For the sake of cla

rity , we will re fer t o the par ties as Randy

and Cherie throug hout our 1 opinion. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00558- CV

Ra ndy F . M c Co llo ugh, App e lla nt

v. Cherie M cCollough, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TOM GREEN COUNTY , 340TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. C-01- 0449 -F , HO NORAB LE THO MAS J. GO SSETT, JUDGE PRESI DING

O P I N I O N Ap pe lla nt R and y Mc Col lou g h s ue d to mod if y a lim on y pa y me nts he wa s r e qu ir e d to make to his ex-wife, a

ppellee Che rie McColloug h, under a n ag ree ment incident t o their di vorce . He relied in pa

rt upon provisions in chapter 8, subchapte r B of the fa

mily code, w hich g overn spousa l
ma int e na nc e pa y me nts . Che ri e ob ta ine d s umm ary jud g me nt t

hat c ha pte r 8 wa s in a

pp lic a ble to Randy ’s alimony

obligation here, a

nd Randy appea ls. We will affirm.

1
BACK GR OUND On Aug ust 3, 2001, the district court re n d er ed an Ag ree d Final De cre e of D ivorce betwee n Randy and Cherie McCollough. I n the dec ree , the district court found that the parties ha d2

enter ed into a separ ate Ag ree ment I ncident to D ivorce , approve d the ag ree ment, incorporated it by ref ere nce, a nd order ed “the parti es t o d o all things ne cessa ry to effe ctuate the ag ree ment.” The ag ree ment, in turn, provided that it was to be enforce able as a contract, stated the intent of providing “a c ontinuing mea sure of support” for

Che ri e after divorc e that qualifie d as contra ctual alimony under the I nterna l Revenue Code, a nd require d Randy

to pay Cherie “ $5,000.0 0 p er m o n t h as alimony .” Pay

ments were to continue for a term of t en y ear s unless one of se vera l specified conditions occurr ed. One such condition was “ the re marria g e of” Cherie.

Rand y br ou g ht t

he pr e se nt a c tio n to mod if y his a lim on y

ob lig a tio ns ba se d o n h is alleg ations that Cherie ha d enter ed into an “inf ormal marr iag e” to a

nother man. H e re lied both on the te rm s of the a g re e me nt inc ide nt to div or c e and va ri ou s pr ov isi on s wi thi n c ha pte r 8 of the fa

mil y code. Specifica lly , Randy pleade d that his obligation to pay alimony terminated unde r family

code section 8.056 bec ause Cher ie had “ rema rried” and had “ cohabit[ed] with another per s o n in a perma nent place of abode on a continuing , conjuga l basis,” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.056( a), ( b) (West 2006), and should be modified due to a “mater ial and substantial cha ng e of c ircumstance s.” Id. § 8.057. Randy

also claimed that he was e ntitled to his reque sted relief via sec tion 8.059 of

the family code, w hich authorizes the district cour t to enforc e by

contempt “the c ourt’s maintena nce order or an a g ree ment for the pa y ment of m aintenanc e volunt arily enter ed int o betwee n the par ties and appr oved by

the Court.” Id . § 8.059. Cherie an s we red a

nd soug ht partial summary judgme nt that, in releva nt part, the
reme dies of cha

pter 8 we re not a

pplicable to R andy ’s alimony obligations under the ag ree ment incident to divor ce. Specifica lly , Cherie asser ted the following summary judgme nt g ro u n d s : (1)Wit hout reque st by either pa

rty , the distri ct co u rt subsequently made “ finding s and 2 conclusions” r eg ardingits rulings g ranting Cherie’ s partial summary judgme nt motion and deny ing Rand y ’s mot ion to str ike an ame ndme nt t o th e mot ion that is no t a t is su e on

a pp e a l. I n r e le va nt p a rt , the cour t stated that “[t] he Ag ree ment I ncident to Divorc e in questi on is g overne d by contra ct law, and no t Su bc ha pte r B of Cha pte r 8 of the F a mil y

Cod e ” and

that th e e ff

e cti ve dat e lan g ua g e in chapte r 8 wa s not intended to “bring all past, pre sent or future contra ctual alimony under the authority of Chapter

8, but to affirm that pre vious court orde red ma intenance would be g overne d under these sections.” These “finding s and conclusions” do not impac t our revie w of the district court’s summary judgme nt order
. IKB Indus. v. Pro- Line Corp. , 938 S.W .2d 440, 442 (Tex. 1997); Linw ood v. NCNB Texas , 8 85 S.W. 2d 10 2, 10 3 ( Te x. 19 94 ); Foster v. Centrex Capital Corp. , 80 S.W .3d 140, 144 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied). 3 ag ree ments incident to divorce a re g overne d by contra ct law, not the family code, “and as such a re not susceptible to modification base d on the Texas Family Code wher e the c ontrac t does not ref er to the Family

Code for modifica

tion”; (2) the a g ree ment to pay alimony here i s not subject to the family code be cause it was created and court-a pproved w ithout refer ence to the fac tors enumer ated in chapter 8 for a war ding c ourt-orde red ma intenance ; and (3) “no evidenc e has bee n produce d that ind ic a te d th a t [Rand

y ] may mod if y the a g re e me nt p ur su ant t o th e F a mil y Cod e ” or that “ tends t o
re fute the fa c t th a t on ly

the te rm s o f t

he Ag re eme nt sh ou ld dict a te the mod if ic a tio n o f [Ra

nd y ’s ] alimony pay ments.” The district cour

t g rante d partial summary judgme nt a g ainst Randy ’s claims “a rising
un de r S e c tio n 8 .0 56 , 8 .0 57 and 8. 05 9, Sub c ha

pte r B , Ch a

pte r 8 of Ti tle 1 o f th e Te xas F a mil y Code.” Randy

later nonsuited his other cl ai m s , and the district cour t rende red a

final judg ment 2 de nyinghis c la ims un de r c ha pte r 8 . F ro m th is f

ina l ju dg me nt, Rand

y a pp e a ls.I n addition, Randy complains that Ch er i e i m p ro p erly soug ht a “no e vidence ” summary 3 judgme nt on a “que stion of law” or did so before an adequate time f or discover

y had passe d. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(i ). As n o t ed previously , Cherie soug ht summary judgme nt based on “ no e vid e nc e ” “ that [Rand

y ] may mod if

y the a g re e me nt p ur su ant t o th e F a mil y Cod e ” or that “ te nd s to re fute the fa c t th a t on ly

the te rm s o f t

he Ag re e me nt s ho uld di cta te th e modif ic a tio n o f [Ra

nd y ’s ] alimony pay

ments.” We ne ed not r eac h Cherie’ s “no evidenc e” arguments beca use, as ex p l ai n ed below, we hold that her t ra d i t i o n al summary judgme nt gr ounds alone support the district c ourt’s judgme nt. See Sh esh un of f v . S he sh un off , 1 72 S.W. 3d

68 6, 69 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 05 , p e t. denied) (“B eca

use the trial c ourt’s or d er d o es notspecify the g rounds for g ranting summary judgme nt, we must aff

irm the s ummary judgme nt if any of t he theories prese nted t o the t rial cour t an d p re s er v edfo r ap p el l at e r e v i e w ar e m er i t o ri o u s ”) (c i t i n g Provident Life & Acc ident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 12 8 S.W.3 d 211 , 2 17 (T e x. 20 03 )) ; see also Te x. R. Ap p. P. 4 7. 1 ( “ Th e c ourt of a pp e a ls mus t hand down a written opinion that is a s brief as prac ticable but that addr esses e very issue raised a

nd nece ssary to final dispositi on of the a ppeal” ). 4 DI SCU SSIO N On appeal, R andy bring s three issues that can be s ummarized as: (1) a s a matter of law, “spousal m ai n t en an ce p ay m en t s ” u n d er

ch ap t er 8 , fa m i l y co d e, i n cl u d e a l i m o n y

p ay m en t s u nder
a g r e e me n ts in c id e n t to d iv o r c e ; ( 2 ) a s a matt e r o f la w , th e a g r e e me n t in c id e n t to d ivor ce he re contemplates mo d ification or ter mination under cha

pter 8; and ( 3) alter

natively , Randy

raised a g enuine issue of materia l f act as to w hether the parties intended the ag ree ment incident to divorce to allow modification or ter mination under cha

pter 8. 3
Stand ard of review

We re vie w the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt of su mma

ry ju dgme nt de novo
. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 16 4 S.W.3 d 656 , 6 61 (T e x. 20 05 ); J oe v . Two Thi rty

Nin e J oin t V e ntu re , 14 5 S. W.3 d 1 50 , 1 56 (T e x. 20 04 ); Pr ov ide nt L ife & Ac c ide nt In s. Co. v . Kn ott , 128 S.W .3d 211, 215 (T e x. 20 03 ); Mi d- Sout h Tele c om ms . Co . v . B est , 184 S.W .3d 386, 389 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.). When re viewing a sum mary judgme nt, we take as true a ll evidence favor able to the5

nonmovant, and we indulge ever y rea sonable infere nce and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor
. ValenceOperating Co. , 1 64 S.W. 3d a t 66 1; Kno tt , 1 28 S.W. 3d a t 21 5; Scienc e Spec trum, Inc.

v . M a rtinez , 941 S.W .2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997). Summary judgme nt is proper whe n there are no dis pu te d is su e s o f m a te ri a l f a c t and the mov ant is e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a ma tte r o f l aw. Te x. R. Civ . P. 16 6a (c ); Shell Oil Co. v. Khan , 1 3 8 S
. W
. 3 d 2 8 8 , 2 9 1 (T ex . 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Kno tt , 128 S.W .3d at 215-16). Our disposition of this appeal turns larg ely upon construction of c hapter 8 of the family code. T he purpose and goal of statutory construction is to g ive ef fec t to the intent of the leg islature. Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc . v. Ry lander , 6 S.W. 3d 27 8, 28 4 ( Te x. 19 99 ); Un ion Ba nk e rs Ins. Co. v. Shelton , 889 S.W .2d 278, 280 (Tex. 1994). We consider, a mong o t h er fa ct o rs, the lang uag e of the statute, leg islative history , the nature and objec t the leg islatu re i n t en d ed to be ob ta ine d, and

the c on se qu e nc e s th a t w ou ld f o l l o w f r o m a l t e r n a t i v e c on str

uc tio ns , e ve n w he n a

statut e is not a mbi g uo us on its fa c e . Te x. Go v’ t Code Ann. § 3 11 .0 23 (We st 2 00 5) ; Helena Che m. Co. v. W ilkins , 47 S.W. 3d 48 6, 49 3 (T e x. 20 01 ); Un ite d S e rv s. Au to. As s’ n v . S

tra y ho rn , 124 S.W .3d 722, 72 8 ( Tex
. Ap p. —A us tin

20 03 , p e t. d e nie d) . We c on sid e r d isp ute d p ro vis ion s in c on te xt, no t in isolation. Texas W

orkers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Continental Cas. Co. , 8 3 S. W. 3 d 9 0 1 , 9 0 5 ( T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 02 , n o p e t.) ; se e Fi tzge ra ld v . A dv an c e d S pin e Fi x ati on Sy s. , 996 S.W .2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1999). “[W ]e pr esume that ever y word of a statute has been included or e x cluded f or a r eason

. . . .” Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanc hez , 149 S.W. 3d 11 1, 11 5 ( Te x. 20 04 ). We a lso
are to presume that the leg islature enac ted a pr ovision with knowledge of the ba ckg round law a nd
awa rene ss of exist ing la

w. See Te x. Go v’ t Co de Ann. § 3 11.0 23 ; see also Ac ker v . Texas W ater6

Comm’n, 790 S.W .2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990) (“Astatute is presumed to have been e nac ted by the leg islature with complete know ledg e of the exis ting law and with re fer ence to it.”). Background and context of chap ter8

Pr ior to 19 95 , th e awa

rd of po st- div or c e a lim on y

or sp ou sa l ma int e na

nc e wa s h e ld to be im permissible under the statutes and publi c policy of Texas. Ex parte Causey , 944 S.W .2d 18, 19 (Tex. App.—Hous ton [ 14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) . Howeve r, the Te x as Supreme Court
c on str ue d th is l imi ta tio n in

a mann e r that p ro hib ite d c ourt -o rd e re d a lim on y bu t a llo we d p art ie s to ag ree to such awa

rds contra ctually
. Se e Fran c is v. Fran c is , 412 S.W .2d 29, 31 (Tex. 1967). The court e x plained that, “When its true mea ning is dist illed from the statutes and the cour t decisions of this S tate, alimony

which contr avene s the public policy of t he S tate is only those pay ments imposed by a cour t order or decr ee on the husband as a persona l obligation for

support and sust enanc e of the wife a fter a

final dec ree of divorce .” Id
. at 33. By contra st, “obligations assumed by the husband in separation ag ree ments or contra cts to make pa y ments for the suppor

t of the wife a fter a

divorce de c re e be c ome s f

ina l, a re no t ob lig a tio ns to pa

y a lim on y and do no t vi olate the pu

bli c po lic y

of thi s State.” Id
. The mer e fact t han an ag ree ment to pay alimony might be inc orporated into a divorce decr ee a nd expli citly approve d by the court did not rende r i t an unenf orce able c ourt order

or aw ard of alimony
. Car

dwe ll v . S

ic ola -C ar dwe ll , 97 8 S.W. 2d 72 2, 72 4 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 98 , pe t. de nie d) . Ins te a d, it h a s lo ngbe e n h e ld t hat su c h al im on y agr e e me nts and oth e r m ari ta l pr op e rt

y ag ree ments, even w hen incor porate d into divorce de cre es, ar e enf orce able as contra cts and g overne d by contra ct law. See, e .g., Allen v. Allen , 7 17 S.W. 2d 31 1, 31 3 ( Te x. 19 86 ); Bishop v. Bishop , 747

S.W. 3d 87 7, 87 9- 80 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n An ton io 20 02 , no pe t.) ; Hurley v . Hurley , 960 S.W .2d 287, 28 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 97 , n o p e t.) ; S o t o v . S oto , 936 S.W
. 2 d

3 3 8 , 3 4 1 ( T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 19 96 , n o w ri t) ; Harve y v. Harv ey , 905 S.W .2d 760, 764 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ). This Court has previously summarized the s tate of the law pr ior to the ena ctment of
c ha pte r 8 re g ard ingc ourt -o rd e re d a lim on y and c on tr a c tua l a lim on y

a g re e me nts :
Even be fore Texas courts could impose spousal s u p p o rt obligations at divorce, parties to a divor ce c ould enter into written a g ree ments providing f o r the ma int e na nc e of e ith e r s po us e . T he c ourt c ou ld t he n in c or po ra te the a g re e me nt i nto the final divorc e dec ree . Be fore statutory approva l of such ag ree ments, the Texas Supreme Court had determined t hat s ettlement agr eeme nts betwee n a husband a nd wi fe ob lig a tin g on e sp ou se to m a ke pe ri od ic pa y me nts in su

pp or t of the oth e r s po us e afte r divorce do not constitute court-orde red a limony and ther efor e are not void in the State o f T e xa s . T h e f

a c t th a t a c o u rt e xp r e s s ly a p p r o v e s s u c h an a g r e e me n t a nd incorpora tes it into t he fina l divorce de cre e does not tra nsform t h e contractua l p aym e n t s i n t o p r o h i b i t e d

c o u rt
- o r d e r e d

a l i m o n y.
Car dwe ll , 978 S.W .2d at 724 (interna l citations omit ted).

Ag ainst this leg al backdr op, eff ective September 1, 1995, the leg islature author ized the awa rd of post-divorc e spousal maintena nce but strictly limit ed the circ umstances unde r which i t co u l d b e aw arde d. See T e x. F a m. Co d e A n n . § § 8
. 0 0 1

- 8
. 3 0 5 ( We s t 2 0 0 6 )
. I nc h a p te r 8,

“ ma int e na

nc e ” is d e fi ne d a s “ an a

wa rd in a su it f or dis so lut ion

of a marr ia g e of

pe ri od ic pa

y me nts from the fu t u re i n co m e of one spouse for the support of the other spouse.” Id . § 8.001(1). The leg islature fur

ther provide d that “the c ourt may order maintenanc e for

either spouse only

if”:8

(1) the spouse fr om whom maintenance is requeste d was c onvicted of or rec eived de fe rr e d a dju dic a tio n for a c ri min a l off e ns e that als o co ns tit

ute s an a c t of

fa mil y violence unde r Title 4 and the of fense occur

red: (A) within two y ear s b ef o re the date on w hich a suit for dissolution of the marria g e is filed; or (B ) while the suit is pending; or (2) the duration of the marr iag e wa s 10 y ea rs or long er, the spouse see king main te n an c e la c k s s u f

f ic ie n t p r o p e rty , in c lu d in g p r o p e rty d is tr ib u te d to the sp ou se un de r t

his c od e , to pro vid e fo r t

he sp ou se ’s min imum r e a so na ble ne e ds , as limited by

Section 8.054, and the spouse se eking maintenanc e: (A) is unable to support himself or her sel f throug h appropr iate employ ment b e c a u s e o f ani n c a p a c i t a t i n g p h ys i c a l o r

m e n t a l d i s a

b i l i t y; ( B ) is th e c u s to d ia

no f a c h il d o f th e ma r r ia g e o f an y a g e w h o r e qu ir es substantial car e and pe rsonal super vision be ca use a phy sical or menta l disability makes it nec essar

y , taking into consideration t h e n eeds of the child, that the spouse not be e mploy ed outside the home; or (C) clea rly lacks earning ability in the l abor ma rket a dequate to provide support for the spouse ' s minim um rea sonable ne eds, as limited by Section 8.054.
Id . § 8.051. I f a c ourt deter mines that a spouse is eligible to rec eive maintena nce unde r cha

pter 8, the cour

t shall then “dete rmine the nature, amount, duration, and manne r of pe riodic pay ments by consideringall rel e v a

nt f a c to r s , ” including the financ ial resour ces of the spouse see king ma intenance and the educa

tion a nd employ

ment skills of the spouses, among others. Id . § 8.052(1)- (12) ( listi ng twelve f actor s in determining maintenanc e). Th e awa rd of ma int e na nc e is f ur the r l imi te d b y

se c tio n 8 .0 54 , w hic h p ro vid e s th a t, except in case s of di sability , a court may not order maintenanc e that re mains in effe ct for mor e than9

three y ear s after

the date of the orde r, and se ction 8.055, which provide s that a cour t may not order
ma int e na nc e that re qu ir e s an ob lig or to pa y mor e tha

n the le sse r of $2 ,5 00 pe r mon th or t wenty perc ent of the spouse ’s ave rag e monthly g ross income. Id . §§ 8.054(a) (1), 8.055.
Whe th e r c hapt e r 8 a pplie s t o c ont r ac tu al a lim ony

Randy contends tha t t h e following statutory terms evidenc e the leg islature’s intent that chapte r 8 embra ce not only court-or dere d “maintena

nce” but also alimony ag ree d to by parties and incor porate d into a divorce decr ee:

• The e ffe ctive date lang uag e g overning sections 8.056, 8.057, and 8.059, which provides: “The chang e in law made by this Act applies to spousal maintenanc e pay ments reg ardle ss of whet

her the pay

ments become due bef

ore, on, or afte r the eff ective date [S ept. 1, 2001] of this Act.” Tex
. Fa m . C ode Ann. §§ 8.056, 8.057, 8.059 historical notes (West 2006) [Act of May 22, 2001, 77th L eg ., R.S., c h. 80 7, § 3 (b ), 20 01 Te x. Ge n. L aws 15 74 , 1 58 6]. Rand y argue s tha t be c a

us e the le g isl a ture d id not e xplic itl y lim it “ sp ou sa l ma int e na nc e pa y me nts ” to “ court-ordere d

” spousal maintena

nce pa y ments, the leg islature must have intended eac h section to a pp l y to all past, prese nt, or future maintenanc e pa y me nts , w he the r c ourt -o rd e re d o r n ot.

• Section 8.059(a) , which provides that “[t] he court may enfor ce by contempt the court’s ma intenance order or an agreeme nt for the pa ym en t of maintenance v olu nta ril ye nte re d in to betw een the p ar tie s a nd ap pr ov e d b ythec ou rt .” (empha sis added). Randy contends that this ref

ere nce de monstrates leg islative int e nt t hat c ha pte r 8 a pp ly no t on ly to c ou rt -or dere d ma int e na nc e , b ut t o vo lun ta ry a g re e me nts fo r p ay

me nt o f m a int e na

nc e a pp ro ve d b y

the c ourt
. Randy also asser ts broadly that “nowhe re w ithin C hapter 8
. . . did the L eg islature ex press a ny intent that s p o u s al m ai n t en an ce p ay

m en t s p ro v i d edi nan Agr ee m en tIn ci d en tt o Di v o rc e o r a nAgreed F inal Dec ree of Divorc e [be] ex cluded f rom the provisions of the Ac t.” We disag ree .10 I n chapte r 8, as pr eviously noted, “maintena nce” is defined a s “an award in a suit for dissoluti on of a marria g e of periodic pay ments from the future income of one spouse for the support of the other

spouse.” Id . ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . V ir tua lly a ll o the r re fe re nc e s to “ ma int e na nc e ” wi thi n chapte r 8 similarly

ref er to c ourt-orde red ma intenance
. Se e id . §§ 8.056(b ) (“After a hear ing, the
co urt shall terminate the maintenanc e or de r if th e o b li g e e c o h a

b it s w it h an o th e r p e r s o n in a perma nent place of abode on a continuing , conjug al basis”) (empha sis added); 8
. 0 5 7(a) (“The
a mou nt o f m a int e na

nc e sp e c if

ie d in a c ourt order o r t h e p o rt i o n of a de cre e that provide s for the
su pp or t of a fo rm e r s po use may be r e du c e d b y the fi lin g of

a mot ion in t he c ourt tha t or ig ina lly rende red the order .”) (empha sis a dded). The only provision in Subchapter B th at co n t em p lates maintenanc e by

ag ree ment is section 8.059, which, as pr eviously noted, contemplate s judicial enfor ceme nt of “a

n ag ree ment for the pa

y ment of m aintenanc e voluntarily enter ed into betwee n the parties a nd approve d by

the cour t.” Id . § 8. 05 9( a ); see also In re Taylor , 1 3 0 S. W. 3 d 4 4 8 , 4 5 0 ( T e x. Ap p . — Texarkana

2004, no pet.) (stating that c ourt may enfor ce by

contempt ag ree ment for the pay ment of maintena

nce) . But this does not imply that any ag ree ment incident to divorce providing sp ou sa l su

pp or t is ips o fa c to within chapter 8. “Maintena

nce” under c hapter 8, ag ain, is permitted only under ve ry

limit ed circ umstances. Car

dwe ll , 978 S.W .2d at 7 2 4 n.1. And the leg islature author ized such “maintena

nce” in the context of a well-e stablished leg al distinction betwe en cour t-order ed alimony (which w as held to be imper missibl e) a

nd alimony by ag ree ment (which, even w hen incor porate d int o a div or c e de c re e , w a s p e rm itt e d) . T he le g isl a tur e ’s e vid e nt i nte nt i n c ha pte r 8 was to c re a te
narr ow circ umstances in which previously prohibited forms of spousal support could be a war ded,11

not to gove rn the forms of contra ctual alimony previously

permitted. Se e id .; Causey , 944 S.W .2d
a t 20 -2 1; see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.023.

Nothing in the e ffe ctive date l an gu age c hang es this conclusion. The leg islature’s
re fe re nc e to “ [t]he c ha

ng e in l aw m a de by

thi s A c t a

pp lie s to sp ou sa l ma int e na nc e pa y me nts ”
ne c e ssa ri ly c on te mpl a te s on ly tho se fo rm s of “ sp ou sa l ma int e na nc e pa y me nts ” g ov e rn e d by the a c t, not to contrac tual alimony previously

permitted under

Texas law.
Whether c hapter 8 appli es here

Randy contends that e ven if c ontrac tual alimony is not alway s g overne d by chapte r 8, the langua g e of

the de c re e here and hi s ag re e me nt i nc ide nt t o d ivo rc e wi th C he ri e br ing s h is spousal support obligation within chapte r 8. He r elies principa lly upon In re Taylor , 130 S.W .3d 448 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2004, orig . proce eding ). I n Taylor , the under ly ing de cre e stated that “t he par ties have a g ree d to contrac tual maintenanc e” a

nd that the re lator “c ontrac ts to pay and is order ed to pay as maintena

nce the sum of $950.00 per month” to his ex-wife. Id
. a t 44 9. Re la tor su bs e qu e ntl y fa ile d to m a ke the se pa y me nts and wa s confined unde r an order of contempt under section 8.059 for failing to pa y a total amount of $16,624.00. Id . Re la tor so ug ht a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s c on te nd ing that he c ou ld no t be he ld i n contempt under

section 8.059 bec ause his under lying oblig ation was to pay ag ree d-to alimony , not court-or dere d maintenanc e. Id
. He r elied upon In re Dupre e , in whic h the Da lla s Cour t of Ap pe a ls held that a contra ctual alimony obligation c ould not be enfor ced by contempt under

section 8.059. 118 S.W .3d 911, 916 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, orig . proce eding ). The D allas cour t relied on (1) the divorce decr ee’ s d e s c r ip tion of Dupre e’s oblig ation as “c ontrac tual alimony ”; and ( 2) the a bsence12

of decr etal lang uag e order ing Dupre e to make the a limony pay ments. Id . at 915-16. In Taylor , the Texarkana

court distinguishe d Dupree : “the dec ree speaks of contract ual maintenanc e rather than alimony , and it clea

rly contains decre t al l an gu age by the trial cour

t orderingRelator to pay

a sum
cer tain. Thus, it is not mere ly an ag ree ment of the pa

rties, but an order of the c ourt.” Taylor , 130 S.W .3d at 449-50.

We consider whether the agr eeme nt incident t o divorce and the decr ee here are more akin to those in Tay lor or those in Dupree
. The pa rti es’ inte nt to be

go v e rne d b

y c hap te r 8 Randy argues that the a g ree ment incident to divorce ma nifests the par

ties’ intent for his spousal support obligation to be gover ned by chapte r 8 rather than c ontrac t law. We conclude otherwise, a s a matter of

law. Ab se nt a mbi g uit y —w hic h we do not f

ind he re —th e c on str

uc tio n o f a

c on tr a c t is a question of law f

or the c ourt. Buys v. B uys , 924 S.W .2d 369, 372 (Tex
. 1996). We examine the entire doc ument and conside r ea ch part with e very other part so that the e ffe ct and mea ning of one part on a ny other part may be dete rmined. Heritage Re s., Inc. v . NationsBank , 939 S.W .2d 118, 121 (T e x. 19 96 ); Steege r v. Be a r d Dr i l l i ng Co. , 371 S.W .2d 684, 688 (Tex. 1963). We interpre t the contra ct by

asce rtaining the true objective intentions of the parties, based on the contra ct lang uag e. SA S I ns t., In c . v . B re ite nfe ld , 167 S.W .3d 840, 841 (Tex. 2005) . We presume that the pa rties to a contra ct intend eve ry

clause to have some eff ec t. He rit

ag e Re s. , 9 39 S.W. 2d

a t 12 1; Ogden v

. Dickinson State Bank

, 662 S.W .2d 330, 331 (Tex. 1983). We g ive wor d s t h eir plain, c ommon, or13

g ener ally acc epted mea

ning unle ss the instrument show s that the parties used them in a technica l or differ ent sense. He rit

ag e Re s. , 939 S.W .2d at 121. The a g ree ment manifests no intent that Ra ndy ’s alimony

obligation be g overne d by chapte r 8 of the f

am i ly code. It beg ins by

stating, “ To the extent permitted by law, the pa

rties stipulate that this agr eeme nt is enfor cea ble as a contra ct.” Then pa ragraph 2 spe cifies that Randy ’s pa y me nts to Che ri e are “ int e nd e d to qu a lif y a s contractual alimony as that term is def ined in section 71(a) of the Interna l Revenue Code of 1986.” (e mphasis added)
. Nowher e does the ag ree ment r e f e r e n c e “ ma in

te n a n c e ” o r c h apter 8 of the fa mily code. I n fac t, the only

ref ere nce to the family

code in the a g ree ment is in parag raph 8, w hich states that the “ag ree ment is made in ac corda nce w ith s ec t i o n 7
. 0 0 6 of the Te x as F amily Code.” Section 7.006 provides for

ag ree ments incident to divorce: (a ) To pr omo te a mic a

ble se ttl e me nt o f d isp ute s in a su it f or div or c e or

annulm e nt, the sp o u s e s ma

y e n te r in to a w r itte n a g r e e me n t c o n c e r n in g th e d iv is io nof the proper ty and the liabiliti es of the spouses a nd maintenanc e of e ither spouse. The ag ree ment may

be re vised or re pudiated be fore rendition of the divorc e or annulment unless the ag ree ment is binding under another rule of la w. ( b ) I f t he court find s th a t t h e te r ms o f th e w r itte na g r e e me n t i na divorce or annulment ar e just and rig ht, those t erms ar e binding on the cour t. I f the c ourt approve s the ag ree ment, the cour t may set forth the ag ree ment in full or incorpora te the ag ree ment by

ref ere nce in the f

inal decr ee. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.006 ( West 2006).

Rand y ’s a g re e d a lim on y

ob lig a tio n a lso wou ld have vio la te d c ha pte r 8 fr om i ts inception. Contrary to se ction 8.054, it a llows f or alimony pay

ments over a

period of te n y ear s. See14

id . § 8.054. I n violation of section 8.055, it provides for monthly alimony pay ments in the amount of $5,000 per

month. Se e id . § 8.055. These f eatur es of the a g ree ment convince us that the parties intende d to cre ate the sor t of c on tr a c tua l a lim on y

ob lig a tio n th a t is pe rm itt e d o uts ide of the c on te xt of

c ha pte r 8, no t a maintenanc e oblig ation g overne d under that chapter
.

I n contending other

wise, Randy

points to parag raph 19 of the ag ree ment, which
c on te mpl a te s ju dic ia l mo dif ic a tio n o r t e rm inatio n o f t he a g re e me nt:
I f either party seeks a modification of this a g ree ment by equitable bill of re view and the ini tiatin g pa

rt y fa ils to s uc c e e d in se tti nga sid e thi s a g re e me nt, the ini tiatin g pa rt y wi ll b e lia ble to t he de fe nd ingpa

rt y fo r any c os ts, a tto rn e y ’s fe e s, c on su lta nt’ s f e e s, appra isal fee s, and any

other e x penses incur

red in de fendingthe ac tion. Rely ing on In re Lendman , 1 70 S.W. 3d 89 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 20 05 , n o p e t.) , Ra

nd y a sse rt s that an e qu ita

ble bil l of re vie w is ava ila ble to mod if

y or se t asi de “ a g re e d to” ma int e na nc e pa y me nts purs ua nt t o s e c tio n 8 .0 57 . We c on c lud e that Lendman is inapplicable to this case . I n Lendman , there
was no c ontrac tual alim o n y agr ee ment at issue. I nstead, the dispute involved a divorce judgme nt that had bee n amende d by ag ree ment, incre asing the child support pay ment and cha

ng ing por tions of the maintena

nce or der. Id . at 896. The husband f iled a motion to modify

the maintenanc e orde r, alleg ing that the trial cour t had exceede d its statutory authorization in entering the orde r. Id . Citi ng to section 8.057 of the f amily code, the appellate court he ld tha t t h e “c o ntinuation of spousal maintenanc e is subject to a mot ion to modify on a showing of a material cha ng e of c ircumstance s of either party aff ecte d by the maintenanc e orde r.” Id . at 899.15 Simpl y beca use the ag ree ment here may be modi fied pursuant to an equitable bill of
re vie w d oe s not me an it may be mod if ie d und e r se c tio n 8.0 57 of the fa mil y c od e . Th e iss ue in t

his
case is not whether the a g ree ment may be modified but whe ther the pa rties contempl ated modification of their a g ree ment under c hapter 8 of the fa

mily code. I f the pa

rties had intended f

or the ag ree ment to be g overne d by section 8.057 or any other provision in chapter 8 of the fa

mily code, the y c ou ld h a ve wr itt e n la

ngua g e to t

hat e ff e c t in to t he c on tr a c t. T he y

did no t.
Dec retal langu age

The divorc e dec ree here is al so more similar to that in Dupree than that in Taylor
. The de cre e incor

porate d the ag ree ment incident to divorce :
The Court finds that the par ties have e ntere d into an Ag ree ment I ncident to Divorc e, in a document separ ate from this F inal Dec ree of Divorce
. The Court a pproves the ag ree ment and incorpora

tes it by ref

ere nce as part of this decr ee a s if it were rec ited here in verbatim and orders the parties to do all thing s nece ssary to effe ctuate the a g re e me nt. A c op y

of the a g re e me nt i s f

ile d w iththe re c or ds of

thi s Co ur t.
Whil e ac knowledg ing that this decreta l lang uag e, unlike Taylor ’s, does not spec ify th e t erms and
a mou nt o f h is obl ig a tio n, Rand y c on te nd s tha t, be c a

us e the dis tr ic t c ourt ordered the par ties to do all things ne cessa

ry to effe ctuate the ag ree ment, this “ decr etal” la ng uag e tra

nsformed the contra ctual alimony pay ments into court-orde red ma intenance pay ments. We disagr ee. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s us e of the wo rd “ or de r” is not a lon e dis po sit ive . “ Court s sh ou ld
no t g ive c on c lus ive e ff

e c t to the jud g me nt’ s u se or omi ssi on of c omm on ly

e mpl oy e d d e c re ta l w or ds , but should inst ead de termine what the trial court a djudicated f rom a fa ir rea ding of all the judg ment’s provisions.” W

ild e v . M ur c hie , 9 49 S.W. 2d 33 1, 33 2 ( Te x. 19 97 ). “ L ike oth e r j ud g me nts , c ourt s16

are to construe divorc e dec ree s as a whole toward the end of harmonizing and g iving e ffe ct to all that is written.” Id
.

Moreove r, t he languag e the pa rties used in their a g ree ment is virtually identical to the lang uag e used in Dupree . Under the hea ding “ Contractual Alimony ,” the Dupree decr ee pr ovided:
I t is the m utual desire of the par ties to provide a c ontinuing mea sure of support for RO B I N A NN DU PRE E, Re c e ivi ngPart y , a ft e r d ivo rc e. T he se su pp or t pa y me nts undertaken by

GORDON G I PP DUPR EE, Paying Par ty , are i n t en ded to qualify as contra ctual alimony

as that term is def

ined in . .
. [t he I nterna l Revenue Code]
. . . . All provisio n s o f this article w ill be interprete d in a manner consistent with that intention. Dupree , 118 S.W .3d at 913.

Wit h the exception of the names of the pa rties, t he above l ang uag e is identical to the lang uag e in par ag raph 2 of the agr ee m en t i n ci d ent to divorce in this case, which the district court incorpora ted by ref ere nce into the divorc e dec ree :
I t is the mutual desire of the parties to pr ovide a continuing measure of support for CHERI E A. McCOL L OUGH, Re ceivingParty , afte r divorce . These suppor t pa y me nts un de rt a ke n b y

RA ND Y F . M c CO L L OU GH , Pa y ing Part y , ar e int e nd e d to qualify as contra ctual alimony

as that t erm is def

ined in . . . [t he Interna l Revenue Code] .
. . . All provisions of this article will be interpre ted in a manne r consistent with that intention.
The c ourt in Dupree wrote:
Th e d iv o r c e d e c r e e s p e c if ic a ll y d e s c r ib e s D u

p r e e ’ s o b li g a ti o na s “ c o n tr a c tua l alimony .” Nothing in the provisions for “c ontrac tual alimony ” re fer s to the spousal maintenanc e provisions of chapter 8 of the family code. T he only

statutory ref ere nce is to the de finition of “contr actua l a limony ” pursuant to the I nterna l Revenue Code. There are no ref

ere nces to F air’s e ligibility for maintena

nce or the fa ctors conside red17

in d e te rm ini ngnatur e , amou nt, duratio n, and

mann e r o f p ay

me nts , p ur su ant t o chapte r 8. . . . Thus, we a g ree with Dupree that the contra ctual alimony provided for in the divorce decr ee is a

n ag ree ment pursuant to section 7.006 of t he family code, and, there fore , it is consider ed a c ontrac t. We further c onclude that the pa rties’ c ontrac tual alimony ag ree ment was not an ag ree ment for spousal maintena nce ma de pursua

nt to chapter 8 of the fa

mily code.
Id . at 915-16 (inter

nal citations omitted) We simi larly

conclude that the ag ree ment incident to divor ce in this ca se is g overne d by contra ct law and not c hapter 8 of the family code. The fa ct that a c ourt expressly approve s such an ag ree ment and incorpora tes it into the final divorce decr ee does not tr ansfor m c ontrac tual alimony pay ments into court-orde red ma intenance p aym en t s subject to the termination and modification provisions of chapte r 8 of the fa mily code. See Car

dwe ll , 9 78 S.W. 2d

a t 72 4; se e als o M

c Go od win v. Mc Go odwin, 67 1 S. W.2 d 8 80 , 8 82 (T e x. 19 84 ) ( “ Suc h a n a g re e me nt, tho ug h in c or po rate d in to a fina l divorce de cre e, is treated as a contra ct, and its leg al forc e and its mea ning a re g ov er n ed by the law of c on tr a c ts, no t by

the law o f j ud g me nts .” ); W oolam v. Tussing , 5 4 S. W. 3 d 4 4 2 , 4 4 9 ( T e x. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (“ A provision in a divorce decr ee or deringpay ment of support to a forme r spouse may

be enf orce d as a c ontrac tual obligation.”).

CO NC LU SION Be cause we c onclud e that, as a matter of la

w, the ter mination and modification provisions of chapte r 8 do not apply to Randy ’s alimony

obligation here, we uphol d the district court’s summary judgme nt on that basis. Se e Te x as W or k e rs’ Com p. Com m’n v . P ati e nt A dv oc ate s, 136 S.W .3d 643, 648 (Tex. 2004); Star-Telegram, Inc . v. Doe , 915 S.W .2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995);18

Carr v. Brasher , 776 S.W. 2d 56 7, 56 9 (T e x. 19 89 ); Tana Oil & Gas Corp. v . Cernosek, 188 S.W .3d 354, 359 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied). We ove rrule Ra ndy ’s issues on appe al, and a ffirm the jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pembe rton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: August 25, 2006