IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

NATHAN SNYDER; AND SAMANTHA 

ORR, 

Appellants, 

vs. 

CLEAR RECON CORP., AND SANAM 

LIMITED, 

Res • ondents. 

No. 82390 

FILE 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

This is an appeal from a final judgment in a real property 

matter. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Eric Johnson, 

Judge.' 

Appellants purchased a home, funded by a mortgage loan, on 

which they later defaulted. Respondent Clear Recon Corp. recorded a notice 

of default in March 2019 and a notice of trustee sale thereafter. Appellants 

then filed for bankruptcy and, after the bankruptcy's dismissal, Clear Recon 

recorded another notice of sale. Appellants then again filed, and had 

dismissed, another bankruptcy case, after which Clear Recon recorded a 

third notice of sale. When appellants' third bankruptcy filing was 

dismissed, Clear Recon proceeded with the foreclosure sale in July 2020. 

Before respondent Sanam Limited recorded the trustee's deed upon sale, 

appellants filed a complaint for injunctive relief, arguing that Clear Recon 

had materially violated NRS 107.550 because no foreclosure sale occurred, 

and more than 90 days passed between the recording of the second and third 

notices of sale. The district court denied injunctive relief and granted 

summary judgment in respondents' favor. 

'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument 

is not warranted 

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Appellants argue that NRS 107.550(1) requires rescission of a 

notice of default when a lender fails to complete a foreclosure sale within 90 

calendar days after a notice of sale. And they argue that such recission is 

required here because Clear Recon failed to conduct a foreclosure sale 

within 90 days after recording the second notice of sale, regardless of the 

fact that fewer than 90 days elapsed between the third notice of sale and 

the foreclosure sale. As this is an issue of statutory interpretation, we 

review the district court's decision de novo. See Senjab v. Alhulaibi, 137 

Nev., Adv. Op. 64, 497 P.3d 618, 619 (2021). 

"If [a] statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce 

the statute as written." Hobbs v. State, 127 Nev. 234, 237, 251 P.3d 177, 

179 (2011). But, "if following the statute's apparent plain meaning results 

in a meaning that runs counter to the 'spirit' of the statute, this court may 

look outside the statute's language." MGM Mirage v. Nev. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 

125 Nev. 223, 228-29, 209 P.3d 766, 769-70 (2009). Similarly, "when [a] 

statute is ambiguous, meaning that it is subject to more than one reasonable 

interpretation . . . we [may also] look beyond the language [of the statute] 

to consider its meaning in light of its spirit, subject matter, and public 

policy." Id. (fourth alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 

(2011) (explaining that when a statute is ambiguous, this court may then 

look to legislative history and construe the statute in a manner consistent 

with reason and public policy). 

NRS 107.550(1) provides: 

1. A civil action for a foreclosure sale 

pursuant to NRS 40.430 involving a failure to make 

a payment required by a residential mortgage loan 

must be dismissed without prejudice, any notice of 

default and election to sell recorded pursuant to 

subsection 2 of NRS 107.080 or any notice of sale 

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recorded pursuant to subsection 4 of NRS 107.080 

must be rescinded, and any pending foreclosure 

sale must be cancelled, if: 

(c) A foreclosure sale is not conducted within 

90 calendar days after a notice of sale is recorded 

pursuant to subsection 4 of NRS 107.080. 

Appellants present a reasonable reading of the statute, under 

which a violation of the foreclosure process occurs when a foreclosure sale 

does not occur within 90 days after a notice of sale is recorded. And here, 

even accounting for NRS 107.550(2)'s tolling periods, the foreclosure sale 

was not conducted within 90 calendar days after the second notice of sale.2

Nevertheless, we conclude that NRS 107.550(1) is ambiguous as applied in 

this case, where a foreclosure sale occurred within 90 days of the most 

recent recorded notice of sale, but more than 90 days passed between notice 

of sale recordings. The district court reasonably interpreted the statute as 

requiring a recission of the notice of default only where a foreclosure sale 

occurs more than 90 days after the recording of a notice of sale, and because 

the sale took place within 90 days of the recording of the third notice of sale, 

the court concluded that the sale met the statute's requirements. Because 

the statute is ambiguous, we look beyond its language to determine its 

meaning. Hobbs, 127 Nev. at 237, 251 P.3d at 179. 

NRS 107.550 is part of the "the Nevada Homeowner's Bill of 

Rights." Relevant legislative history shows that the bill's sponsors intended 

to provide homeowners with adequate notice and certainty regarding 

foreclosure proceedings and with information on ways to avoid foreclosure. 

Hearing on S.B. 321 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 77th Leg. 

2Respondents dispute that more than 90 days elapsed between the 

second and third notice of sale, but the record belies this contention. 

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(May 2, 2013) (testimony of Assemblyman James Healey) (testifying that 

the bill was intended to "protect . . . homeowners" by "requir[ing] borrowers 

to be sent a foreclosure notice, a preforeclosure notice with information 

about their loan, and options on how to avoid foreclosure"); Hearing on S.B. 

321 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 77th Leg. (April 10, 2013) 

(testirnony of Senator Justin Jones) (noting that the bill addressed the 

concern that foreclosure notices would "sit out forever" and that the bill 

would "increase [ ] predictability for all parties involved in the foreclosure 

process," and provide "strong but fair accountability measures by extending 

protections to all residential mortgages written in Nevada"). The sponsors 

were also aware of the potential for abuse by homeowners in default, 

though, stating that it was "not the intent of the bill" to give "those who go 

through this process the ability to abuse the process." Hearing on S.B. 321 

Before the Assembly Comm. on Judiciary 77th Leg. (May 16, 2013) 

(testimony of Senator Justin Jones). Sponsors further stated that they had 

worked with various stakeholders 

to make sure that we are not enabling people who 

are simply trying to game the system. I think what 

we have done is ensure that there is notice at the 

beginning and that there is an opportunity for 

someone to go into either the foreclosure mediation 

process or into another loss mitigation process. 

Hearing on S.B. 321 Before the Assembly Comm. on Judiciary 77th Leg. 

(May 2, 2013) (testimony of Senator Jones). 

Based on the legislative history, we conclude that Clear Recon 

did not violate the statute because it did not conduct a foreclosure sale more 

than 90 days after recording a notice of sale. This interpretation balances 

the bill sponsors' concerns that homeowners were not receiving sufficient 

notice about the foreclosure proceedings with their countervailing concern 

that homeowners could potentially abuse the process. 

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Here, appellants do not dispute that they received all due notice 

regarding the foreclosure proceedings, which is further evidenced by their 

bankruptcy petitions filed immediately before, or on the day of, each of the 

scheduled foreclosure sales. Most importantly, they do not dispute that 

they had notice as to the third notice of sale. And they also do not dispute 

that the foreclosure sale occurred within 90 days after the third notice of 

sale.3 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err by 

granting summary judgment and denying injunctive relief. We, therefore, 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.4

cc: Hon. Eric Johnson, District Judge 

Kristine M. Kuzemka, Settlement Judge 

Kern Law, Ltd. 

Law Office of Andrew H. Pastwick, LLC 

Aldridge Pite, LLP 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

3Because this issue is dispositive, we need not address the parties' 

remaining arguments regarding NRS 107.560 and whether respondent 

Sanam Limited was a bona fide purchaser. 

4We lift the stay imposed by this court on June 10, 2021 (as clarified 

by order entered on January 3, 2022). 

The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the 

decision of this matter under a general order of assignment. 

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