## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D 17

- 3770

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D AVID C HARLES S USSMAN ,
Appellant,

v.

D EPARTMENT O F C ORRECTIONS ,
Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit for Leon County. Charles W. Dodson , Judge

.
June 7, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
Appellant Da vid Charles Sussman has challenged a prison disciplinary report and an order of sanctions entered by the trial
court . We affirm the trial court’s decision to deny his petition for writ of mandamus without comment. We agree with Mr. Sussman, h owever, that the record does not presently support the sanction s order prohibiting him from all future pro se filings.

During the course of litigating the petition for writ of mandamus, the D epartment of Corrections filed a motion for sanctions. The trial court issued an order requiring Appellant to show cause as to why he s hould not “ be prohibited from filing future pro se pleadings in this case

. ” The rationale in the show cause order for considering sanctions was that Appellant had filed2 repetitious and frivolous pleadings. The order also noted that Appellant had filed fift een causes of action, including ten during the last three years. The court attached a printout showing the list of cases Appellant had filed , four of which were still open ca s es

. T he printout did not indicat e the nature of the closed cases , or how they had been resolved

. In response to the show cause order, Appellant contended that his pleadings weren’t abusive, and that only three of the cases listed by the trial court had been decided adversely against him. After receiving Appellant’s response, the cour t concluded that the actions were repetitious and frivolous and prohibit ed him from pro

se “ commencing any actions in [the Circuit Court for Leon County],” except for bona fide habeas corpus petitions.

Litigants “abuse[] the right to pro se access by filing repetitious and frivolous pleadings, thereby diminishing the ability of the courts to devote their finite resources to the consideration of legitimate claims.” State v. Spencer , 751 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1999). Accordingl y, “[c]ourts may, upon a demonstration of egregious abuse of the judicial process, restrict parties from filing pro se pleadings with the court.” Spencer v. State , 717 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (emphasis added). However, “a trial court ’ s exercise o f its duty to limit abuses of court processes in order to preserve the access to courts for all litigants must be undertaken in consideration of the constitutional rights of the pro se litigant in each case.” Edwards v. State , 192 So. 3d 522, 524 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).

In this case, Appellant was prohibited from filing any new actions pro se, after the show cause order had warned of a more limited, case

- specific sanction. With respect to Appellant’s litigation history, his response to the show cause order ind icate d that most of the fifteen cases cited by the trial court either remained pending or were decided in his favor. B ased on this limited record, we cannot conclude that the severe sanction of a total prohibition on pro se filings is supported by the reco rd. Accordingly, we reverse the order prohibiting Appellant from commencing pro se actions . On remand, the trial court may again consider sanctions, but must show how Appellant abuse d the3 judicial process by more than just reciting the number of cases he h as filed

.
A FFIRMED i n part
, R EVERSED in part

, and R EMANDED

.
W OLF , O STERHAUS , and J AY , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

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David Charles Sussman, Appellant , pro se

.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kristen J. Lonergan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.