UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BOBBY LURAY REDDELL,

Petitioner,

v. CASE NO. 09-12781

HONORABLE VICTORIA A. ROBERTS

BLAINE LAFLER,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS,

DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,

DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, BUT

GRANTING IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS ON APPEAL

This matter is pending before the Court on petitioner Bobby Luray Reddell’s pro

se habeas corpus petition and respondent Blaine Lafler’s motion to dismiss the petition. 

Also pending before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s

order denying his motion for injunctive relief. The Court has determined that Petitioner’s

claims are barred by the statute of limitations, that the claims also lack merit, and that

Petitioner is not entitled to the injunctive relief he seeks. Consequently, Respondent’s

motion to dismiss shall be granted and Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration shall be

denied.

I. Background

A. The Charges, Plea, and Sentence

Petitioner was charged in Cheboygan County, Michigan with two counts of first-
2

degree criminal sexual conduct and two counts of second-degree criminal sexual

conduct involving his daughter, who was fifteen years old at the time. The trial court

ordered a competency examination and after the Forensic Center filed its report, the

trial court held a competency hearing and found Petitioner competent to stand trial. 

On November 13, 2000, Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree

criminal sexual conduct, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b, in return for the dismissal of the

other counts and a minimum sentence of nine years, eight months. On December 19,

2000, the trial court sentenced Petitioner pursuant to the plea agreement to a minimum

term of nine years, eight months in prison and to a maximum term of thirty years. 

Petitioner did not take a direct appeal from his conviction and sentence.

B. The State Collateral Appeals

On July 27, 2007, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment, which the trial

court interpreted to allege that Petitioner was incompetent to stand trial and never

received a hearing on the issue. The trial court denied the motion on August 1, 2007,

after noting that Petitioner was evaluated for competency, received a hearing on the

issue, and failed to show that he was incompetent at the time of his plea. 

The trial court’s order apparently was sent by mistake to an attorney who

formerly represented Petitioner. Unaware of the trial court’s order, Petitioner filed an

amended motion for relief from judgment on October 5, 2007. The trial court treated

the amended motion as a second or successive motion for relief from judgment and

denied the motion on October 17, 2007. Petitioner then moved to vacate the trial

court’s two orders. On November 9, 2007, the trial court denied the motion on the

ground that the motion had no basis in fact or law. 
3

Petitioner appealed the trial court’s orders dated August 1, 2007, October 17,

2007, and November 9, 2007, to the Michigan Court of Appeals, which dismissed

Petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals stated that a defendant

cannot appeal the denial or rejection of a successive motion for relief from judgment. 

The dismissal was without prejudice to Petitioner’s right to file an application for leave to

appeal on the competency issue decided by the trial court in its order of August 1, 2007. 

See People v. Reddell, No. 282057 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2007). Petitioner’s

subsequent appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court was denied on the ground that

Petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment was prohibited by Michigan Court Rule

6.502(G). See People v. Reddell, No. 135869 (Mich. Sup. Ct. July 29, 2008). 

On October 23, 2008, Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal in the

Michigan Court of Appeals. He alleged that the trial court deprived him of due process

by failing to hold a competency hearing. The Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner’s

application for lack of jurisdiction. The reason given was that Petitioner failed to file the

application within twelve months of the trial court’s order of August 1, 2007, as required

by Michigan Court Rule 7.205(F)(3). See People v. Reddell, No. 288457 (Mich. Ct.

App. Nov. 26, 2008). The Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s subsequent

application for leave to appeal because it was not persuaded to review the issue. See

People v. Reddell, No. 138119 (Mich. Sup. Ct. June 23, 2009).

C. The Habeas Petition and Motion for Injunctive Relief

On July 14, 2009, Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28
1

 The petition appears to have been signed on July 7, 2009, and placed in the

prison mailing system on July 10, 2009.

4

U.S.C. § 2254.1 He alleges that: (1) the trial court failed to hold a hearing to determine

his competence to stand trial and ability to plead guilty; (2) the plea bargain was illusory;

(3) the trial court deprived him of a competency hearing, as required by Michigan Court

Rule 6.125(E); (4) his right to due process was violated because he was adjudicated

while incompetent; and (5) the Michigan Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed his

appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

 On August 4, 2009, Petitioner filed a motion for injunctive relief, claiming that the

Michigan Parole Board denied his request for release on parole and recommended that

he enroll in sex offender therapy. Petitioner complained that he was required to admit

guilt in order to complete sex offender therapy and that, if he refused to admit guilt, he

would be expelled from group therapy and denied parole in the future. He claimed that

Respondent was compelling him to violate his right against self incrimination during the

pendency of this habeas action. The Court denied Petitioner’s motion because the

motion addressed a matter completely unrelated to the issues in the habeas petition. 

Petitioner seeks reconsideration of that ruling.

Finally, on January 21, 2010, Respondent filed his motion to dismiss the habeas

petition. He claims that Petitioner has failed to comply with the statute of limitations.

II. Discussion

A. The Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 established a oneyear period of limitations for habeas petitions filed by state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. §
5

2244(d). The limitation period runs from the latest of

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State

action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

1. Analysis

Petitioner is not relying on a new constitutional right or newly discovered

evidence, and he has not shown that state action created an impediment to filing a

timely habeas petition. Therefore, section 2244(d)(1)(A) is the only applicable

subsection here. “Direct review,” for purposes of subsection 2244(d)(1)(A), concludes

when the availability of direct appeal to the state courts and to the United States

Supreme Court has been exhausted. Jimenez v. Quarterman, __ U. S. __, __, 129 S.

Ct. 681, 685 (2009). “Until that time, the ‘process of direct review’ has not ‘com[e] to an

end’ and ‘a presumption of finality and legality’ cannot yet have ‘attache[d] to the

conviction and sentence.’” Id. at 685-86 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887

(1983)). 

Petitioner was sentenced on December 19, 2000. He had one year from the
6

date of his sentence to file an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of

Appeals. Mich. Ct. Rule 7.205(F)(3). Because he did not seek direct review of his

conviction, his conviction became final on December 19, 2001, one year after he was

sentenced. See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. at 685; see also Wheeler v. Jones,

226 F.3d 656, 659-60 (6th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the petitioner’s conviction became

final when his ability to file a direct appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals expired). 

The one-year statute of limitations began to run on December 20, 2001, and it expired

twelve months later on December 19, 2002. Petitioner filed his habeas petition more

than six and a half years later on July 14, 2009. 

Although the time during which a post-conviction motion is pending in state court

does not count toward any period of limitation, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), Petitioner did not

file a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment until 2007. By then, the one-year

limitation period had run. 

2. Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner maintains in a reply to Respondent’s motion that the State failed to 

send him the trial court’s order denying his motion for relief from judgment and that the

clock stopped running while he was waiting for the motion to be resolved. This

argument overlooks the fact that the statute of limitations expired before Petitioner filed

his motion for relief from judgment. The filing of the motion did not delay the date on

which the judgment became final. Payton v. Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2001). 

Nor did it cause the statute to begin running anew. Searcy v. Carter, 246 F.3d 515, 519

(6th Cir. 2001). The habeas petition therefore is untimely, absent equitable tolling.

Petitioner claims that he was denied a competency hearing, but the record
7

indicates that he received a hearing on September 26, 2000. To the extent that

Petitioner is seeking equitable tolling on the basis of incompetence, his argument lacks

merit because he has not demonstrated that he was ever incompetent. In fact, a

notation on the trial court’s docket indicates that the parties stipulated to a finding of

competence to stand trial. Petitioner pleaded guilty about seven weeks later, and he

has not provided any documentation showing that he was incompetent at his plea or

during the limitations period.

In conclusion, Petitioner has failed to show that he pursued his rights diligently

and “that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way” of filing a timely habeas

petition. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Accordingly, there is no

basis for equitable tolling of the limitations period. The habeas petition is time-barred. 

B. On the Merits

The petition would have to be dismissed even if it were not barred by the statute

of limitations, because Petitioner’s claims lack merit. Claims one and three allege that 

the trial court failed to hold a hearing to determine Petitioner’s competence to stand trial

and ability to plead guilty. As noted, the record indicates that Petitioner was evaluated

for competency and found competent to stand trial at a hearing held on September 26,

2000. 

Claim two alleges that the plea bargain was illusory. First, Petitioner asserts that

his plea was illusory because he pleaded guilty to criminal sexual conduct with “Jane

Doe,” an imaginary person. The victim in this case was identified as “Jane Doe” at the

plea proceeding. However, Petitioner admitted at the plea proceeding that “Jane Doe”

was his daughter. Thus, he did not plead guilty to criminal sexual conduct with an
8

imaginary person, and the plea agreement was not illusory. 

Petitioner alleges that his plea bargain was illusory for a second reason: he

pleaded guilty to the most severe charge and would have been sentenced to concurrent

prison terms even if he had been convicted of all four charges. This claim has no merit

because, in addition to having three counts of criminal sexual conduct dismissed,

Petitioner was promised a minimum sentence of nine years, eight months. Had he

gone to trial and been convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, he could have

been sentenced to life imprisonment. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b(2)(a). Thus,

the plea bargain was not illusory.

Claim four alleges that Petitioner’s right to due process was violated because he

was adjudicated guilty while incompetent. The trial court, however, found Petitioner

competent to stand trial about seven weeks before Petitioner pleaded guilty, and there

is nothing in the plea transcript to indicate that Petitioner was incompetent. He was

forty-one years old at the time, and he communicated effectively with his attorney and

the trial court. He provided a brief factual basis for the plea and stated that everything

had been explained to him. He also assured the trial court two times that it was his free

choice to plead guilty. The Court finds no basis in fact for Petitioner’s challenge to his

competency to plead guilty. 

The fifth and final claim alleges that the Michigan Court of Appeals erred when it

dismissed Petitioner’s application for leave to appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner

claims that the Court of Appeals should not have treated his amended motion for relief

from judgment as a successive motion. This claim lacks merit because “a state court's

interpretation of state law . . . binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus,” Bradshaw
9

v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005), and “[a] federal court may not issue the writ on the

basis of a perceived error of state law.” Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984).

III. Conclusion

Petitioner’s claims lack merit and are barred by the statute of limitations. 

Accordingly, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. #9] is GRANTED, and the habeas

petition [Dkt. #1] is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner’s motion for re-hearing [Dkt. #7] of

the Court’s order denying his motion for injunctive relief is DENIED because the Court is

not persuaded that it was misled by a palpable defect and that correcting the defect will

result in a different disposition. Local Rule 7.1(h)(3) (E.D. Mich. Mar. 1, 2010). 

The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability because reasonable

jurists would not find the Court’s assessment of Petitioner’s claims debatable or wrong.

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Nor would reasonable jurists debate the

Court’s procedural ruling or find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of

the denial of a constitutional right. Id. However, if Petitioner chooses to appeal the

Court’s decision, he may proceed in forma pauperis on appeal without further

authorization from the Court because he was granted in forma pauperis status in this

Court. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3).

S/Victoria A. Roberts 

Victoria A. Roberts

United States District Judge

Dated: June 15, 2010
10

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this

document was served on the attorneys of

record and Bobby Luray Reddell by electronic

means or U.S. Mail on June 15, 2010.

s/Carol A. Pinegar 

Deputy Clerk