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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MATTHEW CATANZARO,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 5:08-CV-15126

HONORABLE JOHN CORBETT O’MEARA

PATRICIA CARUSO, et al.,

Defendants.

____________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL

AND TRANSFER TO THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

I. Introduction

Matthew Catanzaro (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner presently confined at the St. Louis

Correctional Facility in St. Louis, Michigan, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his constitutional rights have been violated while had has been

confined at several state prisons. In his complaint, Plaintiff names 33 individuals who are

Michigan Department of Corrections officials or employees as defendants in this civil rights

action. Thirty-two of the defendants are based in the Western District of Michigan and one,

Bruce Curtis, warden of the Cooper Street Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan, is based in

the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiff’s claims concern environmental conditions (exposure

to smoke and paint chips), his prison work detail in relation to a back injury, his right of access

to the courts, and retaliation. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief.

Having reviewed the complaint, the Court now dismisses it, in part, for failure to state a
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claim against Bruce Curtis, the only defendant based in the Eastern District of Michigan, and

transfers the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan for

further proceedings.

II. Discussion

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)

(“PLRA”), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint seeking redress against government

entities, officers, and employees which it finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis

either in law or in fact. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

The Court recognizes that a pro se complaint should be held to a “less stringent standard”

than one drafted by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Even a pro se

complaint, however, must plead facts sufficient to show a legal wrong has been committed for

which the plaintiff may be granted relief. To state a federal civil rights claim, a plaintiff must

show that: (1) the defendant is a person who acted under color of state or federal law, and (2)

the defendant’s conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal right, privilege, or immunity. See

Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978); Mueller v. Gallina, 137 Fed. Appx. 847,

850 (6th Cir. 2005); Brock v. McWherter, 94 F.3d 242, 244 (6th Cir. 1996).

Although Plaintiff names Warden Bruce Curtis as a defendant in this action, he fails to

allege any facts indicating that Warden Curtis was personally involved in any alleged

unconstitutional conduct. It is well-established that a civil rights plaintiff must allege the
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personal involvement of a defendant to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monell v.

Department of Social Svs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); Taylor v. Michigan Dep’t. of

Corrections, 69 F.3d 716, 727-28 (6th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff must allege facts showing that

defendant participated, condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in alleged misconduct

to establish liability). Furthermore, conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a civil rights

claim under § 1983 – some factual basis for the claims must be set forth in the pleadings. See

Jackson v. Madery, 158 Fed. Appx. 656, 659 (6th Cir. 2005); Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172,

175-76 (6th Cir. 1996); Lillard v. Shelby Co. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff’s only factual allegation against Warden Curtis is that he “failed to check

accommodations before transfer of the Plaintiff” to another prison as required by a Michigan

Department of Corrections Policy Directive. See Complaint, p. 2. However, the law is clear that

to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove a violation of a federally secured

right. Section 1983 does not provide redress for a perceived state law violation. See Pyles v.

Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir.

1994); Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 240 (6th Cir. 1992) (the failure to comply with an

administrative rule does not by itself give rise to a constitutional violation); see also McVeigh v.

Bartlett, No. 94-23347, 1995 WL 236687, *1 (6th Cir. April 21, 1995) (the failure to follow

policy directive does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because policy directives

do not create protected interests). Additionally, to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must

allege that the deprivation of his rights was intentional. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344,

348 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333-36 (1986). An “injury caused by negligence

does not constitute a deprivation of any constitutionally-protected interest” and a claim that
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officials have engaged in negligent conduct does not state a claim under §1983. See Collins v.

City of Harker Hgts., 503 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1992). Plaintiff has not set forth facts indicating

that Warden Curtis’ action (or inaction) was meant to cause him harm or was otherwise

intentional in the constitutional sense. He has thus failed to state a claim for relief under § 1983

as to Warden Curtis and the complaint against him must be dismissed.

III. Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to Warden Bruce Curtis. 

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that Plaintiff’s complaint against defendant Warden Bruce

Curtis is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Given this dismissal, the Court further concludes that this case should be transferred to

the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The proper venue for civil

actions in which jurisdiction is not based on diversity of citizenship is the judicial district where: 

(1) any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state; (2) a substantial part of the

events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred or a substantial part of the property in

question is situated; or (3) any defendant may be found if there is no other district in which

plaintiff may bring the action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Public officials “reside” in the county

where they serve. See O'Neill v. Battisti, 472 F.2d 789, 791 (6th Cir. 1972). Additionally, a

district court may transfer a civil action to any other district where it might have been brought

for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. §

1404(a).

The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan is the proper venue
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The Court makes no determination as to the merits of Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining

defendants. The Court also has not resolved the issue of Plaintiff’s failure to either pay the filing

fee or submit an application to proceed without prepayment of the fee. Such matters are best left

to the assigned judge in the Western District.

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and more convenient forum for this action. The remaining defendants reside in Ingham, Ionia,

Montcalm Counties for purposes of this complaint and the events giving rise to the complaint

occurred in those counties. Ingham, Ionia, and Montcalm Counties lie in the Southern Division

of the Western District of Michigan. See 28 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1). Accordingly, the Court

ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the

Western District of Michigan. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and 1404(a).

Lastly, the Court concludes that an appeal from this order would be frivolous and

therefore cannot be taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States,

369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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s/John Corbett O’Meara

United States District Judge

Date: December 22, 2008

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties of record on

this date, December 22, 2008, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/William Barkholz

Case Manager