IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-0093

Filed March 7, 2018

IN THE INTEREST OF M.F.,

Minor Child,

N.F., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Rachael E. Seymour, 

District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child. 

AFFIRMED.

Judy D. Johnson of Borseth Law Office, Altoona, for appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Gretchen Witte Kraemer, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Lynn M. Vogan of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, guardian ad litem for 

minor child.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ.
2

VOGEL, Presiding Judge.

The mother appeals the district court’s termination of her parental rights to 

her child, M.F. She asserts the State failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence her rights should be terminated pursuant to Iowa Code section

232.116(1)(e) and (h) (2017), termination is not in the child’s best interest, and her 

bond with the child should preclude termination. Because the mother failed to 

correct the many circumstances in her life that put the child at risk, we affirm the 

order of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

This family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human Services 

(DHS) after M.F. was born, testing positive for cannabinoids in his system. While 

the mother was at the hospital following the child’s birth, her paramour had to be 

removed from the hospital by security for yelling and screaming at the mother. 

After the mother was discharged from the hospital, the paramour threatened the 

mother at her residence, and he later admitted to beating the mother while she 

was pregnant. On January 11, 2017, just seven days after M.F. was born, the 

DHS attempted to remove M.F. from the mother’s care. However, the mother 

would not consent to removal, and she fled suddenly with the child and was not 

located for two days. Once located, M.F. was removed and placed with a foster 

family.

On February 14, the mother stipulated to M.F.’s adjudication as a child in 

need of assistance (CINA) under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2), (n), and (o). 

The DHS provided services, including substance-abuse evaluations and 

treatment, mental-health evaluations and treatment, and domestic-violence 
3

counselling. Following the CINA adjudication, the mother complied with 

substance-abuse services until April when she abruptly stopped, describing the 

counselor as “rude and inappropriate.” She eventually entered another treatment 

program in May, but her attendance was sporadic. She entered an inpatient 

treatment program in mid-June but was dismissed from the program in mid-July 

because of a poor attitude, defacing property, and stealing. The mother attended 

three or four mental-health appointments from April to July. The mother also 

received domestic-violence services, but the last record of her attendance was in 

April.

Following the July 14 permanency hearing, the mother avoided her DHS 

caseworker. The mother did not notify the DHS that she was staying at her sister’s 

apartment or that she had been the passenger in a car her abusive paramour was 

driving while a no-contact order remained in effect. The DHS worker only 

discovered these events after randomly seeing and conversing with the mother at 

a shopping mall. With little if any progress towards reunification being made, the 

State moved to terminate the mother’s parental rights. A contested hearing was 

held on October 11, 2017, after which the district court terminated the mother’s 

parental rights to M.F. under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h).1 The 

mother appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review termination proceedings de novo. In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 

110 (Iowa 2014). Weight is given to the juvenile court’s factual findings, especially 

 

1 The parental rights of the father were terminated, but he does not appeal.
4

when considering the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by those 

findings. Id. Our primary consideration is the best interest of the child. In re A.B., 

815 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Iowa 2012). The grounds for termination must be proved 

by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 774.

III. Statutory Grounds

“We may affirm the juvenile court’s termination order on any ground that we 

find supported by clear and convincing evidence.” See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 

703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (affirming termination under one of six independent grounds 

cited by juvenile court). The fourth element of Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) 

provides termination is warranted if “there is clear and convincing evidence that 

the child cannot be returned to the custody of [the mother] . . . at the present time.” 

Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4). 

In its ruling, the district court concluded:

The child in interest cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s 

[mother] as provided in Iowa Code section 232.102 at the present 

time due to mother’s unresolved substance abuse issues, 

unresolved domestic violence issues, her lack of stable and safe 

housing, her untreated mental health issues, and continued 

association with unsafe persons.

The mother sporadically attended services, including substance-abuse 

treatment, mental-health therapy, and domestic-violence counselling. But any 

compliance with services was short lived. The mother was discharged from one 

substance abuse treatment facility in the middle of July for her destructive attitude 

and behavior. She then sporadically attended a few outpatient classes until the 

beginning of September, and eventually, she signed up for inpatient treatment on 

the day of the termination hearing, October 11. Despite this sporadic attendance, 
5

the mother maintained contact with known drug users, continued to use illegal 

substances, and admitted to smoking marijuana the night before the termination 

hearing. Also, despite attending a domestic violence awareness class, the mother 

maintained contact with her paramour, against whom a no-contact order remained 

in effect. Additionally, the mother still lacks stable housing. The mother currently 

sleeps on the couch at her sister’s apartment, and though the mother claims she 

could take M.F. there, the sister refused to allow the DHS to even enter the home. 

Due to the mother’s failure to address her substance-abuse, mental-health, 

and domestic-violence issues, along with her failure to obtain stable housing, we 

agree with the district court that there is clear and convincing evidence the child

could not be returned to the mother at the time of the termination hearing.

IV. Best Interest

The mother also asserts the State did not prove by clear and convincing 

evidence termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest. See In 

re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40–41 (Iowa 2010). In making a best-interest

determination, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best 

placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the 

physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 

232.116(2). In concluding termination was in the child’s best interest, the district 

court stated:

[The mother] has [not] demonstrated [she is] willing or able to 

fulfill this parental role. The evidence shows mother continues to 

have unresolved substance abuse, mental health, domestic violence 

issues and unstable housing. Mother[’s] testimony revealed her 

complete lack of insight into her decisions and how they negatively

impact this child’s safety and future. It is not in this child’s best 
6

interest to continue to suspend the crucial days of childhood while 

[the mother] experiments with ways to face up to [her] own problems.

M.F. has been safely cared for in his foster family since he was about one-week

old. Due to mother’s inability to make the necessary changes in her life to safely 

parent M.F., we agree with the district court it is in M.F.’s best interest to terminate 

the mother’s parental rights. 

Moreover, the court also considered whether any bond between M.F. and 

the mother would weigh against termination. See Id. § 232.116(3)(c). Such a 

consideration is permissive and not mandatory. See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 39. Due 

to M.F.’s young age and early placement with a foster family, the district court 

found the bond between the mother and M.F. was a “diminished attachment.” We 

agree with the district court; any perceived bond should not preclude termination.

V. Conclusion

Because the mother has not addressed the factors that led to M.F.’s 

removal and M.F. could not be safely returned to the mother, termination is in the 

child’s best interest. Also, due to M.F.’s young age, there are no factors that would 

preclude termination.

AFFIRMED.