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Paul J. Cambria, Jr. (NY 15873, admitted pro hac vice)

pcambria@lglaw.com

Erin E. McCampbell (NY 4480166, admitted pro hac vice)

emccampbell@lglaw.com

LIPSITZ GREEN SCIME CAMBRIA LLP

42 Delaware Avenue, Suite 120

Buffalo, New York 14202

Telephone: (716) 849-1333

Facsimile: (716) 855-1580

Attorneys for Defendant Michael Lacey

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

 Plaintiff,

vs.

Michael Lacey

 

 Defendant.

Case No. CR-18-00422-PHX-SPL (BSB)

DEFENDANT LACEY’S NOTICE OF 

JOINDER IN DEFENDANT LARKIN’S 

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 

UNTIMELY REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS 

APPLICATION FOR ORDER 

REGARDING CRIMINAL FORFEITURE 

(DOC. 304)

Defendant Michael Lacey, by and through his undersigned attorney, joins in defendant 

James Larkin’s Response to Government’s Motion for Leave to File UntimelyReply in Support 

of its Application for Order Regarding Criminal Forfeiture (Doc. 304). Defendant Lacey agrees 

with the arguments made in defendant Larkin’s Response. Defendant Lacey adopts the positions 

set forth in said Response as if fully set forth herein. The issues raised in the Response apply 

with equal force to Mr. Lacey. 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 322 Filed 09/21/18 Page 1 of 3
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of September, 2018

LIPSITZ GREEN SCIME CAMBRIA LLP

/s/ Paul J. Cambria, Jr.

Attorneys for Defendant

Michael Lacey

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 322 Filed 09/21/18 Page 2 of 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 21st day of September 2018, I electronically transmitted a PDF 

version of this document to the Clerk of the Court by filing with the CM/ECF system and 

understand a copy of the filing will be emailed to the attorneys of record.

By: /s/ April Kelly

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 322 Filed 09/21/18 Page 3 of 3
#### Mary ANDERSON, Respondent, v. Lowell ANDERSON, Appellant.

No. WD 46863.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

July 20, 1993.

Gary Vance Cover, Clinton, for appellant.

Martin D. McLaughlin, Warsaw, for respondent.

Before BERREY, P.J. and BRECKENRIDGE and HANNA, JJ.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Appeal from maintenance provisions of dissolution of marriage decree.

Decree affirmed pursuant to Rule 84.-16(b).
Exhibit 32
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of Corporate Property Associates 17  Global
Incorporated.
  /s/ Gordon F. DuGanGordon F. DuGanChief Executive Officer
  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of Corporate Property Associates 17  Global
Incorporated.
  /s/ Mark J. DeCesarisMark J. DeCesarisacting Chief Financial Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Morgan WILLIAMSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 72-2239

Summary Calendar.*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 6, 1972.

*89Robert W. Smith, Dallas, Tex. (court appointed), for defendant-appellant.

Eldon B. Mahon, U. S. Atty., Fort Worth, Tex., Charles D. Cabaniss, Asst. U. S. Atty., Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before BELL, DYER and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

*

 Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Company of New York et al., 5 Cir. 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.

PER CURIAM:

Williamson was found guilty of unlawful escape from the Federal Correctional Institution, Seagoville, Texas,1 and sentenced to thirteen months’ confinement, the sentence to run consecutively to the sentence he was serving under a previous conviction for a violation of the Dyer Act.2 He claims that he has been subjected to double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment because he had already administratively lost “good time” deductions from the term of the earlier sentence. Williamson further complains that the district court erred in refusing to consider his § 2255 motion asserting that the charge of escape arose out of a void judgment entered in the district court of New Mexico and that the judgment of the district court for the Western District of Louisiana revoking his probation was also void. We find Williamson’s contentions without merit and affirm.

In Keaveny v. United States, 5 Cir. 1969, 405 F.2d 821, where a similar double jeopardy issue was raised, we summarily disposed of it saying: “This contention is without merit. Administrative discipline of an escapee does not prohibit criminal prosecution for the escape.”

The court below properly refused to consider Williamson’s § 2255 motion. The statute clearly provides that a prisoner who desires to collaterally attack his sentence “may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” The collateral attack must be filed in the convicting court. Light v. United States, 5 Cir. 1970, 430 F.2d 932; Walker v. United States, 5 Cir. 1970, 429 F.2d 1301.

Affirmed.

1

. 18 U.S.C.A. § 751(a).

2

. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2311-2313.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER 
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Team Nation Holdings Corporation (the
Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:

| |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
| | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (i)
  the accompanying report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the fiscal
  quarter ended June 30, 2009 (the Report) fully complies with the
  requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the
  Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
| | (ii)
  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
  respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.                                                                               

|                      |     |                        
|--------------------- | --- | -----------------------
|Date: August 19, 2009 | By: | /s/ Dennis R. Duffy    
|                      |     |                        
|                      |     | Dennis R. Duffy        
|                      |     | Chief Executive Officer

This certification has not
been, and shall not be deemed, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.

---
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edgar Roberto BRAN, aka Roberto Dran, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-50225. D.C. No. CR-00-01321-AHM-3.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 21, 2003.*

Decided July 28, 2003.

Before LEAVY, HAWKINS, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM**

Edgar Roberto Bran appeals his conviction by unconditional guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to possess pseudoephedrine, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(d)(2). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part and dismiss in part.

*679Bran contends that the district court violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 by failing to sufficiently inform him about the charge to which he was pleading guilty. Because Bran failed to object in the district court, we review for plain error. *United States v. Minore,*292 F.3d 1109, 1115, 1117 (9th Cir.2002). Upon review of the record, we find no error because in addition to the prosecutor reading the terms of the plea agreement and the elements of the crimes to which Bran was pleading in open court, the district court engaged in a lengthy colloquy with Bran to ascertain whether he understood the terms of the agreement, the elements of the crimes to which he was pleading guilty, and the ramifications of his plea. *See United States v. Siu Kuen Ma,*290 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir.2002) (finding no plain error where defendant stated that prior to plea hearing, she had read and understood plea agreement, prosecutor summarized terms of agreement in open court, and the district court ascertained that she understood the essential elements of the charges).

Bran also contends that district court violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 by failing to inform him of his continuing right to plead not guilty. We find no plain error because the district court informed Bran of his right to a presumption of innocence, the right to require the government to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to cross examine government witnesses, the right to testify or to remain silent, the right to subpoena witnesses, and the right to a public jury trial. *See United States v. Morales-Robles,*309 F.3d 609, 610 (9th Cir.2002) (finding no plain error where district court advised defendant of rights subsumed in enumerated right to have a trial).

Because Bran entered an unconditional guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement, we dismiss the remainder of Bran’s appeal. *See United States v. Reyes-Platero,*224 F.3d 1112, 1114-15 (9th Cir.2000) (internal quotation omitted) (“[a]n unconditional guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal all non-jurisdictional antecedent rulings and cures all antecedent constitutional defects”).

AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 418 Engrossed in House (EH)]

  1st Session

                               H. R. 418

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

                 For the relief of Arthur J. Carron, Jr.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 418

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
                 For the relief of Arthur J. Carron, Jr.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. WAIVER OF TIME LIMITATIONS.

    The time limitations set forth in section 3702(b) of title 31, 
United States Code, shall not apply with respect to a claim by Arthur 
J. Carron, Jr., of Bark River, Michigan, for amounts due to him by the 
Department of the Navy. The amounts due are represented by the 
following checks that were received but not negotiated by Arthur J. 
Carron, Jr.:
            (1) Treasury check number 2,831,843, dated October 18, 
        1966, in the amount of $10,850.74 for salary and expenses.
            (2) Treasury check number 10,445,856, dated January 29, 
        1971, in the amount of $1,361.00 for salary and expenses.
            (3) Treasury check number 71,681,041, dated April 1, 1971, 
        in the amount of $562.25 for retirement pay.

SEC. 2. DEALINE.

    Section 1 shall apply only if Arthur J. Carron, Jr., or his 
authorized representative, submits a claim pursuant to such section 
before the expiration of the 3-month period beginning on the date of 
the enactment of this Act.

            Passed the House of Representatives December 19, 1995.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
```
IB

Union Calendar No. 384

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3867

[Report No. 104–719]

To amend the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act

to extend the Act, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 23, 1996

Mr. FRISA (for himself, Mr. BLILEY, Mr. DINGELL, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr.

TOWNS, Mr. GREENWOOD, Mr. STUDDS, and Ms. ESHOO) introduced the

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Commerce

JULY 30, 1996

Additional sponsors: Mr. KLUG, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. GORDON, Ms. FURSE, and

Mr. CRAPO

JULY 30, 1996

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union

and ordered to be printed

A BILL

To amend the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill

of Rights Act to extend the Act, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•HR 3867 RH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Developmental Disabil3 ities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act Amendments of

4 1996’’.

5 SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION OF ALLOTMENTS FOR STATES.

6 Section 130 of the Developmental Disabilities Assist7 ance and Bill of Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 6030) is amended

8 by striking ‘‘the fiscal years 1995 and 1996’’ and inserting

9 ‘‘the fiscal years 1995 through 1999’’.

10 SEC. 3. REAUTHORIZATION OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO

11 PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY OF INDIVIDUAL

12 RIGHTS.

13 Section 143 of the Developmental Disabilities Assist14 ance and Bill of Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 6043) is amended

15 by striking ‘‘the fiscal years 1995 and 1996’’ and inserting

16 ‘‘the fiscal years 1995 through 1999’’.

17 SEC. 4. REAUTHORIZATION OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO

18 UNIVERSITY AFFILIATED PROGRAMS.

19 Section 156(a) of the Developmental Disabilities As20 sistance and Bill of Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 6066(a)) is

21 amended by striking ‘‘the fiscal years 1995 and 1996’’ and

22 inserting ‘‘the fiscal years 1995 through 1999’’.

23 SEC. 5. REAUTHORIZATION OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO

24 PROJECTS OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE.

25 Section 163(a) of the Developmental Disabilities As26 sistance and Bill of Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 6083(a)) is
3

•HR 3867 RH

1 amended by striking ‘‘the fiscal years 1995 and 1996’’ and

2 inserting ‘‘the fiscal years 1995 through 1999’’.

Union Calendar No. 384

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3867

[Report No. 104–719]

A BILL

To amend the Developmental Disabilities Assistand for other purposes. ance and Bill of Rights Act to extend the Act,

JULY 30, 1996

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the

State of the Union and ordered to be printed
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

**CERTIFICATIONS**

I, Michael J. Peninger, certify that: 

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Union Security Life Insurance Company of New York; 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made,not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared; 

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record,process, summarize and report financial information; and 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

Date: February 29, 2008
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent, Case No. 09-cr-20236

HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN 

vs.

QUENTON WHITSELL SR., 

Petitioner.

__________________________________/

ORDER DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

On April 23, 2015, this Court denied Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate Sentence

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because the Court finds that Defendant has not shown that

his conviction violated his constitutional rights, the Court declines to issue a

certificate of appealability in this case.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not

proceed unless a certificate of appealability is issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Rule

11 of the Rules Governing Section 2225 Proceedings, which was amended as of

December 1, 2009, requires that a district court issue or deny a certificate of

-1-

2:09-cr-20236-GAD-MKM Doc # 132 Filed 06/18/15 Pg 1 of 3 Pg ID 1144
appealability when it enters a final order. A certificate of appealability may issue

“only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Courts must either issue a certificate of appealability

indicating which issues satisfy the required showing or provide reasons why such a

certificate should not issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); In re

Certificates of Appealability, 106 F.3d 1306, 1307 (6th Cir.1997). To receive a

certificate of appealability, “a petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could

debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved

in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).

Here, the Court finds that Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the

denial of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Reasonable

jurists could not debate this Court’s conclusion that Petitioner was not constructively

denied the effective assistance of counsel during a critical stage of his criminal

proceedings. Nor could reasonable jurists debate this Court’s conclusion that trial

counsel did not fail in their duty to subject the prosecution to meaningful adversarial

testing. 

The Court therefore DENIES a Certificate of Appealability. 

SO ORDERED.

-2-

2:09-cr-20236-GAD-MKM Doc # 132 Filed 06/18/15 Pg 2 of 3 Pg ID 1145
Dated: June 18, 2015 /s/Gershwin A Drain 

GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

United States District Judge 

-3-

2:09-cr-20236-GAD-MKM Doc # 132 Filed 06/18/15 Pg 3 of 3 Pg ID 1146
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6814

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

WILLIE LEE BURKE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Frank A. Kaufman, Senior District Judge.

(CR-91-119, CA-97-498-K)

Submitted: November 20, 1997 Decided: December 10, 1997

Before MURNAGHAN, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Willie Lee Burke, Appellant Pro Se. Jan Paul Miller, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal from the district court's orders

dismissing for failure to obtain authorization pursuant to 28

U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West Supp. 1997), his second motion filed under 28

U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997), and denying his motion

for reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and the district

court's opinion and find no abuse of discretion and no reversible

error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and

dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. United

States v. Burke, Nos. CR-91-119; CA-97-498-K (D. Md. Apr. 29,

1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
I

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3855

To authorize the reburial in the Memorial Amphitheater at Arlington National

Cemetery of an unknown American who lost his life while serving in

the Union Army of the United States during the Civil War, and for

other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 18, 1996

Mr. KASICH introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on Veterans Affairs

A BILL

To authorize the reburial in the Memorial Amphitheater at

Arlington National Cemetery of an unknown American

who lost his life while serving in the Union Army of

the United States during the Civil War, and for other

purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. REBURIAL OF UNKNOWN SOLDIER FROM CIVIL

4 WAR IN THE MEMORIAL AMPHITHEATER OF

5 ARLINGTON NATIONAL CEMETERY.

6 The Secretary of Defense is authorized and directed

7 to cause to be brought from a National Cemetery the re-
2

•HR 3855 IH

1 mains of an American who was a member of the Union

2 Army of the United States, who served in the Civil War

3 of 1861 through 1865 who lost his life during the Civil

4 War, and whose identity has not been established, for bur5 ial in the Memorial Amphitheater of the National Ceme6 tery at Arlington, Virginia.

7 SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

8 There are authorized to be appropriated such sums

9 as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this

10 Act.

Æ