[Cite as State v. Whites Landing Fisheries, L.L.C., 2017-Ohio-4021.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 ERIE COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. E-16-065 

 

 Appellant Trial Court No. CRB 1500352ABC 

v. 

Whites Landing Fisheries, LLC DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellee Decided: May 26, 2017 

* * * * * 

 Mike DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, Robert W. Cheugh, II, and 

 Kenneth H. Egbert., Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant. 

 William H. Smith, Jr. and Samuel A.J. Sidoti, for appellee. 

* * * * * 

MAYLE, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals the September 26, 2016 

judgment of the Huron Municipal Court, granting the motion to dismiss of defendant-
2. 

appellee, Whites Landing Fisheries, Inc. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial 

court judgment. 

I. Background 

{¶ 2} Whites Landing Fisheries (“WLF”) is a company engaged in the commercial 

fishing industry and licensed by the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (“ODNR”). 

On November 10, 2015, WLF was charged with three separate counts of harvesting Lake 

Erie yellow perch in excess of the established quota, a violation of R.C. 1533.341 and 

Ohio Adm. Code 1501:31-3-12. Because WLF had two prior convictions, it faced 

permanent revocation of its commercial fishing license if convicted of any of the three 

charges. 

{¶ 3} Quotas for the harvesting of Lake Erie yellow perch are determined annually 

by pound and are allocated by statistical districts called “management units.” R.C. 

1533.341; Ohio Adm.Code 1501:31-3-12(A). Lake Erie yellow perch “management 

units” are defined by Ohio Adm. Code 1501:31-1-02(MMM) as “the geographic area 

within the lake Erie fishing district by which yellow perch quotas are allocated. * * *.” 

The Ohio regulations define three Lake Erie yellow perch management units. 

{¶ 4} In a letter dated April 14, 2015, ODNR notified WLF that “there will be no 

[commercial] allocation [of yellow perch] in Management Unit 1 (MU1), 1.311 million 

lbs in Management Unit 2 (MU2), and 266,030 lbs in Management Unit 3 (MU3).” In 

other words, the 2015 yellow perch quota for management unit one was zero. The state 

claims that WLF harvested yellow perch from management unit one. Two of the counts 
3. 

against WLF alleged that it harvested 100 pounds of yellow perch, and one alleged that it 

harvested 200 pounds. 

{¶ 5} At issue here are the definitions of “management unit one” and 

“management unit two.” Those units are defined by Ohio Adm. Code 1501:31-1-

02(MMM) as follows: 

(1) Unit 1 

(a) Lake Erie yellow perch management unit one shall consist of all 

waters in Lucas, Ottawa and Erie counties between east and west 

boundaries as defined: 

(i) The west boundary is the Michigan-Ohio state line beginning in 

Maumee bay and extending northeast to the United States-Canada 

international line in Lake Erie including all waters in Lucas and Ottawa 

counties. 

(ii) The east boundary begins at the Huron pier lighthouse, extends 

along an imaginary line running northeast to the eighty-two degree, thirty 

minute meridian and thenceforth along the meridian north to the United 

States-Canada international line. 

(2) Unit 2 

(a) Lake Erie yellow perch management unit two shall consist of all 

waters in Lorain and Cuyahoga counties between west and east boundaries 

as defined: 
4. 

(i) The west boundary shall begin in the Huron river, including all 

boat ramps or marinas connected to the Huron river, then extending from 

the Huron pier lighthouse along an imaginary line northeast to the eightytwo degree, thirty minute meridian and thenceforth along that meridian 

north to the United States-Canada international line. 

(ii) The east boundary begins at the Fairport harbor light, extends 

north along the eighty-one degree, twenty minute meridian to the United 

States-Canada international line. (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 6} WLF argues—and the trial court agreed—that Ohio Adm. Code 1501:31-1-

02(MMM)(1)(a)(ii) and (MMM)(2)(a)(i), defining the east boundary of management unit 

one and the west boundary of management unit two, are ambiguous in their use of the 

word “northeast.” WLF’s argument and the trial court’s conclusion are premised on the 

fact that https://www.merriam-webster.com/ provides more than one definition for 

“northeast”: (a) “the general direction between north and east,” and (b) “the point 

midway between the north and east compass points.” The state insisted that “northeast” 

refers to a compass point of 45 degrees, but the court concluded that “northeast” could 

refer to any point beyond zero degrees but before 90 degrees. It held, therefore, that 

“management unit one,” is unconstitutionally vague, thereby rendering R.C. 1533.341 

and Ohio Adm. Code 1501:31-3-12 “void as they are applied to the violations against” 

WLF. 
5. 

{¶ 7} It is from this judgment that the state appealed. It assigns the following 

errors for our review: 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 1 

OHIO ADM.CODE 1501:31-1-02(MMM) IS NOT VAGUE 

MERELY BECAUSE THE RULE DOES NOT DEFINE THE WORD 

“NORTHEAST” AS PART OF THE EAST BOUNDARY OF LAKE 

ERIE YELLOW PERCH MANAGEMENT UNIT 1 AND TWO 

DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS OF THE WORD EXIST. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 2 

THE WORD “NORTHEAST’ IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 

VAGUE AS USED IN OHIO ADM.CODE 1501:31-1-02(MMM) 

BECAUSE IT SHOULD BE READ IN THE CONTEXT OF A DEFINED 

COMPASS DIRECTION IN COMMERCIAL FISHING AND 

CONSTRUED ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF GRAMMER [sic] 

AND COMMON USAGE AS THE MIDWAY POINT OF 45 DEGREES 

BETWEEN THE NORTH AND EAST COMPASS POINTS. 

II. Law and Analysis 

{¶ 8} In its first assignment of error, the state argues that the trial court failed to 

apply the common, everyday meaning of the word “northeast.” It argues that “northeast” 

is a specific direction or point on a compass of 45 degrees, precisely between the 

directions of north and east. It points to the testimony of Dr. Christopher Vandergoot, a 
6. 

biologist with ODNR’s Sandusky Fishery Research Office, who characterized this as 

standard knowledge. It maintains that a word is not per se unclear or unconstitutionally 

vague merely because the dictionary provides two definitions for it or because it is not 

defined in a statute, and it urges that the meaning here must be ascertained in the context 

in which it appears—i.e., commercial fishing regulations. 

{¶ 9} Similar to its first assignment, the state argues in its second assignment of 

error that “northeast,” as commonly used and understood in nautical navigation, is a 

specific ordinal direction on a compass found at a point equally between the cardinal 

directions of north and east. While the trial court suggested that the management units 

should have been more specifically defined in a way similar to a metes and bounds 

description for real estate, the state urges that this is impractical and that an ordinary 

person would understand that in the context of commercial fishing regulations, 

“northeast” means a 45-degree angle on a compass. It emphasizes that the regulation did 

not define the boundaries for the management unit by describing it as “in a northeasterly 

direction,” thus to interpret it as anything other than at 45 degrees would change the 

clear, unambiguous meaning of the words used. 

{¶ 10} The state also insists that WLF was on notice of the zero quota for 

management unit one because it was specifically advised of it in a letter sent by ODNR 

and received by WLF via certified mail. And it points out that the violations did not 

occur at or near the angular boundary line—they occurred further north. Thus, it 
7. 

maintains, under the facts of this case, it was clear that the fish were harvested from 

management unit one. 

{¶ 11} As to both of the state’s assignments of error, WLF responds simply that 

“there is no defined compass direction as ‘Northeast,’ particularly along an imaginary 

line.” It maintains that “northeast” may be anywhere between zero and 90 degrees. And 

it insists that Dr. Vandergoot himself admitted that no bearing is defined and that 

“someone else would find it a vague [sic] because it doesn’t give a specific bearing.” 

A. The void-for-vagueness doctrine. 

{¶ 12} “Under the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments 

to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution, any 

statute which fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his 

contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute is void for vagueness.” (Internal 

citations omitted.) State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 472 N.E.2d 689 (1984), quoting 

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 838, 31 L.E.2d 110 

(1972). Indeed, a statute or regulation must meet three requirements to survive a 

challenge under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Viviano v. Sandusky, 2013-Ohio-2813, 

991 N.E.2d 1263, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.), citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-

109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). “It must (1) provide fair warning to the 

ordinary citizen of what conduct is proscribed, (2) preclude arbitrary, capricious, and 

discriminatory enforcement, and (3) not impinge upon constitutionally protected rights.” 

 
8. 

Id. The crime and its elements must be expressed clearly enough for an ordinary person 

to choose, in advance, what course he may lawfully pursue. (Citations omitted.) Tanner 

at 6. 

{¶ 13} Despite these well-recognized principles, a statute need not avoid all 

vagueness and is not necessarily void for vagueness merely because it could have been 

worded more precisely. State v. Stallings, 150 Ohio App.3d 5, 2002-Ohio-5942, 778 

N.E.2d 1110, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.); State v. Dorso, 4 Ohio St.3d 60, 61-62, 446 N.E.2d 449 

(1983). In fact, both the Ohio and U.S. Supreme Courts have recognized that “[m]any 

statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for in most English words and phrases there 

lurk uncertainties.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Dorso at 62, quoting 

Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49-50, 96 S.Ct. 243, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975). Accordingly, 

“[a] statute will not be found void for vagueness if any ‘reasonable and practical 

construction’ can be given to its language.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Sommerfield, 3d 

Dist. Union No. 14-05-23, 2006-Ohio-1420, ¶ 16. 

{¶ 14} Nor is a statute necessarily void for vagueness because it fails to define a 

term or phrase. To the contrary, “[a] legislative body need not define every word it uses 

in an enactment.” Dorso at 62. Undefined terms must simply be accorded their 

common, everyday meaning. Id. This principle is codified in R.C. 1.42, which provides 

that “[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of 

grammar and common usage. Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or 
9. 

particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed 

accordingly.” 

B. Standard of review. 

{¶ 15} The constitutionality of a statute or regulation is a question of law to be 

reviewed de novo. Thorp v. Strigari, 155 Ohio App.3d 245, 2003-Ohio-5954, 800 

N.E.2d 392, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.). “All legislative enactments enjoy a presumption of 

constitutionality.” Dorso at 61. In determining whether a statute or regulation is 

constitutional, therefore, we must apply all presumptions and pertinent rules of 

construction and indulge every reasonable interpretation in favor of its constitutionality. 

Id. at 60. 

{¶ 16} One who challenges the constitutionality of a statute on its face must show 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional; one who challenges the 

constitutionality of a statute as applied must do so by clear and convincing evidence. 

State ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 111 Ohio St.3d 568, 

2006-Ohio-5512, 857 N.E.2d 1148, ¶ 34. The Ohio Supreme Court explained in Harrold 

v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 37-38: 

A party may challenge a statute as unconstitutional on its face or as 

applied to a particular set of facts. Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co.

(1944), 143 Ohio St. 329, 28 Ohio Op. 295, 55 N.E.2d 629, paragraph four 

of the syllabus. A facial challenge to a statute is the most difficult to 

bring successfully because the challenger must establish that there exists no 
10. 

set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid. United States 

v. Salerno (1987), 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697. 

The fact that a statute might operate unconstitutionally under some 

plausible set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid. Id. 

Further, where statutes are challenged on the ground that they are 

unconstitutional as applied to a particular set of facts, the party making the 

challenge bears the burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence of a 

presently existing set of facts that make the statutes unconstitutional and 

void when applied to those facts. Belden, 143 Ohio St. 329, 28 Ohio Op. 

295, 55 N.E.2d 629, at paragraph six of the syllabus. 

These principles apply equally to administrative regulations. Ohio Apt. Ass’n v. Levin, 

127 Ohio St.3d 76, 2010-Ohio-4414, 936 N.E.2d 919, ¶ 56. 

C. “Northeast” in the context of these regulations is not vague. 

{¶ 17} In essence, the state claims in its first assignment of error that “northeast” 

is not vague merely because there exist multiple dictionary definitions for the term. And 

it claims in its second assignment of error that in ascertaining the meaning of the word, it 

is appropriate to consider the context in which the term is used. There is much overlap in 

the state’s arguments in support of these assignments, therefore we address them 

together. 

{¶ 18} The state argues that considering the dictionary definitions and the context 

in which the term is used—i.e., commercial fishing regulations—“northeast” is not 
11. 

vague. It insists that for purposes of nautical navigation, “northeast” directs one to 

proceed at a 45-degree angle. It maintains that the trial court and WLF’s interpretation 

requires one to construe “northeast” to mean “in a northeasterly direction,” and it claims 

that to do this would change the clear, unambiguous meaning of the word. 

{¶ 19} Certainly, the fact that a word is undefined and the dictionary supplies 

more than one definition does not automatically render a regulation void. It is also true 

that the context in which a word is used must be considered in determining its meaning. 

In Dorso, 4 Ohio St.3d at 61-62, 446 N.E.2d 449, for instance, the Ohio Supreme Court 

declined to find an ordinance vague despite the fact that it contained a term that was 

undefined in the statute and had more than one dictionary definition. 

{¶ 20} In Dorso, the defendant was convicted of violating an ordinance that 

prohibited playing music or amplifying sound “in such manner as to disturb the peace and 

quiet of the neighborhood, having due regard for the proximity of places of residence, 

hospitals, or other residential institutions and to any other conditions affected by such 

noises.” Id. at 60. The defendant argued, among other things, that “neighborhood” was 

ambiguous and undefined. The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed. It examined the 

dictionary definitions; specifically, it recognized that Webster’s Third New International 

Dictionary defined “neighborhood” to mean “the quality or state of being immediately 

adjacent or relatively near to something,” and Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 

defined it to denote “a place or region near” and “the people living near one another.” Id. 

at 62. Considering these definitions and the context in which the word was used in the 
12. 

ordinance, the court found that the meaning of “neighborhood” was within the ken of an 

ordinary person and that no further specificity was required. Id. 

{¶ 21} Dorso involved a generally-applicable municipal ordinance. Here, the 

provisions at issue are directed at commercial fishermen. See R.C. 1533.341 (“No person 

who holds a commercial fishing license * * * and who uses trap nets shall harvest a 

quantity of yellow perch that is in excess of the amount of yellow perch that is allocated 

for the person’s commercial fishing license in accordance with the quota set pursuant to 

this section.”) (Emphasis added.) R.C. 1.42 explains that where a word or phrase has 

acquired “a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or 

otherwise,” that word or phrase shall be construed accordingly. Moreover, Ohio case law 

recognizes that “[w]here a statute regulates a specialized industry utilizing terms which 

have acquired a technical meaning in the industry, the words of the statute require a 

technical interpretation considered in the light of the statutory purpose.” State v. Rentex, 

Inc., 51 Ohio App.2d 57, 365 N.E.2d 1274 (8th Dist.1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶ 22} The state contends that “[t]he word ‘northeast,’ as commonly understood 

and used in nautical navigation, is a specific ordinal direction on a compass found at a 

point equally between the cardinal directions of north and east.” It explains that “[t]his 

ordinal direction of ‘northeast,’ which is at 45 degrees * * * is also commonly known as 

an intercardinal direction.” 

{¶ 23} The court conducted a hearing on a number of pretrial motions on August 

26, 2016, at which the state offered testimony from Dr. Vandergoot. At the hearing, 
13. 

WLF’s counsel cross-examined Dr. Vandergoot about the boundaries separating 

management unit one from management unit two. WLF claims that Dr. Vandergoot 

established that “northeast” is vague. It quotes Dr. Vandergoot’s testimony in its brief: 

Q: Is there a bearing to get to the longitude line of 82:30. 

A: No 

Q: There’s no bearing. So it’s an imaginary or speculation as to 

how you get there from the Huron County lighthouse; is that correct. 

A: One could infer that. 

* * * 

Q: One could infer that. So it doesn’t specifically define the unit 1 

and where it ends and where unit 2 begins; is that correct. 

A: Not in that language. 

Q: And that’s the language of the Ohio Revised Code and the Ohio 

Administrative Code? 

A: Correct. 

{¶ 24} But Dr. Vandergoot immediately retreated from this position as the 

questioning continued. He testified: 

Q: (Inaudible.) So based on the language and the chart you cannot 

affirmatively explain to this court the boundaries of unit MU-1 and MU-2. 

Is it MM-1 and MM-2. 
14. 

A: Well, actually it says it extends—well, actually, you would be 

able to infer that. I take that back. 

Q: Can you go infer, can you specifically tell the court where MU-1 

ends and MU-2 starts? 

A: Oh, yes, actually you would be able to. So if it says here if you 

went to—I apologize after reading this. 

Q: You read it, yes. 

A: If you go from the Huron Pier lighthouse it extends along an 

imaginary line running northeast to the 82:30, 82 degrees, 30 minute 

meridian. So if you were standing on the lighthouse and you had a 

compass and it went 45 degrees, because that would be northeast, you be 

able [sic] to determine where a (inaudible). 

Q: Where does it say the degree or the heading? 

A: It says right here, along the imaginary line running northeast. 

Q: Okay. Northeast, is that defined anyplace as being 45 degrees? 

A: That’s standard knowledge. 

Q: Isn’t a compass starting at 0 and going to 90 and anywhere in 

between those would be north, northeast or northwest. That would be the 

northeast? 

A: No, because if you give directions saying I went northeast 

bearing, it’s 45 degrees. 
15. 

{¶ 25} The state, through Dr. Vandergoot, offered a reasonable interpretation of 

“northeast” as the term is used in the context of navigating waters. Other than to simply 

deny that the state offered a correct interpretation, WLF presented no evidence 

challenging the state’s position. While it is true that Dr. Vandergoot initially agreed that 

Ohio Adm. Code 1501:31-1-02(MMM) does not provide a specific bearing to get to the 

eighty-two degree, thirty minute meridian, upon re-reading the definition for 

“management unit,” he realized that it provided a bearing of 45 degrees insofar as it 

described the direction as “northeast.” 

{¶ 26} WLF had the burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is 

unconstitutional. It failed to do so. Because WLF failed to meet its burden, we find the 

state’s two assignments of error well-taken, and we reverse the judgment of the trial 

court.

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 27} We conclude that the state offered a reasonable interpretation of 

“northeast” as the term is used in the context of commercial fishing regulations, thus 

WLF failed to satisfy its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Ohio Adm. 

Code 1501:31-1-02(MMM) is unconstitutional. We find the state’s two assignments of 

error well-taken and reverse the September 26, 2016 judgment of the Huron Municipal 

Court. We remand this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this 

decision. WLF is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal under App.R. 24. 

Judgment reversed. 
16. 

E-16-065 

State of Ohio v. Whites 

Landing Fisheries, Inc. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Arlene Singer, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. 

_______________________________ 

Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE