### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE O ct obe r 28, 200 4 S es sio n UN ION C OUN TY EDU CA TION AS SOC IATION v. U NION CO UN TY BOARD OF EDUCATI ON a nd DR. JAMES PRATT, SUPERINTE NDENT

OF THE U NION CO UN TY SC HOOLS Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Union Coun ty No. 3623 Hon. Bi lly Joe White, Chancellor

No. E2004-00820-COA- R3-CV - F ILED JANUARY 28, 2005

We d ism iss thi s a

pp e a l f ro m a gran ting of

su mma ry jud g me nt b e c a us e the app e a l w a s n ot f ro m a fi na l ju dg me nt a ndthe iss ue s a re moo t.

Te nn. R . A pp. P .3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t A ffirm e d.

H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., and S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., joined. Cha rl e s Wa y ne Ca g le , N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or app e lla nt. Richard L ee Colbert, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or appe llee.

OP IN ION

I n this action plaintiff allege d that the def endant ha d violated the provisions of Te nn. Code Ann. § 49-5-601 et seq. , (t he E du cat io n P rof ess io nal s N egoti ati on s A ct) bydis tr ibu tin g lia bil ity ins ur a nc e pa c ka g e s to te a c he rs du ri ng a ma nd a tory in- se rv ic e tr a ini ng se ssi on , a ndthat st a te me nts wer e made there in by

the B oard’ s manag ement re prese ntative Mark Robe rts that t h e teac hers ha d no rea son to be members of the Union CountyEducation Association (“UCEA” ). Plaintiff furthe r alleg es that anoth er ma nag ement re prese ntative of the B oard, Randy Arwin, c ontacted U CEA members during A ug ust and September 1998, and urg ed them to terminate their member ship.-2- I t w a s a lso a lle g e d th a t th e B oa rdha d d isp ute d a ndre fu se d to re c og nize the ma jority status of the UC EA , e ve n th ou g h th e Boardha d b e e n p ro vid e d r e c or ds wh ic h c on c lus ive ly demonstrated that a majority of the prof

essional employ ees of

the Union Coun ty

Sc hool Sy stem were UCEA member s. Finally , it was alleg ed that the Board refuse d to neg otiate wit h UCEA for a period of time based upon its cha lleng e to the UCEA’ s majority status, and had a calc ulated plan of try ing to thwart the rig hts of the UCEA member s, and had f ailed to neg otiate in g ood faith. Th e B oa rd fi le d a n An sw e r, a nd plaint if f the n fi le d a

Mo tio n f or Sum mary

Judg me nt. The Court held a

hear ing on F ebrua

ry 4, 2004, and dete rmined that UCEA was entitled to judgment a s a ma tte r o f l a w. Th e Cou rt state d in its Or de r o f M arc h 1 0, g ranti ng su mma ry jud g me nt: I t would fly

in the fac e of c ommon sense to think or hold that the B oard of Education has eng ag ed in g ood faith neg ot i at i o n s . For example, the Boa rd of Educ ation has clea rly stated that it will not reach any ag ree ment with the Association that includes binding a rbitration as pa

rt o f g rieva nce pr ocedur es. Grie vance proce dures a re a ma nd a tory

su bje c t of

ne g oti a tio ns . Whil e the B oa rd of Ed uc a tio n is not r e qu ir e d to conce de on any particula

r point in neg otiations, it must ne g otiate in g ood faith. It has not done so. Th e Cou rt

or de re d the pa

rt ie s to me e t a ndne g oti a te in g oo d f a ith , a ndto s ub mit written re ports to the court by Marc h 15, 2004, and stated tha t it would reta in jurisdiction over the s u b j ec t matter pursua nt to Tenn. Code Ann. §49-5- 609(c) (4), a nd would determine on Marc h 15, 2004, what further re ports would be re quired to show the B oard w as neg otiating in g ood faith.

After neg otiation reports we re f iled, plaintiff filed a Petition for Cont empt on Marc h 25, 2004, stating the Boa

rd had a g ain re fused to neg otiate bec ause the UCEA re fused to take binding arbitra tion o u t o f

th e g r ie v a n c e p r o c e d u r e . T h e B o ar d r e s p o n d e d b y s tati n g th a t i t h a d a s k e d for mediation, and a he aring was he ld on April 8, 2004, wher e the Court ag ain found that the Boar d had failed to ne g otiate in g ood faith. The Court t hen orde red tha t a spec ial master would be appointed to require the par t i es t o m ee t and neg otiate in g ood faith in the spec ial master’ s prese nce, and the specia l master wa s empower ed to mediate the dispute.

The a ppeal before us is an appea l from the summary judgme nt gr anted to the plaintiff on Ma rc h 1 0, 20 04 . It r a ise s th e iss ue of the pr op ri e ty

of the su mma

ry jud g me nt. Th e app e a l mu st b e dis mis se d fo r tw o re a so ns : f ir st, the jud g me nt a

pp e a le d f ro m is not a final judg ment. The Court’s orde r of Ma rch 10 e x pressly

stated that the Trial Court was re ta ini ng jurisd ic tio n o ve r the ma tte r an d tha t furthe r pr oc e e din g s we re g oin g fo rw ard , a nddid , in fac t, occur . The Co u rt re t ai ned jurisdiction pursuant to Tenn. Code A nn. §49-5-609( c)( 4), which a llo ws the c ou rt

to “ iss ue a n o rd e r r e qu ir ing su c h part y to ce a se a nd de sis t fr om s uc h u nla wf ul a c t, and take such affirmative action, including resumption of negotiations, re instatement of employ ees with or without back pa y , or ex ecution of a contract the terms of which have be en ag ree d upon, as well as to eff

ect policies of t his part. Such order may further require such party to make reports fr om-3-

time to tim e showing the extent to which it has co m p l i ed with the orde r.” Thus, the Trial Court pr op e rl y re ta ine d ju ri sd ic tio n o ve r the c a se , a nd the or de r app e a le d fr om wa s no t a fi na l ju dg me nt, nor wa s it gra nted pursuant to Te nn. R. Civ. P . 54.02.

Se c on d, the pa

rt ie s st ipu la te d d uring or a l argum e nt ( a ndapp e lla nt c on c e de s in its Reply Brief) that an agr eeme nt had been reache d by the parties, and a three- y ear contra ct had be en enter ed into since the trial court proce eding s here in c ontested took pla ce. T his fact r ender s the issue on appea l moot, as t here is no further relief to be g iven by

this Court. See, e .g., State ex rel. Orr v. Thomas , 585 S.W .2d 606, 607 (Tenn.1979) (" I t is, of course, well settled that when the issues sought to be pre sented by

an appe al have b ee n rendered moot pending the appe al[,] the appe al will be dismiss ed." ). For

the fore g oing r easons, we dismiss t h e appe al and tax the costs equally to the pla int if f a ndde fe nd a nts

.

______________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.