UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MOHAMMAD CONGDON-BOSTON,

 

Petitioner, Case Number 2:09-CV-12212

 Honorable Lawrence P. Zatkoff

v.

BLAINE LAFLER,

Respondent.

____________________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS, DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING

PERMISSION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Mohammad Congdon-Boston’s petition for a

writ of habeas corpus, filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is serving a 18-to-30 year sentence

for his Wayne Circuit Court conviction for second-degree murder, MICH. COMP. LAWS 750.317.

Petitioner claims that his guilty plea was involuntary because he was not taking medication for his

bipolar condition at the time of his plea and because other inmates in the jail gave him erroneous

advice. The record shows, however, that Petitioner voluntarily accepted a plea bargain on the day

of trial when he learned that a key witness for the prosecution who had previously been unavailable

was located and would appear at trial. Petitioner also claims that his sentencing guidelines were

incorrectly scored and that his sentence was based on facts not admitted or proved beyond a

reasonable doubt. In fact, Petitioner received the exact sentence called for in his sentencing

agreement. The Court will therefore deny the petition, deny a certificate of appealability, and deny

permission to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.

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I. Facts and Procedural History

Petitioner and his co-defendant, James Terrell, were charged with first-degree premeditated

murder for the beating death of Ron Franks. At the preliminary examination, Deidra Merritt testified

that she was at a house in the area of Forrer and Fargo streets in Detroit with Franks. They went into

the basement and smoked crack-cocaine together. When Petitioner and co-defendant arrived they

became enraged at Franks because he did not buy the cocaine from them and was smoking it in their

house. Terrell began to punch and kick Franks until his head and face were bloodied. When Franks

attempted to escape from the beating, Petitioner pushed him back towards Terrell. At some point,

Franks was allowed to leave the house. 

When Petitioner gave the factual statement for his guilty plea, he testified that he and Terrell

pursued Franks onto the street after he left the house. When they caught up to him, both Petitioner

and Terrell began kicking the victim against a curb. Petitioner admitted that he believed the victim

would die. The victim was dead on arrival at the hospital. 

On March 26, 2007, the first date set for trial, the prosecution informed the court that it was

not ready because it was unable to locate Deidra Merritt. The prosecutor asserted that Petitioner and

Terrell were attempting to have family members and friends talk with Merritt. The court warned

them against witness intimidation. The court set trial for the following month, but left open the

possibility of beginning trial the next day if the witness could be located. 

Indeed, Meritt was located and brought to court the following day, and a jury was selected.

A few weeks later, on the next trial date, Petitioner informed the court he wished to accept a plea

bargain.

Defense counsel stated that the terms of the agreement were that Petitioner would plead

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guilty to the reduced charge of second-degree murder with a sentencing agreement of 18-to-30 years.

Petitioner was placed under oath and indicated his understanding of the agreement. The court

informed Petitioner of all the trial rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty, and Petitioner

indicated his understanding and acknowledgment. Petitioner denied that anyone had threatened him

with anything if he did not enter into the plea. Petitioner also denied that anyone had promised him

anything other than what was placed on the record. Petitioner indicated that he was entering into

the plea freely, voluntarily, and understandingly. 

Petitioner then gave the following factual basis for the conviction:

Petitioner: The night of November 6th, 2006, we

were over at Greenfield and Fargo at a house. And

Ronald Franks had came over to the house and he

didn’t purchase any drugs from us. He walked into

the basement without saying anything, purchasing

drugs, and I took that offensive. I waited a few

seconds. And I went into the basement and caught

him smoking somebody else’s drugs but I didn’t do

anything.

I walked back upstairs and that is when me

and Mr. Terrell went back downstairs and began

fighting with the guy. And I hit him and I stomped

him a couple of times. And the guy was escorted out

the house. And after he was escorted out the house,

we ran and chased him down and stomped his face

against the curb numerous amounts of time.

 

The Court: And when you left him that evening, was

it your belief that he was going to die?

Petitioner: When I left him?

The Court: Yes.

Petitioner: On the street?

The Court: Yes.

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Petitioner: Yes.

The Court: And you knew that the blows that you

were striking to Mr. Franks at that time could and

would result in death?

Petitioner: Yes.

Plea Tr. at 11-12.

At the sentencing hearing Petitioner moved to withdraw his plea. His counsel explained

Petitioner’s reasons for wishing to do so:

I’m asking the Court as the Court hears my

argument on the issue that it takes into consideration

Mr. Boston is 17 years of age. And even according to

the presentence report on I think it’s page five, he

suffers from a bipolar disorder which I just learned

today. He said he wasn’t taking his medication on the

day of trial.

But Mr. Boston wishes to withdraw his plea,

your Honor. And it’s permissible under the court

rules as justice demands, and there’s no prejudice to

the prosecution. 

I would argue that justice demands based on

his, his youthful age, also of his mental condition.

And the reason why he wants to withdraw,

your Honor, is he feels or he possibly believes he was

overwhelmed when the information that an amended

witness had been located about what the

consequences were. 

As the Court remembered we already had the

jury picked. We were beginning to start oral

argue-beginning to have open, opening statements

and that’s when the prosecution requested a detainer

because they had located a missing witness,

somebody who they hadn’t been able to locate for

about three or four months.

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Mr. Boston says he was heavily influenced by

what was being said in the holding cell where there

was other prisoners. The other prisoners gave him all

kinds of horror stories that scared him into making a,

a rational decision. It’s based on that that he feels he

was under duress.

Sent. Tr. at 3-4.

The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Petitioner under the terms of the agreement.

Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising the

following claims:

I. Petitioner is entitled to resentencing where the guidelines were scored inaccurately

and his sentence was based on facts not admitted by Petitioner or found beyond a

reasonable doubt by a jury.

II. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s presentence motion

to withdraw the plea.

The application was denied “for lack of merit in the grounds presented.” People v. Congdon-Boston,

Mich. Ct. App. No. 282945 (March 31, 2008). Petitioner subsequently filed an application for leave

to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, which raised the same claims. The Michigan Supreme

Court denied the application in a standard order. People v. Congdon-Boston, Mich. Sup. Ct. No.

136388 (September 22, 2008).

II. Standard of Review

Review of this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). Pursuant to the AEDPA, Petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus only if

he can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claims on the merits:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

A decision of a state court is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the

state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000). An “unreasonable

application” occurs when “a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme

Court] to the facts of a prisoner’s case.” Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not “issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 410–11.

The Supreme Court has explained that “[a] federal court’s collateral review of a state-court

decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system.” Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The “AEDPA thus imposes a ‘highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings,’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the

doubt.’” Renico v. Lett, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862, 176 L. Ed. 2d 678 (2010)((quoting Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). “[A]

state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v.

Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The

Supreme Court has emphasized “that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s

contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).

Furthermore, pursuant to § 2254(d), “a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories

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supported or . . . could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is

possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the

holding in a prior decision” of the Supreme Court. Id. “[I]f this standard is difficult to meet, that is

because it was meant to be.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786. 

Although 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the AEDPA, does not completely bar federal

courts from relitigating claims that have previously been rejected in the state courts, it preserves the

authority for a federal court to grant habeas relief only “in cases where there is no possibility

fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with” the Supreme Court’s

precedents. Id. Indeed, “Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against

extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error

correction through appeal.” Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n. 5 (1979)) (Stevens,

J., concurring in judgment)). Therefore, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state

prisoner is required to show that the state court’s rejection of his claim “was so lacking in

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any

possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786–87. 

III. Analysis

A. Sentencing Guidelines

Petitioner first asserts that the trial court incorrectly scored the sentencing guidelines and

based his sentence on facts not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury or admitted by Petitioner.

The trial court’s “alleged misinterpretation of state sentencing guidelines . . . is a matter of

state concern only,” Howard v. White, 76 Fed. App’x 52, 53 (6th Cir. 2003), and “federal habeas

corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (citing

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Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984).

Even if Petitioner’s claim was cognizable on habeas review, he was sentenced pursuant to

a plea and sentencing agreement, which called for the exact same sentence as he received. A

defendant who consents to a specific sentence in a plea agreement and receives the exact sentence

that he bargained for waives the right to challenge the sentence on appeal or collateral review. See

United States v. Livingston, 1 F. 3d 723, 725 (8th Cir. 1993).

Petitioner also alleges that his sentence was improperly enhanced on the basis of facts which

he did not admit and which were not determined by the jury. This claim is based on Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 

In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that,”[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact

that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted

to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. In Blakely, the

Supreme Court stated “that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum

sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted

by the defendant.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 (emphasis omitted).

Unlike the determinate sentencing scheme at issue in Blakely, Michigan has an indeterminate

sentencing scheme in which the maximum penalty is set by statute, but the minimum penalty is

determined by the sentencing court and must fall within a mandated guidelines range. Montes v.

Trombley, 599 F.3d 490, 496 (6th Cir. 2010). “Apprendi’s rule does not apply to judicial factfinding

that increases a minimum sentence so long as the sentence does not exceed the applicable statutory

maximum.” Chontos v. Berghuis, 585 F.3d 1000, 1002 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Harris v. United

States, 536 U.S. 545, 563–68 (2002) (plurality opinion) and 569–70 (Breyer, J., concurring)), cert.

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denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3413, 177 L. Ed. 2d 325 (2010). Petitioner’s sentence did not

exceed the statutory maximum of life imprisonment or any number of years. Therefore, his Blakely

claim lacks merit.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on any of his sentencing claims.

B. Validity of Plea

Petitioner’s second claim asserts that his guilty plea was involuntary. He primarily argues

that he suffers from bipolar disorder and was not on his medication at the time of the plea hearing.

A plea of guilty must be knowingly and voluntarily made. The defendant must be aware of

the “relevant circumstances and likely consequences” of his plea. Hart v. Marion Corr. Inst., 927

F. 2d 256, 257 (6th Cir. 1991). The defendant must also be aware of the maximum sentence that can

be imposed for the crime for which he is pleading guilty. King v. Dutton, 17 F. 3d 151, 154 (6th Cir.

1994). When a petitioner brings a federal habeas petition challenging his plea of guilty, the state

generally satisfies its burden by producing a transcript of the state court proceedings showing that

the plea was made voluntarily. Garcia v. Johnson, 991 F. 2d 324, 326 (6th Cir. 1993). The factual

findings of a state court that the guilty plea was properly made are generally presumed correct.

Petitioner must overcome a heavy burden if the federal court is to overturn these findings by the

state court. Id. Additionally, a habeas petitioner bears a heavy burden of rebutting the presumption

that his guilty plea, as evidenced by the plea colloquy, is valid. See Hastings v. Yukins, 194 F. Supp.

2d 659, 669 (E.D. Mich. 2002).

During the plea colloquy, Petitioner stated that no one coerced or pressured him into

accepting the plea. The terms of the plea agreement were explained to him in clear language, and

there is no indication in the record that he was in anyway confused or incompetent to enter a plea

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during the proceedings. Indeed, Petitioner responded appropriately to the trial judge’s questions,

indicating comprehension of those questions. Moreover, his narrative testimony concerning the

crime was coherent and indicates his clear understanding of the charges. Other than alleging that

he suffers from bipolar disorder, Petitioner proffered no evidence in the state courts—and he offers

none here—to suggest that this disorder rendered him incompetent to plead guilty. In fact,

Petitioner’s counsel frankly acknowledged at the sentencing hearing that Petitioner decided to avail

himself of the prosecutor’s plea offer when he learned that the key witness against him had been

located and would testify against him. A sudden realization that the prosecutor would be better able

to prove his case than Petitioner previously believed does not render a plea involuntary. 

The Court finds that the trial court’s conclusion that the plea was voluntarily entered was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner acknowledged

at the hearing that he was entering into it voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly. He is “bound

by his statements”during the plea colloquy. Ramos v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 560, 564 (6th Cir.

1999)(internal quotation omitted). Thus, the Court denies habeas corpus relief with respect to this

claim.

IV. Certificate of Appealability

Before Petitioner may appeal this decision, a certificate of appealability must issue. See 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); FED. R. APP. P. 22(b). A certificate of appealability may issue “only if the

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2). When a district court denies a habeas claim on the merits, the substantial showing

threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s

assessment of the constitutional claim debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

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484–85 (2000). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude

the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In applying this standard, a court may not conduct a full merits

review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of the claims.

Id. at 336–37. The Court concludes that a certificate of appealability is not warranted in this case

because reasonable jurists could not debate the Court’s assessment of Petitioner’s claims. The Court

will also deny Petitioner permission to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis because an appeal could

not be taken in good faith.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED and the matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that permission to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis is

DENIED.

S/Lawrence P. Zatkoff 

LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 14, 2012

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this Order was served upon the attorneys of record

by electronic or U.S. mail on March 14, 2012.

S/Marie E. Verlinde 

Case Manager

(810) 984-3290

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