UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4398

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TERRENCE JOHNSON, a/k/a Freak,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, 

District Judge. (3:12-cr-00049-GMG-DJJ-1)

Submitted: October 31, 2013 Decided: November 21, 2013

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Nicholas J. Compton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Kristen 

M. Leddy, Research and Writing Specialist, FEDERAL PUBLIC 

DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. 

William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United States Attorney, Paul T.

Camilletti, Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg, West 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Terrence Johnson was convicted by a jury of four 

counts of distributing crack cocaine and heroin, 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) (2006). Based on testimony presented at Johnson’s 

trial, the district court found that Johnson was responsible for 

a total of 196 to 280 grams of crack cocaine, resulting in a 

base offense level of 30. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

(“USSG”) § 2D1.1(c)(5) (2012). After a two-level enhancement 

for possession of a firearm, USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), Johnson’s total 

offense level was 32. With a criminal history category of II, 

Johnson’s advisory Guidelines range was 135-168 months’ 

imprisonment. The court imposed a sentence of 135 months. 

Johnson appeals, claiming that his sentence is unreasonable 

because the drug weights used in determining relevant conduct 

should be limited to the amounts included in the counts of 

conviction and because it was based on the testimony of 

unreliable witnesses. We affirm.

We review a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse 

of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007). This review requires consideration of both the 

procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id.; 

see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010). 

In determining the procedural reasonableness of a sentence, this 

court considers whether the district court properly calculated 
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the defendant’s Guidelines range, treated the Guidelines as 

advisory, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, 

analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and 

sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 

51. A sentence imposed within the properly calculated 

Guidelines range is presumed reasonable by this court. See

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United 

States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2010). 

“[A] defendant can only rebut the presumption by demonstrating 

that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 

§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 

375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006)(alteration in original).

Johnson argues that his sentence is unreasonable 

because the drug quantity attributed to him at sentencing 

included quantities beyond the counts of conviction and was 

based on the testimony of drug addicts. We review the district 

court’s drug quantity finding for clear error. United States v. 

Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 147 (4th Cir. 2009). In calculating drug 

amounts for sentencing purposes, “a sentencing court may give 

weight to any relevant information before it, including 

uncorroborated hearsay, provided that the information has 

sufficient indicia of reliability to support its accuracy.” 

United States v. Wilkinson, 590 F.3d 259, 269 (4th Cir. 2010); 

see also United States v. Uwaeme, 975 F.2d 1016, 1019 (4th Cir. 
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1992) (“For sentencing purposes, hearsay alone can provide 

sufficiently reliable evidence of [drug] quantity.”). Moreover, 

drug quantity determinations for sentencing purposes can include 

drugs not charged in the indictment. See USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2) 

(defining relevant conduct to include the defendant’s acts and 

omissions “that were part of the same course of conduct or 

common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction”); United 

States v. Ellis, 975 F.2d 1061, 1067 (4th Cir. 1992).

In addition to the crack cocaine involved in the 

counts of conviction, the district court also found Johnson 

responsible for an additional quantity of drugs based on the 

testimony of three Government witnesses. Johnson argues that 

these findings were based largely on unreliable testimony of 

long-term drug abusers. However, after having occasion to 

observe the witnesses testify at trial, the district court 

specifically found their testimony credible. Witness 

credibility determinations are generally not reviewable on 

appeal, see United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 

1989), and Johnson has failed to establish that any of the 

information relied upon by the district court was erroneous.

We find that Johnson’s sentence is procedurally 

reasonable. We also find that he cannot overcome the 

presumption of reasonableness afforded his within-Guidelines 

sentence. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. Accordingly, we affirm. 
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED