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1182 954 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 

fied that these letters contained an accurate 

statement of retiree and surviving spouse 

eligibility for health care benefits. Ms. 

Williams never told retirees or surviving 

spouses that benefits could be modified or 

terminated or were dependent upon the. existence of a collective bargaining agreement. 

Audrey Hart conducted exit interviews for 

hourly Gunite employees who were retiring 

from 1982 through 1987. During exit interviews, she told employees that there would 

be no change in their health care benefits 

and, if they died first, their spouses would be 

covered in the same way. Ms. Hart did not ' 

tell retiring employees that their health care 

benefits could be modified or terminated or 

were dependent upon the continuing existence of a collective bargaining agreement. 

Carol Palmer explained retirement benefits to SPECO employees as they were retiring from the mid-1970's through the 1987 

sale. Ms. Palmer also explained benefits 

available to the surviving spouses in person 

after the retirees' death. Ms. Palmer informed retirees and surviving spouses that 

they had lifetime health care benefits. She 

never told retirees that health care benefits 

could be reduced or terminated after retirement or that they were dependent upon the 

continuing existence of a collective bargaining agreement. 

Joseph Lees was the Heintz personnel 

manager from the 1950's until he retired in 

1983. He participated in negotiations and 

explained benefits to retiring hourly employees in the 1970's and the early 1980's. Mr. 

Lees testified that he always informed retiring hourly employees that they had lifetime 

health care benefits and that if they died 

before their spouse, her health care benefits 

would be provided for her lifetime as well. 

He trained Jack Carlson and George Myers 

of the Heintz personnel department to do 

exit interviews. Mr. Carlson and Mr. Myers 

told retirees and surviving spouses they had 

lifetime health care benefits. 

II. Legal Standard 

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure provides that summary judgment 

"shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law." Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of 

material fact as to the existence of an essential element of the non-moving party's case 

on which the non-moving party would bear 

the burden of proof at trial. Martin v. Ohio 

Turnpike Commission, 968 F.2d 606, 608 

(6th Cir.1992); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 

L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In considering a motion 

for summary judgment, the court must view 

the facts and draw all reasonable inferences 

therefrom in a light most favorable to the 

non-moving party. 60 Ivy Street Corporation v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th 

Cir.1987). The court is not required or permitted, however, to judge the evidence or 

make findings of fact. [d. at 1435-36. The 

moving party has the burden of showing 

conclusively that no genuine issue of material 

fact exists. [d. at 1435. 

A fact is "material" for purposes of summary judgment where proof of that fact 

would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or a defense advanced by the parties. 

Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171,174 (6th 

Cir.1984). In other words, the disputed fact 

must be one which might affect outcome of 

the suit under the substantive law controlling 

the issue. Henson v. National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration, 14 'F.3d 1143, 

1148 (6th Cir.1994). A dispute over a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 

the non-moving party." [d. Accordingly, 

where a reasonable jury could not find that 

the non-moving party is entitled to a verdict, 

there is no genuine issue for trial and summary judgment is appropriate. Feliciano v. 

City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 

1993). 

Once the moving party carries its initial 

burden of demonstrating that no genuine 

issues of material fact are in dispute, the 

burden shifts to the non-moving party to 

present specific facts to prove that there is a 

genuine issue for trial. To create a genuine 

2:09-cv-10918-PDB-MKM Doc # 101-8 Filed 05/14/12 Pg 10 of 17 Pg ID 4450
GOLDEN v. KELSEY-HAYES CO. 1183 

Cite as 954 F .Supp. 1173 (E.D.Mich. 1997) 

issue of material fact, the non-moving party the summary shall govern." Edwards, 851 

must present more than just some evidence F.2dat 136. In concluding that the "benefits 

of a disputed issue. As the United States vested at the time each Plaintiff retired," Id. 

Supreme Court stated in Anderson v. Liber- at 251, the Helwig court stated that "[i]n this 

ty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 circuit, ... Companies are held to the promS.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986): ises they make in their SPD's." Id. at 249. 

There is no issue for trial unless there is 

sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for 

that party. If the [non-moving party's] 

evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment 

may be granted. 

(Citations omitted); see also Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 322-23,106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 

475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 

89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Consequently, the 

non-moving party must do more than raise 

some doubt as to the existence of a fact; the 

non-moving party must produce evidence 

that would be sufficient to require submission of the issue to the jury. Lucas v. Leaseway Multi Transp. Serv., Inc., 738 F.Supp. 

214,217 (E.D.Mich.1990), afj'd, 929 F.2d 701 

(6th Cir.1991). 

III. Applicable Law 

Regarding the SPD's. 

Plaintiffs rely primarily on Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes, supra. Helwig is a companion 

case to the instant case in which the SPD's 

issued therein are· indistinguishable, if not 

identical, to the SPD's issued here. The 

Sixth Circuit, in no uricertain terms, stated 

that the Helwig SPD's contain "clear, unambiguous promises of lifetime coverage and 

contained no valid provisions reserving the 

right to modify or terminate the benefits 

conferred. " Helwig, 93 F .3d at 251. In 

. arriving at that conclusion, the court, relying 

on Edwards v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, Co., 851 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 

1988), stated that an "employer[ 1 may not 

construct SPD's in such a manner that they 

mislead employees into thinking they have a 

. right to benefits when other documents 

obliquely negate those rights. (citations 

omitted)." Id. at 250. In Edwards, the 

Sixth Circuit stated that "statements in a 

summary plan are binding and if such statements conflict with those in the plan itself, 

Regar~ng the collective bargaining agreement. 

At the outset, this court notes, with some 

dismay, the defendants' attempt to re-argue 

the applicability of Yard-Man, supra, to the 

instant case. The Sixth Circuit, however, 

has stated, in a prior appeal in this case, that 

"after considering the arguments the defendant makes, and the cases it cites, we conclude that Yardr-Man is still good law, and 

controls this case. The district court did not 

err in following it." Golden v. KelseyHayes, 73 F.3d 648, 656 (6th Cir.1996). 

In Yardr-M an, the Sixth Circuit addressed 

the same issue as in the instant case, namely, 

whether retirees' health insurance benefits 

terminate at the expiration of the current 

collective bargaining agreement or whether 

they continue for the lifetime of the retiree. 

The court stated that resolution of this question depends on the intent of the parties to 

the collective bargaining agreement. YardrMan, 716 F.2d at 1479. First,a court must 

look to the express provisions of the· agreement construing each section "consistently 

with the entire document and the relative 

positions and purposes of the parties." Id. at 

1479-80. The court should interpret each 

provision in question as part of an integrated 

whole. CBA's must be construed so as to 

render no provision nugatory and to avoid 

illusory promises. Id. Where the express 

language of a retiree benefit plan is ambiguous as to the duration of retiree health insurance, courts should look to other provisions 

of the agreement. Id. at 1482. Extrinsic 

evidence is admissible to determine an intent 

to vest benefits· when the language of the 

CBA is ambiguous. Cf, Yardr-Man, supra, at 

1480 n. 1 (implying that extrinsic evidence 

could have been presented). See also Golden, 73 F.3d at 656. 

In determining the duration of retiree 

health benefits, the court noted that: 

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