UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________ ) HENRY SEARCY, JR. , ) ) Plaintiff , ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 19-921 (RBW) ) D EMAURIC E F. SMITH, et al. , ) ) Defe ndants. ) ____________________________________) MEMORANDUM OPINION The plaintiff, Henry Searcy, Jr., proceeding pro se, brought this civil action against the National Football League Players Association (“NFLPA”); DeMaurice F. Smith , the Executive Direc tor of the N FLPA; Prometric LLC (“Prometric”) ; and Michael P. Sawic ki , the Vice President and General Counsel of Prometric (collectively, the “def endants ”), 1 allegin g violations of the Federal Arbitration A ct (the “ FAA ”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307, an d Dis tr ict of Columbi a common law. See Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.” ) ¶¶ 15–59, ECF No. 11. On May 6, 2020, the Court granted each of the defendants ’ motions to dismiss in this case

. Se e Searc y v. S mith , No. 19- cv -921 (RBW), 2020 WL 2198086, a t *9 (D.D.C. May 6, 2020). In response to the Court’s ruling, the plaintiff appealed, see Notice of Appeal at 1, ECF No. 50, and the D istrict of Columbia Circuit subsequently remanded the case t o this Court for “reconsideration of its dismissal of the claims against the NF LPA and Smit h for f ai lur e to state a c laim under Federal

1 Michael Sa wic ki and Prom e tric have sinc e been terminated as defendants pursuant to the Court ’ s Memoran d um Opinion, se e Searc y v. S mith , No. 19

- cv - 921 (RB W ), 2020 WL 219 8086 , at *9 (D.D.C. May 6, 2020) (gran ting t he defendants ’ motion to dismiss pursu ant to Federal R ule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 1) with respect to Sawicki and Prometric ), a nd the C ircuit ’s su b sequent ord e r granting Sawicki and Promet ric ’ s mot i on for summary affirmanc e, s ee Or der at 1 , Searcy v. Smith , 20

- 7048 ( D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2020)

. See Order at 1 ( Nov . 19, 2021) , ECF No. 60 (t erminat ing Sawi cki and Prometric as defendan ts following the Ci r cuit ’ s Mand a te ).2 Ru le of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [,] ” Order at 1 , Searcy v. Smith , 20-7048 (D. C. Cir. Mar. 5, 2021). Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submi ssions, 2 the Court conclude s for th e foll owing re ason s that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff ’ s claims against the defendants and dismisses these claims consistent with the reasoning articulated in its May 6, 2020 Memorandum Opinion. I. BACKGROUND The Court previou sly set f orth the fa c tual backgrou nd of th is c ase in its May 6, 2020 Memorandum Opinion, see Searc y, 2020 WL 2198086, at *2–3, and therefore will not reiterate it again here. T he Court will, however, set for th the procedur al background of this case, which is pert inent to the resol ution of the issues presented on remand. On Ma y 6, 2020, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order, granting defendant Michael P. Sawicki ’s mo tion to dismiss “ to the extent that it s [ought] di smissal of the plaintiff ’ s clai ms . . . pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 1)[ ,] ” Order at 1 (M ay 6, 2020), ECF No. 49; granting defendant De Ma urice F. Smith ’ s motion to dismiss “ to the extent that it s[ought] dismissal of the plai nti ff’s claims . . . pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(6) [,]” id.; granting defendant Prom etric ’s motion to dismiss “ to the extent that it s [ought] dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims . . . pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 1) [,]” id. at 1 –2; and granting d efendan t NFLPA ’ s motion to dismiss pursuan t to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6) , id. at 2. Th e Cour t therefore dismisse d the plaintiff ’s Amended Complaint,

2 In addition to the filings a lre a dy identifie d, the Court consi de r ed the following su bmissions in rend ering it s deci sion: (1 ) Defendants De Mauri ce F. Smith and National F ootball League Players Association ’ s Jurisdi ctional Brief ( “ Def s.’ Br. ” ), E C F No. 61; (2) the Plaintiff [’ s] Motion on C ourt Jurisdiction/Am ount

- in -C ontroversy ( “ Pl. ’ s Br. ” ), ECF No. 63; and (3) Defendant s De M auric e F. Smith an d National Footba ll League Player s Association ’ s Reply Brief Regarding J urisdiction ( “ Def s.’ Reply Br .”) , ECF No. 64

.3 s ee id., and the plaintiff then appealed the Court’s judgment to the Circuit , s ee N otice of Appeal
at 1, ECF No. 50. On Dece mber 22, 2020, the Circuit issued an order granting summary affirmance as to the defendants Michael Sawicki and Prometric , stating that “ [t]he district court correctly dismissed the appellant ’ s claims against Prometric and Sawicki fo r l ack of subj ect matte r jurisdiction[,]” having “properly concluded that it lacked diversity jurisdiction be cause Searcy, Prometric , and Sawicki are all citizens of Maryland ” and the “appellant had no t sh own a basis for federal question jurisdiction in th is c ase. ” Order at 1 , Sea rcy v. Smith, No. 20-7048 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2020). However, o n March 5, 2021, the Circuit issued an order denying summary af

firma nce as to the NFLPA and Smith , and o rdered that the “ case be remanded to the district court for re consider ati on of its dis missal of the claim s a gainst the NFLPA and Smith for failure
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Ci vil Procedure 12( b)(6). ” Order at 1 , Searc y v. Smith, No. 20-7048 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 2021). Specifically, the D.C. Circuit stated in its ord er : T h e dis trict cou rt conclude d t hat i t had jurisdiction over appellant ’ s claims against the NFLPA base d on diversity o f citizenshi p, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and dismissed those claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The distr ict court then dismissed claims again st o ther defend ants for la ck of sub jec t matter jurisdiction because they, like appellant, are citizens of Mar yland, and the claims again st them did not im plicate federal question jurisdiction. But “ [t]he presen ce of a non dive rse party . . . depr ives the d ist r ict court o f [diversity] jurisd ict ion over any of the claims .” In re [] Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 631 F.3d 537, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Consequently, the distri ct cou rt may not exercise diversity jurisdiction over the claims against the NFL PA while also dismissing the cla ims against the nondiverse defendants in this way. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v . Allapatta h Se rvs., Inc. , 545 U.S. 546, 562

– 64 (2005) ( “ A failure of complete diversity

. . . contaminates every claim in the action, ” because “t he pr esence of nondiverse p arties o n bo th sides of a lawsuit eliminates the justification for pro viding a fede ral forum. ” ). More over, the district court did not explain its basis for e xercising jurisdiction over any c laims against S mith, who has represented th at he is a lso a citize n of Mar ylan d. See Sin ochem Int ’ l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int ’ l Shipping Corp

. , 549 U.S. 422, 43 0–31 (2007) ( “ [A ] federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction4 over th e c ategory of claim in su it (subj ect

- matter jurisdiction) and the parties (personal jurisd iction) .” ). While not otherw ise l imited, the district court m ay address on remand which, if any, of Se arcy ’ s state law claims may be pre

- empte d by Section 301 of t he La bor Manage ment Relatio ns Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 185; Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams , 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (noting t he “ complete pr e- emption corollary to the well

pleaded comp laint rule, ” in which “ the pre

- emptive force of a statute is so

‘ extra ordin ar y’ that it ‘c onverts an o rdinary stat e common - law compl aint into one stating a federal claim .’” ) (q uoting Me tro [.] Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor , 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)); Allis -Cha lmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985) ( “ [W]hen resolution of a st ate

- law claim is subs tantiall y depend ent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor con trac t, that clai m must either be treated as a § 301 claim, or dis missed as pre

- empted by federal labor- contract law. ” ) (internal citatio n om itted). Id. a t 1 –2 (a lterations i n original). On May 19, 2021, the Circuit issued its Mandate in this c ase . S ee Mandate at 1, S earc y v. Smith , No. 20-7048 (D.C. Cir. May 19, 2021). Following the issuance of the Cir cuit ’ s Mandate, the Court conducted a status conferenc e, during which t he Co urt orde red the parties to file briefs regarding the jurisdiction issue raised by th e Circu it and ordered that defendants Michael Sawicki and Prom e tric be terminated as defendants in light of the C ircuit ’s order granting these def end ants ’ motion for s ummary

a ffirmance

. See Order at 1 (Nov . 19, 2021) , ECF No. 60. The remaining def endants filed their brief regarding jurisdiction on December 17, 2021, s ee De fs. ’ Br. at 1 , o n Jan uary 4, 2022, the plaintiff file d his brief regarding jurisdiction , 3 s ee Pl. ’ s Br. at 1 , and the defendant s filed their reply brief regarding jurisdiction on January 10, 2022, s ee Def s.’ Reply Br. at 1

. 4

3 Although the plainti ff ’ s brie f is st yled as a “ Motion on Court Jurisdicti on/Amount

- in

- Controversy [,] ” Pl. ’ s Br. at 1, the Co urt has p rev i ou sly con cluded that “ it is in f act a b ri ef regarding the jurisdictio nal issues raised b y the Circui t , filed in response t o the Court ’ s ord er from t he November 19, 2021 status conference ,” see Searcy v. Smith , No. 19

- 921 (RBW), 2022 WL 171 46938, at * 5 (D.D.C . Nov. 22, 2022)

.
4 Th e plaintiff also filed a m otion to fu r ther amend his C om plaint followin g th e Circuit ’s remand , see Mot ion for Leave to Ame n d Plaintiff ’ s Amended Compl aint at 1, ECF No. 62, which the Court denied , see Order at 1 (No v. 22, 2022), ECF No. 71

.5 II. S TANDARD O F REVIEW F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) governs motions to dismiss for lack of sub ject
matte r jurisd icti on. A motion pursuant to this Rule “pr esents a thre shold challenge to the [C] ourt’s jurisdiction . . . .” H aase v. Sessi ons, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001) (noting t hat “a Rule 12(b )(1) moti on imposes on the [C] ourt an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is
act ing wit hin t he sco pe of its jurisdiction al authority. ”). Accordingly, the Court must dismiss a claim if it “lack [s] . . . subj ect matter jur isdic tio n[.]” Fed . R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Und er Rule 12(b) (1), “ [i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [the Court’s] limite d jurisdiction,” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), and the plaintiff bears the burden of es ta blishing the Court’s jur isdict ion by a prep onderance of the evidence, see , e.g., Moore v. Bush, 535 F. Supp. 2d 46, 47 (D.D.C. 2008). In deciding a motion to dismiss based upon lack of subje ct matter jurisdiction, the Co urt is not limit ed to the allegat io ns set forth in the
comp laint and “ma y consider materials outside the pleadings [. ] ” Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc . v. Fo od & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Be cause t he Court must ensure its jurisdicti onal authority, “the [p]lainti ff’s f actu al a llegations i n t he complai nt . . . will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in r esol ving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Gra nd Lodg e of Fr aternal Order of Police , 185 F. Supp. 2d at 13–14 (al teration in origina l) ( inte rnal quotation marks omit ted ). In applying the above framework, the Court is mindful of the fact tha t th e plaintiff is proceeding in this matter pro se. This app reciati on is required because the pleadings of pro se parties are “ to be liberally construed, and a pro se co mplaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,6 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Furthermor e, all factual allegations by a pro se litig ant, whether contained in the complaint or other filings in the matter, should be read together in considering whether to grant a dis positive motio n. See Richardson v. United States , 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999). III. ANALYSIS The Circui t ha s instructed this Court to “ re consider[] [ ] its dismissal of the claims against the NFLPA and Smith for failure to state a claim under Federal Ru le of Ci vil Pr ocedure 12( b)(6)[,] ” Order at 1 , Searc y v. Smith, No. 20-7048 (D. C. Cir. Mar. 5, 2021), in light of the Court’ s dismissal of th e two other non diverse parties in this case , see id. ( stating that because

“ [t]he presence of a nondiverse party . . . deprives the district court of [diversity] jurisdiction over any of the cl aims [,] . . . t he district court may not ex e rcise diversity jurisdiction over the claims against the NFLPA while also dismissing the claims ag ainst the nondiverse defendants in this way ” (quoting In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig. , 631 F.3d a t 541 ( alterations in original) (interna l quotation marks omitted ) ). Fu rther more, the Circuit noted that t his Court “did not explain its basis for exercising jurisdiction over any claims agai nst Smith, who has represented that he is also a [nondi verse party]. ” Id. at 1 –2. The defendants ar gue that : (1) the Court has fe deral question jurisdiction over the p laintiff ’ s state law claims because the claims “require ‘substantial analysis’ of a labor a greement to resolve [,] ” Def s.’ Br. at 5, and theref ore

“ are completely preempted under t he [ Labor M anagement Relations Act (t he ‘ ] LMRA [ ‘),]” id

. at 6; and (2) as to the plaintiff ’ s FAA claim, the Court may either exercise fe deral question jurisdiction, see id. at 8 –9, or supplemental jurisdiction, see id

. at 10

. 5 The plain tiff agrees that

5 The defendan ts also ar gue in the alternative that the Court “ [m]ay [e]xerci se [d]ive rs ity [j]urisdi ction [o]ver the NFLPA by [d]ropping Smith [u ] nder [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 21. ” Def s.’ Br. at 10. However , because (continued . . .)7 the C o urt h as sub ject matter jurisdic tion and argues, in relevant part, that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over his claims against Sm ith. 6 See Pl. ’ s Br . at 16–19. The Court will first analyze whether it may exercise federal qu e stion jurisdict ion over t he plaintiff ’s s tate law claims bef ore turning to whether it may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff ’ s FAA claim. A. The Plain tiff ’ s State Law C laims
T he plaintiff asse rts claims under District of Columbia law of brea ch of contract, negligen t mis representati on, negligence, and inte nt ional infliction of emotional dis tress, against both the NFLPA and Smith. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15–59; see also Searcy , 2020 WL 2198086 , at *3. The bases for these cla ims al l involve “ cha llenge[s to] the NFLPA ’s denial of his [c] ont ract [a] dv isor applicati on through t he ‘ exclus ive’ arbi tration procedure set forth in the [NFLP A’ s] Agent Regulations[,]” Def s.’ Br. at 3 ( citing Am. Compl. ¶ 7) , after the plaintiff twice fa iled the writ ten examination r equired for certi fication of a pro spective c ontract advisor, see id. a t 2 –3 (sta ting that c ontract adv isors must “ meet the requirements for certification set forth i n . . . the [NFLPA ’ s] Agent Regulations [,] ” one being “ a writ ten examination ”). For the following

re asons, the Court concludes that it has federal question juri sdicti on ove r th ese cla ims because they are pree mpted by the LMRA.

(. . . c ontin ued ) the Court concludes that i t has subject matter jurisdic tion over the claims again st both defendants, see infra Se ctions II I.A –B , it need not reach this alternativ e argumen t.

6 The plaintiff also argues that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over the NFLPA, see Pl. ’ s Br. at 4

– 10 , discusses t he m erits of his claims against bot h the N FLPA, see id. at 10

– 14 , and Sm it h, see id . a t 14

– 16 , and references his motion to amend his Complaint in arguing that the remaining claims he wishes the Court to evaluate do not implicate federal la w, see id. at 17

– 19. H o wever, nei ther t he que stion of whether the Court has div ersity jurisdiction ov er the NF LP A, no r the merits of the pla intiff ’ s cla ims against the defendants are at issue pursuant to the Cir cuit ’ s remand , and therefore the Court will not consider thes e arguments

. S ee gener ally O rder , Searc y v. Smith , No. 20

- 7048 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 20 21) . F u rth erm or e, th e Court has alread y denied the plaintiff ’ s motion to amen d, see Order at 1 (Nov. 22, 2022), ECF No. 71 , thu s rend ering his argument regarding the lack o f fede ral la w implication m oot, see Pl. ’ s Br. at 1 7– 19

.8 “One corollary of the well -pleaded complaint rule . . . is that Congress may so completely pre[] empt a par ticular area [of law] t hat any civil complaint raising [a] sel ect gro up of claims i s

nece ssaril y fe der al i n c haracter.” Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 63–64. And, “ [o] nce an area of state law has been completely pre [] empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre [] empted

s tate law is considered, from its incept ion, a fe deral clai m, and therefore arises under federal law. ” Caterp ill ar Inc. , 482 U.S. at 393. Section 301 of the LMRA states: S uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization represe nt ing employees in an ind ustry affe cti ng c o mmerce . . . may be brought i n any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties , without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenshi p of the parties. 29 U.S. C. § 185(a). “In passing the LMRA, Cong re ss ‘ authorize[d] federal court s to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of . . . collective bargaining agreements. ’” Brown v.
P otomac Elec . Power Co., 306 F. Supp. 3d 194, 199 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of M agic C hef, I n c. , 486 U.S. 399, 403 (1988)) ( seco nd alteration in original). “ [T] he preemptive force of Section 301 is so ‘extraordinary . . . that [it] converts an ordinary state common law c omplaint into o ne stating a federal clai m[.]’” Id. (quoting Metro . L ife Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 65) (second alteration in original). Sp ecifically, a state law claim is preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA if: (1) “resolution of [th e] state

- law claim is substantial ly dependent upon analysis of th e terms of an agreement m ad e be twee n the parties in a labor contract ,” Allis

Chalmer s Corp., 471 U.S. at 220 , or (2) the state law claim “ requires the interpretation of a collective -bargaining agreement [,] ” Ling le , 486 U.S. at 413. Fi rst , regarding the pl aintiff ’s breach of cont ract cl aim, i n cases such as this , where the pl aintiff ’ s asse rted contract rights are depen dent upon a collective bargaining agreement, “ courts have held that breach of contract claims are ‘ in extricabl y intertwined ’ or ‘ substantiall y9 depend en t’ on th e [ collective barga ining agreement ], and therefore pr eempted .” Bro wn , 306 F. Supp. 3d at 200–01 (quoting Allis -Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 202) (collecting cases). The plaintiff ’ s breach of con tra ct claim involves alleg ations that the d efendants violate d the NFLPA ’ s Agen t Regulat ions. S ee Am. C ompl. ¶¶ 16–17 (ch allenging variou s aspects of the a rbitra tion
proce ss , through wh ich his Cer tification denial was affirmed); Searcy , 2020 WL 2198086, at *3 ( stating that “t he exclusive method for challen ging [a Certificat ion denial] . . . is through the arbit ration procedure set forth in the [ NFLP A’ s Agent ] Regu lations .” (quoting NFLPA ’ s M em.

a t 4) ( se cond alteration in original) (emphas is in original) (inte rnal quo tation marks omitted) ). And th e NFLPA ’ s Agent Regulations “ were adopted ‘pursuant to the authority and duty conferred upon the N FLPA as the exclusive collective bargaining represe ntati ve of NF L pl ayers ’ and ‘formulated in a ccordance with the colle ctive barg aining agreeme nt’ between the NFL and the NFL PA .” Def s.’ Br. at 2 . Thus, b ecaus e the plaintiff ’ s breach of contract claim implicates the defendants ’ applicat ion of an d ad herence to the NFLPA ’ s Agent Regulations, the claim is “substa ntially dependent on the [collective bargaining agre ement] ”— from which the NFLPA ’ s Agent Reg ulations derive—“and [is] therefore preempted. ” Brown , 306 F. S upp. 3d at 201 ; see Alli s- Chalmers C orp., 471 U.S

. at 220 (stating that a state law claim is preempted if its “r esolution . . . is substantial ly dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract ”).
M oreover, the pl aintiff ’s other state law clai ms are sim il arly preempted by Section 301 of the LM RA. “ State law [-] based claims tha t depend on . . . application of terms in a collective bargaining agreemen t are preempted[,] ” while “[t]hose that have a basis wholly independent of the labor contr act are not. ” Black , 87 F. Supp. 2d at 4 (finding that an NFL cont ract advisor’ s
tort ious interference claim was preempted by the LMRA where the “complaint turn[ed] upon the10 proper application of the [contr act advis or ] regulati ons to [the plaintiff ’ s] alleged illegal activities

a s a contract advisor”). Where a “[u]nion fail[s] to perform a duty . . . arising out o f the [ collective bargaining] agreement . . . , not a duty . . . owed to every person in society[, ] [p]re[]e mption by fe d eral law cannot be avoided by characterizing the [ u]nion’ s neg li gence as a
state

- law tort .” Unit ed Steel wor kers of Am. , AFL

- CIO -C LC v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 363 (1990). And , in that situat ion, a “ tort claim cannot be described as independent of the co ll e ctive

bargaining agreement.” Id. at 371.
L ike th e p laintiff ’ s breach of contract clai m, his claims of n eg ligent mis representation, negligence, and intent ional infliction of emotional distr ess all see k to “ rectify the alleged harm he suffere d from the adv erse Arbi tration Award that affirmed the NFLPA ’ s denial of his Applica tion for Certifi cation as a Contrac t Advisor.” Searcy , 2020 WL 2198086, at *7 (internal quotation marks omitte d) ; see Am. Compl. ¶ 36 (“[T]he NFLPA provided false information to the [p] laintif f prior to th e hearing re lated to the methodology used on the [p] laintiff’s exam . . . .” ); id. ¶ 41 ( “[T]he NFLPA breach ed its duty of care with the [p] laintiff by changing the scoring methodology of the exam without amending its regulations[,] an overt violation of Section 1( c) of th e NFLPA regulations .” ); id. ¶ 54 ( “[T]he extr eme an d outrageous conduct on the part of the NFLPA

. . . [resulted from] having [the] [p]lain tiff participa te in an appeal hearing not governed by the [American Arbitration Association rules] . . . [and] viol at [ing] the [Agent] Regulations and the [ FAA ] i n orde r to secure an adverse ruling . . . .” ). Thus, he challenges the defendants’ actions taken in the cou rse of procedures esta blished and governed by the NFLPA ’ s Agent Regulations, which “ aris [e] out of the [collective bar gai ning] agreement .” Raw son, 495 U.S. at 363. Ther efore, his tor t claims are “ depend[ent] on . . . [t he] application of terms in a collective bargaining agreement [,] ” Black , 87 F. Supp. 2d at 4, and are preempted by the LMRA because11 they “cannot be described as independe nt of the collective

- barga ining agre ement [,] ” Raw son, 495 U.S. a t 371. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the plaintiff’ s state law cl aims are preempted by the LMR A. Furthermore, bec ause a preempted state law claim “is considered, from its inceptio n , a federal cla im, and therefore arise s u nder fede ral law [,] ” Ca terp ill ar Inc. , 482 U.S. at 393, the Court also concludes th at it had federal question jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s breach of contract and tort claims . S ee Br own , 306 F. Supp. 3d at 20 2 (“ Once a court concludes that a plaint iff ’ s state -l aw claim is pr eempted by Sectio n 301, it may . . . treat the claim as a Section 301 claim [.] ”). B. The Plaintiff ’ s FAA Claim The plaintiff also “s[ought] to vacate the Arbitration Award pursu ant t o the [FAA] ‘[a]s a result of the [a]rbitrator’s partiality[.]’” Searcy , 2020 WL 2198086, at *3 (quoting Am. Compl. ¶ 52) ( third and fourth alteration in original). For example, the plaintiff alleged that “the [a] rbitrator provided a basis for denial contrary to fact [,] ” Am. C ompl. ¶ 47; “ the [a]rbit rator procured the award through parti ality by overtly breaching the c ontract between the [p]laintiff

an d the NFLPA by not rendering a decision at the close of the hearing or within thirty (30 ) day s after the hearing accor ding to Se cti on 5 (E) of the NFLPA re gulations [,] ” id. ¶ 49; and “ the [a]rbitra tor procured the awar d through dishonesty by taking the word of the [p]laintiff out o f
context [,] ” id. ¶ 50. For the following reasons, the Court concludes tha t it has supplemen tal jurisd ict ion ove r the plaintiff ’s cla ims brought pursuant to the FAA

. 7

7 Although the FAA is a f ederal statu t e, i t “ is something of a n anomaly in the field of federal

- court jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law establi shing and reg ulating the d uty to honor an a gree ment t o arbitrate, yet it does n ot create any independent fede ral [] question jur isdiction under 2 8 U.S.C . § 1331 or otherwise. ” Mo ses H. Cone Mem ’ l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983). More over, “ th e [ ] Circuit has made clear that t he FAA does not confer federal question jurisdiction over moti on s to vacate .” Technologists, Inc. v. M IR ’ s Ltd. , 725 F. Supp. 2d 120, 128 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Kasap v. Folger Nolan Fleming & Douglas, Inc., 166 F. 3d 1243 , 1246

– 47 (D. C . Cir. 1999)). Thus, “ ther e must be diversity of citizenship or some other indepen de nt basis for f ederal jurisdiction [.] ” M oses H. Cone Mem ’ l Ho sp. , 460 U.S. at 25 n.32.12 A c ourt with f ederal jurisd ic tion over certain claims has suppl emental jurisdiction over state law claims “that are so related

. . . that they form part of the sam e case or controve rsy under Art icle II I of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). “In order for a federal claim and a state

- [] law c laim to form part of th e ‘same case or controversy,’ the claims must derive from a ‘common nucleus of operativ e fact. ’” Taylor v. District o f Columbia, 626 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting United Mine Wo rkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). And, “[ c]laims derive from a ‘common nucl eus of operative fact ’ only if the plaintiff would ordinarily be exp ected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.” Id. (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725). Here, like the plaintiff ’ s state law claims which are preempted by the LMRA, see supra Section III.A , the plaintiff ’ s FAA vacatur claim seeks to “ rectify the alleged harm he suffered f rom the ad v er se Arbi tration Award that affirmed the NFLPA ’ s deni al of his Appl ica tion for Certification as a Contract Advisor [,] ” Searcy , 2020 WL 2198086, at *7 (internal quotation marks om itted) , and involve alleg ations concerning the ad ministration of the arbitration proces s, compare , e .g., Am. Compl. ¶ 36 (“[T]he NFLPA provided false information to t he [p ] laintif f prior to the hearing r el ated to the methodology used on the [p] laintiff’s exam [.] ”) ; id . ¶ 54 ( “[T]he extreme and ou trageous conduct on the part of the NF LPA

. . . [resulted fr om] having [th e p]lain tiff participate in an appeal hearing not governed by t he [American Arbitration Association rules] . . . [and] viol at[ ing] the [ NFLP A’ s Agent] Regulations and the [ FAA ] in order t o secure an adverse ruling [.]”), wit h id. ¶ 52 (“ As a r esult of the Arbitrato r’ s partiality, the [p]laintiff is seekin g vacatur of th e [p ]laintiff ’ s denial of certif ication [.] ” ). T hus, the plaintiff’s
st ate law an d FAA cla ims “ derive from a ‘common nucleus of operative fact [,] ’” Taylor, 6 26 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725)— namely, the fact s concerning the denial of the plaintiff ’ s certi fication as a contract advisor and the associated arbitrat ion proceedings— such13 that “the plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one ju dicial proceeding [,] ” id. (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725). Ac cordingly, having concluded that it has federal quest ion ju risdiction over th e s tate law claims on the basis of preemption, see supra Se ct ion III.A , t he Court also conclude s that it has supple mental jurisdiction over the plaintiff ’ s FAA vacat ur claim pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1367(a). IV. C ONCLUSIO N For the forego ing reasons, the C ourt conclude s th at it has subject mat ter jurisdiction over the plaintiff ’ s claims against the NFL PA an d Smith

. SO O RDERED this 24th day of February , 2023. 8

REGGIE B . WAL T ON United Stat es District Judg e

8 The Cour t will contemporaneo usly is sue a n Order co nsi stent with t his Memor and um O pini on.