UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MELVIN CHRISTIAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 09-13337

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

WELLS FARGO BANK, ARGENT

MORTGAGE, THE COUNTY OF WAYNE,

and TROTT & TROTT,

Defendants.

____________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER 

At a session of said Court, held in the U.S.

District Courthouse, Eastern District

of Michigan, on September 3, 2009.

PRESENT: THE HONORABLE PATRICK J. DUGGAN

 U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Plaintiff initiated this pro se action against Defendants on August 24, 2009,

challenging foreclosure proceedings related to real property located at 11395 Vaughan in

Detroit, Michigan (“property”). On August 31, 2009, Plaintiff filed an “Ex Parte

Emergency Motion for Automatic Stay of Proceedings in the 36th District Court or in the

Alternative for Temporary Restraining Order.” For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s

motion is denied.

Background

According to Plaintiff’s Complaint and pending motion, on or about May 7, 2005,

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2

Plaintiff signed a mortgage on the property in connection with a loan from Defendant

Wells Fargo Bank (“Wells Fargo”). (Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff claims that he was not

provided with the “Notice of Right to Cancel” document at the closing, in violation of the

Truth in Lending Act. (Id. ¶ 7.) Apparently Plaintiff subsequently defaulted on the loan

and foreclosure proceedings were initiated, resulting in a foreclosure sale. Plaintiff

alleges that Adrienne Sanders, who executed the Sheriff’s Deed following the foreclosure

sale, misrepresented that she was duly authorized to act as a “deputy Sheriff” when she in

fact was not a deputy, undersheriff or sheriff. (Id. ¶ 1; Mot. ¶ 3.)

It appears that proceedings subsequently were instituted in the 36th District Court

for the State of Michigan to evict Plaintiff from the property. A hearing in the eviction

proceedings was held in the 36th District Court on August 28, 2009. (Mot. ¶ 5.) 

Apparently a judge of the district court issued a Writ of Eviction, as Plaintiff now asks

this Court to stay the writ or issue a temporary restraining order preventing Defendant

Wells Fargo from evicting Plaintiff from the Property. (Id. ¶ 8.)

Analysis

Plaintiff seeks relief from the state court’s eviction order in his pending motion. 

Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks subject matter to grant Plaintiff

relief. Under that doctrine, “lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to

review the decisions of state courts.” Givens v. Homecomings Financial, 278 Fed. App’x

607, 608-09 (6th Cir. May 20, 2008) (unpublished opinion) (attached as Ex. 1) (citing

D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 1311 (1983) and Rooker

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3

v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S. Ct. 149, 150 (1923)). As the Supreme Court

recently clarified, application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “is confined to . . . cases

brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments

rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting [federal] district

court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517,1521-22 (2005).

The circumstances of the present case are identical to those in Givens. Like the

plaintiff in that case, Plaintiff lost a state court foreclosure and possession action that

culminated in an eviction order. Givens, 278 Fed. App’x at 608. Also like the plaintiff in

Givens, Plaintiff is asking a federal district court to temporarily enjoin the execution of

the state court order. As the Sixth Circuit concluded in Givens, this Court lacks

jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s request.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Emergency Motion for Automatic Stay

or Proceedings in the 36th District Court or in the Alternative for Temporary Restraining

Order is DENIED.

s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Melvin Christian

11395 Vaughan St.

Detroit, MI 48228

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Exhibit 1

This case was not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter.

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter See Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1

generally governing citation of judicial decisions issued on or after Jan. 1, 2007. See also Sixth

Circuit Rule 28. (Find CTA6 Rule 28)

United States Court of Appeals,

Sixth Circuit.

Jason GIVENS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, Defendant-Appellee,

Trott & Trott, P.C., Defendant-Appellee,

Susan Myers, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 07-2359.

May 20, 2008.

Background: Mortgagor brought Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) action against

mortgagee following state court order granting mortgagee possession of residence due to

mortgagor's default. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed

the action. Mortgagor appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Rogers, Circuit Judge, held that:

(1) federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over action under Rooker- Feldman doctrine, and

(2) action was also barred by res judicata.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes

[1] Courts 106 509

106 Courts

 106VII Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction

 106VII(B) State Courts and United States Courts

 106k509 k. Vacating or Annulling Decisions. Most Cited Cases

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Federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)

action brought against mortgagee following state court order granting mortgagee possession of

residence due to mortgagor's default on mortgage, under Rooker- Feldman doctrine, since FDCPA

action was effectively an attempt to appeal the state court order. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,

§ 802 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692 et seq.

[2] Mortgages 266 497(1)

266 Mortgages

 266X Foreclosure by Action

 266X(K) Judgment or Decree

 266k497 Conclusiveness, Operation, and Effect of Judgment or Decree

 266k497(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) action that was brought against mortgagee after state

court order granted mortgagee possession of residence due to mortgagor's default on mortgage was

barred by res judicata, since it was based on issue of whether mortgagee was entitled to possession

of the property, and this issue had been litigated in the state courts. Fair Debt Collection Practices

Act, § 802 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692 et seq.

*608 On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.

Before: ROGERS, COOK, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge.

**1 Jason Givens appeals the dismissal of his Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) action

under the doctrines of Rooker- Feldman and res judicata. Givens's mortgagee obtained a state court

order granting it possession of Givens's residence after he defaulted on his home mortgage. Givens

then filed the immediate action in district court, seeking an injunction barring the enforcement of

the order of possession. Because Givens's suit is essentially an appeal from a state court decision,

we affirm. The federal district courts do not hear appeals from state courts.

In December 2004, Givens executed a mortgage on his home. He defaulted on the loan shortly

thereafter, and the mortgagee, JP Morgan Chase bank, foreclosed. After a sheriff's sale was held, JP

Morgan Chase brought an eviction action in Michigan's 36th District Court. That court issued an

order granting possession to JP Morgan Chase and requiring Givens to vacate the premises. Givens

appealed that judgment to the Wayne County Circuit Court, but the appeal was dismissed due to his

failure to file a transcript of the lower court proceedings.

In December 2006, Givens brought the instant action in federal district court against Homecomings

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Financial, who was JP Morgan Chase's loan servicer, as well as against the attorneys who assisted

JP Morgan Chase in the state proceedings. Givens alleged that defendants violated the FDCPA by

failing to provide him with sufficient verification of his debt. He also brought related claims for

conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of RICO. Foremost among the

remedies requested, Givens asked that the district court issue a preliminary injunction enjoining

defendants from entering the property at issue and “dispos[ing] of” the order of possession. After

defendants moved for summary judgment, the district court dismissed Givens's complaint. The

district court concluded that, under the Rooker- Feldman doctrine, it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over the suit because Givens was asking it to reverse the state court judgment. In the

alternative, it held that Givens's suit was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as his claims were

either litigated, or could have been, during the state proceeding.

[1] The district court was correct. Because Givens is effectively attempting to appeal from the state

order granting possession to JP Morgan Chase, his suit was properly dismissed under RookerFeldman. Pursuant to that doctrine, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction*609 to

review the decisions of state courts. D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303,

75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362

(1923). As the Supreme Court has recently clarified, however, the application of Rooker- Feldman

is confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court

review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.

280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). Thus, Rooker- Feldman deprives a lower court

of jurisdiction only when the cause of the plaintiff's complaints is the state judgment itself.

McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir.2006).

**2 Givens's suit fits squarely within this narrow range of cases over which jurisdiction does not

exist. It is clear from his complaint that the source of Givens's injuries is the state possession order.

Revealingly, the primary relief that Givens requests in his complaint is a temporary injunction that

would “enjoin Defendants from physically entering onto plaintiff[']s property” and that would

“dispos[e] ... of any other civil or procedural action regarding the subject property.” Because the

point of this suit is to obtain a federal reversal of a state court decision, dismissal on the grounds of

Rooker- Feldman was appropriate.FN1 See Kafele v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, L.P.A., 161

Fed.Appx. 487, 489-90 (6th Cir.2005) ( Rooker- Feldman barred FDCPA action filed after entry of

state foreclosure decree and order of sale).

FN1. Even assuming that Givens's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress

could be construed as independent claims for relief, he has not made any arguments that

even remotely assert this on appeal. This court consequently declines to address that issue.

See Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 305 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir.2002).

[2] For similar reasons, Givens's suit is also barred by the doctrine of res judicata. As discussed,

Givens's arguments all come down to one premise: that JP Morgan Chase was not entitled to

possession of the property in question. That issue, however, has already been litigated in the

Michigan courts. Under Michigan law, a party may not bring a second, subsequent action when “(1)

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the prior action was decided on the merits, (2) both actions involve the same parties or their privies,

and (3) the matter in the second case was, or could have been, resolved in the first.” Adair v. State,

470 Mich. 105, 680 N.W.2d 386, 396 (2004). Because all of those criteria are satisfied here,

dismissal was proper.

C.A.6 (Mich.),2008.

Givens v. Homecomings Financial

278 Fed.Appx. 607, 2008 WL 2121008 (C.A.6 (Mich.))

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