alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

 Hawkins moved once already for oral arguments. The Court denied his request.

See Order of April 12, 2010, 1-2 (docket no. 13). 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

THOMAS FRANK HAWKINS, # 200570 

Petitioner,

Case No. 09-cv-12289

v. 

HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY

LLOYD RAPELJE,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF

 COUNSEL (docket no. 15) AND FOR ORAL ARGUMENTS (docket no. 16)

Petitioner Thomas Frank Hawkins has filed a pro se habeas corpus petition

challenging his state conviction for criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. He raises

four claims regarding the use of “prior acts” testimony at his trial in Mecosta County Circuit

Court. The State argues in an answer to the petition that Hawkins’s claims lack merit and

are not cognizable on habeas review. Pending before the Court are Hawkins’s motions for

appointment of counsel and for oral arguments.1

“[T]here is no constitutional right to counsel in habeas proceedings,” Post v.

Bradshaw, 422 F.3d 419, 425 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

752-53 (1991)), and no need for oral arguments, discovery, or an evidentiary hearing in this

case. Furthermore, the interests of justice do not require the appointment of counsel here.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). 

2:09-cv-12289-SJM-MJH Doc # 18 Filed 01/13/11 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 1296
2

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Hawkins’s motions for appointment of

counsel (docket no. 15) and for oral arguments docket no. 16) are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

s/Stephen J. Murphy, III 

STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

United States District Judge

Dated: January 13, 2011

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or

counsel of record on January 13, 2011, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Alissa Greer 

Case Manager

2:09-cv-12289-SJM-MJH Doc # 18 Filed 01/13/11 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 1297
Exhibit 32.2 

 

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF 

UNION SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK 

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 

§ 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

In connection with the annual report of Union Security Life Insurance Company of New York (the“Company”) on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Ranell Jacobson, Treasurer (principal financial officer) of theCompany, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based on my knowledge: 

 

1.     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934; and 

2.     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Company. 

 

Date:March 10, 2006 

 

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350 andis not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure.
#### Percival F. Compart v. Otto Dommasch

Motion granted, with ten dollars costs.
V

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 4116

To provide for the issuance of a noncompetitive oil and gas lease for certain

lands.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 19, 1996

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Resources

A BILL

To provide for the issuance of a noncompetitive oil and

gas lease for certain lands.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. ISSUANCE OF NONCOMPETITIVE LEASE FOR

4 CERTAIN LANDS.

5 The Secretary of the Interior shall issue a non6 competitive oil and gas lease under the Mineral Leasing

7 Act (as in effect before December 22, 1987) in accordance

8 with section 5106(a) of the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas

9 Leasing Reform Act of 1987 (Public Law 100–203; 30

10 U.S.C. 226 note) to Stephen E. Bubala for the area sub-
2

•HR 4116 IH

1 ject to noncompetitive lease offer CA11297 notwithstand2 ing the location of a Known Geologic Structure within

3 such area.

Æ
**Exhibit 32.2**

**WABCO HOLDINGS INC.**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED**

**PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of WABCO Holdings Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2007 as filedwith the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Ulrich Michel, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

(i) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the periods covered in the Report. 

 

Dated: August 8, 2007
175 La. 197

#### STATE of Louisiana v. Charley CHANDLER, Jeff Chandler, and Robert Griffin.

No. 31861.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 20, 1932.

G. L. Porterie, Atty. Gen., James O’Connor, Asst. Atty.' Gen., and David I. Garrett, Dist. Atty., of Monroe, for the State.

E. M. Fraser and Madison, Madison & Fuller, all of Bastrop, for appellee.

ST. PAUL, J.

This case presents the same issues and the same facts as in State v. Charlie Brantley (La. Sup.) 143 So. 46, decided this day; and, for the reasons therein assigned:

It is therefore ordered that the judgment appealed from be reversed, and the case remanded to be proceeded with according to law.
Exhibit 32





Certification of Principal Executive and Financial Officer


Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to


Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Coyote Resources, Inc. a Nevada corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), Earl Abbott, Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certifies to the best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Coyote Resources, Inc., and will be retained by Coyote Resources, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





/s/ Earl AbbottEarl AbbottPrincipal Executive Officer, Principal Financial OfficerMay 23, 2011
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALBERTO SOLORIO; et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

CLOVIS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-16625 

D.C. No. 

1:16-cv-01319-LJO-BAM 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Lawrence J. O’Neill, Chief Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 20, 2018

San Francisco, California

Before: M. SMITH, NGUYEN, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

J.S., by and through her parents Alberto and Alicia Solorio, appeals the 

district court’s affirmance of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision finding 

that, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 

§§ 1400 et seq., Clovis Unified School District’s 2016 individualized education 

program (IEP) was a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least-

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

JAN 15 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

restrictive environment (LRE). We affirm. 

1. The district court did not err in giving due weight to the ALJ’s decision,

which was careful, thorough, well-reasoned, sensitive to the complexity of the 

relevant legal issues, and thus entitled substantial weight. See Ojai Unified Sch. 

Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1476 (9th Cir. 1993). With respect to the 

persuasiveness of Patricia McVay’s testimony, the ALJ was in the best position to 

determine the credibility of the relevant witnesses, see Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. 

v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 889 (9th Cir. 2001), and he offered sound 

reasons for finding McVay’s testimony to be unpersuasive. 

2. There is sufficient evidence to support the determination that Clovis’s 

proposed IEP constitutes a FAPE in the LRE. In balancing the relevant Rachel H.1

factors, the ALJ found that the factors concerning educational and non-academic 

benefits weighed in favor of a conclusion that the proposed IEP was a FAPE in the 

LRE, and that those factors outweighed the disruptiveness and cost factors. The 

district court agreed. Those findings were permissible under our case law, see, 

e.g., Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 826 F.3d 1179, 1188 (9th Cir. 

2016), and we will not disturb them, see Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch.

Dist., 502 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2007).

AFFIRMED.

 

1 Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H. ex rel. 

Holland, 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994).
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

326 ASSOCIATES, L.P., § a Delaware limited partnership, § No. 211, 2016 § Plaintiff-Below, § Court Below: Superior Court Appellant, § of the State of Delaware § v. § C.A. No.: N15C-09-228 § PROGRESSIVE SERVICES, INC., § § Defendant-Below, § Appellee. §

Submitted: October 19, 2016 Decided: November 2, 2016

Before STRINE , Chief Justice; HOLLAND , and SEITZ , Justices.

ORDER

This 2 nd day of November, 2016, after careful consideration of the parties’

briefs and the record on appeal, we find it evident that the final judgment of the

Superior Court should be affirmed on the basis of t he court’s Memorandum

Opinion dated March 29, 2016.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the final judgm ent of the

Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Justice
CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with this Report of
Uplift Nutrition, Inc. (the "Registrant") as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the " Report"), I, Gary C. Lewis, hereby
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and
belief:  (1) This Report fully complies with
the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934; and  (2) The information contained in this
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
result of operations of the Registrant.    Date:
May 19, 2009

By:
/s/Gary C.
LewisGary C. LewisPresident, and Chief
Executive Officer (CEO)   Date:
May 19, 2009

By:
/s/ Gary C.
LewisGary C. LewisPrincipal Financial Officer
(CFO) and Principal Accounting Officer      1
**Exhibit 32.2**

**Certification UnderSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

Inconnection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Samsonite Corporation(the “Company”) for the annual period ended January 31, 2007 as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), each ofthe undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adoptedpursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)          The Report fully complies withthe requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

(2)          The information contained inthe Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial conditionand results of operations of the Company.
| By     |   | /s/ RICHARD H. WILEY                             |   |   |
|--------|--------|--------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
| Name:  |   | Richard H. Wiley                                 |   |   |
| Title: |   | Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Secretary |   |   |
| Date:  |   | May 1, 2007                                      |   |   |

 

This certificationaccompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

 

----
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER ON MOTION

Cause number: 01-13-00219-CV

Style: Anne Moreland

v. Suri Dorai

Date motion filed*: August 29, 2014

Type of motion: Motion by Non-Texas Pro Se Appellant Who Resides Outside of Texas for Permission to

Participate in Appellate Proceeding

Party filing motion: Appellant

Document to be filed:

Is appeal accelerated? No

If motion to extend time:

Original due date:

Number of previous extensions granted: Current Due date:

Date Requested:

Ordered that motion is:

 Granted

If document is to be filed, document due: 

 Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Court will not grant additional motions to extend time

 Denied

 Dismissed (e.g., want of jurisdiction, moot)

 Other: _____________________________________ 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.1(b) (“A party not represented by counsel must sign any document that the party files and

give the party’s mailing address, telephone number, fax number, if any, and email address.”).

Judge’s signature: /s/ Terry Jennings

 

Panel consists of ____________________________________________

Date: September 16, 2014
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Donald NICHOLS, Appellant. Donald D. NICHOLS, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

Nos. WD 50034, WD 51742.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

July 16, 1996.

John M. Sehilmoeller, Asst. Public Defender, St. Louis, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., David J. Hansen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before FENNER, C.J., P.J., and SPINDEN and EDWIN H. SMITH, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Appellant’s direct appeal is dismissed and his appeal of the denial, without evidentiary *887hearing, of his Rule 29.15 motion for postcon-vietion relief is affirmed.

Rule 84.16(b) and Rule 30.25(b).
#### A. Frank Gorski, as Administrator, etc., of Walter Bigosinski, Deceased, Respondent, v. International Railway Company, Appellant.

Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. All concurred, except Williams, J., who dissented; Spring, J., not sitting.
#### GERDE NEWMAN *&*COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. John FOURCADE, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 13972.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Orleans.

March 7, 1932.

Woodville & Woodville, of New Orleans, for appellant.

Ridgtely Moise, of New Orleans, for appel-lee.

WESTERFIELD, J.

This suit grows out of an alleged sale of twenty-five cases of eggs by the plaintiff,to the defendant.

In the case of Gerde Newman & Company v. Roselino Curcuru (La. App.) 139 So. 83, decided January 11, 1932, a case involving the same party plaintiff and the same principles of law and practically the same facts, the defenses made here were held to be without merit.

We have not changed our view. Consequently, and for the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
(September 28, 1998)

#### Rafael Afridonidze, Respondent, v Fox Communications of N. Y. Inc. et al., Appellants.

[678 NYS2d 499]

In an ac*834tion to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Thomas, J.), dated January 29, 1998, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

We agree with the Supreme Court that triable issues of fact exist as to whether the dog which bit the plaintiff had a vicious propensity and whether the defendants had knowledge of such a propensity (see, *Althoff v Lefebvre,*240 AD2d 604). Mangano, P. J., Miller, Pizzuto and Krausman, JJ., concur.
null

421.90262
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 498 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 498

                   For the relief of Jung Ja Golden.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 11, 1995

 Mr. Edwards introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
                   For the relief of Jung Ja Golden.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. IMMEDIATE RELATIVE STATUS FOR JUNG JA GOLDEN.

    (a) In General.--Jung Ja Golden shall be classified as an immediate 
relative within the meaning of section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act for purposes of approval of a relative 
visa petition filed under section 204 of such Act by Jung Ja Golden and 
the filing of an application for an immigrant visa or for adjustment of 
status.
    (b) Adjustment of Status.--If Jung Ja Golden enters the United 
States before the filing deadline specified in subsection (c), she 
shall be considered to have entered and remained lawfully and shall, if 
otherwise eligible, be eligible for adjustment of status under section 
245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act as of the date of the 
enactment of this Act.
    (c) Deadline for Application and Payment of Fees.--Subsections (a) 
and (b) shall apply only if the petition and the application for 
issuance of an immigrant visa or the application for adjustment of 
status are filed by Jung Ja Golden with appropriate fees within 2 years 
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (d) Reduction of Immigrant Visa Number.--Upon the granting of an 
immigrant visa or permanent residence to Jung Ja Golden, the Secretary 
of State shall instruct the proper officer to reduce by 1, for the 
following fiscal year, the total number of immigrant visas available 
under section 201(c)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
                                 <all>
```
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 21, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-51269

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSE MANUEL HERNANDEZ-HERNANDEZ, also

known as Jose Coronado-Cavasos,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-03-CR-1208-1-PRM

--------------------

Before JOLLY, JONES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 Jose Manuel Hernandez-Hernandez appeals the sentence imposed

following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United

States after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

Hernandez-Hernandez contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b) define separate offenses. He argues that the prior

conviction that resulted in his increased sentence is an element

of a separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have
No. 03-51269

-2-

been alleged in his indictment. Hernandez-Hernandez maintains

that he pleaded guilty to an indictment which charged only simple

reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that his sentence

exceeds the two-year maximum term of imprisonment which may be

imposed for that offense.

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235

(1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of

separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing

provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. 

Hernandez-Hernandez acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed

by Almendarez-Torres, but asserts that the decision has been cast

into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 

He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres

“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule

it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED. 

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.