United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-3731

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Rahmad Lashad Geddes

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

___________________________

No. 16-3898

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Rahmad Lashad Geddes

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeals from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul

____________

 Submitted: October 21, 2016

 Filed: January 3, 2017
____________

Before MURPHY, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Rahmad Lashad Geddes of one count of aiding and abetting

sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion; one count of aiding and abetting

transportation with intent to engage in prostitution; and one count of being an armed

career criminal in possession of a firearm. Geddes appeals a number of pre-trial, trial,

and post-trial motions on which the district court ruled in favor of the prosecution. 

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We affirm.

I.

On January 6, 2014, Geddes traveled from Eau Claire, Wisconsin to Duluth,

Minnesota with a woman named Grace Schreiner. Schreiner was under the

impression that they were traveling to St. Paul, rather than Duluth, to sell drugs as

they had done in the past. After a brief sojourn in St. Paul, they drove to Superior,

Wisconsin where they checked into a motel and had sex. Thereafter, the pair drove

to Duluth, and Geddes picked up cocaine from a supplier. Throughout the remainder

ofthistrip, Geddes was actively involved in selling cocaine, and Schreiner witnessed

Geddes meet another woman to exchange cocaine for two handguns.

On January 7, they drove to Rochester, Minnesota to pick up Geddes’s friend,

Shannon Funk. On the return trip, Funk and Geddes proposed that Schreiner engage

in prostitution upon arriving in Duluth. According to Schreiner’s trial testimony, she

felt she had to comply because she would not be able to return home if she refused. 

The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the

1

District of Minnesota.

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They checked into another Duluth hotel, and Geddes began cutting the quantity of

cocaine he purchased into distribution amounts. Geddes and Funk created an

advertisement on a website called Backpage.com with pictures of Schreiner and a

telephone number to call, and Funk gave Schreiner a cellular phone on which to

receive calls. This process culminated in Schreiner completing two transactions as

a prostitute. In the first, she was paid to perform oral sex on one man at the hotel. 

Although the recipient wastold this act would cost $120, he only left $20 on the table

in the room. As a result of this discrepancy, Geddes slapped Schreiner four times in

the face. The second act consisted of an encounter where a man came to the hotel and

paid $20 but then left shortly thereafter without any sexual activity occurring. 

Throughout the trip, Geddes refused Schreiner’s requests to return home. The

two finally returned to Eau Claire on January 14, 2014. Once Geddes left, Schreiner

told her pastor what had occurred, and he called the police. Geddes was indicted on

three counts: (1) sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1591; (2) transportation to engage in prostitution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421;

and (3) being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

A superseding indictment was later returned that was the same as to Counts 1 and 2,

but Count 3 was changed to charge Geddes as an armed career criminal in possession

of a firearm. 

Before trial, Geddes filed three motionsrelevant to this appeal. First, hemoved

to sever the sex trafficking counts from the firearm count, arguing that the two

instances arose from different facts and would depend on different witnesses. The

district court denied this motion. Second, Geddes moved to exclude testimony from

the victim of his earlier conviction for terroristic threats. The government sought to

introduce this evidence as being relevant to show Geddes’s intent on Count 1, and

Geddes opposed its introduction as merely being propensity evidence. The district

court allowed the evidence to be presented subject to a number of limiting

instructions. Finally, Geddes sought to exclude the government's proposed expert

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witness on the basis that her testimony would not help the jury and would be

overbroad. The district court also denied this motion, finding that Eighth Circuit

precedent allowed expert testimony on the operation ofsex trafficking rings. Geddes

renewed all of these motions during trial, and the district court overruled them. 

After a three-day trial, the jury found Geddes guilty of all three counts, and the

district court sentenced him to 282 months imprisonment. He brought this appeal

challenging all three of the above rulings and the sufficiency of the evidence to

sustain a conviction on Counts 1 and 2.

II.

A.

The first issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in denying the

motion to sever the sex trafficking countsfromthe firearm count. This Court reviews

the denial of a motion to sever properly joined counts for an abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Erickson, 610 F.3d 1049, 1055 (8th Cir. 2010). Two or more

offenses may be joined for trial “if the offenses charged—whether felonies or

misdemeanors or both—are of the same orsimilar character, or are based on the same

act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or

plan.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a). “If the joinder of offenses . . . or a consolidation for trial

appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order separate

trials of counts . . . .” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). 

Given the district court’s discretion under Rule 14, “we will not reverse unless

the defendant shows an abuse of discretion resulting in severe prejudice.” United

States v. Steele, 550 F.3d 693, 702 (8th Cir. 2008). “Severe prejudice occurs when

a defendant is deprived of an appreciable chance for an acquittal, a chance that [the

defendant] would have had in a severed trial.” United States v. Scott, 732 F.3d 910,

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916 (8th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Taken Alive, 513

F.3d 899, 902 (8th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] defendant

cannot show prejudice when evidence of the joined offense would be properly

admissible in a separate trial for the other crime.” Erickson, 610 F.3d at 1055. The

evidence may be admissible because it “completes the story of the crime, or as

evidence of a prior bad act of a similar nature admissible under Rule 404(b) of the

Federal Rules of Evidence.” United States v. Brown, 653 F.3d 656, 662 (8th Cir.

2011) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Orozco-Rodriguez, 220 F.3d 940,

942 (8th Cir. 2000) (allowing testimony “because it related to the background and

circumstances of the charged crimes [and] complete[d] the story of the crime or

explain[ed] the relationship of parties or the circumstances surrounding a particular

event” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of severance of the firearm

possession charge from the sex trafficking charges. All three counts involved a 

series of events that occurred between January 6 and January 14, 2014. The sex

trafficking charges asserted, in short, that Geddes forced Schreiner to engage in

prostitution during a trip to Duluth taken during the above dates. The firearm charge

focused on a transaction witnessed by Schreiner during that trip in which Geddes

exchanged cocaine for two handguns. Therefore, because Schreiner’s testimony

provided evidence on the entirety ofthe trip, “it is virtually certain” that her testimony

would be admissible “as evidence that completesthe story of the crime.” See Brown,

653 F.3d at 662 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Geddes’s primary argument on this point is that the jury was unable to

compartmentalize the evidence related to the different counts. Severe prejudice can

also occur where defendants “demonstrat[e] that their defense is irreconcilable with

a codefendant's defense, or the jury will be unable to properly compartmentalize the

evidence as it relates to the separate defendants.” United States v. Young, 753 F.3d

757, 777 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Mock v. United States, 135 S. Ct.

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1005 (2015). On the other hand, where “there [is] little possibility the jury was

confused over which evidence related to which count,” no prejudice occurs to a

defendant’s right to a fair trial. United States v. Wilkens, 742 F.3d 354, 359 (8th Cir.

2014). The facts in this case are relatively straightforward, and this was not a case

presenting a multitude of different defendants and charges. Geddes has failed to meet

his burden of showing severe prejudice. 

B.

Geddes next argues the district court erred in allowing the testimony of Nicole

Meyer, his former girlfriend. During the trial, the prosecution presented Meyer’s

testimony concerning an incident in 2010 where Meyer confronted Geddes about a

text message on his cellular phone. According to her testimony, the argument

escalated and Geddes physically assaulted and threatened to kill her. Prior to Meyer

taking the stand, the district court instructed the jurors that they should consider the

evidence only if they determine the testimony to be more likely true than not. 

Further, the jury wasinstructed that if it found that the evidence met thatstandard, the

jury could consider the testimony only on the issue of whether Geddes intended to

force or coerce Schreiner to engage in prostitution. Finally, the court explicitly told

the jury that it may not use the testimony as evidence Geddes committed the crime

charged in the present case.

“We review the district court’s admission of evidence of past crimes under

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) for abuse of discretion, and we will not reverse

unless the evidence clearly had no bearing on the case and was introduced solely to

prove the defendant’s propensity to commit criminal acts.” United States v. Williams,

796 F.3d 951, 958 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Bassett, 762 F.3d 681,

687 (8th Cir. 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1450

(2016). Rule 404(b)(1) states that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not

admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion

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the person acted in accordance with the character.” However, “[t]his evidence may

be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, . . . intent, . . . absence of

mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). This rule is one “of inclusion

rather than exclusion and admits evidence of other crimes or acts relevant to any issue

in the trial, unlessit tends to prove only criminal disposition.” United States v. Oaks,

606 F.3d 530, 538 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Simon, 767 F.2d 524, 526

(8th Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Our circuit “employ[s] a four-part test to determine whether a district court

abused its discretion in admitting 404(b) evidence.” Williams, 796 F.3d at 958. Such

evidence is admissible if “(1) it is relevant to a material issue; (2) it is similar in kind

and not overly remote in time to the crime charged; (3) it is supported by sufficient

evidence; and (4) its potential prejudice does not substantially outweigh its probative

value.” Id. at 959 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 639 F.3d 489, 494 (8th Cir.

2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Government sought to introduce this

testimony as evidence of Geddes’s intent to coerce or force Schreiner to engage in

prostitution, and the district court allowed the brief testimony, subject to its limiting

instructions. 

Geddes contends that the testimony fails to meet the first, second, and fourth

prongs from the test set out above. We disagree and address each factor in turn. To

convict Geddes on Count 1, the prosecution was required to prove that Geddes acted

“knowing[ly] or in reckless disregard of the fact that means of force, threats of force,

fraud, coercion, or any combination of such means would be used to cause

[Schreiner] to engage in a commercial sex act.” See United States v. Campbell, 764

F.3d 880, 889 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S.

Ct. 1514 (2015); 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). On Count 2, the prosecution was tasked

with proving that Geddes “knowingly transport[ed] [Schreiner] in interstate orforeign

commerce . . . with intent that [she] engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity

for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a). 

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“Both his intent and his knowledge were thus called into question.” Campbell, 764

F.3d at 889 (quoting United States v. Jarrett, 956 F.2d 864, 867 (8th Cir. 1992))

(internal quotation marks omitted). Where knowledge and intent are material issues

at trial, the prosecution is generally allowed to present “evidence of other acts tending

to establish [knowledge and intent].” United States v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 936, 939

(8th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Miller, 725 F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1984))

(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Meyer’s testimony about Geddes’s

earlier use of force against her wasrelevant to the issue of Geddes’s intent, which was

a material issue at trial. The first factor is satisfied. 

Next, the testimony was similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the

crime charged. Meyer’s trial testimony concerned an event in 2010 where Geddes

physically abused and threatened her. “On the issue of similarity, our test merely

requiresthat the prior acts are ‘sufficiently similar to support an inference of criminal

intent.’” Williams, 796 F.3d at 959 (quoting United States v. Walker, 470 F.3d 1271,

1275 (8th Cir. 2006)). Here, the events described by Meyer were sufficiently similar

in substance to Schreiner’s testimony about Geddes’s threatening and physically

abusive actions to satisfy this test. As for the time between the prior bad act and the

charged offenses, we conclude that the passage of four years was insufficient to

diminish the probative value of the evidence. See id. at 959-60 (allowing evidence

of prior bad acts that occurred more than ten years before the charged offense).

Finally, the probative value of Meyer’s testimony was not substantially

outweighed by any prejudicial effect. “Though all Rule 404(b) evidence isinherently

prejudicial, the test under Rule 403 is whether its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. at 960 (quoting United States v.

Cook, 454 F.3d 938, 941 (8th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Meyer’s testimony on this issue is confined to twenty lines of the trial transcript, and

she spoke solely about the fact that Geddes had threatened her and had been

physically abusive. Trial Tr. vol. 4, 842:15-843:9, ECF No. 89. This testimony was

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probative on the issue of Geddes’s intent, and, given the extensive limiting

instructions placed on the jury’s use of the testimony, we find the danger of unfair

prejudice to be minimal. See United States v. Cockerham, 417 F.3d 919, 921 (8th

Cir. 2005) (“[A] proper limiting instruction serves as a protection against unfair

prejudice.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Meyer’s testimony at

trial.

C.

Geddes contends that the district court erred in allowing the prosecution to

present expert testimony fromAnn Quinn, a special agent with the Minnesota Bureau

of Criminal Apprehension. Agent Quinn is a member of a human trafficking task

force, and has done work in this area for roughly fourteen years. At trial, Agent

Quinn testified from her training and experience on the operation of sex trafficking

rings and the terms used therein. “We review the district court’s decision to admit

expert testimony for abuse of discretion, according it substantial deference.” United

States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 803 (8th Cir. 2009). “Federal Rule of Evidence 702

provides that an expert may testify if it ‘will assist the trier of fact to understand the

evidence or determine a fact in issue.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702). Under

Supreme Court precedent, “the [district] judge isto act as a gatekeeper in determining

whether the proposed expert’s testimony both is relevant and rests upon a reliable

foundation.” United States v. Evans, 272 F.3d 1069, 1094 (8th Cir. 2001).

Geddes assigns two points of error to this issue, and we disagree with both. 

First, he argues that the district court’s decision not to hold a Daubert hearing was an

abuse of discretion as a matter of law; however, as we have stated, “[t]here is no

requirement that the [d]istrict [c]ourt always hold a Daubert hearing prior to

qualifying an expert witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.” Id. Next, he

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contends that the testimony was both irrelevant and unreliable. In Evans, we dealt

with a nearly identical issue and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion

in allowing expert testimony “regarding the operation of a prostitution ring, including

recruitment of prostitutes and the relationship between pimps and prostitutes, and

regarding jargon used in such rings.” Id. In this case, Agent Quinn testified on the

same subject matter we allowed in Evans, and she possessed adequate credentials and

sufficient factual data on which to base this testimony. As a result, the district court

did not abuse its discretion in allowing her testimony.

D.

Finally, Geddes attacks the sufficiencyofthe evidence to sustain his conviction

on Counts 1 and 2. Our standard of review for challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence has been well repeated:

We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a

conviction, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict

and accepting all reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. 

Furthermore, [w]e will overturn [Geddes’s] conviction only if no

reasonable jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The standard of review for sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges is

strict. [W]e consider the same quantum of evidence that was presented

at trial, even if some of the evidence was improperly admitted. Finally,

a victim’s testimony alone can be sufficient to prove the sex crime in

question. 

United States v. Bell, 761 F.3d 900, 906-07 (8th Cir. 2014) (first and third alterations

in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

To convict Geddes on Count 1, “the jury had to find he acted knowing[ly] or

in reckless disregard of the fact that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion,

or any combination of such means would be used to cause [Schreiner] to engage in

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a commercialsex act.” Campbell, 764 F.3d at 889 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Geddes’s entire argument on this point concerns whether the prosecution established

the mens rea required by 18 U.S.C. § 1591. The jury convicted Geddes on Count 1

after being presented with conflicting testimony. In short, Schreiner testified that

Geddes hit her in the face on two occasions and that she did not engage willingly in

prostitution. Funk confirmed that Geddes hit Schreiner and further testified that

Geddes wasrunning the operation and receiving any and all money from the sex acts. 

Geddes, on the other hand, testified that Schreiner was a prostitute before the trip and

thatshe participated in every act voluntarily. Given that “[c]redibility determinations

are uniquely within the province of the trier of fact,” United States v. Alaboudi, 786

F.3d 1136, 1146 (8thCir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Goodale, 738 F.3d 917, 923

(8th Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted), the jury was entitled to afford

more weight to the evidence presented by the prosecution. The evidence presented

at trial was sufficient to sustain the conviction on Count 1.

To convict Geddes on Count 2, the jury had to find that he “knowingly

transport[ed] [Schreiner] in interstate or foreign commerce . . . with intent that [she]

engage in prostitution.” 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a). Geddes asserts that he and Schreiner

formulated the plan to engage in prostitution after they entered the State of Minnesota

and that both acts occurred while they were in that State. Therefore, according to

Geddes, he never transported her across state lines for the purpose of engaging in

prostitution. We disagree. In addition to trial testimony where Funk and Schreiner

recount the group’s movements between Superior and Duluth, the prosecution

presented expert testimony on the analysis of the records for cell phones possessed

by Geddes and Schreiner. The expert witness, Special Agent Joseph Raschke,

explained to the jury that cell phones are programmed to find and use the strongest

signal, and that the location of the tower being used by a particular phone at a given

time means that the phone itself is in close proximity to that tower. He testified that,

on January 8, both phones pulled a signal from a tower in Duluth, Minnesota around

9:06 p.m. and then switched to a tower in Superior, Wisconsin around 9:45. 

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Likewise, according to Agent Raschke’s testimony, a similar pattern occurred on

January 12 when the phones switched from using towers in Duluth to towers in

Superior. Thus, in Agent Raschke’s opinion, the phones were in Duluth when using

Minnesota towers and in Superior when using Wisconsin towers. In his brief, Geddes

asserts that “prostitution came up for the first time while driving from Rochester to

Duluth” on January 7. Appellant’s Br. 34. Accepting all reasonable inferences

supporting the guilty verdict on Count 2, the jury was entitled to believe that the

interstate movements on January 8 and 12—both after the date on which, according

to Geddes, the prostitution plan was first discussed—were made with the intent of

engaging in prostitution.

The evidence was sufficient to support Geddes’s conviction on both counts.

III.

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm Geddes’s conviction.

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