UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MUNN S JO,

Plaintiff,

v.

TRIPLE C. TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.,

d/b/a ADVANCED MOVING & STORAGE,

LLC AND JOHN P. CURRENT

Defendants.

 /

Case No. 09-12276

Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RECUSE [22] 

Plaintiff, apparently displeased with this Court’s denial of its motion for reconsideration

of an earlier order, has filed a motion seeking to recuse the assigned Judge from this

case[22]. The Court finds that the decision process would not be significantly aided by oral

argument. Therefore, pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule LR 7.1(e)(2),

Plaintiff’s motion will be decided on the briefs and without oral argument. For the reasons

stated below, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

I. Analysis

Although Plaintiff cites no legal authority, this Court will construe his motion for recusal

as one brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455. Motions for recusal are committed to

the sound discretion of the district court deciding the motion. See Youn v. Track, Inc., 324

F.3d 409, 422 (6th Cir. 2003). Further, it is proper for the challenged judge to rule on the

motion for recusal. See United States v. Hatchett, No. 92-1065, 1992 WL 296865, **2-3

(6th Cir. Oct. 15, 1992). See also Easley v. Univ. of Michigan Bd. of Regents, 853 F.2d

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1351, 1355-56 (6th Cir. 1988). Sections 144 and 455 are construed in pari materia. Youn,

324 F.3d at 423. 

As to Plaintiff’s claims of actual personal bias and prejudice, it is well-established that

such bias must be extrajudicial. United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 405 (6th Cir.

2005) (addressing a motion to recuse brought pursuant to § 455(b)(1)). “‘Personal’ bias

is prejudice that emanates from some source other than participation in the proceedings

or prior contact with related cases.” Youn, 324 F.3d at 423. “Extrajudicial conduct

encompasses only personal bias as distinguished from a judicial one, arising out of the

judge’s background and association and not from the judge’s view of the law.” Id. (internal

quote and citation omitted). 

As the Supreme Court explained in Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994),

knowledge gained and opinions formed by a judge during court proceedings cannot support

a claim of recusal for improper bias or prejudice:

 The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of the evidence,

be exceedingly ill disposed toward the defendant, who has been shown to be

a thoroughly reprehensible person. But the judge is not thereby recusable

for bias or prejudice, since his knowledge and the opinion it produced were

properly or necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings, and are

indeed sometimes (as in a bench trial) necessary to completion of the judge’s

task. As Judge Jerome Frank pithily put it: “Impartiality is not gullibility.

Disinterestedness does not mean child-like innocence. If the judge did not

form judgments of the actors in those court-house dramas called trials, he

could never render decisions.” In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654

(2d Cir. 1943). Also not subject to deprecatory characterization as “bias” or

“prejudice” are opinions held by judges as a result of what they learned in

earlier proceedings. It has long been regarded as normal and proper for a

judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, and to sit in successive trials

involving the same defendant.

Id. at 550-51. Thus, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias

or partiality motion.” Id. at 555. This is because, when viewed alone, “they cannot possibly

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show reliance upon an extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest circumstances

evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required . . . when no extrajudicial source

is involved.” Id. Rather, the challenged judicial rulings “are proper grounds for appeal, not

for recusal.” Id.

The Court further clarified that “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts

introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior

proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a

deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Id.

Despite Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, there is no reasonable factual basis for

concluding that it was impossible for the Court to make a fair judgment with regard to

Plaintiff’s claims. To show improper bias or partiality, Plaintiff must show that the

challenged judicial conduct “reveal[s] an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source.

. . .” Id. Similar to the plaintiff in Jamieson, Plaintiff here makes no allegation that the

Court’s rulings were based on any extrajudicial activities or derived from an extrajudicial

source. Jamieson, 427 F.3d at 405. 

For all the reasons stated above, recusal is similarly not required under 28 U.S.C. §

445(a). See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 553 (holding that the “‘extrajudicial source’ limitation”

governs “for purposes of § 455(a) as well.”). Accord, Youn, 324 F.3d at 423. Applying the

principles set forth in Liteky, this Court concludes that Plaintiff has not alleged facts

reasonably calling into question its impartiality. As in Liteky, Plaintiff’s grounds for recusal

consist of judicial rulings and routine case administration, all occurring during the course

of judicial proceedings. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556. Plaintiff has not shown that the Court

relied on knowledge acquired outside these court proceedings or displayed the sort of

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deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would establish that it was impossible for

the Court to render a fair judgment. Id. 

II. Conclusion

For the above-stated reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for recusal is DENIED.

s/Nancy G. Edmunds 

Nancy G. Edmunds

United States District Judge

Dated: January 26, 2010

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record

on January 26, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Carol A. Hemeyer 

Case Manager

 

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