August 29, 1951 

Hon. D. K. Woodward, Jr., Chairman 

Board of Regents 

The.University of Texas 

Austin, Texas Opinion No. V- 1263 

Re: Oath requirement for Uni- ’ 

versity of Texas employees 

in view of the ‘Non-Subversive Oath” provision of the 

Dear Sir: general appropriation bill, 

Ybur request for an opinion is in part as follows: 

;. 

“I respectfully requ&t your opinion on the question of the proper procedure to be followed by The 

University of Texas in complying with the statutory 

provisions requiring the execution of loyalty oaths by 

its employees. There are three statutes on this subject: 

“(I) Article 29088, Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes (Acts 1941-47th Leg., p. 1355, ch. 617) requires 

the execution of the Constitutional oath required to be 

taken by members of the Legislature and all other officers. 

“(2) Article 2908b, ~Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes (Acts 1949, 51st Leg., p. 1368, ch. 621) requires 

the execution of an oath to the effect, among other 

things, that the affiant does not believe in the overthrow of the government by violence or other unlawful means and that the affiant is not,and has not been 

during the past two years a member of a society or 

group advocating such overthrow. 

“(3) 2ection 1 of Article VI, entitled “General 

Provisions , of House Bill No. 426 (the general ap- 

~propriation bill) passed by the 52nd Legislature requires the execution of an oath to the effect;among 

other things, that .the affiant has not be,en during the 

past ten years a member of any organization listed by 

the Attorney General’:of the United States in 1947 as 

being subversive. 

,E’ 
Hon. D. K.~ Woodward, Jr., Page 2 (V-1263) 

“In order that The University of Texas may follow the correct procedure in making contracts with 

its employees and in paying their compensation, we 

respectfully ask your opinion and advice as to which 

of the above mentioned oaths should be required of 

our employees. 

“The question has been raised because of the 

fact that the Legislature has dealt with the matter as 

a subject of general legislation in Articles 2908a and 

2908b, and the Constitution of Texas has been interpreted in similar cases so as to prohibit the amendment, change, or enaqtment of general legislation in 

an appropriation bill. It presents the problem of whether the rider in the appropriation bill is constitutional, 

and if so. whether the loyalty oath therein required 

shall be substituted for the oath required by Article 

2908a or Article 2908b or whether any two or all three 

of these oaths must be executed by employees of the 

state-supported institutions of higher learning.” 

Article 2908a, V.C.S. (Acts of the 47th Leg., R.S. 1941, 

ch. 617, p. 1355) was passed in 1941 and required an oath of allegiance by teachers, instructors and employees of all tax-supported 

institutions of learning in Texas. This oath has the same wording 

as the constitutional oath required of all State officers. The oath 

reads : 

6. 

I, ) do solemnly swear (or affirm), that I will faithfugy execute the duties of the 

office of of the State of Texas, and will 

to the best of my ability preserve, protect, and defend 

the Constitution and laws of the United States and of 

this State; and I furthermore solemnly swear?(or a& 

firm), that I have not directly nor indirectly paid, offered, or promised to pay, contributed, nor promised 

to contribute any money, or valuable thing, or promised any public office or employment, as a reward for 

the giving or withholding a vote at the election at which 

I was elected. So help me God.” Article XVI, Section 

1, Texas Constitution. 

In 1941 the Legislature enacted Article 2908b, V.C.S. 

(Acts of the 51st Leg., 1949, ch. 621, p. 1368), which applies to 

students as well as employees of all State-supported universities 

and colleges. This statute requires the following oath: 
. 

Han D, K. Woodward, Jr., Page 3 (V-1263) 

“I swear or affirm that I believe in and approve 

the Constitution of the United States and the principles of government therein contained, and will not in 

any manner aid~or assist in any effort or movement 

to subvert or destroy the government of the United 

States or of any State or of any political subdivision 

thereof by force, violence, or any other unlawfulmeans. 

In the event of war with any foreign nation, I will not 

support or adhere to the government of such foreign 

nation 

“I swear or affirm that I am not and have not 

during the past two (2) years been a member of or affiliated with any society or group of persons which 

teaches or advocates that the government of the United 

States or of any State or of any political subdivision 

thereof should be overthrown or destroyed by force, 

violence, or any other unlawful means, or the adherence to the government of any foreign nation in the 

event of war between the United States and such foreign nation. ” 

No person is to be admitted or employed by any of 

these institutions until he has taken the oath, Provisions aremade 

for a hearing and appeal for any person accused and found guilty 

of violating the oath. To our best knowledge, the requirements of 

these statutes have been fully complied with in all respects since 

their passage, and you indicate in your request that they are being 

complied with at The University of Texas 

The Fifty-second Legislature attached a rider in the 

general appropriation bill (House Bill No. 426, Acts 52nd Leg., 

R.S. 1951, ch. 499, p. 1228) which provides: 

“Set 1. No money appropriated by this Act shall 

be paid to any person as salary or as compensation for 

personal services unless and until such person has filed 

with the payroll clerk or official by whom such salary 

or other compensation is certified for payment, an oath 

or affirmation stating: 

“(a) That the affiant is not, and has never been, 

a member of the Communist Party. (The term ‘Communist Party’ as used herein means any organization 

which (a) is substantially directed, dominated or controlled by the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics or 

its satellites, or which (b) seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States or of any State by force, 

violence or any other unlawful means); and 
. ’ 

Hon. D. K. Woodward, Jr., Page 4 (V-1263) 

“(b) That the affiant is not, and for a period of 

at least ten (.lO) years has ,not been, a member of any 

organization, association, movement, group or combination which the Attorney General of the United 

States, acting pursuant to Executive Order>No. 9835, 

March 21, 1947, 12 Federal Register 1,935, has designated as totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or ., 

approving the commission of acts of force or violence. 

to deny others their rights under the Constitution of 

the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of 

Government of the United States by unconstitutional 

means; and 

“(c) That the affiant is not, and for a period of 

at least ten (10) years has not been, a member of any 

‘Communist Political Organization’ or ‘Communist 

Front Organization’ registered under the Federal Internal Security Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.A. 781, et seq.) 

or required to so register under said Act by final order of the Federal Subversive Activities Control Board.*’ 

“Sec. 2. The various agencies, departments, 

boards and institutions for which appropriations are 

made in this Act shall obtain and make available to 

their employees, the names of organizations, associations, movements) groups and combinations comprehended by subdivisions (b) and (c) above in order that 

such employees can readily perceive whether they can 

lawfully and truthfully file the oath or affirmation required herein.“’ Article VI, p. 1447. 

Based upon these facts and summarizing your request, 

the following is the question presented for our consideration: Is 

the “Non-Subversive 0ath”required by Article VI of the General 

Provisions of House Bill No. 426, Fifty-second Legislature, R.S. 

1951, ch. 499, p. 1228, constitutional, and, if so, does it supersede 

either or both of the oaths required by Articles 2908a and 2908b. 

V.C.S.? 

The most serious problem which ,must be considered 

in answering your question is whether legislation such as the rider 

prescribing the “Non-Subversive Oath” can be constitutio,nally included in a general appropriation bill. If the above-quoted language 

were included in a general statute the problem presented would be 

far less difficult. The .Legislature may enact many provisions of 

law in a general statute which it cannot include in a general appropriation bill. The primary constitutional limitation upon the subject matter of riders in a general appropriation bill is Section 35 
Hon. D. K. Woodward, Jr., Page 5 (V-1263) 

of Article III of the Texas Constitution, which provides: 

“No bill, (except general appropriation bills, 

which, may embrace the various subject8 and accounts, 

for and on account of which moneyn are appropriated) 

shall contain more than one subject, which shall be 

expressed in its title. But if any subject shall be embraced ,in an act, w~hich shall not be expressed in the 

title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof, as shall not be so expressed.” 

The courts.of this State and many opinions of the Attorney General have held that under this constitutional provision 

general legislation cannot be contained in a general appropriation 

bill. The rule in this regard is set out in Attorney General’s 

Opinion No, V-1254 (1951) as follows,: 

“As long as a general appropriation bill includes 

only subjects of appropriating money and limiting the 

use thereof in harmony with general legislation, it may 

relate to any number of ,different ‘subjects and accounts.’ 

In such instances all of the subjects are under the one 

general object and purpose of appropriating funds from 

the treasury. The obvious purpose of this limited exception was to make certain that appropriations to more 

than one department in the same bill would not be prohibited. In all other respects generdl appropriation 

bills are subject to the same prohibition as all other 

bills against containing more than one subject. The result is that general legislation cannot be embodied within a general appropriation bill. Moore v Sheppard, 

supra. 

“A general appropriation bill may be defined as 

a single bill which appropriates funds for two or more 

departments, subjects, accounts, or purposes, It has 

the one general purpose or subject matter of appropriating money. 

“General legislation does more than appropriate 

money and limit its expenditure. An said;by a former 

Attorney General in Opinion No. 2965 (1935), 

-I 

. . * if the Bill does more than set aside a 

sum of money, provide the means of itn distribution, and to whom it shall be distributed, then it 

is a general law 0 . . ’ 

“Thus, the distinction between general appropriation bills and general legislation has been recognized 
Hon. D. K. Woodward, Jr., Page 6 W-1263) 

in this State in the simple fact that the former merely sets apart sums of money for specific objects and 

uses while the latter does more than merely appropriate and limit the use of funds. General legislation 

constitutes a separate subject and cannot be included 

within a general appropriation bill. Moore v. Shepe, supra; Att’y Gen. Op. 2965, supra- 

“This does not mean that general legislation may 

not contain an appropriation which is merely incidental 

to and necessary to carry out the subject and purpose 

of the general law. Attorney General’s Opinion No. 

2965, supra. Neither does it mean that a general ap-. 

propriation bill may not contain general provisions and 

details limiting and restricting the use of the funds 

therein appropriated, if such provisions are necessarily connected with and incidental to the appropriation 

and use of the funds and if they do not conflict with or 

amount to general legislation. Conley v. Daughters of 

the Republic, 106 Tex. 80, 156 S.W. 197 (19131.” 

The same opinion states a general rule with reference 

to matters that may be included in a general appropriation bill as 

follows: 

“With special regard to what incidental provisions may be included within a general appropriation 

bill, our Texas courts have not stated a general rule. 

However, from statements as to what may not be irieluded and from numerous opinions of the Attorney 

General, we believe the rule may be stated generally 

as follows: In addition to appropriating money and 

stipulating the amount, manner, and purpose of the 

various items of expenditure, a general appropriation 

bill may contain any provisions or riders which detail, 

limit, or restrict the use of the funds or otherwise insure that the money is spent for the required activity 

for which it~is therein appropriated, if the provisions 

or riders are necessarily connected with and incidental 

tathe4qgr4qriat~anrLlrsedUIP-0111216;.,dprQv~ 

I ,..,a ~>.. 

they do not conflict with general legislation.” 

The legal and historical background of these rules is 

set forth in d*ail in Opinion No. V-1254, -, a copy of which is 

attached for your information. The only way any part of the rider 

here in question can be upheld is under the general rule last quoted 

above. Any part of the rider which does not come within that rule 

is invalid. 
Hon. D. K. Woodward, Jr., Page 7 (V-1263) 

If the “Non-Subversive Oath* rider applied only to 

State employees who are present members of the subversive organizations included in the rider or those who become members 

thereof in the future, we believe the rider would come within the 

above-mentioned rule for insuring that the money is spent for the 

required activity for which it is therein appropriated. This is 

true for the reason that the doctrine and teachings of those organizations is the very antithesis of the normal operation of State 

government and the proper fulfillment of the duties assigned to a 

State employee, hence payment to members thereof would result 

in partial failure of the appropriation. 

It has been held that no unit of government can be de,- 

nied the right to keep out of its employ those who seek to overthrow the eovernment bv force or violence. or those who are 

knowingly members of an organization engaged in such endeavor. 

Garner v. Board of Public Works, 71 S.Ct. 909 (1951). That the 

~iandations ommums which are described as 

“Communist Fronts” come within the proscribed group is clear. 

As stated by Mr. Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in 

United States v. Dennis, 71 S.Ct. 857, 894 (1951): 

” D D . From time to time it [Communism] 

champions all manner of causes and grievances and 

makes alliances that may add to its foothold in government or embarrass the authorities. 

“The Communist Party, nevertheless, does not 

seek its strength primarily in numbers. D . ~ It seeks 

members that are. or may be, secreted in strategic 

posts in transportation, communications, industry, 

government, and especially in labor unions where it 

can compel employers to accept and retain its members. It also seeks to infiltrate and control organieations of professional and other groups. Through these 

placements in positions of power it seeks a leverage 

over society that will make up in power of coercion 

what it lacks in power of persuasion. 

“The United States, fortunately has experienced 

Communism only in its preparatory stages and for its 

pattern of final action must look abroad o ~ ~ Communist technique in the overturn of a free government was 

disclosed by the coup d’etat in which they seized power 

in Czechoslovakia. There fhe Communist Party during 

its preparatory stage claimed and received protection 

for its freedoms of speech. press, and assembly. Pretending to be but another pofitical~ party. it eventuarrji- 
Hon. D. K. Woodward, Jr., Page 8 (V-1263) 

was c,onceded participation in government, where it 

entrenched reliable members chiefly in control of 

police and information services. When the government faced a foreign and domestic crisis, the Cornmunist Party had established a leverage strong enough 

to threaten civil war. In a period of confusion the 

Communist plan unfolded and the underground organization came to the surface throughout the country in 

the form chiefly of labor ‘action committees.’ Communist officers of the unions took over transportation 

and allowed only persons with party permits to travel, 

Communist printers took over the newspapers and 

radio and put out only party-approved versions of 

events.. Possession was taken of telegraph and telephone systems and communications were cut off 

wherever directed by party heads. Communist unions 

took over the factories, and in the cities a partisan 

distribution of food was managed by the Communist 

organization. A virtually bloodless abdication by the 

elected government admitted the Communists to power, whereupon they instituted a reign of oppression 

and terror, and ruthlessly denied to all others the 

freedoms which had sheltered their conspiracy.” 

(Emphases added throughout,) 

A most important and fundamental step in the seizing 

control of existing government by subversives is the creation of 

dissatisfaction among the loyal citizenry with government in its 

present democratic form. This attempt to create dissatisfaction, 

of necessity and by design, extends to all levels from the highest 

governmental position to the lowest. Infiltration and the subsequent performance of assigned duties in an unsatisfactory manner 

is a most logical way to extend the idea that present government 

is inefficient and should be replaced. This weakening process is : 

one of the things which democracy must guard against in order to 

follow the most fundamental principles of self-preservation. It is’ 

also commonly known that subyersives spend on-duty and off-duty 

time in all vocations working for, planning, and spreading their 

political beliefs and tearing down democratic principles and procedures. It is thus reasonable for the Legislature to have made 

the determination that those persons who are members of subversive organizations would not properly fulfill the duties for which 

they would be paid out of funds appropriated in House Bill 426. 

Indeed, it is most reasonable to assume that there would be a fail- 

‘ure of performance, and that the purpose of ~the appropriation would 

be defeated in whole or in part. 

Viewed in this light Section 1 of Article VI of House 

Bill 426 is very closely analogous to the rider prohibiting the use 
: 

. . ” ,. 

Hon. D. K. Woodward, Jr., Page 9 (V-1263) 

of appropriated funds “for the payment of salaries to any employee 

who uses alcoholic beverages while on active duty.” Subdiv. (23). 

Sec. 2, Art. III, H.B. 426, ~su ra, at p. 1441, This rider was recently upheld as “insuring +- tat the purpose of the appropriation 

will not be defeated and the money wasted on an employee who carries on unauthorized activities during the time for which he is 

being paid to attend to the State’s business.” Att’y Gen. Op. No. 

V-1254 (1951). 

Another rider which ,was upheld on the same basis is 

that prohibiting payment of appropriated funds to an employee who 

engages in certain political activities. Subdiv. (1 l), Sec. 2. Art. 

III. H.B. 426, *, at p, 1434. In placing the political activities 

rider in the general appropriation bill the’Legislature has very 

clearly determined that no employee while on duty for the State 

should engage in affairs tending toward the selection of persons to 

occupy elective offices and thus neglect or fail to perform the official duties for which he is being paid from appropriated funds. 

These prohibited activities would undoubtedly~ lead to a failure of 

the appropriation due to the impossibility of properly carrying on 

two functions at the same time. In placing the “Non-Subversive 

0ath”rider in the general appropriation bill the Legislature made 

the same determination with reference to those engaging in subversive activities. Subversives necessarily engage in activities political in nature, as well as other activities tending toward the eventual overthrow of the State government. The two riders having 

been placed in the general appropriation bill for the same purpose 

and the one held a valid inclusion, the other must also be valid. 

As was stated by the Supreme Court of the United States 

in Garner v. Board of Public Works, su ra, with regard to an oath 

similar in many respects to that prescri ----SF ed’by Section 1 of Article 

VI: 

102-103, 67 S. Ct. 556, 570, 571, 91 L.Ed. 754, and a 

State is not ,without power to do as much.” 

What has been said with regard to that part of the rider 

prohibiting payment of funds therein appropriated to present or future 

members ofisub.versive.o’r.ganiaatibns iioes tint-,apply to ‘the rider in 

ifs enfirety. That poition c.oncirning itseas wifh the expendimre of 

appropriated funds for the payment bf,*salaries to, those who once 

belonged to a listed organization and who are now no longer spendin:: 
Hon. D. K. Woodward, Jr., Page 10 (V-1263) 

’ 

,/, 

,/’ 

,/’ 

time in the conflicting and subversive activities contains subject 

matter of general legislation. It is one thing to prohibit payment 

of funds to persons now belonging to subversive organizations and 

quite a different thing to prohibit payment and thereby deny State 

employment to those who once belonged but later renounced and 

do not now belong to such an organization. 

A mere glance at the names of over 100 organizations 

on the Attorney General’s present subversive list will reveal that 

perfectly loyal citizens could have been induced to join some of 

them without knowledge of their evil purposes. Such a person who 

innocently joined one of these organizations 7 years ago but resigned and denounced it upon discovery of its subversive purpose 

6 years ago would nevertheless be prevented from receiving a 

State salary today under the 10 year retroactive feature of the 

rider. This amounts to setting up a general qualification for State 

employees based upon what they belonged to and what their activities were in the past rather than upon what they belong to, and do 

at the present or in the future. Such general legislation may be 

proper and desirable, but if so, it must be enacted in a general 

statute in order to be constitutional. This type of legislation has 

been held to be a punishment for past activities, United States v. 

Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 

(WApp. D.C. 1950) aff’d per curiam by a divided court 71 S.Ct. 

669 (1951), and there can be no doubt but that provisions for punishment of this nature must be contained in general legislation 

rather than a general appropriation bill. Even in drafting a general law with retrospective provisions great care must be taken 

‘to prevent a conflict with Section 16 of Article I of the Texas Constitution and Section 10 of Article I of the United States Constitution prohibiting the passage of bills of attainder or ex post facto 

Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866); Fletcher v. Peck, 

nited States v. Lovett, supra; Garner v. Board 

of Public Works, supra; Bailey v. Richardson, supra. 

The difference between what the Legislature may incorporate in a general appropriation bill and what it may not constitutionally incorporate therein is clearly illustrated by the prospective and retrospective features of the rider under consideration. 

The retrospective provision attempts to do more than insure “that 

the purpose of the appropriation will not be defeated and the money 

wasted on an employee who carries on unauthorized activities during the time for which he is being paid to attend to the State’s business.” It is based on past activities of employees and not present 

activities which are certain to conflict with the purpose of the appropriation. On the other hand, 

+. 

resent membership in an organization bent on overthrowing or un ermming the State government 

has substantial ~effect upon an employee’s productivity at his job. 

As such, the prospective feature is:not an attempt to incorporate 
Hon. D. K. Woodward, Jr., Page 11 (V-1263) 

general legislation in a general appropriation bill, but is only an 

attempt by the Legislature to insure that the money appropriated 

is spent for the designated purpose. The distinction between the 

prospective and retrospective features of the rider with regard 

to ability or willingness to perform present or future duties is 

apparent. Upon this distinction rests the difference in the legal 

principles to be applied, 

With the foregoing in mind, a final answer to your 

quertion involves several general and well-settled legal principles. It is well settled that in determining the constitutionality 

of a statute it is the duty of the courts to uphold the legislative 

enactment if at all possible and to adopt any reasonable construction which will place the statute in harmony with the Constitution 

rather than one which will cause the statute to be in violation 

thereof, Pickle v. Finley, 91 Tex. 484, 44 S.W. 480 (1898) and 

Greene v, Robison, 117 Tkx. 516, 82.S.W.2d 655 (1928). This 

same duty applies with equal force to the Attorney General. 

Similarly, it is incumbent upon us, by direct legislative mandate, should a portion of Section 1 of Article VI of House 

Bill No. 426 be in violation of the Constitution under any reasonable construction, to uphold any portion thereof which is constitutional. Article VII of House Bill 426, a “saving clause,” provides: 

“If any section, sentence,or clause or part of 

this Act shall for any reason.be held to be invalid, 

such decision shall not affect the remaining portions 

of this Act, and it is hereby declared to be the intention of the Legislature to have. passed each sentence, 

section, clause or part thereof, irrespective of the 

fact that any other sentence, section,‘clause, or part 

thereof may be declared invalid.” 

The language of the rider leaves no doubt that the 

Legislature was of the opinion that any person belonging to one 

of the named organizations is unable to carry out his assigned 

duties, thereby causing a failure of the appropriation in part. That 

this is a reasonable assumption is borne out by United States v. 

, and the previous discussion in this opinion. Th 

e attempted to insure that appropriated funds wo?d 

not be paid to one whose purpose is to undermine and destroy the 

State government by failing to perform or improperly performing 

his assigned duties. In our opinion the rider, in so far as it requires an oath of no present or future membership in the subversive organizations, is valid. Under the saving clause this valid 

portion of the rider is severable from that portion which is the 

subject of general legislation attempted in a general appropriation bill and hence unconstitutional under Section 35 .of Article III 

of the Texas Constitution. 
Hon. D. K. Woodward, Jr., Page 12 (V-1263) 

The effect of the ‘Non-SubversiveOath” rider as here- 

,inr.onstrued is to require that every State employee execute the 

oatli required by this rider, which, to comply with the constitutionalrequirements, should read as follows: 

“(a) That the affiant is not a member of, the 

Communist Party. (The term ‘Communist Party’ as 

used herein means any organization which (a) is substantially directed, dominated or controlled by the 

Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics or its satellites, 

or which (b) seeks to overthrow the Government of the 

United States or of any State by force, violence or any 

other unlawful means; and 

“(b) That the affiant is not a member of any organization, association, movement, group or combination which the Attorney General of the United States, 

acting pursuant to Executive Order No. 9835, March 

21, 1947, 12 Federal Register 1935, has designated as 

totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive, or as 

having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the 

commission of acts of force or violence to deny others 

their rights under the Constitution of the United States, 

or as seeking to alter the form of Government of the 

United States by unconstitutional means; and 

“(c) That the affiant is not a member of any 

‘Communist Political Organization’ or ‘CZnmmunist 

Front Organization’ registered under the Federal Internal Security Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.A. 781, et seq.) 

or required to so register under said Act by final order of the Federal Subversive Activities Control Board.” 

After receiving the list of subversive organizations 

listed by the Attorney General of the United States which serves 

as notice that those organizations listed are subversive, each employee must sign the oath prior to receiving his salary. 

We are not unmindful of the rule of law that a general 

appropriation bill may not alter, amend or repeal general law. 

Att’y Gen. Op. V-1254, supra, The constitutional portion of the 

rider in question does not violate this rule but is merely cumulative of statutes requiring execution and filing of oaths. It is in 

complete harmony with the general statutes on the subject. Conley v. Daughters of the Republic, 106 Tex. 80, 156 S.W. 197 m). 

Turning, then, to the procedure to be followed at The University 

of Texas, since the oaths required at State-supported institutions 

of higher learning are cumulative and each an additional safeguard 

against the employment of subversives, all three of the oaths must 
. 

Hon. D. K. Woodward, Jr., Page 13 (V-1263) 

be executed. In this connection we know of no reason why they 

should not be joined in one document and subscribed and sworn 

to as a single instrument. 

. 

SUMMARY _, 

The ‘“Non-Subversive ‘Oath? required by the general appropriation bill for the biennium ending August 

31, 1953 (Art. VI, Sec. 1, H.B. 426, Acts 52nd Leg., 

RS. 1951, ch. 499, pa 1228), is constitutional and cumulative of the existing oaths to the extent that its 

operation is prospective. The rider to this extent is 

a mere limitation upon the use of the money and insures that the money will be spent for the required 

activity for which it was appropriated. 

It is commonly known that Communists and other 

subversives spend on-duty and off-duty time mall vocations working ~for, planning, and spre,ading, ,their politicaI,,beliefs ‘and tearing down democratic principles ‘and 

procedures, It is therefore a reasonable limitation, 

restriction, and safeguard.on the expenditure of public 

fundsfor the Legislature to provide that funds therein 

appropriated for salaries shall not be paid to employees 

who belong to subversive organizations. Since it is incidental to the appropriation and is not. an additional 

subject of general legislation, this provision does not 

violate Sec. 35, Art. III of the Texas Constitution. 

That portion of the rider which is retrospective 

rather than prospective in operation is a subject matter of general legislation and therefore invalid in a 

general appropriation bill. However, the two portions 

are severable, and under the valid portion each State 

employee must execute an oath that he is not a member of the Communist Party or any other subversive 

organisation referred to in the rider before receiving 

a salary from money appropriated by House Bill 426. 

EJ:wb:mwb