IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

October 28, 2004 Session

UNION COUNTY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION v. UNION COUNTY

BOARD OF EDUCATION and DR. JAMES PRATT, SUPERINTENDENT

OF THE UNION COUNTY SCHOOLS

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Union County

No. 3623 Hon. Billy Joe White, Chancellor

No. E2004-00820-COA-R3-CV - FILED JANUARY 28, 2005

We dismiss this appeal from a granting of summary judgment because the appeal was not from a

final judgment and the issues are moot.

Tenn. R. App. P.3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed.

HERSCHEL PICKENS FRANKS,P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in whichCHARLES D.SUSANO,

JR., J., and SHARON G. LEE, J., joined.

Charles Wayne Cagle, Nashville, Tennessee, for appellant.

Richard Lee Colbert, Nashville, Tennessee, for appellee.

OPINION

In this action plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated the provisions of Tenn.

Code Ann. § 49-5-601 et seq., (the Education Professionals Negotiations Act) by distributing liability

insurance packages to teachers during a mandatory in-service training session, and that statements

were made therein by the Board’s management representative Mark Roberts that the teachers had

no reason to be members of the Union County Education Association (“UCEA”). Plaintiff further

alleges that another management representative of the Board, Randy Arwin, contacted UCEA

members during August and September 1998, and urged them to terminate their membership. 
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It was also alleged that the Board had disputed and refused to recognize the majority

status of the UCEA, even though the Board had been provided records which conclusively

demonstrated that a majority of the professional employees of the Union County School System were

UCEA members. Finally, it was alleged that the Board refused to negotiate with UCEA for a period

of time based upon its challenge to the UCEA’s majority status, and had a calculated plan of trying

to thwart the rights of the UCEA members, and had failed to negotiate in good faith. 

The Board filed an Answer, and plaintiff then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court held a hearing on February 4, 2004, and determined that UCEA was entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. The Court stated in its Order of March 10, granting summary judgment:

It would fly in the face of common sense to think or hold that the Board of Education

has engaged in good faith negotiations. For example, the Board of Education has

clearly stated that it will not reach any agreement with the Association that includes

binding arbitration as part of grievance procedures. Grievance procedures are a

mandatory subject of negotiations. While the Board of Education is not required to

concede on any particular point in negotiations, it must negotiate in good faith. It has

not done so.

The Court ordered the parties to meet and negotiate in good faith, and to submit

written reports to the court by March 15, 2004, and stated that it would retain jurisdiction over the

subject matter pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §49-5-609(c)(4), and would determine on March 15,

2004, what further reports would be required to show the Board was negotiating in good faith. 

After negotiation reports were filed, plaintiff filed a Petition for Contempt on March

25, 2004, stating the Board had again refused to negotiate because the UCEA refused to take binding

arbitration out of the grievance procedure. The Board responded by stating that it had asked for

mediation, and a hearing was held on April 8, 2004, where the Court again found that the Board had

failed to negotiate in good faith. The Court then ordered that a special master would be appointed

to require the parties to meet and negotiate in good faith in the special master’s presence, and the

special master was empowered to mediate the dispute. 

The appeal before us is an appeal from the summary judgment granted to the plaintiff

on March 10, 2004. It raises the issue of the propriety of the summary judgment.

The appeal must be dismissed for two reasons: first, the judgment appealed from is

not a final judgment. The Court’s order of March 10 expressly stated that the Trial Court was

retaining jurisdiction over the matter and that further proceedings were going forward, and did, in

fact, occur. The Court retained jurisdiction pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §49-5-609(c)(4), which

allows the court to “issue an order requiring such party to cease and desist from such unlawful act,

and take such affirmative action, including resumption of negotiations, reinstatement of employees

with or without back pay, or execution of a contract the terms of which have been agreed upon, as

well as to effect policies of this part. Such order may further require such party to make reports from
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time to time showing the extent to which it has complied with the order.” Thus, the Trial Court

properly retained jurisdiction over the case, and the order appealed from was not a final judgment,

nor was it granted pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02.

Second, the parties stipulated during oral argument (and appellant concedes in its

Reply Brief) that an agreement had been reached by the parties, and a three-year contract had been

entered into since the trial court proceedings herein contested took place. This fact renders the issue

on appeal moot, as there is no further relief to be given by this Court. See, e.g., State ex rel. Orr v.

Thomas, 585 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Tenn.1979)("It is, of course, well settled that when the issues sought

to be presented by an appeal have been rendered moot pending the appeal[,] the appeal will be

dismissed.").

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal and tax the costs equally to the

plaintiff and defendants.

______________________________

HERSCHEL PICKENS FRANKS, P.J.