Filed 5/18/23 In re M.A. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re M.A., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B316326

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 

21CCJP03185

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.A. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Tamara Hall, Judge. Affirmed, dismissed.

Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the Court of

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant R.A.

Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant M.P.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________

Mother R.A. and father M.P. appealed after the juvenile 

court took jurisdiction over their child, M.A., and removed him 

from their custody. The court found mother used drugs while 

pregnant with M.A. and has unresolved mental health issues. 

Mother admitted using drugs, but she insisted she had not 

known she was pregnant until the day she gave birth. 

On appeal, mother and father challenge the sufficiency 

of the evidence supporting the court’s jurisdictional findings 

and dispositional orders, and father additionally challenges 

the court’s finding that he is an alleged, rather than presumed, 

father. Unfortunately, father passed away while his appeal 

was pending. Accordingly, we dismiss his appeal as moot. 

As to mother’s appeal, we affirm the court’s findings and orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Background

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and 

Family Services (Department) received a report that mother 

had tested positive for marijuana and benzodiazepines after 

giving birth to M.A. in June 2021. One of the nurses said mother 

showed signs of “ ‘very active bi-polar’ ” disorder. According to 

the nurse, mother paced and did not respond to the staff’s 

directions related to M.A.’s care. Mother refused to hold M.A. the 

way the nursing staff had directed her, remarking, “ ‘[H]e’s my 

baby, I know him, I know what he likes.’ ” At one point, mother 

covered herself and the child with a scarf. Hospital staff told 
3

mother not to put the scarf over M.A., because he had been born 

with respiratory issues. Mother nevertheless continued to do so.

Mother told the Department she met father in New York, 

and they had unprotected sex in October 2020. Mother moved 

to California the next day. Father remained in New York.

Mother claimed she had not known she was pregnant—

and had not suspected she was pregnant—until the day she 

gave birth. Mother believed she had stopped menstruating 

due to stress, rather than pregnancy. Mother provided the 

Department a photograph from May 2021, which she insisted 

showed she had no visible signs of pregnancy. A social worker 

who viewed the photo, however, said mother had a visible 

“baby bump” and appeared pregnant.

Two months before giving birth, mother told maternal 

great aunt that she had stopped menstruating. Maternal great 

aunt responded that mother was probably pregnant. After the 

conversation, mother made an appointment with an OBGYN. 

The night before the appointment, she started feeling “ ‘a lot of 

stress’ ” and decided not to go. Mother said she would become 

anxious whenever she thought about being pregnant, which she 

attributed to a prior unsuccessful pregnancy.

Mother said she started having severe abdominal pain two 

days before M.A.’s birth. She thought she was constipated, so she 

ate a psychedelic mushroom, which had relieved her constipation 

in the past. Mother ate a mushroom the day before and the 

day of M.A.’s birth. The pain, however, intensified, so mother 

eventually went to the hospital.

Mother admitted using marijuana during her pregnancy 

to treat chronic pain. However, she denied knowing why she had 

tested positive for benzodiazepines, and she speculated that it 
4

may have been caused by “facial cleansing.” According to 

a nurse, a positive test result for benzodiazepines is usually 

a sign of narcotics use.

Mother reported she had been hospitalized twice for 

psychiatric issues in 2013. Doctors prescribed her lithium 

after the first hospitalization, but she stopped taking it because 

she did not believe she had mental health issues. Mother was 

hospitalized another time in Turkey, which she described as 

an “ ‘accident.’ ” According to mother, she had been mistaken 

for a Ukrainian sex worker. Mother said the hospitalizations 

were the result of misunderstandings, and she insisted she 

does not have bi-polar disorder. She said she does not believe 

in traditional therapy and instead talks to friends who are 

“ ‘healers.’ ”

Mother had been living with maternal grandparents

while pregnant, but she agreed to move out of their house 

so the grandparents could care for M.A. Mother also agreed 

to participate in drug and alcohol testing, enroll in a substance 

abuse program, and undergo a mental health assessment. 

Mother said she would stop using marijuana because she wanted 

to breastfeed M.A. She would instead rely on ibuprofen and 

“ ‘natural foods’ ” to treat her pain.

Father, who lived in New York, told the Department he 

assumed M.A. is his child. Maternal uncle had called father a 

month before mother gave birth and told him she was pregnant. 

Father said there were pictures of mother showing she was 

pregnant, but mother insisted she was not. Father believed 

mother denied being pregnant so she could continue using 

marijuana and drinking alcohol. He said he was aware mother 

had used cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol in the past.
5

Father said mother has “loving intentions,” but her mental 

health can be unstable. According to father, mother had been 

hospitalized twice in the United States for mental health reasons. 

At one point, she went to France to avoid being hospitalized 

again. Mother told him she had been prescribed medication, 

but she did not take it.

Maternal grandmother claimed she did not know mother 

was pregnant until the day she gave birth. She said mother had 

gained weight, but did not appear to be pregnant. The family 

questioned mother many times about whether she was pregnant 

given her stomach growth, but mother always denied it. The day 

before mother gave birth, maternal grandmother gave her money, 

which mother used to purchase marijuana and mushrooms.

According to maternal grandmother, mother had been 

diagnosed with bi-polar disorder. She was hospitalized twice in 

New York and once in Turkey for mental health issues. Maternal 

grandmother said mental health issues ran in her family; 

maternal uncle and maternal great grandmother had been 

diagnosed with schizophrenia.

Maternal grandfather reported that mother had a “bump” 

on her stomach, but she had denied being pregnant. He said 

that, although mother had been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, 

she refused to accept her diagnosis and would not take medicine 

to treat it. He thought she needed intensive mental health 

services.

2. Dependency proceedings

The Department filed a petition asserting M.A. is a person 

described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, 
6

subdivision (b).1 As to mother, the Department alleged two bases 

for jurisdiction: (1) mother has a history of substance abuse and 

used psychedelic mushrooms, benzodiazepines, marijuana, and 

alcohol while pregnant with M.A.; and (2) mother has a history 

of mental and emotional problems—including bi-polar disorder 

and general anxiety—yet refused to take medication or 

participate in consistent mental health treatment. As to father, 

the Department alleged he failed to protect M.A. from mother’s 

substance abuse.

The court held a detention hearing on July 14, 2021, at 

which it found father to be an alleged father. The court detained 

M.A. and ordered mother not to breastfeed the child. Father, 

however, photographed mother breastfeeding M.A. two days after 

the hearing. Maternal grandparents asked father not to report 

that fact to the Department.

In August 2021, the San Bernardino County Department of 

Behavioral Health assessed mother for substance abuse services 

and determined she did not meet the criteria for treatment. 

Mother reportedly told the assessor she did not “use any kind 

of drugs, prescribed or illegal. I have no desire to use any form 

of substance.” Mother enrolled in a different substance abuse 

program, along with a parenting class. She consistently tested 

negative for drugs, with one “no show,” and received positive 

feedback from her counselor.

The Department of Mental Health evaluated mother and 

determined she was not eligible for services. Tri City Mental 

Health also assessed mother, but it did not recommend any 

services. Mother provided the Department paperwork stating 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code. 
7

her “ ‘mental health condition does not meet the medical 

necessary criteria to be eligible for specialty mental health 

services.’ ” According to maternal grandmother, mother had 

been “parading paperwork that indicates” she does not have 

a mental health diagnosis.

On September 16, 2021, mother sent a social worker an 

extremely long text message purporting to explain her positive 

test for benzodiazepines. According to the text message, around 

three years earlier, mother discovered father had put medication 

in her coffee. Mother went through father’s cabinets and found 

“a bottle hidden way in the back of an empty cabinet at the 

very top with a very long name which rings the bell to this 

benzodiazepine.” Mother then explained that she recently 

learned her uncle had also secretly put medication in her aunt’s 

food. The social worker remarked that the text message was 

an example of mother’s tangential thinking.

3. Jurisdiction and disposition hearing

The court held a combined jurisdiction and disposition 

hearing on October 26, 2021. At the hearing, mother urged the 

court to dismiss the petition. She argued her history of substance 

abuse did not pose a current risk of harm because she had been 

open about her past drug use and does not currently abuse any 

substances. Mother pointed to her negative drug test results as 

proof that she was willing and able to stop using drugs. Mother 

also argued there was insufficient evidence that she suffered 

from any mental health issues. She relied on the fact that she 

was denied mental health services, as well as the lack of direct 

evidence of a diagnosis. Mother alternatively asked that M.A. 

be returned to her custody on the condition that she live with
8

maternal grandparents, who would be able to “provide an extra 

set of eyes.”

The court sustained the petition and took jurisdiction 

over M.A. The court found mother has unresolved substance 

abuse issues, and that she was not credible when she claimed 

not to know she was pregnant. The court also found father knew 

mother was using drugs while pregnant, yet he did nothing 

to try to protect the child. As to mother’s mental health issues, 

the court found she suffers from bipolar disorder, yet she refused 

treatment and self-medicated with alcohol and drugs.

Turning to disposition, the court removed M.A. from his 

parents’ custody. The court denied father’s request for a “home 

of parent” placement, noting he is merely an alleged father and 

it would be detrimental to release M.A. to his custody. The court 

also rejected mother’s argument that living with maternal 

grandparents would be sufficient to protect M.A. “based on the

evidence and the [jurisdictional] findings that the court has

already made.”

Mother and father timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

1. Father’s appeal is moot

In his opening brief on appeal, father challenged the 

juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and removal order, as well 

as its finding that he is an alleged, rather than presumed, father. 

In its respondent’s brief, the Department noted the latter issue 

appears to be moot because the court had since placed M.A. with 

father. Nevertheless, the Department indicated it did not object 

to this court directing the juvenile court to enter an order finding 

father to be M.A.’s presumed father. After the Department filed 
9

its brief, father passed away, and the Department moved to 

dismiss his appeal as moot.2

“ ‘An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the 

respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible 

for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief. 

[Citations.]’ ” (In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498; 

see In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).) “For relief to 

be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff 

must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be

redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the 

plaintiff seeks.” (D.P., at p. 276.) Speculative future harm is 

not sufficient to avoid mootness. (Id. at p. 278.)

Even when a case is moot, a court has inherent discretion 

to reach the merits of the dispute. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at 

p. 282.) In deciding whether to exercise that discretion, “a court 

should be guided by the overarching goals of the dependency 

system: ‘to provide maximum safety and protection for children’

with a ‘focus’ on ‘the preservation of the family as well as the 

safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of the 

child.’ ” (Id. at p. 286.) Courts generally will exercise discretion 

to review a moot case when it presents an issue of broad public 

interest that is likely to recur, the controversy between the 

parties may recur, or a material question remains for the court 

to determine. (Id. at p. 282.) In dependency cases, additional 

relevant factors include whether the challenged findings could 

be prejudicial, affect other dependency proceedings, or are based 

2 We grant the Department’s February 8, 2023 motion 

to take judicial notice of juvenile court records that document 

father’s death. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
10

on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing conduct. (See id. at 

pp. 285–286.)

Because father passed away while his appeal was pending, 

the juvenile court’s findings and orders are no longer causing him

harm. As a result, even if we were to grant father the relief he 

requested, the relief would not be effective. Accordingly, father’s

appeal is moot, and we dismiss it as such. (See In re A.Z. (2010) 

190 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1181 [a father’s death rendered moot 

his appeal of a juvenile court’s order terminating his parental 

rights].)

Mother concedes that father’s appeal is moot to the extent 

it challenges the jurisdictional findings and removal order. 

However, she contends father’s challenge to his status as an 

alleged father is not moot because a paternity finding could have 

practical benefits for M.A. She argues that, although it is not 

clear which state’s laws will apply to any distribution of father’s 

assets, a declaration from a California court that father is M.A.’s 

legal parent “should assist this child in asserting any rights he 

has as Father’s heir.” Therefore, she argues, this court’s decision 

would help ensure M.A. enjoys all the relevant financial and 

other benefits available to him as father’s child.

Contrary to mother’s contentions, the fact that a favorable 

decision could have tangential positive benefits for M.A. does not 

render father’s appeal not moot. Nor does it provide a sufficient 

reason to exercise our inherent discretion to decide father’s

appeal on the merits, despite its mootness. While we 

acknowledge it is possible a finding that father is M.A.’s 

presumed parent could be useful to proving M.A.’s status as 

his heir, mother has not shown the finding itself would entitle 

M.A. to any financial benefits or offer the child any other concrete 
11

relief; that such a finding could be helpful in the future is far too 

speculative. Nor has mother shown the juvenile court’s finding 

that father is an alleged parent, if left to stand, would harm M.A. 

in any way. Tellingly, neither father’s counsel nor M.A. has 

asked us to decide father’s appeal. Accordingly, we decline to 

exercise our inherent discretion to overlook the mootness issue.

2. Substantial evidence supports the court’s 

jurisdictional findings as to mother

Mother contends the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings 

related to her substance abuse and mental health issues are not 

supported by substantial evidence.

a. Relevant law and standard of review

“In dependency proceedings, the social services agency 

has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the minor who is the subject of the dependency petition comes 

under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. [Citations.] We review 

the jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. [Citation.] 

We consider the entire record, drawing all reasonable inferences 

in support of the juvenile court’s findings and affirming the order 

even if other evidence supports a different finding. [Citation.] 

We do not consider the credibility of witnesses or reweigh 

the evidence. [Citation.] Substantial evidence does not mean 

‘any evidence,’ however, and we ultimately consider whether 

a reasonable trier of fact would make the challenged ruling in 

light of the entire record. [Citation.] The parent has the burden 

on appeal of showing there is insufficient evidence to support 

the juvenile court’s order.” (In re Isabella F. (2014) 226 

Cal.App.4th 128, 137–138.)

Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) authorizes dependency 

jurisdiction where “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a 
12

substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm 

or illness, as a result of . . . [t]he failure or inability of the child’s 

parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child 

. . . [or] to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s 

or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or 

substance abuse.” Because the statute permits jurisdiction “only 

so long as is necessary to protect the child from risk of suffering 

serious physical harm or illness” (id., subd. (b)(3)), the evidence 

must show the child faces a current risk of serious physical harm. 

(See In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1023.)

Thus, section 300, subdivision (b) requires a showing 

of “concrete harm or risk of physical harm to the child.” (In re 

Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820–821.) “As appellate 

courts have repeatedly stressed, ‘ “[s]ubdivision (b) means what 

it says. Before courts and agencies can exert jurisdiction under 

section 300, subdivision (b), there must be evidence indicating 

that the child is exposed to a substantial risk of serious physical

harm or illness.” ’ ” (In re Jesus M. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 104, 

111.) “The purpose of a dependency proceeding is to protect 

the child, rather than prosecute or punish the parent.” (In re 

Emily L. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1, 15.)

b. Mother’s substance abuse

Generally, a parent’s substance abuse, “without more,” is an 

insufficient basis to assert dependency jurisdiction. (In re L.W.

(2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 849.) Rather, the Department must 

show the parent’s substance abuse harms the child or places 

the child at substantial risk of harm. (In re Drake M. (2012) 

211 Cal.App.4th 754, 766–767 (Drake M.), disapproved of 

on other grounds by D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 282–283;

see L.W., at p. 850 [mother engaged in dangerous behavior due 
13

to substance abuse placing child at risk of harm].) However, 

when a child is “ ‘of such tender years that the absence of 

adequate supervision and care poses an inherent risk to their 

physical health and safety,’ ” a “finding of substance abuse is 

prima facie evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian to 

provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of physical 

harm.” (Drake M., at pp. 766–767.) 

In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210 

(Christopher R.) is instructive. In that case, the juvenile court 

took jurisdiction over a child after finding the mother had used 

cocaine while pregnant. The Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning 

the mother’s repeated use of cocaine, including while pregnant, 

qualified as substance abuse for purposes of section 300, 

subdivision (b) because it constituted recurrent substance use 

that resulted in her failure to fulfill a major role obligation. 

(Christopher R., at p. 1218.) Further, the court concluded the 

mother’s “use of cocaine during the last months of her pregnancy 

confirmed her poor judgment and willingness to endanger her 

children’s safety due to substance abuse.” (Id. at p. 1219.)

Here, there is overwhelming evidence that mother used 

marijuana, psychedelic mushrooms, and benzodiazepines while 

pregnant with M.A. As mother seems to concede, her use of 

those substances constituted substance abuse for purposes of 

section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (See Christopher R., supra, 225 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1218–1219.) Because M.A. was of “tender 

years” as of the jurisdiction hearing, mother’s substance abuse 

is prima facie evidence of her inability to provide regular care 

resulting in a substantial risk of harm to the child. (Ibid.; see 

Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.) Moreover, as in 

Christopher R., mother’s drug use “during the last months of 
14

her pregnancy confirmed her poor judgment and willingness 

to endanger her [child’s] safety due to substance abuse.” 

(Christopher R., at p. 1219.) 

Mother insists that, despite her past drug use, there 

is insufficient evidence of a risk of harm to M.A. as of the 

jurisdiction hearing. In support, she points out she was open 

about her past drug use, promised not to use drugs in the future, 

consistently tested negative for drugs, voluntarily enrolled in 

a treatment program, and had completed several classes with 

positive feedback.

Contrary to mother’s contentions, there is sufficient 

evidence from which the court reasonably could have found her 

substance abuse continued to pose a substantial risk of harm 

to M.A. Although mother admitted using some drugs while 

pregnant, she was not entirely forthcoming with the Department. 

Mother, for example, repeatedly denied using benzodiazepines, 

despite testing positive for the drug shortly after giving birth.

Rather than admit her use of the drug, mother concocted bizarre 

and implausible explanations for the positive test, including that 

it was the result of “facial cleansing” and that father had secretly 

drugged her. On appeal, mother speculates the test might have 

been the result of medication given to her at the emergency room. 

While that is certainly possible, the record does not compel such 

a finding. In fact, a nurse failed to mention it as a possibility 

when asked what might have caused the positive test result.

Mother further minimized the severity of her substance 

abuse issues by insisting she had not known she was pregnant, 

an assertion that strains credulity. The record shows that 

after having unprotected sex with father, mother stopped 

menstruating and gained significant weight in her midsection. 
15

Mother’s family members repeatedly questioned her about 

whether she was pregnant, and mother went so far as to make 

an appointment with an OBGYN. On this record, the juvenile 

court reasonably rejected mother’s contention that she was not 

aware she was pregnant. 

The court also reasonably could have concluded mother’s 

participation in services was not sufficient to alleviate the risk 

of harm to M.A. Although mother tested negative for drugs 

several times, she was a “no show” for one test, which the court 

could have presumed was because she would have tested positive. 

(See In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1384 [“a 

missed drug test, without adequate justification, is ‘properly 

considered the equivalent of a positive test result’ ”].) Mother 

also told a substance abuse program assessor she did not 

“use any kind of drugs, prescribed or illegal. I have no desire 

to use any form of substance.” Given mother had recently been 

unable, or unwilling, to abstain from using substances during her 

pregnancy, the juvenile court reasonably could have concluded 

this was a lie. 

Mother’s reliance on In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036 

is misplaced. In that case, the court determined jurisdiction was 

improper where a mother used edible marijuana to treat her 

pregnancy symptoms after having researched it was a relatively 

safe alternative to other medications. (Id. at p. 1038.) Here, 

the record does not show mother believed her drug use during 

pregnancy was safe. Instead, she simply denied being pregnant, 

a claim the juvenile court reasonably rejected. Therefore, 

as compared to J.A., mother’s substance abuse reflects a 

significantly more severe deficiency in judgment and willingness 

to endanger her child’s safety.
16

In re Rebecca C. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 720 is also 

readily distinguishable. In that case, the court concluded the 

Department failed to produce sufficient evidence that the 

mother’s substance abuse posed a risk of harm to her daughter, 

who was a teenager. (Id. at pp. 722, 727–728.) Here, M.A. 

was four months old at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. 

Therefore, unlike in Rebecca C., mother’s substance abuse is 

prima facie evidence of her inability to provide regular care 

resulting in a substantial risk of physical harm, and the 

Department was not required to present additional evidence 

on the issue. 

c. Mother’s mental health issues

Mother argues the court’s jurisdictional findings related 

to her mental health issues are not supported by substantial 

evidence. She concedes there is evidence that she had 

“outstanding mental health issues such as bipolar disorder,” but 

she argues there is not sufficient evidence that those issues posed 

a risk of harm to M.A. In support, she points to evidence that 

she had appropriate visitations with the child, sought out mental 

health services, and submitted to substance abuse testing.

As a general matter, when a juvenile court asserts 

jurisdiction over a minor based on multiple grounds “ ‘a reviewing 

court can affirm the . . . court’s finding of jurisdiction over the

minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction . . . 

is supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Drake M., supra, 211 

Cal.App.4th at p. 762.) As the jurisdictional findings related 

to mother’s substance abuse support jurisdiction over M.A., 

we “ ‘need not consider whether . . . the other alleged statutory 

grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’ ” (Ibid.) 
17

Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, we consider the 

merits of mother’s arguments related to her mental health issues.

Contrary to mother’s contentions, there is substantial 

evidence of a direct link between her mental health issues and 

a risk of harm to M.A. The court, for example, reasonably could 

have concluded mother used drugs during her pregnancy in order 

to self-medicate. The court also reasonably could have found 

mother’s mental health issues led her to forgo prenatal care, 

which placed M.A. at substantial risk of harm. Indeed, mother 

told a social worker she cancelled an appointment with an 

OBGYN because she was experiencing too much stress and 

anxiety. Mother also reported that she became anxious whenever 

she thought about being pregnant, which would help explain 

her decision to forgo prenatal care.

The juvenile court also reasonably could have concluded 

mother had not sufficiently addressed her mental health issues 

as of the jurisdiction hearing. The record shows mother has 

a long history of severe mental health issues, which resulted 

in at least three hospitalizations. Despite this, mother insisted 

she did not suffer from mental health issues and refused to take 

prescribed medication. While it is true that mother had recently

been denied mental health services, the court reasonably could 

have determined it was because she had failed to disclose her 

extensive history of mental health issues to the service providers.

Mother’s reliance on In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 

129 is misplaced. In that case, the mother had a history of 

mental instability, but there was no evidence she had abused 

or neglected her children. (Id. at p. 136.) Here, in contrast, 

the record supports a finding that mother’s mental health issues 

caused her to self-medicate with drugs while pregnant and forgo 
18

prenatal care, both of which placed M.A. at substantial risk of 

physical harm. Accordingly, there is a direct link between 

mother’s mental health issues and a risk of harm to M.A.

Mother’s reliance on In re A.L. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 1044 

is similarly misplaced. In A.L., the children were significantly 

older than M.A.: one child was 15 years old and the other was 11. 

(Id. at pp. 1045–1046.) The children also lived with their father, 

who was able to protect and care for them while their mother was 

experiencing mental health issues. (See id. at p. 1047.) Here, 

in contrast, M.A. was of tender years and entirely dependent 

on mother for his care. As a result, mother’s unresolved mental 

health issue posed a significantly greater risk of harm than 

in A.L.

3. Substantial evidence supports the court’s order 

removing M.A. from mother’s custody

Mother argues the court’s order removing M.A. from her 

custody is not supported by substantial evidence because there 

was no risk of harm to the child as of the disposition hearing. 

In support, mother points out that she repeatedly tested negative 

for drugs, underwent mental health assessments, participated 

in a substance abuse treatment program and parenting class, 

and was consistently appropriate during visits.

When a minor has been adjudged a dependent child of

the court under section 300, the juvenile court may limit the 

control to be exercised over the dependent child by the parent 

or guardian. (§ 361, subd. (a).) A dependent child may not 

be taken from the physical custody of the parent with whom 

the child resides unless the juvenile court finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that there is a “substantial danger to the 

physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional 
19

well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and 

there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical 

health can be protected” without removal. (Id., subd. (c)(1); see 

In re Ashly F. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 803, 809–810 (Ashly F.).) 

“ ‘The court may consider a parent’s past conduct as well as 

present circumstances.’ ” (In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 

1117, 1126.) “ ‘A removal order is proper if it is based on proof 

of (1) parental inability to provide proper care for the minor and 

(2) potential detriment to the minor if he or she remains with 

the parent.’ ” (In re Francisco D. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 73, 83.)

When reviewing findings that must be proved by clear 

and convincing evidence, “the question before the appellate court 

is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence 

from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly 

probable that the fact was true. Consistent with well-established 

principles governing review for sufficiency of the evidence, in 

making this assessment the appellate court must view the record 

in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and 

give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated 

the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, 

and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” 

(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995–996; see also 

In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 423.) The appellant has 

the burden of showing there is insufficient evidence to support 

the juvenile court’s findings or orders. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 

98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)

Here, substantial evidence supports the court’s removal 

order. As discussed above, the record shows mother has a long 

history of substance abuse and mental health issues. As a result 

of those issues, she exposed M.A. to a substantial risk of harm by 
20

forgoing prenatal care and using benzodiazepines, marijuana, 

and psychedelic mushrooms while pregnant. Although mother 

was somewhat candid about her past drug use and voluntarily 

participated in services, she continued to insist—despite 

overwhelming evidence to the contrary—she did not struggle 

with substance abuse or mental health issues. Mother also 

downplayed the extent of her prior substance abuse—and the risk 

of harm it posed to M.A.—by making the preposterous claim that 

she had not known she was pregnant. On this record, the court 

reasonably could have concluded that, until mother acknowledges 

and addresses her substance abuse and mental health issues, 

there is a substantial risk to M.A.’s health, safety, and 

well-being while in her custody. (See In re Gabriel K. (2012) 

203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“[o]ne cannot correct a problem 

one fails to acknowledge”].)

Mother contends removal was improper because the court 

could have ordered her to reside with maternal grandparents, 

who would have ensured M.A.’s safety. Relatedly, mother argues

the court failed to comply with section 361, subdivision (e), which 

states a juvenile court “shall make a determination as to whether 

reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need 

for removal of the minor from his or her home.” We reject both 

contentions.

Contrary to mother’s suggestions, the court expressly 

found there were no reasonable means to protect M.A. without 

removing him from her custody. The court also expressly rejected 

mother’s argument that ordering her to live with maternal 

grandparents would be sufficient to protect the child. That 

decision is supported by substantial evidence. In arguing 

otherwise, mother overlooks that she lived with maternal 
21

grandparents while pregnant with M.A., yet she continued to use 

drugs and forwent prenatal care. In fact, maternal grandmother 

admitted giving mother money to buy drugs when she was near 

full-term and visibly pregnant. The record also shows mother 

continued to breastfeed M.A. after the court had ordered her 

not to, and maternal grandparents discouraged father from 

reporting that fact to the Department. Given M.A.’s need for 

constant care, mother’s willingness to violate court orders, and 

maternal grandparents’ inability to control mother’s behavior, 

the juvenile court reasonably could have concluded ordering 

mother to live with maternal grandparents would not be 

sufficient to protect the child.

Mother relies upon Ashly F., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th 803,

to argue the juvenile court failed to consider reasonable means 

short of removal; however, the case is inapposite. In reversing 

the disposition order, the Ashly F. court concluded the 

undisputed evidence contradicted the juvenile court’s finding 

because “the court was required to ‘consider, as a reasonable 

means to protect the minor, the option of removing an offending 

parent . . . from the home,’ ” and “[n]othing in the record shows 

that the court considered this option even though the evidence 

showed that it was available.” (Id. at p. 810.) Here, in contrast, 

the court expressly considered, but rejected, returning M.A. to 

mother’s custody on the condition that she live with maternal 

grandparents. As discussed above, that finding is supported 

by substantial evidence.

Mother’s reliance on In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510 

is also misplaced. In I.R., the juvenile court removed the children 

following an incident of domestic violence between the parents. 

The Court of Appeal reversed, reasoning there was no longer a 
22

risk to the children’s safety because the parents had separated 

and had no plans to reunite. (Id. at pp. 521–522.) Here, 

the record supports the court’s finding that mother failed to 

acknowledge meaningfully, let alone resolve, her substance abuse 

and mental health issues. Accordingly, the risk to M.A. was still 

present as of the disposition hearing.

Mother alternatively argues the Department failed to 

comply with rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i) of the California Rules of Court, 

which requires the Department to include in its report a 

“discussion of the reasonable efforts made to prevent or eliminate 

removal.” We agree with the Department that mother forfeited 

this issue by failing to raise it below. (See In re M.V. (2014) 

225 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1508 [“courts have repeatedly held that 

a party’s failure to object forfeits appellate review of the adequacy 

of—or the failure to prepare—mandatory assessment reports 

in juvenile proceedings”].) Accordingly, we need not consider 

mother’s arguments. 

Regardless, even assuming the Department’s report was

insufficient, mother does not identify any reasonable efforts the 

Department could have taken to prevent removal, other than 

requiring that she live with maternal grandparents. The court, 

however, expressly considered, and properly rejected, that option. 

Under these circumstances, any failure to comply with California 

Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i) was harmless.
23

DISPOSITION

We dismiss father’s appeal. We affirm the juvenile court’s 

jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders as to mother.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

LAVIN, J.