[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13348

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MISAEL CEPEDA, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:16-cr-00146-JDW-TGW-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13348

Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Misael Cepeda, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,1 appeals 

the district court’s denial of his pro se motions for compassionate 

release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and for reconsideration of 

that denial. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.

In 2016, Cepeda pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with 

intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), and 846. Cepeda 

was sentenced to 144 months’ imprisonment. 

In 2022, Cepeda moved pro se for compassionate release under section 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act.2 In his 

motion, Cepeda asserted two grounds for compassionate release. 

First, Cepeda said he suffers from hypertension: a condition he alleged has caused loss of eyesight and “constant blackouts.” Cepeda 

also contended that his hypertension puts him at an increased risk 

of serious illness or death if he were to contract COVID-19. Second, Cepeda argued that compassionate release was warranted because Cepeda’s terminally-ill father needed Cepeda to care for him. 

Cepeda also asserted that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors 

1 We read liberally briefs filed by pro se litigants. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 

F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally pro se pleadings. See 

Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).

2 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).

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and his post-conviction rehabilitation weighed in favor of compassionate release. 

The district court denied Cepeda’s motion. The district 

court first determined that Cepeda had shown no extraordinary 

and compelling reason that would warrant compassionate release. 

The district court next determined that -- even if Cepeda could 

demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons -- the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors did not support a reduced sentence. The district 

court later denied Cepeda’s motion for reconsideration. 

“We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).” United States v. 

Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). After eligibility is established, we review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision about whether to grant or to deny a defendant compassionate 

release. See id. “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an 

incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making its 

determination, or makes clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id. 

District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a term 

of imprisonment but may do so to the extent permitted under section 3582(c). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); Giron, 15 F.4th at 1345-46. As 

amended by the First Step Act, section 3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes a 

district court to modify a term of imprisonment under these circumstances:

[T]he court . . . upon motion of the defendant 

after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment 

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. . . after considering the factors set forth in section 

3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds 

. . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant 

such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the 

Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

We have said that a district court may reduce a defendant’s 

term of imprisonment under section 3582(c)(1)(A) only if each of 

these three conditions is met: “(1) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors 

favor doing so, (2) there are ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ 

for doing so, and . . . (3) doing so wouldn’t endanger any person or 

the community within the meaning of § 1B1.13’s policy statement.” See United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 

2021). When the district court determines that a movant fails to 

satisfy one of these conditions, the district court may deny compassionate release without addressing the remaining conditions. Id. 

at 1237-38, 1240.

The policy statement applicable to section 3582(c)(1)(A) is 

found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; United States v. 

Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2021). The commentary to 

section 1B1.13 identifies four categories that might constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting a reduced sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 comment. (n.1). Contrary to Cepeda’s 

assertion on appeal, section 1B1.13’s policy statement is binding on 

district courts. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1247. 

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Pertinent to this appeal, Application Note 1(A) of section 

1B1.13 provides that a prisoner’s medical condition may warrant a 

sentence reduction if the prisoner (1) has a terminal illness, or (2) 

suffers from “a serious physical or medical condition . . . that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide selfcare within” prison. Id. § 1B1.13 comment. (n.1(A)). Application 

Note 1(C) provides that a prisoner’s “family circumstances” might 

constitute an “extraordinary and compelling reason” in two situations: (1) “[t]he death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s minor child or minor children” and (2) “[t]he incapacitation of the defendant’s spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner.” Id. § 1B1.13 comment. (n.1(C)). 

The district court committed no error in determining that 

Cepeda failed to demonstrate an “extraordinary and compelling” 

reason within the meaning of section 1B1.13. Cepeda has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating that his hypertension currently 

constitutes a terminal illness. Cf. 18 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 comment. 

(n.1(A)(i)) (describing a terminal illness as “a serious and advanced 

illness with an end of life trajectory”). Nor has Cepeda offered factual allegations or documentation that would support a finding that 

his medical conditions have diminished substantially his ability to 

provide self-care while in prison. On top of this omission, Cepeda 

says he has completed a host of educational courses and has held a 

prison job in “maintenance and electrical” throughout his time in 

prison: activities that suggest Cepeda retains significant physical capabilities. Cepeda’s purported plans upon his requested release --

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acting as a primary caregiver for his father and starting a business 

as a tattoo artist -- also are inconsistent with a person unable to 

provide self-care. 

The district court also determined correctly that Cepeda has 

shown no family circumstances that would warrant a reduced sentence. Under Application Note 1(C), a prisoner’s family circumstances may constitute “extraordinary and compelling circumstances” only in two limited circumstances. Because Cepeda’s father is neither the caretaker of Cepeda’s minor children nor 

Cepeda’s spouse or partner, his incapacitation is no grounds for relief under Application Note 1(C).3 

Cepeda also contends that the district court had discretion 

to consider whether -- alone or in combination -- Cepeda’s risk of 

serious illness from COVID-19, the harsh prison conditions created 

by COVID-19 lockdowns, his father’s illness, and Cepeda’s postconviction rehabilitation constituted “other” extraordinary and 

compelling reasons under Application Note 1(D).4 This argument 

is foreclosed by our binding precedent. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1248 

3 Cepeda seems to assert for the first time on appeal that his mother’s medical 

condition supports his motion for compassionate release. Like Cepeda’s father, Cepeda’s mother is neither a caretaker to Cepeda’s minor children nor 

Cepeda’s spouse or partner. As a result, Cepeda’s mother’s health can be no 

“extraordinary and compelling reason” under Application Note 1(C). 

4 Application Note 1(D) reads this way: “As determined by the Director of the 

Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant’s case an extraordinary and 

compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described 

in subdivisions (A) through (C).” 18 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 comment. (n.1(D)). 

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(“Application Note 1(D) does not grant discretion to courts to develop ‘other reasons’ that might justify a reduction in a defendant’s 

sentence.”).

Given the lack of an extraordinary and compelling reason 

that would warrant relief, we need not detail whether the section 

3553(a) factors would support a reduced sentence. See Tinker, 14 

F.4th at 1237-38, 1240. Nevertheless, we see no error in the district 

court’s determination that the section 3553(a) factors also weighed 

against granting Cepeda compassionate release. The district court 

noted that Cepeda had two convictions for drug-trafficking offenses (one of which involved nearly 2 kilograms of methamphetamine and one of which involved over 220 kilograms of marijuana) 

and a conviction for illegal reentry after deportation. In the light 

of the seriousness of these offenses, the district court concluded 

reasonably that a reduced sentence would not reflect the seriousness of Cepeda’s offense, promote respect for the law, provide just 

punishment, or provide adequate deterrence. 

Because Cepeda has failed to satisfy all three of the conditions necessary to justify a reduced sentence under section 

3582(c)(1)(A), the district court abused no discretion in denying 

Cepeda’s motion for compassionate release.5

5 We also reject Cepeda’s assertion that the district court violated his due process rights by not allowing him to file a reply to the government’s response to 

Cepeda’s compassionate-release motion. Cepeda alleges no facts showing --

and nothing in the record demonstrates -- that Cepeda attempted to file a reply 

or that the district court otherwise prevented Cepeda from doing so. 

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AFFIRMED.

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