UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ALAN COLE, VINCENT COLE,

and JORDAN COLE,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 09-10941

 Hon. Lawrence P. Zatkoff

CITY OF DEARBORN, EDWARD VILLEMAIRE, 

RICHARD MICHALSKI, SGT. CONRAD and 

OTHER UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS,

 Defendants.

____________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER

AT A SESSION of said Court, held in the United States Courthouse,

in the City of Port Huron, State of Michigan, on October 22, 2010

PRESENT: THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [dkt 45]. The

parties have fully briefed the motion. The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are

adequately presented in the parties’ papers such that the decision process would not be significantly

aided by oral argument. Therefore, pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1 (f)(2), it is hereby ORDERED

that the motion be resolved on the briefs submitted. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

II. BACKGROUND

On March 24, 2007, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Alan Cole, Vincent Cole and Jordan Cole

(“Plaintiffs”), joined by their friend Antoine Badey, drove to the Fairlane Town Center (a shopping

mall located in Dearborn, Michigan) after school. Vincent Cole was wearing a white hooded
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sweatshirt. Alan Cole was wearing a blue jacket with no hood. Plaintiffs walked around the mall

before walking to the Fairlane Town Center’s Star Theater, where they watched a movie. After the

movie, Plaintiffs met with two females outside the theater, who joined Plaintiffs in their walk to a

restaurant located across the street. They arrived at the restaurant at approximately 9:55 p.m. The

restaurant refused to admit Plaintiffs’ group because not all of them were over the age of twenty-one.

While the six of them walked from the restaurant back to Plaintiffs’ car, the group was confronted

by the Dearborn Police. 

At approximately 10:05 p.m. on that same day, the City of Dearborn Police Department

Dispatch received a call from the Fairlane Town Center. The caller identified himself as Officer

Kassim of the Fairlane Town Center Security Police. Officer Kassim reported that there was an

armed robbery in the Fairlane Town Center’s Star Theater parking lot. Officer Kassim stated that

the suspects were four black males, one wearing a white hooded sweater, and one wearing a black

jacket. Officer Kassim also stated that one of the suspects possibly had a gun on him.

Officer Kassim told the dispatcher that he was watching the suspects walk through the

parking lot near the mall’s food court on the Fairlane Town Center’s closed-circuit security camera

system. While still on the line with the dispatcher, Officer Kassim watched the suspects meet with

two females and continue to walk towards the bus stop located in the Fairlane Town Center’s

parking lot near the Star Theater. Officer Kassim continued to give specific directions to the

dispatcher in order to lead responding Dearborn police officers directly to the suspects, providing

the name of the street the suspects were traveling along and the name of the department store that

the suspects were closest to. The Dearborn Police Department’s dispatch services relayed this

information to all Dearborn police cars in the city.
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The first responding officers were Defendants Edward Villemaire and Richard Michalski.

The officers had received the information about the armed robbery from the dispatcher on their radio

while they drove down Evergreen Road in Dearborn, just two blocks from the Fairlane Town Center.

Both officers were fully informed of the Fairlane Town Center Security Police’s description of the

suspects’ physical appearance and location. Villemaire and Michalski state that they found six black

juveniles—four males and two females—and that one suspect was wearing a white hooded

sweatshirt, thus matching the Fairlane Town Center Security Police’s description of the suspects.

The Fairlane Town Center Security Police informed Villemaire and Michalski that they had arrived

at the exact location of the suspects.

Defendants contend that based on the Fairlane Town Center Security Police’s statement that

one of the suspects may be armed with a handgun, Villemaire and Michalski ordered the suspects

to make their hands visible and to lay down on the ground. According to Defendants, the suspects

did not immediately comply. Although the group was not physically aggressive, Villemaire testified

that he was fearful, based on prior experience with suspects failing to comply with officers’ orders,

that the group would attempt to flea. After a period of 5-15 seconds, during which the officers

issued several more verbal commands, the suspects complied, lying on the ground while making

their hands visible. However, while the officers were securing the scene, one of the suspects began

to slide his hands underneath his stomach, purportedly stopping only after the officers made several

additional verbal commands.

Villemaire provided cover while Michalski began handcuffing the suspects as they lay on

the ground. Other Dearborn police officers soon arrived at the scene and assisted in placing

handcuffs on the suspects and frisking them for weapons. By the time Defendant Dearborn Police
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Sergeant Richard Conrad arrived, the suspects had been handcuffed and separated from one

another—some sitting on the ground in the parking lot, and some sitting in the backseats of police

cars. Sergeant Conrad instructed the officers to search the immediate area for the handgun

reportedly involved in the armed robbery. After no handgun was found, Sergeant Conrad requested

that the Fairlane Town Center Security Police bring the victims of the armed robbery to the scene

of the stop in order to determine whether Plaintiffs were the actual perpetrators of the robbery. The

victims told the officers that Plaintiffs were not the people who had robbed them. Plaintiffs were

then released from custody. The stop, from the moment the officers approached Plaintiffs until the

moment they were released, lasted fifteen-to-twenty minutes.

Plaintiffs argue that Villemaire and Michalski were the first to arrive at the scene and, with

weapons drawn, screamed, “Freeze, niggers. Get on the ground or you die.” Plaintiffs contend that

they immediately went to the ground and laid on their stomachs and that the officers began searching

the group. Jordan Cole was asked where the gun was at, and he purportedly told the officers that

none of them had a gun. Alan Cole alleges that as he laid on his stomach with his chin on the

ground, one of the officers stomped on his back and held his boot on his neck, which “messed up”

Alan Cole’s chin and rendered him unable to breathe. Alan Cole also alleges that one of the officers

drove his knee into his back while applying handcuffs, and that the officer then dragged him to a

police car. Jordan Cole alleges that as he laid on the ground, an officer stomped on his lower back

and left him handcuffed on the ground. He also alleges that he suffered shoulder pain after the

incident, that his lower back was swollen from being stomped on, and that the pain continued for

“awhile” after the incident. Vincent Cole contends that one of the officers deliberately and

intentionally stepped on his hand and ground it into the cement, prompting one of the officers to ask
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him if he needed a band-aid. 

After the incident, Plaintiffs walked back to the area in front of the Fairlane Town Center’s

Star Theater and talked to people about the incident for a couple of minutes before driving home.

Plaintiffs allege that once they got home, they informed their mother, Adrian Dupree, of the incident.

According to Dupree, she observed the following: (1) Vincent’s hand was cut, scraped, and

bleeding; (2) Jordan had a footprint on his shirt; and (3) Alan’s chin was scraped and cut. She also

states that: (1) Alan’s neck was sore for one-and-a-half weeks; (2) Jordan’s back was sore for a few

days; and (3) she treated Alan’s and Jordan’s injuries with ice and moist heat. 

Both Jordan and Alan allege that they had back pain “for a couple weeks” after the incident.

Alan also alleges that he stayed home from his job at Art Van Furniture for three days following the

incident, but does not allege that he did so at the instruction of a doctor or his employer. Jordan

claims that he stayed home from school for a week following the incident, but his school’s records

do not indicate any such absences. Dupree thereafter made an appointment with a Dr. Lerner to treat

any injuries Plaintiffs may have suffered as a result of the stop. Though the incident occurred on

March 24, 2007, medical records indicate that Plaintiffs did not see Dr. Lerner until May 29, 2009.

Jordan testified that he is “not sure” whether he saw Dr. Lerner two days after the incident or twoand-a-half years later. Jordan testified that Dr. Lerner gave him a prescription for the pain

medication Motrin (a brand of ibuprofen), which he took for “a week, three times a day” but is “not

sure” when this happened. Alan testified that Dr. Lerner told him that he had no injuries requiring

treatment. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
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and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2001). The moving party bears the initial

burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and all inferences should

be made in favor of the nonmoving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The

moving party discharges its burden by “‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d

906, 909 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). 

Once the moving party has met its burden of production, the burden then shifts to the

nonmoving party, who “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as

to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

The nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the ‘depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “[T]he mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party’s] position will be insufficient

[to defeat a motion for summary judgment]; there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252

(1986).

IV. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs allege claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983 against the individual Defendants for

unreasonable search and seizure and excessive force, and against Defendant City of Dearborn for

municipal liability based on its alleged failure to train and supervise its officers. In deciding
1

Defendants also seek to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law claims for false arrest and assault

and battery. However, the Court finds that since Plaintiffs’ state law claims have previously

been dismissed, Defendants’ motion is moot to the extent it relates to Plaintiff’s state law claims. 

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Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual Defendants, the Court will first consider whether they are

immune from suit.1

A. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

“Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, governmental officials, including police officers,

will not be held liable on a plaintiff’s claim for civil damages so long as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights which the reasonable officer in the

defendants’ position would have known.” Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 641 (6th Cir.

2001) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To determine whether a defendant

is entitled to qualified immunity, the Sixth Circuit has adopted a three-step inquiry: “(1) whether the

facts taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff could establish a constitutional violation; (2)

whether the right was ‘a clearly established’ right of which any reasonable officer could have

known; and (3) whether the official’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of that clearly

established right.” Abel v. Harp, 278 Fed. Appx. 642, 649 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Risbridger v.

Connelly, 275 F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 2002)). 

1. Constitutional Violation

a. Unreasonable Search and Seizure

The parties dispute whether Defendants conducted an investigatory stop of Plaintiffs, which

would have only required the officers to have a reasonable suspicion that crime was afoot, or

whether Defendants arrested Plaintiffs, which would have required the officers to have probable

cause. However, the Court need not decide this issue. For the reasons provided below, the Court
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finds that Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs, and that the search and seizure of

Plaintiffs was therefore reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 

The Fourth Amendment guarantees that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated . . . .” “[W]ith respect to police/citizen contact, [the Fourth Amendment guarantees] vest

only after [a] citizen has been seized.” United States v. Richardson, 949 F.2d 851, 855 (6th Cir.

1991). “A seizure occurs where, ‘in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a

reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’” Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768,

778 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). A seizure

becomes an arrest when police actions “go beyond checking out the suspicious circumstances that

led to the original [investigatory] stop.” United States v. Obasa, 15 F.3d 603, 607 (6th Cir. 1994).

“A warrantless arrest by an officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the arrest is in

public and there is probable cause . . . .” Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 235-36 (6th Cir. 2007)

(United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976)). “For probable cause to exist, the facts and

circumstances within the officers’ knowledge must be sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable

caution to believe that an offense had been, was being, or was about to be committed.” Fox, 489

F.3d at 236 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)). 

Here, the Fairlane Town Center Security Police informed Defendants that an armed robbery

had just taken place in the Fairlane Town Center’s Star Movie Theater parking lot, and that they

were watching the suspects flee the scene on their closed-circuit security camera system. The

Fairlane Town Center Security Police then led Defendants directly to Plaintiffs’ location and

identified them as the suspects, indicating that there were four black males—one wearing a white
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hooded sweater—traveling with two females, and that one of them may have been armed with a gun.

Plaintiffs’ group consisted of four black males and two females, and Vincent Cole was in fact

wearing a white hooded sweatshirt, thus corroborating the information received from the Fairlane

Town Center Security Police. Therefore, the Court finds that, at the time of the detainment, the facts

and circumstances within Defendants’ knowledge were sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable

caution to believe that Plaintiffs had committed the offense of armed robbery. 

While Plaintiffs argue that probable cause did not exist because Plaintiffs did not commit any

crime, and they had no weapons or contraband, this retrospective analysis is irrelevant; whether

Defendants had probable cause when they arrested Plaintiffs depends solely on the facts and

circumstances within Defendants’ knowledge at the time of the arrest. See Fox, 489 F.3d at 236.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs were detained for no more than twenty minutes—a reasonable period of time

for Defendants to secure the scene, search for the gun, and make appropriate inquiries. Under these

circumstances, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence upon which a

reasonable jury could find that Defendants unreasonably searched and seized Plaintiffs in violation

of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court finds that the individual Defendants are immune

from suit with respect to this alleged constitutional violation. See Abel, 278 Fed. Appx. at 649 (“If

the analysis under the first step suggests that no constitutional violation transpired, then the analysis

is complete, and we should grant summary judgment to the defendant.”) (citation omitted). 

b. Excessive Force

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from excessive force by law-enforcement

personnel. Watkins v. City of Southfield, 221 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir. 2000). The Court reviews

claims for excessive force under a standard of reasonableness. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 209
10

(2001). Accordingly, the Court views the use of force from the perspective of a reasonable lawenforcement officer on the scene rather than retrospectively. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

396–97 (1989). The analysis is to be conducted under the totality of the circumstances and without

regard to intentions or motivations. Id. at 397. The inquiry “requires careful attention to the facts

and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. The Court’s analysis must

“embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of

force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396–97. 

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have presented facts sufficient for a reasonable jury to

believe that Defendants applied excessive force. Although Plaintiffs were believed to have

committed an armed robbery, the evidence indicates that at the time Defendants applied force to

Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs were laying passively on the ground. Defendants contend that the force was

necessary because they were outnumbered, Plaintiffs were slow to comply with their orders, and

because one individual in Plaintiffs’ group placed his hand underneath his stomach as he laid on the

ground. However, the evidence shows that these concerns were resolved prior to Defendants’

application of force. At the time when Defendants used force to restrain Plaintiffs, and drag one of

them to a police car, there is no evidence to indicate that Plaintiffs were noncompliant, resisting,

attempting to evade arrest by flight, or that they posed an immediate threat to Defendants’ safety;

they were simply laying on the ground with their hands visible as instructed by Defendants. While

Defendants question the severity of Plaintiffs’ injuries, and take exception with their delay in
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seeking medical treatment, the Court finds that this goes to the issue of Plaintiffs’ damages, rather

than the reasonableness of Defendants’ use of force. Viewing the circumstances in a light most

favorable to Plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could find that application of force sufficient to cause cuts,

scrapes, and soreness for more than a week was unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth

Amendment.

2. Clearly Established

Whether a right is clearly established must be analyzed “in light of the specific context of

the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. “‘[T]he right the official is

alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence

more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official

would understand what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. at 202 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “As a general matter, it is clearly established that a suspect possesses

a right to be free from the use of excessive force.” Abel, 278 Fed. Appx. at 651 (citing Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. at 399)). 

Under Plaintiffs’ version of the events, Defendants had reason to know at a particularized

level that the conduct they allegedly engaged in while apprehending and detaining Plaintiffs was

unlawful. According to Plaintiffs, they laid passively on the ground while Defendants stomped on

one of their backs, drove a knee into another’s back, and stepped on another’s hand, resulting in

cuts, scrapes, and soreness lasting for more than a week. The fact that Plaintiffs’ injuries may have

been minor does not absolve Defendants. Under the circumstances, a reasonable jury could find that

a reasonable official would have understood that Defendants’ application of force violated Plaintiffs’

Fourth Amendment rights.
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3. Objectively Unreasonable 

Next, the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs have offered “sufficient evidence to

indicate that what the official[s] allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly

established constitutional right[].” Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 2003). In

excessive-force cases, “[a]n officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a

mistaken understanding as to whether the particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances.

If the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to

the immunity defense.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.

Here, Plaintiffs’ version of the facts indicate no mistake on the part of Defendants in terms

of what the law requires. Again, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants applied force while they laid

passively on the ground, and that Defendants were aware of their passivity at the time they applied

force. See Abel, 278 Fed. Appx. at 652 (the defendant’s conduct in arresting the plaintiff was

objectively unreasonable where the plaintiff alleged that he assumed a primarily passive position,

which the defendant was alleged to have been aware of at the time the defendant applied force).

While Defendants argue that they were alarmed when an individual in Plaintiffs’ group put his hand

under his stomach, that individual removed his hand from under his stomach according to

Defendants’ orders before the alleged application of force. Furthermore, evidence is lacking to

suggest that Plaintiffs were otherwise noncompliant, aggressive, or resisting, such that it was

necessary for Defendants to apply the alleged force. Therefore, the Court concludes that genuine

issues of material fact exist with respect to whether Defendants’ actions were objectively

unreasonable under the circumstances.
2

 Since the individual Defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to

Plaintiffs’ claim for unreasonable search and seizure, the discussion of municipal liability

pertains only to Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim. 

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4. Conclusion

Due to genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether the individual Defendants’

application of force was excessive under the circumstances, the Court finds that the individual

Defendants are not immune from suit and that Plaintiffs have presented evidence sufficient to have

this claim heard by a jury. Thus, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied with respect

to Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim.

B. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

Generally, a municipality cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the theory of

respondeat superior. Municipal liability lies only when injuries inflicted are done pursuant to the

municipality’s policy or custom. Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

In order to state a claim under the theory of municipal liability, a plaintiff must “identify the policy,

connect the policy to the City itself and show that a particular injury was incurred because of the

execution of that policy.” Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993).2

1. Failure to Train

“The [City] is liable under § 1983 for failure to train if the Plaintiff[s] can prove three

elements: (1) ‘that a training program is inadequate to the tasks that the officers must perform’; (2)

‘that the inadequacy is the result of the [City]’s deliberate indifference’; and (3) ‘that the inadequacy

is ‘closely related to’ or ‘actually caused’ [Plaintiffs’] injur[ies].’” Plinton v. County of Summit, 540

F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hill v. McIntyre, 884 F.2d 271, 275 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989))). “To show deliberate indifference,
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Plaintiff[s] ‘must show prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the [City] has

ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area was

deficient and likely to cause injury.’” Plinton, 540 F.3d at 464 (quoting Fisher v. Harden, 398 F.3d

837, 849 (6th Cir. 2005)). “In the alternative, ‘a single violation of federal rights, accompanied by

a showing that a municipality has failed to train its employees to handle recurring situations

presenting an obvious potential for such a violation, could trigger municipal liability.’” Plinton, 540

F.3d at 464 (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)).

Here, Plaintiffs present no evidence with respect to Defendant City of Dearborn’s training

program, nor do Plaintiffs offer any explanation as to why they believe the training program is

inadequate. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate facts that would allow a reasonable jury to

conclude that Defendant City of Dearborn is liable under § 1983 for failing to train its officers. 

2. Failure to Supervise

A municipality may be liable for failing to supervise its officers if it can be shown that such

failure was a deliberate or conscious choice by the municipality. Kammeyer v. City of Sharonville,

No. 01-00649, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24058, at *33–34 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 26, 2006) (citing City of

Canton, 489 U.S. at 389)). “Determining whether deliberate indifference is present in failure to train

or supervise cases involves applying an objective rather than subjective standard.” Kammeyer, 2006

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24058, at *34 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1970)).

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant City of Dearborn failed to supervise its officers by deliberate

or conscious choice based on the following allegations: (1) Michalski testified that he has had a

previous lawsuit alleging his use of excessive force; (2) Michalski was involved in a criminal matter

where charges of felonious assault, felony firearm, and brandishing a weapon were made; and (3)
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Villemaire testified that while he was a police officer, he has been sued four times—one case

involving excessive force and another involving false arrest. Notably, Plaintiffs do not provide the

Court with any evidence regarding the outcomes of, or the extent of the individual Defendants’

involvement in, the above mentioned civil and criminal proceedings. Plaintiffs offer no other

evidence in support of their failure to supervise claim. As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiffs

have failed to demonstrate facts that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant City

of Dearborn deliberately or consciously failed to supervise its officers. 

3. Conclusion

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue

of material fact regarding their claim for municipal liability. Accordingly, the Court grants

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant City

of Dearborn.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the above stated reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’

motion for summary judgment [dkt 45] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/Lawrence P. Zatkoff 

LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: October 22, 2010
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this Order was served upon the attorneys of record

by electronic or U.S. mail on October 22, 2010.

S/Marie E. Verlinde 

Case Manager

(810) 984-3290