UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MELVIN CHRISTIAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 09-13337

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

WELLS FARGO BANK, ARGENT

MORTGAGE, and THE COUNTY 

OF WAYNE,

Defendants.

____________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER 

At a session of said Court, held in the U.S.

District Courthouse, Eastern District

of Michigan, on February 17, 2010.

PRESENT: THE HONORABLE PATRICK J. DUGGAN

 U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Plaintiff initiated this pro se action against defendants on August 24, 2009,

alleging violations of his rights in connection with a mortgage on real property located at

11395 Vaughan in Detroit, Michigan (“property”). Presently before the Court is a motion

to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment filed by defendant Wells Fargo

Bank (“Wells Fargo”) on November 23, 2009. Plaintiff failed to file a response to the

motion. On February 4, 2010, the Court dispensed with oral argument pursuant to

Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(e)(2).

I. Factual and Procedural Background
1

In certain sections of the complaint, Plaintiff restarts the numbering of his

paragraphs. The paragraph referred to in this citation falls in the first set of numbered

paragraphs under the heading “Count I Allegations Against Wells Fargo Bank.”

2

The paragraphs referred to in this citation fall in the second set of numbered

paragraphs in the complaint under the heading “Elements of Fraud.”

3

The paragraph referred to in this citation falls in the first set of numbered

paragraphs in the complaint under the heading “Count III: Holder in Due Course.”

2

In May 2005, Plaintiff signed a mortgage on the property in connection with a loan

from defendant Argent Mortgage (“Argent”) in the amount of $100,800. (Wells Fargo’s

Mot. Ex. B.) In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was not provided with the “Notice

of Right to Cancel” document at closing as required by the Truth in Lending Act

(“TILA”). (Compl. ¶ 7.1

) Sometime after closing, Argent assigned the mortgage to Wells

Fargo. (Wells Fargo’s Mot. Ex. C.)

By late 2007, Plaintiff had apparently defaulted on the loan and foreclosure

proceedings were initiated, resulting in a foreclosure sale of the property. (See id. Ex. D.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Adrienne Sanders, who executed the Sheriff’s Deed following the

foreclosure sale on December 12, 2007, misrepresented that she was duly authorized to

act as a “Deputy Sheriff” when she in fact was merely a “special deputy.” (Compl. ¶¶ 1-

2.2

) Plaintiff further alleges that Adrienne Sanders was not even lawfully authorized to

act as a special deputy under Michigan law. (Id.) Because of the alleged deficiencies

regarding the authority of Adrienne Sanders, Plaintiff alleges that Argent and Wells Fargo

were unjustly enriched by the foreclosure sale. (Id. ¶ 10.3

)

After Plaintiff’s redemption period expired in June 2008, Wells Fargo filed an
4

On August 31, 2009, Plaintiff filed an “Ex Parte Emergency Motion for

Automatic Stay of Proceedings in the 36th District Court or in the Alternative for

Temporary Restraining Order.” Therein, Plaintiff sought to enjoin enforcement of an

eviction order from the Wayne County District Court apparently issued on August 28,

2009. The Court denied that motion on September 3, 2009. 

5

The complaint does not have a “count II.”

3

action for possession of the property in Wayne County District Court. After a hearing,

the court granted judgment to Wells Fargo. (Wells Fargo’s Mot. Ex. E.) Plaintiff

appealed the judgment to the Wayne County Circuit Court but the appeal was dismissed

without prejudice on October 1, 2008, when plaintiff failed to timely file a transcript. (Id.

Ex. F.) Since that time, Wells Fargo has attempted on several occasions to evict Plaintiff

from the property with orders of eviction from the Wayne County District Court. 

Plaintiff has managed to remain in possession, however, by re-occupying the property

after lockout and by filing bankruptcies and civil lawsuits. As is particularly relevant to

the present motion, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the same defendants named in the

present action in Wayne County Circuit Court on April 14, 2009. Wayne County Circuit

Court dismissed that lawsuit on May 1, 2009. 

As previously noted, Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit on August 24, 2009.4

Plaintiff’s complaint asserts three claims: count I alleges a TILA violation by Wells

Fargo; count III5

 is titled “Holder in Due Course” and alleges that Argent and Wells

Fargo were unjustly enriched by Adrienne Sanders’s unauthorized involvement in the

foreclosure sale; and an unnumbered count alleges fraud by Wayne County related to
4

Adrienne Sanders’s unauthorized involvement in the foreclosure sale. On February 11,

2010, Argent was dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to serve notice of process. In

analyzing the present motion, the Court limits its analysis to the TILA and unjust

enrichment claims because Wayne Count is not before the Court as a moving defendant.

II. Standard of Review

Wells Fargo filed the motion presently pending before the court as both a motion

to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. Because the Court will refer to the

exhibits submitted by Wells Fargo in support of the motion, the Court construes the

motion as one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Summary judgment is

appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The central

inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission

to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986). 

The movant has an initial burden of showing “the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). 

Once the movant meets this burden, the non-movant must come forward with specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). “When a motion

for summary judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party may not rely

merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
5

III. Rooker-Feldman

Wells Fargo first argues that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine generally prohibits federal district courts from

performing appellate review of state court rulings. Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364,

368 (6th Cir. 2008). When the doctrine applies, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the

appealed claims. Hutcherson v. Lauderdale County, 326 F.3d 747, 755 (6th Cir. 2003). 

In 2005 the Supreme Court narrowly defined the types of claims that invoke “appellate”

review. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.

Ct. 1517, 1521-22 (2005) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined to

cases . . . brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district

court review and rejection of those judgments.”). Pursuant to this narrow interpretation

of the doctrine:

The inquiry . . . is the source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in

the federal complaint. If the source of the injury is the state

court decision, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would

prevent the district court from asserting jurisdiction. If there is

some other source of injury, such as a third party’s actions, then

the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.

McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, claims

concerning third party actions remain independent “even if relief is predicated on

denying the legal conclusion reached by the state court.” Brown v. First Nationwide Mtg.

Corp., 206 Fed. Appx. 436, 439 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Exxon, 544 U.S. at 293, 125 S.

Ct. at 1527.
6

This is in contrast to the relief sought by Plaintiff in his August 31, 2009, “Ex

Parte Emergency Motion for Automatic Stay of Proceedings in the 36th District Court or

in the Alternative for Temporary Restraining Order.” That motion was barred by RookerFeldman because Plaintiff specifically sought relief from a state court order. (See

Opinion and Order, September 3, 2009, docket no. 4.)

6

Although Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim against Wells Fargo is nearly

identical to a claim asserted in Plaintiff’s Wayne County Circuit Court lawsuit, (see Wells

Fargo’s Mot. Ex. H ¶¶ 10-11), the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not jurisdictionally bar

Plaintiff from bringing his claims in this Court. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292-93,

125 S. Ct. at 1526-27 (“When there is parallel state and federal litigation,

Rooker-Feldman is not triggered simply by the entry of judgment in state court. . . .

Disposition of the federal action, once the state-court adjudication is complete, would be

governed by preclusion law.”) Plaintiff does not allege injury from the state court

judgment; Plaintiff alleges injury from Adrienne Sanders’s involvement in the foreclosure

sale and asserts that Wells Fargo has been unjustly enriched as a result.6

 For purposes of

the Rooker-Feldman analysis, it does not matter that relief to Plaintiff in the present

action on the unjust enrichment claim would necessarily deny any legal conclusions

reached by the state court on the same claim. The fact that Plaintiff is not identifying the

state court judgment as the source of his injury is dispositive.

IV. Res Judicata

Absent a Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar, Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiff’s

claims are barred by res judicata. “When a federal court is asked to give preclusive effect

to a state court judgment, the federal court must apply the law of the state in which the
7

An exception to the broad application of res judicata under Michigan law where

summary proceedings are involved is not applicable to the present case.

7

prior judgment was rendered in determining whether and to what extent the prior

judgment should be given preclusive effect in a federal action.” Corzin v. Fordu (In re

Fordu), 201 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 1999). In Michigan, “[r]es judicata bars a

subsequent action between the same parties when the evidence or essential facts are

identical.” Sewell v. Clean Cut Mgmt., Inc., 463 Mich. 569, 575, 621 N.W.2d 222, 225

(2001) (quoting Dart v. Dart, 460 Mich. 573, 586, 597 N.W.2d 82, 88 (1999)). More

specifically, res judicata applies when: 

(1) there has been a prior decision on the merits, (2) the issue

was either actually resolved in the first case or could have been

resolved in the first case if the parties, exercising reasonable

diligence, had brought it forward, and (3) both actions were

between the same parties or their privies.

Paige v. City of Sterling Heights, 476 Mich. 495, 522 n.46, 720 N.W.2d 219, 234 n.46

(2006). Michigan courts broadly apply the doctrine of res judicata.7

 Sewell, 463 Mich. at

576, 621 N.W.2d at 225.

Plaintiff’s pursuit of an unjust enrichment claim against Wells Fargo in the present

action is precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff’s civil lawsuit in Wayne

County Circuit Court included a nearly identical claim of unjust enrichment against Wells

Fargo and that court dismissed Plaintiff’s lawsuit. (Wells Fargo’s Mot. Ex. H ¶¶ 10-11,

Ex. I.) Plaintiff cannot relitigate that claim in this Court.

Whether res judicata applies to Plaintiff’s TILA claim is not as clear. Plaintiff’s

state court lawsuit alleged two claims regarding Adrienne Sanders’s involvement in the
8

foreclosure sale in 2007 and a third claim regarding the source of funds or assets used by

Argent to finance Plaintiff’s loan in 2005. (Id. Ex. H.) Plaintiff’s state court lawsuit did

not involve any claims related to the TILA. Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s TILA claim in the

present suit arises from events surrounding the loan/mortgage transaction in 2005. To the

extent that Plaintiff’s state court claim against Argent and his present TILA claim against

Wells Fargo derive from the same transaction or occurrence—namely the loan/mortgage

origination in 2005—it appears that the TILA claim could be barred by Michigan’s broad

application of the res judicata doctrine. Because the TILA claim is clearly barred by a

separate affirmative defense asserted by Wells Fargo, however, the Court declines to

definitively rule on the application of res judicata to the TILA claim.

V. TILA: Statute of Limitations and Statute of Repose

Wells Fargo also argues that Plaintiff’s TILA claim is time barred. Insofar as

Plaintiff seeks damages under the TILA, the relevant statute of limitations has expired. 

TILA damages claims are to be brought “within one year from the date of the occurrence

of the violation.” 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). In this case, Plaintiff’s claims derive from the

origination of the mortgage, meaning that the alleged violations occurred in May 2005. 

Furthermore, the alleged TILA violations were discoverable by Plaintiff at the moment

they occurred; assuming Plaintiff’s allegations are true, Plaintiff could have looked

through the paperwork provided by his lender at the time of the loan/mortgage origination

to discover that he had not been provided with notices regarding his right to cancel. 

Because more than a year passed between the origination of the mortgage and Plaintiff’s

filing of the lawsuit, Plaintiff’s claim for damages under the TILA is barred by the statute
9

of limitations.

In regard to Plaintiff’s claim for rescission, the TILA provides a statute of repose,

not subject to equitable tolling, that terminates a borrower’s right to rescind at the earlier

of the expiration of three years from the origination of the transaction or upon subsequent

sale of the property. 16 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (“An obligor’s right of rescission shall expire

three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the

property, whichever occurs first, notwithstanding the fact that the information and forms

required under this section or any other disclosures required under this part have not been

delivered to the obligor . . . .”). In this case, the transaction originated in May 2005, the

property was sold at foreclosure sale in December 2007, and Plaintiff filed the present

lawsuit in August 2009. Regardless of how the statute of repose is measured, Plaintiff is

barred from obtaining rescission in the present case. Wells Fargo is therefore entitled to

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s TILA claim.

VI. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges two claims against Wells Fargo. Plaintiff’s first claim

alleging unjust enrichment is barred by res judicata given the dismissal of a nearly

identical claim in a separate state court action. Plaintiff’s second claim alleging a TILA

violation is time barred under the relevant statute of limitations and statute of repose.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Wells Fargo’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED.

s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN
10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Melvin Christian

11395 Vaughan St.

Detroit, MI 48228

Richard Welke, Esq.

Margaret M. Flanagan, Esq.