* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P.

34(a)(2). 

# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 25, 2009 *

Decided March 27, 2009

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 08

‐ 3274

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

‐ Appellee,

v.

FLOYD L. SUGGS,

Defendant

‐ Appellant. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 01 CR 206

Matthew F. Kennelly,

Judge

.

O R D E R

Floyd Suggs was convicted after a jury trial in 2001 of possession of a firearm by a

felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Because he already had three prior convictions for a violent

felony, the district court sentenced Suggs as an armed career criminal to 188 months’

imprisonment, the low end of the guidelines range. See id. § 924(e); U.S.S.G. § 4D1.4. In

April 2008 Suggs moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for a sentence reduction based on NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 08

‐ 3274 Page 2

Amendment 709 to the guidelines; that amendment now instructs sentencing courts, when

computing a defendant’s criminal history score, to treat as a single sentence all prior

sentences that were imposed on the same day, unless the underlying crimes were separated

by an intervening arrest. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2), Supp. to App. C 235 (2008)

(Amendment 709); United States v. Alexander

, 553 F.3d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 2009). Suggs had

been sentenced on the same day for two separate robberies committed several months

apart, and, because these sentences were used to calculate his criminal history score, Suggs

asserted that Amendment 709 entitled him to a sentence reduction. The district court

denied the motion, reasoning that it lacked authority to modify Suggs’s sentence because

Amendment 709 is not retroactive.

We review this decision only for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Young

, 555

F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Carter

, 500 F.3d 486, 490 (6th Cir. 2007). Section

3582(c)(2) permits a district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if his guidelines range

has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission and a reduction would be

consistent with the Commission’s policy statements. See United States v. Forman

, 553 F.3d

585, 588 (7th Cir. 2009). The applicable policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(A),

provides that a district court may modify a sentence only if one of a list of enumerated

retroactive amendments applies to the defendant. See Alexander

, 553 F.3d at 593.

Amendment 709 is not on that list. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c). And, in any event, even if

Amendment 709 applied retroactively, it would have no effect on Suggs’s guidelines range

because he was already assigned the minimum criminal history category for an armed

career criminal. See id. § 4B1.4(c).

Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that it lacked authority to reduce

Suggs’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.