alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Matthew CARROLL, Appellant, v. Kermit BLACK, et al., Appellees.

No. 10-96-049-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Waco.

Dec. 18, 1996.

Rehearing Overruled Feb. 19, 1997.

Eric Samuelson, Austin, for Appellant.

William W. KHgarlin, Santa Fe, NM, Ami-cus, for Appellant.

Dan Morales, Attorney General, Jorge Vega, First Assistant Attorney General, La-quita A Hamilton, Deputy Attorney General for Litigation, Toni Hunter, Chief, General Litigation Division, Blake 0. Brodersen, Assistant Attorney General, General Litigation Division, Austin, for Appellees.

Before DAVIS, C.J., CUMMINGS and VANCE, JJ.

OPINION

VANCE, Justice.

Matthew Carroll sued several Texas A & M University officials claiming wrongful discharge. The defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting the defense of sovereign immunity. After a hearing, the court granted the defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction. Carroll appeals on one point: Does the *Sabine Pilot*exception to the employment-at-will doctrine apply to public employees asserting the defense of sovereign immunity? *See Sabine Pilot Serv. Inc. v. Rauch,*687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex.1985).

Texas has long adhered to the employment-at-will doctrine. *East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott,*72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888). Some exceptions have been made to the doctrine by statute. *See, e.g.,*Tex Labor Code Ann. § 451.001 (Vernon 1996) (discharge for filing worker’s compensation claim); Tex Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.002 (Whistleblower Act) (Vernon Supp. 1996). In 1985, our Supreme Court created a “very narrow” judicial exception to the employment-at-will doctrine: an employer may not discharge an employee “for the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act.” *Sabine Pilot,*687 S.W.2d at 735.

The appellees do not dispute that the *Sabine Pilot*exception to the at-will doctrine exists. Instead, they argue that the exception does not overcome their defense of sovereign immunity. As state officials who were acting in their official capacity, appellees assert that — absent legislative consent or statutory exception — they are entitled to the immunity defense. *See Bagg v. University of Texas Med. Branch,*726 S.W.2d 582, 586 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref d n.r.e.).

The justifications for sovereign immunity have long been criticized.1*Green Intern., Inc. v. State,*877 S.W.2d 428, 433 (Tex. *135App.—Austin 1994, writ denied, order withdrawn, dism’d). However, the waiver of sovereign immunity is a matter properly addressed to the legislature. *University of Texas Med. Branch v. York,*871 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex.1994).

Because we find neither legislative consent nor a statutory exception to sovereign immunity, we cannot say the trial court erred in dismissing CarrolTs suit. We affirm the judgment.

1

. Former Supreme Court Justice William Kilgar-lin has filed an *amicus curiae*brief denouncing the doctrines of sovereign immunity and employment-at-will as "relics of the past.”
##### 



Exhibit 10.2
 NON-QUALIFIED STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT
UNDER THE
2007 NON-QUALIFIED STOCK OPTION PLAN FOR DIRECTORS
 Agreement Company  Optionee
 Plan
    1. Award of Option Option [  ] [  ] Option Shares
 2. Nature of the Option not Code
 3. Date of Grant; Term of Option  Effective Date
 4. Option Exercise Price
 5. Exercise of Option
 (a) Right to Exercise
  (b) Method of Exercise
 34




---



##### 



(c) Share Legends
 (d) Partial Exercise provided, however
 (e) Restrictions on Exercise
 6. Investment Representations
 (a)
 (b)
  7. Non-Transferability of Option
 8. Tax Consequences
 9. No Continuation of Service
 10. The Plan
 11. Call upon Cessation of Service.
 (a)
 35




---



##### 



(b)
 (c)
 (d) The Wall Street Journal
 12. Market Stand Off
 13. Entire Agreement
 14. Governing Law
 15. Execution
 This space intentionally left blank; signature page follows.
 36




---



##### 



BANCORP OF NEW JERSEY, INC.By:Title:[PARTICIPANT]SignatureAddress
   37
#### Bao “Michelle” Chau Henderson TIPPY, Relator, v. The Honorable Robert P. WALKER, Judge, Respondent.

No. D-4152.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Nov. 17, 1993.

Rehearing Overruled Jan. 5, 1994.

Connie Moore, Houston, for relator.

*929Steve Carlton, Orange, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This petition for writ of mandamus raises the issue of whether the six months residency period for mandatory transfer of venue in child custody modification motions under Tex.Fam.Code § 11.06(b) only begins to run after the original custody decree is signed, or at the earlier date when the child’s actual residency in the different county begins. Here the facts are that although the child had continuous residency with the mother in Harris County for fifteen months prior to her filing of the motion to transfer venue, the motion was filed less than six months after Judge Walker actually signed the original final custody order.

The respondent and real party in interest have had notice and opportunity to respond, but have offered no argument beyond that advanced in the trial court — that the six months only begins to run after the decree is finally signed. We previously *implicitly*held that residency runs from the earlier date in holding that transfer was mandatory in *Arias v. Spector,*623 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.1981). In our computation in *Arias*we included part of the pre-judgment residency period to reach the required total residency then specified in section 11.06(b). We now make that implicit holding explicit.

After review of the record and consideration of all argument submitted herein, it is the opinion of a majority of the court that relator is entitled by law to relief. Without hearing oral argument, a majority of the court directs that Judge Walker shall transfer the pending motion to modify to a District Court of Harris County. Tex.R.App.P. 122. The writ of mandamus is conditionally issued. The clerk of this court shall issue it to Judge Walker if, and only if, he fails or refuses to comply with this opinion. Nothing in this opinion affects the validity of any temporary or emergency orders Judge Walker may have heretofore issued.
H. R. 4018

One Hundred Fourth Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,

the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-six

An Act

To make technical corrections in the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management

Act of 1982.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.

The Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982

is amended as follows:

(1) In section 3(25)(B) strike the word ‘‘provision’’ and insert

in lieu thereof the word ‘‘provisions’’.

(2) In the second sentence of section 115(l) insert the word

‘‘so’’ before the word ‘‘demonstrate’’.

(3) In the first sentence of section 111(i) insert the word

‘‘not’’ after the word ‘‘shall’’.

(4) In the first sentence of section 111(j) strike the word

‘‘rate’’ and insert in lieu thereof the word ‘‘date’’.

(5) In the third and fourth sentences of section 111(j)

strike the word ‘‘owned’’ and insert in lieu thereof the word

‘‘owed’’.

(6) In the third sentence of section 111(k)(4) strike the

word ‘‘dues’’ and insert in lieu thereof the word ‘‘due’’.

(7) In section 117(b)(1)(C) strike the word ‘‘it’’ and insert

in lieu thereof the word ‘‘its’’.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
#### Vernon SUBLETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. WD 51608.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Nov. 19, 1996.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Dec. 24,1996.

Application to Transfer Denied Jan. 21,1997.

Laura G. Martin, Asst. Appellate Defender, Kansas City, for Appellant.

Philip M. Koppe, Asst. Attorney General, Kansas City, for Respondent.

Before LOWENSTEIN, P.J., and BRECKENRIDGE and EDWIN H. SMITH, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

This appeal arises from an order denying Appellant’s Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief.

Judgment affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 151 (Tuesday, August 5, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Page 45513]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-17944]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Disaster Declaration <greek-i>11342]


Texas Disaster <greek-i>TX-00298

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This is a Notice of the Presidential declaration of a major 
disaster for Public Assistance Only for the State of Texas (FEMA--
1780--DR), dated 07/24/2008.
    Incident: Hurricane Dolly.
    Incident Period: 07/22/2008 and continuing.
    Effective Date: 07/24/2008.
    Physical Loan Application Deadline Date: 09/22/2008.
    Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date: 04/24/2009.

ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business 
Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport 
Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. Escobar, Office of Disaster 
Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street, SW., 
Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that as a result of 
the President's major disaster declaration on 07/24/2008, Private Non-
Profit organizations that provide essential services of governmental 
nature may file disaster loan applications at the address listed above 
or other locally announced locations.
    The following areas have been determined to be adversely affected 
by the disaster:

Primary Counties:
    Aransas, Bexar, Brooks, Calhoun, Cameron, Hidalgo, Jim Wells, 
Kenedy, Kleberg, Nueces, Refugio, San Patricio, Starr, Victoria, 
Willacy.
Contiguous Counties (Economic Injury Loans Only):
    Atascosa, Bandera, Bee, Comal, Dewitt, Duval, Goliad, Guadalupe, 
Jackson, Jim Hogg, Kendall, Lavaca, Live Oak, Matagorda, Medina, 
Wilson, Zapata.

    The Interest Rates are:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other (Including Non-Profit Organizations) With Credit             5.250
 Available Elsewhere.........................................
Businesses and Non-Profit Organizations Without Credit             4.000
 Available Elsewhere.........................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The number assigned to this disaster for physical damage and for 
economic injury is 11342.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59002 and 59008)

Roger B. Garland,
Acting Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.
[FR Doc. E8-17944 Filed 8-4-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
#### Kevin L. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Officer Anthony GRIEMEL, Defendant/Respondent.

No. 69997.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Nov. 5, 1996.

Kevin L. Williams, Mineral Point, Pro Se.

John A Ross, County Counselor, Robert E. Fox, Jr., Asst. County Counselor, St. Louis County, Clayton, for respondent.

Before DOWD, P.J., and REINHARD and GARY M. GAERTNER, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his “Petition for Writ of Replevin” for failure to state a cause of action. We affirm. The judgment of the trial court is supported by substantial evidence and is not against the weight of the evidence; no error of law appears. An extended opinion would have no precedential value. The parties have been furnished with a memorandum for their information only, setting forth the reasons for this order af*904firming the judgment pursuant to Rule 84.16(b).
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

I, Jack P. Healey, Chief Financial Officer of the Industrial Distribution
Group, Inc. (the Company), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 1350 as
adopted by sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|(1) |  | the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the annual period
ended December 31, 2003 (the Report) fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934; and
|--- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   
|(2) |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
the Company.                                                                  

Dated: March 1, 2004

| |  |                          
| |  | -------------------------
| |  | /s/       Jack P. Healey 
| |  |                          
| |  | Jack P. Healey           
| |  | Senior Vice President and
| |  | Chief Financial Officer
I

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 4169

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide that all computer

software shall be depreciable over 24 months.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 25, 1996

Mr. BAKER of California (for himself, Mr. WHITE, and Mr. CAMPBELL) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways

and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide

that all computer software shall be depreciable over 24

months.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. DEPRECIATION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE.

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (1) of section 167(f)

5 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to treat6 ment of certain property excluded from section 197) is

7 amended to read as follows:

8 ‘‘(1) COMPUTER SOFTWARE.—If a depreciation

9 deduction is allowable under subsection (a) with re-
2

•HR 4169 IH

1 spect to any computer software (as defined in sec2 tion 197(e)(3)(B)), such deduction shall be com3 puted—

4 ‘‘(A) by using a useful life of 24 months,

5 and

6 ‘‘(B) by using the straight line method; ex7 cept that—

8 ‘‘(i) 70 percent of the adjusted basis

9 of such software as of the beginning of

10 such 24 months shall be allowed as a de11 duction under such method over the first

12 12 months of such period, and

13 ‘‘(ii) the remainder of such basis shall

14 be allowed as a deduction under such

15 method over the second 12 months of such

16 period.’’

17 (b) EXCEPTION FROM INTANGIBLE AMORTIZATION

18 FOR ALL COMPUTER SOFTWARE.—Subparagraph (A) of

19 section 197(e)(3) of such Code is amended to read as fol20 lows:

21 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Any computer soft22 ware.’’
3

•HR 4169 IH

1 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

2 this section shall apply to property acquired after the date

3 of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-7782

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus GLENN LENDALE JARRETT, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CR-89-355, CA-93-653-AM) Submitted: June 17, 1999 Decided: June 24, 1999 Before MURNAGHAN and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Glenn Lendale Jarrett, Appellant Pro Se. Charles Philip Rosenberg, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Glenn Lendale Jarrett seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.1999). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Jarrett , Nos. CR-89-355; CA-93-653-AM (E.D. Va. Nov. 16, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
 18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 In
connection with the Quarterly Report of 1st Home
Buy & Sell Ltd. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period
ending December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Samuel J. Alderson, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:
 
 (1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
  /s/ Samuel
      J. AldersonSamuel  J.
      Alderson
                Principal
      Financial Officer
                February
      27, 2008
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

THE MJK FAMILY LLC, a Michigan limited 

liability company, AIR BANKS, LLC, a Florida 

limited liability company, WINDSONG LLC, a 

Michigan limited liability company, MARK II 

AVATION, LLC, a Nevada limited liability 

company, CONVENIENSO, LLC, an Illinois 

limited liability company, S4AIR LLC, a 

Michigan limited liability company, NATIONAL 

CITY BANK as Trustee for THE DAVID L. 

HAYS IRA, a national banking association, 

ROBERT SKANDALARIS, an individual, and 

DON DEFOSSET, an individual, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 

v. 

 

CORPORATE EAGLE MANAGEMENT 

SERVICES, INC., a Michigan corporation, and 

RICHARD M. NINI, in his capacity as an Officer 

and Director of Corporate Eagle Management 

Services, Inc., and as an individual, 

 

 Defendants 

__________________________________________/ 

STIPULATED ORDER DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS 

WITH PREJUDICE 

 This matter came before the Court upon the Parties’ May 14, 2013 Stipulation endorsed 

hereon; the Court having considered the Stipulation regarding all claims, and the Court being 

otherwise fully advised in the premises; 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all claims against Defendants in this matter are 

dismissed with prejudice and without costs or attorney fees to any party. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 s/Avern Cohn 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: May 14, 2013 

Case No. 2:09-cv-12613-AC-DAS 

Hon. Avern Cohn 

2:09-cv-12613-AC-DAS Doc # 62 Filed 05/14/13 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 2659
2 

Dated: May 14, 2013 

I hereby stipulate to entry of the above Order. 

MILLER CANFIELD PADDOCK AND STONE, P.L.C. 

By: /s/ Michasel C. Simoni 

Michael C. Simoni P-70042 

Richard C. Sanders P-25210 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs 

KOTZ SANGSTER WYSOCKI P.C. 

By: /s/ Lynn A. Sheehy 

Lynn A. Sheehy P-38162 

Dennis K. Egan P-29116 

Attorneys for Defendants 

2:09-cv-12613-AC-DAS Doc # 62 Filed 05/14/13 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 2660
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## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Daniel Montalvo, Appellant

No. 06

- 18

- 00129

- CR v.

The State of Texas, Appellee Appeal from the 102nd District Court of Bowie County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 16F0235

- 102 ). Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Morriss, Justice Burgess and Justice Stevens participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find there was partial error in the judgment

of the court below. Therefore, we modify the trial court’s judgment to state that Montalvo pled

not guilty to the three counts alleged in the indictment and that he entered pleas of true to the two

enhancement allegations. As modified, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

We note that the appellant, Dan iel Montalvo, has adequately indicated his inability to pay

costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED JANUARY 30, 2019

BY ORDER OF THE COURT JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey, Clerk