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2023 IL App (5th) 180413-U 

NO. 5-18-0413 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Hamilton County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 17-CF-47 

 ) 

ALISA M. McPHERSON, ) Honorable 

 ) Barry L. Vaughan, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Moore and Barberis concurred in the judgment.

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Where the defendant admittedly violated her probation for the second time, the 

circuit court did not err in finding a probation violation or sentencing her to a prison 

term one year above the minimum. The court also did not err in refusing to consider 

 defendant’s untimely postsentencing motion. As any argument to the contrary 

would lack merit, we grant the defendant’s appointed counsel on appeal leave to 

withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment. 

¶ 2 Defendant, Alisa M. McPherson, appeals the circuit court’s orders revoking her probation 

and sentencing her to four years’ imprisonment. Defendant’s appointed attorney, the Office of the 

State Appellate Defender (OSAD), filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, arguing that this appeal 

presents no arguably meritorious issues. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). OSAD 

has notified defendant of its motion. This court provided defendant with ample opportunity to file 

a response, but she has not done so. After reviewing the record and considering OSAD’s motion

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 02/09/23. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
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and the supporting memorandum, we agree that this appeal presents no issue of even arguable 

merit. Therefore, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant was charged with one count of burglary and two counts of possession of a 

controlled substance. She pleaded guilty to burglary in exchange for 21⁄2 years’ probation and the 

State’s agreement to dismiss the remaining charges. The State’s factual basis showed that 

defendant was found behind the wheel of a truck while her fiancé, John Ferris, was removing items 

from a storage building and placing them in the truck. The circuit court accepted the plea and 

imposed the agreed-upon sentence.

¶ 5 On April 6, 2018, the State petitioned to revoke defendant’s probation, alleging that she 

had not reported to her probation officer since December 2017, had been arrested for possession 

of a controlled substance, had consumed drugs and alcohol, and had failed to pay fines, complete 

drug counseling, or to appear for a court hearing. Defendant stipulated that she had violated 

probation. 

¶ 6 Following a hearing, the court sentenced defendant to four years’ probation. One condition 

of probation was that she spend the first 60 days in “home confinement” with Ronald Baker, her 

ex-father-in-law.

¶ 7 On July 11, 2018, the State petitioned to revoke defendant’s second probation, alleging that 

she did not begin her home confinement with Baker as ordered. At a hearing on the petition, Baker 

testified that he picked defendant up from jail on July 9, 2018. He drove her to a gas station, where 

he bought her a drink and cigarettes, then to the welfare office so she could check on her benefits. 

Then, they drove to Walmart, where defendant demanded that Baker buy her clothes. When he 

refused, she asked him to take her to her house or to her grandmother’s house.
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¶ 8 Baker refused these requests. Defendant wanted a pizza, so they drove to Domino’s to 

pick it up. When they arrived at Domino’s, defendant got out to smoke a cigarette while Baker 

went inside for the pizza. When he returned, defendant was gone. He waited for 30 minutes, but 

she did not return. 

¶ 9 Baker drove home and called defendant’s probation officer, Denise Givens, to let her know 

that defendant was missing. Givens asked Baker to go back to Domino’s to see if defendant had 

returned. Baker went back to the restaurant, but defendant was not there. Later that night, he 

called Domino’s and was told defendant had never returned to the restaurant.

¶ 10 Baker explained that staying at his house was defendant’s idea. He said that she “brought 

this up whenever she was in jail.” He agreed that defendant could be placed under “house arrest” 

at his home because this was something she wanted to do, although she had never asked for his 

permission to do so.

¶ 11 Givens testified that, immediately after the prior hearing, she explained to defendant the 

conditions of her probation. Defendant understood that she had to reside with Baker for 60 days. 

A few hours later, Baker called to say that defendant had run away. Later, she received a voicemail 

message from defendant who said that she had gotten into an argument with Baker and left. 

¶ 12 Givens spoke to defendant the following day and told her to go back to Baker’s house. She 

explained that the court had ordered her to reside with Baker and only the court could change the 

terms of probation. Givens told defendant to report to her office the following day, July 11.

¶ 13 Defendant did not report to Givens on July 11. On July 12, Givens received a call from 

Carissa Pyles. Pyles said that she resided at Wildflower house, a “sober living” facility. Pyles 

said that defendant was living there, too, and wanted to talk to Givens. Givens said that defendant 
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had to return to Baker’s residence, and arranged for defendant to report to her on July 13. When 

defendant reported on July 13, she was arrested.

¶ 14 Defendant testified that Baker was being “verbally abusive.” Baker refused to take her 

home so that she could get some clothes. On the way to Walmart, they passed her grandmother’s 

house. Defendant asked him to stop so she could get money from her grandmother to buy clothes. 

He again refused, saying, “We are not dealing with your family. They are not your family no 

more.” When the subject of her children came up, Baker said, “you need to just not worry about 

your kids right now,” which upset defendant.

¶ 15 Baker was smoking marijuana and offered her some. Baker ordered a pizza with meat from 

Domino’s. She said she did not want a pizza with meat because she was a vegetarian. Baker 

replied, “you can just pick it off.” Baker got angry at Walmart, and stormed out, leaving her with 

a shopping cart full of groceries. She described Baker as “being really mean.” She “ran” to a 

friend’s house after they stopped at Domino’s. There, she met Pyles, who took her home to shower 

and get some clothes.

¶ 16 Defendant left a voicemail message for Givens, then spent the night at the friend’s house. 

She spent the next night with another friend. The next day, she went to the Wildflower house, 

where she stayed until July 13.

¶ 17 Defendant said that she called Givens on July 10 and 11 and was told that she needed to 

return to Baker’s residence. Defendant was “scared” because Baker was “not just verbally but 

mentally and emotionally” abusive. Defendant testified that she did not want to stay with Baker 

because there were “too many triggers” at his house.

¶ 18 In rebuttal, Baker denied that he was abusive. He denied smoking marijuana. He did not 

take defendant to see her family because “they are always into some kind of drugs.”
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¶ 19 The court found that the State had proved that defendant violated her probation. The court 

noted that during the sentencing hearing defendant never expressed any reservations about living 

with Baker and, “frankly, that was one of the reasons the Court opted for another chance at 

probation instead of accepting the State’s recommendation of going to DOC.” The court revoked 

defendant’s probation and scheduled a sentencing hearing. 

¶ 20 The presentence report showed that defendant had a burglary conviction from 2004, when 

she was 17 years old. Following the hearing, the court conceded that it had likely “set [defendant] 

up to fail” when it ordered her to live with Baker, but that this appeared to be the only alternative 

to prison. Noting the prior conviction, the court sentenced defendant to four years’ imprisonment, 

one year above the minimum. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 21 On the thirty-first day after sentencing, defendant mailed to the court a motion to reconsider 

the sentence. She contended that her “ONLY motivation to change living arrangements was 

because of the open drug use and her desire to stay clean and sober and not violate any probational 

rules.” The record does not show that the court ever took any action on defendant’s motion.

¶ 22 ANALYSIS

¶ 23 OSAD contends that there is no good-faith argument that the circuit court erred by revoking 

defendant’s probation and sentencing her to prison. We agree.

¶ 24 OSAD initially maintains that the court did not err in finding that defendant violated her 

probation. OSAD contends that the State followed appropriate procedures by filing a revocation 

petition alleging the specific acts that violated probation and providing her with adequate notice.

¶ 25 Further, the State proved that defendant violated her probation. In a revocation proceeding, 

the State has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant violated her 

probation. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4.1(c) (West 2018); People v. Crowell, 53 Ill. 2d 447, 451 (1973). In 
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reviewing whether the evidence is sufficient to support a revocation, we decide “whether, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have 

found the defendant guilty” by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Reher, 361 Ill. App. 3d 

697, 700 (2005). It is the responsibility of the fact finder to judge the weight of the evidence, 

assess the credibility of the witnesses, and draw any reasonable inferences. People v. Ramos, 316 

Ill. App. 3d 18, 22 (2000).

¶ 26 Here, it was not seriously disputed that defendant failed to comply with the conditions of 

her probation. One such condition was that she reside with Baker for 60 days. However, before 

even arriving at Baker’s house, defendant absconded and made living arrangements of her own 

choosing. She ignored Givens’s repeated directives to return to Baker’s house and missed an 

appointment with Givens before finally appearing three days later.

¶ 27 Defense counsel acknowledged in closing that defendant “didn’t strictly comply with the 

Court’s order.” In her own testimony, defendant admitted that she did not reside with Baker as 

the court ordered, but attempted to rationalize her conduct by blaming Baker. However, as the 

court noted, at the sentencing hearing, defendant never expressed any reservations about living 

with Baker. And Baker testified without contradiction that the idea of living with him as an 

alternative to going to prison originated with defendant. Defendant did not present any evidence 

that Baker posed a physical danger to her such that she had no choice but to run away from him 

and seek alternative living arrangements without first petitioning the court.

¶ 28 OSAD further contends that no reasonably meritorious argument exists that the circuit 

court abused its discretion in sentencing. After revoking her probation, the court could sentence 

defendant to any sentence appropriate for the original offense. People v. Rollins, 166 Ill. App. 3d 

843, 844-45 (1988). A circuit court had great discretion in sentencing a defendant, basing its 
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decision on the particular circumstances of each case, considering such factors as the defendant’s 

credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and 

age. People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999). We presumptively defer to the trial court’s 

sentencing decision because the trial judge, having observed the defendant and the proceedings, 

has a far better opportunity to consider these factors than the reviewing court, which must rely on 

the “cold” record. Id. We will not disturb a sentence within the statutory range unless it is “greatly 

at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of 

the offense.” Id. at 54.

¶ 29 Here, after two failed attempts at probation, it could not be seriously argued that the court 

abused its discretion by sentencing defendant to prison. Moreover, the four-year sentence was 

only one year above the minimum for a Class 2 felony such as burglary. See 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) 

(West 2016); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2016). Given that defendant had previously been 

convicted of the same offense, a sentence above the minimum was justified on that basis alone.

¶ 30 Finally, OSAD suggests that there is no viable argument that the court erred by failing to 

rule on defendant’s untimely motion to reconsider the sentence. A court’s authority to modify a 

sentence terminates after 30 days. People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 303 (2003) (citing 730 ILCS 

5/5-8-1(c) (West 2002)). Here, the court properly advised defendant that she had 30 days to file a 

motion to reconsider the sentence, but her motion was mailed on the thirty-first day. Thus, the 

court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. Id.; People v. Bonds, 317 Ill. App. 3d 411, 416-17 (2000).

¶ 31 CONCLUSION

¶ 32 As this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and 

affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 33 Motion granted; judgment affirmed.