1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 05 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### FERNAN DEZ-VARGA S v . GONZ ALE S , ATT O RN EY GEN E RAL CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT No. 04–1 37 6. Ar g u ed M a rc h22, 2006— D e c i ded Ju n e 22, 200 6 Immig r ationl a wh a s forsome time pr ov i d ed th at anor derforr e mov i n g

analienpr es en t u n l aw fu llymaybe r e in stated if h e leav es an d unlawfully ree n ters. The Illegal Immigration Reform an d Immigrant Respon si bili tyAc t of 19 96 ( IIRIRA) amen ded th e Immi g r ationan d Nationa lity Ac t (INA) to enl a rge th e class of illegal reent r ants whose or der s maybe r e in state d an d lim it th e pos s ible r e lief fr o m ar e mov a l order available to them. Se e §241(a)(5 ), 8 U. S. C. §1235(a)(5). Peti

tioner Fernandez-Vargas, aM e xica n citizen, illegally reentered the Un ited Sta t es in19 82, af ter h a v i n gbeendepor t ed. He r e main ed u n detec t ed foro v er20 y e ar s, f ath er in ga sonin19 89 an d mar r y in gth e boy ’ s moth er , a Un itedSt at es c i tizen , in 200 1. Af terh e filed anap plic ationto ad ju st h i s st atu s to th at of a law f u lper m an en t r e siden t , th e G o v e rn men tbeg a npr oceedin g s to r e in state h i s 19 8 1 depor tat ion or deru n d er§241( a)(5), an ddepor t ed h i m . He peti tion ed th e Ten t h Circuit to revi ew the reinstatement order, claiming that, because he illegally reentered the county be fore IIRIRA’s ef fective date, §241( a)(5) didn o t barh i s a pplic ationforadju st men tof sta t u s , an d th at §24 1 (a)( 5 ) w o u l d be imper m issi blyr e tr oac t iv e if it did barh i s ad

ju stmen ta ppl ic ation

. Th e c o u r th e ld th a t§241( a)(5) b a r r e d h i s ap plication and followed Landg raf v. USI Fil m Products, 511 U. S. 244 , in det e rmining t h a tt h e new la w ha d no impermiss ib l y ret r oa ct ive ef

fectin his ca s e . Held: Sec t ion24 1(a)(5) ap plies to th os e w h o r e en ter e d th e Un it ed

States before IIRIRA’s effective date and d o es not retroactively affect an yr i gh t of, orimpose an ybu r d enon, t h e cont inuing vi ola t o r of t h e INA now before this Court. Pp. 5–16.

(a) S t at ut es are dis f a v ored a s ret r oa ct ive when t h eir a pplicat ion2 FERNANDEZ

- VARGAS v. GONZALES Sy llabu s

“ w ould impa ir right s a pa rty pos s e ss ed w h en he a c t e d, increa s e a pa rt y’s liab ility for pa s tconduct , or impos e new dut i es with res p ectt o tr an sac t ion s a l r e adyc o mpleted.” Landg ra f, s u pra, at 28 0. A statu te is not givenre troactive effec t “unle ss such construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implica t ion.” Un ited State sv. St. Louis, S

. F. &T. R. Co. , 270 U. S. 1, 3. Indeter m in in gw h e th era s t at ut e ha s an impermis s i bly ret r oa ct ive effect , t h e Co urtfirs tlooks t o “ whet h er Congres s ha s expres s l y pres crib e d t h e s t atut e ’s proper rea ch,” Landgraf, supra, at 280, an d int h e absen c e of ex pr ess lan

g u ag e tr ies to dr awa c o mpar ablyfir m c o nc lu sionabou tth e tempor a l rea ch s p ecific a lly int e nded b ya pplying it s “ n orma l rule s of cons t r u c tion ,” Lindhv. Murphy, 521 U. S. 32 0, 3 2 6

. If th at eff o r tfail s, th e Cou r tasks w h e th erapply i n gth e statu t e to th e per s onobjec t in g would have a retroactive effect in th e disf avored sense of “affecting su bst a n t iv e r i gh ts, liabi litie s, ordu ties [o nth e basi s of] c o n d u c tar is

ing before [its] enactment,” Landgraf , sup ra, at 27 8. If th e an sw eris y e s, th e Cour t th enapplies th e pr esu m ptionag ain s t r e tr oac t iv ityby c o n s tr u i n gth e statu te a s in a pplic able to th e ev en t or ac t inqu estion

. INS v. St . Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 316. Pp. 5–7. (b) Commonp r in c i ples of st atu tor yin ter p r e tationfai lt o u n s ettl e §241( a)(5)’s a ppar e n tappl i c ationto an yr e en tr an t pr esen t inth e c o u n t ry , w h atev e rth e date of r e tu rn . The statu te doe s n o t ex pr essly in c l u d e inorex c l u d e fr om §241(a)( 5 )’s am b i t in div i du als w h o illeg a lly entered the country beforeIIRIRA’ s eff e ctive date. FernandezVar g as ar g u es th at th e f a c t th at th e oldr e in state men t pr ov isionap plied t o a liens who ha d “ unla w fully reent e red .

. . a f t e r h a ving previ

ously departed or been depo rted .

. . , whet h er beforeor a f ter June 27, 1952 [the INA’s effective date], on any ground described in .

. . sub

section (e),” §242(f), while §241( a)(5) lac k s language of temporal rea ch, s h o w s t h a tCongres s no lon g er me a n tt o cover p r eena ct ment reentrants. But the oldbefo re-o r-a f t e r cla u s e , which wa s sa ndwiched between references to departure o rdeportation and grounds for de

por tation , mos tn atu r a llyr efer r e d n o t to a nalien ’ s illeg a l r e en tr ybu t t o t h e previous deport at ion or depa rt ure. The b e t t e r inference is t h a t th e c l au se w a s r e mov e d bec a u s e, in199 6, a pplic ationkey e d to dep a r t ures in 1 9 52 or ea rlier wa s a c a d em ic. Applying §241(a)(5) only to deportations or departures after IIRIRA’ s effective da te would ex

empt anyone who departed before that date but reentered after it. Tha twould be as t ra nge res u lt , s i nce t h e s t at ut e wa s r e vis e d t o ex pan dth e sc ope of th e r e i n state men ta u th or ityan d in v e st it w i th s o met h ing clos er t o finalit y . Ferna ndez-Va r ga s errs in s u gges t ing th at th e n e wlawis ber eft of c l ar ityan d th e Cou r tsh ould applyth e pr esu m ptiona g ain s t r e tr oac t iv ityas a too lforin ter p r e t i n gth e stat

u t e at th e fir s t Landgraf s t ep. It is not unt il a s t at ute is s h own t o3 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Sy llabu s ha ve no fi rm provis ion ab o utt e mpora lrea ch b u tt o produ c e aret r oa c tive effect when straightforwardly applie d that the presumption has it s work t o do. And IIRIRA ha s ot her provis ions on t e mpora lrea ch, which b l untF e rna ndez-Va r ga s ’ s a r gu men tth at a n e g a t i v e in fer en c e in his fa vor ma y b e dra wn from remova l of t h e b efore-or

- a f t e r cla u s e . Pp. 7–10.

(c) This fa cia lrea d ing is confirmed b yt w o fea t ures of IIRIRA. Fir s t, th e pr ov ision ’ s tex tsh ow s th at it ap plies h e r e n o t bec a u s e Fer

na ndez-Va r ga s reent e red a ta n y pa rt icula rt i me, b u t b e ca us e he c h o se to r e ma inafterth e n e wstatu te be c a me effec t iv e. Wh ile th e law looks bac k to “ a n al ie n [who] has reentered .

. . illegally,” 8 U. S. C. §1231 (a)(5), th e pr o v isiondoes n o t pen a lize an alienforth e r een tr y; it establi s h e s a pr oc ess to r e mov e h i m u n d era“pr i oror der an ytime afterth e r een tr y , ” ibid. Thus , itis t h e conductof rema ining inth e c o u n t r yafteren tr yth at i s th e pr edi c ate ac tion ; th e law applie s to s t op anin d efin i telyc o n t in u i n gv i olationth at th e alie nc o u l d en d at an ytime byv o lu n tar ilylea v in g . It is th er efor e th e alien ’ s c h o ic e to continue his il legal presence, after illega l reentry and after the new law’s effective date, that su bjects him to the new and less generous regime, notapa s t a c tt h atis he helples s to undo. INS v. St. Cyr, su pra, distinguished. Second, IIRIRA’ s effe ctive date pro v ision shows t h a tFerna ndez-Va r ga s ha d a m ple wa rning of t h e comin gcha n g e in t h e la w, b u t chos e t o rema in unt il the old regime expired a n d §241( a)(5) too kits plac e. He h a d anoppor t u n i tyto av oid th e n e w law ’ s applic at i o nbyleav ing th e c o un tr y and en din gh i s violat iondu r ing the 6 mo nths between IIRIRA’s enactment and e ffective date. For t h a tma t t er, he could h a ve ma rried his s o n’s mot h er a n d a pplied for a d j u s t men tof s t a t u s during t h e period, in which ca s e he would a t least h a v e h a da c l aim th at p r ov en r e lian c eonth e lawshou ld be h o n or ed byapply i n gth e pr esumptionag ain s t r e tr oac t iv ity

. In stead, h e au g m en ted h i s 15 y e ar s of u n l aw fu l pr esen c e byr e main in ginth e count r yint o the fut ure s u bj ectt o t h e new la w. And t h e pres umpt ion ag ain s t r e tr oa c t iv itydoes n o t amou n tto a pr esu m ptionof leg a l stas i s forth e ben efit of c o n t in u o u s law b r e aker s. Pp. 11–1 5. 394 F. 3d 88 1, affir m ed.

S OUTER , J ., delivered t h e opinion of t h e Court , in whi ch R OBERTS , C. J., and S CALI A , K ENNEDY , T HOMAS , G INS B URG , B REY ER , an d ALITO , JJ., joined. S TEVENS , J., fileda dissenting opinion._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p r in t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on s m a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp r in t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
No. 04–1 37 6 

### HUM BER T O FE RNA N DEZ-V AR GAS, PE TITIONE R v. ALBE RT O R. GONZAL ES, AT T O RNEY GE N ERAL ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE TENT H CIRCUIT [Ju n e 22, 2006 ] 

### J USTICE 

### S OUTER

### delivered the opinion of the C o urt. For some time, the law has prov ided that an order for removing a nalien present unlawfully may be reinstated if he leaves and unlawfu lly enters again. The I llegal Immi

gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibil i ty Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 104–208, div. C, 110 Sta t . 3009–546, enlarged the class of il legal reentrants whose orders may be reinstated and limited th e po ssible re lief from a re

moval order available to them. See Immigration an d Nationality Act (INA), §241(a)(5), 66 Stat. 2 04, as added by IIRIRA §305(a)(3) , 110 Stat. 3009–599 , 8 U. S. C. §1231(a)(5). The que stions here are whether the ne w version of t h e reinstatement pr ovision is correctly read to apply to individuals who reentered the United State s before IIRIRA’s effecti ve date , and whether s u ch a reading may be reje cted as imp e rmissibl y retroactive. We hold the statute applies to thos e wh o entered before IIRIRA and does not retroactively affect any right of, or impose an y burden on, the continuing violator of the INA now before us.2 FERNANDEZ

- VARGAS v. GONZALES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### I In 1950, Congress provided th at deportation orders issued against some aliens who later reentered the Unite d States illegally could b e reinstated. 1 

### Internal SecurityAc t of 1950, §2 3(d), 64 Stat. 1012, 8 U

. S. C. §156(d) (1946 ed. , Supp. V). 2 

### Only specifi cillegal reentrants were subject to the provision, those deported as “anarchists ” or “subve r sives,” for example, see §23(c), 6 4 Stat. 101 2, while the rest got th e benefit of the ordinary deportation rules

. Congress retained a reinstatement provision two year s later when it revised the immigration laws through th e INA, §242(f), 66 Stat. 2 12, as codified in this subsection: “Should the Attorne y General find that an y alien has unlawfully reentered the United States afte r having previously departed or been deported pursua nt to an order of deportation, whether before or afterJune 27, 1952, 3

### on any ground described in subsection (e) .

. . , the previous order of deportation shall b e d eemed to be reinstated from its original date and such alien shall be deported under such pre v ious order at any time subsequent to such reentry. ” 8 U. S. C. §1252(f) (1994 ed.).

——————

1 Wh at w a s for mer l ykn own as “depor t atio n” is n o wc a lled “r emov al ” in IIRIRA. S e e Neuma n , Hab e a s Corpus , Execut ive Det e nt ion, a n d t h e Remov a l of Alien s , 98 Col u m. L. Rev. 9 61, 966 (1 99 8 ) (IIRIRA “r e alig n e d th e v o c abu lar yof im mig r ationlaw , c r e atin ga n e wc ateg o r yof ‘removal’ proceedings that largely repla c e s wha twere formerly ex clu

sionpr oc eedin g s an d depor tationpr oc eedin g s”). O u ru s e of eac hter m here will vary according to th e scheme under discussion.

2 Th is is th e fu l ltex tof th e pr ov ision : “Sh o u l d an yaliens u bjec t to th e pr ov ision s of su bsec tion(c ) un law f u llyr e tur nto th e Un ited State s afte r ha ving b een r e lea s ed for depa rt ure or dep o rt ed purs ua n tt o t h is s e ct ion, th e pr ev iou s w a r r a n tof depor tationag ai n s t h i m sh all be c o n s ider ed as r e in stated fr om its or ig in al date of issu an c e .”

3 A da t e wa s in s e rt ed when the provis ion wa s codified; a s origina lly enacted, the te xt read, “whether befor e or after the date o f enactment of th is Ac t.” 66 Sta t . 212.3 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Again, only a limited class of illegal reentra nts was su s ceptible, see §242(e), 6 6 Stat. 211; cf. §241(a), id., at 204, and even t h ose aff e cted could see ksome varieties of dis

cretionary r e lief, see, e.g., 8 U. S. C. §1254(a)(1) (1994 ed.) (suspensionof deporta tion available to ali e n s who mai n tained a continuous presence in the United States fo r seven years and could demons trate extreme hardship and a good moral character). In IIRIRA, Congress replaced this reinstatement provi

sion with one that toed a harder line, as th e old §242(f) was displaced by the new §241(a)(5): “If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reen

tered the United Sta t es illegal l yafter ha ving been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an or

der of remo val, the p r ior orderof re moval is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to b e ing re

opened or reviewed, the alien is n o t eligible a n d may not apply for any relief under th is chapter, and the alien shall be removed under the prior orde r at an y time after the reentry.” 8 U. S. C. §1231(a)(5 ) (1994 ed., Supp. III). The new la w became effective on April 1, 1997, “the first day of the first month beginning more than 180 days after” IIRIRA’s en actment. § 309(a), 110 Stat. 3009– 625. Unlike its predecessor, §241(a) (5) app lies t o allill egal reentrants, explicitly i n sulates the removal orders from review, an d generally forecloses discretio nary r e lief from the terms of the reinstated order. 4

——————

4 Notw ith s tan d i n gth e abso l u t e ter m s inw h i c hth e baronr e lief is sta t ed, ev en analiensu bj ec t to §241( a) (5) mayseekw i th h o ldin g of r e mov a l u n d er8 U. S. C. §123 1(b)(3)(A) (200 0 ed.) (ali enmayn o t be removed t o co unt ry if “ t h e a lien’s life or fr eedom would b e t hrea t e ned in t h a tcount ry b e ca us e of t h e a lien’s ra ce, r e ligion, na t i ona lit y, memb er s h ip in apa rt icula rs o cia lgr oup, orpolitical opinion”), or under 8 CFR §§241.8(e) and208.3 1 (200 6) (raising th e p o ssi bili ty of asylum to aliens4 FERNANDEZ

- VARGAS v. GONZALES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### II Humberto Fernandez-Vargas is a citizen of Mexico, who first came to the United States i nthe 1970 s, only to b e deported for immigration violat ions, and to reenter, sev

eral times, his last i l l egal return having been in 198 2. Then his lu ck chan ged, and for over 20 years he remained undetected in Utah, where he started a trucking business and, in 1989, fathered a son, who is a United States citi

zen. In 2001, Fernandez-Vargas married the boy’s mother, who is also a United States citizen. She soon fil e d a relative-visa petitionon behalf of her husband, see 8 U. S. C. §§1154(a), 1151(b) (2000 ed.); see Fer n a ndezVargasv. As hcroft, 394 F. 3 d 8 81, 8 83, n. 4 (CA10 2 0 0 5 ), o n the basis of whichhe filed an a pplication to adjust hi s status to th at of lawful permanent resident, see §1255(i). The filings apparentl ytipped off the authorities to h i s illegal pres ence here, and in November 2003, the Govern

ment began proceedings under §24 1 (a)(5) that eventuated in reinstating Fernandez-Var gas’s 1981 deportation order, but without the possibil i ty of adjusting his status to lawful residence. He was det a ined f o r10 mon t h s bef o r e b e i n g removed to Juarez, Mexico in September 2004

. Fernandez-Vargas petitioned the United Sta t es Court o f Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to r e view the r e instatemen t order. He tookthe position that because he il legally reen

tered the c o untry before IIRI RA’s effective date, the con

trolling reinstatement provision was the old §242(f), which meant he was eligible to apply for adjustment of status a s spouse of acitizen, and he said that the new §241(a)(5) would be impermissib l y retroacti ve if it barred his applica

tion for adjustment. The Court of Appea l s held that §241(a)(5) did bar Fernandez-Va r gas’s appl ication and followed L a ndgra f v. US I Fil m Products, 51 1 U

. S. 244 (19 9 4) , i ndete rmin in g th a tthe ne w la w ha d no im pe rm i s si

-

—————— w h o se r e mov a l or der h a s beenr e in stated u n d erINA §241 (a)(5)).5 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### bl y retro a ctiv e e ffe ct i n Fe rn an de z-Va rgas ’s ca s e . 39 4 F. 3d, at 8 8 6 , 89 0–89 1. We gra n te d ce rtio rari to re solv e a s p li t a m ong th e C o urt so f Ap p e al s ove rthe application of §24 1 (a)(5 ) to an alie n who ree nte red ille ga ll y b e fo re I I R IRA’ s ef fe ctiv e dat e , 5 

### 546 U. S. ___ (2005), and we no w affi rm . III Statutes ar e disfavored as retroactive when their appli

cation “wo uld impair rights a p a rty possessed when he acted, incre ase a party’s liability for past conduct, or im

pose new duties wit hresp ect to transact i ons already completed.” Land graf , supra , at 280. The modern la w thus follows Justice Story ’ s defi nition of a retroacti v e statute, as “tak[ing] away or impair[ing] vested rights acquired u n der existi ng laws, o rcreat[ing] a new obliga

tion, impos[ing] a new duty, or a t tach[ing] a new disabil

ity, in respect to transactions orconsiderations already past,” Socie t y for the Propaga t ion of the Gosp elv. Wh eele r, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767 (No. 13,156) (CCNH 18 14). Accord

ingly, it has become “arule of gen e ral application” that “a

——————

5 Tw o Cour ts of Appeals h a v e h e ld th at §241(a)( 5 ) does n o t applyat all to aliens who reentere d beforethe provision’s effective date, see Bejjaniv. IN S, 271 F. 3d 670 (CA 620 0 1 ); Castro-Cor tez v. INS, 239 F. 3d 103 7 (C A9 2 0 0 1 ), w h ile eigh t h a v e h e ld th at it d o es, at lea s t i n s o me circums t a nces , s e e Arevalo v. Ash croft, 344 F. 3d 1 (CA 1 200 3); Avila-Macias v. Ashcroft, 328 F. 3d 108 (C A3 20 03); Vela sq uez -Gab rie l v. Crocetti, 263 F. 3d 1 02 ( CA4 20 01); Ojeda-Te rraza s v. As hc roft, 290 F. 3d 292 (CA 5 200 2); Faiz- M ohammadv. As hcrof t, 395 F. 3d 799 (CA 7 200 5); Alvarez -Portillo v. As hcroft, 280 F. 3d 858 (C A8 2 002); 3 9 4 F

. 3 d 8 8 1 (CA1 0 2 0 05) (c ase belo w) ; Sarmien t oCisnero sv. United Stat es Attor ney G ene ral, 381 F. 3d 127 7 (C A11 2 004). Th e Co u r t s of Appea l s inth e major i tyar e th emselv es div i ded onth e qu estionw h e th era n alien’s marriage or application for adju stmen tof sta t u s befor e th e sta t ute’s effective date (fac t s not inpla yhere) rende r s the statut e impermiss ibly ret r oa ct ive when itis a p plied t o t h e a l ien. S e e, e.g., Faiz -Mohammad, supra, at80 9–8 10 (ap p lic ationfor adju st men tof sta t u s ); Alvarez-Portillo, sup r a, at 862, 867 (mar r i ag e).6 FERNANDEZ

- VARGAS v. GONZALES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### statute shall not be given re troac tive effect unless suc h constructio nis required by explici tlanguage or by neces

sary implication.” United States v. St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. Co., 270 U. S. 1, 3 (1926) (opinion forthe Court by Brandeis, J.). This Court has worked out a sequence of ana lysis when an objection is made to applying a particular statute said to affect a vested righ t or to imp o se some burden on t h e basis of an act or event preceding the statute’ s enactment. We first look to “ w he ther Cong r e ss has expressly pre

scribed the statute’s proper reach,” Landgraf, supr a , at 280, and in the absence of language as helpful as that we try to dra wa comparably firm conclusion about the tem

poral reachspecifically intended b yappl ying “our norma l rules of construction,” Lindhv. Mu r p h y , 521 U. S. 320, 326 (1997). If that effort fails, we ask whether applying th e statute to the person objecting w o uld have a retroactiv e consequenc e in the dis f avored sense of “affect ing substan

tive rights, liabilities, or duties [on the basis of] conduct arising before [its] enactment,” Landg raf, supra, at 27 8; see also Li ndh, supra, at 326. If the answer is yes, we then apply the presumption ag ainst retroacti vity b ycon struing the statute as inapplic able to the event or act in question owing to the “ absen[ce of] a clear ind i cation fro m Congress that it intended such a result.” INS v. St. Cy r, 533 U. S. 2 89, 316 (2001); see Martinv. Had ix, 527 U. S. 343, 352 (1999) (quoting Landg ra f, supra, at 280). Fernandez-Vargas figh ts at each s t ep of the way, argu ing that Co ngress intended that INA §241(a)(5) would n o t apply to ill egal reentrants lik e him who returned to this country bef o re the provision’ s effective date; and in any event, that application of the provision to such illegal reentrants would have an imperm issibly retroactive effect , to be avoided by applying the presumption against it. We7 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### are not persuaded by either contention. 6 

### A Needless to say, Congress did not complement the new version of §241(a)(5) with any clause expressly dealing with indivi duals who illegally reentered the country before IIRIRA’s April 1, 1997, effective date, either including them within §241(a)(5 )’s ambit or excluding them from i t
. Fernandez-Vargas a r gues instea d on the basis of the generally available interpretive rule of nega tive implica

tion, when he draws attention to langua ge governi n g temporal reach contained in the ol d reinstatement provi

sion, but missing from the current one. Section 242(f) applied to “any alien [who] has unlawfully reentered the United Sta t es after having previ o usly departed or been deported pursuant to an order of deportation, whether before or after June 27, 1952, on any ground described in

. . . subsection (e).” 8 U. S. C. §12 52(f) (1994 ed.). Accord

ing to Fernandez-Vargas, since that before-or

- after clause made it clear that the statut e applied to alie ns who reen

tered before the enact m ent date of the earlier version, its eliminationin the current iterati o n shows that Congre ss no longer meant to c o ver preen actment re entrants. See Brewste r v. Gage, 2 8 0U. S. 3 2 7 , 337 (19 3 0 ) ( “ d e l ib e r a t e selection of language .

. . differing from tha t used in the earlier Acts” can indicate “that achange of law was in

-

——————

6 The Gove rnm entur ges us t o forgo Landgraf an aly s is altog e th er because §241( a)(5) regulates only a present removal process, not past prima r y cond uct , cit i ngou r rece ntdecis i on in Repu bl ic o f Aus t ri a v. Altman n, 541 U. S

. 67 7 (2004). Al t h o u gh w e u l t i m a t e l ya g r e e w i t ht h e G o v e rn men t , inth e abs tr ac tat le as t, th atth e r e in state men tpr ov isio n conce rns it s e lf wit hpos t enact m enta ffa irs, s e e infra , at 13– 15, w e fin d t h e Gover n ment ’s a llus i on to Altmannina p t
. The Court ’s conclus ion i n th at c a se, th a t Landgraf wa s t o b e a v oided, t urned on t h e peculia rit i es of t h e Foreig nS o vereignImmunit i es Act

. S e e Altmann, supra , at 694– 696. Th ose pe c u liar i ties ar e absen t h e r e , an d w e th u s adv e r tto Land

graf , as weord i narily do.8 FERNANDEZ

- VARGAS v. GONZALES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### t e n d e d” ) ; cf. 2B N. Singer , St atut es and St atutory Construc tio n §5 1.04 , p. 24 4 (6 th re v. ed. 2 0 0 0). Bu t the cl ues are no t th a ts i m p le

. To begin with, the old befo re-or-after clause was sand

wiched between references to departure or deportation under a de portation order andto grounds for deporta tion set out in a different subsectiono f t h e I NA

. I tt h u s m o s t naturally r e ferred not to the illegal reentrybut to the alien’s previous deportation or departure. If its omission from the new subsection (a)(5) is si gnificant, its immediat e significance goes to the date of leaving this country, no t the date of illegal retu rn. Since the old clau se referred to the date of enactment of the INA in 1952, the negative implication argument from droppi ng the language is tha t the reinstatement section no long er applies t o those wh o left the country before that date. But, in 1996, application keyed to departures in 1952 or ea rlier was academic, an d the better inference is that the c l ause was removed for that reason. 7 

### If, moreover, we indulged any suggestion that omittin g the clause showed an intent to apply §241(a)(5) only to deportations or departures af ter IIRIRA’s effective date , the result would be a very strange one: it would exempt from the n e w reinstat ement prov ision’s coverage anyon e who depart ed before IIRIRA’s effe ctive date b u t reentered after it. Th e point of the statute’s revision, however, wa s obviously toexpand the scope of the reinstate m ent autho r ity and invest it with somethin g closer to finality, and it would make no sens e to in fer that Congre ss meant to except the broad class of persons who had de parted before the time of enactment but who might return illegally at some point in the future.

——————

7 We therefore need not entertain Fe rnandez-Vargas’s argument that th e pr ov ision ’ s dr aftin gh i stor yin dic ates th at th e lan g u a g e w a s elimi

nated deliberately.9 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Fernandez-Vargas sidesteps this problem ( o n a very generous reading of his argument) by ma king amore general suggestion of c o ngressiona lintent: whatever the event to which the old law was ti ed , activity be fore as well as activit yafter iti m plicated t h e reinstatement pow e r. Since the new law is bereft of such clarity, we should apply the “ ‘longstanding principle of construing any lin

gering ambiguities in deportati on statutes infavor of th e alien,’ ” St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 320 (quoting INS v. Ca r doza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 44 9 (1987)), which woul d effectively impose “[t]h e pr esumption against retroactive application of ambigu ous statutory provisions,” St. Cy r, supra , at 3 20. If we d i d so, we would find that §241(a)(5) operates only to reentries after its effective date. Even at th is amorphously general level, however, the argument s u ffers from two flaws, the first b e ing that it puts the c a rt before the horse. As Ferna n dez-Varga s realizes, h eurges application of t h e presumption against retroactivit yas a toolfor interpr e ting the s t atute att h e first Land graf step. B u t if tha t w e re legitimate, a statu t e lacking an express pro v ision abou ttemporal reach woul d never be construed as having a retroactive po tential and the final t w o steps in the Landgraf enquiry would never occur (tha t is, asking whether the statute wou l d produce a retroactive effect, and barring any such application by applying th e presumption against retroactivi ty). It is not until a stat ute is shown to have no firm provision abou t temporal reach but to produce aretroactive effect when straightforwardly applied t hat the presumption has i t s work to do. See 511 U. S., at 280. The second flaw is the argument’s failure to account fo r the new statute’s other provisio ns on temporalreach, from which one might draw a negative inference t h at subsec

tion (a)(5) was (or at l e ast may well have been) meant t o apply to re entries before its e ffective date. In contrast t o their silence about the temporal sweep of §241(a)(5), th e10 FERNANDEZ

- VARGAS v. GONZALES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### 1996 amen dments speak directly to the scope of changes in provisions making reentry criminal andsetting civil penalties. IIRIRA §324(c), 110 Stat. 3009–629, note fol

lowing 8 U. S. C. §1326 (2000 ed.), provides that the ex

panded cri minal prohibitions, see §1326(a), apply only to reentries orattempts after the effective date, and §105(b) , 110 Stat. 3 009–556, note followin g8 U. S. C. §1325, pro

vides the same as to civil pe nalties for illegal reentry, see §1325(b). The point here is not that these provisions alon e would supp ort an inference of intent to app l y the rein

statement provision retroactively, see Lindh, 521 U. S., at 328, n. 4, f o r we require a clear statement for that, see Martin, 527 U. S., a t 354. But these provisions do blunt any argum e nt that removal of the before-or-after clause suffices to establish the applicability of §241(a)(5) only to posteffective date reentries. The fact is that IIRIRA some

times expressly made changes prospective as from its effective date and sometimes ex pressly provided they were applicable to earlier acts; compare §§324(c) and 105(b), with §347(c), 110 Stat. 3009–639 (provision governing removal of aliens who have unlawfully voted is applicable “to voting occurringbefore, on , or after the date of th e enactment of this Act”), and §351(c), id., at 3009–64 0 (provision applicable to “waivers fi led before, on, or after the date of the enactm ent of this Act”). Withsuch avari

ety of treat ment, it is j u st too hard to infer any clear inten

tion at any level of generality from the fact of retiring the old before-or-after language from what is now §241(a)(5). One conclusion can be stated, however. Common prin

ciples of statutory int e rpreta tion fail to unsettle the ap

parent application of §241(a)(5) to any reentrant present in the country, wha t ever the date of return. 8

——————

8 J US TI CE S TEVENS sta t es th at w h e n , in1 952, Con g r e ss in ser t ed th e before-or-after clause with the old §242(f ) , it was resp onding to the Immig r ationa n d Natu r a liza t ionSer v ic e (INS) pr ac tic e of apply i n gth e11 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### B This facial reading i s confirmed by two features of IIRIRA, not pre v iousl ydiscussed, that describe the co n duct to which §241(a)(5) applies, and show that the appli

cation suffers from no retroa ctivity in denyin g Fernande z Vargas the opportunity for adjus t ment of status as the spouse of a citizen of the United States. 9 

### One is in the text of that provision itself, showin g that it applies to Fernan

dez-Vargas today not because he reentered i n1982 or at any other p a rticular ti me, but because he chose to remain after the new statute b e came effec t ive. The second is the provision setting IIRIRA’s effective date, §309(a), 110 Stat. 3009–625, which shows that Fernandez-Va r gas had an ample warn ing of the coming change in the law, but chose

—————— r e in statemen tpr ov isiononlyto depor tationor der s issu ed afterth e pr ov ision ’ s enac tmen t, a pr ac tic e th at n e c e ssar ilymea n t INS applie d th e pr ov ision on lyto postenac tmen t r e en tr ies. By c o rr ec tin gth e INS’s in ter p r e tationon lyas to depor tationor ders, J US TI CE S TEVENS su g g e sts, Con g r e ss did n o th in gto distu rb th e pr ac tic e as to r e en tr ies. An d w h e n it removed the obsolete bef o re-or-a fter cl ause in 1996 without adding alter n ativ e la n g u a g eof tempor al r e ac h , th e ar gu ment g o es, Con gre s s h e ld fast to i t s in ten tin1950 an d 19 52 to applyth e r e in statemen t pr ov isionon lyto po sten ac t m en t r e en tr ies. Bu tth e I N S’s pr ac tic e c i r c a 195 1 of app l y i n gth e r e in statemen tpr ov i s ionon lyto posten ac tmen t r een tr ies follow e d fr om its polic yr e g a r d i n gdepor tationor der s , an d in 1 9 5 2 Congres s mightj u st a s eas ily ha v e a s s u med t h a tt h e b r a nch would go t h e wa y of t h e ro ot
. In a n y e v ent , itis difficultt o a ccept J US TI CE S TEVENS ’s view t h a tcongres s i ona lunders t a n ding from 40 y e ar s bac k w a s in ten d ed to g o v e rnth e IIRIRA r e in sta t e m en t pr ov isio n , given Congres s ’ s ca re t o make t h e revis e d crimina l a n d civil pena lt ie s applic a b le on lyto posten ac tmen t r e en tr ies.

9 We would rea ch t h e s a me conclus ion ab o utdenia lof opport unit i es t o applyforpermiss i onforvolu n tar ydepar t u r e as analter n ativ e to r e mov a l, see 8 U. S. C. §12 29c , an d abou tc a n c e llation of r e mov a l, se e §122 9b(b), if t h er e wer e a need to deal w i thth ese matt er s separ ately

. Alth ou ghFern an dez-Var g as ar g u es th at h e is bein gden i ed th e c h a nc e to seek these forms of relief, he ne ve rapplied foreith er of th em an d h a s n o t for mallya ttemp ted to c l aim th em inr e spon se to th e r e in statemen t and removal proceedings.12 FERNANDEZ

- VARGAS v. GONZALES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### to remain until the old regimeexpired and §241(a)(5) took its place. As a preface to identifying the conduct b yFernandezVargas to which the reinstatement provision applies (t he conduct th at results in rein stating the old deportation order witho u t the form er opportu nities to seekadjustment of status), alook at our holding in St. Cyr , 533 U. S. 289, i s helpful. The alien, S t . Cyr, wa s a lawful, permanent resident wh o made a pl ea agreement and plea ded guilty to an aggrava t ed felony charge. Although the resultin g conviction justified his depo rtation, when he entered his plea the law allowed him to seek a waiver of deportation at the disc retion of the Attorney General. Between th e plea and deportation proceedings, however, IIRIRA and another statute repealed the provision for that discretion

ary relief, converting deporta tion from a po ssibility to a certainty. Id., at 325. The question was wh ether Land

graf barred application of the new law elimin ating discre

tionary relief, onthe gr ound that applying it to a d e fen

dant who pleaded guilt y before the enactment of the new law would attach a further burdensome cons equence to h i s plea, amounting to “a new dis ability, in respect to transa c tions or considerations already past,” 533 U. S., at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted). The answer was t hat converting deportation from a l i kely possibi li ty to a dea d certainty would add su ch a burden, and application of t h e new law w a s accordin gly bar red. Id., at 325

. In makin g this “comm onsense, functional judgment,” M a rtin, sup r a, at 357, we emphasized that plea agreements “involve a quid pro q u o betweena criminaldefendant and the gov

ernment,” St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 321, in whi c h a waiver of “constitutional rights (includi ng the right to a trial),” ha d been exchanged for a “perceived b e nefit,” id., at 322, whi c h in practicalterms was valued in l i ght of the possible dis

cretionary r e lief, a focus of expectation and reliance, id., at 323.13 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### St. Cyr’ s agreement for a quid pro quo and his plea were entirely past, and there was no question of undoing them, but the “transactio[n] or con s ideratio[n]” on which §241(a)(5) turns is different. 10 

### While the law looks back to a past act i nits application to “an alien [who] has reen

tered .

. . il legally,” 8 U. S. C. §1 231(a)(5), the provision does not penalize an a lien for the reentry (criminal and civil penalties do that); it establishes a proce ss to remove him “under the prior order at anytime after the reentry. ” Ibid. Thus , it is the c o nduct of r e maining in the count ry after entr y that is the predicate a ction; the st atute appli e s to stop anindefinitely continuing violation that the alien himself cou l d end at any time by voluntarily leaving th e country. Itis therefor e the alien’s choice to continue his illegal presence, after i llegal reentry an d after the effective date of the new law, th at subjects him to the new and less generous legal regime, not a pasta ct that he i s helpless t o undo up to the moment the Govern ment finds him out. That in itself is enough to explain that FernandezVargas has no retroactivity claim based on a new disabil

-

——————

10 We understand Fernandez -Vargas’ s clai m as fa lling within the s e cond of J u s t ice S t ory’s ca t e gories of ret r oa ct ivit y (newcons eq uences of past ac ts), n o t th e fi r s t c ateg o r yof can c e lin g v e sted r i gh ts. The forms of relief identifiedby Fernand ez-Va r ga s a s render ed una va ilable to h i m by§241(a)( 5 ) in c l ude c a n c e llatio nof r e mov a l, see 8 U. S. C. §122 9b(b), ad j u stmen tof st atu s, see §12 55, an d v o lu ntar ydepar t u r e, see §1 229c

. Th ese pu tat iv e c l aim s to r e lief ar e n o t “v ested r i gh ts,” a t e rm t h a tdes c rib e s s o met h ing more s u b s t a n t i a l t h a ninchoa t e expect a t i ons a n d unr ea lized opportunit i es . In co nt ra s tt o “ a nimmedia t e fixed right of prese n t or future e n joyment,” Pe arsa ll v. Great Norther n R. Co., 161 U. S

. 646 , 673(1896) (i n t ern al qu ot ation marksomitted), Fern a n dezVarg as ’ sclaim t osuch relief wascon ting e n t , a n d itwasu p t ohim t o take so m eac ti onth at w o u l d e l e v at e itab ov e th e l ev e l of h o pe . I ti s n o t th a t the s e for ms of re lief ar e di sc retion ary, c f

. St . C y r, 533 U. S

. , at 3 25; itis rath er th atbefore IIR IRA’ seffec tive date Ferna n d ez-Var g a snev e r av ailed himse lf of the m or to ok ac tion th at e n h a n c ed th eir sign ific a nce to him in partic ular , a sS t
. C yr did i n maki n g his quid pro quoagre eme n t , s ee supra , at11–12

.14 FERNANDEZ

- VARGAS v. GONZALES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### ity consequent to a completed a ct, but in fac this positi on is weaker s t ill. ForFernandez-Va r gas could not only have chosen to end his continuing violation and his exposure to the less favorable law, he even had an ample warning th at the new law could be applie d to him and ample opportu

nity to a v oid that very possibility by leaving the country and ending his violation in the pe riod between enactment of §241(a)(5 ) and its eff e ctive date. IRRIRA became law on September 30, 1996, b u t it be came effective and enforce

able only on “the first day of the first month beginning more than 180 days after” IIRIRA’s enactm ent, that is, April 1, 19 97. §309(a), 110 Stat. 3009–625. Unla wful alien reent r ants like Fernande z -Vargas thus had the advantage of a grace period between the unequivocal warning th at a tough e r removal regime lay ahead and actual imposition of the less opportune term s of the ne w law. In t hat stretchof six months, Fernandez-Vargas could have ended his il legal presence and potential expo

sure to the coming law by c r ossing back into M e xico. 11 

### F o r

——————

11 Ina ser i es of letter s su b m i tted to th e Co u r tafteror al ar g u men t , t h e pa rt ies dis p ut e t h e cons eq uences if Ferna ndez-Va r ga s ha d left v o lu n tar ilyafterIIRIRA’s en ac tmen t an d, spec ific ally , th e per i od o f ina d miss ib ility t o which Fer n a n dez-Va rga s would t h ereupon ha ve b e en s u bj ect
. Becaus e we conclu d e t h a t § 2 41( a)(5) does not operate on a c o mpleted pr e -en ac tmen t a c t, w e n e ed n o t c o n s iderth e r e tr oac t iv e implications e i ther of the fact of hi s inad miss ibi lity or of any variance betw eenth e p e r i od of in ad miss ibi lityu p ona pos t en ac tmen t v o lu n t a r y ret urn a n dt h a tpres crib e d under t h eold regime. T h eperiod of ina d

miss ibi lity ste m s from an alien’s ille gal reentry within a specified time a f

t e r aprior remova l a n d is a pplicab le t o Ferna ndez-Va r ga s b e ca us e he r een ter e d sh or tlyafterh i s 19 81 depor t ation , bu t Fe r n a n d ez-Var ga s does notcha llenge a s impermis sib l y ret r oa ct ive IIRIRA’s lengt h ening of th at per i od fr o m 5 to 1 0 or2 0 y e ar s, see 8 U. S. C. §1182 (a)(6)(B) (1 99 4 ed.); §1182(a)( 9 )(A)(ii) (20 00 ed.).

In any event, any period of i n admis s ib ilityis subjectto waiver by the Attor n e yG e ner a l, see § 1 1 82(a)( 6 )(B) (1994 ed.); §1182(a)( 9 )(A)(iii) (200 0 ed.), an d pr esu m ablyFer n a n d ez -Va r ga s could plea d his s e rious ca s e for s uch awa iver (his ma rria g e, his child) in s e eking lega l reent r y15 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### that mat t er , he could h a ve marrie dthe moth er of his son and applied for adjus t ment of sta t us during that period, in which case he would at least have had a c l aim (about which we express no opinion) that proven reliance on the old law should be hon o red by applying the presumptio n against retr oactivity. 12 

### Fernandez-Vargas did not, however, take advantage o f the statutory warning, but augmented his past 15 years of unlawful presence by remaining in the country into th e future subject to the new law, whose applicability thu s turned not on the comp leted act of reentry, buton a failure to take timely action t hat would have avoided application of the new law altogether. To be sure, a choice to avoid the new law before its effective d a te or to end the contin u ing violation thereafter would ha ve come at a high per

sonal price, for Fernan dez-Vargas would have had to leave a business and a fa mily he had established during his illegal resid e nce. But the branch o f retroactivi ty la w tha t concerns us here is meant to avoid new burdens imposed on completed acts, not all difficult choices occasioned by new law. Wh a tF e r n a n d e z - V a rg as complains of is the appli c a tio n of n e w l a w to co n tin uo usl y ille gal acti on withi n his co nt ro l b o th be fo re a n d af te r th ene w la w to ok e f fe ct
. He cl aim sa ri ght to co ntin ue il le ga l co ndu c t i n de fi ni tel y un de r the terms o n whi c h i t be ga n, a ne ntitleme n t of le gal s t a s is fo r tho s e whose la wb re a kin g is co ntin uou s . Bu t “[i] f e v ery ti me a m a nrelie d o nexi s tin g l a w in a rra n gin g hi s affa i r s , he were made sec u re ag ainstany chan ge in le ga l rules , th e whole body of our law wo uld be ossified fo re ve r. ”L. Fuller , The M o rali ty o f La w 60 (1 96 4) (quo te d in La ndgraf , 511 U

. S

. , a t 26 9, n. 2 4)

. 13

—————— to the United States.

12 See 394 F. 3d, at 8 90, an d n

. 11 (dis tin g u i sh in gFern a n d ez-Var g a s’s circums t a nce f r om t h a tof a l iens who ha d ma rried, or b o t hma rried a n d applied for adjustment of status, before IIRIRA’s effective date).

13 This is t h e nub of our dis a gr eementwit hJ US TI CE S TEVENS
. He says16 FERNANDEZ

- VARGAS v. GONZALES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Because we conclude that §241(a)(5) has no retroacti ve effect whenapplied to aliens like Fernandez-Vargas, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so orde red.

—————— it mi sse s th e poin t to s a yt h at Fer n a n d ez-Var g a s c o u l d av oid th e n e w la w b yret u r n ing t o Me xico, w h ich he t h inks is like s a ying t h a t a defendant could avoid a retroactive criminal penalty by locking himself u p for10 y e ar s, post, at 5, n

. 2. J US TI C E S TEVENS th u s ar g u es th at reimposing an order of removal to en d ille gal residence is like impo sin g a penalty for a comple ted act (the defend a nt’s unspeci fied act in his a n a l ogy). Buteven onhis own a n a l ys is , Ferna ndez-Va r ga s cont inue d to v i olate th e lawby r e main in gin th is c o u n t ryday afterday , an d J US TI CE S TEVENS does n o t d e n yth at th e Un ited S t a t es w a s en ti tled to br in gth at c o n t in u i n g v i olationto anen d. He say s , h o w e v e r , th at Con g r e ss sh ou ld n o t be un der s tood to pr ov ide th at if th e v i olatio n c o n t in u e s in to th e fu tur e it maybe en ded onter m s less fav o r able th an th ose at th e beg i n n i ng . But th is is n o t t h e positionth at r e tr oac t iv it y doct rine imput e s t o a ninexplicitCongres s . Ferna ndez-Va r ga s ma y h a v e anequ i t able ar g u men tth at th e G o v e r n m en t sh ou ld n o t, fort h e future, eliminate an opportunity fo r conti nuing illegalit y accompanied by the hopes t h at long illega l residence and a prospect of marriage gave him in t h e pa s t
. But Congres s a ppa rent ly did not a ccepts uch an a r gument , w h i ch could pre v a il here onlyif t h e pres umpt ion a g a i nst ret r oa ct ivit y amount ed t o a pres umpt ion of lega l st as is for t h e b e nefit of cont inuo us la wb rea k ers ._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
No. 04–1 37 6 

### HUM BER T O FE RNA N DEZ-V AR GAS, PE TITIONE R v. ALBE RT O R. GONZAL ES, AT T O RNEY GE N ERAL ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE TENT H CIRCUIT [Ju n e 22, 2006 ] 

### J USTICE 

### S T EVEN S 

### , dissenting. In 1982, petitioner Humberto Fernandez-Vargas, an alien who had previously been deported, reentered the United States ill egally. Over the next 20 years, petitioner remained here. He w o rked as atruc k d r iver, owned a trucking business, fathered a chil d, and eventually mar

ried the chi l d’s mother, a United S t ates citizen. The law s in place at the time of petitioner’s entry andfor the firs t 15 years of his residence in this country would have re

warded this behavior, allowing him to seek discretionar y relief from deportation on the basis of his co ntinued pres

ence in and strong ties to the United States. See 8 U. S. C. §1254(a)(1) (1994 ed.). In 1996, however, Con gress passed a new version of the applicable provision el iminating almost entirely the possi

bility of reli ef from deportati on for aliens who reenter the country illegally having previously been deported. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibil

ity Act (IIRIRA), §305(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009–5 99, 8 U. S. C. §1231(a)(5) (2000 ed.); see also ante , at 3, n. 4

. The 1996 provision is silent as to whether i twas inten d ed to appl y retroactivel yto conduct t hat predated its enactment. 1

——————

1 Th e statu tor ypr ov ision s ex pan d in gth e c l ass of peo p le to w h o m criminal pena lties for illega l reentry might apply, however, explicitly2 FERNANDEZ

- VARGAS v. GONZALES S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### Despite a historical practice supporting petitioner’s read

ing, and despite the h a rsh consequences th at attend its application to thousands of individuals wh o, like peti

tioner, entered the country illegally before 19 97, the Cou r t not only holds that th e statute applies to preenactment reentries but also that it has no retroactive effect. I dis

agree with both of these conclusions. I In 1950, when Congress first gave the Attorney General the authority to reinst ate an order of deport ation, it en

acted a reinstatement provision containing no explicit temporal reach. 2 

### See Internal S e curity Act , §23(d), 64 Stat. 1012, 8 U. S. C. §156(d) (1 946 ed., Su pp. V). The natural rea d ing of this provision, the one most consistent with the “d eeply rooted” tra ditional presumption against retroactivit y , Landgraf v. USI Film Products , 511 U. S. 244, 265 (1 994), is tha tit would a pply to deportations that occurredb e fore the provision’s enactment butnotto preenactment reentries. Wh ile both deportation and reentry canconstitute “events completed before [the provi

sion’s] enactment,” id. , at 270, an alien’s reentry is the act that triggers the provis ion’ s op erat ion and is t h erefore th e act to whic h the provision attaches legal consequences. When the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) promulgated regulations implementing the 1 950 statute , however, it did not read the sta t ute so naturally. Instead, the INS’ re gulations, embodying an overly strong version

—————— applyon lyto posten ac tmen tr e en tr ies. See IIRIRA, §32 4 (c ), 110 St at. 300 9– 629, n o t e follow i n g8 U. S. C. §1326

.

2 The provision sta t ed: “Sh o u l d an yaliensu bjec t to th e pr ov ision s of su bsec tion(c ) un law f u lly return to the United State s after havi ng been released f o r departure or depor t ed pu r s u a n tto th is se c t ion , th e pr eviou s w a r - r a n tof depor tation ag ain s t h i m s h all be c o n s id er ed as r e in st ated fr om it s or ig in al date of issu an c e .” 64 Sta t . 10 12, c o dified a s 8 U. S. C. §15 6 (d) ( 194 6 ed., Su p p . V).3 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### of the pres umption against retroactivity, provided that an order of dep o rtation could only be reinstated if that depor

tation occu rred aftert h e statute’s enactmentdate. See 8 CFR §152.5 (1950 Cu m. Supp.). Thus, the INS read the reinstatement provision as inapplicable evento reentries that occurr ed afterth e statute’s enactment date if the underlying deportation had been entered before that date ; it follows a fortiorithat the provision was considered inapplicable to reentries that occu rred before the statute’s enactment. Congress corrected th e INS’ error two year s later by adding the clause “whether before or after the date of enactment of this Act.” Immigration and Nationality Act, §242(f), 66 Stat. 212, 8 U. S. C. §1252(f) (1994 ed.); see also ante , a t2, a n d nn. 2–3. As the Co urt correctl y notes, tha t amendment “most naturally re ferred not to the illegal reentry butto the alien’s previou s deportati on or depar

ture.” Ante , at 8. The best int e rpretation of Congress’ intent with regard to the 1952 statute, then, was that it meant to apply the re instatement provision to preenact

ment deportations but to preserve the status quo with regard to p r eenactment reentri es: In accorda n ce with th e traditional presumpti o n agai nst retroactivi ty, p r eenact

ment reentries would remain uncovered by the reinstate

ment provision. In 1996, when Congress enacted the current reinstate

ment provision, itdrafted a version of the statute that, lik e its 19 50 predecessor, was s ilent as to its temporal reach. See 8 U. S. C. §1231(a)(5) (2000 ed.). If we assume (as the Co urt does) that the addition of t h e “before- or after” claus e in the 195 2 statute merely clarified Congress’ original intent in 1950 to make the provision applicable to preenactment departu r e s without authorizing any appli

cation to preenactment reentries, it is reasonable to at

tribute pre c isely the same intent to the C o ngress tha t enacted the 1996 statute: As in the 1950 an d 1952 ver

-4 FERNANDEZ

- VARGAS v. GONZALES S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### sions of the provision, Congress i n tended th e 1996 rein

statement provision to apply to preenactment deportations but not to preenactment reentries. In sum, our normal r u les of construction s u pport the reasonable presumption that Congress intended the provi

sion to cov e r only postenactm entreentries. Accordingl y, the 1996 reinstatement provision should not be construed to apply to petitioner’s earlier entry into the Unit ed States. II The Court not only fails to give the 1996 Act its most normal interpretation, but also err o neously concludes that the provision does not have anyretroactive effect. The Court reaches this conclusion ba sed on its j u dgment th at the provision applies n o t to conduct that occ u rred before the statute’s enactment date, butr a ther to “anindefinitely continuing violation th at the alien himself c o uld end a t any time b yvoluntarily leaving the country.” Ante , a t13. This reason ing is unpersuasive. It is true, of course, that the order of deportation en

tered against petitioner in 1981 could not be reinstated unless he w a s present in the United States, an d that, unti l he was arrested in 2003, petitioner could have chosen to leave the United States. But it is precisel y petitioner’ s “continuing violation” that allowed him to b e eligible f o r relief from deportation in the first place: He was require d to have bee nphysically present in the United States for a period of not less than seven years, to have been a person of good moral charact e r duri ng that time, and to have developed ties to the U n ited State s such that his deporta

tion would result in extreme hard s hip to himself or to his United Sta t es citizen wife or c h ild. 3

### See 8 U. S. C.

——————

3 Alth ou ghpetition erbec a me elig ible forr e lief fr om depo r tationafter being physically present in the Unit ed St at es for s e ven yea r s , he could nota pply for t h a trelief unt il t h e Gove rn mentpla c ed him in deport a -5 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### §1254(a)(1) (1994 ed.); see al so INS v. Phin pathya , 46 4 U. S. 183 (1984) (strictly construing physical presence requiremen t). Moreover, under the pre-1996 version of the reinstatement provision, thelonger petitioner re

mained in the United States the more lik ely he was to be granted relief from deportation. See Matter of Ige , 20 I. & N. Dec. 880, 882 (1994) (listin gfactors considered i n evaluating extreme hardship requirement, including alien’s l e ngth of resid e nce inUnited States, family i n United States, busine ss or occu pation, an d position in community)

. Given thes e incentives, petitioner legitimately com

plains that the Government has change dthe rul e s midgame. At the time of his entry, and for the next 15 years, it inured to peti tioner’s benefit for him to remain in the United States conti nuously, to build a busi n ess, and to start a family. After April 1, 1997, the date on which the applicable reinstatement provision became effective, all of these activities were rendered irrelevant in th e eyes of the law. Only the Court’s unfortunately formalistic search for a single “past act tha t[petit ioner] is helpless to undo, ” ante , at 13, allows it to concludethat the provi s ion at issu e has no retroactive effect. 4

### For regardless of whether his

—————— t i on proceedings , a twhich pointhe co uld raise hi s el igibili ty as a n affirmative de fense. Cf. Hugh es Ai rcraf tCo. v. Unite dStates ex re l

. Schume r , 520 U. S. 939, 9 5 1 –95 2 (1 997) ( a pply i n gpr esumptionag ain s t retroactivity to statute eli m i n ating affirmative defense).

4 Even on it s own t e rms t h e Court ’s logic is t r oub ling. The Court b e l i e ves t h at pet i t i oner coul d ha ve a v oi ded b e i n g a ffect ed b yt h e 1 996 r e in statemen tpr ov ision , n o t ju st r e tr oac t i v elybu t inan yw a yw h atso

ever, by leavi n g the co untry prior to its effective date—a date that oc c u r r e d six mon t h s after th e sta t u t e’s en ac tmen t da te n o t to g i v e a liens “ a mple wa rning ,” ante , at 1 1 , 1 3 , b u t in ste a d to allowth e At to r n e yG e n e r a l to pr epar e forth e su bstan tial c h a n g es c a u s ed byth e IIRIRA an d to pr omu l g ate r e g u lation s to e ffec t u ate th at Ac t. See §3 09 , 110 Sta t . 300 9–6 25. Bu t h a d petition e r“take[n ] adv a n tag e of th e s t at ut ory wa r n ing,” ante , a t1 5 , he wouldha ve impos e d upon hims elf6 FERNANDEZ

- VARGAS v. GONZALES S TEVENS , J., di ssenting 

### 1982 reentry was or was not anact that h e could now “undo,” it is certainly an act to which the 1996 reinstate

ment provision has attached s e rious adverse conse

quences. B e cause the provision h a s an undeniably harsh retroactive effect, “absent a cl ear indication fr om Congres s that it intended such a result,” INS v. St. C y r , 533 U. S. 289, 316 (2 001), we sh ould apply the presumption against retroactivity and hold that the 19 96 reinstatement provi

sion does n o t apply to petitioner. Accordin gly , I respectfully dissent.

—————— t h e verys a me punis h ment—t he gua r a n t e e of remova l t o Mexico—t h a t he hopes to av oid. Just as we would no t say that a defendant may av oid th e r e tr oac t iv e applic ationof a c r i min a l s tatu te byloc k in gh i m self u p for10 y e ar s, it c a nn ot be th at petition er ’s abil i tyto leav e th e count r yof his own a ccord s o mehow helps to prove t h a t the provis ion at issue has no retroactive effect.