UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PRESIDENTIAL FACILITY, LLC, 

 Plaintiff, 

 Case No. 09-12346 

v. Hon. Lawrence P. Zatkoff 

 

CHRISTOPHER J. DEBBAS and 

JAMES R. GRIFFITHS, 

 Defendants, 

and 

GREGORY S. CAMPBELL and 

ROBERT PINKAS, 

 Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs, 

v. 

PETER SINATRA, EMERALD PARTNERS V, LP, 

and JETDIRECT AVIATION HOLDINGS, LLC, 

 

Third-Party Defendants. 

____________________________________________/

ORDER 

 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Charging Order [dkt 196]. 

The motion has been fully briefed. The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are 

adequately presented in the parties’ papers such that the decision process would not be 

significantly aided by oral argument. Therefore, pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(e)(2), it is 

hereby ORDERED that the motion be resolved on the briefs submitted. For the following 

reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. 

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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 16, 2012, the Court entered judgment in favor Plaintiff and against 

Defendants—including Defendant Gregory Campbell (“Campbell”)—in the amount of 

$9,500,000.00. On July 3, 2012, the Court certified that judgment as final [dkt 170]. 

 Plaintiff now brings the instant motion for a charging order against Defendant Campbell. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Campbell has not “voluntarily paid any portion of the judgment.” 

Plaintiff’s motion seeks to encumber any interests in limited partnerships or limited liability 

companies in which Defendant Campbell has or may subsequently acquire. 

II. ANALYSIS 

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a), which governs the enforcement of final judgments in federal court, 

provides: 

A money judgment is enforced by a writ of execution, unless the 

court directs otherwise. The procedure on execution—and in 

proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or 

execution—must accord with the procedure of the state where the 

court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it 

applies. 

Thus, since this Court sits in the Eastern District of Michigan, the enforcement of Plaintiff’s 

judgment is governed by the appropriate Michigan law. 

Under Michigan law, a charging order is the exclusive remedy by which a judgment 

creditor may satisfy a judgment out of a partner’s or member’s interest in a limited partnership or 

limited liability company. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 449.1703, 450.4507(1), (6). A charging order 

is a lien on the partnership or membership interest of the partner or member that is the subject of 

the charging order. See id. at §§ 449.1703, 450.4507(5). Thus, to the extent the partnership or 

membership interest is charged, the judgment creditor has the right only to receive distributions 

to which a partner or member is entitled. See id. at §§ 449.1703, 450.4507(2). 

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 Plaintiff petitions this Court for a charging order against Defendant Campbell on any 

interests in limited partnerships or limited liability companies in which he has or may 

subsequently acquire. Issuing a charging order on prospective—and possibly unrealized—

interests does not appear to be contemplated by the Michigan statutes governing charging orders. 

To be sure, the Court has not found—and Plaintiff does not cite to—legal authority that is 

factually on point with the circumstances presented here. While it is true that the Court has 

broad authority pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.6104(5) to make “any order as within [its] 

discretion . . . to subject any nonexempt assets of any judgment debtor to the satisfaction of any 

judgment against the judgment debtor,” the Court will not issue the requested charging order for 

the following reasons. 

 Plaintiff identifies in its motion Defendant Campbell’s interest in G.D. Campbell & 

Associates, a limited partnership, as an appropriate interest that should be subject to a charging 

order. This is Defendant Campbell’s only interest in either a limited partnership or limited 

liability company that Plaintiff has located and apparently is apprised of. On March 20, 2013, 

however, Plaintiff and Defendant Campbell submitted to the Court a stipulation and order that 

granted Plaintiff a charging order with respect to Defendant Campbell’s interest in G.D. 

Campbell & Associates [dkt 206]. Thus, Defendant Campbell’s only identifiable interest in a 

limited partnership—or limited liability company—is currently encumbered by a charging order. 

Moreover, the Court does not believe it is appropriate, at this time, to issue a charging order to 

reach subsequently-acquired interests in limited partnerships or limited liability companies. 

Plaintiff may apply to the Court to subject future interests to a charging order should such 

interests materialize. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking a blanket charging order on 

any interests which Defendant Campbell may acquire in the future, the Court denies that request. 

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 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Charging Order [dkt 196] is DENIED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 s/Lawrence P. Zatkoff

 Hon. Lawrence P. Zatkoff 

 U.S. District Judge 

 Date: April 12, 2013 

 

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