# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

No. 19

- 20752

**Audrey K. Miller,**

Plaintiff

— Appellant **,**

versus

**Sam Houston State University; Texas State University System,** 

Defendants

— Appellees **,**

**consolidated with**

No. 19

- 20753

**Audrey K**

**. Miller,** 

Plaintiff

— Appellant **,**

versus

**University of Houston System; University of Houston Downtown,** 

Defendants

— Appellees

**.** United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED January 29, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/29/2021No. 19

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2 Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:15

- CV

- 2824 USDC No. 4:15

- CV

- 2927

Before **Jolly, Southwick,** and **Wilson,** Circuit Judges

**. Cory T. Wilson,**  Circuit Judge **:** A litigant has the fundamental right to fairness in every proceeding. Fairness is upheld by avoiding even the appearance of partiality. See, e.g. , Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. , 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)

. When a judge’s actions
stand at odds with th ese basic notion s , we must act or suffer the loss of public confidence in our judicial system. “ [J] ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United States , 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)

. Audrey Miller sued Sam Houston State University (SHSU) and
Texas St ate University System (TSUS) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et. seq. , and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), alleging sex discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work
environment. A week later, Miller filed a s eparate action against the University of Houston Downtown (UHD) and the University of Houston System (UHS) , also under Title VII, alleging that UHD’s denial of employment constituted retaliation

. 1

From the outset of these suits , the district judge’s actions evinced a prejudgment of Miller ’s claims

. At the beginning of the I nitial C ase M anagement C onference, the judge dismissed sua sponte Miller’s claims against TSUS and UHS, countenancing no discussion regarding the
dismissal. Later in the same conference, the judge responded to the parties’

1 There are thirty

- seve n public universities in Texas; thirty

- four universities belong to one of six state university systems. SHSU is a component of TSUS, and UHD belongs to UHS. Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/29/2021No. 19

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3 opposition to consolidating Miller’s two cases by telling Miller’s counsel, “ I will get credit for closing two cases when I crush you.

. . . How will that look on your
record? ”

And t hing s went downhill from there. The court summarily denied
Miller’s subsequent motion for reconsideration , denied Miller’s repeated requests for leave to take discovery ( including depositions of material
witnesses ) , and eventually granted summary judgment in favor of SHSU and
UHD , dismissing all claims. Miller now appeals the district court’s rulings
and asks for her case s to be reassigned on remand. Mindful of the fundamental right to fairness in every proceeding

— both in fact, an d in

appearance , we **REVERSE** , **REMAND** , and direct that these cases be
**REASSIGN ED**  to a new district judge for further proceedings

.
I

.
A

. Miller joined SHSU as a tenure

- track Assistant Professor of Psychology in the U niversity’s Clinical Psychology Doctoral P rogram (“Clindoc Program”) in the Department of Psychology and Philosophy in August 2007. In this position, Miller supervised students in the Clindoc Program , taught practicum courses, and served on students’ dissertation and
thesis committees. According to SHSU , Miller was “lack ing in collaborative and attentive generosity towards her colleagues .” She complained about her heavy workload, which she believed to be disproportionate compared to that
of her colleagues. Miller also disagreed with ot her members of the faculty
while serving on dissertation and thesis committees

. She was removed from

one committee due to her inflexibility and voluntarily offered to step down
from another due to conflicts with other committee members. Miller
contend s t hese disagreements were retaliatory because of her sex and the complaints that she raised concerning her clinical workload. Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/29/2021No. 19

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4 Despite these issues, Miller applied for tenure at SHSU in late 2012

. B ut her reviewers recommended that Miller’s tenure and promotion be
denied due to her lack of collegiality

. SHSU informed Miller of its decision to deny tenure on March 27, 2013.
Thereafter, Miller filed charge s of sex discrimination and retaliation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the
Texas Workforce Commission. She then utilized the Texas Public
Information Act to obtain voluminous documentation from SHSU. A few months later, SHSU d enied Miller a merit

- based salary increase for the 2013

- 2014 academic year. Miller filed a formal grievance with SHSU, based on the same allegations as her EEOC charge (i.e., that her tenure decision was adversely affected by sex discrimination and retali ation). Miller’s employment with SHSU ended on May 31, 2014.

B

. After learning of her tenure denial at SHSU , Miller applied for one of
three open faculty position s at UHD. On March 17, 2014, s he interviewed
with the UHD search committee, as well as Dep artment Chair Jeffery Jackson, Dean DoVeanna Fulton , and Provost Edward Hugetz

. During the
interview , search committee members asked Miller why SHSU denied her tenure. Miller responded that she “ believed [she] had been denied tenure because [she] was a woman and because [she] had raised concerns about the mistreatment of women in the department at SHSU prior to applying for
tenure.” Following the interview, the committee rated Miller as the second highes t candidate for a position.
On April 4, 2014, the UHD search chair emailed Department Chair Jackson and Dean Fulton and stated that the search committee was interested in extending offers to three candidates, including Miller. That same day, the
search chair asked Miller if she would allow UHD to contact her SHSU Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/29/2021No. 19

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5 Department Chair , Christopher Wilson . Miller obliged but advised the
search chair that Wilson was one of the individuals about whom she had complained at SHSU.
On April 7 , Department Chair Jac kson sent an email to the search
chair . He stated that while Dean Fulton seemed agreeable to the committee’s recommendations, Fulton wanted to follow up with Miller’s supervisors at SHSU

. The search chair responded that she was “worried [ SHSU Department Chair Wilson would ] have to be very careful [] discussing [Miller’s] tenure denial because of the legal issues we [have]
discussed. ” Later that day, Jackson called Wilson to inquire into SHSU’s decision to deny Miller tenure and promotion

. What was said during the phone call is nowhere in the record. But

a fter Department Chair Jackson’s call with Department Chair Wilson, UHD

revers ed course from the search committee’s previous recommend ation , decid ing not to extend Miller an offer of employment. On April 29, Miller emailed the UHD search chair regarding the status of her UHD application. The search chair responded that the position had been filled : “The final employment decision was co mplicated and involved the search committee, department chair, dean, and provost.”
In the end, UHD filled all three open positions with candidates who scored lower on UHD’s hiring metrics than Miller. According to Dean Fulton, UHD’s decision not to hire Miller was “based entirely on [] concerns regarding [] Miller’s teaching and service due to her tenure denial at SHSU

. ”
The dean further stated that she was never “made aware that [] Miller had filed a charge of discrimination or other complai nt against SHSU with any
federal or state authorities.” Miller later filed complaints against UHD with
the EEOC and the Texas Workforce Commission. Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/29/2021No. 19

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6 C

. On September 28, 2015, Miller filed suit against SHSU and TSUS in
the Southern District of Texas

. On October 6, Miller filed a separate lawsuit against UHD and UHS in the same court . The district court issued an order
to handle the suits jointly, but the y were not formally consolidated.

From the start , the district court effectively stifled Miller’s at tempts at discovery

. The day after Miller filed suit , the district court issued an Order
of Conference in each action that limited discovery

. T he ( identical ) order s foreclosed the parties from propounding written discovery or notic ing depositions “without court approval

. ” The district court then issued an
Order for Disclosure that mandated the parties’ exchange of certain relevant
documents in each case , including Miller’s performance and personnel records, her pay records, names of relevant parties, and organizational charts

. On the surface, th e district court’s initial discovery management orders w ere perhaps unremarkable

. But the court did not stop there , as we discuss in greater deta il below

. On January 25, 2016, t he parties in both cases first met at a joint I nitial
C ase M anagement C onference. At the outset , and without any prior notice , t he district judge stated :

THE COURT: [Miller], we’ve got four parties instead of

t he t wo. [ Miller’s counsel ]: Oh. The

– THE COURT: You sued the System [s] and the institution [s]

. So, pick any two you want. I don’t care. [Mille r’s counsel ]: I am going to go with the Universities.

THE COURT: Is that right? Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/29/2021No. 19

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7 [Opposing counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. To be clear, you know, that was an issue that we were going to hope to resolve by

– THE COURT: I just did. [Opposing counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We’ll dismiss the Systems

. [Opposing counsel]: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Systems don’t do anything. They hire large staffs and go around and make life difficult for the actual institutions themselves. It’s in their charter; annoy their workers. As the conference continued, the district judge made several other off

key remarks, such as his thoughts concerning Miller’s behavior : “Now, to be candid with you,

. . . there is nothing that [Miller] didn’t complain about. Anything anybody did for two and a half years, three years, was all for some
ulterior motive.” The judge also lumped Miller’s c laim s in with preconceived notions from previous cases involving professors: “As near as
I can tell, [Miller’s] only complaint here is likely she was paid less but that she didn’t get tenure.” He then supported th is statement by revealing his familiarity with Title VII cases : “I have never thought about it, but I have
had more tenure decisions tha n you can imagine working here. You wouldn’t think professors were litigious, but apparently they are.”

T he judge made other remarks that signaled a predisposition against
Miller’s claims. When Miller requested additional discovery, including the
opport unity to take depositions , t he district judge denied her request, noting
that it was “too argumentative” and extensive. Finally, as the initial
conference ended , the judge asked the parties if the cases should be
consolidated

. Contrary to the judge’s apparent preference , the parties Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/29/2021No. 19

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8 unanimously requested that the court keep the cases separate. The district judge replied to Miller’s counsel, “ All right. I will get credit for closing two cases when I crush you. ” Miller ’s counse l attempted to respond , but the judge interjected : “How will that look on you r record ? ”

The day after the Initial Case Management Conference, the district court formally dismissed TSUS and UH S with prejudice

. The court did not
allow Miller to amend her c omplaint s or otherwise respond prior to dismissing TSUS and UHS

. Miller moved for reconsideration, arguing that the Systems w ere “responsible for managing and controlling their
Universities .” 2 The next day, before TSUS or UHS respond ed , the court denied Miller’s motion , reason ing that Miller failed to supply “ objective
facts ” in her complaint about the Systems’ actions.
On April 13, 2016, Miller filed opposed motion s for discovery. Miller sought , inter alia , performance records concerning tenure

- track and tenured faculty members in the SHSU psychology department, pay records, and work assignments (i.e., course loads). Miller also sought applications and related communications from UHD regarding its employment decisions. The
district court denie d Miller’s motion s the following day , without response
from SHSU or UHD

. The district court held a pretrial conference on May 4, 2016. There, the parties discussed the limited discovery that had been exchanged. The
district judge asked the Universities’ counsel if he had taken Miller’s deposition and then permitted counsel to notice the deposition. Miller’s
counsel then asked , “May we take depositions as well?” The judge

2 Miller only filed her motion for reconsideration in her action against SHSU and TSUS. However, the motion addressed both TSUS and UHS, and the district court ruled in regard to both parties. For the sake of simplicity, we likewise treat the motion for reconsideration as pertaining to Miller’s claims against both TSUS and UHS. Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/29/2021No. 19

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9 responded, “No.” Afterwards, t he court enter ed a Management Order th at stated that SHSU and UHD “may depose Miller in Judge Hughes’s Jury
Room.”
On May 12, Miller again filed opposed motion s for leave to propound discovery , renewing her “ request that in the interest of efficiency and economy, the court order the full scop e of discovery that has been specifically requested by Plaintiff.” Miller attached extensive discovery requests to the
motion s and stated that she had also “submitted the attached discovery
requests

. . . i n document form during the last pretrial conference

. . . held on May 4, 2016.”

TSUS and UHD deposed Miller on May 25 , while Miller’s motion s remained pending

. T he district judge actually attended parts of the deposition and participated. A t one point , the judge admonish ed Miller :

THE COURT: I f you’re unhappy with the rulings I’ve made about discovery, that’s fine. Free C ountry. This is not a place to discuss your feelings. It’s a place to answer [opposing counsel’s] questions. You have sued his client

– their

– their cli ent s’ people , and they have a right to know exactly why.

Later , the judge again interjected :

THE COURT: Ma’am, you’re not to lecture the State of Texas on the law. [Your counsel] and I will do that. It is not important to your case what you think about what nine old people on the Potomac River talk about something. We’re here to find out what you actually know . . . about the facts. So, please, do not burden the rec ord with side trips

. Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/29/2021No. 19

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10 After the deposition, the district court held a nother hearing. Within
the first minute of th at hearing, the district judge queried TSUS and UHD’s
counsel : “So are you going to move for summary judgment ?”

— clearly
i mplying that they should. And l ater , as Miller’s counsel sought to explain why he believed that certain data provided by SHSU was inaccurate, the judge responded, “I think you’re making that up.”

Both SHSU and UH D moved for summary judgment in June 2016

. By the n , the court had yet to allow Miller to take any depositions. In response
to the summary judgment motions , Miller requested a Rule 56(d) continuance, asking the court to grant discovery beyond the “general information provided by the Defendant [s] ” under t he court’s original
disclosure order. Miller also moved to strike certain declarations in each

case

. T he court denied both Miller’s Rule 56(d) discovery requests and her May 12 motion s for leave to propound discovery

. On March 29 , 2017, the district cour t held oral argument on the
Universities ’ summary judgment motions

. After the hearing (and after summary judgment brief ing was complete ), the court entered a Management
Order that allow ed Miller to depose Dean Fulton , but only “for two hours,
at most.”
Following Dean Fulton ’s deposition , Miller again moved for leave to conduct additional depositions in the UHD action

. She requested permission to depose Department Chair Jackson and the UHD search chair and several
search comm ittee members. I n support of her motion, Miller asserted that
it [wa ]s increasingly clear that Defendants have avoided testimony about the contents of the telephone reference from Wilson of SHSU, not only because of its obvious relevance in this case but also in an attempt to protect SHSU from liability for its own retalia tory actions

. [Miller] should have an opportunity to depose Wilson of SHSU in this case

. Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/29/2021No. 19

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11 (emphasis in original). The district court again denied Miller’s request , and

o n September 30, 201 9 , t he court grant ed TSUS ’s and UHD’s motion s for summary judgment

. Miller filed notices of appeal in both cases on October 30, 2019.

II

. On appeal, Miller raises the following issues : ( A ) whether the district court erred by dismissing sua sponte her claims against TSUS and UHS ; ( B )
whether the di strict court erred by denying her motion for reconsideration of that ruling ; ( C ) whether the district court abused its discretion by denying her repeated discovery requests; and ( D ) whether the case s should be reassigned on remand. We address each issue i n turn.

A

. Miller first asserts that the district court erred by dismissing sua sponte her claims against TSUS and UHS

. She contends that the court failed to provid e her notice, an opportunity to respond, or the opportunity to allege
her best case before dismissing the claims with prejudice

. TSUS and UHS

counter that the dismissal was fair. We review de novo

. Carroll v. Fort James Corp. , 470 F.3d 1171, 1173 (5th Ci r. 2006).

A district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim on its own motion “as long as the procedure is fair.” Davoodi v. Austin Indep.
Sch. Dist. , 755 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While there is no bright

- line rule, generally “f airness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (citing Lozano v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB , 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007)) ; see also Gaffney v. Sta te Farm Fire & Cas. Co

. , 294 F. App’x 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008). But “[w]e do not always require notice prior to sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim, as long as the plaintiff has alleged [her] best case.” Lozano , 489 F.3d at 643 (internal quotation marks and Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/29/2021No. 19

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12 citation omitted). We have reasoned that “ [a] t some point a court must decide that a plaintiff has had fa ir opportunity to make [h er] case [, and] if, after that time, a cause of action has not been established, the court should finally dismiss the suit.” Jacquez v. Procunier , 801 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1986).

W e ha ve not ruled on a case with facts squarely aligned to th e ones here , but we glean insight from our prior decisions

. In Carroll , the defendant moved to dismiss a fraud claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Carroll , 470 F.3d at 117 3

. Although t here were additional tort claims beyond the scope of the
defenda nt’s motion, the district court dismissed the case in its entirety
without providing any specific reference to the remaining claims. Id. On appeal , this court found that the district court failed to provide notice or an opportunity to respond as to the tort claims pled in the plaintiff’s complaint , and th us, the district court ’s dismissal “did not provide adequate fairness” to the plaintiff. Id. at 1177. Gaffney , though nonprecedential, is likewise analogous. There, the plaintiffs sought damages against their insurer for failing to tender coverage
payments

. Gaffney , 294 F. App’x at 976. T he plaintiffs later moved to transfer venue, continue the trial, and consolidate their case with a related

ca se. Id. But a fter considering the motion, the court dismissed sua sponte the plaintiffs’ claims , finding the plaintiffs had no cause of action. Id. As in
Carroll , we held on appeal that the district court denied the plaintiffs both notice “that it migh t sua sponte dismiss their case and an opportunity to respond.” Id. at 977 . We also noted that “ [t] here [wa] s no evidence in the record to suggest that the district court notified any party that it was considering dismissal, neither party briefed the issue, and [p]laintiffs were not given an opportunity to amend their complaint to cure any deficiencies that the district court thought warranted dismissal.” Id

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13 Finally, in Davoodi , the plaintiff filed suit in state court against his former employer, a sserting claims of discrimination, retaliation, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Davoodi , 755 F.3d at 308. Following removal to federal court, the defendant filed a partial motion to dismiss, seeking to dismiss all claims but one. Id. a t 309. The district court granted the defendant’s partial motion to dismiss and then dismissed sua sponte the plaintiff’s remaining claim

. Id. We reversed the district court’s
dismissal because the plaintiff “had no notice or opportunity to be heard
bef ore the district court issued its order of dismissal.” Id. at 310. Whether Miller received proper notice under the circumstances here
is debatable

. Similar to Carroll and Davoodi , nothing in t he record suggests
the district court notified the parties that it was considering dismissal of
Miller’s claims against TSUS or UHS before the court raised the issue at the beginning of the Initial Case Management C onference

. To the contrary, as the conference began, the district judge simply demanded that Miller “pick any two [ of the four parties ] you want. I don’t care.” Once she did so, the

court ruled on the spot : “We’ll dismiss the Systems.”

E ven assuming that exchange constituted notice to Miller prior to the Systems’ dismissal, the district court failed to give Miller an adequate opportunity to respond to the court’s intention to dismiss her claims

. T he
district court dismissed Miller’s claims at the Initial Case Management
Conference and memorialized the dismissal in an order entered a day later

. T he record provides no indication that any party briefed th e issue until Miller
moved for reconsideration

. It is also notable that the district court dismissed
TSUS and UHS with prejudice , so Miller was likewise not given any opportunity to am end her complaint to cure the deficiencies that ostensibly
warranted dismissal of the Systems

. “Dismissing an action after giving the plaintiff only one opportunity to state [h er] case is ordinarily unjustified.” Jacquez , 801 F.2d at 792 ; see also Gaffne y , 294 F. App’x at 977

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14 Taking all of this into consideration , the district court failed to give Miller an adequate opportunity to respond before it dismiss ed her claims against TSUS and UHS with prejudice ; accordingly , the court erred in its sua sponte dismiss al of TSUS and UHS

. 3

B

. It follows that the district court likewise erred when it denied Miller’s
motion for reconsideration. So w e need not tarry long on this issue, except to underscore a couple points. The first , succinctly, is that it was not a “fair procedure , ” as required for a sua sponte dismissal, for the court to force Miller
to resort to a motion to reconsider

— as a proxy f or arguments she might have
made before dismiss al

— as her only avenue to oppose the dismissal of her
claims. See Carroll , 470 F.3d at 1177; see also Gaffney , 294 F. App’x at 977.
The second, less succinctly, is that the points raised in Miller’s
motion for reconsideration illuminate why dismissal of the Systems was
premature under the fact

- specific inquiry used to evaluate employment relationships , at least given the scant record before us

. In her motion, Miller alleged that the Systems were her “employer s ” because they were “responsible for the control and management of the ir Universities,” including personnel decisions and the granting of tenure. This court applies

a two

- step process for determining whether a defendant is an “employer”
under Title VII. E.g. , Deal v. State Farm Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. , 5 F.3d 117, 118 n.2 (5th Cir. 1993)

. 4 Relevant here, one component of this test is “[t]he right to control [the] employee’s conduct.” Id. at 119. And w hen examining the

3 We also reject SHSU’ s and UHD’s argument that Miller alleged her “best case” because she was not given a chance to amend her complaint. Jacquez , 801 F.2d at 792.

4 Miller’s claim against UHS (and UHD) is premised on “retaliation, in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII , 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

- 3(a),” as a prospective employer; however, the relevant test for determining whether a defendant is an “employer” is the same. Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 14 Date Filed: 01/29/2021No. 19

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15 control component, we have focused on whether the alleged employer has the right to hire, fire, supervise, a nd set the work schedule of the employee.
Id. An other component focuses on the “economic realities” of the relationship, including “whether the alleged employer paid the employee’s salary, withheld taxes, provided benefits, and set the terms and conditio ns of employment.” Id.

T h is test is “ necessarily a fact

- specific inquiry and is therefore typically applied in a summary judgment context, in which a court is permitted to go beyond the pleadings and examine the state law and the
evidence relevant to the employment relationship.” Muhammad v. Dallas Cnty. Cmty. Supervision & Corrs. Dept. , 479 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2007); cf. Weeks v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys.

– at Galveston , 762 F. App’x 203, 204

– 05 (5th Cir. 2019) (finding, at summary judgment stage, that plaintiff was not employed by the University System because “[i]t lacked the right to hire, fire, supervise, and set [his] work schedule; [and] it therefore could not be said to have the right to control [the plaintiff’s] conduct”)

. By contr ast, here, the district court’s initial dismissal of TSUS and
UHS apparently rested only on the district judge’s own expressed view that “Systems don’t do anything.” The court’s denial of Miller’s motion for reconsideration, the day after she filed it, sq uelched any further development of Miller’s allegations and arguments to the contrary (and any opposition to Miller’s motion the Systems might have interposed)

. While there are cases
in which a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be appropriate , the district cour t’s
premature ruling here was “based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly
erroneous assessment of the evidence , ” Austin v. Kroger Tex

. , L.P. , 864 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 2017 ) , such that it was an abuse of discretion

. Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 15 Date Filed: 01/29/2021No. 19

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16 C

. After its dismissal of TSUS and UHS and its denial of Miller’s motion for reconsideration, the district court repeatedly denied Miller’s requests for discovery, including her requests to depose witnesses w ith knowledge
material to her claims. Miller asser ts the district court abused its discretion in doing so. Based on our review of the record, we agree.

W e review a district court’s discovery rulings for an abuse of
discretion. Vantage Deepwater Co

. v. Petrobras Am., Inc. , 966 F.3d 361, 373 (5th Ci r. 2020). Generally, b road discretion is afforded to the district court when deciding discovery matters

. Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co. , 647 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 2011). We reverse “only if [the decision] affected a party’s substantial rights .” N

. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co. v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co. , 898 F.3d 461, 476 (5th Cir. 2018). Substantial rights are affected if the district court’s decision was “arbitrary or clearly unreasonable.” Fielding v. Hubert Burda Media, Inc. , 415 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b), “ [p] arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense or proportional to the needs of the case . . . [.]” This standard is broad, especially when viewed in the context of Title VII. See Trevino v. Celanese Corp. , 701 F.2d 397, 405 (5th Cir. 1983) (“The imposition of unnecessary limitations on discovery is especially frowned upon in Title VII cases.”).
In support of her position, Miller refers us to McCoy v. Energy XXI GOM, LLC , 695 F. App’x 750 (5th Cir. 2017). In that case, the same district judge imposed s ubstantially s imilar discovery restrictions to those imposed
here. Id

. at 753. Specifically, t he district judge denied almost al l requests for discovery and “permitted only the deposition of [the plaintiff]” and “the Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 16 Date Filed: 01/29/2021No. 19

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17 disclosure by the defendants of certain documents pertaining to the specific [object] at issue , ” certain photographs , and a video. Id. On appeal, we reversed and remanded the case on summary judgment grounds, finding genuine issues of material fact existed, even with the limited discovery that had been permitted

. Id. at 758. But w e also noted that “[t]he district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow [the plaintiff] to conduct sufficient discovery . . . to support the allegations he ha [d] fairly raised [.] ” Id. at 759.

We have a sense of déjá vu

. The district court’s discovery restr ictions
in the instant case s are strikingly similar to th ose in McCoy

. And “[a]lthough the district court is customarily accorded wide discretion in handling discovery matters, we will not uphold a ruling which has failed to adhere to the liberal spirit of the Rules.” Coughlin v. Lee , 946 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991)

. As in McCoy , the district judge here permitted only Miller’s deposition to be taken before summary judgment briefing and argument

— and then actually participated in the deposition

. By contrast, t he court repeatedly denied Miller the opportunity to depose any witnesses , relenting only after summary judgment briefing was complete to allow Miller one deposition , of UHD’s Dean Fulton . And that deposition was limited to “ two hours, at most.”
To put it simply, the court’s discovery restrictions suffocated any chance for Miller fairly to present her claims. While the Universities offer that Miller was not prejudiced because she had already received voluminous
documentation fro m a pre

- suit Texas Public Information Act request, we are not persuaded given the district court’s inflexible denials of both her written discovery requests and her requests to take depositions. Miller requested discovery on multiple occasions and was den ied, almost instantly, at every

turn : January 25, 2016 (denied same day); April 13, 2016 (denied April 14, 2016); May 4, 2016 (denied same day); May 12, 2016 (denied June 30, 2016);
and June 2, 2017 (denied via summary judgment September 30, 2019). Even Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 17 Date Filed: 01/29/2021No. 19

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18 g iven the deference afforded to district court s when deciding discovery

matt ers, the restrictions here “ failed to adhere to the liberal spirit of the
Rules , ” Coughlin , 946 F.2d at 1159 , to the extent that they were “arbitrary or clearly unreasonable.” Fielding , 415 F.3d at 428 (citation omitted). Although we are never quick to second

- guess a district court’s management of discovery, we must do so here.

A final example demonstrates why

. In her respective action s , M iller sought to depose SHSU’s Department Chair Wilson and UHD’s Department Chair Jackson , two witnesses who fairly likely have knowledge
of facts highly relevant to Miller’s claims in both cases

. Among other
interactions d uring UHD’s hiring process, Jacks on tele phoned Wilson about
Miller and purportedly discussed the reasons SHSU denied Miller tenure. After that call, UHD decided not to hire Miller, though she had been recommended for employment before the call. Because the district court
denied Miller’s repeated requests to depose these witnesses, the record is silent about this telephone call . Yet it is plain that Miller’s claims may well hinge on what was said during the call

.

“ W hen a party is not given a full and fair opportunity to discover information essential to its opposition to summary judgment, the limitation on discovery is reversible error.” McCoy , 695 F. App’x at 759 (quoting Brown v. Miss. Valley State Univ. , 311 F.3d 328, 333 (5th Cir. 2002 ) ). Miller has
demonstrated that the district court’s almost blanket denials of her discovery
requests affected her substantial rights , including her ability to respond to the Universities’ motions for summary judgment

. Because t h e district court
abused its discretion in this regard , w e reverse the district court’s summary judgment s and remand th ese ca s e s to allow Miller the opportunity to obtain discovery “ relevant to any party’s claim or defense or proportional to the
needs of th e case

. ” **Fed. R. Civ. P.** 26(b). Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 18 Date Filed: 01/29/2021No. 19

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19 D

. Lastly , Miller ask s this court to reassign her case s

. We find her
request warranted.

The power to reassign “ is an extraordinary one ” and “ is rarely
invoked. ” Johnson v. Sawyer , 120 F.3d 1307, 1333 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[R]eassignments should be made infrequently and with great reluctance.” United States v. Winters , 174 F.3d 478, 487 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and cita tion omitted).
In determining whether reassignment is proper, t h is court has applied

two tests

— one more lenient than the other . The more stringent test consider s the following : (1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to h ave substantial difficulty in putting out of his mind or her mind previously

- expressed vie w s or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness.
In re DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 294 F.3d 697, 700

– 01 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) . The more lenient test looks at whether the judge’s role “might reasonably cause an objective observer to question [the judge’s] impartiality.” Id. at 701 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp. , 56 F.3d 1448, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1995))

. Reassignment of
Miller’s cases is appropriate under either test. Here, the district judge ’s conduct from the outset of Miller’s cases “might [, at the least,] reasonably cause an objective observer to question [the judge’s] impartiality.” Id. Moreover, the cumulative weight of both prejudicial comments and peremptory rulings by the district judge leads us Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 19 Date Filed: 01/29/2021No. 19

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20 to conclude that “ the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his mind

. . . previously

- expressed views

. . . [and that] reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice [.]” Id. at 700

– 01. Finally , we do not believe reassignment would disrupt judicial efficiency, particularly because
full disc overy has not yet occurred in either of Miller’s actions

. See, e.g. , Johnson , 120 F.3d at 1333 (reassigning case on remand after the completion of a jury trial).

I II

. Miller, like every litigant, is entitled to a full and fair opportunity to make her case in a fair and impartial forum. See United States v. Jordan , 49 F.3d 153, 155 (5th Cir. 1995). Beyond that, “ fundamental to the judiciary is the public’s confidence i n the impartiality of our judges and the proceedings over which they preside.” Id. “[ J ] ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice. ” Offutt , 348 U.S. at 14.

We **REVERSE** the district court’s judgment s , including its sua sponte Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of TSUS and UHS and summary judgment in favor
of SHSU and UH D, and **REMAND** for further proceedings . On remand,

we further direct the Chief Judge of the Southern District of Texas to
**REASSIGN** th ese case s

. Case: 19-20752 Document: 00515726301 Page: 20 Date Filed: 01/29/2021