UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

THOMAS V. MACLEAN,

Petitioner, 

v.

KENNETH T. MCKEE,

Respondent. 

 /

Case Number: 2:09-CV-12992

HONORABLE GERALD E. ROSEN

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION PURSUANT TO FRCP 59(e)

This matter is presently before the Court on Petitioner Thomas V. MacLean’s

Motion for Reconsideration Pursuant to FRCP 59(e). In this Motion, Petitioner argues

that the Court should have treated the issuance of an arrest warrant as the triggering point

for a speedy trial analysis rather than Petitioner’s arrest and that the delay between

issuance of the warrant and Petitioner’s arrest and trial should be attributed to the State. 

The disposition of a motion filed under Rule 59(e) is “entrusted to the court’s

sound discretion.” Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. United States, 940 F. Supp.

1139, 1140 (W.D. Mich. 1996), citing Huff v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 119,

122 (6th Cir. 1982). Generally, a court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion in one of three

situations: (1) to correct a clear error of law; (2) to account for newly discovered

evidence; (3) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) to prevent

manifest injustice. Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th Cir. 2005). 

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However, a motion filed under 59(e) “‘may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to

raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of

judgment.’” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5 (2008), quoting 11 C.

Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 pp. 127-128 (2d ed. 1995).

“A motion to alter or reconsider a judgment is an extraordinary remedy and should be

granted sparingly.” Plaskon Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Allied–Signal, Inc., 904 F.Supp. 644,

669 (N.D. Ohio 1995).

Petitioner’s argument that the Court improperly used Petitioner’s arrest date as the

trigger for a speedy trial analysis is not supported by clearly-established Supreme Court

precedent. Petitioner conflates the question of when the speedy trial clock commenced

with the question of to whom the delay in arresting Petitioner may be attributed. Analysis

of to whom a pretrial delay is attributable is only triggered where there is some delay that

is presumptively prejudicial. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Here, the sixmonth delay between arrest and trial was not presumptively prejudicial and, therefore,

Petitioner’s right to a speedy trial was not violated. The Speedy Trial Clause does not

apply to a delay preceding an indictment or arrest. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.

307, 313-315 (1971). 

Petitioner also argues that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in United

States v. Geelan, 520 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1975) “cannot be ignored” and supports granting

his motion for reconsideration. Petitioner’s Brief in support of motion, p. 9. The Geelan

decision is inapposite for two reasons. First, habeas relief may not be granted based upon

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a state court’s failure to reasonably apply the holding of a circuit court. Thaler v. Haynes,

559 U.S. 43, __, 130 S. Ct. 1171, 1173 (2010) (“A legal principle is ‘clearly established’

within the meaning of [§2254(d)(1)] only when it is embodied by a holding of this

[Supreme] Court.”). Second, the Geelan decision addressed a delay in the trial of a

mentally incompetent defendant who was involuntarily committed while awaiting trial. 

In this case, Petitioner was not arrested until six months before his trial. He remained free

of any state-imposed restrictions on his freedom for the eight-year period preceding his

arrest. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s “Motion for Reconsideration Pursuant to FRCP 59(e)” is

DENIED. 

s/Gerald E. Rosen 

Chief Judge, United States District Court

Dated: March 4, 2013

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or

counsel of record on March 4, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Julie Owens 

Case Manager

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