S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting

_________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)

Order in Pending Case 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 13A1284

WHEATON COLLEGE v. SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL

.
ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTION
[July 3, 2014]
The application for an injunction having been submitted to J USTICE K AGAN and by her referred to the Court, the Court orders: If the applicant informs the Secretary of Health and Human Services in writing that it is a non

profit organization that holds itself out as religious and has religious objections to pr oviding coverage for contra

ceptive services, the respondents are enjoined from enforc

ing against the applicant the challenged provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and related regulations pending final disposition of appellate review. To meet the condition for injunction pending appeal, the applicant need not use the form prescribed by the Gov

ernment, EBSA Form 700, and need not send copies to health insurance issuers or third-party administrators. The Circuit Courts have divided on whether to enjoin the requirement that religious nonprofit organizations use EBSA Form 700. Such division is a traditional ground for certiorari. See S. Ct. Rule 10(a). Nothing in this interim order affects the ability of the applicant’s employees and students to obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA approved contraceptives. The Gov

ernment contends that the applicant’s health insurance issuer and third-party administrator are required by federal law to provide full contraceptive coverage regard

less whether the applicant completes EBSA Form 700.2 WHEATON COLLEGE v. BURWELL

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
The applicant contends, by contrast, that the obligations of its health insurance issuer and third-party administrator are dependent on their receipt of notice that the applicant objects to the contraceptive coverage requirement. But the applicant has already notified the Government— without using EBSA Form 700—that it meets the re

quirements for exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement on religious grounds. Nothing in this order precludes the Government from relying on this notice, to the extent it considers it ne cessary, to facilitate the provi

sion of full contraceptive coverage under the Act. In light of the foregoing, this order should not be con

strued as an expression of the Court’s views on the merits. J USTICE S CALIA concurs in the result.

J USTICE S OTOMAYOR , with whom J USTICE G INSBURG and J USTICE K AGAN join, dissenting. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119, through its implementing regulations, requires employer group health insur ance plans to cover contracep

tive services without cost s haring. Recognizing that peo

ple of religious faith may sincerely oppose the provision of contraceptives, the Government has created certain excep

tions to this requirement. Churches are categorically exempt. Any religious nonprofit is also exempt, as long as it signs a form certifying that it is a religious nonprofit that objects to the provision of contraceptive services, and provides a copy of that form to its insurance issuer or third-party administrator. The form is simple. The front asks the applicant to attest to the foregoing representa

tions; the back notifies third- party administrators of their regulatory obligations. The matter before us is an application for an emergency injunction filed by Wheaton College, a nonprofit liberal arts college in Illinois. There is no dispute that Wheaton is entitled to the religious-nonprofit exemption from the3 Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
contraceptive coverage requirement. Wheaton nonethe

less asserts that the exemption itself impermissibly bur

dens Wheaton’s free exercise of its religion in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U. S. C. §2000bb et seq ., on the theory that its filing of a self-certification form will make it com

plicit in the provision of contraceptives by triggering the obligation for someone else to provide the services to which it objects. Wheaton has not stated a viable claim under RFRA. Its claim ignore s that the provision of con

traceptive coverage is triggere d not by its completion of the self-certification form, but by federal law. Even assuming that the accommodation somehow bur

dens Wheaton’s religious exe rcise, the accommodation is permissible under RFRA because it is the least restrictive means of furthering the Government’s compelling inter

ests in public health and women’s well-being. Indeed, just earlier this week in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.

, ante, at ___, the Court described the accommodation as “a system that seeks to respect the religious liberty of reli

gious nonprofit corporations while ensuring that the em

ployees of these entities have precisely the same access to all [Food and Drug Administration (FDA)]-approved con

traceptives as employees of companies whose owners have no religious objections to pr oviding such coverage.” Ante, at 3. And the Court concluded that the accommodation “constitutes an alternative that achieves all of the Gov

ernment’s aims while providing greater respect for reli

gious liberty.” Ibid. Those who are bound by our decisions usually believe they can take us at our word. Not so to

day. After expressly relying on the availability of the religious-nonprofit accommodation to hold that the contra

ceptive coverage requirement violates RFRA as applied to closely held for-profit corpor ations, the Court now, as the dissent in Hobby Lobby feared it might, see ante, at 29–30 (G INSBURG , J., dissenting), retreats from that position.4 WHEATON COLLEGE v. BURWELL

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
That action evinces disregard for even the newest of this Court’s precedents and undermines confidence in this institution. Even if one accepts Wheaton’s view that the self

certification procedure violates RFRA, that would not justify the Court’s action today. The Court grants Wheaton a form of relief as rare as it is extreme: an inter

locutory injunction under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. §1651, blocking the operation of a duly enacted law and regulations, in a case in which the courts below have not yet adjudicated the merits of the applicant’s claims and in which those courts have declined requests for similar injunctive relief. Injunctions of this nature are proper only where “the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC , 507 U. S. 1301, 1303 (1993) (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers) (internal quotation marks omi tted). Yet the Court today orders this extraordinary relief even though no one could credibly claim Wheaton’s right to relief is indisputably clear. The sincerity of Wheaton’s d eeply held religious beliefs is beyond refute. But as a legal matter, Wheaton’s appli

cation comes nowhere near the high bar necessary to warrant an emergency injunction from this Court. For that reason, I respectfully dissent.

I A The Affordable Care Act requires certain employer group health insurance plans to cover a number of preven

tative-health services without cost sharing. These services include “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration . . . approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and pa

tient education and counseling for all women with repro

ductive capacity, as prescribed by a provider.” 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (2012) (brackets and internal quotation marks5 Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
omitted). As a practical matter, the provision ensures that women have access to contrace ption at no cost beyond their insurance premiums. Employers that do not comply with the mandate are subject to civil penalties. Recognizing that some religions disapprove of contra

ceptives, the Government has sought to implement the mandate in a manner consistent with the freedom of conscience. It has categorically exempted any group health plan of a “religious em ployer,” as defined by refer

ence to the Tax Code provis ion governing churches. See 45 CFR §147.131(a); http://hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (as visited July 2, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). And it has extended a further accommodation to religious nonprofits that do not satisfy the categorical exemption. All agree that Wheaton qualifies as a religious nonprofit. To invoke the accommodation and avoid civil penalties, a religious nonprofit need only file a self-certification form stating (1) that it “opposes pr oviding coverage for some or all of any contraceptive serv ices required to be covered under [the regulation] on account of religious objections,” (2) that it “is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity,” and (3) that it “holds itself out as a religious organization.” §147.131(b). The form is reprinted in an appendix to this opinion. Any organization that completes the form and provides a copy to its insurance issuer or third-party administrator 1 need not “contract, arrange, pay, or refer for contraceptive coverage” to which it objects. 78 Fed. Reg. 39874 (2013); see 29 CFR §2590.715–2713A(b)(1) and (c)(1). Instead, the insurance issuer or third-party admin

-

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1 Typically, an employer contracts to pay a health insurer to provide coverage; the insurer both covers the cost of medical claims and man

ages the process for administerin g those claims. Employers who maintain self-insured plans cover the cost of claims for medical treat

ment directly. Such employers often contract with third-party adminis

trators to administer the claims process.6 WHEATON COLLEGE v. BURWELL

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
istrator must provide contraceptive coverage for the organ

ization’s employees and may not charge the organization any premium or other fee related to those services. The back of the self-certification form reminds third-party administrators that receipt of the form constitutes notice that they must comply with their regulatory obligations. See Appendix, infra

. B Rather than availing itself of this simple accommoda

tion, Wheaton filed suit, asserting that completing the form and submitting it to its third-party administrator would make it complicit in the provision of contraceptive coverage, in violation of its religious beliefs. On that basis, it sought a preliminary injunction, claiming that the law and regulations at issue violate RFRA, which provides that the Government may not “substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless the application of that burden “is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.” 42 U. S. C. §§2000bb– 1(a) and (b). 2 The District Court denied a preliminary injunction on the ground that the regulations exempting Wheaton from the contraceptive coverage requirement do not substan

tially burden its exercise of religion. App. to Emergency Application for Injunction Pending Appellate Review 1–20. Under Circuit precedent, the court reasoned, Wheaton’s act of “filling out the form and sending it to the [third

party administrator]” in no way “triggers” coverage of contraception costs. Id., at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Seventh Circuit in turn denied Wheaton’s motion for an injunction pending appeal. See Order in No. 14–2396 (CA7, June 30, 2014). In doing so, it relied on

——————

2 Wheaton also raised claims und er the First Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. Because it does not press those claims in this Court as a basis for injunc tive relief, I do not discuss them.7 Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
this Court’s pronouncement in Hobby Lobby “that the accommodation provision (applicable in this case) ‘consti

tutes an alternative that achieves all of the Government’s aims while providing greater respect for religious liberty.’ ” Ibid. Wheaton applied to J USTICE K AGAN , in her capacity as Circuit Justice for the Seventh Circuit, for an emergency injunction against enforcement of the law and regulations pending resolution of its legal challenge. She referred the matter to the Conference, which entered a temporary injunction and called for a response from the Government. See ante, at ___. After receipt of the Government’s re

sponse, the Court today enters an order granting injunc

tive relief.

II A I disagree strongly with what the Court has done. Wheaton asks us to enjoin the enforcement of a duly en

acted law and duly promulgated regulations before the courts below have passed on the merits of its legal chal

lenge. Relief of this nature is extraordinary and reserved for the rarest of cases. With good reason. The only source of authority for this Court to issue an injunction pending review in the lower courts is the All Writs Act, which provides that this Court “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of [its] . . . jurisdictio[n] and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U. S. C. §1651(a). This grant of equitable power is a failsafe, “to be used ‘sparingly and only in the most critical and exigent cir

cumstances.’ ” Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC , 479 U. S. 1312, 1313 (1986) (S CALIA , J., in chambers). Under our precedents, “[a]n injunction is appropriate only if (1) it is necessary or appropriate in aid of our juris

diction, and (2) the legal rights at issue are indisputably8 WHEATON COLLEGE v. BURWELL

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting

clear.” Turner Broadcasting System

, 507 U. S., at 1303 (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citations omit

ted). 3 To understand how high a bar that second prong is, consider that this Court has previously pointed to differ

ences of opinion among lower co urts as proof positive that the standard has not been met. See Lux v. Rodrigue s, 561 U. S. 1306, 1308 (2010) (R OBERTS , C. J., in chambers) (observing that “the courts of appeals appear to be reach

ing divergent results” respecting the applicant’s claim, and that, “[a]ccordingly, . . . it c annot be said that his right to relief is ‘indisputably clear’ ”). Neutral application of this principle would compel the denial of Wheaton’s application without any need to examine the merits, for two Courts of Appeals that have addressed si milar claims have rejected them. See Notre Dame v. Sebelius , 743 F. 3d 547 (CA7 2014); Michigan Catholic Conference and Catholic Family Services v. Burwell , ___ F. 3d ___, 2014 WL 2596753 (CA6, June 11, 2014). 4 Remarkably, the Court uses division

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3 Indeed, some of my colleagues who act to grant relief in this case have themselves emphasized the ex ceedingly high burden that an applicant must surmount to obtain an interlocutory injunction under the All Writs Act. See Lux v. Rodrigues , 561 U. S. 1306, 1307 (2010) (R OBERTS , C. J., in chambers) (an applicant must demonstrate that “the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear” in order to obtain such injunctive relief) (internal quotation marks omitted); Respect Maine PAC v. McKee , 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (unlik e a stay of a lower court’s order, a request for an injunction against the enforcement of a law “ ‘does not simply suspend judicial alteration of the status quo but grants judicial intervention that has been withheld by lower courts ’ ”) (quoting Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC , 479 U. S. 1312, 1313 (1986) (S CALIA , J., in chambers)).

4 To be sure, two other Courts of Appeals have recently granted tem

porary injunctions similar to the on e Wheaton seeks here. See Order in Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Secretary, U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services , No. 14–12696–CC (CA11, June 30, 2014) (granting injunction pend ing appeal); Order in Diocese of Cheyenne v. Burwell , No. 14–8040 (CA10, June 30, 2014) (same). Although denying the injunction in this case would produce a different outcome, the Government could of course move to vacate those injunctions were we9 Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
among the Circuits as a justification for the issuance of its order, noting that “division is a traditional ground for certiorari.” Supra , at 1. But a petition for writ of certiorari is not before us. Rather, given the posture of this application—for an emergency inj unction under the All Writs Act—division of authority is reason not to grant relief.

B Wheaton’s RFRA claim plainly does not satisfy our demanding standard for the extraordinary relief it seeks. For one thing, the merits of this case are not before this Court for full review; adjudication of the merits is still pending in the District Court. So nothing necessitates intervention in order to “ ‘aid . . . our jurisdiction,’ ” Turner Broadcasting System

, 507 U. S., at 1301 (alterations omit

ted), over any eventual certiorari petition from a decision rendered below. If the Government is allowed to enforce the law, either Wheaton will file the self-certification form, or it will not. Either way, there will remain a live contro

versy that this Court could ad judicate after the case is decided on the merits below. And either way, if Wheaton is correct in its challenge to the law, its rights will be vindicated and it will obta in the relief it seeks. As to the merits, Wheaton’s claim is likely to fail under any standard, let alone the standard that its entitlement to relief be “ ‘indisputably clear,’ ” ibid. Wheaton asserts that filing the self-certification form might ultimately result in the provision of contraceptive services to its employees, thereby burdening its religious exercise. And it points out that if it does not file the form, it will face civil penalties. But it is difficult to understand how these arguments make out a viable RFRA claim. RFRA requires Wheaton to show that the accommoda

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—————— to deny this one. Moreover, while uniformity certainly is important, uniform error is not.10 WHEATON COLLEGE v. BURWELL

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
tion process “substantially burden[s] [its] exercise of reli

gion.” §2000bb–1(a). “Congress no doubt meant the modi

fier ‘substantially’ to carry weight.” Hobby Lobby , 573 U. S., at ___ (G INSBURG , J., dissenting) (slip op., at 20). Wheaton, for religious reasons, categorically opposes the provision of contraceptive services. The Government has given it a simple means to opt out of the contraceptive coverage mandate—and thus avoid any civil penalties for failing to provide contraceptive services—and a simple means to tell its third-party administrator of its claimed exemption. Yet Wheaton maintains that taking these steps to avail itself of the accommodation would substantially burden its religious exercise. Wheaton is “religiously opposed to emergency contraceptives because they may act by killing a human embryo.” Emergency Application for Injunction Pending Appellate Review 11. And it “believes that au

thorizing its [third-party administrator] to provide these drugs in [its] place makes it co mplicit in grave moral evil.” Ibid. Wheaton is mistaken—not as a matter of religious faith, in which it is undoubtedly sincere, but as a matter of law: Not every sincerely felt “burden” is a “substantial” one, and it is for courts, not litigants, to identify which are. See Hobby Lobby , 573 U. S., at ___ (G INSBURG , J., dissenting) (slip op., at 21–22). Any provision of contra

ceptive coverage by Wheaton’s third-party administrator would not result from any action by Wheaton; rather, in every meaningful sense, it would result from the relevant law and regulations. The law and regulations require, in essence, that some entity provide contraceptive coverage. A religious nonprofit’s choice not to be that entity may leave someone else obligated to provide coverage instead— but the obligation is created by the contraceptive coverage mandate imposed by law, not by the religious nonprofit’s11 Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
choice to opt out of it. 5 Let me be absolutely clear: I do not doubt that Wheaton genuinely believes that signing the self-certification form is contrary to its religious beliefs. But thinking one’s religious beliefs are substantially burdened—no matter how sincere or genuine that belief may be—does not make it so. An analogy used by the Seventh Circuit may help to explain why Wheaton’s complicity theory cannot be legally sound: “Suppose it is wartime, there is a draft, and a Quaker is called up. Many Quakers are pacifists, and their pacifism is a tenet of their religion. Suppose the Quaker who’s been called up tells the selective service system that he’s a conscien tious objector. The selec

tive service officer to whom he makes this pitch ac

cepts the sincerity of his refusal to bear arms and ex

cuses him. But as the Quaker leaves the selective service office, he’s told: ‘you know this means we’ll have to draft someone in place of you’—and the Quaker replies indignantly that if the government does that, it will be violating his religious beliefs. Because his religion teaches that no one should bear arms, drafting another person in his place would make him responsible for the military activities of his replace

ment, and by doing so would substantially burden his own sincere religious beliefs. Would this mean that by exempting him the government had forced him to

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5 Wheaton notes that the back of the self-certification form provides third-party administrators with notice of their regulatory obligations. See Emergency Application for Injunc tion Pending Appellate Review 8; see also Appendix, infra . That notice is merely an instruction to third

party administrators; it is not a part of any of the representations required on the front of the form . No statement to which Wheaton must assent in any way reflects ag reement with or endorsement of the notice.12 WHEATON COLLEGE v. BURWELL

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
‘trigger’ the drafting of a replacement who was not a conscientious objector, and that the Religious Free

dom Restoration Act would require a draft exemption for both the Quaker and his non

‐ Quaker replace

ment?” Notre Dame , 743 F. 3d, at 556.
Here, similarly, the filing of the self-certification form merely indicates to the third-party administrator that a religious nonprofit has chosen to invoke the religious accommodation. If a religious nonprofit chooses not to pay for contraceptive services, it is true that someone else may have a legal obligation to pay for them, just as someone may have to go to war in place of the conscientious objec

tor. But the obligation to provide contraceptive services, like the obligation to serve in the Armed Forces, arises not from the filing of the form but from the underlying law and regulations. It may be that what troubles Wheaton is that it must participate in any process the end result of which might be the provision of contraceptives to its employees. But that is far from a substantial burden on its free exercise of religion. Even if one were to conclude that Wheaton meets the substantial burden requirement, the Government has shown that application of the burden is “the least restric

tive means” to further a “comp elling governmental inter

est,” §2000bb–1(b)(2). The contraceptive coverage re

quirement plainly furthers compelling interests in public health and women’s well-being. See Hobby Lobby

, ante, at 2 (K ENNEDY , J. concurring). And it is the “least restrictive means” of furthering those interests. Indeed, as justifica

tion for its decision in Hobby Lobby —issued just this week—the very Members of the Court that now vote to grant injunctive relief concluded that the accommodation “constitutes an alternative that achieves all of the Gov

ernment’s aims while providing greater respect for reli

-13 Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
gious liberty.” Ante, at 3 (majority opinion); see also ante, at 4 (“The effect of the [Dept. of Health and Human Ser

vices (HHS)]-created accommodation on the women em

ployed by Hobby Lobby and th e other companies involved in these cases would be precisely zero. Under that ac

commodation, these women would still be entitled to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost sharing”); ante, at 44 (“At a minimum . . . [the accommodation] does not impinge on the plaintiffs’ religious belief that providing insurance coverage for the contraceptives at issue here violates their religion, and it serves HHS’s stated interests equally well”); see also ante, at 4 (K ENNEDY , J., concur

ring) (“[I]t is the Court’s understanding that an accommo

dation may be made to the employers without imposition of a whole new program or burden on the Government. As the Court makes clear, this is not a case where it can be established that it is difficult to accommodate the govern

ment’s interest, and in fact the mechanism for doing so isalready in place”). Today’s grant of injunctive relief simply does not square with the Court’s reasoning in Hobby Lobby

. It should by now be clear just how far the Court has strayed in granting Wheaton an interlocutory injunction against the enforcement of the law and regulations before the courts below have adjudicated Wheaton’s RFRA claim. To warrant an injunction under the All Writs Act, the Court must have more than a bare desire to suspend the existing state of affairs; Wheaton’s entitlement to relief must be indisputably clear. While Wheaton’s religious conviction is undoubtedly entitled to respect, it does not come close to affording a basis for relief under the law.

C The Court’s approach imposes an unwarranted and unprecedented burden on the Government’s ability to administer an important regulatory scheme. The Execu

-14 WHEATON COLLEGE v. BURWELL

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting

tive is tasked with enforci ng Congress’ mandate that preventative care be available to citizens at no cost beyond that of insurance. In pr oviding the accommodation for which Wheaton is eligible, the Government has done a salutary thing: exempt religious organizations from a requirement that might otherwise burden them. Wheaton objects, however, to the minimally burdensome paperworknecessary for the Government to administer this accommodation. If the Government cannot require organizations to attest to thei r views by way of a simple self-certification form and no tify their third-party admin

istrators of their claimed exemption, how can it ever iden

tify the organizations eligible for the accommodation and perform the administrative tasks necessary to make the accommodation work? The self -certification form is the least intrusive way for the Gove rnment to administer the accommodation. All that a religious organization must do is attest to the views that it holds and notify its third

party administrator that it is exempt. The Government rightly accepts that attestation at face value; it does not question whether an organization’s views are sincere. It is not at all clear to me how the Government could adminis

ter the religious nonprofit accommodation if Wheaton were to prevail. The Court has different ideas, however. Stepping into the shoes of HHS, the Court sets out to craft a new admin

istrative regime. Its order gr ants injunctive relief so long as Wheaton “informs the Secretary of Health and Human Services in writing that it is a non-profit organization that holds itself out as religious and has religious objections to providing coverage for contraceptive services.” Supra , at 1. And it goes further—“[t]o meet the condition for injunc

tion pending appeal,” the Court continues, Wheaton “need not use the [self-certification] form prescribed by the Government . . . and need not send copies to health insur

ance issuers or third-party administrators.” Ibid. This15 Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
Court has no business rewriting administrative regula

tions. Yet, without pause, the Court essentially does just that. 6 It is unclear why the Court goes to the lengths it does to rewrite HHS’s regulations. Presumably the Court intends to leave to the agency the ta sk of forwarding whatever notification it receives to th e respective insurer or third

party administrator. But the Court does not even require the religious nonprofit to identify its third-party adminis

trator, and it neglects to ex plain how HHS is to identify that entity. Of course, HHS is aware of Wheaton’s third

party administrator in this case. But what about other cases? Does the Court intend for HHS to rely on the filing of lawsuits by every entity claiming an exemption, such that the identity of the third-party administrator will emerge in the pleadings or in discovery? Is HHS to under

take the daunting—if not impossible—task of creating a database that tracks every employer’s insurer or third

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6 This case is crucially unlike Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius , 571 U. S. ___ (2014). There, the Court i ssued a comparable order “based on all the circumstances of the case”— in particular, the fact that the applicants’ third-party administrator was a “church plan” that had no legal obligation or intention to pr ovide contraceptive coverage. See Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius , 2013 WL 6839900, *10–*11, *13 (D Colo., Dec. 27, 2013). As a consequence, whatever the merits of that unusual order, it did not affect any individual’s access to contraceptive coverage. Not so here. Wheaton’s third-party administrator bears the legal obligation to provide contraceptive coverage only upon receipt of a valid self-certification. See 26 CFR §54.9815–2713A(b)(2) (2013); 29 CFR §2510.3–16(b) (2013). Today’s injunction thus risks depriving hundreds of Wheaton’s employees and students of their legal entitle

ment to contraceptive coverage. In addition, because Wheaton is materially indistinguishable from ot her nonprofits that object to the Government’s accommodation, the issuance of an injunction in this case will presumably entitle hundreds or th ousands of other objectors to the same remedy. The Court has no reason to think that the administra

tive scheme it foists on the Government today is workable or effective on a national scale.16 WHEATON COLLEGE v. BURWELL

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
party administrator nationwide? And, putting that aside, why wouldn’t Wheaton’s claim be exactly the same under the Court’s newly-fashioned system? Either way, the end result will be that a third-party administrator will provide contraceptive coverage. Su rely the Court and Wheaton are not just objecting to the use of one stamp instead of two in order to avail itself of the accommodation. The Court’s actions in this case create unnecessary costs and layers of bureaucracy, and they ignore a simple truth: The Government must be allowed to handle the basic tasks of public administration in a manner that comports with common sense. It is not the business of this Court to ensnare itself in the Government’s ministerial handling of its affairs in the manner it does here.

* * * I have deep respect for religious faith, for the important and selfless work performed by religious organizations, and for the values of pluralism protected by RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause. But the Court’s grant of an injunc

tion in this case allows Wheaton’s beliefs about the effects of its actions to trump the democratic interest in allowing the Government to enforce the law. In granting an injunc

tion concerning this religio us nonprofit accommodation, the availability of which served as the premise for the Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby

, the Court cannot possibly be applying our longstanding requirement that a party’s entitlement to relief be indisputably clear. Our jurisprudence has over the years drawn a careful boundary between majoritarian democracy and the right of every American to practice his or her religion freely. We should not use the extraordinary vehicle of an injunc

tion under the All Writs Act to work so fundamental a shift in that boundary. Because Wheaton cannot justify the relief it seeks, I would deny its application for an injunction, and I respectfully dissent from the Court’s refusal to do so.S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting 17 Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)

Appendix to opinion of S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting

APPENDIX 7

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7 Source: United States Dept. of Labor, online at http://www.dol.gov/ ebsa/pdf/preventiveserviceseligibleor ganizationcertificationform.pdf (as visited July 2, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting 18 WHEATON COLLEGE v. BURWELL

Appendix to opinion of S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting