Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1701-CR-89 | August 8, 2017 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Matthew D. Anglemeyer

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hall, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ian McLean

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Marlon Jackson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 8, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A04-1701-CR-89

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Jose D. Salinas, 

Judge

The Honorable John M. Christ, 

Commissioner

Trial Court Cause No.

49G14-1603-F6-10184

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1701-CR-89 | August 8, 2017 Page 2 of 11

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Marlon Jackson (Jackson), appeals the trial court’s denial 

of his motion to suppress certain evidence. 

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Jackson presents us with two issues in this interlocutory appeal, which we 

restate as: 

(1) Whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence 

obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights under the United 

States Constitution; and

(2) Whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence 

obtained in violation of Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On July 25, 2016, Jackson filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court set 

for an evidentiary hearing on August 4, 2016. Prior to the hearing, the State 

dismissed Jackson’s charge of possessing a narcotic drug, a Level 6 felony, 

because Jackson presented a valid prescription. At the hearing, the parties 

informed the trial court that Jackson had very recently discovered legal 

authority which, according to Jackson, would prevent the State from 

proceeding with Jackson’s remaining charge of possession of marijuana, a Class 

B misdemeanor. Although Jackson had provided this case law to the State 
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immediately prior to the hearing, the State requested time to review the case 

and to decide whether to proceed. The trial court continued the suppression 

hearing to September 1, 2016.

[5] A set of pretrial conferences was conducted respectively on September 1, 2016, 

and September 15, 2016. During the latter pretrial conference, the parties 

stipulated to the facts contained in the affidavit of probable cause filed by the 

arresting officer, which read as follows:

On 3/13/2016 at approx. 1008 [sic] pm I, Officer Bryan M. Zotz 

[Officer Zotz] with the IMPD, was sitting northbound on Drexel 

Ave at 36th St. I observed a gray Cadillac driving backwards, 

westbound on 36th St. I observed the vehicle stop at the stop sign 

at 36th St., and then continue westbound on 36th St., driving 

backwards. I activated my emergency lights and stopped that 

vehicle westbound on 36th St. at Linwood Ave. 

I approached the vehicle on the passenger side and observed the 

driver, later identified as [Jackson], b/m, d.o.b. . . . take off his 

ball cap and place it over the items in the floorboard tray in front

of the center console. Jackson was leaning hard to his right, and 

kept repositioning the hat to cover the center tray. I asked 

Jackson why he was driving down the street backwards. Jackson 

stated that his car would not drive forward, and that he was 

headed home to Rural Ave. I asked Jackson for his driver’s 

license. Jackson started to look around his person and about the 

vehicle. Jackson opened up the center console, and I was able to 

observe a digital scale inside. Due to my training and experience 

as a police officer, I know a digital scale to be commonly used to 

weigh illegal narcotics.

Jackson verbally gave me his identifiers, and I moved to the rear 

of the vehicle to have IMPD Control run the IN temporary 
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license plate of G242370. As I did so, I observed Jackson and his

front seat passenger start reaching around the floor board tray 

area. I then ran both individuals through IMPD 

Communications and requested backup.

After Officer Chad Gibbson, A366, had arrived on the scene, I 

had Jackson step from the vehicle. When Jackson stepped from 

the vehicle, I would smell the odor of raw marijuana coming off 

of his person. I moved Jackson to the rear of the vehicle, 

performed a pat down of his outer clothing, and had him sit on 

the ground. I then performed a search of the driver’s 

compartment of the vehicle. I recovered the digital scale from 

the center console. I also observed small amounts of marijuana 

shake and seeds on the floorboard of the vehicle.

I then went back to Jackson to perform a search of his person. I 

asked Jackson if he had any marijuana on his person. He stated 

he did, and that it was in his pocket I then searched Jackson, and 

found inside his right front pant pocket, a clear bag containing a 

green leafy substance that, due to my training and experience as a

police officer, I believed to be marijuana. [Jackson] was arrested 

for [p]ossession of marijuana, . . . ., and [p]ossession of 

[p]araphernalia, . . . 

Jackson was transported to the APC by MCSO. Deputy 

Patterson 30679, advised me that when Jackson was received in 

the APC, Deputy Ladd, 31153, located a white pill suspected to 

be hydrocodone inside the right front undershorts pocket of 

Jackson. Deputy Patterson then collected and transported the 

white pill back to me. I then transported the pill, suspected 

marijuana, and digital scale to the IMPD property room, placed 

the items in a heat seal envelope, and into the narcotics box. 

Jackson was also arrested for [p]ossession of a [c]ontrolled 

[s]ubstance, . . . Vehicle was transported by Auto Return.
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All events occurred in Marion Co., State of IN.

The suspected substance(s) were tested in the IMPD Property 

room. The results were as follows: Marijuana 8.49 grams.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 11-12). 

[6] On October 6, 2016, the State submitted a memorandum in opposition to 

Jackson’s motion to suppress. Jackson’s memorandum in response was 

submitted on October 21, 2016. During a hearing on November 3, 2016, the 

trial court denied Jackson’s motion to suppress. The trial court granted Jackson 

leave to file an interlocutory appeal, which we accepted on February 3, 2017. 

[7] Jackson now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[8] Jackson contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress as 

certain evidence was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights

under the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana 

Constitution.

[9] We review the denial of a motion to suppress in a manner similar to reviewing 

the sufficiency of the evidence. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013). 

We consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court’s ruling, alongside 

substantial uncontradicted evidence to the contrary, to decide if that evidence is 

sufficient to support the denial. Id. We review de novo a ruling on the 

constitutionality of a search or seizure, but we give deference to a trial court’s 
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determination of the facts, which will not be overturned unless clearly 

erroneous. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008).

I. Fourth Amendment

[10] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the privacy 

and possessory interests of individuals by prohibiting unreasonable searches and 

seizures. “The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment ‘is to protect 

the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens possess in their persons, their 

homes, and their belongings.’” Mullen v. State, 55 N.E.3d 822, 827 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2016) (quoting Trotter v. State, 933 N.E.2d 572, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). 

This protection has been extended to the states through the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957, 

961 (Ind. 2001). In general, the Fourth Amendment prohibits searches and 

seizures conducted without a warrant that is supported by probable cause. 

Mullen, 55 N.E.3d at 827. As a deterrent mechanism, evidence obtained 

without a warrant is not admissible in a prosecution unless the search or seizure 

falls into one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirements. Id. 

“Where a search or seizure is conducted without a warrant, the State bears the 

burden to prove that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the 

time of the search or seizure.” Brooks v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1234, 1240 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2010), trans. denied.

[11] One such exception was created in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 

L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), pursuant to which an officer is permitted to “stop and 
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briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable 

suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’

even if the officer lacks probable cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 

109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Reasonable suspicion entails some 

minimal level of objective justification for making a stop, something more than 

an un-particularized suspicion or hunch, but less than the level of suspicion for 

probable cause. Polson v. State, 49 N.E.3d 186, 189-90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), 

trans. denied. What constitutes reasonable suspicion is determined on a case-bycase basis, and the totality of the circumstances is considered. Id. at 190. As a 

result, the reasonable suspicion requirement is satisfied where the facts known 

to the officer at the moment of the stop, together with the reasonable inferences 

arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe 

that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur. Lyons v. State, 735 

N.E.2d 1179, 1183-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. In judging the 

reasonableness of investigatory stops, courts must strike “a balance between the 

public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary 

interference by law [enforcement] officers.” Polson, 49 N.E.3d at 190. Indeed, 

“there is no ‘bright line’ for evaluating whether an investigative detention is 

unreasonable, and ‘common sense and ordinary human experience must govern 

over right criteria.’” Reinhart v. State, 930 N.E.2d 42, 46 (quoting United States v. 

Sharp, 470 U.S. 675, 685 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985)). 

[12] Jackson now contends that Officer Zotz lacked reasonable suspicion to stop 

him when the officer observed Jackson “driving backwards at around 10:00 
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p.m., stop[ing] at a stop sign, and continu[ing] to drive backwards.” 

(Appellant’s Br. p. 15). Analogizing to Ransom v. State, 741 N.E.2d 419 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied, Jackson asserts that Officer Zotz did not have an 

objectively justifiable reason for stopping him. In Ransom, Ransom was driving 

his vehicle on a narrow Indianapolis street when he encountered an 

approaching police vehicle. Id. at 420. Because of the narrowness of the road 

and the presence of parked vehicles on both sides by the road, the two vehicles 

could not both fit in the traveled portion of the road. Id. As the police officer 

put his vehicle to the side of the road, Ransom put his vehicle in reverse and 

backed around the corner. Id. The officer stopped Ransom’s vehicle for 

“operating his vehicle in reverse.” Id. A subsequent search of the vehicle 

revealed a handgun. Id. at 421. After the trial court denied Ransom’s motion 

to suppress, we accepted his interlocutory appeal. On appeal, we reversed the 

trial court, noting that as driving in reverse is an activity, that in and of itself, is 

not unlawful, and as Ransom did not commit any traffic violation, the officer 

lacked reasonable suspicion that justified the stop. Id. at 422. 

[13] Although we recognize that our legislature does not prohibit driving in reverse, 

nor does it mandate driving forward as a custom, unlike in Ransom, the instant 

“set of individually innocent facts, when observed in conjunction, [is] sufficient 

to create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Polson, 49 N.E.3d at 190. 

At approximately 10:00 p.m., Officer Zotz was sitting northbound on Drexel 

Ave at 36th St., where he observed a gray Cadillac driving backwards, 

westbound on 36th St. The vehicle came to a stop at the stop sign at 36th St., 
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and then continued westbound on 36th St., driving backwards. Distinguished 

from the obstacles and narrow street in Ransom, Jackson drove backwards 

unrestrained and over a considerable distance. “Common sense and ordinary 

human experience” would qualify this as a most unusual and suspicious 

situation. Reinhart, 930 N.E.2d at 46. Therefore, these facts, together with the 

reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinary prudent 

person to believe criminal activity may be afoot. We conclude that Officer Zotz 

was justified in stopping Jackson for investigatory purposes.1

II. Article I, Section 11

[14] Jackson also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress 

under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Article 1, Section 11 of 

the Indiana Constitution is identical to the Fourth Amendment, but is analyzed 

differently. Croom v. State, 996 N.E.2d 436, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), reh’g 

denied, trans. denied. The Indiana Constitutional analysis focuses on the 

reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances. 

Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). We determine

 

1 We acknowledge that the State also asserted Officer Zotz’ Terry stop was justified based on several traffic 

infractions about the required illumination for vehicles. It argued that Jackson’s vehicle violated the 

headlamp statute by not having headlamps illuminating the area ahead of his vehicle because he was driving 

in reverse. See I.C. §§ 9-19-6-6; -17(b); -24(b). Second, the State claimed that Jackson violated the tail lamp

and stop lamp statutes by not having tail lamps emitting red light visible from the rear of the vehicle and by 

not having stop lamps emitting red to amber light visible from the rear of the vehicle because he was driving 

in reverse. See I.C. §§ 9-19-6-6; -17(b); -24(b). Third, the State claimed that because Jackson was driving 

backward, it is likely his tail lamps were illuminated, displaying a red light in the direction of his travel. See

I.C §§ 9-19-6-6; -17(b); -24(b). Nevertheless, the stipulated facts are silent as to the vehicle’s lamp location, 

number, color, operation, or other modifications or additions. Accordingly, the State’s arguments amount to 

nothing more than mere speculation.
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reasonableness under the Indiana Constitution by balancing “1) the degree of 

concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of 

intrusion the method of search or seizure impose on the citizen’s ordinary 

activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Id. at 361. The State 

carries the burden of proving that the search was reasonable under the totality 

of the circumstances. Croom, 996 N.E.2d at 442. 

[15] A brief investigatory stop may be justified by reasonable suspicion that the 

person detained is involved in criminal activity. Id. See also State v. Renzulli, 958 

N.E.2d 1143, 1146 (Ind. 2011). Such suspicion “exists where the facts known 

to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, 

would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity is or 

is about to occur.” Id.

[16] Office Zotz’ stop was reasonable under the Indiana Constitution. Driving a car 

backwards for an extended distance in the late evening created a reasonable 

degree of concern that something criminal was occurring. Officer Zotz’ brief 

stop of Jackson’s vehicle to investigate why Jackson was driving backwards 

imposed a minimal degree of intrusion. Thirdly, the need of law enforcement 

to stop and conduct an investigation was reasonable. The only way to 

determine the reason for Jackson’s driving style and to dispel Officer Zotz’ 

concern was to ask Jackson directly. Although the evidence is silent as to any 

other vehicles on the road at that time of the evening, Jackson’s driving 

backwards created a safety hazard for the public. Balancing the reasonable 

degree of concern, the minimal intrusion, and the need of law enforcement, we 
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conclude that Officer Zotz had reasonable suspicion under Article 1, Section 11 

of the Indiana Constitution. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 

Jackson’s motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION

[17] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly denied

Jackson’s motion to suppress.

[18] Affirmed.

[19] Najam, J. and Bradford, J. concur