I

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JIMMAl-rOX AttorneyGeneral

Supreme Court Building P.0. Box 12546 Austin. TX. 76711. 2546 5121475-2501 Telex 9101674.1367 TRlecoPier 5121475.0266

714Jackson. Suite 700 Dallas. TX. 75202.4506 2141742.0944

4824 Alberta Ave., Suite 160 ElPaso. TX. 799052793 91515333464

1001 T.X.8. suite 700 liouston. TX. 77002.311 t 713l223.5666

SC8Broadway. Suite 312 Lubbock. TX. 79401.3473 6C61747.5238

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2@.lMain Plaza. Suite 400 San Antonio. TX. 162052797 5121225.4191

An Ewal OpportunityI Aftirmative Action Erptoyc

# TheAttorney GeneralofTexas

Oc:tojer 26, 1984

Ronorable MikeDriscoll Harris County Attorney 1001Preston, Suite 634 Opinion No. JM-221

Re: Whether section 11.431 of Houston, Texas 77002 theTaxCodepermits refunds of taxes for homestead exemptions not filed in time

DearMr. Drlscoll:

Youask the following question:
May the Harris County tax assessor-collector accept an application for a residence bonestead for the yei~r 1981 which is submitted to the 

### tax assessor-collector prior to February 1, 1983, or within one year after the 1981 taxes on said residence were paid, whichever is earlier. and refund tothe applicant the difference between the amount pa:Ldand the amount that would have been due if the homestead application had been submitted prfor toMay1. 19812

Section 11.43 ‘,:I the Tax Code requires Initial applications for residence homestead exemptions to be filed prior to May 1. The section also permits a 60-day extension. In 1981, the legislature amendedtheTaxCode,byadding section 11.431, which provides:

(a) T1.e chief appraiser shall accept and approve or deny an application for a residence homestead exemption after the deadline for filing it has paszsed if it is filed not later than one year after the date the taxes on the homestead
were paic, or became delinquent, whichever is earlier.
(b) If ’ a late application is approved after approval elfthe appraisal records bythe appraisal review boz.rd, the chief appraiser shall notify the collector for each unit Inwhich the residence is located. The collector shall deduct from the person’s ls,xbill the amountof tax imposed onthe exempted ilmountif the tax has not been paid. If

D. 992Eonarable MikeDriscoll - Pa(:e!2 (JM-221)

the tax has been paid. the collector shall refund the amount of 

### tax imposed onthe exempted amount.

Theeffective date of sectian 11.431 wasJanuary 1, 1982. Acts 1981, ,67th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 13, 5168. 

### at 182. Youwish to knowwhether section 11.431 permits late applications for 

### residence homestead exemptions beginning with the 1981 tax year or the 1982 

### tax year. Since you raise no constlt,utlonal issue, we raise nz here. We conclude that section 11.431 permits the filing of late applications beginning vith the 1982tax year.
The guiding principl~r of statutory interpretation is the ascertains&t of-legislative! intent. State v. Shoppers World, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1972); State v. Jackson, 376 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1964). Weconclude for two different reasons that the legislature clearly intended for sectilan 11.431 of the Tax Code to become effective beginning with the 1982tax year.
First, the legislature clearly could not have intended for only
one section of the Tax Code’s administration of exemptions provisions to take effect and reach tares implied in ayear earlier than that in which the remaining sections take effect. Subsection (a) of section 11.431 requires the chief appraiser to accept and approve or deny an application for aresidence homestead exemption If it is filed within
aspecified time. Subsection (b) provides that, if alate application is approved after approval of the appraisal records by the appraisal 

### review board, the chief apI,raiser must notify the collector for each affected taxing unit. The collector Is then required to recalculate the taxpayer’s tax liability If the tax has not yet been paid; if the 

### tax has been paid, the coll.ector is required to refund the amount of tax onthe exempted amount.

It would makeno sense 

### for us to conclude that section 11.431 would reach the 1981 tar: year, because tax appraisal districts administered by chrappr;r!;sers came into being on January 1, 1982 with the beginning of the 1982 tax year. Acts 1979, 66th Leg., ch. 841. 53, at 2313. .-- Chief appraisers never had authority to accept exemption applications for the 1981 tax year. Applications in 1980 and 1981 were submitted to the tax assessor-collectors for the respective taxing units offering them. Appraisal review boards did no; review and approve sapraissl records for the 1981 tax year; appraisal review boards were created beginning with the 1982tax year. Such records were reviewed in 1981 by local boards of equalization who, unlike the appraisal re’view boards created after January 1, 1982, did not possess the authority to review and approve or reject the granzg of exemptions by ,:helocal tax assessor-collectors. Compare repealed V.T.C.S. art. 72(16 (and cases decided thereunder) and Tax Code 1541.01, 41;02. The legislature could not have intended that appraisal review boards rer::lew

### and approve appraisal records in 1982 of 1981 tax rolls which ha*rc:already been approved by local boards of equalization. Rather, the 1,egislature intended for section 11.431 to

P. 

### 993Ilonorable MikeDriscoll - Page 3 (m-221)

reach only tax years beginning with 1982, Just as it intended the reaalnder of the administration of exemptions provisions, A. subchapter Cof chapter 11c~fthe code, to reach only those tax years beginning with 1982. Bythe ve:ryterms which the legislature employed .in section 11.431. 

### it is clear that the legislature intended the prevision to become effecti,ve and reach those taxes imposed in the
sase year in which the rest: of the newcode became effective. I.e., 1982.
Second, wemust‘construe s’:atutes inamannerwhich is not forced
or strained, but is supporl:ei: by the words of the statute. See Rai,lroad Commissj.on of Tex,ls ‘1. Miller, 434 S.W.2d 670, 672 (TK 19t8). We shculd, if posXle, give effect to every part of a statute, Cerst v. OakCliff Sa’rings andLoan Association, 432 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. 1968). and avoid Tz.pting a construction that will render anypart inoperative or superfluous. Spence v. Fenchler, lE0S.W. 597 (Tc.x. 1915).

In our opinion, concluding that section 11.431 of the Tax Code permits the filing of late applications for the 1981 tax year would eff ’ectively render the 

### section superfluous. Webelieve the legislature could only have intended for the section 11.431 application extension toapply tothe 1581 taxyear if there wasapplicable during that year somefiling deadline which section 11.431 could validly or effectively extend. There was in 1980and 1981, however, nostatutory deadline. Andbecause weco,nclude that the “administrative” deadline discussed in Attorney General Opinion MU-259 (1980) wouldsnot permit the filing of anapplication for the 1981 tax year as late as January of 1982, weconclude that there was no non-statutory deadline which could have been extended past the January 1, 1982 effecti.ve date of section 11.431. Sfnce therr?ws.8nodeadline, statutory or otherwise, for claiming homestead exemptions for the 1981 tax year which could have been extended into 198.1, section 11.431 cannot apply to that tax year. To conclude otherwi:,e is to conclude that section 11.431 expanded adeadline when, in 1981, there~was no legal principle upon wh;ch it could validly operate toproduce this effect.

In 1978. the voters of Texas added subsections (c) and (d) to article VIII, section l-b of: the Texas Constitution. Subsection (c) created a self-executing aslvalorem tax exemption of $5,000 of the market value of residence homesteads from elementary and secondary public school taxes. It al!lo permitted the legislature bygeneral law toexempt from elementary audsecondary public school taxes $10,000 of the market value of residerze homesteads of persons whoare disabled
asdefined byarticle VIII. section l-b(b) of the constitution andwho
are 65years of age or olde!r.

In 1979. during the same session in which the Tax Code was passed, Acts 1979. 66th Leg., ch. 841, .at 2217 [hereinafter Senate Bi:Ll No. 6211, the legjslature passed implementing legislation creating the disabled and the elderly residence homestead exemptions.Honorable MikeDriscoll - Page 4 (JM-221)

Acts 1979, 66th Leg., ch. 302, art. 7, II, at 690 [hereinafter House Bill No. 10601. Both bills contemplated annusl filing requirements; however, Senate Bill No. li2l’s effective date provision section provided that subchapter C of chapter 11 of the Tax Code, the subchapter setting forth the administration of exemptions provisions,
was not to become effective until January 1, 1982. even though the portions of Senate Bill No. 621 creating the exemption became effective on January 1, 1990. -.--w See Senate Bill No. 621, supra. at 231.3-2315. In 1981, the legislature amended subchapter Cof chapter 11 by providing essentially for a one-time-only application; this amendment became effective ouJanuary 1, 1982. Acts 1981, 67th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 13, 9540, 168,, at 131, 182. During the same session, section 11.431 wasalso added tosubchapter C. Id. 142, at 132.
- The thrust of the foregoing is that the original implementing legislatfon, coupled with the Tax Code, created three periods during which different requirements for filing applications for residence homestead exemptions existed. In 1979, House Bill No. 1060controlled and required that application,s be flied yearly. House Bill No. 1060
was repealed effective January 1, 1980, however, andwas replaced by the Tax Code. The code Implemented the constitutional exemption beginning on January 1, 19M. but it contained filing application requirements which became effective on January 1, 1982. As noted above, these requirements wel’e amendedin 1981. Acts 1981. 67th Leg., 1st C.S.. ch. 13. 540, at 1.31. In 1980 and 1981. therefore. there
were no specific statutorr provisions requiring the filing of applications for exemptions, nor were there any.provisions imposing a deadline for filing.

It would make sense tc. conclude that the legislature intended that section 11.431 permits late application for residence homestead exemptions for the 1981 ta:c year only if an applicant could have applied for such exemption M late as January 1. 1982. If such an application was possible, then it would arguably make sense to conclude that the legislature ~intended for the deadline extension to also apply to the 1981 tax year. Weconclude, however, that such was not the case; whatever the C,eadline was for application for the 1981 tax year, January 1, 1982war;too late. 

# I

It has heen suggested that Attorney General Opinion Mu-259 (1980) effectively created an“admlu%strative” filing deadline. This opinion addressed the effect of a taxpayer’s failure to timely apply for a residence homestead exemption during 1980and 1981. whenthere were no s - statutory filing requirement:%;;, it concluded that ataxpayer maybecome estopped to claim the exemption if his delay makes its recognition

“administratively impractlcab3.e.” Attorney General Opinion MW-259relied inter alla on Gragg v. Cayuga Independent School District, 539S.W.?d 861 (Tex. 19761, appeal dlsm’d, 429U.S. 973 (1976); Moorev. White, 569S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Civ. APP. - Corpus Christi 1978, rGmref ’d.1; andJayv. Devers, 563. I

Honorable MikeDtiscoll - Page 5 (JM-221)

S.W.Zd 880 (Tex. Civ. App. ‘- Eastland 1978, no writ). These cases concerned applicants for special advalorem valuation of land under the “agricultural use” prov::sions of article VIII, section l-d of the Texas Constitution. Articlsr VIII, section l-d is self-executing and contains no language regal,d,ing its administration or establishing .deadlines for filing affidavits therefor. In each of the three cases cited above, however, the cc ’urts determined, byconsidering the entire enactment, that applicationr, deemed “untimely” were not intended tobe allowed. InMoorev. White,, =ra at 536, the court declared that an application for special vcl,uatG under article ‘VIII, section l-d filed in December was not timely and should not be accepted by the taxing jurisdiction, becaurie the applicant “waited until after the [taxing jurisdiction’s] plans of taxation were put into effect before filing her claim for exemption.” In Gragg v. Cayuga Independent Sch,>ol District, supra at E’rO,the supreme court held that ataxpayer G not entitled to special valuation under article VIII, section l-d, because the applicant “sat by and permitted the assessments to be madma,the tax

. . . to be prepared, and this suit for taxes to be fil.ad against himbefore challenging the refusal by the tax assessor to give his land ths agricultural use designation.” See a@, Jayv. Devars, supra; Attorney Genc!ral Opinion H-988 (1977).
-- Where the constitution does not by its own terms exempt a particular kind of property but merely permits its exemption without prescription, the legislature may ordinarily prescribe reasonable conditions for the exemption’s receipt. Dlckison v. Woodmenof the World. Life Insurance Socies!, 280 S.W.Zd 315 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1955. writ ref ’d). Bet in this instance, as with article VIII, section l-d, the. :isgislature prescribed no dead:llnes for application during 1980and 1.981. Weare therefore left wi.ththe rule set-forth ina, Moore, ;nldil -- namely, that taxpayers mayestop themselves through tardiness from claiming the benefits conferred by the constitution and statutes. In Attorney General Opinion Mu-259 this office declared that a“taxpayer maybecome estopped to claim the exemption if his delay makes its recognition administratively impracticable” (emphasis adcled). Theopinion did not, however, define what constitutes “administ~cstively impracticable,” saying only that each case would turn onIts ownfacts.

In our opinion, the cases cited above; coupled with the statutes in effect during 1980 and 1981, i.e.. V.T.C.S. articles 7111. 7112 (governing the authority ard responsibilities of aboard of equalizadon), indicate that in alt l.ikelihood. granting an exemption at any point after the board of ec,ualization has certified the values onthe tax roll would be “administratively impracticable.” It was arule of long standing under now-repealed articles 7111 and 7112 that once the valuation of property hadheen determined and entered upon the roll, the board of equalization had no power to increase or reduce such valuation. Bass v. Aransas County Independent School District, 389 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1,Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref ’d n.r.e.1; Chicago R.I. (LG.Railway CD.v. State, 241S.W. 255 (Tex. Civ. App. -

n. 996Honorable MikeDrlscoll - Pa@! 6 (JM-221)

Texarkana 1922). aff ’d 263 S.W. 249 (Tex. Comm’nApp. 1924, judgmt adopted); Attorneyzral Opinion H-988 (1977). At the very least, relying onGragg. Moore, and%, webelieve wecan safely state that
anapplication isxely :.i’ it is filed as late as December of the tax year in which the benef:lt is sought. In this instance, then, we conclude that an applicant who filed for a residence homestead exemption for the 1981 tax Irear as late as January of 1982would not be entitled to receive the benefits of the exemption for 1981. Accordingly, since the granting of any application for a residence homestead exemption for 1981would, at least after December 31. 1981, be “administratively impracticable,” weconclude that the legislature could not have intended for the section 11.431 application extension to apply to the 1981 tax yes. Thus, section 11.431 of the Tax Code could reasonably permit only thegranting of refunds andthe filing of late applications for residence homestead exemptions beginning with the 1982 tax year.
.SUMMARY

Section 11.431 of the Tax Code p.ermits the granting of refunds and the filing of late applications for residence homestead exemptions beginning with the 1982tax year.

Attorney General of Texas

TOMGREEN First Assistant Attorney Cereral

DAVIDR. RICHARD8 Executive Assistant Attorney, General

RICKGILPIN Chairman. Opinion Committee Prepared byJimMoellinger Assistant Attorney General

APPROVED: OPINIONCOMNITTEE

Rick Gilpin. Chairman Susan Garrison JimHoellinger Nancy Sutton