beginning on or after October 1, 1997.
                                 <all>
```