UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

QUENTON THOMAS WHITSELL SR,

Defendant.

 /

Case No. 2:09-cr-20236

HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S PRO SE MOTION TO SET AND 

RELEASE ON BOND/PERSONAL RECOGNIZANCE (docket no. 37)

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Quenton Thomas Whitsell Sr.'s pro

se motion to set and release on bond or personal recognizance (docket number 37). The

defendant originally waived his detention hearing and consented to pre-trial detention, but

has now moved for a detention hearing. In accordance with the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.

§3142(f), a detention hearing was held on May 18, 2010. Upon review of the record, the

Court concludes that the facts in this case require the detention of the defendant pending

trial.

A criminal defendant must be detained if the Court finds that no condition or

combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as

required and the safety of other persons or the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Where

there is probable cause to believe that a defendant has committed an offense for which a

maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled

Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., a rebuttable presumption arises that no condition

or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant or

safety of any other person and the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A). A grand jury
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indictment is sufficient to establish probable cause for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).

United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985). The presumption "shifts the

burden of production to the defendant to show that his release would not pose a flight risk

or a danger to any person and the community [but t]he government retains the burden of

persuasion." United States v. Hinton, 113 Fed. Appx. 76, 77-78 (6th Cir. 2004). Even if the

defendant comes forward with evidence to rebut the presumption, however, the

presumption does not vanish. Id. at 78. Instead, the Court "may continue to give the

presumption some weight by keeping in mind that Congress has determined that 'drug

offenders pose a special risk of flight and dangerousness to society.'" Id. (quoting United

States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796, 798-99 (5th Cir. 1989)).

There is no dispute that the statutory presumption in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) applies in

this case. The grand jury has charged defendant in a five count indictment for distribution

of fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); possession

with intent to distribute fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §

841(a)(1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 924(c); possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k); and felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

922(g)(1).

The evidence that links the defendant to the crimes charged is strong. There is

evidence showing that the defendant sold drugs to an informant and an undercover officer

on several occasions. A search of defendant's house resulted in the seizure of four

weapons, as well as significant amounts of crack and powder cocaine. See Exhibits to

Docket no. 24. 
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The record also shows that the defendant has had numerous felony convictions over

the course of over twenty years, including convictions for possession and sale of drugs and

possession of firearms.

In support of his motion, the defendant points to the following: He is a life-long

resident of Detroit and has numerous close family ties, including with his mother and his

seven children. The defendant does not possess a passport, he in not on probation or

parole, he does not have outstanding warrants or any pending charges outside the current

charges, and was gainfully employed in home renovations at the time of his arrest. The

defendant argues that the charged offense is not a crime of violence, that he does not have

a history of violence, and that there were no acts of violence or resistance during his arrest.

Upon review of the entire record and the arguments and evidence presented, the

Court finds that the defendant has failed to rebut the statutory presumption of

dangerousness and risk of flight. The record and the affidavits on file show that the

defendant has had numerous past felony convictions and terms of imprisonment for drug

and weapons charges, yet there is probable cause to believe he returned to selling cocaine

and possessing weapons despite his felony convictions. The crimes charged are extremely

serious. There is substantial evidence linking the defendant to the crimes charged,

including numerous sales to an undercover officer and the seizure of significant quantities

of powder and crack cocaine and four firearms from a house owned by the defendant. If

convicted, the defendant faces a mandatory minimum sentence of at least ten years. The

defendant's ties to the community are not sufficiently strong to prevent flight given the

penalties defendant faces and the strength of the evidence against him.

In sum, the Court finds that the defendant has failed to rebut the statutory presumption

in favor of detention. 
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WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Set and Release

Bond/Personal Recognizance (docket no. 37) is DENIED and defendant's detention is

continued.

SO ORDERED.

s/Stephen J. Murphy, III 

STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

United States District Judge

Dated: May 20, 2010

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or

counsel of record on May 20, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

Alissa Greer 

Case Manager