alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 20, 2011*

Decided January 25, 2011

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

   

No. 10‐2517

SABEEL CAUDLE EL,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

LAKE COUNTY SHERIFFS, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.                 

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 08 C 6534

Amy J. St. Eve,

Judge.

O R D E R

Sabeel Caudle El sued the Lake County sheriffs and other county officials under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, among other things, that the conditions of his pretrial confinement

violated his constitutional rights.  After dismissing several claims at the pleading stage, the

court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the remaining claims.  

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 10‐2517 Page 2

Caudle El devotes the bulk of his appellate brief to arguing about exhaustion of

administrative remedies, an issue wholly irrelevant to the district court’s disposition of the

case.  He also enumerates a list of “issues on appeal,” some of which merely restate the

claims he raised in the district court, but fails to develop an argument for any of these

contentions or supply them with legal authority.  A litigant in this court, however, must

supply “an argument consisting of more than a generalized assertion of error, with citations

to supporting authority.” Haxhiu v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 685, 691 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001)); see also Fed. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9)(A).

And although we construe pro se filings liberally, even litigants proceeding without the

benefit of counsel must articulate some reason for disturbing the district courtʹs judgment.

See Anderson, 241 F.3d at 545.  Caudle El does not challenge the district courtʹs reasoning: in

fact, it is impossible to discern any argument at all.

DISMISSED.
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL
& ACCOUNTING OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 USC § 1350 AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the quarterly report of Premier Power Renewable
Energy, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2012 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Miguel de Anquin, Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting
Officer) of the Company, hereby certify as of the date hereof, solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the
United States Code, that to the best of my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities
    Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
    and results of operations of the Company at the date and for the periods indicated.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------





|Date:    November 19, 2012                                                                            | 
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | 
|                                                                                                      | 
|/s/ Miguel de Anquin                                                                                  | 
|Miguel de Anquin
        Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting
        Officer) |
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-18-00027-CR

JERMEY SHOUN MYERS AKA JEREMY 

SHOUN MYERS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

§

§

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from

Criminal District Court No. 1

of Tarrant County (1433128D)

December 13, 2018

Opinion by Justice Kerr

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there 

was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of the trial 

court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By _/s/ Elizabeth Kerr__________________

 Justice Elizabeth Kerr
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONALD WAYNE HARRIS, 

Petitioner,

v. Case Number: 09-cv-12898

Honorable Victoria A. Roberts

THOMAS BIRKETT,

Respondent,

_______________________________/

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO EXPEDITE HABEAS PETITION

Petitioner Ronald Wayne Harris, a state inmate currently confined at Camp Lehman in

Grayling, Michigan, filed a pro se Habeas Corpus Petition under 28 U.S .C. § 2254. Petitioner

commenced this proceeding by raising four issues for review, challenging the constitutionality of

his incarceration. His current maximum discharge date is August 26, 2034. Pending before the

Court is his “Motion for Expedited Consideration” [dkt. # 3]. For the reasons set forth below,

the Motion is denied.

I.

Petitioner filed a Motion requesting that the Court expedite its decision relative to his

Habeas Petition. In the present case, Petitioner has failed to show good cause to expedite a

ruling on his Petition for habeas relief. Petitioner has not demonstrated that reviewing this

matter in the Court’s normal course would be prejudicial to his interests or constitute undue

delay, specifically in light of the fact that Respondent’s Answer and the Rule 5 materials have

not yet been filed–due February 3, 2010. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner’s request for

the Court to immediately consider his Habeas Petition.

II.

2:09-cv-12898-VAR-CEB Doc # 6 Filed 10/19/09 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 88
2

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s “Motion for Expedited Consideration”

[dkt. # 3] is DENIED.

s/Victoria A. Roberts 

Victoria A. Roberts

United States District Judge

Dated: October 19, 2009

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this

document was served on the attorneys of record

and Ronald Wayne Harris by electronic means or

U.S. Mail on October 19, 2009.

s/Linda Vertriest 

Deputy Clerk

2:09-cv-12898-VAR-CEB Doc # 6 Filed 10/19/09 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 89
Exhibit 32.01








CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Anoteros, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Michael J. Sinnwell, Jr., Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:





(1)        The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)        The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.











/s/ Michael J. Sinnwell Jr.


By: Michael J. Sinnwell Jr.


Chief Executive Officer





Dated: August 10, 2011





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
182. La. 43

#### STATE v. MISTICH.

No. 33375.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

April 11, 1935.

*15Rule nisi made absolute, and bail reduced in accordance with opinion.

Hugh M. Wilkinson, Fred W. Oser, and Neil A. Armstrong, Jr., all of New Orleans, for relator.

LAND; Justice.

Relator has been indicted in the Twenty-Fifth district court for the parish of Plaque-mines on fifteen charges for cattle stealing and on eight charges for altering the mark or brand of cattle. The bail bond in each case was fixed by the district judge at $2,000, or a total of $46,000.

The Constitution of this state provides that, “Excessive bail shall not be required,” and that, “All" persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties,” except “persons charged with capital offense where the proof is evident or the presumption- great.” Const. 1921, art. 1, § 12.

The offense of cattle stealing in this state is *a*felony punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years; and altering the mark or brand of cattle is a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than two years and a fine not exceeding $1,000.

The judge should take into consideration each ease by itself in determining the amount of bail; and the determination of what is disproportionate to the offense involved depends on the moral turpitude of the crime, the danger resulting to the public from the commission of such offenses, and the punishment imposed or authorized by ■law therefor. State v. Hopson, 10 La. Ann. 550; State ex rel. Chandler, 45 La. Ann. 696, 702, 12 So. 884.

Although in the matter of the amount of bond required, the judge of the district court has large discretion, yet, in the present case,, the amount of bail is manifestly excessive. State v. Gomilla, 131 La. 286, 59 So. 402.

We are of the opinion that a bail bond of $500 in each of the fifteen cases for cattle stealing, and a bail bond.of $250 in each of the eight cases for altering the mark or brand of cattle, will be adequate to secure the presence of relator, who is a butcher, at the trial of the indictments returned against him.

For the reasons assigned, the. rule nisi herein issued is made absolute, and relator’s application to have- the amount of bail reduced is granted to the extent of permitting relator to obtain his liberty, after he shall have furnished bonds in the fifteen indictments for cattle stealing in the sum of $500 each, and bonds in the eight indictments for altering the mark or brand of cattle in the sum of $250 each, to the satisfaction of the trial judge, with all the required conditions, to which amount bonds in.the sum of $46,000 heretofore required of relator are reduced. -
Exhibit 23.2

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

PHC, Inc.
Peabody, MA.

We  hereby  consent  to the  incorporation  by  reference  in  the  Registration
Statements on Form S-3 (No's.  333-2246,  333-41494,  333-76137,  333-117146 and
222-141431)  and Form S-8 (No's  333-102402  and  333-123842)of  PHC,  Inc.  and
subsidiaries of our report dated August 23, 2005,  relating to the  consolidated
statements  of income,  changes in  stockholders'  equity and cash flows for the
year ended June 30, 2005, which appears in this Form 10-K.




/s/  BDO Seidman, LLP
Boston, MA
September 27, 2007




                                    94
Exhibit
32.1
 
 
 CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Omni Bio Pharmaceutical, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 31, 2009 (the “Report”),
I, Charles A. Dinarello, Acting Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby
certify that, to the best of my knowledge:
 
 (1)             The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and
 
 (2)             The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company for the period
covered by this report.
 
 Date:  February
      4, 2010
              /s/ Charles A.
    DinarelloCharles
      A. DinarelloActing
      Chief Executive Officer
#### Fred BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. WD 52340.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Nov. 12, 1996.

Rosemary E. Percival, Asst. Pub. Defender, Kansas City, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, Kurt U. Schaefer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before LOWENSTEIN, P.J., and BERREY and SMITH, JJ.

*918
      *ORDER*

PER CURIAM:

Appeal from denial of Rule 24.085 motion for post-conviction relief.

Affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
I

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 4067

To provide for representation of the Northern Mariana Islands by a nonvoting

Delegate in the House of Representatives.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 12, 1996

Mr. GALLEGLY (for himself, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. UNDERWOOD, Mr.

FALEOMAVAEGA, and Mr. KILDEE) introduced the following bill; which

was referred to the Committee on Resources

A BILL

To provide for representation of the Northern Mariana Islands by a nonvoting Delegate in the House of Representatives.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Northern Mariana Is5 lands Delegate Act’’.

6 SEC. 2. DELEGATE TO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM

7 THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS.

8 The joint resolution entitled ‘‘Joint Resolution to ap9 prove the ‘Covenant To Establish a Commonwealth of the
2

•HR 4067 IH

1 Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the

2 United States of America’, and for other purposes’’ ap3 proved March 24, 1976 (48 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is

4 amended by adding at the end the following new section:

5 ‘‘SEC. 6. DELEGATE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

6 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Northern Mariana Islands

7 shall be represented in the United States Congress by a

8 nonvoting Delegate to the House of Representatives. The

9 Resident Representative of the Northern Mariana Islands,

10 as authorized by section 901 of the foregoing Covenant

11 and upon election pursuant to subsection (c) of this sec12 tion, after the date of the enactment of this section, shall

13 be the Delegate.

14 ‘‘(b) COMPENSATION, PRIVILEGES, AND IMMUNI15 TIES.—Until the Rules of the House of Representatives

16 are amended to provide otherwise, the Delegate from the

17 Northern Mariana Islands shall receive the same com18 pensation, allowances, and benefits as a Member of the

19 House of Representatives and shall be entitled to whatever

20 privileges and immunities are, or hereafter may be, grant21 ed to the Delegate from Guam to the House of Represent22 atives.

23 ‘‘(c) ELECTION OF DELEGATE.—The Delegate from

24 the Northern Mariana Islands shall be elected, but not ap25 pointed, as authorized by section 901 of the foregoing Cov-
3

•HR 4067 IH

1 enant and the Constitution and laws of the Northern Mar2 iana Islands so long as such authorization complies with

3 the Federal election criteria for, and provides for elections

4 in sequence with, the election of other Delegates to the

5 House of Representatives.

6 ‘‘(d) VACANCY.—In case of a permanent vacancy in

7 the office of Delegate, by reason of death, resignation, or

8 permanent disability, the office of Delegate shall remain

9 vacant until a successor is elected and qualified.

10 ‘‘(e) LACK OF EFFECT ON COVENANT.—This section

11 shall not be construed to alter, amend, or abrogate any

12 provision, other than section 901, of the foregoing Cov13 enant.’’.

Æ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

 

COMMODITIES EXPORT COMPANY,

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,

v.

CITY OF DETROIT, UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, 

Defendants/Cross-Defendants,

and

DETROIT INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE

COMPANY,

Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/CrossPlaintiff/Third Party Plaintiff,

v.

WALTER LUBIENSKI and DEAN AYTES,

Third Party Defendants.

Case No. 09-CV-11060-DT

 /

ORDER STRIKING JANUARY 27, 2010 FILING

AND DIRECTING THAT CROSSCLAIM AND THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT BE 

RE-FILED BY FEBRUARY 3, 2010

On January 29, 2010, the court conducted a status conference in this case. 

During the conference, the court informed counsel that certain filings had been

improperly docketed by counsel, and actions need to be taken to correct the docket. 

Specifically, Plaintiff Commodities Export Company improperly filed its “Second

Amended Complaint” twice, the second time mislabeling it as an “Answer to Amended

Complaint.” To avoid confusion, the mislabeled docket entry will be stricken. 

2:09-cv-11060-RHC-RSW Doc # 45 Filed 01/29/10 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 538
2

Additionally, on January 25, 2010, Defendant Detroit International Bridge

Company (“DIBC”) filed a “Counterclaim, Crossclaim and Third Party Complaint,”

labeling it on the docket solely as a “Counterclaim.” For docketing purposes, the Clerk’s

Office requires that counterclaims, crossclaims, and third party complaints each be

docketed separately. The current entry will be allowed to remain as the “Counterclaim,”

but DIBC shall be required to re-file, in separate entries, its “Crossclaim” and “Third

Party Complaint.” Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s January 27, 2010 “Second Amended Complaint,”

Docketed as an “Answer to Amended Complaint” [Dkt. # 43] is hereby STRICKEN from

the docket of this court. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, by February 3, 2010, Defendant DIBC shall refile, in separate entries, its “Crossclaim” and “Third Party Complaint.” 

 S/Robert H. Cleland 

ROBERT H. CLELAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: January 29, 2010

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record

on this date, January 29, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

 S/Lisa Wagner 

Case Manager and Deputy Clerk

(313) 234-5522

S:\Cleland\JUDGE'S DESK\C3 ORDERS\09-11060.COMMODITIES.StrikingAmendCompl.OrderingThirdPartyComplaint.wpd

2:09-cv-11060-RHC-RSW Doc # 45 Filed 01/29/10 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 539
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DEANNA ADAMS, EUGENE DENEUTTE, Case No. 2:09-cv-12900

COLLIN D. SMITH and BARRY S.

WEINER, Individually and on Behalf of All

Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL

LABORATORIES, LTD., DANIEL H.

MOVENS and MUKUL RATHI,

Defendants.

___________________________________________________________________________/

STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

The parties by their undersigned counsel hereby stipulate and agree to the entry of the

Stipulation and Order to dismiss Case No. 2:09-cv-12900 without prejudice.

WHEREAS, Plaintiffs and Defendants have agreed dismiss Case No. 2:09-cv-12900

without prejudice.

STIPULATED AND AGREED:

/s/ Dennis J. Levasseur

Dennis J. Levasseur (P39778)

BODMAN LLP

Attorneys for Defendants Caraco

Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. et al.

6th Floor at Ford Field

1901 St. Antoine Street

Detroit, MI 48226

(313) 259-7777

/s/ S. Thomas Wienner

S. Thomas Wienner (P29233)

Weinner & Gould P.C.

Attorneys for Plaintiff Kevin Koziatek and

Liaison Counsel for the Kendall Law Group

LLP

950 W. University Drive Suite 350 

Rochester , MI 48307 

248-841-9400

Dated: October 30, 2009

Case 2:09-cv-12900-RHC-MJH Document 19 Filed 11/09/2009 Page 1 of 2
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Case No. 2:09-cv-12900 is dismissed without prejudice.

 S/Robert H. Cleland 

ROBERT H. CLELAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: November 9, 2009

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record on this

date, November 9, 2009, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

 S/Lisa Wagner 

Case Manager and Deputy Clerk

(313) 234-5522

____________________________________

Case 2:09-cv-12900-RHC-MJH Document 19 Filed 11/09/2009 Page 2 of 2
Case 2:09-cr-20295-MOB-RSW ECF No. 86, PageID.436 Filed 05/20/10 Page 1 of 7
Case 2:09-cr-20295-MOB-RSW ECF No. 86, PageID.437 Filed 05/20/10 Page 2 of 7
Case 2:09-cr-20295-MOB-RSW ECF No. 86, PageID.438 Filed 05/20/10 Page 3 of 7
Case 2:09-cr-20295-MOB-RSW ECF No. 86, PageID.439 Filed 05/20/10 Page 4 of 7
Case 2:09-cr-20295-MOB-RSW ECF No. 86, PageID.440 Filed 05/20/10 Page 5 of 7
Case 2:09-cr-20295-MOB-RSW ECF No. 86, PageID.441 Filed 05/20/10 Page 6 of 7
Case 2:09-cr-20295-MOB-RSW ECF No. 86, PageID.442 Filed 05/20/10 Page 7 of 7
174 La. 472

#### PERRY v. AKIN et al.

No. 31129.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 30, 1932.

F. A. Blanchard, of Shreveport, and Seals *&*Atkins, of Homer, for appellants.

Goff & Goff, of Arcadia, for appellee.

ST. PAUL, J.

This is a suit by the trustee in bankruptcy of Leonard F. Akin to set aside as a fraudulent simulation a certain conveyance of lands and mineral rights in Claiborne parish; being a sale thereof made by said Akin to his brother-in-law, J. A. Tipton, on March 25, 1926.

It must be admitted that this salé was made under circumstances that throw much suspicion on the reality thereof, but on the 'other hand the deed is in due form and the burden of proof is upon him who attacks it to show that the transaction was not a real one, but only simulated.

The suspicious circumstances under which the deed was passed need not be gone into in detail; suffice it to say that Akin conveyed the land and mineral rights to his brother-in-law (Tipton) just at the time that the divorced wife of said Akin was suing him for some $4,000, being about as much as all his visible property was then worth, said visible property consisting exclusively of the lands and mineral rights herein involved and other small landed properties also disposed of about the same time.

The only witness called to impugn the sale was Akin. He testified that the sale was a genuine and bona fide transaction. But his testimony is so self-contradictory and improbable that little faith is to be attached to it. However, the mere fact that his testimony to the reality of the transaction is entitled to no weight does not of itself establish as a fact that the contrary is true. So that there is in his testimony nothing on which to base a legally sound conclusion that the sale was simulated. It means simply that his testimony should be disregarded, leaving, therefore, in this record no testimony to impugn the sale.

Nor can any weight be attached to the fact Tipton was not called to testify, on the theory that his testimony was withheld because it might be against the interest of defendants. For Tipton is now dead and cannot testify; and his widow and children, who are the defendants here, cannot be prejudiced by their failure to produce evidence out of their power to produce.

So that plaintiff has not shown, either by evidence produced by himself or by presumption arising from any suppression of evidence by the defendants, that the conveyance was not real. Hence, as we said at the beginning, the sale by Akin to Tipton may not be above suspicion, but is not shown by any species of legal evidence to have been simulated or fraudulent; and, the burden of proof being upon him and not upon defendant, plaintiff has failed to make out his case.

We think the trial judge erred in setting-aside the sale complained of.

Decree.

For the reason assigned, the judgment appealed from is reversed; and it is now ordered that the plaintiff’s demand be rejected at his costs in both courts.

O’NIELL, C. J., absent.