NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 09

- 4422

_____________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. RAFAEL MARCANO, Appellant
On Appeal fr om the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 5

- 08

- cr - 00 504

- 0 01 ) District Judge: Honorable James Knoll Gardner

Submitted u nder Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

on July 12, 2012 Before: FUENTES , HARDI MAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : January 3, 2013 )

O P I N I O N
ROTH, Circuit Judge : Rafael Marcano appeal s h is November 23 , 2009, judgment of conviction

. For the following r eas ons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Cour t.2

I. BACKGROUND
A t the time of his arrest and the disputed search of his residence , Marcano was on parole for a felony drug offense under the supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole

. The conditions of his par ole included two rel evant terms

. First,
Marcano was required to receive written permission from the parole supervision staff before changing his residence from his approved address of 716 Railroad Street , Allentown , Pennsylvania

. S econd, Marcano had consented t o the search by parole officers without a warrant of his pers on, property, and residence, as well as the seizure of items that consti tuted a violation of his parole

. In August 2007, Marcano was granted permission by his p arole officer to change his address from 716 R ailroad Street to 1020 Tioga Street. On March 26, 2008, an

ano nymous telephone caller told parole officers that Marcano was selling large quantities of drugs and living at either 716 Railroad Street or 133 Tilghman Street. On April 24 , 2008, the p arole o ffice received information from an Allentown detec tive that Marcano appeared to be living at 1 33 Tilghman

. The parole officer confirmed with the Allentown police that Marcano had been living there for five months. On April 29 , Marc ano’s parole officer m et with Marcano regarding a traffic citation . Marcan o had told police during a traffic stop that he lived at 716 Rai lroad Street but claimed during his conversation with the parole officer that he only gave t hat address because it was listed on his licens e. Marcano maintained that throughout this period he was living at 1020 Tioga Street , which was his only approved address

.3

Police officers saw Marcano on April 1, 2008, in an alley behind the 100 block of Tilghman Street , handing an item to someone and r eceiving money in exchange

. Based on that observation and a subsequent search of the individual, an arrest warrant was issued for Marcano

. On May 14, police officer s saw Ma rcano behind the 133 Tilghman Street apartment and arrested him on the warrant. M arcano told police during the arrest that he was staying at 716 Railroad Street. Police confirmed with the ow ner of 133 Tilghman that Marcano was renting the first floor apartment there

. Poli ce then called Marcano’s parole officer to tell him that Marca no had been arrested

. Pa role officers were also told that the name “R. Marcano” was taped to the mailbox for 133 Tilghm an. The parole officers searched the apartment while the police officers waited outside. They dis covered paraphernalia associated wi th heroin distribution and a bag
containi ng what appeared to be cocaine . The parole off i cers invited the police officers into the apartment and sho wed them what they had discovered

. All the parole officers and police then exited the apartment. The detec tive investigating Marcano prepared a search warrant application and an affidavit that described Marcano’s arrest, the search and discoveries of the parole agents, and the detective’s experience in drug investigations
that led him to believe that more evid ence w ould be found in th e apartment. A magistrate judge issued the warrant. Police exe cuted the warrant and seized drugs, paraphernalia , weapon s, and a large amount of cash

. The District C ourt held a suppression hearing on the physical evidence seize d from the apartment . The motion was denied. Marcano then ple d guilty on charges of possession with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug4

trafficking, and felon in possession of a firearm , but reserved the right to challeng e the suppression ruling on appeal. On November 5, 2009, Marcano was sentenced to a total
term o f imprisonment of 240 months, to be followed by five years of supervised release. Marcano appealed.
II. DISCUSSION The District Cou rt had jurisdiction pur suant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231

. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We review the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual determinations and exercise plenary review over the application o f the law to those facts. United States v. William s , 417 F.3d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 2005). A. Reasonable Suspicion for Parole Search
Marcano first argues that the search of his residence by parole officers violate d his Fourth Ame ndment rights. However, p aro lees who have conse nted to warrantless searches have reduced expectation s of privacy

. Id

. (citing United States v. Knights , 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001))

. Parole officers with reasonable suspicion may perform

w arrantless searches for the purpose of determini ng whether conditions of parole have been violated

. Id

. An analysis of r easonable suspicion considers, under the totality of the circumstances, whether the officer “ has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)

. Marcano contends that we should consider , under the totality of the circumstances , whether state parole officers actually had reasonable suspicion or w ere “caj oled” by5

police into entering. How ever, this analysis would require an impermissible inquiry into the underlying motivations or “official purpose” of a parole officer conducting such a
search. See Williams , 417 F.3d at 377

- 78

. Here, reasonable suspicion existed that Marc ano had violated the terms of his parole by li ving at 133 Tilghman Street

. Questions as to his actual address arose from the traffic stop and the anonymous tip to the parole office . The police investigation turned up credible evidence that Marcano was re siding at 133 Tilghman

. With “R. Marcano” taped to the mailbox outside 133 Tilghman, the evidence sup porting reasonable suspicion was overwhelming at the time of entry

. B. Warrantless Entry by Police Marcano next argues that , even if the parole officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct the search, the subsequent warrantless entry by police at the invitation of the p arole officers violate d the Fourth Amendment

. T hus , w hat they saw could not be the basis for probable cause

. In United Stat es v. Brown , the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determin ed that the presenc e of law enforcement officers during a parole search did not violate the Fourth Amendment . 346 F.3d 808, 812 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Knights , 534 U.S. 112, 115 (2003))

. In doing so, the court balanced “any additional privacy intrusion resulting from the presence of the additional personnel against the legitimate interests advanced by their pr esence. ” Id

. Here , the additional intru sion was minimal and without consequence , as poli ce did n ot actually participate in the search. Everything seen by police had already been discovered by the parole officers

. Therefore, pr obab le cause based on the items in the apartment was not “the product of6

illegal governmental activity.” United Sta tes v. Crews , 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980). Thus, the warrantless entry by police at the request of parole officers did not require the exclusion of evidence in this case. C . Probable Cause for Search Warrant Marcano next argues that the affidavit did not present probable cause for the magistrate to issue the search warrant

. Where the district court has based its probable cause ruling solely on the affidavit, our standard of review is plenary

. United States v. Conley , 4 F.3d 1200, 1204 (3 d Cir. 1993). Ho wever, “b oth we and the district court exercise only a deferential review of the initial probable cause determination made by the magistrate.” Id. at 1205

. In addition , the magistrate judge “ may give considerable weight to the conclusions of experienced law enforcement officers regarding where evidence of a crime is likely to be found and is entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense.” Whitner , 219 F.3d at 296.
Marcano also contends that information in the affidavit relating to the arrest warrant and drug activity at 133 Tilghman was too old to support probable cause

. However, here the warrant was actually premised on the parole officers’ search , rather th an the earlier facts that had created probable cause for the arrest warrant. Because the magistrate could infer from the totality of the circum stances described in the affidavit that the parole officer ’s search was very recent, there is no defect to the w arrant based on staleness.7

Marcano further argues that the affidavit lacked a sufficient nexus between Marcano and the criminal conduct , or b etween Marcano and 133 Tilghman. This assertion i gnore s the fact that the affidavit was based on the pro ducts of t he parole officer ’s search of the residence

. “[S]earch warrants are directed, not at persons, but at property where there is probable cause to believe that instrumentalities or evidence of crime will be found.” United States v. Tehfe , 722 F.2d 1114, 111 7 (3 d Cir. 1983).
III. CONCLUSION Therefore, for the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District
Court

.