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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 48023

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JESSIE DON ADAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: December 14, 2021

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Michael J. Reardon, District Judge. 

Order of restitution, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jennifer Jensen, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Chief Judge

Jessie Don Adams appeals from the district court’s order to pay restitution in excess of 

$999.99 imposed after a jury found him guilty of misdemeanor petit theft. Adams argues the 

district court abused its discretion by ordering restitution in excess of the statutory amount for petit 

theft. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Adams was charged with two counts of grand theft. In Count I, the State alleged that 

Adams cashed checks written to his employer and took the money for himself. In Count II, the 

State alleged Adams made unauthorized charges to the employer’s bank account using a company

debit card. Adams pleaded not guilty and the case proceeded to trial. The jury found Adams guilty 
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of Count I, grand theft. The jury acquitted Adams of Count II, but found him guilty of the lesserincluded offense of petit theft. 

During the subsequent restitution proceedings, the State requested $10,185.54 in restitution 

for the stolen checks; Adams did not object, and the district court ordered restitution in the amount 

of $10,185.54 for Count I. The State also requested $15,053.49 in restitution for Count II. Adams 

did not dispute the individual amounts or the total. Instead, Adams argued that because the jury 

found him guilty of misdemeanor petit theft, the district court could only order up to $999.99, the 

amount associated with the statutory delineation between grand theft and petit theft. The district 

court rejected Adams’ argument, finding that the amount of restitution awarded is not limited by 

the statutorily defined monetary limits of the crime but rather, by the amount of economic loss 

suffered by the victim. The district court ordered restitution in the amount of $10,185.54 for the 

stolen checks and $15,053.49 for the total amount charged to the company account, for a total of 

$25,239.03. Adams timely appealed. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Idaho Code Section 19-5304(2) authorizes a sentencing court to order a defendant to pay 

restitution for economic loss to the victim of a crime. The decision of whether to order restitution, 

and in what amount, is within the discretion of a trial court, guided by consideration of the factors 

set forth in I.C. § 19-5304(7) and by the policy favoring full compensation to crime victims who 

suffer economic loss. State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002); 

State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 543, 768 P.2d 804, 806 (Ct. App. 1989). Idaho appellate courts

will not overturn an order of restitution unless an abuse of discretion is shown. Richmond, 137 

Idaho at 37, 43 P.3d at 796. When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the 

appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly 

perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion;

(3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and 

(4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 

421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).
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III.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Adams argues the district court abused its discretion when it ordered Adams to 

pay $15,053.49 in restitution stemming from his unauthorized charges to the company bank 

account. Adams asserts that because he was found not guilty of grand theft related to the charges 

to the company account and instead was found guilty of petit theft, the district court did not have 

the authority to order restitution in an amount greater than $999.99. Recognizing that Richmond

addressed this precise issue, Adams argues Richmond was wrongly decided because the Court of 

Appeals incorrectly relied upon “its perception of the legislature’s intent, rather than the plain 

language contained in the restitution statute.” The State asserts Richmond was correctly decided 

and the district court had the authority to order restitution for the full economic loss of Adams’ 

crime. We hold that Richmond was not wrongly decided and controls the outcome here. 

In this case, Adams makes the same arguments that were rejected in Richmond. There, 

Richmond was charged with felony malicious injury to property; he was acquitted of the felony 

charge, but convicted of the lesser-included charge of misdemeanor injury to property. Richmond, 

137 Idaho at 36, 43 P.3d at 795. The district court ordered approximately $15,000.00 in restitution. 

Id. Richmond appealed, arguing that because he was acquitted of the felony charge, the district 

court could not order restitution in excess of $1,000.00--the statutory amount separating the 

misdemeanor from the felony charge. Id. at 37, 43 P.3d at 796. This Court rejected that argument. 

First, the Court looked to the plain language of the statute defining the terms “victim” and 

“economic loss.” Id. Because Richmond did not provide a sufficient record to challenge the 

amount of restitution, the Court held that the district court did not err in determining the amount 

of economic loss or that the parties were victims as defined by I.C. § 19-5304(1). Id. at 37-38, 43 

P.3d at 796-97. 

The Court next analyzed whether the “mandate” of I.C. § 19-5304 to order restitution in 

the amount of actual economic loss was limited by the statutory monetary elements that distinguish 

whether the crime is a felony or misdemeanor. Id. at 38-39, 43 P.3d at 797-98. The Court looked 

to the plain language of I.C. § 19-5304(6) and (7) to ultimately hold the statute requires restitution 

for the actual economic loss of the victim, regardless of whether the crime is a felony or 

misdemeanor. Id. at 37-39, 43 P.3d at 796-98. The Court noted that the district court ordered 
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restitution based on the actual economic loss of the victim, which was in excess of $1,000.00. Id. 

at 38, 43 P.3d at 797. The Court reasoned:

By establishing that economic losses are to be determined by a civil preponderance 

of the evidence standard, I.C. § 19-5304(6), the legislature clearly intended to allow 

trial courts in a criminal case to resolve the restitution question, thus freeing the 

crime victim of the burden of instituting a civil action based on the same conduct, 

and our court system from unnecessary, repetitive trials. 

Id. at 38-39, 43 P.3d at 797-98. The Court held that because Richmond’s actions caused economic 

loss greater than $1,000.00, Richmond was required to pay restitution for the actual economic loss 

caused by his conduct. Id. at 39, 43 P.3d at 798. 

Adams takes issue with the Court’s statement:

Furthermore, we are not persuaded that the legislature intended, when it enacted 

I.C. § 19-5304, to create exceptions for those crimes that designate monetary 

amounts in their defining elements, i.e., grand theft, petty [sic] theft, and the two 

grades of malicious injury to property. Rather, the statute clearly intends for full 

restitution to be ordered on economic loss from one’s criminal conduct or criminal 

act. 

Id. at 39, 43 P.3d at 798. Adams cites Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 

892-93, 265 P.3d 502, 505-06 (2011) to support his argument that the Richmond Court improperly 

looked to the legislative intent rather than the plain meaning of the statute to justify its conclusion. 

We are not persuaded. It is true that Verska held, in part, that “The asserted purpose for enacting 

the legislation cannot modify its plain meaning.” Id. However, the Richmond Court did not use 

legislative intent to modify the plain language of the statute. Instead, the Court reviewed the statute

and concluded the plain language of the statute authorizes courts to order restitution in the amount 

of the actual economic loss suffered by the victim. Richmond, 137 Idaho at 39, 43 P.3d at 798.

The Court then noted its conclusion was consistent with the legislative intent of making victims 

whole. Id. 

The Court’s conclusion in Richmond rested upon a finding that the plain language of the 

statute requires restitution for the actual economic loss suffered by the victim regardless of the 

crime of conviction. Thus, the holding in Richmond is consistent with the plain language of the 

statute and the Supreme Court’s policy behind statutory interpretation: “to derive the intent of the 

legislative body that adopted the act.” State v. Foeller, 168 Idaho 884, 890, 489 P.3d 795, 801 

(2021). Consequently, Richmond was not wrongly decided and controls the outcome in this case. 
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That Adams was guilty of petit theft and not grand theft did not limit the district court’s exercise 

of its discretion to order restitution for the full economic loss causally related to Adams’ theft.

Adams also contends that this Court’s holdings in State v. Schultz, 148 Idaho 884, 231 P.3d 

529 (Ct. App. 2008) and State v. Aubert, 119 Idaho 868, 811 P.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1991) preclude the 

district court from ordering Adams to pay restitution for the full economic loss resulting from his 

unauthorized charges to the company account. As the Richmond Court considered and 

distinguished Aubert, we need not address it here. 

In Schultz, the State charged the defendant with grand theft by exercising unauthorized 

control and/or making unauthorized transfers on the victim’s credit card accounts and/or bank

accounts in an amount exceeding $1,000.00. Schultz, 148 Idaho at 885, 231 P.3d at 530. At trial, 

the State presented evidence showing the defendant made unauthorized transactions on the 

victim’s bank card, and the jury found the defendant guilty. Id. At the restitution hearing, the 

State sought, and was awarded, restitution for additional unauthorized individual transactions. Id. 

On appeal, Schultz argued that the court could not order restitution for each individual act of theft 

unless each specific act was adjudicated at trial. Id. at 886, 231 P.3d at 531. 

This Court declined to read the statute as narrowly as Schultz requested. Instead, we held 

that the State could seek restitution for similar, unauthorized transactions within the same time 

frame and criminal theory alleged in the charging document regardless of whether the State proved 

each individual act of theft. Id. Consequently, we affirmed the restitution award, holding that

restitution was “statutorily available for all unauthorized transactions as a direct result of 

defendant’s criminal conduct and conviction for grand theft in exercising unauthorized control 

and/or making unauthorized transfers over the victim’s accounts during the time frame in 

question.” Id. at 887, 231 P.3d at 532 (emphasis added). Similar to Schultz, Adams is statutorily 

required to pay restitution for all unauthorized charges to the company account that were causally 

related to the criminal theory of theft charged in the information. Accordingly, the district court’s 

order of restitution is consistent with the holding in Schultz. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Adams to pay $15,053.49 in 

restitution. As the Richmond Court held, I.C. § 19-5304 gives trial courts the discretion to order 

restitution for the victim’s economic loss caused by a defendant’s criminal conduct, even if the 

actual loss is greater than one of the statutory elements of the crime itself. Consequently, the 

district court did not act outside its statutory authority in awarding restitution for the full economic 
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loss suffered by the victim from Adams’ unauthorized charges to the company account. The 

district court recognized this decision was a matter of discretion, and the decision is within the 

boundaries of such discretion and consistent with the applicable legal standards. The district court 

found by a preponderance of the evidence that Adams’ unauthorized charges to the company bank 

account resulted in an economic loss of $15,053.49, and Adams makes no challenge to the factual 

determination.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Adams to pay $15,053.49 in 

restitution upon his conviction of petit theft. Accordingly, the district court’s order of restitution

is affirmed. 

Judge BRAILSFORD and Justice Pro Tem HORTON CONCUR.