UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

BLYTHE TAPLIN, : 

on Behalf of Rogers Lacaze, : 

 : 

 Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 12-1815 (RC) 

 : 

 v. : Re Document No.: 17 

 : 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et al., : 

 : 

 Defendants. : 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION 

This matter comes before the Court on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

The plaintiff, an attorney representing a Louisiana death row inmate convicted of first-degree 

murder, filed a Freedom of Information Act request seeking federal law enforcement records 

relating to the third party whom the plaintiff asserts actually perpetrated the crime for which her 

client was convicted. The defendants seek summary judgment under Exemption 7(C) on the 

basis that the public interest in production of the requested documents—or even an 

acknowledgement that such documents exist—is outweighed by the third party’s privacy interest. 

Because the plaintiff has not met her evidentiary burden of showing that a reasonable person 

would believe that the government is withholding information that could corroborate her theory 

that the third party committed the crime, the Court will grant the defendants’ motion. 
2 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

In 1995, Rogers Lacaze was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder and 

sentenced to death in connection with the brutal shootings that occurred at the Kim Anh 

Vietnamese Restaurant in New Orleans East. See generally State v. Lacaze, 824 So. 2d 1063 

(La. 2002). During the early morning hours of March 4, 1995, New Orleans Police Officer 

Antoinette Frank, who often worked an off-duty security detail at the family-owned Kim Anh, 

entered the restaurant with a man she had earlier introduced as her nephew. The assailants shot 

and killed 25-year-old New Orleans Police Officer Ronald Williams, who was on detail at the 

restaurant that night, along with siblings 24-year-old Ha Vu and 17-year-old Cuong Vu, 

employees and members of the family that owned the restaurant. See id. at 1066, 1069. Officer 

Williams’s wallet was also taken after he was killed. See id. at 1069. Quoc Vu and Chau Vu, 

siblings of Ha and Cuong, sought refuge in a room-sized cooler and survived the attack. See id.

at 1067. According to the prosecution’s theory of the case, Ms. Frank “was becoming 

increasingly angry over being cut out of what she considered an equitable share of the paid 

details at the Kim Anh Restaurant.” Id. at 1070. The murder weapon was not found before trial, 

and the New Orleans Police Firearms Examiner was unable to conclude that all casings, bullets, 

and fragments recovered from the crime scene were fired from the same weapon. See id. at 1069 

& n.6. 

Mr. Lacaze and Ms. Frank were both charged with the Kim Anh murders, but the cases 

were severed. See id. at 1066. Quoc Vu had positively identified Mr. Lacaze as Ms. Frank’s 

accomplice in a photo line-up the morning after the murders and identified him again at trial. 

See id. at 1068. Chau Vu also identified Mr. Lacaze as the accomplice at trial, but had been 

unable to make an identification from the photo line-up. See id. The prosecution also connected 
3 

Mr. Lacaze to the Kim Anh murders by presenting evidence that (1) phone records showed a 

series of calls from Mr. Lacaze to Ms. Frank around the time of the murders; (2) on March 3, a 

uniformed Ms. Frank and a young African-American male with gold teeth1

 were seen in a WalMart store inquiring about 9 mm cartridges; and (3) the night manager of a Chevron gas station 

near the home of Mr. Lacaze’s brother told police that Mr. Lacaze used Officer Williams’s credit 

card to purchase gasoline at around 2:30 a.m. one morning in early March. See id. at 1069–70 

& n.7. In his initial statements to police the morning after the murders, Mr. Lacaze admitted that 

he was in the restaurant at the time of the shootings but insisted that he did not kill anyone or fire 

any weapon. See id. at 1068. He told detectives that “Frank told him not to worry, that she 

would return and take care of things[.] She would go to the [station] and report that several 

black masked men broke through the back door and started shooting.” Id. at 1068 n.5. 

At trial, Mr. Lacaze repudiated his statements to police and insisted that those statements 

were products of police threats and coercion. See id. at 1070. He testified that, instead, he 

initially went to Kim Anh with Ms. Frank to eat, but Ms. Frank dropped him off at his 

girlfriend’s apartment at around 12:20 a.m., before the shootings occurred. See id. He also 

testified that his brother picked him up at 12:30 a.m. to shoot pool at Mr. C’s Pool Hall, where 

they played until about 2:00 a.m. and then returned to his brother’s apartment. See id. 

Mr. Lacaze’s brother, Michael Lacaze, supported this alibi at trial, but “the manager of Mr. C’s 

Pool Hall testified unequivocally that Michael played pool late that Friday night without his 

brother.” Id. at 1070–71. The defense posited that Adam Frank, Antoinette’s brother, was the 

true accomplice, but the evidence in support of this theory presented at trial, if any, is unclear 

from the record. See id. at 1071. 

 1

 At trial, Mr. Lacaze “was asked to stand and display his (gold) teeth for jurors.” State v. 

Lacaze, 824 So. 2d 1063, 1066 n.4 (La. 2002). 
4 

After 79 minutes of deliberation, the jury unanimously found Mr. Lacaze guilty of all 

three counts of first-degree murder. See id. at 1072. In a separate sentencing phase in which 

both sides presented evidence relating to aggravating and mitigating factors, the jury 

recommended—and the court adopted—a sentence of death. See id. In a separate trial after 

Mr. Lacaze’s conviction, Antoinette Frank was also convicted of first-degree murder and 

sentenced to death. See generally State v. Frank, 803 So. 2d 1 (La. 2001). 

After 18 years on death row, Mr. Lacaze maintains that he is innocent. According to the 

attorneys now representing Mr. Lacaze in post-conviction proceedings, evidence that has come 

to light after trial supports the defense’s argument that Antoinette’s brother, Adam, was the 

actual accomplice. See Compl. ¶¶ 18–30, ECF No. 1. The attorneys assert that (1) reports from 

Mr. Frank’s arrest related to a separate crime reveal that witnesses had heard him bragging about 

killing a New Orleans Police officer; (2) Mr. Frank was later found in possession of a 9 mm 

Beretta, model 92G—the same caliber, make, and model as the weapon believed to have been 

used to commit the Kim Anh murders;2

 and (3) sometime before the murders occurred, Officer 

Williams ejected Adam Frank from the Kim Anh restaurant, prompting Antoinette to threaten 

Officer Williams’s life. See id. ¶¶ 25, 27–28; Hardy Decl. Ex. A n.1, ECF No. 17-3. 

The plaintiff, Blythe Taplin, is an attorney for the Capital Appeals Project—an 

organization that provides representation to indigent individuals on Louisiana’s death row, 

including Mr. Lacaze. On February 24, 2012, Ms. Taplin submitted a request to the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552 (2012), seeking the production of documents relating to any investigation the agency had 

 2

 The gun allegedly found on Mr. Frank contained a partial serial number, whose 

identifiable digits matched exactly with the number of the gun believed to have been used in the 

Kim Anh murders. See Compl. ¶ 28, ECF No. 1. 
5 

done regarding Adam Frank, Jr. See generally Hardy Decl. Ex. A, ECF No. 17-3. Ms. Taplin 

asserts that the FBI has responsive documents based on (1) an Ouachita Parish Sheriff’s 

Department notice specifying that Mr. Frank was “wanted by . . . the FBI in New Orleans”; and 

(2) an entry in an Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office privilege log described as “Adam 

Frank, Jr.’s FBI rap sheet.” See Compl. ¶¶ 26, 28, ECF No. 1. On March 14, 2012, the agency 

issued a Glomar response,3

 invoking FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C) and refusing to either 

confirm or deny that it has any documents concerning Mr. Frank. See Hardy Decl. Ex. B, ECF 

No. 17-3. Ms. Taplin promptly appealed the FBI’s response to the Department of Justice’s 

Office of Information Policy (“OIP”), and the OIP affirmed the agency’s Glomar response. See

id. Exs. C, E. 

On November 8, 2012, Ms. Taplin filed a complaint in this Court against both the FBI 

and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) (collectively, “Defendants” or the “Government”).4

 In 

her prayer for relief, Ms. Taplin seeks an order directing the Government to process and produce 

the requested documents in an expedited manner or, in the alternative, to produce an index of the 

requested documents and submit them to the Court for in camera review. See Compl. ¶¶ 10–11, 

ECF No. 1. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the FBI’s Glomar response. See 

 3

 In a Glomar response, the agency refuses to either confirm or deny the existence of 

responsive documents on the basis that doing so would compromise security or privacy. See 

generally Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In Phillippi, “[r]esponding to a 

journalist’s FOIA request for records regarding the CIA’s alleged efforts to convince media 

outlets not to make public what they had learned about the Hughes Glomar Explorer, the Agency 

refused to either confirm or deny whether it had such records. Thus the term ‘Glomar response’ 

entered the FOIA lexicon.” Roth v. U.S. DOJ, 642 F.3d 1161, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation 

omitted). 

4

 On January 24, 2013, Ms. Taplin filed a second complaint against the Government, 

seeking a Court order compelling the production of documents responsive to her FOIA request 

regarding any investigation or background information regarding the activities of the New 

Orleans Police Department, 7th District, between 1994 and 1996. That case is still pending 

before this Court, and the Government is making a series of rolling productions. See generally

Taplin v. U.S. DOJ, No. 1:13-cv-00102-RC (D.D.C.). 
6 

generally Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 17. Ms. Taplin has taken the position that the case 

was not ripe for dispositive briefing. See Joint Status Rep. 2, ECF No. 16. 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Legal Standard 

When assessing a summary judgment motion in a FOIA case, the district court reviews 

the matter de novo. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Life Extension Found., Inc. v. IRS, 915 F. 

Supp. 2d 174, 179 (D.D.C. 2013). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Ultimately, an agency’s justification for invoking a 

FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or ‘plausible.’” Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 

374–75 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). The 

reviewing court’s determination may be based on the record and agency affidavits “if the 

affidavits describe the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably 

specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed 

exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of 

agency bad faith.” Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 

Generally, a reviewing court should “respect the expertise of an agency” and not “overstep the 

proper limits of the judicial role in FOIA review.” Hayden v. Nat’l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 

608 F.2d 1381, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 

“[D]isclosure, not secrecy, is dominant objective of [FOIA].” Dep’t of the Air Force v. 

Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976). “Consistent with this purpose, agencies may withhold only 

those documents or portions thereof that fall under one of nine delineated statutory exemptions.” 

Elliott v. USDA, 596 F.3d 842, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)). “[T]he 
7 

exemptions are ‘explicitly exclusive.’” U.S. DOJ v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 151 (1989) 

(quoting FAA Adm’r v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 262 (1975)). And it is the agency’s burden to 

show that withheld material falls within one of these exemptions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); 

Elliott, 596 F.3d at 845. 

Under Exemption 7(C),5 an agency is exempt from producing “records or information 

compiled for law enforcement purposes . . . to the extent that the production of such law 

enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an 

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). As a preliminary step in 

applying Exemption 7(C), the Court must identify the individual’s personal privacy interest in 

avoiding disclosure of the information sought. See U.S. DOJ v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom 

of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989). Once the privacy interest is identified, the Court 

evaluates the public interest in disclosure and determines whether the interest is strong enough to 

warrant an invasion of the privacy interest at stake. See id. at 771; Davis v. U.S. DOJ, 968 F.2d 

1276, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 

 5

 The FBI also invoked Exemption 6 in its denial of Ms. Taplin’s FOIA request, but the 

OIP only invoked Exemption 7(C) on review. See Hardy Decl. Exs. B & E, ECF No. 17-3. 

Because Ms. Taplin appears to concede that this FOIA dispute involves law enforcement 

records, and because Exemption 7(C) imposes a lesser burden on an agency with respect to the 

privacy interests of third parties named in such records, compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) 

(exempting “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would 

constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” (emphasis added)), with id.

§ 552(b)(7) (exempting records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes [that] 

could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” 

(emphasis added)), this dispute has been narrowed to just the applicability of Exemption 7(C). 

See Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 6 n.3, ECF No. 18; see also Roth, 642 F.3d 

at 1173 (“If the information withheld here was ‘compiled for law enforcement purposes,’ thus 

implicating Exemption 7(C), then we would have no need to consider Exemption 6 separately 

because all information that would fall within the scope of Exemption 6 would also be immune 

from disclosure under Exemption 7(C).”). 
8 

B. Balance of Interests 

Before applying the Exemption 7(C) balancing test, it is important to define the scope of 

the dispute. Because the FBI rejected Ms. Taplin’s FOIA request in a Glomar response—

refusing to either confirm or deny the existence of responsive documents—the interests to be 

balanced at this stage are not the private and public interests in the documents themselves, but 

rather the interests in having the FBI acknowledge that it possesses responsive documents. See

Roth v. U.S. DOJ, 642 F.3d 1161, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Similarly, should the Court order 

identification of responsive documents (or categories of responsive documents), the FBI would 

still have the opportunity to claim exemptions over individual documents pursuant to regular 

FOIA practice because the instant dispute is ripe only as to the FBI’s Glomar response. See id. 

Having so framed the interests at stake, the Court proceeds to balance Mr. Frank’s privacy 

interest against the public interest in disclosure. 

1. Third Party’s Privacy Interest 

As a general rule, the D.C. Circuit has recognized that “the targets of law-enforcement 

investigations . . . have a substantial interest in ensuring that their relationship to the 

investigations remains secret.” Id. at 1174 (quoting Schrecker v. U.S. DOJ, 349 F.3d 657, 666 

(D.C. Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The interest is substantial because “the 

mention of an individual’s name in a law enforcement file will engender comment and 

speculation and carries a stigmatizing connotation.” Branch v. FBI, 658 F. Supp. 204, 209 

(D.D.C. 1987); accord Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1990). However, 

“FOIA-exempt information may not be withheld if it was previously disclosed . . . .” 

Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 722 F. Supp. 2d 66, 72 (D.D.C. 
9 

2010) (quoting Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

If the FBI did in fact investigate Mr. Frank in relation to the Kim Anh murders, then 

under the general rule he is presumed to have a substantial interest in ensuring that the FBI keeps 

the fact of his investigation a secret. However, Mr. Lacaze’s defense at trial pointed to Adam 

Frank as the true accomplice, and a Richland Parish Sherriff’s Office report indicates that 

Mr. Frank had been bragging about shooting a New Orleans police officer. See Pl.’s Mem. P. 

& A. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 2, ECF No. 18-2. And during the sentencing in 

Mr. Frank’s armed robbery conviction, for which he is currently carrying out a 65-year sentence, 

the presiding judge stated openly on the record: “I am extremely, extremely, extremely 

concerned that if this man ever gets out on the street, he is going to do some serious harm to 

somebody, somewhere, somehow, someday, and that serious harm could include murder. . . . 

You are a danger to society, you are really a danger to society.” Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. Opp’n Mot. 

Summ. J. Ex. 1 (Sent. Tr. 7, Feb. 22, 2005), ECF No. 18-1. These facts weaken the rationales 

supporting Mr. Frank’s privacy interest in non-disclosure. In view of the police report 

documenting Mr. Frank’s supposed admission that he killed a New Orleans police officer, and 

the sentencing judge’s damning statements about the threat Mr. Frank poses to society, it is not 

clear that an FBI admission that it has records concerning Mr. Frank would “engender comment 

and speculation and carr[y] a stigmatizing connotation” far beyond that which already exists. 

Branch, 658 F. Supp. at 209. In fact, given that Mr. Frank is, apparently, such a dangerous 

individual, members of the public might be surprised if the FBI did not have documents about 

him. 
10 

Ms. Taplin’s request seeks all records relating to Adam Frank, and not just those related 

to the Kim Anh murders. See Hardy Decl. Ex. A, ECF No. 17-3. An Ouachita Parish Sheriff’s 

Department notice specified that Mr. Frank was wanted by the FBI in New Orleans, strongly 

suggesting that that field office had responsive records to the request. Although that non-federal 

agency cannot waive the FBI’s right to assert its Glomar response, see Marino v. DEA, 685 F.3d 

1076, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2012), if it was publicly known that the New Orleans field office sought 

Mr. Frank, it follows that no added stigma would accrue in confirming that this FBI interest 

resulted in the creation of documents. While it is the law of this circuit that another agency’s 

disclosure cannot altogether preclude the FBI from asserting a Glomar response, the rule does 

not speak to the much narrower issue of whether such a disclosure can diminish a third party’s 

privacy interest for purposes of Exemption 7(C). The Court finds that Mr. Frank’s privacy 

interest exists in a diminished capacity. 

2. Public Interest 

The Court’s next step is to identify the public interest at stake and weigh it against Adam 

Frank’s diminished privacy interest. Roth, 642 F.3d at 1174–75. In putting forth the public 

interest, a plaintiff must show (1) “that the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant 

one, an interest more specific than having the information for its own sake”; and (2) that “the 

information is likely to advance that interest.” Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 

U.S. 157, 172 (2004). 

Although a prisoner in post-conviction proceedings has an “intense personal interest” in 

obtaining documents that are potentially exculpatory, such a “personal stake in the release of the 

requested information is ‘irrelevant’ to the balancing of public and third-party privacy interests 

required by Exemption 7(C).” Roth, 642 F.3d at 1177 (quoting Mays v. DEA, 234 F.3d 1324, 
11 

1327 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). “FOIA is not a substitute for discovery in criminal cases or in habeas 

proceedings.” Id. However, the D.C. Circuit has recognized “the public’s more general interest 

in knowing whether the FBI is withholding information that could corroborate [a prisoner]’s 

claim of innocence.” Id. at 1176. Indeed, “[t]he fact that [a prisoner] has been sentenced to the 

ultimate punishment strengthens the public’s interest in knowing whether the FBI’s files contain 

information that could corroborate his claim of innocence.” Id. The heightened public interest is 

evidenced in part by the high-profile exonerations of death-row inmates and the recent flurry of 

popular media coverage of the topic. See id. (collecting media coverage). Although the 

Government seeks to distinguish Roth based on the FBI’s participation in the underlying 

prosecution in that case, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion does not emphasize the agency’s involvement 

and repeatedly characterizes the applicable public interest as “whether the FBI is withholding 

information that could corroborate a death-row inmate’s claim of innocence.” Id. at 1175; 

accord, e.g., id. at 1176 (noting “the public’s more general interest in knowing whether the FBI 

is withholding information that could corroborate Bower’s claim of innocence”); id. at 1178 

(identifying Roth’s second asserted public interest as “the public’s interest in knowing whether 

the FBI is withholding information that could help exonerate a potentially innocent death-row 

inmate”); id. at 1180 (“[W]e turn to the far more interesting question of whether Roth may 

overcome the FBI’s Glomar response based on the public’s more general interest in knowing 

whether the FBI is withholding information that could corroborate Bower’s claim of 

innocence.”). In light of the public’s general interest in the exoneration of individuals who have 

been sentenced to the “ultimate punishment,” the public interest in Mr. Lacaze’s potential 

innocence may outweigh Mr. Frank’s diminished privacy interest in the non-disclosure of FBI 

documents that could link him to the Kim Anh murders. 
12 

However, this public interest could outweigh the third party’s privacy interest only if the 

plaintiff can meet a certain evidentiary threshold. Because Ms. Taplin seeks records concerning 

Adam Frank, whom she alleges actually committed the Kim Anh murders, she “must show that a 

reasonable person could believe that the following might be true: (1) that [Mr. Frank was] the 

real killer[], and (2) that the FBI is withholding information that could corroborate that theory.” 

Id. 

Ms. Taplin has not satisfied this evidentiary threshold. To show that Adam Frank was 

Antoinette’s true accomplice, Ms. Taplin alleges that (1) a police report says that witnesses had 

heard Mr. Frank bragging about killing a New Orleans Police officer; (2) Mr. Frank was later 

found in possession of the weapon believed to have been used to commit the Kim Anh murders; 

and (3) Antoinette had threatened Officer Williams’s life for ejecting her brother from the 

restaurant. See Compl. ¶¶ 25, 27–28, ECF No. 1; Hardy Decl. Ex. A n.1, ECF No. 17-3. But the 

record does not contain any evidence of these three assertions, and Ms. Taplin’s opposition brief 

repeatedly cites to the complaint and original FOIA request for support. Neither of those 

documents had evidence attached, and the Court is unable to find any elsewhere in the record.6

 

To show that “a reasonable person could believe” that Mr. Frank was the killer, Ms. Taplin must 

point to evidence. But she provides only allegations. Roth, 642 F.3d at 1180. 

If the Court were to accept as true Ms. Taplin’s allegations regarding Mr. Frank, it would 

conclude that a reasonable person could believe that Mr. Frank was the real accomplice. But 

Ms. Taplin must also show that a reasonable person could believe that the FBI is withholding 

 6

 Although Ms. Taplin requested limited discovery as part of this proceeding, the Court 

notes that the requested discovery would not have led to the production of evidence relevant to 

Ms. Taplin’s factual burden. Ms. Taplin “d[id] not seek discovery about the content of any 

documents.” Joint Status Rep. 2, ECF No. 16. Rather, she sought information related to the 

Government’s searches, if any, for responsive documents. See id. at 2–3. 
13 

evidence that corroborates her theory. See id. Ms. Taplin does not provide any evidence, or 

even allegations, that meet this burden. While the complaint points to documents suggesting that 

the FBI has some files on Adam Frank, see Compl. ¶¶ 26, 28, ECF No. 1, it does not show that 

the agency is likely to have any that link him to the Kim Anh murders. The complaint does not 

allege, for example, that the FBI investigated those murders, which would have made it likely 

that the agency’s documents regarding Mr. Frank are relevant to Mr. Lacaze’s case. In view of 

Mr. Frank’s extensive criminal background, it would not be surprising that the FBI has files on 

him. However, Ms. Taplin has not presented cause for a reasonable person to believe that the 

documents would have anything to do with the Kim Anh murders rather than Mr. Frank’s other 

crimes. The evidentiary threshold is not satisfied in this case.7

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Government’s motion for summary 

judgment. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and 

contemporaneously issued. 

Dated: September 10, 2013 /s/ Rudolph Contreras 

 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS 

 United States District Judge 

 7

 The Department of Justice must also be the department of justice. Mr. Lacaze is on 

death row. That is neither a routine nor trivial matter, and Ms. Taplin’s allegations raise serious 

questions. Although FOIA may not require that the FBI review any responsive documents it 

may possess in order to determine whether it has information that could support Mr. Lacaze’s 

claim of innocence, it may wish to do so nonetheless.