alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

Darryl B. Kaplan,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 09-10047

Experian, Incorporated, et al., Honorable Sean F. Cox

Defendants.

_________________________________/

OPINION & ORDER 

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

AND SETTING ASIDE DOCKET ENTRY NO. 83

Plaintiff Darryl Kaplan (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against Defendant Experian,

Incorporated (“Experian”), and two other credit reporting agencies, asserting that each agency

violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). 

Following the close of discovery, Plaintiff and Defendants filed cross-motions for

summary judgment. This Court struck some motions filed by Plaintiff but allowed him to file

new motions, which resulted in numerous motions and briefs being filed. On April 9, 2010, this

Court issued an Opinion & Order granting summary judgment in favor of Experian.

On April 20, 2010, Plaintiff filed an Emergency Motion for Reconsideration. (Docket

Entry No. 84). In that motion, Plaintiff notes that he filed a Reply Brief on February 11, 2010,

that does not appear to have been considered by the Court prior to issuance of the April 20, 2010

Opinion & Order. Plaintiff contends that, given an affidavit attached to his February 11, 2010

Reply Brief, the April 20, 2010 Opinion & Order should be set aside. Plaintiff notes that case
2

evaluation is currently scheduled to take place on April 26, 2010, and asks the Court to make an

expedited ruling on this motion, so that all remaining parties may participate in case evaluation.

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the Court concludes that the

April 20, 2010 Opinion & Order should be set aside. This Court did not receive a courtesy copy

of Plaintiff’s Reply Brief and had not reviewed that brief, or its exhibits, prior to issuing the

April 20, 2010 Opinion & Order. Because that brief presented evidence that had not previously

been submitted to the Court that may impact the Court’s rulings, the Court shall set aside the

April 20, 2010 Opinion & Order so that the Court may consider Plaintiff’s February 11, 2010

Reply Brief.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that this Court’s April 20, 2010 Opinion & Order (Docket

Entry No. 83) is SET ASIDE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, because Plaintiff’s Reply Brief raised certain issues

regarding damages for the first time, thereby preventing Experian to respond to those arguments,

Experian may, by April 28, 2010, file a supplemental brief of no more than three (3) pages that

responds solely to Plaintiff’s February 11, 2010 Reply Brief.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Experian shall participate in case evaluation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/Sean F. Cox 

Sean F. Cox

United States District Judge

Dated: April 21, 2010

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on

April 21, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

S/Jennifer Hernandez 
3

Case Manager
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PAULINE COLEMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

Defendant.

 /

Case No. 09-12833

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

JUDGMENT

On July 17, 2009, Plaintiff Pauline Coleman (“Plaintiff”) filed a three-count

Complaint against her former employer, Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Defendant”). 

In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Michigan’s ElliotLarsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws. §§37.2101-37.2804, and discrimination in

violation of Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws

§ 37.1101-37.1607. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on March 12, 2010,

which this Court granted in an Opinion and Order entered on this date.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that Plaintiff’s Complaint is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

DATE: May 17, 2010 s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to: 

Lance W. Mason, Esq.

Elizabeth P. Hardy, Esq.

Sonja L. Lengnick, Esq.

Thomas G. Kienbaum, Esq.
#### Victor W. VUKONICH, Jr., Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE OF MISSOURI, Appellant.

No. 20681.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

Aug. 13, 1996.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., James A. Chenault, III, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for appellant.

No appearance for respondent.

MONTGOMERY, Chief Judge.

Respondent was arrested in Branson, Missouri, on April 15, 1995, for driving while intoxicated. His breathalyzer test revealed *726an alcohol concentration of more than ten-hundredths of one percent. Respondent’s operator’s license was administratively suspended pursuant to § 302.505.1, RSMo 1994. Respondent was charged with the Branson municipal ordinance violation of driving while intoxicated, and he subsequently entered a plea of guilty. His guilty plea took place prior to his suspension.

After an administrative hearing the suspension of Respondent’s driving privileges was sustained. Respondent timely filed a Petition for Trial De Novo in the Taney County Circuit Court. His case was submitted on stipulated facts. Respondent claimed the administrative suspension constituted “double jeopardy” after his conviction for driving while intoxicated, which arose from the same set of facts that formed the basis for his suspension. The trial court agreed. The State appeals.

The only issue on appeal is whether the suspension of Respondent’s driving privileges constituted a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause after he was convicted of driving while intoxicated arising out of the same incident. We determine that the trial court erroneously applied the law.

The Missouri Supreme Court recently held that criminal prosecution and suspension of driving privileges arising out of the same action do not constitute a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. *State v. Mayo,*915 S.W.2d 758, 762-63 (Mo. banc 1996). The purpose behind suspending the driving privileges of a person convicted of driving while intoxicated is not to impose additional sanctions on that person. It is done to ensure the safety of others on Missouri highways. *Id.*at 762. For that reason, there is no violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. *See State v. Grisham,*918 S.W.2d 926 (Mo.App.1996); *State v. Champlin,*919 S.W.2d 24 (Mo.App.1996).

The order reinstating Respondent’s driving privileges is reversed, and the case is remanded for entry of a judgment denying relief to Respondent.

CROW, P.J., and PARRISH, J., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. §1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of NovaBay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2010 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Thomas
J. Paulson, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that:





1. The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2. The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date: May
12, 2010





/s/
      Thomas J. PaulsonThomas
      J. PaulsonChief
      Financial Officer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs. Civil Case No. 09-10463

Honorable Robert H. Cleland

FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY SEVEN Magistrate Michael Hluchaniuk

(477) FIREARMS,

Defendants in Rem.

___________________________________/

ORDER REGARDING WITHDRAWAL OF CLAIM BY TERROT MYLES

Upon filing of the accompanying Stipulation for Withdrawal of Claim by Terrot

Myles, the terms of which are incorporated herein, and the Court being otherwise advised

in the premises;

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 S/Robert H. Cleland 

ROBERT H. CLELAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: February 1, 2010

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record on this

date, February 1, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

 S/Lisa Wagner 

Case Manager and Deputy Clerk

(313) 234-5522

2:09-cv-10463-RHC-MJH Doc # 61 Filed 02/01/10 Pg 1 of 1 Pg ID 493
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

December 19, 2018

No. 04

- 18

- 00720

- CR

Bruce Ryan GUADIANA

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 437th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2016CR1151

Honorable Lori I. Valenzuela , Judge Presiding

ORDER

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED.

It is so ORDERED on December 19, 2018

.

_____________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 19th day of December, 2018

.

_____________________________ Keith E. Hottle, Clerk of Court
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 7692** 

FLOYD JOYNER, SR. , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. SHARON JONES, Clerk Isle of Wight Circuit Court; ANTOINETTE E. TUCKER, Office of the Public Defender , Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Alexandria

. Liam O’Grady , District Judge. ( 1:14

- cv - 01771

- LO

- MSN )

Submitted : March 17, 2016 Decided: March 21, 2016

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Floyd Joyner, Sr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Floyd Joyner, Sr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (2012) . We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Parties are accorded 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appe al in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bow l e s v. Russell , 551 U.S. 2 0 5, 2 1 4 ( 2007 ). The district court’s order was filed on April 30, 2015, and entered on the docket on May 1 , 2015 . The notice of appeal was filed on October 14, 2015 . Because Joyner failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We deny Joyner’s motions for default judgment and to amend and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES F. TOMASIK

Plaintiff,

Case No. 09-12816

vs. HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

______________________________________________/

J U D G M E N T

The above entitled matter has come before the Court on the parties’ cross motions

for summary judgment, and in accordance with the Court's order granting plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment and denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment entered this

date;

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment hereby is GRANTED in favor of

plaintiff.

DAVID J. WEAVER

CLERK OF THE COURT

BY: s/Josephine Chaffee 

 DEPUTY COURT CLERK

Dated: May 17, 2010
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-31-1997
<CASH>                                           99310
<SECURITIES>                                    100000
<RECEIVABLES>                                   614733
<ALLOWANCES>                                    344899
<INVENTORY>                                     338655
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                806110
<PP&E>                                          455843
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 1431549
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          3848547
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                       1001
<COMMON>                                         10795
<OTHER-SE>                                   (2428794)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   1431549
<SALES>                                        2729045
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               2729045
<CGS>                                          1884295
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 11979626
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              148268
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (9372855)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (9372855)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (9372855)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.99)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.99)
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 4.7


 


English Translation of Business License for SGOCO (Shenzhen)
Technology Co., Ltd.


 


Registered Number: 440301503468784


 


Date of Set-up: November 14, 2013


 


The Enterprise Name: SGOCO (Shenzhen)
Technology Co., Ltd.


 


Address: Room 201, Block A, Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong
Kong Cooperation District Authority Office Building, Qian Wan One Road, Li Yu Men One Street, Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong Kong Cooperation
District


 


Legal Representative: Wen Li Hong


 


Registered Capital: USD 5,000,000


 


Paid up Capital: Nil


 


Enterprise Type: Limited liability (Limited
liability (Taiwan, Hong Kong & Macao Corporation Owned Enterprises)


 


Scope of Management:  Engage
in research and development, wholesale, Commission agency and Import and export related business of Digital Electronic Product,
electrical material, computer-aided design, new type flat panel monitor parts, digital TV, Mobile Phone, Smart Phone, Tablet computer,
TGT-LCD, PDP, OLED, FED (include SED) display monitors, digital video, digital speaker, large screen colored display engine, light-source,
projector, laptop computer, high end computer server, car electronic accessories, ,metal product standard mold, high precision
stamping dies, precision cavity mold, mold standard parts, and non-metal product mold. Supply Chain Management and service;


 


Shareholder (The founder): SGOCO International (HK)
Limited


 


Business Term:
November 14, 2013 to November 13, 2043


 


Issued Unit: Market Supervision Administration
Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-10174

Conference Calendar

 

CARL V. LONG,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

C. TONY WRIGHT, attorney at law;

JOHN H. JACKSON, Judge,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:03-CV-2697-D

--------------------

Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Carl V. Long, Texas prisoner #1001354, has filed a motion to

proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the district

court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint as frivolous

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b). By

moving for IFP, Long is challenging the district court’s

certification that IFP status should not be granted on appeal

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 22, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 04-10174

-2-

because his appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v.

Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).

Long does not address the district court’s reason for

dismissing his claims against C. Tony Wright, namely that Wright

is not a state actor. He also presents no nonfrivolous issue for

appeal with respect to his claim against Judge John Jackson. 

“[L]itigants may not obtain review of state court actions by

filing complaints about those actions in lower federal courts

cast in the form of civil rights suits.” Hale v. Harney, 786

F.2d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the relief Long sought

was in the nature of mandamus relief. Federal courts have no

power to direct state judicial officials in the performance of

their functions. See Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb County Superior

Court, 474 F.2d 1275, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973). Accordingly, we

uphold the district court’s certification that the appeal

presents no nonfrivolous issues. Long’s motion for IFP is

DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202

and n.24; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

Both the district court’s dismissal of Long’s complaint and

this court’s dismissal of this appeal count as “strikes” for

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103

F.3d 383, 385-87 (5th Cir. 1996). We caution Long that once he

accumulates three strikes, he may not proceed IFP in any civil

action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in
No. 04-10174

-3-

any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious

physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

MOTION DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS; SANCTIONS

WARNING ISSUED.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Vignette Corporation (the "Company") on
Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Thomas E. Hogan,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. (S) 1350, as adopted pursuant to (S) 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.



/s/ Thomas E. Hogan
-------------------
Thomas E. Hogan
President and Chief Executive Officer
March 28, 2003
EXHIBIT 32.1


CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





The undersigned, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Tongji Healthcare Group, Inc. (the "Company"), does hereby certify under the standards set forth and solely for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended  June 30, 2011 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in that Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated: August 15, 2011



/s /Yunhui YuYunhui Yu

Ptresident and Chief Executive Officer
2:09-cr-20249-AJT-DAS Doc # 5 Filed 06/12/09 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 9
2:09-cr-20249-AJT-DAS Doc # 5 Filed 06/12/09 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 10
Exhibit 4.9


 


Credit Facility and
Loan Agreement


 


Contract No. :EBXM2013507ZH


 


Borrower:
SGOCO (Fuijian) Electronic Co., Ltd.


Lender:
China Everbright Bank (Xiamen Branch)


Signing
Date: September 26, 2013


Amount:
RMB50, 000,000


 


Length of
maturity: From September 26, 2013 to September 25, 2014


Use of Loan:
Working Capital


Date of
Draft: September 26, 2013


Withdrawal
Amount: RMB25, 000,000


Loan Interest: 7.2%


Payment Method: The interest should be repaid by monthly. The
principal shall be fully repaid at the maturity date of the loan.


Repayment
Date: September 26, 2014


 


Loan Guarantee: Guaranty by Guanke (Fujian)
Electron Technological Industry Co., Ltd.


 


- Guanke (Fujian) Electron Technological Industry Co., Ltd.
entered into The Maximum Pledge Contract with the lender, with the contract no.EBXM2013507ZH-B
EX-10.24



 Exhibit 10.24 

FIRST AMENDMENT TO GEORGIA HOLDINGS, INC. 

MANAGEMENT EQUITY PLAN 

The Georgia Holdings, Inc. Management Equity Plan (the “Plan”), is hereby amended effective as of February 4, 2014 (the
“Effective Date”) as follows: 
 1.         Amendment to Section 3 of the
Plan. The first sentence of Section 3 of the Plan shall be deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following: 
 “Subject
to the provisions of Section 7, the total number of Shares with respect to which Awards may be granted under the Plan shall not exceed 763,688, and the full number of Shares available for delivery under the Plan may be delivered pursuant to
ISOs.” 
 2.         Amendment to Section 4 of the Plan. Section 4 of the Plan
shall be amended to add a new subsection (d) to the end thereof, as follows: 
 “(d)     Actions by the
Board. The Board shall have all the authority granted to the Committee under the Plan, and may at any time and from time to time, grant Awards and administer the Plan with respect to such Awards.” 

3.         Effect on the Plan. This Amendment shall not constitute a waiver, amendment or
modification of any provision of the Plan not expressly referred to herein. Except as expressly amended or modified herein, the provisions of the Plan are and shall remain in full force and effect and are hereby ratified and confirmed. On and after
the Effective Date, each reference in the Plan to “this Plan,” “herein,” “hereof,” “hereunder” or words of similar import shall mean and be a reference to the Plan as amended hereby. To the extent that a
provision of this Amendment conflicts with or differs from a provision of the Plan, such provision of this Amendment shall prevail and govern for all purposes and in all respects.
#### Lula DUKE, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Eric VICKERS, Defendant/Respondent.

No. 68158.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Feb. 13, 1996.

Lula Duke, St. Louis, Pro Se.

Eric E. Vickers, Vickers & Associates, St. Louis, for respondent.

Before REINHARD, P.J., and KAROHL and DOWD, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Client appeals from a judgment for attorney in client’s action for refund of attorney’s fees. Client filed an action in small claims court for a refund of $1,500.00 of $2,000.00 client paid to attorney. Attorney counterclaimed for $620.00, and the small claims court found for attorney on both claims and ordered client to pay $620.00 to attorney. Following a trial *de novo,*the court entered judgment for attorney on client’s claim and for client on attorney’s counterclaim. We affirm. The judgment of the trial court is supported by substantial evidence and is not against the weight of the evidence; no error of law appears. An extended opinion would have no precedential value. Rule 84.16(b).