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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

ex rel. RUQIAYAH MADANY and 

JOHN B. COLLINS, 

 Plaintiffs/Relators, 

v. 

PAUL M. PETRE, M.D., et al., 

 Defendants. 

 / 

Case No. 2:09-cv-13693 

HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

OMNIBUS OPINION AND ORDER 

 Plaintiff brought the present complaint and alleged that Defendants violated 

the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., were unjustly enriched, and 

received payments by mistake. ECF 186, PgID 1458–67. The Court has dismissed 

some Defendants and Clerk of the Court has entered default judgment against others. 

Now only three Defendants remain: Victor Savinov, Nabila Mahbub, and Chiradeep 

Gupta. After extensive pretrial litigation, the Government and Defendant Savinov 

cross-moved for summary judgment. ECF 324, 327. The Court reviewed the briefing 

and finds that a hearing is unnecessary. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f). For the following 

reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the motions. 

BACKGROUND 

 The Relators initially filed a qui tam complaint and alleged that Defendants 

violated the FCA when they participated in a massive scheme to defraud Medicare. 

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The Government intervened in the lawsuit, ECF 44, and later filed an amended 

complaint that detailed the conspiracy, ECF 186. 

 Muhammad Shahab was at the heart of the conspiracy. Shabab owned two 

home healthcare agencies and provided funds for other individuals to purchase 

several healthcare agencies. ECF 324-10, PgID 2401. Shabab employed "[m]arketers" 

who paid individuals to enroll as patients in the home healthcare agencies. Id. at 

2402. He also paid kickbacks to several physicians to secure home healthcare 

referrals. Id. at 2403–07. 

 The Relators quickly uncovered the scheme and filed the present case. ECF 1. 

The Government then intervened, ECF 44, and either dismissed, entered consent 

judgments, or received default judgments against all but five Defendants. ECF 68, 

262–83, 285, 320, 370–92. The Government moved for summary judgment against 

Defendants Mahbub, Gupta, Petre, Savinov, and the estate of Pramod Raval. ECF 

324. Savinov also moved to dismiss the complaint or in the alternative for summary 

judgment. ECF 327. The parties stipulated to dismiss the claims against Petre and 

Raval. ECF 402, 404. Thus, Mahbub, Gupta, and Savinov are the only remaining 

Defendants. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A court analyzes a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings using the 

same standard it would employ for a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Tucker v. 

Middleburg-Legacy Place, 539 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). The 

Court accepts as true all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings and draws 

reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party, but "need not accept 

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as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences." JPMorgan Chase Bank, 

N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581–82 (6th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). The 

complaint must "raise a right to relief above the speculative level, and [] state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face." Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 

609 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). It is 

not enough to offer mere "'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is "no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material for purposes of summary judgment if its 

resolution would establish or refute an "essential element[] of a cause of action or 

defense asserted by the parties[.]" Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 

1984) (quotation omitted). 

The Court must view the facts and draw all inferences in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party. Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger Cnty., 819 F.3d 834, 

848 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). The Court must then determine "whether the 

evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or 

whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986). And although the Court may not 

make credibility judgments or weigh the evidence, Moran v. Al Basit LLC, 788 F.3d 

201, 204 (6th Cir. 2015), a mere "scintilla" of evidence is insufficient to survive 

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summary judgment; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find 

for the plaintiff," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 

DISCUSSION 

 The Court will first address the Government's claims against Mahbub and 

Gupta. It will then address the competing motions involving Savinov. 

I. Defendants Mahbub and Gupta 

 The Government argued that it is entitled to summary judgment against both 

Mahbub and Gupta because they were found guilty of offenses stemming from the 

conspiracy and are "estopped 'from denying the essential elements of the offense' in 

this action because it involves 'the same transaction as in the criminal 

proceeding . . . ." ECF 324, PgID 2262 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3731(e)). For the FCA's 

estoppel provision to apply, Defendants' conviction must stem from "fraud or false 

statements." § 3731(e). 

 A jury convicted Gupta of health care fraud conspiracy and money laundering. 

ECF 324-32, PgID 3174–75 (verdict); ECF 324-16 (judgment). And a jury convicted 

Mahbub of health care fraud conspiracy. ECF 324-33, PgID 3176 (verdict); ECF 324-

15 (judgment). Both convictions stem from Defendants' involvement in the conspiracy 

at the heart of the present case. Compare ECF 324-6 (criminal indictment against 

Gupta and Mahbub) with ECF 186 (amended complaint); see also United States v. 

Szilvagyi, 398 F. Supp. 2d 842, 847 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (applying collateral estoppel to 

a civil charge under the FCA after a defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit 

health care fraud). Because Gupta and Mahbub were convicted of a fraud offense 

stemming from the same actions in the present case, they are estopped from denying 

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any of the essential elements of the present claim.1 As a result, the Government is 

entitled to summary judgment against Gupta and Mahbub. 

 The Court must now calculate the damages the Government is entitled to from 

the two Defendants. The FCA provides that the Government is entitled to "a civil 

penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000 . . . plus 3 times the amount 

of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person." 31 

U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). Courts generally base the amount of damages the Government 

sustains on the restitution ordered during Defendants' criminal trial. See Szilvagyi, 

398 F. Supp. 2d at 849–50. But the Court must reduce the amount by any restitution 

Defendants previously paid. United States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 2008) 

(Easterbrook, J.) (noting that the Court must reduce the amount of damages by the 

amount of restitution paid). The Government did not ask for any penalty between 

$5,000 and $10,000 but did ask for damages equal to three times the amount the 

Government incurred because of Defendants' actions. But the parties have not stated 

1 After Mahbub was sentenced, she appealed her conviction and the Sixth Circuit 

remanded the case to the trial court for a decision on whether the Government 

discriminated during jury selection. United States v. Mahbub, 818 F.3d 213, 233 (6th 

Cir. 2016). The trial judge has yet to rule on the discrimination issue. Thus, Mahbub 

argues that the Court cannot consider her convicted for purposes of the Government's 

summary judgment motion. ECF 417, PgID 6349. Perhaps so. But Mahbub has 

neither sought a writ of mandamus to compel a decision by the trial judge or, to the 

Court's knowledge, done anything else to move that matter along. The Court has been 

advised for three years, since May 2018, that a ruling on the discrimination issue was 

forthcoming. ECF 395. And waiting longer is not warranted. Further delay beyond 

three full years clearly contravenes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1's requirement 

of a speedy resolution of every action. If the trial judge overturns Mahbub's 

conviction, she can simply move for further relief here under Rule 60. Szilvagyi, 398 

F. Supp. 2d at 847 (noting that a defendant can move for relief from collateral estoppel 

under Rule 60 if the criminal judgment is later vacated). 

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how much restitution that Defendants have paid. The parties must therefore submit 

a joint status report within fourteen days of this order and state how much restitution 

Gupta and Mahbub have paid. The Court will then issue a supplemental order that 

calculates the outstanding damages. 

II. Defendant Victor Savinov 

 Savinov and the Government both argue that they are entitled to a judgment 

in their favor. ECF 324, 327. The Government argues that it is entitled to summary 

judgment because the evidence shows that Shahab paid for Savinov's office space and 

administrative assistant for a few months. ECF 324, PgID 2271. But Savinov, argues 

that he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings because the claims against him were 

not pleaded with specificity. ECF 327, PgID 4827–28. He alternatively argues that 

he is entitled to summary judgment because the evidence establishes that he never 

received any illegal kickbacks. Id. 

A. Judgment on the Pleadings 

 Savinov argued that the Government failed to plead its fraud claim with 

particularity. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), "a party must state with 

particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." "Complaints alleging 

FCA violations must comply with Rule 9(b)'s requirements that fraud be plead with 

particularity because 'defendants accused of defrauding the federal government have 

the same protections as defendants sued for fraud in other contexts.'" Chesbrough v. 

VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 

341 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2003)). "Thus, where a relator pleads a complex and farCase 2:09-cv-13693-SJM-MKM ECF No. 419, PageID.6405 Filed 04/23/21 Page 6 of 12
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reaching fraudulent scheme, he must also provide examples of specific false claims 

submitted to the government in order to proceed." United States ex rel. Ibanez v. 

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 874 F.3d 905, 914 (6th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). 

 Here, the Government adequately pleaded the claims. The complaint alleged 

that "[i]n return for unlawful financial inducements, Savinov, a Wayne County 

resident, caused the submission of at least 1,073 false claims for 865 Medicare 

beneficiaries for services ostensibly rendered . . . between October 3, 2008 and 

September 22, 2010, costing the Medicare program $4,063.393.21." ECF 186, PgID 

1384. The complaint also alleged that Savinov and Shahab had a quid pro quo 

arrangement by which Shahab supplied Savinov with an office and assistant, and 

paid Savinov's American Express bill in exchange for certifying individuals as 

needing home healthcare services. Id. at 1455–56. The allegations alone established 

the "time, place, and context of the alleged misrepresentations," "the fraudulent 

scheme; the fraudulent intent of the defendants; and the injury resulting from the 

fraud." United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 506 (6th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., 342 F.3d 634, 

637–40 (6th Cir. 2003)). The Government therefore adequately pleaded the fraud 

scheme at the heart of the complaint and Savinov is not entitled to judgment under 

Rule 12. 

B. Summary Judgment 

 The Court will now address the Government and Savinov's competing motions 

for summary judgment. ECF 324, 327. In Savinov's motion, he noted that the 

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Government asserted only that he, and all the remaining Defendants, violated the 

federal Anti-Kickback Statute ("AKS"), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(b)(1)(A), and therefore 

automatically violated the FCA. ECF 327, PgID 4849–51. But Savinov also argued 

that an AKS violation is not a per se FCA violation. Id. Finally both sides argued that 

they are entitled to summary judgment on the FCA claim. Id. at 4847–49; ECF 324, 

PgID 2267–74. The Court will first address the relationship between the AKS and 

the FCA and then address the remaining arguments. 

1. Relationship Between FCA and AKS 

 Savinov argued that 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(g)—which provides that an AKS 

violation constitutes a per se FCA violation—was not enacted until 2010, after the 

alleged kickbacks in this case occurred. ECF 327, PgID 4850. The Government 

admitted that § 1320(a)–7b(g) was enacted in 2010 but argued that before 2010, 

courts permitted AKS violations to proceed under the FCA. ECF 322, PgID 5203. And 

that position is well supported by case law. See McNutt ex rel. United States v. 

Haleyville Med. Supplies, Inc., 423 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2005) (Pryor, J.) 

(finding that an AKS violation can sustain a FCA claim before 2010.); U.S. ex rel. 

Kosenske v. Carlisle HMA, Inc., 554 F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2009) (same). Thus, based on 

caselaw, the Court finds that an AKS violation constituted an FCA violation before 

2010, though not a per se violation as it would be under the post-2010 statutory 

scheme. 

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2. Remaining Summary Judgment Arguments 

 Finally, the Court will address the competing summary judgment arguments. 

The Government reasoned that it is entitled to summary judgment because the 

evidence is clear that Savinov took kickbacks. To support the claim, the Government 

attached Shahab's deposition transcript of when he testified that Savinov was able to 

"bill services performed on [Medicare] beneficiaries produced by [Shabab's] recruiters 

directly to Medicare." ECF 324-10, PgID 2406. Shabab also testified that he paid 

Savinov's administrative assistant's salary "for a few months" and loaned three or 

four months of office rent to Savinov as Savinov started up his practice. Id. The 

Government also noted that Savinov invoked the Fifth Amendment when he was 

asked about kickbacks or how he got involved in the alleged conspiracy. The 

Government maintains that it is entitled to an adverse inference on those issues. ECF 

324, PgID 2272. And finally, in its response to Savinov's summary judgment motion, 

the Government attached an agreement signed by Savinov and Shahab's wife, ECF 

332-5, that stated Savinov would receive $80 per visit for each new patient, $60 for a 

follow up/revisit, and that he would not have to pay for office rent. a medical assistant, 

among other things. Id. And, when asked under oath about the agreement, Savinov 

asserted his Fifth Amendment right. ECF 327-2, PgID 4880–82. Based on all the 

evidence, the Government contends it is entitled to summary judgment. 

 Savinov, however, argued that he—not the Government—is entitled to 

summary judgment. He maintained that he never asked for, or received, a kickback 

for referring any patient to Shahab's home healthcare facilities. ECF 327, PgID 4847; 

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ECF 327-2, PgID 4922 (Savinov testimony that he never "received any remuneration 

from Muhammad Shahab"). Shahab's testimony also supports Savinov's position, in 

part. Shahab testified that he "did not give [Savinov] any kickback[s]." ECF 327-3, 

PgID 4975. Shahab also testified that he paid only one doctor, Dr. Raval, "to certify 

patients for home healthcare for [his] agencies." Id. at 4952, 4956. 

 The Government's and Savinov's motions show the inconsistency in Shahab's 

testimony. Shahab, for example, said that he did and did not pay kickbacks to 

Savinov. See, e.g., ECF 327-3. Thus, there is a clear and genuine dispute of material 

fact about whether Savinov received a kickback. The Court will therefore deny both 

summary judgment motions as they relate to the FCA claims because there of the 

genuine dispute over whether Savinov accepted kickbacks and violated the FCA. 

 Finally, Savinov broadly argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on 

the unjust enrichment/constructive trust and payment by mistake claims because he 

"did not participate in the submission of any false claim in any manner." ECF 327, 

PgID 4845. But because there is a genuine dispute of material fact the Court cannot 

determine whether Savinov violated the AKS, and thus violated the FCA (and 

submitted false claims). As a result, the Court cannot grant summary judgment on 

the unjust enrichment/constructive trust and payment by mistake claims. 

CONCLUSION AND CASE MANAGEMENT 

 For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the 

Government's summary judgment motion and deny Savinov's summary judgment 

motion. 

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 Last, because the case has been pending since 2009, and due to the ongoing 

delay in all in-person jury trials in the Eastern District of Michigan because of 

COVID-19, see 20-AO-038, 21-AO-006, the Court will refer the case to mediation with 

Mr. Patrick Seyferth. The mediation must occur no later than May 23, 2021. 

ORDER 

WHEREFORE it is hereby ORDERED that the Government's motion for 

summary judgment [324] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that summary judgment is GRANTED in the 

Government's favor against Defendants Gupta and Mahbub. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties must SUBMIT a joint status 

report within fourteen days of this order and STATE how much restitution 

Defendants Gupta and Mahbub have paid. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Government's motion for summary 

judgment [324] is DENIED as it relates to Defendant Victor Savinov. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Victor Savinov's motion to 

dismiss and for summary judgment [327] is DENIED. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court REFERS the case to Mr. 

Patrick Seyferth2 for mediation and settlement discussions and ORDERS the parties 

to proceed in compliance with Local Rule 16.4. The mediation and settlement 

discussions shall occur no later than May 23, 2021. The parties shall contact Mr. 

2 Patrick Seyferth is a private attorney and founding member of the firm Bush 

Seyferth, PLLC. He can be reached at (248) 822-7802 and at Seyferth@bsplaw.com. 

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Seyferth and provide him with a copy of this order as soon as practicable and shall 

NOTIFY the Court of the date of the mediation session once it is scheduled. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Seyferth shall NOTIFY the Court 

within seven days of completion of the mediation, stating only the "date of completion, 

who participated, whether settlement was reached, and whether further [alternative 

dispute resolution] proceedings are contemplated." E.D. Mich. L.R. 16.4(e)(6). If a 

settlement is reached, the parties shall NOTIFY the Court immediately upon 

completion of the mediation and shall SUBMIT a proposed order of dismissal within 

21 days. Id. at 16.4(e)(7). If a settlement is not reached, the parties shall NOTIFY

the Court within seven days of the completion of the mediation. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the parties are unable to resolve the case 

with Mr. Seyferth's assistance, they must SUBMIT a joint status report, no later 

than seven days after the mediation, informing the Court if they will consent to a 

bench trial. 

SO ORDERED. 

 s/ Stephen J. Murphy, III 

 STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: April 23, 2021 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties 

and/or counsel of record on April 23, 2021, by electronic and/or ordinary mail. 

 s/ David P. Parker 

 Case Manager 

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