2016 IL 118672

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 118672) 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.

GREGORY HERNANDEZ, a/k/a Israel Ramos, Appellee.

Opinion filed May 19, 2016.

JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Burke, and 

Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant, Gregory Hernandez, was found guilty following a Du Page County 

bench trial of several charges, including armed robbery, a Class X felony under 

section 18-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 1998)). 

Defendant was eventually sentenced, as pertinent here, to an extended term of 40 

years’ imprisonment for armed robbery. Defendant filed an amended petition 

pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 

2012)). Following a 2014 evidentiary hearing on his postconviction claim that the 

40-year term imposed for armed robbery violated the proportionate penalties clause 

of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11), the circuit court 
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granted defendant a new sentencing hearing. The court’s order stated the armed 

robbery statute used to sentence defendant was “facially unconstitutional” because 

it carried a harsher penalty than the penalty for “armed violence with a Category III 

weapon (bludgeon) 720 ILCS 5/33A-1 (1998).”1 The State filed a direct appeal to 

this court, citing the circuit court’s judgment declaring an Illinois statute 

unconstitutional. Therefore, we have jurisdiction pursuant to article VI of the 

Illinois Supreme Court Rules, “Appeals in Criminal Cases, Post-Conviction Cases, 

and Juvenile Court Proceedings,” Rule 603, which states that appeals in cases “in 

which a statute of *** this State has been held invalid shall lie directly to the 

Supreme Court as a matter of right.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013); see also 

Ill. S. Ct. R. 302(a) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the 

judgment of the circuit court and affirm defendant’s 40-year term of imprisonment 

for armed robbery. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In January 1999, defendant was indicted for various offenses arising out of an 

incident in which he allegedly entered a residence, inflicted bodily harm on its 

occupants, Gus and Eunice Pakosta, and took certain property. The indictment 

included counts for, inter alia, home invasion, armed robbery, and armed violence. 

All four armed robbery counts alleged that defendant had committed the offense of 

armed robbery “while armed with a dangerous weapon, a bludgeon,” citing “720 

ILCS 5/18-2(a).” Similarly, all three armed violence counts alleged that defendant 

committed an underlying felony, other than armed robbery, “while armed with a 

 1

As noted by defendant in his brief before this court, the offenses in this case occurred in 1998, 

and the circuit court and both parties below cited the 1998 version of the armed violence statute. 

However, this citation is technically incorrect, as the 1998 armed violence statute included 

amendments from the “Safe Neighborhoods Act” (SNA), Public Act 88-680, which this court held 

to be unconstitutional in People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d 80 (1999). Therefore, it is the 1994 version 

of the armed violence statute that applies here, under which bludgeons and certain like weapons 

were defined as Category II weapons. See People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 390 (1990) (enacting an 

unconstitutional amendment to a statute leaves the law in force as it was before the unconstitutional 

amendment). But because the SNA did not change the sentencing provision for committing armed 

violence with a bludgeon or certain like weapons, instead merely redefining those weapons as 

Category III weapons, defendant concedes there is no practical difference between the 1994 and 

1998 statutes for our purposes, as the sentencing ranges were unchanged. Thus, to maintain 

consistency and avoid confusion, we follow the parties herein and the circuit court in citing to the 

1998 version of the armed violence statute and in describing bludgeons and certain like weapons as 

“Category III” weapons. 
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dangerous weapon, a bludgeon,” citing “720 ILCS 5/33A-2.” Prior to trial, the 

State entered a nolle prosequi on each of the armed violence counts, as well as two 

of the four armed robbery counts. 

¶ 4 A bench trial was held on the remaining counts. Relevant to the issue presented 

in this court, the Pakostas, an elderly married couple, testified that defendant 

entered their home in the early morning hours of December 7, 1998, that he struck 

each of them in the head with a metal tool, and that he forced Eunice to open a safe, 

from which he took money and jewelry before fleeing the scene. According to the 

Pakostas, the metal tool the defendant used during the incident belonged to them 

and had been stored in their basement. That specific tool was never recovered. Gus 

described the tool as a pair of “big shears.” Eunice described the tool as a pair of tin 

snips, which she stated was “very heavy” and “very big” and identified a 

demonstrative exhibit as a pair of tin snips that was “almost exactly” identical to the 

tin snips defendant had used. The trial court found defendant guilty on numerous 

counts, including the two remaining armed robbery counts, but did not expressly 

find whether defendant had been armed with a “bludgeon.” 

¶ 5 Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate consecutive term of 90 years’ 

imprisonment. On direct appeal, the appellate court vacated several convictions, 

leaving one home invasion conviction and one armed robbery conviction, and 

remanded the cause for a new sentencing hearing. People v. Hernandez, No. 

2-02-0717 (2004) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). On remand, 

the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 80 years’ imprisonment, 

consisting of a 40-year term for home invasion involving Gus and a consecutive 

40-year term for armed robbery involving Eunice. 

¶ 6 Defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition while his appeal from the 

conviction was pending. The trial court appointed counsel for defendant. 

Postconviction proceedings were stayed until the appeal process had concluded and 

resumed in February 2012. In September 2013, defendant was allowed to file a new 

pro se postconviction petition. An amended petition, incorporating the claims 

raised in the pro se petition, was filed by appointed counsel in June 2014. In 

September 2014, the trial court, following a hearing, granted the State’s motion to 

dismiss all of defendant’s postconviction claims except for his claim that his 

40-year, extended-term, Class X sentence imposed on remand for armed robbery 

violated the proportionate penalties clause because it had the same elements as the 

lesser Class 2 offense of armed violence with a Category III weapon. 
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¶ 7 Following a third-stage hearing in October 2014, the trial court entered an order 

on December 3, 2014, granting defendant a new sentencing hearing as relief on the 

proportionate penalties claim of his amended postconviction petition. The court’s 

order further stated: “The sentencing scheme for armed robbery set forth in 720 

ILCS 5/18-2(b) (1998) is facially unconstitutional as it provides disproportionate 

penalties to armed violence with a Category III weapon (bludgeon) 720 ILCS 

5/33A-1 (1998).” A timely direct appeal by the State followed. 

¶ 8 ANALYSIS 

¶ 9 Article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution provides that “[a]ll penalties 

shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the 

objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 

§ 11. “In analyzing a proportionate penalties challenge, our ultimate inquiry is 

whether the legislature has set the sentence in accord with the seriousness of the 

offense.” People v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d 533, 543 (2005); see also People v. 

Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 473-74 (1998). In cases such as this one, where 

defendant argues his sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause because it 

is greater than the sentence for an offense with identical elements, this court has 

repeatedly observed that, “ ‘[i]f the legislature determines that the exact same 

elements merit two different penalties, then one of these penalties has not been set 

in accordance with the seriousness of the offense.’ ” People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 

107821, ¶ 30 (quoting People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 522 (2005)); see also 

People v. Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 11. 

¶ 10 Further, as recently stated by this court in Ligon: 

“An expectation of identical penalties for identical offenses comports with 

‘common sense and sound logic’ (People v. Christy, 139 Ill. 2d 172, 181 

(1990)) and also gives effect to the plain language of the Illinois Constitution 

(Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 30). Thus, where identical offenses do not yield 

identical penalties, this court has held that the penalties were unconstitutionally 

disproportionate and the greater penalty could not stand. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 

504 (citing Christy, 139 Ill. 2d at 181). As the constitutionality of a statute is 

purely a matter of law, we review the question de novo. People v. Hauschild, 

226 Ill. 2d 63, 83 (2007); Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 486-87. However, we begin with 

the presumption that the statute is constitutional and that, if reasonably 
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possible, this court must construe the statute so as to affirm its constitutionality 

and validity. In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289, 310 (2005).” Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, 

¶ 11. 

¶ 11 Given these principles, we find that our decision in Ligon is dispositive of the 

main issue presented in this case, i.e., whether the Class X sentence for armed 

robbery which defendant received on remand from his direct appeal violated the 

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, 

art. I, § 11). In Ligon, we agreed with the State’s contention that the lower court 

erred in finding a violation of the proportionate penalties clause where the elements 

of aggravated vehicular hijacking with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm 

(AVH/DW), a Class X felony, were not identical to the elements of armed violence 

with a Category III weapon. 2016 IL 118023, ¶¶ 10, 20. The holding in Ligon was 

based on this court’s conclusion that: 

“[M]any objects, including the BB gun defendant possessed in this case, satisfy 

the ‘dangerous weapon’ element of AVH/DW, but not the ‘Category III 

weapon’ element of armed violence with a category III dangerous weapon. See 

People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 141 (2002) (holding a BB/pellet gun did not 

qualify as a ‘bludgeon’ under the armed violence statute); see also People v. 

Myers, 101 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1075 (1981) (holding that ‘what constitutes a 

dangerous weapon for armed robbery does not necessarily constitute a 

dangerous weapon under the armed violence statute, wherein categories of 

dangerous weapons are specified’).” Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 20. 

¶ 12 “Dangerous weapon” is not defined in either the armed robbery statute at issue 

here, or the AVH/DW statute at issue in Ligon, but is derived from common law. Id.

¶ 21. “As this court concluded in People v. Skelton, 83 Ill. 2d 58, 66 (1980), what 

constitutes a dangerous weapon is a question of fact and includes any object 

sufficiently susceptible to use in a manner likely to cause serious injury.” Id.

Therefore, the definition of dangerous weapon for purposes of the armed robbery 

statute includes not only objects that are per se dangerous, but objects that are used 

or may be used in a dangerous manner. See People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 275 

(2008). Here, the dangerous weapon defendant was armed with during the 

commission of the armed robbery of Eunice Pakosta, a pair of tin snips, fits into the 

latter category. See Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 22. 
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¶ 13 In contrast, for purposes of the armed violence statute, a person is considered 

“armed with a dangerous weapon” when he or she “carries on or about his or her 

person or is otherwise armed with a Category I, Category II, or Category III 

weapon.” 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(a) (West 1998); see Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 19. 

Category III weapons are defined as “a bludgeon, black-jack, slungshot, sand-bag, 

sand club, metal knuckles, billy, or other dangerous weapon of like character.” 720 

ILCS 5/33A-1(c) (West 1998); see Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 19. Thus, Category III 

dangerous weapons for purposes of the armed violence statute are defined by the 

statute and are therefore limited to the weapons identified by the statute. Id. ¶ 23 

(citing 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(c) (West 2000)).

¶ 14 Accordingly, this court in Ligon (id. ¶¶ 23-24), relying upon Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 

130, held that a BB gun or pellet gun was not a bludgeon or other dangerous 

weapon of like character under the armed violence statute, where those objects 

were not specifically named in the armed violence statute. “Furthermore, although 

a metal pellet/BB pistol might be capable of being used as a bludgeon, it is not 

typically identified as such and, under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, cannot be 

interpreted to be ‘of like character’ to the bludgeon-type weapons included in the 

category [III] listing.” Davis, 199 Ill. 2d at 141; Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 23 n.4. 

Therefore, as in Ligon and Davis, the tin snips with which defendant herein was 

armed cannot be considered a bludgeon “or other dangerous weapon of like 

character” under the armed violence statute. 

¶ 15 However, the tin snips defendant used do qualify as a dangerous weapon under 

the common-law definition applicable to the statutory offense of armed robbery, as 

they are essentially a craftsman’s tool (Carlson v. Moline Board of Education, 

School District No. 40, Moline, 124 Ill. App. 3d 967, 973 (1984) (tin snips are a 

workman’s tool used to cut building materials), abrogated on other grounds by

Meyer v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 135 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1990)) but are often heavy and 

large enough that when used in the manner they were in this case, to strike a victim, 

they become dangerous. See Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 24 (metal BB gun used to

threaten and strike victim was a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the 

offense of armed robbery (citing People v. Johnson, 323 Ill. App. 3d 284 (2001))). 

Further, in People v. Vue, 353 Ill. App. 3d 774, 775-76, 783 (2004), the appellate 

court affirmed the defendant’s armed robbery conviction where, similar to the facts 

herein, the defendant entered a residence, struck the victim in the head with a heavy 

metal object, a flashlight, and caused serious injuries before taking valuable 

belongings and fleeing. Although no proportionate penalties claim was made in 
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Vue, the panel, citing Davis, did find that the defendant’s armed violence 

conviction should be vacated, holding the metal flashlight was not a “dangerous 

weapon” within the meaning of the armed violence statute as, notwithstanding 

shared characteristics with a bludgeon and that it was used like a bludgeon, the 

flashlight was not “of like character” to a bludgeon, where it was not inherently 

dangerous and had a legitimate use. Id. at 779-81. 

¶ 16 As these cases reflect and as earlier stated, the definition of dangerous weapon 

for purposes of the armed robbery statute includes not only objects that are per se

dangerous, but objects that are used or may be used in a dangerous manner. See 

Ross, 229 Ill. 2d at 275. It is clear then that the common-law definition of 

“dangerous weapon” found in the armed robbery statute is broader than the 

definition of “dangerous weapon” in the armed violence statute. See Ligon, 2016 IL 

118023, ¶ 27. Thus, contrary to the postconviction court’s finding below, the 

elements of armed robbery, which require, inter alia, proof that defendant was 

“armed with a dangerous weapon” in violation of 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 1998), 

are not identical to the elements of armed violence, which require, inter alia, proof 

that defendant committed a qualifying felony while armed with a Category III 

weapon in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33A-1, 33A-2 (West 1998). See Ligon, 2016 IL 

118023, ¶ 25. Consequently, we hold that the lower court erred in concluding that a 

violation of the proportionate penalties clause under the identical elements test 

occurred in this case. Id.

¶ 17 However, defendant argues before this court that the State is judicially estopped 

from asserting that, as charged herein, section 18-2 of the armed robbery statute and 

section 33A-2 of the armed violence statute do not have identical elements. 

Contrary to defendant's claim, our decision in Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432, 

does not support a finding of judicial estoppel. 

¶ 18 In Seymour, this court stated: 

“Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by the court at its discretion. 

[Citations.] As the Supreme Court has observed, the uniformly recognized purpose of 

the doctrine is to protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from 

‘deliberately changing positions’ according to the exigencies of the moment. 

[Citation.] Judicial estoppel applies in a judicial proceeding when litigants take a 

position, benefit from that position, and then seek to take a contrary position in a later 

proceeding. [Citation.]” Id. ¶ 36. 
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While this court has identified five prerequisites as “generally required” before a 

court may invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel (id. ¶ 37), the core concern in 

establishing judicial estoppel is “that a party takes factually inconsistent positions, 

in separate proceedings, intending that the trier of fact accept the truth of the facts 

alleged.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 38. Here, although the position taken by the State 

at trial was clearly factual, its position before the court in postconviction 

proceedings was one of law. 

¶ 19 This case began with the State securing an indictment for violating, inter alia, 

section 18-2(a) of the armed robbery statute, “in that the said defendant while 

armed with a dangerous weapon, a bludgeon, knowingly took property *** from 

the presence of Eunice Pakosta, by the use of force.” Defendant argues that where 

the State adopted the factual position at trial that defendant used “a bludgeon,” it is 

estopped from arguing that this object was anything else. However, any object, 

including tin snips, may be considered a common-law “dangerous weapon” if it can 

be used in a dangerous manner, for example, as a bludgeon. 

¶ 20 Thus, at trial, in order to prove the offense of armed robbery, the State needed 

only to establish the fact that defendant committed a robbery while “armed with a 

dangerous weapon.” 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 1998); see also People v. Skelton, 

83 Ill. 2d 58, 66 (1980) (for purposes of armed robbery statute, many objects, 

including guns, can be dangerous and cause serious injury, even when used in a 

fashion for which they were not intended). Here, as we have established, the State 

did not argue at trial that the tin snips used herein were a dangerous weapon, per se, 

but instead presented evidence that the tin snips were “actually used in a dangerous 

manner.” 2 See People v. Thorne, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1070-71 (2004). 

Accordingly, the question of whether the tin snips herein could be used as a 

“dangerous weapon” to establish armed robbery under section 18-2(a) was a 

question for the trier of fact, and the trial court accepted the truth of this fact in 

convicting defendant of this charge. 

¶ 21 Yet, unlike this factual position taken at trial, the State argued, in response to 

defendant’s later postconviction identical elements claim, that his Class X sentence 

imposed for armed robbery with “a dangerous weapon, a bludgeon,” did not violate 

 2 We note that while the State referred to the pair of tin snips as “a bludgeon” at times during 

trial, it never argued that the object with which defendant was armed was anything other than a pair 

of tin snips.
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the proportionate penalties clause because the tin snips at issue did not satisfy the 

“dangerous weapon” element of the Class 2 offense of armed violence. “The issue 

of whether a sentencing provision violates the proportionate penalties clause is a 

matter of law ***.” People v. Span, 2011 IL App (1st) 083037, ¶ 96; see also Davis, 

199 Ill. 2d at 141 (noting a pellet gun could be “used as a bludgeon” even as it held, 

as a matter of law, that a pellet gun was not a bludgeon). Indeed, defendant has 

conceded as much in his brief before this court, noting that whether he was armed 

with a Category III “dangerous weapon” is a “legal opinion.” 

¶ 22 We therefore conclude that the core prerequisite for invoking judicial estoppel, 

i.e., that the State took factually inconsistent positions in separate proceedings, did 

not exist here. See Seymour, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 38. Because the proportionate 

penalties argument made by the State was one of law, rather than fact, the State was 

not equitably barred from taking that position in defendant's postconviction

proceedings nor, for that matter, before this court. Cf. Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 28 

(a party may not “ ‘advance a theory or argument on appeal that is inconsistent with 

the position taken below’ ” (quoting People v. Denson, 2014 IL 116231, ¶ 17)). 

¶ 23 CONCLUSION

¶ 24 We hold, based upon the foregoing, that the trial court erred in finding a 

proportionate penalties violation under the Illinois Constitution. Accordingly, the 

trial court also erred in granting defendant a new sentencing hearing as relief on the 

proportionate penalties claim of his amended postconviction petition. Therefore, 

the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court 

with directions to reinstate defendant’s 40-year sentence for the Class X felony of 

armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 1998)). 

¶ 25 Circuit court judgment reversed. 

¶ 26 Cause remanded with directions.