1

Defendant also filed a response in opposition to plaintiff’s motion (D/E #18). 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

STANLEY PRICE 

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-13081

v. DISTRICT JUDGE BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN

MICHIGAN STATE TREASURER, MAGISTRATE JUDGE VIRGINIA M. MORGAN

Defendant.

 /

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S DISPOSITIVE MOTION (D/E #16) and

TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS (D/E #17)

I. Introduction

This is a pro se action in which the plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Michigan

Department of Corrections (MDOC), alleges that defendant violated his constitutional right to

due process by garnishing a portion of his City of Detroit pension. Plaintiff also appears to

assert a claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29

U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. The matter comes before the court on plaintiff’s “Dispositive Motion”

(D/E #16) and defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss (D/E #17).1

 For the reasons discussed

below, this court recommends that plaintiff’s dispositive motion (D/E #16) be denied,
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defendant’s second motion to dismiss (D/E #17) be granted, and the case be dismissed with

prejudice.

II. Background

On August 5, 2009, Price filed a one-count complaint in this court. Price alleges a denial

of due process as a result of his pension benefits being assigned or alienated to the MDOC

without his consent or at his direction (D/E #1). In lieu of an answer, defendant filed a motion to

dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment (D/E #7). This court then recommended that

defendant’s motion be denied and issued an order directing plaintiff to file a more definite

statement (D/E #10, #12). That report and recommendation was subsequently adopted by the

Honorable Bernard A. Friedman (D/E #15).

On July 19, 2010, plaintiff filed a more definite statement (D/E #14). In that statement,

plaintiff alleges that, on September 5, 2008, defendant filed a complaint against plaintiff and the

City of Detroit Retirement System pursuant to Michigan’s State Correctional Facility

Reimbursement Act (“SCFRA”), M.C.L. 800.401, et seq. (D/E #14, p. 1). Plaintiff also alleges

that the City of Detroit sent him a copy of two orders of Ingham Circuit Court, issued in

September of 2008, that appointed a receiver and froze any funds payable to plaintiff. (D/E #14,

p. 2) According to plaintiff, the subsequent seizure of plaintiff’s pension assets violated

plaintiff’s rights under the United States Constitution and ERISA (D/E #14, pp. 5-6). 

On October 12, 2010, plaintiff filed a “Dispositive Motion” (D/E #16). In that motion,

plaintiff argues that defendant’s earlier motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary

judgment (D/E #7) was denied (D/E #15) and that all the facts are already before the court. 
2

See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75

L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362

(1923). 

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Plaintiff also argues that the court should accept the pleadings and make a final judgment in his

favor. 

Defendant subsequently filed a response in opposition to plaintiff’s dispositive motion

(D/E #18). In that response, defendant argues that the court should deny plaintiff’s motion for

lack of merit and for the reasons already articulated in defendant’s second motion to dismiss.

On October 15, 2010, defendant filed a motion to dismiss (D/E #17). In that motion,

defendant argues that plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.2

 Plaintiff

did not file a response to that motion and the deadline for filing such a response has passed (D/E

#19).

III. Discussion

A. Plaintiff’s Dispositive Motion (D/E #16)

Plaintiff does not identify the rule under which he moves for judgment, but it is clear that,

regardless of the basis, his motion must be denied. Plaintiff appears to argue that because

defendant’s earlier motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment (D/E #7) was

denied by the court (D/E #15), he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. However, the denial

of defendant’s earlier motion does not establish that plaintiff is entitled to judgment and plaintiff

offers no other arguments. Moreover, as discussed below, plaintiff’s claims are barred by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion should be denied. 
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B. Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss (D/E #17)

Defendant moves for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the

trial court “must construe the complaint liberally in the plaintiff's favor and accept as true all

factual allegations and permissible inferences therein.” Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061,

1064 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir. 1976)); see also

Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1995). Because a motion to dismiss rests upon the

pleadings rather than the evidence, “[i]t is not the function of the court [in ruling on such a

motion] to weigh evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Miller, 50 F.3d at 377

(citing Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264, 270 (6th Cir. 1994)). However, while this standard is

decidedly liberal, it requires more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. In re DeLorean

Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops,

Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1988)). Rather, the complaint must contain either direct or

inferential allegations with regard to all the material elements to sustain recovery under some

viable legal theory. DeLorean, 991 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded

facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint

has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]’-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129

S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). However,

“determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context specific, requiring the

reviewing court to draw on its experience and common sense.” Id. at 1940.
3

See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75

L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149 (1923). 

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Here, defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted because plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.3

 Under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal court review of state court proceedings is jurisdictionally

limited to the Supreme Court of the United States and a litigant who loses in state court may not

seek “what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States

district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s

federal rights.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U. S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517,

1521-22, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2l005) (internal citation omitted). See also Johnson v. De Grandy,

512 U.S. 997, 114 S.Ct. 2647 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994). The proper avenue to redress such

grievances is application to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review a

final decision of a state’s highest court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine proceeds on two fronts. “First, in order of the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply to a claim presented in federal district court, the issue before

the Court must be [inextricably intertwined] with the claim asserted in the state court

proceeding.” Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted). 

“Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it

is difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited

appeal of the state-court judgment.” Catz, 142 F.3d at 293 (internal citation omitted). Second,

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal court jurisdiction where the claim is “a specific
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grievance that the law was invalidly-even unconstitutionally-applied in the plaintiff’s particular

case.” Catz, 142 F.3d at 293 (internal citation omitted). Exceptions to this doctrine of abstention

exist when plaintiffs attack the constitutionality of the statute or authority for the state court

proceedings themselves, see Howard v. Whitbeck, 382 F.3d 633, 639 (6th Cir. 2004), or raise “a

general challenge to the constitutionality of the state law applied in the state action,” Catz, 142

F.3d at 293; see also Patmon v. Mich. Sup. Ct., 224 F.3d 504, 509-10 (6th Cir. 2000), but neither

of these exceptions applies here. 

As noted by defendant, the Sixth Circuit has already applied the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine with preclusive effect to challenges, such as plaintiff’s, by prisoners to State court

judgments authorizing asset seizure under Michigan’s State Correctional Facility

Reimbursement Act (“SCFRA”), M.C.L. 800.401, et seq. See, e.g., Abbott v. Michigan, 474

F.3d 324, 332 (6th Cir. 2007); McCarty v. Doe, 289 Fed. Appx. 836, 837-838 (6th Cir. 2008). In

Abbot, state inmates brought a class action against the State of Michigan, Department of

Treasury and the Michigan Department of Corrections, together with state officers and officials,

alleging that defendants violated the Due Process Clause, ERISA and state law when defendants

collected a portion of the inmates’ pension benefits by securing state court orders under SCFRA. 

Abbot, 474 F.3d at 326-328. The district court concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and

res judicata required dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the

judgment of the district court for those same reasons. Abbot, 474 F.3d at 326. As stated by the

Sixth Circuit: “The plaintiffs’ claims of particular injuries that they have suffered arise as a

direct result of prior state-court judgments. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents
4

The Sixth Circuit also held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar lower federal

courts from exercising jurisdiction over general challenges to the validity of SCFRA, Abbot, 474

F.3d at 330, but plaintiff makes no such challenge here. Moreover, even if plaintiff did make

such a claim, it would be barred by res judicata just like the general challenges in Abbot were. 

See Abbot, 474 F.3d at 331-332.

5

This court would note that neither party has provided any orders or judgments from the

state court. However, the parties do not appear to dispute what occurred and the court will

proceed based on their representations regarding the state court action.

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lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over their challenges to SCFRA seeking to

overturn the state-court judgments.” Abbot, 474 F.3d at 330.4 See also McCarty, 289 Fed.

Appx. at 837-838 (holding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine and res judicata barred action by

Michigan state prisoners filed against the Michigan State Treasurer and others pursuant to §

1983, ERISA, and state tort law where there was a state court judgment upholding the seizure of

pensions pursuant to SCFRA).

The disposition of this case should be the same as in Abbot and McCarty. As

acknowledged by plaintiff in his amended complaint, his alleged injuries arise as a direct result

of a state-court judgment authorizing the seizure of his pension.5

 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine

prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over their challenges seeking to

overturn state-court judgments and, here, the federal relief plaintiff seeks can only be predicated

upon a conviction that the state court was wrong. Consequently, plaintiff’s claims should be

dismissed with prejudice. 

IV. Conclusion
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For the reasons discussed above, this court recommends that plaintiff’s dispositive

motion (D/E #16) be denied, defendant’s second motion to dismiss (D/E #17) be granted, and the

case be dismissed with prejudice.

The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and

Recommendation, but are required to act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as

provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). Failure to file specific

objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v.

Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949-50 (6th Cir. 1981). The filing of objections which raise some issues,

but fail to raise others with specificity, will not preserve all the objections a party might have to

this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Secretary of HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir.

1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).

Within fourteen (14) days of service of any objecting party’s timely filed objections, the

opposing party may file a response. The response shall be no more than 20 pages in length

unless, by motion and order, the page limit is extended by the court. The response shall address 

each issue contained within the objections specifically and in the same order raised.

S/Virginia M. Morgan 

Virginia M. Morgan

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: December 14, 2010 
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PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and plaintiff via

the Court’s ECF System and/or U. S. Mail on December 14, 2010.

s/Jane Johnson 

Case Manager to

Magistrate Judge Virginia M. Morgan