UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CHRISTINE TIMMON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROL WOOD, SANDY ALLEN, HAROLD

LEEMAN, and KATHY DUNBAR,

Defendants.

 /

Case Number: 09-13763

HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AND DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Christine Timmon’s Application to

Proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s application and

affidavit, and for the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to

proceed in forma pauperis; but, the Court also DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint

because it is frivolous and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The standards governing in forma pauperis motions are set forth in 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a). The district court may authorize the commencement of a civil action without

the prepayment of fees or costs by a person who submits an affidavit that she “is unable

to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The district court

must examine the financial condition of the applicant to determine whether the payment

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of fees would cause an undue financial hardship. Prows v. Kastner, 842 F.2d 138, 140

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 941 (1988).

Plaintiff’s claim of hardship is supported by her application. Based on her

affidavit, the Court concludes that paying the filing fee is beyond Plaintiff’s means. 

Consequently, the Court grants Plaintiff’s application to proceed without prepayment of

fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

Even when a plaintiff establishes indigence, however, the district court must

screen the complaint as mandated by Congress in § 1915(e)(2). Section 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) states: 

Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines

that-

(B) the action or appeal-- 

 

(i) is frivolous or malicious; 

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

The Court is mindful that a pro se litigant’s complaint is to be construed liberally,

Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 100 (6th Cir. 1991), and is held to “less stringent

standards” than a complaint drafted by counsel. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). Nonetheless, such complaints still must plead facts sufficient to show a

redressable legal wrong has been committed. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b); Lillard v. Shelby

County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996) (observing that the court is not

required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal conclusions in determining

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whether complaint states a claim for relief); Dekoven v. Bell, 140 F.Supp.2d 748, 755

(E.D. Mich. 2001). “A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations

respecting all the material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice

pleading requirements.” Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437

(6th Cir.1988).

In her complaint, Plaintiff claims that in two prior consolidated lawsuits she filed

against Defendants, the district court judges from the Western District of Michigan

granted unconstitutional immunities to Defendants. See Timmon v. Wood, No. 5:05-cv00127 (W.D. Mich.); Timmon v. Leeman, No. 5:06-cv-00007 (W.D. Mich.). In particular,

Plaintiff indicates that after the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants,

Timmon v. Wood, 2006 WL 2033903 (W.D. Mich. 2006), was reversed by the Sixth

Circuit Court of Appeals, Timmon v. Wood, 316 Fed. Appx. 364 (6th Cir. 2007), the

district court proceeded to grant summary judgment to Defendants on different grounds,

(see Timmon v. Wood, No. 5:05-cv-00127, doc. 109 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2008)). 

Plaintiff contends that the district court ignored the Sixth Circuit’s mandate by granting

summary judgment to Defendants a second time.

Plaintiff, however, already properly challenged the district court’s second grant of

summary judgment by appealing, for a second time, to the Court of Appeals; and the

Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s second grant of summary judgment to

Defendants. See Timmon v. Wood, No. 08-1667 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 2009). Plaintiff

cannot challenge the Court of Appeals’ ruling (or the district court’s grant of summary

judgment) by filing suit in this Court. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s present suit is

frivolous and fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the

Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

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In sum, Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, and this

action is DISMISSED under § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Marianne O. Battani 

 MARIANNE O. BATTANI

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: October 2, 2009

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served upon Plaintiff and counsel of record on this

date by ordinary mail and/or electronic filing.

s/Bernadette M. Thebolt

Case Manager

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