alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

JOEL ALEXIS ROMERO-GIRON,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 13-10162

D.C. No. 4:12-cr-00924-JGZ

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 12, 2014** 

Before: McKEOWN, WARDLAW, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

Joel Alexis Romero-Giron appeals from the district court’s judgment and

challenges his jury-trial conviction and 51-month sentence for reentry after

deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967), Romero-Giron’s counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no

FILED

JUN 17 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have

provided Romero-Giron the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro

se supplemental brief or answering brief has been filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief on direct appeal. 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED. 

Romero-Giron’s pro se motion for appointment of new counsel is DENIED.

The government’s motion to allow late filing of the Anders letter is

GRANTED. 

AFFIRMED.

2 13-10162
Summary Translation	Exhibit 4.60


 


Loan Agreement


 


  Contract No. :ABC(2012)1011-1 13062020130000552


 


Borrower
: Shijie Kaiyuan Auto Trade Co., Ltd.


Lender :
Agricultural Bank of China, Shijiazhuang North City Branch


 


Signing Date : August 29, 2013


 


Loan Amount
: RMB100,000,000


 


Length of
maturity : From August 29, 2013 to February14,2014


 


Use of Loan
: Vehicle Purchase


 


Loan Interest : 6.16%


 


Date of Draft :August 29, 2013


 


Withdrawal
Amount : RMB100,000,000


 


Payment Method : The principal shall be fully repaid with interest
at the maturity date of the loan.


.


Repayment
Date : February14,2014


 


Loan Guarantee : Guaranty of Pledge


- Shijie Kaiyuan Auto Trade Co., Ltd. make pledge account receivable
to Agricultural Bank of China, Shijiazhuang North City Branch, with the contract no. ABC(2012)1011-6 2013082904
**Exhibit 24****POWER OF ATTORNEY**We, the undersigned directors of the Registrant, hereby severally constitute and appoint Rick Greenour true and lawful attorney and agent, to do any and all things in our names in the capacitiesindicated below which said person may deem necessary or advisable to enable the Registrant tocomply with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and any rules, regulations andrequirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in connection with the annual report onForm 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007, including specifically, but not limited to, powerand authority to sign for us in our names in the capacities indicated below the annual report andany amendments thereto; and we hereby approve, ratify, and confirm all that said person shall do orcause to be done by virtue thereof.   /s/ Jim Berry
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PATRICIA VANNER,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 09-CV-12082

vs. HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

__________________________________/

ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (# 35), DENYING

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE (# 28), AND DENYING AS MOOT 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT’S MOTION (# 32)

In this case, plaintiff Patricia Vanner sought review of the decision denying her

application for social security disability benefits. On September 28, 2010, the court

remanded the action for further development of the record. On December 28, 2010,

plaintiff filed a motion for attorney fees under the Equal Justice Act. On January 25,

2011, defendant filed a motion to strike plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees under the

Equal Justice Act. Defendant argues plaintiff’s request for attorney fees should be

denied because plaintiff was not represented by a properly admitted attorney as

plaintiff’s counsel was not an active member of the state bar of Michigan and did not

specify local counsel. Plaintiff responded to defendant’s motion to strike and defendant

filed a reply in support of the motion. On February 22, 2011, plaintiff filed a motion to

dismiss, as moot, defendant’s motion to strike because local counsel for plaintiff filed an

appearance on February 9, 2011. Defendant responded to the motion. On February

2:09-cv-12082-GCS-VMM Doc # 36 Filed 03/15/11 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 573
2

23, 2011, Magistrate Judge Morgan issued a report and recommendation suggesting

defendant’s motion to strike be denied. In the report, Magistrate Judge Morgan notes:

(1) defendant failed to cite any cases in which a court denied attorney fees under the

EAJA on the basis that plaintiff was not represented by local counsel; (2) defendant

waited until almost two years of litigation had taken place before raising the local

counsel issue; and (3) EAJA fees are payable to plaintiff, not to counsel, thereby

undermining the significance of the local counsel argument in this context. The

objection deadline of March 14, 2011 has passed and no objections were filed. For the

reasons set forth in Magistrate Judge Morgan’s well-reasoned report and

recommendation, the report and recommendation (#35) is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED

and defendant’s motion to strike (#28) is DENIED. Defendant is ordered to file a

response to plaintiff’s request for attorney fees by March 31, 2011. Plaintiff’s motion to

dismiss defendant’s motion is DENIED as moot. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 15, 2011

S/George Caram Steeh 

GEORGE CARAM STEEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on

March 15, 2011, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Marcia Beauchemin

Deputy Clerk

2:09-cv-12082-GCS-VMM Doc # 36 Filed 03/15/11 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 574
#### Dennis F. ROBERTSON, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. A.I.G. AGENCY, et al., Defendant/Respondent.

No. 64009.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

July 12, 1994.

Roger S. Lahr, St. Louis, for appellant.

Benson Cytron, Daniel A. Cytron, Cytron Law Offices, House Springs, for respondent.

Before CRANDALL, P.J., and REINHARD and CRIST, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Employee appeals from the trial court’s decree granting employer, A.I.G. Agency, *929Inc., an injunction based upon a noncompetition clause contained in a contract between employee and employer. We affirm. The judgment of the trial court is supported by substantial evidence and is not against the weight of the evidence; no error of law appears. An extended opinion would have no precedential value. The parties have been furnished with a memorandum for their information only, setting forth the reasons for this order affirming the judgment pursuant to Rule 84.16(b).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PHYLLIS HARDEN, 

Plaintiff,

Case No. 09-CV-13778

vs. HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK,

Defendant.

_____________________________/

ORDER REGARDING PRO BONO COUNSEL REQUEST

The court made an effort to find an attorney willing to provide pro bono

assistance to plaintiff Phyllis Harden, stating in its May 19, 2010 order that counsel

should be appointed to represent plaintiff “if such pro bono counsel is available through

a court-sponsored program.” (Emphasis in original). The court was advised that an

initial effort was unsuccessful, as was a subsequent effort. No further effort will be

made by the court to assist Ms. Harden in obtaining counsel, pro bono or otherwise. 

Accordingly, if plaintiff wishes to file her response to the pending motion to dismiss or

for summary judgment she shall do so on or before July 15, 2010. 

Dated: July 8, 2010

S/George Caram Steeh 

GEORGE CARAM STEEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on

July 8, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

S/Marcia Beauchemin

Deputy Clerk
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-88,230-01

EX PARTE DAMONTE JACQUE PATTERSON, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. CCC-18-22653A IN THE 52 DISTRICT COURT ND

FROM CORYELL COUNTY 

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of the offense of

assault of a family or household member by impeding breath or circulation and sentenced to

imprisonment for seven years. 

On March 21, 2018, an order designating issues was signed by the trial court. The habeas

record has been forwarded to this Court prematurely. We remand this application to the 52 District nd

Court of Coryell County to allow the trial judge to complete an evidentiary investigation and enter

findings of fact and conclusions of law.
This application will be held in abeyance until the trial court has resolved the fact issues. The

issues shall be resolved within 90 days of this order. A supplemental transcript containing all

affidavits and interrogatories or the transcription of the court reporter’s notes from any hearing or

deposition, along with the trial court’s supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, shall

be forwarded to this Court within 120 days of the date of this order. Any extensions of time must

be requested by the trial court and shall be obtained from this Court. 

Filed: April 11, 2018

Do not publish
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Team Nation Holdings Corporation (the “Company”) hereby certifies, to such officer’s knowledge, that:





(i) the accompanying report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2010 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date: May 17, 2010
By:
/s/ Daniel J. DuffyDaniel J. DuffyPrincipal Financial Officer





This certification has not been, and shall not be deemed, “filed” with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Exhibit 31.2




CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER




I, Carl
Oberg, Chief Financial Officer of Classic Costume Company, Inc., (the
“Registrant”), certify that:




1.    I
have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the Registrant;




2.    Based
on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of
a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;




3.    Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;




4.    The
Registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and we have:




(a)    designed
such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;




(b)    evaluated
the effectiveness of the Registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluation; and




(c)    disclosed
in this quarterly report any change in the Registrant’s internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the Registrant’s most recent fiscal
quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the Registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;
and




5.    The
Registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
Registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of Registrant’s board of
directors:




(a)    all
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the Registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and




(b)    any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the Registrant’s internal controls over financial
reporting.




November
      12, 2008
              By:
              /s/ Carl
      ObergCarl
      ObergChief
      Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting
    Officer)
DAN MORALES

.+TTORSEI’ CXSERAL 

# QBffice

of the !Zlttornep @enera tiMateof Qexae April lo,1992
Honorable Debra Danburg Chair Committee on Elections Texas House ofRepresentatives P. 0. Box2910 Austin, Texas 78768-2910 Opinion No. DM-104 Re: Completion of a life sentence (RQ-277)

Dear Representative Danburg: You askwhether a person who hasbeen finally convicted of a crime and duly sentenced to life imprisonment may complete his sentence prior to his death. We find that a life sentence is exactly what it purports to be--a sentence that will continue until a person’s death. A person sentenced to life imprisonment may become eligible for release from incarceration onparole prior to his death. See, e.g., Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.18, 58(b)(2) (“aprisoner..
. serving a life sentence for a capital felony.
. .is not eligible for release on parole until the actual calendar time the prisoner has served..
.equals 35 calendar years”). However, it is clear that albeit freed from incarceration, one on parole continues to serve his sentence.. The Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.18, section 2(l) defines “parole” as release from physical custody “ifthe prisoner contractually agrees to serve the remainder of his sentence under the supervision and control ofthe pardons and paroles division.” (Emphasis added.)We note that sections 8(a) and 15(a)ofarticle 42.18provide for the period of parole in somewhat different language. Section 8(a) provides that “[t]he period of parole shall be equivalent to the maximum term for which the prisoner was sentenced less calendar time actually served on the sentence.” Section U(a) provides that “[i]norder to complete the parole period, a parolee shall be required to serve out the whole term for which he was sentenced, subject to the deduction of the time he had served prior to his parole.” However, particularly when read in conjunction with the section 2(1)definition ofparole quoted above, we construe the quoted language in sections 8(a) and 15(a) as also providing that in the case of a life

p. 526Honorable Debra Danburg -Page 2 (DM-104)

sentence, the parole period ofone released on parole willbe for the duration ofhis life. We note also that a person may be relieved of a sentence imposed upon him by pardon or commutation of the sentence, see Code Crim. Pmt. ch. 48, or the sentence may be set aside in habeas corpus proceedings. However, in answer to your question we find no provisions of Texas law under which a person finally convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment may compfere a life sentence prior to hisdeath. 

### SUMMARY

A life sentence continues until the time of a convicted person’s death. The fact that a person sentenced to life may be released on parole does not constitute completion of his sentence. Very truly yours,

DAN MORALES Attorney General ofTexas WILL PRYOR First Assistant Attorney General MARY KELLER Deputy Assistant Attorney General RENEA HICKS Special Assistant Attorney General MADELEINE B.JOHNSON Chair, Opinion Committee Prepared byWilliam Walker Assistant Attorney General

p. 527
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

NORTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, CASE NO: 09-20020

v. DISTRICT JUDGE THOMAS L. LUDINGTON

MAGISTRATE JUDGE CHARLES E. BINDER

WILLIAM ELMER RICE,

Defendant.

/

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT, FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING PLEA OF GUILTY

I. REPORT AND FINDINGS

On June 10, 2009, the case was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1(B) and 636(b)(3) for purposes of receiving, on consent of the parties,

Defendant’s offer of a plea of guilty. The Defendant, along with counsel, appeared before me

on June 16, 2009. In open court I examined the Defendant under oath, confirmed the

Defendant’s consent, and then advised and questioned the Defendant regarding each of the

inquiries prescribed by Rule 11(b) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. Based

upon the Defendant’s answers and demeanor, I HEREBY FIND 1) that the Defendant is

competent to tender a plea, 2) that Defendant’s plea was knowingly, intelligently made, and 3)

that the offense(s) to which he pled are supported by an independent basis in fact containing

each of the essential elements of the offense(s). Therefore, I have ordered the preparation of a

presentence investigation report.

1:09-cr-20020-TLL-CEB Doc # 24 Filed 06/16/09 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 53
II. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that subject to the Court’s

consideration of the plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c) of the FEDERAL RULES OF

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, the Defendant be adjudged guilty and have sentence imposed.

III. REVIEW

The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and

Recommendation within ten (10) days of service of a copy hereof as provided for in 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of

appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed.2d 435 (1985); Frontier Ins.

Co. v. Blaty, 454 F.3d 590, 596 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984

(6th Cir. 2005). The parties are advised that making some objections, but failing to raise

others, will not preserve all the objections a party may have to this Report and

Recommendation. McClanahan v. Comm’r of Social Security, 474 F.3d 830, 837 (6th Cir.

2006); Frontier Ins. Co., 454 F.3d at 596-97. Pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of

any objections is to be served upon this Magistrate Judge.

 s/ Charles` E Binder 

CHARLES E. BINDER 

Dated: June 16, 2009 United States Magistrate Judge

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that this Report and Recommendation was electronically filed this date,

electronically served on Norman Donker and Barbara Klimaszewski, and served on District

Judge Ludington in the traditional manner.

Date: June 16, 2009 By s/Jean L. Broucek 

Case Manager to Magistrate Judge Binder

1:09-cr-20020-TLL-CEB Doc # 24 Filed 06/16/09 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 54
Case 2:09-cr-20353-PJD-MKM ECF No. 11, PageID.78 Filed 08/04/09 Page 1 of 2
Case 2:09-cr-20353-PJD-MKM ECF No. 11, PageID.79 Filed 08/04/09 Page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

In re: Refrigerant Compressors Case No. 2:09-md-02042

Antitrust Litigation

Honorable Sean F. Cox

United States District Court

___________________________/

ORDER GRANTING 

UNOPPOSED MOTION TO WITHDRAW

Defendant Appliances Components Companies, S.p.A. and Defendant ACC USA, LLC

(collectively “ACC”) are currently represented in this action by attorneys from two law firms: 1)

Hogan Lovells US LLP (“Hogan Lovells”); and 2) Barris Sott Denn Driker PLLC (“BSDD”).

On July 19, 2013, Hogan Lovells and BSDD jointly filed a motion seeking to withdraw

from representation of ACC for failure to pay legal fees. (Docket Entry No. 382). The motion

states that ACC is now in insolvency proceedings in Italy and has no ability to pay counsel in

this action.

In an order issued on August 5, 2013, this Court ordered that “if any party opposes the

motion to withdraw, it shall SHOW CAUSE, in writing, no later than August 12, 2013, why the

pending motion should not be granted.” (Docket Entry No. 386) (emphasis in original). No

responses in opposition to the Motion to Withdraw, and no responses to this Court’s Show Cause

Order, have been filed.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the unopposed Motion to Withdraw filed by Hogan 

2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 395 Filed 08/29/13 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 9131
Lovells and BSDD (Docket Entry No. 382) is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/Sean F. Cox 

Sean F. Cox

United States District Judge

Dated: August 29, 2013

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on

August 29, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

S/Jennifer Hernandez 

Case Manager

2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 395 Filed 08/29/13 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 9132