UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PRESIDENTIAL FACILITY, LLC, 

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, 

Case No. 09-12346

v. Hon. Lawrence P. Zatkoff 

GREGORY S. CAMPBELL, 

CHRISTOPHER J. DEBBAS, and 

JAMES R. GRIFFITHS, 

Defendants,

and

ROBERT PINKAS, 

Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/Third-Party Plaintiff, 

v. 

STERLING BANCORP, INC., PETER SINATRA, 

SCOTT SELIGMAN, CAPITAL INVESTMENTS VII, 

Third-Party Defendants.

 /

OPINION AND ORDER

AT A SESSION of said Court, held in the United States Courthouse,

in the City of Port Huron, State of Michigan, on March 31, 2010

PRESENT: THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Debbas and Griffiths’ motion to dismiss [dkt

18] and Defendant Campbell’s motion to dismiss or transfer [dkt 23]. Plaintiff has responded to

each of the motions. Defendant Campbell has filed a reply brief; Defendants Debbas and Griffiths
1

This entity was previously known as JetDirect Aviation, and many of the pleadings refer

to the entity under this moniker. 

2

It is unclear to the Court whether Presidential, LLC is incorporated under the laws of

Michigan or Nevada. 

2

have not. The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the parties’

papers such that the decision process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Therefore,

pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(e)(2), it is hereby ORDERED that the motions be resolved on the

briefs submitted. For the following reasons, the motions are DENIED. 

II. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises from a complicated series of business ventures and transactions that

culminated in a July 2008 loan from Wachovia Bank (“Wachovia”) to SJH Capital Partners, LLC,

(“SJH”), and the subsequent default on that loan.

Defendant Gregory Campbell (“Campbell”) is a resident of Pennsylvania. Campbell ran a

small charter-jet company that, following several acquisitions, operated under the name of Sentient

Jet Holdings, LLC (“Sentient”)1. 

Defendants Christopher Debbas (“Debbas”) and James Griffiths (“Griffiths”) are investment

bankers and residents of Pennsylvania. Debbas and Griffiths are partners in a private investment

firm known as Julip Run Capital, LLC. Along with Campbell, Debbas and Griffiths are also

partners in an investment firm called CD Ventures, which invests in Sentient. 

Third-party Defendant Scott Seligman (“Seligman”) was the owner of Presidential Aviation,

LLC. Presidential Aviation was acquired by Sentient, and Seligman subsequently became an

investor in Sentient. Seligman is a Michigan resident and is the majority owner of Presidential, LLC

(“Presidential”). Presidential is a “Michigan-based company”2

 with its principal place of business
3

Brantley Partners V has filed a motion to intervene, and Pinkas argues that he was acting

on behalf of Brantley Partners V at all times during the transactions at issue. This motion, along

with the various motions filed in response to Pinkas’s counter-complaint and third-party

complaint, will be addressed by a separate opinion. 

3

in Southfield, Michigan. 

Sentient had several investors, including CD Ventures (i.e., Campbell, Debbas, and

Griffiths), Presidential, and Defendant Robert Pinkas (through an entity known as Brantley Partners

V)3

. Despite these resources, Sentient still faced mounting financial troubles. In January 2008,

Presidential increased its investment in Sentient by $5 million. CD Ventures also increased its

investment at that time. In April and May 2008, Presidential invested an additional $1.5 million in

Sentient.

Notwithstanding the additional capital infusions, Sentient continued to struggle financially.

One of the parties involved in Sentient apparently had a “connection” with Wachovia that would

allow Sentient to secure a substantial loan. Wachovia, however, would not lend directly to Sentient

due to that entity’s significant existing debt. Therefore, SJH was created for the sole purpose of

securing the loan from Wachovia. SJH’s membership included CD Ventures and Pinkas/Brantley

Partners V. It also included Plaintiff Presidential Facility, LLC (“Plaintiff”), an entity specifically

created by the principals of Presidential to participate in SJH and facilitate the Wachovia loan.

Plaintiff is incorporated under the laws of Nevada and has its principal place of business in

Southfield, Michigan. 

Wachovia required additional protection for the loan. To entice Wachovia to make the loan,

Plaintiff offered Wachovia an unconditional guarantee to repay 24.231%, not to exceed $3 million,

of the approximately $12.4 million loan in the event of default. Shortly thereafter, the loan amount
4

was amended to make available to SJH an additional $10 million. In support of the amended loan,

Plaintiff again gave Wachovia an unconditional guarantee, this time for 59.348% of the total loan

amount, not to exceed $13 million. 

Plaintiff proffered its unconditional guarantees to Wachovia based on separate guarantee

agreements (the “Agreements”) between Plaintiff and Defendants. The Agreements guaranteed

reimbursement to Plaintiff of any amount in excess of $3 million that Plaintiff expended under its

unconditional guarantee to Wachovia. Defendants Campbell, Debbas, and Griffiths executed one

such Agreement, and Defendant Pinkas executed a separate Agreement. As part of the Agreements,

each Defendant pledged a certain commitment amount, as follows: (1) Defendant Pinkas—$5

million; (2) Defendant Campbell—$2.5 million; (3) Defendants Debbas and Griffiths—$1 million

each; and (4) Third-Party Defendant Peter Sinatra (“Sinatra”)—$500,000. The Agreements also

provided that all of the guarantors were jointly-and-severally liable for any default of the Agreement.

Plaintiff maintains that it would not have agreed to the additional $10 million unconditional

guarantee to Wachovia if not for the Agreements with Defendants. 

SJH defaulted on the Wachovia loan. Wachovia sought payment from Plaintiff under the

terms of the unconditional guarantee, and Plaintiff satisfied that demand. In turn, Plaintiff demanded

reimbursement from Defendants under the terms of the Agreements. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants have failed to remit payment in violation of the Agreements, and it filed this diversity

action to recoup said obligations.

Defendants Debbas and Griffiths have moved for dismissal on the basis of personal

jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Defendant Campbell filed a similar motion and has also

requested that the Court transfer the case. 
5

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The plaintiff has the burden of proving the Court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Theunissen v Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991). When, as in the present case, the court

does not hold an evidentiary hearing in deciding a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, “the court must consider

the pleadings and affidavits in a light most favorable to the plaintiff[.]” CompuServe, Inc. v.

Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996). “In sharp contrast to summary judgment procedure

. . . the court disposing of a 12(b)(2) motion does not weigh the controverting assertions of the party

seeking dismissal. Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1458. 

The plaintiff “need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.” CompuServe, 89 F.3d

at 1262. “The burden upon a plaintiff to respond to a ‘properly supported’ motion to dismiss is not

particularly demanding.” Turi v. Main St. Adoption Servs., LLP, No. 08-14511, 2009 WL 2923248,

at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2009)

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Personal Jurisdiction

The Due Process Clause protects an individual from “not being subject to the binding

judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations.”

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985) (citing Int’l Shoe Corp. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). This allows “potential defendants to structure their primary

conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable

to suit.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 

Therefore, in a case dependant on diversity of citizenship, the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction

“must be both (1) authorized by the law of the state in which it sits, and (2) in accordance with the
4

There is no argument that any of the Defendants would be subject to general personal

jurisdiction under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.701. 

6

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282

F.3d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 2002). 

1. Michigan Long-Arm Statute

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e), the Court must look to the Michigan long-arm statute, Mich.

Comp. Laws § 600.705, to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists in the case at bar.4

 Mich.

Comp. Laws § 600.705 provides, in pertinent part:

The existence of any of the following relationships between an

individual or his agent and the State shall constitute a sufficient basis

of jurisdiction to enable a Court of record of this State to exercise

limited personal jurisdiction over the individual and to enable the

Court to render personal judgments against the individual or his

representative arising out of an act which creates any of the following

relationships:

(1) The transaction of any business within the state.

In Sifers v. Horn, 385 Mich. 195 (1971), the Michigan Supreme Court stated that the phrase

“transaction of any business within the State” found in Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.705 “means just

what it says. It includes ‘each’ and ‘every’ . . . . It comprehends the ‘slightest’” contact. Id. at 199

n.2. See also Lanier v. Am. Bd. of Endodontics, 843 F.2d 901, 905–06 (6th Cir. 1988). 

The Agreements meet this broad standard. Furthermore, “[t]he Michigan statute confers on

the state courts the maximum scope of personal jurisdiction permitted by the due process clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment.” Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1236 (6th Cir.

1981). Therefore, the Court finds that the Michigan long-arm statute is satisfied so long as its

exercise of jurisdiction would not offend due process. 
7

2. Due Process

“[C]onstitutional concerns of due process limit the application of [the Michigan long-arm

statute].” Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1459 (citation omitted). A defect in the Due Process

considerations “would foreclose the exercise of personal jurisdiction even where a properly

construed provision of the long-arm statute would permit it.” Id. The relevant criteria for Due

Process considerations (the Mohasco requirements) are:

First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege

of acting in the forum state or causing consequence in the forum

state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s

activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences

must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to

make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.

Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1460 (quoting LAK, Inc. v. Deer Creek Enters., 885 F.2d 1293, 1299 (6th

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056 (1990)) (citing S. Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401

F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968)). The Court will address each criterion separately. 

a. Purposeful Availment 

“Th[e] ‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into

a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts . . . or of the

unilateral activity of another party or a third person[.]” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (quotations

and citations omitted). “Jurisdiction is proper, however, where the contacts proximately result from

the actions by the defendant himself that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum state.”

Conti v. Pneumatic Prods. Corp., 977 F.2d 978, 982 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Burger King, 471 U.S.

at 475). 

Defendants Debbas, Griffiths, and Campbell (hereinafter “Defendants”) argue that any

contacts with the State of Michigan were unintended and fortuitous. They contend that they were
8

unaware that Plaintiff’s principal place of business was in Michigan, and they knew only that

Plaintiff was a Nevada-incorporated entity. Defendants maintain that (1) they never visited

Michigan in regard to this transaction; (2) the majority of the negotiations were through Sinatra, and

to a lesser extent, Seligman, both of whom were located in California at the time; and (3) the

transaction was negotiated entirely by conference calls and e-mail. 

Defendants further cite to the Agreements, which list Plaintiff only as a Nevada limitedliability company. In addition, each Defendant has attached an affidavit indicating his lack of

contacts, or lack of knowledge thereof, with the State of Michigan. Finally, Defendants argue that

they were never aware that the Agreements were fully executed, as they did not receive a copy

signed by all signatories. 

Plaintiff responds that the Court clearly enjoys jurisdiction because Defendants

executed—and in Plaintiff’s view, initiated—a multi-million-dollar guarantee agreement with a

Michigan-based company. Plaintiff suggests that throughout the course of dealings, Defendants

became aware, or should have known, where Plaintiff’s place of business was located. Plaintiff

urges the Court not to consider only the Agreement, but rather to consider the two-year history of

the parties, especially those events in the several months leading up to the execution of the

Agreements. In support, Plaintiff attaches voluminous emails exchanged between the actors.

Plaintiff also attaches declarations of Sinatra and of its—and Presidential’s—general counsel,

Stephanie Zimmerman, detailing Defendants’ contacts in Michigan. Finally, Plaintiff notes that the

Agreements contain a Michigan choice-of-law clause. 

Certain facts are not in dispute. The Defendants were not physically present in Michigan at

any time. Defendants did not execute the Agreements in Michigan. The negotiations were
9

conducted by telephone and email. The Agreement does not indicate the location of Plaintiff’s

principal place of business; it states only that Plaintiff is a Nevada LLC. The only signatory listed

on the Agreement on Plaintiff’s behalf was Sinatra, a California resident. 

It is equally clear that the July 2008 negotiations and conference call were not the isolated

events portrayed by Defendants. The arrangement between the parties was a complex investment

scheme involving Presidential (i.e., Plaintiff’s parent corporation) and Sentient. Two new entities,

Plaintiff and SJH, were created to obtain the loan. A letter of credit from Comerica Bank, located

in Michigan, was required on Plaintiff’s behalf to complete the transaction. Aside from

Zimmerman, at least one other Michigan attorney was involved in the transaction. 

 “If, as here, a nonresident defendant transacts business by negotiating and executing a

contract via telephone calls and letters . . . then the defendant has purposefully availed himself of

the forum by creating a continuing obligation to [the forum state].” Cole v. Mileti, 133 F.3d 433,

436 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Air Prods. & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Inter., Inc., 503 F.3d 544 (6th

Cir. 2007). In Lanier, however, the Sixth Circuit noted that the United States Supreme Court has

“stopped short of allowing jurisdiction whenever an out-of-state defendant contracts with a forum

resident.” 843 F.2d at 911. See also Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 147, 151

(6th Cir. 1997) (“The mere fact that Paragon entered into a contract with a Michigan corporation

does not mean that Paragon purposefully availed itself of the ‘benefits and protections.’”). Instead,

Lanier requires that “prior negotiations, contemplated future consequences, the terms of the contract,

and the actual course of dealing need be addressed to evaluate in a ‘highly realistic’ way, the

intended future consequences that are ‘the real object of the business transaction.’” 843 F.2d at 915.

The course of dealings in the instant case is revealing. Presidential and CD Ventures were
10

each investors in Sentient, and they jointly agreed to increase their investment in that entity between

January and May of 2008. After the Wachovia loan was approved, the loan amount was

immediately increased, which required additional guarantees by Plaintiff to Wachovia, and which

in turn necessitated the Agreements between Defendants and Plaintiff. 

These factors clearly suggest an on-going relationship between Defendants and a company

doing business in Michigan. Of note, this court has found that a “decision to extend the terms of the

original Agreement can be seen to reflect an intent to pursue an ongoing relationship, and perhaps

to expand it further in the future.” See Terry Barr Sales, L.L.C. v. Amtek Metal Indus., Inc., No. 08-

10749, 2008 WL 4449633, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 2, 2008). The conduct at issue in this case is

likewise the result of an ongoing relationship between the parties, and those associated with them,

in which the parties continued to extend themselves both temporally and financially. Had Sentient

not become insolvent, such relationship likely would have continued. Put differently, this was not

a “one-time shot”, but rather one of a series of deliberate events. 

The parties also disagree over which side initiated the contractual negotiations. Debbas and

Griffiths represent that the Agreements were essentially thrust upon them by the other investors, and

they were advised that the Agreements were procedural only and would never be enforced.

Conversely, Plaintiff paints Debbas and Griffiths as the architects of the entire transaction. 

This argument is immaterial. “[T]he question of which party solicited the business interface

is irrelevant, so long as the defendant then directed its activities to the forum resident.” Lanier, 843

F.2d at 910. Even if Plaintiff initiated the negotiations, “the fact that the Michigan plaintiffs

initiated the contact does not render personal jurisdiction inappropriate, especially where the

defendants responded and developed a legal relationship with Michigan residents.” Turi, 2009 WL
11

2923248, at *7. 

Furthermore, the Court is required to draw all factual inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, and

doing so suggests that it was Defendants who initiated the transaction as a whole by arranging the

Wachovia line of financing. The Supreme Court has “emphasized that parties who ‘reach out

beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state’

are subject to regulations and sanctions in the other State for the consequences of their activities.”

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 (quoting Travelers Heath Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950)).

Thus, this case is distinguishable from those cases finding a lack of jurisdiction when it is the

plaintiff who initiates a transaction with a non-resident. See Kerry Steel, 106 F.3d at 151; LAK, Inc.,

885 F.2d at 1300. That is, viewing the facts in Plaintiff’s favor, Defendants sought out a company

that was domiciled in Michigan, rather than the other way around. 

Finally, the Court is not persuaded by the arguments that Defendants, who are sophisticated

businessmen, were completely unaware of the forum in which Plaintiff—and Presidential—conduct

business. The Court recognizes that email addresses do not necessarily reveal the location of the

recipient. Plaintiff, however, alleges that many negotiations regarding the transactions were

conducted by conference call, which would reveal the location of the recipient. Further, the SJH

Operating Agreement lists the Southfield, Michigan, address in Plaintiff’s membership roster entry.

See Pl.’s Ex. J. Finally, while the Agreements do not list the Michigan address, they did contain a

Michigan choice-of-law clause—which should have raised questions if the arrangement had no ties

whatsoever to Michigan. For these reasons, the Court finds that this case is one in which the

Defendants, “through [their] negotiation of the contract . . . bound [themselves] to pay money to an

entity that [they] should have known was operating in Michigan.” Salom Enters., LLC v. TS Trim
12

Indus., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 676, 685 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 

The Court recognizes that the advent of smartphones, email, and other similar technologies

has blurred the lines of when and where business is transacted and has lessened the need for one to

be physically present in order to conduct business in a given forum. Considering the legal principals

that this Court is compelled to follow, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met its minimal burden of

proving a prima facie case of purposeful availment. 

 b. Action Arising From Activities in Forum State 

The second Monasco factor requires that Plaintiff’s cause of action arises from Defendant’s

activities in Michigan. 

Defendants argue that the cause of action arose in Pennsylvania, because that is where any

alleged breach of the contract occurred due to Defendant’s failure to remit the allegedly-owed funds.

See Kerry Steel, 106 F.3d at 153. The Sixth Circuit has held, however, in cases involving a contract

with a nonresident, “if the cause of action is for breach of that contract, as it is here, the cause of

action naturally arises from the defendant’s activities in [the forum state]. Cole, 133 F.3d at 436.

See also Nat’l Can Corp. v. K Beverage Co., 674 F.2d 1134, 1138 (6th Cir. 1982) (“The second

aspect of the test obviously is satisfied. The guaranty agreements are the basis for the action.”). 

The Court agrees, and finds that this cause of action arises from Defendant’s actions in the

forum state. 

c. Reasonableness

Finally, the third Monasco factor requires that the acts of Defendants and the consequences

of their acts have a substantial enough connection with Michigan to make the exercise of jurisdiction

over them reasonable. If the first two factors are met, jurisdiction is “presumed” to be reasonable.
13

Cole, 133 F.3d at 436. 

As discussed above, construing all facts in Plaintiff’s favor, Defendants and Presidential,

Plaintiff’s principal, engaged in a several-month increase of investment capital in Sentient, which

ultimately resulted in Defendants seeking the Wachovia line of credit. Further, as discussed above,

sophisticated businessmen such as Defendants should have known the location of the company with

which they were dealing. While the moving Defendants are from Pennsylvania, this case also

includes parties from Michigan, Ohio, and California. Finally, the State of Michigan has a “manifest

interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents[.]” McGee, 355 U.S. at 224. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the presumption of reasonableness applies. The Court

concludes that Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in Michigan, and such jurisdiction

does not offend due process. 

B. Campbell’s Motion to Transfer 

In his motion to dismiss, Defendant Campbell alternatively moves for dismissal based on

improper venue pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), or for a transfer of the case against him to the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 

i. Improper Venue

Campbell first claims that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is the proper venue for this

case. The federal venue statute provides that: 

A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of

citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought

only in 

(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all

defendants reside in the same state,

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events
14

or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial

part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, 

(3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to

personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if

there is no district in which the action may otherwise be

brought. 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Subsection (1) is inapplicable because Defendant Pinkas does not reside in the

same state as the other Defendants. Subsection (3) applies only when the preceding two subsections

do not. 

 Under § 1391(a)(2), the Eastern District of Pennsylvania most likely would be a proper

venue for this action. It is well-settled, however, that there can be more than one proper venue for

an action. See First of Mich. Corp. v. Bramlet, 141 F.3d 260, 263 (6th Cir. 1998). Campbell offers

no argument why venue is not proper in this district; therefore, the Court has no basis on which to

conclude that the current venue is improper. 

ii. Transfer 

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest

of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might

have been brought.” The Court has broad discretion to grant or deny a transfer, and a denial is

reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. See Phelps v. McClellan, 30 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1994).

The following factors are to be considered in determining whether transfer is appropriate:

(1) the convenience of the parties; (2) the convenience of the

witnesses; (3) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (4) the

availability of process to compel attendance of unwilling witnesses;

(5) the cost of obtaining willing witnesses; (6) the practical problems

associated with trying the case most expeditiously and inexpensively;

and (7) the interest of justice.

Helder v. Hitachi Power Tools, USA Ltd., 764 F. Supp. 93, 96 (E.D. Mich. 1991). See also
15

LaFrance v. Grand River Nav. Co., Inc., No. 08-13411, 2008 WL 5413078, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec.

29, 2008). 

Campbell’s motion does not analyze the above factors; rather, it merely argues that the case

be transferred on the basis of convenience. Such an argument fails to consider the required factors.

It also ignores the deference that the Court must give to Plaintiff’s choice of forum, which choice

will not be disturbed “unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant.” Stewart v. Dow

Chem. Co., 865 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09

(1947)). Considering that the Court is unable to complete the required analysis, the request for

transfer is denied. 

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, and for the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Debbas

and Griffiths’ motion to dismiss [dkt 18] is DENIED and Defendant Campbell’s motion to dismiss

[dkt 23] is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

S/Lawrence P. Zatkoff 

LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 31, 2010

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
16

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this Order was served upon the attorneys of record

by electronic or U.S. mail on March 31, 2010.

S/Marie E. Verlinde 

Case Manager

(810) 984-3290