UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

 

WILLIAM BOND,

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,

v. Case No. 09-11699

U.S. MANUFACTURING CORP.,

Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff.

 /

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Pending before the court is a motion for reconsideration filed by Plaintiff/CounterDefendant William Bond (“Plaintiff”). Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff U.S. Manufacturing

Corporation (“Defendant”) filed a timely, court-ordered response. No hearing is

required. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h). For the reasons stated below, the court will deny

Plaintiff’s motion.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant initiated its counterclaim on October 14, 2009 to assert one count of

fraudulent misrepresentation against Plaintiff under Michigan state law. The

counterclaim alleges that Plaintiff misrepresented his marital status on his health and

dental insurance forms by listing a woman as his spouse, even though he was not

actually married, and that Defendant paid higher premiums as a result. Defendant filed

a summary judgment motion, asserting that it was entitled to summary judgment on the

counterclaim because the undisputed facts showed that (1) Plaintiff falsely represented

the material fact of his marital status; (2) Plaintiff knew the representation was false
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All citations are to the original briefing on the summary judgment motion.

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when he made it; (3) Plaintiff intended that Defendant would rely on the false

representation; (4) Defendant in fact relied on the representation; and (5) Defendant

suffered damage in the form of higher insurance premiums as a result of its reliance. 

The court granted Defendant’s motion on July 30, 2010. Plaintiff filed for

reconsideration on August 16, 2010. 

II. BACKGROUND

In granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court relied on the

following facts, which were undisputed for purposes of the summary judgment motion:

Defendant U.S. Manufacturing Corporation (“USMC”) hired Plaintiff as a

Manufacturing Technician on March 1, 2004. (Def.’s Ex. A, Pl.’s Dep. at 50:12-14, 21-

23.)1

 That day, Plaintiff completed enrollment forms for USMC’s health and dental

insurance plans, in which USMC permits an employee to enroll a spouse. (Def.’s Ex. A,

Pl.’s Dep. 185:18–186:12; Def.’s Ex. B; Def.’s Ex. C, Hudson Aff. at ¶ 10.) On these

enrollment forms, Plaintiff named “Gail Stamps Bond” as his spouse. (Def.’s Ex. B.) 

Plaintiff was not married at the time and had never been married as of his September 9,

2009 deposition. (Def.’s Ex. A, Pl.’s Dep. at 186:9-10, 5:9-10.) A woman named Gail

Stamps (“Stamps”) is Plaintiff’s girlfriend, and Plaintiff testified that he named Stamps as

his spouse because “[they] were getting married,” even though they had not yet wed. 

(Def.’s Ex. A, Pl.’s Dep. at 4:9-10, 4:17, 186:4.) USMC enrolled Stamps in its health

and dental insurance plans and paid $25,087.68 in additional premiums to cover her

from March 2004 to September 2009, except when Plaintiff was on layoff for a seven
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month period between December 2008 and June 2009. (Def.’s Ex. C, Hudson Aff. at ¶

5.) On September 10, 2009, the day after his deposition in this matter, Plaintiff

submitted to USMC paperwork to remove Stamps from his company insurance policy.

(Def.’s Ex. C, Hudson Aff. at Ex. C at ¶ 12.)

III. STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 permits a court to grant relief from an order

for several reasons, including “excusable neglect” and “newly discovered evidence that,

with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new

trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1 provides that a

motion for reconsideration shall be granted only if the movant can (1) “demonstrate a

palpable defect by which the court and the parties have been misled,” and (2) “show

that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.” E.D. Mich. LR

7.1(h)(3). “A ‘palpable defect’ is ‘a defect that is obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest,

or plain.’” United States v. Lockett, 328 F. Supp. 2d 682, 684 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (citing

United States v. Cican, 156 F. Supp. 2d 661, 668 (E.D. Mich. 2001)). 

IV. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the court finds that Plaintiff’s motion must be denied because

it is untimely. The local rules provide that “[a] motion for rehearing or reconsideration

must be filed within 14 days after entry of the judgment or order.” E.D. Mich. LR

7.1(h)(1). Plaintiff did not file his motion within 14 days of the entry of the court’s July

30, 2010 order, but instead filed it three days after this time period expired. Under the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[w]hen a party may or must act within a specified

time after service and service is made under Rule 5(b)(2)(C),(D),(E), or (F), 3 days are
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added after the period would otherwise expire under Rule 6(a).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d)

(emphasis added). This rule, while applicable to service made by electronic means, is

not implicated by Local Rule 7.1(h) because the time period under that rule begins to

run on entry of the challenged order, not on service of the challenged order. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is untimely and will be denied as such. 

Nonetheless, even if Plaintiff’s motion had been timely, it would have been

denied on the merits as well. Plaintiff first argues that the court erred in its July 30,

2010 order by erroneously applying the preponderance of the evidence standard in

evaluating Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court did not apply this

standard. The court noted that Michigan law is somewhat ambiguous as to the

standard of proof at trial in fraud cases. (7/30/10 Order 5-6.) The court continued,

however, to state that any ambiguity was immaterial because Defendant was entitled to

summary judgment even under the “clear and convincing” standard. (Id. 6.) The court

stated throughout the opinion that no reasonable jury, applying the clear and convincing

standard, could find in favor of Plaintiff on Defendant’s counterclaim. (See, e.g., id. 7,

12.) Plaintiff’s first ground for relief is therefore misplaced.

The remainder of Plaintiff’s motion amounts to little more than “second-guessing”

the court’s July 30, 2010 opinion. In doing so, he fails to identify any palpable defect by

which the court has been misled, and instead simply attempts to relitigate issues that

the court has already determined. A motion for reconsideration that presents “the same

issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication,” will not be

granted. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3); Czajkowski v. Tindall & Assocs., P.C., 967 F. Supp.

951, 952 (E.D. Mich. 1997). 
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 There appears to be a serious question about whether the instruction sheet

submitted by counsel is the instruction sheet that corresponds to the form completed by

Bond. It is not necessary to expend further judicial resources at this time determining

whether Plaintiff or counsel has proffered as an exhibit something that is not what it is

purported to be, or the reason for such act if it occurred. This issue may be addressed

in connection with the motion for sanctions already pending.

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Plaintiff’s arguments are belated, unsupported, and ill-founded. Plaintiff primarily

focuses on the alleged “possibility” that Plaintiff was somehow confused when he filled

out his medical forms and that a reasonable jury could conclude that he simply made a

mistake in listing “Gail Stamps Bond” as his spouse on his form. There is no evidence

to support this theory –only rank speculation. Plaintiff is not able to avoid summary

judgment “with the hope that something can be developed at trial.” Smith v. Hudson,

600 F.2d 60, 65 (6th Cir. 1979) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv., 391 U.S. 253,

289-90 (1968)); see also Bryant v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 490 F.2d 1273, 1275

(6th Cir. 1974) (“[W]here the movant brings forward and supports his motion for

summary judgment, his opponent may not rest merely upon his pleadings but rather

must come forward to show genuine issues of fact. Mere conclusory and unsupported

allegations, rooted in speculation, do not meet that burden.”). Further, Plaintiff

improperly attempts to rely on additional “evidence,” attached to his motion for

reconsideration, which is unauthenticated and accompanied by no argument as to why

any of it was not submitted earlier.2

 
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In its response, Defendant asks that the court award sanctions under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1927 for Plaintiff’s frivolous motion for reconsideration. The court does not typically

entertain such requests unless they are filed in a separate motion. Here, Defendant has

already filed a sanctions motion, which the court will consider after judgment has been

entered in this case. Defendant need not file a separate motion for sanctions related to

the motion for reconsideration because, if meritorious, Defendant’s original motion could

encompass the costs associated with preparing a response to the motion for

reconsideration.

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In whole, Plaintiff’s motion is untimely and without merit. Nor does it, in any

manner whatsoever, raise any legitimate challenge to the court’s July 30, 2010

summary judgment order.3

V. CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration [Dkt. # 61] is DENIED. 

 S/Robert H. Cleland 

ROBERT H. CLELAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: November 22, 2010

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record

on this date, November 22, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

 S/Lisa Wagner 

Case Manager and Deputy Clerk

(313) 234-5522