### In the



# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 19

‐ 1909

U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA

, Plaintiff

‐ Appellee

,

v.

O RLANDO M EDINA

, Defendant

‐ Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 2:15

‐ cr

‐ 00016

‐ PP

‐ 1

— Pamela Pepper

, Chief Judge.

A RGUED F EBRUARY 12, 2020

— D ECIDED A UGUST 13, 2020

Before B AUER

, K ANNE

, and B ARRETT

, Circuit Judges

.

B AUER

, Circuit Judge. Orlando Medina was convicted of

conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. At a

bench trial, key evidence included the testimony of police

officers from Puerto Rico, four mail receipts, and the testimony

of co

‐ conspirator Rodolfo Duenas. Medina argues his convic

‐

tion must be reversed because the judge should have found2 No. 19

‐ 1909

this evidence lacked credibility as a matter of law. He also

argues this evidence constituted false testimony and violated

his due process rights. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 19, 2014, Puerto Rico police received a tip that

Medina was transporting firearms. When officers attempted to

stop Medina’s car, he fired gunshots and fled. Police then

seized Medina’s abandoned car. Upon searching the car, police

found Medina’s birth certificate and four mail receipts. Three

receipts were for packages sent to Puerto Rico by Duenas in

Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

The United States Postal Inspection Service identified

suspicious packages sent from Puerto Rico to Duenas.

Milwaukee

‐ based police officers intercepted and followed a

package containing cocaine and arrested Duenas once he

accepted delivery. Duenas mentioned the shooting incident

and stated that Medina had repeatedly shipped him cocaine

from Puerto Rico.

Forensic scientists determined that the powdery substance

in the intercepted package contained cocaine and that the forty

small bags amounted to more than one kilogram. A print

analyst found that three of the seven fingerprints inside the

package matched Medina’s fingerprints.

Medina was indicted with one count of conspiring to

distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. He received a bench

trial, which took place in early 2018. The government’s

witnesses included three officers from Puerto Rico, two

Milwaukee

‐ based police officers, and Duenas. The governmentNo. 19

‐ 1909 3

also offered expert testimony identifying Medina’s finger

‐ prints. The defense moved for a judgment of acquittal after the

government’s case, but the court denied the motion. The

parties proceeded to closing arguments.

The court found Medina guilty. The defense suggested that

the fourth mail receipt—labeled as being sent from Milwaukee

on August 19, 2014 at 3:25pm—could not have been in Me

‐

dina’s car. The judge said the receipt raised a “mystery” but

dismissed the idea that it created a reasonable doubt as to the

Puerto Rico officers’ testimony or the receipts bearing Duenas’

name. The judge stated that Duenas had a “tenuous relation

‐ ship with the truth” but nevertheless, after considering the

entirety of the evidence, determined his testimony helped

establish the existence of a conspiracy with Medina.

II. DISCUSSION

We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in

a bench trial under the same deferential standard that applies

to a jury verdict: we reverse “only if we conclude, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prose

‐

cution, that no rational trier of fact could have found the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.

Wasson, 679 F.3d 938, 949 (7th Cir. 2012). We do not reweigh

evidence or reassess witness credibility and may uphold a

conviction based on circumstantial evidence. Id.

The government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that Medina conspired to distribute 500 grams or more of

cocaine. 21 U.S.C. § 841; 21 U.S.C. § 846. Medina seeks acquittal

by challenging the credibility of witness testimony, which is

particularly difficult under our deferential standard of review.4 No. 19

‐ 1909

United States v. Carraway, 612 F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 2010).

Testimony lacks credibility as a matter of law only in situations

where “it would have been physically impossible for the

witness to observe what he described, or it was impossible

under the laws of nature for those events to have occurred at

all.” United States v. Conley, 875 F.3d 391, 400 (7th Cir. 2017)

(citing United States v. Hayes, 236 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2001)).

Medina claims that Duenas and the testifying officers from

Puerto Rico lacked credibility as a matter of law. “Credibility

determinations are best handled by the trier of fact, not the

appellate court,” and here the judge found them to be credible

after considering the entirety of the evidence. Carraway

, 612

F.3d at 645 (citation omitted). Indeed, the judge recognized the

factual discrepancies that Medina identifies and only relied on

the credible portions of the testimony. Medina’s arguments do

not render the testimony physically impossible or otherwise

unbelievable and thus cannot succeed on appeal.

Given the testimony and the corroborating physical

evidence, a rational trier of fact could have easily found

Medina guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Medina would have

us view all the testimony as suspicious and therefore unbeliev

‐

able, but that betrays our standard of review. In viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Me

‐

dina’s challenges fail. Medina also asks us to reverse the denial

of his motion for a judgment of acquittal, but this likewise fails

since the standard of review is “in essence the same as a review

of the sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Johns

, 686

F.3d 438, 446 (7th Cir. 2012).No. 19

‐ 1909 5

Finally, Medina raises a due process argument that he did

not make to the district court, and so our review is for plain

error. United States v. Coleman

, 914 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 2019).

Specifically, he contends that the government used the false

testimony of Duenas and of the police officer who recovered

the mail receipts. While Medina characterizes Duenas’ testi

‐

mony as perjury, the judge found much of it to be credible and

only relied on those portions. Similarly, with regard to the

officer, the judge largely credited his testimony and chose not

to rely on the fourth mail receipt. Moreover, upon reviewing

the record, there is little basis to infer the officer lied about

discovering the receipts. Ultimately, there was no error in

introducing or relying upon this evidence, and there is no

likelihood that any false testimony affected the decision.

III. CONCLUSION

We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict

Medina of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of

cocaine. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.