alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-13-0000593

31-MAR-2014

03:37 PM
EXHIBIT C


WILLENKEN

WILLENKEN WILSON LOH & LIEB Lip

January 4, 2010

! vis ELECTRONIC MAIL (ENRICO@TRAVERSELEGAL.COM)

‘Enrico Schaefer, Esq.

| Traverse Legal

!810 Cottageview Drive, Suite G-20
{Traverse City, MI 49684

iRe: Weather Underground v. Navigation Catalyst Systems, Inc.

‘Dear Enrico:

‘Lefer to your letter of January 4, 2010. To begin, I have a different recollection of our
‘telephone conference on December 15". I believe I noted that I would like a greater
‘period for fact discovery and that I would need to speak to my client about what that
time period would be. :

! After considering your proposal, discussing with my client, and reviewing your client’s
initial Disclosures, I believe a 12 month time period to be appropriate for various
jreasons. First, NCS is a small company with a handful of employees. While it is
‘committed to abiding with its discovery obligations, it cannot simply shut the company
‘down to do so. Second, the parties, witnesses, and documents are spread across the
‘country which will require significant travel and coordination of schedules. Third,
‘discovery in trademark matters simply takes time. While I can appreciate that your

‘ client’s marks are incontestable, that does not eliminate all possible grounds for showing
at they are invalid. And, it says little about the “likelihood of confusion” analysis. In
imy experience, that analysis necessarily requires a good deal of discovery, particularly
‘third party discovery on the issues of “the crowded marketplace” and “actual confusion.”

: Lastly, Plaintiff’s Initial Disclosures list 180 different individuals likely to have
‘knowledge and evidence about this case. Over a dozen of them are your client’s own

: employees which makes it likely that I will have to depose them. And, while I disagree
‘ with your need to take third party discovery as to other marks, to the extent that the

: Court allows it, we will need sufficient time to deal with that.

! Quite candidly, I actually believe that the 12 month period is a conservative one. In my
! last trademark case to go to trial, the parties were engaged in fact discovery for

| approximately 8 months. But, that case involved two companies located down the

' 213.955.9240 / 213.955.9250 FAX

| 707 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 3850, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90037
| www.willenken.com


wi ! WILLENKEN WILSON LOH & LIEB Lip

‘highway from each other, with a limited number of witnesses and documents, all of
‘whom lived here in Southern California (except one). Your initial disclosures list a
‘number of witnesses across the world that is a multiple of thirty from the initial

‘disclosures I received in that case.
{As to when discovery should commence, I can appreciate your position and the
‘statement from the Court’s clerk, but my client is entitled to advocate its position until
‘the Motion for Reconsideration is decided.

In conclusion, my proposed plan has nothing to do with delay. It is simply an attempt to
‘put together a reasonable discovery plan with which the parties can comply.

! 707 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, SUITE 3850, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017
213.955.9240 / 213.955.9250 FAX
I

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3688

To require that 401(k)-type pension plans be subject to the same prohibited

transaction rules that apply to traditional defined benefit pension plans.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 20, 1996

Mr. CONDIT introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities

A BILL

To require that 401(k)-type pension plans be subject to

the same prohibited transaction rules that apply to traditional defined benefit pension plans.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘401(k) Pension Protec5 tion Act of 1996’’.

6 SEC. 2. CERTAIN PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS APPLIED TO

7 401(k) PLANS.

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (3) of section 407(d)

9 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

10 (29 U.S.C. 1107(d)) is amended by adding at the end the
2

•HR 3688 IH

1 following new sentence: ‘‘Such term also excludes an indi2 vidual account plan that includes a qualified cash or de3 ferred arrangement described in section 401(k) of the In4 ternal Revenue Code of 1986, if such plan, together with

5 all other individual account plans maintained by the em6 ployer, owns more than 10 percent of the assets owned

7 by all pension plans maintained by the employer. For pur8 poses of the preceding sentence, the assets of such plan

9 subject to participant control (within the meaning of sec10 tion 404(c)) shall not be taken into account.’’.

11 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE; TRANSITION RULE.—

12 (1) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Except as provided in

13 paragraph (2), the amendment made by this section

14 shall apply to plans on and after the date of the en15 actment of this Act.

16 (2) TRANSITION RULE FOR PLANS HOLDING

17 EXCESS SECURITIES OR PROPERTY.—In the case of

18 a plan which on the date of the enactment of this

19 Act has holdings of employer securities and employer

20 real property (as defined in section 407(d) of the

21 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

22 (29 U.S.C. 1107(d)) in excess of the amount speci23 fied in such section 407, the amendment made by

24 this section shall apply to any acquisition of such se25 curities and property on or after such date of enact-
3

•HR 3688 IH

1 ment, but shall not apply to the specific holdings

2 which constitute such excess during the period of

3 such excess.

Æ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

CLIFTON E. JACKSON and Case No.: 2009-11529

CHRISTOPHER M. SCHARNITZKE, Judge Nancy Edmonds

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and 

 other persons similarly situated

SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT 

SERVICES, INC, and COCA COLA

ENTERPRISES, INC, foreign corporations,

and DR. PAUL DROUILLARD, 

Jointly and Severally, Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

MARSHALL LASSER P25573 

MARSHALL LASSER PC

Attorney for plaintiffs

po box 2579 

Southfield MI 48037

248-647-7722

mlasserlaw@aol.com

ddtalon@gmail.com

Thomas W. Cranmer P25252

Matthew F. Leitman P48999

Miller Canfield Paddock & Stone, P.L.C.

840 West Long Lake Road, Ste. 200

Troy, MI 48098

248-879-200

cranmer@millercanfield.com

leitman@millercanfield.com

BUTZEL LONG

By: Daniel B. Tukel P34978

Lynn A. Sheehy P38162

Katherine D. Goudie P62806

Attorneys for Defendant Dr. Drouillard

150 W. Jefferson, Ste. 100

Detroit, MI 48226

313-225-7000

tukel@butzel.com

sheehy@butzel.com

goudie@butzel.com

Kathleen H. Klaus P67207

Maddin, Hauser, Wartell , Roth

 & Heller, P.C.

Attorney for Sedgwick 

28400 Northwestern Hwy., 3rd Fl

Southfield, MI 48034

248-354-4030

khk@maddinhauser.com

PLAINTIFFS’ NOTICE OF APPEAL

Clifton Jackson and Christopher Scharnitzke, on behalf of themselves and other persons

similarly situated, appeal to the United States court of appeals for the sixth circuit the following

judgments and orders:

PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that this instrument, together with all referenced attachments was

served on all parties to this case and/or their attorneys of record at their respective addresses

as disclosed by the pleadings on April 5, 2010 by the following method(s): 

[] U.S. Mail [] Fax [] Hand Delivered 

[] Federal Express [] UPS

[X] Other: ELECTRONICALLY EMAILED

 /s/Delilah D. Talon 

Signature of Serve

2:09-cv-11529-NGE-VMM Doc # 66 Filed 04/05/10 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 1057
2

1. “Opinion and order denying plaintiffs’ motion for an amendment of findings and

judgment under rule 52, for reconsideration of under rule 59, and for relief from

judgment under rule 60 [62,63],” filed 3/22/2010 (document 64).

2. “Opinion and order granting defendants’ motions to dismiss [15, 21, 39] and

denying plaintiffs’ motions for leave to amend [31,44]”, filed 3/11/2010.

3. “Judgment” filed 3/11/2010 [document 60].

/s/ Marshall Lasser 

Marshall Lasser PC, by 

Marshall Lasser P25573

po box 2579

Southfield MI 48307

(248) 647 7722

mlasserlaw@aol.com

ddtalon@gmail.com

Dated: April 5, 2010 

C:\wp51\DOCS\CocaColaRICO\NoticeofAppea.wpd 

2:09-cv-11529-NGE-VMM Doc # 66 Filed 04/05/10 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 1058
Exhibit 32.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.
 /s/ Erik Olsson
Erik OlssonPresident andChief Executive OfficerOctober 29, 2009/s/ David MathiesonDavid MathiesonSenior Vice President, andChief Financial OfficerOctober 29, 2009
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 02-4501

JAMES CLARK,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Leonard D. Wexler, Senior District Judge, sitting by designation.

(CR-01-445)

Submitted: February 27, 2003

Decided: March 14, 2003

Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Matthew W. Greene, SMITH & GREENE, P.L.L.C., Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Justin

W. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney, Dennis M. Kennedy,

Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

James Clark was convicted of unauthorized use of access devices

and possession of fifteen or more unauthorized access devices, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2) and § 1029 (a)(3) (2000), respectively. He was sentenced to forty-six months of imprisonment for

each conviction, to run concurrently, and ordered to pay $104,029.49

in restitution. On appeal, he alleges that there was insufficient evidence of his intent to defraud—a necessary element for both offenses.

See United States v. Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1999).

For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

We must affirm a conviction challenged on the grounds of insufficient evidence if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Glasser v.

United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). Further, we do not review witness credibility on appeal. United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60

(4th Cir. 1989). 

Viewing the evidence as we must, we find that the jury could have

found beyond a reasonable doubt that Clark knowingly committed

fraud when he obtained credit cards based upon another person’s

name and social security number and used the cards to accumulate

large losses for the credit companies involved. This evidence was sufficient to meet the fraudulent intent element of the crimes. Akinkoye,

185 F.3d at 199-200. 

Accordingly, we affirm Clark’s convictions. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

addressed in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

2 UNITED STATES v. CLARK
<TABLE> <S> <C>



<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL  INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE AUDITED
FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED APRIL 30, 2000, AND IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-30-2000
<CASH>                                           1,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   48,052
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                49,052
<PP&E>                                           9,468
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,247,520
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          451,900
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         8,730
<OTHER-SE>                                     753,890
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,247,520
<SALES>                                         55,501
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                55,501
<CGS>                                           82,903
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   82,903
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             4,252,135
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,166
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (4,269,683)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (4,269,683)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (4,269,683)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.43)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.43)



</TABLE>
**Exhibit 31.2**

**CERTIFICATION**

I, Michael J. Culotta, certify that: 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of PharMerica Corporation; 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, includingits consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

b. [Intentionally omitted] 

c. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

d. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control overfinancial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

b. Any fraud,whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

DATE: May 8, 2008
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Remon M. LEE, Appellant. Remon M. LEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

Nos. WD 49456, WD 51717.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Oct. 22, 1996.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Nov. 26,1996.

Application to Transfer Denied Jan. 21,1997.

Susan L. Hogan, Appellate Defender, Kansas City, for Appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Kurt U. Schaefer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Respondent.

Before SPINDEN, P.J., and SMART and EDWIN H. SMITH, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Appeal from judgment of conviction for murder in the first degree, § 565.020 RSMo 1994, and armed criminal action, § 571.015 RSMo 1994, and order denying Rule 29.15 motion without an evidentiary hearing.

Judgment of conviction and order denying Rule 29.15 motion affirmed. Rule 30.25(b); and Rule 84.16(b).
Exhibit 21  SUBSIDIARIES OF SFN GROUP, INC. Following is a list of the direct and indirect subsidiaries of SFN Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation. Certain inactive subsidiaries have been excluded from the list below as such subsidiaries, when considered in the aggregate as one subsidiary, would not constitute a significant subsidiary. All active subsidiaries do business under their corporate name listed below, or close derivatives thereof, except where indicated otherwise: 6063721 Canada Inc.
     CanadaComtex Information Systems, Inc.
     DelawareHuman Resource Capital Group Inc.
     CanadaIMARK/TSRC Management Corp.
     DelawareIMRC, Inc.
     NevadaIntelliMark Holdings, Inc.
     DelawareNorCross Holdings LLC
     DelawareNorCross Teleservices L.P.
     DelawareNorrell Corporation
     DelawareSpherion Assessment Inc.
     North CarolinaSFN Professional Services LLC*
     DelawareSpherion Atlantic Resources LLC**
     DelawareSpherion (Europe) Inc.
     DelawareSpherion Financial Corporation
     DelawareSpherion Government Services LLC
     DelawareSpherion Operations Inc.
     DelawareSpherion Staffing LLC***
     DelawareSpherion Technology (UK) Limited
     United KingdomSpherion U.S. Inc.
     FloridaSpherion Worldwide Holding B.V.
     NetherlandsTechnisource, Inc.****
     Delaware
     *
     Formerly Spherion Atlantic Enterprises LLCAlso does business as:The Mergis GroupNorell (ceased use in 2009)SourceRight SolutionsTodays Office Professionals**
     Also does business as:The Mergis GroupTodays Office ProfessionalsTechnisource***
     Also does business as:Todays Staffing****
     Also does business as Provali Group


---
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-6942
JESSE TRUJILLO, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus S. K. YOUNG, Warden, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District Judge. (CA-02-1083-7) Submitted: August 28, 2003 Decided: September 10, 2003 Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Jesse Trujillo, Appellant Pro Se. Susan Foster Barr, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Jesse Trujillo appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Trujillo v. Young , No. CA02-1083-7 (W.D. Va. June 5, 2003). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
I

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3918

To amend title 5, United States Code, to treat employees of the Government

of the District of Columbia in the same manner as employees of State

and local governments are treated for the purposes of the Hatch Act.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 30, 1996

Ms. NORTON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

A BILL

To amend title 5, United States Code, to treat employees

of the Government of the District of Columbia in the

same manner as employees of State and local governments are treated for the purposes of the Hatch Act.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE

4 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

5 (a) TREATMENT AS A STATE.—(1) Section 1501(1)

6 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting

7 ‘‘, the District of Columbia,’’ after ‘‘State’’.

8 (2) Section 1501(4) of such title is amended—
2

•HR 3918 IH

1 (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and

2 (B) as clauses (i) and (ii), respectively;

3 (B) by inserting ‘‘(A)’’ after ‘‘(4)’’; and

4 (C) by adding at the end the following:

5 ‘‘(B) For the purposes of subparagraph (A), a

6 payment by the United States to the District of Co7 lumbia pursuant to section 503 of the District of

8 Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reor9 ganization Act is not financing in whole or in part

10 by a loan or grant.’’.

11 (3) Section 1502(c) of such title is amended—

12 (A) by striking ‘‘or’’ at the end of paragraph

13 (3);

14 (B) by striking the period at the end of para15 graph (4) and inserting ‘‘; or’’; and

16 (C) by adding at the end the following:

17 ‘‘(5) the Recorder of Deeds of the District of

18 Columbia.’’.

19 (b) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES.—Section 7322(1) of such

20 title is amended—

21 (1) by inserting ‘‘or’’ at the end of subpara22 graph (A);

23 (2) by striking ‘‘or’’ at the end of subparagraph

24 (B); and

25 (3) by striking subparagraph (C).
3

•HR 3918 IH

1 (c) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 717(b) of

2 the District of Columbia Self-Government and Govern3 mental Reorganization Act (Sec. 1–208, D.C. Code) is

4 amended by striking ‘‘, except that’’ and all that follows

5 through the end and inserting a period.

Æ