J-S19004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

DELAINE ANDREWS 

Appellant

v.

BERNICE AND TIMOTHY BARNES

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1046 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered June 27, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Civil Division at No(s): 

2019 CV 8624-DJ

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 08, 2023

Appellant, Delaine Andrews, appeals pro se from the trial court’s June 

27, 2022 order that, inter alia, found that she did not qualify for in forma 

pauperis (“IFP”) status, and dismissed her appeal from an arbitration award. 

We affirm.

The trial court provided the following summary of this matter:

The instant case arises from a landlord[/]tenant dispute initially 

filed before the Honorable Magisterial District Judge Paul T. Zozos, 

MDJ 12-2-05. At Docket No. MJ-12205-CV-0000061-2019[,] Ms. 

Andrews named [Appellees, Bernice and Timothy Barnes,] as 

defendants.[1] At Docket No. MJ-12205-CV-0000083-2019, 

[Appellees] named Ms. Andrews as a defendant. After hearing the 

cases together, Judge Zozos entered judgment in favor of 

[Appellees] and against Ms. Andrews in the amount of 

$4,150.00[.]

Ms. Andrews appealed the magisterial district judgment to the trial 

court. Ms. Andrews filed a Complaint[,] which alleged Breach of 

Contract, Sewer and Trash Rents, Tenant Damages and 

____________________________________________

1 By way of background, Ms. Andrews was Appellees’ landlord. 
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Recoverable Litigation Costs Pursuant to the Terms of the Lease. 

(Delaine Andrews v. Timothy Barnes and Bernice Barnes, 

Docket No. 2019 CV 8624). She did not seek [IFP] status in 

connection with [her] appeal from the magisterial district 

judgment. 

[Appellees] filed a Complaint against Ms. Andrews asserting 

Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability, Breach of Lease, 

Violation of the Landlord Tenant Act, and Violation of the 

Consumer Protection Law.... (Bernice Barnes and Timothy 

Barnes v. Delaine Andrews, Docket No. 2019 CV 8628 DJ).

The parties engaged in a complex series of cross-preliminary 

objections.1

1 We refrain from reciting the history of the preliminary 

objections because they are not controlling to the issue sub 

judice. 

On January 19, 2021, [Appellees] filed Motions to Consolidate 

Dockets at Docket No. 2019 CV 8624 and 2019 CV 8628. Ms. 

Andrews filed no opposition at either docket. Accordingly, on May 

3, 2021, we ordered that the captions be consolidated at Docket 

No. 2019 CV 8624 and that no further filings be docketed to 

Docket No. 2019 CV 8628 DJ.

The cases proceeded to arbitration. By Report and Award of 

Arbitrators dated September 8, 2021, filed September 10, 2021, 

the arbitration panel found in favor of Ms. Andrew[s] in the 

amount of $1,117.92[,] and in favor of [Appellees] in the amount 

of $2,525.00, which constituted a new award to [Appellees] of 

$1,407.08.

On September 30, 2021, Ms. Andrews filed a Petition to Proceed 

[IFP], which she verified, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 (Crime of 

Unsworn Falsification to Authorities). In the attached affidavit in 

support of her petition, Ms. Andrews stated that she was, because 

of her financial condition, unable to pay the fees and costs 

associated with this case and was unable to obtain funds from 

anyone, including family and friends. The Affidavit further 

represented that she was, at the time, unemployed and owned 

real estate valued at $40,000. Based upon ... Ms. Andrews[’s]

verified statements, the court granted Ms. Andrews [IFP] status 

by Order filed September 30, 2021. On the same date, Ms. 

Andrews filed a Notice of Appeal from [the] Award of Board of 

Arbitrators which stated that application had been made to 
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proceed IFP. (Notice of Appeal from Board of Arbitrators, Docket 

No. 2019 CV 8624-DJ, September 30, 2021).[2]

On November 22, 2021, [Appellees] filed a Motion to Strike Appeal

in which they asserted that[,] although Ms. Andrews stated in her 

Petition to Proceed [IFP] that she owned real estate valued at 

$40,000, public records reflect that she owns seven properties 

with a total value in excess of $40,000.[3, 4] [Appellees] asserted 

that Ms. Andrews falsely reported the value of the real estate and 

that without IFP status, she would have been required to pay $400 

to appeal the Report and Award of Arbitrators as arbitrators’ 

compensation. [Appellees] asserted that Ms. Andrews’[s] appeal 

was therefore invalid and should be stricken. 

On December 9, 2021, Ms. Andrews filed a Motion to 

Strike/Dismiss with Prejudice [Appellees’] Motion to Strike Appeal. 

On the same date, Ms. Andrews filed an Answer/Reply in 

Opposition to Strike Appeal. [She also filed a Reply/Reply Brief in 

Opposition to Motion to Strike Appeal.]

We conducted argument on February 22, 2022, on [Appellees’] 

Motion to Strike Appeal. In support of their argument, counsel for 

[Appellees] presented exhibits regarding seven properties which 

[Appellees] asserted Ms. Andrews owned at the time she filed the 

[petition for] IFP.[5] We granted [Appellees’] leave to file 

documents following the argument which would reflect the status 

of payment of property taxes on those properties. We denied Ms. 

Andrews’[s] Motion to Strike/Dismiss with Prejudice [Appellees’] 

Motion to Strike Appeal. 

On February 25, 2022, [Appellees] filed of record Property Taxes 

of Plaintiff Delaine Andrews for Dauphin County. 

____________________________________________

2 Ms. Andrews only filed this appeal at Docket No. 2019 CV 8624-DJ.

3 Of the seven properties, Appellees asserted that Ms. Andrews owned four of 

them outright. N.T., 2/22/22, at 3. 

4 The docket reflects that no activity occurred between the court’s September 

30, 2021 order granting Ms. Andrews leave to proceed IFP, and Appellees’ 

November 22, 2021 motion to strike. 

5 The trial court also permitted Ms. Andrews to submit exhibits. 
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On March 10, 2022, we ordered as follows:

The [c]ourt having reviewed the documents of [Appellees] 

and of [Ms.] Andrews submitted at oral argument held [on] 

February 22, 2022, on the respective parties’ motions, and 

the supplemental exhibits regarding [Ms.] Andrews’[s]

property taxes submitted by [Appellees], the court finds 

that inquiry into the issue of whether [Ms.] Andrews was 

entitled to proceed [IFP] requires an evidentiary hearing. 

See, e.g., Kovalev v. Step[ansky, 240 A.3d 955 (Pa. 

Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum)]. 

[Ms.] Andrews filed a Petition to Proceed [IFP] on 

September 29, 2019[,] pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 

(Crime of Unsworn Falsification to Authorities). Accordingly, 

inasmuch as [Ms.] Andrews will have the opportunity to 

present testimony under oath regarding said Petition, [Ms.] 

Andrews is hereby apprised of the right to seek 

representation related to presentation of testimony during 

such hearing, which will be held on April 29, 2022[,] at 9:15 

... a.m., in Courtroom No. 1, Fifth Floor, Dauphin County 

Courthouse. 

[Ms.] Andrews shall bear the burden of proof as to whether 

the September 29, 2019[] Petition to Proceed [IFP] was true 

and correct[,] and whether she is a party without financial 

resources to pay the costs of litigation pursuant to 

Pa.R.C[iv].P. 240(b).

We convened for the April 29, 2022[] hearing. Counsel for 

[Appellees] appeared. Ms. Andrews did not appear. [Appellees], 

by their counsel, asserted that the February 25, 2022[] filing, 

Property Taxes of Plaintiff Delaine Andrews, demonstrates that 

Ms. Andrews owns seven properties having a total value of 

$384,000. The documents further reflected that Ms. Andrews paid 

property taxes in 2021[,] which totaled $3,112.07. We issued our 

ruling in open court on [Appellees’] Motion to Strike Appeal and 

stated the reasons therefore. 

On June 27, 2022, we filed the following written [o]rder:

Upon hearings conducted February 22, 2022, and April 29, 

2022, we found the testimony of [Appellees] to be credible.

We found non-credible the testimony of [Ms.] Andrews that 

she had little income and qualified for [IFP] status. [Ms.] 
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Andrews failed to appear at the April 29, 2022[] hearing set 

for the purpose of taking additional testimony regarding 

[Ms.] Andrews’[s] evidence in support of her claim for [IFP] 

status. 

We find that she does not qualify for [IFP] status and did 

not so qualify at the time she appealed the September 8, 

2021[] arbitration award of $1,407.08 in favor of 

[Appellees]. 

The September 8, 2021[] arbitration award of $1,407.08 in 

favor of [Appellees] is AFFIRMED and [Ms.] Andrews’[s]

appeal of that award is DISMISSED.

Ms. Andrews filed the instant appeal.[6] On September 2, 2022, 

Ms. Andrews filed a Motion to Correct (Material Omissions) (sic) 

Lower Court Record[,] to which [Appellees] filed an Answer. By 

our Order of October 3, 2022, we granted in part and denied in 

part the Motion. We granted the Motion to the extent that we 

supplemented the record with documents which Ms. Andrews 

handed to the [c]ourt at the February 22, 2022[] proceeding. We 

did not rely upon those documents as they lacked evidentiary 

foundation.

Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 11/4/22, at 1-5 (some internal citations omitted; 

emphasis and capitalization in original). 

The trial court later issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion. In its opinion, it 

referenced Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 240(j)(1), which states that,

[i]f, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or 

proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a petition 

for leave to proceed [IFP], the court prior to acting upon the 

petition may dismiss the action, proceeding or appeal if the 

allegation of poverty is untrue or if it is satisfied that the action, 

proceeding or appeal is frivolous.

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6 The trial court did not order Ms. Andrews to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and she did not do 

so. 
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Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1). The trial court went on to recognize that Rule 240(j)(1) 

allows for dismissal for untrue statements before an action proceeds. TCO at 

8. Nevertheless, it stated that it did not “read Rule 240(j)(1) to preclude us 

from considering a claim of false representation raised during the pendency 

of the action.” Id. It reasoned that ignoring such claims “would be 

tantamount to knowingly allowing a case to proceed having been commenced 

based upon false statements without sanction.” Id. 

Presently, on appeal, Ms. Andrews raises eight questions for our review, 

which we set forth verbatim:

1.Error of Law as a matter of law : Did the trial court Error 

in its actions in the action detailed in theJune 27, 2022 

court Order and who’s actions and decisions were a 

misapplication of law and that were an error of law. More 

specifically it was an error of law for the trial court judge 

to “act” (to undermine) on an approved IFP (in forma 

pauperis) application after it was approved by the courts.

2.Did the trial court have authority to “act on” the 

September 30, 2022 IFP approval order after 30 days had 

lapsed after the entry of the order?.

3.Did the trial court Erred as a matter of law : Once 

Appellant Andrews petition for IFP had been approved did 

the trial court have authorization under the law to hold a 

IFP evidentiary hearing on the same identical IFP 

application and subsequently determine that Appellant was 

not entitled to IFP status when the court had approved 

Appellant IFP status at the time of filing Appellant 

Arbitration appeal 

4.Did the court Error as a matter of law regarding the “denial 

IFP” remedy provisions in 240 ( C) 1 (ii) If the Appellate Court 

finds that the trial court had authorization under the law to 

hold an IFP evidentiary hearing and subsequently 

determine that Appellant was not entitled to IFP status. then 

the trial court erred in their remedy in invalidating Andrews 
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appeal and dismissing Appellant arbitration appeal and the 

remedy was manifestly abusive and contrary to the law .

5.Did the court Error as a matter of law regarding the “denial 

IFP” remedy provisions in 240( C) 1 (ii) If the Appellate Court 

finds that the trial court had authorization under the law to 

hold an IFP evidentiary hearing and subsequently 

determine that Appellant was not entitled to IFP status. then 

the trial court erred in their remedy in invalidating Andrews 

appeal and dismissing Appellant arbitration appeal and the 

remedy was manifestly abusive and contrary to the law .

6.Did the Trial Court Erred as a matter of law in that the 

Evidence of Record does not reflect that in anyway was 

Appellant Andrews untruthful on her IFP application The 

trial court was manifestly unreasonable and abused 

discretion because the evidence that the trial court relied 

on wholly does not support that Andrews had the ability to 

pay the Arbitration filing fee in September 2021 . 

7 .Did the trial Court demonstrate bias, and ill will 

prejudicing Appellant thus violating Constitutional rights?

8.Did the trial Court Error when they failed to grant 

Appellant Andrews unopposed Motion to Strike Barnes 

Motion to Strike causing prejudice in this case?

Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 2-3.7 

First Issue

____________________________________________

7 Ms. Andrews’s brief fails to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). See Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(a) (“The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are 

questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive 

type or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point treated therein, 

followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed 

pertinent.”). Although she raises eight issues in her Statement of Questions 

Involved, she does not divide the Argument section of brief into eight 

corresponding parts. See Donaldson v. Davidson Bros., Inc., 144 A.3d 93, 

99 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2016) (determining that the appellant failed to comply with 

Rule 2119(a) where the appellant’s brief did not “present and develop eight 

arguments in support of the eight questions raised”). While we admonish Ms. 

Andrews for failing to follow Rule 2119(a), her noncompliance does not 

prevent our review. We will therefore overlook her violation of Rule 2119(a) 

and address the issues she raises in her Statement of Questions Involved. 
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In Ms. Andrews’s first issue, she argues that the trial court erred in

acting on her IFP petition after it had already been approved by another judge. 

She says “[n]either the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure or Pennsylvania 

statutory law provide authorization for the Honorable Judge Cherry (another 

trial court judge) to make a new finding on a previously granted IFP [petition] 

dated September 30, 2021 by the Honorable Judge McNally (another trial 

court judge)....” Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 7.

No relief is due. “Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and 

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). 

Problematically, Ms. Andrews does not indicate where she raised this claim 

before the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e) (“Where under the applicable 

law an issue is not reviewable on appeal unless raised or preserved below, the 

argument must set forth, in immediate connection therewith or in a footnote 

thereto, either a specific cross-reference to the page or pages of the statement 

of the case which set forth the information relating thereto as required by 

Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c), or substantially the same information.”); Commonwealth 

v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 502 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[I]t is not the 

responsibility of this Court to scour the record to prove that an appellant has 

raised an issue before the trial court, thereby preserving it for appellate 

review.”) (citations omitted). 

Further, our own review of the record does not indicate that Ms. Andrews 

raised this issue below. To review, Appellees filed a motion to strike Ms. 

Andrews’s appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 240. See 
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Motion to Strike Appeal, 11/22/21, at 1 (specifically citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(b), 

(j)(1)); id. at ¶ 14 (“Since [Ms.] Andrews falsely reported her value in real 

estate in the IFP petition and she is able to pay the costs of litigation, this 

appeal was granted pursuant to an invalid IFP.”). Ms. Andrews then filed a 

Motion to Strike/Dismiss with Prejudice Appellees’ Motion to Strike Appeal. 

Therein, she asserted that Appellees’ motion to strike appeal was procedurally 

defective because they erroneously mailed the motion to the wrong P.O. Box. 

In addition, she baldly claimed that Appellees untimely filed their motion to 

strike, but she set forth no authority or legal analysis in support of that 

assertion. Notably, she did not complain that the trial court could not act on 

her IFP petition after another judge had already granted it. 

In addition, Ms. Andrews filed an Answer/Reply in Opposition to Motion 

to Strike Appeal. In that filing, she again did not raise that the trial court 

could not act on her IFP petition after it had already been granted. 

She also submitted a Reply/Reply Brief in Opposition to Motion to Strike 

Appeal. In this reply, she reiterated her argument that the motion to strike 

was procedurally defective because it had been sent to the wrong P.O. box,

and again claimed that Appellees’ motion to strike was untimely without 

providing any authority or legal analysis in support. She additionally

maintained that she had insufficient funds at the time she filed her petition to 

proceed IFP, and that her estimate of the value of her real estate took into 

consideration the repairs the properties need. Finally, without any elaboration 

or supporting legal authority, she claimed that striking her appeal is unduly 
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prejudicial as it puts her out of court, and she stated that her appeal should 

not be deemed invalid because she completed the petition to proceed IFP 

truthfully, to the best of her ability, and in compliance with the relevant rule. 

Amidst these arguments, she did not raise that the trial court could not now 

act on her petition after it had already been granted. 

Last, our review of the transcript from the February 22, 2022 oral 

argument does not reveal that Ms. Andrews brought up this specific issue 

there either. Further, she did not raise it at the April 29, 2022 hearing because 

she did not attend that proceeding. As such, this issue is waived. 

Second Issue

In Ms. Andrews’s second issue, she contends that the trial court did not 

have the authority to act on the September 30, 2021 IFP approval order after 

30 days had lapsed after the entry of the order. Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 8-9. 

Citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505, she says that the trial court may only modify a 

previous order within 30 days after its entry, and after that 30-day period, the 

trial court’s jurisdiction is divested. Id. 

Though Ms. Andrews did not raise this issue below, we will address it 

since it ostensibly raises an issue of jurisdiction. See Borough of Media v. 

County of Delaware, 82 A.3d 509, 512 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (“Section 5505 

of the Judicial Code authorizes a court, upon notice to the parties, to modify 

or rescind an order within 30 days of its issuance. This 30–day limitation is 
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jurisdictional and cannot be waived by the parties.”) (cleaned up).8 Section 

5505 provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a 

court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 30 

days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of court, 

if no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. 

Importantly, “Section 5505 applies only to final orders.” Manufacturers and 

Traders Trust Co. v. Greenville Gastroenterology, SC, 108 A.3d 913, 917

n.3 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). Here, the trial court’s September 

30, 2021 order granting Ms. Andrews IFP status was not a final order. 

Therefore, the 30-day time limit of Section 5505 did not apply to it, and Ms. 

Andrews’s argument fails. 

Third Issue

In Ms. Andrews’s third issue, she argues that “[n]either the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure or Pennsylvania statutory law provide 

authorization for a trial court judge to hold an evidentiary hearing on the same 

identical IFP petition once the courts have approved an IFP application.” Ms. 

Andrews’s Brief at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). Again, Ms. Andrews 

does not point us to where she raised this claim below. See Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(e), supra; Baker, supra. Further, our own review of the record does 

____________________________________________

8 “Although decisions by the Commonwealth Court are not binding on this 

Court, they may be persuasive.” Cresci Const. Services, Inc. v. Martin, 

64 A.3d 254, 256 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). 
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not show that she presented it to the trial court. Accordingly, it is waived. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), supra. 

Fourth and Fifth Issues

Ms. Andrews’s fourth and fifth issues duplicate each other and, 

therefore, we address them together. Ms. Andrews complains that the trial 

court should not have dismissed her appeal, but instead permitted her to pay 

the filing fee. Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 2-3, 10. We deem this argument waived 

on multiple grounds. First, she does not point us to where she specifically 

raised this argument below. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e), supra; Baker, supra. 

Second, our own review of the record does not show that she specifically 

raised it below. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), supra. Third, she sets forth no 

developed argument that the trial court should have permitted her to pay the 

filing fee rather than dismissing her action. See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 

918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“This Court will not act as counsel and 

will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. Moreover, when defects 

in a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may 

dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived.”) (citations 

omitted). Thus, for all these reasons, it is waived.

Sixth Issue 

In Ms. Andrews’s sixth issue, she claims that the trial court erred and/or 

abused its discretion in concluding that she was untruthful on her IFP 

application. See Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 10. She asserts that she offered 

evidence to substantiate her indebtedness and the poor condition of her 
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properties. Id. at 11. She challenges the assertion that her seven properties 

have a value of $384,000, which she says was nothing more than a ‘Zestimate’ 

from Zillow. See id. at 12. She also says that the fact that she paid property 

taxes on the properties in March of 2021 does not mean that she could pay 

the $400 filing fee to appeal the arbitration award six months later in 

September of 2021. Id. at 12-13. Moreover, she claims that her selfemployment income only amounts to $500-800/month, as her income was

severely impacted by the Covid-19 crisis. Id. at 13. 

We discern no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

determination that Ms. Andrews was untruthful on her IFP petition. Initially, 

Ms. Andrews failed to appear at the April 29, 2022 hearing, which was 

scheduled for the specific purpose of taking additional evidence regarding her

IFP status, including her testimony. TCO at 5, 7-8. To the extent Ms. Andrews 

argues that she offered evidence at the February 22, 2022 proceeding of her 

indebtedness and the conditions of her properties, the trial court reasonably 

explained that it did not rely on such evidence as it lacked an evidentiary 

foundation. Id. at 5. Instead, the trial court weighed the evidence presented 

by Appellees, specifically that Ms. Andrews owned seven properties and was 

in good standing on her tax bills for them, which led it to the conclusion that 

Ms. Andrews provided false information on her IFP petition. Id. at 4-5, 7-8. 

Given the record before it, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred or 

abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion. 

Seventh Issue 
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In Ms. Andrews’s seventh issue, she argues that the trial court 

demonstrated bias and ill-will toward her, thus violating her constitutional 

rights. Most of her argument on this issue, however, rehashes the evidence 

before the trial court and argues that it did not support that she could pay the 

filing fee in September of 2021. See Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 11-13. Because 

this argument fits better with her Sixth Issue, we incorporated her assertions 

into our consideration of her Sixth Issue. Therefore, to the extent she argues 

in her Seventh Issue that the evidence did not support that she could pay the 

filing fee, we reject this argument for the reasons set forth in her Sixth Issue, 

supra. Further, to the extent she argues that the trial court demonstrated 

bias and ill-will toward her, violating her constitutional rights, we deem this 

claim waived for lack of development. See Hardy, supra.

Eighth Issue 

Finally, in Ms. Andrews’s eighth issue, she advances that the trial court 

erred when it failed to grant her unopposed Motion to Strike/Dismiss with 

Prejudice Appellees’ Motion to Strike Appeal. She claims that the trial court 

never ruled on this motion. Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 13.

The record belies this argument. At the February 22, 2022 proceeding, 

the trial court denied her motion. N.T., 2/22/22, at 20 (“Based on the 

evidence that was presented here[,] your motion is denied. ... The reason for 

my decision is there is a great amount of evidence which may call into question 

whether or not such conduct was performed by [Ms. Andrews]. The [c]ourt 

isn’t ready to render a verdict, but certainly there was not evidence presented 
J-S19004-23

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by [Ms. Andrews] to show that this motion to strike should be denied and 

stricken.”). 

Further, we are unpersuaded that the trial court erred in denying the 

motion. We reiterate that, in her Motion to Strike/Dismiss with Prejudice 

Appellees’ Motion to Strike Appeal, Ms. Andrews presented two arguments. 

First, she claimed that Appellees’ motion to strike her appeal was procedurally 

defective because they erroneously mailed the motion to the wrong P.O. Box. 

However, she admitted at the February 22, 2022 proceeding that she received 

the motion in time for her to file a response. Id. at 21-22. Thus, we are 

unconvinced by her argument that relief is due on this basis. 

Second, Ms. Andrews baldly advanced that Appellees’ motion to strike 

was untimely. However, she provided no authority or legal analysis to support 

this claim. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying her 

motion on this basis either. Further, to the extent she raises a legal theory to 

support her assertion of untimeliness on appeal, we deem such an argument 

waived. See Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 733 A.2d 623, 630 n.8 (Pa. 

1999) (finding issue waived where the appellant raised a legal theory for the 

first time on appeal to the Superior Court). Thus, all of Ms. Andrews’s issues 

fail. 

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 08/08/2023