UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TIMOTHY M. BENNETT, 

 Plaintiff, No. 09-cv-12352 

 Hon. Gerald E. Rosen 

vs. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Defendants. 

___________________________________/ 

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS MADE BY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY 

 This case involved Plaintiff Timothy M. Bennett’s (“Bennett”) challenge to a tax 

lien placed on property he owned. The parties stipulated to a dismissal, effectively 

resolving the case, in May 2011. Months later, Plaintiff’s attorney in this case, Stephen 

Joseph Dunn (“Dunn”), filed three motions concerning the attorney-client relationship 

between Dunn and Bennett. First, Dunn filed a motion to reopen the case. Second, Dunn 

filed a motion for attorney fees allegedly owed by Bennett. Third, Dunn moved for a 

temporary restraining order against Bennett, prohibiting him from disposing of proceeds 

that were produced by the sale of the property that was at the center of this case. Having 

reviewed Dunn’s motions, the Court finds that the pertinent allegations and legal 

arguments are sufficiently addressed in these materials and that oral argument would not 

assist in the resolution of this motion. Accordingly, the Court will decide Dunn’s 

motions “on the briefs.” See L.R. 7.1(f)(2). 

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 Dunn’s first motion seeks to reopen the case for the purpose of entertaining his 

two subsequent motions. As the case need not be reopened in order for the Court to hear 

Dunn’s motions for attorney fees and a temporary restraining order, denial of the motion 

to reopen is appropriate. 

 Dunn next seeks a temporary restraining order to prevent Bennett from spending 

proceeds from the sale of the property underlying this case. He does so because Bennett 

has allegedly refused to compensate Dunn for his services in the prosecution of this 

matter. Dunn claims Bennett owes over $116,000. The Court balances four factors when 

deciding whether to grant a temporary restraining order: (1) whether the movant has 

established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether there exists the 

threat of irreparable harm without a temporary restraining order; (3) whether the 

temporary restraining order risks substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public 

interest would be harmed. Babler v. Futhey, 618 F.3d 514, 519-20 (6th Cir. 2010). Here, 

while the first, third, and fourth factors arguably weigh in Dunn’s favor, the Court will 

deny the motion because of an overwhelming lack of irreparable harm. 

 The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he basis of injunctive relief in the federal 

courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies[.]” Sampson 

v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974) (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 

500, 506-07 (1959)). See also Russell v. Ohio, Dept. of Admin. Servs., 302 Fed. App’x 

386, 394 (6th Cir. 2008) (same). Irreparable harm and the inadequacy of legal remedies 

are essential to the Court’s determination since an injunction is unnecessary if ordinary 

legal proceedings will sufficiently redress the parties’ dispute. 11A Charles Alan Wright 

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& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2951 (2011). Here, not only has 

Dunn failed to make any showing regarding the irreparable harm he faces, precedent 

clearly establishes that “the temporary loss of income, ultimately to be recovered, does 

not usually constitute irreparable injury.” Sampson, 415 U.S. at 90-91. 

 Most cases where irreparable injury is found involve injuries that cannot be easily 

quantified or subsequently redressed. For instance, in Council on American-Islamic 

Relations v. Gaubatz, 667 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2009), the court found irreparable harm 

in the disclosure of an organization’s confidential, proprietary information. Likewise, in 

Kelly v. Evolution Markets, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), a former 

employer faced the prospect of irreparable injury through the loss of customers if an 

injunction enforcing the parties’ restrictive covenant was not issued. Finally, in Miller v. 

Blackwell, 348 F. Supp. 2d 916 (S.D. Ohio 2004), registered voters faced the irreparable 

loss of their right to vote without an injunction against pre-election challenges to their 

voter registrations. 

 By contrast, the harm alleged here is purely monetary; and there are legal 

processes available to enable Dunn’s recovery. Further, nothing suggests that these 

processes are insufficient in any way. Put another way: 

The key word in this consideration is irreparable. Mere 

injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and 

energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are not 

enough. The possibility that adequate compensatory or other 

corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the 

ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim 

of irreparable harm. 

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Virginia Petrol. Job. Ass'n v. Federal Power Com'n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958) 

(quoted in Sampson, 415 U.S. at 90) (emphasis original). See also Babler v. Futhey, 618 

F.3d 514, 523-24 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Lost wages are readily compensable and do not 

constitute irreparable harm.”); Greer v. Detroit Pub. Schools, 10-14623, 2011 WL 

196928, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 2011) (citing Sampson, 415 U.S. at 90). The only 

harm alleged by Dunn is a monetary loss. Dunn’s purported injury does not constitute 

irreparable harm, and the legal remedies available are perfectly adequate. As such, denial 

of Dunn’s motion for a temporary restraining order is appropriate. 

 Finally, Dunn seeks $40,110.77 from Bennett’s property sale as a charging lien 

towards over $116,000 in attorney fees. A charging lien “is an equitable right to have the 

fees and costs due for services secured out of the judgment or recovery in a particular 

suit.” George v. Sandor M. Gelman, P.C., 506 N.W.2d 583, 584 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 

Here, Dunn does not have a valid charging lien because there has been neither a judgment 

nor a recovery through suit. A judgment is “[a] court's final determination of the rights 

and obligations of the parties in a case.” Black’s Law Dictionary 918 (9th ed. 2009). 

The term also includes equitable decrees and any order from which an appeal lies. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 54(a). This case was resolved by stipulated dismissal [Dkt. #65]. Furthermore, 

the dismissal was without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B) (“Unless the notice 

or stipulation states otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice.”). A voluntary 

dismissal without prejudice cannot be appealed and does not constitute an equitable 

decree. Dearth v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 2008). A stipulated dismissal 

also does not constitute a final determination of the parties’ rights and obligations. 

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Moreover, since the sale of the home took place outside the confines of this 

lawsuit, it cannot be said that there has been a “recovery in a particular suit.” George, 

506 N.W.2d at 584. As such, Dunn’s claimed charging lien fails as a matter of law. To 

recover the fees allegedly owed Dunn should instead pursue a separate claim in a court of 

appropriate jurisdiction. Therefore, 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Stephen Joseph Dunn’s motion to reopen the case 

[Dkt. #66] is DENIED. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Stephen Joseph Dunn’s motion for attorney fees 

[Dkt. #67] is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Stephen Joseph Dunn’s motion for a temporary 

restraining order [Dkt. #68] is DENIED. 

 

 s/Gerald E. Rosen 

 Chief Judge, United States District Court 

Dated: February 28, 2012 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on 

February 28, 2012, by electronic and/or ordinary mail. 

 s/Ruth A.Gunther 

 Case Manager 

 (313) 234-5137 

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