### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Jul y 15, 200 8 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE, ex rel. BEE DES ELM , e t al., v. TE NN ESSE E P EA C E O F F IC ER S ST A N D A RD S C OM M IS SI ON , e t al.

Di r e c t A ppe al fr om th e Cha nc e r y C our t fo r Da vid so n Co unt y, P ar t I II No. 07-343-III Hon. Ellen H obbs Lyle, Chancellor

No. M2007- 01855-COA-R 3-CV - F iled October 16, 2008

Plaintiffs broug ht this action ag ainst t h e Te nnessee Peace Offic ers Standar ds Commi ssion, the Tenne ssee Attorne y

Ge n er al , Knox C ounty

May or and Timothy

Hutchison seekingdecla ratory judgme nt that Hutchison was disqualified to serve as a deputy sheriff of Knox County

. Responding to a Mo tio n to Di smi ss, the Cha nc e llo r d ism iss e d th e a c tio n a nd , o n a pp e a l, w e a ff

ir m.

Te nn. R . A pp. P .3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t A ffirm e d.

H ER S CHEL P IC K E N S F RAN KS , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , P.J .M.S., and S HAR ON G. L EE , J ., joined.

He rb e rt S. M on c ie r, Kn oxvil le , T e nn e sse e , f or Pla int if fs /App e lla

nts

. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral a

nd Reporter , Michae l E. Moore, Solicitor Ge n er al, and Wil liam R. L

undy , J r., Assistant A ttorney Gene ral, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or Appe llees, Tenne ssee Pe a c e Of fi c e rs Stand a rd s and

Tr a ini ngCom mis sio n a

nd Te nn e sse e At tor

ne y Ge ne ra l.
Mary Ann Stackhouse, K

nox ville, Tennesse e, for

Appellee , Knox C ounty

May or Mike Rag sdale.

Gar y M. Prince and Jeffr ey

R. Thompson, Knox ville, Tennesse e, for Appellee , Timothy

Hutchison.-2- OP IN ION

Plaintiff s f il e d a Co mp la in t a g a in s t t

h e T e n n e s s e e Pe a c e O f f ic e r s St a n d a r ds Commi ssion, Tenne ssee Attorney Gene ral Robert Cooper, J r., Knox Count y May or Mike Rag sdale, and Timothy

Hutchison, seeking a

decla ratory judgme nt that Hutchison was disqualified to be a Te nn e sse e Ce rt if

ie d L a w En fo rc e me nt O ff ic e r a nd De pu ty She ri ff fo r K no x Coun ty , d

ue to h is contempt convictions for

making false statements to a cour t, for dishonest ac ts, and for pa rticipating in politi cal a ctivity

.

Plaintiffs sought a de clar atory judgme nt and mandamus commanding the Tenne ssee Peace Offic ers Standards and Training Commi ssion to revoke Hutchison’s cer tificati o n as a law enfor ceme nt office r, suspending him from t h e off ice of deputy sheriff , a wr it of mandamus commanding Rag sdale not to sign c hecks to Hutc hison, and seekingremova l and ouster of Hutchison.
Plaintiffs alleg ed that Hutchison wa s convicted of six counts of cri m i n al contempt in a ca se sty led Moody v . Hutchison , for makingfalse statements to t h e court. Furthe r, Jordan v. Kno xCou nty , 2007 WL 92351 (Tenn. 1/12/07), he ld that Knox County ’s Charter Term L imits wer e
va lid and a pp lie d to the of

fi c e of Kn ox Cou

nty sh e ri ff , a nd that a ft e r a

va lid e lec ti on wa s h e ld elec ting the ne w sherif

f, J. J

. J ones, Jones appointed Hutchison to the office of deputy sheriff , when he did not meet the qua lifications beca use of his c riminal convictions. Plaintiffs further a lleg ed that Hu tc his on

ha d p a rt ic ipate d in po lit ic a l a c tiv ity a s a de pu ty sh e ri ff , in vio la tio n of

va ri ou s st a tut e s, but the Attorney

Gene ral ha d issued an opinion finding that convictions fo r cr i m inal contempt of court for making false statements to a cour t were not “offe nses re lating to dishonesty ” for the purposes of T enn. Code Ann. §38- 8-106(4)

.

Es se nti a lly , p la int if

fs so ug ht a

de c larator

y jud g me nt t

hat s uc h c on vic tio ns did disqualify Hutchison from be ing a

cer tified law e nforc ement off icer and deputy

sheriff , and soug ht to have his ce rtification re voked and r emove him from of fice

.
May or Ra g sd a le fi le d a

Mo tio n to Di smi ss, a sse rt ing that pla int if fs ha d fa ile d to st a te a cla im, that venue wa s improper, that plaintiffs lac ked standing , that the lawsuit was ba rre d by the doctrine of

prior ca ses pending in Knox County , collater al estoppel a nd res judicata, etc. Asimil ar mot ion wa s file d on Hut c his on ’s be ha lf , as we ll as the POS T Comm iss ion a nd the At tor ne y Ge ne ra l.

Plaintiffs then filed a Ru l e 1 5

. 0 1 M o t i o n t o Am en d , s ee k i n g t o am en d t h ei r C o mp l ai nt to state that plaintiffs’ c laims were based on de privation of substantive due pr ocess, a nd to make clea r that no monetar

y judgme nt was soug ht ag ainst any defe ndant other tha

n Hutchison.

The Court issued a M em o ra n dum and Orde r on May 30, 2007, and found that the claims ag ainst Rag sdale, Hutc hison, and the Attorney Gene ral ha d to be dismissed for improp er venue, f ailure t o s tate a c laim, lack of standing , and sover eig n immunit y . The Court found that-3-

plaintiffs’ cla ims ag ainst POST wer e colorable, but t hat the Court had no jurisdiction until plaintiffs filed a c omplaint with POST a nd exhausted their administrative reme dies. The Court found that the claims ag ainst Rag sdale a nd Hutchison wer e loca liz ed in Knox County , and thus venue was improper. The Court held that plaintiffs did not have standing to br ing an ouster or L ittle Hatch Ac t
c l a i m , an d

t h a t t h e c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l w e r e b a r

r e d b y s o v e r e i g n i m m u n i t y. F i n a l l y, the Court held that it had no jurisdiction to hear a claim agai n s t P OST until t he administrative

reme dies had be en exhausted, and that the filing of a cla im with P OST was not bar red by res judicata.

Plaintiffs then filed a Motion to Alt er or Amend, see king to have the Court conside r the c la im a g a ins t PO ST b y vir tue of havin g fi le d a c la im wi th P OST on Ma y 30 , 2 00 7 ( imm e diate ly

a ft e r t he jud g me nt w e nt d ow n), a nd a lso so ug ht t o h a ve the dis mis sa l of the c la ims a g a ins t PO ST

reve rsed be cause POST had not plead that administrative re medies wer e not e x hausted. The Court de nie d th e mot ion

on June 4, 20 07 , a nd on June 7, 20 07 , pla int if fs fi le d a “ Sup ple me nta l F ili ngin Support of T. R. Civ. P

. 59.04 Motion to Alter or Amend this Court’s Memorandum Dated May 30, 2007", a nd attache d a claim filed with POST on J une 1, 2007. On June 15, 2007, plaintiffs filed a Mo tio n to Sup ple me nt C om pl ain t, to a dd e ve nts that ha d h a

pp e ne d s inc e the fi lin g of the fi rs t Complaint. P laintiffs then filed a Motion to R enew

their ea rlier Motion to Alter or A mend.

After numerous filings by the par ties, the Court issued a Memora ndum and Orde r on J une 28, 2007, and f

ound that plaintiffs’ late s t m otion had to be denied, be cause the Court had alre ady dismiss ed plaintiffs’ claims, had denied plaintiffs’ subseque nt motion t o alter or amend, a nd thus the lawsuit could not be re surre cted. The Court sugg ested that the plaintiffs could file a new lawsuit, and plaintiffs had done so, but denied plaintiffs re lief in any event.

These issues a

re pr esente d for r eview:

1. Does sover eig n im m u n ity forbid bring ing a

decla ratory judgme nt action as to the validity

of an attorney

g ener al opinion?

2. Do appe llants hav e s tanding to bring actions for decla ratory judgme nt and seek a dditional relief?

3. Were a

ppel l an t s entitled to Tenn. R. Civ. P . 59.04 relief from the Ma

y 30, 2007, Memorandum Opinion pending POST’s administrative a ctions on

a pp e lla nts ’ c omp la int s?

4. Were a

ppellants entitled to file a sup p l emental Com plaint, seek injunctive relief , and re new their

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 m otion?

5

. W a s v e n u e a s t o H u t c h i s o n a n d R a g s d a l e p r o p e r

i n D a v i d s o n C o u n t y?
Appellants ar g ue that the Trial C ourt err ed in holding that sovere ign immunity barr ed-4-

their cla ims for a de clar atory judgme nt action per

taining to a

n opinion i s s u ed b y

the Attorney Gene ral. Appellants re ly

on the opinion in Cam

pb e ll v . S un dq uis t , 926 S.W .2d 250 (Tenn. 1996) , wher ein th e Su

p r e me Co u rt r

u le d th a t th e p la in ti f

f s c o u ld b r in g s u it a g a in s t th e St a te u n d er the Dec laratory

J udg ment Act cha lleng ing the constitu t i o n al i ty of a state statute. I n that opinion, the Court re lie d u po n th e e xpre ss l a ng ua g e of the Ac t, wh ic h state s that a ny pe rs on “ wh os e ri g hts , s ta tus , or other le g al re lations are a ffe cted by a statute, municipal ordina nce, c ontrac t, or fr an ch i se, may have de termined a

ny question of construc tio n o r validity arising under” said statute or ordina nce. Id ., see a lso Tenn. Code Ann. §29-14- 103.

Cam pb e ll is clear ly distinguishable from this c ase, in that attorney g ener al opinions

are ne ith e r s ta tut e s no r mun ic ipa l or din a nc e s, no r a ny of the oth e r ty pe s of ins tr

ume nts re fe rr e d to i n the Dec laratory

J udg ment Act. Attorne y g ener al opinions are pe rsuasive in nature, but do not

c ar r y th e w e ig ht of law. City of C le v e lan d v . B ra dle

yCou nty , 1999 WL 281086 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 1999). T he other differ ence is that the appellants’ rig hts/status we re not dire ctly aff ecte d by the opinion in issue, whic h dealt with Hutchison’s c ertification as a pea ce of fice r. The T rial Court

corr ectly ruled that a

ppellants’ cla im under the De clar ato ry J u d gment Act ag ainst the Attorney Gene ral re g ardingsai d o p i nion was bar red by sovere ign immunity . Additionally , we know of no
c a us e of a c tio n un de r wh ic h a pa

rt y c a n su e the At tor

ne y Ge ne ra l on the ba sis of dis a g re e me nt w ith

an o pin ion

iss ue d b y the Attor ne y Ge ne ra l.
Appe l l an ts nex t argue that the Tr ial Court incorre ctly ruled that they

did not have sta nd ingto p ur su e the ir

c la ims of ou ste r p ur su a nt to Te nn

. Cod e Ann. §8 -4 7- 10 2, no r t he ir c la ims under the L ittle Hatch Ac t, found at Tenn. Code Ann. §2-19-202 et seq . The Tr ial Court held that claims under the L ittle Hatch Ac t had to be filed by the Attorney

Gene ral p ursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §2-19-2 0 8 , beca

use it provides for

only a cr iminal penalty , which is ac curate. Violations of the Act are a misdemeanor, a nd there is no provision in t he Ac t for a pr ivate rig ht of ac tion. Also, the Tr ia l Co ur

t f ound that ou ste r s uit s h a d to be fi le d b y the At tor

ne y Ge ne ra l, o r c ounty

/c ity

a tto rn e y s, a s se t fo rt

h in the ou ste r s ta tut e . T e nn . Co de Ann. §8 -4 7- 10 2 e xpre ssl y pr ov ide s th a t th e se
are the only

individuals empowere d to bring such an a ction.
Appellants ar g ue that pursua nt to Be nn e tt v . S

tut ts , 521 S

. W

. 2 d 575 (Tenn. 1975) , pr ivate c iti zen s c a n br ing su c h a su it if the y sh owa sp e c ia l in te re st o r s pe c ia l in jur y no t c omm on

to the public gene rally

. Appellants state that they have show n such a spe cial intere st, in that they are

“ pu bli c sp ir ite d c iti zen s” wh o ar e tr y ingto p ro te c t lo c a l ta xpay e rs . Cl e a rl y , th is i s n ot a de qu a te to sh owa sp e c ia l in te re st o r i nju

ry tha t is no t c omm on

to t he g e ne ra l pu

bli c , a s c iti zen s o f K

no x Coun ty
are ta xpay e rs . T he Tr ia l Co ur t pr op erl y hel d that a

pp e lla nts did no t ha ve sta nd ingto b ri ngthe se
c la ims

. Appellants take issue with the Trial Court’s ruling on venue, as the Tria l Court found that the claims ag ainst Hutchison and Rag sdale we re loc alized to Knox County , and thus the Da v i d s o nC o u n t y

C h an ce ry C o u rt wa s an i mp ro p er v en u e. T h e T ri al C o u rt wa s co rr ec t i n i t s ru l i n g,
a s th e statut e re g a rd ingve nu e e xpre ssl y state s:-5- (a ) I n a ll c ivi l a c tio ns of

a tr a nsit ory natur e , unle ss v e nu e is o the rw ise e xpre ssl y pr ov ide d f

or , th e a c tio n may be br ou g ht in the c ounty wh e re the c a us e of a c tio n a

ro se or in the county

wher e the de fenda

nt resides or is found.
(b ) I f, ho we ve r, the plaint if f and def e nd a nt b oth

re sid e in t

he same c ounty

in t his state, then such a ction shall be brought either i n the county wher e the c ause of

action

arose or in the county

of their r esidenc e. (c ) Wh e re the a c tio n is bro ug ht ei the r in the c ounty wh e re the c a us e of a c tio n a ro se
or in t he c ounty wh e re the de fe nd a nt r e sid e s, pr oc e ss m a y be se nt t o a

no the r c ounty
a s in loc a l a c tio n, a nd it sh a ll no t be ne c e ssa ry no r r e qu ir e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt b e in the county

of ac tion either whe n the ac tion is commenced, or dur ing the time betwee n the c omm e nc e me nt o f t

he a c tio n a

nd se rv ic e of

pr oc e ss. Tenn. Code Ann. §20- 4-101.

As the Tria l Court found, both Ragsda le and Hutc hison reside in Knox County and the e ve nts in iss ue oc c ur

re d in Kn ox County

and the re wa s, the re fo re , n o b a sis fo r f ili ngsu it a g a ins t the de fe nd ants in D a vid so n Co un ty . T he iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

Appellants also ar g ue that the Court er red in fa iling to g rant them Rule 59 re lief fr om the M ay 30, 2007 judgme nt, beca use t hey immediately

filed a c laim with POS T afte r the judg ment
wa s e nte re d. As the Tr ia l Cour t found , how e ve r, the pr op e r re me dy wo uld be fo r a pp e lla nts to r e -f ile the ir laws uit a ft e r t he ir a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me die s we re e xha us te d, a nd the Tr ia l Court did no t a bu se its discretion in denying appellants Rule 59 relief

. As we have previously explained, the purpose of a Rule 59 motion is to allow the trial cour t to corre ct a mistake be fore a judg ment become s final, and may be g rante d “(1) when the c ontrolling lawchang es bef ore a judgme nt becomes f

inal, (2) whe n previously

unavailable evidenc e becomes available, or (3) when, for sui ge neris re asons, a judg ment should be amende d to corr ect a clea r error of law or to pre vent injustice.” Va c c ar e lla v . V ac c ar e lla , 49 S.W .3d 307 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). None of these c onditions appeare d in this case. The filing of a c laim on the day

of the judg ment does not war rant re lief on this rec ord.

L ike wi se , a

pp e lla nts ’ c om p l a int s r e g a rd ingthe Tr ia l Co ur t’ s d e nia l of

the ir la te r R ule 59 motion are a lso meritless. Appellants had alr eady soug ht Rule 59 relief f

rom the Court’s orde r, which wa s denied, but they filed a motion see king to “ rene w” their ear lier Rule 59 motion, which did not state any

new ba sis for re lief.
Ap pe lla nts a rgue tha

t th e Cou rt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

de ny in g t heir mo tio n to
s u p p l e m e n tt h e i r

c o m p l a i n t , b u ta s t h i s C o u rth a s e x p l a i n e d , “ [ t ] h e t r i a l c o u rt ' s d e c i s i o n t o d e n y a motion to am en d a complaint is reviewe d under a n abuse of

discretion standa

rd.” Merriman v

. Sm ith , 5 99 S.W. 2d

54 8, 55 9 ( Te nn . Ct . App .1 97 9) . T he Sup re me Court ha s summ a ri zed the a bu se of dis c re tio n s tand a rd

of re vie w a s f

oll ow s:-6- A tri a l c ourt ' s r

uli ng“ wi ll be up he ld so lon g a s re a so na ble min ds c a n d isa g re e a s to the pr op ri e ty

of the de c isi on

ma de .” A tri a l c ourt

a bu se s it s disc re tio n only

wh e n it

“ a pp l[ie s] an in c or

re c t le g a l st a nd a rd , o r r e a c h[e s] a de c isi on wh ic h is a g a ins t lo g ic

or re asoning that cause [s] an injusti ce to the party complaining .” The abuse of discretion standa

rd does not pe rmit the appellate court to substitute its j udg ment for that of the tr ia l c ourt

. Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted).

F a c tor s t o be c on sid e re d b y the c ourt in d e te rm ini ngwh e the r t o g ra nt a mot ion to amend include: “[u] ndue delay in filing; lack of not ice to the opposing par ty ; bad fa ith by

the moving party , repe ated failure to cure defic iencies by previous ame ndments, undue pre judice to the opposing party , and futility

of ame ndment.” Merriman , 599 S.W .2d at 559.

I n this case, a

ppellants soug ht to amend their complaint af ter the f inal order had bee n enter ed by

the Trial Court dismiss ing their claims, and afte r the Rule 59 motion see king to a lter and amend the or der ha d been de nied. The a m en d m en t was a rg uably untimely , and would have prejudice d the opposing party by rene wing claims t h at had alr eady been dismissed. Re a so na ble mi nd s c ou ld d isa g re e a

bo ut t he pr op ri e ty

of the de c isi on , a

nd the Tr ia l Co ur

t di d n ot a

bu se its discretion.
The Judgment of the Trial Court is aff irmed, and the cost of the a ppeal is asse ssed t o t h e p l a i n t i f

f s , c o l l e c t i v e l y.

_________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.