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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TERRENCE GARRETT,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-13141

v. DISTRICT JUDGE AVERN COHN

SCOTT ADAMS, TROY SZUKHENT, MAGISTRATE JUDGE VIRGINIA MORGAN

MICHIGAN STATE POLICE

DEPARTMENT, STATE OF MICHIGAN,

TIM LIGHT, GENESEE COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT, COUNTY OF GENESEE,

DENNIS CHASE, BRIAN SAVARD, AARON

QUINN, TIM BUECHE, GRAND BLANC

TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, and

TOWNSHIP OF GRAND BLANC,

Defendants.

______________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (D/E #75, #78, #79)

I. Introduction

This is a pro se 42 U.S.C § 1983 action in which the plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of

the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), alleges that the defendants violated his

constitutional rights by using excessive force during his arrest and subsequently conspiring to

cover-up that use of excessive force. The matter comes before the court on defendants Chase,

Quinn, Bueche, Savard, Grand Blanc Township and Grand Blanc Township Police Department’s
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Motion for Summary Judgment (D/E #75), defendants Genesee County, Genesee County

Sheriff’s Department and Deputy Light’s Motion for Summary Judgment (D/E #78), and

defendants State of Michigan, Michigan State Police Department, Trooper Scott Adams and

Trooper Troy Szukhent’s Motion to Dismiss or, alternatively, for Summary Judgment (D/E #78). 

For the reasons discussed below, this court recommends that defendants’ motions all be

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, this court recommends that:

1. Defendants Chase and Quinn should be granted summary judgment on all claims

against them due to lack of personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations.

2. Defendants Grand Blanc Township and Genesee County should be granted summary

judgment on all claims against them because no genuine issue of material fact exists with

respect to municipal liability.

3. All claims against defendants Grand Blanc Township Police Department and Genesee

County Sheriff’s Department should be dismissed because those defendants are not

entities that can be sued under § 1983.

4. All claims against the State of Michigan and the Michigan State Police Department

should be dismissed on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity.

5. Defendants Adams and Szukhent’s motion to dismiss the conspiracy claims against

them be denied. 

6. Defendants Bueche, Savard and Light’s motions for summary judgment on the

conspiracy claims against them should be denied.

7. Any decision on defendants Bueche, Savard, Light, Adams and Szukhent’s request for

summary judgment on the excessive force claims against them should be stayed pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) until plaintiff has the opportunity to conduct additional discovery.

In light of the above recommendations, this court also recommends that defendants Chase,

Quinn, Grand Blanc Township, Genesee County, Grand Blanc Township Police Department,

Genesee County Sheriff’s Department, State of Michigan, and Michigan State Police Department
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be dismissed as defendants in this action. The case should proceed against defendants Bueche,

Savard, Light, Adams and Szukhent with respect to plaintiff’s excessive force and conspiracy

claims. 

II. Background

A. Complaint and Amended Complaint

On November 13, 2009, plaintiff filed the complaint in this action (D/E #1). On

November 13, 2009, plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint pursuant to a court order (D/E

#21). In that amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that, on June 23, 2009, he was arrested for

fleeing and eluding after pulling his car over on northbound I-475. (Amended Complaint, p. 3) 

According to plaintiff, after he took the keys out of the ignition and placed his hands in the air,

his car was surrounded by law enforcement officers. (Amended Complaint, p. 3) Plaintiff also

alleges that defendant Light, a Deputy in the Genesee County Sheriff’s Department, tazed

plaintiff and pulled him from the car. (Amended Complaint, p. 3) Plaintiff further alleges that

he was tazed again by defendant Szukhent, a Trooper for the Michigan State Police Department,

and assaulted and battered by other officers. (Amended Complaint, p. 3) Plaintiff also claims

that, following his arrest, the law enforcement officers conspired to falsify their police reports in

order to make it appear that plaintiff was resisting arrest and to justify the tazing and assaults. 

(Amended Complaint, p. 3)

Given those above actions, plaintiff specifically alleges that his constitutional right, under

the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment “was violated by the arresting officers when he was unjustly tazed by them and
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assaulted after surrendering[.]” (Amended Complaint, p. 4) As relief, plaintiff seeks punitive,

compensatory and pecuniary damages, as well as damages for physical and mental anguish, in

the amount of $250,000 per defendant. (Amended Complaint, p. 5) 

B. Pending Motions for Dismissal and/or Summary Judgment

On September 17, 2010, defendants Chase, Quinn, Bueche, Savard, Grand Blanc

Township and the Grand Blanc Township Police Department (the “Grand Blanc Defendants”)

filed a motion for summary judgment (D/E #75). In that motion, those defendants first argue

that, because neither Sgt. Chase nor Officer Quinn were involved in the chase, apprehension or

arrest of plaintiff, they are entitled to summary judgment. The Grand Blanc Defendants also

argue that, because neither Officer Savard nor Officer Bueche used the taser, authorized the use

of the taser or had the means or opportunity to prevent the use of the taser, they are entitled to

summary judgment as well. Defendants further argue that plaintiff has failed to establish that

either Officer Savard or Officer Bueche used any force that can be construed as excessive force

under the circumstances and that, consequently, those officers are entitled to qualified immunity. 

Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to establish a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy or

any municipal liability claim against Grand Blanc Township.

Defendants Genesee County, Genesee County Sheriff’s Departmant, and Deputy Light

(the “Genesee County Defendants”) also filed a motion for summary judgment on September 17,

2010 (D/E #78). In that motion, the Genesee County Defendants argue that the Genesee County

Sheriff’s Department is not a entity subject to suit under §1983, plaintiff cannot establish a

violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and plaintiff’s claims against Genesee County and
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Deputy Light in his official capacity fail. Defendants also argue that Deputy Light is entitled to

qualified immunity and that plaintiff’s conspiracy claim is deficiently pled and unsupported by

the evidence.

Defendants State of Michigan, Michigan State Police Department, Trooper Scott Adams

and Trooper Troy Szukhent (the “State of Michigan Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss or,

alternatively, for summary judgment on September 17, 2010 (D/E #78). In that motion, those

defendants first argue that the State of Michigan and the Michigan State Police Department

should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and

that, to the extent that plaintiff’s complaint contains a conspiracy claim, it fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. Defendants also argue that the troopers are entitled to

summary judgment because there is no dispute that the force used by the troopers was reasonable

and necessary under the circumstances. Defendants further argue that the troopers are entitled to

qualified immunity because their conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the clearly

established law.

Plaintiff did not file any responses to defendants’ motions and the deadline for filing a

response has passed. However, as discussed below, plaintiff did file a Motion to Stay pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), seeking a postponement of a court ruling on the dispositive motions filed

by defendants so that Plaintiff may conduct additional discovery (D/E #92).
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III. Standards of Review

A. Motion to Dismiss

The State of Michigan Defendants argue that some of plaintiff’s claims should be

dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the trial court “must construe

the complaint liberally in the plaintiff's favor and accept as true all factual allegations and

permissible inferences therein.” Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1064 (6th Cir. 1994)

(citing Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir. 1976)); see also Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d

373, 377 (6th Cir. 1995). Because a motion to dismiss rests upon the pleadings rather than the

evidence, “[i]t is not the function of the court [in ruling on such a motion] to weigh evidence or

evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Miller, 50 F.3d at 377 (citing Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d

264, 270 (6th Cir. 1994)). However, while this standard is decidedly liberal, it requires more

than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1240

(6th Cir. 1993) (citing Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th

Cir.1988)). Rather, the complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations with regard

to all the material elements to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory. DeLorean, 991

F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not

‘show[n]’-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173

L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). However, “determining whether a
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complaint states a plausible claim is context specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1940.

B. Motions for Summary Judgment

All defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56(b), which states that “[a] party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted

or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move without or without supporting

affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part thereof.” Summary

judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). 

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and draw

all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. See Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.,

Ltd. et al. v. Zenith Radio Corp., et. al., 475 U.S. 547, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986); see also

B.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 245 F.3d 587, 591-92 (6th Cir. 2001). The moving party

bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Once

the moving party has carried his burden, the party opposing the motion “must come forward with

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106

S.Ct. 1348. The opposing party cannot merely rest upon the allegations contained in his

pleadings. Rather, he must submit evidence demonstrating that material issues of fact exist. 

Banks v. Wolfe County Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 2003); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
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“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348

(quoting First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575,

1592 (1968)).

IV. Discussion

A. Sgt. Chase and Officer Quinn

Defendants Chase and Quinn argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because

they were not involved in the chase, apprehension or arrest of plaintiff. To succeed in an action

under § 1983, a plaintiff must show personal involvement by the defendant in the constitutional

violation. Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Here, plaintiff

conceded in his motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (D/E #85) that those

defendants did not take part in the alleged constitutional violation. This court has also reviewed

the evidence in the record and that evidence also demonstrates a lack of personal involvement by

Sgt. Chase or Officer Quinn. Accordingly, those two defendants should be granted summary

judgment. 

B. Grand Blanc Township and Genesee County

Defendants Grand Blanc Township and Genesee County argue that they are entitled to

summary judgment because plaintiff has failed to establish any municipal liability on their part. 

A municipality cannot be liable for the constitutional torts of its employees; that is, it cannot be

liable on a respondeat superior theory. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98

S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); see also Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Com'n, 
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501 F.3d 592, 607 (6th Cir. 2007). Rather, liability will attach only where the plaintiff

establishes that the municipality engaged in a “policy or custom” that was the “moving force”

behind the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see also Miller v.

Sanilac County, 606 F.3d 240, 254-255 (6th Cir. 2010) (“To succeed on a municipal liability

claim, a plaintiff must establish that his or her constitutional rights were violated and that a

policy or custom of the municipality was the “moving force” behind the deprivation of the

plaintiff's rights.”)

The Monell Court described a municipal policy as including “a policy statement,

ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated....” 436 U.S. at 690. An

actionable “custom,” in contrast, “has not received formal approval through ... official

decisionmaking channels.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. A § 1983 plaintiff may establish the

existence of a custom by showing that policymaking officials knew about and acquiesced in the

practice at issue. Memphis, Tenn. Area Local, Am. Postal Workers Union v. City of Memphis,

361 F.3d 898, 902 (6th Cir. 2004). “The inadequacy of police training only serves as a basis for

§ 1983 liability ‘where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of

persons with whom the police come into contact.’” Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 457 (6th

Cir. 2008) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d

412 (1989)). To establish deliberate indifference, the plaintiff “must show prior instances of

unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the County has ignored a history of abuse and was

clearly on notice that the training in this particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury.”

Fisher v. Harden, 398 F.3d 837, 849 (6th Cir. 2005).
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In this case, plaintiff’s amended complaint does not make any specific allegations against

defendants Grand Blanc Township and Genesee County. Nor does it allege either of those two

defendants engaged in a “policy or custom” that was the “moving force” behind the deprivation

of the plaintiff’s rights. Discovery is over in this case and plaintiff did not file a response to

defendants’ motions for summary judgment providing any evidence related to municipal

liability. Plaintiff did file a Motion to Stay pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), seeking a

postponement of a court ruling on the dispositive motions filed by defendants so that plaintiff

may conduct additional discovery (D/E #92), but none of that additional discovery relates to

municipal liability in any way. Accordingly, this court finds that no genuine issue of material

fact exists with respect to plaintiff’s claims against defendants Grand Blanc Township and

Genesee County, and that those defendants should be granted summary judgment. 

C. Grand Blanc Township Police Department and Genesee County Sheriff’s 

Department

Defendants Grand Blanc Township Police Department and Genesee County Sheriff’s

Department are not legal entities against which a suit under § 1983 can be directed. See

Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994); Watson v. Gill, 40 Fed.Appx. 88, 89 (6th

Cir. 2002). Instead, because they are departments of the Township and County respectively, the

Township and County are the appropriate parties to address plaintiff’s suit and the claims against

defendants Grand Blanc Township Police Department and Genesee County Sheriff’s Department

should be dismissed. See Matthews, 35 F.3d at 1049; Watson, 40 Fed. Appx. at 89. Moreover,

even if any claims against those two entities were deemed to be against Grand Blanc Township
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and Genesee County, those defendants would still be entitled to summary judgment for the

reasons stated above.

D. State of Michigan and Michigan State Police Department

Defendants State of Michigan and Michigan State Police Department argue that the

claims against them should be dismissed because of their immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit brought in

federal court against a state and its departments or agencies unless the state has waived its

sovereign immunity or unequivocally consented to be sued. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S.

781, 782, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978); Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 876-77 (6th

Cir. 1986). Because the Michigan State Police Department is a state agency and the state of

Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in the federal courts, both the State of Michigan

and the Michigan State Police Department are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See

Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100, 104 S.Ct. 900; Pugh, 438 U.S. at 782, 98 S.Ct. 3057; Abick, 803
1

As discussed by the Sixth Circuit in Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 358-359 (6th Cir.

2005), a state’s immunity comes with a host of exceptions; the immunity does not attach if the

lawsuit is not against the state or an arm of the state, the immunity does not extend to counties

and similar municipal corporations, the immunity does not apply if the lawsuit is filed against a

state official for purely injunctive relief enjoining the official from violating federal law, the

immunity may be abrogated by Congress when exercising its enforcement authority under the

Fourteenth Amendment, and the immunity does not apply when the federal government brings

the lawsuit. Additionally, a state may elect to waive that immunity through legislation or

through its conduct in litigation. Ernst, 427 F.3d at 358. None of these exceptions are applicable

in this case.

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F.2d at 877.1

 Consequently, the claims against the State of Michigan and the Michigan

Department of State Police should be dismissed.

E. Officer Bueche, Officer Savard, Deputy Light, Trooper Adams and Trooper 

Szukhent

1. Conspiracy Claims

Defendants Adams and Szukhent argue that plaintiff has failed to properly plead his

conspiracy claim with specificity and, therefore, the claim must be dismissed. Conspiracy

claims must be pled with particularity. Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir. 2003). 

Although courts construe pro se complaints liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1989), even pro se complaints must satisfy basic pleading requirements. See, Wells v. Brown,

891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). However, in this case, it is not clear how plaintiff could have

been more specific at the time he filed his complaint. He particularly alleged that the defendant

law enforcement officers conspired to cover-up the use of excessive force and that they all

falsified their reports pertaining to plaintiff’s apprehension and arrest. Such allegations

sufficiently describe plaintiff’s claim and, in light of plaintiff’s pro se status and the liberal
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reading given to such complaints, this court recommends that defendants Adams and Szukhent’s

motion to dismiss the conspiracy claims against them be denied. 

Defendants Bueche, Savard and Light argue that they are entitled to summary judgment

with respect to the conspiracy claims made against them because there is no evidence that such

conspiracy was motivated by some racial or other invidiously discriminatory animus. According

to those defendants, conspiracy claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by 42

U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1985 claims only cover conspiracies to prevent officers from performing

official duties, conspiracies to intimidate a party, witness or juror, and conspiracies motivated by

some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus, to deprive

persons of rights or privileges because. However, defendants assertion that all conspiracy claims

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1985 is simply incorrect. 

Defendants offer no support for their argument and, while related, § 1983 and § 1985 are two

different statutes addressing different circumstances. As set forth by the Sixth Circuit, the

standard for proving a § 1983 conspiracy claim is as follows:

A civil conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to

injure another by unlawful action. Express agreement among all

the conspirators is not necessary to find the existence of a civil

conspiracy. Each conspirator need not have known all of the

details of the illegal plan or all of the participants involved. All

that must be shown is that there was a single plan, that the alleged

coconspirator shared in the general conspiratorial objective, and

that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy

that caused injury to the complainant.

[Spadafore, 330 F.3d at 854 (quoting Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943-944 (6th Cir.1985)]. 

There is no requirement that a conspiracy under § 1983 be motivated by some racial or other
2

The Genesee County Defendants correctly note that, while plaintiff identifies his claims

as being brought pursuant to the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the

alleged constitutional violations occurred during the arrest of plaintiff and the Eighth

Amendment is not implicated by alleged misconduct that occurs prior to conviction. See Bass v.

Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048-49 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he State does not acquire the power to

punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal

adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430

U.S. 651, 671 n. 40, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.E.2d 711 (1977))). Nevertheless, plaintiff’s claims need

not be dismissed on that basis. “Pro se plaintiffs enjoy the benefit of a liberal construction of

their pleadings and filings” Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999), and, in this

case, the pro se plaintiff clearly alleges the use of excessive force during his apprehension and

arrest. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person applies

to excessive-force claims that “arise[ ] in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free

citizen,” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). 

Consequently, this court will construe plaintiff’s complaint as alleging a violation of the Fourth

Amendment, as incorporated to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. 

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invidiously discriminatory animus and defendants’ argument is incorrect. Therefore, defendants

Bueche, Savard and Light’s motion for summary judgment on the conspiracy claims against

them should be denied.

2. Excessive Force Claims2

Defendants Bueche, Savard, Light, Adams and Szukhent all argue that they are entitled to

summary judgment and qualified immunity with respect to the excessive force claims against

them based on the evidence in the record. Plaintiff did not file any responses to defendants’

motions, but he did file a Motion to Stay pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), seeking a

postponement of a court ruling on the dispositive motions filed by defendants so that plaintiff

may conduct additional discovery (D/E #92). 

As discussed in this court’s order granting plaintiff’s motion to stay pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(f), plaintiff’s affidavit sufficiently and persuasively details why audio and visual
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recordings possessed by defendants, which captured the events surrounding plaintiff’s

apprehension and arrest, go to the heart of his excessive force claims and are necessary for him

to respond to the motions for summary judgment on those claims. Plaintiff’s affidavit also

sufficiently describes how his incarceration has impaired his ability to obtain the discovery and

what specific material facts he hopes to uncover through the recordings. 

This court has ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held with respect to the recordings

on February 16, 2011 at 9:30 a.m in the federal courthouse in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Given the

importance of the recordings to plaintiff’s excessive force claims and plaintiff’s inability to view

them, no decision should be made on the excessive force claims until the evidentiary hearing has

been held and plaintiff has been given a chance to respond to fully respond to defendants’

motions for summary judgment.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, this court recommends that defendants’ motions all be

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, this court recommends that:

1. Defendants Chase and Quinn should be granted summary judgment on all claims

against them due to lack of personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations.

2. Defendants Grand Blanc Township and Genesee County should be granted summary

judgment on all claims against them because no genuine issue of material fact exists with

respect to municipal liability.

3. All claims against defendants Grand Blanc Township Police Department and Genesee

County Sheriff’s Department should be dismissed because those defendants are not

entities that can be sued under § 1983.

4. All claims against the State of Michigan and the Michigan State Police Department

should be dismissed on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
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5. Defendants Adams and Szukhent’s motion to dismiss the conspiracy claims against

them be denied. 

6. Defendants Bueche, Savard and Light’s motion for summary judgment on the

conspiracy claims against them should be denied.

7. Any decision on defendants Bueche, Savard, Light, Adams and Szukhent’s request for

summary judgment on the excessive force claims should be stayed pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(f) until plaintiff has the opportunity to conduct additional discovery.

In light of the above recommendations, this court also recommends that defendants Chase,

Quinn, Grand Blanc Township, Genesee County, Grand Blanc Township Police Department,

Genesee County Sheriff’s Department, State of Michigan, and Michigan State Police Department

be dismissed as defendants in this action. The case should proceed against defendants Bueche,

Savard, Light, Adams and Szukhent with respect to plaintiff’s excessive force and conspiracy

claims. 

The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and

Recommendation, but are required to act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as

provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). Failure to file specific

objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v.

Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949-50 (6th Cir. 1981). The filing of objections which raise some issues,

but fail to raise others with specificity, will not preserve all the objections a party might have to

this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Secretary of HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir.

1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).
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Within fourteen (14) days of service of any objecting party’s timely filed objections, the

opposing party may file a response. The response shall be no more than 20 pages in length

unless, by motion and order, the page limit is extended by the court. The response shall address 

each issue contained within the objections specifically and in the same order raised.

S/Virginia M. Morgan 

Virginia M. Morgan

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: November 5, 2010

 

PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and plaintiff via

the Court’s ECF System and/or U. S. Mail on November 5, 2010.

s/J. Johnson 

Case Manager to

Magistrate Judge Virginia M. Morgan