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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

HANNA JABER,

Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER: 09-11610

HONORABLE VICTORIA A. ROBERTS

v.

WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY

BOARD OF GOVERNORS,

and DR. PAULA C. WOOD

Defendants.

 /

ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Preclude

Plaintiff’s Requested Equitable Relief. (Doc. # 45) Plaintiff filed a Brief in Response

(Doc. # 46), to which Defendants replied. (Doc. # 49) For the reasons stated,

Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

On September 21, 2010, Plaintiff Hanna Jaber filed a Second Amended

Complaint against Defendants Wayne State University Board of Governors and Dr.

Paula C. Wood. (Doc. # 41) Her complaint states a procedural due process violation

claim under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arising from the revocation of her

doctoral degree, as well as additional claims which were dismissed by the Court in a

previous order. (Doc. # 37) She requests a jury trial.
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Should Jaber succeed on the merits of her procedural due process claim, she

seeks certain legal and equitable relief. Of relevance to Defendants’ motion, Jaber

seeks (1) return of her doctoral degree and (2) an opportunity to revise her doctoral

dissertation. (Doc. #41, p. 8) Defendants argue that if Jaber succeeds on the merits of

her claim, the Court lacks the authority to award these equitable remedies.

III. ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

The gravamen of Defendants’ argument is that neither the Court nor a jury can

grant Jaber’s request for equitable relief because to do so would infringe on Wayne

State University’s (“WSU”) right to academic freedom. (Doc. #45, p. 1) Defendants cite

the Michigan Constitution, as well as Michigan state law, for the proposition that the

university has complete control over the conduct of its affairs, in particular the conferral

of degrees. (Id. at 1-2) By “awarding” Jaber a degree, the Court would usurp the

administrative independence of the university, say Defendants. (Id. at 3) 

Jaber responds that district courts have broad authority to provide equitable

relief, and that the concept of academic freedom applies to claims of substantive due

process violations, while hers is a procedural due process claim. (Doc. # 46, pp.1-3)

She cites Supreme Court desegregation rulings to support her position that this Court

has the authority to order equitable relief in cases involving educational institutions. (Id.

at 3-4) Finally, Jaber asks that the Court grant her requested equitable relief without a

trial. (Id. at 6)

Jaber emphasizes that her claim is not one of substantive due process and that

she is not challenging the determination that she committed plagiarism. (Doc. # 46, p. 3)

Thus, the jury would not weigh the substance of the decision to revoke Jaber’s degree.
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Instead, the focus at trial would be on the process utilized to make and enforce the

substantive determination. Concerns of academic freedom come into play largely when

courts rule on the substance of university decisions and not on the process by which

those decisions are made. See, e.g., Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225

(1985) (“It is important to remember that this is not a case in which the procedures used

by the University were unfair in any respect.... When judges are asked to review the

substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they should show great

respect for the faculty’s professional judgment.”) (emphasis added).

While the authority cited in Defendants’ motion supports their position that the

university enjoys a right of institutional freedom in academic decision-making, it is

Jaber’s position that Dean Wood, and not the university, revoked her degree. Indeed,

Jaber claims that Dean Wood’s conduct in this regard violates Michigan law. This

alleged violation is cited in support of her procedural due process claim. 

The Court disagrees with Defendants here--that the Court would usurp the

institutional freedom of the university by returning Jaber’s degree–since the university

never acted to revoke Jaber’s degree in the first instance. The opinions relied on by

Defendants consistently reference the discretionary powers of the academy, not of

individual staff members of the academy. Michigan law specifically vests control over

WSU’s affairs, including the conferral of degrees and granting of diplomas, in the board

of governors, not in the university’s dean. MICH COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 390.641-390.645

(West 2010). 

Further, it has long been recognized that district courts have broad power to

grant or deny equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Geier v. Univ. of
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Tennessee, 597 F.2d 1056, 1068 (6th Cir. 1979) (a district court is controlled by general

principles of equity in fashioning relief); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,

402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (“Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a

district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and

flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”); Knowles v. Bd. of Public Instruction of

Leon Cnty., Fla., 405 F.2d 1206, 1207 (5th Cir. 1969). “The remedy for a procedural due

process violation is restoration of the status quo ante and an injunction barring

deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights without the requisite procedural protections.” Taylor v.

Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 822 (11th Cir. 1987) (Tjoflat, J. concurring in part and

dissenting in part) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976)); Geier, 597

F.2d at 1068 (one factor courts should consider when fashioning an equitable remedy is

that relief must be remedial in nature, that is, it must be designed to restore Plaintiff to

the position she would have been in absent the unlawful conduct).

By returning Jaber to the position she occupied pre-violation, the Court would not

be “awarding” her a degree, but exercising its broad equitable power to restore the

status quo, by vacating an improper degree revocation. The distinction between

ordering WSU to award a degree which was never conferred in the first place, and

vacating the unlawful revocation of a degree, is an important one. For example, in

Wenner v. Sun Life Ass. Co. of Canada, 482 F.3d 878, 883 (6th Cir. 2007), the Sixth

Circuit emphasized the distinction between a disability claimant whose initial disability

claim is denied, who has no expectation of receiving benefits unless her claim is

meritorious, from a claimant whose benefits have been unlawfully terminated. The latter,

the court opined, “has, prior to the termination, a full expectation of continued disability
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payments until they are terminated by lawful procedures.” Id. “Thus, prior to the

termination of her benefits by improper procedures, the status quo was that the plaintiff

was receiving long-term disability benefits and the appropriate remedy is an order

vacating the termination of her benefits and directing the defendant to reinstate

retroactively the benefits.” Id. at 884 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Likewise, here, prior to the revocation of her degree, the status quo was that Jaber held

a Ph.D. from WSU. If the jury finds a procedural due process violation, a proper remedy

would be an order vacating the revocation of Jaber’ degree.

Following an order vacating the unlawful revocation of Jaber’s degree and

enjoining Defendants from revoking her degree without utilizing the proper procedure,

the university would, of course, be able to begin anew the revocation process. The

Court would not require the university to give Jaber the opportunity to correct and

resubmit her doctoral dissertation. Such relief, in all likelihood, would infringe on WSU’s

institutional freedom to conduct its own affairs.

Finally, the Court denies Jaber’s request to enter judgment in her favor, without a

trial, and to grant her requested equitable relief. Jaber argues that because Dean Wood

violated Michigan law, there are no issues for a jury to resolve. (Doc. #46, p. 6)

However, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of its Order

Granting in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgement, and vacated its ruling

that Dean Wood acted outside of Michigan law when she revoked Jaber’s degree. (Doc.

# 44) Even if there was a determination that Michigan law was violated, Jaber does not

include a state law claim in her complaint. Instead, her amended complaint states that

Dean Wood violated Michigan law by revoking her degree in support of her procedural
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due process claim. (Doc. # 41, pp. 5-6) 

A jury might find that a violation of Michigan law, standing alone, or in

combination with the other facts alleged in Count One of the amended complaint,

amount to a procedural due process violation. However, it need not, as a matter of law,

reach that conclusion. See Wedgewood Ltd. P’Ship v. Twp. of Liberty, Ohio, 610 F.3d

340, 354 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[V]iolations of state law do not automatically translate into a

deprivation of procedural due process under the United States Constitution.”) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). To establish a procedural due process violation

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Jaber must establish three elements: (1) that she had a

property interest in her degree protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment; (2) that she was deprived of that protected interest within the meaning of

the clause; and (3) that the state did not afford her adequate procedural rights before

depriving her of her protected interest. See id. at 349. “The Supreme Court has

described ‘the root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause as notice and an

opportunity to be heard before one is deprived of a significant property interest.” Id. at

354 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)). A jury

could reasonably conclude that despite any state law violation, Jaber received all of the

notice and opportunity to be heard that was due her under the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.
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IT IS ORDERED.

s/Victoria A. Roberts 

Victoria A. Roberts

United States District Judge

Dated: October 29, 2010

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this

document was served on the attorneys of

record by electronic means or U.S. Mail on

October 29, 2010.

s/Linda Vertriest 

Deputy Clerk