UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

GWENDOLYN ROBERSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 09-12083

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF

STATE POLICE, MICHIGAN STATE

POLICE TROOPER DARRIN GRANDISON,

MICHIGAN STATE POLICE TROOPER

CLARENCE VINCENT, and MICHIGAN

STATE POLICE TROOPER COPPENS, in 

their official and individual capacities,

Defendants.

____________________________/

GWENDOLYN ROBERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 09-14101

MGM GRAND DETROIT, LLC, MGM Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

GRAND DETROIT CASINO, LCC, MGM

GRAND DETROIT CASINO II, LLC,

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF

STATE POLICE, MICHIGAN STATE

POLICE TROOPER DARRIN GRANDISON,

MICHIGAN STATE POLICE TROOPER

CLARENCE VINCENT, and MICHIGAN

STATE POLICE TROOPER COPPENS,

Defendants.

____________________________/

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The owner/operator of the MGM Grand Casino in Detroit is MGM Grand Detroit,

LLC. According to MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, the other entities named by Plaintiff do

not exist. (Doc. 21 at 1 n.2.)

2

Complaint I initially was assigned to the Honorable John Feikens. Complaint II,

upon removal, was assigned to the Honorable Lawrence P. Zatkoff, but it was reassigned

to Judge Feikens as a companion matter on November 5, 2009. Both lawsuits were then

reassigned to the undersigned pursuant to Administrative Order 10-AO-033 on November

24, 2010.

2

OPINION AND ORDER (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT MGM GRAND

DETROIT, LLC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND (2) GRANTING

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY DEFENDANTS MICHIGAN STATE

POLICE AND TROOPERS GRANDISON, VINCENT, AND COPPENS

Following a May 29, 2007 incident at the MGM Grand Casino in Detroit,

Michigan, Plaintiff Gwendolyn Roberson (“Plaintiff”) filed two lawsuits. Plaintiff filed

the first lawsuit, Civil Case No. 09-12083 (also “Complaint I”), in this Court against the

Michigan Department of State Police (“MSP”) and Michigan State Troopers Darrin

Grandison (“Detective Grandison”), Clarence Vincent (“Detective Vincent”), and Robin

Coppens (“Sargent Coppens”) (collectively “MSP Defendants”). Plaintiff filed the

second lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Wayne County, Michigan on July 9, 2009, against

the MSP Defendants and MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, MGM Grand Detroit Casino, LLC,

and MGM Grand Detroit Casino II, LLC (collectively “MGM”).1

 The MSP Defendants

removed Plaintiff’s second lawsuit to this Court on October 16, 2009, where it was

assigned Civil Case No. 09-14101 (also “Complaint II”). The lawsuits were consolidated

on January 5, 2010, and were assigned to the undersigned on November 24, 2010.2

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At that time, MGM’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56(c) and the MSP Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) and/or for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) were pending. This Court

held a hearing with respect to the motions on February 3, 2011.

I. Applicable Standards

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the

legal sufficiency of the complaint. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78

F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). Reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must construe

the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as

true, and “determine whether the complaint contains ‘enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Bledsoe v. Community Health Sys., 501 F.3d 493, 502

(6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 127 S. Ct 1955,

1974 (2007)). 

Summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is

appropriate if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any

affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c). The central inquiry is

“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury

or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986). After adequate

time for discovery and upon motion, Rule 56(c) mandates summary judgment against a

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party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case and

on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986).

The movant has an initial burden of showing “the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2553. Once the movant meets this burden, the

“nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.’” Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587,

106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To demonstrate a genuine

issue, the nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could

reasonably find for that party; a “scintilla of evidence” is insufficient. See Liberty Lobby,

477 U.S. at 252, 106 S. Ct. at 2512. The court must accept as true the non-movant’s

evidence and draw “all justifiable inferences” in the non-movant’s favor. See id. at 255,

106 S. Ct. at 2513.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

On May 29, 2007, at approximately 9:40 p.m., Plaintiff and her husband, Horace

Roberson (“Mr. Roberson”), entered the MGM Grand Casino (“casino”). After they

entered the casino, Plaintiff proceeded toward the cage cashier to cash a check so she

would have some money for gaming purposes. Mr. Roberson walked toward a gaming

table.

When she arrived at the window of MGM Casino Cage Cashier Angela Chipp

(“Cashier Chipp”), Plaintiff presented a personal check in the amount of $200 for

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cashing. The check was a temporary check provided to Plaintiff by her credit union, COOP Services Credit Union. Cashier Chipp obtained Plaintiff’s Michigan Driver’s License

and had Plaintiff mark her thumb print on the check. Upon her examination of the check,

Cashier Chipp immediately noticed that the check was misprinted. Specifically, the bank

logo was crooked in relation to the memo line and the check was printed off-center. 

(Doc. 21 Ex. 5 at 27; Ex. 4.) Cashier Chipp therefore did not run the check through

MGM’s check verification service, Certegy. She testified that pursuant to Certegy’s rules

and MGM’s standard protocol, a cashier noticing physical oddities with a check must

present the check to a supervisor. (Doc. 21 Ex. 5 at 14-19; Ex. 13 at 23-24.) Cashier

Chipp brought Plaintiff’s check to her supervisor, Ebony Robinson (“Supervisor

Robinson”).

Supervisor Robinson also found the check suspicious and therefore, also pursuant

to MGM policy, notified MGM Security Supervisor Michael Mitchell (“Security

Supervisor Mitchell”). Security Supervisor Mitchell reviewed Plaintiff’s check and found

it suspicious based on the fact that it was printed “crooked.” (Doc. 21 Ex. 6 at 54.) 

Pursuant to Michigan gaming statutes and regulations, MGM has a duty to report all

potential crimes against the casino to MSP. (Id. Ex. 21 at 61-63; see also Mich. Comp.

Laws § 432.209(10).) MGM therefore contacted MSP regarding Plaintiff’s check.

After notifying MSP, Security Supervisor Mitchell approached Plaintiff. At the

time, he was wearing an MGM security guard uniform which consisted of a white shirt

and dark pants and he had handcuffs inside a case attached to the back of his belt. MGM

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security guards carry handcuffs, however, they are not authorized to make arrests and are

not “PA-330 certified”. (Doc. 21 Ex. 6 at 29; Ex. 7 at 85; see Mich. Comp. Laws

§ 338.1079 (Public Act 330).) Plaintiff testified during her deposition that when Security

Supervisor Mitchell approached her, he told her that she needed to step out of line and

that there seemed to be something wrong with her check that required the casino to notify

MSP. (Doc. 21 Ex. 3 at 55.) According to Security Supervisor Mitchell and MGM’s

Incident Reports concerning the event, Security Supervisor Mitchell informed Plaintiff

that MSP would like to speak with her, that her check looked questionable, and that she

nevertheless was free to leave. (Id. Ex. 6 at 25; Ex. 12.)

Plaintiff then told Security Supervisor Mitchell that she needed to find her husband

and tell him what was happening. (Id. Ex. 3 at 58; Ex. 6 at 25.) Plaintiff testified during

her deposition that when she walked away, she looked over her shoulder and saw two

security guards who she believes were following her. (Id. Ex. 3 at 63-64.) Plaintiff then

located her husband and the two of them returned to where Security Supervisor Mitchell

was waiting.

By that time, approximately four other MGM security guards were congregating in

the area near Security Supervisor Mitchell, Plaintiff, and Mr. Roberson. None of them

said anything to Plaintiff or Mr. Roberson. (Id. at 60.) Security Supervisor Mitchell

testified during his deposition and Plaintiff stated later on the videotape of the incident

that these additional security guards were in the area at that time because it was near the

security podium and there was a shift change. (Id. Ex. 6 at 71; Doc. 34 Ex. 1.) Within a

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few minutes, Security Supervisor Mitchell instructed the other guards to leave. (Id.)

Mr. Roberson asked Security Supervisor Mitchell what the problem seemed to be.

Security Supervisor Mitchell explained that there was a problem with how Plaintiff’s

check looked; that “the numbers weren’t lined up right or something to that effect.” (Id.

Ex. 3 at 59.) He further explained that the casino was required to notify MSP when it

received a suspicious check. Plaintiff testified during her deposition that Security

Supervisor Mitchell told Mr. Roberson that “this is a fraudulent check, we have our

procedures to follow.” (Id. at 67.) Mr. Roberson testified during his deposition that

Security Supervisor Mitchell told him that “it looks like we have a fraudulent or bad

check here” and that he showed Mr. Roberson how the check was printed crooked, that it

was not lined up properly. (Doc. 24 Ex. 12 at 14-15.)

At that point, Plaintiff or one of the cage cashiers asked if the group could move to

another location, as it was getting crowded in front of the cage. (Id. at 16; Doc. 21 Ex. 3

at 70-71.) As Plaintiff, Mr. Roberson, and Security Supervisor Mitchell walked away

from the cage area, they were approached by Detective Grandison. Detective Grandison

was in plain clothes, wearing a Lions jersey. Detective Grandison took over the

investigation at that point and escorted Plaintiff onto an elevator to the casino’s interview

room. Mr. Roberson was not permitted to join her. Three MGM security guards were in

the elevator with Plaintiff and Detective Grandison, as well as an unknown female patron

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Apparently the unknown female was at the cage around the same time as Plaintiff

and was being questioned about a check she was attempting to cash. Reviewing the

videotape from the incident during his deposition, Detective Grandison testified that he

was carrying the unknown female patron’s documents when the group rode the elevator

to the interview room. (Doc. 25 Ex. 10 at 28.)

8

and MSP Trooper Emerson Cox.3

 (Doc. 25 Ex. 10 at 27-28.)

When they reached the interview room, Plaintiff was directed to a seat on one side

of a desk and Trooper Cox took the seat across from her. (Doc. 34 Ex. 1.) Detective

Grandison entered another interview room with the unknown female. A female MGM

security guard remained in the interview room with Plaintiff and Trooper Cox while

Trooper Cox spoke with Plaintiff. During this time, Plaintiff was searching through her

purse for information related to her credit union checking account. (Id.) Trooper Cox

remained in the room with Plaintiff for three minutes and then left. (Doc. 25 Ex. 2.) A

minute later, Detective Grandison entered the room. (Id.)

In his report regarding the incident, Detective Grandison described what transpired

next as follows:

I entered the security interview room and noticed Roberson seated at the

table. I also noticed Roberson had a purse and two other bag type items on

the table. Roberson was gathering the three items together and started to

slid [sic] them on the table, close to her body.

I did not know if the bags were searched or not, for safety and security

reasons I wanted to separate them from the suspect.

I then grabbed two of the bags and began to push them back to the center of

the table, while telling Roberson, the items had to stay in the center on the

table.

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Roberson quickly pulled the items back, along with my hand and began to

clutch them to her chest. I told Roberson a second time, that the items had

to be in the center of the table and she refused to surrender the bags. I made

one attempt to retrieve the bags from her and she refused to surrender them

again.

At this point, I could feel Roberson getting combative and I told her to

stand up and go into the holding cell. Roberson refused and held on to the

chair and a group of lockers, next to the floor. I pulled on her arm, in order

to get her to comply and she still refused [to] move.

I then warned Roberson that I would use force to make her enter the holding

cell if she did not go on her own power, on two occasions. Roberson still

held onto the chair and [a] panel of lockers.

(Doc. 25 Ex. 3 (emphasis in original, capitalization removed).) What the video of the

incident reveals is somewhat different.

Before Detective Grandison entered the interview room, Plaintiff was rummaging

through her purse, removing some items, and putting some items back inside. (Doc. 34

Ex. 1.) She continued to do this when Detective Grandison entered the room. At first,

Detective Grandison stood on the opposite side of the desk from Plaintiff, talking to her,

while she continued to rearrange the items from her purse. (Id.) A few seconds later,

Detective Grandison turned his back on Plaintiff and took one or two steps away from the

desk where she sat. (Id.)

At this exact point, Plaintiff tells Detective Grandison that she is “very upset with

this situation . . . that this is just totally unacceptable.” (Id.) In response, Detective

Grandison returns to the desk, telling Plaintiff: “Well look, it don’t matter how you feel. 

It’s not our fault that you’re here. It’s your check that’s bad.” (Id.) Detective Grandison

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then walks around the desk to where Plaintiff is sitting while stating, “I have no idea why

you’re here and I don’t care, but you don’t get upset with us.” (Id.) Plaintiff responds:

“I’m upset period and you’re supposed to know how to deal with that.” (Id.) Detective

Grandison then begins to reach for Plaintiff’s purse, which is still in Plaintiffs hands but

sitting on the desk. (Id.) Detective Grandison instructs Plaintiff to set her “things down

here”; Plaintiff tells him not to take her stuff and slides her belongings away from

Detective Grandison. (Id.) At that point, Detective Grandison tells Plaintiff to “get up

and go in here,” pointing at a holding cell adjoining the interview room. (Id.) He states

again, “get up before I get you up” and grabs Plaintiff’s arm. (Id.)

 Plaintiff, still sitting in the chair, tells Detective Grandison not to touch her. (Id.)

Standing over her, he instructs her again to go into the holding cell. (Id.) Plaintiff asks

Detective Grandison why she needs to go into the holding cell and he replies, “cuz, I’m

tired of talking to you.” (Id.) At that point, Detective Grandison grabbed an exposed

portion of the front seat and the backrest of the chair and dragged it, along with Plaintiff,

into the holding cell. (Id.) As he is doing so, the chair tipped over inside the holding cell,

with Plaintiff still in it. (Id.) Detective Grandison exits the holding cell and closes the

door. (Id.)

Detective Grandison then proceeds to empty the contents of Plaintiff’s purse onto

the desk, including removing the items from what appears to be wallets and flipping

through the pages of what looks like a date or address book. (Id.) At this point,

additional people (an MGM security guard, two men whose associations are not

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identified, and Sargent Coppens) enter the interview room. (Doc. 34 Ex. 1.) When asked

during his deposition in this case what evidence he had at this point to believe Plaintiff

committed check fraud, Detective Grandison answered: “I just walked into the room and

as of right now I believe I’m just now taking over the case, so I have not looked at

anything yet.” (Doc. 25 Ex. 10 at 40.) He told the other individuals who had entered the

interview room after he placed Plaintiff in the holding cell that he had not spoken with the

cage cashier yet. (Doc. 34 Ex. 1.)

About three minutes after putting Plaintiff in the holding cell, Detective Grandison

notices that she has her cell phone with her. (Id.) Detective Grandison enters the holding

cell and attempts to take the phone from Plaintiff; at which point, Plaintiff placed the cell

down her pants. (Id.) Plaintiff tells Detective Grandison to have a woman come in and

she will give her the cell phone. (Id.) Sargent Coppens is summoned to the holding cell,

at which time Plaintiff gives Sargent Coppens the phone. (Id.)

Over the next two hours, Detective Grandison, Sargent Coppens, and Trooper

Vincent investigated the matter. Detective Grandison contacted Certegy and was

informed that two other checks drawn on Plaintiff’s credit union account had been cashed

at the casino recently. (Doc. 25 Ex. 3; Doc. 24 Ex. 17 at 20.) Certegy indicated that both

checks initially were denied but were accepted after the cashier continued to process the

checks over and over again. (Id.) 

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Additional starter checks were located in Plaintiff’s purse that also were not

printed straight.

5

“Trespassing” a patron is a process whereby the casino places the patron on its

“disassociated persons list.” Photographs are taken of the patron and he or she is read the

trespassing statute, Michigan Compiled Laws § 432.225, and warned not to enter the

casino premises again. If such a person attempts to enter the casino, it is considered a

misdemeanor criminal trespass punishable by one year in prison and/or a $1,000 fine. 

Mich. Comp. Laws § 432.225(13).

12

In light of the uneven printing of Plaintiff’s checks4

 and the circumstances

surrounding the cashing of her prior checks, Detective Grandison decided shortly after

midnight, now May 30, 2007, to book Plaintiff pending further investigation. At

approximately 12:15 a.m., Plaintiff was escorted out of the holding cell, handcuffed by

Sargent Coppens, and transported by Sargent Coppens to an MSP office for processing. 

Before leaving the interview room, however, an MGM security guard approached

Plaintiff and “permanently trespassed” her.5

 (Doc. 25 Ex. 2.) This means that Plaintiff

was informed that she could no longer enter any MGM/Mirage properties.

At the MSP office, Plaintiff was booked on two felony charges: (1) “2693 Uttering

and Publishing” in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.249; and (2) “5099

Obstruction of Justice” in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.505. (Doc. 25 Ex.

3.) Plaintiff was released sometime after 1:00 a.m.

In the days that followed, Detective Grandison contacted Plaintiff’s credit union

and learned that Plaintiff’s checks were drawn on a valid account. Accordingly, the MSP

closed its investigation and did not pursue any charges against Plaintiff.

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As indicated earlier, Plaintiff thereafter filed two separate lawsuits arising from the

May 29, 2007 incident. In Complaint I, Plaintiff names the MSP Defendants, only. She

names the MSP Defendants and the MGM Defendants in Complaint II. Plaintiff asserts

the following claims in both complaints:

•Unlawful confinement, unlawful search, conspiracy, and “refusing or

neglecting [to] prevent” (i.e. failure to train or supervise) in violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1983, filed against the MSP Defendants (in Counts 1-5 of

Complaint I and Count 4 of Complaint II);

•False imprisonment, filed against the MSP Defendants (in Count 6 of

Complaint I and Count 5 of Complaint II) and against MGM (in Count 1 of

Complaint II);

•Assault and Battery, filed against the MSP Defendants (in Count 7 of

Complaint I and Count 6 of Complaint II);

•Defamation/Slander, filed against the MSP Defendants (in Count 8 of

Complaint I and Count 7 of Complaint II) and against MGM (in Count 2 of

Complaint II);

•Violations of the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, filed against the MSP

Defendants (in Count 9 of Complaint I and Count 8 of Complaint II) and

against MGM (in Count 3 of Complaint II); and

•Intentional/Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, filed against the

MSP Defendants (in Count 10 of Complaint I) and against MGM (in Count

9 of Complaint II).

III. Applicable Law and Analysis

A. Defamation against MGM and the MSP Defendants

A plaintiff alleging defamation must establish the following elements: “(1) a false

and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged communication to

a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and

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(4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or

the existence of special harm caused by publication [(defamation per quod)].” Oesterle v.

Wallace, 272 Mich. App. 260, 263-64, 275 N.W.2d 470 (2006). MGM seeks summary

judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s defamation claim arguing (1) there was no false

statement made by MGM; (2) there was no unprivileged communication to a third party

because any statement was made, at most, to Mr. Roberson and MSP; (3) there was no

malice or fault on the part of MGM; and (4) there is no defamation per se or special harm. 

The MSP Defendants seek summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s defamation

claims, contending that they are entitled to qualified immunity pursuant to Michigan

Compiled Law Section § 691.1407.

Even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, this Court

finds no evidence that MGM or MSP communicated a false statement regarding Plaintiff

to anyone other than MGM staff, MSP personnel, and Mr. Roberson. According to

Plaintiff, Security Supervisor Mitchell was the only defendant who communicated with

her and/or Mr. Roberson regarding the check while on the casino floor (i.e. in public). 

(Doc. 21 Ex. 3 at 70.) Security Supervisor Mitchell indicated that “there seems to be

something wrong with [Plaintiff’s] check” or there “seemed to be a problem.” (Id. at 55.) 

When asked by Mr. Roberson, Security Supervisor Mitchell explained that “there seemed

to be a problem with how the checks looked; they didn’t look right.” (Id. at 59.) Mr.

Roberson testified that Security Supervisor Mitchell stated “that it looks like we have a

fraudulent or bad check here” and “it looks like there’s a bad check.” (Doc. 24 Ex. 12 at

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14-15.)

Plaintiff later testified in her deposition that Security Supervisor Mitchell told

Plaintiff and Mr. Roberson “look, this is a fraudulent check.” (Id. at 67.) However, as

Plaintiff’s counsel conceded at the motion hearing, there is no evidence that anyone other

than MGM staff heard this alleged statement and the videotape of Security Supervisor

Mitchell’s encounter with Plaintiff and her husband (specifically where they were

standing in relation to other patrons and patrons’ reactions as they walked near them),

suggests this as well. Plaintiff also points to statements in MGM’s Incident Reports;

however, there is no evidence that these statements were communicated to a third party. 

At the motion hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that one of the MSP Defendants

contacted Plaintiff’s employer and told the employer that Plaintiff would be late for work

that evening because she was being investigated for check fraud. There is nothing false

about this statement, however, to support the first element of Plaintiff’s claims.

Any statements made by MGM to the MSP or vice versa are privileged, as MGM

has a statutory duty to notify the MSP of any suspected or potential criminal activity in its

casino. See Mich. Comp. Law § 432.209(10); see also Hall v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 153

Mich. App. 609, 619, 396 N.W.2d 809, 813 (1986) (“information given to police officers

regarding criminal activity is absolutely privileged.”) There is no evidence of malice or a

lack of good faith on the part of Security Supervisor Mitchell or anyone else sufficient to

overcome this privilege.

Based on the above discussion, the Court concludes that MGM and the MSP

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Defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s

defamation/slander claims. The Court therefore finds it unnecessary to address

defendants’ other arguments in support of dismissal of these claims.

B. Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”) against MGM and the MSP

Defendants

Plaintiff alleges that MGM and the MSP Defendants discriminated against her

based on her race in violation of the ELCRA. Specifically Plaintiff, an AfricanAmerican, alleges that she received service from defendants in a “markedly hostile

manner” that a reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory. (See Doc. 24 at

19.) To prevail on her ELCRA claims, Plaintiff must establish the following: “(1)

discrimination based on a protected characteristic (2) by a person (3) resulting in the

denial of the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,

advantages, or accommodations (4) of a place of public accommodation.” Hayes v.

Neshewat, 477 Mich. 29, 35, 729 N.W.2d 488, 492 (2007). To establish the first element,

Plaintiff “may prove either intentional discrimination or disparate treatment by

Defendant[s].” Sanders v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 86 F. Supp. 2d 739, 744 (E.D. Mich.

2000) (citing Reisman v. Regents of Wayne State Univ., 188 Mich. App. 526, 538, 470

N.W.2d 678, 685 (1991)). Plaintiff in the present case attempts to demonstrate

discrimination through the second method.

“Disparate treatment may be proved by showing that the plaintiff is a member of a

protected class and was treated differently than persons of a different class for the same or

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similar conduct.” Sanders, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 744 (citing Reisman, 188 Mich. App. at 538,

470 N.W.2d at 685). With respect to MGM, Plaintiff attempts to make this showing by

referring to the sample of Incident Reports involving check fraud investigations that the

casino produced during discovery. First, Plaintiff has not presented these incident reports

as evidence. She asserts in her response brief, however, that of the 70 check fraud

investigations for which reports were produced, 88% involved black suspects and only

7% involved white suspects. (Doc. 24 at 19.) This purported evidence proves nothing,

however.

Plaintiff has not presented evidence to enable this Court to determine whether the

70 reports provided to her are representative of the check fraud investigations that MGM

has conducted or whether suspicious checks are presented to the casino proportionally by

Caucasian and African-American patrons to make the statistics suggestive of

discriminatory treatment. According to Security Supervisor Mitchell, of the check fraud

investigations in which he has been involved, the majority involve Caucasian patrons. 

(Doc. 21 Ex. 6 at 39-40.)

To support her race discrimination claim against the MSP Defendants, Plaintiff

relies on a single incident report involving Detective Grandison. This report summarizes

Detective Grandison’s investigation of a $1,000 check presented by a male, Caucasian

patron at the Motor City Casino in Detroit. (Doc. 25 Ex. 16.) The check had been

rejected by the “computer system” and the casino contacted MSP to investigate. (Id.) 

Detective Grandison contacted Certegy and, after determining that the account number

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and routing number were valid and valid to the presenter, advised the patron that he was

free to go. (Id.) This evidence summarizing only one other investigation involving

Detective Grandison is insufficient to lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that

Plaintiff’s race was the basis for the manner in which she was treated by the MSP

Defendants.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to present evidence to create a

genuine issued of material fact with respect to her race discrimination claims under the

ELCRA. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to

these claims.

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Plaintiff has not asserted any § 1983 claims against MGM, although she relies on

case law addressing § 1983 false arrest claims in response to MGM’s motion to dismiss

her state-law false imprisonment claim. (See Doc. 24 at 16-17.). To the extent Plaintiff

intended to assert § 1983 claims against MGM, those claims would fail. In determining

whether private security guards are private actors whose conduct in detaining the

plaintiffs is “fairly attributable to the state” for purposes of § 1983, the Sixth Circuit has

focused on whether the security guards are licensed pursuant to Michigan Compiled Law

§ 339.1079. Compare Lindsey v. Detroit Ent’t LLC, 484 F.3d 824, 829-30 (6th Cir. 2007)

(holding that where none of the casino’s security guards were authorized to make arrests

under Michigan law means that their conduct was not “fairly attributable to the state” and

they are not state actors); with Romanski v. Detroit Ent’t LLC, 428 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir.

2005) (finding that casino security guards licensed under Michigan Compiled Laws

§ 339.1079 are de facto police officers and may qualify as state actors for purposes of

§ 1983). As set forth in the factual background section, MGM’s security guards are not

§ 339.1079 certified and are not authorized to make arrests.

19

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims Against the MSP Defendants6

Plaintiff alleges, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the MSP Defendants

unlawfully arrested, detained, and confined her, unlawfully searched her belongings,

engaged in a conspiracy to violate her civil rights, and that the MSP and Sargent Coppens

failed to supervise, train, or control the remaining MSP Defendants. To state a § 1983

claim, a plaintiff must establish: “‘(1) the deprivation of a right secured by the

Constitution or the laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under the color

of state law.’” Miller v. Sanilac County, 606 F.3d 240, 247 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006)).

As an initial matter, the MSP and the individual troopers to the extent that they are

sued in their official capacities are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See, e.g., Will v.

Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989). They also are

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entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity. See Johnson v. Unknown Dellatifa, 357 F.3d

539, 545 (6th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lapides v. Board of Regents,

535 U.S. 613, 122 S. Ct. 1640 (2002), to argue that the MSP Defendants waived their

immunity under the Eleventh Amendment when they removed Plaintiff’s complaint to

federal court. First, Plaintiff overlooks the fact that she filed her first complaint in this

Court against the MSP Defendant alleging § 1983 violations. Second, the Supreme

Court’s holding in Lapides is far narrower than Plaintiff reads it. Lapides is expressly

limited to the issue of whether a state that removes state-law claims to federal court

having already consented to suit in its own courts can remove the case to federal court

and invoke Eleventh Amendment Immunity. 535 U.S. at 617-18, 122 S. Ct. at 1643

(indicating that “we must limit our answer to the context of state-law claims, in respect to

which the State has explicitly waived immunity from state-court proceedings” and “[n]or

need we address the scope of waiver by removal in a situation where the State’s

underlying sovereign immunity from suit has not been waived or abrogated in state

court”).

To the extent Plaintiff is suing the MSP officers in their individual capacities, the

MSP Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. “Under the doctrine

of qualified immunity, ‘government officials are shielded from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Phillips v. Roane County, 534

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F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.

Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982)). The determination of whether government officials are entitled

to qualified immunity requires two inquiries: “First, viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, has the plaintiff shown that a constitutional violation has

occurred? Second, was the right clearly established at the time of the violation?” Id. at

538-39.

The MSP Defendants argue that they did not violate Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

rights because their conduct constituted a lawful Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). A Terry stop is a “brief investigatory stop[ ] of persons,” United

States v. Cambell, 549 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted), that is

justified under the Fourth Amendment when an officer has reasonable suspicion “to

conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry, 392 U.S. at

30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884. The Sixth Circuit has provided the following guidance in

evaluating the validity of a Terry stop:

We engage in a two-part analysis when evaluating the constitutionality of a

Terry stop. First, we determine “whether there was a proper basis for the

stop, which is judged by examining whether the law enforcement officials

were aware of specific and articulable facts which gave rise to reasonable

suspicion.” [United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 354 (6th Cir. 2005)]

(quoting United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir.1993)). We

examine the totality of the circumstances in order “to determine the

reasonableness of the investigatory stop.” Id. (citing United States v. Bailey,

302 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir.2002)). . . .

Second, we examine “whether the degree of intrusion . . . was reasonably

related in scope to the situation at hand, which is judged by examining the

reasonableness of the officials’ conduct given their suspicions and the

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surrounding circumstances.” Davis, 430 F.3d at 354 (quoting Garza, 10

F.3d at 1245). Thus, we must determine (1) if the detention was

“sufficiently limited in time” and (2) if “the investigative means used the

least intrusive means reasonably available.” Id. (quoting Bennett v. City of

Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 825-26 (6th Cir.2005)).

United States v. Davis, 514 F.3d 596, 608 (6th Cir. 2008). During a Terry stop, an officer

may perform “a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer.” 

Id. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883. This search must be based on the officer’s “belie[f] that he is

dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.” Id. In order to arrest a suspect, an

officer must have probable cause. See, e.g., Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 573

(6th Cir. 2005).

Applying the above criteria, the Court finds a genuine issue of material fact only

with respect to whether Detective Grandison engaged in an unlawful seizure of Plaintiff

or search of her belongings and with respect to whether Sargent Coppens engaged in an

unlawful arrest of Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not created a genuine issue of material fact with

respect to whether Detective Vincent violated her Fourth Amendment rights.

It is clear from the videotape of the incident and the remaining evidence presented

by the parties, including Plaintiff’s testimony, that there was a proper Terry stop of

Plaintiff at least up to the point when Detective Grandison grabbed the chair on which

Plaintiff sat and dragged it, along with Plaintiff, into the holding cell. There is no dispute

that the check Plaintiff presented to Cashier Chipp was misprinted and therefore

suspicious. Additionally, it was a starter check and the casino, as a practice, does not

cash them very often. (Doc. 21 Ex. 6 at 67.) Pursuant to MGM policy, a casino cashier is

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required to notify a supervisor when presented with a suspicious check and a supervisor

agreeing with the assessment is required to notify casino security. Pursuant to MGM

policy and Michigan law, a casino is required to notify MSP when a patron is potentially

committing check fraud or some other crime. Mich. Comp. Laws § 432.209. Thus there

was a proper basis to investigate Plaintiff’s check and the time it took for MGM to follow

its and the State’s procedures was not unreasonable.

Before the MSP troopers arrived, Plaintiff expressed her desire to move off the

casino floor and, as Security Supervisor Mitchell escorted her to a more private area, the

troopers arrived and took Plaintiff to the casino’s interview room. Trooper Cox then

began interviewing Plaintiff to gather information concerning check. Up until that point,

any detention of Plaintiff was sufficiently limited in time and utilized the least intrusive

means reasonably available under the circumstances.

However, when Detective Grandison grabbed Plaintiff’s chair and dragged it, and

Plaintiff, into the holding cell, Plaintiff’s detention went beyond a Terry stop and had to

be supported by probable cause. Nevertheless, there is no dispute that when this

occurred, there were no other MSP officers in the interview room with Detective

Grandison. There also were no other MSP officers in the interview room when Detective

Grandison began searching Plaintiff’s belongings and there is no indication that the other

MSP Defendants participated in the search once they entered the room. Further, Plaintiff

presents no evidence to support her failure to supervise or train claim against Sargent

Coppens with respect to Detective Grandison’s conduct up to this point. Sargent

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Coppens, however, subsequently handcuffed Plaintiff and transported her to the MSP

office, thereby participating in what Plaintiff alleges was an unlawful arrest.

To demonstrate that Detective Grandison or Sargent Coppens wrongfully arrested

Plaintiff, she must prove that the officers lacked probable cause. Miller, 606 F.3d at 250. 

“‘Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a

prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed.’” Id. (quoting Brooks v.

Rothe, 577 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 2009)). By his own admission, Detective Grandison

did not have any information as to why Plaintiff was suspected of check fraud when he

entered the interview room, subsequently moved Plaintiff into the holding cell, and

searched her belongings.

Detective Grandison contends that he searched Plaintiff’s belongings because he

was concerned that she might have had a weapon. The videotape of the incident

undermines his claim as it clearly shows Plaintiff rummaging through her bags for some

time after Detective Grandison entered the interview room and before he attempted to

take them from her. In fact, at one point while Plaintiff’s hands were inside her purse,

Detective Grandison turns his back to her. Detective Grandison did not turn around in

response to Plaintiff pulling the bags towards herself or putting her hands inside the bags

(she was doing both before he turned away); rather, Detective Grandison turned back

towards Plaintiff in response to her complaint regarding the way she was being treated.

At the motion hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel asserted that Detective Grandison seized

Plaintiff because she refused to comply with his request to put her bags in the middle of

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the table. To the extent this was Detective Grandison’s reason for seizing Plaintiff, he did

not make that clear during his deposition in this case and it is not asserted in the MSP

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, based on the facts discussed

above, the Court finds a jury question as to whether Plaintiff resisted a lawful police

order.

With respect to Sargent Coppens, by the time she handcuffed Plaintiff and

transported her to the MSP office, the officers had obtained information that a reasonable

jury could find negated probable cause for her arrest. First, by this time, Detective

Grandison had contacted Certegy and been informed that Plaintiff cashed two checks at

the casino in the previous two weeks on the same credit union account. The officers also

were informed that Certegy had not rejected the check Plaintiff presented on May 27,

2009 (i.e. the night she was arrested); rather the cage cashier questioned the check simply

because it was printed crooked. Sargent Coppens in fact stated before handcuffing and

transporting Plaintiff for booking: “All we have is a crappily printed check.” (Doc. 25

Ex. 12 at 238-40.)

For these reasons, the Court cannot find that Detective Grandison is entitled to

qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s § 1983 unlawful arrest or search claims or

that Sargent Coppens is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s § 1983

false arrest claim. The Court believes that it is a jury question whether Plaintiff’s conduct

towards Detective Grandison justified his decision to place her in the holding cell and

search her belongings and whether the officers had probable cause to subsequently

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handcuff Plaintiff, transport her to the MSP office, and charge her with check fraud and

obstructing a police officer. For the reasons discussed earlier, however, Detective

Grandison and Sargent Coppens are entitled to summary judgment with respect to these

claims to the extent they are sued in their official capacities. Plaintiff has not created a

genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Detective Vincent violated her

Fourth Amendment rights and MSP is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 

Therefore Detective Vincent and MSP are entitled to summary judgment with respect to

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

D. False Imprisonment Against MGM and the MSP Defendants

Under Michigan law, false imprisonment is the unlawful restraining of a person’s

liberty or freedom of movement. Stowers v. Wolodzko, 386 Mich. 119, 134, 191 N.W.2d

355, 363 (1971) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The essence of a claim of false

imprisonment is that the imprisonment is false, [i].e., without right or authority to do so.” 

Hess v. Wolverine Lake, 32 Mich. App. 601, 604, 189 N.W.2d 42, 44 (1971). “In order to

prevail on a claim of false arrest or false imprisonment, the plaintiff must show that the

arrest was not legal, i.e. that it was made without probable cause.” Tope v. Howe, 179

Mich. App. 91, 105, 445 N.W.2d 452, 459 (1989) (citation omitted).

For the reasons discussed in the preceding section, Plaintiff presents no evidence

to support her false imprisonment claims against Detective Vincent or MGM and thus

summary judgment is granted to those defendants on those claims. In comparison, the

Court finds evidence to create a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether Detective

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Grandison and Sargent Coppens unlawfully restrained Plaintiff. The MSP Defendants,

however, also argue that they are entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’

intentional tort claims, including her claim of false imprisonment, based on governmental

immunity.

Under Michigan law, to be entitled to governmental immunity for an intentional

tort, a defendant must establish: “that he was acting in the course of his employment [or]

at least reasonably believed that he was acting within the scope of his authority, that his

actions were discretionary in nature, and that he acted in good faith.” Miller, 606 F.3d at

254 (citing Odom v. Wayne County, 482 Mich. 459, 480, 760 N.W.2d 217, 228 (2008)). 

This Court finds the only fact at issue in this case with respect to governmental immunity 

to be whether Detective Grandison and Sargent Coppens acted in “good faith” or

“without malice.” Id. As the Michigan Supreme Court explained in Odom, “[t]he goodfaith element . . . protects a defendant’s honest belief and good-faith conduct with the

cloak of immunity while exposing to liability a defendant who acts with malicious

intent.” 482 Mich. at 481-82, 760 N.W.2d at 229. A state defendant-employee does not

act with good faith when he “does not act honestly,” but acts with “a wanton or reckless

disregard for the rights of another.” Id. at 473-74, 760 N.W.2d at 225.

Detective Grandison contends that he moved Plaintiff into the holding cell because

she was being belligerent and that he searched her belongings because he was afraid that

she may have had a weapon. The videotape of the incident creates a genuine issue of

material fact with respect to the honesty of his claims. The Court already has addressed

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Detective Grandison’s claim that he searched Plaintiff’s bags for fear that she was armed. 

As to Plaintiff’s alleged belligerence, the Court believes that it is for the jury to evaluate

Plaintiff’s conduct and decide whether a reasonable officer would have found it necessary

to move her into the holding cell. In light of the information known to Detective

Grandison and Sargent Coppens before Plaintiff was handcuffed and transported to the

MSP office, the Court also finds a question of fact as to whether these officers acted with

reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s rights when they thereafter continued to detain her and

charge her with check fraud. The Court therefore finds a genuine issue of material fact

with respect to whether Detective Grandison and Sargent Coppens are entitled to

governmental immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s false arrest claims.

E. Assault and Battery against the MSP Defendants

Under Michigan law, an assault is defined as “an attempt to commit a battery or an

unlawful act which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate

battery.” People v. Nickens, 470 Mich. 622, 627, 685 N.W.2d 657, 661 (2004)). A

battery is defined as “an intentional, unconsented and harmful or offensive touching of

the person of another, or of something closely connected with the person.” Id. at 628, 685

N.W.2d at 661. “[A] police officer may use reasonable force when making an arrest. . . .

the measure of necessary force is that which an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person,

with the knowledge and in the situation of the arresting officer, would have deemed

necessary.” Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 252 (6th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks

and citation omitted).

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For the reasons discussed earlier, the Court finds a genuine issue of material fact

with respect to whether Detective Grandison and Sargent Coppens, but not Detective

Vincent, are liable for assault and battery against Plaintiff and whether they acted in good

faith so as to be entitled to governmental immunity.

F. Intentional/Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress against the MSP

Defendants and MGM

The facts of this case do not support a negligent infliction of emotional distress

claim. Such a claim requires proof of the following elements:

(1) serious injury threatened or inflicted on a person, not the plaintiff, of a

nature to cause severe mental disturbance to the plaintiff, (2) shock by the

plaintiff from witnessing the event that results in the plaintiff's actual

physical harm, (3) close relationship between the plaintiff and the injured

person (parent, child, husband, or wife), and (4) presence of the plaintiff at

the location of the accident at the time the accident occurred or, if not

presence, at least shock “fairly contemporaneous” with the accident.

Hesse v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 466 Mich. 21, 34, 642 N.W.2d 330, 337 (2002).

In contrast, to establish a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a

plaintiff must show: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3)

causation, and (4) severe emotional distress.” Graham v. Ford, 237 Mich. App. 670, 674,

604 N.W.2d 713, 716 (1999); see also Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 422 Mich. 594,

374 N.W.2d 905 (1985). In Graham, the Michigan Court of Appeals provided the

following description of the conduct required to support an intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim:

Liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress has been found

only where the conduct complained of has been so outrageous in character,

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and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,

and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized

community. Doe v. Mills, 212 Mich. App. 73, 91, 536 N.W.2d 824 (1995).

Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances,

petty oppressions, or other trivialities. Id. It is not enough that the defendant

has acted with an intent that is tortious or even criminal, or that he has

intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been

characterized by “malice,” or a degree of aggravation that would entitle the

plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins.

Co., 422 Mich. 594, 602-603, 374 N.W.2d 905 (1985), quoting Restatement

Torts, 2d, § 46, comment d, pp. 72-73. . . . The test has been described as

whether “the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community

would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,

‘Outrageous!’” Roberts, 422 Mich. at 603, 374 N.W.2d 905. 

237 Mich. App. at 674, 604 N.W.2d at 716.

The only behavior in the present matter that the Court believes could possibly

satisfy this test is Detective Grandison’s treatment of Plaintiff, particularly his grabbing

of her chair and dragging it, along with Plaintiff, into the holding cell. The Court believes

that it is a jury question whether this conduct constitutes intentional infliction of

emotional distress and therefore denies summary judgment to Detective Grandison on

these claims. The Court concludes, however, that MGM and the remaining MSP

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to these claims.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed, this Court concludes that MGM, MSP, and Detective

Vincent are entitled to summary judgment with respect to all of Plaintiff’s claims against

them. Detective Grandison and Sargent Coppens are entitled to summary judgment to the

extent they are sued in their official capacities and with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims

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alleging conspiracy and a failure to supervise or train under § 1983, defamation, and

violations of the ELCRA. Sargent Coppens additionally is entitled to summary judgment

with respect to Plaintiff’s claims alleging an unlawful search pursuant to § 1983 and

intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress; although the Court finds a genuine

issue of material fact with respect to Detective Grandison’s liability on these claims. 

There also is a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment in favor of

Detective Grandison and Sargent Coppens with respect to Plaintiff’s claims alleging an

unlawful arrest or detention under § 1983 and her state-law claims alleging false

imprisonment and assault and battery.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED, that Defendant MGM’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED and Counts 1, 2, 3, and 9 of Civil Case No. 09-14101 are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE and MGM is DISMISSED from this lawsuit;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the MSP Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The following claims

against the MSP Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE: (1) Plaintiff’s

claims alleging conspiracy and “refusing or neglecting to prevent” under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (Counts 4 and 5 of Civil Case No. 09-12083 and Count 4 of Civil Case No. 09-

14101); defamation/slander (Count 8 of Civil Case No. 09-12083 and Count 7 of Civil

Case No. 09-14101); and violations of the ELCRA (Count 9 of Civil Case No. 09-12083

and Count 8 of Civil Case No. 09-14101). The Michigan Department of State Police and

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Michigan State Police Trooper Clarence Vincent are DISMISSED from this lawsuit.

DATE: February 11, 2011 s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Gabriel B. Locher, Esq.

Michael D. Socha, Esq.

Steven M. Cabadas, Esq.

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