COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Overton 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

DAVID STEVENS SOZIO 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2018-95-4 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 APRIL 16, 1996 

KELLEY ELIZABETH THORPE 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Jane Marum Roush, Judge 

 Nancy D. Poster for appellant. 

 James Ray Cottrell (Gannon, Cottrell & 

 Ward, P.C., on brief), for appellee. 

 The trial judge dismissed David Stevens Sozio's petition to 

adopt a child born to Sozio's former spouse, Kelley Elizabeth 

Thorpe. The child is not Sozio's biological child. Sozio 

contends on appeal that the trial judge erred (1) in refusing to 

waive the requirement of Code § 63.1-221 that Sozio's current 

spouse join in the petition, and (2) in ruling that under Code 

§ 63.1-233 the legal effect of allowing Sozio to adopt Thorpe's 

child would be the termination of Thorpe's parental rights. 

Because the trial judge correctly ruled in both instances, we 

affirm her decision. 

 The evidence proved that Sozio and Thorpe were married in 

1984. While married to Sozio, Thorpe gave birth to a male child 

in 1986 and a female child in 1990. After Sozio and Thorpe 

separated in 1991, Sozio learned that another man, Elmer William 

Senne, was the father of Thorpe's female child. 
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 During their separation, Sozio and Thorpe entered into a 

property settlement agreement which states that the male child is 

their only child, that the male child shall reside with Thorpe, 

and that Sozio is the female child's stepfather. The agreement 

gives Sozio limited visitation with the female child and provides 

that he will maintain health insurance for her if he is able to 

do so under his insurance policy without additional cost to him. 

 The agreement does not require Sozio to support the female 

child. 

 Sozio and Thorpe were divorced in 1993. The final decree of 

divorce recites that the male child is the only child of Sozio 

and Thorpe, and the decree incorporates by reference the property 

settlement agreement. 

 In January 1994, Thorpe's present husband, David Thorpe, 

filed a petition to adopt the female child. With the consent of 

the child's biological father, Sozio also filed a petition to 

adopt her. Both petitions were voluntarily withdrawn after a 

clinical psychologist opined that the child's best interests 

would be served by not granting either petition. 

 Thorpe later petitioned the circuit court for approval to 

relocate to South Carolina with her children and husband. Sozio 

then filed another petition to adopt the female child and again 

obtained her biological father's consent. Thorpe demurred to 

Sozio's petition for adoption and sought dismissal of the 

petition on the grounds that Sozio failed to join his present 
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wife as a co-petitioner as required by Code § 63.1-221 and failed 

to allege a basis to terminate Thorpe's parental rights. The 

trial judge sustained the demurrer, dismissed the petition, and 

denied Sozio's motion to reconsider. 

 In pertinent part, the first paragraph of Code § 63.1-221 

contains the following requirement for an adoption petition: 

 In the case of married persons, the petition 

shall be the joint petition of the husband 

and wife but, in the event the child to be 

adopted is legally the child by birth or 

adoption of one of the petitioners, such 

petitioner shall unite in the petition for 

the purpose of indicating his or her consent 

to the prayer thereof only. 

 The parties disagree whether this statute requires a trial 

judge to dismiss a petition for adoption if the spouse of a 

married petitioner does not join in the petition. Sozio argues 

that because the second paragraph of Code § 63.1-221 states that 

"[t]he court shall not waive any of the requirements of this 

paragraph [i.e., the second paragraph] nor any of the 

requirements of Code § 63.1-220.3," the legislature obviously 

intended that a trial judge could waive any other provision of 

Code § 63.1-221, including the requirement that Sozio and his 

wife file a joint petition. We agree with Thorpe that Sozio's 

argument ignores the clear and plain meaning of Code § 63.1-221. 

 "Adoption in Virginia is solely a creature of statute." NPA 

V. WBA, 8 Va. App. 246, 250, 380 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1989). 

Although the "adoption statutes should be liberally construed to 

carry out the beneficent purposes of . . . adoption," McFadden v. 
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McNorton, 193 Va. 455, 461, 69 S.E.2d 445, 449 (1952), the 

principle is well established that "[c]ourts must construe 

statutes according to the language used by the legislature." 

Anderson v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 560, 565, 29 S.E.2d 838, 840 

(1944). Where the statutory language is clear and plain, we 

cannot look for ambiguities under the guise of applying liberal 

construction. Id.

 The legislative expression that the trial judge "shall not 

waive" any of the requirements that govern the direct placement 

of a child for adoption by the child's parents does not lead by 

necessary implication to the conclusion that the trial judge may 

waive other provisions of the adoption statute. The language in 

Code § 63.1-221 prohibiting waiver obviously conveys the 

legislature's view of the importance of the extensive safeguards 

that are mandated in Code § 63.1-220.3. Those statutory 

procedures are quite detailed and obviously reflect the 

legislative concern that private placement adoptions be strictly 

scrutinized. The legislative emphasis in Code § 63.1-221 that 

each step of the procedure be followed when parents directly 

place the children for private adoptions does not suggest that 

other provisions of the act are discretionary. 

 The statute is clear, plain, and definite in requiring that 

an adoption petition, when filed by a married person, shall be 

made by joint petition of the husband and wife. The language 

that the legislature used in Code § 63.1-221 admits of no 
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exception. 

 The question here is not what the legislature 

intended to enact, but what is the meaning of 

that which it did enact. We must determine 

the legislative intent by what the statute 

says and not by what we think it should have 

said. 

Carter v. Nelms, 204 Va. 338, 346, 131 S.E.2d 401, 406-07 (1963). 

 The trial judge properly dismissed Sozio's petition because it 

was not the joint petition of Sozio and his wife. 

 We need not address in detail the issue Sozio raises 

concerning the trial judge's refusal to ignore Code § 63.1-233. 

The trial judge properly ruled that by statute "[t]he legal 

effect of an adoption is to divest [Thorpe] of all legal rights 

and obligations with respect to the child unless [Thorpe] is the 

spouse of the petitioner." The language of Code § 63.1-233 is 

unambiguous and supports the trial judge's ruling. Accordingly, 

we hold that the trial judge did not err in ruling that she had 

"no discretion as to the legal effect of adoption." 

 For these reasons, we hold that the trial judge properly 

sustained the demurrer and dismissed the petition. 

 Affirmed.