1 

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-23-00131-CV

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IN THE INTEREST OF K.H., I.H., Z.H., AND L.H.

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On Appeal from the 279th District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. F-241,521

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant J.H. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her 

four children—nine-year-old K.H., seven-year-old I.H., two-year-old Z.H., and tenmonth-old L.H.1 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

statutory grounds exist for termination of J.H.’s parental rights and that termination 

of her parental rights would be in the children’s best interests. See Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (2). 

1 To protect the identity of the children, we use pseudonyms to refer to the 

children and the parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). The trial court’s Order of 

Termination also terminated the children’s fathers’ parental rights, but the fathers 

are not parties to this appeal.
2

J.H.’s appointed attorney submitted a brief in which she contends that there 

are no meritorious issues for appeal and that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730-31 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination 

cases). The brief presents the attorney’s professional evaluation of the record and 

explains why no arguable grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s judgment. The 

attorney represented to the Court that she gave J.H. a copy of the Anders brief she 

filed, notified J.H. of her right to file a pro se brief, and notified J.H. of how to access 

the appellate record. This Court notified J.H. of her right to file a pro se response 

and of the deadline for doing so. J.H. did not file a response with the Court. 

We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the brief filed by 

J.H.’s court-appointed attorney. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citing 

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). 

Based on our review, we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal 

and we agree that the appeal is frivolous and lacks merit. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d 

at 827-28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it 

considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error 

but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619. Therefore, we find it 
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unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief the appeal. Cf. Stafford 

v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating J.H.’s parental 

rights.2

AFFIRMED.

 LEANNE JOHNSON

Justice

Submitted on October 18, 2023

Opinion Delivered October 19, 2023

Before Horton, Johnson and Wright, JJ.

2 We note that if Appellant decides to pursue review by the Supreme Court of 

Texas, counsel may satisfy her obligations to Appellant “by filing a petition for 

review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 

27-28 (Tex. 2016).