IN THE SUPREME COURT OFTHE STATE OF NEVADA

NATHAN SNYDER;AND SAMANTHA ORR, Appellants, vs. CLEAR RECON CORP., AND SANAM LIMITED, Res•ondents. No. 82390 

# FILE

ORDER OFAFFIRMANCE This is an appeal from a final judgment in a real property matter. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Eric Johnson, Judge.' Appellants purchased a home, funded by a mortgage loan, on whichtheylaterdefaulted. Respondent Clear ReconCorp. recorded a notice ofdefault inMarch 2019 and a notice oftrustee sale thereafter. Appellants thenfiledforbankruptcyand, afterthebankruptcy'sdismissal, Clear Recon recorded another notice of sale. Appellants then again filed, and had dismissed, another bankruptcy case, after which Clear Recon recorded a third notice of sale. When appellants' third bankruptcy filing was dismissed, Clear Recon proceeded with the foreclosure sale in July 2020. Before respondent Sanam Limited recorded the trustee's deed upon sale, appellants filed a complaint for injunctive relief, arguing that Clear Recon had materially violated NRS 107.550 because no foreclosure sale occurred, and morethan90dayspassedbetween therecordingofthe second andthird notices of sale. The district court denied injunctive relief and granted summaryjudgment in respondents' favor.

'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument is not warranted SUPREME COURT

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(C)) 1947ASUPREME COURT

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notice ofdefault when a lenderfailstocomplete a foreclosure sale within 90 calendar days after a notice of sale. And they argue that such recission is required here because Clear Recon failed to conduct a foreclosure sale within 90 days after recording the second notice of sale, regardless of the fact that fewer than 90 days elapsed between the third notice of sale and the foreclosure sale. As this is an issue of statutory interpretation, we review the district court's decision de novo. See Senjab v. Alhulaibi, 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 64, 497 P.3d 618, 619 (2021).

"If [a] statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce the statute as written." Hobbs v. State, 127 Nev. 234, 237, 251 P.3d 177, 179 (2011). But, "iffollowing the statute's apparent plain meaning results in a meaning that runs counter to the 'spirit' ofthe statute, this court may look outside the statute'slanguage." MGMMirage v. Nev. Ins. Guar.Ass'n, 125 Nev. 223, 228-29, 209 P.3d 766, 769-70 (2009). Similarly, "when [a] statuteisambiguous, meaningthatit issubjecttomorethanone reasonable interpretation

. . . we [may also] look beyond the language [of the statute] to consider its meaning in light of its spirit, subject matter, and public policy." Id. (fourth alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011) (explaining that when a statute is ambiguous, this court may then look to legislative history and construe the statute in a manner consistent with reason and public policy).

NRS 107.550(1) provides: 1. A civil action for a foreclosure sale pursuantto NRS40.430involvinga failureto make a payment required by a residential mortgage loan must be dismissed without prejudice, any notice of default and election to sell recorded pursuant to subsection 2 of NRS 107.080 or any notice of sale 2 (0) 1947A magOtorecorded pursuant to subsection 4 of NRS 107.080 must be rescinded, and any pending foreclosure sale must be cancelled, if:
(c) A foreclosure sale is not conducted within 90 calendar days after a notice of sale is recorded pursuant to subsection 4 ofNRS 107.080. Appellants present a reasonable reading of the statute, under which a violation of the foreclosure process occurs when a foreclosure sale does not occur within 90 days after a notice of sale is recorded. And here,
even accounting for NRS 107.550(2)'s tolling periods, the foreclosure sale
was not conducted within 90 calendar days after the second notice ofsale.2 Nevertheless, we conclude that NRS 107.550(1) is ambiguous as applied in this case, where a foreclosure sale occurred within 90 days of the most recent recorded notice ofsale, but more than90 dayspassed between notice of sale recordings. The district court reasonably interpreted the statute as requiring a recission of the notice of default only where a foreclosure sale
occurs more than 90 daysafter the recordingofa notice ofsale, andbecause the saletook place within 90 daysofthe recordingofthe third notice ofsale, the court concluded that the sale met the statute's requirements. Because the statute is ambiguous, we look beyond its language to determine its meaning. Hobbs, 127 Nev. at 237, 251 P.3d at 179.

NRS 107.550 is part of the "the Nevada Homeowner's Bill of Rights." Relevantlegislativehistoryshowsthat thebill's sponsorsintended to provide homeowners with adequate notice and certainty regarding foreclosure proceedings and with information on ways to avoid foreclosure. Hearing on S.B. 321 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 77th Leg.

2Respondents dispute that more than 90 days elapsed between the second and third notice ofsale, but the record belies this contention. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA
(0) I947A(May 2, 2013) (testimony of Assemblyman James Healey) (testifying that

thebill wasintended to "protect

. . . homeowners"by "requir[ing]borrowers to be sent a foreclosure notice, a preforeclosure notice with information about their loan, and options on how to avoid foreclosure"); Hearingon S.B. 321 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 77th Leg. (April 10, 2013) (testirnony of Senator Justin Jones) (noting that the bill addressed the
concern that foreclosure notices would "sit out forever" and that the bill would "increase[] predictability for all parties involved in the foreclosure process," andprovide "strongbut fair accountability measuresbyextending protections to all residential mortgages written in Nevada"). The sponsors
were also aware of the potential for abuse by homeowners in default, though, statingthat it was "not the intent ofthe bill" to give "those who go through thisprocess the ability to abuse the process." Hearing on S.B. 321 Before the Assembly Comm. on Judiciary 77th Leg. (May 16, 2013) (testimony ofSenator Justin Jones). Sponsors further stated that theyhad worked with various stakeholders

to make sure that we are not enabling people who are simplytryingto game the system. I think what we have done is ensure that there is notice at the beginning and that there is an opportunity for someone to go into either the foreclosure mediation process or into another loss mitigation process. Hearing on S.B. 321 Before the Assembly Comm. on Judiciary 77th Leg. (May 2, 2013) (testimony ofSenator Jones).

Based on the legislative history, we conclude that Clear Recon did not violate the statutebecause it did not conduct a foreclosure sale more than 90 days after recording a notice of sale. This interpretation balances the bill sponsors' concerns that homeowners were not receiving sufficient notice about the foreclosure proceedings with their countervailing concern that homeowners could potentially abuse the process. 4 SUPREME COURT

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10) 1947ASr.J. J. Silver Here, appellantsdonot disputethattheyreceived alldue notice regarding the foreclosure proceedings, which is further evidenced by their bankruptcy petitions filed immediately before, or on the day of, each ofthe scheduled foreclosure sales. Most importantly, they do not dispute that they had notice as to the third notice of sale. And they also do not dispute that the foreclosure sale occurred within 90 days after the third notice of sale.3 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err by granting summaryjudgment and denying injunctive relief. We, therefore,

ORDER thejudgment ofthe district court AFFIRMED.4

cc: Hon. EricJohnson, District Judge Kristine M. Kuzemka, Settlement Judge Kern Law, Ltd. Law Office ofAndrew H. Pastwick, LLC Aldridge Pite, LLP Eighth District Court Clerk

3Because this issue is dispositive, we need not address the parties' remaining arguments regarding NRS 107.560 and whether respondent Sanam Limited was a bona fide purchaser.

4We lift the stay imposed by this court on June 10, 2021 (as clarified by order entered on January 3, 2022). The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the decision ofthis matter under a general order ofassignment. 5 SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA
(0) I947A 42N.