UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4999

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LANAIRE E. WHITE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Mark S. Davis, District 

Judge. (4:11-cr-00011-MSD-TEM-1)

Submitted: April 20, 2012 Decided: May 4, 2012

Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Stephen A. Hudgins, STEPHEN A. HUDGINS, PC, Poquoson, Virginia, 

for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Brian 

J. Samuels, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Lanaire E. White challenges the district court’s 

jurisdiction over his prosecution. A jury convicted White of 

sixteen federal offenses: conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1343, 1349 (West Supp. 2011) (Count 

1); wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1343, 2 (West 

Supp. 2011) (Counts 2-10); theft of government property, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 2 (2006) (Count 11); unauthorized 

access device fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(2), 2 

(2006) (Counts 12-15); and possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006)

(Count 16). He was sentenced to eighty-four months’ 

imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release and 

ordered to pay restitution and a special assessment. We affirm.

White contends that the district court lacked 

jurisdiction over his prosecution because he is a Moorish 

American. White’s argument seems to rest on the proposition 

that his ancestors were captured, bonded into slavery, and 

transported to the United States against their will and then 

ostensibly (but not actually) made citizens of the United States 

through emancipation from slavery. According to White, 

descendants of freed slaves are not United States citizens, but 

confiscated human property for which no compensation has been 
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paid. His argument, however, fails to make the necessary link 

between his historical recitation and the jurisdiction of 

federal district courts.∗

We review a challenge to a district court’s 

jurisdiction de novo. United States v. Winfield, 665 F.3d 107, 

109 (4th Cir. 2012). We find no merit in White’s jurisdictional 

argument. Neither the citizenship nor the heritage of a 

defendant constitutes a key ingredient to a district court’s 

jurisdiction in criminal prosecutions: “The district courts of 

the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of 

the courts of the states, of all offenses against the laws of 

the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2006); see also Hugi v. 

United States, 164 F.3d 378, 380 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Subjectmatter jurisdiction in every federal criminal prosecution comes 

from 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and there can be no doubt that Article 

III permits Congress to assign federal criminal prosecutions to 

federal courts. That’s the beginning and the end of the 

‘jurisdictional’ inquiry.” (quoted in United States v. Hartwell, 

448 F.3d 707, 716 (4th Cir. 2006)).

 ∗ To the extent that White’s opening brief obtusely refers 

to other potential arguments, we find those arguments waived for 

failure to develop them as required by Fed. R. App. P. 28. See, 

e.g., Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 653 n.7 (4th 

Cir. 2006).
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Physical presence in the United States usually 

supplies the only necessary prerequisite for personal 

jurisdiction in a federal criminal prosecution. See United 

States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 972 (4th Cir. 1983) (“It has 

long been the general rule that a court’s power to try a 

criminal defendant is not impaired by the government’s use of 

even forcible abduction to bring the defendant within the 

court’s jurisdiction.”); see also United States v. Burke, 425 

F.3d 400, 408 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Personal jurisdiction is 

supplied by the fact that [the defendant] is within the 

territory of the United States.”); United States v. Rendon, 354 

F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003) (“A federal district court has 

personal jurisdiction to try any defendant brought before it on 

a federal indictment charging a violation of federal law.”). 

The manner through which a defendant found himself within the 

United States generally does not affect the jurisdiction of the 

district court to preside over his prosecution. See United 

States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992) (district 

court had jurisdiction over prosecution of Mexican national who 

had been forcibly kidnapped and brought to the United States 

where abduction did not violate extradition treaty between 

United States and Mexico); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 

(1952) (“[T]he power of a court to try a person for crime is not 
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impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court’s 

jurisdiction by reason of a ‘forcible abduction.’” (citing 

Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886)); see also Kasi v. 

Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 493-500 (4th Cir. 2002) (forcible 

abduction of defendant from Pakistan did not divest state trial 

court of jurisdiction because such abductions were not 

prohibited by relevant extradition treaty); United States v. 

Porter, 909 F.2d 789, 791-92 (4th Cir. 1990) (district court had 

jurisdiction over defendants involuntarily deported from the 

Philippines to the United States); United States v. Arbane, 446 

F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[A] criminal defendant cannot 

defeat personal jurisdiction by asserting the illegality of the 

procurement of his presence in the relevant jurisdiction — here, 

the United States.”).

We therefore find no merit in White’s claim that the 

district court lacked jurisdiction over his prosecution because 

his ancestors had been illegally seized and brought to the 

United States. He was present in the district court and 

prosecuted for the commission of federal offenses. In short, 

“[t]here is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to 

permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice 

because he was brought to trial against his will.” Frisbie, 342 

U.S. at 522.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED