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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD GLADSTON ROSARIO

PRAGASAM,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 09-11660

v. Honorable Paul D. Borman

United States District Judge

Virginia M. Morgan

REHAB CARE GROUP, INC., United States Magistrate Judge

TRACY HUFF, and JANE DOE 1-2,

Defendants.

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OPINION AND ORDER (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO THE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (DKT. NOS. 92 AND 93);

(2) ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S AUGUST 18, 2010 REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION (DKT. NO. 91); (3) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 16) AND (4) DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE

Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Objections to Magistrate Judge Virginia M. Morgan’s August

18, 2010 Report and Recommendation to grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Dkt.

Nos. 92 and 93.) Defendants have filed a response to Plaintiff’s Objections. (Dkt. No. 95.)

The Court reviews de novo those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which a

specific objection has been filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Having

considered the entire record and having reviewed de novo those portions of the Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation to which specific objections have been filed, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s objections, ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation, GRANTS Defendants’ motion
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for summary judgment and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice

I. BACKGROUND

The Magistrate Judge succinctly set forth both the procedural and factual background of this

matter in her Report and Recommendation and the Court adopts those portions here. The Court

further notes that this pro se Plaintiff, contrary to his repeated and offensive accusations against both

Magistrate Judge Morgan and this Court, has been given multiple opportunities and granted

numerous leniencies throughout this litigation, both with regard to repeatedly missing time deadlines

and with regard to failures to comply with applicable local rules in his voluminous filings. For

example, although Plaintiff has failed to engage in any discovery in this matter, and although

Plaintiff failed to attach any supportive documents when filing his response to Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment, this Court gave Plaintiff an opportunity to have those exhibits considered

despite the fact that they were untimely filed and had not previously been produced to Defendants.

(See Opinion and Order Returning Matter to the Magistrate Judge Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b)(3), Dkt. No. 77.) The Magistrate Judge has now considered all of the evidence that Plaintiff

submitted in support of his response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. This Court,

having reviewed the matter de novo, and having reviewed Plaintiff’s objections thereto, agrees with

the Magistrate Judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court must conduct a de novo review of the parts of a magistrate judge's report and

recommendation to which a party objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A district “court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge.” Id. A general objection, or one that merely restates the arguments previously presented,
1 Plaintiff’s 36-pages of objections are filed in violation of Magistrate Judge Morgan’s direct order

in her August 18, 2010 Report and Recommendation that any party wishing to file objections to her

order do so within fourteen (14) days and that any such objection be no more than 20 pages in length

unless, by motion and order, the page limit is extended by the court. (Dkt. No. 91, Aug. 18, 2010

Report and Recommendation, p. 15.) Plaintiff never filed a motion for extension of the page limit

and the Court therefore strikes pages 21- 36 of Plaintiff’s objections and refuses to consider any

argument appearing, or exhibits referred to, in those stricken pages. The Court also notes that at oral

argument held on July 14, 2010 before Magistrate Judge Morgan on Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment, Plaintiff refused to address the substantive merits of his Whistleblower claim

and devoted his entire oral argument to the alleged “fraud” and “bias” of Magistrate Judge Morgan

and this Court in the handling of his claim. 

2 While the Court will not address each of Plaintiff’s misguided allegations against the Court, the

Court notes that it is within its power to “designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any

pretrial matter pending before the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). That section also states that

magistrate judges may not “determine” motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. However,

when those matters have been referred to a magistrate judge, the magistrate judge may submit to the

Article III judge “proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition.” 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B) (stating that “a judge may also designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings,

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does not sufficiently identify alleged errors on the part of the magistrate judge. An “objection” that

does nothing more than disagree with a magistrate judge's conclusion, or simply summarizes what

has been argued before, is not considered a valid objection. Howard v. Sec'y of Health and Human

Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir.1991). “The objections must be clear enough to enable the district

court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373,

380 (6th Cir. 1995).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s rambling, 36 page “objections” fail to identify any specific alleged errors in the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.1

 Indeed, the objections are largely dedicated to

accusations against both Magistrate Judge Morgan and this Court for “fraud” and “bias” and fail to

identify any of the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions as to the substantive issues of Plaintiff’s

Whistleblower claim with which Plaintiff disagrees.2

 In fact both Magistrate Judge Morgan and this
including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and

recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of any motion excepted in

subparagraph (A)”). This procedure has been followed in this case and the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendations are now properly before this Court for final determination.

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Court have granted Plaintiff great leniency in the presentation of his case, though he has failed to

abide by several procedural rules and Court orders. (See Dkt. No. 75, Transcript of Motion Hearing

held on June 29, 2009 before Magistrate Judge Morgan, pp. 9-21, the Magistrate Judge explaining

to Plaintiff ways in which he should amend his Complaint to adequately plead his Whistleblower

Claim; Dkt. No. 77, Order Returning Matter to the Magistrate Judge for hearing and determination.)

The Court notes, however, that “[t]he leniency granted to pro se [litigants] . . . is not boundless.”

Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004). Both this Court and Magistrate Judge

Morgan have stretched the bounds of leniency in Plaintiff’s case and Plaintiff’s accusations against

Magistrate Judge Morgan and this Court, expressed both in his filings and at oral argument on July

14, 2010, offend the rules of civility practiced in this Court. 

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s lack of civility and failure to adequately address specific portions

of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the Court turns to the substantive allegations

of Plaintiff’s Whistleblower claim against Defendants, and agrees with Magistrate Judge Morgan’s

conclusion that Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence of “evidentiary quality” in response to

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment which establishes a prima facie claim against

Defendants. Plaintiff’s Whistleblower claim is brought under Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.362 which

provides:

An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an

employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or

privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the

employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a
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suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this

state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless

the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is requested by

a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that

public body, or a court action.

“To establish a prima facie case under [the Whistleblower act], a plaintiff must show that

(1) the plaintiff was engaged in protected activity as defined by the act, (2) the plaintiff was

discharged or discriminated against, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity

and the discharge or adverse employment action.” West v. General Motors Corp., 469 Mich. 177,

183-184, 665 N.W.2d 468, 471-472 (2003). Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s “evidence,” which consists largely of self-serving hearsay-ridden documents,

fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the essential causal link between Plaintiff’s

alleged protected activity and his termination. Plaintiff has failed its burden, at the summary

judgment stage, to come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

“Something more than a temporal connection between protected conduct and an adverse

employment action is required to show causation where discrimination-based retaliation is claimed.”

West, 469 Mich. at 473 (analogizing a claim under the Michigan Whistleblower’s act to an antiretaliation claim based on other prohibited types of employment discrimination). “Plaintiff must

show something more than merely a coincidence in time between protected activity and adverse

employment action.” Id. (finding no causal link where plaintiff failed to show “any reaction or

conduct on the part of his supervisors that reasonably suggests that they were upset by the [protected

activity].”). 

Plaintiff has produced absolutely no admissible evidence that his employer reacted in any
3 Indeed, as the Magistrate Judge points out in her Report and Recommendation, the evidence which

Plaintiff has proffered indicates just the opposite. Plaintiff’s email to Tracy Huff dated February 12,

2009, indicated to Ms. Huff that Plaintiff had complained to the government about Defendants’

“unethical therapy practices.” (Dkt. No. 36, Ex. 5, Feb. 12, 2009 email from Plaintiff to Tracy

Huff.) More than a week after receiving this email, Plaintiff was specifically instructed, in a letter

from human resource employee Rosalyn Calhoun, regarding the procedure to be followed if and

when Plaintiff decided to return work following his personal leave. (Dkt. No. 36, Ex. 4, February

20, 2009 letter from Rosalyn Calhoun to Plaintiff.) Thus, the evidence indicates that after receiving

notice of Plaintiff’s alleged complaint to the government, Defendants continued to acknowledge that

Plaintiff could possibly return to work.

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way, antagonistic or otherwise, to Plaintiff’s alleged protected activity or even acknowledged such

alleged complaints.3

 The non-moving party “may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his

pleadings,” but must instead present “significant probative evidence” establishing that “there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256- 257 (1986). Plaintiff

has not carried his burden of establishing that a genuine question of material fact exists on the issue

of causation. The mere temporal proximity of the termination to the alleged protected activity

cannot sustain Plaintiff’s burden on the issue of causation. 

Moreover, Defendants have provided affidavit testimony that the entity for which Plaintiff

worked prior to his personal leave of absence, Boulevard Temple, had expressly requested that

Plaintiff not return to Boulevard Temple after his personal leave expired. (Dkt. No. 85, Def.’s Reply

in Support Summ. Judg., Ex. 1, Affidavit of Tracy Huff, June 16, 2010 ¶ 11.) Plaintiff has never

contested this evidence and has offered no evidence to support his self-serving contention that he

was terminated because of his alleged protected activity. “The fact that a plaintiff engages in a

‘protected activity’ under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act does not immunize him from an

otherwise legitimate, or unrelated, adverse job action.” West, 469 Mich. at 187. “[P]laintiff has

failed to establish a prima facie claim because he has not demonstrated a causal connection-an
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essential element of a claim under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act-between the protected activity

and the adverse employment action.” Id. at 188. Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Morgan correctly

concluded that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case under the Michigan Whistleblower

act.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s

August 18, 2010 Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 93), ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 91), GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(Dkt. No. 16) and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/Paul D. Borman 

PAUL D. BORMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: December 21, 2010

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served on the attorneys of record by electronic means or U.S. Mail on

December 21, 2010.

S/Denise Goodine 

Case Manager