After examining the briefs and the records, we have concluded that oral argument

*

is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the records. See FED. R.

APP. P. 34(a)(2)(B).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 3, 2010*

Decided March 4, 2010

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

Nos. 08-4282 & 09-1218

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JEROME SCOTT & 

CHARLES LAWRENCE, 

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

Nos. 07 CR 652-2, 07 CR 652-3

Elaine E. Bucklo,

Judge.

O R D E R

In this consolidated criminal appeal, Jerome Scott and Charles Lawrence appeal

from respective criminal judgments sentencing them each to prison terms for conspiracy to

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
Nos. 08-4282 & 09-1218 Page 2

possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 2, and

consecutive sentences for possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Defendants argue that because they were subject to a longer

mandatory-minimum sentence under § 841(a)(1), the district court should not have

imposed a consecutive five-year sentence under § 924(c)(1)(A). We affirm.

Scott and Lawrence were charged in a multiple-count indictment in connection with

a government sting operation. A confidential informant approached another co-defendant

(not a party to this appeal) with a plan to rob a drug warehouse. That co-defendant

brought the plan to Scott and Lawrence and all agreed to assist the informant. All three

were eventually arrested and charged in connection with the plot. Both Scott and

Lawrence pleaded guilty in September 2008 and were sentenced in separate proceedings. 

Scott was sentenced to 168 months’ imprisonment for the drug offense, below the properly

calculated range of 188 to 235 months, and a mandatory, consecutive 60 months under

§ 924(c)(1)(A). Lawrence was sentenced to 124 months’ imprisonment for the drug offense,

below the properly calculated range of 135 to 168 months, and a mandatory, consecutive 60

months under § 924(c)(1)(A). Because each defendant was found to be responsible for more

than 5 kilograms of cocaine, their respective drug counts carried a mandatory-minimum

sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Both acknowledged at

sentencing that a consecutive, mandatory-minimum sentence on the gun charge was

correct.

On appeal defendants argue for the first time that the district court was incorrect to

give each of them a mandatory consecutive sentence under § 924(c)(1)(A); they rely instead

on an approach adopted by the Second Circuit determining that a district court may not

impose an additional consecutive term of imprisonment for violating § 924(c) if the term

would be shorter than the mandatory minimum required by another count of conviction.

See United States v. Williams, 558 F.3d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Whitley, 529

F.3d 150, 158 (2d Cir. 2008).

The defendants did not raise this issue before the district court and the government

argues that the defendants waived the argument by failing to do so. We disagree. To

waive an issue in a criminal matter, a defendant must intentionally relinquish a known

right, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); United States v. Acox, No. 09-1258, 2010 WL

431698, at *1 (7th Cir. Feb. 9, 2010); United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 541 (7th Cir. 2009). 

But we construe waiver principles liberally in criminal matters to avoid unnecessary

waiver. See United States v. Farmer, 543 F.3d 363, 372 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Sumner,

265 F.3d 532, 539 (7th Cir. 2001). Although both defendants did acknowledge at sentencing

the mandatory, consecutive nature of § 924(c)(1)(A), such was the understanding of the
Nos. 08-4282 & 09-1218 Page 3

statute at that time. Defendants could not have intentionally relinquished their right to

challenge the consecutive, mandatory sentence if they then believed it foreclosed.

Even so, defendants’ argument cannot succeed. In United States v. Easter, we

recently rejected the Second Circuit’s approach and joined the majority of circuits that have

upheld the imposition of a mandatory, consecutive sentence under § 924(c)(1)(A)

irrespective of the other mandatory-minimum sentences to which the defendant is subject. 

See United States v. Easter, 553 F.3d 519, 525 (7th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Mitten, 592

F.3d 767, 778-79 (7th Cir. 2010) (reaffirming Easter). We decline to revisit the issue today. 

The district court’s order is AFFIRMED.