UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

ROLLIN E. DIBBLE, et al., 

 

 Plaintiffs, Civil Case No. 

 09-CV-13314 

vs. 

 HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

SECURITY CORPORATION, 

 Defendant. 

__________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

I. Introduction 

 Plaintiff Rollin Dibble filed this age discrimination suit against his former employer, 

Defendant Security Corporation, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 

U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), Mich. 

Comp. Laws § 37.2101 et seq. Before the Court is Security Corporation’s motion for summary 

judgment. Because Dibble presents evidence from which a fact finder could conclude that 

Security Corporation’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Dibble was 

pretextual, the motion is denied. 

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II. Factual and Procedural Background 

 Dibble was employed by Security Corporation from February 15, 1999 until his 

termination on or about March 30, 2007.1

 At the time of his termination Dibble was 64 years 

old, and worked as a service technician with Security Corporation. 

 Security Corporation provides security equipment and service for burglary and fire 

alarms, network video cameras, network access control systems, and 24/7 monitoring and 

service. D.E. 36 at 1 (summary judgment motion). The company also has bank clients for which 

it provides security equipment and service related to vaults, teller drawers, and remote drive-up 

teller systems. Id. Security Corporation’s various departments report to Greg Fry, the operations 

manager. Id. at 2. Dibble worked in the service department; while he was employed with 

Security Corporation, either Lee Womer or Mark Barnby was the service manager. Id.

 Security Corporation is located in Novi, Michigan, and services customers in Michigan, 

Northern Ohio, and Northern Indiana. Id. at 1. Security Corporation’s service technicians 

provide service to customers from an equipped company van which they use to service their 

assigned territory and to commute to and from home. Id. at 2. In Security Corporation’s 

“Metro” area (i.e., Southeastern Michigan extending northwest to Lansing), the high density of 

customers means that the service territories are generally small; in West Michigan, where Dibble 

worked, lower customer density means that territories are larger. Id. With regard to the larger 

territories, Security Corporation intentionally hires service technicians (like Dibble) who live in 

the territory area in order to minimize unproductive drive time for the technician and to reach 

customers quickly. Id. 

                                                           

1 Original plaintiffs Phillip Latona and Michael Magyar are no longer parties to this case. See

docket entry (D.E.) 74 & 75 (stipulated orders of dismissal with prejudice as to Plaintiffs Latona 

and Magyar). Dibble is the only remaining plaintiff. 

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 According to Security Corporation, the company delivers its products and services in one 

of two “formats”: “service contracts” or “time and materials.” Id. Under a service contract, a 

customer pays a fixed price per period to get all necessary service, including preventative 

maintenance. Under time and materials, customers order services or items as they are needed 

and the company charges the customer for its time and necessary materials. Id. The service 

contracts are more desirable because they generate predictable work and revenue. Id. at 3. 

 The parties give differing accounts of Dibble’s work history while at Security 

Corporation. Security Corporation characterizes Dibble as often uncooperative, resisting 

performing service calls for other departments (such as installation and special projects).2

 Also 

according to Security Corporation, Dibble often upset customers.3 In contrast, Dibble cites the 

last (March 2006) employee review he received in which service manager Lee Womer concluded 

that he met or exceeded standards in all categories -- including the one pertaining to 

communicating with customers -- and praised his productivity and teamwork.4 The review 

                                                           

2 In support, Security Corporation cites the affidavits of the installation manager and another 

employee in installation, stating that when asked to do a simple installation job typically done by 

an installer rather than a service technician, Dibble would strongly resist and complain about 

helping, unlike the other service technicians working in his area. See D.E. 36-7 & 36-8. 

3 In support, Security Corporation cites (i) a 2004 employee review of Dibble which stated that 

Dibble “requires improvement” in the category of “planning and organizing”: “Ron has a good 

handle on his organization but does tend to upset customers with parts issues. Do not make 

promises we can[’]t keep” and (ii) a 2005 written warning Dibble received after a customer 

complained when Dibble used inappropriate language after finding he was missing some 

necessary screws. See D.E. 36-9 & 36-10. 

4 The 2006 employee review stated in part: 

Ron is a strong team player and ideal technician; he travels to other territories on 

a regular basis to help out technicians that need it and at the same time keeps his 

own territory well under control. 

. . . 

Ron communicates well with dispatch and does close calls in real time. Ron did 

receive a single customer complaint in August 2005 regarding his use of 

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recommended that Dibble’s “commitment to our department and to our customer’s needs should 

be rewarded with a promotion to Senior Service Technician.” D.E. 42-12. 

 In November 2006 Huntington Bank terminated its bank equipment services contract 

with Security Corporation for its West Michigan region, effective January 1, 2007. D.E. 36-28. 

This meant that Security Corporation lost the contract work related to the banking equipment, 

though it did not lose the contract work related to non-banking equipment (such as video 

surveillance cameras, fire alarms, burglar alarms). Still, the banking equipment service work 

was more than half of the service work at each Huntington branch. D.E. 36 at 12. Service 

manager Mark Barnby estimated that $200,000 in revenue was lost as a result. D.E. 36-5 at 83 

(Barnby deposition). 

 According to Security Corporation, in the last several years before his termination, 

Dibble admitted that he did not have enough service work to do in his territory and that he had to 

look for work to keep busy. He frequently asked central station manager Jenifer Jason, who 

managed the company’s service dispatch, to assign him service calls in the neighboring 

territories of fellow West Michigan technicians Greg Garska and Duane Hoops. D.E. 36-3 at 2 

(Jason affidavit). While Security Corporation acknowledges that the Huntington Bank work was 

also lost in the territories serviced by Garska and Hoops, it contends that Garska and Hoops “had 

more than enough work to do in their territories,” while Dibble had already been struggling to 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

language, which resulted in a written warning. There have been no further 

incidents since. 

. . . 

Ron continues to be as productive as possible and wastes very little time. Ron is 

still the most productive technician in the region and always gives his customer[s] 

110%. 

. . . 

Keep up the good work Ron! 

D.E. 42-12. 

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find enough work to keep busy. D.E. 36 at 12. Accordingly, service manager Mark Barnby and 

operations manager Greg Fry made the business decision to terminate Dibble and assign the bulk 

of his territory to Greg Garska and the remaining portion to Duane Hoops. Id. at 12. In addition, 

Security Corporation maintains that Greg Garska had better training, knowledge, and capability 

regarding access panels, a relevant skill in the territories at issue, and that both central station 

manager Jenifer Jason, and employees in the installation department had more problems and 

dissatisfaction with Dibble than with Garska or Hoops. Id. at 13. 

 Dibble takes issue with several aspects of Security Corporation’s account. Dibble 

stresses that the company did not lose Huntington Bank as a customer, and maintains that “the 

billing arrangement changed, not the work performed or the revenues generated.” D.E. 42 at 9 

(Plaintiff’s response). Dibble cites a sampling of invoices for service work he performed for 

Huntington after January 2007. See D.E. 42-34. Dibble also points out that the company’s 

service department revenue in June 2007 (after Huntington terminated the contract) was higher 

than it was in June 2006 (before Huntington terminated). See D.E. 42-36 (income statements). 

 Further, Dibble disputes that he lacked work and argues that Greg Garska was the one 

struggling to keep busy. D.E. 42 at 10. Dibble cites Garska’s August 2006 employee report, 

which noted that Garska averaged 2.69 calls per day (in contrast to Dibble’s 4.12) and stated that 

“Greg’s only problem is that his territory is not busy enough to keep him busy.” D.E. 42-39; 42-

12. With regard to Garska’s superior training, Dibble argues that he had asked to obtain the 

access panel training that Garska received, but that Security Corporation did not provide him 

with the training. D.E. 42-10 at 49-53 (Dibble deposition).5

 

                                                           

5

 Specifically, Dibble contends that Security Corporation (i) gave part of his territory to Garska, 

(ii) assigned Garska a major new account, Mona Schools, which was in Dibble’s territory, and 

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 On or about March 30, 2007, Barnby met with Dibble and informed him that he was 

terminated “due to the loss of the Huntington service in Western Michigan.” D.E. 36-29 (payroll 

change notice). 

At some point thereafter Dibble filed a complaint with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In October 2007 Security Corporation sent a letter to Dibble 

“recalling” him and offering him a position in the Detroit Metropolitan area. D.E. 42-58 

(reinstatement offer). Dibble did not respond.6 On July 18, 2008, the EEOC issued a 

determination that there was reasonable cause to believe a violation had occurred. See D.E. 42-8 

(EEOC letter citing violations of, inter alia, the ADEA). The EEOC apparently issued a right-tosue notice in June 2009. D.E. 1 at ¶ 24 (complaint). On August 21, 2009, Dibble filed suit in 

this Court, alleging age discrimination under the ADEA and the ELCRA. The parties engaged in 

discovery, and on June 30, 2010, Security Corporation filed the instant motion for summary 

judgment. This Court held a hearing on December 21, 2010. 

III. Discussion 

A. Summary Judgment Standard 

A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a). When evaluating a summary judgment motion, 

credibility judgments and weighing of the evidence are prohibited. Rather, the 

evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

(iii) gave Garska, and not Dibble, the access panel training necessary to service the school’s 

equipment. See D.E. 42 at 10-11; 42-10 at 51-59. 

6

 The letter stated that failure to respond by October 26, 2007 “will be considered a voluntary 

resignation.” D.E. 42-58. Although the letter was dated October 10, 2007, it was postmarked on 

October 23, 2007, and Dibble states that he received it on October 25th. See id.; D.E. 42-59 

(postmark). 

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 

202 (1986). Thus, the facts and any inferences that can be drawn from those facts 

[ ] must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 

1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). 

Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365, 373 (6th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). 

B. ADEA 

 Under the ADEA, it is “unlawful for an employer . . . [to] discriminate against any 

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 

because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Similarly, Michigan’s ELCRA 

prohibits “discriminat[ing] against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a 

term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of . . . age . . .” Mich. Comp. Laws § 

37.2202(a). Because “ELCRA claims are analyzed under the same standards as federal ADEA 

claims,” the Court’s analysis of Dibble’s ADEA claim also applies to his ELCRA claim. Geiger 

v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614, 620, 626 (6th Cir. 2009) 

 A plaintiff may establish a violation of the ADEA by either direct or indirect (also called 

circumstantial) evidence. Blair v. Henry Filters, Inc., 505 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir. 2007), 

abrogated on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). “Direct 

evidence of discrimination is that evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that 

unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.” Wexler v. 

White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is proof that does not on its face 

establish discriminatory animus, but does allow a factfinder to draw a reasonable inference that 

discrimination occurred.” Id. Regardless of the type of evidence a plaintiff uses to support his 

claim, “the burden of persuasion remains on ADEA plaintiffs to demonstrate ‘that age was the 

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“but-for” cause of their employer’s adverse action.’” Geiger, 579 F.3d at 620 (quoting Gross, 

129 S. Ct. at 2351 n.4). 

 Here, Dibble does not offer any direct evidence of discrimination. Thus, in the Sixth 

Circuit, courts apply the evidentiary framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). Schoonmaker v. Spartan Graphics Leasing, LLC, 595 F.3d 261, 

264 n.2 (6th Cir. 2010). Under this framework, 

the plaintiff must first submit evidence from which a reasonable jury could 

conclude that he or she established a prima facie case of discrimination. The 

defendant must then offer admissible evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason for its action. If the defendant does so, the plaintiff must identify evidence 

from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the proffered reason is actually 

a pretext for unlawful discrimination. 

Blair, 505 F.3d at 524 (internal citations omitted). “Although the burdens of production shift, 

[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated 

against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

1. Prima Facie Case 

 In order to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination, a terminated plaintiff 

normally must show that: (i) he was a member of a protected age class (i.e., at least forty years 

old), (ii) he suffered an adverse employment decision, (iii) he was qualified for the job, and (iv) 

the employer gave the job to a younger employee. Blair, 505 F.3d at 529. With regard to 

reduction-in-force cases, because a plaintiff has not been replaced by another employee, “the 

fourth prong is modified” to require a plaintiff to provide “additional direct, circumstantial, or 

statistical evidence tending to indicate that the employer singled out the plaintiff for discharge 

for impermissible reasons.” Id. (quoting Erceovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 

344, 350 (6th Cir. 1998)). One example of when this reduction-in-force fourth prong is satisfied 

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is when the plaintiff “demonstrates that a comparable non-protected person was treated better.” 

Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 350.7

 However, there are various ways by which a plaintiff may 

establish a prima facie case. See Blair, 505 F.3d at 529. “The key question is always whether, 

under the particular facts and context of the case at hand, the plaintiff has presented sufficient 

evidence to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that he or she suffered an adverse employment 

action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Id. Finally, 

the burden of establishing a prima facie case at this stage is not onerous; “[g]enerally, at the 

summary judgment stage, a plaintiff’s burden is merely to present evidence from which a 

reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action ‘under 

circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.’” Id. at 528 (citing 

Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). 

 Security Corporation concedes the first three prongs of the prima facie case. D.E. 36 at 

19. Thus, the Court will focus on the fourth prong. 

Dibble first maintains that this is not a reduction-in-force case because he was replaced. 

See, e.g., Barnes v. GenCorp., Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir. 1990) (“An employee is not 

eliminated as part of a work force reduction when he or she is replaced after his or her 

discharge.”). Dibble presumably wishes this Court to apply the traditional termination fourth 

prong, that the employer gave the job to a younger employee. The Court rejects this argument 

for two reasons. First, Dibble’s work was redistributed among other existing West Michigan 

employees who were performing related work. The Sixth Circuit has specifically instructed that 

“a person is not replaced when another employee is assigned to perform the plaintiff’s duties in 

                                                           

7

 By this, the Ercegovich court means that a plaintiff must establish “(1) that he was a member of 

a protected class and (2) that for the same or similar conduct he was treated differently than 

similarly-situated non-minority employees.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582-83 

(6th Cir. 1992).

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addition to other duties, or when the work is redistributed among other existing employees 

already performing related work.” Id. 

Second, the individuals that Dibble cites as his replacements did not actually replace him. 

Dibble lists three individuals as alleged replacements: (i) 37-year-old Lee Womer, who was 

demoted to service technician from service manager, (ii) 29-year-old Seth Leising, and (iii) 44-

year-old Douglas Black. D.E. 42 at 14. Of the three individuals, two (Womer and Leising) 

worked in a completely different area than Dibble. Dibble worked in Security Corporation’s 

West Michigan area. Womer worked in the Metro Detroit area, and Leising worked in Ohio. 

Dibble makes no claim that either Womer or Leising serviced his territory. The third individual, 

Black, may have worked in the West Michigan area.8 However, Black was not a new addition: 

at the time Dibble was terminated on March 30, 2007, Black was working as a service technician 

in the West Michigan area. It was only after Dibble had already left the company that Black 

resigned (April 2007) and then was rehired (June 2007). See D.E. 42-48; 42-49. 

Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact whether Security Corporation 

replaced Dibble. Thus, Dibble cannot make out a prima facie case by arguing that the company 

gave his job to a younger employee. 

However, Dibble successfully makes out a prima facie case by showing that comparable 

non-protected employees were treated better. Dibble cites numerous reasons in support. The 

most compelling are, first, that Security Corporation offered key training to “younger 

technicians,” but refused to provide the same training to Dibble and, second, that Security 

Corporation altered territory lines to favor younger workers. In particular, Dibble cites (i) 

                                                           

8

 Black’s territory is listed as “Battle Creek” rather than “West” on the Security Corporation’s 

service technician list. See D.E. 36-34. But the company’s territory map appears to show Battle 

Creek as a West Michigan territory. See D.E. 36-2. 

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Security Corporation’s giving part of what had been his territory to 36-year-old Greg Garska, (ii) 

its giving Garska the Mona Schools account, despite the fact that it was in Dibble’s territory, and 

(iii) its giving Garska, and not Dibble, access card training, despite the fact that Dibble had asked 

for it. See D.E. 42 at 15-16; 42-10 at 51-59. Security Corporation does not deny Dibble’s 

contentions about his territory, Mona Schools, and training. Nor does it otherwise address these 

issues in its reply brief. Therefore, the Court concludes that a reasonable fact finder could 

conclude that Security Corporation treated a comparable non-protected person better. Dibble has 

satisfied the fourth prong and made out a prima facie case of age discrimination.9 

2. Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason 

 Security Corporation responds that it terminated Dibble for the legitimate 

nondiscriminatory reason that the loss of contract revenue from Huntington Bank meant that it 

would have to reduce the number of West Michigan service technicians. Further, Security 

Corporation contends that Dibble specifically was selected for termination because of the low 

workload in his territory, the fact that his territory was directly adjacent to that of Duane Hoops 

and (the better trained) Greg Garska and could be “absorbed” by theirs, and Dibble’s overall 

performance and abilities. See D.E. 36 at 23; D.E. 45-6 (Barnby letter to EEOC). Security 

Corporation has met its burden to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Dibble’s 

termination. 

                                                           

9 Dibble also argues that statistical evidence suggests that Security Corporation terminated the 

Plaintiffs because of their age. See D.E. 42 at 17-19. Dibble submits an expert report which 

states that “there is strong statistical evidence that older workers were terminated at a higher rate 

than younger workers were.” D.E. 42-57; 42-56. Because Dibble offers the statistical 

information in order to meet the fourth prong of his prima facie case, and he presents sufficient 

other evidence to establish a prima facie case, the Court will not consider the statistical evidence 

for the purpose of making a determination on the instant summary judgment motion. 

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3. Pretext 

Since Defendant Security Corporation has articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory 

reason, the issue that remains is pretext. In order to show pretext, a plaintiff must demonstrate 

that the defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason (i) has no basis in fact, (ii) did not 

actually motivate the defendant’s challenged conduct, or (iii) was insufficient to warrant the 

challenged conduct. Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 576 (6th Cir. 2003) 

(en banc). Dibble offers several reasons why Security Corporation’s rationale is pretextual, with 

some challenging the general reduction-in-force rationale, and others challenging the company’s 

reasons for selecting Dibble in particular for termination. 

a. Pretext: Reduction in Force 

 With regard to the reduction in force, Dibble first argues that there was no loss in revenue 

from the loss of the Huntington Bank contract. D.E. 42 at 20. The Court rejects this as a basis 

for pretext. The invoices showing Dibble performing work for Huntington after the termination 

of Huntington’s contract do not establish that there was no loss in revenue, as Dibble does not 

establish how those figures compare to revenues from Huntington before it terminated its 

contract. Further, the June 2006 and June 2007 “snapshots” showing the company’s service 

department revenue are of limited value. They do not separate the West Michigan revenue from 

the revenue of the entire service department. And they merely show a single month as a 

comparison point. This evidence, even if believed by a fact finder, does not establish that 

Security Corporation did not experience a loss in revenue.10 

                                                           

10 There is conflicting information about the amount of that loss. In his deposition, Fry estimated 

that the loss was $350,000. Barnby estimated a more modest $200,000. Regardless of the 

precise amount of actual loss, Dibble’s proffered evidence does not rebut the assertion that 

revenue was lost. 

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 Second, Dibble argues that Security Corporation’s offer of reinstatement is inconsistent 

with a reduction in force. D.E. 42 at 22-23. This is potentially a powerful argument: If Security 

Corporation was truly forced to reduce its number of West Michigan service technicians because 

of a loss of business, why was it suddenly able a few months later to offer Dibble a position 

again? This argument is flawed, however. Dibble’s reinstatement offer was for a position 

outside of the West Michigan area, in the Detroit Metro area. In addition, as Dibble himself 

argues, the offer did not seem legitimate: (i) it was sent so that it arrived almost beyond the 

deadline to respond, (ii) Barnby admitted that, despite the letter, he did not have any actual job 

openings, and (iii) Barnby stated in deposition that he made the offer “to make this EEOC thing 

go away.” D.E. 42-6 at 163. Thus, the letters do not undercut the reduction-in-force rationale. 

Third, Dibble argues that Security Corporation’s claim that it was economically 

necessary to reduce the number of West Michigan service technicians is rebutted by the fact that 

the company spent “lavishly” on a $100,000 conference room renovation, and bartered with one 

customer for the use of a luxury suite instead of accepting payments worth $160,000. D.E. 42 at 

21. In response, Security Corporation argues that the reduction in force was due to “business 

considerations” as distinguished from “economic necessity,” and that therefore it need not 

defend against economic necessity arguments. See D.E. 36 at 24 (citing Grzybowski v. 

DaimlerChrysler Servs., No. 05-71286, 2006 WL 1374050, at *4 (E.D. Mich. May 17, 2006) 

(reduction in force need not be driven by economic necessity; it can be driven by business 

considerations). This Court need not resolve the question of economic necessity versus business 

consideration. On this record, a reasonable fact finder could not conclude that the expenditures 

cited by Dibble are evidence of pretext. Because Dibble presents no evidence describing when 

the conference room was renovated, he fails to establish that there was lavish spending around 

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the time of his termination. Further, the minimal documentation apparently showing the contract 

for the luxury suite does not establish that Security Corporation chose the option of a luxury suite 

rather than accepting $160,000 in payments. D.E. 42-53. Also, because the evidence does not 

establish when the luxury suite deal was negotiated, Dibble does not show that there was a 

frivolous financial decision around the time of his termination. Accordingly, the Court rejects 

this argument. 

 Dibble’s fourth argument, however, does raise a question of fact as to pretext relating to 

the reduction-in-force. Dibble argues that Security Corporation lacked a plan for carrying out its 

reduction in force. See Blair, 505 F.3d at 533 (“a lack of evidence regarding a company’s 

objective plan to carry out a reduction in force” is a “factor[ ] that might indicate that an alleged 

reduction in force is pretextual.”) (citation omitted); see also Godfredson v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 

173 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 1999) (factors that might indicate that an alleged reduction in force is 

pretextual include “general business improvement, a lack of evidence regarding a company’s 

objective plan to carry out a reduction in force, and a situation in which only one or two 

management employees are aware of the reduction plan.”). Security Corporation argues that “a 

formal, written plan or process” was not necessary to execute a reduction in force because Fry 

and Barnby knew all the service technicians and the relevant factors. D.E. 45 at 1. This may be 

so. However, Fry and Barnby appear to be the only two management employees involved in the 

reduction decision. And, both Barnby and Fry describe a decisionmaking process that was 

undocumented. See D.E. 42-9 at 98-102 (Fry deposition); D.E. 36-5 at 170-71 (Barnby 

deposition).11 Thus, the record reflects a lack of objective evidence of any plan related to the 

                                                           

11Barnby described the process in his deposition: 

Q: Do you have anything in writing explaining the criteria you used? 

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reduction in force, and a limited number of people who knew about the reduction in force. These 

are appropriate factors for a fact finder to consider and create a genuine issue of material fact 

regarding pretext. 

b. Pretext: Selecting Dibble for Termination

In addition to Dibble’s arguments that the general reduction-in-force rationale was 

pretextual, Dibble argues that the company’s reasons for selecting him in particular for 

termination are pretextual. 

First, Dibble argues that Security Corporation’s rationale that the loss of Huntington 

Bank created a lack of work is pretext. In support, Dibble cites the hiring of five individuals in 

the few months directly after Dibble was terminated. D.E. 42 at 21. The Court rejects this 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

A: No. 

Q: And do you have any type of an analysis that was done that would indicate 

how you arrived at your decisions? 

A: Nothing really on paper specifically. A lot of it is just knowing the basic 

call volume of what comes in every day and knowing that Ron was always 

looking for something to do because he didn’t have the calls coming in on 

a regular basis. He was looking into other areas to help out the other guys 

just to keep busy. 

Q: But you said you looked at call volumes, you looked at all these things, 

whatever you looked at. Do you have any type of a document you can 

show us that indicates the things that you looked at [and how you arrived 

at your decisions]? 

. . . 

A: No. I mean we’ve been doing this long enough, a lot of it is gut instinct. 

. . . 

Q: Okay. Any communications between you and Mr. Fry discussing who 

was going to be let go? 

A: Most of that was done in his office, not in writing. 

Q: Anything – any emails even? 

A: No. 

Q: So really, sitting here today, we have no way of tracing the decisionmaking process, other than accepting your testimony and Mr. Fry’s 

testimony on this, right? 

A: I guess that’s what I’m saying. 

D.E. 36-5 at 170-71. 

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argument. Of the new hires Dibble cites, all but one were either out of Dibble’s area, or for a 

position other than service technician. The remaining individual, Doug Black, was (as explained 

above) not a new hire. Accordingly, these hires do not rebut the assertion that there was a lack 

of work for West Michigan service technicians. Dibble also cites in support the fact that Service 

Corporation’s labor costs “barely dropped,” from $133,717 in June 2006 (before Dibble and the 

other two original plaintiffs were fired) to $130,006 in June 2007 (after their termination). D.E. 

42 at 10, 22; 42-36. Setting aside the fact that the labor costs Dibble cites actually show a $3700 

decrease in cost, these figures are of little use in determining whether there was a lack of work in 

West Michigan. The figures appear to be company-wide. In addition, the relationship between 

labor costs and lack of work is unclear. 

Dibble’s remaining arguments are substantially better, however. Dibble’s second 

argument is that the purported issues with his job performance are pretext. This point is 

convincing. To the extent Dibble’s performance might have been unsatisfactory because of the 

2005 incident for which he received a written warning, the company’s own subsequent 

evaluation of his skills in this area indicated that he met the company’s standards and did not 

seem to regard the prior complaint as indicative of a performance problem. See D.E. 42-12 

(March 2006 employee review stating, “Ron communicates well with dispatch and does close 

calls in real time. Ron did receive a single customer complaint in August 2005 regarding his use 

of language, which resulted in a written warning. There have been no further incidents since.”). 

To the extent that Dibble’s performance might have been unsatisfactory because of his purported 

resistance to performing service calls for other Security Corporation departments, the company’s 

own review again tells a different story, indicating that Dibble “exceeds standards” in the 

category of “Team Working Skills,” and stating that “Ron is a strong team player and ideal 

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technician; he travels to other territories on a regular basis to help out technicians that need it and 

at the same time keeps his own territory well under control.” Id. The employee review does not 

mention the resistance that the company now cites. A reasonable fact finder could conclude 

from this evidence that at least part of Security Corporation’s explanation for choosing to 

terminate Dibble has no basis in fact. 

 Third, Dibble argues that Security Corporation changed its rationale for terminating him, 

providing evidence that the reason given was pretext. “An employer’s changing rationale for 

making an adverse employment decision can be evidence of pretext.” Asmo v. Keane, Inc., 471 

F.3d 588, 596 (6th Cir. 2006). Although Security Corporation denies that its explanation has 

shifted, a reasonable fact finder could disagree. When Dibble was terminated he was informed 

that it was “due to the loss of the Huntington service in Western Michigan.” D.E. 36-29 (payroll 

change notice). Similarly, Fry testified at his deposition that Dibble was terminated because his 

territory lost the most Huntington-related business and not for performance reasons. D.E. 36-4 at 

47.12 However, Barnby stated to the EEOC that in addition to the loss of the Huntington 

business, Security Corporation considered Dibble’s “past performance, geographic location, as 

well as overall abilities.” D.E. 42-38. And before this Court, Security Corporation argues that 

(in addition to the loss of the Huntington business) it terminated Dibble based on “customer 

need, performance and skill set.” D.E. 45 at 5. The company also specifically argues that 

Garska was better trained than Dibble and that Dibble had caused “problems and dissatisfaction” 

for the Installation Department and Central Station Manager Jenifer Jason. D.E. 36 at 13. 

Security Corporation’s evolving explanations could be understood to be raising the issue of 

                                                           

12 See id. (“Again, with Mr. Dibble it was strictly territory, who is losing the most, who can be – 

remain productive in that area. That was that. It had no bearing on performance. Mr. Dibble 

did, you know, good work, but . . . it was just – unfortunately, it was strictly a financial decision, 

nothing more.”) 

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performance for the first time after Dibble had already been terminated. A fact finder could 

conclude that this is evidence of pretext. 

 In addition to the pretext arguments raised by Dibble, the Court considers the unrebutted 

evidence referenced in the prima facie case analysis that Security Corporation (i) gave part of 

Dibble’s territory to Garska, (ii) gave Garska the Mona Schools account, despite the fact that it 

was in Dibble’s territory, and (iii) gave Garska, and not Dibble, access card training, despite the 

fact that Dibble had asked for it. See Blair, 505 F.3d at 533 (a court may consider evidence a 

plaintiff presented in support of his prima facie case as evidence for pretext purposes). A fact 

finder could conclude that this evidence rebuts two of the legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons 

Security Corporation gave for selecting Dibble for termination. The company cited the low 

workload in Dibble’s territory, and argued that, in contrast, Garska and Hoops had more than 

enough work. However, because there is evidence that Security Corporation gave some of 

Dibble’s territory to Garska, a fact finder could conclude that the disparity in workload was due 

at least in part to the company’s own actions. In addition, another reason Security Corporation 

gave for selecting Dibble was that Garska was better trained. However, because there is 

evidence that Dibble sought the better training that Garska had received from Security 

Corporation -- and was refused -- a fact finder could conclude that the company itself was 

responsible for the disparity in training. 

Accordingly, Dibble has presented several points sufficient to show a genuine issue of 

material fact as to pretext. 

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IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons Dibble has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine 

issue of material fact with regard to his ADEA and ELCRA claims. Defendant Security 

Corporation’s motion for summary judgment (D.E. 36) is DENIED. 

 SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 5, 2011 s/Mark A. Goldsmith 

MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

United States District Judge 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record 

and any unrepresented parties via the Court=s ECF System to their respective email or First Class 

U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on January 5, 2011. 

s/Deborah J. Goltz 

DEBORAH J. GOLTZ 

Case Manager 

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