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O c t ober 27, 1998 C eci l C r o w son, Jr . A ppel l a t e C our t C l e r k IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

______________________________________________ BOB T. SOUDER, Individually and on behalf of all othe rs similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appel

lees, Madison Chancery No. 53326 Vs. C.A. No. 02A01-9712-CH-00321 HEALTH PARTNERS, INC., Defendant-App

ellant.

______________________ _____________________________________________________ _ FROM THE MADISON COU NTY CHANCERY COURT THE HONORABLE JOE C. MORRIS, CHANCELLOR

William H. West; Stok

es & Bartholomew of

Nashville William H. Shackelford of Jackson

For Appellees Robert B. Littleton, Mary Ellen Morris; Trabue, Sturdivant & DeWitt

of Nashville For Appellant

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED Opinion filed:

W. FRANK CRAWFORD,

PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.

CONCUR: ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE HERSCHEL P. FRANKS, JU DGE This c ase involves a contract arbitration clause and the Tennessee Open Meetings Ac t (Act). Defendant, Health Partners, Inc. (HP), appeals the Chancellor’s order denying its

motion to compel arbitration and granting the Plaintiff’s, Dr. Bob T. Souder, M.D. (Souder), motion for1 According to HP’s charter, its purpose is to “further . . . the statutor y mission of the

Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District to make health car

e available to

the public.” 2 This letter was sent to Soude r and the others by Joseph McGuire (McGuire), the Interim Director of Operations of HP.

3 Souder’s contract was due to expire on February 1, 1997. 2 judgment on the pleadings. HP is a Preferred

Provider Organization(PPO) that contracts with insurance companies and employers from Tennessee and other states. HP provides contract in g third-party pay

ors with a network of

physicians. HP was created in 1994 under the authority of the Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District (District) as a “governmental instrumentality” of the District. The Distri ct create d HP in order to further the District’s mission to provide the full range of health care and allied

and incidental se

rvices. 1 HP is a not-for-profit mutual benefit corporation which has, as its sole member, the District. In 1994, Souder ente

red into a Physician Participation Agreement (PPA) with HP. In late 199 6, Souder and other p hysicians who wer

e participating me

dical providers i

n HP’s PPO received a letter 2 dated November 2

6, 1996 from HP whic

h stated in part as

follows: The Board of Directors of Health Partne r s recently approved actions which offer an exclusive provider r el ationship to West Tennessee Alliance for He alth care (WTAH), a Physi cian Hospital Organization (PHO), and the Jackson Clinic to serve as the sole physician networks, for services they render, in Madison County.

. . . * * * It is our understandi

ng that you are not currently a member of WTAH. Because of the above described decision, we are hereby notifying you that your existi ng contract with H

ealth Partners wi

ll not be renewed. 3

The action of

the Board of Directors of HP described in the above-quoted letter did not take place at a

board meeting, but instead took place in the form of a written consent resolution4 The board meeting which was

originally called

on July 29, 1996 to re

view this issue failed to produce

a quorum. 5 The District is, as

a matter of law, s

ubject to the requ

irements of the Ac

t. 3 in lieu of a meeting. 4 On January 9, 1997, the Board of Directors of HP adopted a resolution in which it restated its previously adopted policy of limiting HP’s physician provide r network in Madison County. This meeting took plac e without prior public notice as had all previous meetings of the Boa

rd of Directors o

f HP. Subsequently, Souder and the othe r physicians rec

eived a letter fr

om Mc Gu ire dated January 31, 1997,

which stated as fo

llows: You previously received from us a letter dated No v ember 26, 1996, advising that your Physician Participation Agreement with Health Partners, Inc. would

not be renewed. We understand there may be some misunderstanding as to the effec t of the notice of nonrenewal. In order to clarify anyconfusion that may exist, and to assure an order

ly transition, this le

tter is notice, pur

suant to Section 9.2 of the Physician Participation Agreement, that the agreement

is terminated. The effective date of the termination of your Phys ici an Participation Agreement is sixty (60) days from the date of this letter

, April 1 , 1 997. Until this date, you will remain a participating provider in Health Partners, Inc. On July 29, 1997, the Board of Trustees of the District amended HP’s charter making the Board of Trustees of the District the Board of Trustees of HP. This meeting was annou nced to the public and open to such. 5 In addition to amending HP’s charter, the Board of Trustees of the District ratified and con

firmed all action

s o f the previous Board of Directors of HP and the management of HP. In May 1997, Souder

filed this suit seeking reinstatement of his PPA with HP alleging that the actions of HP violated the Act. Soude r alle ges that the Act is applicable to the Board of Directors of HP in that it is an entity that falls within the provisions of the Act. Furthermore, Souder avers that the action of the Board of Directors of HP to limit its network, thereby excluding himself and other similarly situated physician providers, was taken at meetings without the required public notice. Souder alleges that all actions taken by the B oard o f Directors of HP are void

and of no effect since no

ne of its meetings ha

ve been open to the

public pursuant to the Ac

t. HP filed a motion to compel Souder to submit the case to arbitration as required by the PPA. This motion and a subsequent motion to reconsider were denied by the Chancellor. After6 The Chancellor a lso conc luded that HP’s assertion that the subsequent action of the

Board of Trustees cured any violation of the Act to constitute a conclusion of law. As such, the Chancellor stated that such a conclusion of law is not effective to establish a disputed issue of fact on the basis of the p

leadings in order

to avoid entry of a

judgment on the plea

dings. Furthermore, the Chancellor re jected HP’s claim

t hat the decision to terminate Souder’s Physician Provider Agreem ent was purely

a management decision made without reference to the resolution of the Bo

ard of Director

s as a legally imposs

ible fact. 4 HP’s answer was filed, Souder filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings with reg

ard to the applicability of the Act to HP and the possible violations of the Act by HP. The Chancellor granted Soude r’s motion. The Chancellor concluded that HP was subject to the coverage and requirements of the Act because of i ts status as a governmental instrumen tality according to its charter, and because of its status as a subsidiary entity of the District acco rding to Chapter 165 of the Private Acts of 1992 of the Tennessee General Assembly. Furthermore, the Chancellor concluded that HP had committed numerous violations of the Act in that it ha

s never published

or publicized any

publi c notic e of the meetings o f its Board of Directors.Finding such, the Chancellor declared, as required by statute, all actions of HP’s Board of Directors void and of no effect. Thus, the action of HP’s Board

of Directors in terminating Souder

’s contract was d

eclared void an

d of no effect,

and the Chancellor declared the PPA between Souder and HP still in effect. In addition, the Chancellor issued an injunction enjoining HP from fu

rther violations of

the Act. 6 HP perfected the

present appeal, and presents the following issues, as stated in its brief, for our review: 1. Whether it was error for the ch ancer y court to fail to compel

the Plaintiff to submi

t his cl aim against the De fendant to arbitration. 2. Whether it was error for the chancery court to gr ant t he Plaintiff a judgment on the ple

adings on the appli

cabilityof the Open Meetings Ac

t. 3. Whether it was error for the chan cery court to find that the Open Meetings Ac

t applied to Health

Partners. 4. W hether it was error for the chancery court to find that th e termination of the Plaintiff’s contract with Health Partners was an action of Health P

artners’ Board o

f Directors. 5. Whether it was error for the chancery court not to find that any violation of the Open Meetings Act that might have occurred was cured by action o

f the Board of Tru

stees of the Distr

ict. 6. Whether the scop e of the injunction entered by the chancery5 court is impermissibly broad.

Standard of Review It appears from an examination of the Chancellor’s Conclusions of Law, that he relied on matters outside the pleadin gs. “When matters outside the pleadings are presented to and considered

by the court, the motion is treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.

. . .” 3 Nancy F. MacLean and Bradley A. MacLean, Tennessee Practice §12.12, p. 191 (2d ed. 1989). Generally, a

motion for summary judgment allows the non-moving party time to present a defense, Tenn.

R. Civ. P. 56.03, but HP ma kes no c omplaint that it was denied extra time. Thus, Souder’s motion will be treated as a summary judgment motion. A motion for summary judgment should be granted when the movant demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Bain v. Wells , 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). On a motion for summar y judgment, the cou

rt must take the stronges

t legitimate view of the evidence

in favor of the non

moving party, allow

all reasonable

inferences in favor of that

party, and discard all countervailing evidence. Id. In Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993), our Supreme Court stated: Once it is shown by the moving party that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must then demonstrate, by affidavits or disc overy materials, that there is a genuine, mate rial fact dispute

to warrant a trial . In this regard, Rule 56.05 provides that the nonmoving party cannot simply rely upon his pleadings but mus t set fort h specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material

fact for trial. Id. at 211 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Summary judgmentis only appropriate when the facts and the legal conclusions drawn from the facts reasonab

ly permit only

one conclusion. Carvell v. Bottoms , 900 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995). Since only questions of law are involved, there is no presumption of correctness regarding a trial court's grant of summary judgment. Bain , 936 S.W.2d at 622. Therefore, our review of the trial court

’s grant of summar

y judgment is de novo on the record before this Court. Warren v. Estate of Ki

rk , 954 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tenn. 1997).

Arbitration H P contends t hat t he Chancel l o r er r ed by not com pel l i ng Souder t o subm i t hi s c l a i m t o ar b i t r a t i on. H P7 The Chancellor relied on E xhibit A o f Michael Graft on’s affidavit in r

endering his decision. 6 prem i ses th i s conten t i on upon a pr

ovi s i on i n t he PPA w h i ch pr ovi des t hat any cont r over sy, di sput e or di s a g r eem ent a ris i n g ou t of or relat ing to the P P A be sub m i t ted to a rbit rati o n .H P further co nten

ds t hat suc h a cl aus e m andat i n g a r b i t r a t i on r equi r e s t h i s Court t o subm i t a di sput e over t he vi o l a t i on of t he A c t t o ar b i t r a t i on. W e note t hat Souder ’ s c o m p l a i n t does not pr e s ent i s s ues deal i ng w i t h t he t erm s and provis i ons of hi s cont rac t w ith H P. To the contr

ary, t he con t ent i on in hi s com p l a i n t i s t hat H P’s ac tio n i n curt a i l i ng the provi der net w ork w a s t aken i n vi o l a t i on of t he A c t .Such a com

p l a i n t i s out s i de of t he am b i t of So uder’ s cont

rac t and d eal s w i t h an ext r aneous m a tte r t hat i s not pr oper l y a s ubj ect f o r ar b i t r a t i on.I n City of Blaine v. John Colem an Hays & Assoc., Inc., 81 8 S . W

. 2 d 33 (T e n n. A p p .19 9 1 ) , thi s C o u r t he ld t h a t an a rbit rati o n clau s e in a contr act w as not appli cabl e i n d e t e r m i n i n g w het her a cont rac t i ng p art y w as f raudul ent l y i ndu ced t o enter i n t o t he con t rac t .W e det erm i ned th a t i nducem ent t o enter i n t o t he con t rac t w as not w i t h i n t he pu rvi e w of t he con t rac t i t sel f . T h e refore, t h e arb i t rati o n clau s e w a s not appl i cabl e . A l t hough t he ca s e at bar i s not factua l l y the sam e a s City of Blaine ,

w e do have a n anal ogous situ a tio n i n t hat Souder ’ s c o m p l a i n t deal s wit h a m a t t e r t hat i s not w i t h i n t he pu rvi e w of t he con t rac t but r a t her t hat HP ’ s m anner of deal i ng w i t h t he cont r act w a s i l l egal beca use of t h e v i o l a tio n of t he A c t .The t r i a l cour t di d not er r i n denyi n g H P’s m o t i on t o subm i t t h i s m a t t e r t o ar b i t r a t i on. Judgment on the Pleadings In t he second i s s ue present ed t o t h i s C ourt , H P co n t ends t hat i t w as er ror f o r t he Chancel l o r t o grant So uder a j udg m ent on the pl eadi ngs. A s w e explai ned earl i er, t he C hancell or r e l i ed on m a t t e r s out s i de t he pl eadi ngs. 7 Th i s rel i ance co n v erted the m oti o n for jud g m e n t on the plea ding s to a m oti o n for su m m ary judg m e n t and ren d e rs H P ’ s asse r t ions m o o t . Open Meetings Act I n th e t h i rd and m ost com p l ex i s s ue, H P cont ends t hat t he A c t does not appl y beca use i t s Boar d of D i r ect o r s i s not a “gov erni ng b ody ” as def i ned b y st a t u t e and case l a w .W e re spect ful l y dis agree. T h e l egi s l a t u r e has decl a r ed t hat i t i s t h e pol i cy of t h i s s t a t e t hat “t he f o r m a t i on of publ i c pol i cy and de c i s i ons i s publ i c bus i nes s a nd sha l l not be conduc t ed i n se c r e t . ” T. C . A .§ 8- 44- 101( a )

( 1993) .Publ

i c know l edge of t h e m anner i n w hich go v e rnm e n t dec isi o n s are m a d e b y p u b l i c o ffi cials i s a n es s e n t i a l el e m ent of a dem ocr a t i c gover n m ent . Metropolitan Air Research Testing Auth., Inc. (MARTA) v. Metropolitan Gov’t , 842 S. W . 2d 611, 616 (T e n n. A p p .19 9 2 ) . In o rde r t o p rov ide o p en n ess in g o v ern m e n t , the leg isl ature p asse d the O p en M e e t i n g s A c t . T h e A ct, in pe r t inen t part, pro vide s:7 Open meetings - “Governing body” def ine d - “Meeting” defined. - (a) A l l m eet i ngs of any gover n i ng body ar e dec l a r ed t o be pub l i c m eet i ngs op e n t o t he pu b l i c at al l t i m es, except as provi ded b y t he C onst i t u t i on o f Tenn ess ee. ( b ) ( 1 ) "G over n i ng body" m eans : ( A ) The m e m ber s of any publ i c body w h i ch cons i s t s of t w o (2) or m ore m e m bers , w ith th e aut hor i t y t o m ake de c i s i ons f o r or r ecom m endat i ons t o a publ i c body on p o lic y o r a d m i n i s tra tio n . . . . T . C . A .§ 8- 44- 102 ( 1993 &

Supp. 1998) . T h e Ac t i s r e m edi a l i n natur e . Dorrier v. Dark ,

537 S. W . 2d 888, 891 ( Tenn. 1976) ; Memphis Publ’g Co. v. City of Memphis ,

513 S.W . 2d 5 11, 513 (Ten

n . 197 4). “It shoul d , t her e f o r e , be cons t r ued br oadl y t o pr o m o t e opennes s a nd acc ount abi l i t y i n gover n m ent , ... and to prot

ect t he pu b l i c agai nst cl osed do or m eet i ngs at every st age o f a gov ernm ent bod y’s del i berat i on.” MARTA ,

842 S. W . 2d at 616 ( c i t a t i ons om i t t ed) .Furt her , “[ t ] he [ A ] c t i s t o be const rued m ost fav ora bly to the pu bli c a n d is al l enc o m p a ssi n g an d a p p l i es to ever y m eet i ng of a gover n i ng body exce p t w here t he st a t u t e , on i t s f ace , excl udes i t s a ppl i cat i on. ” State v. Shelby County

Bd. of Comm’rs ,

1990 W L 29276, at *4 ( Tenn. A

pp.W . S . M a r ch 21, 1990) .To tha

t end, t he A c t r equi res pub l i c noti ce of al l regul ar or speci a l m eet i ngs of a governm

ent a l bod y . T . C . A .§ 8-44-103 (199

3). Fu r t herm ore, secr e t vot e s ar e pr ohi b i t ed, and m i nutes o f t he m eet i ng ar e r equi r ed. T. C . A .§ 8- 44- 104 ( 1993) .I n t he eve n t t hat t hes e r equi r e m ent s a r e not m e t , “[ a ] n y act i o n t aken a t a m eet i ng i n vi o l a t i on of t h i s pa r t sha l l be voi d and of no ef f ect . ” T. C . A .§ 8- 44- 105 ( 1993) . T he i s s ue before us i

s one of f i r s t i m pres s i on. The ter m “pub l i c bod y” as used i n t he abo ve st a t u t e , w a s not def i ned. T heref ore, w e m ust fi r s t det erm i ne w het her t he G eneral A s s e m b l y i n t ended t hat a PPO ’ s boa r d of di r ect o r s f a l l w i t h i n t he cove r age of a “governi

ng b ody . ” See Mid-South Publ’g Co. v. Tennessee State Univ. & Community College Sys. Bd. of Re gents , N o . 01- A - 01- 900 2CH 000 74, 199 0 W L 2074 10 ( Tenn . A pp. M . S . D ec. 19, 1990) . T h e ground w ork f or det erm i n i ng w hat const i t u t e s a “gove r n i ng body” f o r t he pur pose s of t he A c t i s f ound i n t he ca s e of Dorrier v. Dark ,

537 S.W . 2d 8 88 (T enn. 1976). Jam es D ark w a s a t eac her w i t h t he D avi dson Count y s c hool syst e m w hen t he l ocal sc hool boar d br ought “negl ect of du ty an d c o n d u ct un b e c om ing a teach er” ch a rge s ag ainst h i m . A f t e r a hea r i ng i n f r ont of t he M e t r opol i t an Board of Educat i on, D a r k w a s t e r m i nat ed. D a r k chal l enged t h e deci s i o n in co urt an d “ asse r t e d that t h e B o a rd’s ac t i o n w as v oid b e c a u se it w as ‘fo r m u l a t ed’ i n a cl ose d se s s i on i n v io l a t i on . . . of t he O pen M eet i ngs A c t . ” Id. at 889. T h e Supre m e Court di s c uss ed t he A c t i n dept h and at t e m p t ed t o cl a r i f y T. C . A .§ 8- 44- 102.A

f t e r car e f u l cons i der a t i on, t he cour t concl uded t hat t h e t e r m “publ i c body” s houl d be br oadl y i n t e r p r e t ed. The C our t not ed t hat t h e t erm “pub l i c bod y” as used i n T . C . A .§ 8-44-102 w

as not an un cer t a i n t erm .T he C ourt st a t ed:8 T he court relied heavily on the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Red & Black

Publ’g Co. v. Board of Rege nts , 427 S.E.2d 257 (1993). In that case, the Court held tha t the Student Organization Court of the University of Georgia was subject to the Open Meetings Act because a public agency had delegated o fficial responsibilities and authority to the Student Organization Court. Thus, a subsidiary of a public agency was deem ed subje ct to the Open Meetings Act. 8

I t i s cl ear th a t fo r th e pur pose of t h i s Act , t he Legi s l a t u r e i n t ended t o i ncl ude any boar d , com m i s s i on, com m i t t ee, agenc y , aut hor i t y or any ot her body, by w hat ever nam e , w hose or i g i n and aut hor i t y m ay be t r ace d t o St a t e , C i t y or C ount y l e g isla tiv e act i on and w h o se m e m b e r s ha ve aut hor i t y t o m ake de c i s i ons or r ecom m e ndat i ons on pol i cy or adm i n i s t r a t i on af f ect i ng t he conduc t of t h e busi nes s of t he peopl e i n t he gover n m ent a l se c t o r . Id. a t 892. W h ile Dorrier

provi des i nsi ght i n t o t he A c t , i t does no t address t he part i cul ar i s s ue before t h i s court . T h e cas e of Northwest

Georgia Health Sys., Inc. v. Times-Journal, Inc. , 461 S. E . 2d 297 ( G

a . A pp. 1995) i s i nst ruct i ve on t h i s i s s ue. T here, t he M ari e t t a D a i l y Jour n a l fi l ed sui t al l egi ng that t he N ort h w est G eorgi a H eal t h S y s t e m , I nc. and Pr o m i na H eal t h Syst e m , I nc. vi o l a t ed t he G eor g i a O pen M eet i ngs Act by r e f usi ng t o hol d publ i c m eet i ngs. Id. at 298. Prom i n a w as the sole m e m b e r of N orthw est G e o rgia H e a l t h S ystem s .N orthw est w as a “ p r i vat e , nonpr o f i t G eor g i a cor por a t i on . . .or gani zed ‘ f o r t he bene f i t of , t o per f o r m t he f unct i ons of , or t o car r y out t he pur pose s of ’ ” sever a l loca l cou nty h osp i t als. Prom i na cha r act e r i zed i t s e l f as a hol d i ng com pany and pa r ent cor por a t i o n o f N o rth w e st. F u r t her, N o r t h w e s t ’ s boa r d of t r ust ees w e r e nom i nat ed by N o r t h w e s t ’ s boa r d and appr o ved by Pr o m i na’ s boa r d . Fi nal l y , t h e only t a x dol l a r s Nort h w e s t r ece i ved w e r e count y fun ds re i m b u rsi n g N orthw est for pro viding indige nt ca re. T h e s e reim b u rsem e n ts am o u nted to l ess tha n tw o (2 ) pe rcen t of N orthw est’s r e v e n u e s . Id. at 298- 99. T h e G eor g i a Court of A ppeal s he l d t hat N o r t h w e s t w a s a publ i c age ncy be caus e i t s “ subs i d i a r y hospi t a l cor por a t i ons contr act ual l y agree d t o op erate p u b l i c h osp i t al au thorit y a ssets for t h e pu bli c g o o d a n d N orthw est’s s t a t e m ent of cor porat e purpose i s ( i n part ) t o op era t e t hose asset s for t he ben efi t ...of publi c hospit a l aut hori t i es. ” Id. a t 300. C itin g t he G eor g i a Supr e m e Court , 8 t he cou r t of appeal s s

t a t ed “t hat an enti t y t o w h ich a pu b l i c agency had del egat e d its o f f i c i a l re s p o n sib ilitie s a n d a u t h o rity w a s th e v e h i c l e b y w h i c h th e a g e n c y c a r r i e d o u t its r e s p o n sib ilitie s and . . . w as s ubject t o t he O pen M eet i ngs A c t . ” Id. Fi nal l y , t he cour t concl uded: W i t hout ques t i on, t hes e pr i vat e , nonpr o f i t corporat i ons becam e t he veh i c l e t h r oug h w h ich t he pu b l i c hospit a l aut hori t i es car r i ed ou t t hei r of f i c i a l r e s p o n sib ilitie s . C onse quent l y , des p i t e t he pr i vat e , nonpr o f i t st a t us of def endant s N ort h w est and P rom i na and t hei r s ubsi d i ary hospi t a l cor por a t i ons, t he t r i a l cour t i n t he case sub j udice w

as aut hori zed t o con c l ude o n t he fact s bef ore i t th a t N ort h w est an d P rom ina, as ve hicles f or publi c agencies , w ere subj ect t o t he [O pen M e e tin g s ] A c t. . . .9

Id. (citation

o m i t ted ) . I n ad d i t i on t o t he f o r egoi ng cas e , t he ca s e of Finister v. Humboldt Gen. Hosp., Inc. , 970 S. W . 2 d 435 ( Tenn. 1998)

pr ovi d e s f u r t her i nsi ght i n t o t he i s s ue bef o r e us .I n Finister ,

M a r y Fi n i s t e r f i l ed s u i t se eki n g w orker s ’ com pens a t i o n benefi t s fr o m H u m boldt G eneral .H u m boldt G eneral cl a i m ed i m m unit y un der t he T ennessee W orker s ’ C o m pensat i on A c t , T . C . A .§ 50 -6- 106 (5) , w h ich st a t es: “[t ]he W orker s ’ C o m pensat i on A c t sha l l not appl y to . . .[t ]he stat e o f T e n n e ssee, co u n t i es the reo f an d m u n ici p a l corp ora t i o n s . ” H u m bol d t G ener a l and H P occupy i dent i cal posi t i ons in re l a tio n to th e D istr i c t. H u m b o l d t G e n e r a l, lik e H P , i s a cr eat i on of t he J acks on- M adi son Count y H o s p ita l D istr i c t. It w a s o r g a n i z e d in 1 9 9 1 , a n d th e D istr i c t is its so l e m e m ber. In def ense t o F i n i s t er’ s w orker s ’ com pensat i on clai m , H u m boldt G eneral “ar gued th a t it is a su b sid i a r y o f th e exem p t H o s p ita l D istr i c t a n d as a r esul t , i t i s al so exem p t fr o m t he W orker s [ s i c] Co m pensat i on L a w s . ” Id. at 437. F i n i s t e r ar gued t hat nei t her t he D i s t r i c t nor H u m bol d t G ener a l w e r e exe m p t . T h e C ourt det erm i ned that t he D i s t r i c t w as not covered by t he W orker s ’ Co m pensat i o n A c t .R e l y i ng on Johnson v. Chattanooga-Hamilto n County Hosp. Auth. ,

749 S. W . 2d 36 ( Tenn. 1988) ,

t he Court f ound t hat “a l egi s l a t i vel y cr eat ed non- p r o f i t H ospi t a l D i s t r i c t w h i ch ac t s on be h a lf of a g o vernm ent a l ent i t y and w h ic h per f o r m s a gover n m ent a l f unct i on i s a ‘ m uni c i pal cor por a t i on’ w i t h i n t he m eani ng of t he s t a t u t o r y exem p t i on pr o v i s i on. ” Finister , 970 S. W . 2d at 438.The C

our t f ound th a t th e D istr i c t in t ended t o and does “ac t on behal f of and f o r t h e benefi t of M adi son C oun t y and t he C i t y of Jackson.

” T he C ourt hel d t hat t he D i s t r i c t w a s a m uni c i pal cor por a t i o n and exem p t fr o m w orker s ’ com pensat i on u nder t he st a t u t e . Id. a t 439 . The C our t concl uded t hat a s ubsi d i a r y of a m unici pal corporat i on is , i n essence, “a di v i s i on o r depar t m ent of t he S t a t e or count y or m uni c i pal cor por a t i on, ” and t h e statu tory ex e m pti o n ap pli e d to suc h d ivi sions a n d de p a r t m e n ts. Id .Sever

a l f act o r s c onvi nced t he Court t hat H u m bol d t G eneral w as, i n fact , a subsi d i ary of t he D i s t r i c t .Fir s t , t he C ourt noted t hat t he D i s t r i c t organi zed H u m boldt G eneral a s a non- p r o f i t , publ i c bene f i t cor por a t i on.Second, t he Board of T rus t ees of H u m boldt G eneral and the D i s t r i c t w ere i denti cal .T h i rd, t he bo ard m e m bers rec e i ved n o com pensat i on an d w ere sel ect e d by co u n ty an d c i t y o ffi cials. Fourt h , none of H u m bol d t G ener a l ’ s ne t ear n i ngs were di s t r i but ed t o any pr i vat e per son or ent i t y . Fi f t h , upon di s s o l u t i on, t h e D istr i c t w oul d r ece i ve any ne t as s e t s . I n addi t i on t o t he f o r egoi ng, t he Court found tw o fact ors very pers uasi ve. First, the Tennessee General Assembly has provided:

T h e m i s s i on and pur pose of t he J acks on-M adi son Co unt y G eneral H ospi t a l D istr i c t sh all b e fo r t he bene f i t of t he Cit y of Ja cks on, Tenness ee a nd M adi son C ount y , T ennessee, t o provide, on a f ee- f o r - s e r v i ce ba s i s wit h due r egar d f o r t h e needs of l o w - i ncom e and indi gen t pat i ent s , t he ful l range of heal

t h care. . . . Each nonprofit corporati on of which such hospital dis trict is the sole member existing when this amendment

becomes law or thereafter

created, shall be deemed a subsidiary entity of such10 hospital district created by

this a ct and s

hal l be a gove r n m ent a l ent i t y for purposes of t

he T ennessee G overnm ent a l T ort L i abi l i t y A c t .... C hapter 165, Pri vat e A c t s of 1992 ( e m phas i s a dded) .Secondl

y , H u m b o ldt G e n eral’s corp ora te ch arter em p o w ers it t o : “f u r n i sh a f f o r dabl e an d m ore ac c e ssi ble h e a l t h c are a n d serv ices to the c i t izen s of the C i t y of Ja cks on and M adi son C ount y as ‘ a gover n m ent a l i nst r u m ent a l i t y f o r t h e excl usi ve ben efi t of t he Jackson-M

adi son C oun t y H ospi t a l D i s t r i c t . ’ ” Finister, 970 S. W

. 2d at 439- 40. Finister w

a s conce r ned w i t h t h e appl i cat i on of t he w o r ker s ’ com pens a t i on l a w and t h e exem p t i on aff orded t o , am ong ot hers , m uni c i pal cor por a t i ons. H o w ever , w e bel i eve t hat i f t he D i s t r i c t i s a m uni c i pal cor por a t i o n fo r th e purposes of the w ork ers’ co m p ensa t i o n law , it is al s o a m unici pal cor por a t i on and a publ

i c body as r e f e r r ed t o i n T. C . A . § 8- 44- 102 ( 1993 &

Supp. 199 8). Fu r t herm ore, t he si m i l ari t i es of H P in t he i nst ant case and H u m boldt G eneral in th e Finister case ar

e re adi l y app are n t .H P is a non prof i t corporat i on w i t h t he D i s t r i c t as i t s onl y m e m ber, and i s deem e d a subs i d i a r y ent i t y of t he D i s t r i c t by C hapt e r 165, Pri vat e A c t s 1992. T he corporat e chart er of H P clear l y st a t es t hat it w a s crea ted a s “a go v e rnm e n t i nstrum e n tal i t y o f t h e Jac kso n-M a d ison C o u nty G eneral H o s p ita l D i s tri c t.” H P ’ s exi s t ence i s pr e m i s e d on t he i dea tha t i t w i l l furth er “ the statu tory m issio n o f the [D istri ct] to m a k e q u ality h e a l t h ca r e avai l abl e t o t he pu b l i c at rea sonable cost s . ” O t her fac t ors are al so pert i nent. H P co m m i ngled f und s w i t h t he D i s t r i c t , and H P ev en al l o w ed i t s f und s and bookkeepi n g t o be handl ed by t he ac count i ng depar t m ent of t he D i s t r i c t .H P funds w e r e depos i t ed and i nvest e d in th e sam e m anner as f u nds of t he D i s t r i ct. F urthe r m ore , the D ist r i ct ap p o int e d the m e m b e rs of H P ’s B o a rd, and these m e m bers r ece i ved no com pens a t i on.Fi nal l y , i n or ar ound 1992, t he D i s t r i c t gave H P $400, 0 0 0 i n se ed ca p i t a l and ext ended a $500, 000 l i ne of cr edi t . A fte r e x a m inin g all the rele v a n t fac tors , w e fin d tha t H P is a s u b sid iary o f the D istri ct. A su b sid iary o f a n exem p t m uni c i pal cor por a t i on l i k e t he D i s t r i c t i s “com parabl e t o a di v i s i on o r depar t m ent of t he S t a t e or county. ” See Finister , 970 S. W . 2 d at 439 .W e agree w i t h t he G eor g i a Court of A ppeal s r eas oni ng i n Times-Journal

and hol d t hat subs i d i a r i e s t o w h i ch m uni c i pal cor por a t i ons have d e l egat ed t hei r of f i c i a l res pon s i b i l i t i es and authori

t y are s ubject t o t he O pen M eet i ngs A c t . See Northwest Georgia Health Sys. v. Times-Journal, Inc. , 461 S. E . 2d 297 ( G a . A pp. 1995). W i t h t he for egoing, w e conclude t hat H P is subj ect t o t he provis i ons and requi rem ent s of t he A c t , and t he m eet i ng of i t s gove r n i ng body ar e publ i c m eet i ngs. T. C . A .§ 8- 44- 102 ( 1993 &

Supp. 1998) . Decision of the Boa

rd of Directors

or of Management N ext , H P asser t s t hat even if t he A c t i s appl i cable , So uder canno t

cl a i m t hat t he P P A w as t erm i nat e d i n v i o l a t i on of t h e Ac t beca use t he ac t ual deci s i on t o t e r m i nat e t he PPA w a s i ndepende n t l y m ade by H P’s m anage m ent ,11

not i t s B oard of D i rec t ors .H P co n t ends t hat t he P P A contai ned a p rovi s i on that al l o w e d ei t her par t y t o t e r m i nat e t h e agr eem ent w i t h or w i t hout caus e , and t hat such provis i on w as exer c i sed by H P’s m anagem ent i n a l e t t er t o So uder dat e d January 31, 199 7 no t

i fyi ng h i m t hat t he P P A w as t erm i nat ed pu r s uant t o t he provis i on in t he P P A al l o w i ng such . H P ’ s content i on that t h i s w as a m anagem ent deci s i on is w i t hou t m eri t . From t he fac ts in th e re c o r d , it is obvi ous t hat t he dec i s i on t o l i m i t the n etw ork thereb y term inati n g S o u d e r’s PP A , i n add i t i on to t he con t rac t s of ot her physi c i ans , wa s m ade by H P’s B oard of D i rec t ors .In t he l e t t er s ent t o S oud e r f r o m H P dat ed N ovem ber 26, 1996, i t is state d tha t “[t]h e b o ard o f d irec tors o f H eal t h P art ners rec ent l y app roved act i ons w h ich off er a n exclusi ve provider r e l a t i onshi p t o t he W est T ennessee A l l i ance for H eal t hcare. ” T he l e t t er c onti nues by st a t i ng t hat “[ b ] eca use of t he above descr i bed deci s i on, w e ar e her eby not i f y i ng you t hat your exi s t i ng cont r act w i t h H eal t h Par t ner s wil l not be r enew ed. ” T h i s letter re fers t o act i on t aken by t he Board of D i r ect o r s t h r ough a w r i t t en cons ent r e s o l u t i o n to lim i t H P ’s n etw o r k . F u r t herm ore, on Janu ary 9, 199 7 , t he B oard of D i rec t ors of H P ad opted a r esol u t i on in w h ic h it re sta t e d t he abo ve po l i c y o f li m i t ing H P ’s n etw o r k i n M adi son Cou n t y . I n addi t i on t o t he N ovem ber 26, 1996 l e t t e r and t he J anuar y 9, 1997 r e s o l u t i on, an aff i davit , of M i chael G raf t on, V i ce Presi dent f or Fi scal A f f a irs a n d C h i e f F i n a n c i a l O f f i c e r o f th e D istr i c t , s t a t ed t hat t he Board of D i r ect o r s of H P m ade t he dec i s i on t o l i m i t i t s ne t w o r k . I n cons i der a t i on of t he f o r egoi ng i t e m s , i t appea r s t o t h i s Court t hat t he dec i s i on t o l i m i t H P’s net w o r k t her eby r e q u irin g th e te r m i n a tio n of Soud e r ’ s PPA w a s m ade by t he Board of D i r ect o r s of H P . The cont ent i on of H P t hat t h i s w a s a m anage m ent deci s i on i s unt enabl e in t h e face of the facts prese nted .T h u s , w e agr ee w i t h t he Chancel l o r i n hi s concl usi o n t hat t he “a c t i o n s r e f e r ence d i n t he J anuar y 31, 1997 l e t t e r ...m ake i t cl ear t hat t he t e r m i nat i on of t h e phy s i c i a n part i c i pat i on ag ree m ent w as ent i rel y con s i s t ent w i t h , and w as r equir ed by , t he ac t i on of t he boar d of di r ect o r s of H eal t h P art ners , Inc. ” Ratification H P fur t her as s e r t s t hat i f i t i s s ubj ect t o t he A c t and t hat t he ac t i on of t he Board of D i r ect o r s r e s u l t ed i n t h e t erm i nat i on o f Soud er’ s PP A , So uder has no basi s f

or r e l i ef because any vi o l a t

i on o f t he A c t has been cu red by t h e s u b s e q u e n t ra tific a tio n o f a ll a c tio n s o f H P ’ s B o a r d o f D ire c t o r s b y th e B o a r d o f T r u ste e s o f th e D istr i c t in a m e e tin g hel d i n com p l i ance w i t h t he A c t . A s pr evi ousl y st a t ed, T. C . A .§ 8- 44- 105 pr

ovi des t hat “[ a ] ny act i on t aken a t a m eet i ng i n vi o l a t i on of [ t h e A c t ] sha l l be voi d and of no ef f ect . ” H o w ever , i t w a s not t he i n t ent of t he l egi s l a t u r e t o f o r ever bar a gover n i n g bod y fr o m rat i fyi ng a p r i or deci s i on m ade i n viol a t i on o f t he A c t . Neese v. Paris Spe

cial Sch. Dist. ,

813 S . W . 2d 432, 436 ( Tenn. A

pp.1990) .O

n t he ot her hand, i t w a s not t he i n t ent of t he l egi s l a t u r e t o al l o w a gover n i n g bod y t o rat i fy a deci s i on in a subsequent m

eet i ng b y a “perf unctor y cryst a l l i zat i on” o f i t s pr evi ous act i on. Id.9 The record was deficient w ith regard to a copy of the notice of the July 29, 1997 meeting of the Board of Trustees of the District. 12 R athe r , “the pu rpo se o f t h e ac t i s sati sfi e d if the u l t i m ate d e c isi o n is m a d e in a c c ord a n c e w i t h the [A ct], an d if i t i s a new and sub s t ant i a l rec onsi derat i on o f t he i s s ues i nvo l ved, i n w h ich t he pu b l i c i s af for ded am p l e opp ort unit y t o kno w t he fact s and t o be h ear d w i t h ref ere nce t o t he m a t t ers at i s s ue. ” Id. C oncedi ng t hat t he ac t i on of t he Board of D i r ect o r s c oul d have be en r a t i f i ed t h r ough t he s ubse quent act i o n of t he B oard of Trust

ees, So uder ass ert s t hat t he Jul y 29 , 199 7 m eet i ng o f t he B oard of Trust

ees of t he D i s t r i c t fai l e d t o cur e any pr evi ous vi o l a t i on of t he A c t i n t hat not i ce of t he m eet i ng w a s not i n com p l i ance w i t h t he pr ovi s i ons of t he A c t .Souder cont ends t hat t he not i ce f a i l ed t o m ent i on any cont ent of t he m eet i ng and f a i l ed t o gi ve t he publ i c any n o t i ce of w hat i s s ues w ould be dis cussed at such m eet i ng. Thu s , si nce no t i ce of t he m eet i ng w as def ect i ve, t h e act i on o f t he B oard of Trust

ees f a i l ed t o com p l y w i t h t he A c t t hereby renderi

ng such act i on v o i d and of no eff ect . T . C . A .§ 8-44-103 p

rovi des t hat “adequ a t e pub l i c noti ce” m ust be given of m

eet i ngs by t he go vernm ent a l bod y ho l d i ng such m eet i ngs be it a re gular or s peci a l m eet i ng. I n con s i deri ng the phrase “

adequ a t e pub l i c noti ce, ” t he Tennes s e e Supr e m e Court has obse r ved: W e t h i nk it i s i m possi b l e t o for m u l a t e a general rul e i n regar d t o w hat t he ph ras e “adequ a t e pub l i c noti ce” m e a ns. H o w e ver , ...adequa t e publ i c not i ce m eans adequ a t e pub l i c noti ce und er t he ci rcum s t ances, or s uch n o t i ce based on t h e t o t a l i t y of t he ci rcum s t ances as w ould f a i r l y i nfor m t he pu b l i c . Memphis Publ’g Co. v. C ity of Memphis ,

513 S. W . 2d 511, 513 ( Tenn. 1974) . Thus, t he ci rcum s t ances of eac h cas e m ust be t aken i n t o acc ount i n or der t o det e r m i n e t he ade quacy of t he not i ce gi ven. A ccor d i n g to t he fact s as pres ent ed i n t he recor d , t he B oard of Trust

ees of t he D i s t r i c t hel d a m eet i ng on Jul y 29, 1997, i n w h ich t he B oard of Trust

ees am ended t he chart er of H P m aki ng the B oard of Trust

ees of t he D i s t r i c t th e B oard of Trus t ees of H P. Furt herm ore, t he B oard of Trust

ees r a t i f i ed and confi r m e d al l act i ons of t he previ ous B oard o f D irec tors o f H P and t he m anage m ent of H P “i ncl udi ng w i t hout l i m i t a t i on t he l e t t i ng and t e r m i nat i on of cont r act s of a l l ki nds. ” T he B oard of Trust

ees annou nced thi s m eet i ng to t he pu b l i c by m a i l i ng n o t i ce of t he m eet i ng to t he l ocal new spaper, l ocal r adi o st a t i ons, and t he l ocal t e l evi s i on st a t i on appr oxi m a t e l y ei ght days bef o r e t he m eet i n g w as hel d . A ccor d i n g t o Souder ’ s br i e f , t he not i ce of t he m eet i ng, w h i ch Souder cont ends do e s not cons t i t u t e ade quat e publ i c noti ce, stat e d , “[t] h e bo ard of trustees o f W est T e n n e ssee H e a l t h c are w i l l m e e t i n the cit y-c o u nty c o n feren c e of Ja c k son - M adi son Count y G ener a l H ospi t a l at 5: 00 p. m .on Tuesday,

___________. ” 9 W h i l e t he A c t requi res al l m eet i ngs of ent i t i es s ubject t o t he A c t be op en t o t he pu b l i c , i t does no t guarant e e a l l cit izen s the right to pa

r t ici p a te i n the m e e t i n g s . Whittemore v. Brentwood Planning Comm’n , 83 513

S . W . 2d 11, 18 ( Tenn. A

pp.1992) . [ T ] h e noti c e r equi r ed b y T e n n. C o d e A n n .§ 8 -44 -10 3 is suffici e n t as l o n g a s it g i ves i n t e r e s t ed ci t i zens a r eas onabl e oppor t uni t y t o exer c i s e t h e i r r i g h t to b e p r e s ent at a gov erni ng b ody ’ s m eet i n g .The not i ce ne ed not i nvi t e publ i c p a r t ici p a t i o n in a p u b l i c m e e t i n g in ord er to sati sfy the [A ct’s] req uirem e n ts. State ex rel. Akin v. Town of Kingston Springs , N

o . 01- A - 01- 9209- C H 00360, 1993 W L 339305, at

*5 ( Tenn. A pp.M . S . Sept .8, 1993) . I n vi e w of t he t o t a l i t y of t he ci r cum s t ance s , t he not i ce of t he m eet i ng com por t s w i t h t he provis i ons of t he A c t . N o tic e w as gi ven to t he m edi a i n order t o not i f y t he publ i c of t he m eet i ng.The not

i ce pr ovi ded t he publ i c w i t h a r eas onabl e oppor t uni t y t o be p res ent at t he m eet i ng. I n fact , acc o r d i ng t o t he m i nut e s of t he m eet i ng, m e m ber s of t h e m edi a and the publi

c w ere i n at t endan ce at t he m eet i ng. Furt herm ore, w h i l e So uder prot

est s t he con t ent s of t he no t i c e i n not r e f e r r i ng t o t he pr opose d act i on of l i m i t i ng t he phys i c i an net w o r k , t he m eet i n g w a s n o t lim ite d to th i s sol e subj ect . T h e agend a of t he m eet i ng p res ent ed several di f f ere n t are as r egardi ng the busi ness o f th e D istr i c t. T h u s, f a ilin g to speci f i cal l y st a t e i n t he not i ce t he i s s u e conce r n i ng H P di d not m ake t h e noti ce i nadeq uat e i n l i ght of t he several purposes o f t he m eet i ng. W e ar e of t he op i n ion that noti ce w as gi ven w h i ch “w oul d f a i r l y i n f o r m t he publ i c” unde r t h e circum stanc es. W h ile t he no t i ce m ay com port w i t h t he A c t , w e fi nd that t he rat i f i cat i on an d con f i r m a t i on o f al l act i ons of t h e B oard o f D irec tors of H P by t he Board of Trus t ees of t h e D istr i c t w a s m e r e l y a p e r f u n c t o r y ru b b e r s t a m p th e r e b y fa ilin g t o cur e t he pr evi ous vi o l a t i ons of t he A c t .A ccor d i ng t o t he m i nut e s of t he J u l y 29, 1997 m eet i ng, t he onl y r e s o l u t i o n per t a i n i n g t o H P t hat w a s r a i s e d dur i ng t he m eet i ng i n di s c uss i o n w as t he est abl i shm ent of t he Board of Trus t ees of t h e D istr i c t as t he B oard f or H P. The m i nutes st a t e t hat “M r . M oss expl a i ned to t he B oard t he pu rpose of reor gani z i n g H eal t h Part ners w h ic h w ill e sta b lish t he D i s t r i c t ’ s B oard of Trust

ees as t he B oard f or H eal t h P art ners as out l i ned in t h e r e s o l u t i o n pr e s ent ed. D r .N e w ell m a d e a m oti o n to ap pro v e , sec o n d e d b y M r . M a n sfi eld a n d the B o a rd u n a nim o u sly approved . ” T here w a s no di s c uss i on by t he Board of Trus t ees per t a i n i ng t o th e l i m i t a t i on of H P’s physi c i an net w o r k p r evi ousl y adop t ed by t he B oard of D i rec t ors of H P. A s pr evi ousl y st a t ed, t he ado p t ed r e sol u t i on of t he Board of T rus t ees m ere l y st a t es t hat al l act i ons of t he B o a r d of D i r ect o r s of H P ar e r a t i f i ed and c onf i r m ed i ncl udi ng t h e t e r m i n a tio n of al l contr act s . Since t here w as no dis cussi on o f t he m a t t er of l i m i t i ng the net w ork and the onl

y m ent i o n o f suc h i s t he adopt ed r e s o l u t i on of w h i ch t her e is n o evi dence o f any di scuss

i on o n t he m a t t er, t he act i on o f t he B oard of T rustees is m erely a “p erfun ctory cry stal l i z a t i o n ” o f t h e de cisi o n m a d e b y the B o a rd o f D i r e c tors. I n th a t th e B oard of Trust

ees f a i l ed t o give “new and sub s t ant i a l rec onsi derat i on” o f t he act i ons t aken b y t h e14

B oard of D i rec t ors , t he act i on o f t he B oard of Trust

ees w as a s ubter fuge and n o t h i ng m ore t han a m e r e r a t i f i cat i on of t he previ ous act i ons t aken i n cont r avent i on of t he A c t .A s s uch, t h e act i ons of t he Board of Trus t ees di d not cur e t h e p r evi ous vi o l a t i ons of t he A c t by t he Board of D i r ect o r s . There f o r e , t he ac t i on by t he Board of D i r ect o r s i s voi d and of n o e ffect and rem ains su c h since it w as n ot cu red by the a cti o n s of the B o a rd o f T rustees. Injunction The Fina l Judgm ent and I n j unct i o n of t he C hancell or pr ovides i n pert i nent par t : 4 .Pri o r t o any ac t i o n t aken b y t he curr ent board of H eal t h P art ners , Inc. agai nst t h e contr a c t ual i n t ere s t s of D r . So uder t o be eff ect i ve, H eal t h P art ners , Inc. , beca use of its h i s t o r y of i gnor i ng t he cl ear r equi r e m ent s of t he O pen M eet i ngs A c t , m ust es t abl i sh, t o t he s a t i s f act i on of t h i s C our t , t hat suc h act i ons w ere t aken i n ful l com p l i ance w i t h t he requi rem ent s of t he O pen M eet i ngs A c t . U n til su c h a det erm i n a tio n occurs, al l pref err ed provider agreem ent s bet w een H eal t h Part ners , Inc. and an y part i c i pat i n g provi der s hal l rem a i n i n eff ect unti l t hey e x pire b y o p e rati o n of the i r ow n term s . 5 .T h i s C ourt shal l ret a i n j uri sdi c t i on o ver t he part i e s heret o , and H eal t h Part ners , Inc. shal l r epor t t o t h i s Court i n w r i t i ng ev ery s i x m onths f or a per i od o f one year f r o m t he dat e of t he ent r y of th i s O rder w i t h regar d t o t he fact of i t s com p l i ance o f t he O pen M eet i ngs A c t ....H eal t h P a r t n e r s , I nc. i s he r eby r e s t r a i ned f r o m v io l a t i ng an y of t he requi rem ent s of t he O pen M eet i ngs A c t .... H P clai m s t hat t he i n j uncti on is i m perm i s s i b l y broad in t hat i t w ent fur t her t han n ecess ary t o grant So uder rel i ef, t he on l y plai n t i f f befor e t he cou r t .H P co n t ends t hat t he C hancell or overs t epped hi s j uri sdi c t i on b y grant i n g such a broad inj

uncti on d espi t e t he fact t hat So uder never t

ook st eps t o hav e t he case cer t i f i ed as a cl ass act i on. F u r t herm ore, H P asser t s t hat t here i s not h i ng in t he recor d t o i ndicat e t hat ot her physi c i ans w hose P P A s w ere t erm i nat ed hav e any d esi re t o rem a i n m e m bers of H P. I n add i t i on, H P co n t ends t hat t he i n j uncti on is i n t ernal l y i ncon s i s t ent i n t hat i t decl are s al l act i ons ever t aken b y H P’s B oard of D i rec t ors null and v o i d t hereby vo i d i ng all P P A s ent ere d i n t o by H P w h i l e si m u l t aneou s l y requi r i ng that al l PP A s r e m a i n i n eff ect . T . C . A .§ 8-44-106 p

rovi des i n pert i nent par t : (a) T he ci rcui t court s , ch ance r y c our t s , and ot her cour t s whic h have e qui t y j u ris d i c tio n , have j u r i sdi c t i on t o iss u e i n j unct i ons, i m p o se p e n alt ies, an d o therw ise enfor ce t he pu rposes of [ t he A c t ] upon ap p l i cat i on o f any ci t i zen of t h i s s t a t e . * * * ( c ) The cour t sha l l per m anent l y enj o i n any per son a d j udged by it in v i o l a tio n of [th e A c t] f r o m fu rth e r v i o l a tio n o f [ t h e A c t]. E a c h separ a t e occurr ence of such m eet i ngs no t hel d i n accordance w

i t h t h i s par t const i t u t es a s eparat e vi o l a t i on. ( d ) The fi nal j udgm ent or decr ee i n eac h s u it sh a l l st a t e t hat t he cour t r e t a i n s j uri sdi c t i on o ver t he part i es and subject

m a tte r f o r a p e rio d of one ( 1 ) year f r o m dat e of ent ry, and the court

shal l o r d e r t he def endant s t o r epor t i n w r i t i n g sem i annu a l l y t o t he cou r t of t hei r com p l i ance w i t h [t he A c t ] . W e agr ee w i t h t h e Chancel l o r i n Par agr aph 5 of t he above - quot ed por t i on of t he i n j unct i on.This se c t i on i s i n keepi ng w i t h t he pr ovi s i ons of T. C . A .§ 8- 44- 106( c )

- ( d ) .O n t he ot her hand, Par agr aph 4 of t he above - quot ed por t i o n15

i s und u l y broad in i t s r each. So uder w

a s t he onl y pl a i n t i f f bef o r e t he Chancel l o r .A s s uch, t he i n j unct i on af f ect i n g al l p refe rred provi der agr eem ent s i s i m perm i s s i b l y broad because i t goes w e l l beyo nd w hat i s necess ary t o aff ord So uder r e lie f as t he on l y pl a i n t i f f i nvol ved i n t he l a w sui t . Furt her m o r e , Par agr aph 4 i s que s t i onabl e in th a t it sta t e s th a t “ [ p ] r i o r t o any ac t i on t aken . . . H eal t h P art ners , Inc. ...m ust est abl i sh . ..t hat such act i ons w ere t aken in f u l l com p l i ance” w i t h t h e A c t .T h i s par agraph i s unw

orkabl e and u nnecessar y . Paragraph 5 provides t

he proper m echa n i s m fo r as s u ring com p l i ance w i t h t he A c t i n t he for m of a cont e m p t act i on if t he A c t i s vi o l a t ed by H P in t he fut ure. W e cons t r u e t he j udgm ent t o per m anent l y enjo i n H P f r o m f u r t her vi o l a t i ons of t he A c t as r equi r ed by T. C . A . § 8-44-106(c) .T

heref ore, the jud g m e n t shall be m o d i f ied to e l i m inate P arag rap h 4 .T h u s , H P i s e n j o i ned f r o m vi o l a t i n g any of t he r equi r e m ent s of t he A c t and s hal l r epor t t o t he Chancel l o r as pr ovi ded f o r i n Par agr aph 5. Conclusion T he j udg m ent of t he C hancell or, as m odif i ed i n regar d t o t he i n j uncti on, i s af f i r m e d , and the case is remanded for such further proceedings as necessary. Costs of appeal are a ssessed against the appellants.

_________________________________ W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S. CONCUR:

____________________________________ ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE

____________________________________ HERSCHEL P. FRANKS, JU DGE