United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted March 10, 2022 

Decided March 10, 2022 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge 

CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge

No. 21-1583 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

THOMAS E. TYNAN, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of 

Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:19-CR-00732(1) 

John Z. Lee, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Thomas Tynan pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), 

for which he was sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised 

release. Although his plea agreement contains an appeal waiver, Tynan filed a notice of 

appeal. His appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to 

withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the 

nature of the case and raises potential issues that an appeal like this would be expected 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 
No. 21-1583 Page 2 

to involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, and Tynan has not responded 

to the motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that counsel 

discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Counsel confirms that Tynan wishes to withdraw his guilty plea, see United 

States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012), so she explores possible challenges to 

his plea. A defendant can withdraw a guilty plea only for fair and just reasons, which 

include his legal or actual innocence or his entry of an unknowing or involuntary guilty 

plea. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B); United States v. Barr, 960 F.3d 906, 917 (7th Cir. 2020). 

Counsel properly concludes that Tynan cannot raise a nonfrivolous challenge based on 

a claim of innocence. As she explains, he waived any such challenge at his plea hearing 

when he admitted the factual basis for the charges. See United States v. Robinson, 964 

F.3d 632, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2020). 

Counsel also rightly concludes that Tynan cannot raise a nonfrivolous challenge 

to the voluntariness of the plea. As she notes, the record of the plea colloquy does not 

reflect that Tynan was either coerced or—as he would like her to argue—induced to 

plead guilty by a promise of a prison sentence no longer than a year and a day. The 

transcript reflects that the district court complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure and confirmed that no one pressured him to sign the agreement or 

made promises to induce him to sign the agreement. No evidence undermines these 

sworn statements, which are presumed true. See United States v. Graf, 827 F.3d 581, 584 

(7th Cir. 2016). 

Next, counsel explores whether Tynan could attack any aspect of his sentence 

but properly concludes that doing so would be pointless. The district court correctly 

calculated a guidelines range of 33 to 41 months, based on a total offense level of 19 

(which included a two-level enhancement for taking property from a financial 

institution, see U.S.S.G. §§ 2B3.1(a), (b)(1)), and a criminal-history category of II. Any 

challenge to the reasonableness of Tynan’s sentence would also be futile. Tynan’s 36-

month prison sentence is within the guidelines range, so we would presume it to be 

reasonable. See United States v. Wehrle, 985 F.3d 549, 557 (7th Cir. 2021). Like counsel, we 

see no basis in the record that might rebut that presumption. The district court 

adequately addressed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors such as the nature of Tynan’s 

offense and criminal history, noting that Tynan repeatedly resorted to criminal activity 

when he faced financial difficulty or other stressors. The court also acknowledged 

Tynan’s mitigating arguments, agreeing that he had the potential to make a positive 

impact in the community through his education and consistent employment. 
No. 21-1583 Page 3 

Counsel then evaluates whether Tynan could challenge the term of supervised 

release but rightly concludes that Tynan waived any such argument when he declined 

to object to the term and conditions at the sentencing hearing. See United States v. 

Canfield, 2 F.4th 622, 626–27 (7th Cir. 2021). At sentencing, Tynan objected to only one 

supervised-release condition (an objection that the court granted), waiving any 

challenge to the remaining conditions. 

Finally, counsel considers whether Tynan could argue that his trial counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance but appropriately concludes that any such claim is best 

reserved for collateral review, where a record could be developed. See Massaro v. United 

States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003); United States v. Cates, 950 F.3d 453, 456–57 (7th Cir. 2020).

Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.