1

 This Opinion & Order was originally published on February 25, 2010 [See Doc. No. 32]. This

Amended Opinion & Order corrects a typographical error in the introductory paragraph. The remainder

of the Court’s February 25, 2010 Opinion & Order remains unchanged. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SOMANETICS CORP., 

Case No. 09-13110

Plaintiff, 

HONORABLE SEAN F. COX

v. United States District Judge

CAS MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendant. 

___________________________________/

AMENDED OPINION & ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO STRIKE OR DISMISS [Doc. No. 22]1

Plaintiff Somanetics Corporation (“Somanetics”) filed this patent infringement action

against Defendant CAS Medical Systems, Inc. (“CAS”) on August 7, 2009 [Doc. No. 1]. CAS

filed its answer and affirmative defenses on October 19, 2009 [Doc. No. 12]. The matter is

before the Court on Somanetics’ Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 22], wherein Somanetics seeks an

order striking CAS’s affirmative defenses and dismissing CAS’s counterclaims. The parties

have fully briefed the issues, and the Court declines to hear oral argument pursuant to E.D.

MICH. L.R. 7.1(e)(2). For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion [Doc. No.

22]. 

BACKGROUND

Somanetics is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Troy,

Michigan, and is engaged in the business of manufacturing devices used by physicians and
2

nurses to monitor the oxygen levels in a patient’s tissues. CAS is a Delaware corporation with

its principal place of business in Branford, Connecticut, and is a competitor of Somanetics in the

oxygen level monitoring industry. 

Somanetics alleges that early technologies in its field “were only capable of providing

whole-body measurements. This meant that a dangerously low oxygen level could go undetected

by doctors if it existed only in a certain organ or region of the body.” [Pl.’s Br., Doc. No. 22,

pp.1-2]. Recognizing this deficiency in its industry: 

Somanetics designed, developed, and commercialized a revolutionary device

(called the INVOS system), which launched in the U.S. in 1998, and allows

physicians and nurses to continuously monitor the blood oxygenation levels at

specific, targeted locations in a patient’s body. Somanetics diligently sought and

obtained patent protection for its innovative technology, including U.S. Patent

No. 5,482,034 (“the ‘034 Patent), U.S. Patent No. 5,902,235 (“the ‘235 Patent”),

and U.S. Patent No. 6,615,065 (“the ‘065 Patent) (collectively, “the patents-insuit”).

Id. at p.2. 

In 2007, CAS launched a product intended to compete with Somanetics’ INVOS system,

called the FORE-SIGHT, which Somanetics argues infringes on its patented technology. 

Somanetics filed suit against CAS on August 7, 2009 [See Complaint, Doc. No. 1], alleging that

CAS infringed against the ‘034 [Count I], ‘235 [Count II] and ‘065 [Count III] Patents in

violation of the Lanham Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271. Somanetics also advances claims for false

advertising [Count IV] in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) and common-law claims of

unfair competition [Count V] and trade libel [Count VI]. 

CAS filed its “Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims” [Doc No. 12] to

Somanetics’ Complaint on October 12, 2009. In that document, CAS alleges several affirmative

defenses, three of which are relevant to the instant motion: the defenses of unclean hands and of
3

patent misuse, [See Def.’s Affirmative Defenses, Doc. No. 12, p.5, ¶¶7,8], and that the patents

are unenforceable due to Somanetics’ fraud and inequitable conduct. Id. at ¶12. CAS also filed

four counterclaims against Somanetics, alleging antitrust violations under the Sherman Act, 15

U.S.C. § 1 et seq. In particular, CAS argues that the following conduct represents evidence of

Somanetics’ fraud in its prosecution of the ‘065 Patent before the PTO: 

The Agreement Offering the INVOS 4100 For Sale.

During Somanetic’s prosecution of the ‘065 Patent before the PTO, CAS alleges that

Somanetics failed to disclose the fact that it had offered the INVOS for sale more than one year

beforehand. On September 22, 1997, Bruce J. Barrett - one of the inventors of the INVOS, and

CEO of Somanetics - allegedly executed an agreement (“the Agreement”) with China Equities,

Ltd., for the distribution of “50 units of the INVOS 4100 Oximeters at a price of USD

5,200/unit.” [Def.’s Counterclaim, Doc. No. 12, ¶¶21, 22]. Somanetics issued a press release

regarding the Agreement on October 9, 1997. Id. at ¶24. This Agreement was entered into more

than one year prior to the October 13, 1998 priority date claimed by the ‘065 Patent, and

Somanetics’ failure to disclose the Agreement is alleged by CAS to be fatal to the patentability

of the ‘065 Patent. Id. at ¶¶26-27. 

The Scholarly Article.

In May of 1998, CAS alleges that Somanetics contributed to an article (“the Article”)

entitled “Transcranial Optical Spectroscopy - A comparison of the TOS 96 and INVOS 3100

cerebral oximeters,” published in Biomedizinsche Technik (Vol. 43, pp.133-136). Id. at ¶34. 

The article’s synopsis states “[w]e evaluated two user-friendly, commercially available

transcranial cerebral oximeters (TOS 96, Tostec, Tokyo, Japan and INVOS 3100, Somanetics,
4

Troy, USA) for use in adults.” Id. at ¶36. Somanetics was aware of the article - as they

contributed to it - prior to its prosecution of the ‘065 Patent, but despite the its relevance, CAS

alleges that Somanetics intentionally failed to disclose the Article to the PTO. Id. at ¶¶40-43. 

The IEEE Article About the TOS 96, and the TOS 96 Manual.

CAS also alleges that evidence was available to the general public regarding the TOS 96

one year prior to the ‘065 Patent’s prosecution. Specifically, the TOS 96 was described in an

article entitled “A New System for Noninvasive Measurement of Cerebral Regional Oxygen

Supply,” in the Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Converence of the IEEE

Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society, held October 31 - November 3, 1996, Vol. 1

pp.194-195 (“the IEEE Article”). Id. at ¶47. The IEEE Article describes oxygen saturation and

blood tissue experiments using the TOS 96, as well as clinical measurement of cerebral regional

oxygenation and volume of hemoglobin, the claimed invention in the ‘065 Patent. Id. Tostec

created an English-language user’s manual for the TOS 96 more than one year prior to the

prosecution of the ‘065 Patent, which describes the TOS 96's ability to monitor cerebral oxygen

levels from multiple regions simultaneously. Id. at ¶¶50-55. 

Somanetics’ Instant Motion.

Somanetics filed the instant motion on November 19, 2009 [Doc. No. 22], seeking an

order striking CAS’s affirmative defenses as ‘insufficient defenses’ under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f),

because CAS failed to sufficiently plead those defenses under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and 9(b). 

[Pl.’s Br., Doc. No. 22, p.2]. Somanetics also seeks dismissal of CAS’s Sherman Act

counterclaims for failure to state a valid claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW
5

A “court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Such motions “are

generally regarded with disfavor because of the limited importance on pleading in federal

practice, and because they are often used as a delaying tactic.” United States v. Quadrini, 2007

WL 4303213, *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2007), quoting Quintani v. Baca, 233 F.R.D. 562, 564

(C.D. Cal. 2003). 

A three-part test assists courts in deciding whether to strike an affirmative defense:

(1) the matter must be properly pleaded as an affirmative defense; (2) the matter

must be adequately pleaded under the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 8 and 9; and (3) the matter must withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge.

Williams v. Provident Investment Counsel, Inc., 279 F.Supp.2d 894, 904-05 (N.D. Ohio 2003). 

Motions to dismiss are governed by FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), which require the Court to

treat all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d

633, 638 (6th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is only proper if it, on the pleadings themselves, the plaintiff

does not have a “reasonably founded hope” of making his or her case. Bell Atlantic v.

Twombley, 550 U.S. 554, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1970 (2007). 

ANALYSIS

In the instant motion, Somanetics argues that the Court should strike CAS’s affirmative

defenses of inequitable conduct, patent misuse, and unclean hands due to CAS’s alleged failure

to effectively plead those affirmative defenses. Somanetics also seeks dismissal of CAS’s

antitrust counterclaims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court

finds no merit in these arguments, and therefore DENIES Somanetics’ motion [Doc. No. 22] in

its entirety. 
6

I. CAS’s Affirmative Defense of Inequitable Conduct.

Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that “[i]n all averments of

fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake should be stated with

particularity.” “[I]nequitable conduct, while a broader concept than fraud, must be pled with

particularity under Rule 9(b).” Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326

(Fed. Cir. 2009). Whether inequitable conduct has been pled with particularity under Rule 9(b)

is a question governed by Federal Circuit law. Id. at 1318, citing Cent. Admixture Pharm.

Services, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac Solutions, P.C., 482 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 

A pleading that simply avers the substantive elements of inequitable conduct, without

setting forth the particularized factual bases for the allegation, does not satisfy Rule 9(b). 

Exergen, 575 F.2d at 1326-27. The Federal Circuit in Exergen elaborated as follows: 

For example, in a case where inequitable conduct was alleged on the basis that an

applicant “failed to disclose all the relevant prior art known to it,” we found this

allegation deficient because it did not identify the specific prior art that was

allegedly known to the applicant and not disclosed. Cent. Admixture, 482 F.3d at

1356-57 (internal quotation marks omitted). In that case, the accused infringer

also alleged that the applicant “sought to mislead the [PTO] regarding the

relationship between the claimed invention and the prior art” “by manipulation of

various measurements and units.” Id. at 1356 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

This pleading, too, was deficient because it failed to identify “what

‘measurements and units’ were manipulated, or how the manipulation was meant

to mislead the PTO.” Id. at 1357. 

*****

Based on the foregoing. . . we hold that in pleading inequitable conduct in patent

cases, Rule 9(b) requires identification of the specific who, what, when, where,

and how of the material misrepresentation or omission committed before the

PTO. 

Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327 (emphasis added).

Although Exergen was only recently decided by the Federal Circuit, a number of federal

district courts have already applied the Exergen “who, what, when, where, and how” test to
7

evaluate inequitable conduct affirmative defenses. All of these district court holdings found that

inequitable conduct affirmative defenses were sufficiently pled - on far fewer facts than those

advanced by CAS in their instant counterclaim - to survive a Rule 9(b) inquiry. 

A. WesternGeco.

In WesternGeco v. Ion Geophycisal Corp., 2009 WL 3497123 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2009),

the Southern District of Texas denied a motion to dismiss inequitable conduct claims. 

WesternGeco claimed that “Ion had actual or constructive knowledge of a [scholarly] paper”

which disclosed similar technology as that in Ion’s patent, and that “Ion failed to disclose this

prior art. . . to the PTO. A reasonable patent examiner would have found this information highly

material to the patentability of the 992 patent claims.” Id. at *6 (internal quotations omitted). 

In denying Ion’s motion to dismiss, the district court held as follows: 

The heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) do not require that

WestenGeco definitively prove the merits of its claim. What is determinative

here is that Ion was given fair notice of the basis for WesternGeco’s inequitable

conduct defense. The Court also notes that WesternGeco’s inequitable conduct

claims go to the heart of the issue disputed in this case - namely inventorship of

the technology at issue. The court therefore finds Ion’s assertions that it has been

inadequately informed of the basis of WesternGeco claims that Ion acted

unlawfully before the PTO somewhat disingenuous. 

Id. at *7 (emphasis added). 

B. Power Integrations, Inc.

In Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 2009 WL 4928024 (D.

Del. Dec. 18, 2009), the District of Delaware struck some, but not all, of the plaintiff’s amended

defenses and counterclaims. With regard to the claims in which the district court found the

plaintiff’s pleadings sufficient, the district court offered the following analysis:

Power’s allegations against inventor Yang sufficiently allege the who, what,
8

where, when, and how of his purported inequitable conduct. The “who” is Tom

Yang, who is the sole named inventor of the ‘972 patent and was also a

participant in the prosecution of that patent. The “what” of Yang’s allegedly

inequitable conduct is his alleged failure to disclose material prior art - Power’s

‘876 and ‘366 patents and the Rhakala article, with its references to two of

Power’s. . . products - to the PTO during prosecution. The claim charts power

appended to the Counterclaims clearly identify “where” in the alleged prior art the

material references can be found, and further identify the limitations in the ‘972

patent to which they correspond. Finally, Fairchild concedes that Power has

satisfied the “when” and “how” requirements. 

Id. at *8. The court then held that “it is reasonable to infer that Yang would have actually known

of these three pieces of prior art since he explicitly distinguished them in the background

sections of two co-pending patent applications.” Id. 

C. HTC Corporation.

In HTC Corp. v. IPCom Gmbh & Co., 2009 WL 4363206 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2009), the

federal district court for the District of Columbia denied a motion to strike inequitable conduct

counterclaims. HTC Corp. held that information withheld from the PTO “is material if it tends

to prove that the applicant’s claim is unpatentable or challenges a position the applicant takes in

asserting the patentability of his claim.” Id. at *3, quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b). “The threshold

showing of materiality. . . can be met by showing a reasonable examiner would have considered

such information important in deciding whether to allow the application.” Id., citing Aventis

Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 176 Fed.Appx. 117, 118-20 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 

Turning to the question of whether the defendant sufficiently pled an inequitable conduct

affirmative defense, HTC Corp. held as follows: 

HTC’s Amended Answer and Counterclaims identify three precise documents as

the prior art that was not submitted to the PTO. HTC specifically accuses certain

named inventors of the ‘751 Patent, and explains where, when, and how these

inventors allegedly became aware of the documents that were withheld from the

PTO. These allegations clearly provide sufficient notice to IPCom to allow it to
9

prepare its defense. Furthermore, HTC has satisfied Exergen’s “who, what,

when, where, and how” standard with respect to pleading inequitable conduct. 

Id. at *4. HTC Corp. also dismissed plaintiff’s argument that the prior art references at issue

were “lengthy, and HTC has not proven that the named inventors read the particular pages of the

standards documents that are relevant.” Id. “Such arguments,” to the district court in HTC

Corp., “confuse the burdens of proof at trial with the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).” Id. 

D. Konami Digital Entertainment.

In Konami Digital Entertainment Co., Ltd. v. Harmonix Music Systems, Inc., 2009 WL

5061812 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2009), the Eastern District of Texas denied a motion to dismiss and

to strike allegations of inequitable conduct. The “who” element of Exergen was met where the

pleadings “identified specific individuals that it accuses of withholding material prior art and

violating a duty of candor to the PTO.” Id. at *2. The “what” and “where” elements were also

met through “charts of potentially invalidating Konami prior art games - on a claim-by-claim and

limitation-by-limitation basis.” Id. The pleadings also point out “why a reasonable examiner

would have considered the withheld reference important to the patentability of a claim.” Id. 

Thus, the Konami court found that the defendant “provides a consistent set of allegations that

disclose both its theory of inequitable conduct and the individuals it alleges have violated their

duty of candor to the PTO.” Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 

F. The Instant Case.

In light of WesternGeco, Power Integrations, HTC Corp., and Konami, CAS’s

inequitable conduct counterclaims and affirmative defenses are sufficient under the Exergen

standard. The Court will consider each of these alleged failures to disclose material information

to the PTO in turn. 
10

1. The Agreement. 

CAS sufficiently alleges that Somanetics committed inequitable conduct by failing to

disclose the Agreement, offering for sale Somanetics’ INVOS 4100 Cerebral Oximeter more

than a year before filing the application for the ‘065 Patent. As argued in its response brief, CAS

has sufficiently pled: 

• Who - Bruce Barrett, signatory of the Agreement, inventor of the ‘065

Patent, and President and CEO of Somanetics, and the other inventors

(Messrs. Gonopolsky and Scheuing) who deliberately failed to disclose

the Agreement to the Patent Office. See Answer, Affirmative Defenses

and Counterclaims (the “Pleadings”), ¶¶ 16, 20-21, 26, 28-29; 

• What - the Agreement is sufficiently identified by its title, parties, and

date. See the Pleadings, ¶21; 

• When - CAS identified the execution date of the Agreement, and the issue

date of two relevant press releases related to the Agreement. See the

Pleadings, ¶¶21, 23-24;

• Where - CAS identified and quoted material portions of the Agreement

offering for sale Somanetics’ INVOS 4100 Cerebral Oximeter. See

Pleadings, ¶¶22, 25, 27; and 

• How - CAS plainly articulated why a reasonable examiner would consider

the Agreement material in determining whether the invention claimed in

the ‘065 Patent is patentable. See Pleadings, ¶¶25-27, 32. 

[Def.’s Br., Doc. No. 28, p.4]. Nothing more is required under Exergen. 

Though Somanetics argues that CAS failed to “identify which claims of the ‘065 patent

are allegedly rendered unpatentable by the Agreement. . . ,” [Pl.’s Br., Doc. No. 22, p.7], this

simply is not the case - CAS identified which features of the INVOS 4100 Cerebral Oximeter are

relevant [See Doc. No. 12, ¶¶22, 25, 27], and how the PTO would have used the omitted

information. Id. at ¶¶25-27, 32. 

Somanetics’ arguments against CAS’s claims regarding the Agreement ring somewhat

hollow. As CAS argues in their response brief: 

the Agreement is for its own product, and Somanetics has claimed that the INVOS
11

4100, offered for sale more than a year before the ‘065 Patent application, is the

commercial embodiment of the claimed invention. Undoubtedly, Somanetics is

well aware of the features of its own product, and what claims of the ‘065 Patent

cover that product. 

[Def.’s Br., Doc. No. 28, p.5 (emphasis in original)]. Somanetics’ arguments to the contrary are

without merit. 

2. The Article.

CAS sufficiently alleges that Somanetics committed inequitable conduct by failing to

disclose the Article - to which Somanetics is alleged to have contributed - which compares

Somanetics’ INVOS 3100 Cerebral Oximeter with another competing product, the TOS 96, and

which embodies the invention claimed in the ‘065 Patent. As argued in their response brief,

CAS has sufficiently pled: 

• Who - Somanetics provided “feedback and stimulating discussions” in the

preparation of the Article and the inventors (Messrs. Barrett, Gonopolsky

and Scheuing) who deliberately failed to disclose the Article to the Patent

Office. See the Pleadings, ¶¶39-40, 42-44;

• What - the Article and its publication information. See the Pleadings,

¶34; 

• When - the publication date in May 1998. See the Pleadings, ¶34;

• Where - material portions of the Article evaluating Somanetics’ own

product and the TOS 96, both cerebral oximeters. See the Pleadings,

¶¶35-37; and

• How - why a reasonable examiner would consider the Article material. 

See the Pleadings, ¶¶38, 41, 61. 

[Def.’s Br., Doc. No. 28, p.7]. As with CAS’s pleadings regarding the Agreement, nothing more

is required under Exergen. 

Though Somanetics argues that CAS failed to identify which claims are disclosed in the

Article, where the relevant information is found in the Article, why the Article is not cumulative,

or how the examiner would have applied the Article to the claims of the ‘065 Patent [See Pl.’s
12

Br., Doc. No. 28, p.8], this simply is not the case. CAS identified where relevant information is

found in the Article [See Doc. No. 12, ¶¶36-37] and how the PTO would have used that

information. Id. at ¶¶38, 41. As stated by CAS in their reply brief: 

Somanetics does not need CAS, for purposes of notice pleading, to explain why a

three page article comparing Somanetics’ product to a pre-existing product that

embodies the invention claimed in the ‘065 Patent is not cumulative or how the

examiner would have applied it. 

[Def.’s Br., Doc. No. 28, p.8]. Somanetics’ arguments to the contrary lack merit. 

3. The IEEE Article and the TOS 96 Manual.

CAS sufficiently alleges that Somanetics committed inequitable conduct by failing to

disclose the IEEE Article and the TOS 96 Manual, both of which are alleged to have been

material prior art precluding the issuance of the ‘065 Patent. As argued in their response brief,

CAS has sufficiently pled: 

• Who - Somanetics and the inventors (Messrs. Barett, Gonopolsky and

Scheuing), who were aware of the Article, were also aware of or should

have been aware of the IEEE Article and the TOS 96 Manual, and

deliberately failed to disclose them to the Patent Office. See the

Pleadings, ¶¶39-40, 42, 45, 56-57, 59;

• What - the IEEE Article and the TOS Manual. See the Pleadings, ¶¶47,

50;

• When - the presentation and publication date of the IEEE Article, and the

creation and publication of the TOS 96 Manual. See the Pleadings, ¶¶47-

48, 50-52, 54;

• Where - material portions of the IEEE Article and the TOS 96 Manual

describing the TOS 96 cerebral oximeter of which Somanetics and the

inventors were aware from the Article. See Pleadings, ¶¶35, 47, 53, 59;

and 

• How - why a reasonable examiner would consider the IEEE Article and

the TOS 96 Manual material. See Pleadings, ¶¶49, 55, 59-61. 

[Def.’s Br. Doc. No. 28, p.11]. As with CAS’s pleadings regarding both the Agreement and the

Article, nothing more is required under Exergen. 
13

 Though Somanetics argues that CAS failed to allege facts that connect the IEEE Article

or the TOS 96 Manual to the claims of the ‘065 Patent [See Pl.’s Br., Doc. No. 28, p.16], this

simply is not the case. CAS identified what relevant information is found in the IEEE Article

and in the TOS 96 Manual [See Doc. No. 12, ¶¶35, 47, 53, 59] and how the PTO would have

used that information. Id. at ¶¶49, 55, 59-61. Somanetics’ arguments to the contrary lack merit. 

4. The ‘235 Patent’s Allegedly False Declaration.

CAS sufficiently alleges that Somanetics committed inequitable conduct by submitting a

false declaration in their prosecution of the ‘235 Patent. Though Somanetics argues that CAS

failed to allege acts identifying who submitted the false declaration, what was false about the

declaration, or how the false declaration is material to the patentability of the ‘235 claims [See

Pl.’s Br. Doc. No. 28, p.17], this simply is not the case. 

Regarding the “who” element of Exergen, CAS identified the inventors who signed the

Declaration - Gary D. Lewis, Melville C. Stewart, II, and Wayne P. Messing. [Doc. No. 12, ¶14]. 

As to the “what” and “how” elements of the Exergen analysis, CAS argues as follows: 

Presumably, Somanetics will agree that the declaration is false because it claims

priority to U.S. Patent No. 4,570,638 (“the ‘638 Patent”), while the specification

of the ‘235 Patent states only that the ‘638 Patent is related to the ‘235 Patent. If

the ‘235 declaration is true, then the ‘235 Patent expired along with the ‘638

Patent on March 29, 2009. If that is not Somanetics’ contention, then the ‘235

declaration which claims priority to the’638 Patent is false. See Pleadings, ¶¶13-

14. Submissions of false declarations have been found to be inequitable conduct

which result in the unenforceability of a patent, and that is “how” the false

declaration is material to the patentability of the ‘235 Patent claims. 

[Def.’s Br., Doc. No. 28, p.13]. 

The Court agrees, in light of several Federal Circuit opinions holding that such affidavits

are inherently material to the patent prosecution process. See, e.g., Refact Int’l Ltd. v. Lotus Dev.
14

Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223,

1233 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Somanetics’ arguments to the contrary lack merit. 

II. Defendant’s Antitrust Counterclaims.

CAS alleges, in four counterclaims, that Somanetics committed antitrust violations. [Doc.

No. 12, pp.17-21]. Somanetics argues that these counterclaims should be dismissed pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). [See Pl.’s Br., Doc. No. 22, pp.10-13]. The Court disagrees. 

Generally, the enforcement of a patent through litigation is immunized from antitrust

liability. See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 1375

(Fed. Cir. 2004). Two exceptions to this general rule exist, however. First, a patentee who

brings an infringement action may incur antitrust liability if the alleged infringer proves that the

asserted patent was obtained through knowing and willful fraud on the PTO - known as a Walker

Process claim. See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed.

Cir. 1998). Second, a patentee may be subject to antitrust liability under the “sham” litigation

exception if the infringement action is “a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than

an attempt to interfere with the business relationships of a competitor.” Id. Upon meeting one -

or both - of these exceptions, an alleged infringer must still prove the substantive elements of an

antitrust violation under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d

1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 

 A. The Walker Process Counterclaims.

In Counts I and II of CAS’s counterclaim, CAS advances two Walker Process claims -

one for monopolization and one for attempted monopolization. [Doc. No. 12, pp.17-19]. 

Somanetics’ argument for dismissal of these counterclaims is as follows: 
15

CAS bases its Walker Process counterclaims upon the same factual allegations as

its inequitable conduct defenses. As explained above [in Somanetics’ motion to

strike CAS’s allegations of inequitable conduct], CAS failed to plead sufficient

facts to satisfy Rule 9(b) with respect to. . . inequitable conduct. And, since the

common law fraud component of a Walker Process claim must be pleaded with

the same specificity under Rule 9(b) as an inequitable conduct defense, CAS has

likewise failed to sufficiently plead common law fraud. 

[Pl.’s Br., Doc. No. 22, pp.11-12]. 

As explained supra, however, the Court holds that CAS’s inequitable conduct allegations

were adequately pled under Rule 9(b). As Somanetics’ argument regarding the inequitable

conduct allegations fail, Somanetics’ Walker Process arguments - which are supported by the

same conduct as are the inequitable conduct allegations - also fail. 

B. The “Sham” Litigation Counterclaims.

In Counts III and IV of CAS’s counterclaim, CAS advances two “sham” litigation claims

- one for monopolization and one for attempted monopolization. [Doc. No. 12, pp.19-21]. 

Somanetics argues that these counterclaims should be dismissed, as “CAS’s pleading provides

nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of the claim.” [Pl.’s Br., Doc. No. 22,

p.12 (internal quotations and brackets omitted)]. The Court disagrees. 

To be considered “sham” litigation, the Supreme Court requires the following:

We now outline a two-part definition of “sham” litigation. First, the lawsuit must

be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically

expect success on the merits. . . Only if challenged litigation is objectively

meritless may a court examine the litigant’s subjective motivation. Under this

second part of our definition of sham, the court should focus on whether the

baseless lawsuit conceals “an attempt to interfere directly with the business

relationships of a competitor, through the use of the governmental process - as

opposed to the outcome of that process - as an anticompetitive weapon. This twotiered process requires the plaintiff to disprove the challenged lawsuits legal

viability before the court will entertain evidence of the suit’s economic viability. 

Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61
16

(1993) (emphasis in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

CAS’s pleadings meet both prongs of this test. As CAS argues in its response brief, the

following satisfies the first prong of the Professional Real Estate Investors analysis: 

CAS alleges that Somanetics’ lawsuit is objectively baseless because Somanetics

asserts the ‘034 Patent, the ‘235 Patent, and the ‘065 Patent, which it knows are

invalid, not infringed, and/or unenforceable. . . . CAS alleges that the ‘235 Patent

is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct resulting from the submission of a

false declaration, and if this is not the case, then the ‘235 Patent is unenforceable

because it expired. An examination of CAS’s Fore-Sight ® monitor and sensors,

which Somanetics undoubtedly undertook prior to bringing suit, would have led

to the obvious conclusion that they do not infringe the ‘034 Patent. As discussed

[in its brief section outlining inequitable conduct arguments], CAS has

sufficiently alleged at least four ways by which the ‘065 Patent is unenforceable

due to Somanetics’ inequitable conduct. . . .

[Def.’s Br., Doc. No. 28, pp.15-16 (internal citations omitted)]. Further, both of CAS’s “sham”

litigation counterclaims allege that Somanetics brought this suit intending that the process - as

opposed to the outcome - would interfere with CAS’s business relationships. [See Doc. No. 12,

¶¶89, 95]. Nothing more is required to state valid claims for “sham” litigation under

Professional Real Estate Investors, and Somanetics’ arguments to the contrary lack merit. 

III. Defendant’s Allegations of Patent Misuse and Unclean Hands.

In paragraphs 7 and 8 of its affirmative defenses, CAS asserts the affirmative defenses of

patent misuse and of unclean hands. [Doc. No. 12, p.5]. Somanetics argues that these

affirmative defenses must be stricken “because they are based entirely on CAS’s inequitable

conduct defenses and antitrust counterclaims, none of which were sufficiently pleaded under the

applicable standard[s].” [Pl.’s Reply Br., Doc. No. 29, p.5 (internal quotation omitted)]. As

explained supra, the Court disagrees, and holds that CAS has sufficiently pled its claims of

inequitable conduct and antitrust violations. Somanetics’ arguments regarding CAS’s patent
17

misuse and unclean hands affirmative defenses lack merit, and Somanetics’ motion is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons explained above, the Court DENIES Somanetics’ motion to strike CAS’s

affirmative defenses and to dismiss CAS’s counterclaims [Doc. No. 22]. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/Sean F. Cox 

Sean F. Cox

United States District Judge

Dated: May 17, 2010

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on

May 17, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

S/Jennifer Hernandez 

Case Manager