UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CATHERINE HOELSCHER,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 09-11581

HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI

OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT ADOPTING THE REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are Plaintiff Catherine Hoelscher’s Objections to the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”). (Doc. 17; Doc. 16). The R&R recommends

that the Court deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56 and grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56 (Doc. 8; Doc. 14). The Magistrate Judge found that substantial

evidence supported the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) and the Commissioner of Social

Security’s (“Commissioner”) decision denying benefits. (Doc. 16 at 10). For the reasons

discussed below, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s R&R in its entire. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED, and the findings of the Commissioner are AFFIRMED.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
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A. Procedural Facts

On January 25, 2005, Plaintiff Catherine Hoelscher applied for Supplemental

Security Disability benefits alleging a disability onset date of May 17, 2002. (Tr. 44). After

the initial denial of the claim, she requested an administrative hearing, which was held

before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on May 8, 2008. (Tr. 420). Plaintiff testified

at the hearing and was represented by counsel. (Id.). On September 3, 2008, the ALJ

found Plaintiff not disabled because she could perform a significant number of limited lightlevel jobs despite her impairments. (Tr. 17-26). On April 9, 2009, the Appeals Council

denied review and concluded the ALJ’s decision stands as the Commissioner’s final

decision. (Tr. 6-9). 

On April 28, 2009, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff filed for judicial review

of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. (Doc. 1). The case was referred to United States

Magistrate Judge Virginia M. Morgan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. (Doc. 3). The parties

filed cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

The Magistrate Judge entered a R&R granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment

finding the Commissioner’s nondisability determination was supported by substantial

evidence. 

B. Plaintiff’s Medical History

As the parties do not object to the R&R’s recitation of the background facts

concerning Plaintiff’s medical history, the Court adopts those portions of the R&R here.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
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A district court must conduct a de novo review of the parts of a Magistrate Judge’s

R&R to which a party objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court “may accept, reject,

or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.”

Id. The requirement of de novo review “is a statutory recognition that Article III of the

United States Constitution mandates that the judicial power of the United States be vested

in judges with life tenure.” United States v. Shami, 754 F.2d 670, 672 (6th Cir.1985).

Accordingly, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) to “insure[ ] that the district judge

would be the final arbiter” of a matter referred to a magistrate judge. Flournoy v. Marshall,

842 F.2d 875, 878 (6th Cir.1987).

The Court must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions so long as the Commissioner

applied the correct legal standards and made findings of fact that are supported by

substantial evidence in the record. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th

Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate evidence in support a conclusion. Id. This means that administrative findings

are not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence exists in the

record to support a different conclusion. The substantial evidence standard

presupposes that there is a ‘zone of choice’ within which the [Commissioner]

may proceed without interference from the courts. If the [administrative]

decision is supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court must affirm.

Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit

has further explained, “[i]f supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's decision

must be affirmed, even if the reviewing court would decide the case differently and even

if the claimant's position is also supported by substantial evidence. Linscomb v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 25 Fed.Appx. 264, 266 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS
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A. Plaintiff’s Objections to the R&R

Plaintiff raises two main objections to the R&R. First, she argues that the Magistrate

Judge and the ALJ failed to follow the Social Security Administration’s rules and regulations

when evaluating Plaintiff’s credibility concerning her subjective complaints of pain and

functional limitations. (Doc. 17 at 1). Second, she contends it was legal error for both the

Magistrate Judge and the ALJ to reject Dr. Kodali’s opinion concerning Plaintiff’s mental

residual function capacity (“RFC”). (Doc. 17 at 3). Each objection is reviewed and

discussed below.

B. The ALJ Followed the Applicable SSA Rules and Regulations

Plaintiff argues she was prejudiced in this matter because the ALJ’s findings did not

adequately address her credibility. (Doc. 17, 1-3). She contends her subjective complaints

of pain and physical limitations are consistent with the medical evidence from her treating

physicians, her treating physicians opinions on her RFC, and her alleged inability to

perform substantial gainful activity. 

The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly stated “[t]he ALJ's credibility findings are subject

to substantial deference on review.” White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 287 (6th

Cir. 2009) (citing Barker, at 795). “It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court,

to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including that of the claimant.” Rogers v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007). In cases where an ALJ expressly states

she has considered SSR 96-7p, and there is no indication she failed to do so, an ALJ’s

credibility determination should not be disturbed. White, 572 F.3d at 287. The Sixth

Circuit has also stated, “while credibility determinations regarding subjective complaints rest
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with the ALJ, those determinations must be reasonable and supported by substantial

evidence.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 249.

The Court has reviewed the ALJ’s credibility determination and finds that it is

supported by substantial evidence. When deciding Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ expressly

considered 20 C.F.R. § 1529 and SSRs 96-4p and 96-7p. (Tr. 21). There is no indication

the ALJ did not consider these rules and regulations. Thus, the credibility finding is due

substantial deference. White, 572 F.3d at 287. 

The ALJ’s decision includes a detailed, four page analysis on how the objective

medical evidence does not support certain parts of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (Tr.

21-24). The ALJ methodically identified the record evidence which undermines certain

portions of Plaintiff’s complaints of pain, mental distress, and allegations of severe physical

limitation. Throughout the credibility analysis, the ALJ separates record supported

subjective complaints from unsupported complaints. 

The ALJ’s separation of Plaintiff’s non-credible limitations from credible complaints

shows that the ALJ engaged in a more than adequate credibility determination. Though

the ALJ rejected some of Plaintiff’s unsupported complaints, the ALJ did not find Plaintiff

unimpaired. Indeed, the ALJ incorporated many of Plaintiff’s credible physical and

psychiatric restrictions into the hypothetical questioning of the vocational expert as well as

Plaintiff’s RFC assessment. Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was capable of

performing jobs only with a limited range of light, simple, repetitive work which allowed her

to alternate between standing and sitting every 30 to 45 minutes. The ALJ included further

work restrictions: no repetitive shoulder use, no production pace requirements, no work with

general public or close contact with co-workers, and no work as part of a group in which
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the group depended on Plaintiff’s performance. (Tr. 448-451). The ALJ’s credibility

determination is reasonable given that she throughly analyzed and incorporated credible

limitations into Plaintiff’s RFC assessment while rejecting those which were unsupported.

 C. The ALJ Properly Discounted the Weight of Dr. Kodali’s Opinion

Plaintiff contends that it was legal error for the Magistrate Judge and ALJ to

conclude that treatment notes of Dr. Kodali do not support the doctor’s conclusions in the

Medical Source Statement concerning Plaintiff’s RFC. (Doc. 17 at 3). Plaintiff argues Dr.

Kodali is a treating physician and that there is no medical evidence which contradicts Dr.

Kodali’s opinion of Plaintiff’s RFC. 

The opinion of a consulting physician is not entitled to the deference due the opinion

of a treating physician. Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994). The Sixth

Circuit explained, “[t]he treating physician doctrine is based on the assumption that a

medical professional who has dealt with a claimant and his maladies over a long period of

time will have a deeper insight into the medical condition of the claimant than will a person

who has examined a claimant but once....” Id. (internal citation omitted). The rationale

behind the treating physician doctrine is absent from the consultative or “one-time”

examining relationship.

Based on the administrative record, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that

Dr. Kodali is not a treating physician. The Sixth Circuit has observed, “a plethora of

decisions unanimously hold that a single visit does not constitute an ongoing treatment

relationship.” Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 167 Fed.Appx. 496, 505 (6th Cir. 2006). 

Plaintiff’s objections simply assume that Dr. Kodali is a treating doctor. The record does

not support such an assumption. Plaintiff testified that she first saw Dr. Kodali sometime
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in January 2008. (Tr. 436). On April 9, 2008, one month before Plaintiff’s administrative

hearing, Dr. Kodali issued a Medical Source Statement concerning Plaintiff’s mental

limitations -. (Tr. 371 - 374 ). The record shows only the single January visit and is silent

as to any treatment plan, subsequent office visits, or details of the relationship between

Plaintiff and Dr. Kodali. This one-time visit does not make Dr. Kodali a “treating” source.

Accordingly, Dr. Kodali’s opinion is not due controlling weight.

Plaintiff’s objection that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Kodali’s Medical Source

Statement because the doctor’s own treatment notes do not support his opinion is a

mischaracterization of the record. The ALJ concluded that other treatment notes in the

record do not substantiate Dr. Kodali’s opinion and thus assigned greater weight to that

evidence. (Tr. 24). In fact, the record does not contain any of Dr. Kodali’s treatment notes,

only the doctor’s conclusory mental health opinion. An ALJ “is not bound by conclusory

statements of doctors, particularly where they are unsupported by detailed objective criteria

and documentation.” Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

After review, the Court finds that Dr. Kodali’s Mental Source Statement does not include

detailed objective criteria nor any supporting documentation, thus the ALJ properly

discounted its weight. Moreover, the ALJ expressly applied 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d) in

rejecting Dr. Kodali’s opinion. (Tr. 24). 

Given that Dr. Kodali is not a treating source, the ALJ was not required to provide

detailed findings about why Dr. Kodali’s opinion was given little weight. Kornecky, 167 Fed.

Appx. at 507-508. No purpose is served by remanding to the ALJ for a more explicitly

discussion on how the record treatment notes contradict Dr. Kodali’s conclusory Medical

Source Statement. See, Kornecky, 167 Fed. Appx. at 507 (“[n]o principle of administrative
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law or common sense requires us to remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion unless

there is reason to believe that remand might lead to a different result.” (citing Fisher v.

Bowen, 869 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir.1989) (citation omitted))). Additionally, there is no

reason to depart from the usual harmless-error rule when the ALJ merely failed to give a

detailed explanation why she gave less weight to a one-time examining opinion. Id. 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s objections, a remand will not lead to a different result because,

in addition to permissibly discounting the opinion under 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d), the ALJ

identified record medical evidence which contradicts Dr. Kodali’s opinion. (Tr. 24).

Psychiatric treatment notes that are concurrent with Plaintiff’s visit with Dr. Kodali

undermine Dr. Kodali’s conclusions. (Tr. 24, 352-359). These notes describe Plaintiff as

properly groomed, depressed but with appropriate affect, having normal mental and

language abilities, as well as normal thought content. (Tr. 352-359). Such evidence

conflicts with a majority of Dr. Kodali’s summary conclusions. As with Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints, the ALJ resolved the conflict by incorporating Dr. Kodali’s record supported

opinions in her RFC assessment, while rejecting the doctor’s conclusory limitations. The

ALJ’s resolution of the conflict is within the “zone of choice” accorded to the fact finder at

the administrative hearing level under Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1986) (en

banc). The Court finds the ALJ’s decision discounting certain portions of Dr. Kodali’s

Mental Source Statement was supported by substantial evidence. 

V. CONCLUSION

The Court has reviewed de novo the entire record and the pleadings, giving

particular attention to those portions of the record relevant to Plaintiff's objections. 28
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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The Court finds that substantial evidence supports

the Commissioner’s decision denying disability benefits. Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, (Doc. 8), is DENIED, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

(Doc. 14), is GRANTED, and the findings of the Commissioner are AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 s/Marianne O. Battani 

 MARIANNE O. BATTANI

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: October 20, 2010

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served upon counsel of record on this date by ordinary

mail and/or electronic filing.

s/Bernadette M. Thebolt

Case Manager