The Honora ble Geor g e Caram Steeh, U nited States District J udg e for the Easter

n District * of Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. 1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0057n.06 F iled: Janu ary 26, 2009 No. 07-5859 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
F RE DE RI CK

M . C RE USE RE , P laintif f-App ellant,
v. ROSA L. WEAVER, et al., De fend ant s- App e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) O N A P P E A L F R O M T H E U N I T ED STA TES DI STR IC T C OU RT F OR THE EA S TE RN D IS TR IC T O F K EN TU CKY

Before: G IBBO NS and COOK, Cir cuit Judges; STE EH, District Judge. * J UL IA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Jud ge. Pl a in ti f f

- a p p e ll an t F r e d e r ic k

M
. Cr euser e appea ls the district cou rt ’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C . § 1983 civil rig hts action arisingout of the
a dmi nis tr a tiv e re vo c a tio n of his te a c hin g c e rt if ic a te
. B e c a

us e the de fe nd ants are immun e fr om s uit and bec ause this suit is barred due to i s s u e and c laim prec lusion, we aff irm the judg ment of the dis tr ic t c ourt
. I. The fa cts in this matter stem from incidents beg inning dur ing the 1994-1995 school y ear and include lawsuits i n federal c ourt and Ke ntucky state cour

ts. The district court distilled theCre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

2 vo lum ino us re c or d to the fo llo wi ngre le va nt f a c ts: Plaintiff Fre deric k M. Creuser e wa s ce rt ified as a seconda ry teac her a

nd awa rded his B ache lor of Scienc e deg ree from the Unive rsity of Ke ntucky

in 1970. He earne d his Master of Science deg ree from Ea stern Ke ntucky University

in 1972. I n 1972, plaintiff moved to New Mexi co as a

Ph.D. candidate
. Plaintiff later returne d to Kentucky and, on Aug ust 12, 1994, he ac cepte d a hig h s c ho ol tea chin g and c oa c hin g po sit ion

a t H e nr y County Pub lic Sc ho ols (“H CPS ”) in Ke ntucky . At the end of the 1994-1995 school y ear, p laintiff was evaluated by

Principal Dar

rel Tr eec e, who r ecommende d that plaintiff not be re -hired for the f ollowing y ear . On Ap ri l 7, 19 95 , the Sc ho ol B oa rd ma ile d a le tte r to pla int if f t e rm inatin g his c o n t r a c t a n d i m m e d i a t e l y r e l i e v i n g h i m o f h i s c o a c h i n g an d t e a c h i n g d u t i e s . It informed him that he would not be r e-hire d for the 1995- 1996 school y ea r, citing insubordination, incompetency , neg lect, and c onduct unbec oming a teac her. Plaintiff initi ated a

timely response to the termination, and a hear ing on the matter was conducte d. The hearing panel reinstated plainti ff f or the re mainder of

the contra ct but ag ain re lieved him of all duties. The action wa s appea led to the Henr y Circuit Court and the Kentuc ky Court of Appea ls, eac h of which uphe l d the reinstateme nt for the r emainder of the school y ear . On J uly 25, 1995, the Kentuc ky

Ed u ca t ion Professional Standards B oard (“ KE PSB ” ) n oti fi e d p la int if f t hat it ha d p ro ba

ble caus e to c on du c t a

c e rt if ic a te revoc ation hear ing. T here afte r, plaintiff filed a fede ral law suit in t he Ea stern District of Ke ntucky

challeng ing KEPSB’s authority to rev oke his teac hing c ertificate and alleg ing violations of his civil rig hts. During the pendency of the fe dera l action, the KEPSB held the c ertifica te re vocation hea

ring in abey ance . Creusere v . W

eave r , No. 99-101, slip op. at 1-3 (E
. D. Ky . Mar. 20, 2007) (“ Creusere I ”). The district court dismissed Mr. Creuser e’s f eder al lawsuit ag ainst the KEP SB i n May of 1998, and the KEPSB re sumed proce eding s to revoke Cre usere ’s t eac hing cer tificate shortly there afte r. Id. The dis tr ic t c ourt

we nt o n to de sc ri be su

bs e qu e nt e ve nts a s f

oll ow s: Duringthe interve n in g

p e r io d , plaintiff bec ame e mploy ed with the Coving ton I ndepende nt Schools (“CI S”). On Apr il 9, 1999, the KEP S B am en d ed its charg es ag ainst plaintiff to include a l l eged wrong ful conduc t occur ring during plaintiff’s e mpl oy me nt w iththe CI S. O n M ay 5, 19 99 , th e KE PSB fi le d an e me rg e nc y re qu e st to s us pe nd pla int if

f’ s te a c hin g c e rt if

ic a te ba se d on le tte rs se nt b y pla int if f a lle g e dly threatening phy sical har

m to hims elf a

nd others. The KE P S B e ntere d a tempora ry order immediately

suspending the ce rtificate
.Cre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

The de fenda

nts-appellee s fall into three se parate c a te g o r ie s : the KEPSB member s, Matthew 1 Mooney , and the pro se defe ndants. The KE PSB m em b er s ar e t hose individuals employ ed by KEPSB: Ros a

L
. We a v e r, Ter ry J ean Poindexter, Marc ia Seiler, Dor is Bar low, Tim Dedman, Sandra W
. H ar r i s , C h e r yl H aye s , F r an c e s S t e e nb e r g e n , B e v e r l y T o m l i n , Z e l l a W e l l s , A r l e t t a M
. K e n n e dy, L y dia Coffe y , J ac k D. Rose, Susan L eib, Gene Wil hoit, J oseph E. Ea rly , Gre g ory

McClellan, and Charles Wade. Matthew Mooney ’s attorne y submitt ed a se parate brief on his behalf
. Mooney claimed that only two issues in Creuser e’s brief pertain to Mooney : whether the district court prope rly dismiss ed the damage cla im s a g a in M oo ne y ba se d o n ju dic ia l im mun ity , q ua lif ie d im mun ity , o r E le ve nth Amendment sover eig n immunit y , or be ca u s e t he cla ims were moot. Mooney serve d as a he aring of fi c e r i n th e KEP S B a dmini str a tiv e a c tio n a g a ins t Cr e us e re fr om S e pte mbe r 1 0, 19 98 , unti l hi s v o l u n t ar y r e c u s a l o nJ u n e 9 , 1 9 9 9
. A tt h e t i m e o f t h e h e ar i n g , M o o n e y w a s m ar r i e d t o C h e r yl L alonde Moone y , an employ ee of the Of fice of the Ke ntucky

Attorney Gene ral’s Civil Division’s B oa rd s and Ag e nc ie s B ra

nc h, wh e re sh e pr ov ide s le g a l se rv ic e s to sma ll a dmi nis tr a tiv e a g e nc ie s. Ms. Mooney

did not participate in a

ny administrat ive ac tion ag ainst Creuser e. Creuse re f iled a motion to d is qu a li f

y M o o n e y f r o m t h e p r o c e e d in g s o nM ay

2 4 , 1 9 9 9 , an d

M o o n e y w it h dr e w and disqualified himself as he aringoffice r on June 10, 1999. De fe n d an t s -ap p el l ee s R

u t h H. W eb b an d

C o u rt n ey

T
. B a x t e rar e p ro ce ed i n g pro se and adopted the statements and arguments of Mooney ’s brief and KEPSB’ s brief on D ece mber 10, 2007, and De cembe r 12, 2007, re spectively
. 3

I n response , plaintiff filed [this federa l lawsuit] on May 24 , 1 9 9 9
. The KEPSB sche duled an e merg ency suspension hear ing f

or May 28, 1999 based on the threateni n g t o nes of plaintiff’ s letters. Plaintiff moved [the district court] for a temporar y restra ining order to enjoin the hearing , which the court denied. O n May 28, 1 9 9 9 , an emer g ency suspension hear ing w as held, a nd plaintiff’s tea ching cer tificate r emained suspe nded af ter that he aringon an eme rg ency basis. On J une 23, 1999, the KE PSB defe ndant s fi l ed a motion t o dismiss , which wa s f ull y br ie fe d in

Se pte mbe r 1 99 9. On

Oc tob e r 2 2, 19 99 , [th e dis tr ic t c ourt ] or de re d th a t th is c a se be he ld i n a bey anc e pe nd ingpla int if f’ s e xha us tio n o f h is reme dies under K entucky law. I n 200 1, the KE PSB imp os e d a fi na l c e rt if

ic a te re vo c a tio n o n p la int if f w ith a fi ve-y ear wa iti ngpe ri od

be fo re re a

pp lic a tio n. Pla int if

f a pp e a le d to the F ra

nk lin Circuit Court which, afte r taking proof, overr uled the appe al and a ffirme d the orde r of the KE PSB . Pl a int if

f a pp e a le d to the Ke ntu c ky

Cou rt of Ap pe a ls whic h, on

July 15 , 2 00 5, iss ue d a

n o pin ion re je c tin g a ll of his argume nts and a ff ir min g the F ra

nk lin Circuit Court. On April 12, 2006, the Kentucky Supreme Court denied discre tionary revie w. Creusere I

, slip op. at 3-4. Creuser e then filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim i n the United States District Court f o r th e E a s te r

n D is tr ic t o f K e n tu c ky . D e f e n d an ts mo v e d to d is mi s s , an d th e d is tr ic t court

1Cre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

4 g rante d defe ndants’ motion to dismiss on Marc h 20, 2007, finding that: (1) Cre usere ’s claims for money damag es under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 ag ainst the KEPSB member s are barr ed based upon K entucky ’s soverei gn i m m unity under the Eleventh Ame ndment; (2) the individual KE PSB me mbe rs are a lso e nti tle d to abs olute immun ity ; (3) in t he a lte rn a tiv e , th e ind ivi du a l K EPSB members a

re e ntitled to qualified immuni ty ; (4) Creuse re’ s orig in al cl ai m s are barr ed by the doctrines of

issue and cla im preclusion; (5) to the e x tent Creuser e’s c laims seek re view of the Kentucky state court decisions, they are barr ed by

the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine; a nd (6) Cre usere ’s proposed amended c laims ag ainst two new de fenda nts, Curtsinger

and Weber , are not barre d by the statut e of lim itatio ns du e to e qu ita ble tol lin g ; ho we ve r, the dis tr ict court de c lin e d to e xer c ise its supplemental jurisdiction over those c laims. Cr e us e re fi le d mo tio ns to ob ta in an inj un c tio n, a wr it of pr oh ibi tio n o r a wr it o f m and a mus ; to a me nd the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ing s p ur su ant t o F e de ra l Rule of Civ il Pro c e dure (“ F RCP” ) 5 2; t o reope n, alter, amend, or vacate t he judgment pursuant to FRCP 59; to obt ain summary judgme nt; and to rec eive r econside ration pursua nt to FRCP 60(b). The district court state d that these motions were “esse ntially mov[ ing] the cour t to revisit and alter its pre vious decision” but “pr ovid[ ing] no g rounds upon which thi s court may disturb its decision.” Creusere v . W eave r , No. 99-101 (E .D. Ky . J une 14, 2007) (or der de ny ing Cre usere ’s motions). The district court ther efor e denie d the motions on J une 14 , 2 00 7. Cr e us e re su

bmi tte d h is pro se appellate brief to this court on November 6, 2007. Creuser e
a dv anc e d tw e nty

argume nts se e kin g re lie f, wh ic h a re lis te d a s f

oll ow s: 1. Th e Di str ic t Co ur

t e rr e d by no t unde rs tand ing imp or tant fa c ts fo r t

he his tor y of thi s case , and fa cts nec essar

y to decide this ca se. 2. Appellant Creuse re did not re ceive a fa ir hea ring befor e an i ndepende nt and impartial dec isionmaker in the state a dminist rative pr ocess.Cre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

5 3. Ap pe lla

nt C re us ere wa s d e nie d a tim e ly and me anin g fu l he ari ngfo r h is s tate administrative proc ess and f or his fede ral c ivil rights complaint. 4. Th e Di str ic t Cour

t er re d b y fo rc ingCr e us e re to e xha us t a ll s tate re me die s f

or his § 19 83 c omp la int and a g a ins t his wi ll t o s e e k a n a pp e a l in a state c ourt

fo rum w ith few rig hts and a re stricted re view, denie d a fe dera l forum. 5. T h e Di strict Court erre d by denying Cre usere his seventh amendme nt rig ht to a trial by a jury of his peer s for Cre usere ’s fe dera l claims. 6. The District Court e rre d when the court decide d or disreg arde d questions of fac t a jury should have de termined. 7. The District Court er

red w hen the c ou rt d i d not reviewCreuser e’s e vidence and sworn af fidavits in a light most favor able t o C reusere, inc luding spe ech reta liation/mental health issues, while dismissi ng the Appellee s. 8. The District Court er

red a nd abused its discre tion by not issuing a t imely

and meaning ful injunction in 1999. 9. The District Court er

red a nd denied Creuser e his f

irst a mendment rig ht to seek a Court le g a l r e dr e ss a

nd its re su lt in his favo r, by a llo wi ng an admin istra tiv e bo ard to counter mand a Court dec ision. 10 . T he Di str ic t Co ur

t e rr e d b y c omp ari ngCr e us e re ’s sc ho ol di stric t du e pr oc e ss rig hts to an internal prison proc edure
. 11. The District Court er

re d b y n o t protec ting a

nd upholding Cre usere ’s 1996-97 satisfac tory

teac hing de termination by Covington schools. 12. The District Court er red by not permitting Cre usere t o am end his orig inal complaint to clarify

orig inal claims and issues and a dd those occ uring [si c] therea fter arising from the or igina l nucleus of f acts a nd issues in 1999. 13 . T he Di str ic t Co ur

t e rr e d b y no t he ari ngCr e us e re ’s c on sti tut ion a l li be rt y c la ims resulting from untrue disseminations to ot hers. 14. The District Court erred by dismiss ing the Appellee s, disreg ardingCreuser e’s undisputed aff

idavits and motions for summary judgme nt. 15. The District Court er red a nd abused its discre tion by not gr anting Creuser e’s Motion for a Writ of Prohibition an d / or Mandamus, etc. wrong ly stating it lac ked jurisdiction to do so. 16
. Th e Di str ic t Co ur

t e rr e d b y dis mis sin g the Ap pe lle e s f un c tio nin gsimult ane ou sly a s c omp la ini ngpa

rt y , p ro se c uto r a

nd de c is ionmake r whe n n o a bs olute immun ity exis ted in 1871 for this ag ency tri-func tion, and for c onstitut ional violations and administrative func tions clearly not adjudicative. 17. The District Court er

red by dismiss ing the Appellee s on the g rounds of qua lified immunit y , and not addr essing Creuser e’s c laims. 1 8
. T h e D i s t ri ct C o u rt erre d b y d i s m i s s i n g t h e Ap p el l ee s o nt h e gr o u n d s o f s o v er ei gn immunit y , applying a

wrongversion of K

RS 161.028 not in effe ct in 1994-2000 and ignor ing KEPSB actions for matters outside of Ky
. 19. The District Court er

red by dismiss ing the Appelle es on g rounds of issue a nd claim pre clusion and the Rooker -F eldman doctr ine.Cre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

As an init ia l matt e r, we no te that this ca se wa s su bmi tte d o n th e br ie fs , a s is c us tom ary in 2 thi s cou rt wh e n a p art

y is pr o s e . Cr e us e re , ho we ve r, e le c te d to a tte nd c ourt the da y the c a se wa s to be submitted, even thoug h argument was not schedule d. He ha s filed a post-submission moti on or co mp l ai n t , ad dre s s ed t o C h i ef J u d ge Da n n y Bo ggs an d fo rw ar d ed t o t h i s p an el s i n ce C h i e f J u d ge Bog g s is not a part of the pa nel assig ned to the ca se. In the motion, he claims that there wer e “ope n court laug hter a

nd ridicule by

the judg es” that indicate bias in his case . Subsequent to this fili ng , he ha s f ile d a mis c on du c t c omp la int

a g a ins t th e pa

ne l. Creuser e mischar acte rizes and misunderstands what occur red in court. When his case was called, f or the sole pur

pose of noting that it was to be submit ted on the brie fs, the deputy cler k rea d the leng thy

sty l e o f t h e case , including the full name of e ach de fenda nt. There wer e brie f, lig ht c omm e nts (m isq

uo te d b y Cr e us e re in h is m oti on ) d ir e c te d at th e de pu ty c le rk abo ut hi s c ho ic e to rea d t h e fu l l sty le ra

ther than use a shortene d version, as w ould be more ty pical. No one made a c omm e nt i nd ic a tin g bia s or re latin g in any wa y to the me ri ts of the c a se . Any la ug hte r w a s si mil arl y not relate d to the merits or the pa rties, but to the court’s ow n employ ee. To the extent Creusere ’s filing s are construed a s a m otion for recusa l, the motion is denied. The statute 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides that: “Any justice, judg e, or ma g istrate of the United States sha ll disqualify

himself in any

proce eding in which his impartiality might re asonably

be questioned.” §455(b) state s that a judg e shall also re cuse himself if “ he has a p er s o n al bias or pr ejudice conce rning a par

ty .” Rec usal is an objective sta ndard a nd is not based on t he subjec tive viewpoint of a pa rty
. W heele r v. Southland Corp. , 875 F.2d 1246, 1251 ( 6th Cir. 1989). I n order for rec usal to be justified, a judge ’s pre judice or bia s must be personal, e manating from some sourc e other

than par ticipation in the judicial pr ocee dings. United States v. J amieson , 427 F.3d 394, 405 (6th Cir. 2005). The insi g nificant events when this ca se wa s called do not satisfy the objective sta

ndard f or re cusal or ind i ca t e b i as on the pa rt of the pa

nel, let alone the sort of pe rs on a l, e xtra

jud ic ia l bi a s r e qu ir ingre c us a l. See Nair v. Oak

land Count

y C mt y. Mental He alth Auth. , 443 F.3d 469, 473- 77 (6th Cir. 3 2006) (c ollecting case s). 6 20. The District Court denie d Creuser e equal pr otection under the law a nd threw out the entire mental hea lth profession by its abey ance . Br ief for Appellant at 2- 3, Creusere v. W eave r , ___ F.3d ___ ( 6th Cir. 2008) (No. 99-101)
. 2 II. Whil e ther e is conflictingauthority from this court about whe ther we m u s t re s o l ve a
sovere ign- immunit y

defe nse bef

ore pr ocee ding to the merits, we g ener ally consider jur isdictional 3 matters befor e rea ching the merits. Se e Ro ssb or ou gh Mf g. Co. v . Tr im ble , 3 01 F .3 d 4 82 , 4 89 (6 thCre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

7 Cir. 2002). C re u s er e arg ues on appe al that the district cour t erre d in finding that his mot ions for i n j u n ct i o n s aga i n s tt h e d ef en d an t s we re b arre d

b y Ke n tu ck y ’ s E l ev en t h Am en dm en ts o v er ei gn immun ity . Wh e the r E le ve nth Am e ndme nt s ov e re ig n im mun ity e xists in a

ny pa rt icu lar c a se is a qu e sti on of c on sti tut ion a l la

w that th is c ou rt

re vie ws de novo. E

rnst v. Rising , 427 F.3d 351, 359 (6th Cir. 2005) ( en banc ). The E leventh Amendment provide s that: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construe d to ext end to any suit in l aw or

equity , commence d or prose cuted ag ainst one of the U nited States by Citi zens of an o t h er S tate, or by Citi zens or Subjects of any For eig n State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI . I n addition to the states themselves, Eleventh Amendment immunit y can also extend to depar tments a nd ag encie s of states. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984). To de termine wh et her a n entity is a state depa

rtment or
a g e nc y fo r p ur po se s of the El e ve nth Am e ndme nt, the pr ima ry iss ue is w he the r t

he state its e lf

wo uld be liable for money damag es ag ainst the entity
. Brotherton v. Cleve land , 173 F .3 d 5 52 , 5 60 -6 1 ( 6th Cir. 1999). Courts also look to such other fa ctors as howstate law de fines the e ntity and the de g ree of control the state exercises ove r the e ntity
. Id. at 561. KE PSB wa s c re a te d b y

Ke ntu c ky

statut e and is an a g e nc y

of Ke ntu c ky ’s state g ov e rnme nt, which exerc ises control over KEPSB and pr ovides its funding. See KRS § 161.028(1) (“[The B oard is] an ag ency

and instrumentality

of the Com m o n we al th, in the perfor mance of esse ntial g overnme ntal functions.”) . There is n o s er ious doubt in t his case that KEPSB is a g overnme nt
a g e nc y that th e re fo re e njo y s E le ve nth Am e ndme nt s ov e re ig n immun ity a g a ins t Cr e us e re ’s c la ims for money

damag es. Al tho ug h in div idu a l me mbe rs of KE PSB are a lso immun e fr om s uit fo r m on e y

damage s,Cre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

8 Edelman v . Jordan , 415 U.S. 651, 666 (1974), the Ele venth Amendment doe s not bar an injunction to prohibit a state offic ial from enf orcinga state statute that violates the United States Constituti on, Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123, 16 7 (1 9 0 8 ). T o deter mine whether

an injunction can be enfor ced ag ainst a st ate official, a court should conduct a “straig htforwa rd inquiry into whether the complaint alleg es an ongoing violation of federa l law and seeks relief properly char acte rized as prospe ctive.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md. , 5 3 5 U. S
. 6 3 5 , 6 4 5 (2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Idaho v. Coeur d’AleneTribe of Idaho , 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997) (O’Connor, J ., concur ring ) (in t er n al quotation marks omitted)). Creu s e r e s e e k s a

p e r ma n e n t i n ju n c ti o n“ p r o h ib it in g th e A p p e ll e e s f r o m d is s e mi n a ting statements or doc uments to others false ly indicating the Appellant ha s eng ag ed in cr iminal conduct
or th at the A

pp e lla nt h a s ang e r m ana g e me nt p ro ble ms a nd is d ang e ro us to h ims e lf or oth e rs , requiringcompelle d m en t al health tre atments as a c ondition for reinstateme nt of his teaching
c e rt if ic a te .” He a lso se e ks a

pe rm ane nt i nju

nc tio n p ro hib iti ngthe de fe nd ants fro m rel e a sin g his Social Security

number to any

other individual. Creuser e ca

nnot meet his burden because he has f ailed to alleg e an ong oing violation of fede ral law . His reque sts for injunctive relief there fore do not satisfy the re quirements of Ex pa rte Y oung . See V

erizon , 535 U. S. at 645
. To the c on tr ary , his moti on fo r a n in jun c tio n me re ly

re pe a ts his various complaints about how KEPSB ha s treate d him in the past. He points to no case s stating that it is a violation of fede ral law to impose conditions on an applica nt in order to be r ece rtified as a tea cher . Fur

thermore , we ha

ve held that the disc losure of a n individual’s Socia l Security number does not implicate a c onstitut ional privac y interest. Lambert v. Hartman , 517 F.3d 433, 445 (6th Cir.Cre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

9 2008). Since Cre usere is merely seekingto relitigate re t rospec tive harms rather than to pre vent prospec tive violations of federa l law, his reque st for injunctive re lief does not fit within the Ex pa rte Y oung ex c e pti on

to E le ve nth

Am e ndme nt i mmunit

y and is the re fo re ba

rr e d b y the El e ve nth Amendment. III
. Th e di str ic t c ourt

fo un d th a t th e ind ivi du a l bo ard me mbe rs we re e nti tle d to a bs olute immun ity
. Th is c ourt re vie ws a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt of summa

ry jud g me nt o n th e ba sis of a bs olute i m m u n i t y deno v o. Ho llo way v . B ru sh , 2 20 F .3 d 7 67 , 7 72 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0). Abs olute immun ity ag ainst suits for money

damag es is “we ll established” for judge s, and such immunity has also bee n extended to non-judicial offic ers pe rfor ming “ quasi-judicial” duties. Bush v. Rauc h , 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994). Quasi-judicia l immuni ty “extends to those persons per forming tasks so integ ral or intertwined w ith the judicial pr ocess that these persons a re c onsidered a

n arm of the judicial office r who is immune.” Id. The Supreme Court held in Butz v. Econom ou that “adjudicat ion within a fede ral administrative ag ency

share s enoug h of the c hara cter istics of th e j u d icial proc ess that those who participate in such adjudication should also be [ absolutely ] i mmune from suits for damag es.” 438 U.S. 478, 512-13 (1978). Courts must use a func tional approa ch to deter mine whether

an off icial is entitled to absolute immuni ty . Und er t h i s approa ch, cour ts look to “the nature of

the func tion perf ormed, not the identity

of the a ctor who pe rfor

med it.” Buck

ley v . Fitzsimmons , 509 U.S. 259, 2 6 9 (1 9 9 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Fo rre ste r v . W hite , 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (inter nal quotation marksCre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

I n an unpublished ca se in 1999, we c ited with approva l a Fir st Circuit test to determine whe n 4 to a pp ly qu a si- jud ic ia l im mun ity : F i r s t , d o e s a

B o ar d m e mb e r , l i k e a j u d g e , p e r f o r m a t r a d i t i o n a l ‘ a d

j u d i c a t o r y’ function, in that he de cides fa cts, applies law, a nd otherwise r esolves disputes on the merits (fr ee f

rom direc t politi cal influe nce) ? Second, does a B oard me mber, like a judge, dec ide c a se s su ff ic ie ntl y c on tr ov e rs ia l th a t, i n th e a bs e nc e of

a bs olute immunit y , he would be subje ct to numerous damag es ac tions? Third, does a Boa rd member, like a

judge , adjudicate disputes ag ainst a bac kdrop of multiple safe g uards d e s i g n e d t o p r o t e c ta

[ d e f e n d an t ] ’ s c o n s t i tu t i o n a l r i g h t s ? Hale v. Cody , 1 9 9 9 U. S
. Ap p . L E XIS 2 1 0 3 9 , at * 4 (A u g. 2 7 , 1 9 9 9 ) ( qu o t i n g W att s , 978 F.2d at 278) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Cr e us e re is p re suma

bly re fe rr ingto t

he y e ar i n w hic h Con g re ss p a sse d th e statut e c ur re ntl y 5 codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but he is wrong in stating that absolute immunit y did not ex ist then. “[T] he doctr ine of absolute i mmunity for members of tribunals perf orming a judicial func tion was well established in 1871 . . . .” W att s , 978 F.2d at 275.

10 omitted)). 4 I n this inst ance , the Stand ards Boar d members qua lify for a bsolute immuni ty . They perf ormed a traditional adjudicator y function of deciding fac ts in this di sputed ac tion, apply ing la w, and re solving the c ase a g ainst Creuser e on its merits. KEP S B d ec i d ed t h e sig nificant issue of whether to strip Creusere of his teac hing lice nse, an a ction which has a n enormous impact on Cr e us e re ’s a

bil ity to p ur su e his c are e r. KE PSB a lso uti lize d mu lti ple sa fe g ua rd s in its pr oc e dure s; Creuser e rec eived notice , an opportunity to be hea rd, and judicia l review
. Se e W att s v . B ur k ha rt , 978 F.2d 269, 275-76 (6th Cir. 1992) (e mphasizi ng the proc edura l safeguards in plac e and f inding that medical e x aminers qua lified for a bsolute immuni ty). Cr e us e re c on te sts wh e the r ab so lut e immun ity sh ou ld ap ply , s tatin g that su c h im mun ity did
no t e xist in

18 71
. Cr e us e re a lso state s th a t r e tali ation f or pr ote c te d F ir st A me ndme nt s pe e c h is 5
un c on sti tut ion a l, a s is re ta liatio n f or the e xer c ise of

le g a l r e dr e ss. How eve r, he of fe rs no thi ngtoCre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

11 sug g est he is beingreta liated ag ainst here . Moreove r, he is ba rre d by issue prec lusion from making such an argument. Macy v. Hopkins County Sch. Bd. of Educ. , 484 F.3d 357, 367- 68 (6th Cir. 2007) (pre cluding the plaintiff fr om relitigating di s puted issues of fa ct when the Kentucky state cour

t sy stem had alre ady

ruled on these issues). Cr e us e re ’s c la ims a g a ins t Mo on e y a lso fa il b e c a

use Mo on e y

is i mmune fr om s uit . F ir st, Cr e us e re fa ile d to de ve lop fu lly hi s cla im s a g a ins t Mo on e y in h is a pp e llate br ie f. He br ie fl y discussed the c laims in the St atement of the Case Section, alleg ing that the Mooney s had a “pec uniary interest with the KEP SB” and that Mooney downplay ed his wife’ s potential conflict of interest. Neverthe less, Creuser e failed to demonstrate how this harme d him or what further a ctions Mooney could have taken, particula rly since Mooney

voluntarily

rec used himself to eliminate any po te nti a l f

or c on fl ic t. Cr e us e re ’s fa ilure to de ve lop su ff ic ie ntl y the su bs tanc e of

his c la im a g a ins t Mooney waives the claim. Langley v. Daimle rChrysler Corp. , 502 F.3d 475, 483 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (holding the appe llant’s claim was waived where she “failed to discuss or cite to the district c ourt’s analy sis in any

detail” with no re al “e ffor t at develope d argumentation” ( i n terna l quotation marks omi tte d) ). Se c on d, e ve n if Cr e usere’s c la ims a g a ins t Mo on e y we re no t w a ive d, his a c tio ns in conducting an ad m i nistrative hea ring for a state ag ency

wer e prote cted by

absolute quasi-judicia l immunit y . Di

xo n v. Clem , 492 F.3d 665, 674- 75 (6th Cir. 2007) (setting forth fr amewor k and finding administrative offic er immune fr om suit). Creusere ’s claim ag ainst Mooney was thus proper ly dismiss ed. I V. The district cour

t found, in the alternative, that the individual boa rd member s were entitledCre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

12 t o qu a l i f i e d i m m u n i t y. T h i s c o u rtr e v i e w s a d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’ s g r an to f

qu a l i f i e d i m m u n i t y de novo
. Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir
. 2 0 06)

. Qualified immunity “shields g overnme ntal officia ls perfor ming discr etionary

functions . . . from civil da mag es liability

as long as their a ctions could rea sonably have been thought consist ent wit h the rights they are alleg ed to have violated.” Livermore e

x rel. Rohm v . Lubelan , 476 F.3d 397, 403 (6th Cir. 2007) (interna l quotation
and c itatio n o mitte d) . In r e so lvi ngqu e sti on s o f q ua lif ie d im mun ity , w e pr oc e e d in tw o s te ps . F ir st, we determine whether “[t ]aken in the light most favor able to the pa rty asser ting the injury [,] . . . the fac ts a lleg ed show the office r’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” Sc ott v . H arris , 12 7 S. Ct. 1 7 6 9 , 1 7 7 4 (2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Sa uc ie r v . Ka tz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (inter nal quotation marks omi tte d) ). I f t

his qu e sti on

is a ns we re d in

the a ff ir mativ e , w e ne xt as k “ wh e the r t he ri g ht w a s c le arl y established . . . in light of the spec ific conte x t of the ca se.” Sc ott , 1 2 7 S
. C t
. at 1 7 7 4 (quoting Saucier , 53 3 U. S. a t 20 1) ; se e als o E sta te of B ing

v . Ci ty of W hite ha ll, Oh io , 45 6 F .3 d 5 55 , 5 69 (6 th Cir. 2006). “F or a r ight to be c lear ly

established, the contours of the rig ht must be sufficie ntly clea r that a reasonable officia l would understand that what he is doingviolates that rig ht.” Feathers v . Aey , 319 F.3d 843, 848 ( 6th Cir. 2003) (interna l quotation marks and citation omi tted). Althoug h the ver y action in question nee d not have be en pre viously held unlawf

ul, unlawfulness can be “a ppare nt from direc t holdings, fr om specific e x amples desc ribed as prohibited, or from the gene ral reasoningthat
a cour t employ s.” Id. (c i t i n g Ho pev . P e lze r, 536 U.S. 730, 7 4 1 (2 002)). See also Baranski v

. Fifteen Unknown Agents of the Bureau of A lcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 45 2 F .3 d 4 33 , 4 47 (6 th C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Brosseau v. Hauge n , 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (a lteration in orig inal)) ( “A r ightCre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

I t is wo rt h no tin g that Cr e us e re ha d fi le d a laws uit c ha lle ng ingKE PSB ’s a

uth or ity to b e g in 6 license r evoca

tion procee dings a g ainst him. I f Creuse re had succe eded in that lawsuit, “any hear ing 13 is ‘clea rly established,’ the Supreme Court has said, when it is no longe r among the ‘hazy ’ area of constitutional iss ues that mig ht be ‘re asonably misapprehe nd[ed] ’ by

a law enfor ceme nt office r at the sce ne.”) . Over all, beca use “r easona

ble mistakes ca

n be made as to the leg al const ra ints on particula r police c onduct,” Saucier, 53 3 U.S. a t 205, qu a lif ie d im mun ity

pr ote c ts “ a ll b ut t

he pla inl y incompetent or those w ho knowing ly violate the law.” Malley v . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Where a defe ndant ra ises a qualifie d immunit y defe nse, the plaintiff bea rs the burde n of proving that office rs ar e not s hielded by qualified immunity
. Liv e rm or e , 476 F.3d at 403. “The issue of qu a lif ie d immu ni ty

may be su bmi tte d to a

jur y on ly if the le g a l qu e sti on

of immun ity

is completely

depende nt upon which view of the [ disputed] fac ts is acc epted by the jury .” Humphrey v. Mabry , 4 8 2 F
. 3 d

8 4 0 , 8 4 6 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 7 ) ( in te r

n a l q u o tati o nma

r k s an d c it a ti o no mi tte d) (alter ation in orig inal). Cr e us e re a lle g e s th a t KEPSB fa ile d to fo llo w i ts o wn pr oc e dure s b e c a

us e it d id n ot g ive him a copy of a r eport in 1995 and did not hold a hear ing in a timely fashion afte r char g es wer e broug ht
a g a ins t Cr e us e re . Ev e n tak ing the se a lle g a tio ns a s tr ue , it is n ot a c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n f

or a state ag ency not to follow its own procedure s. Se e Le v ine v . To rv ik, 986 F.2d 1506, 1515 ( 6th Cir. 1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Thompson v. Keohane , 51 6 U. S. 99 , 11 1 (1 99 5) (“A st a te cannot be said to have a

fede ral due proce ss obligation to follow all of its proce dures; such a sy stem would result in t h e co n s t i tutionaliz ing of ever y state rule, a

nd would not be administrable.” ). There fore , KEPSB’s allege d failure to g ive a copy of t he report to Creuser e is not a constitutional violation, nor is its delay in holding a he aring
. Since n o constitutional viol ation occur red, the 6Cre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

would have b ee n m oot and a wa ste of time.” Creusere I , slip op. at 10. Thus their delay was not only constitutional but also reasonable g iven the pendinglawsuit. 14 KEPSB member s are entitled to rely upon qualified immunity for their actions. V. The district cour

t also found that Creuse re’ s claims wer e bar red by the doctrine s of issue and claim pre clusion. We review de novo a district c ourt’s dec ision reg ardingissue or cla im preclusion beca use it is a question of law. Stemler v . City of Florence , 350 F.3d 578, 585 (6th Cir. 2003). “The F ull F a ithand

Cr e dit Ac t, 2 8 U .S. C. § 17 38 , . . . re qu ir e s th e fe de ra l c ourt s to g ive the same prec lusive eff

ect to a state-c ourt judgme nt a s another c ourt of that State would g ive.” Ex x on Mo bil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There fore , in case s wher e there i s para llel fede ral a nd state cour

t liti g ation, “a f

eder al cour

t may be bound to recog nize the claim- and issue- prec lusive eff ects of a state-c ourt judg ment.” Id. Un de r K e ntu c ky

law, iss ue pr e c lus ion

a pp lie s if fo ur e le me nts are me t: First, the issue in the se cond ca se must be the same as the issue in the fir st case. Second, the issue must have been a ctually litigated. T hird, eve n if an i ssue was actua lly litigated in a prior action, issue prec lusion will not bar subseque nt liti g ation un le ss t he iss ue wa s ac tua lly

de c ide d in

tha t a c tio n. F ourt

h, fo r i ssu e pr e c lus ion

to operate as a

bar, the decision on the issue in t h e p ri o r action must have been nece ssary to the court’s judg ment. Y e om an v . Co mm on we alt

h , 9 8 3 S
. W
. 2 d

4 5 9 , 4 6 5 ( K

y . 1 9 9 8 ) ( i n t e r

n a l c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )
. In addition, if a state age n cy i s actingin a judicial ca pacity , a fe dera l court “must g ive the ag ency ’s fac tfinding the same prec lusive eff ect to which it would be entitled in the State’s cour ts.” Dave t v. City of Cl eve land , 456 F.3d 549, 552 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Un iv . o f Te nn . v . E lli ott , 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986))
.Cre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

15 Creuser e’s claims meet all four elements above and t hus are barr ed by issue prec lusion. “The Ke ntu c ky Court of Ap pe a ls d e c isi on

make s c le ar t

hat pl a int if

f l iti g a te d a

nd los t in the Ke ntu c ky

state court proce eding s all the issues he ra ises here ag ainst the KEPSB def endants.” Creusere I

, slip op. at 13. Creuser e’s claims wer e heard and reje cted by the Kentucky courts, including , inte r a lia , his
c la ims that he wa s p re

jud ic e d b y

KE PSB ’s de lay in c on du c tin g c e rt if ic a te re vo c a tio n p ro c e e din g s; that he wa s d e nie d a

fa ir and imp art ia l hea

ri ng ; tha t he wa s unf

a ir ly pr e jud ic e d b y

a me nta l he a lth expert’s testimony

at the proce eding s; that KEPSB exceede d its authority by putting into evidenc e letters prote cted by

attorney -client privilege ; and that the KE PSB revoc ation decision wa s not based
on substantial evidenc e and that it denied his due proce ss rig hts and his rig ht to pursue his chosen
car eer . This case bear s a striking simil arity to Macy , 484 F.3d at 360. I n that case , Sharon Mac y
a lle g e d that th e school bo ard fi re d h e r b e c a

us e of he r d isa bil ity and in r e ta liatio n f

or e ng a g ingin protec ted activities. Id
. The school board claimed that Mac y “wa s fired f

or threatening students and making inappropriate re marks about the stude nts a nd their fa

milies.” Id
. The district cour t gr anted the school boar d’s motion for summary judgme nt, c oncluding that Macy did not present suff

icient evid en ce fo r a j u ry

to find that she was f

ired due to her disability

and in re taliation. We affirme d, finding that Macy

was ba rre d from deny

ing the underly

ing ina ppropriate incidents by the doctrine of issue pre clusion. Id. at 367. “Mac y has already litigated the underly ing issue twice, and has not prese nted any new evidence or any other re ason sug g esting why litigating it a third time would be appropr iate.” Id. at 367 n.5. We held t hat “she is preclude d from ar g uing [the same issue] in fede ral court.” Id. at 368.Cre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

16 L ike Macy , Creuser e has alre ady litigated the under ly ing issues r eg ardingthe re vocation of his teachingcer

tificate. The issues were actua l l y l itigate d and dec ided in the state c ourt ac tion. Creuser e’s a

rg uments were hear d by

the KEPSB, F ranklin C ircuit Court, and the Ke ntucky Court of Ap pe a ls. F ina lly , th e pr ior de c is io n was necess a

ry to t he pr ior c ourt ’s jud g me nt b e c a

us e it addre ssed Creuse re’ s claims that his teachinglicense was unfairly revoke d and that his rig hts were be ingde nie d. Th e re fo re iss ue pr e c lus ion op e ra te s to ba r r e lit ig a tio n o f t

he un de rl yingc la ims in t

his
case . Cla im p re c lus ion

op e rate s to ba

r f ur the r l iti g a tio n und e r Ke ntu c ky law w he re thr e e e le me nts
are prese nt: 1) identity

of par ties, 2) identity

of the c auses of

ac t i o n , an d 3 ) t he ac tion has been resolved on the merits. Stemler , 350 F.3d at 588. I n this case, ther e is an identity of par ties and
c a us e s o f a c tio n, be c a

us e Cr e us e re lit ig a te d th e se c la ims a g a ins t the same pa rt ie s in Ke ntu c ky

state
c ourt . T he Ke ntu c ky

state c ourt fi na lly re so lve d Cre us e re ’s c la ims on the me ri ts. Th e re fo re , c la im prec lusion also operate s as a ba r to rehe aringCreuser e’s c laims.

V I. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

fo un d that Cre us e re ’s pr op os e d ame nd e d c la ims that se e k r e vie w o f s tate court de cisions were barr ed by the Rooke r-Feldman d o ct ri n e. W e r ev i ew t h at ru l i n g de novo
. McCormick

v. Brave rman , 451 F.3d 382, 389 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (citation om i t t ed ). The Ro ok e rFeldman doctrine emanate d from two cases, Rooke r v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of A ppeals v. Fe ldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983), in which the losing parties in s ta te c ourt fi le d suit in fe de ra l court a ft e r the state pr oc e e din g s end e d, c omp la ini ngthat th e state
c ourt jud g me nt ca

us e d the pa

rt y to be inj ur e d an d s e e kin gfe de ra l r e vie w a nd re je c tio n o f t

he stateCre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

17 court judg ment. The Supreme Court clarifie d the scope of the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine in 2005: The Rooke r-Feldman doctrine, w e hold today , is confined to case s of the kind from which the doc trine acq u i red its name: cases br oug ht by state-c ourt losers complaining of injuries ca used by state-c ourt judg ments rende red be fore the district court proc eeding s commence d and in v i t i n g district court re view and r ejec tion of t h o s e judgme nts. Rooke r-Feldman does not otherwise overr ide or supplant pr e c lus ion

do c tr ine or a

ug me nt the c ir c ums c ri be d doc tr ine s tha t allo w f e de ra l c ourt s to stay or dismiss procee dings in de fer ence to state-cour t actions. Exx on Mobil Corp. , 544 U.S. at 284. Thus, Rooke r-Feldman primarily bars c laims that seek re lief from injury

cause d by

the state c ourt judg ment. In re Ham ilton , 540 F.3d 367, 372 (6th Cir. 2008). Al tho ug h Cr e us e re a t ti me s a pp e ars to c oll a te ra lly a tta c k the jud g me nts of the Ke ntu c ky

state
co u rt s i n his brief, his primary arguments are alleg ations that the district court committed var ious
e r r o r s . The R o o ke r -Feldman doctrine doe s not apply to these ar g uments that Creuser e adva nces beca use Creuse re is not claiming that the state c ourt judg ment injured him. I n addition, the district court e rre d in apply ing the Rooke r-Feldman do c tr ine in thi s c a se sin c e Cr e us e re ini tia lly fi le d s uit i nfe d er al co u rt an d

t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt o rd er edt h at s u i t h el d i nab ey an ce wh i l e s t at e c o u rt p ro ce ed i n gs went for war d. The dist ri ct co urt’s er ror in finding that the Rooke r-Feldman doctrine a pplied was harmless, howe ver, since Creuser e’s c laims are ne verthe less barr ed by issue and cla im preclusion. See E xxon M obil Corp. , 544 U.S. at 282 (“D ispositi on of the fed er al ac t i o n, once the state-c ourt adjudication is complete, w ould be g overne d by prec lusion law.”). VI I
. T he district cour

t declined to exerc ise supplemental jurisdiction over Cre usere ’s proposed amende d claims ag ainst proposed ne w def endants Curtsing er and W eber . We reviewa district court’s r efusa l to ex erc ise supplemental jurisdiction under t h e d efe rential a buse-of -discre tionCre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

18 standard. Nov ak

v . M e tro He alt h M e d. Ctr

. , 503 F.3d 572, 583 (6th Cir. 2007). Creuser e propose d to ame ndhi s co mp lai nt to addMo na C urt si nger an d Al li so n W eber , t wo m emb ers of t he K EP S B, alleg ing that the two women dis seminated false st atements about him in 2001 to the New Me x ico Depa rtment of Educ ation and to a national information clea ring house. Creusere I

, slip o p . at 15. Creuser e spec ifically

argued that they

falsely acc used hi m o f

c r im in a l a c tivity

and ang er ma

nag ement
and oth e r m e nta l hea lth iss ue s. Cr e us e re did no t spe c if y wh e the r h e me ant t o s tate a § 1 98 3 c la im or a tort c laim for defa

mation, but since his brief s used the languag e of de famation, the district court construed the alleg ations as a ba sis for a state law def amation claim. Creusere I , slip op. at 15-16. Although he filed these c laims after the one- y ear

statute of limitat i o ns, the district court used the doctrine of

equitable tolling to c onclude that the m o t i o n t o add the two defenda nts would be considere d timely since Creuser e filed the claims within one y ear afte r the stay

lifted. The district
c ourt ’s sta

y ha d h e ld t

he fe de ra l pr oc e e din g s in abey ance until the e nd

of state c ourt

pr oc e e din g s. Howeve r, since the se cla ims presen t ed state la w alleg ations with no feder al question, the district court de clined to exercise supple mental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Th e re le va

nt statut e , 2 8 U .S. C. § 13 67 (c )( 3) , s tate s th a t a dis tr ic t c ourt

may de c lin e to
e xer c ise su

pp le me nta l jur isd ic tio n if the dis tr ic t court ha s dism iss e d all oth e r cl a ims ov e r whic h it had orig inal jurisdiction. “When all fede ral c laims are dismiss ed b efore trial, the ba lance of considerations usually will point to dismi ssing the state law c laims, or rema nding the m to state court if the ac tion was remove d.” Musson Theatrical, Inc. v . Fed. Ex press Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254- 55 (6th Cir. 1996)
. Be cause the district c ourt dismiss ed Creuser e’s fede ral claims , i t wa s a p roper
e xer c ise of

its dis c re tio n to de c lin e to e xer c ise su pp le me nta l juri sd ic tio n o ve r t he se pr op os e d s tateCre us e re v . W e av e r, e t al

. , No. 07-5859

19 law c la ims
. VI I I
. For the for e g oing r easons, we aff irm the judg ment of the district cour t and dismiss C reuse re’ s
c la ims
.