UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MELVIN CHRISTIAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 09-13337

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

WELLS FARGO BANK, ARGENT

MORTGAGE, and THE COUNTY 

OF WAYNE,

Defendants.

______________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER 

At a session of said Court, held in the U.S.

District Courthouse, Eastern District

of Michigan, on July 16, 2010.

PRESENT: THE HONORABLE PATRICK J. DUGGAN

 U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Plaintiff initiated this pro se action against defendants on August 24, 2009,

alleging violations of his rights in connection with a mortgage on real property located at

11395 Vaughan in Detroit, Michigan (“property”). Presently before the Court is a motion 

for summary judgment and dismissal filed by defendant Wayne County on March 29,

2010. The motion has now been fully briefed. On July 12, 2010, the Court dispensed

with oral argument pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The Court previously set forth the facts giving rise to this lawsuit in its February

17, 2010, Opinion and Order dismissing defendant Wells Fargo. In sum, Plaintiff signed
1

In certain sections of the complaint, Plaintiff restarts the numbering of his

paragraphs. The paragraphs referred to in this citation fall in the second set of numbered

paragraphs in the complaint under the heading “Elements of Fraud.”

2

a mortgage on the property in connection with a loan from defendant Argent Mortgage

(“Argent”) in the amount of $100,800 in May 2005. Sometime after closing, Argent

assigned the mortgage to Wells Fargo and, by late 2007, Plaintiff defaulted on the loan. 

Foreclosure proceedings were then initiated, resulting in a foreclosure sale of the

property. (See Wayne County’s Mot. Ex. A.) 

As relevant to the motion presently pending before the Court, Plaintiff alleges that

Adrienne Sanders, who executed the Sheriff’s Deed following the foreclosure sale on

December 12, 2007, misrepresented that she was duly authorized to act as a “Deputy

Sheriff” when she in fact was merely a “special deputy.” (Compl. ¶¶ 1-2.1

) Plaintiff

further alleges that Sanders was not even lawfully authorized to act as a special deputy

under Michigan law. (Id.) Based on these allegations, Plaintiff seeks to hold Wayne

County liable for fraud.

On April 14, 2009, prior to filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff filed a complaint against

the same defendants in Wayne County Circuit Court. Therein, Plaintiff challenged

Sanders’s role in the foreclosure process and alleged that she was “not a deputy,

undersheriff, or sheriff.” (Wayne County’s Mot. Ex. D ¶ 6.) Wayne County Circuit

Court dismissed that lawsuit on May 1, 2009. (Id. Ex. E.)
2

On August 31, 2009, Plaintiff filed an “Ex Parte Emergency Motion for

Automatic Stay of Proceedings in the 36th District Court or in the Alternative for

Temporary Restraining Order.” Therein, Plaintiff sought to enjoin enforcement of an

eviction order from the Wayne County District Court apparently issued on August 28,

2009. The Court denied that motion on September 3, 2009. 

3

As previously noted, Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit on August 24, 2009.2

 On

February 11, 2010, Argent was dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to serve. On

February 17, 2010, the Court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by Wells

Fargo. The Court now considers the sole remaining claim against Wayne County.

II. Standard of Review

Wayne County filed the motion presently pending before the court as both a

motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. A motion to dismiss pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. RMI

Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). Under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” To survive a motion

to dismiss, a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain

more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 555, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955,

1964-65 (2007). A complaint does not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of

‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S. Ct at 1966).
4

As the Supreme Court recently provided in Iqbal, “[t]o survive a motion to

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127

S. Ct. at 1974). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). The

plausibility standard “does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it

simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence of illegal [conduct].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965.

In deciding whether the plaintiff has set forth a “plausible” claim, the court must

accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Id.; see also Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). This presumption, however, is not applicable

to unsupported legal conclusions. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Therefore, “[t]hreadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65). Ultimately,

“[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense.” Id. at 1950. In conducting this analysis, the Court may consider the

pleadings, exhibits attached thereto, and documents referred to in the complaint that are

central to the plaintiff’s claims. See Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 177 F.3d 504, 514

(6th Cir. 1999).
5

Meanwhile, summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The central inquiry on a motion for summary judgment is “whether

the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether

it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986). After adequate time for

discovery and upon motion, Rule 56(c) mandates summary judgment against a party who

fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case and on which

that party bears the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). 

III. Res Judicata

Wayne County first seeks dismissal or summary judgment on grounds that

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata. “When a federal court is asked to give

preclusive effect to a state court judgment, the federal court must apply the law of the

state in which the prior judgment was rendered in determining whether and to what

extent the prior judgment should be given preclusive effect in a federal action.” Corzin v.

Fordu (In re Fordu), 201 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 1999). In Michigan, “[r]es judicata

bars a subsequent action between the same parties when the evidence or essential facts

are identical.” Sewell v. Clean Cut Mgmt., Inc., 463 Mich. 569, 575, 621 N.W.2d 222,

225 (2001) (quoting Dart v. Dart, 460 Mich. 573, 586, 597 N.W.2d 82, 88 (1999)). 

More specifically, res judicata applies when: 

(1) there has been a prior decision on the merits, (2) the issue
3

An exception to the broad application of res judicata under Michigan law where

summary proceedings are involved is not applicable to the present case.

4

On May 10, 2010, Plaintiff “filed” an amended complaint with the Court. Therein

Plaintiff elaborates on his claim regarding Sanders’s allegedly improper involvement in

the sheriff’s sale and adds allegations regarding Wayne County’s supposedly fraudulent

attempts to explain her involvement. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

Plaintiff may only amend his complaint at this point in the litigation with the consent of

Wayne County or with leave of the Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Plaintiff

obtained neither. Plaintiff’s “First Amended Complaint” therefore is not the effective

complaint in this case. In any event, the Court notes that acceptance of the First

Amended Complaint would not change the outcome of this litigation.

6

was either actually resolved in the first case or could have been

resolved in the first case if the parties, exercising reasonable

diligence, had brought it forward, and (3) both actions were

between the same parties or their privies.

Paige v. City of Sterling Heights, 476 Mich. 495, 522 n.46, 720 N.W.2d 219, 234 n.46

(2006). Michigan courts broadly apply the doctrine of res judicata.3

 Sewell, 463 Mich. at

576, 621 N.W.2d at 225.

Plaintiff’s pursuit of a fraud claim against Wayne County in the present action is

precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff’s civil lawsuit in Wayne County

Circuit Court included similar allegations against Wayne County regarding Sanders’s

involvement in the foreclosure sale, and that court dismissed Plaintiff’s lawsuit. In

response to the present motion, Plaintiff appears to acknowledge that he is seeking relief

from what he believes to be an erroneous decision of the Wayne County Circuit Court. 

(Pl.’s Resp. at 4 (“In sum, plaintiff is fairly contending that the circuit court judge’s

rulings in the sate court was [sic] erroneous . . . .”). Plaintiff, however, cannot relitigate

that decision in this Court.4

 Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that granting Wayne County’s

present motion would violate his Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury lacks merit. 
5

Wayne County argues in its motion that Sanders was a duly appointed Special

Deputy Sheriff authorized to conduct the sheriff’s sale at issue in this litigation. 

Additionally, Wayne County argues that, if Sanders was not so appointed and authorized,

it is entitled to governmental immunity, that the relevant statutes provide Plaintiff with no

private right of action, and that Plaintiff failed to plead the alleged fraud with sufficient

particularity.

7

Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336, 99 S. Ct. 645, 654 (1979) (“The

Seventh Amendment has never been interpreted in the rigid manner advocated by the

petitioners. On the contrary, many procedural devices developed since 1791 that have

diminished the civil jury’s historic domain have been found not to be inconsistent with

the Seventh Amendment.”). The Court therefore grants Wayne County’s motion and

need not address Wayne County’s remaining arguments for dismissal.5

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Wayne County’s Motion for Summary Judgment and

Dismissal is GRANTED.

A judgment consistent with this order shall enter.

s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Melvin Christian

11395 Vaughan St.

Detroit, MI 48228

Margaret M. Flanagan, Esq.