UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOSEPH PRACH,

Plaintiff,

v.

HOLLYWOOD SUPERMARKET, INC.,

Defendant.

 /

Case No. 09-13756

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

 At a session of said Court, held in the U.S.

District Courthouse, Eastern District 

of Michigan, on November 5, 2010.

PRESENT: THE HONORABLE PATRICK J. DUGGAN

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Joseph Prach (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on September 22, 2009, alleging that

Hollywood Supermarket, Inc. (“Defendant”) discriminated against him on the basis of

religion, in violation of his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and

Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment on April 30, 2010, and Plaintiff responded on June 2, 2010. The Court heard

oral argument on the matter, and granted Defendant’s Motion in an Opinion and Order

dated August 27, 2010. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, filed

on September 10, 2010, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Eastern

District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(h).
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A motion to alter a judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may

be granted where there is a clear error of law, newly discovered evidence, an intervening

change in controlling law, or to prevent manifest injustice. Gencorp, Inc. v. Am. Int’l

Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999). Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule

7.1(h)(3) provides that a motion for reconsideration should be granted only if the movant

demonstrates that the court and the parties have been misled by a palpable defect and that

correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case. A motion that merely

presents the same issues already ruled upon by the Court shall not be granted. Id.

Plaintiff asserts that the Court misapplied the law in concluding that accommodation

of Plaintiff’s religious beliefs would result in undue hardship. Plaintiff claims that Title

VII requires employers to attempt to reasonably accommodate employees’ religious

beliefs, relying on EEOC v. Arlington Transit Mix, Inc., 957 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1991). 

Arlington, however, did not involve a collective bargaining agreement, leaving the

employer with greater flexibility in scheduling employees’ shifts. Employers are not

required to accommodate where the proposed accommodations violate a collective

bargaining agreement. See Virts v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 285 F.3d 508, 519 (6th

Cir. 2002). Defendant has established that its collective bargaining agreement prevented it

from scheduling Saturdays off for Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that this is speculation, but

the employer need not actually experience the hardship for it to be recognized. Id.

Plaintiff argues that no undue hardship would result because his prior employer,

Farmer Jack, accommodated his religious practices for eight years at the same store. This

assertion is irrelevant, because the reasonableness of an accommodation is generally
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determined on a case-by-case basis according to the facts as they existed at the time of the

plaintiff’s employment. Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1378-80 (6th Cir.

1994). Defendant established that it could not reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s

scheduling request because of the recent firing of another employee, Joe Hollewa. This is

all that Title VII requires.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant could have transferred another employee to his

department, alleviating any scheduling constraints. An employer, however, need not incur

more than a de minimis cost to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs. Virts, 285

F.3d at 516. Adding another employee to Plaintiff’s department would increase

Defendant’s costs considerably, and Title VII imposes no such obligation.

Plaintiff has raised essentially the same arguments he relied upon in opposing

summary judgment, but this Court finds no error in its conclusions.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Beth M. Rivers, Esq.

Kevin M. Carlson, Esq.

Andrew T. Baran, Esq.