alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<![CDATA[1st Amendment to Master Product Development & Clinical Supply Agreement]]>



 [***] = CERTAIN CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION CONTAINED
IN THIS DOCUMENT, MARKED BY BRACKETS, IS FILED WITH THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION PURSUANT TO RULE 406 UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933,
AS AMENDED. 
 EXHIBIT 10.25 

FIRST AMENDMENT TO 

MASTER PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND CLINICAL SUPPLY AGREEMENT 

THIS FIRST AMENDMENT TO MASTER PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND CLINICAL SUPPLY AGREEMENT (“Amendment”) is entered into effective as of
March 15, 2013 (the “Effective Date”) between Alder Biopharmaceuticals, Inc., a Delaware corporation, with its principal offices at 11804 North Creek Parkway South, Bothell, WA 98011 (“Client”) and Althea
Technologies, Inc., a Delaware corporation, with its principal offices at 11040 Roselle Street, San Diego, CA 92121 (“Althea”), in order to amend that certain Master Product Development and Clinical Supply Agreement between Client and
Althea dated March 21, 2011 (the “Agreement”). The parties agree as follows: 
 1. The first sentence in Section 3.1 (Term) in the
Agreement is hereby amended to read in its entirety as follows: “This Agreement shall commence on the Effective Date and will continue until the later of (a) [***], and (b) the date on which the Production services, as described in
the last outstanding PWA, have been completed, unless sooner terminated pursuant to Section 3.2 herein (the “Term”). 
 2. All other
terms and conditions of the Agreement remain unchanged and in full force and effect. In the event of a conflict between the Agreement and this Amendment, this Amendment will control. 

3. This Amendment may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original and all of which shall constitute one and the same
instrument. This Amendment shall be effective upon full execution, and a facsimile or other electronic signature shall be deemed to be and shall be as effective as an original signature. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Amendment to be executed by their duly authorized representatives as of the Effective Date.

  

									
	ALDER BIOPHARMACEUTICALS, INC.	 		 	ALTHEA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
					
	By:	 	 /s/ Mark J. Litton, Ph.D.
	 		 	By:	 	 /s/ Martha J. Demski

					
	Name:	 	Mark J. Litton, Ph.D.	 		 	Name:	 	Martha J. Demski
					
	Title:	 	Chief Business Officer	 		 	Title:	 	SVP and CFO
					
	Date:	 	 March 15, 2013
	 		 	Date:	 	 2013.03.19         10:25:10-07’00’


 Althea & Alder Confidential
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kevin Jerome MORRIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 03-4276.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted July 15, 2003.

Decided Aug. 18, 2003.

*977Eric J. Foster, Law Office of Rick Foster, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C.F. Shappert, Office of the United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before LUTTIG and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Kevin Jerome Morris pled guilty to possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000), and was sentenced to 96 months imprisonment. Morris appeals, claiming that the district court erred in finding that he used the firearm in connection with another felony offense and thus enhancing his sentence by four levels under *U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual*§ 2K2.1(b)(5) (2000). At Morris’ sentencing hearing, the Government presented testimony establishing that, on December 10, 1999, Morris shot and seriously wounded Tyrone Scott. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court specifically found that Morris’ shooting of Scott was not done in self-defense.

To apply the enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5), the Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence facts that establish that the defendant used a firearm and that such use was in connection with another felony offense. The district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. *United States v. Garnett,*243 F.3d 824, 828-29 (4th Cir.2001); *see also United States v. Nale,*101 F.3d 1000, 1004 *&*n. 3 (4th Cir.1996).

Morris claims that the district court erred in assigning the four-level enhancement because he presented evidence sufficient to support his claim that he acted in self-defense. However, after hearing testimony from a number of witnesses to the shooting, the district court specifically found no believable evidence that Morris was defending himself at the time he shot Scott or that Scott was armed at the time Morris shot him. Morris cannot show that this conclusion was clearly erroneous.

Morris also argues that no separate felony occurred because there were no state charges filed against him as a result of the shooting.

However, Application Note 7 to § 2K2.1 provides that a felony offense, “as used in subsection (b)(5), means any offense (federal, state, or local) punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, whether or not a criminal charge was brought, or conviction obtained.” Morris’ conduct (assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill) clearly constitutes a felony for purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(5).

Accordingly, we affirm Morris’ sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### Edmund O. SCHWEITZER, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent (two cases).

Nos. 5323, 5324.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Nov. 24, 1937.

Hugh W. McCulloch, of Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.

James W. Morris, Department of Justice, and James P. Wenchel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Washington, D. C., for respondent.

Before EVANS, SPARKS,' and LINDLEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States directing that the judgment of this court heretofore entered in this cause on February 23, 1935, be reversed, and for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of said court, having been received and filed, on consideration whereof, it is now here ordered that the mandate of this court heretofore issued to the United States Board of Tax Appeals on March 16, 1935, be, and the same is hereby, recalled.

It is further ordered that the judgment of this court heretofore entered on February 23, 1935, be, and the same is hereby, vacated.

It is now here ordered and adjudged by this court that the decision of the United States Board of Tax Appeals entered in this cause on March 27, 1934, be, and the same is hereby, affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
Financial Data Schedule as of and for the year ended March 31, 1999 (Presented
below are the operating results for the Reorganized Company (6 months ended
March 31, 1999) and the Predecessor Entity (7 months ended October 14, 1998).
</LEGEND>

<S>                                    <C>               <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                          6-MOS             7-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                      MAR-31-1999       MAR-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                         OCT-15-1998       APR-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                           MAR-31-1999       OCT-14-1998
<CASH>                                  53,734,577                 0
<SECURITIES>                                     0                 0
<RECEIVABLES>                            2,069,856                 0
<ALLOWANCES>                               585,401                 0
<INVENTORY>                                      0                 0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 0                 0
<PP&E>                                  78,367,893                 0
<DEPRECIATION>                           9,932,143                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                         483,453,950                 0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            0                 0
<BONDS>                                353,139,771                 0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            0                 0
<PREFERRED>                                      0                 0
<COMMON>                                   172,414                 0
<OTHER-SE>                              34,470,114                 0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>           483,453,950                 0
<SALES>                                          0                 0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                        15,433,357        11,481,498
<CGS>                                            0                 0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                           57,920,783        34,423,362
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                        38,740,977        62,585,349
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             6,950           115,050
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                      30,937,947        18,243,038
<INCOME-PRETAX>                       (110,647,883)      (99,905,471)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     0                 0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                   (110,647,883)      (99,905,471)
<DISCONTINUED>                                   0                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  0        85,355,624
<CHANGES>                                        0                 0
<NET-INCOME>                          (110,647,883)      (14,549,847)
<EPS-BASIC>                                (6.42)                0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                (6.42)                0



</TABLE>
**Exhibit 32.2**

**WABCO HOLDINGS INC.**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED**

**PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of WABCO Holdings Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Ulrich Michel, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

(i) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and 

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the periods covered in the Report. 

 

Dated: November 6, 2008
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-7118

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

MICHAEL ANTHONY KENNEDY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District

Judge. (6:05-cr-00815-HMH)

Submitted: November 15, 2007 Decided: November 26, 2007 

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael Anthony Kennedy, Appellant Pro Se. Regan Alexandra

Pendleton, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Michael Anthony Kennedy seeks to appeal the district

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion.

The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge

issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)

(2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. See Miller-El

v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529

U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.

2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that

Kennedy has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny

a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma

pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
241 So.2d 331

#### In re OPELIKA COCA-COLA BOTTLING CO., Inc. v. Albert JOHNSON. Ex parte OPELIKA COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, Inc.

5 Div. 906.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Nov. 5, 1970.

Brown & McMillan, Auburn, for petitioner.

Russell, Raymon & Russell, Tuskegee, for respondent.

BLOODWORTH, Justice.

Petition of Opelika Coca-Cola Bottling. Company,. Inc., for certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals to review and revise the judgment and decision of that court' in Opelika Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc. v. Johnson, 5 Div. 12, 46 Ala.App. 298, 241. So.2d 327, is denied.

We consider it appropriate here to note that the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari to either of our courts of appeal does not necessarily indicate our approval of all the language used, nor of the statements of law made in the opinion of that court. Mobile Pure Milk Co. v. Coleman, 230 Ala. 432, 161 So. 829.

Writ denied.

SIMPSON, MERRILL, COLEMAN, HARWOOD, MADDOX and McCALL, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 31.1
 RULE 13a-14(a) CERTIFICATION
OF THE PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
      (a)
    
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to
us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
which this report is being prepared;(b)
    
    [Intentionally omitted.];(c)
    
    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end
of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and(d)
    
    disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants
most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in
the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal
control over financial reporting; and
  (a)
    
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to
record, process, summarize and report financial information; and(b)
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a
significant role in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting.
 Date:  August 14, 2008
    /s/ Albert F. BuzzettiAlbert F. BuzzettiPresident and Chief Executive
Officer 31
| No. |   | Company Name                                 |   | Shareholders                                 |   | % of Interest |
|-----|--------|----------------------------------------------|--------|----------------------------------------------|--------|---------------|
| 1   |   | Linkwell Tech Group, Inc                     |   | Linkwell Corporation                         |   | 90%           |
| 2   |   | Shanghai Likang Disinfectant Hi-Tech Co.,Ltd |   | Linkwell Tech Group, Inc                     |   | 100%          |
| 3   |   | Shanghai Likang Biological Hi-Tech Co.,Ltd   |   | Shanghai Likang Disinfectant Hi-Tech Co.,Ltd |   | 100%          |

----
#### Douglas L. Veasey v. State.

No. 25622.

January 16, 1952.

Rehearing Denied February 20, 1952.

Appellant’s Second Motion for Rehearing Denied (Without Written Opinion) April 2, 1952.

Hon. M. L. Cobb, Judge Presiding.

*Wm. H.*Hamblen, Edna, for appellant.

*George P. Blackburn,*State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is driving while intoxicated; the punishment, a fine of $50.00.

*171We find the evidence sufficient to support the verdict and proceed to pass upon appellant’s one bill of exception. It recites that appellant objected to the use of the venire on the grounds that he had not been furnished a list thereof prior to the trial and, further, that he objected to the use of the jury selected therefrom for the same reason. We find no certificate of the judge in the bill that the facts which constitute the basis of the objection are true. The mere recitation of an objection in a bill is not sufficient. It, therefore, follows that the bill presents nothing for review. Texas Digest, Crim. Law, 1901 (10)i; Garza v. State, No. 25,510, (page 6, this volume) 246 S.W. 2d 635.

Appellant, in his brief, makes reference to a hearing on motion for new trial. No record of such hearing appears before us.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

ON appellant’s motion for rehearing.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

In addition to what was said in overruling appellant’s bill of exception relative to the jury panel, we note that this record fails to reflect that any member of the jury which tried this case was selected from the jury panel to which appellant objected. The members of the jury may have been selected from talesmen summoned by the sheriff.

The motion for rehearing is overruled.

Opinion approved by the court.
174 La. 1012

#### IBECK v. WISE-MILLER *et*al.

No. 31666.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 25, 1932.

Rehearing Denied May 23,1932.

*156Theo. Cotonio, Jr., and Theo. Cotonio, Sr., both of New Orleans, for applicant.

P. B. Ereeland, of New Orleans, for appel-lee Wise-Miller.

Joseph Lautenschlaeger, of New Orleans, for appellee Mrs. Catherine Newman.

ST. PAUL, J.

This case was ordered up from the Court of Appeals for the Parish of Orleans whose opinion is published in full- in 137 Southern Reporter at page 652 and need not be reproduced here; but the gist of that opinion is that the circumstances (detailed in said opinion) disclose that the purchaser (plaintiff) was wholly responsible for the failure of a certain sale to go through, and hence was responsible for the commission promised the brokers (defendants) if the sale failed through her fault.

Now that the whole record is before us we find that the case involved only a question of fact, and that that issue was correctly decided by the Court of Appeal against the plaintiff.

In this court the plaintiff urges that, since the vendor (Mrs. Newman) did not insist on specific performance of the contract, nor ask for damages, nor resist the return of plaintiff’s deposit, therefore the sale could not have fallen through by her fault.

That is a nonsequitur; the vendor may have had, and doubtless did have, reasons s 'tisfactory to herself for not insisting on the sale going through after plaintiff’s default. She may have been quite willing to have the sale rescinded because she saw a better price could be obtained than plaintiff had offered, or she may have thought that litigation with plaintiff might be both annoying and expensive and hence unprofitable. We do not know.

But, be this as it may, the record discloses that she would have been entitled to a decree of specific performance had she chosen to ask for it, and tiie brokers are in no way concerned in her refusal to ask for that relief. Their right against this plaintiff were fixed when she refused, without just cause, to comply with her obligation to purchase, and the vendor’s acquiescence in her unfounded refusal to go on with the sale did not prejudice their right to claim their commission from plaintiff.

Decree.

Eor the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal, affirming the judgment of the district court, is affirmed.
EXHIBIT
      32.1





CERTIFICATION





Pursuant
to the requirement set forth in Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of
Title 18 of the United States Code (18 U.S.C. Section 1350), Steven R.
Springsteel, Chief Executive Officer of Chordiant Software, Inc. (the “Company”)
and Peter S. Norman, Chief Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer of
the Company, each hereby certifies that, to the best of his
knowledge:





1.
The Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended September 30,
2009, and to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the “Annual
Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
and





2.
The information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and the results of operations of the
Company.





IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have set their hands hereto as of the 19th day
of November, 2009.





/s/  STEVEN
      R. SPRINGSTEELSteven
      R. Springsteel, Chairman, President, and
              Chief
      Executive Officer/s/  PETER
      S. NORMANPeter
      S. Norman, Chief Financial Officer and
              Principal
      Accounting Officer





This
certification accompanies the Form 10-K to which it relates, is not deemed filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by
reference into any filing of Chordiant Software, Inc. under the Securities Act
of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before
or after the date of the Form 10-K), irrespective of any general incorporation
language contained in such filing.