This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2018 UT 11

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL BINKS,

Appellant.

No. 20160235

Filed March 6, 2018

On Direct Appeal

Fourth District, Provo

The Honorable Claudia Laycock

No. 141401875

Attorneys:

Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., Karen A. Klucznik, Asst. Solic. Gen., Julia 

Thomas, Salt Lake City, for appellee

Douglas J. Thompson, Margaret P. Lindsay, Provo, for appellant

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE authored the opinion of the Court, in 

which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE HIMONAS, JUSTICE PEARCE, 

and JUSTICE PETERSEN joined.

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court:

¶1 Michael Binks was convicted of possession of drugs and drug 

paraphernalia. In this appeal he challenges the denial of his motion 

to suppress the evidence that formed the basis for his conviction. We 

affirm. 

¶2 When officers stopped Binks’s vehicle, they had at least 

reasonable suspicion to investigate two traffic violations and 

possible drug possession. And when the officers approached the 

vehicle they gained reasonable suspicion of another offense—driving 

under the influence. The officers were entitled under Terry v. Ohio, 
STATE v. BINKS

Opinion of the Court

2

392 U.S. 1 (1968), to detain Binks for a reasonable time while they 

investigated these offenses. We affirm on that basis without reaching 

the other two grounds asserted by the State for defending the 

search—that police were justified in searching Binks based on the 

warrant for the apartment Binks had just visited and that Binks was 

within the vicinity of the residence covered by the search warrant 

and thus a proper subject of the warrant under Bailey v. United States, 

568 U.S. 186 (2013).

I

¶3 On June 26, 2014, the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force 

executed a search warrant on an apartment in American Fork, Utah. 

Officers with the task force had obtained a warrant to search the 

listed apartment for “narcotics, paraphernalia,” and “other items 

associated with the use/distribution of controlled substances.” The 

warrant also authorized police to search (1) any “person at the 

location or attempting to leave the location at the time of warrant 

service” and (2) “[a]ny vehicle parked at the location or attempting 

to leave the location during the time of service.”

¶4 Shortly before 8:00 a.m. on June 26, Detective Phillip 

Crawford began surveilling the apartment from a position in the 

parking lot behind the apartment. Two other officers, Sergeant Jones 

and Deputy Robinson, had set up surveillance a few blocks away. 

Just before Detective Crawford could leave his vehicle and serve the 

warrant, he saw two men arrive in a silver SUV. One or both men 

then entered the apartment, stayed for two or three minutes, and left 

in the SUV.

¶5 As the SUV left the premises, Detective Crawford radioed 

orders to Sergeant Jones and Deputy Robinson to stop the car.

Detective Crawford also reported that the SUV had failed to signal 

when exiting the parking lot. Crawford believed that the vehicle was 

covered within the terms of the warrant, but noted the traffic 

violation as “kind of a double safety.”

¶6 Immediately after radioing to Sergeant Jones and Deputy 

Robinson, Detective Crawford and other officers served the warrant 

on the apartment identified in the warrant. Detective Crawford 

testified that the elapsed time between radioing a description of the 

car and serving the warrant on the apartment was just “long enough 

to walk . . . the distance from our vehicle to where the residence is.”
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Opinion of the Court

3

¶7 Sergeant Jones received the order from Detective Crawford 

and almost immediately spotted the silver SUV. While tailing the 

car, Jones saw the driver commit yet another traffic violation—

stopping beyond the painted line at a stop sign. The officers 

activated their lights and stopped the car at 8:01 a.m.

¶8 When Deputy Robinson approached the vehicle, he noticed 

that Michael Binks, the driver, had glossy and bloodshot eyes and 

that the vehicle smelled of alcohol. The officer also noted that Binks 

seemed “very nervous”—“actually shaking, he was that nervous.”

Deputy Robinson suspected that Binks was under the influence of 

drugs or alcohol and promptly performed several field sobriety tests. 

Binks passed those tests.

¶9 Deputy Robinson then returned to his patrol car and ran 

Binks’s license, the passenger’s license, and the SUV’s license plate 

number. Sergeant Jones stayed with Binks and checked for signs and 

symptoms of drug use. The record checks were completed between 

8:16 a.m. and 8:17 a.m.

¶10 While Sergeant Jones and Deputy Robinson questioned Binks, 

Detective Crawford searched the apartment. The occupants of the 

apartment confirmed that the two men who had visited the 

apartment while police were surveilling had purchased $30 worth of 

methamphetamine. The detective began trying to contact Sergeant 

Jones, but reception was spotty.

¶11 Sergeant Jones testified that he received word from Detective 

Crawford at 8:22 a.m. that Binks had bought methamphetamine. 

Deputy Robinson immediately searched Binks and found a baggie 

with half a gram of methamphetamine inside a pocket. The officers 

arrested Binks, and he was charged with possession of a controlled 

substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.

II

¶12 Binks challenges all three of the State’s grounds for defending 

the search at issue in this case. He says that that the length of his 

detention was too prolonged to be justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 

U.S. 1 (1968); that the search was not authorized by the terms of the 

warrant; and that the scope of the warrant cannot be extended to 

encompass him within the standard set forth in Bailey v. United 

States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013). 
STATE v. BINKS

Opinion of the Court

4

¶13 We affirm on the first ground without reaching the other two. 

We hold that Binks’s detention was valid under Terry because the 

officers had at least reasonable suspicion of several separate 

offenses—two traffic violations, driving under the influence, and 

drug possession—and officers did not prolong the stop longer than 

was reasonably necessary to investigate each offense.

¶14 Binks’s detention was reasonable under the standard set forth 

in the Terry case. Terry authorizes a brief detention of a person by 

police based on reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal 

wrongdoing. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A Terry

stop survives Fourth Amendment scrutiny if it is (1) “lawful at its 

inception” and (2) “otherwise executed in a reasonable manner.” 

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005).

¶15 Binks concedes that the stop was lawful at its inception 

because an officer has reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle after 

observing a traffic violation. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 

1609, 1614 (2015). He even seems to acknowledge that Deputy

Robinson acquired reasonable suspicion during the stop to 

investigate him for driving under the influence. But he argues that 

the stop became unreasonable when officers finished investigating 

him for those offenses and continued to detain him while 

investigating him for drug possession.

¶16 Binks contends that the officers’ testimony and radio logs 

show that by 8:16 a.m. they had completed their sobriety tests and 

had completed all their record checks on him. He argues then that 

the officers should have issued him a citation or allowed him to 

leave by 8:16 a.m. because they had concluded “the only mission 

they [were] justified in pursuing, namely the traffic citation.”

¶17 But Binks’s argument ignores the fact that the officers had at 

least reasonable suspicion to begin investigating another criminal 

act—possession of a controlled substance. Minutes before Binks’s 

detention, Detective Crawford saw him enter an apartment for 

which police had a warrant to search for drug distribution. And,

consistent with a drug buy, Binks had stayed in the apartment for 

only two or three minutes. Binks also had glossy and bloodshot eyes 

when Deputy Robinson approached Binks’s vehicle. This arguably 
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Opinion of the Court

5

gave officers probable cause to search Binks immediately;

1 it 

undoubtedly gave them reasonable suspicion to investigate the 

matter further and to detain Binks in the process.

¶18 So when Sergeant Jones and Deputy Robinson had completed 

the traffic stop and had determined that Binks was not under the 

influence of alcohol—the point in time when Binks argues they 

should have let him go—they were still entitled to continue their 

investigation into drug possession. And this included trying to 

deduce signs and symptoms of drug use as well as waiting for word 

from Detective Crawford regarding the results of his search of the 

apartment. 

¶19 We affirm on these grounds. We conclude that officers 

detained Binks “no longer than [was] necessary to effectuate the 

purpose of the stop.” State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶ 17, 229 P.3d 650

(citation omitted). Detective Crawford relayed information to the 

officers from his parallel investigation in a reasonable amount of 

time, and Sergeant Jones and Deputy Robinson worked diligently to 

wrap up their investigation into drug possession.

III

¶20 Binks has raised important legal questions regarding the 

proper scope of the warrant at issue under the standard set forth in 

Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013), and whether police were 

justified in relying on the warrant to stop and search him. We do not 

reach these questions, however, because we conclude that the 

officers conducted a proper search under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 

(1968).

_____________________________________________________________

1 The State has argued only that the officers conducted a reasonable 

Terry stop, so we do not decide whether these circumstances amount 

to probable cause.