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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 

Docket Nos. 38534, 38536, 38567

IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION 

OF THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF JOHN 

(2011-03) DOE.

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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & 

WELFARE,

 Petitioner-Respondent on Appeal,

and

GUARDIAN AD LITEM,

 Respondent on Appeal,

v.

JOHN (2011-03) DOE,

 Respondent-Appellant,

and

JANE DOE and JOHN DOE I,

 Respondents.

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Supreme Court Docket No. 38534

Boise, June 2011 Term

2011 Opinion No. 90

Filed: August 8, 2011

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 

IN THE MATTER OF THE PARENTAL 

TERMINATION OF JANE (2011-04) DOE.

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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & 

WELFARE, 

 Petitioner-Respondent,

and

GUARDIAN AD LITEM,

 Respondent on Appeal,

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Supreme Court Docket No. 38536
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v.

JANE (2011-04) DOE,

 Respondent-Appellant,

and

JOHN DOE and JOHN DOE I,

 Respondents.

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IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION 

OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF JANE (2011-

06) DOE.

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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & 

WELFARE,

 Petitioner-Respondent on Appeal,

and

GUARDIAN AD LITEM,

 Respondent on Appeal,

v.

JANE (2011-06) DOE,

 Respondent-Appellant,

and

JOHN DOE and JOHN DOE I,

 Respondents.

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 Supreme Court Docket No. 38567

 

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Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 

Falls County. Hon. R. Barry Wood, Senior District Judge.

Trial court’s findings of fact and order terminating parental rights, affirmed. 

Williams Law Office, Ctd., Twin Falls for appellant John (2011-03) Doe.
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Twin Falls County Public Defender’s Office, Twin Falls for appellants Jane 

(2011-04) Doe and Jane (2011-06) Doe. Marilyn Paul, Deputy Public Defender 

argued. 

Jamie A. LaMure, Kimberly, argued for Guardian Ad Litem.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent Idaho 

Department of Health & Welfare. James T. Baird, Deputy Attorney General 

argued. 

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BURDICK, Chief Justice 

Jane Doe and John Doe appeal the trial court’s February 3, 2011 Findings of Fact, 

Conclusions of Law and Order (hereinafter “Feb. 3, 2011 Order”) terminating Jane Doe’s 

parental rights to her four children (T.S., S.S., A.H. and S.H.) and John Doe’s parental rights to 

his two children (T.S. and S.S.) on the grounds of neglect and the best interest of the children. 

We affirm. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

S.S. and T.S. were born to Jane Doe and John Doe in 2003 and 2006 respectively. Jane 

Doe and John Doe lived together for a total of approximately eleven months. They never 

married. Eventually their relationship ended, and Jane Doe began a relationship with John Doe 

II. John Doe has two other children, who are not Jane Doe’s children and were not involved in 

the termination proceedings at issue here. John Doe went to prison on June 21, 2007, for writing 

checks with insufficient funds. He topped out his sentence on May 6, 2010.

On August 14, 2008, Detective Mittlestadt from the Twin Falls Police Department visited 

the residence of Jane Doe and John Doe II in response to a referral from the Idaho Department of 

Health and Welfare (the Department) concerning possible child abuse and marijuana sales. At 

the residence, marijuana was being smoked in the presence of S.S. and T.S. Jane Doe and John 

Doe II were arrested for injury to children and marijuana possession. S.S. and T.S. were 

declared to be in imminent danger and were taken into State custody.

Both on the day of their arrest and at the adjudicatory hearing held on August 21, 2008, 

Jane Doe and John Doe II stipulated to an unstable home environment, and S.S. and T.S. were 

placed in the legal custody of the Department. On May 28, 2009, S.S. and T.S. returned to the 

home of Jane Doe and John Doe II for an extended home visit. A.H. was born to Jane Doe and 

John Doe II in 2009. On October 16, 2009, when the Department discovered that the home was 
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filthy, cluttered and smelled of urine, S.S. and T.S. were placed in foster care due to an unstable 

home environment, and A.H. was declared to be in imminent danger. 

On May 20, 2010, the Department filed a petition to terminate the parental rights to S.S., 

T.S., and A.H. The petition alleged that Jane Doe, John Doe and John Doe II neglected the 

children, failed to address substance abuse issues and home sanitation problems, failed to 

maintain adequate income, failed to demonstrate that they could keep the children safe, and had

been hostile and uncooperative to the Department’s service providers. The petition also alleged

that termination would be in the best interest of the children, because Jane Doe, John Doe and 

John Doe II can barely support themselves, and adoptive parents can provide a more financially 

and emotionally stable home environment for the children.

S.H. was born to Jane Doe and John Doe II in 2010. On June 16, 2010, S.H. was 

declared to be in imminent danger, and a Child Protective Act (CPA) petition was filed. On June 

17, 2010, S.H. was found to come within the CPA’s protection, but S.H. was ordered to be 

returned to Jane Doe and John Doe II on an extended home visit. However, on July 7, 2010, 

S.H. was removed from the home based upon unsanitary conditions. On July 29, 2010, the trial 

court entered an order adopting a renewed case plan involving all four children and the three 

parents. On July 30, 2010, the Department filed a petition to terminate Jane Doe and John Doe

II’s parental rights in S.H. on the same grounds that it petitioned to terminate their rights in the 

three older children. The two termination cases were consolidated. 

On February 3, 2011, the trial court issued its decision terminating the parental rights of 

Jane Doe and John Doe II in all four children, and terminating John Doe’s parental rights in S.S. 

and T.S. The trial court ruled that the State established by clear and convincing evidence that the 

children were individually and collectively neglected by their parents and that termination was in 

the children’s best interests. 

Jane Doe and John Doe appealed to this Court. John Doe II did not appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We recently set forth the relevant standard of review in Idaho Department of Health & 

Welfare v. Doe:

Grounds for termination of parental rights must be shown by clear and 

convincing evidence because each parent has a fundamental liberty interest in 

maintaining a relationship with his or her child. Clear and convincing evidence is 

generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is 

highly probable or reasonably certain. On appeal, this Court will not disturb the 
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magistrate court's decision to terminate parental rights if there is substantial, 

competent evidence in the record to support the decision. Substantial, competent 

evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. This Court is required to conduct an independent review of 

the magistrate court record, but must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 

the magistrate court's judgment because the magistrate court has the opportunity 

to observe witnesses' demeanor, to assess their credibility, to detect prejudice or 

motive and to judge the character of the parties.

150 Idaho 36, , 244 P.3d 180, 185 (2010) (quotations and citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A court may grant an order terminating parental rights where it finds that (1) termination 

is in the best interests of the child and (2) one of the statutory conditions for termination exists. 

Idaho Code § 16-2005(1). Neglect is one of the statutory conditions for termination. Idaho Code 

§ 16-2005(1)(b). The trial court found that each parent neglected his or her children and that 

termination was in each child’s best interest. 

Idaho Code § 16-2002(3) defines “neglected” as:

(a) Conduct as defined in section 16-1602(25), Idaho Code; or 

(b) The parent(s) has failed to comply with the court's orders in a child protective 

act case or the case plan, and reunification of the child with his or her parent(s) 

has not occurred within the time standards set forth in section 16-1629(9), Idaho 

Code.

Idaho Code § 16-1602(25)(a) provides that “neglected” means a child: “Who is without 

proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for 

his well-being because of the conduct or omission of his parents, guardian or other custodian or 

their neglect or refusal to provide them”.

Idaho Code § 16-1602(25)(b) provides that “neglected” means a child: “Whose parents, 

guardian or other custodian are unable to discharge their responsibilities to and for the child and, 

as a result of such inability, the child lacks the parental care necessary for his health, safety or 

well-being”.

Both Jane Doe and John Doe argue that there was not substantial and competent evidence 

to support the trial court’s findings of neglect. Jane Doe raises numerous other issues on appeal. 

A. John Doe.

The trial court found that John Doe neglected S.S. and T.S., both of whom have special 

needs, concluding that John Doe “is barely able to provide for himself” and that termination is in

both his and the children’s best interests. 
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John Doe argues that the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights in both S.S. 

and T.S. was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Specifically, John Doe 

argues that he did not neglect the children based on the following: (1) before his incarceration, he 

had both telephone and physical contact with them; (2) while in prison, he arranged for telephone 

visits with them and made positive steps on his case plan; and (3) after his incarceration, he 

immediately contacted the Department, arranged for visitation, and completed most of his case 

plan despite facing significant difficulties. John Doe does not challenge the best interests of the 

children prong of the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights. 

In reaching its decision, the trial court noted that John Doe completed some of the

requirements of his case plan: taking parenting classes, obtaining a substance abuse evaluation in 

2007, and regularly attending supervised visits with the children after his release from prison. 

However, the trial court found that, even though John Doe received services under a case plan 

for two years and had been out of prison for over seven months on the date of the trial, John Doe 

“utterly and completely failed to complete the two primary requirements of his case plan”: (1) 

providing a safe and stable home environment; and (2) providing a legal source of income for his 

family. John Doe admitted at trial that he does not have a suitable home environment for his 

children and that he has no money or job. Since his release from prison on May 6, 2010, he has 

“bounced between friends” for his living arrangements, and he has worked only one day and has 

lived off of support from friends, food banks, food stamps and clothing vouchers. He says his 

future plan is to return to his mother’s property in Mississippi, purchase a trailer home for the 

property and work for $8.50 per hour on a water-well drilling rig with his brother.

In Doe v. Department of Health and Welfare, this Court upheld the trial court’s decision 

to terminate parental rights where two of the primary factors upon which the trial court found 

neglect as defined in I.C. § 16-2005(b) were the parents’ unfavorable living arrangements and 

employment situation. 141 Idaho 511, 513–16, 112 P.3d 799, 801–04 (2005). Similarly, in this 

case, John Doe admits that he does not have suitable living arrangements and employment. 

In addition to John Doe’s failure to establish a suitable residence and obtain adequate 

employment, John Doe has a criminal history, including convictions for misdemeanor injury to a 

child, misdemeanor assault, lack of vehicle insurance, and felony writing checks with

insufficient funds. John Doe also has multiple convictions for driving without privileges, 

including one since his release from prison. He has no driver’s license, and his driving privileges 
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are suspended. He has not been paying child support for S.S. and T.S., nor has he been paying 

child support for his two other children. He has not yet obtained a GED. While he was initially 

sentenced to probation for the felony insufficient funds conviction, he violated his probation for 

drinking alcohol on the job. He failed his programming under the retained jurisdiction program. 

He was denied parole, because as he explained, “he would rather do his time than the

programming.” 

Despite John Doe’s efforts to maintain some contact with his children and despite some 

progress on his case plan, we hold that the trial court had substantial and competent evidence to 

find that John Doe neglected S.S. and T.S. under I.C. § 16-1602(25)(a) and (b) and I.C. § 16-

2002(3)(b). 

John Doe argues that his case is similar to Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 53 P.3d 341 

(2002). In Doe v. State, the district court affirmed the trial court’s decision to terminate the 

father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment and neglect where the father was 

incarcerated on the child’s date of birth, failed his rider program, never met his child, and never 

provided child support. Id. at 759–61, 53 P.3d at 342–44. This Court held that the finding of 

neglect and abandonment was not supported by substantial and competent evidence, finding that 

the Department trivialized the father’s efforts to have a relationship with his son, which were 

significant in light of the reality of the father’s “situation” (being incarcerated from birth through 

a significant portion of the child’s life up to the time of the termination), and that the Department 

did “little or nothing to assist in” the father’s efforts. Id. at 762, 53 P.3d at 345. This Court 

remanded the case for consideration of the evidence already presented as well as evidence of 

Doe’s conduct since his release from the penitentiary, stating: “The record stops short of 

evidence as to [the father’s] conduct since his release. If he has taken no steps to establish a 

parental relationship since his release that evidence may be considered . . . .”

The case at hand is distinguishable. John Doe was not incarcerated when his children 

were born, yet he did little at that time to provide parental care. While incarcerated, John Doe 

had phone visits with his children, but he failed to take advantage of work opportunities which 

could have allowed him to help provide for his children. John Doe received assistance from the 

Department in working on his case plan. Most significantly, there is evidence in the record of 

the steps John Doe has and has not taken since his release from prison, including his failure to 
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establish suitable living arrangements, his failure to obtain adequate employment and his 

conviction for driving without privileges.

Finally, John Doe claims that since his release from prison he has faced logistical 

difficulties which prevented him from discharging his parental duties. However, John Doe fails 

to point to neglect cases where logistical difficulties were deemed to excuse a parent from 

discharging their parental duties. John Doe relies on Doe v. Doe, 150 Idaho 46, 244 P.3d 190 

(2010). In Doe v. Doe, this Court held that the trial court’s finding that the father abandoned his 

child based upon the failure to maintain a normal parental relationship without just cause was not 

supported by substantial and competent evidence, because the record showed that the father had 

just cause based upon the fact that he did not have the time, money or requisite permission from 

the military to regularly visit his son. Id. at , 244 P.3d at 195–96. Doe v. Doe is inapplicable to 

the case at hand because it concerns the just cause defense to abandonment; there is no just cause 

defense for neglect. 

B. Jane Doe.

Jane Doe raises 13 issues on appeal. We find that the following four issues, each of 

which is addressed below, cover all issues Jane Doe properly raises on appeal: (1) whether the 

trial court’s finding that Jane Doe neglected the three older children is supported by substantial 

and competent evidence; (2) whether the Department was authorized to petition for the 

termination of Jane Doe’s parental rights in her youngest child and whether the court had 

jurisdiction over that petition; (3) whether the trial court’s finding that Jane Doe neglected her 

youngest child is supported by substantial and competent evidence; and (4) whether the trial 

court erred in terminating Jane Doe’s parental rights where the Department allegedly failed to 

inform her of her status as someone with a disability and allegedly failed to fairly assist her 

toward reunification with her children.

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Four issues raised by Jane Doe fail to meet the requirements of Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6), which provides: 

“The argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the 

reasons therefor, with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and the record relied upon.” See 

also Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 374, 234 P.3d 696, 698 (2010) (we will not consider an issue which is not 

supported by cogent argument and authority). First, Jane Doe asserts that her equal protection rights were violated 

because she has been subjected to a preemptive filing of the termination petition as to the youngest child, and she is 

unaware of anyone else being subjected to such a filing. She cites no authority other than referencing the Fourteenth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution and makes no further argument. Second, Jane Doe restates the same 

equal protection issue. Third, Jane Doe asserts that her rights to uniform court procedure were violated. Jane Doe 

cites no authority other than Article V, Section 26 of the Idaho Constitution, and makes no argument on this issue. 

Fourth, Jane Doe argues that two of her assigned caseworkers engaged in actions which were unfairly adverse to her 

interest while she attempted to complete her case plans. According to Jane Doe, the caseworkers lacked a 
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1. The trial court’s finding that Jane Doe neglected her three oldest children is supported 

by substantial and competent evidence.

The trial court terminated Jane Doe’s parental rights on the grounds of neglect and the 

best interests of the children upon concluding that while Jane Doe “was very pleasant to IDHW 

workers, and seemed to genuinely care about the children, [she] would simply never follow 

through with the responsibilities involving the children.” (Emphasis in the original). The trial 

court continued, “[Jane Doe] is barely able to provide for herself . . . let alone multiple children”.

The trial court found that Jane Doe “has not consistently provided or been able to provide 

an adequate safe and stable home environment for any of her children” while the children have 

been in her custody and in the Department’s legal custody. S.S. and T.S. were first removed 

from the home when a police officer found marijuana being smoked in Jane Doe’s home in their 

presence. On more than one occasion, the children were removed from the home on the basis of 

its filth. The trial court also found that despite the effort and services provided by both the 

Department and the drug court, Jane Doe “still has insufficient resources and/or abilities to care 

for any of her children—financial, residential, emotional or otherwise”, noting that there was “no 

. . . direct evidence of resources available to Jane Doe other than her nominal income from her 

meager employment.” Additionally, the trial court found that following the adjudicatory hearing 

in the first child protective petition, Jane Doe was provided with many services, including inhome parenting training, and while she showed some learning, the home was quite dirty and 

cluttered on certain occasions, she missed scheduled visits with the children and left others early, 

she failed to bring appropriate things like snacks and activities to the scheduled supervised visits, 

she had to be reminded what to do to complete the case plan, and she did not pay support. 

The trial court found that Jane Doe failed to satisfactorily complete her case plan during 

the approximately two-year period that caseworker Fuller oversaw the case by: (1) failing to 

verify her weekly attendance at Narcotics Anonymous meetings; (2) never consistently 

maintaining a safe, stable, drug-free home; (3) failing to maintain financial stability for her and 

 

commitment to reunify her with her children, which was supposed to be brought about by the case plans, and one of 

the caseworkers instructed John Doe to file for custody of his children, pitting him against her. She also argues that 

the Department used her visitation periods to unfairly glean negative information that may have been determinative 

of her case, and one of the case workers did not notify Jane Doe that the caseworker had already found that Jane Doe 

failed the case plan and that the caseworker had already pursued termination by internally filing a Report of 

Investigation for Termination. While Jane Doe thoroughly cites the record to identify these allegedly unfair acts and 

omissions of the Department and its workers, she cites to no authority in support of her argument that the trial court 

erred in terminating her rights when these acts and omissions allegedly occurred.
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her family; (4) failing to regularly attend therapy sessions; (5) failing to complete her substance 

abuse treatment; (6) failing to follow through with the recommendations from the assessments of 

S.S. and T.S. concerning their special needs; and (7) failing to demonstrate adequate parenting 

skills to keep her children safe. The trial court also found that Jane Doe failed the drug court 

based on six problems with her participation. 

Jane Doe argues that she demonstrated her willingness and ability to care for her 

children. While admitting that she did not fully complete her case plan, she argues that she 

substantially completed a number of the requirements and that the two caseworkers involved in 

her cases testified that they believed she could possibly complete her case plans. She admits that 

she failed to submit verification of attending Narcotics Anonymous meetings and did not 

complete her substance abuse treatment program, but she argues that the fact that she tested 

negative for drugs during the two CPA cases overcomes these failures. As to the trial court’s 

finding that she is unable to support herself, as well as any children, financially, Jane Doe argues 

that she was pregnant during much of time of the first CPA case, suffers mental illness, gained 

part-time employment in September 2010, and has increased the part-time hours she works. As 

to the trial court’s finding that she is unable to care for her two eldest children, who suffer severe 

behavioral and development problems respectively, Jane Doe argues that she has demonstrated

her ability to care for them by taking actions such as enrolling them in Head Start. She also 

argues that the trial court focused on limited instances concerning the cleanliness of her home

without giving enough credit to her for the home’s safety.

We recently upheld a termination on the grounds of neglect in Department of Health and 

Welfare v. John Doe (2011-2), 2011 WL 2682907, at *11 (Idaho July 12, 2011), in which the 

relevant facts were similar to the facts in this case. In John Doe (2011-2), we held that the 

failure to complete a case plan is relevant to finding neglect under I.C. §16-2002(3)(a) (based 

upon the definitions of neglect in I.C. § 16-1602(25)(a) and/or (b)) and is not limited to a finding 

of neglect under I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). Id. at *8–10. We upheld the termination where: 

Although [Father] has completed several of the required evaluations, he has not 

demonstrated a commitment to completing parenting classes for children with 

behavior disorders, or to completing substance abuse treatment classes. Father 

has also failed to demonstrate an ability to provide stable income and employment 

to provide for his family.

Id. at *11. 
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Similarly, in the case at hand, Jane Doe failed to fully comply with her case plan and 

failed to demonstrate an ability to provide stable income and employment to provide for her 

family. Additionally, she has failed to find suitable housing for her children. Ultimately, Jane 

Doe seems to be asking this Court to reweigh evidence upon which the trial court based its 

decision to terminate her parental rights in her three older children. However, it is well 

established that:

On appeal, the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence to determine if it 

was clear and convincing. Rather, “where a trial court has noted explicitly and 

applied a clear and convincing standard, an appellate court will not disturb the 

trial court's findings unless they are not supported by substantial and competent 

evidence.” State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 534, 535, 164 P.3d 814, 815 (2007).

Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 149 Idaho 207, 210, 233 P.3d 138, 141 (2010). The trial 

court explicitly noted and applied the clear and convincing standard, and the trial court’s findings 

are supported by the substantial and competent evidence set forth above. We therefore affirm the 

trial court in terminating Jane Doe’s parental rights in her three older children on the ground of 

neglect as defined in I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) and I.C. § 16-16205(a) and (b). 

Jane Doe also argues that the trial court improperly relied upon the fact that she chose not 

to testify in reaching its decision to terminate her parental rights. In the Feb. 3, 2011 Order, the 

trial court began his discussion concerning Jane Doe as follows:

[Jane Doe] did not testify at the trial, and as such, the Court has no competent 

evidence of her future plans. Additionally, much of the evidence presented by the 

State regarding [Jane Doe’s] failure to adequately complete her case plan and that 

[she] neglected each of her four children, remains uncontradicted.

In concluding this portion of the Feb. 3, 2011 Order, the trial court stated:

Because [Jane Doe] did not testify at the termination trial, and because there was 

no other direct evidence of resources available to [Jane Doe] other than her 

nominal income from her meager employment, there is no competent evidence 

upon which this Court could find that [Jane Doe] can care for herself, let alone 

any one of her children or any combination of her children.

Jane Doe relies on Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe I, 2011 WL 667969 

(Idaho, Feb. 25, 2011), in which we noted that it is permissible to draw negative inferences in a 

civil trial against a person who chooses not to testify. Id. at *10 (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 

425 U.S. 308, 318–19, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 1557–58, 47 L.Ed.2d 810, 821–22 (1976)). In Doe I, we

held that where there was no direct evidence concerning the mother’s abuse, neglect or 

abandonment of her children, “any inferences that could have been drawn from [the mother’s]
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invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights were not enough to support a finding that it would be 

contrary to the children's welfare to be placed in her care.” Id. The case at hand differs from 

Doe I. Upon reviewing the Feb. 3, 2011 Order, it does not appear that the trial court based his 

decision on any negative inferences drawn from Jane Doe’s decision not to testify; rather, he 

references Jane Doe’s decision not to testify merely to point out that there is little evidence to 

contradict the evidence put forth by the Department. And as already set forth, the Department’s 

evidence is substantial and competent. 

2. The Department was authorized to petition for the termination of Jane Doe’s parental 

rights in her youngest child, and the court had jurisdiction to consider the petition.

Jane Doe argues that it was premature for the Department to file a petition for the 

termination of her parental rights in her youngest child S.H, because she was not given a 

reasonable chance to complete the case plan. According to Jane Doe, “the Department wished to 

simply go through the motions of preparing a case plan, with no intention of it allowing for the 

constitutionally and statutorily required reunification.” She argues that under these 

circumstances, the Department is not authorized to petition for termination, the court does not 

have jurisdiction, and her due process rights have been violated.

The Department’s authority to petition for the termination of parental rights is set forth in 

both the CPA (chapter 16, title 16, Idaho Code) and the termination statute (chapter 20, title 16, 

Idaho Code). Pursuant to the termination statute, a “petition may be filed by . . . [a]n authorized 

agency”. I.C. § 16-2004. “Authorized agency” is defined as including “the department”, which 

is in turn defined as “the department of health and welfare.” Idaho Code § 16-2002(9) and (10). 

Idaho Code § 16-2003 grants courts exclusive jurisdiction over termination actions where the 

court has jurisdiction over the child under the CPA. Thus, pursuant to the termination statute, 

the Department is generally authorized to petition for the termination of parental rights, and the 

court has jurisdiction over such a termination proceeding as long as it has jurisdiction over the 

child under the CPA. 

Under the CPA: “If the child has been placed in the legal custody of the department or 

under its protective supervision pursuant to section 16-1619, Idaho Code, the department may 

petition the court for termination of the parent and child relationship in accordance with chapter 

20, title 16, Idaho Code.” Idaho Code § 16-1624. After a CPA petition has been filed, the court 

must set an adjudicatory hearing to be held within thirty days, and if a preponderance of the 

evidence at the adjudicatory hearing shows that the child comes within the court’s jurisdiction 
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under the CPA, then the court must place the child in either the legal custody of the Department 

or under its protective supervision. Idaho Code § 16-1619. If the court choses to place the child 

in legal custody of the Department, it must make additional written findings as provided in I.C. § 

16-1619(6); however, if the court chooses instead to place the child under the protective 

supervision of the Department, it need do no more than find jurisdiction under the CPA. Thus, 

under the authority granted by the CPA, the Department is authorized to petition for termination 

if the court has jurisdiction over the child under the CPA. 

Idaho Code § 16-1603 grants courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all proceedings 

under the CPA “concerning any child living or found within the state: (a) Who is neglected, 

abused or abandoned by his parents, guardian or other legal custodian, or who is homeless; or (b) 

Whose parents or other legal custodian fails to provide a stable home environment.” In the case 

at hand, S.H. was found to be within the court’s jurisdiction under the CPA at the adjudicatory 

hearing based upon an unstable home environment and was placed in the legal custody of the 

Department. On appeal, Jane Doe does not challenge the trial court’s finding of jurisdiction over 

S.H. at the adjudicatory hearing. This jurisdiction is the trial court’s basis for jurisdiction in 

these termination proceedings; therefore, we hold that the Department had the authority to pursue 

the termination of Jane Doe’s rights in her youngest child, and the court had jurisdiction over the 

petition.

Jane Doe also argues that both due process and the Idaho Code require the Department to 

make reasonable efforts at reunification before a court can terminate parental rights. Jane Doe 

argues that in a case like this where there is a case plan under the CPA, the parent must be given 

a sufficient chance to complete the case plan before termination is pursued in order for the 

Department to fulfill its obligatory efforts to reunite the parent and child. Jane Doe relies on the 

purpose section of the termination statute, which provides in relevant part: 

(1) The purpose of this chapter is to: 

. . .

(b) Provide permanency for children who are under the jurisdiction of the 

court through the child protective act, chapter 16, title 16, Idaho Code, 

where the court has found the existence of aggravated circumstances or 

that reasonable efforts to return the child to his or her home have failed.

Idaho Code § 16-2001. Relatedly, the policy provision of the CPA notes the importance of 

family unity. Idaho Code § 16-1601. 
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Both the termination statute and the CPA seek to balance aims that are sometimes in 

conflict—such as the best interests of the child and family unity. While the purpose provision of 

the termination statute suggests that the termination statute addresses only those cases where the 

court has found either aggravated circumstances or the failure of reasonable efforts to return the 

child, the purpose provision in the termination statute is not a source of specific substantive 

criteria for termination, and while the purpose and policy provisions may shed some light on the 

statutes, the specific provisions govern. As already explained, I.C. § 16-1624 explicitly 

authorizes the Department to file a petition to terminate parental rights after a court has placed 

the child in either the legal custody of the Department or under its protective supervision upon 

concluding the adjudicatory hearing pursuant to I.C. § 16-1619. Upon conclusion of the 

adjudicatory hearing in this case, the trial court found that it had jurisdiction and placed S.H. in 

the legal custody of the Department. Thus, at this point, the Department was authorized to 

petition for termination. And, whether the Department had enough admissible evidence to 

support the clear and convincing standard for termination was not at issue at this moment in 

time; this issue was left to the trial process, affording Jane Doe the requisite due process 

protections.

Jane Doe also relies on the time standard under the definition of neglect in I.C. § 16-

2002(3)(b), which provides that neglect means: “The parent(s) has failed to comply with the 

court's orders in a child protective act case or the case plan, and reunification of the child with 

his or her parent(s) has not occurred within the time standards set forth in section 16-1629(9), 

Idaho Code.” Idaho Code § 16-1629(9) provides that “[t]here shall be a rebuttable presumption 

that if a child is placed in the custody of the department and was also placed in out of the home 

care for a period not less than fifteen (15) out of the last twenty-two (22) months from the date 

the child entered shelter care, the department shall initiate a petition for termination of parental 

rights.”

Idaho Code § 16-2002(3)(b) sets forth one of three definitions of neglect, each of which 

definitions are independent bases upon which a parent’s rights may be terminated. As set forth 

in the next section (infra Part B.3), we affirm the trial court’s termination of Jane Doe’s parental 

rights in her youngest child based on neglect as defined in both I.C. § 16-1602(25)(a) and (b), not 

as defined in I.C. §16-2002(3)(b). Therefore, the time standard referenced in I.C. § 16-
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2002(3)(b) has no bearing on this decision, and the definitions of neglect in I.C. § 16-1602(25)(a) 

and (b) do not contain a time standard. 

3. There is substantial and competent evidence in support of the trial court’s finding that 

Jane Doe neglected her youngest child.

The trial court ruled that the Department is entitled to rely upon the course of conduct of 

the parents involving the three older children to support terminating the parents’ rights in S.H., 

the youngest child. Jane Doe acknowledges that evidence concerning the other three children 

can be considered by the trial court, but she contends that this evidence alone cannot suffice to 

support the termination of her rights in another child—S.H. Jane Doe argues that the trial court’s 

decision to terminate her rights in S.H. was based upon the evidence concerning the three older

children in violation of her due process rights.

First, the trial court did not base his decision solely upon evidence from the other CPA 

case involving the three older children. S.H. was initially removed from his home after an inhome risk assessment by a Department caseworker found animal feces, a strong odor of urine 

and general filth and clutter at Jane Doe’s home three days after S.H.’s birth. These conditions 

were a continuation of Jane Doe’s habits which led the Department to act with respect to the 

three older children approximately one year prior. S.H. returned to Jane Doe’s home on an 

extended home visit, but less than one month later, S.H. was again removed from her home 

based upon unsanitary conditions. While Jane Doe finally obtained marginal employment in 

September of 2010, the trial court found that her part-time job was “clearly insufficient to 

support any child or combination of children.” The trial court also noted that Jane Doe and John 

Doe II recently lost the last family residence they occupied together and that Jane Doe moved in 

the late summer of 2010 into a friend’s residence, which her own sister testified was not safe or 

suitable for children. At the time of the termination trial, Jane Doe lived in an apartment with 

both her biological father and her stepfather, which was also deemed to be an unsuitable home 

for a child. 

Second, nothing prohibits basing a decision to terminate on conduct related to the other 

CPA case, as long as that evidence suffices to show that Jane Doe neglected S.H. “Neglected” is 

defined in I.C. §16-1602(25), in relevant part, as a child:

(a) Who is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or 

other care or control necessary for his well-being because of the conduct or 

omission of his parents, guardian or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to 

provide them . . . ; or 
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(b) Whose parents, guardian or other custodian are unable to discharge their 

responsibilities to and for the child and, as a result of such inability, the child 

lacks the parental care necessary for his health, safety or well-being . . . .

Evidence that Jane Doe merely is involved in another CPA proceeding involving other children 

might not be highly probative as to whether the child in the present case has been neglected. 

However, specific evidence from another CPA proceeding concerning Jane Doe’s ability at 

present to provide parental care and control may be probative of neglect as defined in I.C. § 16-

16025(a) or (b), particularly in a situation like this where the facts of the case involving the three 

other children overlap temporally with the case involving S.H. 

We hold that the trial court’s finding that Jane Doe neglected S.H. under I.C. § 16-

1602(25)(a) and (b) is supported by substantial and competent evidence based upon both the 

evidence directly concerning Jane Doe’s parenting of S.H., set forth earlier in this section, as 

well as the evidence concerning her ability to parent her three older children, set forth in supra

Part III.B.1.

Jane Doe also argues that by allowing the State to rely on the evidence concerning the 

case of the three older children, the trial court impermissibly put the burden on her to prove that 

she is capable to parent her youngest child. Jane Doe fails to recognize the difference between 

putting the burden of proof on the wrong party and finding that the party with the burden of 

proof met its burden. The trial court found, based upon the evidence concerning the three other 

children and the evidence directly concerning S.H., that the Department met its burden to prove 

by clear and convincing evidence that Jane Doe neglected S.H. After the Department made such 

a showing, it was Jane Doe’s burden to come forward with contradictory evidence, and as 

explained earlier, there was virtually no contradictory evidence in the record. Supra Part III.B.1.

Jane Doe next draws this Court’s attention to Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. 

Doe II, where this Court held that there need not be a showing of actual harm or the risk of harm 

in order to terminate parental rights on the ground of neglect. 150 Idaho 36, 42, 244 P.3d 180, 

186 (2010). Jane Doe correctly points out that Doe II was decided based on neglect as defined 

pursuant to I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b); whereas, here, Jane Doe neglected S.H. as defined in I.C. § 16-

1602(25)(a) or (b). Due to this distinguishing feature, Jane Doe suggests that holding of Doe II

does not apply. However, in Doe II, this Court reached its decision based on the fact that the 

language of I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) “does not require the court to make a finding of actual harm or 

a risk of harm before finding neglect.” 150 Idaho at 42, 244 P.3d at 186. Similarly, neither I.C. 
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§ 16-1602(25)(a) nor (b) require the court to making a finding of actual harm or risk of harm; 

these provisions define a “neglected” child, in short, as a child who either is without proper 

parental care and control or has no parents who are able to discharge their parental 

responsibilities.

Finally, Jane Doe argues that her fundamental right to parent S.H. is violated by 

terminating her rights in S.H. shortly after S.H. was born, because she has not been given a 

chance to demonstrate her ability to provide S.H. the necessary parental care. While Jane Doe 

has a fundamental right to parent her child, Idaho’s termination statute does not violate that 

fundamental right. In order to terminate parental rights based on neglect, the trial court must find 

that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that the parent neglected her child 

and that termination is in the child’s best interest. Id. at 42, 244 P.3d at 186. This standard 

suffices. Generally, it may be more difficult for the Department to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that a parent neglected her child as defined in I.C. § 16-1602(25)(a) or (b) 

when the child is very young; however, so long as the Department meets that burden, the 

parent’s due process rights have not been violated. 

4. The trial court did not err in terminating Jane Doe’s rights where the Department 

and/or its caseworkers failed to notify her that she was disabled under applicable law.

Jane Doe asserts that she was unfairly disadvantaged in both CPA cases because the 

Department lacked any procedure for determining whether she was disabled, which allegedly 

made it more difficult for her to complete her case plans. In February 2009, Jane Doe was 

evaluated by a clinical psychologist, who diagnosed her with Bipolar I Disease and generalized 

anxiety disorder. According to Jane Doe, she was never notified of any change in her status

under Idaho law as the result of her evaluation, and the Department did not treat her as it should 

have treated her given her status as a disabled person.

Under the CPA, Idaho Code § 16-1619 provides: “At the adjudicatory hearing, parents or 

guardians with disabilities shall have the right to introduce admissible evidence regarding how 

use of adaptive equipment or supportive services may enable the parent or guardian to carry out 

the responsibilities of parenting the child by addressing the reason for the removal of the child.” 

Under the termination statute, Idaho Code § 20-2005(6) provides in relevant part: “If the parent 

has a disability, as defined in this chapter, the parent shall have the right to provide evidence to 

the court regarding the manner in which the use of adaptive equipment or supportive services 

will enable the parent to carry out the responsibilities of parenting the child.” “Disability” is 
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defined under Idaho Code §16-1602(14) as, in relevant part, “any mental or physical impairment 

which substantially limits one (1) or more major life activity of the individual including, but not 

limited to, self-care, manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, learning or working, or a 

record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.” 

Neither the CPA nor the termination statute imposes a requirement on the Department to 

notify Jane Doe of her status as a disabled person. As a disabled person, Jane Doe is statutorily 

granted a right to put forth evidence during the adjudicatory hearing and the termination 

proceedings regarding the manner in which adaptive equipment or supportive services would

assist her in discharging her parental responsibilities. Jane Doe does not argue that the trial court

denied her this right. She had the opportunity to put forth evidence of adaptive equipment or 

supportive services which could assist her in providing proper parental care despite her 

disabilities. Jane Doe does not point to any such evidence which was put forth but which the 

trial court failed to consider in finding neglect, and we do not see any indication that the trial 

court treated her unfairly due to her disability. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order terminating John Doe’s and Jane Doe’s parental rights. 

Justices J. JONES, W. JONES, HORTON and TROUT, Pro Tem, CONCUR.