### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5 -00 850 -CR

Tim ot hy Ric har d Wo oda ll , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WI LLIAM SO N COUNTY , 368TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 03- 401- K3 68 , HO NORAB LE B URT CARNES , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A j ur y c on vic te d a

pp e lla nt T imoth y Ri cha

rd Woo da ll o f f

e lony dr ivi ngwh ile in to xic a te d an d f

o u n d th a t h e u s e d th e v e h ic le h e w a s dr iv in g a s a d e a d ly w e apon during the commission of the offe nse. The tr ial court sente nced Woodall to ten y ear s in prison. I n two issues
on a pp e a l, Wo od a ll c on te nd s th a t (1) the e vid e nc e is le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the jur y ’s de a dly
wea pon finding , and (2) the trial court err ed by denying his re quested jury instruction expl aining the phrase “ca

pable of causingdeath or

s er ious bodily

injury ” as it per

tains to the definition of

“ de a dly we a po n. ” We a ff

ir m. At approximately

11:00 p.m. on the eveningof Februa ry 8, 2003, L arr

y Mey er w as d ri v i n g h ome on US 183 towards Ceda r Park. He testified that he sa w “a vehicle c ome off of McNe il and Spicewood Spring s exi t and hit some of the bar rels off to the side that merg ed onto 183 and then a lmost hi t the front of me .” Mey er the n observe d the vehicle “[c]ome back ove r into the2

lane that he wa s at and

the n h it the c ur

b on the ri g ht- ha

nd sid e of the ve hic le a

c ou ple of tim e s, jus t
sw e rv ingba c k a

nd fo rt h into i t.” At

thi s p oin t, Mey e r c a lle d 9 11 to r e po rt the ve hic le be c a

us e “it was obvious that something was wr ong ” and, a ccor ding to Me y er, “ there was no control of the
car . Imean somebody

was g oing to g et hurt, whe ther [t he driver of the vehicle ] or somebody else.” Whil e he wa s o n th e te le ph on e wi th 9 11 , M e y e r sa w the ve hic le , wi th its br a ke s “ loc ke d up ,” sk id to a stop in the middle of an interse ction wher e the lig ht was re d. After stopping in the middle of the intersec tion, the vehicle c ontinued to travel down the acc ess roa d.

Mey er f ollowed the vehicle to a restaur ant at US 183 and Hig hway 620 and followe d the dr ive r, late r i de nti fi e d a s T imo thy Woo da ll, ins ide the re sta ur ant. On c e ins ide the re sta ur ant, Mey er a pp ro ac h ed Austi n Police Depa rtment offic ers Rober

t Mitchell and Gre g Thornton, who ha pp e ne d to be e a tin g the re , a nd e xpla ine d th e sit

uatio n to the m. Me y e r t

he n id e nti fi e d Wo od a ll t o Of fi c e r M itc he ll a s th e dr ive r o f t he ve hic le tha

t ha d a lmo st h it h im. Offic er Mitche ll testified that he appr oache d Woodall, who was si t t i n g o n a benc h
ne ar the e ntr anc e of the re sta ur ant, and “ e xpla ine d to him

tha t so me bo dy

ha d s e e n h im d

ri vin g his
car n o rt h bound on 183, driving err atically , striking ba rre ls, striking the c urb, that kind of thing .” Woodall ini tially

denied that he had bee n driving and cla i m ed t h at he had taken a ta x i to the
re sta ur ant. Up on

fu rt he r q ue sti on ing , h ow e ve r, Woo da ll a dmi tte d th a t he ha d d ri ve n “h is SV U” to the re sta ur ant
. Of

fi c e r M itc he ll t e sti fi e d th a t, d ur ingthe ir

c on ve rs a tio n, Woo da ll h a d d if fi c ult y standing , smelled of alcohol, and sl urre d his speec h. Woodall eventually told Office r Mitchell that h e h adco n s u m eds i x b ee rs ea rl i er t h at ev en i n g.3 Outside the re staurant, Of fice r Mitchell inspecte d Woodall’s vehicle. He noticed
scra pes on the left front bumper “that may have been consistent with hitti ng the traf fic ba rre ls that Mr. Mey er ha d descr ibed.” Of fice r Mi tchell t hen adminis tere d field sobriety tests to Woodall, and conclude d that Woodall exhibi ted s igns of intox ication. At t his point, Officer Mitchell determined that Woodall “had lost the normal ability to function both mentally and phy sically

due to the introduction of alcohol into his sy stem” and a rre sted Woodall for driving while intox icated. Woodal l w a s in d ic te d

for f elony driving while intox icated. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 4 9
. 0 4 ( We s t 2 0 0 3 ) ( dr iv in g w h il e in to xic a te d ) , § 4 9
. 0 9 ( We s t S u p p . 2 0 0 8 ) ( e n h an c e d

o f f ense)
. The indictment included a penalty para g raph a lleg ing that Woodall had pr eviously been c onvicted of felony dri v in g w h il e in to xic a te d a s w e ll a s a

n o ti c e a ll e g in g th a t W o o d a ll h a d u s e d a motor vehicle a s a dea dly

wea pon during the commission of the cha rg ed off ense. O n October

10, 2005, Woo da ll w a s tr ie d be fo re a jur y on his ple a of no t g uil ty . T he State pr e se nte d mu lti ple wi tne sse s, a videotape from the nig ht of the ar rest, and Woodall’s criminal recor d. After the close of

evidenc e, Woodall subm itted a propose d jury instruction expl aining the phra se “c apable of ca using de ath or serious bodi ly injury ” as it perta ined t o the s tatutory definition of “deadly wea pon.” The trial court denied the pr oposed instruction. The jury returne d a guilty verdic t and made a

n aff irmative finding that Woodall used his motor vehicle as a dea dly wea pon during the commission of the offe nse. The trial court a ssessed punishment at ten y ear s in prison.

I n his first issue on appea l, Woodall contends that the evidence is l eg ally insufficient to support the jury ’s findi ng that he used his vehicle as a deadly wea pon during the commission of the of fe ns e . We re vie w the re c or d to det e rm ine wh e the r, a ft e r v ie wi ngthe e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t4

favor able to the State, a

ny rational trier of fact could have found bey ond a reasonable doubt that the vehicle was used as a deadly wea pon. Cat es v . S

tate , 102 S.W .3d 735, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A d e a dly we a po n is de fi ne d as “a

ny thi ng that in the mann e r of its us e or int e nd e d u se is capab le o f c a us in g deat h o r se ri ou s b od il y in ju ry .” T ex . P enal Co de A nn . § 1. 07 (a)(1 7)( B) (West Supp. 20 08). An a utomobile can be a

deadly wea pon if it is driven so as to be ca pable of causingdeath or

serious bodily

injury
. Cates , 1 02 S.W. 3d a t 73 8. Th e “ c a

pa bil ity” of c a us ingde a th
or ser ious bodily injury must be evaluated in light of the fac ts that actually exis ted while the f

elony DWI was c ommitt ed, rather than c onjecture about what might have happene d if the fac ts had bee n differ ent. W

ill iam s v . S

tate , 946 S.W .2d 4 3 2 , 4 35 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1997), rev’d on other grounds , 9 70 S.W. 2d

56 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ); se e als o Dr ic ha s v . S tate , 175 S.W .3d 795, 799 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ) ( c a pa bil ity is e va luate d b a se d on the c ir c ums tanc e s th a t e xiste d at th e tim e of the off ense) . There must also be evidenc e that others wer e actua lly endang ere d by the def endant’ s use of the ve hicle, and not “ mere ly a hy pothetical potential for da ng er if othe rs had be en pre sent.” Cates , 102 S.W .3d at 738 (c i t i n g Ma nn v . S tate , 13 S.W .3d 89, 92 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000), aff’d , 58 S.W .3d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)).

Severa l courts have found evidence le g ally sufficie nt to sustain a deadly wea pon finding in felony

DWIcase s w h en t here are specific fac ts demonstrating that others we re actual l y en d an ger ed by

the def endant’ s use of a

motor vehicle. F or example, in Mann v . S tate , the c o u rt f

o u n d e v id e n c e th a t t

h e d e f e n d an t “ a lm o s t h it

an o th e r v e h ic le h e a d

- o n ” w hen he drove acr oss the cente r line of the hig hway and for ced a

n onco m i n g vehicle to take

“ e v a s i v e a c t i o n ” l e g a l l y

s u f f i c i e n t t o s u

p p o rta d e a d l y w e a p o nf i n d i n g . 1 3 S
. W
. 3 d

a t9 2
. In5

Dr ic ha s v . S

tate , the cour

t found evidenc e that the defendant drove t he wrong way down a highwa y wi th “ so me tr a ff

ic ” le g a lly su ff

ic ie nt to su

pp or t a de a dly we a

po n fi nd ing de sp ite te sti mony fr om a police off icer that he did not see “an y m o t o ri s t s swerve to avoid hitting [the defenda nt’s truck].” 175 S.W .3d at 798. I n Oc ho a v . S tate , the court concluded that testimony from a police office r that the de fe nd ant c a me “ re a l clo se to s tr iki ngand hittin g ” ano the r v e hic le on the ro a d s up po rt e d a

de a dly
wea pon finding . 119 S.W .3d 825, 828 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.).

When there ha

ve bee n no specific fac ts demonstrating t h at anyone wa s in actual da ng e r o f s e ri ou s b od ily

inj ur y or de a th, c ou

rt s h a ve fo un d evid ence le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o sustain a finding that a motor vehic le was used as a de adly wea pon. For example, in Bo es v . S

tate , a police of

fice r testified that he saw B oes ac cele rate and “momentarily los[ e] control of his vehicle”
a t an in te rs e c tio n. No
. 03 -0 3- 00 32 6- CR, 20 04 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 68 06 , at *2 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin J uly 29, 2004, no pet.) (me m. op., not designated fo r p u b l i cation). A lthough ther e wa s another vehicle behind Boe s at t he interse ction, there was no e vidence , even when viewingthe fa cts in the lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he ve rd ic t, t

hat th e dr ive r of the oth e r ve hic le wa s e nd ang e re d b y B oe s’ s lo ss of c on tr ol at th e int e rs e c tio n o r t hat th e oth e r d

ri ve r h a d to take e va siv e a c tio n to a vo id a n a c c ide nt. Id. a t * 6
. A c c o r d i n g l y, th i s C o u rt c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e r e g ar d i n g t h e v e h i c l e ’ s “ c a p a b i l i t y” of ca using death or serious bodi ly injury “mer ely raises conjecture about what might have happene d had the f acts be en diffe rent than the y wer e” a nd was, therefor e, leg ally insufficient to support the jury ’s dea dly

wea pon finding
. Id. at *8. Simi larly , in W

ill iam s v . S

tate , a police of

fice r testified that he saw a truck roll to a stop in the middl e of the highw ay with Wil liams “slumped over, passed out or a sleep” in the driver’ s6

seat. 946 S.W.2d at 433. The offic er stopped, w alked to the dr iver’s side of the truck , smelled
a lc oh ol bo th on

Willi a ms a

nd ins ide the tr

uc k, pe rf or me d f ie ld s ob ri e ty

te sts , a nd arr e ste d Wil liams for dr iving while intoxicated. Id. A jury convicted Wi lliams of felony driving while intox icated a nd found that he use d his truck as a de adly wea pon during the commission of the offe nse. Id. at 432. On appe al, Will iams argued that the t rial court err ed by char g ing the jury on the dea dly wea pon issue beca use his act of driving while i ntox icated did not put anyone in ac tual dang er of death or serious bodily injury
. Id. at 433. B eca use there wa s n o evidence that “a ny other motorist was on the highw ay at the time and plac e that Willi ams drove in a n i n t ox icated c ondition or that any other motorist (be sides other troopers the ar resting office r ca lled for a ssistance) e ver c ame upon the sc ene
or encounte red dang er from Wil liams’ truck,” the cour t held that the trial cour

t erre d by char g ing the jury on the dea dly

wea pon issue. Id. at 435-36. The police off icer ’s testimony

“that he a

nd others
c ou ld have be e n en da

ng e re d by Willi a ms’ c on du c t if others had been prese nt is only hy pothetical and not evidence of ac tual dang er.” Id. at 434.

We con clu de tha t th e fa c ts o f t his c a se are dis tin g uis ha

ble fr om t

he sit uatio ns in Bo es and W

ill iam s beca

use the re cord c ontains evidenc e tha t M ey er was a ctually endang ere d by Wo o d a ll ’ s dr iv in g w h il e Wo o d a ll w a s in to xic a ted. I n Boes , there was no e vidence that any other drivers w ere close e noug h t o b e ac t ually endang ere d by

Boe s’s loss of control at the inter section. See No. 03-03-00326- CR, 2004 Tex. App. L EXI S 6806, at *6. In W illiams , there was no e vidence t h a t a n y m o t o r i s t s w e r e o nt h e h i g h w ay a s W i l l i a m s c a m e t o a

s t o p i nt h e m i d d l e o f

t h e h i g h w a y. See 94 6 S. W.2 d at 43 5. I n th is c a se , ho we ve r, Me y e r t e sti fi e d th a t he wa s tr a ve lin g a pp ro xima te ly 45 mph when Woodall entere d h i s l an e o f t raffic a nd “almost hit my

truck.” He testified that althoug h he did not swerve to avoid a collision, W oodall “just bare ly misse[ d] m y

truck to whe re I7

had to slow down when he came out into my lane.” Additionally , Mey er dr ew a diag ram for

the jury de pic tin g the path Wood a ll’ s veh ic le too k as it ent e re d US 18 3, str uc k s e ve ra l ba

rr e ls, and a lmo st hit the front of Meyer’ s vehicle. This e vidence of a ne ar c ollisi on betwee n Woodall’s ve hicle and Mey er’ s vehicle, w hen viewe d in the light most favor able to the verdic t, c ould le ad a r ational trier of fa ct to conclude bey ond a re asonable doubt that Mey er w as ac t u ally endang ere d by

Woodall’s vehicle a s he drove it while intox icated. Thus, the evidenc e is le g ally sufficie nt to support the jury ’s finding t h at W o o d al l used his vehicle a s a dea dly wea pon during the cour se of c ommitt ing the offe nse of f

elony driving while intox icated. I n his second issue, Woodall cont en d s t hat the trial c ourt err ed by denying his pr op os e d ju

ry in st ructio n d e sig ne d to e xpla in t he statut or

y ph ra se “ c a

pa ble of c a us ingde a th
or ser i o us bodily

injury ” as it per

tains to a finding that a per son used a de adly wea pon during the c omm iss ion

of an o ff e ns e . Re vie w o f alleged ju ry cha rg e e rr or re qu ir e s th a t an a

pp e llate court make a two-f

old inquiry : (1) whe ther error exi sts in the jury char g e, and ( 2) whe ther sufficie nt harm wa s cause d by the error to require re versa l. Ab dn or v . S tate , 871 S.W .2d 726, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

Woodall subm itted the following proposed jury instruction relating to the issue of whether he used his vehic le as a

deadly wea pon:
A v e hic le c an b e a

de a dly we a po n if it is dri ve n so as t o b e c a pa ble of c a us ingde a th or ser ious bodily injury
. The “ca pability ” of causing death or serious bodily injury must be evaluated in light of t h e fa cts that ac tually exis ted when the incident occur red, r ather

than conjec ture a

bout what might have happe ned if the fac ts had be e n s ome wh a t di ff

e re nt. Th e re mus t be e vid e nc e that ot hers we re a c tua lly endang ere d, not me rely a hy pothetical potential for dang ers if others h ad been prese nt. For the re to be evidenc e that other s were actua lly endang ere d by

the use of8

a vehic le, there must be evidenc e that other driver( s) wer e both pre sent and endang ere d by

the def endant’ s use of his vehicle
. The trial c ourt denied this re quested instruction and instea d submitt ed the f ollowing instruction:
I n addition, if y ou find the Defenda nt g uilty of fe lony

driving while intox icated, you must fur ther find bey ond a rea sonable doubt whether the def endant use d or exhibit ed a dea dly wea pon, namely

a motor vehic le, duringthe commission of the offe nse.

“ De a dly we a po n” me a ns any thi ngthat in

the mann e r o f i ts us e or inte nd e d u se is c a p a b l e o f c a u s i n g d e a t h o r

s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n

j u r y. On appe al, Woodall arg ues that t he word “ca pable” in the statutory

definition of “de adly

wea pon” mis le d th e jur

y wi th r e sp e c t to the re qu ir e me nt t hat th e re mus t be e vid e nc e that ot he rs we re a c tua lly endang ere d by

his use of the ve hicle to sustain a findingthat his vehicle wa s a dea dly wea pon. The trial judg e must submit t o the jury “a written cha

rg e distinctly

setting f orth the law applica

ble to the ca se; not expressing a ny opinion as to the weig ht of the evide nce, not summing up the testimony , discussing the fac ts or using a ny argument in his char g e calc ulated to arouse the sy mpathy or ex cite the passions of t he jury .” Te x . Code. Crim. Proc. Ann. ar t. 36.14 (West 2007). I f a phr ase, term, or word is statutoril y define d, the trial cour

t must subm it the statutory definition to the jury
. Mu rp hy

v . S tate , 44 S.W .3d 656, 661 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.). Words that
are not statutorily

define d are to be g iven their c ommon, ordinary , or usual mea ning. Ro isev . S

tate , 7 S. W.3 d 2 25 , 2 42 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 19 99 , p e t. r e f’ d) . A s a g e ne ra l r

ul e, no sp e c if

ic instruction is required f

or such unde fined wor ds in the jury char g e, and jur ors may

thus give th em an y m eaningthat is acc eptable in c ommon parlanc e . M e dfo rd v . S tate , 13 S.W .3d 769, 772 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Ma rti ne z v . S tate , 924 S.W .2d 693, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Howeve r,9

words or te rms that do not ha ve a common meaningthat the jurors c an be f airly presumed to know
as we ll as words or te rms with technica l leg al meaning s may need to be define d in the char g e. Mi dd le ton v . S tate , 125 S.W .3d 450, 454 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A trial cour t has broad disc retion in submit ting pr oper de finitions and expl anator y phrase s to the jury
. Ro sie , 7 S.W .3d at 242. Be cause the ca se law r equire s evidenc e that others we re actually endang ere d as opposed to evidenc e of hy pothetical or potential dang er be fore someone may be convic ted of using
a ve hic le a s a

de a dly we a po n, it i s argua

ble that su

bmi tti ng on ly

the statut or

y de fi nit ion

of de a dly
wea pon to the jury

does not distinctly

set forth the la

w applica ble to the ca se. Howe ver, e ven if e rror exis ted in the jury

char g e in this case, the err or did not result in sufficient ha rm so as to requir e
reve rsal. Unde r Al

ma nz a , we r eview the rec ord for “some ha

rm” be cause Woodall’s proposed instr u ct i o n dispensed with the nee d for f urther obje ction at trial. Abdnor , 871 S.W .2d at 732;

see Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art 36.15 (West 2006).

As we have no te d, the re c or d c on ta ins le g a lly su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e that Woo da ll’ s u se of his vehicle pla ced Me y er in a ctual dange r. I n fac t, the evidence of how Woodall was driving and his near- miss of Mey er w as undisputed. Woodall plainly endang ere d Mey er. Whil e there may be
a c a se wh e re the iss ue of

wh e the r anyon e wa s in

a c tua l da ng e r i s d e bata

ble or dis pu te d, it i s n ot t

his
case . Thus, even if

the fa ilure to submit the inst ruction propose d by Woodall was err or—a point on which we express no opinion—there is no reve rsible err or here beca use the jury could not have be en misled by the statutory

definition of dea dly

wea pon into render ing a

n unjust verdict base d on the evidenc e in this recor d.10 I n li g ht o f t

he e nti re jur

y c ha rg e , th e fa c t th a t th e mann er in wh ic h Wo od a ll
was driving and Mey er’ s proxi mity wer e undisputed, and all other rele vant informatio n re v eale d by the re c or d o f t

he tr ia l a s a

wh ole , w e c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ourt ’s de cis io n to re fu se Woo da ll’ s p ro po se d in str uc tio n d id n ot r e su lt i n “ so me ha rm ” to Wo od a ll. Any

c ha rg e e rr or wa s, the re fo re , h arm le ss.

Affir med.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: August 14, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh