UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SEVEN BROTHERS PAINTING, INC., 

and SEVEN BROTHERS COATINGS, 

LLC,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PAINTERS DISTRICT COUNCIL NO. 22 

OF THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 

OF PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES 

(AFL-CIO), and ROBERT GONZALES,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 09-12506

HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTION TO 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER OF JUNE 7, 2010

On June 7, 2010, Magistrate Judge Michael Hluchaniuk entered an order that

granted motions to quash filed by nonparties, Painters Union Deposit Fund (the Fund) and

the Duross Painting Company, R. Duross Financial Corporation, and Duross Maintenance

Company (Duross). See Doc. No. 30. 

Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ objection to the Order. The Court has reviewed

all the pleadings as well as the Magistrate Judge’s Order and finds oral argument will not

aid in the resolution of this dispute. See E. D. Mich. LR 7.1(e)(2). For the reasons that

follow, the objection is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

According to Plaintiffs Seven Brothers Painting, Inc. and Seven Brothers Coatings’

(collectively “Seven Brothers”) complaint, Defendant Painters District Council No. 22 of the
2

International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades (AFL-CIO) (“Union”), and Robert

Gonzales defamed Seven Brothers, tortiously interfered with business relationships, and

violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) by treating Plaintiffs unfairly or

differently than other signatories to the CBA. See Doc. No. 1. Plaintiffs sought information

from nonparties relative to their assertion that the Union engaged in selective enforcement

practices. 

As to Duross, Plaintiffs asked for “all documents referencing, relating to or regarding

the UNION from January 1, 2006, to the present; all documents referencing, relating to or

regarding the Trustees of the Painters Union Deposit Fund (Fund) from January 1, 2006,

to the present; all of Duross’ incorporation and organization documents, along with those

of any company with common ownership; all documents evidencing payments to the Union

or the Fund from January 1, 2006, to the present; and all contracts and payments made

by Duross to any company or individual for the performance of painting work from January

1, 2006 to the present.” (See Doc. No. 20, Ex. B). 

As to the Fund, Plaintiff sought documents, payroll forms, and all communications

between the Fund and Union regarding Plaintiffs as well as audits of Plaintiffs and four

other companies; documents reflecting contributions paid to the Fund from the four

companies; and all meeting minutes from the Trustees’ meetings of the Fund from January

1, 2006 to the present. (See Doc. No. 22, Ex. A).

After the Magistrate Judge granted the nonparties’ motions, Plaintiffs filed an

objection. Plaintiffs contend that production of the documents is not unduly burdensome

and the information is relevant to the claims in this case. In addition, Plaintiffs argue that

they have demonstrated that the information cannot be obtained from another source.
3

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party may object to a magistrate judge’s nondispositive discovery orders. FED.

R. CIV. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The reviewing court must affirm the magistrate

judge’s ruling unless the moving party demonstrates the ruling is “clearly erroneous" or

"contrary to law.” Id. The “clearly erroneous” standard does not empower a reviewing

court to reverse a magistrate judge's finding because it would have decided the matter

differently. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985). Instead,

the standard is met when despite the existence of evidence to support the finding, the

court, upon reviewing the record in its entirety, “is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 33 U.S. 364, 395

(1948). 

III. ANALYSIS

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are in place to facilitate discovery of all

relevant evidence. Rule 26 authorizes expansive discovery, provided the material sought

has some probative value in proving or disproving a claim or defense. FED. R. CIV. P.

26(b)(1). Nevertheless, discovery is not limitless. Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(I), provides that a

court, “must limit the. . extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules. . .if it

determines that the discovery sought. . .can be obtained from some other source that is

more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” Moreover, a court has broad

discretion over discovery matters, Trepel v. Roadway Express, Inc., 194 F.3d 708 (6th Cir.

1999), and in deciding discovery disputes, a magistrate judge is entitled to that same

broad discretion, and his order is overruled only if the district court finds an abuse of

discretion. 
4

In this case, the Court finds that Magistrate Judge Hluchaniuk did not abuse his

discretion in holding that the challenged subpoenas must be quashed. In reaching his

decision, the Magistrate Judge cited the governing law and applied it to the circumstances

of this case. First, he correctly identified the burden on the movant to establish good cause

for an order to quash. HCP Laguna Creek v. Sunrise Senior Living Management, 2010 WL

890874, *3 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (quoting, Nix v. Sword, 11 Fed. Appx. 498, 501 (6th Cir.

2001). Second, In exercising his discretion, the Magistrate Judge properly considered the

reasonableness of the subpoena, which required him to balance competing interests.

Finally, he considered whether the information was necessary and whether it could be

obtained from another source. 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure § 2463.1, pp. 501-506 (3d ed. 2008).

Seven Brothers raises the same arguments in its objections that the Magistrate

Judge considered in resolving the motions to quash. He balanced the benefits and

burdens of requiring compliance with the subpoena and concluded that the nonparty

movants showed good cause for their requests. 

In reviewing that assessment, the Court cannot conclude that the decision was

clearly erroneous. The Magistrate Judge conducted a “case specific inquiry” regarding the

particular subpoenas at issue. Plaintiffs’ mere disagreement with his evaluation simply is

not enough.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because the Magistrate Judge’s Order of June 7, 2010, is neither clearly erroneous

nor contrary to law, Plaintiffs’ objection is DENIED.
5

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Marianne O. Battani 

MARIANNE O. BATTANI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Date: August 24, 2010

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were mailed and/or electronically filed to counsel of record on

this date.

s/Bernadette M. Thebolt

Case Manager