UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

NA’IM ABDUL-MATEEN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 09-CV-13710

THOMAS BELL and

JANE DOE,

Defendants.

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OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS; ACCEPTING AND

INCORPORATING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION;

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL AND GRANTING DEFENDANT

BELL’S MOTION TO DISMISS

A motion to dismiss was filed by Defendant Thomas Bell and referred to United

States Magistrate Judge Charles Binder pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The

magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation suggesting that the

Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be granted. Plaintiff filed timely objections

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). For the reasons set forth below, the court will accept

the recommendation of the magistrate judge and grant Defendant’s motion.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff is a prisoner in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections.

This is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 revolving around Plaintiff’s claim that he

should have been assigned to a lower bunk, and that the injuries he says he suffered in

slipping and falling while getting down from an upper bunk are the responsibility of the

Warden.
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II. STANDARD

The filing of timely objections requires the court to “make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendations

to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See United States v. Raddatz, 447

U.S. 667 (1980); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). This de novo

review, in turn, requires this court to re-examine all the relevant evidence previously

reviewed by the magistrate to determine whether the recommendation should be

accepted, rejected or modified in whole or in part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court

may “receive further evidence” if desired. Id.

A general objection, or one that merely restates the arguments preciously

presented is not sufficient to alert the court to alleged errors on the part of the

magistrate judge. An “objection” that does nothing more than state a disagreement with

a magistrate’s suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented

before, is not an “objection” as that term is used in this context. A party who files timely

objections to a magistrate's report in order to preserve the right to appeal must be

mindful of the purpose of such objections: to provide the district court "with the

opportunity to consider the specific contentions of the parties and to correct any errors

immediately." United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949-50 (6th Cir. 1981). The

Supreme Court upheld this rule in Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), a habeas

corpus case. The Supreme Court noted that "[t]he filing of objections to a magistrate's

report enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues--factual and

legal--that are at the heart of the parties' dispute." Id. at 147 (footnote omitted). 

Further, “[o]nly those specific objections to the magistrate's report made to the
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district court will be preserved for appellate review; making some objections but failing

to raise others will not preserve all the objections a party may have." Smith v. Detroit

Federation of Teachers, Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987) 

 A general objection to the magistrate's report has the same effect as a failure to

object. The district court's attention is not focused on any specific issues for review,

thereby making the initial reference to the magistrate useless. The functions of the

district court are effectively duplicated as both the magistrate and the district court

perform identical tasks. The duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources

rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act. 

Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s objection to the dispositive R&R is that the magistrate judge failed to

agree with Plaintiff’s central point, i.e., that defendant Warden retains a personal

responsibility of “maintaining a safe environment.” Pl. Obj. at p. 1. The court interprets

this objection as general, a restatement of the argument first presented in the complaint

and his response to the motion to dismiss. Plaintiff accompanied his objection with a

citation to Taylor v. Michigan Dept. Of Corrections, 69 F. 3d 76 (6th Cir. 1995), not

earlier cited, in which the Court of Appeals located sufficient evidence in the record to

support denial of summary judgment: 

[The warden’s] testimony from his own deposition reveals that he was

aware that his direct designees were redelegating his authority over

transfers to lower echelon prison staff without any explicit authorization to

do so, that he was not even sure of the procedures for approval of

transfers, and that he had no review procedures to determine whether his

authority was being abused. . . . His testimony certainly presents a jury

question about the existence and adequacy of reasonable transfer
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procedures.”

Taylor, 69 F. 3d at 80.

First, the court observes that Plaintiff’s argument from Taylor was not presented

to the magistrate judge, nor was there any suggestion in the complaint or in the

response to the motion to dismiss that there existed any knowing re-delegation without

authorization or that there was a knowing failure to establish review procedures

equivalent to those in Taylor. Second, the Taylor panel analyzed and rendered its factfinding with respect to a post-discovery motion for summary judgment under Rule 56,

the standards for which are distinct from Rule 12(b)(6), under which the pending motion

was brought. Third, Taylor predated by twelve years Bell Atlantic v. Twombley, 550

U.S. 544 (2007), and its explanation of the requirement of factual plausibility.

This is insufficient. The objection is rejected.

Plaintiff’s second objection is to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the

Plaintiff’s motion to compel be denied. The magistrate judge included this discussion in

his Report and Recommendation, but this non-dispositive motion under § 636(b)(1)(A)

is subject to the magistrate judge’s decision, not mere recommendation. The court

interprets the determination on the motion to compel as such a decision in this instance. 

A determination made by the magistrate under § 636(b)(1)(A) on a discovery motion

may be appealed. “A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter under this

subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the magistrate judge's order is clearly

erroneous or contrary to law. § 636(b)(1)(A) No such showing is made in this instance. 

In any event, discovery built on the foundation of an insufficient complaint is inherently

inappropriate. See, e.g., Skousen v. Brighton High School, 305 F.3d 520, 527 (6th Cir.
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2002) (“[T]he district court was required to determine –prior to permitting further

discovery– whether Skousen's complaint alleged the violation of a constitutional right at

all, and if so, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged

violation.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s second objection is also rejected.

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s objections [Dkt. # 18] are DENIED, and the

magistrate judge’s recommendation [Dkt. # 17] to grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss

and/or for summary judgment is ADOPTED AND INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to compel [Dkt. # 11] is

DENIED and Defendant’s motion to dismiss [Dkt #13] is GRANTED.

Judgment will issue for Defendants.

 S/Robert H. Cleland

ROBERT H. CLELAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: April 28, 2010

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record

on this date, April 28, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

 S/Lisa Wagner

Case Manager and Deputy Clerk

(313) 234-5522

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