alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 124 (Wednesday, June 26, 1996)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 32924]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-16270]



=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

8 CFR PARTS 3 AND 242

[EOIR 102F]
RIN 1125-AA01


Executive Office for Immigration Review; Motions and Appeals in 
Immigration Proceedings; Correction

AGENCY: Department of Justice.

ACTION: Correction to final regulation.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This document contains additional corrections to the final 
regulation published Monday, April 29, 1996 (61 FR 18900), relating to 
new motions and appeals procedures in immigration proceedings.

EFFECTIVE DATE: July 1, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Margaret M. Philbin, General Counsel, 
Executive Office for Immigration Review, Suite 2400, 5107 Leesburg 
Pike, Falls Church, VA 22041, (703) 305-0470 (not a toll free call).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The final regulation that is the subject of these corrections 
streamlines the motions and appeals practice before the Board of 
Immigration Appeals and establishes a centralized procedure for filing 
notices of appeal, fees, fee waiver requests, and briefs directly with 
the Board. The new regulation also establishes time and number 
limitations on motions to reconsider and on motions to reopen and makes 
certain changes to appellate procedures to reflect the statutory 
directives of section 545 of the Immigration Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-
649, 104 stat. at 4978).

Need for Correction

    As published, the final regulation contains errors that may prove 
to be misleading and are in need of clarification.

Correction of Publication

    Accordingly, the publication on April 29, 1996 of the final 
regulation (EOIR 102F), which was the subject of FR Doc. 96-10157 is 
corrected as follows:


Sec. 3.2(b)  [Corrected]

    1. On page 18904, in the third column, in Sec. 3.2 paragraph (b), 
line 13, the word ``shall'' is corrected to read ``may'' and in line 
17, the last sentence of the paragraph is corrected to read ``Such 
motion may be consolidated with, and considered by the Board in 
connection with the appeal to the Board.''


Sec. 246.7  [Corrected]

    2. On page 18910, in the first column, Sec. 246.7, line 4, the 
following language is removed: ``except that no appeal shall lie from 
an order of deportation entered in absentia''.
Rosemary Hart,
Federal Register Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. 96-16270 Filed 6-25-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-01-M
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED DECEMBER 17, 2015

NO. 03-15-00712-CR

Frank Joseph, Jr., Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 299TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE, JUSTICES PEMBERTON AND FIELD

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION-- OPINION BY JUSTICE PEMBERTON

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction signed by the district court. Having reviewed 

the record, it appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. Therefore, the Court 

dismisses the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay 

costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

IN THE INTEREST OF: F.R.P., JR., A

MINOR

PETITION OF: F.R.P., FATHER :

:

:

:

: No. 46 EAL 2017

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 1st day of March, 2017

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
#### Christopher MASSELINK, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Van E. DONLEY, Chairman Missouri State Tax Commission and Dennis A. Hill, Assessor of the City of St. Louis, Defendants/Respondents.

No. 69554.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Five.

Nov. 5, 1996.

Christopher Masselink, Pro Se.

Tyrone A. Taborn, City Counselor, Eugene J. Hanses, Jr., Associate City Counselor, St. Louis, R. Randall Turley, State Tax Commission of Missouri, Jefferson City, for Defen-daiits/Respondents.

Before AHRENS, C.J., and CRANDALL, J., and CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, Senior Judge.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Christopher Masselink appeals from a judgment by the circuit court affirming the decision and order by the State Tax Commission of Missouri. The commission’s decision is supported by competent and substantial evidence; no error of law appears. An opinion would have no precedential value. The judgment is affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
2:09-mj-30223-DUTY Doc # 4 Filed 05/12/09 Pg 1 of 3 Pg ID 6
2:09-mj-30223-DUTY Doc # 4 Filed 05/12/09 Pg 2 of 3 Pg ID 7
2:09-mj-30223-DUTY Doc # 4 Filed 05/12/09 Pg 3 of 3 Pg ID 8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DONNA SQUALLS-EL,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

PATRICK M. DOHANY,

Defendant(s).

 /

Case No. 2:09-cv-11110

HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (docket 4)

AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS (docket 7)

This is an action by a pro se plaintiff, Donna Squalls-El, against Patrick Dohany, the

Oakland County Treasurer, challenging the foreclosure of certain property allegedly owned

by Dorothy Squalls. On April 14, 2009, Dohany filed a motion to dismiss the complaint with

prejudice on the grounds that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a basis for the Court’s

jurisdiction and that plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This

motion was referred by order of this Court, along with all other pretrial matters, to United

States Magistrate Judge Virginia Morgan on April 17, 2009.

Plaintiff did not file any response to defendant’s motion to dismiss. On May 27, 2009,

Magistrate Judge Morgan held a hearing on the motion to dismiss, but the plaintiff did not

appear. 

On May 29, 2009, Magistrate Judge Morgan issued a report and recommendation on

the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Magistrate Judge Morgan recommended that this Court

grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff had failed to properly identify

a basis for federal jurisdiction and because, even if federal jurisdiction existed over the

plaintiff’s claims, jurisdiction would be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The

2:09-cv-11110-SJM-VMM Doc # 8 Filed 06/25/09 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 90
2

Magistrate Judge also notified the parties that any objections must be filed within ten days

of service. No party has filed objections to the report and recommendations.

The Court’s standard of review for a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation

depends upon whether a party files objections. If a party does not object to the report and

recommendation, the Court does not need to conduct a review by any standard. Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Because neither party filed timely objections to

Magistrate Judge Morgan’s report and recommendation, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(B)(1)(c);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e), this Court need not and will not conduct a review.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation

[docket entry 7] is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED as the opinion of this Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss [docket entry 4] is

GRANTED and plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

s/Stephen J. Murphy, III 

STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

United States District Judge

Dated: June 25, 2009

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or

counsel of record on June 25, 2009, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

Alissa Greer 

Case Manager

2:09-cv-11110-SJM-VMM Doc # 8 Filed 06/25/09 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 91
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PRASAD NAIR,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 09-CV-11934 

vs. HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH

UNIFIED BUSINESS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Defendant.

_____________________________/

ORDER ENTERING JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 68(a) (# 16)

On August 24, 2009, plaintiff Prasad Nair filed an acceptance of defendant Unified

Business Technologies, Inc.'s ("UBT") offer of judgment in the amount of $2,500.00

inclusive of all claims filed by Nair. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68(a),

judgment SHALL enter in favor of Nair and against UBT in the amount of $2,500.00. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2009

s/George Caram Steeh 

GEORGE CARAM STEEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on

August 31, 2009, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Marcia Beauchemin

Deputy Clerk

2:09-cv-11934-GCS-DAS Doc # 17 Filed 08/31/09 Pg 1 of 1 Pg ID 149
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-40301

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ALBERT SMITH, III,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:03-CR-41-1

Before BENAVIDES, PRADO, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Albert Smith, III, federal prisoner # 10498-078, appeals the district court’s

judgment denying his motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(C)(2) based on the amendment of the crack cocaine Sentencing

Guidelines. Smith argues that in denying the motion, the district court treated

the Guidelines as mandatory in violation of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.

220 (2005) and Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), and thus, failed

to consider the purpose of the amendment, which was to cure the disparity in

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 9, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 09-40301 Document: 00511075597 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/09/2010
No. 09-40301

2

sentencing between crack and powdered cocaine. He asserted that his

sentencing under the career offender Guideline did not preclude a reduction of

his sentence under § 3582(c)(2).

Smith’s argument that his sentencing under the career offender Guideline

does not preclude a reduction of his sentence is foreclosed by this court’s

precedent. See United States v. Anderson, 591 F.3d 789, 790 & n.4, 791 & n.8.

His arguments based on the Booker and Kimbrough decisions are foreclosed by

our decision in United States v. Doublin, 572 F.3d 235, 236-29 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 130 S. Ct. 517 (2009).

Accordingly, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is

GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The

Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time in which to file a brief

is DISMISSED AS MOOT.

Case: 09-40301 Document: 00511075597 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/09/2010
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BYRON FELTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CIVIC PROPERTY & CASUALTY CO.

Defendant.

 /

Case No. 09-12063

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

OPINION AND ORDER

At a session of said Court, held in the U.S.

District Courthouse, City of Detroit, County of

Wayne, State of Michigan, on June 22, 2009.

PRESENT: THE HONORABLE PATRICK J. DUGGAN

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

On May 1, 2009, Byron Felton (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit in Wayne County

Circuit Court alleging that Civic Property and Casualty Company (“Defendant”)

wrongfully denied coverage on a fire-loss claim to Plaintiff’s insured property. On May

28, 2009, Defendant removed Plaintiff’s lawsuit to this Court on the basis of diversity

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332, 1441. Presently before the Court is a Motion to

Remand filed by Plaintiff on June 9, 2009. Plaintiff argues that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1332(c)(1), this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

As described above, Plaintiff, an insured, is suing Defendant, his insurer, on

grounds that Defendant wrongfully denied him coverage on a fire-loss claim. For

purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction in lawsuits against insurers, 28 U.S.C. §

1332(c)(1) provides:

2:09-cv-12063-PJD-DAS Doc # 9 Filed 06/22/09 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 36
[A]ny direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability

insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the

insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed

a citizen of the State of which the insured is a Citizen, as well as of any

State by which the insurer has been incorporated and of the State where

it has its principal place of business . . . .

Plaintiff argues that because he is not joined as a party-defendant, Defendant is deemed a

citizen of his state—Michigan—and diversity is destroyed.

Although the literal reading espoused by Plaintiff would destroy diversity in this

case, courts have consistently held that the direct action provision does not apply to

lawsuits, like this one, where an insured sues his or her own insurance provider because

such a reading “would result in an absurdity—federal courts would never hear common

insurance disputes because the insured and the insurer, the plaintiff and the defendant,

would always be considered citizens of the same state.” Lee-Lipstreu v. Chubb Group of

Ins. Cos., 329 F.3d 898, 899-900 (6th Cir. 2003). Because the direct action provision

does not apply, Plaintiff, a citizen of Michigan, and Defendant, a California corporation

with its principal place of business in California, are diverse and this Court has subject

matter jurisdiction.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is DENIED.

s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Copies to:

Allen J. Counard, Esq.

Mark S. Hayduk, Esq.

2:09-cv-12063-PJD-DAS Doc # 9 Filed 06/22/09 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 37
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

NORTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, CASE NO: 09-20006-07

v. DISTRICT JUDGE THOMAS L. LUDINGTON

MAGISTRATE JUDGE CHARLES E. BINDER

ADAM CADENA,

Defendant.

/

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT, FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING PLEA OF GUILTY

I. REPORT AND FINDINGS

On January 8, 2010, the case was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1(B) and 636(b)(3) for purposes of receiving, on consent of the parties,

Defendant’s offer of a plea of guilty. The Defendant, along with counsel, appeared before me

on February 3, 2010. In open court I examined the Defendant under oath, confirmed the

Defendant’s consent, and then advised and questioned the Defendant regarding each of the

inquiries prescribed by Rule 11(b) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. Based

upon the Defendant’s answers and demeanor, I HEREBY FIND 1) that the Defendant is

competent to tender a plea, 2) that Defendant’s plea was knowingly, intelligently made, and 3)

that the offense(s) to which he pled are supported by an independent basis in fact containing

each of the essential elements of the offense(s). Therefore, I have ordered the preparation of a

presentence investigation report.

1:09-cr-20006-TLL-CEB Doc # 199 Filed 02/04/10 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 739
II. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that subject to the Court’s

consideration of the plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c) of the FEDERAL RULES OF

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, the Defendant be adjudged guilty and have sentence imposed.

III. REVIEW

The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and

Recommendation within ten (10) days of service of a copy hereof as provided for in 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of

appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed.2d 435 (1985); Frontier Ins.

Co. v. Blaty, 454 F.3d 590, 596 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984

(6th Cir. 2005). The parties are advised that making some objections, but failing to raise

others, will not preserve all the objections a party may have to this Report and

Recommendation. McClanahan v. Comm’r of Social Security, 474 F.3d 830, 837 (6th Cir.

2006); Frontier Ins. Co., 454 F.3d at 596-97. Pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of

any objections is to be served upon this Magistrate Judge.

 s/ Charles` E Binder 

CHARLES E. BINDER 

Dated: February 4, 2010 United States Magistrate Judge

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that this Report and Recommendation was electronically filed this date,

electronically served on Shane Waller and Robert Dunn, and served on Pretrial Services and

District Judge Ludington in the traditional manner.

Date: February 4, 2010 By s/Jean L. Broucek 

Case Manager to Magistrate Judge Binder

1:09-cr-20006-TLL-CEB Doc # 199 Filed 02/04/10 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 740
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Annual Report of Spherion Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the period ending December 26, 2003 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Roy G. Krause, President and Chief Operating Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted
pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|/s/ROY G. KRAUSERoy G. Krause
President and Chief Operating Officer
March 10, 2004 |  | 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | 

76

---

QuickLinks
TITN-2014-1-31-EX10.55






EXHIBIT 10.55




Peter Christianson
c/o Titan Machinery Inc.
644 East Beaton Drive
West Fargo, ND 58078-2648


Dear Peter: 


This letter agreement amends the letter agreement dated March 6, 2013, between you and Titan Machinery Inc. (the “Company”).  The paragraph entitled “Long-Term Equity Incentive” is amended as follows: 
	
			
	 
	 
	 

	Long-Term Equity Incentive:
	 
	On June 1, 2014 and on June 1 of each year thereafter, or such other date as determined by the Compensation Committee, that this letter agreement is in effect, you will be entitled to receive an equity award.  Each award shall be granted in accordance with the terms of the Company’s Equity Grant Policy.  The value of the award will be equal to your annual base salary in effect on the date of grant.  The award will be subject to such terms (including, without limitation, vesting, risk of forfeiture, or similar terms) as shall be determined by the Company’s Compensation Committee.






All other terms and provisions of the March 6, 2013 letter agreement not specifically modified or altered, or not specifically deleted in this amendment are hereby ratified and confirmed and shall remain in full force and effect.


Sincerely, 


TITAN MACHINERY INC.




By:     /s/ Stanley Dardis                    
Stanley Dardis,
Chair of the Compensation Committee


I accept and agree to the amendment to the March 6, 2013 letter agreement with Titan Machinery Inc. as set forth above. 
	
			
	 
	 
	 

	/s/ Peter Christianson________________________
	 
	March 1, 2014                                              

	Peter Christianson 
	 
	Dated
#### Rannie McCASTON, III, Movant/Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent/Respondent.

No. 68870.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Aug. 20, 1996.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Oct. 1, 1996.

Application to Transfer Denied Nov. 19, 1996.

Dave Hemingway, Asst. Public Defender, St. Louis, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Kurt U. Schaefer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before REINHARD, P.J., and KAROHL and GRIMM, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

The grand jury charged defendant with first degree murder, first degree assault, attempt to commit forcible rape, and three counts of armed criminal action. Further, he was charged as a prior and persistent offender.

In exchange for the State waiving the death penalty, defendant pled guilty to all six counts. Pursuant to the plea bargain, the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of probation or parole and to five concurrent 30 year sentences.

Defendant now appeals the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion. He contends the motion court erred in refusing to grant him an evi-dentiary hearing.

No jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum opinion for their information only, setting forth the facts and reasons for this order.

The motion court’s findings of facts are not clearly erroneous. No error of law appears. The judgment is affirmed in accordance with Rule 84.16(b).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

THOMAS MARIO RANGE,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 09-10945

MARY BERGHUIS,

Respondent.

________________________________/

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY

Petitioner moves for discovery. Petitioner has submitted an amended habeas

petition, Respondent has filed an answer and the state court record, and Petitioner has

filed a reply. Petitioner requests discovery of an expert witness’s forensic report. 

According to Petitioner, the expert witness testified at Petitioner’s trial but the report was

not admitted into evidence. Petitioner claims that the expert’s testimony was improperly

admitted at trial.

Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires a respondent to

submit with its answer all transcripts and documents relevant to the determination of the

habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, Rule 5. A court may also require that the record

be expanded to include additional material relevant to the resolution of the habeas

petition. 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, Rule 7. Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases provides, in pertinent part:

If the petition is not dismissed at a previous stage in the proceeding, the

judge, after the answer and the transcript and record of state court

proceedings are filed, shall, upon review of those proceedings and of the

expanded record, if any, determine whether an evidentiary hearing is

2:09-cv-10945-RHC-SDP Doc # 19 Filed 03/18/13 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 1480
S:\Cleland\JUDGE'S DESK\C2 ORDERS\09-10945.RANGE.Discovery.ckbedit.wpd

2

required.

Petitioner’s motion for discovery was filed after Respondent filed the state court

material, but Petitioner has not shown that the requested report, which was not admitted

into evidence at trial, is necessary for the proper resolution of this matter. Moreover,

“[a] habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, is not entitled to

discovery as a matter of ordinary course.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). 

Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides that a habeas court may

authorize a party to conduct discovery upon a showing of good cause. 28 U.S.C. foll. §

2254, Rule 6(a). Petitioner has not made the requisite showing of “good cause.” 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for discovery [Dkt. #15] is DENIED. 

 s/Robert H. Cleland 

ROBERT H. CLELAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 18, 2013

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record

on this date, March 18, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

 s/Lisa Wagner 

Case Manager and Deputy Clerk

(313) 234-5522

2:09-cv-10945-RHC-SDP Doc # 19 Filed 03/18/13 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 1481
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-19-00138-CV

PERRY PRICE,

Appellant

v.

AMOS PHILLIPS AND KAITLYN PHILLIPS,

Appellees

From the 52nd District Court

Coryell County, Texas

Trial Court No. DC-16-44889

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Perry Price, filed an unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1). Dismissal of this appeal would not prevent a party from seeking 

relief to which it would otherwise be entitled. The motion is granted, and the appeal is 

dismissed.

JOHN E. NEILL

Justice
Price v. Phillips Page 2

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Neill

Motion granted; appeal dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed May 22, 2019

[CV06]