DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

v.

ROBERT RUNCIE,

Appellee.

No. 4D2023-1061

[October 2, 2024]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Martin S. Fein, Judge; L.T. Case No. 21-003634CF10A.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, 

Jeffrey P. DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Alison E. Preston, 

Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, for 

appellant.

Michael Dutko and Jeremy J. Kroll of Dutko & Kroll, Fort Lauderdale, 

and Johnny McCray, Jr. of Johnny McCray, P.A., Pompano Beach, for 

appellee.

GERBER, J.

The state appeals from the circuit court’s order dismissing, for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, a statewide grand jury’s perjury indictment 

against a school district superintendent. The state primarily argues that 

the circuit court erred in granting the superintendent’s motion because 

section 905.34, Florida Statutes (2020), empowers a statewide grand jury 

to indict a person for perjury which occurred “in two or more judicial 

circuits as part of a related transaction,” and the indictment here satisfied 

those jurisdictional elements. We agree and therefore reverse.

We present this opinion in four parts:

1. The procedural history, based on the pleadings filed below;

2. The state’s indictment, the superintendent’s motion to dismiss the 

indictment, and the state’s response;

3. The circuit court’s order granting the motion to dismiss; and

4. This appeal.
2 

1. Procedural History 

In response to the mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High 

School, the Governor petitioned the Florida Supreme Court to impanel a 

statewide grand jury. The Governor requested the statewide grand jury be 

impaneled to investigate, among other things, “whether school officials 

committed—and continue to commit—fraud and deceit by mismanaging, 

failing to use, and diverting funds from multi-million dollar bonds 

specifically solicited for school safety initiatives.” In re: Final Rep. of the 

20th Statewide Grand Jury, 343 So. 3d 584, 587-88 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). 

The Florida Supreme Court granted the petition and authorized a 

statewide grand jury to “‘investigate crime, return indictments, make 

presentments, and otherwise perform all functions of [a] grand jury’ related 

to the issues identified in the Governor’s petition.” Id. at 588 (emphasis 

and footnote omitted); Ord. Granting Petition for Statewide Grand Jury, In 

re: Statewide Grand Jury #20, No. 19-0240 (Fla. Feb. 25, 2019). The 

statewide grand jury was empowered with “jurisdiction throughout the 

State of Florida” and was to be drawn from “the Eleventh, Fifteenth, and 

Seventeenth Judicial Circuits.” Ord., In re Statewide Grand Jury #20, No. 

19-0240. 

At all times relevant to the statewide grand jury’s investigation, the 

defendant was the superintendent of the Broward County Public Schools 

(“the school district”). During the superintendent’s tenure, the school 

district established a program to issue up to $800 million in general

obligation bonds to fund various school projects benefitting safety, music 

and arts, athletics, renovations, and technology (the “SMART program”). 

In January 2021, the statewide grand jury indicted the school district’s 

chief information officer (“the CIO”) for alleged bid tampering. Specifically, 

the CIO was alleged to have unlawfully diverted SMART program funds—

through the use of a sole-source contract referred to as a “piggyback 

contract”—to circumvent a legally-required competitive bid process. 

The superintendent was scheduled to testify before the statewide grand 

jury on March 31 and April 1, 2021. The day before the superintendent’s 

testimony, a witness notified Florida Department of Law Enforcement 

(“FDLE”) agents that the superintendent had called the witness on the 

previous night, seeking the witness’s help in understanding the school 

district’s use of piggyback contracts. The witness claimed the following 

had occurred during that call. The witness explained to the 

superintendent why the district used piggyback contracts, how such 
3 

contracts are used correctly, and what cannot be done. The witness also 

explained to the superintendent why the CIO’s actions were improper. The 

witness further gave the superintendent the names of three companies for 

which the school district had used piggyback contracts. 

The witness also informed the FDLE agents that after receiving the 

superintendent’s call, the witness had received a call from the school 

district’s general counsel, who said she was helping the superintendent’s 

attorney prepare the superintendent for his testimony to the statewide 

grand jury. The witness told the general counsel that the witness already 

had spoken to the superintendent, and then provided the general counsel 

with the same information which the witness had provided to the 

superintendent. 

On April 1, 2021, the superintendent testified from the Broward County 

Courthouse before the statewide grand jury. Because of the COVID-19 

pandemic, the statewide grand jurors had convened virtually from the 

respective three circuits from which each juror had been drawn. 

When an assistant statewide prosecutor asked the superintendent 

about the contract upon which the statewide grand jury had indicted the 

CIO, the superintendent initially testified he “wasn’t aware of the contracts 

or the [related] process.” But when the prosecutor asked a contracting 

process question, the superintendent brought up piggyback contracts. 

When the prosecutor asked why the district used piggyback contracts, the 

superintendent spoke to such contracts’ advantages and identified two of 

the three companies whose names he allegedly had obtained from the 

witness two days before. When the prosecutor asked when the 

superintendent had discussed one of the companies, the superintendent 

testified, “quite some time ago, maybe even longer” than three or four 

years. When the prosecutor asked the superintendent whether he had 

spoken with anyone to prepare for his testimony related to the CIO’s 

situation or contracting issues, the superintendent testified “no.” 

On the evening after the superintendent’s testimony had concluded, an 

FDLE agent confirmed again with the witness that, during the calls which 

the witness had received a few days earlier from the superintendent and 

the general counsel, the witness had provided the company names to 

which the superintendent had referred during his testimony. The witness 

then provided corroborating phone screenshots reflecting the incoming 

calls which the witness had received from both the superintendent and the

general counsel. 
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2. The State’s Indictment, the Superintendent’s Motion to Dismiss 

the Indictment, and the State’s Response 

On April 16, 2021—fifteen days after the superintendent’s testimony

had concluded—the statewide grand jury issued a one count indictment 

against the superintendent for perjury in an official proceeding—that 

proceeding being his testimony before the statewide grand jury. The 

indictment pertinently alleged: 

The GRAND JURORS of the ... Statewide Grand Jury for 

the State of Florida ... present and charge that beginning on 

or about March 31, 2021[,] and continuing to on or about 

April 1, 2021, in the Eleventh, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth 

Judicial Circuits of Florida to wit: Miami Dade, Palm Beach, 

and Broward Counties, [the superintendent], while testifying 

under oath in an official proceeding, to wit: the ... Statewide 

Grand Jury ... did make a false statement which [the 

superintendent] did not believe to be true, in regard to a 

material matter, in violation of Section[] 837.02(1) of the 

Florida Statutes. 

AND ALL SAID OFFENSES OCCURRED IN TWO OR MORE 

JUDICIAL CIRCUITS IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA AS PART OF 

A RELATED TRANSACTION .... 

(emphases added). 

The superintendent filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The 

superintendent primarily argued that the indictment did not satisfy 

section 905.34, Florida Statutes (2020)—the statute governing a statewide 

grand jury’s jurisdiction. Section 905.34 pertinently provides: 

The jurisdiction of a statewide grand jury impaneled under 

this chapter shall extend throughout the state. The subject 

matter jurisdiction of the statewide grand jury shall be limited 

to [certain enumerated] offenses ... [including]: ... perjury ... 

or any attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit any 

violation of the crimes specifically enumerated above, when 

any such offense is occurring, or has occurred, in two or more 

judicial circuits as part of a related transaction or when any 

such offense is connected with an organized criminal 

conspiracy affecting two or more judicial circuits. The 

statewide grand jury may return indictments and 

presentments irrespective of the county or judicial circuit 
5 

where the offense is committed or triable. If an indictment is 

returned, it shall be certified and transferred for trial to the 

county where the offense was committed. The powers and 

duties of, and law applicable to, county grand juries shall 

apply to a statewide grand jury except when such powers, 

duties, and law are inconsistent with the provisions of 

ss. 905.31-905.40.

 

§ 905.34, Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphases added). 

According to the superintendent’s motion, his allegedly perjurious 

testimony, “occurred [in] and affected only Broward County, a single 

judicial circuit.” 

The state filed a response to the motion to dismiss. The state’s response 

pertinently argued: 

The Statewide Grand Jury was given “jurisdiction 

throughout the State of Florida” (all twenty Circuits). Lying to 

that body occurred in the context of its investigative efforts 

“throughout the State of Florida.” The Statewide Grand Jury 

was drawn from three separate Circuits. ... [W]hen [the 

superintendent] lied to the Statewide Grand Jurors, although 

he may have been physically located in Broward County, [the 

Statewide Grand Jurors] were not—the Court had convened 

the session virtually, and the jurors attended from their home 

sites (in three Circuits) in secured fashion. 

(emphases added; internal footnote omitted). 

3. The Circuit Court’s Order Granting the Motion to Dismiss 

After a hearing, the circuit court entered an order granting the 

superintendent’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The order pertinently 

provides: 

The [superintendent] moves to dismiss the indictment ... 

and takes the position that the Statewide Grand Jury lacks 

the authority and subject matter jurisdiction to indict the 

[superintendent] based on alleged conduct that occurred in a 

single judicial circuit. The [superintendent] argues this 

position is supported by [section] 905.34[, Florida Statutes 

(2020),] as well as McNamara v[.] State, 357 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 

1978). In McNamara[,] the Florida Supreme Court stated[:] 
6

“absent allegations of multi-county activity on the face of the 

indictment[,] the Statewide Grand Jury was without authority 

to properly indict” the [d]efendant. Id. at 414.

...

The indictment in the present case states in pertinent 

part[:]

[The superintendent] ... while testifying under oath 

in an official proceeding, to wit: the ... Statewide Grand 

Jury, did make a false statement which [the 

superintendent] did not believe to be true, in regard to 

a material matter in violation of [section] 837.02(1)[, 

Florida Statutes (2020),] AND ALL SAID OFFENSES 

OCCURRED IN TWO OR MORE JUDICIAL CIRCUITS IN 

THE STATE OF FLORIDA AS PART OF A RELATED 

TRANSACTION ....

[Section] 905.34 creates the authority and subject matter 

jurisdiction of the Statewide Grand Jury and expressly states 

“[t]he subject matter jurisdiction of the Statewide Grand Jury 

shall be limited” to the offenses listed in the statute “when any 

such offense is occurring[, or] has occurred[,] in two or more 

judicial circuits as part of a related transaction or when any 

such offense is connected with an organized criminal 

conspiracy affecting two or more judicial circuits.”

State v[.] Ostergard, 343 So. 2d 874[, 877] (Fla. 3d DCA 

1977) ... stated “... it [is] necessary that proper jurisdictional 

allegations be made on the face of [an] indictment.” ... 

Ostergard ... went on to hold that “absent the proper 

jurisdictional allegations on the face of the indictment[]” that 

“dismissal was proper.” Id. ...

This Court finds nothing on the face of the indictment in 

the present case that charges the [superintendent] with any 

crime listed in [section] 905.34[,] that occurred in two or more 

judicial circuits as part of a related transaction or any crime 

that is connected with an organized criminal conspiracy 

affecting two or more judicial circuits. ...
7 

In McNamara[,] the Florida Supreme Court[, quoting Judge 

Barkdull’s specially concurring opinion in Ostergard,] stated 

in pertinent part[:] 

“The Statewide Grand Jury, as created by the 

Legislature, was created solely according to the very 

wording of the statutes themselves to investigate multicounty crimes and nothing more. ... It has no more 

right to indict for a crime committed in a single county 

than a Grand Jury for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in 

and for Dade County would have the right to indict for 

a crime committed in ... Broward [County]. The 

Legislature might have given the Statewide Grand Jury 

such power but it did not.” [357 So. 2d at 413] 

(emphasis added). 

Pursuant to [section] 905.34[,] ... McNamara[,] and 

Ostergard[,] if a Statewide Grand Jury finds evidence of a local 

crime it must forward that evidence to the Grand Jury or State 

Attorney for that judicial circuit as those are the only 

authorities with jurisdiction to prosecute said local crime. 

.... 

Therefore, ... it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the 

[superintendent’s] ... motion to dismiss [the] indictment [for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction] is GRANTED. 

4. This Appeal 

This appeal followed. The state primarily argues that the circuit court 

erred in granting the superintendent’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, because section 905.34, Florida Statutes (2020), 

empowers a statewide grand jury to indict a person for perjury which 

occurred “in two or more judicial circuits as part of a related transaction,” 

and the indictment here satisfies those jurisdictional elements. 

The superintendent pertinently responds: “[Section] 905.34[, Florida 

Statutes (2020),] establishes clear limitations on the subject matter 

jurisdiction of a statewide grand jury to offenses that are occurring, or 

have occurred, in two or more judicial circuits as part of a related 

transaction. The indictment charged [the superintendent] with perjury 

based upon testimony that occurred exclusively in one judicial circuit[, 
8 

that is, Broward County]. The [statewide] grand jury thus lacked authority 

to indict [the superintendent] for that offense.” 

Applying de novo review, we agree with the state’s argument. See 

Ehrlick v. State, 898 So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (“We conduct a 

de novo review of orders on motions to dismiss when they concern a 

question of law.”); Morel v. State, 138 So. 3d 1122, 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2014) (“We review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.”). 

As we explained in Final Report of the 20th Statewide Grand Jury: 

A statewide grand jury’s subject matter jurisdiction is 

limited by statute to certain enumerated offenses, to the 

extent the offense at issue “is occurring, or has occurred, in 

two or more judicial circuits as part of a related transaction” 

or “is connected with an organized criminal conspiracy 

affecting two or more judicial circuits.” § 905.34, Fla. Stat. 

(2018). A statewide grand jury lacks the authority to return 

an indictment for an offense beyond the scope of its 

jurisdiction. McNamara v. State, 357 So. 2d 410, 413–14 (Fla. 

1978). 

343 So. 3d at 588. 

Here, we conclude the “enumerated offense” at issue—the alleged 

perjury—“occurred, in two or more judicial circuits as part of a related 

transaction.” § 905.34, Fla. Stat. (2020). “Perjury” occurs when a person 

“makes a false statement, which he or she does not believe to be true, 

under oath in an official proceeding in regard to any material matter.” § 

837.02(1), Fla. Stat. (2020). In the instant case, the “official proceeding” 

was the statewide grand jury proceeding on March 31 and April 1, 2021. 

During that proceeding, while the superintendent was physically located 

in only the Seventeenth Circuit, he was testifying to the statewide grand 

jury, whose members were located in three different circuits—the Fifteenth, 

Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Circuits—during the remote proceedings. 

Thus, the “related transaction”—the communication of the alleged 

perjurious testimony to the statewide grand jurors—occurred 

simultaneously in all three circuits when the superintendent allegedly 

“ma[de] a false statement, which he ... [did] not believe to be true, under 

oath in [that] official proceeding” generally regarding whether he had 

spoken with anyone to prepare for his testimony related to the CIO’s 

situation or contracting issues. As the state appropriately argues: 
9 

In urging affirmance, [the superintendent] fixates on where 

his act of speaking falsely occurred: in Broward County. On 

his view, the Statewide Grand Jury could bring this charge 

only if he physically committed his crime in two or more 

circuits. But [the superintendent] ignores the nature of a 

perjury offense, which involves speaking falsehoods to an 

audience—and here that audience was drawn from and 

present in different circuits from [the superintendent] himself. 

(underlining added; internal citations omitted). 

 

The superintendent’s response that, but for the COVID-19 pandemic, 

the statewide grand jurors all would have been physically present with him 

in the Broward County Courthouse, is unavailing. While this virtuallyconvened proceeding may have been an atypical event, the fact of the 

matter is the statewide grand jurors were not physically present with the 

superintendent in the Broward County Courthouse in this instance. The 

statewide grand jurors had convened virtually from the respective three 

circuits from which each juror had been drawn, meaning that each alleged 

false communication from the superintendent to the statewide grand 

jurors occurred simultaneously in all three circuits. 

The superintendent’s response also is countered by the mere existence 

of “perjury” as one of the enumerated offenses referenced in section 

905.34. The Legislature, by including “perjury” as one of the enumerated 

offenses referenced in section 905.34, necessarily recognized “perjury” can 

occur “in two or more judicial circuits as part of a related transaction,” 

and not just in the single circuit where the speaker “makes a false 

statement, which he or she does not believe to be true, under oath in an 

official proceeding in regard to any material matter.” §§ 905.34 & 

837.02(1), Fla. Stat. (2020). The instant case presents one such factual 

scenario where “perjury” can occur “in two or more judicial circuits as part 

of a related transaction.” While other factual scenarios may exist where 

“perjury” can occur “in two or more judicial circuits as part of a related 

transaction,” our review is limited to the instant case’s facts. 

Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the circuit court’s order dismissing, 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the statewide grand jury’s perjury 

indictment against the superintendent. We remand for the circuit court 

to commence further proceedings on the indictment. Nothing in this 

opinion should be construed as commenting on the indictment’s merits. 
10

We note the state’s alternative arguments for reversal—that the 

superintendent’s alleged phone call to the witness, who was located in 

Miami-Dade County, further supported section 905.34 jurisdiction, or that 

the statewide grand jury somehow possessed non-textual “inherent 

authority” to seek to punish perjury committed in the statewide grand 

jury’s presence—lack merit without further discussion.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

KLINGENSMITH, C.J., and LEVINE, J., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.