* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-30283

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

AMELIE BROWN,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the

Western District of Louisiana

(95-CR-20042-01)

February 24, 1997

Before JOHNSON, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Amelie Brown appeals his convictions for interstate

transportation of a stolen vehicle and making false claims and

statements to an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and § 1001 respectively. Brown

contends that (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress statements made to the FBI agents allegedly in violation

of his Miranda rights, and (2) the district court erred in denying

his motion for judgment of acquittal. 
2

“In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to

suppress based on live testimony at a suppression hearing, the

district court’s findings of historical fact must be accepted

unless clearly erroneous or influenced by an incorrect view of the

law.” United States v. Foy, 28 F.3d 464, 474 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 (1994). After thoroughly review of the

record in this case, we conclude that the district court’s finding

that Brown was properly advised of his constitutional rights prior

to making statements to the FBI agents was not clearly erroneous.

Thus, the district court’s denial of Brown’s motion to suppress

statements made to FBI agents was proper.

In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal

conviction this Court must determine whether, viewing the evidence

in a light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of

fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). We find that

a reasonable juror could have determined that Brown intentionally

deprived the vehicle’s owner of the benefit of its ownership and

that Brown was properly convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2312.

See United States v. Martinez, 694 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1982).

A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 requires five elements: “(1)

a statement that is (2) false, (3) material, (4) made with the

requisite specific intent, and (5) within the purview of government

agency jurisdiction.” United States v. Shah, 44 F.3d 285, 289 (5th

Cir. 1995). In challenging his conviction under § 1001, Brown

claims that his statement was not material. He asserts that
3

because the FBI agents were aware of the falsity of the statement

before he made the statement, it could not have been material. 

A material statement is defined as statement that has “a

natural tendency to influence, or [one that is] capable of

affecting or influencing, a government function.” United States v.

Swaim, 757 F.2d 1530, 1534 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 825

(1985). Importantly, “actual influence or reliance by a government

agency is not required.” United States v. Puente, 982 F.2d 156,

159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 962 (1993). Thus, a

statement may still be material irrespective of whether the

government had prior knowledge of the falsity of the statement. As

such, we find that a reasonable juror could have concluded that

Brown made a material misrepresentation of fact with the intent to

mislead agents of the FBI into believing that he was in lawful

possession of the vehicle. 

Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Brown’s

motion to suppress or Brown’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

AFFIRMED.