### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT A pril 1 3, 2005 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK

Honora ble Adalbe rto J ordan, United States J udg e for the Southern District of F lorida, * sitti ngby desig nation. [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1130 2

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 02-01851 CV -O DE -1 JAC QUELINE SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellee, ve rs us MARK F . T AY LO R, in his o fficial c apacity

as Lieutenant G overnor of Ge orgia, STAN WATSON, in h is o ff ic ia l c ap ac ity

a s C ha ir pe rs on o f the De Ka lb Count y

House D elegation and a m em ber of th e Geo rg iaHou se of R ep res en ta ti ve s, etal., D ef en dants -Appe llants ,

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (Apr il 13, 200 5) Before AN DE RSO N and W IL SO N, Circuit Judges, and JORD AN , D istrict Judg e. *2

AN DE RSO N, Circuit Judge: This appeal ra ises the questio n of whether indiv idual state legislato rs are en tit le d to absol ute le gis la tiv e im m uni ty f ro m of fi ci al c ap ac ity

sui ts f or pr ospe ct ive re lie f. T he dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e state le gis la tor de fe ndants ’ m oti on f

or j udgm en t onthe ple ad ing s, hol din g th at le gis la tiv e im

m uni ty doe s no t a

ppl y to suc h su its . B ec au se the state le gis la tor s are e nti tle d to absol ute le gis la tiv e im m uni ty , w e re ve rs e an d r em an d w ithins tr uc tio ns tha t the y

be dis m iss ed . I. BACKGROUND Appe lle e Ja cque lin e Sc ott , aw hit e D em oc rat, is a fo rm er D eK al b C ounty Co m m iss ion er . S he se rv ed

a s th e re pr es en ta tiv e of

the c ounty ’ s th ir d di str ic t f ro m 1991 -2002. In 2002, the Ge orgia Ge neral A ssem bly passed “ Ac t 401,” w hich ad opt ed ane wdis tr ic t m ap f

or the D eK al b C ounty

Co m m iss ion . U nde r A ct

401 , the area of D eK alb Countywher e Sc ott resides was r em oved from district three and added to di strict five. Scott thereby lost her incum

bent status in district three, an d s he was n otele ct edto th e Co m m is si on in th e Nov em

be r 20 02 ele ct io ns . Scott filed her c om

plaint in July , 2002. I n it, she alleged that she wa s m ove d ou t of

the thi rd dis tr ic t i n an e ff

ort t o a ch ie ve am aj or ity

bla ck Co m m iss ion an d t ha t t hi s co ns ti tu te d wro ng fu l ra ci al di sc riminat io n a ndvi ol at ed42 U.S.C. §Glenn Richar dson was substituted as a pa rty pursuant to Fe d. R. Civ. P . 26(d)( 1), 1 which provide s for a

utomatic substitut ion when a public of fice r who is a pa

rty to an ac tion in an officia l capa city

is succee ded in offic e duringthe pende ncy of the a ction. 3 1983 . S he nam ed

Mark T ay lor , the L ie ute nant G ove rn or of G eo rg ia , T om Mur phy ( sin ce e xc hange d f

or G le nn R ic hard son ), the S pe ak er of G eo rg ia ’ s H ouse 1 of Re pr es en ta tiv es , S tan W at son, the Ch ai rp er son of the D eK al b C ounty

H ouse D el eg at ion , and N ad ine T hom as , the Ch ai rp er son of the D eK al b C ounty

S en at e De legation, as defendants. All four of these defendants (“ Appellants”) w ere sued onl y in the ir of fi ci al c ap ac iti es . S co tt al so n am ed a s a de fe ndant the D eK al b Co unty Bo ar d of E le ct ion s and V ote r Re gis tr at ion( “ Bo ar d of E le ct ion s” ). S he soug ht d ec larator

y and i nj unc tiv e re lie f fo r he r § 19 83 c la im a s w el l a s an aw ar d of attorney ’ s fees pursuant to 42 U.S .C. § 1988 . She did not d isput e that A ct 401 was en ac te d a s part

of the state ’ s le gis la tiv e pr oc es s and tha t Appe llants a ct ed in the ir le gis la tiv e ca

pa ci tie s. A ft er the c los e of

dis co ve ry , Appe llants suc ce ssf ull y m ove d to a m en d th ei r an sw er to inc lud e the de fe nse of le gis la tiv e im

m uni ty . T he y

sim ult an eo usl y m oved for j udgm ent on the pleadin gs based on their am ended answer, arguing that legislative imm

unitybars officia l capacity suits for injunctive and declaratory re lie f ag ai nst

state le gis la tor s. T he dis tr ic t c ourt i ssu ed an or de r de ny ing Appellants’ m otion for j udgm ent on the pleadin gs. Appellants’ interlocutoryTh is i s a dir e c tly a pp e a la ble int e rl oc uto ry

or de r, a s le g isl ativ e immun ity is 2 eff ectively lost if the defe ndants are forc ed to proc eed w ith a trial. See El lis v. Cof fe e County Bd. of Reg istrars, 981 F .2d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 1996). 4 ap pe al of that or de r is n owbe fo re thi s c ourt. 2

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW W e rev ie w th e d en ia l o f a m ot io n fo r jud gm en t o n t he pl ead in gs de no vo . Can no n v . Cit y

of WestPal m

Beac h, 2 50 F.3d12 99 , 13 01 (11 th Cir . 20 01 ). Judg m en t onthe ple ad ing s is appr opr ia te w he n th er e ar e no m at er ia l f ac ts i n dis put e an d th e m ovi ng p ar ty is en tit le d to j udgm en t a s am atte r of law . I d. A ll fa ct s a lle ge d inthe c om

pla int m ust be a cc ep te d a s tr

ue and v ie w ed

in the li ght m ost f av or ab le to the non m ovi ng p ar ty . I d.

III. DISC USSION W e be lie ve that the S upr em e Co urt’ s op ini on i n C onsum er s U nio n v. Su pr em e Co urt of

V ir gin iais co ntr oll ing in thi s c as e. 446 U . S. 719 , 100 S . Ct . 1967 ( 1980 ). I n C onsum er s U nio n, pla int if fs br ough t a

§ 19 83 c ha lle nge to the attor ne y dis ci pli nary

r ule s pr om ulg at ed by the S upr em e Co urt of

V ir gin ia (V ir gin iaCo urt) . I d. a t 72 1, 100 S . Ct . a t 19 69. T he c om pla int nam ed the V ir gin iaCo urt’ s c hie f j ust ic e in h is i ndi vid ua l and o ff

ic ia l c ap ac iti es and s ough t5

de cl ar at or

y and i nj unc tiv e re lie f. I d. a t 72 5- 26, 100 S . Ct . a t 19 71. O ne of the issues before the Suprem e Court w as whether the Vir ginia Court and its chief jus ti ce were en ti tl edto an y so rt o f imm

un it y . Id. at72 1, 1 00 S. Ct. at19 69 . Af ter concluding th at the V irginia Court acted in a legislative capacity when pr om ulg at ing the c ha lle nge d r ule s, the S upr em e Co urt tur ne d to it s le gis la tiv e im m uni ty ana ly sis . I d. a t 73 1, 100 S . Ct . a t 19 74. T he Co urt no te d th at “ state legislators enjoy

com m on law im

m unityfrom

liabilityfor their le gislativ e acts, an im m unitythat is sim ilar in origin and rationale to th at acc orded Congressm en unde r the S pe ec h or

D eb at e Cl au se . ” I d. a t 73 2, 100 S . Ct . a t 19 74. T his im m uni ty w as not abr ogate d by

§ 19 83, and i t a

ppl ie s w ithe qua l f

or ce to sui ts se ek ing dam ag es and those se ek ing de cl ar at or y or inj unc tiv e re lie f. I d. a t 73 2- 33, 100 S. Ct . a t 19 74- 75. T he re c oul d be “ little doubt, ” the Co urt c onc lud ed , that the pla int if fs c oul d no t have m ai nta ine d th ei r sui t “ ag ai nst the [ state ] le gis la tur e, it s co m m itt ee s, or

m em be rs . ” I d. a t 73 3, 100 S . Ct . a t 19 75. T he Co urt the n he ld that, be ca use state le gis la tur es and the ir m em be rs are im

m une to sui t, “ the V ir gin ia Co urt and i ts m em

be rs [ w er e] im

m une to sui t whe n a ct ing in the ir le gis la tiv e ca pa ci ty . ” I d. a t 73 4, 100 S . Ct . a t 19 76. T he squ ar e hol din g of Co nsum er s U nio n ap pli es w ithf

ull f or ce he re ; the se state le gis la tor de fe ndants e nj oy

le gis la tiv e im m uni ty pr ote ct ing the m

f ro m asui t c ha lle ngi ng the ir

a ct ion s take n inthe irScott here c halleng es these de fenda nts’ actions only

in their leg islative capa city . 3 Indeed, it is undisputed that these de fenda nts have no role at all with respe ct to the enf orce ment or imp le me ntatio n o f t

he c ha lle ng e d v oti ngdis tr ic ts. We acknowle dg e that the Consumers Union Court, in the par ticular portion of the 4 opinion dealingwith leg islative immuni ty , did not make explicit refer ence to the fac t that the chief justice of the Vir g inia Court was entitled to leg islative immuni ty in both his i ndividual and officia l capa cities. Howe ver, it is clea r that the Court’s holdingapplied in both capa cities. As noted in the text above, the chief justice was sue d in both capac ities, and the Court held that he was e ntitled to legislative immunity . Had the Court intende d to limi t its hol ding to the c hief jus tic e ’s ind ivi du a l c a

pa c ity , th at w ou ld h ave le ft pe nd ingthe pla int if

fs ’ o ff ic ia l c a pa c ity c la im; h o we v er , th e c o urtcl earl y l ef tn o s u ch cl ai mp en d i n g.

6 of fic ia l l eg is la ti ve cap aci ti es an d s eek in g d ecl arat ory or i nju nc ti ve rel ie f. 3 S c o t ts e e k s t o d i s t i n g u i s h C o n s u me r s U n i o nb y a r g u i n g th a tth e S up r e me Court did no t distin guish betwee n personal and official capacity actions when dis cu ssi ng l eg isl at ive im

m uni ty . Appe lle e re lie s onK en tuc ky v. G raham , 473 4 U. S. 159, 105 S. Ct. 3099 (1985). I n Graham , the C ourt em phasized “ the practical and doctrinal differences betw een personal and official ca pacity actions.” I d. at 166, 105 S. Ct. at 3105. O ne key differ ence betw een individual and official ca pa ci ty sui ts i s th e av ai la

ble de fe nse s. I d. T he Co urt no te d th at agov er nm en t official sued in his ind ividu al capac ity m ay be entitled to various personal im m uni ty de fe nse s. I d. H ow ev er , be ca use an of fi ci al c ap ac ity

sui t a ga ins t a gove rn m en t of

fi ci al is ge ne ra lly

tr eate d a s asui t a ga ins t the und er ly ing gove rn m en ta l e nti ty , suc h pe rs ona l i m m uni ty de fe nse s are unava ila

ble . I d. a t 16 5- 67, 105 S . Ct . a t 31 05- 06. I n th is r eg ar d, the c ourt st at ed :I f off icial ca pacity actions ag ainst state leg islators were treated as a ctions ag ainst the 5 state , th e y wo uld be ba rr e d b y state s’ El e ve nth

Am e ndme nt s ov e re ig n immun ity . Se e Gr aham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14, 105 S. Ct . at 3106 n.14. 7 Inan of fi ci al -c ap ac ity

a ct ion , the se de fe nse s are unava ila ble . . . . T he onlyim m uniti es that can be claim ed in an official-c apacity action are fo rm s o f so ve rei gn imm

un it y th atth e en ti ty, qua e nti ty , m ay pos se ss, suc h a s th e E le ve nthA m en dm en t. Id. at 167, 105 S.Ct. at 3106 (citations om itted). Sc ott r el ie s onthe f

or eg oin g langua ge in G raham in ar gui ng tha t the ins tant ac tio n su es the state le gis la tor s inthe ir of fi ci al c ap ac ity

and tha t the se de fe ndants th er ef o re ar e n o ten t i t l edt o l eg i s l at i v e i m m u n i ty, a p er s o n al d ef

en s e. Sc o t t ’s ar g u m en tfa i l s t o ap p re ci at e a ni m p o rt an tex ce p t i o nt o th e G ra h am op i n i o n ’s ge ne ral rul e. A s th e G raham

Co urt st at ed , pe rs ona l de fe nse s are ge ne ra lly unava ila ble in of fi ci al c ap ac ity

sui ts b ec au se suc h su its are tr eate d a s su its a ga ins t the und er ly ing entity . Id. at 166-67 , 105 S. Ct. at 3105-06 . The e xception, however, is derived from Ex P arte Y oung , 209 U. S. 123, 28 S.C t. 441 (1909), w hich held th at official ca pa ci ty sui ts f or pr ospe ct ive r el ie f to e nj oinstate of fi ci al s f ro m e nf or ci ng unc onst itutio na l a ct s are not de em ed to be sui ts a ga ins t the state and thus ar e not barr ed by the E le ve nthA m en dm en t. I nde ed , G raham it se lf r ec ogni ze d th is i n a 5 fo otn ote appe nde d to the pa ssa ge quo te d a bove . T ha t f

ootnot e state d inr el ev an t8

part : U nle ss a

state ha s w ai ve d it s E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m uni ty or Co ng res s h as ov erri dd en it , a st at e can no t b e su eddi rect ly in i ts own nam e re gard le ss o f the r el ie f soug ht . . . . T hus, im ple m en ta tio n of

state pol ic y or c ust om m ay be r ea ch ed

in fe de ra l c our

t on ly be ca use official-c apacity

actions for prospective relief are not treated as ac tio ns a ga ins t the S ta te . S ee E x P ar te Y oung . G raham , 473 U . S. a t 16 7 n. 14, 105 S . Ct . a t 31 06 n . 14. T hus, the ins tant a ct ion– seeking pros pective relief against these state legislator defendants in th eir off icial ca pa ci tie s – i s no t t o be tr eate d a s aa ct iona ga ins t the e nti ty . T he re fo re , the ge ne ral rul e o f Grah am

is no t ap pl ic ab le . Fo r the se r ea sons , our

hol din g is not

onl y c ontro lle d by

Co nsum er s U nio n, it is entirely

consistentwith G raham . Indeed, the S uprem e Court in Gr aham discuss ed and expressly

approved of the Consum ers U nion Court’ s hold ing th at the V ir gin iaS upr em e Co urt’ s c hie f j ust ic e w as pr ote ct ed by absol ute le gis la tiv e im m unitywhen sued in his official capac ity for prom ulgatin g an attorney

ethics co de that vi olate d th e Fi rs t A m en dm en t. T he Co urt i n G raham state d: W e re cognized as m

uch in Suprem e Court of V irginia, supra. T here, a three- j udge District Court had found th e V irginia Suprem e Court an d it s c hie f j ust ic e in h is o ff ic ia l c ap ac ity

li ab le f or pr om ulg at ing , an d r ef usi ng t o am en d, aS ta te Bar Co de that vi olate d th e Fi rs t A m en dm en t. T he dis tr ic t c ourt a lso aw ar de d f ee s a ga ins t the se de fe ndants pur suant t o § 1 988. W e he ld tha t a bsol ute im

m uni ty s h i e l d e dth e s e d e f

e n d an t s f o r a c t s t a k e ni nth e i r

l e g i s l a t i v e c ap a c i ty.Sc ott su g g e sts that a

sin g le un e xpla ine d s e nte nc e in B oa rd of County 6 Commi ssioners v. Umbehr , 518 U.S. 668, 116 S. C t. 2342 (1996), over rules the holdingof Consumers Union. We disag ree . Scott’s relianc e on Umbehr is mispl ace d for the sa

me re asons that G ra ham is c on sis te nt w ithCon sume rs Un ion . A ft e r d isp os ingof the pr ima

ry iss ue be fo re it – whether independe nt contrac tors with at-will contrac ts enjoy ed the same Fir st Amendment fre e speec h protec tion ag ainst retaliation as did c ounty employees – the Supreme Court in Umbehr s um m ar i l y

d i s p o s edo f o th er

ar gum en t s as s ert edb y

th e c o un ty

co m m i s s i o n er s , i n cl u d i n g a leg islative immuni ty

argument. The Court stated that the le g islative immuni ty claim was moot beca use only officia l capa city

claims ag ainst the commissioners wer e bef ore the Court. To the extent that thi s impli es that off icial ca pacity claims are claims ag ainst the entity and leg islative immunit y is unavailable, it is never theless no help to Scott. Umbehr involved a § 1983 officia l capa city claim ag ainst local g overnme ntal officia ls. Accor dingly , the g ener al rule of Gra ham applied whe reby

the offic ial capa city

claim was to be treated as a claim ag ainst the entity

and pe rs on a l immun iti e s w ou ld n ot b e ava ila ble . U mbe hr , li ke Gr aham, i s e nti re ly c on sis te nt w ith the holding of

Consumers Union. For this reason, we need not a ddress Appe llants’ argument that the fore g oing imp lic atio n in

Um be hr ha s b e e n s up e rc e de d b y

B og an v . Sc ott -H arr is, 52 3 U .S. 44 , 1 18 S. Ct . 966 (1998). It is true that Bog an squar ely held that local leg islators are entitled to the protec tion of a bs olute le g isl ativ e immun ity fo r t he ir le g isl ativ e a c tiv iti e s. Ho we ve r, the Court ’s op ini on is no t c le ar a s to wh e the r t

he loc a l le g isl ator s w e re su e d in the ir of fi c ia l or ind ivi du a l c a

pa c iti e s, and thus we c annot be sure whether there is tension between B og an and the one-se ntence infere nce in Umbe hr. In any event, we are not conce rned in this case with local leg islators, and there fore we lea

ve to another

day issues relatingto scope a nd brea dth of their leg islative i m mun i ty. 9 Id. at 164, 105 S.Ct. at 3104 (em phasis add ed). T hus, nothi ng in Graham un de rm in es th e h ol di ng in Co ns um ers Uni on . Fol lo win g C on su m ers Uni on , we hol d th at the le gis la tor

de fe ndants in the ins tant o ff ic ia l c ap ac ity

sui t f or pr ospe ct ive r el ie f ar e en tit le d to absol ute im m uni ty . A cc or d L ar se n v. S en at e of

6 Pe nnsy lvania , 152 F . 3d 2 40, 252 -5 4 ( 3d C ir . 199 8) ( fo llo w ing Co nsum er s U nio n an d ho ldi ng tha t st at e se na tor s su ed f or de cl ar at or

y and i nj unc tiv e re lie f in the ir official ca

pacities we re protecte d by legislative imm

unity ). Ina ddi tio n to be ing c onsi ste nt w ithpr ior S upr em e Co urt op ini ons, ourWe pause he re to note that Appellants’ alleg edly improper motives in ena cting 7 Act 401 ar e irre levant with re spect to dete rmining the applicability of leg islative immuni ty . See Ellis v. C offe e County

Bd. of Reg istrars, 981 F .2d 1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 1993) (“ [A] ny subjective motivations are irrele vant to absolute leg islative immuni ty .”). 10 h o l d i n g i s c o n s i s t e n tw i th th e p u r p o s e s o f l e g i s l a t i v e i mmu n i ty. T h e S up r e me Co urt ha s no te d th at

le gis la tiv e im

m uni ty “ w oul d be of

li ttl e va lue if

[ state legislators] could be subje cted to the cost and incon venience and distractions o f a trial upon a conclusi on of the pleader, or to the hazard of a j udgm ent against them based on a jury ’ s speculation as to m otives.” T enney v. Br andhov e, 341 U.S . 7 367, 377 , 71 S . Ct . 783 , 788 ( 1951 ). Whil e Appe llants w oul d no t be sub j ec te d to any j udgm en t i n th is c as e an d w oul d no t have to be ar the c ost of de fe ndi ng the m se lve s, the y

w oul d st ill f

ac e the not

inc onsi de ra

ble inc onve nie nc es and dis tr ac tio ns o f a tr ia l. S ee Co nsum er s U nio n, 446 U . S. a t 73 3, 100 S . Ct . a t 19 75 (“ ‘ [A ] pr ivate c ivi l a ct ion , w he the r fo r aninj unc tio n or dam ag es , c re at es a dis tr ac tio n and f

or ce s [ le gis la tor s] to div er t the ir ti m e, e ne rg y , and atte nti on f ro m their legislative tasks to defend the litigation .’ ” (quoting Eastland v. United State s Se rv ic em en ’ s F und, 421 U . S. 491 , 503 , 95 S . Ct . 181 3, 182 1 ( 1975 )) . T he pur pose of le gis la tiv e im

m uni ty be ing to fr ee le gis la tor s f ro m suc h w or ri es and dis tr ac tio ns, it

m ak es se nse to ap ply

the doc tr ine r eg ar dle ss o f the c ap ac ity in w hic h astate le gis lator

is sue d.On e pe c uli ari ty of thi s c a se is the fa c t th at Sc ott se e ks no a c tua l r e lie f a g a ins t 8 these state le g islator defe ndants. The r elief Scott see ks pertains to the e nforc ement and implementation of the cha lleng ed votingdistrict; the undisputed fact is that these le g islator defe ndants have absolutely no role to play

in that reg ard. Thus, it is extremely doubtful that Scott could satisfy

the third prongof the standingrequire ments – a substantial likelihood that her injury could be r edre ssed by

a fa vorable decision ag ainst these leg islator defe ndants. See United States v. Hay s, 515 U.S. 737, 742-43, 115 S. Ct . 2431, 24435 (1995). How ever , our pre cede nt sug g ests that we should not addre ss standing in this appea l. The instant case is an interlocutory a pp e a l of the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of le g isl ativ e immun ity . In a n a na log ou s c onte xt, th is c ourt in Summi t Medical Assoc iates, P.C. v. Pry or, 180 F .3d 1326 (1999), he ld that an interlocutory a pp e a l ba se d o n E le ve nth

Am e ndme nt i mmunit

y wo uld no t su pp or t pe nd ant a

pp e llate jurisdiction on a standingissue. Acc ording ly , we do not dec ide the standingissue. 11 W e fi na lly

tur n our atte nti on t o S co tt’ s arg um en t tha t a ppl y ing le gis la tiv e im m unityin this case would leave her w ith no rec ourse for the alleged dis cr im inatio n sh e suf

fe re d. T his is not

so. S co tt is f

re e to m ai nta in h er

sui t ag ai nst the Bo ar d of

E le ct ion s. I nde ed , the Bo ar d of E le ct ion s is the onl y de fe ndant i n th is c as e w hic h ha s any r ole w ithr es pe ct

to the r el ie f soug ht b y

S co tt, i. e. , pr ospe ct ive r el ie f se ek ing to en j ointhe e nf

or ce m en t of

the c ha lle nge d vo tin g dis tr ic t and a

de cl ar at iona s to it s le ga lity . A s no te d a bove , the le gis la tor 8 de fe ndants have no r ole in the e nf or ce m en t or

im ple m en ta tio n of

the vot ing dis tr ic t. S houl d S co tt pr ev ai l, she w ill sti ll be able to obt ai n a ll of the r el ie f she seeks. S ee, e. g., Sm ith v. Cobb Count y Bd. of Ele ctions and Regist ration, 230 F. Su pp. 2d 1 313, 131 5 (N . D . G a. 200 2) ( de cl ar ing dis tr ic tin g pl an s f or the Co bb Co unty Co m m iss ionunc onst itutio na l and e nj oin ing the c ounty board of e le ct ion s from conductin g elections in accordance w ith them ).12 IV. CONCLUSION Be ca use Appe llants are state le gis la tor s who a ct ed in the ir le gis la tiv e ca pa ci tie s, the y

are e nti tle d to absol ute le gis la tiv e im m uni ty . T his is tr

ue re gard le ss o f w he the r a sui t se ek s dam ag es or pr ospe ct ive r el ie f an d r eg ar dle ss o f w he the r the state le gis la tor s are nam ed in the ir ind ivi dua l or

of fi ci al c ap ac ity . T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r is the re fo re RE V E RS E D in part and RE MA

N D E D w ith ins tr uc tio ns t o di sm iss a ll cl ai m s a ga ins t Appe lla nts . REVERSED an d R EMANDED.13

JO RD A N , D istri ct

Jud ge , c onc ur

ri ng: I co nc ur in the m aj or ity

opi nio n, w hic h ho lds that the doc tr ine of le gis la tiv e imm un it y ba rs th e cl ai m s o f Ms . Sco ttag ai ns t t he in di vi du al st at e le gi sl at or s. W ere it not, however, for Su mmit t Med ic al Ass oc ia te s, P.C. v. Pry or , 180 F. 3d 1326 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) , and Mon izv. Cit y o f Ft . Lau de rd

al e, 145 F. 3d 1 278 (1 1th Cir. 1998 ), I w oulddism iss the appeal based on Ms. Scott’ s lack of A rticle II I standi ng w ithr es pe ct

to the le gis la tor s, and n ot r ea chthe que sti on o f le gis la tiv e i mm u n i ty. In Su mmit t Med ic al

, a ca se inv olv ing A la

bam a’ s part ia l- birth a

bortio n s t a tu e , th i s C o u rtw a s p r e s e n t e dw i th th e i n t e r l o c u t o ry ap p e a l o f v ar i o u s A l ab a ma officials whose Eleventh Am endm ent im m unitydefense the district court had re j ec te d. I n a ddi tio n to r ai sin g th e E le ve nthA m en dm en t onappe al , the of fi ci al s as se rte d t ha t t he pl ai nt iff s l ack edst an di ng . Id. at 1334. The Court, noting that an E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m uni ty c la im w as appe al ab le w ith out

af ina l j udgm en t unde r the c oll at er al or de r doc tr ine , e xpl ai ne d th at ade nia l of

am oti on t o di sm iss on j ust ic ia

bil ity gr ound s w as not

so r ev ie w ab le : “ W e co nc lud e that the que sti on o f standi ng d oe s no t f

it w ith in the c oll at er al or de r doc tr ine , and, the re fo re , that [ the A la bam a of fi ci al s] m ay

not a s of r igh t t ak e anim

m ed ia te int er loc uto ry

appe al on this iss ue.” Id. at

133 4- 35. T he Co urt a lso he ld, r el y ing on M oni z , 145 F. 3d at14

1283 n. 1, that i t w oul d no t e xe rc ise it s di sc re tio n to c onsi de r the standi ng i ssu e un de r th e d oc tri ne of p en de ntap pe ll at e juri sd ic ti on . Su mmit t Med ic al , 180 F.3d at 13 35 -3 6. If Sum m itt

M edic al an d M

oni z pr ec lud e us f

ro m a ddr es sin g athr es hol d j ust ic ia bil ity iss ue suc h a s st an din g inan in te rl oc uto ry appe al – and l ike the m aj or ity , I thi nk the y

do – tho se c as es sho uld

be r ee xam ine d by

the Co urt si tti ng en banc. I m ag ine , f

or e xam ple , that whil e thi s c as e w as on a ppe al , the G eo rg ia legislature passed a law that som ehow gave Ms. Scott the relief she soug ht when she f ile d su it. S uppo se f

urthe r that the part ie s di d no t a dvi se us o f thi s de ve lop m en t be ca

use , f or the ir own r ea sons , the y

w an te d to obt ai n ade fi nit ive ap pe llate r

uli ng o n le gis la tiv e im

m uni ty . I f w e le ar

ne d of the ne wle gis la tio n on our own, w e w ouldhave no choice but to in quire as to m ootn ess, at least insofar as an y cla im s fo r in

jun ct iv e rel ie f were c on cern ed . See generally Pacific I ns. Co. v. Gen er al Dev. Co rp ., 28 F.3d 1093 , 1096 (11th Cir. 1994) (an appellate court

“ m ust c onsi de r m ootne ss s uaspo nte and, abse nt an a ppl ic ab le e xc ep tio n to the m ootne ss d oc tr ine , [ it] m ust dis m iss any

appe al that no lon ge r pr es en ts a via ble ca se or c ontro ve rs y ”) . I t w oul d no t m atte r that m ootne ss c annot ind ep en de ntl y

be th e su bjec t o f an in te rlo cu to ry ap pe al un de r th e co ll at eral ord er d oc tri ne . Se e, e.g ., Bro ok s v. Geo rg ia Bd. o

f El ect io ns , 59 F . 3d 1 114, 111 8- 19 ( 11th C ir . 199 5)15

(d ism iss ing int er loc uto ry appe al und er

28 U . S. C. § 12 92( a) (1 ) on m ootne ss gr ou nd s) . St an din g sh oul d be no d if fe re nt. F ed er al c ourts h av e, in the w or ds o f the Su pr em e Co urt, an “ ind ep en de nt o bli ga tio n to e xam ine the ir own j ur isd ic tio n, and standin g is perhaps the m ost im port of the j urisdictio nal doctrines.” United States v. Hays, 515 U . S. 737 , 742 , 115 S . Ct . 243 1, 243 5 ( 1995 ) (i nte rn al quo ta tio ns om itt ed ). Af

ed er al c ourt m ay

be able to c hoos e w hic h of vari ous “ ca se or co nt ro ve rs y ” co nc ern s i t wi ll ad dr es s fi rs t, e.g ., Orti z v. Fi br eb oa rd

Co rp ., 527 U. S. 815, 831, 119 S.Ct. 2295 , 2307 (1999) (taking up statuto ry standing before A rt ic le I II standi ng) , but

it m ust r es olv e al l su chc onc er

ns b ef or e re ac hin g th e m eri ts . Se e Ari

zo na ns fo r Of

fi ci al Eng lish v. Ari

zo na , 520 U . S. 43, 66, 117 S . Ct . 1055 , 106 8 ( 1997 ) (“ W e m ay r es olv e the que sti on whe the r the re r em ai ns a li ve ca se or c ontro ve rs y

w ithr es pe ct

to Y nig ue z’ s c la im

w ith out f ir st d et er m ini ng w he the r A O E or

P ar k ha s st an din g to appe al be ca use the f orm er que sti on, li ke the la tte r, goe s to the A rt ic le I II j ur isd ic tio n of thi s C ourt, and the c ourts b el ow , not to th e m eri ts of t he cas e.”). L eg isl at ive im

m uni ty is ana ff irm at ive de fe nse w hic h c anbe w ai ve d or fo rf ei te d, and, unl es s r ai se d, doe s no t a ff ec t the pow er

of af ed er al c ourt t o ad jud ic at e. Se e, e.g ., Kin gma n Pa rk Civ ic Ass ’n v. W

il li ams , 348 F. 3d 1 033, 103 916

(D . C. Ci r. 200 3) ( m ay or

w ai ve d le gis la tiv e im

m uni ty by e xpr es sly

dis av ow ing it in the dis tr ic t c ourt) ; Pow el l v. Ri dg e, 24 7 F .3d52 0, 5 31 (3dCir . 20 01 ) (Ro th , J., concurring) (“ legislative imm unitym ay

be w aived”); Fraternal Order of Police v. Ci ty of Hob ar t, 864 F. 2d 5 51, 554 ( 7thCi r. 198 8) ( by f ai lin g to inv oke le gis la tiv e imm un it y in th e d is tri ctco ur t, m em be rs of c it y

co un se l wai ve d t ha t d efen se ). In de ed , som et im es le gis la tor s who are sue d de ci de to fo re go l eg isl at ive im m uni ty an d d efen d o n t he m eri ts . Se e, e.g ., Mar ti ne z v. Bu sh , 234 F. Su

pp. 2d 1 275, 127 8 (S . D . F la . 200 2) ( thr ee -j udge c ourt) ( Fl or ida r ed istri ct ing c as e) . Wha t this m eans is tha t, in de ci din g th e que sti on o f le gis la tiv e im m uni ty , w e ar e re ac hin g the m er its of the c as e. B ut a cc or din g to S upr em e Co urt pr ec ed en t, that i s no t pe rm is si bl e. Se e Ste el

Co . v. Cit iz en s f

or Bett er Envi ro nme nt

, 527 U . S. 83, 94- 95, 11 8 S .Ct. 1 00 3, 1 01 2- 13 (19 98 ) (rejec ti ng do ct rin e o f “ hypo th et ic al juri sd ic ti on ,” unde r w hic h af

ed er al c ourt c oul d a ssum e it ha d su bj ec t- m atte r j ur isd ic tio n f or the pur pose of de ci din g th e m er its ). O ne m igh t be te m pte d to arg ue that l eg isl at ive im m unityis one of those thresho ld issu es that a court can nevertheless consid er be fo re ad dr es si ng whet he r a “ cas e o r co nt ro ve rs y ” ex is ts un de r Arti cl e III. See Ten et v. Doe, 125 S.Ct. 1230 , 1235 n.4 (2005) (explaining that a fe deral court can ch oose a m ong thr es hol d gr ound s to pr ec lud e co nsi de ratio n of the m er its ). T he problem with this argum ent is that the Suprem e Court has not treated im m unityas17

one of tho se thr es hol d is sue s. I n Ca lder on v. Ash mus , 523 U . S. 740 , 745 , 118 S. Ct . 169 4, 169 7- 98 ( 1998 ), ac as e inv olv ing ac la im of E le ve nthA m en dm en t im m unityby state officia ls, the Suprem e Court ruled that it had to decide whether a“ c a s e o r c o n tr o v e r s y” e x i s t e db e f o r e an a l yz i n g El e v e n th Ame n d men ti mm u n i ty, an d ul tim at el y

dis m iss ed

the c as e as non -j ust ic ia

ble be ca use the c om

pla int sou ght an ad vi so ry

de cl arat ory

jud gm en t. L ike E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m uni ty , le gis la tiv e im

m uni ty is not

“ coextensive with the lim itations on judicial power in Article III ,” id. at

745 n. 2, 118 S.Ct at 1697 n.2, and in my view is not an alternative threshold issue that perm its us to avoid the qu estion of stand ing. A s explained belo w, Ms. S cott’ s lack of Arti cl e III s ta nd in g wi th res pe ctto th e le gi sl at or s i s d is po si ti ve . In ord er t o h av e st an di ng , a li ti ga ntm us t d em on st rat e in

jury in fa ct(i.e ., a harm that i s “ co nc re te and a ct

ua l or im m ine nt” ), c au sa tio n ( i. e. , a“ fa ir ly tr ac e[ ab le ] c onne ct ionbe tw ee n th e al le ge d in j ur y . . . and the a lle ge d c ondu ct of the defendant”), and redressability (i. e. a “ subs tantial likelih ood th at the requested rel ie f wil l re m ed y

th e al le ge d i nju ry ”). Ve rmont Agency of Natura l Resour ces v. Uni te d Sta te s ex rel . St even s, 529 U . S. 765 , 771 , 120 S . Ct . 185 8, 186 1- 62 ( 2000 ) (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar

ks r earr an ge d) . S tandi ng, m or eo ve r, c onc er ns the congruence or fit betw een the plaintiff and the defendants. “ In its constit ution al9 Ido no t me an to s ugge st that su c h a n d ir e c tiv e c ou ld b e le g a lly iss ue d, and

me re ly u s e t h e e x amp l e t o ex p l ai nwh y M s . S co t tl ac k s s t an d i n g.

18 dim en sio n, standi ng i m

ports j ust ic ia

bil ity : whe the r the pla int if f ha s m ad e out

a ‘c a s e o r c o n tr o v e r s y’ b e tw e e n h i m s e l f a n d th e d e f e n d a n t [ s ] w ith in the m eanin g of Art[icle] III .” W

ar th v. Se ld in , 422 U . S. 490 , 498 , 95 S . Ct . 219 7, 220 5 ( 1975 ) (em ph as is ad de d) . Thus , in a su itag ai ns t s ta te off ic ia ls forin

jun ct iv e rel ie f, a plaintiff does no t have Ar ticle III standing with re spect to thos e offic ials who are po werl es s t o re m ed y

th e al le ge d i nju ry . Se e Li nd a R.S. v. Rich ar d D., 410 U.S . 614, 616 -1 8, 93 S . Ct . 114 6, 114 7- 49 ( 1973 ); Okp al ab i v. Fo st er , 244 F. 3d 4 05, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2001 ) ( en ban c ). Se e als o id . at 4 29 (Hig gi nb ot ha m , J., co nc ur ri ng) ( inj unc tio n a ga ins t st at e of fi ci al is “ utt er ly

m eanin gle ss” f

or “ al l pr act ic al pu rp os es ” if

th e o ffi ci al ha s “ no po wer t o re dr es s t he ass ert edin juri es ”). The le gislators in this case do not h ave enforc em ent authorityand are not in volv ed in con du ct in g e le ct io ns in DeKalb Co un ty. Thei r ro le is li m it edto m ak in g l aw. See G a. Co nst . , A rt . I II , § V I; O . C. G . A . § 28 -1 -1 et seq . A n in

j unc tio n r unni ng against them

therefor e w oulddo not hing to help Ms. Scott. Furtherm ore, even an extraordinary

injunction ordering the legis lators to vot e to repea l or am end Act 401 w oul d be ine ff

ec tiv e, f or the le gis la tor s, by

the m se lve s, are pow er le ss t o pa ss laws. Ms. Scott theref

ore cannotsatisfy

the redre ssabilit y

prong of Article III 910 In the Eleve nth Circuit, a panel is bound by a p ri o r d ec i s i o n unless there is an interveningSupreme Court dec ision overrulingit or conflictingwith it. See, e .g., In re Prov enzano, 215 F.3d 1233, 1234 ( 11th Cir. 2000). The Supreme C o u rt d ec i sions in Arizonans for Off icial English, Ashmus, Citiz ens for Better Env ironment, and Or tiz predate Summitt Medical . A s a re su lt, Su mm itt Me dic al i s b i n d i n g. 19 standi ng w ithr es pe ct

to the le gis la tor s, and w e shou ld d ism iss he r cl ai m s a ga ins t the m on tha t gr ound . Beca use of Sum m itt

M edic al an d Mon iz

, we have essentially

issued an advis or y opi nio n onle gis la tiv e im m uni ty . Apane l sh oul d no t, how ev er , have the

10 discretion to b y

pass a core “ case or c ontroversy ” re quirem ent like Article III standi ng j ust

be ca use the appe al is int er loc uto ry in na tur e. “ W ith out

j ur isd ic tio n, the c ourt c annot

pr oc ee d a t a ll in any

c as e. Jur isd ic tio n is the pow er to de cl ar e the law , and whe n it

c ea se s to e xis t, the onl y

f unc tio n r em ai nin g f

or the c ourt i s th at

of announ cing that fact and dism issin g the case. ” Ex pa rt e McCa rdle , 74 U. S. (7 W al l. ) 506, 514 , 19 L . E d. 204 ( 1868 ). L ike oth er c ir cu its , thi s C ourt sh oul d en sur e that the re is A rt ic le I II standi ng b ef or e re sol vin g is sue s of

E le ve nth Am en dm en t, s ov erei gn , abs ol ut e, orqu al ifi edimm un it y in in te rlo cu to ry

ap pe al s. Se e, e.g ., W

eb b v . Cit y o f Da ll as , 314 F. 3d 7 87, 790 -9 1 ( 5thCi r. 200 2) ; Price v. Aka ka , 3 F .3d12 20 , 12 23 -2 4 (9 th Cir . 19 93 ).