FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

June 29, 2009

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DAVID A. ECKHART,

Defendant - Appellant.

_______________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JUAN PEREZ CARDENAS,

Defendant - Appellant

No. 07-4126

No. 07-4022

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Utah

(D.C. No. 2:05-CR-00529-DAK-1-2)

Submitted on the briefs:

Brett Tolman, United States Attorney, and Diana Hagen, Assistant United States

Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney for the District of Utah, Salt Lake

City, Utah, for Plaintiff - Appellee.

Steven B. Killpack, Utah Federal Defender, and Scott Keith Wilson, Assistant

Federal Defender, Utah Federal Defender’s Office, Salt Lake City, Utah, for
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Defendant - Appellant Eckhart.

Mary C. Corporon of Corporon & Williams, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant -

Appellant Cardenas.

Before O’BRIEN, TYMKOVICH and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

O’Brien, Circuit Judge.

Juan M. Perez Cardenas and David A. Eckhart were stopped because the

license plate on their truck was not visible to a police officer traveling in the

adjoining lane. After twenty-seven minutes of questioning, they consented to a

search of their vehicle, which revealed 1,027 grams of cocaine and 213 grams of

methamphetamine. Charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent

to distribute, they filed motions to suppress, which were denied. Their cases were

then severed and each pled guilty, reserving the right to appeal from the denial of

the motion to suppress. The court denied their requests for minor participant

status and sentenced each defendant to 87 months imprisonment, the low end of

the advisory guideline range. In separate appeals, Cardenas (07-4022) and

Eckhart (07-4126) now challenge the denial of their motions to suppress and the

denial of minor participant status. Because the factual and legal arguments

underlying these two appeals are the same, we have consolidated them for
1 Specifically, Gould could not read the second digit of the license plate number. 

He thought it might be a “6” or a “G” but it turned out to be a “C.”

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administrative purposes. Their arguments fail; we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

At 10:30 p.m. on Friday, June 17, 2005, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper

Donald Robert Gould, a nine-year police veteran with specialized training in drug

pipeline interdiction, was driving eastbound on a remote section of Interstate 80

in Tooele County, Utah, when he was passed by a small pickup truck traveling in

the left lane. The truck had a California license plate, but Gould was unable to

read the plate number. He ran the number two different ways, but it came up as

“not on file” both times.1

 Gould pulled the truck over, as he believed Utah law

required license plates to be visible from a distance of one hundred feet. 

After the stop, Gould illuminated the rear plate with his spotlight and was

finally able to read the number. He contacted dispatch with the number and then

approached the truck. As he did so, he noticed there were after-market metal

plates bolted on the back bumper. He also noticed the light designed to

illuminate the license plate was not working. In his opinion, the lack of a

functioning plate light impeded his ability to read the plate and a trailer hitch may

also have obscured his view.

Gould asked the driver, Eckhart, for his license and registration. Eckhart
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produced a Pennsylvania license but did not produce the truck’s registration,

instead motioning to indicate the truck belonged to the passenger, Cardenas. 

Eckhart was “visibly shaking” when he handed Gould his license and did not

make eye contact with Gould. (R. Vol. II (Eckhart), Supp. Vol. I (Cardenas) at

14.) Gould believed Eckhart’s nervousness could indicate possible criminal

activity. He asked Cardenas if it was his truck and Cardenas stated the truck

belonged to his uncle. He also asked Cardenas for his driver’s license but

Cardenas was only able to produce a Washington identification card.

Gould asked Eckhart why he and Cardenas had the truck. Eckhart stated he

was going back to Pennsylvania and Cardenas was going along for a vacation. 

Gould observed only a small backpack in the truck, which he believed was

inconsistent with Eckhart’s story of a cross-country trip. Gould suspected the

truck might be stolen because neither Eckhart nor Cardenas could provide 

documentation for the vehicle. He decided to separate Eckhart and Cardenas and

ask about the truck and their travel plans. 

He first spoke to Eckhart, who answered as follows. Eckhart knew

Cardenas because he had a friend, Jorge, in Pennsylvania, who was related to

Cardenas. He and Cardenas were planning to visit Cardenas’ uncle in

Pennsylvania. Despite their supposed friendship, Eckhart did not know Cardenas’

last name but knew him only as “Juan.” Eckhart had just been laid-off but had

worked in landscaping and construction. He had flown from Pennsylvania to Los
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Angeles, where he was picked up by Cardenas and his uncle. The three men

drove to Fresno, where Eckhart vacationed for about a week. Eckhart asked

Cardenas’ uncle for permission to borrow the truck to drive back to Pennsylvania. 

The uncle said he could but only if Cardenas accompanied him on the trip. 

Eckhart and Cardenas left California that morning and had been taking turns

driving all day. As Gould and Eckhart were standing behind the truck, Eckhart

acknowledged the license plate was difficult to read. 

While questioning Eckhart, Gould received a phone call from dispatch

advising the truck had not been reported stolen. This did not alleviate Gould’s

suspicion, however, because stolen vehicles are not always listed in the national

database. Based on his training and experience, Gould also suspected Eckhart and

Cardenas might be transporting illegal narcotics. 

Gould then questioned Cardenas. Cardenas’ story was consistent with

Eckhart’s in many respects, though Cardenas stated he had not accompanied his

uncle to the airport in Los Angeles to pick up Eckhart. He said the truck had

been purchased by his uncle about four days ago. He said Eckhart was traveling

to Pennsylvania to visit his father and he (Cardenas) was going along for the ride. 

He did not intend to visit his relative in Pennsylvania because he had to be back

in Fresno on Monday (three days later) for work. When Gould asked how

Cardenas was planning to get back, Cardenas stated he would either drive the

truck or take a bus, which Gould found to be implausible because of the short
2

 In addition, Cardenas did not have a driver’s license and thus, could not have

legally driven the truck back.

3

 The police later determined title to the truck had been transferred from Davida or

Roy Peden to Gustavo Martinez (neither “Jose” nor “Pedro”) on April 23, 2005, almost

one month (not four days) prior to the stop.

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time-frame.2

Gould and Cardenas returned to the truck. Cardenas still could not locate a

registration. Gould requested a phone number for Cardenas’ uncle so he could

confirm his ownership of the truck. Cardenas provided a phone number with a

Fresno area code and stated his Fresno uncle’s name was “Jose.” (Eckhart later

said the uncle’s name was “Pedro.”) Gould’s dispatcher called the phone number

and spoke with someone who said the truck had been sold. Obviously, this call

did not confirm rightful possession of the truck.3

Trooper Croft arrived at the scene. Gould explained what had happened

and Croft agreed criminal activity was likely. Continued questioning revealed

Eckhart had been driving the whole time because Cardenas did not have a driver’s

license. After more questioning (and the arrival of at least one or two more

officers), Gould asked Eckhart whether there was any contraband in the truck

such as large amounts of cash or illegal drugs. Eckhart answered “no.” Gould

then asked Eckhart for permission to search the truck. Eckhart said, “I don’t

care.” (Id. at 31.) Gould asked him again and he said, “sure.” (Id.) Gould asked

Cardenas if there was anything in the truck he needed to know about. Cardenas
4

 In a supplemental indictment, Eckhart was also charged with possession of

cocaine. The government later agreed to drop this charge in exchange for Eckhart’s

guilty plea to the methamphetamine charge.

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said he was not aware of anything. Gould then asked Cardenas if it was okay to

search the truck and he said, “go ahead.” (Id. at 33.) 

The officers removed the items in the truck bed and began searching,

looking in particular for a hidden compartment. Gould called for a drug dog, who

arrived at the scene with his handler approximately twenty minutes later. The dog

alerted to the shifter boot and the passenger side air vent. Nothing was found in

either location. Gould then searched the items removed from the truck bed. He

looked closely at a small red cooler which appeared to have been modified. 

Gould separated the lining of the cooler from the body and discovered three

packages where the insulation should have been. The packages contained a

substance which tested positive in the field for methamphetamine. The packages

were later determined to contain 1,027 grams of cocaine and 213 grams of

methamphetamine.

B. Procedural History

On July 21, 2005, Eckhart and Cardenas were charged with possession of

methamphetamine with intent to distribute.4

 Cardenas moved to suppress the

statements made during the stop and the evidence discovered during the search. 

A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing at which Gould testified. The

magistrate concluded: (1) the traffic stop was justified at its inception; (2) the
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stop was not unreasonably broad in scope; (3) Cardenas had standing to contest

the search but validly consented to it; and (4) the stop was not tainted by the

officers’ failure to advise Cardenas of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436 (1966). The district judge adopted the report and recommendation with

one exception; he concluded Cardenas did not have standing to challenge the

search and therefore did not consider whether the consent was valid. 

After the court ruled on Cardenas’ motion, Eckhart filed a motion to

suppress raising the same arguments made by Cardenas. The court ruled

Cardenas’ motion would apply to Eckhart and denied the motion, thus preserving

Eckhart’s right of appeal.

Cardenas and Eckhart both pled guilty to one count of possession of

methamphetamine with intent to distribute while reserving the right to appeal the

denial of the motion to suppress. A presentence investigation report (PSR) was

prepared on each individual. Both PSRs determined the applicable sentencing

guideline range was 87-108 months imprisonment, assuming Cardenas and

Eckhart received safety valve relief under USSG §5C1.2(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).

Both Cardenas and Eckhart requested a two-level downward adjustment

under USSG §3B1.2, each claiming they played only a minor role in the offense.

Cardenas claimed he had agreed to help Eckhart transport the drugs in order to

pay off an outstanding drug debt. He claimed he had never met Eckhart prior to

the trip. In response to Cardenas’ request, the probation officer stated:
5

 Eckhart claimed he had contacted Jorge, a drug dealer in Pennsylvania, and asked

if he could stay with his brother, Pedro, while visiting California. One of Jorge’s friends

took Eckhart to the airport. There he purchased a one-way ticket for $311 in cash with

his own money. That left him with $389 for traveling expenses. Pedro and Cardenas

picked Eckhart up at the airport and drove to a hotel, where they spent the night. When

they arrived at Pedro’s house the next day, Pedro’s wife would not allow Eckhart to stay. 

Pedro paid for Eckhart to stay at a hotel for another night and gave him drugs for his use. 

The next morning, Pedro asked Eckhart if he would drive to Pennsylvania with Cardenas

so Cardenas could visit his uncle. Eckhart agreed and, prior to leaving, was informed by

Cardenas they would be transporting drugs to Pennsylvania. 

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“Investigative materials do not indicate that [Cardenas’] knowledge and conduct

were less than that of [Eckhart]. Both men appear to be equally responsible for

transporting the drugs. [Cardenas] reported he agreed to help with the driving to

pay off a personal drug debt.” (R. Vol. III (Cardenas) at addendum.) At

sentencing, Cardenas claimed he was merely “a mule.” The court sentenced

Cardenas to 87 months imprisonment, concluding a safety-valve reduction was

warranted, but a reduction under §3B1.2 was not because “[t]here is nothing in

the record that convinces me . . . [Cardenas] is eligible for minimal or minor

participant [status].” (R. Vol. II (Cardenas) at 3.)

Eckhart argued he was entitled to a §3B1.2 reduction because he had no

knowledge of the amount or purity of the drugs; he was not a drug dealer,

purchaser or a courier prior to this offense; he did not know the source or exact

destination of the drugs; he received no compensation for his involvement; and he

was less culpable than Cardenas.5

 At Eckhart’s sentencing hearing, the

government argued a reduction for minor participant status was not justified. 
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Even taking Eckhart’s facts as true, he knew they were transporting drugs and he

was the primary, if not sole, driver. He was not a minor participant. The court

sentenced Eckhart to 87 months imprisonment, explaining: “I guess I don’t

believe that under the law even if the facts are as represented by defendant it still

looked to me like a minimum . . . or minor participant will not apply.” (R. Vol.

III (Eckhart) at 14.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Denial of Motion to Suppress

Cardenas and Eckhart contend the district court erred in denying their

motions to suppress because: (1) the initial stop was not justified at its inception;

(2) the police exceeded the scope of the stop; and (3) they have standing to

contest the search, which was not conducted pursuant to valid consent. Cardenas

also contends the roadside statements he made should have been suppressed on

account of the officers’ failure to give a Miranda advisement. “When reviewing

the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government, accept the district court’s findings of fact unless

clearly erroneous, and review de novo the ultimate determination of

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Katoa, 379 F.3d

1203, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004).

1. Initial Stop

Cardenas and Eckhart contend the traffic stop was not justified at its
6

 They also argue the stop was not justified at its inception because “Gould should

have known . . . that stopping a vehicle based on an officer’s misinterpretation of a

foreign state’s law is an illegal stop.” (Cardenas’ Opening Br. at 13). Gould never

claimed he pulled the truck over for a violation of California law; rather, he believed the

truck was in violation of Utah law. Not only is the case relied upon by Cardenas and

Eckhart, Utah v. Friesen, not controlling on the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment,

it is inapposite. 988 P.2d 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). In Friesen, the defendant was driving a

vehicle with a Wyoming license plate affixed to the rear and was stopped by a state

trooper in Utah who believed Wyoming law required the display of front and rear license

plates. The court held: “Although the people of Utah have an interest in requiring

individuals traveling our highways to comply with the law, including the law regarding

the display of license plates, this interest does not justify arbitrarily stopping out-of-state

vehicles on the chance that there has been a violation of another state’s law.” Id. at 10-

11. That reasoning does not apply here as Gould stopped the truck for a violation of Utah

law, not California law. Moreover, California, like Utah, requires license plates to be

clearly visible. See Cal. Veh. Code § 5201 (“License plates shall at all times be . . .

mounted in a position so as to be clearly visible, and shall be maintained in a condition so

as to be clearly legible.”) Thus, if Gould had pulled Cardenas and Eckhart over based on

his understanding that California law requires license plates to be clearly visible, he

would not have been mistaken.

7

 While Cardenas and Eckhart rely on the Privileges and Immunities Clause

in Article I, the Supreme Court has considered the federal right of interstate travel

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inception because it was based on a mistake of law. See United States v.

DeGasso, 369 F.3d 1139, 1144 (10th Cir. 2004) (“An officer’s reasonable mistake

of fact, as distinguished from a mistake of law, may support the probable cause or

reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop.”). In addition, they

contend the stop was not justified because Utah police officers may not enforce

Utah license plate statutes on cars licensed in California.6

 They claim “[s]topping

an out-of-state vehicle impedes the occupants’ right to interstate travel, as

protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection

Clause.”7

 (Cardenas’ Opening Br. at 11.) 
to arise from the Commerce Clause, not the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 

See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1987). 

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a. Mistake of Law

The government asserts the stop was justified at its inception because the

license plate was not clearly visible and legible, as required by Utah law. See

Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-404(3) (“Every license plate shall at all times be: (a)

securely fastened: . . . (iii) in a place and position to be clearly visible; and (b)

maintained: . . . (ii) in a condition to be clearly legible.”). 

“[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based

on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable

suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.” 

United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 

“Our sole inquiry is whether this particular officer had reasonable suspicion that

this particular motorist violated ‘any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and

equipment regulations’ of the jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440

U.S. 648, 661 (1979)). In Botero-Ospina, we upheld the denial of a defendant’s

motion to suppress where “[the deputy] observed a violation of [Utah law]

relating to lane straddling” and “he was able to articulate specific facts which, in

light of his training and experience, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that [the

defendant] may have been driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of

[Utah law].” Id. at 788. We explained “either or both of these reasons” provided
8

 Utah law requires “[e]ither a tail lamp or a separate lamp shall be so

constructed and placed as to illuminate with a white light the rear registration

plate.” Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1604(2)(c). While Gould was not aware of this

violation until after he pulled the truck over, it likely explains why the license

plate was not legible. 

9

 In his reply brief, Eckhart argues the observations made by Gould after he

pulled over the vehicle “cannot be considered as facts in support of the [district]

court’s conclusion that [Gould] had grounds to initiate the stop in the first place.” 

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justification for the initial stop. Id.

Gould stopped this truck because he “could see the plate, but [ ] could not

read all the digits on it.” (R. Vol. II at 11 (Eckhart), Supp. Vol. I (Cardenas) at

11.) After he stopped the truck and with the aid of a spotlight, he could read all

the digits. As he walked toward the truck, he observed the license plate light was

not properly working.8

 Like the officer in Botero-Ospina, Gould observed a

violation of Utah law before he made the stop. However, Gould was incorrect

about which provision of law had in fact been violated. He believed Utah law

required license plates to be visible up to 100 feet at any time. He was mistaken

– the 100-foot limitation is only applicable in daylight. See Utah Code Ann. §

41-1a-403 (“License plates and the required letters and numerals on them . . .

shall be of sufficient size to be plainly readable from a distance of 100 feet during

daylight.”). However, he was not mistaken that what he observed – a license

plate not clearly visible or legible – violated Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. §§

41-1a-404(3)(b)(ii). At the time of the stop, Gould knew the plate was not clearly

legible, even though he did not know precisely why not.9
(Eckhart’s Reply Br. at 2.) We disagree. Gould was traveling in the lane next to

Cardenas and Eckhart and could not read the back plate on their truck – it was not

clearly visible and legible, in violation of Utah law. Eckhart also argues Gould

did not observe a violation because Utah law requires only that the license plate

be “fastened . . . in a place and position” and “maintained . . . in a condition” to

be clearly visible and legible. (Id. (quotations omitted).) If the license plate was

not illuminated as required by Utah law, see supra note 8, it was obviously not

“maintained . . . in a condition to be clearly legible.” Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a404(3)(b)(ii). 

10 The statute in effect on the date of the stop provided: “Fog lamps shall

not be used in substitution of headlamps, except under conditions of rain or fog

rendering disadvantageous the use of headlamps.” Okla. Stat. tit. 47 § 12-217.D,

amended by 2003 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 411, § 34 (effective Nov. 1, 2003). The

defendant was driving “during daylight hours when visibility was clear.” 

DeGasso, 369 F.3d at 1144. Thus, the use of fog lamps was not illegal. 

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In DeGasso, an officer stopped a vehicle based on his mistaken belief that

the driver’s use of fog lamps violated Oklahoma law.10 369 F.3d at 1141-42. 

Unlike Gould, the officer in DeGasso was not simply mistaken about which

particular statute was violated. Rather, the conduct he observed – driving with

fog lamps illuminated during daylight hours when visibility was clear – did not

violate “any of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of

the jurisdiction.” Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787 (quotations omitted). 

Notwithstanding the officer’s mistake of law, the district court held the stop was

justified because the officer reasonably believed the fog lamp statute had been

violated. We stated the court’s reasoning “misses the mark.” DeGasso, 369 F.3d

at 1144. It is “irrelevant” whether the officer acted in good faith; instead, “the

dispositive inquiry is whether Oklahoma traffic law regarding the use of fog
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lamps provided [the trooper] with an objectively justifiable basis for stopping

Defendants.” Id. We concluded it did not because there was 1) no mistake of

fact or 2) violation of Oklahoma law.

An officer need not be able to quote statutes (or scripture), chapter and

verse. Some confusion about the details of the law may be excused so long as

there was either “an observed [actual] traffic violation or [] reasonable articulable

suspicion that [an actual] traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is

occurring.” Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787. 

Here, the district court did not err in concluding the initial stop was

justified based on the illegibility of the vehicle’s license plate, which was an

actual violation of Utah’s equipment laws. That Gould was wrong about the

particulars of the law is not fatal. See United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216,

1220 (9th Cir. 2000) (initial stop justified where “[the officer]’s observations

correctly caused him to believe that [the defendant]’s window tinting was illegal”

though he was “wrong about exactly why” because “[t]he issue was not how well

[the officer] understood California’s window tinting laws, but whether he had

objective, probable cause to believe that these windows were, in fact, in

violation”). 

b. Right to Travel

Cardenas and Eckhart’s constitutional argument is equally unavailing

because enforcement of Utah’s license plate statutes on out-of-state drivers does
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not violate the Commerce Clause. Freedom to travel is indeed a basic

Constitutional right. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966). “The

federal guarantee of interstate travel . . . protects interstate travelers against two

sets of burdens: ‘the erection of actual barriers to interstate movement’ and ‘being

treated differently’ from intrastate travelers.” Bray v. Alexandria Women’s

Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1993) (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S.

55, 60 n.6 (1982)). Neither set of burdens is implicated here. Utah does not treat

intra- and interstate travelers differently. Moreover, Utah’s requirement that

license plates be clearly visible and legible does not place a barrier on interstate

movement as it is not unique to Utah and does not contradict the laws of other

states. See United States v. Martinez, 512 F.3d 1268, 1273 n.2 (10th Cir.) (stop

of defendants’ vehicle did not violate their right to interstate travel where officer

in Utah stopped vehicle registered in California for not displaying a front license

plate because “under both Utah and California traffic laws, a vehicle must display

a front license plate”), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2461 (2008); see also DeGasso,

369 F.3d at 1148 (“[W]hile every state has some statute prohibiting the

obstruction of license plates, none has interpreted its statutory scheme to allow

out-of-state cars to be driven with obscured license plates.”); see, e.g., Cal. Veh.

Code § 5201 (requiring license plates to be “clearly visible” and “clearly

legible”). Cardenas and Eckhart’s reliance on Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.

is misplaced as the appellees in Bibb made a “rather massive showing of burden
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on interstate commerce.” 359 U.S. 520, 528 (1959). Cardenas and Eckhart have

made no such showing. 

2. Scope of the Stop

Cardenas and Eckhart argue even if the initial stop was valid, the scope of

the stop was not reasonably related to the circumstances which justified the

interference in the first place, a requirement under the Fourth Amendment. See

Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 786 (to be reasonable, a traffic stop must not only be

“justified at its inception,” the temporary detention associated with the stop must

be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the

interference in the first place”). Relying on United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d

558 (10th Cir. 1994), and United States v. Edgerton, 438 F.3d 1043 (10th Cir.

2006), they claim the reasonable suspicion for the stop evaporated as soon as

Gould was able to read their license plate number, and at that point, they should

have been allowed to go on their way. 

McSwain and Edgerton do not support Cardenas and Eckhart’s position. In

McSwain, a state trooper stopped the defendant’s vehicle “for the sole purpose of

ensuring the validity of the vehicle’s temporary registration sticker.” 29 F.3d at

561. As the trooper approached the vehicle on foot, he verified the tag was valid

and had not expired. Id. We held the trooper’s decision to prolong the detention

by requesting the defendant’s license and registration “exceeded the scope of the

stop’s underlying justification” and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. Id.
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In Edgerton, a state trooper stopped the defendant’s vehicle because he could not

read the temporary registration tag. 438 F.3d at 1044. We held “[o]nce [the

trooper] was able to read the Colorado tag and deem it unremarkable, any

suspicion that defendant had violated [the Kansas statute relating to the display of

license plates] dissipated . . . [and] [the trooper], as a matter of courtesy, should

have explained to Defendant the reason for the initial stop and then allowed her to

continue on her way without requiring her to produce her license and

registration.” Id. at 1051. 

The troopers in McSwain and Edgerton had reasonable suspicion the

vehicles they stopped were violating the traffic laws, thus justifying the initial

stops, but their suspicion evaporated when they determined no violations had in

fact occurred. Here, by contrast, Gould’s suspicion did not evaporate but was

instead validated by an actual violation – the license plate on the truck was not

“clearly visible” and “clearly legible” and was not illuminated as required. See

Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-1a-404(3)(a)(iii), (b)(ii); 41-6a-1604(2)(c). Thus, Gould’s

request for Cardenas and Eckhart’s licenses and registration and his questioning

of them did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Karam, 496

F.3d 1157, 1161 (10th Cir. 2007) (“During a routine traffic stop, an officer may

request a driver’s license and vehicle registration, run a computer verification of

these documents and issue a citation or warning. An officer can also ask the

driver questions about matters both related and unrelated to the purpose of the
11 The officers could reasonably detain the vehicle and its occupants until the

issue of ownership and right to possession were resolved.

12 The district court did consider this question and concluded Gould had

reasonable suspicion the vehicle might be stolen and Cardenas and Eckhart might be

involved in drug trafficking based on the lack of documentation for the vehicle, the

vehicle’s registration in the name of an unknown third party, Eckhart’s nervousness, the

presence of metal plates bolted on the back bumper, inconsistent stories and implausible

travel plans.

-19-

stop . . . .”) (citation omitted); see, e.g., United States v. Ledesma, 447 F.3d 1307,

1314 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding it was reasonable for a trooper “to issue a written

warning, verify [the defendant]’s license and registration information, and ask

preliminary questions about travel plans” where defendant’s registration tag was

displayed in an unlawful manner); DeGasso, 369 F.3d at 1149 (upholding a

trooper’s detention of defendant because the trooper observed a continuing

violation of state law after stopping defendant’s vehicle). 

Cardenas and Eckhart do not contend Gould’s questioning prolonged the

detention beyond the time required for the initial stop.11 Thus, we need not

consider whether Gould had reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal

activity to justify the detention.12 See United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d

1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 2006) (no justification necessary where officer’s

questioning prior to issuing warning ticket does not “appreciably lengthen the

detention”). The district court did not err in concluding the twenty-seven minute

detention of Cardenas and Eckhart prior to the search was permissible.

3. Standing to Contest Search
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Cardenas and Eckhart contend the district court erred in holding they lack

standing to contest the search. “We review a court’s determination of standing de

novo.” United States v. Allen, 235 F.3d 482, 489 (10th Cir. 2000). 

“Fourth Amendment rights are personal and cannot be claimed

vicariously.” United States v. Hocker, 333 F.3d 1206, 1208 (10th Cir. 2003). 

“The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of adducing facts at the

suppression hearing indicating that his own rights were violated by the challenged

search.” Allen, 235 F.3d at 489 (quotations omitted). 

Whether a defendant’s own Fourth Amendment rights were violated

by a challenged search turns on the classic Fourth Amendment test:

whether the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy

in the area searched and whether society is prepared to recognize that

expectation as objectively reasonable. This court has held that, in

order for a defendant to show such an expectation of privacy in an

automobile, the defendant bears the burden at the suppression

hearing to show a legitimate interest in or [a] lawful control over the

car. 

Id. (quotations and citations omitted).

“[A] defendant need not submit legal documentation showing a chain of

lawful custody from the registered owner to himself.” Hocker, 333 F.3d at 1209. 

Where, as here, “the proponent of a motion to suppress is . . . not the registered

owner . . . the proponent bears the burden of establishing ‘that he gained

possession from the owner or someone with authority to grant possession.’” Id.

(quoting United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 445 (10th Cir. 1990)). We

consider: “(1) whether the defendant asserted ownership over the items seized
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from the vehicle; (2) whether the defendant testified to his expectation of privacy

at the suppression hearing; and (3) whether the defendant presented any testimony

at the suppression hearing that he had a legitimate possessory interest in the

vehicle.” Allen, 235 F.3d at 489. 

While Cardenas and Eckhart did assert ownership over the items seized

from the vehicle, they did not meet their burden of establishing a legitimate

possessory interest in the vehicle. They did not testify to their expectation of

privacy; nor did they present testimony or evidence establishing they gained

possession of the truck from someone with authority to grant it. They both

claimed the truck had recently been purchased by Cardenas’ Fresno uncle, who

had given them permission to drive it to Pennsylvania, but they produced no

evidence to support this claim and never explained their relationship to the

registered owner of the vehicle, Gustavo Martinez (neither “Jose” nor “Pedro”). 

Our cases are clear. A defendant does not have standing to contest a search

where he does not establish a link between himself and the registered owner. See

United States v. Betancur, 24 F.3d 73, 77 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding the borrower

of a car lacks standing where the car registration indicates it is owned by someone

other than the alleged lender and the borrower fails to present any evidence of a

linkage between the lender and registered owner); United States v. Martinez, 983

F.2d 968, 973 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding the driver of a car lacks standing where

she claims she borrowed the car from a friend, who in turn borrowed it from a
13 Specifically, Cardenas seeks suppression of “all the statements [he made] about

the truck, his travel plans, family, and co-defendant.” (Cardenas’ Opening Br. at 23.)

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third person, who was not shown to be connected in any way with the registered

owner); Arango, 912 F.2d at 445-46 (denying standing to defendant who

borrowed the vehicle from a person whom he knew was not the registered owner

and who provided no evidence suggesting the lender was in lawful possession of

the vehicle); United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1989) (denying

standing to defendant who did not introduce any evidence at his suppression

hearing to establish his legitimate possession of the vehicle). The district court

correctly concluded Cardenas and Eckhart lack standing to challenge the search. 

Thus, we need not examine the constitutionality of that search. See Allen, 235

F.3d at 490.

4. Lack of Miranda Advisement

Cardenas contends the roadside statements he made should have been

suppressed because the officers failed to advise him of his Miranda rights.13 The

government contends no Miranda advisement was necessary because the traffic

stop did not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation. 

 “It is well established that police officers are not required to administer

Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.” United States v. Hudson,

210 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted). “Instead, the

protections set out by the Supreme Court in Miranda only apply when an
14 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

-23-

individual is subject to custodial interrogation.” United States v. Rogers, 391

F.3d 1165, 1169 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted). Generally, “Miranda

warnings are . . . not implicated in the context of a valid Terry stop.” United

States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993).14 As we explained in

Perdue, “the typical police-citizen encounter envisioned by the Court in Terry

usually involves no more than a very brief detention without the aid of weapons

or handcuffs, a few questions relating to identity and the suspicious

circumstances, and an atmosphere that is substantially less police dominated than

that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda.” Id. (quotations

omitted). In Perdue, we recognized a limited exception to this general rule,

holding police officers must advise suspects of their constitutional rights, even in

the context of a Terry stop, “if they . . . take highly intrusive steps to protect

themselves from danger.” Id. at 1465.

 The officers here did not take highly intrusive measures against Cardenas. 

Cardenas was never handcuffed or placed in a police cruiser and no weapons were

drawn. Moreover, the officers were polite in their demeanor and did not use or

threaten the use of force at any time. This stop was the typical “noncoercive” and

“nonthreatening” Terry stop. See id. at 1464-65. The force used was not of a

level “more associated with formal arrest,” id., and stands in stark contrast to

Perdue, where we held a Miranda advisement was required after the police forced
15 All references to the United States Sentencing Guidelines are to the 2006

version.

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the suspect off the road and then onto the ground, handcuffed him and questioned

him at gunpoint with a helicopter hovering overhead. Id. at 1464. None of those

extreme factors are present here and a Miranda advisement was not necessary

prior to arrest.

B. Sentencing

Both Cardenas and Eckhart requested a downward adjustment pursuant to

USSG §3B1.2, which allows the sentencing judge to decrease a defendant’s

offense level by four levels “[i]f the defendant was a minimal participant in any

criminal activity,” by two levels “[i]f the defendant was a minor participant in

any criminal activity,” or by three levels for cases falling in between.15 The

district court denied the requested adjustment. “We review the sentencing court’s

factual decisions for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States

v. Salazar-Samaniega, 361 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 2004). “We do not require

a district court to make detailed findings, or explain why a particular adjustment

[under the guidelines] is or is not appropriate.” United States v. Bowen, 437 F.3d

1009, 1019 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).

The §3B1.2 adjustments are intended “for a defendant who plays a part in

committing the offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the

average participant.” USSG §3B1.2, comment. (n.3(A)). The determination
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whether to apply an adjustment under this section “is heavily dependent upon the

facts of the particular case. As with any other factual issue, the court, in

weighing the totality of the circumstances, is not required to find, based solely on

the defendant’s bare assertion, that such a role adjustment is warranted.” Id.,

comment. (n.3(C)). “[T]he defendant has the burden of proving his minor or

minimal participation.” Salazar-Samaniega, 361 F.3d at 1277.

Though Cardenas and Eckhart contend they were mere couriers, we have

recognized “[d]rug couriers are an indispensable component of drug dealing

networks” and have “refused to adopt a per se rule allowing a downward

adjustment based solely on a defendant’s status as a drug courier.” United States

v. Rangel-Arreola, 991 F.2d 1519, 1524 (10th Cir. 1993). “Instead, a downward

adjustment for a defendant’s role in an offense turns on the defendant’s

culpability relative to other participants in the crime.” Id. Both Cardenas and

Eckhart claim they are less culpable than the other. There is no evidence to

support that, apart from their self-serving statements, which the district court

could well have found not credible. See Salazar-Samaniega, 361 F.3d at 1278. 

“A defendant’s own testimony that others were more heavily involved in a

criminal scheme may not suffice to prove his minor or minimal participation,

even if uncontradicted by other evidence.” Id. The district court’s determination

that Eckhart and Cardenas failed to establish their minor or minimal participation

was not clearly erroneous.
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AFFIRMED.