1

Filed 6/10/24 P. v. Thomas CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MELINDA KAY THOMAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

E079946

(Super.Ct.No. FVI17002966)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Debra Harris, 

Judge. Affirmed.

Jeffrey Manning-Cartwright and Siri Shetty, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina,

and Arlyn Escalante, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2018, defendant and appellant Melinda Kay Thomas was convicted of one 

count of attempted criminal threats (Pen. Code,

1 §§ 644, 422, subd. (a); count 1); two 

counts of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); counts 2, 

3) and one count of possession of ammunition by a prohibited person (§ 30305, 

subd. (a)(1); count 4). In 2022, defendant petitioned to vacate her convictions pursuant to 

newly enacted section 236.15, which generally permits the trial court to vacate a 

conviction upon a showing that the conviction was the direct result of being a victim of 

intimate partner violence or sexual violence. (§ 236.15, subd. (a).)

Defendant appeals from the denial of her petition, arguing: (1) the trial court’s 

factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the trial court erred by 

utilizing incorrect evidentiary and legal standards beyond those specified in section 

236.15; and (3) the matter should be remanded for full reconsideration of her petition in 

light of amendments made to section 236.15 during the pendency of her appeal. We 

conclude: (1) substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings; (2) the 

record does not affirmatively demonstrate the trial court misapplied section 236.15; and 

(3) any error based upon the failure to apply the current version of section 236.15 was 

harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the order.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Defendant was convicted of one count of attempted criminal threats (§§ 644, 422, 

subd. (a); count 1); two counts of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person 

(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); counts 2, 3) and one count of possession of ammunition by a 

prohibited person (§ 3035, subd. (a)(1); count 4). The convictions arose from an incident 

on September 19, 2017, in which defendant allegedly sent several text and voice 

messages threatening to shoot A.M.; texted photographs of two firearms to A.M.; and 

was observed in possession of firearms and ammunition while driving toward A.M.’s 

residence. Defendant was eventually sentenced to a term of 13 years four months in state 

prison.

2

 Beginning in January 2022, defendant filed multiple petitions for relief seeking 

to vacate her convictions pursuant to newly enacted section 236.15. On September 30, 

2022, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s petition.

2

 On direct appeal, this court modified defendant’s original sentence and 

remanded the matter for resentencing. Upon remand, the trial court resentenced 

defendant to a term of 13 years 4 months in state prison, representing: (1) six years on 

count 2, representing the upper term, doubled as the result of a prior strike offense; (2) 

eight months on count 1, representing one-third the middle term; (3) one year and four 

months on count 3, representing one-third the middle term, doubled as the result of a 

prior strike offense; and (4) a five-year enhancement pursuant to section 667, subdivision 

(a)(1). The trial court imposed the upper term of three years on count 4 but stayed 

execution pursuant to section 654.
4

B. Relevant Evidence Submitted on Petition

1. Written Statements3

In her written statements to the trial court, defendant stated that she and A.M. 

began a romantic relationship sometime in 2016; the two began cohabitating in 2017; and 

A.M. began to physically abuse defendant during this time. As a result of this alleged 

abuse, A.M. moved out of their shared home in July 2017. According to defendant, the 

two became involved in an altercation on September 8, 2017, in which A.M. allegedly 

physically assaulted defendant. Following this incident, defendant sought a restraining 

order against A.M. Defendant stated that, had she not suffered from this abuse, “the 

events of September 19, 2017 would have never happened.”

In her declarations, defendant also claimed to have “suffered a lifetime of mental 

and mood related disorders [that] stem[med] from being raped, molested, and abused as a 

child”; to have been a victim of childhood sexual trauma; and to have had “a long history 

of mental and mood related disorders.” In one declaration, defendant stated that she was 

acting erratically on the evening of September 19, 2017 because A.M. had stollen the 

medication defendant used to treat her bipolar disorder. 

2. Police Report

Defendant submitted a police report dated November 2, 2017. According to the 

3

 Defendant filed a total of four petitions pursuant to section 236.15 before the 

trial court set the matter for a hearing. Each petition was accompanied by its own written 

statement. However, we summarize all of the relevant facts taken from these written 

statements together.
5

report, the deputy had responded to a call on September 8, at defendant’s residence. 

When the deputy arrived, she encountered defendant and A.M., both of whom stated that 

they were only arguing, denied any physical altercation, and agreed that there was no risk 

of escalation. The deputy did not witness any visible injuries on either party, and the 

deputies left the scene.

On November 2, 2017, defendant called the deputy claiming that A.M. had 

subsequently physically assaulted defendant on the night of September 8, after deputies 

left the scene. The deputy met with defendant and took a statement. During this 

interview, the deputy did not observe any injuries on defendant “due to the report being 

taken several weeks after the incident.” However, defendant provided photographs of 

injuries allegedly sustained during the incident, which were attached to the report.

The deputy proceeded to conduct a personal interview with A.M. A.M. denied 

any physical altercation on the evening of September 8, 2017. Instead, A.M. disclosed 

that defendant had threatened to shoot him on September 19, and that defendant was 

arrested as a result of that incident. He expressed the belief that A.M. fabricated her 

report of an assault as retaliation for her arrest on September 19.

3. Testimony of J.W. and R.C.

Defendant called two witnesses to testify in support of her petition. Both 

witnesses testified they had known defendant for years. They both testified to witnessing 

defendant with visible signs of physical injury during the time she was in a relationship 

with A.M. However, one witness admitted that he had never personally witnessed how 

defendant received any of her injuries. The other testified that he had personally seen 
6

A.M. forcefully grab defendant’s arm on one occasion but formed his own assumptions 

regarding the causes of defendant’s other injuries.

4. Defendant’s testimony

Defendant also testified in support of her petition. She reaffirmed the facts set 

forth in her written statement that she began a romantic relationship with A.M. in 2016; 

the two began living together in 2017; A.M. physically abused her while they were living 

together; and A.M. moved out in July 2017. She recounted several incidents in which 

A.M. purportedly physically abused her, causing physical injuries. Defendant testified 

that she obtained a restraining order against A.M. in November 2017 as the result of this 

physical abuse. With respect to the events of September 19, resulting in her convictions, 

defendant testified that the firearms she was in possession of at the time belonged to 

A.M.; A.M. had called her the day prior to request that she return his belongings; and she 

was only attempting to comply with A.M.’s request. When asked why she would agree 

to this request, defendant stated her rationale was “To see [A.M.], I guess,” and “I guess 

as an excuse to go see [A.M.].”

Defendant contradicted the claim in her written statement that she was acting 

erratically because A.M. had stollen her medication. Instead, defendant testified that she 

was attempting to see A.M. on the evening of September 19, 2017, because she believed 

A.M. was attempting to take medications in order to commit suicide or otherwise inflict 

self-harm.

When asked why defendant would message A.M. with a photograph of firearms as 

well as send messages with threatening comments, the only explanation defendant 
7

offered was that “[t]here w[ere] comments back and forth between both of us,” and that 

she had sent threatening messages out of anger. 

Defendant admitted she had been diagnosed with several mental health disorders, 

including bipolar, PTSD, and attention deficit disorder. Defendant also admitted that 

A.M.’s testimony at the time of her trial, if believed, could support the conclusion that 

defendant was the individual in their relationship who manipulated A.M., and not the 

other way around.

C. Ruling and Order

The trial court denied defendant’s petition for vacatur of her convictions. The trial 

court found that defendant had established by clear and convincing evidence that 

defendant was a victim of physical abuse. However, the trial court found that the 

evidence presented failed to show that the commission of the offense was caused by 

defendant’s status as a victim of prior abuse.

The trial court provided a statement of reasons on the record, explaining: “[T]his 

is my understanding, that [defendant]’s position is that, based on her domestic abuse, she 

was in some type of cycle of abuse, and that led her to commit the offense. Problem 

number 1, she is denying that she made a threat. Problem number 2, . . . [t]here’s no 

expert testimony. There is nothing to inform this Court that this cycle of abuse is that 

you are separated from the abuser. [¶] You are still caught in this cycle to where you 

indeed would like to go back and start the relationship, and you make irrational decisions 

because of the abuse. . . . [A]nd her way of getting back together was a threat, a gun, a 

cry for help, or whatever. I didn’t hear that. [¶] [W]hat I heard was a denial that she did 
8

not commit the [offense] at all. Not that [the offense] was committed based on the 

intimate partner violence. And I find that the burden has not been met, and I’m going to 

deny the petition.”

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Background

In 2021, the Legislature enacted section 236.15, which became effective 

January 1, 2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 1.) As originally enacted, subdivision (a) of the 

statute provided: “If a person was arrested for or convicted of any nonviolent offense 

committed while the person was a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual violence, 

the person may petition the court for vacatur relief of their convictions and arrests . . . . 

The petitioner shall establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the arrest or 

conviction was the direct result of being a victim of intimate partner violence or sexual 

violence.” (Ibid.) Subdivision (g) of the statute provided: “After considering the totality 

of the evidence presented, the court may vacate the conviction and expunge the arrests 

and issue an order if it finds all of the following: [¶] (1) That the petitioner was a victim 

of intimate partner violence or sexual violence at the time the nonviolent offense was 

committed[;] [¶] (2) The commission of the crime was a direct result of being a victim of 

intimate partner violence or sexual violence[;] [¶] (3) The victim is engaged in a good 

faith effort to distance themselves from the perpetrator of the harm[;] [¶] (4) It is in the 

best interest of the petitioner and in the interests of justice.” (Ibid.)

In 2022, the Legislature amended section 236.15, which became effective 

January 1, 2023. (Stats. 2022, ch. 776, § 2.) As relevant to this appeal, subdivision (a) 
9

was amended to state that: “The petitioner shall establish, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that the arrest or conviction was the direct result of being a victim of intimate 

partner violence . . . which demonstrates that the person lacked the requisite intent to 

commit the offense. Upon this showing, the court shall find that the person lacked the 

requisite intent to commit the offense and shall therefore vacate the conviction as invalid 

due to legal defect at the time of the arrest or conviction.” (Ibid.) Subdivision (g) was 

amended to remove the requirement that the trial court find the victim is engaged in a 

good faith effort to distance themselves from the perpetrator of the harm, and the 

requirement that the court find relief is in the best interest of the petitioner. (Ibid.)

B. Standard of Review

As the People correctly observe, there are no published decisions setting forth the 

applicable standard of review on an appeal from denial of a motion to vacate under 

section 236.15. However, we agree with the People that the abuse of discretion standard 

is the appropriate standard of review for this specific appeal. Notably, the version of 

section 236.15 in effect at the time of the hearing on defendant’s petition provided that 

the trial court “may” grant relief after making specific factual findings. (Former 

§ 236.15, subd. (g); Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 1.) Additionally, one of the findings 

necessary to obtain relief is that vacatur be in the interests of justice. (Ibid.) Such 

language clearly indicates that the decision whether to grant relief under the statute was 

intended to be discretionary. (See People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 239 

[Language stating that relief is conditioned on a court’s finding that it is “in the interest of 

justice” suggests the trial court exercises discretion in its decision.]; People v. Perez
10

(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1008, 1014 [“ ‘It is a well-settled principle of statutory 

construction that the word “may” is ordinarily construed as permissive, whereas “shall” is 

ordinarily construed as mandatory . . . .’ ”].) As such, it is appropriate for this court to 

review the trial court’s order for abuse of discretion.

We briefly observe that the abuse of discretion standard may no longer be 

appropriate for petitions denied under the current version of the statute. (Stats. 2023, 

ch. 131, § 149.) The Legislature created considerable ambiguity on this point when it 

amended section 236.15 during the pendency of this appeal to add language in 

subdivision (a) to provide that, upon a showing that a conviction was the direct result of 

intimate partner violence, the trial court “shall” find that the person lacked the requisite 

intent to commit the offense and “shall” vacate the conviction. (§ 236.15, subd. (a).) 

This language now suggests relief may be mandatory and is analogous to the language 

used in section 1473.7, addressing petitions to vacate convictions on other grounds 

(§ 1473.7, subd. (e)), which the California Supreme Court has instructed should be 

subject to independent review (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 527). To add to 

the ambiguity, the Legislature left intact the provisions in subdivision (g) providing that 

the trial court find that relief is in the interests of justice before it “may” grant a petition 

under section 236.15. (§ 236.15, subd. (g); Stats. 2023, ch. 131, § 149.)

Ultimately, we need not resolve the ambiguity introduced to the statutory scheme 

by the Legislature in this appeal. Defendant’s petition in this case proceeded under the 

former section 236.15, which clearly provided that the decision to grant relief was a 

matter of the trial court’s discretion. Thus, the abuse of discretion standard is the 
11

appropriate standard of review on appeal from this discretionary order. However, “[t]he 

abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies 

according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of 

fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, 

and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” 

(Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712.) In this case, the trial 

court denied defendant’s petition after determining that she failed to meet her burden of 

proof to establish that her conviction was the direct result of being a victim of intimate 

partner violence. This aspect of the trial court’s discretionary ruling is reviewed for

substantial evidence. (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298 [When a 

statute requires a trial court to “sit as the trier of fact,” we “review the trial judge’s 

factfinding for substantial evidence.”].)

Further, “[t]he substantial evidence standard of review takes on a unique 

formulation where, as here, ‘the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the 

party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals.’

[Citation.] ‘[W]here the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question 

for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the 

appellant as a matter of law.’ [Citation.] Specifically, we ask ‘whether the appellant’s 

evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and 

weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support 

a finding.” ’ ” (In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 671; see In re R.V. (2015) 

61 Cal.4th 181, 201 [In the context of a criminal competency hearing where the 
12

prosecution has no obligation to present affirmative evidence, “the inquiry on appeal is 

whether the weight and character of the evidence . . . was such that the . . . court could 

not reasonably reject it.”].) Thus, in reviewing the trial court’s factual finding for 

substantial evidence, we apply this modified standard of review.

4

B. The Trial Court’s Factual Finding Is Supported by Substantial Evidence

Applying the modified standard of review, we conclude substantial evidence 

supports the trial court’s finding that defendant failed to meet her burden of proof to 

establish that her convictions were the direct result of being a victim of intimate partner 

violence.

First, defendant’s evidence was not uncontradicted or unimpeached. Defendant 

claimed in her written statements that A.M. stole her bipolar medication, which caused 

her to irrationally seek to find him on the evening of September 19, 2017. However, 

defendant made no mention of this claim in her live testimony. Further, defendant gave 

multiple, differing reasons for why she sought out A.M. on the evening of September 

4

 Ultimately, because the trial court in this case also received live testimony from 

multiple witnesses, our review on appeal would be substantively the same even if we 

applied the independent standard of review articulated in Vivar. Even when subject to 

independent review, the Court of Appeal defers to the trial court’s factual findings that 

are based upon personal observation of witnesses and evaluation of witness credibility. 

(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 527-528 [Under an independent standard of review, 

“appellate courts should . . . give particular deference to factual findings based on the trial 

court’s personal observations of witnesses.”]; People v. DeJesus (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 

1124, 1133 [“We independently review the order denying the motion to vacate” [under 

section 1473.7], but we “defer to the trial court’s factual determinations if supported by 

substantial evidence . . . .”].)
13

19—first claiming that she was responding to a request by A.M. to return his possessions; 

then claiming that she was just seeking an excuse to see A.M.; and finally claiming that 

she was attempting to seek out A.M. to dissuade him from committing suicide or 

inflicting self-harm. Defendant claimed in her written statements that the entire incident 

on September 19, was a set up and that A.M. manipulated defendant into committing the 

offenses. However, defendant also admitted in her live testimony that evidence presented 

at the time of her trial could support the conclusion that she was the individual 

manipulating A.M. in their relationship. Thus, the evidence regarding defendant’s 

motives for committing the offenses for which she was convicted was conflicting, 

potentially presenting multiple scenarios in which her motives would not have been 

clearly connected with being a victim of intimate partner violence.

Second, the evidence presented at the hearing was not of such weight and 

character as to compel a finding that defendant’s possession of a firearm and criminal 

threats were the direct result of suffering intimate partner abuse. Defendant concedes on 

appeal that she failed to provide a coherent explanation for why she committed the 

offenses for which she was convicted, but she argues that incoherent statements are “the 

sort of statements abused people make to explain actions that, considered apart from the 

abuse, seem inexplicable.” However, as the trial court correctly observed, there was no 

evidence, expert or otherwise, from which the trial court could infer that defendant’s 
14

statements were typical of persons suffering from intimate partner abuse.

5

 

Even if it would have been reasonable for the trial court to infer that being the 

victim of intimate partner violence could have induced defendant to engage in erratic or 

irrational behavior, this was far from the only inference that could have been drawn based 

upon the evidence presented. Notably, defendant presented evidence that she suffered 

from numerous other mental health issues unrelated to her status as a victim of intimate 

partner violence at the time she committed her offenses, including the fact she was the 

subject of physical abuse as a child, sexually abused as a child, suffered from bipolar 

disorder, and suffered from adult attention deficit disorder. Thus, absent any other 

evidence, it would have been equally reasonable for the trial court to infer that 

defendant’s behavior could have been caused by any of these various mental health 

issues. And while we are sympathetic to defendant’s condition, section 236.15 authorizes

5 The phrase “intimate partner violence” is the now preferred terminology for 

what was once commonly referred to as “battered women’s syndrome.” (See In re 

Walker (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 533, 536, fn. 1 [“Although often referred to as ‘battered 

women’s syndrome,’ ‘intimate partner battering and its effects’ is the more accurate and 

now preferred term.”].) Our Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the reactions 

of an individual suffering from intimate partner violence are often subject to popular 

misconceptions and beyond the common knowledge. (People v. Humphrey (1996) 

13 Cal.4th 1073, 1087-1088 [Expert testimony is admissible because it would help 

counter “ ‘ “popular misconceptions about battered women.” ’ ”]; People v. Brown

(2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 905 [The behavior of victims of domestic violence is sufficiently 

beyond common experience to permit admission of expert testimony on the subject.].) 

Where a fact is not a matter of common knowledge, it would be inappropriate for the trial 

court or this court to accept that fact in the absence of evidence. (People v. Davis (2013) 

57 Cal.4th 353, 360-361 [A court cannot take judicial notice of additional facts that were 

not proved at trial if the missing facts cannot be deemed a matter of common 

knowledge.].)
15

relief only when a conviction was the direct result of intimate partner violence or sexual 

violence, not the victim of mental health or mood disorders generally. Thus, the evidence 

was not of such character that it would compel the conclusion that any irrational behavior 

by defendant was directly caused by being a victim of intimate partner violence.

Given this record, the trial court was entitled to weigh the credibility of defendant 

as a witness and make factual findings in light of its credibility determinations. Under 

the modified substantial evidence standard applicable to a party who bears the burden of 

proof in the trial court proceeding, reversal is not warranted where the evidence is 

conflicting and does not compel a finding in defendant’s favor.

C. The Record Does Not Suggest the Trial Court Misunderstood the Law

Defendant also suggests that the trial court erred by reading an expert testimony 

requirement into the statute or, alternatively, by claiming that defendant needed to admit 

her crimes as a prerequisite for relief. We conclude the record does not support 

defendant’s assertions.

“A trial court abuses its discretion when . . . its decision is based on an incorrect 

legal standard.” (People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 433; In re M.W. (2018) 

26 Cal.App.5th 921, 931 [“[A] court abuses its discretion when it misinterprets or 

misapplies the law.”].) The People concede, and we agree, that section 236.15 does not 

require expert testimony in order to establish that a conviction was the direct result of 

intimate partner violence. We also agree with defendant that the statute does not require 

her to explicitly admit she committed the underlying offenses resulting in her conviction. 

However, “ ‘[e]rror on appeal must be affirmatively shown by the record, and “[w]e 
16

presume the trial court knew and properly applied the law absent evidence to the 

contrary.” ’ ” (People v. Johnson & Johnson (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 295, 322; People v. 

Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 944 [“[T]he general rule” is “that a trial court is 

presumed to have applied the law correctly in the absence of a clear indication to the 

contrary . . . .”].) Thus, we will not presume the trial court misinterpreted or misapplied 

the law absent an affirmative indication in the record.

Here, defendant directs our attention to isolated comments by the trial court in 

order to suggest that the record affirmatively establishes the trial court misunderstood or 

misapplied the law. We are unpersuaded by defendant’s characterization. Instead, we 

view the entire context of the trial court’s stated reasons. (See People v. Williams (1997) 

16 Cal.4th 153, 281-282 [Rejecting defendant’s claim that trial court failed to follow the 

law “[b]ased solely on” an isolated remark and instead explaining that the trial court’s 

“full remarks” must be considered.].) 

Thus, while the trial court explicitly referenced defendant’s failure to present 

expert testimony, it followed that comment by also stating that there was “nothing to 

inform this [c]ourt” regarding defendant’s theory of a connection between her 

convictions and being a victim of intimate partner violence. In context, the trial court’s 

comments suggest that it considered expert testimony as one type of evidence that might 

have been persuasive on the issue but that, ultimately, it did not find any evidence at all 

to support defendant’s position. More specifically, the trial court never expressed a view 

that the causal connection between the crime and intimate partner violence could only be 

shown by resort to expert testimony.
17

Likewise, we disagree with defendant’s characterization that the trial court 

“repeatedly faulted [defendant] for failing to acknowledge guilt.” Instead, in its actual 

statement of reasons, the trial court explained: “[W]hat I heard was a denial that 

[defendant] did not commit the [offense] at all. Not that the [offense] was committed 

based on the intimate partner violence.” In our view, this was a correct statement of the 

law. The basis for relief under section 236.15 is a showing that the petitioner’s 

conviction was the “direct result” of being a victim of intimate partner violence. Absent 

such a showing, the defendant cannot meet her burden of proof even if she presents new 

evidence to negate the elements of the underlying crime.

6,7

. In context, the trial court’s 

statement merely expressed its view that defendant directed her evidence and arguments 

towards the wrong issue, while ignoring the threshold showing required under the statute.

When considered in context, the trial court’s comments on the record do not rise to 

6

 To the extent petitioner believed that additional evidence might negate elements 

of the offenses for which she was convicted, the Penal Code provides other procedural 

mechanisms for seeking relief. (See § 1473, subd. (b) [person may seek relief via writ of 

habeas corpus based upon claims of false evidence introduced at trial, discovery of new 

evidence not previously presented or heard at trial, or a significant dispute regarding 

expert testimony].) However, a petition pursuant to section 236.15 is not an appropriate 

vehicle to make such a showing. 

7

 Similarly, the trial court’s reference to the fact that it “can’t change the 

standard” must be viewed in context of all its comments at the hearing. As we have 

explained, the trial court correctly articulated that a necessary prerequisite for relief under 

section 236.15 is a showing that a conviction was the direct result of being a victim of 

intimate partner violence, regardless of whether other evidence presented might negate an 

underlying element of the offense. Having correctly articulated defendant’s burden on 

this issue in stating its reasons on the record, we decline to interpret the trial court’s 

reference to a “standard” as suggesting some other evidentiary burden.
18

the level of an affirmative showing that it misunderstood or misapplied the law. Absent 

such a showing, defendant has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, and reversal is 

not warranted on this ground.

D. Remand for Reconsideration of the Petition Is Unwarranted

Finally, we address defendant’s claim that she is entitled to remand for full 

reconsideration of her petition in light of amendments made to section 236.15 while her 

appeal was pending. According to defendant, the amendments made to section 236.15 

are ameliorative in nature and, as a result, should be retroactively applied pursuant to In 

re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada).

8

 In response, the People argue that the 

amendments do not apply retroactively and, even if they did, any failure to apply the 

amended provisions of section 236.15 should be deemed harmless.

We need not definitively resolve the issue of retroactivity in this case. Even where 

a legislative amendment is deemed retroactive under Estrada, reversal and remand is not 

warranted where any alleged error is harmless. (See People v. Lewis (2023) 

88 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1131-1138 [retroactive ameliorative amendments to §§ 1170 & 

1170.1 subject to harmless error review], review granted May 17, 2023, S279147; People 

v. Boukes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 937, 948 [even if ameliorative amendments to section 

1109 apply retroactively, remand unnecessary where any error would be harmless], 

8

 Generally, Estrada “stand[s] for the proposition that (i) in the absence of a 

contrary indication of legislative intent, (ii) legislation that ameliorates punishment (iii) 

applies to all cases that are not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. 

Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 675.)
19

review granted Dec. 14, 2022, S277103; In re Hansen (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 906, 920-

921 [retroactive application of judicial narrowing of second-degree-felony-murder rule 

subject to harmless error review].) In this case, the record is clear that any failure to 

apply the amended version of section 236.15 would be harmless under any standard.

9

In this case, the trial court made a factual finding that defendant failed to meet her 

burden of proof to show that her convictions were the direct result of being the victim of 

intimate partner violence. The version of section 236.15 in effect at the time required the 

trial court to make such a factual finding as a prerequisite to granting discretionary relief. 

(Former § 236.15, subd. (g).) While language added to section 236.15 now suggests that 

relief may be mandatory instead of discretionary, the current version of the statute still 

requires the trial court to make this factual finding as a prerequisite to obtaining relief. (§

236.15, subds. (a),(g).) Further, the amendments to section 236.15 did not change the 

burden of proof, admissibility of evidence, or the procedural rules applicable to a 

petitioner seeking to meet their evidentiary burden.

10

 Thus, we fail to see how defendant 

9 Generally, errors under state law require reversal only if it is “reasonably 

probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in 

the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) An error 

implicating federal constitutional law requires reversal unless the error can be deemed 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.) 

Defendant does not suggest that federal law is implicated by any failure to apply the 

amended version of section 236.15. Indeed, defendant’s reply brief and supplemental 

reply brief do not attempt to respond to the People’s prejudice argument at all.

10

 While the amendments removed other factual findings necessary to obtain 

relief, the requirement that the trial court find the conviction was the direct result of being 

a victim of intimate partner violence remains unchanged. (§236.15, subds. (a),(g).) Nor 

could the removal of other necessary findings impact the trial court’s ability to grant 
20

could possibly obtain a different outcome even under the version of section 236.15 now 

in effect.

In light of the trial court’s factual finding on a threshold issue necessary to obtain 

relief, the trial court could not have granted defendant’s petition regardless of which 

version of the statute is applied to defendant’s case. Thus, under any applicable standard, 

the failure to apply the current version of section 236.15 must be deemed harmless 

because there is no possibility that defendant could have obtained a different result, even 

if the current version of section 236.15 had been in effect at the time of her hearing.

IV. DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS

J.

We concur:

MILLER

Acting P. J.

MENETREZ

J.

relief, as the necessary factual findings are not factors to be weighed. Instead, the statute 

requires the trial court find “all of the following” enumerated facts before it can grant 

relief. (§236.15, subd. (g).)