NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

NO. CAAP-20-0000153

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOHN KEONI JARDINE, also known as JOHN KEONI JARDINE III 

and JOHN JARDINE III, Defendant-Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT

(CR. NO. 1CPC-19-0001233)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER

(By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, Hiraoka and Wadsworth, JJ.)

Plaintiff-Appellant State of Hawai#i appeals from the

"Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Felony Information Based Upon a

Defective Charge, Filed 1/27/20" (Order) entered by the Circuit

Court of the First Circuit on February 20, 2020.1 For the

reasons explained below, we affirm the Order.

Defendant-Appellee John Keoni Jardine (also known as

John Keoni Jardine III and John Jardine III) was charged by

felony information with assault in the second degree in violation

of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-711(1)(a) and/or (1)(d). 

Jardine moved to dismiss the charge. The circuit court dismissed

the charge without prejudice, concluding that the charge was

defective because it failed to recite the statutory definitions

1 The Honorable Karen T. Nakasone presided.

Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-20-0000153

22-JUN-2021

07:51 AM

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of "substantial bodily injury" and "dangerous instrument." This

appeal followed.

"Whether a charge sets forth all the essential elements

of a charged offense is a question of law, which [an appellate

court] reviews under the de novo, or right/wrong, standard." 

State v. Kauhane, 145 Hawai#i 362, 369, 452 P.3d 359, 366 (2019)

(cleaned up).

"A charge's essential elements include conduct,

attendant circumstances, and results of conduct." Kauhane, 145

Hawai#i at 370, 452 P.3d at 367 (citing HRS § 702-205 (2014))

(other citations omitted). "Where a statute sets forth with

reasonable clarity all essential elements of the crime intended

to be punished, and fully defines the offense in unmistakable

terms readily comprehensible to persons of common understanding,

a charge drawn in the language of the statute will be

sufficient." Id. (cleaned up). However, where the statutory

definition of an element of the crime "does not necessarily

coincide with its common meaning[,]" State v. Baker, 146 Hawai#i

299, 307, 463 P.3d 956, 964 (2020), the statutory definition must

be included in the charge. State v. Pacquing, 139 Hawai#i 302,

308, 389 P.3d 897, 903 (2016).

Jardine was charged with violation of HRS § 707-

711(1)(a) and/or (1)(d). HRS § 707-711 (2014 & Supp. 2018)

provides, in relevant part:

Assault in the second degree. (1) A person commits the

offense of assault in the second degree if:

(a) The person intentionally, knowingly, or

recklessly causes substantial bodily injury to

another; [or]

. . . .

(d) The person intentionally or knowingly causes

bodily injury to another with a dangerous

instrument[.]

(Emphasis added.)

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The felony information charging Jardine stated:

On or about August 25, 2019, in the City and County of

Honolulu, State of Hawaii, JOHN KEONI JARDINE . . . did

intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause substantial

bodily injury to Paul Costa, and/or did intentionally or

knowingly cause bodily injury to Paul Costa with a dangerous

instrument, thereby committing the offense of Assault in the

Second Degree, in violation of Section 707-711(l)(a) and/or

Section 707-711 (l)(d) of the Hawaii Revised Statutes.

(Emphasis added.)

The issues presented by this appeal are whether the

statutory definitions of "substantial bodily injury" and

"dangerous instrument" coincide with the common meanings of those

terms. Concerning "substantial bodily injury," the Oxford

Learner's American English Dictionary contains the following

definitions:

substantial: large in amount, value, or importance2

bodily: connected with the human body3

injury: harm done to a person's or an animal's body4

HRS § 707-700 (2014) provides, in relevant part:

"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any

impairment of physical condition.

. . . .

"Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury which

causes:

(1) A major avulsion, laceration, or penetration of

the skin;

(2) A burn of at least second degree severity;

2 Substantial, Oxford Learner's Dictionaries,

https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/substantial?q

=substantial (last visited June 17, 2021).

3 Bodily, Oxford Learner's Dictionaries,

https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/bodily_1?q=bo

dily (last visited June 17, 2021).

4 Injury, Oxford Learner's Dictionaries,

https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/injury?q=inju

ry (last visited June 17, 2021).

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(3) A bone fracture;

(4) A serious concussion; or

(5) A tearing, rupture, or corrosive damage to the

esophagus, viscera, or other internal organs.

The HRS § 707-700 definition of "substantial bodily injury" is

limited to five specific types of bodily injury. The common

meaning of "substantial bodily injury" could encompass more types

of bodily injury than the five specified in the statute. Because

the common meaning of "substantial bodily injury" is broader than

the statutory definition, the charge against Jardine was

defective. See, e.g., Kauhane, 145 Hawai#i at 371, 452 P.3d at

368 (common meaning of "obstructs" was broader than defined term

in Obstructing statute, HRS § 711-1105); Pacquing, 139 Hawai#i at

308, 389 P.3d at 903 (common meaning of "confidential personal

information" was broader than defined term in UPCPI statute,

HRS § 708-839.55); State v. Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i 383, 394, 219

P.3d 1170, 1181 (2009) (common meaning of "operate" was broader

than defined term in OVUII statute, HRS § 291E-61).

Quoting State v. Mita, 124 Hawai#i 385, 245 P.3d 458

(2010), the State argues that requiring inclusion of the

statutory definition of "substantial bodily injury" "would render

charges unduly complex, in contravention of the policy reflected

in [Hawai#i Rules of Penal Procedure] Rule 7(d) that '[t]he

charge shall be a plain, concise and definite statement of the

essential facts constituting the offense charged.'" Id. at 392,

245 P.3d at 465. The supreme court has noted, however, that if

the statutory definition of an element of an offense is complex

or lengthy, the specific conduct, attendant circumstance, or

result of conduct may be specified in a "to wit" clause of the

charge. See Pacquing, 139 Hawai#i at 308, 389 P.3d at 903 ("The

State should have included in the charge the statutory definition

of 'confidential personal information' under HRS § 708-800 or at

least specified in the charge the items of information that

allegedly were unlawfully possessed.") (emphasis added).

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The State's argument lacks merit under the

circumstances of this case. The charge against Jardine neither

recited the statutory definition of "substantial bodily injury"

nor specified what type of bodily injury Jardine allegedly

inflicted upon the complaining witness. The circuit court did

not err by dismissing the felony information without prejudice on

that basis.

In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the

State's other arguments. We affirm the circuit court's Order

entered on February 20, 2020.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 22, 2021.

On the briefs:

/s/ Katherine G. Leonard

Stephen K. Tsushima, Presiding Judge

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

City and County of Honolulu, /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka

for Plaintiff-Appellant. Associate Judge

Emmanuel G. Guerrero, /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth

for Defendant-Appellee. Associate Judge

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