### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 16

- 3766
N APERVILLE S MART M ETER A WARENESS , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v.

C ITY OF N APERVILLE , Defendant

- Appellee

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois , Eastern Division. No. 11 C 9299

— John Z. Lee , Judge

.

____________________
A RGUED M ARCH 27, 2018

— D ECIDED A UGUST 16, 2018

____________________

Before W OOD , Chief Judge , and B AUER and K ANNE , Circuit Judges

. K ANNE , Circuit Judge

. The City of N aperville owns and operates a public utility that provides electricity to the city ’ s residents. The utility collects resident s ’ ene rgy

- co nsumption data at fifteen

- minute intervals

. It then stores the data fo r up to three years. This case presents the question whether Naperville ’ s collection of this data is reasonable under the Fourth2 No. 16

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Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 6 of the Illinois Constitution

. I. B ACKGROUND The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 set aside funds to modernize the Nation’s electric al grid. The Act tasked the Department of Energy with distributing these funds under the Smart Grid Investment Grant program. Th r ough this program, the City of Naperville was selected to receive $ 11 million to update its own grid . As part of these upgrades, Naperville began replacing its residential , analog energy meters with digital “sma rt meters.” Using traditional energy meters, utilities typically collect monthly energy consumption in a sin gle lump figure once per month. By contrast, smart meters record consumption much more frequently, often collecting thousands of readings every

mon th. Due to this frequency, smart meter s show both the amount of electricity being used inside a home and when that energy is used.
This data reveals information about the happenings inside a home. That is because individual appliances have distinct

ene rgy

- cons umption patterns or “load signa tures.” Ramyar Rashed Mohassel et al., A S urvey on Advanced Metering Infrastructure , 63 Int’l J. Electrical Power & Energy Systems 473, 478 (2014)

. A refrigerator, for instance, draws power differently than a television, res pirator, or indoor grow light. B y comparing longitudinal energy

- consumption data against a growing library of appliance load signatures, researche r s can predict the appliances that a re present in a home and when those appliances are used. See id.; A. Pr udenzi, A Neuron Nets Based Procedure for Identifying Domestic Appliances Pattern

- of

-No. 16

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Use from Energy Recordings at Meter Panel , 2 IEEE Power Engineering Soc ’ y Winter Meeting 941 (2002). The accuracy of these predictions depends, of course, on the frequency at which the data is collected and the sophistication of the tools used to analyze that data

. While some cities have allowed residents to decide whether to adopt smart meters, Naperville’s residents have little choice. If they want electricity in their h omes, they must buy it from the city’ s public utility. And t hey cannot opt out of the smart

- meter program

. 1 The meters the city inst alled collect residents’ energy

- usage data at fifteen

- minute intervals. Naperville then stores the data for up to three years. Naperville Smart Meter Awareness (“ Smart Meter Awareness”) , a group of concerned citizens , sued Naperville over the smart

- meter program . It allege s that Naperville’s smart meters reveal “intimate pers onal details of the City ’ s electric customers such as when people are home and when the homeis vacant, sleeping routines, eating routines, specific appliance types in the home and when used, and charging data for plug

- in vehicles that can be used to ident ify travel routines and history.” (R. 102

- 1 at 14.) The organization further allege s that collection of this data constitutes an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as well

1 Residents may request that Naperville replace their analog meters with “non

- wireless” smart meters. But these alternatives are smart meters with wireless transmission disabled. They collect equally rich data. The difference is that the data must be manuall y retrieved. (R. 117 at 3.)4 No. 16

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as an unreasonable search and invasion of priva cy under Article I, § 6 of the Illinois Constitution. 2
The district court dismissed two of Smart Meter Awareness’s complaints without prejudice. Smart Meter Awareness requested leave to file a third, but the district court denied that request . It reason e d that amending the complaint would be futile because even the proposed third amended complaint had not plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment violation or a violation of the Illinois Constitution. Smart Meter Awareness appealed. Because the district court d enied leave to amend on futility grounds, we apply the legal sufficiency standard of Rule 12(b)(6) de novo to determine if the proposed amend ed complaint fails to state a claim. See , e.g. , Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp. , 128 F.3d 1074, 1085 (7th Cir. 1997)

. II. A NALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Similarly, Article I, § 6 of the Illin ois Constitution affords people “ the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches,seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means .”
We ca n resolve both the state and federal constitutional claims by answering the following two questions

. 3 First, has

2 Smart Meter Awareness challenged the smart

- meter program on a number of other grounds that are not relevant to this appeal.

3 The Illinois Supreme Court applies “a ‘limited lockstep’ approach when interpreting cognate provisi ons of [the Illinois] and federal constitutions. ” See , e.g. , City of Chicago v. Alexander , 89 N.E.3d 707, 713 (Ill. 2017)No. 16

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the organization plausibly alleged that the data collection is a search? Second, is the search un reasonable? For the reasons that follow, we fi nd that the data collection constitutes a search under both the Fourth Amendmen t and the Illinois Constitution. This search, however, is reasonable. 4
A. The c ollection of smart

- meter data at fifteen

- minute intervals constitutes a search. “At the [Fourth Amendment’s] very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion.” Silverman v. United States , 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). This protection, though previously tied to common

- law trespass, now encompasses

(citing People v. Caballes , 851 N.E.2d 26 , 35

– 36 ( Ill. 2006)). Under this approach, the Illinois Supreme Court will interpret a provision of the IllinoisConstitution in the same way as a similar provision in the Federal Constitution absent certain exceptional circumstances. See Caballes , 851 N.E.2d at 31

– 46 ( tracing the development and appli cation of the limited lockstep approach). Here, our analysis focuses on two terms: “searches” and “unreasonable.” These terms appear in both documents in analogous fashion. Neither party has “made a case for an exception to the lockstep doctrine.” Id . at 46. And we see no reason for an exception. Thus, our analysis ofSmart Meter Awareness’s claim under the Fourth Amendment also resolves its claim under Article I, § 6 of Illinois Constitution.

4 Smart Meter Awareness also c laims that smart meters are an invasion of privacy under Article I, § 6 of the Illinois Constitution. It’s certainlypossible that this is the case. But the Illinois Supreme Court conducts reasonableness balancing for the invasion of privacy under the same framework as searches under the Fourth Amendment. In re May 1991 Will Cty. Grand Jury , 604 N.E.2d 929, 93 4

– 3 5 ( Ill. 1992). Even were we to find thatthe data collection was an invasion of privacy as well as a search, our reasonableness analysis for both c laims would be the same. We therefore decline to conduct the additional analysis.6 No. 16

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searches o f the home made possible by ever

- more sophisticated technology

. Kyllo v. United States , 533 U.S. 27, 31

– 32 (2001). A ny other rule would “erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.” Id . at 34

. “Where ... the Government us es a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that wouldpreviously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search

. ’” Id . at 40

. T h is protection remain s in force even when the enhancement s do not allow the g overnment to literally peer into the home . In Kyllo , for instance, the intrusion by way of thermal imaging was relatively crude

— it showed that “the roof over the garage and a side wall of [a] home were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially warmer th an neighboring homes in the tri plex.” Id . at 30 . The device “did not show any people or activity within the walls of the structure” nor could it “penetrate walls or windo ws to reveal conversations or human activities.” Id (quoting Supp.App. to Pet. for Cert. 39

– 40)

. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement had searched the home when they collected thermal images. Id . at 40

. The technology

- assisted data co llection that Smart Meter Awareness alleges here is at least as rich as that found to be a search in Kyllo . Indeed , the group alleges that energy

- consumption data collected at fifteen

- minute intervals reveals when people are h ome, when people are away, whe n people sleep and eat, what types of appliances are in the home , and when those appliances are used. 5 (R. 102

- 1 at 14.) By contrast,

5 Smart Meter Awareness direct ed the court to academic studies demonstratin g the revealing nature of smart

- meter data c ollected at fifteen

- minute intervals, s ee , e.g

. , Ramyar Rashed Mohassel et al.
, supra atNo. 16

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Kyllo merely revealed that something in the home was emitting a large amount of energy (in the form of heat).
It’s true t hat observers of smart

- meter data must make some inferences to conclude, for instance, that an occupant is showering, or eating, or sleeping. But Kyllo rejected the “extraordinary assertion that anything learned through ‘an inference’ cannot be a search.” Id . at 36 ( quoting id . at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting ) )

. What’s more, the data collected by Naperville can be used to draw the exact inference that troubled the Court in Kyllo

. There, law enforcement “concluded that [a home’s occupant] was using halide lights to grow marijuana in his house ” based on an excessive amount of energy coming from the home. Id . at 30. Here too, law enforcement could conclude that an occupant was using grow li ghts from incredibly high meter readings, particularly if the power was drawn at odd hours. In fact, t he data collected by Naperville could prove even more intrusive . By analyzing the energy consumption of a home over time in concer t with appliance load pr o fil es for grow lights, Naperville law enforcement could “conclude” that a resident was using the lights with more confidence than those using thermal imaging could ever hope for. With little effort, t hey could conduct this analysis for many homes over man y years. Under Kyllo , however, even an extremely invasive technology can evade the warrant requirement if it is “in general public use.” Id. at 40

. While more and more energy providers are encouraging (or in this case forcing) their customers to

478 ; A. Prudenzi, supra , and to commercially available products that can identify what appliances are used in a home and when they are used based
on smart

- meter data

. See Disaggregation , Ecotagious, https://www.ecotagious. com/disaggregation/ (last visited July 25, 2018)

.8 No. 16

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permit th e installation of smart meters, the meters a re not yet so pervasive that they fall into this class

. To be sure, t he exact contours of this qualifier are unclear

— since Kyllo, the Supreme Court has offered little guidance. But Kyllo itself suggests that the use of technology is not a search when the technology is both widely available and routinely used by the general public. See id. at 39 n.6 (quoting California v. Ciraolo ,476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (“In an age where private and commercial flight in the publi c airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants wereconstitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet.”) ) . Smart meters, by contrast, have been adopted only by a po rtion of a highly specialized industry.
The ever

- accelerating pace of technological development carries serious privacy implications

. Smart meter s are no exception. Their data, even when collected at fifteen

- minute intervals, reveals details about the hom e that would be otherwise unavailable to government officials with a physical search. Naperville therefore “searches” its residents’ home s when it collects this data. Before continuing, we address one wrinkle to the search analysis

. Naperville argues that the third

- party doctrine renders the Fourth Amendment’s protections irrelevant here. Under th at doctrine, a person surrenders her expectation of privacy in information by voluntarily sharing it with a third party. See Carpenter v. United States , 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (citing Smith v. Maryland , 442 U.S. 735, 743

– 744 (1979) and United States v. Miller , 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)) . Thus, when a government authority gathers the information from the thirdNo. 16

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party, it does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment

. Id

. Referencing this doctrine, Naperville argues that its citizens sacrifice t heir expectation of privacy in smart

- meter data by entering into a “ voluntary relationship” to purchase electric ity from the city

. This argument is unpersuasive . As a threshol d matter, Smart Meter Awareness challenges the collection of the data by Naperville’s public utility. There is no third party involved in th e exchange. 6 Moreover, were we to assume that Napervill e’s public utility was a third party , the doctrine would stil l provide Naperville no refuge

. T he t hird

- party doctrine rests

on “the notion that an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in information knowingly shared with another.” Carpenter , 138 S. Ct. at 2219. But i n this context, a choice to share data imposed by fiat is no choice at all. If a person does
not

— in any meaningful sense

— “voluntarily ‘assume the risk’of turning over a comprehensive dossier of physical movements” by choosing to use a cell phone, Carpente r , 138 S. Ct.
at 2220 (quoting Smith , 442 U.S. at 745), i t also goes that a home occupant does not assume the risk of near constant monitoring by choosing to have electricity in her home. We therefore doubt that Smith and Miller extend this far

.

6 This alone renders Naperville’s reference to the Eighth Circuit’s decision, United States v. McIntyre , 646 F.3d 1107 ( 8th Cir. 2011) , irrelevant

. Whereas here residents contest the utility’s initial collection of the data , McIntrye challenged law enforcement’s subsequent warrantless collection of traditional meter readings from the utility.10 No. 16

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B

. The da ta collection is a reasonable search

. That the data collection constitutes a search does not endour inquiry. Indeed, “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Florida v. Jimeno , 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991). Thus, if Naperville’s search i s reasonable, it may collect the data without a warrant. Since these searches are not performed as part of a criminal investigation, see Riley v. California , 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014), we can turn immediately to an assessment of whether they are reasonable, “by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court , 542 U.S. 177, 187

– 88 (2004) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 6 54 (1979)). Although in this case, our balancing begins with the presumption that this warrantless search is unreasonable, see Kyllo , 533 U.S. at 40, Naperville’s smart

- meter ordinance overcomes this presumption.

R esidents certainly have a privacy interest in thei r energy

consumption data. But its collection

— even if routine and frequent

— is far less invasive than the prototypical Fourth Amendment search of a home. Critically, Napervil le conducts the search with no prosecutorial intent

. Employees of the city’ s public utility

— not law enforcement

— collect and review the data.
In Camara v. Mun icipal Court , the Supreme Court noted th at this consideration lessen s an individual’s privacy interest

. 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967). And though the Court held that a warrantless, administrative, home inspection violated the Fourth Amendment in that case, it did so based on concerns largely absent from this one

. Id

. at 530

– 31. Indeed, u nlike the search in Camara , Naperville’s data collection reveals detailsNo. 16

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about the home with out physical entry. See id . at 531 (highlighting the “serious threat to personal and family security” posed by physical entry)

. Moreover, the risk of corollary prosecution that troubled the court in Camara is minimal here

. See id . (noting tha t “most regulatory laws, fire, health, and housing codes are enforced by criminal process.”)

. To this court’s knowledge, using too much electricity is not yet a crime in Naperville. And Naperville’s amended “Smart Grid Customer Bill of Rights” clarifies t hat the city’s public utility will not provide customer data to third parties, including law enforcement, without a warrant or court order. Thus, the privacy interest at stake here is yet more limited than that at issue in Camara

. Of course, even a lessened privacy interest must beweighed against the government’s interest in the data collection. That interest is substantial in this case . Indeed, the modernization of the electrical grid is a priority for both Naperville , (R. 120

- 1, Smart Meter Agree ment between Napervil le and the Department of Energy ) , and the Federal Government , s ee Smart Grid , Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Apr. 21, 2016) , https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus

act/sma rt

- grid.asp

. Smart meters play a crucial role in this transition. See id

. For instance, they allow utilities to restore service more quickly when power goes out precis ely because they provide energy

- consumption data at regular intervals. See
, e.g. , Noelia Uribe

- P é rez et al., State of the Art and Trends Review of Smart Metering in Electricity Grids , 6 Applied Sci. , no. 3, 2016, at 68, 82

. The meters also permit utilities to offer time

- based pricing, an innovation which reduces strain on the grid by encourag-12 No. 16

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ing consumers to shif t usage away from peak demand periods. Id. In addition, s mart meters reduce utilities ’ labor costs because home visits are needed less frequently. Id.
With these benefits stacked together, the government’s interest in smart meter s is significant

. Smart met ers allow utilities to reduce costs, provide cheaper power to consumers, encourage energy efficiency, and increase grid stability. We hold that these interests render the city’s search reasonable, where the search is unrelated to law enforcement, is minima lly invasive, and presents little risk of corollary criminal consequences. We caution, however, that our holding depends on the particular circumstances of this case. Were a city to collect the data at sh orter intervals, our conclusion could change. Likew ise, o ur conclusion might change if the data was more easily accessible to law enforcement or other city officials outside the utility.
III. C ONCLUSION Naperville coul d have avoided this controversy

— and may sti ll avoid future uncertainty

— by giving its residents a genuine opportunity to consent to the installation of smart meters, as many other utilities have. Nonetheless , Naperville ’ s warrantless coll ection of its residents ’ energy

- consumption data survives our review in this case

. Even when set to collect read ings at fifteen

- minute intervals, smart meters provide Naperville rich data. Accepting Smart Meter Awareness ’ s well

- pled allegations as true, this collection constitutes a search. But because of the significantNo. 16

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government interests in the program, and the diminished privacy interests at stake, the search is reasonable

. We therefore AFFIRM the district court ’ s denial of leave to amend.