Docket No. 88503–Agenda 10–September 2000.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 

								CHARLES C. DRUM, Appellee.

Opinion filed November 22, 2000.

	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

	Defendant, Charles Drum, was charged with first degree

murder (720 ILCS 5/9--–1(a) (West 1996)). The circuit court of

Coles County denied the State’s pretrial motion to admit certain

hearsay statements at defendant’s trial. See 725 ILCS 5/115--–10.2

(West 1998). The State brought an interlocutory appeal to the

appellate court pursuant to our Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R.

604(a)(1)). The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction. 307 Ill. App. 3d 743. We allowed the State’s petition

for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We now reverse and

remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

	The State charged defendant; his brother, Thomas Drum; and

their friend, Marcus Douglas with the first degree murder of the

victim, Shane Ellison. Thomas and Marcus were tried separately.

At their trials, Thomas and Marcus each testified in his own

defense; each acknowledged that he was involved in the victim’s

murder; but each characterized his involvement as minimal and

defendant’s involvement as primary. Marcus testified at Thomas’

trial, but Thomas refused to testify at Marcus’ trial. Thomas and

Marcus were each convicted of first degree murder.

	Other than defendant, Thomas and Marcus were the only

witnesses to the murder. Thomas and Marcus, respectively,

through each of their counsel, indicated that they did not intend to

testify at defendant’s trial.

	In pretrial motions, the State sought to admit the prior

testimony of Thomas and Marcus at defendant’s trial, pursuant to

the statutory residual hearsay exception. 725 ILCS 5/115--–10.2

(West 1998). At the close of a hearing, the trial court denied the

State’s motions.

	Pursuant to our Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)), the

State brought an interlocutory appeal from the denial of these

motions to the appellate court, which held as follows:

			““The State contends that we have jurisdiction pursuant

to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) [citation]. We disagree

and instead hold that when (1) the State files a motion in limine that seeks the admission of evidence and (2) the trial court enters a discretionary ruling–that is, a ruling

that we would normally review deferentially–denying that

motion, then (3) Rule 604(a)(1) does not confer

jurisdiction on this court to hear an interlocutory appeal of

that ruling.”” 307 Ill. App. 3d at 745.

Concluding that it lacked jurisdiction, the appellate court dismissed

this interlocutory appeal. The State appeals to this court.

DISCUSSION

	As in People v. Phipps, 83 Ill. 2d 87, 90 (1980): ““The issue on this appeal is very narrow. It is simply whether the State may take

an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s pretrial order.”” At the

outset, we note the following:

			“Under the 1970 Illinois Constitution, the final authority

to prescribe the scope of interlocutory appeals by the State

in a criminal case rests exclusively with this court

[citation], and whether a particular order may be appealed

depends solely upon our construction of our Rule

604(a)(1).” People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 239 (1980).

The interpretation of a supreme court rule, like a statute, is a

question of law that we review de novo. In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395, 401 (1998).

	I. Substantive Effect of Pretrial Order

	The law is quite settled. Rule 604(a)(1) provides in pertinent

part: “In criminal cases the State may appeal only from an order or

judgment the substantive effect of which results in *** suppressing

evidence.” 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). In Phipps, 83 Ill. 2d at 90-91, this court concluded that the State could bring an interlocutory

appeal from a pretrial order, reasoning as follows:

		“In our recent decision in People v. Young (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 234, we held ‘that Rule 604(a)(1) allows an

interlocutory appeal by the State of a pretrial suppression

order whenever the prosecutor certifies to the trial court

that the suppression substantially impairs the State’s ability

to prosecute the case.’ (People v. Young (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 234, 247.) The court stated that ‘suppressed evidence’ is

to have a broader meaning than evidence which is illegally

obtained. (82 Ill. 2d 234, 242-43, 246.) Thus, the instant

inquiry is whether the trial court’s order could be

considered to have suppressed evidence.

			We think that in its substantive effect, rather than simply

its form, the trial court’s order in this case does operate to

prevent evidence from being admitted.” (Emphasis in

original.)

	Despite Young and Phipps, defendant relies on People v. Van De Rostyne, 63 Ill. 2d 364 (1976), in contending that, under Rule 604(a)(1), the State may not bring an interlocutory appeal from a

pretrial order that excludes evidence. Van De Rostyne stressed the distinction between the “exclusion” of evidence and the

“suppression” of evidence. That decision stated: “Rule 604 was not

intended to give the State the right to an interlocutory appeal from

every ruling excluding evidence offered by the prosecution.” Van De Rostyne, 63 Ill. 2d at 368.

	However, this court in Young concluded that “the State should be allowed to appeal from a pretrial suppression order which

substantially impairs its ability to prosecute the case involved. To

the extent that Van De Rostyne may be read to the contrary it is overruled.” Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247. The reasoning of Young has overruled Van De Rostyne on this point and allows the State to bring an interlocutory appeal from a pretrial evidentiary ruling that

has the substantive effect of suppressing evidence. See, e.g., People v. Keith, 148 Ill. 2d 32, 38-39 (1992); People v. Kite, 97 Ill. App. 3d 817, 822-23 (1981).

	This court has repeatedly stressed that the substantive effect

of a trial court’s pretrial order, not the label of the order or its

underlying motion, controls appealability under Rule 604(a)(1).

See, e.g., People v. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d 148, 152 (1997); Keith, 148 Ill. 2d at 38-39. Four of the five districts of our appellate court

have applied this conclusion. See, e.g., People v. Sargeant, 292 Ill. App. 3d 508, 510 (1st Dist. 1997); People v. Smith, 248 Ill. App. 3d 351, 356-57 (2d Dist. 1993); People v. Thompson, 213 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1029-30 (5th Dist. 1991); People v. Keith, 206 Ill. App. 3d 414, 416-17 (3d Dist. 1990), aff’d, 148 Ill. 2d at 38-39. Scholars have so recognized:

		“Following Young and Phipps, the appellate court has repeatedly entertained state appeals in which the order

suppressing evidence was based on an evidentiary ground

rather than a finding that the evidence was obtained

illegally. These cases rejected defense claims that the

Young holding should be limited to cases of constitutional or statutory violations or that it did not extend to rulings

of mere exclusion of evidence.” 2 R. Ruebner, Illinois

Criminal Procedure §7.13, at 7-36 (2d ed. 1997).

Courts in other jurisdictions are in accord. See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 246 Kan. 320, 321-24, 787 P.2d 701, 703-04 (1990) (State may appeal from pretrial discretionary evidentiary ruling that

has substantive effect of excluding evidence so as to substantially

impair state’s ability to prosecute case).

	We note that in Young this court cited federal criminal procedure to support its holding. Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 248. The issue in this case is a nonissue under federal law (18 U.S.C. §3731

(19984)). The federal government may bring an interlocutory appeal

from a pretrial order that has the practical effect of excluding

evidence, although not expressly doing so. 9A Federal Procedure

L. Ed.awyers Edition §22:1988, at 531 (1993); accord United States v. Brooks, 145 F.3d 446, 454 (1st Cir. 1998) (collecting cases) (“pretrial orders that have the practical effect of excluding material

evidence at trial are appealable under section 3731, regardless of

nomenclature”); see, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 404, 408 (7th Cir. 1992).

	However, the appellate court in this case reached a contrary

conclusion. After quoting from Young, the appellate court reasoned as follows:

		“[T]he supreme court did not intend to create unlimited

appellate jurisdiction to hear the State’s interlocutory appeals from the sort of discretionary rulings that a trial

court traditionally makes in determining whether evidence

is ` ‘otherwise probative and admissible.'’ Instead, the

supreme court in Young focused on the need to review trial court rulings, whether pursuant to statute or

constitutional provision, that exclude evidence for reasons

other than its evidentiary value. In other words, a

distinction exists between traditional, discretionary rulings

relating to the evidentiary value of proffered evidence on

one hand and suppression of evidence in the furtherance of

some social policy on the other hand.” (Internal quotes omitted.) 307 Ill. App. 3d at

746.

	We disagree. For the purposes of this aspect of Rule

604(a)(1), there is no substantive distinction between evidence that

is “excluded” and evidence that is “suppressed.” The reasoning of

the appellate court in this case is contrary to Phipps and the other above-referenced authority. This court has already explained that

“[t]he focus of the holding in Young is on the effect of the suppression order and not on the nature of the evidence

suppressed.” People v. Carlton, 98 Ill. 2d 187, 191, 193 (1983). This well-settled interpretation of Young permits “the State to take interlocutory appeals from all orders which substantially impair the prosecution of a case without fitting those orders into neatly compartmentalized classifications.” (Emphasis added.) Carlton, 98 Ill. 2d at 193.

	II. The Present Case

	Turning to the facts of this case, the trial court’s order simply

had the substantive effect of suppressing evidence. The State

sought to admit the prior testimony of Thomas and Marcus at

defendant’s trial because they indicated that they would not testify.

The trial court’s order barred the use of this testimony; the

evidence “is thus being ‘suppressed’ as of the moment.” Phipps, 83 Ill. 2d at 91. Substantively, the trial court’s order bars the use of

this testimony at defendant’s trial, regardless of whether the order

is characterized as “excluding” the testimony or “suppressing” it.

	Indeed, the trial court and the parties recognized the

substantive effect of the court’s order. The court concluded that the prior testimony of Thomas and Marcus did not meet the

requirements of the statutory residual hearsay exception. In

denying the State’s motion to admit this testimony, the court ruled:

			“I now conclude that the statements of Thomas * * * and

the statements of Marcus *** lack the equivalent

circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, and so I am

going to at this time exclude the transcripts as evidence, or

if you will, I will suppress them as evidence. Is my ruling

clear?”

The State and defense counsel each answered in the affirmative.

Thus, the trial court and the parties believed that this pretrial order

had the substantive effect of suppressing this evidence.

	This case is distinguishable from our decision in Truitt. This court in Truitt concluded that the State could not appeal from a pretrial order regarding how it would be required to prove that

certain material was an illegal controlled substance. The Truitt court reasoned that the pretrial order did not prevent any

information from being presented to the jury. Rather, the sole

impact of the order was on the means inby which that information

was presented. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d at 152.

	In this case, however, the trial court’s order substantively bars

the prior testimony of Thomas and Marcus; for the moment, the

order prevents this information from being presented to the fact

finder. Accordingly, the State may appeal therefrom under Rule

604(a)(1). Of course, we express no opinion as to the merits of the

trial court’s order.

	CONCLUSION

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court

is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the appellate court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded,

with directions.