Honorable Everett L. A.nschutz 

Executive Secretary 

Opinion No. H- 85 

Employees Retirement System of Texas Re: Effect, if any, of Senate 

Box 12337 Capitol Station Bi,ll 123 on benefits being 

Austin, Texas 78711 paid or to be paid to minor 

children of deceased employees, and related questions under Article 62281, 

Dear Mr. Anschutz: V.T.C.S. 

Your Letter requesting our opinion advises: 

“The State Empfoyees Retirement System 

of Texas is a constitutional state agency (Article 

16, Section 62a, Constitution of Texas). The 

Board of Trustees of this System is charged with 

the responsibility of administering the State Employees Retirement Act (Article 6228a, Vernon’s 

Texas Civil Statutes) I In addition to its other 

duties, the Board is also given responsibility for 

the administration of death benefit payments to 

the surviving spouses and minor children of deceased law enforcement- officers and firemen. 

(See Article 3, Section 51d, Constitution of Texas; 

and Article 6228f, Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes.)” 

You ask four specific questions, the fi,rst two of which having to do 

with the effect of Senate Bifl 123, 63rd Legislature (The Eighteen Year Old 

Bill) are: 

“1. Does Senate Bill No. 123 disqualify a 

person eighteen (f,8j years of age or over from 

continuing k receive the monthly annuity as the 

p. 385 
-_ ?IS kionorablc Everett L. Anschute, page 2 (H-85) 

surviving minor child of the deceased law enforcement officer or fireman who died prior to 

the effective date of Senate Bill No. ,l23? If 

your answer is in the affirmative, on what date 

must payments be suspended? 

“2. Does Senate Bill No. 123 disqualify 

a person eighteen (18) years of age and over from 

receiving benefits where the law enforcement 

officer or fireman dies on or after the effective 

date of Senate Bill No. 123?” 

Section 51-d of Article 3 of the Constitution provides that the Legislature shall have the power to provide for the payment of benefits to “the 

surviving spouse and minor children” of officers of po,lice and fire departments. 

Article 6228f governs assistance paid to the survivors of law enforcement officers, etc., under that provision. It defines “minor child” as 

meaning a child who, on the date of the violent death of any person covered 

by the Act, has not reached the age of twenty-one years. It provides in 

> 3 that the State will pay to the surviving spouse certain benefits and, if 

he is survived by a minor child or minor children the State will pay the 

benefits to guardians of the children according to the number of minor 

children surviving, “provided, that when any child entitled to benefits 

under this Act ceases to be a minor child as that term is defined herein, 

his entitlement to the benefits shall terminate. . . . ” 

In our opinion there is no escape from the conclusion that the statute 

confers rights and benefits dependent upon legal infancy. Indeed, in the 

case of children of law enforcement officers, the statute would be unconsti-, 

tutional if benefits were extended on a different basis, since Article 3, 

5 51-d of the Constitution authorizes benefits for children only if they are 

minors, i. e., if they are incapacitated because of legal infancy. 

The definition contained in Article 6228f, 5 2(a) (7) must be viewed in 

that context. A,gain, we must construe “has not reached the age of 21 years” 

p. 386 
T%e Honorable Everett L. Anschutz, page 3 (H-85) 

to mean “has not been emancipated from disabilities of minority”, else 

the statute and the Constitution conflict. Were it necessary to declare 

the existence of a conflict, the statutory language of Art. 6228f could not 

control, and because persons 18 years of age or older will be emancipated 

by Senate Bill 123 from such disabilities after August 27, 1973, on that 

day they will cease to be minors within the meaning of Articles 6228a and 

6228f, V. T. C.S., in our opinion, See Attorney General Opinion H-82(1973). 

Your remaining questions are: 

“3. May this System make payments directly 

to any qualified surviving minor or must payments 

be made through (1) the natural guardian, (2) a Courtappointed guardian, or (3) some other qualified adult? 

“4. Will marriage of the minor or adoption of 

such minor disqualify the minor for future payments 

under Article 6228f. Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes? ” 

Minors are legal infants, without legal capacity. They are not legally 

qualifi?d to act on their own behalf, generally speaking, and have no capacity 

to give a binding discharge for obligations due them. Hence payment of a 

debt to a.minor will not necessarily constitute a discharge of the debtthe &or: It ordinarily can be legally received on behalf of the minor only 

by a co&-appointed guardian of the minor’s estate. See Silber v. Southern 

National Life Ins. Co., 326 S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ.App., 1959, writ refused). 

The Board of Trustees of the State Employees Retirement System of 

Texas is not presently authorized, in our opinion, to pay Article 6228f benefits due minors to anyone except a person designated by a court to receive 

them,eg,., a court-appointed guardian of the minor’s estate or a guardian 

appointed to receive governmental funds. See Probate Code $ § 109, 184, 

228, 246, V. T. C. S. See also Article ,l994, V. T. C.S. 

Article 6228f $3 says the benefits payable to children under that statute 

may be p&d to “the duly appointed or qualified guardian or other legal representative of each minor child. ” We do not think-these passages were intended 

to displace the law otherwise applicable to the property of’minors. 

p, 387 
, . 

‘--I : :I: Honorable Everett L. Anschutz, page 4 (H-85) 

Even natural parents are not authorized to control and manage 

the property of their children without spec,ific court or statutory authority. Silber v. Southern National Life Ins, Co.. supra. Such restri,ctions are imposed for the protecti.on of the children. In the absence of 

a specific legisl,ative intent that such protections be abrogated or of an 

irreconcilable conf~lict: between the statutes (neither of which we fi,nd), 

we think the courts will ho:ld that benefits for children payable under 

Article 6228f may not be properly paid to any person other than one 

,iawfull,y designated by the court to receive suc,h payment. 

We answer your last question in the affirmative, but with a caveat 

regarding adoption. 

The same reasoning that requires the disqualific,ation of 18 year 

old children when they are no longer protected by “:legal infancy” status 

also applies to married persons, regardless of their ages. See Ex parte 

Williams, 420 S. W, 2d 135 (Tex. 1967); _Pittman vr Ti,mes Securit,ieg, 

301 S. W. 2d 521 (Tex. Civ.App. ~ 1957, no writ), And the, children of a 

deceased law officer who have been adopted by someone else cease to 

be his children. They would not be entitled to continue receiving benefits. 

See A,rticle 46a, § 9, Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes; Patton v. Shamburger, 

431 S. W. 2d 506 (Tex. 1968). 

SUMMARY 

-- 

Persons cease to be minors within the meaning 

of A,rtic,le 6228f, V. T. C. S., when they are no longer 

under disabilities as “legal infants”. After the effective 

date of Senate Bill 123, 63rd Leg., persons at least ,l8 

years old will not be legal infants. Persons who are 

married, regardless of their age, have the st.atus of 

adu1t.s. Benefits due minors under the statute cannot 

properly be paid direct.ly to them but must be paid to 

the persons duly appoi.nted by a court to receive them. 

Marriage or adopt,ion of a minor will disqualify him 

from future payments under Article 6228f, V. T. C. S. 

Attorney General of Texas 

pe 388 
The Honorable Everett L. Anschutz, page 5 (H-85) 

?lTTF.YORkYirst ssistant 

DAVID M. KENDALL, Chairman 

Opinion Committee 

p. 389