alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLARD L. SLOAN, EUGENE J.

WINNINGHAM, and JAMES L. KELLEY, 

on behalf of themselves and a similarly 

situated class, Case No. 09-cv-10918

Hon. Paul D. Borman

Plaintiffs, Magistrate Mona K. Majzoub

v. Class Action

BORGWARNER, INC., BORGWARNER 

FLEXIBLE BENEFITS PLANS and

BORGWARNER DIVERSIFIED 

TRANSMISSION PRODUCTS, INC.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________________________________________________/

EXHIBIT LIST TO

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO LIABILITY

1. Richard Nuerge Deposition Transcript

2. 1989 Health Insurance Agreement

3. Jerry French Deposition Transcript and Exhibits

4. 1992 Agreement and Modification and Extension of Health Insurance Agreement 

5. 1992 Health Insurance Agreement

6. 1995 Health Insurance Agreement

7. 11/1/04 Turczynowsky Email re Deductible/Stop-Loss

8. 1998 Insurance Highlights

9. 11/28/00 Tentative Agreement on Insurances and Pensions

10. 11/28/00 “Excerpts” from Agreement on Insurances and Pensions

11. George Turczynowsky Transcript

2:09-cv-10918-PDB-MKM Doc # 103 Filed 05/14/12 Pg 1 of 3 Pg ID 4650
12. 4/1/05 Tentative Agreement

13. 4/8/05 Clarifications on Tentative Agreement

14. UAW Local 287 April 2005 Tentative Agreement 

15. Order in 2006 BorgWarner Case in Indiana

16. Michelle DuFour Deposition Transcript

17. 2009 Your Health Care Travel Guide

18. 5/1/09 BorgWarner DTP Notice re Prescription and Medicare

19. 2009 Your Retiree Health Care Travel Guide

20. 2009 BorgWarner Benefit Enrollment Form

21. 2009 Plant Shutdown Agreement 

22. 10/27/89 Retirement Income Program Guide Booklet 

23. 3/12/95 Retirement Income Program Guide Booklet

24. 1/90 Retirement- General Summary

25. 5/95 Retirement- General Summary

26. 2/14/89 Fax with Retirement- General Summary

27. 9/27/99 Nuerge Letter

28. Letters to Surviving Spouses re Health Care Coverage

29. Borg Warner DTP/UAW Joint Position Statement

30. 3/24/87 Hourly Retirees Insurance Booklet Draft

31. 12/18/95 Turczynowsky Letter to CIGNA re Stop-Loss and Deductibles

32. 1986 Health Insurance Agreement

33. Bender v. Newell Window, Case No. 11-1335

34. McCoy v. Meridian Automotive Systems, Inc., C.A. No. 03-74613, 

2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29219 *2 (E.D. Mich., Feb. 6, 2004)

2:09-cv-10918-PDB-MKM Doc # 103 Filed 05/14/12 Pg 2 of 3 Pg ID 4651
35. McCoy v. Meridian Automotive Systems, Inc., 

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40129 (E.D. Mich. 2005)

2:09-cv-10918-PDB-MKM Doc # 103 Filed 05/14/12 Pg 3 of 3 Pg ID 4652
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4320 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4320

 To amend the Truth in Lending Act to require a credit card issuer to 
 disclose only 1 annual percentage rate of interest in any preapproved 
application or solicitation to open a credit card account under an open 
           end consumer credit plan, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 28, 1996

 Mr. Schumer introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
              Committee on Banking and Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Truth in Lending Act to require a credit card issuer to 
 disclose only 1 annual percentage rate of interest in any preapproved 
application or solicitation to open a credit card account under an open 
           end consumer credit plan, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Truth in Credit Card Offers Act''.

SEC. 2. TRUTH IN CREDIT CARD OFFERS.

    (a) Disclosure of Actual Applicable Annual Percentage Rate.--
Section 127(c) of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1637(c)) is 
amended--
            (1) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and
            (2) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new 
        paragraph:
            ``(5) Preapproved credit card solicitations.--If any 
        application, solicitation, or offer to open a credit card 
        account under an open end consumer credit plan is designated or 
        described as `preapproved' or contains similar terms which 
        would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the consumer's 
        acceptance of the terms of the account will result in the 
        issuance of a credit card, only 1 annual percentage rate of 
        interest may be disclosed in such application or solicitation 
        as the annual percentage rate applicable to such account at the 
        time the account is opened.''.
    (b) Conspicuous Disclosure of Annual Percentage Rate.--Section 
122(c)(2) of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1632(c)) is amended by 
adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
                    ``(D) Conspicuous disclosure of annual percentage 
                rate.--The typeface used to disclose the annual 
                percentage rate shall be twice as high as the typeface 
                used for any other item in the table.''.
                                 <all>
```
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL TROFATTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

KRISTINA KIRY and ANNE M.

WESTFALL,

Defendants.

/

Case Number: 5:09-CV-13457

HON. JOHN CORBETT O’MEARA

ORDER OF TRANSFER

Plaintiff Michael Trofatter has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. 

Venue is appropriate in the judicial district where either all defendants reside or where

the claims arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); Al-Muhaymin v. Jones, 895 F.2d 1147 (6th Cir. 1990). 

Plaintiff complains of actions taken by defendants in connection with their employment by the

Ingham County Circuit Court. Ingham County is located in the Western District of Michigan. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 102(b). The defendants reside and the claims arose in the Western District of

Michigan. See id. Therefore, venue is not appropriate in this district. 

Accordingly, in the interests of justice, the Court transfers Plaintiff’s case to the United

States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Southern Division and 

ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to transfer the Court file to the Western District of Michigan,

Southern Division. 

s/John Corbett O’Meara 

United States District Judge

Date: September 28, 2009

5:09-cv-13457-JCO-DAS Doc # 4 Filed 09/28/09 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 22
2

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties of

record on this date, September 28, 2009, using the ECF system and/or ordinary mail.

s/William Barkholz

Case Manager

5:09-cv-13457-JCO-DAS Doc # 4 Filed 09/28/09 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 23
#### Vivian Arnold v. State.

No. 25852.

May 14, 1952.

Hon. Joe B. Brown, Judge Presiding.

*314
      *R. L. Wade, H. E. Tarpley,*and *W. R. Sessions,*all of Dallas, for appellant.

*Henry Wade,*District Attorney, *Charles S. Potts*and *Robert L. Shaw,*Assistants District Attorney, and *George P. Black-bum,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

The appeal is from a conviction for keeping a bawdy house, there being alleged five different offenses at different dates, in which a jail sentence of 20 days and a $200.00 fine was imposed in each case, making 100 days in jail and $1,000.00 fine.

In the progress of the trial it was shown that the officers obtained a search warrant from a justice of the peace, by virtue of which they seized certain articles and introduced them as exhibits for the purpose of showing that the premises were used as a house of prostitution. Objection was made to the introduction of these articles in evidence. Bill of Exception No. 6 shows that both the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself were introduced in evidence, over the defendant’s objection. This was clearly error.

It is contended in brief filed by the district attorney’s office that the objection is insufficient in that the grounds were based on the claim of an invalid search warrant. We have always held that it is not admissible for any purpose and, therefore, it is not necessary to state the grounds. We do observe, however, that the search warrant fails to comply with Article 316, Vernon’s Ann. C.C.P., in that it does not “* * * state the particular offense for which such implements are designed.” It follows, further, that the search warrant is invalid and the fruits of the search are not admissible in evidence.

Other errors complained of in the appeal should not occur on another trial and it is not deemed necessary to discuss them herein. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                          83,957
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               12,575,663
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                 17,975,354
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            31,278,417
<PP&E>                                     115,364,365
<DEPRECIATION>                            (12,073,477)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             148,876,016
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       34,390,871
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        86,374
<OTHER-SE>                                   8,533,008
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               148,876,016
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           131,370,003
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              122,661,040
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 6,771
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           5,974,213
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              2,727,979
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          2,727,979
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 2,727,979
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.32
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.30


</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-40401

Conference Calendar

 

ROBERT L. WILLIAMS, III,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BRADSHAW STATE JAIL, Facility Health Administrator,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:01-CV-43

- - - - - - - - - -

December 11, 2001

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Robert L. Williams, III, a Texas prisoner (# 680652),

appeals from the dismissal of his pro se, in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) civil rights action as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). The court dismissed the complaint, which was

filed on January 26, 2001, and which concerned injuries allegedly

inflicted by the defendant on January 21, 1999, because it was

barred by the applicable two-year Texas statute of limitations. 

A district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint as frivolous
No. 01-40401

-2-

on statute-of-limitations grounds where “it is clear from the

face of a complaint that the claims asserted are barred by the

applicable statute of limitations.” Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d

616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994). For § 1983 claims, federal courts

apply the general personal injury statute of limitations of the

forum state, Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989), which

is two years in Texas. See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237

F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 53

(2001); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (West 1999). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding that Williams’ complaint was not filed within the

applicable two-year limitations period. Because Williams’ appeal

is without arguable merit, the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. 

5TH CIR. R. 42.2; see Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th

Cir. 1983). The dismissal of the instant appeal as frivolous and

the district court’s dismissal of his § 1983 complaint as

frivolous each count as a “strike” under the three-strikes

provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103

F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996). Williams is cautioned that, once

he accumulates three strikes, he may not proceed IFP in any civil

action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in

any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious

physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1078

In re: LAWRENCE VERLINE WILDER, SR.,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

Submitted: May 21, 2015 Decided: May 26, 2015

Before MOTZ, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lawrence Verline Wilder, Sr., Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Lawrence Verline Wilder, Sr., petitions for a writ of 

mandamus seeking an order reversing the dismissals of his civil 

actions filed between 1997 and 2015. We conclude that Wilder is 

not entitled to mandamus relief.

Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used only 

in extraordinary circumstances. Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 

U.S. 394, 402 (1976); United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 

516-17 (4th Cir. 2003). Further, mandamus relief is available 

only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. 

In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 

1988). Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. In 

re Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2007).

The relief sought by Wilder is not available by way of 

mandamus. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

In re:

 MATHSON INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Debtor,

______________________________/

WENDY TURNER LEWIS, Trustee of the

Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Estate of Mathson

Industries, Inc.,

Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

NEGRI BOSSI USA, INC.,

Defendant/Appellant,

 /

Case Nos. 09-13148

 09-13149

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

Chapter 7 Case No. 09-42894

Adversary No. 09-04639-tjt

Honorable Thomas J. Tucker

JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s appeal from the bankruptcy court’s

partial grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff and entry of a permanent injunction against

Defendant. For the reasons set forth in an opinion issued this date,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the bankruptcy court’s

July 30, 2009, bench opinion and subsequent entry of a permanent injunction against

Defendant is AFFIRMED.

s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Date: January 26, 2010

copies to:

Howard S. Sher, Esq.

Michele L. Walton, Esq.

Anissa C. Hudy, Esq.

John J. Bursch, Esq.

Hon. Thomas J. Tucker

2:09-cv-13148-PJD-MKM Doc # 16 Filed 01/26/10 Pg 1 of 1 Pg ID 189
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

Raymond Riza,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 09-12605

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., Honorable Sean F. Cox

Defendant.

_________________________________/

ORDER REMANDING STATE LAW CLAIMS

Plaintiff filed this action in Wayne County Circuit Court alleging the following claims:

“Violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1639” (Count I); “Predatory Lending” (Count II); “Violation of Truth

in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.” (Count III); “Fraudulent Misrepresentation” (Count

IV); “Negligent Misrepresentation” (Count V); “Violation of Fair Credit Reporting Act” (Count

VI); and “Violation of Mortgage Brokers, Lender & Services Licensing Act, M.C.L. § 445.1651

et seq.” (Count VII). Defendant removed the action to this Court, asserting federal question

jurisdiction. 

Although Plaintiff’s federal causes of action (Counts I, III, and VI) are cognizable in this

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the remaining counts are based on state law.

The applicable statute regarding supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, provides, in

pertinent part, that district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim

when:

1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law;

2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the

district court has original jurisdiction;

2:09-cv-12605-SFC-RSW Doc # 4 Filed 11/10/09 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 39
3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction, or

4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining

jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Having reviewed the state-law claims in Plaintiff’s complaint, this Court concludes that

Plaintiff’s state-law claims predominate. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). In addition, the Court finds

that the potential for jury confusion in this case would be great if Plaintiff’s federal claims were

presented to a jury along with Plaintiff’s state-law claims. Thus, the potential for jury confusion

is yet another reasons for this Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s state-law claims. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Padilla v. City

of Saginaw, 867 F.Supp. 1309 (E.D. Mich. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Counts II, IV, V, and VII of Plaintiff’s Complaint

are hereby REMANDED to the Wayne County Circuit Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/Sean F. Cox 

Sean F. Cox

United States District Judge

Dated: November 10, 2009

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on

November 10, 2009, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

S/Jennifer Hernandez 

Case Manager

2:09-cv-12605-SFC-RSW Doc # 4 Filed 11/10/09 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 40
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF HEADWAY CORPORATE RESOURCES, INC., FOR THE
YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1998, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                           4,157
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   47,017
<ALLOWANCES>                                       593
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                53,345
<PP&E>                                           4,566
<DEPRECIATION>                                   3,628
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 126,946
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           21,206
<BONDS>                                         61,714
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           20,000
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             1
<OTHER-SE>                                      22,570
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   126,946
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               291,303
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  276,583
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   427
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,515
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 11,258
<INCOME-TAX>                                     4,639
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              6,619
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                 (1,557)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     5,062
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.43
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.36
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit
32.1





CERTIFICATION




PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Report of
Acquired Sales Corp. a Nevada corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the
period ending June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the “Report”) I, Gerard M. Jacobs, Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive
Officer) hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that, to my knowledge:





a.
            the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d));
      and





b.
            the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.











/s/ Gerard M.
Jacobs


Gerard M.
Jacobs, President and Chief Executive Officer


(Principal
Executive Officer)





Dated
August 12, 2008