UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 09-20025

D-3, MONICA CONYERS, HON. AVERN COHN

Defendant.

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MEMORANDUM REGARDING SENTENCING

I.

This is a criminal case. Defendant pled guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§771

and 666(a), Conspiracy to Commit Bribery Concerning Program Receiving Federal

Funds. On March 10, 2010, the Court sentenced defendant to a custody term of 37

months, to be followed by two (2) years of supervised release under the standard terms

and conditions of this district. The Court imposed a special assessment of $100.00. No

fine was imposed, and defendant was not required to pay the costs of supervised

release. This memorandum supplements (and repeats in part) the Court’s bench

comments at the sentencing.

II.

The Rule 11 Plea Agreement accompanying the plea stated that the guideline

term of imprisonment could not exceed 60 months, which is the maximum term of

imprisonment for the offense of conviction. The plea agreement further stated that the
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Court was not bound by either party’s evaluation of the guideline range. The plea

agreement also contained a waiver of the right to appeal if the Court imposed a

sentence in accordance with the plea agreement.

The Presentence Investigation Report recommended a guideline scoring for the

offense of conviction as follows:

Base Offense Level 14

Value of Payments Received ($16,000) +4

Elected Public Official +4

Acceptance of Responsibility -3

Offense Level 19

The Offense Level of 19, coupled with a Criminal History of I, called for a

sentencing range of 30-37 months.

As reflected in the record of the sentencing hearing, the Court at the time was

under the impression the Probation Department had filed a supplement to the

Presentence Investigation Report, which showed an increase in the Offense Level to 23

because of the inclusion of Relevant Conduct under Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.3. 

This increase was consistent with the position of the government as set forth in its

Sentencing Memorandum (Doc. No. 152). However, this was not the case; the

supplement was not the recommendation of the Probation Department, but rather a

description of Relevant Conduct and the guideline range should the Court include

Relevant Conduct in its calculation of the Offense Level.

After an extended discussion, including an objection by defendant to the inclusion

of Relevant Conduct in the computation of the Offense Level, the Court did not include
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No useful purpose would be served by a description of the Relevant Conduct

initially included by the Court. What was not appreciated by any of the parties, including

the Court, was the import of E.D. Mich. LCrR. 32.1(f) which reads:

When the Court resolves disputed sentencing factors, it shall

notify the parties of its tentative findings and provide a

reasonable opportunity for the submission of oral or written

objections to the Court before the imposition of sentence. If

the Court determines that a hearing is necessary to resolve

disputed sentencing factors, a hearing shall be held for that

purpose upon reasonable notice to all interested parties. 

See Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.

See also United States v. Ramirez, 196 F.3d 895, 897-99 (8th Cir 1999).

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Relevant Conduct in its guideline calculation of the Offense Level.1

III.

The Court imposed a sentence at the top of the guideline range of 30-37 months. 

The reasons as stated on the record follow:

[T]he Court has considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.

3553(a). Not each of the factors is relevant to the sentence. 

What is relevant is the nature and circumstances of the

offense [of conviction]. . .the need for the sentence imposed

to reflect the seriousness of the offense; the need to promote

respect for the law and to [provide] just punishment for the

offense; to afford adequate deterrence to other public

officials who use their positions to enrich themselves.

Because of the impact the transgressions of the defendant

has had on the people of Detroit as reflected in the extensive

and perhaps excessive media coverage of the case, some

[further] comment is appropriate in explanation of the

sentence imposed.

First, there are some facts in the defendant’s favor. She

immediately resigned from the City Council following the plea

of guilty and has remained publicly silent since then. 

Also in her favor are her efforts to cooperate with the
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government. However, the government has advised the

Court that much of the information the defendant has

provided is somewhat conclusory and not firsthand evidence

which can be introduced in a court proceeding. For this

reason the government says it has not filed a motion under

Section 5K1.1 of the guidelines for a downward departure. 

Significantly, the government has also advised the Court,

and I quote:

The government cannot say at this time what value

Ms. Conyers’ leads might yield until the government

has had a chance to investigate further some of the

matters she described. That investigation will not be

completed by the time of Ms. Conyers’ sentencing in

March. If her leads later prove to be significant, the

government may, if appropriate, file a motion with the

Court for a reduction of the sentence pursuant to

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35.

The defendant is a first-time offender and unlikely to ever

engage in criminal conduct again.

Finally, the defendant has done some good works outside of

her official position. The Presentence Investigation Report

notes that the defendant has been a positive influence on

the community, that she has volunteered at homeless

shelters, assisted convicted felons with finding employment

and worked with disadvantaged women. Ordinarily such

activity should work in defendant’s favor. However, as a

nationally known expert in criminal law has said:

Although the consideration of good works look beyond

the crime of conviction to view the whole individual,

that approach should not be followed when the

defendant is an elected official who betrayed the

public trust.

In the end in fashioning an appropriate sentence the Court

has balanced individual characteristics against institutional

values.

The law requires the Court to impose a sentence that is

sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy the

purposes of sentencing: [j]ust punishment, general

deterrence and protection of the public. The sentence of
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[37] months accomplishes these goals.

The defendant’s conduct while a member of the Detroit City

Council fell woefully short of what the people of Detroit were

entitled to when they elected her to the City Council. For

reasons not fathomable to the Court, and likely to the

defendant herself, she violated fundamental precepts

expected of an elected official and public office holder. As

far back as the Book of Exodus we find recited obligations to

which each of us are subject and which in the defendant’s

case were violated. Chapter 23 tells each of us to:

Take no rewards in a cause, for rewards make those

blind who have eyes to see, and make the decisions

of the upright false.

As to a government official such as defendant herself, Judge

John T. Noonan in his seminal work Bribes says:

Bribery is a betrayal of trust.

And then says:

The social injury inflicted by breaches of trust goes

beyond any material measurement. When

government officials act to enrich themselves, they

act against the fabric on which they depend; for what

else does government rest upon except the

expectation that those chosen to act for the public

welfare will serve that welfare.

The sentence imposed is consistent with the most recent

sentences imposed by judges of this district against public

officials who breached their oath of office. The sentence is

more severe than others because the defendant’s

responsibility was greater and . . . her offense was more

egregious.

IV.

During the course of the sentencing hearing, several times the defendant stated

her desire to withdraw her guilty plea. This request was denied. The defendant’s plea

of guilty was made knowingly and voluntary. As stated by the government’s attorney,
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defendant “has pled guilty to a bribery offense, and she should be held responsible for

it.”

The transcript of the plea hearing reads in part as follows:

THE COURT: Did you, as charged in the information,

engage in a conspiracy to commit bribery concerning

programs receiving federal funds?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Yes? The answer is yes?

DEFENDANT: Correct.

THE COURT: The government lawyer described the

circumstances of the offense. I want you to listen to him

because I believe he’s going to describe it, and I want to

know from you if he describes it correctly, okay?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Go ahead, sir [to the government attorney].

GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY: The factual basis is contained

on Pages 3 and 4, and I’ll summarize those. On January 1,

2006 defendant began serving a four-year term on the

Detroit City Council as president pro tem. Starting January

2007, the defendant served a two-year term as an ex officio

trustee of the City of Detroit General Retirement System. In

connection with her official duties with the city council and

the General Retirement System, the defendant and an aide

received payments from persons who sought contracts,

money or favorable treatment from those two entities. The

defendant and the aide did so with the intent that the payers

would perceive that defendant would be influenced by the

payments in her official actions.

One instance in which this occurred was in 2007 when the

City Council was considering whether to approve a waste

water treatment contract between Synagro Technologies

and the City of Detroit. The parties further stipulate that the

Synagro contract . . . involved more than $5,000 and that in

2007 the City of Detroit received benefits of more than
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$10,000 from the federal government.

THE COURT: Is that complete?

GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY: That’s complete, Your Honor.

THE COURT: [To defendant] You have heard what he

says? That’s what this agreement says?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And you agree that’s accurate?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

 S/Avern Cohn 

AVERN COHN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 29, 2010

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to the attorneys of

record on this date, March 29, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

 S/Julie Owens 

Case Manager, (313) 234-5160