alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES SIMPSON,

Petitioner, 

v.

BLAINE LAFLER,

Respondent. 

/

Case Number: 2:09-CV-11998

HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO AMEND PETITION

Petitioner James Simpson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his convictions for second-degree murder, assault with intent to

commit murder, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Petitioner previously

filed a habeas petition challenging these convictions which was denied on the merits. Simpson v.

Howes, No. 01-cv-10307 (E.D. Mich. June 10, 2002) (Lawson, J.). On June 4, 2009, the Court

transferred the petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit so that

Petitioner could request authorization from the Court of Appeals to file a second petition

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 

The Court of Appeals granted permission to file a second § 2254 petition. In re Simpson,

No. 09-1818 (6th Cir. June 24, 2010). The matter has now been reopened and the Court directed

Respondent to file an answer addressing the merits of the petition by December 30, 2010. Now

before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion to Amend Petition. 

Section 2242 of Title 28 provides that an application for a writ of habeas corpus “may be

amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.” 28
2

U.S.C. § 2242. The applicable civil rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, allows a party to

amend a pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served

or by leave of court. A responsive pleading has not yet been filed. 

Petitioner seeks to amend his petition to provide further argument in support of the

claims already raised in his petition. The Court finds that the interests of justice are best served

by permitting Petitioner to amend his petition. 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Amend Petition [dkt. # 10] is

GRANTED.

Dated: September 27, 2010

S/George Caram Steeh 

GEORGE CARAM STEEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on

September 27, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail and sent to

James Simpson at Carson City Correctional Facility, 10522 Boyer

Road, Carson City, MI 48811

S/Josephine Chaffee

Deputy Clerk
#### STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. Thomas M. TERBROCK, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 69058.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

July 9, 1996.

William P. Grant, William S. Margulis, Margulis & Grant, P.C., St. Louis, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Joanne E. Joiner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before REINHARD, P.J., and KAROHL and GRIMM, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals after his conviction following a bench trial for the class D felony, driving while intoxicated, §§ 577.010 and 577.023.3, RSMo 1994. The court sentenced him to the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections for a period of three years. We affirm. We have reviewed the record and find the claims of error to be without merit. An opinion would have no precedential value nor serve any jurisprudential purpose. The parties have been furnished with a memorandum for their information only, setting forth the reasons for this order pursuant to Rule 30.25(b).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD THOMAS,

Petitioner, 

v.

CAROL HOWES,

Respondent.

/

Case Number: 08-cv-14273

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan 

JUDGMENT

Petitioner Edward Thomas, a state prisoner, filed this pro se habeas petition

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his convictions for kidnapping, fourth-degree

criminal sexual conduct (CSC), and domestic violence, following a bench trial in Wayne

County Circuit Court in 2006. In an Opinion and Order issued on this date, the Court

concluded that Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that Petitioner’s application

for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Dated: March 23, 2011 s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Edward Thomas, #524590

Cooper Street Correctional Facility

3100 Cooper Street

Jackson, MI 49201

AAG Laura A. Cook

2:08-cv-14273-PJD-MKM Doc # 22 Filed 03/23/11 Pg 1 of 1 Pg ID 470
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOYCE MICSAK-TOLBERT,

Petitioner,

v.

MILLICENT WARREN, 

Respondent.

 /

Case No. 09-13432

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

 At a session of said Court, held in the U.S.

District Courthouse, Eastern District 

of Michigan, on July 19, 2010.

PRESENT: THE HONORABLE PATRICK J. DUGGAN

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Petitioner, a state prisoner currently confined at the Huron Valley Complex-Women’s

in Ypsilanti, Michigan, filed this pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 on August 31, 2009. This Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Paul

J. Komives on March 9, 2010. On June 11, 2010, Magistrate Judge Komives filed his Report

and Recommendation (R&R) recommending that this Court deny Petitioner’s application for

the writ of habeas corpus and also deny a certificate of appealability (“COA”). At the

conclusion of the R&R, Magistrate Judge Komives advises the parties that they may object

to and seek review of the R&R within 14 days of service upon them. (R&R at 15.) He

further specifically advises the parties that “[f]ailure to file specific objections constitutes a

waiver of any further right of appeal.” ( Id. at 15.) Neither party has filed objections to the

R&R.
2

The Court has carefully reviewed the R&R and concurs with the conclusions reached

by Magistrate Judge Komives.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED.

A judgment consistent with this opinion shall enter.

s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Joyce Micsak-Tolbert, #161000 

Huron Valley Complex-Women’s

3201 Bemis Road

Ypsilanti, MI 48197

Laura A. Cook, A.A.G.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

DAVID WILSON and DEBORAH WILSON, 

individuals,

Plaintiffs Case No.: 2:09-cv-12626

v. Hon. Robert H. Cleland

FEDERAL DEPOSIT

INSURANCE CORPORATION, as receiver 

for MAIN STREET BANK and FREEDOM

PROPERTY SERVICES, L.L.C.,

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________

J. PAUL SUGAMELI, P-58944

SUGAMELI & SUGAMELI, P.L.C.

Attorney for Plaintiffs

2833 Crooks Road, Suite 104

Troy, MI 48084

248/649-8600

F - 248/822-3174

email: psugameli@sugamelilaw.com 

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUBPOENA FOR CREDITOR’S

EXAMINATION DEFENDANT FREEDOM PROPERTY SERVICES, L.L.C. 

At a session held in above-stated Court, held in the United

States District Court in the City of Detroit, Wayne County,

State of Michigan

on: 12/16/2010

Present: Hon. Robert H. Cleland 

United States District Court Judge

This matter having come before this Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Subpoena for Creditor’s

Examination of Judgment Defendant Freedom Property Services, L.L.C. , the Court having entered

a Default Judgment as to Defendant Freedom Property Services, LLC, Plaintiffs having submitted a Motion

seeking execution of a Subpoena directing Defendant Freedom Property Services, L.L.C., by its owner

William L. Marra, to appear and testify for a creditor’s examination pursuant to said Judgment, the Court
being otherwise fully informed in the premises:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Subpoena for Creditor’s Examination

of Judgment Defendant Freedom Property Services, L.L.C. is granted;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Freedom Property Services, LLC will appear

at the place and time directed by the Court in an executed Subpoena for the purpose of answering

questions, under oath, in a creditor’s examination.

 S/Robert H. Cleland 

ROBERT H. CLELAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: December 16, 2010

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record on this date, December

16, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

 S/Lisa Wagner 

Case Manager and Deputy Clerk

(313) 234-5522
174 La. 430

#### STATE v. O’REAR.

No. 31621.

Supreme Court of Louisiana,

March 30, 1932.

*19Thomas W. Robertson, of Shreveport, for appellant.

Percy Saint, Atty. Gen., Robert 3?. Kennon, Dist. Atty., of Minden (James O’Niell, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen., of counsel), for the State.

BRUNOT, J.

The defendant was charged with selling intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes. After arraignment and plea he was tried, found guilty as charged, and was sentenced to serve forty-five days in the parish jail, subject to work on the parish farm, and to pay a fine of $500 and costs, and, in default of the payment of the fine and costs, to serve six months in the parish jail, subject to work on the parish farm.

The defendant appealed from the verdict and sentence.

After conviction the defendant filed' a motion for a new trial. The motion is based upon the alleged insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, and upon newly discovered evidence. The motion was heard and overruled, and defendant reserved a bill of exceptions to the ruling. This is the only bill in the record. No appearance was made in this court for defendant, and no brief filed in support of the bill.

The alleged newly discovered evidence was merely corroborative of evidence offered by defendant on the trial relative to the color of the car in which the two prohibition enforcement officers were riding at the time the defendant is charged with selling them whis-ky.

We quote from the trial judge as follows:

“Defendant’s witnesses all testified that they saw two men drive up to defendant’s house in a gray Ford Coupe, bearing an Arkansas license plate, and that defendant did not sell them any whiskey. The two United States Agents both testified that they were driving a black Ford coupe with Louisiana license that had been confiscated at Ferriday, Louisiana, a day or so before that time, and the Sheriff and his deputy testified that the men left Minden and returned to Minden in a black Ford Coupe. There was and is no doubt in my mind as to the guilt of the defendant. I am of the opinion that if a gray Ford Coupe bearing an Arkansas license drove up to defendant’s house that morning, that it was not occupied by the prosecuting witnesses,” etc.

This court has repeatedly held that it ean-not pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence. It is only where there is no evidence at all of guilt that a question is presented which we may consider. It is clear that, if the alleged newly discovered evidence had been before the court, it would not have affected the verdict. It is the settled jurisprudence of this court that the refusal of the trial judge to grant a new trial will not be disturbed unless it appear that the ruling was clearly erroneous. . La. Dig. vol. 2, p. 667.

For the reasons stated, the verdict and sentence are affirmed.

O’NIELL, C. J., absent.
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Terry RICHARDSON, Appellant.

No. 70688.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Northern Division.

Oct. 29, 1996.

*901Gary E. Brotherton, Asst. Public Defender, Columbia, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., David G. Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before AHRENS, C.J., and DOWD and RHODES RUSSELL, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Terry Richardson appeals his conviction and sentencing for distribution of a controlled substance near public housing. We affirm.

An extended opinion would serve no prece-dential value. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum opinion for their information only, setting forth the reasons for this order. The judgment is affirmed pursuant to Rule 30.25(b).
Exhibit 4.1


 




	
  

  	
  Resonant Inc.  THIS CERTIFIES that INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE
  OF DELAWARE COMMON STOCK (CUSIP 76118L 10 2) 
  SEE REVERSE FOR CERTAIN DEFINITIONS is the owner of FULLY PAID AND NON-ASSESSABLE SHARES OF THE
  COMMON STOCK,PAR VALUE $0.001 PER SHARE OF 1D 0  (-<) (0)c “‘  — 5 
  :onz ,.-1’1 z o lll;ol> 
  ‘l)>Z Pl;oO :(o),.;(u) 
  n(l>z)n”‘)  “‘(-0-)  Resonant Inc.  transferable
  only on the books of the Corporation by the holder hereof in person or by
  Attorney upon surrender of this Certificate properly endorsed. This
  Certilicate is not valid until countersigned by the Transfer Agent and
  registered by the Registrar.  IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said Corporation
  has caused this Certificate to be signed by the facsimile signatures of its
  duly authorized officers and its Corporate seal to be hereunto affixed.  DATED: 
  # c£¥-  )> 
  J:  0  :0 
  0  Ill (5)  c :0 
  “‘)  l>z;ll Z nl’l 0”110  ;111’1 
  Jll;ll (n)-o ,.,.  :uz
  (-<)  SECRETARY CHAIRMAN OF THE
  BOARD COUNTERSIGNED AND REGISTERED REGISTRAR AND TRANSFER COMPANY TRANSFER
  AGENT AND REGISTRAR BY AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

   

  






 


 














	
  

  	
  The following
  abbreviations, when used in the inscription on the face of this certificate,
  shall be construed as though they were written out in full according to
  applicable laws or regulations: TEN COM - as tenants in common UNIF GIFT MIN
  ACT- — Custodian   TEN ENT  — as tenants by the entireties  (Cust) (Minor) JT TEN — as joint tenants
  with right of  under Uniform Grfts to
  Minors survivorship and not as tenants Act _ in common (State) Additional
  abbreviations may also be used though not in the above list. For Value Received,     hereby sell, assign and transfer  unto PLEASE INSERT SOCIAL SECURITY
  OR OTHER IDENTIFYING NUMBER OF ASSIGNEE (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPEWRITE NAME AND
  ADDRESS INCLUDING POSTAL ZIP CODE OF ASSIGNEE) Shares of the Common Stock represented by the within Certificate,
  and do hereby irrevocably constitute
  and appoint _  -Attorney to transfer the said Shares on the
  books of the within named Corporation with full power of substitution in the
  premises. Dated:  Signature(s) Guaranteed
  x _ x NOTICE: THE SIGNATURE(S) TO THIS ASSIGNMENT MUST CORRESPOND WITH THE
  NAME(S)   AS WRITTEN UPON THE
  FACE OF THIS CERTIFICATE IN EVERY PARTICULAR, WITHOUT ALTERATION OR
  ENLARGEMENT OR ANY CHANGE WHATEVER BY: THE SIGNATURE(S) SHOULD BE
  GUARANTEED BY AN ELIGIBLE GUARANTOR INSTITUTION (BANKS,STOCKBROKERS. SAVINGS
  AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS AND CREDIT UNIONS WITH MEMBERSHIP IN AN APPROVED
  SIGNATURE GUARANTEE MEDALLION PROGRAM), PURSUANT TO S E.C. RULE 11Ad-15.
NUMBER 13-16-00219-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

IN RE FEDERAL CORPORATION

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

ORDER

Before Justices Benavides, Perkes, and Longoria

Order Per Curiam 

Relator, Federal Corporation, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the above 

cause on April 14, 2016. Through this original proceeding, relator seeks to compel the 

respondent trial court judge to vacate his order of March 14, 2016 compelling relator to 

respond to discovery. Through its motion for emergency relief, relator seeks a stay of the 

order compelling discovery.

The Court, having examined and fully considered the motion for emergency relief, 

is of the opinion that the motion should be granted. The motion for emergency relief is 

GRANTED and the trial court’s order of March 14, 2016 compelling discovery is ordered 
2

STAYED pending further order of this Court, or until the case is finally decided. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 52.10(b) (“Unless vacated or modified, an order granting temporary relief is 

effective until the case is finally decided.”). 

The Court requests that the real party in interest, Jose Gonzalez, or any others 

whose interest would be directly affected by the relief sought, file a response to the 

petition for writ of mandamus on or before the expiration of ten days from the date of this 

order. See id. R. 52.2, 52.4, 52.8. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

PER CURIAM

Delivered and filed the

15th day of April, 2016.
<PAGE>   1

                                                                  EXHIBIT 23.1


                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-3 No. 33-91218, Form S-3 No. 333-20143 and Form S-8 No. 333-3310) of
Jameson Inns, Inc. of our report dated February 21, 1997, with respect to the
consolidated financial statements and schedule of Jameson Inns, Inc. and our
report dated February 14, 1997 except as to the fourth paragraph of Note 6 as
to which the date is April 22, 1997 with respect to the financial statements of
Jameson Operating Company included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K/A1) of 
Jameson Inns, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 1996.





                                        ERNST & YOUNG LLP

Atlanta, Georgia
April 22, 1997
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 408

To repeal the reduction in the deductible portion of business meals and

entertainment made by the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 4, 1995

Mr. ZIMMER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To repeal the reduction in the deductible portion of business

meals and entertainment made by the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. REPEAL OF REDUCTION IN DEDUCTIBLE POR4 TION OF BUSINESS MEALS AND ENTERTAIN5 MENT.

6 Section 13209 of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of

7 1993 is hereby repealed, and the Internal Revenue Code

8 of 1986 shall be applied and administered as if such sec-
2

HR 408 IH

1 tion (and the amendments made thereby) had not been

2 enacted.

Æ
ex10_1.htm


  
Exhibit 10.1












AMENDMENT TO THE


AMENDED AND RESTATED EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


 







THIS AMENDMENT to the Amended and Restated Employment Agreement dated as of July 1, 2010 (the “Employment Agreement”) by and between 1st Constitution Bancorp, a New Jersey corporation, having its principal place of business at 2650 Route 130 North, Cranbury, New Jersey 08512 (the “Employer”), and Robert F. Mangano (the “Employee”), is effective as of April 4, 2014 (the “Effective Date”).


 


WHEREAS, the Employee is employed by the Employer as its President, and is also employed by 1st Constitution Bank, a New Jersey commercial bank (the “Bank”), as its President and Chief Executive Officer; and


 


WHEREAS, the Employer and the Employee are parties to the Employment Agreement; and


 


WHEREAS, the Employer and the Employee wish to amend the Employment Agreement as set forth herein.


 


NOW, THEREFORE, it is AGREED as follows:


 



	
  

	
1.

	
Section 3 of the Employment Agreement is amended by deleting the phrase “provided, however, that the term of this Agreement shall end on the seventieth (70th) birthday of the Employee” and replacing it with “provided, however, that the term of this Agreement shall end on the seventy second (72nd) birthday of the Employee.”







 



	
  

	
2.

	
The Employment Agreement is amended by adding the following new Section 19, immediately following current Section 18:







 




  





  











  






 


“19.  Limitation on Payments.  Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Agreement, the Employer shall not be obligated to make any payment hereunder in violation of any law, rule or regulation applicable to the Employer or any of its subsidiaries or in violation of any requirement of any exchange on which the Employer’s securities are listed and any payment hereunder may be subject to claw back pursuant to any law, rule or regulation or requirement applicable to the Employer or any of its subsidiaries or any exchange on which the securities of the Employer are listed or any policy adopted by the board of directors of the Employer pursuant to the requirements of any law, rule or regulation applicable to the Employer or its subsidiaries or any requirement of any exchange on which the Employer’s securities are listed.”







IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment as of the Effective Date.


 




	
WITNESS:

	 	
1ST CONSTITUTION BANCORP


	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	  	 	  	  
	
/s/ DAVID P. CUSHING

	 	
By:

	
       /s/ CHARLES S. CROW, III 


	  	 	  	
CHARLES S. CROW, III,


	  	 	  	
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD


	  	 	  	  
	  	 	  	  
	
WITNESS:

	 	EMPLOYEE
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	  	 	  	  
	
/s/ JACALYN NAKUSHIAN 

	 	
By:

	
       /s/ ROBERT F. MANGANO 


	
      

	 	  	
ROBERT F. MANGANO,


	
    

	 	  	
INDIVIDUALLY









 


 


-2-
#### Ralph ELMORE, Appellant, v. Gracie A. STEVENSON, Respondent. Ralph ELMORE, Appellant, v. DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, Respondent.

Nos. 69323, 70171.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Jan. 28, 1997.

Alan W. Cohen, St. Louis, for appellant.

Douglas R. Beach, David A. Shaller, Clayton, Orval E. Jones, Shelley Thomas-Benke, Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before DOWD, P.J., and REINHARD and GARY M. GAERTNER, JJ.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

In this consolidated appeal, Ralph Elmore (“Father”) appeals the circuit court’s judgment denying his petition for review of an administrative order under § 536.010 et seq. RSMo 1994, awarding Gracie Stevenson (“Mother”) child support, and the judgment of the trial court affirming the findings of the commissioner in Father’s action filed under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law, § 454.010 et seq. Father alleges the trial court erred when it (1) failed to find the Division of Child Support Enforcement (“Division”) abused its discretion when it imputed income to Father, and (2) approved the family court commissioner’s findings imputing income to Father. We affirm.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and find the claims of error to be without merit. An opinion reciting the detailed facts and restating the principles of law would have no precedential value. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum opinion for their information only, setting forth the facts and reasons for this order. The judgment is affirmed in accordance with Rule 84.16(b).