NUMBERS 13-14-00008-CR 

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

 

BRYAN SOLIS, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 36th District Court

of Aransas County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Perkes and Longoria

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes

Appellant Bryan Solis pleaded guilty to the possession of cocaine in an amount 

between 4 and 200 grams, a second-degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 

ANN. § 481.115 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). The trial court placed him on 

five years’ deferred-adjudication community supervision. The State subsequently 

moved to revoke his community supervision, alleging that he used a controlled substance 
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and failed to pay his restitution and Crime Stoppers Fee in violation of his communitysupervision conditions. Appellant pleaded true to not paying the restitution and the fee.

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The trial court revoked his community supervision, adjudicated him guilty of cocaine 

possession, and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s appointed appellate counsel filed a 

brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating his review of the record yielded no 

grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. See Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents 

a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance 

on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In 

Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance 'arguable' points of error if counsel 

finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and 

set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).

 

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In reviewing a probation revocation, a single violation of probation is sufficient to support the trial 

court's decision to revoke. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Herrera 

v. State, 951 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.). A plea of true to not paying fees 

does not relieve the trial court of the responsibility to inquire whether the defendant can pay the fees, see 

Gipson v. State, 383 S.W.3d 152, 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), but a plea of true to not paying restitution 

does not trigger an ability-to-pay inquiry, see Gipson v. State, 428 S.W.3d 107, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 

Appellant’s plea of true to nonpayment of the restitution is sufficient to support revocation. See Gipson, 

428 S.W.3d at 109; see also Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979)

(holding a plea of true is sufficient to support revocation); Nino v. State, No. 13-97-00930-CR, 1998 WL 

34202482, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug.20, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (same). 
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In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel 

Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), 

appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no 

reversible error in the trial court's judgment. Counsel has informed this Court, in writing, 

that counsel has: (1) notified appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a 

motion to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed 

appellant of appellant’s rights to file a pro se response,2to review the record preparatory 

to filing that response and seek discretionary review if the court of appeals concludes the 

appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the 

appellate record, including the mailing address for the court of appeals and instructions 

to file the motion within ten days and lacking only appellant’s signature and the date. 

See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 318–19; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 

n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. 

Adequate time has passed, and appellant has not filed either a timely motion 

seeking pro se access to the appellate record or a motion for extension of time to do so. 

Appellant has not filed a pro se brief.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we conduct a full examination of all the 

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 

 

2 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with 

the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the 

court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the 

case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) 

(quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).
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75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief, and we find 

nothing that arguably supports an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–

28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion 

that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible 

error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. There is no reversible error in the 

record, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney has asked this Court for 

permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also 

In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, 

he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the 

appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the 

appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (quoting Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 

779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.))). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. 

Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of 

this opinion and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file a 

petition for discretionary review.3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 

 

3 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this 

case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for 

discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review 

must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or 

timely motion for en banc reconsideration that is overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any

petition for discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 68.4. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4.
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252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

GREGORY T. PERKES

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

22nd day of January, 2015.