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Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

C hief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan	 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2002
 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 

Plaintiff-Appellant,


Cross-Appellee
 

v	 No. 120825
 

MOBILE LUNDY,
 

Defendant-Appellee,


Cross-Appellant.
 

PER CURIAM
 

A jury convicted defendant of first-degree felony murder,
 

MCL 750.316(1)(b).1

 The Court of Appeals determined that
 

there was insufficient evidence of the underlying felony of
 

1MCL 750.316(1) provides:
 

A person who commits any of the following is


guilty of first degree murder and shall be punished


by imprisonment for life:
 

(b) Murder committed in the perpetration of,


or attempt to perpetrate . . . larceny of any kind


. . . .
 
larceny and remanded the case to the circuit court for entry
 

of a conviction of second-degree murder and resentencing.2
 

Finding the evidence of larceny sufficient, we reverse the
 

judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate defendant’s
 

first-degree felony-murder conviction.
 

I
 

This case arose out of the robbery and stabbing death of
 

Reginald May. The prosecutor’s theory was that defendant and
 

his girlfriend, Debra Hart, were alone with the victim in an
 

apartment when defendant saw he had some money, stabbed him to
 

death, and took the money. 


Defendant testified that he, Hart, the victim, and two
 

others had been drinking beer and vodka and smoking crack
 

cocaine. He said he went to use the bathroom when the two
 

others left to get more crack cocaine. Defendant indicated
 

that, when he came out of the bathroom, Hart said the victim
 

had been bothering her. He explained that he stabbed the
 

victim to protect Hart and himself from the victim during a
 

struggle.3 Defendant said that the victim’s money was not
 

related to the stabbing, that he did not see the victim with
 

2Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 9, 2001


(Docket No. 220100).
 

3The medical examiner testified that the victim had been
 

stabbed nine times.
 

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money before the altercation, and that Hart took the money
 

from the victim after the stabbing as they were leaving the
 

apartment. However, defendant acknowledged during crossexamination that he had made a prior inconsistent statement to
 

the effect that he had seen the victim with money before the
 

stabbing. 


After considering all the evidence, the jury returned a
 

verdict of first-degree felony murder.
 

II
 

The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the basis
 

that defendant’s prior inconsistent statement, that he had
 

seen the victim with money before the stabbing, had been
 

improperly considered as substantive evidence, rather than
 

just for impeachment purposes. In reaching this conclusion
 

the Court of Appeals relied upon People v Jenkins, 450 Mich
 

249, 260-261; 537 NW2d 828 (1995).
 

Judge Zahra dissented, indicating that he believed the
 

evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
 

III
 

The prosecution has applied to this Court for leave to
 

appeal. Defendant has filed a cross-appeal regarding other
 

issues that the Court of Appeals rejected. 


The prosecution contends, and we agree, that the Court of
 

Appeals erred in applying People v Jenkins to defendant’s
 

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prior inconsistent statement. Jenkins stands for the general
 

proposition that prior unsworn statements of a witness are
 

mere hearsay and are generally inadmissible as substantive
 

evidence. However, Jenkins is inapplicable because it related
 

to impeachment of a prosecution witness with an inconsistent
 

statement, whereas this case concerns defendant’s out-of-court
 

statement. Admissions by a party are specifically excluded
 

from hearsay and, thus, are admissible as both impeachment and
 

substantive evidence under MRE 801(d)(2).4

 Thus, properly
 

understood, Jenkins only applies to nonparty witnesses.
 

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
 

evidence, this Court analyzes the evidence presented in the
 

light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether
 

any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential
 

elements of the crime charged were proven beyond a reasonable
 

doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992)
 

mod 441 Mich 1201 (1992). The element in dispute here is
 

whether the defendant, at the time he stabbed the victim, was
 

committing or attempting to commit a larceny or helping Hart
 

4MRE 801(d) provides:
 

A statement is not hearsay if—
 

(2) . . . The statement is offered against a party and is


(A) the party’s own statement . . . .
 

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commit a larceny.5
 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
 

prosecution, including defendant’s prior inconsistent
 

statement that he had seen the victim with money before the
 

stabbing, we hold that the evidence of the underlying larceny
 

was sufficient. As Judge Zahra indicated, from the evidence
 

the jury could conclude that defendant or Hart knew that the
 

victim had money and decided to seize the moment to rob and
 

murder the victim. Slip op at 1. The jury was free to
 

discount testimony suggesting that defendant or Hart formed
 

the intent to take the money only after the stabbing.6
 

It is for these reasons that we reverse the judgment of
 

the Court of Appeals and reinstate defendant’s first-degree
 

5The trial court correctly instructed the jury that, in


order to find defendant guilty, it had to find that, at the


time defendant did the act that caused the victim’s death, he


was committing, or attempting to commit, or helping someone


else commit the crime of larceny. 


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[A]ppellate courts are not juries, and even


when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,


they must not interfere with the jury's role: 


[An appellate court] must remember that the


jury is the sole judge of the facts. It is the


function of the jury alone to listen to testimony,


weigh the evidence and decide the questions of


fact. . . . Juries, not appellate courts, see and


hear witnesses and are in a much better position to


decide the weight and credibility to be given to


their testimony. [Wolfe, supra at 514-515].
 

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felony-murder conviction. With regard to the defendant's
 

cross-appeal, we deny leave to appeal.
 

CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, KELLY, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and
 

MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.
 

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