Affirmed; Opinion Filed July 23, 2015.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-14-01019-CV

FEYSAL AYATI-GHAFFARI AND IRANA HAGNAZARI, Appellants

V.

HAZAWIPERI JACKIE GUMBODETE AND JOSE ANAYA, Appellees

On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 429-04867-2012

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Bridges, Lang, and Schenck

Opinion by Justice Lang

Hazwiperi Jackie Gumbodete and Jose Anaya (“appellees” or “plaintiffs”) filed this 

lawsuit in the trial court below against Feysal Ayati-Ghaffari and Irana Hagnazari (“appellants” 

or “defendants”) seeking damages for loss of personal property allegedly caused by appellants. 

After considering appellees’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court signed a “Final 

Summary Judgment” granting appellees’ motion and awarding them $41,804 in actual damages, 

$7,287.50 in attorney’s fees, and $3,719.12 in prejudgment interest and other fees and costs 

against Ayati-Ghaffari.1

Proceeding pro se on appeal, Ayati-Ghaffari asserts seventeen issues, which we describe 

below. We decide against Ayati-Ghaffari on all issues. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

 

1

Hagnazari has not filed a brief in this Court. 
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Because the law to be applied in this case is well settled, we issue this memorandum opinion. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties do not dispute that on approximately October 5, 2009, Ayati-Ghaffari, as 

“landlord,” and Gumbodete, as “tenant,” executed a one-year written residential lease for certain 

real property in Plano, Texas (the “Premises”). Gumbodete and Anaya resided at the Premises 

for the lease term and continued to reside there for several months after the lease expired. 

This case was filed by plaintiffs on December 27, 2012. In their petition, plaintiffs stated 

that on approximately December 27, 2010, a fire “severely damaged the Premises” and “made it 

impossible” for them to continue to reside at that location. According to plaintiffs, due to the 

condition of the Premises, they “were unable to gain access to most of their possessions” and 

“were only able to take a few items of personal property with them when they moved 

temporarily into a hotel.” Additionally, plaintiffs contended as follows:

Since they were not able to move their possessions from the Premises, the 

Plaintiffs requested on several occasions that the Defendants waterproof the 

Premises as soon as possible. Defendant Ayati represented to the Plaintiffs that 

their personal property would be secured and protected. Despite these

representations, Defendants wholly failed to secure and waterproof the Premises. 

In early January 2011, substantial rainfall occurred at the Premises. Since 

the Defendants had failed to secure and waterproof the Premises, many items of 

personal property belonging to the Plaintiffs were damaged or destroyed by 

exposure to the rain and cold.

Plaintiffs asserted claims for (1) violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act 

(“DTPA”), see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41–17.63 (West 2011); (2) negligence; and 

(3) breach of contract. Also, plaintiffs requested attorney’s fees pursuant to the DTPA and Texas 

Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 38.001. See id. § 17.50 (providing for recovery of 

attorney’s fees in DTPA actions); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (West 2015)

(providing for recovery of attorney’s fees respecting breach of contract claims).
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Defendants, proceeding pro se, filed separate answers in which they asserted general 

denials and several affirmative defenses not relevant to this appeal. Additionally, Ayati-Ghaffari 

asserted several counterclaims against plaintiffs. Those counterclaims stated in part (1) “NonPaying-RENTER made them TRESSPASSERS [sic] (Breach-of-Contract together with 

ExParte)”; (2) “Lack of PROOF-of-OWNERSHIP created their problems, that’s why the 

Defendants are becoming COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS because economic damages over 

$300,000.00, plaintiff’s Fraudulent-Activities and their misrepresentations,”; and (3) “AGENCY 

and RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR: Whenever in this petition it is alleged that the Plaintiffs did 

any act or thing, it is meant that Plaintiffs themselves and their accessory agents Westerburg & 

Thornton, P.C. and Foremost Insurance Group servants, employees or representatives did such 

act or things. . . . [Plaintiffs or their agents] knowingly/intentionally refused to notify the 

Defendants 30 days before filing this lawsuit of 12/27/2012 accordingly, under Tex. Civ. Prac. &

Rem. Code Ann. 38.001et seq., defendants are entitled to recover the amount of defendant’s 

valid claim and costs under the contract with plaintiffs and the EXPARTE FOREMOST 

INSURANCE GROUP.” (emphasis original). 2 

On March 21, 2014, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs contended 

in part they were entitled to summary judgment because “no genuine issue of material fact exists 

regarding Plaintiffs’ causes of action.” Additionally, plaintiffs asserted specific arguments 

respecting their entitlement to summary judgment on their breach of contract and DTPA claims. 

Attached to plaintiffs’ motion were a copy of the written lease described above and affidavits of 

Gumbodete and plaintiffs’ counsel. Gumbodete’s affidavit included an exhibit listing the “items 

of personal property” allegedly damaged. 

 

2

In addition to asserting the above-described counterclaims against plaintiffs, Ayati-Ghaffari named Foremost Lloyds of Texas (“Lloyds”) 

as a third party defendant and asserted the same counterclaims against Lloyds. Prior to the judgment complained of, the trial court signed (1) a 

November 7, 2013 order dismissing those claims against Lloyds with prejudice and (2) a January 8, 2014 order severing those claims from all 

other pending claims in this case. 
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In his response to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, Ayati-Ghaffari asserted, in 

part, an objection to plaintiffs’ summary judgment evidence on the grounds that the exhibit 

attached to Gumbodete’s affidavit (1) was “Internet-generated,” (2) lacked “any proof-ofpurchase,” and (3) “would not be admissible at trial.” Attached to Ayati-Ghaffari’s summary 

judgment response was an affidavit of Rebecca Cucovatz, a real estate broker, in which Cucovatz 

stated she wrote the lease executed by Gumbodete and Ayati-Ghaffari described above. 

Plaintiffs filed a reply to Ayati-Ghaffari’s summary judgment response in which they 

contended in part the trial court “should sign a final summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and 

against Defendant disposing of all parties and causes of action in this case” because “[t]he 

pleadings and the evidence before [the trial court] authorize such a ruling.” Specifically, 

plaintiffs argued in part (1) the evidence attached to the motion for summary judgment set forth 

all facts necessary to show their entitlement to the requested relief and (2) defendants failed to 

raise any issue of material fact. 

Several days later, Ayati-Ghaffari filed a document titled “Motion for No-Evidence 

Summary Judgment Plaintiff’s Reply to Irelevant [sic] Defendant’s Response.” In that motion, 

Ayati-Ghaffari specifically moved for no-evidence summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ causes of 

action. Further, Ayati-Ghaffari stated in part (1) “[d]efendant waives all causes of action and 

relief not requested in this motion” and (2) “defendants asks [sic] the court to grant this motion 

and sign an order for a final summary judgment.” 

The trial court considered plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment “by submission.”3 

The “Final Summary Judgment” described above is dated June 11, 2014, and states in part, (1) 

“[a]fter considering the parties’ motions, responses, evidence, objections to evidence, pleadings 

and arguments of counsel, this Court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs’ motion should be granted”

 

3 The appellate record does not contain a reporter’s record of a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. 
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and (2) “[t]his judgment finally disposes of all parties and claims and is an appealable 

judgment.” 

Ayati-Ghaffari filed a June 26, 2014 “Motion for New Trial” in which he, inter alia, 

restated his arguments described above. Ayati-Ghaffari’s motion for new trial was denied by the 

trial court. This appeal timely followed. 

II. ISSUES ASSERTED ON APPEAL

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. See, e.g., Spicer v. Tex. Workforce 

Comm’n, 430 S.W.3d 526, 532 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. 

Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010)). Summary judgment is proper when there are no 

genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. 

(citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548–49 (Tex.

1985)). 

“We construe liberally pro se pleadings and briefs; however, we hold pro se litigants to 

the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable laws and 

rules of procedure.” Washington v. Bank of N.Y., 362 S.W.3d 853, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2012, no pet.) (citing Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978)). “To 

do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant who is represented 

by counsel.” Id. Pursuant to rule 38.1(i) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, an 

appellant’s brief “must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with 

appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); accord Cruz v. 

Van Sickle, 452 S.W.3d 503, 511 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). “Appellant has the burden

to present and discuss his assertions of error in compliance with the appellate briefing rules.” 

Cruz, 452 S.W.3d at 511. “We have no duty, or even right, to perform an independent review of 
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the record and applicable law to determine whether there was error.” Id. “When a party fails to 

adequately brief a complaint, he waives the issue on appeal.” Washington, 362 S.W.3d at 854–

55. “Bare assertions of error, without argument or authority, waive error.” Id. at 854 (citing 

Sullivan v. Bickel & Brewer, 943 S.W.2d 477, 486 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, writ denied); 

Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994)). 

B. Analysis

We quote Ayati-Ghaffari’s seventeen issues on appeal as follows:

Issue 1: The evidence does not support the final summary judgment to questions

about violations of the DTPA, negligence, and questions about breach of contract.

Issue 2: The trial court should not have submitted a general damage issue; instead, 

it should have submitted defendant’s requested question regarding the separate 

items of damages.

Issue 3: The trial court should not have rendered judgment against defendant for

cumulative damages for concurrent causes of actions arising out of the same acts.

Issue 4: 4/16/2014 defendant filed Special exceptions for the errors be amended in

her summary judgment filed on 3/21/2014, and plaintiff never did amended.

Issue 5. DTPA requires 60 days Fair Notice, plaintiff violated, defect cannot be 

cured

Issue 6. DTPA requires of inspection, there are no item exist to inspect $0.00, no

jurisdiction for level 2 claim must be over $50,000.00, fabricated jurisdiction.

Issue 7. There are plenty genuine issues of material facts exist, such as date of

loss and amount of real damages (internet generated list is not admissible), 

falsified affidavit.

Issue 8. 10/5/2010 Holdover started, and plaintiffs could not afford to pay the 

rent, eviction and 30 days notice provided by landlord/defendant. Evicted plaintiff 

12/29/2010, had no down payment and ability to purchase a home.

Issue 9. 12/29/2010 Church furnished a U-Haul-Truck and moved out, without 

any forwarding address, public storage, and hotel receipts does not exist, 

(dishonesty).

Issue 10. Clerk’s duty to give notice. mail that the court signed a judgment 

violated
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Issue 11. Defendant in his response to plaintiff’s summary judgment asked for

hearing and he did not get 21 day notice to have a hearing, final judgment in 

absentia.

Issue 12. Judge. 5/28/2014 defendant filed motion to disqualify. Vindictive final 

sj 

Issue 13. One-final-judgment rule. This final judgment of unknown date signed.

Issue 14. Abandonment. Past two (2) years defendants made many trips to the

courthouse and many Written Motions made, the plaintiff never made any Written

motion/Response/Amend Special Exceptions, or any Discovery, the agreed 

motion to continuance to cancel the First jury trial of 11/4/2013 was to complete 

the Discovery, and plaintiff never started the discovery, But; on 3/21/2014 

Summary-Judgment & rewarded. HOW?

Issue 15. The second defendant never got served in this lawsuit.

Issue 16. Order or Judgment. If the trial court denies the motion for JNOV, it 

should sign an order denying the motion.

Issue 17. DTPA Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Section 17.43 33, 38, 43 and Section 

17.45(5) require written contract to specify the job need to be done, deadline, 

consideration, time, place, and the amount of money to do the job. There is no 

such a contract exist to perform in January 2011 between parties.

Appellees contend in part that Ayati-Ghaffari “has waived all of his issues or points of 

error by failing to comply with the briefing requirements of the Texas Rules of Appellate 

Procedure.” Further, appellees contend “[i]f this Court determines that Appellant did not waive 

all of his errors due to his briefing issues, none of Appellant’s issues or arguments justifies 

reversal of the Trial Court’s decision to grant Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.”

In the section of his appellate brief titled “Argument,” Ayati-Ghaffari addresses only his 

first issue. Further, to the extent the section of his appellate brief titled “Summary of the 

Argument” can be construed to assert arguments pertaining to some of his other issues, he 

includes no citations to authority or to the record respecting those arguments. Accordingly, we 

conclude Ayati-Ghaffari’s second through seventeenth issues present nothing for this Court’s 
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review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). We decide against Ayati-Ghaffari on his second through 

seventeenth issues. 

We construe Ayati-Ghaffari’s first issue as a challenge to the legal and factual sufficiency 

of the evidence to support the trial court’s summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ claims for breach 

of contract, negligence, and violation of the DTPA. Specifically, Ayati-Ghaffari contends (1) 

“[t]he entire argument under the legal and factual sufficiency challenges hangs on Gumbodete’s 

credibility” and (2) “plaintiff’s falsified affidavit is inconsistent” and “should be disregarded as a 

matter of law.” (emphasis original). In support of his argument, Ayati-Ghaffari cites Missouri 

Pacific Railway Co. v. Somers, 14 S.W. 779, 780 (Tex. 1890), for the following assertion: “The 

Supreme Court has permitted the credibility of a party to be questioned on appeal when the 

plaintiff’s falsifying affidavit is inconsistent and is contradicted by disinterested witnesses.” 

“Objections that statements of an interested witness are not clear, positive, direct, 

credible, and free from contradiction raise defects in form.” Four D Constr., Inc. v. Util. & 

Envtl. Servs., Inc., No. 05-12-00068-CV, 2013 WL 2563785, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 7, 

2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing S & I Mgmt., Inc. v. Sungju Choi, 331 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.)). A party must object in the trial court and obtain a ruling from the 

trial judge to preserve a complaint about the form of summary judgment evidence. See, e.g., 

Nat’l Health Res. Corp. v. TBF Fin., LLC, 429 S.W.3d 125, 129 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no 

pet.). As described above, the record shows Ayati-Ghaffari objected to Gumbodete’s affidavit in 

question on the grounds that the exhibit attached to that affidavit was “Internet-generated,” 

lacked “any proof-of-purchase,” and “would not be admissible at trial.” Ayati-Ghaffari cites no 

portion of the record, and we have found none, showing he asserted a complaint in the trial court 

that Gumbodete’s affidavit was not credible because it was “inconsistent.” On this record, we 
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conclude Ayati-Ghaffari’s appellate complaint respecting Gumbodete’s affidavit presents 

nothing for this Court’s review. See id.

We decide against Ayati-Ghaffari on his first issue.

III. CONCLUSION

We decide Ayati-Ghaffari’s seventeen issues against him. The trial court’s judgment is 

affirmed.

/ Douglas S. Lang/

DOUGLAS S. LANG

JUSTICE

141019F.P05
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

FEYSAL AYATI-GHAFFARI AND 

IRANA HAGNAZARI, Appellants

No. 05-14-01019-CV V.

HAZAWIPERI JACKIE GUMBODETE 

AND JOSE ANAYA, Appellees

On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District 

Court, Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 429-04867-2012.

Opinion delivered by Justice Lang, Justices 

Bridges and Schenck participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellees Hazawiperi Jackie Gumbodete and Jose Anaya recover 

their costs of this appeal from appellant Feysal Ayati-Ghaffari.

Judgment entered this 23rd day of July, 2015.