Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 149 / Friday, August 1, 2008 / Notices 45029 

All counties within the State of Nebraska 

are eligible to apply for assistance under the 

Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. 

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic 

Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used 

for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, 

Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora 

Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 

97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, 

Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 

97.046, Fire Management Assistance Grant; 

97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to 

Individuals and Households In Presidential 

Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, Presidential 

Declared Disaster Assistance—Disaster 

Housing Operations for Individuals and 

Households; 97.050 Presidential Declared 

Disaster Assistance to Individuals and 

Households—Other Needs, 97.036, Disaster 

Grants—Public Assistance (Presidentially 

Declared Disasters); 97.039, Hazard 

Mitigation Grant.) 

R. David Paulison, 

Administrator, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency. 

[FR Doc. E8–17688 Filed 7–31–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–10–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Federal Emergency Management 

Agency 

[FEMA–1780–DR] 

Texas; Major Disaster and Related 

Determinations 

AGENCY: Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, DHS. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: This is a notice of the 

Presidential declaration of a major 

disaster for the State of Texas (FEMA–

1780–DR), dated July 24, 2008, and 

related determinations. 

DATES: Effective Date: July 24, 2008. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Peggy Miller, Disaster Assistance 

Directorate, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, Washington, DC 

20472, (202) 646–2705. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is 

hereby given that, in a letter dated July 

24, 2008, the President declared a major 

disaster under the authority of the 

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 

Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 

5121–5206 (the Stafford Act), as follows: 

I have determined that the damage in 

certain areas of the State of Texas resulting 

from Hurricane Dolly beginning on July 22, 

2008, and continuing, is of sufficient severity 

and magnitude to warrant a major disaster 

declaration under the Robert T. Stafford 

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 

Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121–5206 (the Stafford Act). 

Therefore, I declare that such a major disaster 

exists in the State of Texas. 

In order to provide Federal assistance, you 

are hereby authorized to allocate from funds 

available for these purposes such amounts as 

you find necessary for Federal disaster 

assistance and administrative expenses. 

You are authorized to provide assistance 

for emergency protective measures (Category 

B), including direct Federal assistance, under 

the Public Assistance program in the 

designated areas; Hazard Mitigation 

throughout the State; and any other forms of 

assistance under the Stafford Act that you 

deem appropriate subject to completion of 

Preliminary Damage Assessments (PDAs), 

unless you determine that the incident is of 

such unusual severity and magnitude that 

PDAs are not required to determine the need 

for supplemental Federal assistance pursuant 

to 44 CFR 206.33(d). 

Consistent with the requirement that 

Federal assistance be supplemental, any 

Federal funds provided under the Stafford 

Act for Public Assistance and Hazard 

Mitigation will be limited to 75 percent of the 

total eligible costs, except for any particular 

projects that are eligible for a higher Federal 

cost-sharing percentage under the FEMA 

Public Assistance Pilot Program instituted 

pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 777. If Other Needs 

Assistance is later warranted, Federal 

funding under that program will also be 

limited to 75 percent of the total eligible 

costs. 

Further, you are authorized to make 

changes to this declaration to the extent 

allowable under the Stafford Act. 

The Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that 

pursuant to the authority vested in the 

Administrator, Department of Homeland 

Security, under Executive Order 12148, 

as amended, Sandy Coachman, of FEMA 

is appointed to act as the Federal 

Coordinating Officer for this declared 

disaster. 

I do hereby determine the following 

areas of the State of Texas to have been 

affected adversely by this declared 

major disaster: 

Aransas, Bexar, Brooks, Calhoun, Cameron, 

Hidalgo, Jim Wells, Kenedy, Kleberg, Nueces, 

Refugio, San Patricio, Starr, Victoria, and 

Willacy Counties for Public Assistance 

Category B (emergency protective measures), 

including direct Federal assistance. 

All counties within the State of Texas are 

eligible to apply for assistance under the 

Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. 

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic 

Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used 

for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, 

Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora 

Brown Fund Program; 97.032, Crisis 

Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services 

Program; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment 

Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management 

Assistance; 97.048, Individual and 

Household Housing; 97.049, Individual and 

Household Disaster Housing Operations; 

97.050, Individual and Household Program—

Other Needs; 97.036, Public Assistance 

Grants; 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant 

Program.) 

R. David Paulison, 

Administrator, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency. 

[FR Doc. E8–17686 Filed 7–31–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–10–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Federal Emergency Management 

Agency 

[Docket ID FEMA–2004–0004] 

[Z–RIN 1660–ZA02] 

Planning Guidance for Protection and 

Recovery Following Radiological 

Dispersal Device (RDD) and 

Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) 

Incidents 

AGENCY: Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, DHS. 

ACTION: Notice of final guidance. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) is issuing final guidance 

entitled, ‘‘Planning Guidance for 

Protection and Recovery Following 

Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) 

and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) 

Incidents’’ (the Guidance). This 

Guidance is intended for Federal 

agencies, State and local governments, 

emergency management officials, and 

the general public who should find it 

useful in developing plans for 

responding to an RDD or IND incident. 

The Guidance recommends ‘‘protective 

action guides’’ (PAGs) to support 

decisions about actions that should be 

taken to protect the public and 

emergency workers when responding to 

or recovering from an RDD or IND 

incident. The Guidance outlines a 

process to implement the 

recommendations, discusses existing 

operational guidelines that should be 

useful in the implementation of the 

PAGs and other response actions, and 

encourages federal, state and local 

emergency response officials to use 

these guidelines to develop specific 

operational plans and response 

protocols for protection of emergency 

workers responding to catastrophic 

incidents involving high levels of 

radiation and/or radioactive 

contamination. 

DATES: This notice is effective August 1, 

2008. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Craig Conklin, Director Sector Specific 

Agency Executive Management Office, 

Office of Infrastructure Protection, 

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45030 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 149 / Friday, August 1, 2008 / Notices 

Department of Homeland Security at 

703–235–2850 (phone), or 

craig.conklin@dhs.gov (e-mail), or, John 

MacKinney, Deputy Director, Nuclear/ 

Radiological/Chemical Threats and 

Science and Technology Policy, Office 

of Policy, Department of Homeland 

Security, at (202) 447–3885 (phone), or 

john.mackinney@dhs.gov (e-mail). 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents 

Preface 

(a) Introduction 

(b) Characteristics of RDD and IND 

Incidents 

(1) Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) 

(2) Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) 

(3) Differences Between Acts of Terror and 

Accidents 

(c) Phases of Response 

(1) Early Phase 

(2) Intermediate Phase 

(3) Late Phase 

(d) Guidance for RDD and IND Incidents 

(1) Protective Actions 

(2) Protective Action Guides (PAGs) 

(3) Early and Intermediate Phase Protective 

Action Guides for RDD and IND 

Incidents 

(A) Early Phase PAGs 

(B) Intermediate Phase PAGs 

(4) Late Phase Guidance 

(5) Emergency Worker Guidance 

(e) Operational Guidelines for Early and 

Intermediate PAGs 

(1) Derived Response Levels (DRLs) 

(2) Derived Intervention Levels (DILs) for 

Food 

(3) Radiation Levels for Control of Access 

to Radiation Areas 

Appendix 1. Planning for Protection of 

Emergency Workers Responding to RDD 

and IND Incidents 

(a) Guidelines for Emergency Workers in 

Responding to RDD and IND Incidents 

(b) Controlling Occupational Exposures 

and Doses to Emergency Workers 

(c) Understanding Radiation Risks 

(d) Preparedness 

Appendix 2. Risk Management Framework 

for RDD and IND Incident Planning 

(a) The Stages of the Risk Management 

Framework for Responding to RDD and 

IND Incidents 

(1) Define the Problems and Put Them in 

Context 

(2) Analyze the Risks 

(3) Examine the Options 

(4) Make a Decision 

(5) Take Action To Implement Decision 

(6) Evaluate the Results 

(b) Technical Advisory Committee 

Appendix 3. Federal Cleanup 

Implementation Cleanup Activities 

Overview 

(a) General Management Structure 

(1) Technical Working Group 

(2) Stakeholder Working Group 

(b) Activities 

(1) Optimization and Recommendation 

(2) Public Review of Decision 

(3) Execute Cleanup 

Appendix 4. Operational Guidelines for 

Implementation of Protective Action 

Guides and Other Activities in RDD or 

IND Incidents 

(a) Group A: Access Control During 

Emergency Response Operations 

(b) Group B: Early Phase Protective Action 

(Evacuation or Sheltering) 

(c) Group C: Relocation and Critical 

Infrastructure Utilization in Affected 

Areas 

(d) Group D: Temporary Access to 

Relocation Areas for Essential Activities 

(e) Group E: Transportation and Access 

Routes 

(f) Group F: Release of Property From 

Radiologically Controlled Areas 

(g) Group G: Food Consumption 

(h) Derivation of Operational Guidelines 

Appendix 5. References 

Appendix 6. Acronyms/Glossary 

Background 

This Guidance was developed to 

address the critical issues of protective 

actions and protective action guides 

(PAGs) to protect human health and to 

mitigate the effects caused by terrorists’

use of a Radiological Dispersal Device 

(RDD) or Improvised Nuclear Device 

(IND). This document provides 

guidance for site cleanup and recovery 

following an RDD or IND incident, and 

affirms the applicability of existing 1992 

EPA PAGs for radiological emergencies. 

The development of this Guidance 

was directed by the White House, Office 

of Science and Technology Policy, 

through the National Science and 

Technology Council, Committee on 

Homeland and National Security, 

Subcommittee on Standards (SoS). In 

2003, the SoS convened a senior level 

Federal working group, chaired by DHS, 

to develop guidance for response and 

recovery following a radiological 

dispersal device (RDD) or improvised 

nuclear device (IND) incident. The 

working group consisted of senior 

subject matter experts in radiological/ 

nuclear emergency preparedness, 

response, recovery, and incident 

management. The following Federal 

departments and agencies were 

represented on the working group: DHS, 

EPA, Department of Commerce (DOC), 

Department of Energy (DOE), 

Department of Defense (DOD), 

Department of Labor (DOL), Department 

of Health and Human Services (HHS), 

and Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC). 

On January 3, 2006, DHS issued the 

‘‘Preparedness Directorate; Protective 

Action Guides for Radiological 

Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised 

Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents; Notice’’

(71 FR 174, Jan. 3, 2006), and requested 

public comments on this interim 

Guidance. Some changes to the 

Guidance were made as a result of these 

comments. A summary of the comments 

on the interim Guidance document and 

responses are available at Docket ID No. 

FEMA–2004–0004 at http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

In addition to the issuance of this 

Guidance, in response to interagency 

working group discussions and public 

comments, further guidance will be 

provided for the consequences that 

would be unique to an IND attack. This 

Guidance was not written to provide 

specific recommendations for a nuclear 

detonation (IND), but to consider the 

applicability of existing PAGs to RDDs 

and INDs. In particular, it does not 

consider very high doses or dose rate 

zones expected following a nuclear 

weapon detonation and other 

complicating impacts that can 

significantly affect life-saving outcomes, 

such as severely damaged infrastructure, 

loss of communications, water pressure, 

and electricity, and the prevalence of 

secondary hazards. Scientifically sound 

recommendations for responders are a 

critical component of post-incident lifesaving activities, including 

implementing protective orders, 

evacuation implementation, safe 

responder entry and operations, and 

urban search and rescue and victim 

extraction. In the interim, this Guidance 

should be used until the IND guidance 

is developed. 

The intended audience of this 

document are Federal, State, and local 

radiological emergency response and 

incident management officials. This 

Guidance is not intended to impact site 

cleanups occurring under other 

statutory authorities such as the 

Environmental Protection Agency’s 

(EPA) Superfund program, the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) 

decommissioning program, or other 

Federal and State cleanup programs. In 

addition, the scope of this Guidance 

does not include situations involving 

U.S. nuclear weapons accidents. 

In addition to the issuance of this 

Guidance, further guidance is being 

planned for the devastating 

consequences that would be unique to 

INDs. In the interim, the present 

document will provide general RDD and 

IND guidance. 

By agreement with the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA), the Guidance 

being published today is final and its 

substance will be incorporated without 

change into the revision of the 1992 

EPA Manual of Protective Actions 

Guides and Protective Actions for 

Nuclear Incidents (the PAG Manual). 

This notice of final guidance will 

therefore sunset upon publication of the 

new EPA PAG Manual (see, http:// 

www.epa.gov/radiation/rert/pags.html). 

The reader will then be directed to the 

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new EPA PAG Manual, where these 

provisions may be found. 

(a) Introduction 

For the early and intermediate phases 

of response, this document presents 

levels of projected radiation dose at 

which the Federal Government 

recommends that actions be considered 

to avoid or reduce adverse public health 

consequences from an RDD or IND 

incident. This document incorporates 

guidance and regulations published by 

the EPA, Food and Drug Administration 

(FDA), and the Occupational Safety and 

Health Administration (OSHA). For the 

late phase of the response, this 

Guidance presents a process for 

establishing appropriate exposure levels 

based on site-specific circumstances. 

This Guidance addresses key 

radiological protection questions at each 

stage of an RDD or IND incident (early, 

intermediate, and late) and constitutes 

advice by the Federal government to 

Federal, State, and local decision 

makers. 

The objective of the Guidance is to aid 

decision makers in protecting the 

public, first responders, and other 

emergency workers from the effects of 

radiation, and cleaning up the affected 

area, while balancing the adverse social 

and economic impacts following an 

RDD or IND incident. Restoring the 

normal operation of critical 

infrastructure, services, industries, 

business, and public activities as soon 

as possible can minimize adverse social 

and economic impacts. 

This Guidance for RDD and IND 

incidents is not a set of absolute 

standards. The guides are not intended 

to define ‘‘safe’’ or ‘‘unsafe’’ levels of 

exposure or contamination; rather they 

represent the approximate levels at 

which the associated protective actions 

are justified. The Guidance provides 

Federal, State and local decision makers 

the flexibility to be more or less 

restrictive, as deemed appropriate based 

on the unique characteristics of the 

incident and local considerations. 

This RDD/IND Guidance can be used 

to select actions to prepare for, respond 

to, and recover from the adverse effects 

that may exist during any phase of a 

terrorist incident—the early (emergency) 

phase, the intermediate phase, or the 

late phase. There may be an urgent need 

to evacuate people; there may also be an 

urgent need to restore the services of 

critical infrastructure (e.g., roads, rail 

lines, airports, electric power, water, 

sewage, medical facilities, and 

businesses) in the hours and days 

following the incident—thus, some 

response decisions must be made 

quickly. If the decisions affecting the 

recovery of critical infrastructure are not 

made quickly, the disruption and harm 

caused by the incident could be 

inadvertently and unnecessarily 

increased. Failure to restore important 

services rapidly could result in 

additional adverse public health and 

welfare impacts that could be more 

significant than the direct radiological 

impacts. 

(b) Characteristics of RDD and IND 

Incidents 

A radiological incident is defined as 

an event or series of events, deliberate 

or accidental, leading to the release, or 

potential release, into the environment 

of radioactive material in sufficient 

quantity to warrant consideration of 

protective actions. Use of an RDD or 

IND is an act of terror that results in a 

radiological incident. 

(1) Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) 

An RDD poses a threat to public 

health and safety through the malicious 

spread of radioactive material by some 

means of dispersion. The mode of 

dispersal typically conceived as an RDD 

is an explosive device coupled with 

radioactive material. The explosion 

adds an immediate threat to human life 

and property. Other means of dispersal, 

both passive and active, may be 

employed. 

There is a wide range of possible 

consequences that may result from an 

RDD, depending on the type and size of 

the device and how dispersal is 

achieved. The consequences of an RDD 

may range from a small, localized area, 

such as a single building or city block, 

to large areas, conceivably several 

square miles. However, most experts 

agree that the likelihood of impacting a 

very large area is low. In most plausible 

scenarios, the radioactive material 

would not result in acutely harmful 

radiation doses, and the primary public 

health concern from those materials 

would be increased risk of cancer to 

exposed individuals. Hazards from fire, 

smoke, shock (physical, electrical, or 

thermal), shrapnel (from an explosion), 

hazardous materials, and other chemical 

or biological agents may also be present. 

(2) Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) 

An IND is an illicit nuclear weapon 

bought, stolen, or otherwise originating 

from a nuclear State, or a weapon 

fabricated by a terrorist group from 

illegally obtained fissile nuclear 

weapons material that produces a 

nuclear explosion. The nuclear yield 

achieved by an IND produces extreme 

heat, powerful shockwaves, and prompt 

radiation that would be acutely lethal 

for a significant distance. It also 

produces radioactive fallout, which may 

spread and deposit over very large areas. 

If a nuclear yield is not achieved, the 

result would likely resemble an RDD in 

which fissile weapons material was 

utilized. 

(3) Differences Between Acts of Terror 

and Accidents 

Most radiological emergency planning 

has been conducted to respond to 

potential nuclear power plant accidents. 

RDD and IND incidents differ from a 

nuclear power plant accident in several 

ways, and response planning should 

take these differences into account. 

First, the severity of an IND incident 

would be dramatically greater than any 

nuclear power plant accident. An IND 

would have grave consequences for the 

human population and create a large 

radius of severe damage from blast and 

fires, which could not occur in a nuclear 

power plant accident. 

Second, the radiological release from 

an RDD or IND may start without any 

advance warning and would likely have 

a relatively short duration. In a major 

nuclear power plant accident, there is 

likely to be several hours or days of 

warning before the release starts, and 

the release is likely to be drawn out over 

many hours. This difference means that 

most early phase, and some 

intermediate phase, protective action 

decisions, which may be made in a 

timely fashion during power plant 

incidents, must be made much more 

quickly (and with less information) in 

an RDD or IND incident if they are to 

be effective. 

Third, an RDD or IND incident is 

more likely to occur in a major city 

center with a large population. Because 

of the rural setting in which many 

nuclear facilities are located, the lower 

number and density of people affected 

by a nuclear plant incident would be 

less, making evacuations much more 

manageable, and the amount of critical 

infrastructure impacted is also likely to 

be smaller. 

Fourth, large nuclear facilities have 

detailed emergency plans developed 

over years that are periodically 

exercised including specified protective 

actions, evacuation routes, and methods 

to quickly alert the public of the actions 

to take. This would not be the case for 

an RDD or IND incident. This level of 

radiological emergency planning 

typically does not exist in most cities 

and towns without nearby nuclear 

facilities. 

Fifth, the radioactive material releases 

from a nuclear power plant incident 

would be well known in advance based 

on reactor operational characteristics 

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45032 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 149 / Friday, August 1, 2008 / Notices 

1Additional protective action guides and 

recommendations are needed for the close-in zones 

after an IND. A follow-on Federal effort is underway 

to address this critical need. 

whereas releases associated with an 

RDD or IND would not. 

Sixth, in an act of terrorism, the 

incident scene becomes a crime scene. 

As such, the crime scene must be 

preserved for forensic investigation. 

This may impact emergency responders 

during the early and intermediate 

phases of response. It should be noted 

that other personnel responding to the 

incident (i.e., law enforcement, security 

personnel) will be involved in addition 

to emergency responders. 

(c) Phases of Response 

Typically, the response to an RDD or 

IND incident can be divided into three 

time phases—the early phase, the 

intermediate phase, and the late phase—

that are generally accepted as being 

common to all radiological incidents. 

The phases represent time periods in 

which response officials would be 

making public health protection 

decisions. Although these phases cannot 

be represented by precise time periods, 

and may overlap, they provide a useful 

framework for the considerations 

involved in emergency response 

planning. 

(1) Early Phase 

The early phase (or emergency phase) 

is the period at the beginning of the 

incident when immediate decisions for 

effective protective actions are required, 

and when actual field measurement data 

generally are not available. Exposure to 

the radioactive plume, short-term 

exposure to deposited radioactive 

materials, and inhalation of radioactive 

material are generally taken into 

account when considering protective 

actions for the early phase. The 

response during the early phase 

includes initial emergency response 

actions to protect public health and 

welfare in the short term, considering a 

time period for protective actions of 

hours to a few days. Priority should be 

given to lifesaving and first-aid actions. 

In general, early phase protective 

actions should be taken very quickly, 

and the protective action decisions can 

be modified later as more information 

becomes available. If an explosive RDD 

is deployed without warning, however, 

there may be no time to take protective 

actions to significantly reduce plume 

exposure. Also, in the event of a covert 

dispersal, discovery or detection may 

not occur for days or weeks, allowing 

contamination to be dispersed broadly 

by foot, vehicular traffic, wind, rain, or 

other forces. 

If an IND explodes, there may only be 

time to make early phase protective 

action recommendations (e.g., 

evacuation, or shelter-in-place) many 

miles from the explosion to protect 

areas against exposure to fallout. Areas 

close to the explosion will be 

devastated, and communications and 

access will be extremely limited. 

Assistance will likely not be 

forthcoming or even possible for some 

hours. Self-guided protective actions are 

likely to be the best recourse for most 

survivors (e.g., evacuation 

perpendicular to the plume movement if 

it can be achieved quickly, or sheltering 

in a basement or large building for a day 

or more after the incident 1). Due to the 

lack of communication and access, 

outside guidance and assistance to these 

areas can be expected to be delayed. 

Therefore, response planning and public 

outreach programs are critical measures 

to meet IND preparedness objectives. 

(2) Intermediate Phase 

The intermediate phase of the 

response may follow the early phase 

response within as little as a few hours. 

The intermediate phase of the response 

is usually assumed to begin after the 

incident source and releases have been 

brought under control and protective 

action decisions can be made based on 

measurements of exposure and 

radioactive materials that have been 

deposited as a result of the incident. 

Activities in this phase typically overlap 

with early and late phase activities, and 

may continue for weeks to many 

months, until protective actions can be 

terminated. 

During the intermediate phase, 

decisions must be made on the initial 

actions needed to recover from the 

incident, reopen critical infrastructure, 

and return to a state of relatively normal 

activity. In general, intermediate phase 

decisions should consider late phase 

response objectives. However, some 

intermediate phase decisions will need 

to be made quickly (i.e., within hours) 

and should not be delayed by 

discussions on what the more desirable 

permanent decisions will be. Local 

officials must weigh public health and 

welfare concerns, potential economic 

effects, and many other factors when 

making decisions. For example, it can 

be expected that hospitals and their 

access roads will need to remain open 

or be reopened quickly. These interim 

decisions can often be made with the 

acknowledgement that further work may 

be needed as time progresses. 

(3) Late Phase 

The late phase is the period when 

recovery and cleanup actions designed 

to reduce radiation levels in the 

environment to acceptable levels are 

commenced. This phase ends when all 

the remediation actions have been 

completed. With additional time and 

increased understanding of the 

situation, there will be opportunities to 

involve key stakeholders in providing 

sound, cost-effective cleanup 

recommendations that are protective of 

human health and the environment. 

Generally, early (or emergency) phase 

decisions will be made directly by 

elected public officials, or their 

designees, with limited stakeholder 

involvement due to the need to act 

within a short timeframe. Long-term 

decisions should be made with 

stakeholder involvement, and can also 

include incident-specific technical 

working groups to provide expert advice 

to decision makers on alternatives, 

costs, and impacts. The relationship 

between typical protective actions and 

the phases of the incident response are 

outlined in Figure 1. There is overlap 

between the phases; this framework 

should be used to inform planning and 

decision-making. 

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BILLING CODE 9110–21–C 


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(d) Guidance for RDD and IND Incidents 

This section defines protective actions 

and protective action guides, and 

provides guidance for their 

implementation in RDD and IND 

incidents. In addition, this section 

provides guidance for protection of 

emergency workers, and a strategy for 

devising cleanup plans, criteria, and 

options. 

(1) Protective Actions 

Protective actions are activities that 

should be conducted in response to an 

RDD or IND incident in order to reduce 

or eliminate exposure of the public to 

radiation or other hazards. These 

actions are generic and are applicable to 

RDDs and INDs. The principal 

protective action decisions for 

consideration in the early and 

intermediate phases of an emergency are 

whether to shelter-in-place, evacuate, or 

relocate affected or potentially affected 

populations. Secondary actions include 

administration of medical 

countermeasures, decontamination 

(including decontamination of persons 

evacuated from the affected area), use of 

access restrictions, and use of 

restrictions on food and water. In some 

situations, only one protective action 

needs to be implemented, while in 

others, numerous protective actions 

should be implemented. Many factors 

should be considered when deciding 

whether or not to order a protective 

action based on the projected dose to a 

population. For example, evacuation of 

a population is much more difficult and 

costly as the size of the population 

increases. 

(2) Protective Action Guides (PAGs) 

A PAG is the projected dose to a 

reference individual, from an accidental 

or deliberate release of radioactive 

material, at which a specific protective 

action to reduce or avoid that dose is 

recommended. Thus, protective actions 

are designed to be taken before the 

anticipated dose is realized. 

The Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA) has published PAGs in the 

‘‘Manual of Protective Action Guides 

and Protective Actions for Nuclear 

Incidents’’ (EPA 400–R–92–001, May 

1992), in coordination with the Federal 

Radiological Preparedness Coordinating 

Committee (FRPCC). The PAGs 

presented in this manual, hereafter 

referred to as the 1992 EPA PAGs, are 

non-regulatory. They are designed to 

provide a flexible basis for decisions 

under varying emergency 

circumstances. The 1992 EPA PAGs 

meet the following principal criteria and 

goals: (1) Prevent acute effects, (2) 

reduce risk of chronic effects, and (3) 

require optimization to balance 

protection with other important factors 

and ensure that actions taken result in 

more benefit than harm. 

The 1992 EPA PAG Manual, however, 

was not developed to address response 

actions following radiological or nuclear 

terrorist incidents and does not address 

long-term cleanup. The 1992 EPA PAG 

Manual was written to address the kinds 

of nuclear or radiological incidents 

deemed likely to occur. While intended 

to be applicable to any radiological 

release, the 1992 EPA PAGs were 

designed principally to address the 

impacts of commercial NPP accidents, 

the worst type of incident under 

consideration at that time. This is 

important for two reasons: Commercial 

nuclear power plant accidents are 

almost always signaled by preceding 

events, giving plant managers time to 

make decisions, and giving local 

emergency managers time to 

communicate with the public and 

initiate evacuations if necessary. In 

addition, the suite of radionuclides 

present at nuclear power plants is wellknown, and is dominated by relatively 

short-lived isotopes. 

The 1992 EPA PAG Manual provides 

a significant part of the basis of this 

document and should be referred to for 

additional details. In deriving the 

recommendations contained in this 

Guidance, new types of incidents and 

scenarios that could lead to 

environmental radiological 

contamination were considered. The 

interagency working group determined 

that the 1992 EPA PAGs for the early 

and intermediate phases, including 

emergency responder guidelines, are 

also appropriate for use in RDD and IND 

incidents. This Guidance is intended to 

supplement the 1992 EPA PAG Manual 

for application to RDD and IND 

incidents, including providing new late 

phase guidance. 

The RDD/IND Guidance provides 

generic criteria based on balancing 

public health and welfare with the risk 

of various protective actions applied in 

each of the phases of an RDD or IND 

incident. The RDD/IND Guidance is 

specific to radiation and radioactive 

materials, and must be considered in the 

context of other chemical or biological 

hazards that may also be present. 

Though the early and intermediate 

PAGs in this Guidance are values of 

dose to be avoided, published dose 

conversion factors and derived response 

levels may be utilized in estimating 

doses, and for choosing and 

implementing protective actions. Other 

quantitative measures and derived 

concentration values may be useful in 

emergency situations; for example, for 

the release of goods and property from 

contaminated zones, and to control 

access into and out of contaminated 

areas. 

Because of the short time frames 

required for emergency response 

decisions in the early and intermediate 

phases, it is likely there will not be 

opportunities for local decision makers 

to consult with a variety of stakeholders 

before taking actions. Therefore, this 

Guidance incorporates the significant 

body of work done in the general 

context of radiological emergency 

response planning from the 

development of the 1992 EPA PAGs, 

and represents the results of scientific 

analysis, public comment, drills, 

exercises, and a consensus at the 

Federal level for appropriate emergency 

action. 

In order to use the early and 

intermediate phase PAGs to make 

decisions about appropriate protective 

actions, decision makers will need 

information on suspected radionuclides; 

projected plume movement, and 

radioactive depositions; and/or actual 

measurement data or, during the period 

initially following the release, expert 

advice in the absence of good 

information. Sources of such 

information include on-scene 

responders, as well as monitoring, 

assessment, and modeling centers. 

(3) Early and Intermediate Phase 

Protective Action Guides for RDD and 

IND Incidents 

The early and intermediate phase 

RDD/IND PAGs are generally based on 

the following sources: The 1992 EPA 

PAGs developed by EPA in coordination 

with other Federal agencies through the 

Federal Radiological Preparedness 

Coordinating Committee; guidance 

developed by the FDA for food and food 

products and the distribution of 

potassium iodide. Table 1 provides a 

summary of the early and intermediate 

phase PAGs for protection of the general 

public in an RDD or IND incident and 

key protective actions. 

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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 149 / Friday, August 1, 2008 / Notices 45035 

TABLE 1—PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDES FOR RDD AND IND INCIDENTS

Phase Protective action recommendation Protective action guide 

Early ......................... Sheltering-in-place or evacuation of the 

publica.

1 to 5 rem (0.01–0.05 Sv) projected dose.b

Administration of prophylactic drugs—

potassium iodidec,e Administration of 

other prophylactic or decorporation 

agentsd.

5 rem (0.05 Sv) projected dose to child thyroid.c,e

Intermediate ............. Relocation of the public ........................ 2 rem (0.02 Sv) projected dose first year. Subsequent years, 0.5 rem/y (0.005 

Sv/y) projected dose.b

Food interdiction .................................... 0.5 rem (0.005 Sv) projected dose, or 5 rem (0.05 Sv) to any individual organ 

or tissue in the first year, whichever is limiting. 

Drinking water interdiction ..................... 0.5 rem (0.005 Sv) projected dose in the first year. 

aShould normally begin at 1 rem (0.01 Sv); take whichever action (or combination of actions) that results in the lowest exposure for the majority of the population. Sheltering may begin at lower levels if advantageous. bTotal Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE)—the sum of the effective dose equivalent from external radiation exposure and the committed effective dose equivalent from inhaled radioactive material. cProvides thyroid protection from radioactive iodine only. 

dFor other information on other radiological prophylactics and medical countermeasures, refer to http://www.fda.gov/cder/drugprepare/default.htm, http:/www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation, or http://www.orau.gov/reacts. e Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE). FDA understands that a KI administration program that sets different projected thyroid radioactive dose 

thresholds for treatment of different population groups may be logistically impractical to implement during a radiological emergency. If emergency 

planners reach this conclusion, FDA recommends that KI be administered to both children and adults at the lowest intervention threshold (i.e., >5 

rem (0.05 Sv) projected internal thyroid dose in children) (FDA 2001). 

In the early and intermediate phases 

of an RDD or IND incident there may 

not be adequate information to 

determine radiation levels or make dose 

projections because there may be little 

or no advance notice of an attack, the 

characteristics of the RDD or IND may 

not be immediately known, monitoring 

equipment may not be available to make 

measurements, or there may not be time 

to do measurements or projections 

before emergency response actions need 

to be initiated. Therefore, to use this 

guide to determine whether protective 

action is needed in a particular 

situation, it may be necessary to 

compare the PAGs to results of a dose 

projection. In general, it should be 

emphasized that realistic assumptions, 

based on incident-specific information, 

should be used when making radiation 

dose projections so that the final results 

are representative of actual conditions 

rather than overly conservative 

exposures. It is very important that local 

officials responsible for carrying out 

emergency response actions conduct 

advance planning to ensure that they are 

adequately prepared if such an incident 

were to occur. 

(A) Early Phase PAGs 

For the early phase, the 1992 EPA 

PAGs for evacuation and sheltering-inplace are appropriate for RDD and IND 

incidents (see Table 1). Early phase 

protective action decisions in an RDD or 

IND must be made quickly, and with 

very little confirmatory data. While 

sheltering-in-place should be carried out 

at 1 rem (0.01 Sv) sheltering-in-place 

can begin at any projected dose level. 

FDA guidance on the administration 

of stable iodine is also considered 

appropriate (useful primarily for NPP 

incident involving radioiodine release). 

The administration of other medical 

countermeasures should be evaluated 

on a case-by-case basis and depend on 

the nature of the event and 

radionuclides involved. 

The initial zone should be established 

and controlled around the incident site, 

as is the case for other crime scenes and 

hazards. This Guidance allows for the 

refinement of that area if the radiation 

exposure levels warrant such action. 

Advance planning by local officials for 

messaging, communications, and 

actions in the event of an RDD or IND 

are strongly encouraged. 

(B) Intermediate Phase PAGs 

The decisions in the intermediate 

phase will focus on the return of key 

infrastructure and services, and the 

rapid return to normal activities. This 

will include decisions on allowing use 

of roads, ports, waterways, 

transportation systems (including 

subways, trains, and airports), hospitals, 

businesses, and residences. It will also 

include responses to questions about 

acceptable use and release of real and 

personal property such as cars, clothes, 

or equipment that may have been 

impacted by the RDD or IND incident. 

Many of the activities will be concerned 

with materials and areas that were not 

affected, but for which members of the 

public may have concern. Thus, the 

RDD/IND Guidance serves to guide 

decisions on returning to impacted 

areas, leaving impacted areas, and 

providing assurance that an area was 

not impacted. The intermediate phase is 

also the period during which planning 

for long-term site cleanup and 

remediation should be initiated. 

For the intermediate phase, relocation 

of the population is a protective action 

that can be used to reduce dose. 

Relocation is the removal or continued 

exclusion of people (households) from 

contaminated areas in order to avoid 

chronic radiation exposure, and it is 

meant to protect the general public. For 

the intermediate phase, the existing 

relocation PAGs of 2 rem (0.02 Sv) in 

the first year and 0.5 rem (0.005 Sv) in 

any subsequent year are considered 

appropriate for RDD and IND incidents. 

However, for IND incidents, the area 

impacted and the number of people that 

might be subject to relocation could 

potentially be very large and could 

exceed the resources and infrastructure 

available. For example, in making 

relocation decisions, the availability of 

adequate accommodations for relocated 

people should be considered. Decision 

makers may need to consider limiting 

action to those areas most severely 

affected, phasing relocation 

implementation based on the resources 

available. 

The relocation PAGs apply 

principally to personal residences, but 

may impact other locations as well. For 

example, these PAGs could impact work 

locations, hospitals, and park lands, as 

well as the use of highways and other 

transportation facilities. For each type of 

facility, the individual occupancy time 

should be taken into account to 

determine the criteria for using a facility 

or area. It might be necessary to avoid 

continuous use of homes in an area 

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45036 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 149 / Friday, August 1, 2008 / Notices 

because radiation levels are too high; 

however, a factory or office building in 

the same area could be used because 

occupancy times are shorter. Similarly, 

a highway could be used at higher 

contamination levels because the 

exposure time of highway users would 

be considerably less than the time spent 

by residents in a home. 

The intermediate phase PAG for the 

interdiction of food is set at 0.5 rem 

(0.005 Sv) projected dose in the first 

year, and the intermediate phase PAG 

for the interdiction of drinking water is 

set at 0.5 rem (0.005 Sv) projected dose 

for the first year for RDD and IND 

incidents. These values are consistent 

with those now used or being 

considered as PAGs for other types of 

nuclear/radiological incidents. 

The use of simple dose reduction 

techniques is recommended for personal 

property and all potentially 

contaminated areas that continue to be 

occupied. This technique is also 

consistent with the 1992 EPA PAGs 

developed for other types of nuclear/ 

radiological incidents. Examples of 

simple dose reduction techniques 

would be washing all transportation 

vehicles (e.g., automobiles, trains, ships, 

and aircraft), personal clothing, eating 

utensils, food preparation surfaces, and 

other personal property before next use, 

as practicable and appropriate. 

(4) Late Phase Guidance 

The late phase involves the final 

cleanup of areas and property at which 

radioactive material is present. Unlike 

the early and intermediate phases of an 

RDD or IND incident, decision makers 

will have more time and information 

during the late phase to allow for better 

data collection, stakeholder 

involvement, and options analysis. In 

this respect, the late phase is no longer 

a response to an ‘‘emergency situation,’’

and is better viewed in terms of the 

objectives of cleanup and site recovery. 

Because of the extremely broad range 

of potential impacts that may occur 

from RDDs and INDs (e.g., light 

contamination of one building to 

widespread destruction of a major 

metropolitan area), a pre-established 

numeric cleanup guideline is not 

recommended as best serving the needs 

of decision makers in the late phase. 

Rather, a process should be used to 

determine the societal objectives for 

expected land uses and the options and 

approaches available, in order to select 

the most acceptable criteria. For 

example, if the incident is an RDD of 

limited size and the impacted area is 

small, it might reasonably be expected 

that a complete return to normal 

conditions can be achieved within a 

short period of time. However, if the 

impacted area is large, achieving low 

cleanup levels for remediation of the 

entire area, and/or maintaining existing 

land uses, may not be practicable. 

It should be noted that an 

intermediate phase PAG is not 

equivalent to a starting point for 

development of the late phase cleanup 

process. However, contamination and 

radiation levels existing after an 

incident (e.g., concentrations, or dose 

rates), as well as actions already taken, 

provide practical starting points for 

further action and cleanup. The goal of 

cleanup is to reduce those levels as low 

as is reasonable. It is possible that final 

criteria for reoccupation at a given 

incident site may be either below or 

above the intermediate phase PAG dose 

value, since no dose or risk cap for the 

late phase is explicitly recommended 

under this Guidance. 

Late phase cleanup criteria should be 

derived through a site-specific 

optimization process, which should 

include potential future land uses, 

technical feasibility, costs, costeffectiveness, and public acceptability. 

Optimization is a concept that is 

common to many State, Federal, and 

international risk management programs 

that address radionuclides and 

chemicals, although it is not always 

referred to as such. The Risk 

Management Framework described in 

Appendix 2 provides such a process and 

helps assure the protection of public 

health and welfare. Decisions should 

take health, safety, technical, economic, 

and public policy factors into account. 

Appendix 3 utilizes the framework as a 

basis for RDD and IND site cleanup 

planning. 

Broadly speaking, optimization is a 

flexible, multi-attribute decision process 

that seeks to weigh many factors. 

Optimization analyses are quantitative 

and qualitative assessments applied at 

each stage of site recovery decisionmaking, from evaluation of remedial 

options to implementation of the chosen 

alternative. The evaluation of cleanup 

alternatives, for example, should factor 

in all relevant variables, including areas 

impacted (e.g., size and location relative 

to population), types of contamination 

(chemical, biological, and/or 

radioactive), human health, public 

welfare, technical feasibility, costs, and 

available resources to implement and 

maintain remedial options, short-term 

effectiveness, long-term effectiveness, 

timeliness, public acceptability, and 

economic effects (e.g., on residents, 

tourism, and business, and industry). 

Various Federal, and State agencies, 

along with other organizations (e.g., 

national and international advisory 

organizations), already have guidance 

and tools that may be used to help 

establish cleanup levels. The 

optimization process allows local 

decision makers to draw on the thought 

processes used to develop the dose and/ 

or risk benchmarks used by these State, 

Federal, or other sources. These 

benchmarks, though developed within 

different contexts, may be useful for 

analysis of cleanup options. Decision 

makers might reasonably determine that 

it is appropriate to move up or down 

from these benchmarks, depending on 

the site-specific circumstances and 

balancing of other relevant factors. 

In developing this Guidance, the 

Federal Government recognized that 

experience from existing programs, such 

as the EPA’s Superfund program, the 

NRC’s standards for decommissioning 

and decontamination to terminate a 

plant license, and other national and 

international recommendations, may be 

useful in planning the cleanup and 

recovery efforts following an RDD or 

IND incident. This Guidance allows the 

consideration and incorporation, as 

appropriate, of any or all of the existing 

environmental program elements. 

The site-specific optimization process 

includes quantitative and qualitative 

assessments applied at each stage of site 

cleanup decision making, from initial 

scoping and stakeholder outreach, to 

evaluation of cleanup options, to 

implementation of the chosen 

alternative. The evaluation of options 

for the late phase of recovery after an 

RDD or IND incident should consider all 

of the relevant factors, including: 

• Areas impacted (e.g., size, location 

relative to population). 

• Types of contamination (chemical, 

biological, and radiological). 

• Other hazards present. 

• Human health risk. 

• Public welfare. 

• Ecological risks. 

• Actions already taken during the 

early and intermediate phases. 

• Projected land uses. 

• Preservation or destruction of 

places of historical, national, or regional 

significance. 

• Technical feasibility. 

• Wastes generated and disposal 

options and costs. 

• Costs and available resources to 

implement and maintain remedial 

options. 

• Potential adverse impacts (e.g., to 

human health, the environment, and the 

economy) of remedial options. 

• Short-term effectiveness. 

• Long-term effectiveness. 

• Timeliness. 

• Public acceptability, including local 

cultural sensitivities. 

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2 In the intermediate and late phases, standard 

worker protections, including the 5 rem 

occupational dose limit, would normally apply. 

• Economic effects (e.g., on 

employment, tourism, and business). 

• Intergenerational equity. 

The site-specific optimization process 

provides the best opportunity for 

decision makers to gain public 

confidence through the involvement of 

stakeholders. This process should begin 

during, and proceed independently of, 

intermediate phase protective action 

activities. 

Appendix 3 provides additional 

details on a process that may be used to 

implement this Guidance, describing 

the role of the Federal Government and 

how it could integrate its activities with 

State and local governments and the 

public. For some radiological terror 

incidents, States may take the primary 

leadership role in cleanup and 

contribute significant resources toward 

recovery of the site. 

As explained in Appendix 3, the 

Incident Command or Unified 

Command should develop a schedule 

with milestones for conducting the 

optimization process as soon as 

practicable following the incident. 

While the goal should be to complete 

the initial optimization process as soon 

as possible following an incident 

(depending on the size of the incident), 

the schedule must take into 

consideration incident-specific factors 

that would affect successful 

implementation. This schedule may 

need to reflect a phased approach to 

cleanup and is subject to change as the 

cleanup progresses. 

(5) Emergency Worker Guidelines 

The response during the early phase 

includes initial emergency response 

actions to protect public health and 

welfare in the short term. Priority 

should be given to lifesaving and firstaid actions. Following an IND 

detonation in particular, the highest 

priority missions should also include 

actions such as suppression of fires that 

could result in further loss of life. 

For the purposes of this Guidance, 

‘‘emergency worker’’ is defined as any 

worker who performs an early or 

intermediate phase work action. Table 2 

shows the emergency worker guidelines 

for early phase emergency response 

actions. In intermediate and late phase 

actions (i.e., cleanup and recovery), 

standard worker protections, including 

the 5 rem (0.05 Sv) occupational dose 

limit, apply. 

TABLE 2—EMERGENCY WORKER GUIDELINES IN THE EARLY PHASE 2

Total effective dose 

equivalent (TEDE) a

guideline 

Activity Condition 

5rem (0.05 Sv) ......... All occupational exposures ................... All reasonably achievable actions have been taken to minimize dose. 

10 rem (0.1 Sv) ........ Protecting valuable property necessary 

for public welfare (e.g., a power 

plant).

• All appropriate actions and controls have been implemented; however, exceeding 5 rem (0.05 Sv) is unavoidable. 

• Responders have been fully informed of the risks of exposures they may experience. 

• Dose >5 rem (0.05 Sv) is on a voluntary basis. 

• Appropriate respiratory protection and other personal protection is provided 

and used. 

• Monitoring available to project or measure dose. 

25 rem (0.25 Sv) b .... Lifesaving or protection of large populations. It is highly unlikely that doses 

would reach this level in an RDD incident; however, worker doses higher 

than 25 rem (0.25 Sv) are conceivable in a catastrophic incident such 

as an IND incident.

• All appropriate actions and controls have been implemented; however, exceeding 5 rem (0.05 Sv) is unavoidable. 

• Responders have been fully informed of the risks of exposures they may experience. 

• Dose >5 rem (0.05 Sv) is on a voluntarily basis. 

• Appropriate respiratory protection and other personal protection is provided 

and used. 

• Monitoring available to project or measure dose. 

aThe projected sum of the effective dose equivalent from external radiation exposure and committed effective dose equivalent from internal radiation exposure. bEPA’s 1992 PAG Manual states that ‘‘Situations may also rarely occur in which a dose in excess of 25 rem for emergency exposure would 

be unavoidable in order to carry out a lifesaving operation or avoid extensive exposure of large populations.’’ Similarly, the NCRP and ICRP 

raise the possibility that emergency responders might receive an equivalent dose that approaches or exceeds 50 rem (0.5 Sv) to a large portion 

of the body in a short time (Limitation of Exposure to Ionizing Radiation, National Council on Radiation Protection and Measures, NCRP Report 

116 (1993a). If lifesaving emergency responder doses approach or exceed 50 rem (0.5 Sv) emergency responders must be made fully aware of 

both the acute and the chronic (cancer) risks of such exposure. 

This Guidance document and the 

emergency worker guidelines were 

developed for a wide range of possible 

radiological scenarios, from a small RDD 

that may impact a single building to an 

IND that could potentially impact a 

large geographic region. Therefore, the 

5, 10 and 25 rem guidelines (Table 2) 

should not be viewed as inflexible 

limits applicable to the range of early 

phase emergency actions covered by 

this Guidance. Because of the range of 

impacts and case-specific information 

needed, it is impossible to develop a 

single turn-back dose level for all 

responders to use in all events, 

especially those that involve lifesaving 

operations. Indeed, with proper 

preparedness measures (training, 

personal protective equipment, etc.) 

many radiological emergencies 

addressed by this document, even 

lifesaving operations, may be 

manageable within the 5 rem (0.05 Sv) 

occupational limit. Moreover, Incident 

Commanders should make every effort 

to employ the ‘‘as low as reasonably 

achievable’’ (ALARA) principle after an 

incident. Still, in some incidents 

medically significant doses above the 

annual occupational 5 rem (0.05 Sv) 

dose limit may be unavoidable. For 

instance, in the case of a catastrophic 

incident, such as an IND, Incident 

Commanders may need to consider 

raising the lifesaving and valuable 

property (i.e., necessary for public 

welfare) emergency worker guidelines 

in order to prevent further loss of life 

and prevent the spread of massive 

destruction. Ensuring that emergency 

workers have full knowledge of the 

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45038 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 149 / Friday, August 1, 2008 / Notices 

3These materials and additional information on 

the FRMAC can be obtained at http://

www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/

homelandsecurity/frmac. 

associated risks prior to initiating 

emergency action and medical 

evaluation of emergency workers after 

such exposure is essential. (See 

Appendix 1 for additional discussion of 

ALARA.) 

Ideally, the Incident Commanders 

should define and enforce the 

emergency dose limits in accordance 

with the immediate risk situation and 

the type of emergency action being 

performed (see Table 2). However, in 

the case of an attack it may not be 

possible to conduct dose measurements 

or projections before initiating 

emergency response activities. 

Therefore, it is crucial that officials 

responsible for carrying out emergency 

response actions in the early phase 

conduct thorough advance planning to 

ensure that they are adequately 

prepared if such an incident occurs. 

Planning should include evaluating data 

and information on possible or 

anticipated radiation exposures in RDD 

or IND incidents, developing procedures 

for reducing and controlling emergency 

responder exposures to allowable dose 

limits (Table 2), obtaining appropriate 

personal protective equipment (e.g., 

respirators, clothing) for protecting 

emergency responders who enter 

contaminated areas, and developing 

appropriate decision-making criteria for 

responding to catastrophic incidents 

that may involve high radiation 

exposure levels. Planning should also 

include informing and educating 

emergency workers about emergency 

response procedures and controls as 

well as the acute and chronic (cancer) 

risks of exposure, particularly at higher 

dose levels. Effective advance planning 

will help to ensure that the emergency 

worker guidelines are correctly applied 

and that emergency workers are not 

exposed to radiation levels that are 

higher than necessary in the specific 

emergency action. 

In addition, as part of advance 

planning, officials should develop a 

process for assessing hazards and for 

determining appropriate actions in 

incidents that may involve high 

radiation doses. Decisions regarding 

emergency response actions in incidents 

involving high radiation exposures 

require careful consideration of the 

benefits to be achieved by the ‘‘rescue’’

or response action (e.g., the significance 

of the outcome to individuals, large 

populations, general welfare, or 

valuable property necessary for public 

welfare), and the potential health 

impacts (i.e., acute and chronic) to 

emergency workers. The planning for a 

potential high radiation exposure 

incident should consider how to weigh 

the potential for and significance of the 

success of the emergency response/ 

rescue operation against the potential 

for and significance of the health and 

safety risks to the emergency workers. 

Federal, state and local emergency 

response officials should use these 

guidelines to develop specific 

operational plans and response 

protocols for protection of emergency 

response workers. 

(e) Operational Guidelines for Early and 

Intermediate PAGs 

Implementation of the early and 

intermediate PAGs may be supported by 

operational guidelines that can be 

readily used by decision makers and 

responders in the field. Operational 

guidelines are levels of radiation or 

concentrations of radionuclides that can 

be accurately measured by radiation 

detection and monitoring equipment, 

and then related or compared to the 

PAGs to quickly determine whether 

actions need to be implemented. Federal 

agencies are continuing development of 

operational guidelines to support the 

application of this Guidance, and other 

site-level decisions; therefore, they are 

provided here in overview only. 

Some values already exist that could 

potentially serve as operational 

guidelines for RDD and IND response 

and recovery operations, and there are 

various tools available to help derive 

operational guidelines for response 

planning. Appendix 4 presents a 

summary of the types of operational 

guidelines for RDD and IND response 

operations currently under 

development. 

Additional tools and assessment 

methodologies to aid in planning and 

development of operational guidelines 

for use with PAGs for a wide range of 

situations are available from the Federal 

Radiological Monitoring and 

Assessment Center (FRMAC). These 

tools and methods are written to 

support FRMAC operations during 

radiological and nuclear emergency 

responses. The FRMAC manuals 

provide detailed methods for computing 

Derived Response Levels (DRLs) and 

doses based on measurement or 

modeling results and suggest input 

parameters for various situations.3

Some examples of existing values that 

can be used as operational guidelines 

for RDD and IND response operations 

and tools that could be used to establish 

site-specific operational guidelines 

include, derived response levels, 

derived intervention levels for food, and 

radiation levels for control of access to 

radiation areas. 

(1) Derived Response Levels (DRLs) 

The 1992 EPA PAG Manual contains 

guidance and Derived Response Levels 

(DRLs) for various potential exposure 

pathways, including external exposure, 

inhalation, submersion, ground shine, 

and drinking water, for application in 

the early and intermediate phases. 

These values serve as, or can be adapted 

to serve as, operational guidelines to 

readily determine if protective actions 

need to be implemented. The summed 

ratios of radionuclide concentrations 

obtained through field measurements 

can be compared to the DRLs to 

determine whether the PAGs are likely 

to be exceeded. If concentrations of 

radionuclides obtained through field 

measurements are less than the DRLs, 

the PAGs are not likely to be exceeded 

and, thus, a protective action may not 

need to be taken. 

(2) Derived Intervention Levels (DILs) 

for Food 

The FDA has developed Derived 

Intervention Levels (DILs) for 

implementation of the early and 

intermediate PAGs for food. These DILs 

establish levels of contamination that 

can exist on crops and in food products 

and still maintain dose levels below the 

food PAGs, and could therefore be used 

as operational guidelines for RDD and 

IND incidents. More information on 

DILs can be found in ‘‘Accidental 

Radioactive Contamination of Human 

Food and Animal Feeds: 

Recommendations for State and Local 

Agencies’’ (U.S. Department of Health 

And Human Services, Food and Drug 

Administration, August 13, 1998). 

(3) Radiation Levels for Control of 

Access to Radiation Areas 

Additional operational guidelines for 

use in the early and intermediate phases 

of response are being developed for 

issues such as clearance of personal and 

real property, land and facility access, 

and for response actions. A DOE project 

supported by an interagency effort is 

developing needed tools and 

operational guidelines that address 

continued use, or necessary control for 

personal property (e.g., vehicles, 

equipment, personal items, debris) and 

real property (e.g., buildings, roads, 

bridges, residential and commercial 

areas, national monuments and icons) 

that may be impacted by an RDD or IND 

incident. The effort includes 

consideration of short and long term use 

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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 149 / Friday, August 1, 2008 / Notices 45039 

4Preliminary Report on Operational Guidelines 

Developed for Use in Emergency Preparedness and 

Response to a Radiological Dispersal Device 

Incident, DOE/HS–0001. The report and associated 

material will be available at http:// 

www.ogcms.energy.gov. 

5RESRAD–RDD is derived from RESRAD, which 

is a computer model designed to estimate radiation 

doses and risks from residual radioactive materials. 

The RESRAD model has been applied to determine 

the risk to human health posed at over 300 sites in 

the United States and abroad that have been 

contaminated with radiation. 

or access to areas. A DOE report 4 is 

available for review, and use as 

appropriate. The report includes 

proposed operational guidelines and 

their technical derivation, and provides 

tools such as the computer model 

RESRAD–RDD 5 for calculating incidentspecific guidelines and worker stay-time 

tables for access control, and dose-based 

soil and building contamination levels 

to assist in the site-specific optimization 

process. The goal of the DOE report is 

to provide sufficient information to 

assist decision makers and responders 

in executing their responsibilities in a 

safe way. Appendix 4 of this Guidance 

provides a more detailed overview of 

the operational guidelines contained in 

the DOE draft report and their intended 

applications. 

Appendix 1—Planning for Protection of 

Emergency Workers Responding to 

RDD and IND Incidents 

The purpose of this appendix is to provide 

Federal, state, and local decision makers with 

information on how to prepare for, and 

implement emergency worker guidance in 

RDD and IND incidents. Because there may 

not be adequate information or time for 

determining radiation levels or making dose 

projections in the early phase of an RDD or 

IND incident, it is very important that 

emergency management officials conduct 

worker health and safety planning and 

training in advance to ensure they are 

adequately prepared if such an incident 

occurs. 

Planning should include evaluating data 

and information on possible or anticipated 

radiation exposures in RDD and IND 

incidents and on acute and chronic risks of 

radiation exposures, developing procedures 

for reducing and controlling emergency 

worker exposures, obtaining appropriate 

personal protective equipment (e.g., 

respirators, protective clothing) to help 

protect emergency workers who enter 

exposure areas, and developing appropriate 

decisionmaking criteria for responding in 

catastrophic incidents, such as an IND, that 

may involve high exposure levels. Planning 

should also include training and educating 

emergency workers about emergency 

response procedures in radiological 

environments, radiation exposure controls 

and the risks of exposure, particularly at 

higher levels. Effective planning and training 

will help to ensure that exposures to 

emergency workers are kept to the lowest 

radiation levels necessary for the particular 

emergency response action. 

This appendix provides information to 

assist local, State, and Federal authorities, 

and emergency workers in planning for 

radiological emergencies, in particular those 

related to terrorist attacks using RDDs and 

INDs. The appendix is not intended to 

provide comprehensive training guidance. 

Other information useful in the planning 

process may be available from the following 

organizations: 

• The National Council on Radiation 

Protection and Measurements, 

• the International Commission on 

Radiological Protection, 

• the International Atomic Energy Agency, 

• the American Nuclear Society, 

• the Health Physics Society, and 

• the Conference of Radiation Control 

Program Directors. 

(a) Guidelines for Emergency Workers in 

Responding to RDD and IND Incidents 

Table 2 in Section (d)(5) of the Guidance 

shows the emergency worker guidelines for 

the early phase. In the intermediate and late 

phases, standard OSHA and other worker 

health and safety standards apply. The DOE 

and NRC also have standards that govern 

worker health and safety for normal 

operations at their owned or licensed 

facilities. OSHA’s occupational radiation 

dose limit (1.25 rem (0.0125 Sv) per annual 

quarter, or 5 rem (0.05 Sv) total in one year) 

minimizes risk to workers consistent with the 

Occupational Health and Safety Act (29 

U.S.C. 651 et seq.). 

In many radiological incidents, particularly 

RDD situations, the actual dose to emergency 

workers may be controlled to less than 5 rem 

(0.05 Sv). However, in other radiological 

incidents precautions may not be sufficient 

or effective to keep emergency worker doses 

at or below 5 rem (0.05 Sv), because of the 

magnitude of the incident and because 

certain measures typically used to control 

exposures in normal operations may not be 

applicable. For example, one of the major 

radiation protection controls used in normal 

radiological operations is containment of the 

radioactive material. Another is to keep 

people away from the source material. During 

emergency response to an RDD or IND 

incident use of these controls may not be 

possible due to the nature of the incident and 

the urgency of response actions. As a result, 

high radiation exposures for emergency 

responders may be unavoidable and have the 

potential to exceed regulatory limits used for 

normal operations. Therefore, the 5, 10 and 

25 rem guidelines found in Table 2 should 

not be viewed as absolute standards 

applicable to the full range of incidents 

covered by this guidance, but rather serve as 

decision points for making worker protection 

decisions during emergencies. 

Emergency response actions in 

catastrophic incidents that involve high 

exposure levels require careful consideration 

of both the benefits to be achieved by the 

‘‘rescue’’ or response action (e.g., the 

significance of the benefit to individuals, 

populations, valuable property necessary for 

general welfare), and the potential for acute 

and chronic health impacts to individuals 

conducting the emergency response 

operation. That is, in making an emergency 

response decision, the potential for the 

success of the response/rescue operation and 

the significance of its benefits to the 

community should be weighed against the 

potential for, and significance of, the health 

and safety risks to workers. 

(b) Controlling Occupational Exposures and 

Doses to Emergency Workers 

Appropriate measures should be taken to 

minimize radiation dose to emergency 

workers responding to an RDD or IND 

incident. With proper preparedness measures 

(e.g., training, personal protective 

equipment), many emergencies that this 

document addresses, including lifesaving 

actions, may be possible to manage within 

the 5 rem (0.05 Sv) occupational limit. 

Emergency management officials responsible 

for an incident should take steps to keep all 

doses to emergency workers ‘‘as low as 

reasonable achievable’’ (ALARA). Protocols 

for maintaining ALARA should include the 

following health physics and industrial 

hygiene practices: 

• Minimizing the time spent in the 

contaminated area (e.g., rotation of 

emergency responders); 

• Maintaining distance from sources of 

radiation; 

• Shielding of the radiation source; 

• Using hazard controls that are applicable 

to the work performed; 

• Properly selecting and using respirators 

and other personal protective equipment 

(PPE), to minimize exposure to internally 

deposited radioactive materials (e.g., alpha 

and beta emitters); and 

• Using prophylactic medications, when 

appropriate, that either block the uptake or 

reduce the retention time of radioactive 

material in the body. 

To minimize the risks from exposure to 

ionizing radiation, all emergency responders 

should be trained and instructed to follow 

emergency response plans and protocols and 

be advised on how to keep exposures as low 

as reasonably achievable. Health physics and 

industrial hygiene practices should include 

the use of dosimetry for monitoring of 

individual exposure with real-time readings 

(i.e., real-time electronic dosimeters) and 

permanent records (e.g., film badges, 

optically stimulated luminescent [OSL], or 

thermoluminescent dosimeters [TLDs]). Also, 

employers should (1) develop procedures 

and training that relate measurements to dose 

and risk, (2) understand and practice ALARA 

procedures with workers, and (3) address 

other issues related to performing response in 

a radiological environment. 

(c) Understanding Radiation Risks 

If there is the possibility that emergency 

workers would receive a radiation dose 

higher than the 5 rem (0.05 Sv) guideline, 

emergency workers should be trained to 

understand the risk associated with such 

doses, including a thorough explanation of 

the latent risks associated with receiving 

doses greater than 5 rem (0.05 Sv), and acute 

risks at higher doses. Emergency workers 

should be fully aware of both the projected 

acute and chronic risks (cancer) they may 

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6Risk per dose of a fatal cancer for members of 

the general public is assumed to be about 6 × 10¥4

per rem. Cancer incidence is assumed to be about 

8 × 10¥4 per rem (see Federal Guidance Report No. 

13). Occupational risk coefficients are slightly 

higher. 

incur in an emergency response action. 

Furthermore, emergency workers cannot be 

forced to perform a rescue action involving 

radiation doses above regulatory limits, and 

they should be given reasonable assurance 

that normal controls cannot be utilized to 

reduce doses to less than 5 rem (0.05 Sv). 

After the event, it is essential that emergency 

workers be provided with medical follow up. 

The estimated risk of fatal cancer 6 for 

healthy workers who receive a dose of 10 rem 

(0.10 Sv) is about 0.46 percent over the 

worker’s lifetime (i.e., 4–5 fatal cancers per 

1000 people, or 0.4–0.5 percent). The risk 

scales linearly. For workers who receive a 

dose of 25 rem (0.25 Sv), the risk is about 1.1 

percent. The risk is believed to be greater for 

those who are younger at the time of 

exposure. For example, for 20–30 year olds 

the estimated risk of fatal cancer at 25 rem 

(1.75 percent) is about twice as large as the 

risk for 40–50 year olds (0.8 percent). 

Above 50 rem (0.5 Sv) acute effects are 

possible. Where lifesaving actions may result 

in doses that approach or exceed 50 rem 

(0.50 Sv), such as in an IND incident, 

emergency workers need to have a full 

understanding of the potential acute effects 

of the expected radiation exposure, in 

addition to the risk of chronic effects. The 

decision to take these lifesaving actions must 

be based on the estimation that the human 

health benefits of the action exceed the safety 

and health risks to the emergency workers. 

It is important to note that the approach 

used to translate dose to risk in this 

discussion is a simplistic approach for 

developing rough estimates of risks for 

comparative purposes. Other more realistic 

and accurate approaches are often used in 

assessing risks for risk management decisions 

(other than for emergencies) when more 

complete information about the contaminants 

and the potential for human exposure is 

available. These approaches rely on 

radionuclide-specific risk factors (e.g., found 

in Federal Guidance Report No. 13 and EPA 

Health Effects Assessment Summary Tables), 

and are typically used in long-term 

assessments, such as environmental cleanup. 

(d) Preparedness 

To prepare for large radiological disasters, 

local officials and Incident Commanders will 

need to have a decision-making process 

already developed and ready to implement 

when they can no longer use standard 

occupational dose limits or when there is the 

possibility that they may face decisions 

involving exposures approaching or 

exceeding 25 rem (0.25 Sv) for lifesaving 

operations. Preparedness entails investigating 

the nature of the RDD and IND incident for 

which local officials must be prepared, 

having appropriate worker health and safety 

plans and protocols for such incidents, and 

training and exercises to assure a level of 

readiness among officials and responders. 

Incident Commanders and emergency 

responders should thoroughly understand 

the emergency worker guidelines for 

radiological emergency response, including 

specific emergency responder health and 

safety procedures and ALARA principles. 

The reader is referred to the EPA PAG 

Manual (May 1992), the FRMAC Radiological 

Emergency Response Health and Safety 

Manual (May 2001), and the Hazardous 

Waste Operations and Emergency Response 

(HAZWOPER) regulations. The EPA has a 

Worker Protection (40 CFR part 311) standard 

that applies the HAZWOPER standard to 

State and local workers in States that do not 

have their own occupational safety and 

health program. 

The HAZWOPER regulations, found in 29 

CFR 1910.120 and 1926.65, were 

promulgated to protect personnel working at 

a hazardous waste site, or a treatment, 

storage, or disposal facility, or performing 

emergency response. This standard also 

covers employers whose employees are 

engaged in emergency response without 

regard to the location of the hazard (unless 

specifically exempted or where a more 

protective safety and health standard 

applies). If an employer anticipates that their 

employees will respond to a potential hazard, 

HAZWOPER requires such actions as (1) the 

development of an emergency response plan 

(including personnel roles, lines of authority, 

training, communication, personal protective 

equipment, and emergency equipment), (2) 

procedures for handling a response, (3) 

specific training requirements based on the 

anticipated roles of the responder, and (4) 

medical surveillance. For specific 

interpretations regarding HAZWOPER and/or 

other occupational safety and health 

standards, employers should consult the 

appropriate implementing agency (e.g., 

appropriate Federal agencies, State 

Occupational Safety and Health Programs, or 

State Radiation Control Programs). 

Appendix 2—Risk Management 

Framework for RDD and IND Incident 

Planning 

This appendix contains a description of a 

risk management framework for making 

decisions to protect public health and 

welfare in the context of cleanup and site 

recovery following an RDD or IND incident. 

The framework is based on the report, 

‘‘Framework for Environmental Health Risk 

Management,’’ mandated by the 1990 Clean 

Air Act Amendments published by the 

Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk 

Management in 1997. This appendix 

provides specific material for RDD and IND 

incidents, and reference to the report is 

encouraged for the details of the general 

framework. A plan for implementing this 

framework for RDD and IND incidents is 

provided in Appendix 4. 

The ‘‘Framework for Environmental Health 

Risk Management’’ is considered generally 

suitable for addressing the long-term cleanup 

issues for RDDs and INDs. Given the time 

frames following an RDD or IND incident 

there is generally not sufficient time in the 

early phase to conduct a full risk assessment 

and get stakeholder involvement. In order for 

the framework to be most useful it must be 

used in planning and preparing for a 

radiological or nuclear incident. Many of the 

basic risk management principles were also 

used in development of the 1992 EPA PAGs. 

The framework is designed to help 

decision makers make good risk management 

decisions. The level of effort and resources 

invested in using the framework should be 

commensurate with the significance of the 

problem, the potential severity and economic 

impact, the level of controversy surrounding 

the problem, and resource constraints. The 

health and environmental hazards that must 

be considered are radiation hazards, and 

potentially chemical or biological hazards. 

Other factors to be considered include the 

continued disruption in normal activities, 

loss of, or limited access to critical 

infrastructure and health care and general 

economic damage. 

The framework relies on the three key 

principles of (1) broad context, (2) 

stakeholder participation, and (3) iteration. 

Broad context refers to placing all of the 

health and environmental issues in the full 

range of impacts and recovery factors 

following an RDD or IND incident, and is 

intended to assure that all aspects of public 

welfare are taken into account. Stakeholder 

participation is critical to making and 

successfully implementing sound, costeffective, risk-informed decisions. Iteration is 

the process of continuing to refine the 

analysis base on information available, and 

improve the decisions and actions that can be 

taken at any point in time. Together these 

principles outline a fair, responsive approach 

to making the decisions necessary to 

effectively respond to the impacts of an RDD 

or IND incident. 

Risk management is the process of 

identifying, evaluating, selecting, and 

implementing actions to reduce risk to public 

health and the environment. The goal of risk 

management is scientifically sound, costeffective, integrated actions that reduce or 

prevent public health impacts while taking 

into account social, cultural, ethical, public 

policy, and legal considerations. In order to 

accomplish this goal, information will be 

needed on the nature and magnitude of the 

hazard present as a result of the incident, the 

options for reducing risks, and the 

effectiveness and costs of those options. 

Decision makers also compare the economic, 

social, cultural, ethical, legal, and public 

policy implications associated with each 

option, as well as the unique safety and 

health hazards facing emergency responders 

and ecological hazards the cleanup actions 

themselves may cause. Often a stakeholder 

working group can provide input needed to 

consider all of the relevant information. 

Stakeholders can provide valuable input to 

decision makers during the long-term 

cleanup effort, and the key decision makers 

should establish a process that provides for 

appropriate stakeholder input. Identifying 

which stakeholders need to be involved in 

the process depends on the situation. In the 

case of a site contaminated as a result of an 

RDD or IND incident, stakeholders may 

include individuals whose health, economic 

well-being, and quality of life are currently 

affected or would be affected by the cleanup 

and the site’s subsequent use, or nonprofit 

organizations representing such individuals. 

They may also include those who have 

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regulatory responsibility, and those who may 

speak on behalf the environment generally, 

business and economics, or future 

generations. 

Stakeholder input should be considered 

throughout all stages of the framework as 

appropriate, including analyzing the risks, 

identifying potential cleanup options, 

evaluating options, selecting an approach, 

and evaluating the effectiveness of the action 

afterwards. Their input will assist decision 

makers in providing a reasoned basis for 

actions to be taken. Further information on 

the importance and selection of stakeholders 

can be found in the Framework for 

Environmental Health Risk Management. 

Decision makers can also benefit from the 

use of working groups that provide expert 

technical advice regarding the decisions that 

need to be made during the long-term 

recovery process. Further information on 

how to incorporate the use of technical 

working groups is provided later in this 

appendix. 

(a) The Stages of the Risk Management 

Framework for Responding to RDD and IND 

Incidents 

The ‘‘Framework for Environmental Health 

Risk Management’’ has six stages: 

1. Define the problem and put it in context. 

2. Analyze the risks associated with the 

problem in context. 

3. Examine options for addressing the 

risks. 

4. Make decisions about which options to 

implement. 

5. Take actions to implement the decisions. 

6. Evaluate results of the actions taken. 

Risk management decisions under this 

framework should do the following: 

• Clearly articulate all of the problems in 

their public health and ecological contexts, 

not just those associated with radiation. 

• Emerge from a decision-making process 

that elicits the views of those affected by the 

decision. 

• Be based on the best available scientific, 

economic, and other technical evidence. 

• Be implemented with stakeholder 

support in a manner that is effective, 

expeditious, and flexible. 

• Be shown to have a significant impact on 

the risks of concern. 

• Be revised and changed when significant 

new information becomes available. 

• Account for their multi-source, 

multimedia, multi-chemical, and multi-risk 

contexts. 

• Be feasible, with benefits reasonably 

related to their costs. 

• Give priority to preventing risks, not just 

controlling them. 

• Be sensitive to political, social, legal, and 

cultural considerations. 

(1) Define the Problems and Put Them in 

Context 

In the case of RDDs, the initial problem is 

caused by the dispersal of radioactive 

material. The incident may also result in the 

release of other types of contaminants 

(chemical or biological) or create other types 

of public health hazards. Individuals exposed 

may include emergency workers and 

members of the public, and there may be 

different associated assumptions; for 

example, how long the individuals will be 

exposed in the future. 

The potential for future radiation exposure 

of the public from the site must be 

considered within the context of the societal 

objectives to be achieved, and must examine 

cleanup options in the context of other risks 

members of the community face. There may 

also be broader public health or 

environmental issues that local governments 

and public health agencies have to confront 

and consider. 

The goals of the cleanup effort will extend 

well beyond the reduction of potential 

delayed radiation health effects, and may 

include: 

• Public health protection goals, including 

mitigating acute hazards and long-term 

chronic issues, and protecting children and 

other sensitive populations. 

• Social and economic goals, such as 

minimizing disruption to communities and 

businesses, maintaining property values, and 

protecting historical or cultural landmarks or 

resources. 

• National security goals, such as 

maintaining and normalizing use of critical 

highways, airports, or seaports for mass 

transit; maintaining energy production; and 

providing for critical communications. 

• Public welfare goals, including 

maintaining hospital capacity, water 

treatment works, and sewage systems for 

protection of community health; assuring 

adequate food, fuel, power, and other 

essential resources; and providing for the 

protection or recovery of personal property. 

(2) Analyze the Risks 

To make effective risk management 

decisions, decision makers and other 

stakeholders need to know what potential 

harm a situation poses and how great the 

likelihood is that people or the environment 

will be harmed. The nature, extent, and focus 

of a risk analysis should be guided by the risk 

management goals. The results of a risk 

analysis—along with information about 

public values, statutory requirements, court 

decisions, equity considerations, benefits, 

and costs—are used to decide whether and 

how to manage the risks. 

Risk analyses can be controversial, 

reflecting the important role that both science 

and judgment play in drawing conclusions 

about the likelihood of effects on public 

health and the environment. It is important 

that risk assessors respect both the scientific 

foundation of risks and the procedures for 

making inferences about risks in the absence 

of adequate data. Risk assessors should 

provide decision makers and other 

stakeholders with plausible conclusions 

about risk that can be made on the basis of 

the available information. They should also 

provide decision makers with evaluations of 

the scientific support for their conclusions, 

descriptions of major sources of uncertainty, 

and alternative views. 

Stakeholders’ perception of a risk can vary 

substantially depending on such factors as 

the extent to which the stakeholders are 

directly affected, whether they have 

voluntarily assumed the risk or had the risk 

imposed on them, and the nature of their 

connection with the cause of the risk. For 

this reason, risk analyses should characterize 

the scientific aspects of a risk and note its 

subjective, cultural, and comparative 

dimensions. Stakeholders play an important 

role in providing information that should be 

used in risk analyses and in identifying 

specific health and ecological concerns. 

(3) Examine the Options 

This stage of the risk management process 

involves identifying potential cleanup 

options and evaluating their effectiveness, 

feasibility, costs, benefits, cultural or social 

impacts, and unintended consequences. This 

process can begin whenever appropriate, 

after defining the problem and considering 

the context. It does not have to wait until the 

risk analysis is completed, although a risk 

analysis often will provide important 

information for identifying and evaluating 

risk management options. In some cases, 

examining risk management options may 

help refine a risk analysis. Risk management 

goals may be redefined after decision makers 

and stakeholders gain some appreciation for 

what is feasible, what the costs and benefits 

are, and how the process of reducing 

exposures and risks can improve human and 

ecological health. 

Once potential options have been 

identified, the effectiveness, feasibility, 

benefits, detriments, and costs of each option 

must be assessed to provide input into 

selecting the best option. Key questions 

include determining (1) the expected benefits 

and costs, (2) distribution of benefits and 

costs across the impacted community, (3) the 

feasibility of the option given the available 

time, resources, and any legal, political, 

statutory, and technology limitations, and (4) 

whether the option increases certain risks 

while reducing others. Other adverse 

consequences may be cultural, political, 

social, or economic. Adverse economic 

consequences may include impacts on a 

community, such as reduced property values 

or loss of jobs, environmental justice issues, 

and harming the social fabric of a town or 

tribe by relocating the people away from an 

area. 

Many risk management options may be 

unfeasible for social, political, cultural, legal, 

or economic reasons—or because they do not 

reduce risks to the extent necessary. For 

example, removing all the soil from an entire 

valley that is contaminated with radioactive 

material may be infeasible. On the other 

hand, the costs of cleaning up an elementary 

school may be considered justified by their 

benefits: Protecting children and returning to 

daily activities and a sense of normalcy. Of 

course, the feasibility and cost-effectiveness 

of an option may change in the future. 

(4) Make a Decision 

A productive stakeholder involvement 

process can generate important guidance for 

decision makers. Thus, decisions may reflect 

negotiation and compromise, as long as risk 

management goals and intentions are met. In 

some cases, win-win solutions that allow 

stakeholders with divergent views to achieve 

their primary goals are possible. Decision 

makers should allow the opportunity for 

public comment on proposed decisions. 

Decision makers must weigh the value of 

obtaining additional information against the 

need for a decision, however uncertain the 

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decision may be. Sometimes a decision must 

be made primarily on a precautionary basis. 

When sufficient information is available to 

make a risk management decision, or when 

additional information or analysis would not 

contribute significantly to the quality of the 

decision, the decision should not be 

postponed. 

(5) Take Action To Implement the Decision 

When options have been evaluated and 

decisions made, a plan for action should be 

developed and implemented. The issuance of 

protective action recommendations is the 

responsibility of local officials to protect the 

public and the environment during 

emergencies: Long-term cleanup decisions 

have the same basic risk management 

framework, but entail substantially more 

analysis and stakeholder involvement. When 

government officials and stakeholders have 

agreed on a strategy, cleanup activities 

should commence. It may take considerable 

time for these actions to be completed, and 

additional decisions may often be necessary 

as the actions proceed. 

(6) Evaluate the Results 

Decision makers and other stakeholders 

must continue to review what risk 

management actions have been implemented 

and how effective these actions have been. 

Evaluating effectiveness involves monitoring 

and measuring, as well as comparing actual 

benefits and costs to estimates made in the 

decision-making stage. The effectiveness of 

the process leading to implementation 

should also be evaluated at this stage. 

Evaluation provides important information 

about the following: Whether the actions 

were successful; whether they accomplished 

what was intended; whether the predicted 

benefits and costs were accurate; whether 

any modifications are needed to the risk 

management plan to improve success; 

whether any critical information gaps 

hindered success; whether any new 

information has emerged which indicates 

that a decision or stage of the framework 

should be revisited; whether unintended 

consequences have emerged; how 

stakeholder involvement contributed to the 

outcome; and what lessons can be learned to 

guide future risk management decisions, or to 

improve the decision-making process. 

Evaluation is critical to accountability and 

to ensure efficient use of valuable but limited 

resources. Tools for evaluation include 

environmental and health monitoring, 

research, analyses of costs and benefits, and 

discussions with stakeholders. 

(b) Technical Advisory Committee 

Making decisions on the appropriate 

cleanup approaches and levels following an 

RDD or IND incident will undoubtedly be a 

challenging task for decision makers. As 

already noted, the technical issues may be 

complex. Many potentially competing factors 

will need to be carefully weighed and 

decision makers should expect public 

anxiety in the face of a terrorist act involving 

radioactive materials. Different regulatory 

authorities and organizations historically 

have taken different cleanup approaches for 

radioactively contaminated industrial sites. 

Given this context, decision makers will need 

to determine how best to obtain the necessary 

technical input to support these decisions 

and demonstrate to the public that the final 

decisions are credible and sound. 

There are a variety of ways to approach 

this situation, and decision makers will need 

to tailor the process to particular site 

circumstances. This section describes one 

approach that is available to decision makers, 

which is based on the ‘‘ad hoc’’ mechanisms 

used for coordinating interagency expertise 

and assessing the effectiveness in general of 

the cleanup in response to the 2001 anthrax 

attacks in Washington, DC. For significant 

decontamination efforts, the key decision 

makers may choose to convene an 

independent committee of technical experts 

to conduct a deliberative and comprehensive 

post-decontamination review. The committee 

would evaluate the effectiveness of the 

decontamination process and make 

recommendations on whether the 

decontaminated areas or items may be 

reoccupied or reused. It is important to note 

that although this review may enhance the 

scientific credibility of the final outcome, 

final cleanup decisions rest with decision 

makers. 

The committee may consist of experts from 

Federal agencies, State and tribal public 

health and environmental agencies, 

universities and private industries, the local 

health department, and possibly 

representatives of local workers and the 

community. To maximize objectivity, the 

committee should be an independent group 

that will provide input to the decision 

makers, not be a part of the decision-making 

team. 

The scientific expertise in the committee 

should reflect the needs of the decision 

makers in all aspects of the decontamination 

process (e.g., environmental sampling, 

epidemiology, risk assessment, industrial 

hygiene, statistics, health physics, and 

engineering). Agencies on the committee may 

also have representatives on the technical 

working group, but in order to preserve the 

objectivity of the committee, it is best to 

designate different experts to serve on each 

group. The chair and co-chair of the 

committee should not be a part of the 

decision-making group at the site. 

The decision makers should develop a 

charter for the committee that specifies the 

tasks committee members are intended to 

perform, the issues they are to consider, and 

the process they will use in arriving at 

conclusions and recommendations. The 

charter should also specify whether the 

individual members are expected to 

represent the views of their respective 

agencies, or just their own opinions as 

independent scientific experts. Consensus 

among committee members is desirable, but 

may not be possible. If consensus cannot be 

achieved, the charter should specify how 

decision makers expect the full range of 

opinions to be reflected in the final 

committee report. 

In general, the technical peer review 

committee would evaluate pre- and postdecontamination sampling data, the 

decontamination plan, and any other 

information key to assessing the effectiveness 

of the cleanup. Based on this evaluation, the 

committee would make recommendations to 

the decision makers on whether cleanup has 

reduced contamination to acceptable levels, 

or whether further actions are needed before 

re-occupancy. 

Appendix 3—Federal Cleanup 

Implementation 

This appendix provides a federallyrecommended approach for environmental 

cleanup after an RDD or IND incident to 

accompany the risk management principles 

outlined in Appendix 2. This approach 

describes how State and local governments 

may coordinate with Federal agencies, and 

the public, consistent with the National 

Response Framework (NRF). The approach 

does not attempt to provide detailed 

descriptions of State and local roles and 

expertise. It is assumed those details will be 

provided in State and local level planning 

documents that address radiological/nuclear 

terrorism incidents. 

This site cleanup approach is intended to 

function under the NRF with Federal 

agencies performing work consistent with 

their established roles, responsibilities, and 

capabilities. Agencies should be tasked to 

perform work under the appropriate 

Emergency Support Function, as a primary or 

support agency, as described in the NRF. 

This plan is also designed to be compatible 

with the Incident Command/Unified 

Command (IC/UC) structure embodied in the 

National Incident Management System 

(NIMS). 

The functional descriptions and processes 

in this approach are provided to address the 

specific needs and wide range of potential 

impacts of an RDD or IND incident. During 

the intermediate phase, site cleanup planners 

should begin the process described below, 

under the direction of the on-site IC/UC, and 

in close coordination with Federal, State and 

local officials. After early and intermediate 

phase activities have come to conclusion and 

only long-term cleanup activities are 

ongoing, the IC/UC structure may continue to 

support planning and decision-making for 

the long-term cleanup. The IC/UC may make 

personnel changes and structural adaptations 

to suit the needs of a lengthy, multifaceted 

and highly visible remediation process. For 

example, a less formal and structured 

command, more focused on technical 

analysis and stakeholder involvement, may 

be preferable for extended site cleanup than 

what is required under emergency 

circumstances. 

Radiological and nuclear terrorism 

incidents cover a broad range of potential 

scenarios and impacts. This appendix 

assumes that the Federal Government is a 

primary funding agent for site cleanup. In 

particular, the process described for the late 

phase in section (d)(4) of this document 

assumes an incident of relatively large size. 

For smaller incidents, all of the elements in 

this section may not be warranted. The 

process should be tailored to the 

circumstances of the particular incident. 

Decision makers should recognize that for 

some radiological/nuclear terrorist incidents, 

states will take the primary leadership role 

and contribute significant resources toward 

cleanup of the site. This section does not 

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address such a scenario, but states may 

choose to use the process described here. 

This implementation plan does not address 

law enforcement coordination during 

terrorism incident responses, including how 

the FBI will manage on-scene activities 

immediately following an act of terror. 

Agencies’ roles and responsibilities will be 

implemented according to the NRF and 

supporting documents. Also, victim triage 

and other medical response procedures are 

beyond the scope of this Guidance. The plan 

presented in this appendix is not intended to 

impact site cleanups occurring under other 

statutory authorities such as EPA’s 

Superfund program, the NRC’s 

decommissioning program, or Stateadministered cleanup programs. 

Cleanup Activities Overview 

As described earlier in the document, 

radiological/nuclear emergency responses are 

often divided roughly into three phases: (1) 

The early phase, when the plume is active 

and field data are lacking or not reliable; (2) 

the intermediate phase, when the plume has 

passed and field data are available for 

assessment and analysis; and (3) the late 

phase, when long-term issues are addressed, 

such as cleanup of the site. For purposes of 

this appendix, the response to a radiological 

or nuclear terrorism incident is divided into 

two separate, but interrelated and 

overlapping, processes. The first is 

comprised of the early and intermediate 

phases of response, which consists of the 

immediate and near-term on-scene actions of 

State, local, and Federal emergency 

responders under the IC/UC. On-scene 

actions include incident stabilization, 

lifesaving activities, dose reduction actions 

for members of the public and emergency 

responders, access control and security, 

emergency decontamination of persons and 

property, ‘‘hot spot’’ removal actions, and 

resumption of basic infrastructure functions. 

The second process pertains to 

environmental cleanup, which is initiated 

soon after the incident (during the 

intermediate phase) and continues into the 

late phase. The process starts with convening 

stakeholders and technical subject matter 

experts to begin identifying and evaluating 

options for the cleanup of the site. The 

environmental cleanup process overlaps the 

intermediate phase activities described above 

and should be coordinated with those 

activities. This process is interrelated with 

the ongoing intermediate phase activities, 

and the intermediate phase protective actions 

continue to apply through the late phase 

until cleanup is complete. 

Cleanup planning and discussions should 

begin as soon as practicable after an incident 

to allow for selection of key stakeholders and 

subject matter experts, planning, analyses, 

contractual processes, and cleanup activities. 

States may choose to pre-select stakeholders 

for major incident recovery coordination. 

These activities should proceed in parallel 

with ongoing intermediate phase activities, 

and coordination between these activities 

should be maintained. Preliminary 

remediation activities during the 

intermediate phase—such as emergency 

removals, decontamination, resumption of 

basic infrastructure function, and some 

return to normalcy in accordance with 

intermediate phase PAGs—should not be 

delayed for the final site remediation 

decision. 

A process for addressing environmental 

contamination that applies an optimization 

process for site cleanup is presented below. 

As described in this document, optimization 

is a flexible process in which numerous 

factors are considered to achieve an end 

result that considers local needs and desires, 

health risks, costs, technical feasibility, and 

other factors. The general process outlined 

below provides decision makers with input 

from both technical experts and stakeholder 

representatives, and also provides an 

opportunity for public comment. The extent 

and complexity of the process for an actual 

incident should be tailored to the needs of 

the specific incident; for smaller incidents, 

the workgroups discussed below may not be 

necessary. 

The goals of the process described below 

are: (1) Transparency—the basis for cleanup 

decisions should be available to stakeholder 

representatives, and to the public at large; (2) 

inclusiveness—representative stakeholders 

should be involved in decision-making 

activities; (3) effectiveness—technical subject 

matter experts should analyze remediation 

options, consider established dose and risk 

benchmarks, and assess various technologies 

in order to assist in identifying a final 

solution that is optimal for the incident; and 

(4) shared accountability—the final decision 

to proceed will be made jointly by Federal, 

State, and local officials. 

Under the NRF, FEMA may issue mission 

assignments to the involved Federal agencies, 

as appropriate, to assist in response and 

recovery. Additional funding may be 

provided to State/local governments to 

perform response/recovery activities through 

other mechanisms. The components of the 

process are as follows: 

(a) General Management Structure 

Planning for the long-term cleanup should 

begin during the intermediate phase, and at 

that time, a traditional NIMS response 

structure should still be in place. However, 

NIMS was developed specifically for 

emergency management and may not be the 

most efficient response structure for longterm cleanup. If the cleanup will extend for 

years, the IC/UC may decide to transition at 

some point to a different long-term project 

management structure. 

Under the NRF and NIMS, incidents are 

managed at the lowest possible jurisdictional 

level. In most cases, this will be at the level 

of the Incident Command or Unified 

Command (IC/UC). The IC/UC directs onscene tactical operations. Responding local, 

State, and Federal agencies are represented in 

the IC/UC and Incident Command Post in 

accordance with NIMS principles regarding 

jurisdictional authorities, functional 

responsibilities, and resources provided. For 

INDs, and large RDDs, multiple Incident 

Command Posts (ICPs) may be established to 

manage the incident with an Area Command 

or Unified Area Command supporting the 

ICPs and prioritizing resources and activities 

among them. If the RDD/IND incident 

happens on a Federal facility or involves 

Federal materials, the representatives in the 

UC may change appropriately and the 

response will be conducted according to the 

applicable Federal procedures. 

Issues that cannot be resolved at the IC/UC 

or Unified Area Command level may be 

raised with the JFO and JFO Unified 

Coordination Group for resolution. The JFO 

coordinates and prioritizes Federal resources, 

and when applicable, issues mission 

assignments to Federal agencies under the 

Stafford Act. Issues that cannot be resolved 

at the JFO level may be raised to the DHS 

NOC, senior-level interagency management 

groups, and the White House Homeland 

Security Council. 

Day-to-day tactical management, planning, 

and operations for the RDD/IND cleanup 

process will be managed at the IC/UC level, 

but for large-scale cleanups, it is expected 

that the JFO Unified Coordination Group will 

review proposed cleanup plans and provide 

strategic and policy direction. The agency(s) 

with primary responsibility for site cleanup 

should be represented in the JFO Unified 

Coordination Group. The IC/UC will need to 

establish appropriate briefing venues as the 

cleanup process proceeds, including the 

affected mayor(s) and Governor(s). 

The discussion below assumes a traditional 

NIMS IC/UC structure; if the IC/UC 

transitions later to a different management 

structure for a longer-term cleanup, the IC/ 

UC would need to determine the appropriate 

way to incorporate the workgroups described 

below into that structure. 

Appendix 2 presented the general steps in 

the cleanup process: Analyze the risks, 

examine the options, make and implement a 

decision, evaluate the results. This process 

will be managed by the IC/UC, who 

ultimately determines the structure and 

organization of the Incident Command Post, 

but the discussion below provides one 

recommended approach for managing the 

cleanup process within a NIMS ICS response 

structure. The Incident Command Post 

Planning Section has the lead for response 

planning activities, working in conjunction 

with other sections, and would have the lead 

for development of the optimization analysis, 

working closely with the Operations Section. 

The NIMS describes the units that make up 

the Planning Section, and allows for 

additional units to be added depending on 

site-specific needs. NIMS states that for 

incidents involving the need to coordinate 

and manage large amounts of environmental 

sampling and analytical data from multiple 

sources, an Environmental Unit may be 

established within the Planning Section to 

facilitate interagency environmental data 

management, monitoring, sampling, analysis, 

assessment, and site cleanup and waste 

disposal planning. RDD/IND incidents would 

involve the collection of not only large 

amounts of radiological data, but also data 

related to other environmental and health 

and safety hazards, and would therefore 

likely warrant the establishment of an 

Environmental Unit in the Planning Section. 

Planning for FRMAC radiological sampling 

and monitoring activities will be integrated 

into the Planning Section, and coordinated 

with other Situation and Environmental Unit 

data management activities. 

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7For purposes of this appendix, ‘‘relocation area’’

refers to an area that local officials have determined 

is not safe for prolonged occupation by the public, 

based on the intermediate phase PAGs, and have 

recommended that the public be relocated. 

8RESRAD–RDD is a computer modeling tool 

developed by the U.S. Department of Energy for 

calculating radiation concentrations on different 

media, and doses and dose rates following an RDD 

incident. 

The IC/UC would assign the responsibility 

for coordinating and development of the 

optimization analysis to a specific unit. For 

incidents in which the contaminated area is 

small and the analysis is straightforward, the 

IC/UC may choose to assign such 

responsibilities to the Environmental Unit. 

On the other hand, for large incidents 

requiring more complicated tradeoffs or the 

evaluation of cleanup goals with broad 

implications, the IC/UC may choose to 

establish a separate unit in the Planning 

Section (for example, a Cleanup Planning 

Unit) to coordinate the development of the 

optimization analysis. The IC/UC may then 

convene a technical working group and a 

stakeholder working group, managed by the 

Environmental or Cleanup Planning Unit, to 

analyze cleanup options and develop 

recommendations. The Environmental or 

Cleanup Planning Unit would coordinate 

working group processes and interactions 

and report the results of the optimization 

analysis and workgroup efforts to the IC/UC 

through the Planning Section Chief. 

The development and completion of the 

optimization analysis is expected to be an 

iterative process, and for large incidents, the 

cleanup will likely proceed in phases, most 

likely from the ‘‘outside in’’ toward the most 

contaminated areas. The extent of the 

analysis and process used to develop it 

would be tailored to the needs of the specific 

incident, but the following working groups 

may be convened by the IC/UC to assist 

decision makers in the optimization process, 

particularly for large or complex cleanups. 

(1) Technical Working Group 

A technical working group should be 

convened as soon as practicable, normally 

within days or weeks of the incident. The 

technical working group would be managed 

by the Planning Section Unit that is assigned 

responsibility for the optimization analysis. 

The technical working group may or may not 

be physically located at the ICP. The group 

may review data and documents, provide 

input electronically, and meet with incident 

management officials. The group may also be 

asked to participate in meetings with the JFO 

Unified Coordination Group if needed. 

Function: The technical working group 

provides multi-agency, multi-disciplinary 

expert input on the optimization analysis, 

including advice on technical issues, analysis 

of relevant regulatory requirements and 

guidelines, risk analyses, and development of 

cleanup options. The technical working 

group would provide expert technical input 

to the IC/UC; it would not be a decisionmaking body. 

Makeup: The technical working group 

should include selected Federal, State, local, 

and private sector subject matter experts in 

such fields as environmental fate and 

transport modeling, risk analysis, technical 

remediation options analysis, cost, risk and 

benefit analysis, health physics/radiation 

protection, construction remediation 

practices, and relevant regulatory 

requirements. The exact selection and 

balance of subject matter experts is incidentspecific. The Advisory Team for the 

Environment, Food, and Health is comprised 

of Federal radiological experts in various 

fields who may warrant representation on the 

technical working group. 

(2) Stakeholder Working Group 

The stakeholder working group should be 

convened as soon as practicable, normally 

within days or weeks of the incident. The 

stakeholder working group would be 

managed by the Planning Section Unit that 

is assigned responsibility for the 

optimization analysis. The IC/UC may direct 

the Public Information Officer (who would 

coordinate with the JIC) to work with the 

group, including establishing a process for 

the group to report out its recommendations. 

How and where the stakeholder working 

group would meet to review information and 

provide its input would need to be 

determined in conjunction with the group 

members. The stakeholder working group 

may also be asked to participate in meetings 

with the JFO Unified Coordination Group if 

needed. 

Makeup: The stakeholder working group 

should include selected Federal, State, and 

local representatives; local non-governmental 

representatives; and local/regional business 

stakeholders. The exact selection and balance 

of stakeholders is incident specific. 

Function: The function of the stakeholder 

working group is to provide input to the IC/ 

UC concerning local needs and desires for 

site recovery, proposed cleanup options, and 

other recommendations. The group should 

present local goals for the use of the site, 

prioritizing current and future potential land 

uses and functions, such as utilities and 

infrastructure, light industrial, downtown 

business, and residential land uses. The 

stakeholder working group would not be a 

decision-making body. 

(b) Activities 

(1) Optimization and Recommendations 

The IC/UC directs the management of the 

optimization analysis through the Planning 

Section. Technical and stakeholder working 

groups assist in performing analyses and 

developing cleanup options and provide 

input to the IC/UC, and may be asked to 

participate in meetings with the JFO Unified 

Coordination Group if needed. The IC/UC 

reviews the options described in the 

optimization analysis and selects a proposed 

approach for site cleanup, in close 

coordination with Federal, State and local 

officials. Again, depending on the incident 

size, it may be necessary to conduct the 

cleanup in phases. Thus, decisions on 

cleanup approaches may also be made in 

phases. As appropriate for the magnitude of 

the cleanup task, the IC/UC would brief 

relevant Federal, State, and local government 

officials on proposed cleanup plans for 

approval. This may involve the office of the 

affected mayor and Governor. At the Federal 

level, it may involve the JFO Unified 

Coordination Group and higher-level 

officials. 

(2) Public Review of Decision 

The IC/UC should work with the POI and 

JIC to publish a summary of the process, the 

options analyzed, and the recommendations 

for public comments. Public meetings should 

also be convened at appropriate times. Public 

comments should be considered and 

incorporated as appropriate. A reconvening 

of the stakeholder and/or technical working 

groups may be useful for resolving some 

issues. 

(3) Execute Cleanup 

Cleanup activities should commence as 

quickly as practicable, and allow for 

incremental reoccupation of areas as cleanup 

proceeds. For significant decontamination 

efforts, the IC/UC may choose to employ a 

technical peer review advisory committee to 

conduct a review of the effectiveness of the 

cleanup. The technical peer review advisory 

committee is discussed in more detail in 

Appendix 2. 

Appendix 4—Operational Guidelines 

for Implementation of Protective Action 

Guides and Other Activities in RDD or 

IND Incidents 

During all phases of an incident, many 

decisions will need to be made at the fieldlevel, such as making protective action 

decisions, opening critical infrastructure, 

limited re-entry of citizens to homes or 

businesses, release of personal property, and 

others. This appendix presents operational 

guidelines being developed to assist decision 

makers and emergency responders in 

implementing protective actions and making 

other on-site decisions.7 Operational 

guidelines are levels of radiation or 

concentrations of radionuclides that can be 

accurately measured by radiation detection 

and monitoring equipment that can then be 

compared to PAGs, or field-level radiation 

dose decision points (such as for the release 

of personal property) to quickly determine 

what action should be taken. In most 

situations, the operational guidelines will be 

given in terms of external gamma rates or 

media-specific (e.g., surfaces, soil, or water) 

radionuclide concentration units. Both 

external and internal exposure potential were 

considered in the development of the 

operational guidelines. 

This appendix discusses the operational 

guidelines qualitatively and does not provide 

actual numeric values. The operational 

guidelines are being developed to provide 

reasonable assurance that field-level 

radiation dose decision points and the PAGs 

recommended in this document can be met 

under different circumstances. The 

operational guidelines also address, to some 

extent, the impact of protective actions, such 

as controlling wash water after rinsing 

vehicles to remove contamination. Actual 

conditions may warrant development of 

incident-specific guidelines. To support this 

need, the RESRAD–RDD 8 software tool was 

developed to allow for easy and timely 

calculation of site-specific operational 

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guidelines that can be tailored to the specific 

emergency and the required response. 

The operational guidelines are organized 

into seven groups that are generally 

categorized by the phase of emergency 

response in which they would be 

implemented or used for planning purposes. 

Individual groups are further categorized into 

subgroups as appropriate. Table 3 

summarizes operational guideline groups and 

subgroups. A summary description of these 

groups and subgroups is provided below. 

Detailed descriptions of the operational 

guidelines, to include their technical 

derivation, intended application, and tools to 

assist in their application, are provided in the 

Preliminary Report on Operational 

Guidelines Developed for Use in Emergency 

Preparedness and Response to a Radiological 

Dispersal Device Incidents (DOE/HS–0001, 

available at http://www.ogcms.energy.gov). 

TABLE 3—OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES: GROUPS AND SUBGROUPS

Groups Subgroups 

A. Access control during emergency response operations .............................................................. 1. Life and property-saving measures. 

2. Emergency worker demarcation. 

B. Early-phase protective action ....................................................................................................... 1. Evacuation. 

2. Sheltering. 

C. Relocation from different areas and critical infrastructure utilization in relocation areas ............ 1. Residential areas.

2. Commercial and industrial areas. 

3. Other areas, such as parks and monuments. 

4. Hospitals and other health care facilities. 

5. Critical transport facilities. 

6. Water and sewer facilities. 

7. Power and fuel facilities. 

D. Temporary access to relocation areas for essential activities ..................................................... 1. Worker access to businesses for essential 

actions. 

2. Public access to residences for retrieval of 

property, pets, records. 

E. Transportation and access routes ................................................................................................ 1. Bridges. 

2. Streets and thoroughfares. 

3. Sidewalks and walkways. 

F. Release of property from radiologically controlled areas ............................................................. 1. Personal property, except wastes. 

2. Waste. 

3. Hazardous waste. 

4. Real property, such as lands and buildings. 

G. Food consumption ........................................................................................................................ 1. Early-phase food guidelines. 

2. Early-phase soil guidelines. 

3. Intermediate-phase soil guidelines. 

4. Intermediate- to late-phase soil guidelines. 

(a) Group A: Access Control During 

Emergency Response Operations 

These operational guidelines are designed 

to assist responders in decision making for 

worker health and safety in the early to 

intermediate phases of response when the 

situation has not been fully stabilized or 

characterized. They are designed to guide 

responders in establishing radiological 

control zones or boundaries for the areas 

directly impacted by the RDD or IND 

incident where first responders and 

emergency response personnel are working. 

They are not intended to restrict emergency 

worker access, but rather to inform workers 

of potential radiological hazards that exist in 

the area and to provide tools to those 

responsible for radiation protection during 

response activities. These operational 

guidelines may be used to restrict the access 

of nonessential personnel and members of 

the public to specific areas. Examples of 

operational guidelines developed in this 

group include life- and property-saving 

measures and emergency worker zone 

demarcation. 

Group A operational guidelines are 

expressed as a series of reference ‘‘stay time’’

tables for responders who may have only 

limited health physics information and 

personal protective equipment at the time of 

the response. For example, the health physics 

information available to them could include 

or be limited to measurements of the external 

exposure rate, gross alpha surface 

contamination, beta/gamma surface 

contamination, and/or air concentration. 

Radionuclide-specific correction factors as 

well as radionuclide-specific and respiratory 

protection-specific tables are also provided. 

Stay times are provided for a range of doses 

(i.e., 0.1 rem (.001 Sv), 0.5 rem (.005 Sv), 1 

rem (.01 Sv), 2 rem (.02 Sv), 5 rem (.05 Sv), 

10 rem (.10 Sv), 25 rem (.25 Sv), 100 rem (1 

Sv), many of which correspond to guidelines 

used for workers and the public). 

(b) Group B: Early-Phase Protective Action 

(Evacuation or Sheltering) 

Group B operational guidelines are 

designed to help decision makers make 

timely protective action decisions, such as 

whether to evacuate or shelter the general 

public in the early phase. These operational 

guidelines are similar to values presented in 

the FRMAC Assessment Manual for 

evacuation and sheltering. Group B 

operational guidelines are typically 

expressed as limiting concentrations of 

radioactivity in surface soil. 

(c) Group C: Relocation and Critical 

Infrastructure Utilization in Affected Areas 

These operational guidelines are intended 

for early-to intermediate-phase protective 

actions. They are designed for use in 

deciding whether to relocate the public from 

affected areas for a protracted period of time. 

Screening values are provided to delineate 

areas that exceed the relocation PAGs. These 

areas include residential areas, commercial/ 

industrial areas, and other areas such as 

parks, cemeteries, and monuments. Group C 

operational guidelines also assist in efforts to 

ensure that facilities critical to the public 

welfare can continue to operate, if needed. 

These facilities include hospitals, airports, 

railroads and ports, water and sewer 

facilities, and power and fuel facilities. These 

operational guidelines are typically 

expressed as soil, building, or street-surface 

contamination concentrations (e.g., pCi/m2). 

(d) Group D: Temporary Access to Relocation 

Areas for Essential Activities 

Group D operational guidelines pertain to 

intermediate phase protective actions. They 

are designed to assist in determining 

constraints necessary to allow for temporary 

access to restricted (relocation) areas. For 

example, the public, or owners/employees of 

businesses, may need temporary access to 

residences, or commercial, agricultural, or 

industrial facilities in order to retrieve 

essential records, conduct maintenance to 

protect facilities, prevent environmental 

damage, attend to animals, or retrieve pets. 

These operational guidelines describe the 

level and timeframes at which these actions 

can be taken without supervision or 

radiological protections. The public or 

employees may occasionally (e.g., a few days 

per month) access areas that do not exceed 

these guidelines. Temporary access to 

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9The American National Standards Institute 

(ANSI) produces consensus based national 

standards. ANSI standard N13.12, Surface and 

Volume Radioactivity Standards for Clearance, can 

be found at http://hps.org/hpssc/ 

N13_12_1999.html. 

10These radionuclides were determined by a joint 

DOE and NRC study to be the most likely sources 

available for potential terrorist use in an RDD 

(Interagency Working Group on Radiological 

Dispersal Devices, May 2003) (DOE/NRC 2003). 

relocation areas that exceed these levels 

should be permitted only under the 

supervision, or with the permission of, 

radiation protection personnel. The 

guidelines are typically expressed in terms of 

stay-times during which the public or 

employees may access the areas without 

receiving a predetermined dose. 

(e) Group E: Transportation and Access 

Routes 

These operational guidelines apply to 

intermediate phase actions. They are 

designed to assist in determining whether 

transportation routes (e.g., bridges, highways, 

streets) or access ways (e.g., sidewalks and 

walkways) may be accessed by the public for 

general, limited, or restricted use. The 

relocation PAGs serve as the basis for these 

operational guidelines. For example, 

operational guidelines may be defined for 

industrial or commercial use of various 

roads, bridges, or access ways. These may be 

necessary to allow for access between nonrelocation areas via a highway that passes 

through a relocation area or for access to 

recovery areas in the immediate area of an 

incident. These operational guidelines 

assume regular or periodic use and are not 

appropriate for one-time events, such as 

evacuation or relocation actions. They are 

typically expressed as surface contamination 

concentrations (e.g., pCi/m2). 

(f) Group F: Release of Property From 

Radiologically Controlled Areas 

Group F operational guidelines are 

intended for intermediate to long-term 

recovery-phase protective actions. During 

response and recovery operations, property 

and wastes must be cleared from 

radiologically controlled areas (relocation 

areas). Property includes personal property, 

debris and non-radiological wastes, 

hazardous waste, and real property (e.g., 

buildings and lands). These operational 

guidelines support such actions. Because 

subsequent retrieval of cleared, or released, 

properties will be difficult, these levels 

should be consistent with late-phase cleanup 

goals wherever practicable. For this reason, 

they should not be applied to property that 

will continue to be used within controlled 

areas. These operational guidelines should 

also be used for screening property that was 

located outside the controlled area for 

possible contamination. In general, the 

operational guidelines in this group provide 

reasonable assurance that the cleared 

property is acceptable for long-term, 

unrestricted use (or appropriate disposition, 

in the case of wastes) without further 

radiological reassessment or control. 

For personal property such as vehicles and 

equipment, the operational guideline values 

were derived using the ANSI N13.12 

standard clearance screening levels.9 These 

draft operational guidelines are available for 

review and use as appropriate at http:// 

www.ogcms.energy.gov. The guidelines 

establish three property categories: at greater 

than 200 times ANSI N13.12 screening levels, 

monitored remediation or control is 

recommended; at levels between 10 and 200 

times the levels, self-remediation 

(conventional washing) of the property is 

recommended as soon as practical; and 

below the self-remediation levels, no control 

or protective action is necessary. 

Operational guidelines for real property 

(buildings and lands) are designed to assist 

on-scene decision-making, and in 

development of the cleanup options 

described in section (d)(4), Late Phase 

Guidance, of this document. Section (d)(4) on 

long-term cleanup incorporates the principle 

of site-specific optimization, and highlights 

stakeholder involvement and shared 

accountability. The guidelines for real 

property are unique in that there is no one 

specific, predefined numeric criterion (i.e., 

expressed in terms of concentration, dose, or 

risk) on which to base decisions. These 

guidelines are intended to be utilized in the 

optimization process, which will likely 

consider the magnitude and extent of the 

contamination and the radionuclide(s) 

involved, the proposed long-term land and 

building use in the affected areas, the need 

for expedited recovery, public welfare issues, 

the cost impacts for each proposed cleanup 

option, the ecological considerations, and 

other factors. Real property operational 

guidelines are provided as reference values 

(e.g., soil and building-surface concentrations 

or risks) that can be used as a starting point 

for evaluating options and impacts relative to 

a range of dose or risk-based benchmarks 

(e.g., 500, 100, 25, or 4 millirem per year; 

lifetime risk ranges, and others) that could be 

considered as part of cleanup options 

analysis. Thus, they are not regulatory dose 

limits or criteria, but serve as concentration 

values that provide support to the 

optimization analyses. 

(g) Group G: Food Consumption 

Group G operational guidelines apply to 

early through long-term recovery phase 

protective actions, as needed. They are 

designed to aid in decision making about the 

need for placing restrictions on consumption 

of contaminated foods or on agricultural 

products during and following an RDD or 

IND incident. Four subgroups were 

developed (Subgroups G.1–G.4; see Table 

4A), which are intended for use in 

conjunction with the operational guidelines 

in other groups. Subgroup G.1 guidelines 

pertain to food consumption in the early 

response phase immediately after an 

incident. These guidelines can be used to 

screen against measured concentrations taken 

from previously harvested food or from 

animal products exposed during the incident. 

Subgroup G.1 guidelines also can be used to 

determine the need for a food embargo, or 

restrictions on consumption of contaminated 

foods. Subgroup G.2 guidelines, soil 

guidelines, also apply to the early phase of 

response, but they are intended for use in 

evaluating crops or animal products exposed 

during the RDD incident (e.g., after the plume 

has passed). They serve as a comparison with 

measured concentrations taken from surface 

soil in which plant foods and fodder had 

been growing during the incident. Subgroups 

G.3 and G.4 are intended for use of soil in 

the intermediate to long-term recovery 

phases and can be used for placing land use 

restrictions on agricultural activities after an 

RDD incident. They can be used to determine 

if crops can be grown on residually 

contaminated soil to produce a harvest that 

would be acceptable for public consumption. 

(h) Derivation of Operational Guidelines 

Operational guidelines for each group are 

being derived through a systematic approach 

in which, (1) applicable release/exposure 

scenarios for each group were defined, (2) 

appropriate human receptors for each 

scenario were identified, and (3) the receptor 

doses from applicable exposure pathways 

were estimated. Operational guidelines 

(Groups A–G; see Table 4A), which 

correspond to specific PAGs, were derived 

for 11 potential RDD radionuclides:10 Am241, Cf-252, Cm-244, Co-60, Cs-137, Ir-192, 

Po-210, Pu-238, Pu-239, Ra-226, and Sr-90. 

The concepts and overarching methodology 

used to derive operational guidelines for 

RDD-related radionuclides could also be 

generally applied, with modifications, to 

radionuclides associated with an IND. 

Additional RDD or IND incident scenarios 

were analyzed to support the derivation of 

the operational guideline groups and 

subgroups described above. Two of these 

additional scenarios involve the use of water 

to flush streets and clean vehicles. 

Accordingly, operational guidelines for street 

flushing and cleaning contaminated vehicles 

are also provided. The operational guidelines 

will be submitted in the Federal Register for 

comment prior to finalization. 

Appendix 5—References and Resources 

‘‘Access to Employee and Medical Records.’’

Occupational Safety and Heath Standards. 

29 CFR part 1910.1020. 

‘‘Accidental Radioactive Contamination of 

Human Food and Animal Feeds: 

Recommendations for State and Local 

Agencies’’, U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services, Food and Drug 

Administration, August 13, 1998. 

‘‘Developing Radiation Emergency Plans for 

Academic, Medical or Industrial 

Facilities.’’ National Council on Radiation 

Protection and Measurement (NCRP). 

NCRP Report No. 111 (1991). 

‘‘Framework for Environmental Health Risk 

Management.’’ Commission on Risk 

Assessment and Risk Management (1997). 

‘‘FRMAC Radiological Emergency Response 

Health and Safety Manual’’ (May 2001), 

see, http://www.nv.doe.gov/ 

nationalsecurity/homelandsecurity/frmac/ 

default.htm. 

‘‘Guidance: Potassium Iodide as a Thyroid 

Blocking Agent in Radiation Emergencies.’’

Food and Drug Administration, 66 FR 

64046, Dec. 11, 2001. 

‘‘Hazardous Waste Operations and 

Emergency Response.’’ Occupational 

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Safety and Health Standards. 29 CFR part 

1910.120. 

‘‘Health Effects Summary Tables,’’

Environmental Protection Agency, http:// 

www.epa.gov/radiation/heast/. 

‘‘Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels 

of Ionizing Radiation: BEIR VII Phase 2.’’

National Research Council of The National 

Academies (2006). 

‘‘Ionizing Radiation.’’ Occupational Safety 

and Health Standards. 29 CFR part 

1910.1096. 

‘‘Key Elements of Preparing Emergency 

Responders for Nuclear and Radiological 

Terrorism.’’ National Council on Radiation 

Protection and Measurements (NCRP). 

NCRP Commentary No. 19 (2005). 

‘‘Management of Equipment Contaminated 

with Depleted Uranium or Radioactive 

Commodities.’’ Army Regulation 700–48 

(2002). 

‘‘Management Of Terrorist Events Involving 

Radioactive Material.’’ National Council on 

Radiation Protection and Measurements 

(NCRP). NCRP Report No. 138 (2001). 

‘‘Manual of Protective Action Guides and 

Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents’’

(1992 EPA PAG Manual). EPA 400–R–92–

001 (1992). 

National Response Framework, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security (2008). 

National Incident Management System, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security (2007). 

‘‘National Oil and Hazardous Substances 

Pollution Contingency Plan.’’ 40 CFR part 

300. 

‘‘Occupational Radiation Protection.’’

Department of Energy. 10 CFR part 835. 

‘‘Preliminary Report on Operational 

Guidelines Developed for Use in 

Emergency Preparedness and Response to 

a Radiological Dispersal Device Incident.’’

DOE/HS–0001. http:// 

www.ogcms.energy.gov. 

‘‘Protective Action Guides for Radiological 

Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised 

Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents; Notice.’’

71 FR 174, Jan. 3, 2006. 

‘‘Radiation Protection Guidance to Federal 

Agencies for Occupational Exposure.’’

Presidential Directive. 52 FR 2822, Jan. 27, 

1987. 

‘‘Radiological Dispersal Devices: An Initial 

Study to Identify Radioactive Materials of 

Greatest Concern and Approaches to their 

Tracking, Tagging, and Disposition.’’ DOE/ 

NRC Interagency Working Group on 

Radiological Dispersal Devices, Report to 

the NRC and the Secretary of Energy 

(2003). 

‘‘Reporting and Recording Occupational 

Injuries and Illnesses.’’ U.S. Department of 

Energy Occupational Safety and Health 

Standards. 29 CFR part 1904. 

‘‘Risks from Low-Level Environmental 

Exposure to Radionuclides,’’ Federal 

Guidance Report 13, Environmental 

Protection Agency, January 1998, EPA 

402–R–97–014. 

‘‘Standards for Cleanup Of Land and 

Buildings Contaminated with Residual 

Radioactive Materials from Inactive 

Uranium Processing Sites.’’ Health and 

Environmental Protection Standards for 

Uranium and Thorium Mill Tailings. 40 

CFR part 192.10–12. 

‘‘Standards for Protection Against 

Radiation.’’ Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 10 CFR part 20. 

‘‘Surface and Volume Radioactivity 

Standards for Clearance.’’ American 

National Standards Institute (ANSI), 

N13.12 (1999). 

Appendix 6—Acronyms/Glossary 

AMS Aerial Measuring System—A DOE 

technical asset consisting of both fixed 

wing and helicopter systems for measuring 

radiation on the ground; a deployable asset 

of the NIRT. 

ALARA As low as reasonably achievable—

A process to control or manage radiation 

exposure to individuals and releases of 

radioactive material to the environment so 

that doses are as low as social, technical, 

economic, practical, and public welfare 

considerations permit. 

ANSI American National Standards 

Institute. 

ARS Acute Radiation Syndrome. 

CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental 

Response, Compensation, and Liability 

Act, commonly known as Superfund. This 

legislation was enacted by Congress in 

1980 to protect households and 

communities from abandoned toxic waste 

sites. 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations. 

CMS Consequence Management Site 

Restoration, Cleanup and Decontamination 

Subgroup. 

DEST Domestic Emergency Support 

Team—A technical advisory team designed 

to pre-deploy and assist the FBI Special 

Agent in Charge. The DEST may deploy 

after an incident to assist the FBI. 

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security. 

DIL Derived Intervention Level—The 

concentration of a radionuclide in food 

expressed in Becquerel/kg which, if 

present throughout the relevant period of 

time (with no intervention), could lead to 

an individual receiving a radiation dose 

equal to the PAG. 

DOD U.S. Department of Defense. 

DOE U.S. Department of Energy. 

DRL Derived Response Level—A level of 

radioactivity in an environmental medium 

that would be expected to produce a dose 

equal to its corresponding PAG. 

EMP Electromagnetic Pulse—

Electromagnetic radiation from a nuclear 

explosion. 

EMS Emergency Medical Service. 

EOC Emergency Operations Center—A 

response entity’s central command and 

control center for carrying out emergency 

management functions. 

EPA U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency. 

ESF Emergency Support Function—The 

ESFs provide the structure for coordinating 

Federal interagency support for domestic 

incident response. 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. 

Department of Justice. 

FCO Federal Coordinating Officer—

Appointed by the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, on behalf 

of the President, to coordinate federal 

assistance to a state affected by a disaster 

or emergency. 

FDA Food and Drug Administration, U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services. 

FRMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring 

and Assessment Center—A coordinating 

center for Federal, State, and local field 

personnel performing radiological 

monitoring and assessment—specifically, 

providing data collection, data analysis 

and interpretation, and finished products 

to decision makers. The FRMAC is a 

deployable asset of the NIRT administered 

by DOE. For more information, see http:// 

www.nv.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/ 

homelandsecurity/frmac/default.htm. 

FRN Federal Register Notice. 

Gy One gray is equal to an absorbed dose 

(mean energy imparted to a unit of matter 

mass) of 1 joule/kilogram. 1 gray (Gy) = 

10,000 erg/g = 100 rad. 

HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services. 

HAZWOPER Hazardous Waste Operations 

and Emergency Response Standard (29 

CFR 1910.120). 

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive—Executive Order issued to the 

Federal agencies by the President on 

matters pertaining to Homeland Security. 

IC/UC Incident Command/Unified 

Command—A system to integrate various 

necessary functions to respond to 

emergencies. The system is widely used by 

local responders. Under Unified 

Command, multiple jurisdictional 

authorities are integrated. 

ICP Incident Command Post—The field 

location where the primary functions are 

performed. The ICP may be co-located with 

the incident base or other incident 

facilities. 

ICRP International Commission on 

Radiological Protection. 

ICS Incident Command System—A 

standardized, on-scene, all-hazard incident 

management concept. ICS is based upon a 

flexible, scalable response organization 

providing a common framework within 

which people can work together 

effectively. 

IND Improvised Nuclear Device—An illicit 

nuclear weapon that is bought, stolen, or 

otherwise obtained from a nuclear State, or 

a weapon fabricated by a terrorist group 

from illegally obtained fissile nuclear 

weapons material and produces a nuclear 

explosion. 

JFO Joint Field Office—The operations of 

the various Federal entities participating in 

a response at the local level should be 

collocated in a Joint Field Office whenever 

possible, to improve the efficiency and 

effectiveness of Federal incident 

management activities. 

JFO Unified Coordination Group JFO 

structure is organized, staffed and managed 

in a manner consistent with NIMS 

principles and is led by the Unified 

Coordination Group. Personnel from 

Federal and State departments and 

agencies, other jurisdictional entities and 

private sector businesses and NGOs may be 

requested to staff various levels of the JFO, 

depending on the requirements of the 

incident. 

JIC Joint Information Center—A focal point 

for the coordination and provision of 

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information to the public and media 

concerning the Federal response to the 

emergency. 

JOC Joint Operations Center—The focal 

point for management and coordination of 

local, State and Federal investigative/law 

enforcement activities. 

KI Potassium Iodide. 

LNT or LNT model—Linear no-threshold 

dose-response for which any dose greater 

than zero has a positive probability of 

producing an effect (e.g. , mutation or 

cancer). The probability is calculated either 

from the slope of a linear (L) model or from 

the limiting slope, as the dose approaches 

zero, of a linear-quadratic (LQ) model. 

MERRT Medical Emergency Radiological 

Response Team—Provides direct patient 

treatment, assists and trains local health 

care providers in managing, handling, and 

treatment of radiation exposed and 

contaminated casualties, assesses the 

impact on human health, and provides 

consultation and technical advice to local, 

State, and Federal authorities. 

NCP National Oil and Hazardous 

Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (40 

CFR part 300)—The Plan provides the 

organizational structure and procedures for 

preparing for and responding to discharges 

of oil and releases of hazardous substances, 

pollutants, and contaminants. 

NCRP National Council on Radiation 

Protection and Measurements. 

NIEHS National Institute for Environmental 

Health Sciences. 

NIMS National Incident Management 

System—The Homeland Security Act of 

2002 and HPSD–5 directed the DHS to 

develop NIMS. The purpose of the NIMS 

is to provide a consistent nationwide 

approach for Federal, State, and local 

governments to work effectively and 

efficiently together to prepare for, respond 

to, and recover from domestic incidents. 

NIRT Nuclear Incident Response Team—

Created by the Homeland Security Act of 

2002, the NIRT consists of radiological 

emergency response assets of the DOE and 

the EPA. When called upon by the 

Secretary for Homeland Security for actual 

or threatened radiological incidents, these 

assets come under the ‘‘authority, 

direction, and control’’ of the Secretary. 

NOC National Operations Center. 

NPP Nuclear Power Plant. 

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

NRF National Response Framework—The 

successor to the National Response Plan. 

The Framework presents the doctrine, 

principles, and architecture by which our 

nation prepares for and responds to allhazard disasters across all levels of 

government and all sectors of 

communities. 

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. 

PAG Protective Action Guide—The 

projected dose to a reference individual, 

from an accidental or deliberate release of 

radioactive material at which a specific 

protective action to reduce or avoid that 

dose is recommended. 

PFO Principal Federal Official—The PFO 

will act as the Secretary of Homeland 

Security’s local representative, and will 

oversee and coordinate Federal activities 

for the incident. 

PIO Public Information Officer—The PIO 

acts as the communications coordinator or 

spokesperson within the Incident 

Command System. 

PPE Personal protective equipment. 

R Roentgen—Measure of exposure in air. 

Rad Radiation absorbed dose. One rad is 

equal to an absorbed dose of 100 erg/gram 

or 0.01 joule/kilogram. 1 rad = 0.01 gray 

(Gy). 

RAP Radiological Assistance Program—A 

DOE emergency response asset that can 

rapid deploy at the request of State or local 

governments for technical assistance in 

radiological incidents. RAP teams are a 

deployable asset of the NIRT. 

RDD Radiological Dispersal Device—Any 

device that causes the purposeful 

dissemination of radioactive material, 

across an area with the intent to cause 

harm, without a nuclear detonation 

occurring. 

REAC/TS Radiation Emergency Assistance 

Center/Training Site—A DOE asset located 

in Oak Ridge, TN, with technical expertise 

in medical and health assessment 

concerning internal and external exposure 

to radioactive materials. REAC/TS is a 

deployable asset of the NIRT. 

Rem Roentgen Equivalent Man; the 

conventional unit of radiation dose 

equivalent. 1 rem = 0.01 sievert (Sv). 

REMM Radiation Event Medical 

Management—A Web-based algorithm 

providing just-in-time information for 

medical responders. It is also useful for 

education and training. Developed by the 

Office of Assistant Secretary for 

Preparedness and Response and the 

National Library of Medicine. Available at 

http://www.remm.nlm.gov. 

RERT Radiological Emergency Response 

Team—An EPA team trained to do 

environmental sampling and analysis of 

radionuclides. RERT provides assistance 

during responses and takes over operation 

of the FRMAC from DOE at a point in time 

after the emergency phase. RERT is a 

deployable asset of the NIRT. 

Shelter-in-Place The use of a structure for 

radiation protection from an airborne 

plume and/or deposited radioactive 

materials. 

SI International System of Units. 

Stakeholder A stakeholder is anybody with 

an interest (a ‘stake’) in a problem and its 

solution. The involvement of stakeholders 

(i.e., parties who have interests in and 

concern about a situation) is seen as an 

important input to the optimization 

process. It is a proven means to achieve 

incorporation of values into the decisionmaking process, improvement of the 

substantive quality of decisions, resolution 

of conflicts among competing interests, 

building of shared understanding with 

both workers and the public, and building 

of trust in institutions. Furthermore, 

involving all concerned parties reinforces 

the safety culture, and introduces the 

necessary flexibility in the management of 

the radiological risk that is necessary to 

achieve more effective and sustainable 

decisions. 

Sv Sievert; the SI unit of radiation dose 

equivalent. 1 Sv = 100 rem. 

TEDE Total effective dose equivalent—The 

sum of the effective dose equivalent from 

external radiation exposure and the 

committed effective dose equivalent from 

internal exposure. 

Dated: July 18, 2008. 

Michael Chertoff, 

Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security. 

[FR Doc. E8–17645 Filed 7–31–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–21–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Transportation Security Administration 

Extension of Agency Information 

Collection Activity Under OMB Review: 

TSA Customer Comment Card 

AGENCY: Transportation Security 

Administration, DHS. 

ACTION: 30 Day Notice. 

SUMMARY: This notice announces that 

the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) has forwarded the 

Information Collection Request (ICR) 

abstracted below to the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) for 

review and approval of an extension of 

the currently approved collection under 

the Paperwork Reduction Act. The ICR 

describes the nature of the information 

collection and its expected burden. TSA 

published a Federal Register notice, 

with a 60-day comment period soliciting 

comments, of the following collection of 

information on May 9, 2008, 73 FR 

26404. TSA uses a customer comment 

card to collect passenger comments 

including complaints, compliments, and 

suggestions at airports. 

DATES: Send your comments by 

September 2, 2008. A comment to OMB 

is most effective if OMB receives it 

within 30 days of publication. 

ADDRESSES: Interested persons are 

invited to submit written comments on 

the proposed information collection to 

the Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs, Office of Management and 

Budget. Comments should be addressed 

to Nathan Lesser, Desk Officer, 

Department of Homeland Security/TSA, 

and sent via electronic mail to 

oira_submission@omb.eop.gov or faxed 

to (202) 395–6974. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Joanna Johnson, Communications 

Branch, Business Management Office, 

Operational Process and Technology, 

TSA–11, Transportation Security 

Administration, 601 South 12th Street, 

Arlington, VA 22202–4220; telephone 

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