UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

EARLAND J. COLLINS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case Number: 09-CV-11785

Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds

WARREN POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING 42 U.S.C. §1983 CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT

AND CONCLUDING THAT AN APPEAL CANNOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH

I.

Plaintiff Earland J. Collins, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Oaks

Correctional Facility in Manistee, Michigan, filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is proceeding without prepayment of the filing fee in this action under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Plaintiff filed this complaint as a result of his confinement in the Wayne

County Jail in Detroit, Michigan; Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully convicted and

incarcerated. He names Detective Timothy Maniere and Detective Eidt, the “Police Officers

Involved,” and P.O. Krist, Isaacson, Robert Schaffner, Michael Laruso, Darcy Leutzinger,

Chester Holub, John Newman III, the “Crime Scene Officers,” as Defendants. In his pro se

pleadings, Plaintiff alleges that the convictions for which he is currently incarcerated are based

upon police misconduct, perjury and obstruction of justice. However, Plaintiff has failed to

specifically identify what each Defendant did or did not do, and has failed to provide the Court

with the necessary addresses of Defendants. Plaintiff is seeking, among other things, monetary

damages.

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The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se pleadings under “less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and

accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. 

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying those standards, the Court will dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court also concludes that an appeal cannot

be taken in good faith.

II.

A.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996) 

(“PLRA”), a court is required to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before

service on a defendant if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when it is clear that no relief could be

granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the

complaint. Jones v. City of Carlisle, 3 F.3d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1177

(1994). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed

by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v.

Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for

vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under

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§ 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510

U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal because he challenges his wrongful

conviction and incarceration–which fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. A claim under § 1983 is an appropriate remedy for a state prisoner

challenging a condition of his imprisonment, see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973),

not the validity of his continued confinement. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87

(1994) (holding that a state prisoner does not state a cognizable civil rights claim challenging his

imprisonment if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his continuing confinement

invalid, until and unless the reason for his continued confinement has been reversed on direct

appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into

question by a federal court’s issuance or a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254). This

holds true regardless of the relief sought by the plaintiff. Id. at 487-89.

Heck and other Supreme Court cases, when “taken together, indicate that a state

prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)–no matter the relief sought

(damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to

conviction or internal prison proceedings)–if success in that action would necessarily

demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74,

81-82 (2005).

Plaintiff alleges that he was imprisoned for a crime that he did not commit. According to

Plaintiff, false warrants and false police reports, which caused his imprisonment, were fabricated

by Defendants. A judgment in favor of Plaintiff would imply the invalidity of his conviction. 

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Plaintiff’s conviction has not been overturned or declared invalid. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to

state any claims upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; his claims are barred

by Heck and must be dismissed. 

III.

Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s

action fails to state a claim and will therefore be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),

1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611

(6th Cir.1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no

good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the

appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is

barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is

barred, he will be required to pay the appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

This dismissal counts as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A judgment

consistent with this opinion will be entered.

s/Nancy G. Edmunds 

Nancy G. Edmunds

United States District Judge

Dated: June 4, 2009

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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or

counsel of record on June 4, 2009, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Carol A. Hemeyer 

Case Manager

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