IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-40921

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff–Appellee

v.

JUAN ROLANDO ZUNIGA-MEDRANO,

Defendant–Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:18-CR-443-1

Before OWEN, Chief Judge, and SOUTHWICK and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Juan Rolando Zuniga-Medrano pleaded guilty to being an alien 

unlawfully found in the United States and was sentenced within the advisory 

guidelines range to 46 months in prison. Zuniga-Medrano argues that the 

district court’s reasons for denying his request for a downward variance were 

inadequate. He also argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable 

because the district court erred by (1) denying his request for a downward 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 2, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 18-40921

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variance based on sentencing manipulation and (2) relying on an improper 

sentencing factor. 

Because Zuniga-Medrano did not object to the sufficiency of the district 

court’s reasons for the sentence it imposed, our review is for plain error. See 

United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 2009). For 

sentences within the guidelines range, little explanation is necessary; however, 

when parties present nonfrivolous arguments for imposing a different 

sentence, “the judge will normally go further and explain why he has rejected 

those arguments.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-57 (2007). 

The district court did not plainly err with respect to the sufficiency of its 

explanation for its denial of the downward variance; the court considered 

Zuniga-Medrano’s arguments for a sentence below the guidelines range, 

including his request for a downward variance based on sentencing

manipulation. When imposing the 46-month sentence, the district court 

expressly noted that it had imposed a lenient sentence in a prior case, that 

Zuniga-Medrano had reoffended despite that leniency, and that it had 

“factored everything in” when denying his request for a downward variance. 

Thus, the record reflects that the court considered all the evidence and 

arguments but simply found the circumstances insufficient to warrant a lesser 

sentence in light of the Sentencing Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

factors. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 358-59.

With respect to Zuniga-Medrano’s argument that the district court 

imposed a greater sentence than necessary because it did not consider the 

impact of sentencing manipulation, we review the sentence for reasonableness 

in light of the sentencing factors in § 3553(a). See Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Because Zuniga-Medrano’s claim is unavailing under both 

the abuse of discretion and plain error standards of review, we need not 

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determine which standard applies in this case. See United States v. Rodriguez, 

523 F.3d 519, 525 (5th Cir. 2008). 

Zuniga-Medrano argues that his sentence was manipulated because 

after border patrol agents apprehended him for transporting marijuana, they 

released him to state authorities for prosecution rather than first prosecuting 

him for related federal offenses. He asserts that the Government’s actions 

resulted in higher sentencing exposure because the prior state court conviction 

factored into the calculation of his guidelines range for the underlying offense. 

We have not decided whether sentencing entrapment or sentencing factor 

manipulation is a viable defense, and we need not do so here. See United States 

v. Stephens, 717 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2013). Even if the defense is viable, 

Zuniga-Medrano has not shown that he was persuaded to commit a greater 

offense than he otherwise was predisposed to commit or that the Government’s 

conduct in the instant case was overbearing or outrageous. See id.; United 

States v. Jones, 664 F.3d 966, 984 (5th Cir. 2011). He likewise has not shown 

that his sentence was substantively unreasonable in light of the time he spent 

in state custody on the state drug conviction. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

Finally, Zuniga-Medrano has not shown plain error in connection with 

his argument that the district court considered an improper sentencing factor, 

i.e., his broken promise to the district court in a prior case that he would not 

illegally reenter this country. See United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 186 

(5th Cir. 2009); Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d at 361. The district court’s

statements show that it implicitly relied on permissible factors, including the 

nature and circumstances of the offense, Zuniga-Medrano’s history and 

characteristics, and the need for the sentence to promote respect for the law, 

to provide just punishment for the offense, and to afford adequate deterrence 

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to his criminal conduct. See § 3553(a)(1), (2); United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 

704, 709 (5th Cir. 2006). 

AFFIRMED.

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