NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MOHAMMAD K., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, C.C., J.O., J.J., C.K., N.K., M.K.,

Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 15-0401

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD511307

The Honorable Karen L. O’Connor, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

John L. Popilek, PC, Scottsdale

By John L. Popilek

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Amber E. Pershon

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
MOHAMMAD K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Mohammad K. (“Father”) appeals from the superior court’s 

order terminating his parental rights to three of his children. For reasons 

that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Channtell K. (“Mother”) began their relationship 

in 2010. Mother had three older children from previous relationships—

C.C., J.O., and J.J.—who lived with the couple; Father had four children 

from previous relationships who lived out of state. Mother and Father are 

the biological parents of C.K., born in March 2012, N.K., born in March 2013, 

and M.K., born in December 2014.

¶3 In late August 2013, Father took N.K. to the hospital because 

the child’s arm was limp and swollen. X-rays showed that N.K. had 

suffered multiple fractures consistent with non-accidental trauma and 

potentially indicative of abuse: an acute fracture to N.K.’s right elbow, a 

healing fracture to his right forearm, healing fractures to the back of two 

ribs, and a healing fracture to his lower right leg. The combination of rib 

and leg fractures particularly suggested abuse.

¶4 When Father and Mother could not provide an explanation 

for the five-month-old child’s multiple broken bones, the hospital contacted 

the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”), and DCS took N.K. and the older

children into care. DCS took M.K. into care immediately after his birth in 

December 2014.

¶5 The hospital performed additional testing to find the cause of 

N.K.’s fractures, but the results did not support any medical cause (e.g., 

nutrient deficiencies or bone abnormalities). A repeat x-ray in September

showed another fracture to N.K.’s upper right leg and a possible rib 

fracture, which the doctor posited could have occurred before N.K.’s 

removal, and simply became more clearly visible over time as they began 

to heal. Subsequent x-rays in February and November 2014—after N.K. 
MOHAMMAD K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

had been in an out-of-home placement for a matter of months—showed no 

new fractures.

¶6 The older children also showed signs of abuse. C.C. told a 

police officer that Mother and Father hit the children with a belt as 

punishment. C.C. also exhibited fear behavior consistent with having 

witnessed abusive situations. J.O. similarly indicated that he would be 

“whooped with a belt” as punishment, and he had several long, linear 

hyperpigmented marks on his legs and a mark on his temple that suggested 

patterned injuries resulting from impacts with a stick or the side of a belt.

He also exhibited an abnormal fear of belts, suggesting previous trauma 

involving a belt. J.J. stated that Father “‘whoops’ him with a stick all over.” 

Like J.O., J.J. had several linear and curvilinear marks and scars on his back, 

buttocks, and thighs, suggesting patterned injuries resulting from nonaccidental trauma, consistent with being hit with a stick. J.J. exhibited fear 

of belts and sticks, and C.K. was afraid of belts.

¶7 DCS sought to terminate Father’s parental rights to C.K., 

N.K., and (after his birth) M.K., as relevant here, on grounds that he had 

willfully abused a child or had failed to protect a child from willful abuse. 

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 8-533(B)(2).1 At the severance trial, Father 

acknowledged using physical discipline—“whooping”—on the children, 

although he characterized it as a last resort. He stated that he would spank 

the children with his hand, not an object, but admitted hitting each child

with a belt once. He also testified that he and Mother shared responsibility 

for punishing the children equally, and that although Mother also used 

physical punishment on a few occasions, “[s]he never crossed the line.” 

Mother acknowledged “whooping” the children with a belt, but only 

approximately four times.

¶8 Father testified that he was the primary caretaker of the 

children after N.K. was born, but had hired a babysitter for about two 

weeks immediately before N.K.’s fractures were discovered. Father stated

that he had no idea how N.K. had been injured, although he noted that N.K. 

had been born premature. He also noted that, beginning at two or three 

months old, N.K. would cry and scream in pain when being picked up, but 

that the doctor thought it was related to gas or bowel issues. Father 

acknowledged pleading guilty in 2008 to corporal injury to one of his other, 

out-of-state children, although he denied actually hitting that child.

 

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant date, we cite a statute’s 

current version.
MOHAMMAD K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

¶9 Mother and Father presented a report from an expert who 

concluded N.K. was not a victim of child abuse, and that his fractures could 

be explained medically by temporary bone fragility. A board certified child 

abuse pediatrician testified to the contrary, however, stating that temporary 

brittle bone is not a legitimate medical condition and that N.K.’s fractures 

were highly specific for child abuse. The pediatrician further testified that 

none of the follow-up testing that was conducted suggested any bone 

abnormalities that would explain N.K.’s fractures, and that the absence of 

additional fractures after N.K. was removed was inconsistent with a genetic

condition causing bone fragility.

¶10 The superior court found grounds for termination based on 

willful abuse or failure to protect from willful abuse, found that severance 

would be in each child’s best interests, and terminated Father’s parental 

rights to C.K., N.K., and M.K.2 Father timely appealed, and we have 

jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 8-235.

DISCUSSION

¶11 The superior court may terminate the parent–child 

relationship if there is clear and convincing evidence of at least one 

statutory ground for severance and a preponderance of the evidence shows 

severance to be in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8–533(B); Kent K. v. 

Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). We review the superior court’s 

severance ruling for an abuse of discretion, deferring to the court’s 

credibility determinations and factual findings. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t 

of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004); Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002).

 

2 At the same hearing, the court found M.K. to be dependent as to 

Mother and Father. Father does not challenge the dependency finding on 

appeal.

The court found additional grounds for severance as to C.K. and 

N.K. based on 15 months’ time in care under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). We 

need not address the ground because we affirm on the basis of abuse or 

failure to protect. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251, 

¶ 27 (2000).

The superior court also terminated Mother’s parental rights to C.C., 

J.O., J.J., C.K., N.K., and M.K. Although she appealed the severance ruling, 

this court later dismissed her appeal after her attorney certified that he had 

found no non-frivolous issues to raise.
MOHAMMAD K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

¶12 Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), severance may be justified if “the 

parent has neglected or wilfully abused a child.” The statute expressly 

includes “situations in which the parent knew or reasonably should have 

known that a person was abusing or neglecting a child.” Id. “Abuse” 

includes causing or allowing either physical or serious emotional injury. 

A.R.S. §§ 8-201(2), -533(B)(2). Abuse of one child supports termination of 

parental rights to other children, even absent evidence that the other 

children were abused. Linda V. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 76, 79, 

¶ 14 (App. 2005).

¶13 Father argues the superior court erred because the evidence 

did not establish the cause of the children’s injuries; he does not challenge 

the court’s best interests determination. He asserts that both DCS and the 

court simply assumed that “the children showed evidence of injuries, 

therefore, Father either was the abuser or failed to protect the children.”

¶14 We disagree. The evidence showed that N.K.’s fractures were 

highly specific for child abuse. Additional testing effectively ruled out 

other, non-trauma medical causes. And although Father and Mother 

presented a contrary medical opinion concluding that N.K.’s injuries did

not indicate abuse, the superior court weighed the conflicting evidence and 

concluded otherwise. See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 4.

¶15 Moreover, substantial evidence showed that Father was 

responsible for the children’s injuries or should have known of the abuse. 

Although Father argues that Mother was responsible for the physical 

discipline and that he did not know and could not have known if she 

injured the children, he was the children’s primary caretaker at the time

they were injured. Additionally, the older children stated that both Father 

and Mother used a belt to impose physical punishment; J.J. specified that 

Father punished him by hitting him with a stick. Two of the older children 

had patterned marks and scars on their bodies consistent with being hit 

with a belt or stick, and all four older children exhibited abnormal fear 

behavior, three of them specifically triggered by belts. Father himself 

acknowledged “whooping” the children. Although he denied doing so 

regularly, using an implement like a stick or belt, or ever leaving a mark,

there was evidence to the contrary, and we defer to the superior court’s 

assessment of conflicting evidence and witness credibility. Id.

¶16 Although, as DCS acknowledged, Father cared deeply for the 

children, participated in services, and made significant progress in other 

areas, the record supports the superior court’s determination that severance 
MOHAMMAD K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

6

was warranted on grounds of abuse. Accordingly, the court did not err by 

terminating Father’s parental rights to C.K., N.K., and M.K.

CONCLUSION

¶17 The judgment is affirmed.