Be cause the appe llant and the a ppellee sha re the same surna

me, we w ill refer

to the 1 a p p e l l an ta s J o h nan d

t h e a p p e l l e e a s J o y. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 650 -CV

Jo hn C ox , A ppe lla nt

v. Joy Cox , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 419TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- F M- 08- 0005 51 , HO NORAB LE SUZ ANNE COVINGTO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N

This is a restricte d appea l from a de fault judg ment gra n t i ng a fina l divorce de cre e b e tw e e na p p e ll an t Jo h nCo x an d

a p p e ll e e Jo y

Co x. J ohn argues that there is error on the fa ce of

the 1

rec ord i n t h at (1 ) h e was not served with the first ame nded petition; (2) ther e wa s no ag ree ment to the terms of the f

inal divorce decr ee; a

nd (3) the evi dence was insuffic ient to support the trial court’ s order s reg ardingthe division of the marital es t at e, custody and contr ol of the couple’ s minor children, the spousa l-maintenanc e aw ard, a n d the awa rd of attorney ’s fe es. Joy

c on te nd s th a t J oh n doe s not me e t the re qu ir e me nts of a re str ic te d ap pe a l bec a us e he pa rt ic ipate d in the proc eeding s below. I n the alter native, Joy

arg ues that there is no error on the face of the re cord,

e xce pt a s to the awa

rd of sp ou sa l ma int e na

nc e . H avin g de te rm ine d th a t John me e ts the re qu ir e me nts of a re str ic te d a

pp e a l be c a

us e he di d no t pa

rt ic ipate in t

he pr oc e e din g s b e low

and that th e re is2

e rr or on the fa c e of the re c or d in that John wa s no t se rv e d wi th the fi rs t a me nd e d pe tit ion , w e re ve rs e the def ault judgme nt and re mand the ca use to the trial cour

t for fur ther proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.

BACK GR OUND

J ohn and Joy

wer e mar

ried in 1983. The y h ad fi v e chil dren, two of whom wer e minors at the t ime of t he divorce. J ohn and Joy separ ated in August 2007. On Fe bruar y 1, 2008, J oy filed a pe tition for divorce. Ahear ing on te mporary order s was sche duled for A pril 21. J ohn was persona lly

serve d with citation and a c opy of the pe tition on April 16. J ohn, J oy , and Joy ’s attorne y signe d a docume nt entitled, “Neg otiated Rule 11 Ag ree ment for Temporar

y Orde rs” (the “wr itten settlement ag ree ment”), which was filed w ith the tr ia l c ourt on Ap ri l 17 , 2 00 8. Th e do c ume nt n ote d th a t:

Th e pa rt ie s a g re e to e nte r the a tta c he d Te mpo ra ry Or de rs , a tta c he d a s e xhibi t A , w ith the Court as their a g ree ment for F inal Ag ree ment in D ivorce . . . . The pa rties ag ree that th e De c re e in a

nd of its e lf is a

[sic ] bin din g and

no t su bje c t to re vo c a tio n a

nd it is in the best interest of their c hildren and te mporarily divi d es t h ei r asse ts and liabiliti es . . . . The parties have ag ree d, as evide nced by their sig nature s below, that thi s a g re e me nt i s c on tr a c tua l and bin din g on

the pa rt ie s and the y have a g re e d, by

the ir signatures below that this is binding and not subje ct t o revocation. The He ar ing sc he dule d for th e wee k of A pr il 2 1, 20 08 sha ll be pas se d as th is ag reem e nt is bin din g and made in go o d fai th. The parties wi ll w ork toget her to at tem pt to r e ac h a F ina l A gr e e m e nt and att empt t o ha ve a fina l ag r e e m e nt by May 15, 2008.

The trial c ourt enter ed the “ Temporary Or d er s ” attached to the wr itten settlement ag ree ment that same da y . The order s included provisions r eg arding custody and support of the children, division of the mar ital estate, a

nd spousal maintenanc e.3 On J uly 23, 2008, the day of the defa ult-judgme nt hear ing, Joy filed her first amende d orig inal petition. The amende d petition contained a cer tification from Joy ’s attorne y that a copy

of the petition was ser

ved on John at “5420 Be e Cave s Rd., Austin, Tex as.” See T ex . R. Civ. P . 20, 21a. J oy and her attorney appea red on J uly 23; J ohn did not. J oy testified i n support of her petition, and re fer red to doc umentary

evidenc e pre viously

filed with the trial court reg ardingthe value of the

c o u p l e ’ s c o m m u n i t y a s s e t s an d l i a b i l i t i e s . T h e t r i a l c o u rte n t e r e d t h e f i n a l d e c r e e o f d i v o r c e t h a td a y. The fina l decr ee inc luded provisions not c ontained in the written settlement ag ree ment reg ardingthe division of certa in marital proper ty not list ed in the wr itten settlement ag ree ment, possession of the children dur ing sc hool holiday s, possession of the childre n should the pare nts ever reside more than 100 mi le s a

p art, an d a

p p e ll a te a tt o r

n e y ’ s f e e s . In a d d it io n , th e f

in a l d e c r e e c o n ta in e d a modified spousal-maintena

nce a war d. On Septem b er 1 1 , fifty

day s after

the dec ree was sig ned, John filed a motion for new tria l, arguing that he had not be en g iven notice of the trial se tting. On Septembe r 26, John fil ed a motion to ex tend the post-judg ment deadlines be cause he wa s not tim ely g iven notice of the final judgme nt. See Te x. R. Civ. P. 306 a (4 ). Af te r a he ari ng on Oc tob e r 22, the tr ia l court de nie d b oth

o f J o h n ’s m o t i o n s , fi n d i n g:

To the extent Mr. Cox was entitled to Notice of the Trial setting , the Court finds that Mr . Co x re c e ive d co ns tr

uc tiv e no tic e of the tr ia l set tin g in t his ma tte r a

nd fa ile d to a pp e ar a t tr ia l and wh oll y de fa

ult e d. To the e xten t Mr

. Cox’ s a pp e ara nc e in t he c a se via a Rule 11 Ag ree ment and his ag ree ment to the t erms and substance of Tempora ry Orde rs does not constit ute an answe r because he failed to put any of the re quests of Ms. Cox ’s Petition for Divorce in issue, Mr. Cox ’s failure to answer befor e judg ment in this case was intentional, wa s the result of c onscious indiffer ence on his part and wa s N OT du e to a

mis take or

an a c c ide nt.

J ohn then filed a

notice of r estricted a

ppeal on Nove mber 17, 2008.4 STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW T o p re v ai l o n a re stricted appe al, an a ppellant must demonstrate: (1) the notice of

re str ic te d ap pe a l wa s file d with in six mon ths of the date of the jud g me nt or or de r; (2 ) he wa s a pa rt y to the s uit; (3) he did not participate i n the hearing that resulted in the judg ment complained of and did not tim ely

file a post-judgme nt motion or re quest for f indings of f

acts a nd conclusions of law ; and (4) err or is appar ent on the fa ce of the re cord. See T e x. R

. A p p . P

. 3 0 ; A l ex a n der v. Lynda’ s Boutique , 1 3 4 S

. W

. 3 d 8 4 5, 848 (Tex. 2004). The f ace of the re cord, f

or purpose s of a r estricted appea l, c onsists of all the pape rs that wer e bef ore the trial court whe n it render ed its judgme nt. See Alexande r , 134 S.W .3d at 848-49; Ge ne ra l El e c . Co. v . Fa lc on Ri dg e Ap ar tm e nts , Jo in t V entu re , 811 S.W .2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1991)

. These require ments are jurisdictional a nd cut off a

party ’s rig ht to seek re lief by way of a restric ted appea l if they are not met. See Clopton v. Pak, 66 S.W .3d 513, 51 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or

t Wor th 2 00 1, pe t. d e nie d) . T he pa rt ie s a g re e that John

me e ts the fi rs t two elements; thus we f ocus our a

naly sis on w h et h er J o hn has established that (a) he did not participate in the hea

ring resulting in the judgme nt and (b) e rror is appare nt on the fac e of the rec ord.

DI SCU SSIO N D id J o hn P a r t ic ip a t e in t he He a r in g Be lo w?

To deter mine whether

J ohn meets the non-par

ticipation r equire ment of a r estricted appea l, we ask w hether

he took par

t in the decision-making event that resulted in the adjudication

o f his rig hts. Texaco, I

nc. v. Ce ntral Power & Light Co. , 9 2 5 S. W. 2 d 5 8 6 , 5 8 9 (Tex. 1996); Pa rso ns v . D all

as Cou nty , 182 S.W .3d 451, 453 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). The nature a nd extent of participation nec essar y to prec lude a r estricted a

ppeal in any particula

r case is a matter of5

deg ree beca

use trial cour

ts decide case s in a

wide var iety

of proc edura l settings. Texaco , 925 S.W .2d

a t 58 9; Parsons , 182 S.W .3d at 453. I t is the fac t of non-par ticipation, a

nd not the rea son for it, that deter mines a person’ s rig ht to pursue a re stricted appe al. Texaco , 925 S.W .2d at 589. Participation fo r p ur po se s o f a

re str ic te d a

pp e a l sh ou ld be c on str

ue d li be ra lly

in f a vo r o f a ri g ht t o a

pp e a l. Stubbs v. Stubbs , 685 S.W .2d 643, 645 (Tex. 1985).

J ohn contends that ther e ar e substantive differ ence s betwee n the written settlement ag ree ment and the f

inal decr ee a

nd that those diffe renc es make the hea ring wher e the f

inal decr ee was prove n up and ente red the decision-makingevent. Joy responds that the se ttlement confe renc e, in which J ohn participated, was the actual decision-making event be cause the settlement ag ree ment “wa s the basis for a

nd is very simil ar to” the final divorc e dec ree . We ag ree with J ohn. The de cision-making event is t he procee ding in which the questions of law and fa ct

are decide d. Texaco , 9 2 5 S

. W

. 2 d at 5 8 9 (c i t i n g Lawyers Lloyds v. W ebb , 152 S.W .2d 1096, 1097-98 (Tex. 1941)). I n a summary -judg ment case , the dec isions are made on the evidenc e pre sented to the trial court pr ior to the ac tual summary -judg ment hear ing; thus “ a party who has take n part in all steps of a summar

y -judg ment proce eding except the hea ring on the motion has p ar t i ci p ated” in the decision-makingevent. Id. ; Thacker v . Thacker , 496 S.W .2d 201, 204-05 (Te x . Civ. App.—Amar illo 1 9 7 3 , wr i t dism’d). But in a jur y case , the dec isions are made on the evidenc e pr e se nte d to t he jur

y , a nd thu s a pa rt y mus t pa rt ic ipate in t

he he ari ngbe fo re the jur y in o rd e r t o participate in the decision-makingevent. Texaco , 925 S.W .2d at 589. I n a divorce ca se, it follows that the dec ision-making e vent is the eve nt in which the final divorc e decr ee is proven up. See Ba rn e tt v . B ar

ne tt , 750 S.W .2d 881, 883 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no wr it) (appe llant participate d6

in decision-makingevent whe n prese nt at hear ing w here terms of de cre e we re pr oven up, but not at he ari ngwh e re de c re e wa s e nte re d) ; cf. Texac o , 9 2 5 S

. W

. 2 d a t 5 9 1 (c i t i n g Lawyers Lloyds , 15 2 S. W.2 d at 10 98 ) (a

pp e lla nt wh o do e s no t pa

rt ic ipate in h e ari ngof

e vid e nc e do e s n ot p art ic ipate in decision-makingevent)

.

I n this case , the t erms of the final divorce decr ee w ere proven up at the J uly 23, 2008, defa ult-judgme nt hear ing. A t the defa ult-judgme nt hear ing, Joy was re quired to pre sent evid ence of the va lue of the ma

rital assets and l i abil ities to be divided, that the proposed division was equitable a

nd just, that the custody

order s were in the best interests of the children, and that she was elig i b l e fo r spousal maintena nce. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.701 ( West 2006) (“In a suit for divorce , the petition may not be taken as co n fe s s ed if the re spondent does not file a n answe r.”) ; Ba rry v . B arry , 193 S.W .3d 72, 75 (Te x . Ap p . — Ho uston [ 1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (in divorc e defa ult-judgme nt hear ing, pe titioner must present e v id e n ce at trial of petition’s materia l alleg ations). Be cause J ohn did not participate in the de fault-judg ment hear ing, he did not hear this evidenc e and is theref ore unf amiliar with the re cord. Texaco , 925 S.W

. 2 d at 590-91 (citing Lawyers Lloyds , 15 2 S. W .2 d a t 10 98 ) ( purp os e of re str ic te d a

pp e a l is to a llo w a

pp e lla nt w ho did

no t pa rt ic ipate in hear ing evidence and is thus unfamiliar with the re cord more time to prepar e for appea l). Ther efor e, we hold that the de fault-judg ment hear ing w as the decision-making event f or purpose s of deter mining John’s participation.

J oy next poi nts to a line of ca ses in which our sister co u rt s h av e h eld that the appellant participated in the de cision-making event whe re the appellant, thoug h not present at the hear ing w here the final de cre e was enter ed, si g ned or otherwise signa led hi s or her approva l of the final dec ree prior to its entry by the trial cour

t. See Hammond v . Hammond , 688 S.W .2d 690, 691-927

(Tex. App.—Be aumont 1985, writ dism’d) (a ppellant sig ned p ro p er t y

settlement ag ree ment and approve d final divorce decr ee) ; Blan k ins hip v . B lan k

ins hip , 572 S.W .2d 807, 808 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 1978, no writ) (appellant si g ned divorce decree prior to entry by trial

c ourt ); see also Sey mour v. Se ymour , No. 14-07-00280- CV, 2009 Tex. App. L EXI S 1235, at *7 (T ex . Ap p . — Ho u s t o n[ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] F e b

. 1 0 , 2 0 0 9 , p et

. fi l ed ) ( m em . o p . ) ( ap p el l an td i d n o ts i gn divorce decr ee, but sig ned ag ree d motion to reinstate, which re quested that trial court finalize decr ee that had bee n proven up at prior he aring ); Pi e rc e v . A bb ott , No. 04-98-00150- CV, 1998 Tex. App. L EXI S 2452, at *3-4 (Te x . App.—San Antonio Apr. 22 , 1 9 9 8 , no pet.) (not de signated for publication) ( ap p el l an ts i gn edfi n al d i v o rc e d ec re e)

. J o y ar gu es t h at t h e w ri t t en s et t l em en tagr ee m ent was irr evoca

ble and J ohn there fore signa led his approva l of the final divorc e dec ree by signingthe

wr itt e n s e ttl e me nt a g re e me nt.

J ohn counter s that beca

use the fina l d i vorce decr ee c ontained substantive cha ng es from the wr itten settlement ag ree ment, this case is more c losely akin to the line o f cases in which the appe llant approve d a preliminary order or agr eeme nt but did not approve the final de cre e or or der at issue in the appe al. I n those ca ses, the supre me cour t an d o u r s i s t er courts have held that the appellant did not pa

rticipate in the de cision-making event. See Stubbs , 685 S.W .2d at 646 (a ppellant sig ne d re vo c a

ble a g re e me nt i nc ide nt t o d ivo rc e ); McKnight v. Trogdon-Mc Knight , 132 S.W .3d 126, 13 0 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 20 04 , n o p e t.) (a pp e lla nt p art ic ipate d in he ari ng re su lti ngin final divorce decr ee, but did not par ticipate in proce eding s resulting in clar ification order, ame nded qu a lif ie d d ome sti c re la tio ns or de rs , a nd st ock div isi on

or de r at is su e on

a pp e a l) ; Campsey v. Campsey , 1 11 S.W. 3d

76 7, 77 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 20 03 , no pe t.) (a

pp e lla nt p art ic ipate d in TRO he ari ng g ov e rn ing c on du c t wh ile div or c e pe nd ing ); cf. Kisinger v. Kisinger , 748 S.W .2d 2, 4I n their ar g uments to this Court, both John a nd J oy rely on the testimonial and documenta ry 2 evidenc e pre sented to the trial c ourt in the hea ring on J ohn’s motion to ex tend post-judg ment deadlines. H oweve r, bec ause that evidence was not before the trial cour t when it rende red its final jud g me nt, we do no t c on sid e r i t in thi s r e str ic te d a

pp e a l. 8 (Tex. Ap p . — H o u s to n[1 4 th D is t. ] 1 9 8 7 , n o w r it ) ( a p p e ll an t s ig n e d

o r d e r mo d if y in g c u s to dy ag ree ment, but nothing in orde r stated that sig nature indicated a pproval or a g ree ment). Her e agai n , we ag ree with J ohn. The fina l divorce de cre e conta ins substantive differ ence s from the written settlement ag ree ment. I t includes provisions for the division of marital proper ty , for c ustody

of the c hildren, and f

or appe llate attorne y ’s fe es, none of which we re inc luded in the wr i tten settlement ag ree ment; it also includes a g reater monthly amount of spousal maintenanc e. J ohn could not, and did not, signa l his approval of the se terms by signingthe written settlement ag ree ment. W e h o ld that J ohn did not participate in the de cision-making event by par ti c ip a ti n g in

th e s e tt le me n t n e g o ti a ti o n s an d s ig n in g th e s e tt le me n t a g r e e me n t w h e r e th e f inal div or c e de c re e is s ub sta

nti ve ly dif fe re nt f ro m th e wr itt e n se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt. B e c a us e Johnme e ts the non-pa

rticipation require ment of a restric ted appea l, w e next t urn to the question of whe ther ther e is error appar ent on the fa ce of

the re cord.

Is E r r or App ar e nt on t he F ac e of t he Re c or d?

I n his se c on d iss ue , Joh n c on te nd s th a t th e re is e rr or on the fa c e of

the re c or d b e c a

us e he wa s not serve d with the first amende d petition. I n deter mining whe ther ther e is err or on the fa ce of the re c or d, we may on ly c on sid e r t he e vid e nc e that w a s b e fo re the tr ia l c ourt wh e n it re nd e re d it s fi na l ju dg me nt. See A lexande r , 134 S.W .3d at 848-49; Gene ral Elec. Co. , 811 S.W .2d at 944. 29 Upon a pa

rty ’s appe ara

nce, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedur e re quire that c opies of eve ry pleading filed be serve d on all the par ties. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 21. An amended plea ding must be serve d on the ot her party “not less than thre e day s befor e the time spec ified for the hea ring unless otherwise provided by these rules or shortene d by the cour t.” Id. ; see also Dav is v. Burnam , 137 S.W .3d 325, 334-35 (Te x . App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). Under Rule 21a, t he pleading must be

serve d in person, by

fax, or by

cer tified or re g istered mail to the par ty ’s last known a d d ress. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 21a. A defa ult judgment ca

nnot stand if the def

endant wa s not served, in a

manner authorized by Rule 21a, with an ame nded plea ding that reque sted more one rous re lief than the orig inal petition. See I n re E.A. , 5 2 T ex . S u p . J . 833, 2009 Tex. L EXI S 322, at *12 (Tex. J une 5, 2009); Sm ith v . S mi th , 241 S.W .3d 904, 906-07 (Te x . App.—B eaumont 2007, no pet.) ; In re R. D. C. , 912 S.W .2d 854, 855-56 (Te x . App.—Eastland 1995, no wr it). J oy has the burde n of proving that J ohn was ser ved in strict compliance with the rules. Sm ith , 241 S.W .3d at 909. The fir st question we addr ess is whether J ohn was ser

ved with the first amended pe tit ion in s tr ic t c omp lia

nc e wi th R

ule s 2 1 a nd 21 a . Th e re c or d re fl e c ts that Joy did no t fi le he r f ir st amende d petition until 8:10 a.m. on J uly 23, 2008, the morning of the de fault judg ment hear ing. T he amende d p e ti ti o nc o n ta in e d

a c e rti f ic a te o f s e r v ic e b y Jo y ’ s a tt o r

n e y th a t s tate d : “ Ih e r e b y

c e rtif y by the sig nature above, that a true a nd corr ect c opy

of the a bove was s er v ed u pon J ohn Cox at 5420 Be e C aves Rd., Austi n, Texas.” See Te x. R. Civ

. P. 21 (“ Th e pa rt y or a tto rn e y of re c or d s ha ll

certify to th e c o urt c o mp li an c e w it h th is r u le in w r it in g o v e r

s ig n a tu r e o nth e f

il e d p le a d in g , p le a, motion or a p p l i ca tion.”). Joy did not certify

or otherw ise provide pr oof of the me thod or date of service . There fore , we a ssume that J ohn was served on the day the amended pl eadingwas filed—the day of t he defau lt

ju d g me n t h e ar in g . Jo y

d id n o t r e qu e s t l e a v e o f

th e c o u rt t o f

il e ana me n ded10

pleadingon the day of the hear ing or to shorten the thre e-da y notice re quirement. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 21 (requiringservice at least thre e day s befor e the he ar i n g u nless time shortened by court), 63 (re quiring leave of the c ourt befor e filing an amende d pleadingwithin seven day s of date of trial); Da v is , 1 37 S.W. 3d

a t 33 4- 35 (h old ingthat tr ia l c ourt sh ou ld n ot h a ve ru le d o n me ri ts o f c la im i n amende d petition filed one day befor e trial). F urthermor e, the last kno wn ad d re s s for J ohn, as provided in the wr itten se ttlement a g ree ment, was “5324 Be e Caves Road, Austin, Te x as 78746.” The c ertification, however , states t hat J ohn was served at “5420 Be e Cave s Rd., Austin, Tex as”—the addre ss of the marital r esidenc e, which w as aw arde d to J oy in the temporar

y order s s i gn ed b y

the court on Apr il 17, 2008. On this record , we must hold t hat J ohn was not ser ved with the first amende d petition in st rict complianc e with the rule s of civil proce dure.

The sec ond question we must addre ss is whether the first amende d petition requested

mor e on e ro us re lie f. Johnargue s th a t th e a me nd e d p e tit ion re qu e sts mor e on e ro us re lie f be c a us e it reque sts several perma

nent injunctions, where as the orig inal injunction requested only temporar y injunctions, and beca

use it reque sted additional temporar y an d p er m anent injunctions barr ing John fr om “ b e i n g o n t h e c o mp u t e r o r h a v i n g t h e c o mp u t e r o n , w h i l e t h e c h i l dr e n ar e in h is possession” and “ discussing this litigation or any future litigation with the children or within hearing of the c hildren.”

A per manent injunction i s , b y i ts very nature , more one rous than a te mporary injunction. No n et h eless, Joy claims that the ame nded petition is not more onerous be cause the additional injunctive relief soug ht in the amended pe tition i s “virtually identical” to the injunctive

re lie f i nc lud e d in

the te mpo ra

ry or de rs John a g re e d to as part of the wr itt e n s e ttl e me nt a g re e me nt. Be cause the q u es tion presented is whe ther the a mended pe tition i s more oner ous than theThe supre me cour t rec ently noted, “We have never

decide d whether constructive notice of 3 a more onerous amende d petition satisfied due proc ess.” See I n re E.A. , 52 Tex. S up. J . 833, 2009 Tex. L EXI S 322, at *12 (Tex. J une 5, 2009). 11 or ig ina l pe tit ion , n ot w he the r it wa s mor e on e ro us tha n th e wr itt e n s e ttl e me nt a g re e me nt, we a ssume that J oy is essentially claiming that the written settlement a g ree ment g ave John constructive notice that she would be se eking the more one rous re lief.

As su min g argue nd o tha t c on str uc tiv e no tic e of

a mor e on e ro us pe tit ion

c an s ub sti tut e fo r n oti c e in co mpl ianc e wi th Rule 21 a , we ho ld that the wr itt e n settle me nt ag re e me nt did no t c le a rl y

n o t i f y J o h n t h a tJ o y w o u l d

b e s e e k i n g s u c h r e l i e f

p e r m an e n t l y. J oy cites to lang uag e in the dec ree

3 stating that the “par

ties understand that this agr eeme nt is bindi ng upon the sig nature of the pa rties and is not subject to revoc ation.” Howe ver, the dura t i o n o f t h e ag ree ment is not as clear as the selec ted lang uag e would seem to indicate. First, we note that the docume nt is entitl ed “N eg otiated Rule 11 Ag ree ment for Te mporary Orde rs.” While J oy corr ectly notes that we g ive g reater we ight to the o p er at i v e clauses of a contra ct than the c aptions or titles, see Ente rprise Leasing Co. v. Barrios , 156 S.W .3d 547, 549 (Tex. 2004), the re levant oper ative cla uses i n the written settlement ag ree ment also contain indicators that the injunctive re lief re quested would last only until the parties ag ree d to, and the trial c ourt enter ed, a f inal divorce decr ee. T he wr itten settlement ag ree ment continually re fe rs t o t he attac hed orde rs as “ Tempora ry Orde rs.” The opening para g raph of the written settlement ag ree ment notes, “The parties will work tog ether to attempt to reac h a Final Ag ree ment and attempt to have [a] final ag ree ment by May 15, 2008.” The section conta ining the injunctive re lief is under the heading “Te mporary I njunctions as to Persons.” I t then vacillates be tw e e n r e fe rr ingto t

he re qu e ste d in

jun c tio ns a s te mpo ra

ry and pe rm ane nt:We a lso no te that the wr itt e n se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt e njo ins bo th John and Joy fr om m os t 4 of the be havior, whe rea s the amende d petition and the final divorc e dec ree enjoins only J ohn. 12 T h e C o u rt fi n d s t h at t h e p ar t i es h av e a gre edt o t h e f o l l o wi n g permane nt injunction

. The temporary injunction g rante d below shall be effe ctive im mediately and shall be binding on J ohn Cox and J oy Cox ; on their ag ents, serva nts, employ ees, a

nd attorney s; and on those per sons in active conc ert or pa rt i ci p ati on with them who rec eive a ctual notice of

this order by

persona l service or otherw ise. I T I S O R D E R E D A

N D D E C R E E D t h a t Jo h n C o x o r Jo y C o x is perma ne ntl y enjoined from: . . . . 4 (Emphase s added.) The fina l clause of the written settlement a g ree ment states, “The se Tempor ary Orde rs s hall continue in forc e unti l the s igning of t he Final Dec ree of Divorce or until further orde r of this Court.” The va cillation betwee n the terms “te mporary” and “ perma nent , ” an d the jux taposition of refe renc es to an “ irrev o ca b l e and binding ag ree ment” with the stateme nt that the parties will c ontinue to work towar d a fina l ag ree ment, make the doc ument entirely ambig uous and confusing . Given the bur den on Joy to pr ove “strict compliance ” with the rules of se rvice , we c annot say that an ambiguously draf ted writt en settl ement agr eeme nt is enoug h to g ive J ohn constructive notice such that J oy

did not have to serve him in accor dance with Rule 21a. Be cause J ohn was not proper ly serve d with a more one rous amende d petition, there is error on the face of the record and the default judgme nt cannot stand. See I n re E.A. , 52 Tex. S up. J . 833, 2009 Tex. L EXI S 322, at *12; W eave r v. Hartford Ac cident & Indem . Co. , 570 S.W .2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1978); Sm ith , 241 S.W .2d at 909-10; Caprock Constr. Co. v. Guaranteed F loorcove ring, Inc. , 950 S.W .2d 203, 204-05 (Te x . App.—Dallas 1997, no writ). We sustain J ohn’s second issue on13

appea l. Be cause of our disposition of this point , it is not nece ssary to r eac h J ohn’s claims re g arding the suffic iency

of the e vidence to support cer tain terms of the de cre e. See Tex. R. App. P . 47.1.

CO NC LU SION We r e v e r s e th e d e f

a u lt ju d g me n t e n te r in g th e f in a l d iv o r c e d e c r e e an d r e mand the

cause to the trial court for further proce eding s. We also reinstate the te mporary order s entere d by the trial cour

t on April 17, 2008.

___________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and He nson Reverse d and Remande d Filed: August 28, 2009