United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

Nos. 18-1618; 18-1684

MARIA SUÁREZ-TORRES and 

NORBETO MEDINA-RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

PANADERIA Y RESPOSTERIA ESPAÑA, INC., d/b/a PANADERIA ESPAÑA

and IMMOBILIARIA ISLA VERDE, INC.,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Barron, Lipez, and Dyk,



Circuit Judges.

Jose Carlos Velez Colon for appellants, with whom Law Offices 

of Velez-Colon was on brief.

José Enrico Valenzuela-Alvarado for appellees, with whom 

Valenzuela-Alvarado, LLC was on brief. 

February 17, 2021

 Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
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LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises from a lawsuit 

brought by appellants Maria Suárez-Torres and Norberto MedinaRodriguez against appellees Panaderia y Reposteria España, Inc., 

a bakery in Carolina, Puerto Rico, and Inmobiliaria Isla Verde, 

Inc. (collectively, "Panaderia España")1 under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA")2 and the Puerto Rico Civil Rights 

Act.3 Suárez-Torres and Medina-Rodriguez appeal the district

court's post-judgment denial of their motion for attorney's fees

and motion to reopen. After careful review, we affirm. 

I.

Suárez-Torres and Medina-Rodriguez are described in the 

complaint as "testers" who visit local places of public 

accommodation in Puerto Rico primarily to assess and challenge 

violations of the ADA. Suárez-Torres and Medina-Rodriguez allege 

that they each visited Panaderia España on separate occasions --

Medina-Rodriguez in early 2015 and Suárez-Torres in early 2016 --

and encountered barriers to their equal access and full enjoyment 

of appellees' facilities, services, goods, and amenities. In April 

1 The parties do not explain in their briefing the 

relationship between Panaderia y Reposteria España, Inc. and 

Inmobiliaria Isla Verde, Inc., and the record provides no insight. 

We therefore treat the defendants as a single entity (Panaderia 

España), as the parties have done throughout these proceedings.

2 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.

3 P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, § 13. 
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2016, Suárez-Torres and Medina-Rodriguez filed suit against 

Panaderia España, alleging that the bakery had violated the ADA by 

failing to remedy architectural barriers -- specifically, 

inadequate accessible parking, lack of accessible seating and 

service counters, and structural deficiencies in the accessible 

restroom -- and by maintaining a discriminatory policy of keeping 

the accessible restroom, but not other restrooms, locked, which 

forced disabled individuals to ask for a key to use the restroom. 

Shortly thereafter, Suárez-Torres and Medina-Rodriguez sent a 

letter to Panaderia España requesting that all ADA violations be 

remedied and demanding a settlement of $4,500.

In January 2017, an expert retained by Suárez-Torres and 

Medina-Rodriguez conducted an inspection of the bakery and drafted 

a report, which was provided to Panaderia España. At a status 

conference shortly after the inspection, the district court 

granted Panaderia España's request to retain its own expert to 

conduct a site inspection within 30 days. The court also set a 

deadline for the parties to file simultaneous motions for summary 

judgment. 

In April 2017, Panaderia España filed a motion for 

summary judgment, challenging appellants' standing as testers and 

arguing that appellants failed to show an injury-in-fact because 

they did not prove they actually visited the bakery. It also 

argued that appellants' claims were moot because the bakery had 
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renovated its premises to comply with ADA standards. In a sworn 

statement, the owner of the bakery attested to the renovations, 

stated that he had hired an expert to inspect whether the 

renovations brought the property into compliance with the ADA, and 

explained that the expert found additional "situations" involving 

ADA noncompliance that would "be fully corrected soon." SuárezTorres and Medina-Rodriguez filed an opposition to Panaderia 

España's motion for summary judgment, but it was stricken as 

untimely and noncompliant with the federal rules. 

The district court denied Panaderia España's summary 

judgment motion in an order dated January 23, 2018. The court 

first rejected Panaderia España's argument that Suárez-Torres and 

Medina-Rodriguez lacked standing because of their status as 

testers. The court concluded that "'tester' motive does not defeat 

standing," and may even make it more likely that plaintiffs would 

return to the bakery, even if only to ensure ADA compliance. The 

court also declined to afford any weight to Panaderia España's 

contention that plaintiffs were lying about whether they visited 

the bakery.

Then, turning to Panaderia España's claim that the 

business was renovated to comply with ADA standards and that any 

remaining violations would be "fully corrected soon," the court 

explained that,
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the motion for summary judgment fails to set 

forth evidence of the completion of these 

changes or adjustments to the design of the 

locale, which would thereby make the 

plaintiffs' ADA claims moot at this stage. 

Because defendants do not purport to have 

addressed the alleged ADA violations, the

motion for summary judgment is DENIED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE. Defendants are hereby ordered to 

submit evidence of the completion of the 

changes to the design of the business 

establishment that would make it fully 

compliant with all applicable standards and 

guidelines under [the] ADA.

The district court convened a status conference two days 

later. The minute entry for that conference reads, in its 

entirety:

[Counsel for] defendants informed [the court] 

that completion of the changes to be made at 

Panaderia y Reposteria España to comply with 

[the] ADA shall be completed within 90 days. 

Hence, the defendants were granted the request

[for 90 days to make the identified changes]

and shall file a motion by not later than April 

27, 2018 and shall submit the pertinent 

documents in compliance as to the changes made 

at the establishment under [the] ADA. No 

objection by counsel for plaintiffs.

Less than two weeks after that status conference -- well 

before the ninety-day deadline for Panaderia España to complete 

and submit evidence of the outstanding architectural renovations 

-- Suárez-Torres and Medina-Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss 

their claims brought under the Puerto Rico Civil Rights Act and 

for final judgment on their ADA claims "on account that [they]

obtained the requested relief under federal law and [we]re fully 
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satisfied with the result of th[e] civil action." Appellants 

specifically noted that judgment in their favor was appropriate 

because Panaderia España had agreed to complete the "required 

changes or adjustments to the design of the locale" within 90 days. 

In an electronic docket order, the district court 

"noted" plaintiffs' motion for judgment, indicated that it would 

"dismiss[] [the] state law claims with prejudice and ADA claims 

without prejudice," and stated that the plaintiffs "may file a 

motion to reopen [the] case if the defendants fail to comply with 

the deadlines established in the most recent status conference." 

The court entered a judgment of dismissal in accordance with that 

docket order the same day.

Suárez-Torres and Medina-Rodriguez then moved for 

attorney's fees. They argued that they were "prevailing parties" 

under the ADA's fee-shifting provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, because 

Panaderia España admitted noncompliance with the ADA and the 

district court had ordered it to submit evidence of compliance. 

Panaderia España opposed, arguing that plaintiffs failed to 

litigate the case and their attorney's ethically suspect conduct 

precluded a fee award. 

The district court denied the motion, remarking that it 

"certainly did not address the merits of the plaintiffs' ADA claim" 

and "did not place itself in a position to enforce the terms of 

any settlement agreement or to compel the defendant to make any 
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alterations to its place of business." To the contrary, the court 

explained, it had merely "noted the plaintiffs' satisfaction with 

the defendants' voluntary modifications to the building," 

proceeded to enter judgment "as requested," and notified

plaintiffs of their ability to request that the case be reopened

if the agreed-upon changes were not completed in a timely manner. 

Panaderia España secured an extension of time to submit 

evidence of the completed alterations. Two weeks after the new 

deadline, it filed a "Motion in Compliance with Order" accompanied 

by an expert report. The report detailed the many architectural 

changes that Panaderia España had made and concluded that the 

premises were,

in compliance with the [ADA] as they relate to 

persons with disabilities parking at 

designated accessible spaces, entering the 

facilities, and being able to reach and make 

use of the accessible sales and service 

counter, tables and restroom. 

In response, Suárez-Torres and Medina-Rodriguez moved to 

reopen the case. They argued that the expert report showed that 

Panaderia España was still violating the ADA because: (1) a newly 

designed accessible parking space encroached on a pedestrian 

walkway, (2) certain pipes in the accessible restroom were not 

properly insulated or covered, and (3) Panaderia España continued 

to maintain its discriminatory policy of locking the accessible 

restroom. 
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The district court denied the motion to reopen in a brief 

electronic docket order:

[The motion to reopen] stems from Panaderia 

[España's] motion in compliance (Docket No. 

93) that it has addressed any and all alleged 

and supposed structural and design 

deficiencies raised in the ADA complaint in 

regards to the establishment's parking, access 

aisles, tables, service counters and 

restrooms. Therefore, the court finds that 

the new and different allegations from those 

in the claim are not the subject or object of 

this suit. Accordingly, the court denies the 

plaintiffs' motion to reopen the case.

Suárez-Torres and Medina-Rodriguez timely appealed both the 

district court's order denying their request for attorney's fees 

and its order denying their motion to reopen. 

II.

A. Standing

Panaderia España argues that appellants are not entitled 

to collect fees because they lacked standing to pursue their ADA 

claims in the first instance. Specifically, Panaderia España 

contends that appellants never visited the bakery themselves and, 

even if they did, they were not injured because the only purpose 

of their visit was to test ADA compliance. Panaderia España raised 

those same arguments as grounds for summary judgment below but the 

district court disagreed, holding that Panaderia España offered 

"no extraneous evidence to support the[] contention that the court 
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should doubt the sincerity of plaintiffs' averment," and that 

appellants' tester status did not defeat standing. 

Panaderia España never challenged the district court's

determination that appellants had standing. Instead, the case 

settled shortly after summary judgment was denied and, thereafter,

the court entered a judgment of dismissal. Panaderia España now 

seeks to raise lack of standing as an alternative ground for 

affirmance of the district court's post-judgment rulings on 

appellants' motions for attorney's fees and to reopen. Arguably,

principles of collateral estoppel might preclude Panaderia España

from relitigating the district court's standing determination on 

summary judgment. See Burlington Northern R.R. v. Hyundai Merchant 

Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227, 1233 n.8 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that 

denial of summary judgment can sometimes support collateral 

estoppel); but see Kay R Elect. Corp. v. Stone & Webster 

Constructions Co., 23 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding that 

the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment 

supporting issue preclusion). Moreover, whether appellants had 

standing to bring their ADA claims in the first instance may be 

irrelevant to their ability to seek attorney's fees. See D.A. 

Osguthorpe Fam. P'ship v. ASC Utah, Inc., 705 F.3d 1223, 1236 (10th 

Cir. 2013) (explaining that "a district court may still award 

attorney's fees after dismissing the underlying action for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction. . . . because a claim for attorney's 
- 10 -

fees gives rise to issues separate and distinct from the merits of 

the original cause of action" (internal citation omitted)). 

On the other hand, Panaderia España's argument challenges 

the existence of an injury-in-fact, a constitutional standing 

requirement that implicates our subject-matter jurisdiction and, 

hence, we may be obliged to consider it. Merrimon v. Unum Life 

Ins. Co. of Am., 758 F.3d 46, 51-52 (1st Cir. 2014) ("The presence 

or absence of constitutional standing implicates a federal court's 

subject-matter jurisdiction. . . . [A] federal court is obliged to 

resolve that issue even if the parties have neither briefed nor 

argued it."). We need not resolve whether Panaderia España's 

standing challenge is procedurally proper, however, because we 

conclude that it fails in any event.

The three familiar requirements of standing are: 

(1) injury in fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and 

the defendant's alleged misconduct, and (3) that the injury would 

have been redressed by a favorable outcome. Lujan v. Defs. Of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Panaderia España challenges 

only the first prong, alleging that appellants fabricated their 

visits to the bakery and cannot establish an injury because they 

are testers.4 

4 Panaderia España does not challenge the other requirements 

of an injury-in-fact under the ADA: whether appellants (1) are 

disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) encountered barriers 

at the property in violation of the ADA, and (3) were deterred 
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The burden of proof to establish standing is consistent

with "the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive 

stages of the litigation." Id. at 561. Where, as here, the case 

progresses to the summary judgment stage, the moving party --

Panaderia España -- must initially support its challenge to 

standing "by citing to particular parts of materials in the record 

. . . or showing that the materials cited do not establish . . . a 

genuine dispute [of material fact]." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

The nonmoving party -- Suárez-Torres and Medina-Rodriguez -- must 

then counter with specific facts supported by affidavits or other 

affirmative evidence. See Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 436 

(1st Cir. 1995); see also Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th 

Cir. 2007) ("To prevail at summary judgment on standing grounds, 

the defendant must show that the record is devoid of evidence 

raising a genuine issue of material fact that would support the 

plaintiff's ultimate burden of proving standing. . . . 'In response 

to a summary judgment motion,' the plaintiff cannot 'rest on "mere 

allegations," but must "set forth" by affidavit or other evidence 

from patronizing the property in the future because of those 

violations. See, e.g., Disabled Ams. For Equal Access, Inc. v. 

Ferris Del Caribe, Inc., 405 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2005) 

(explaining the requirements of establishing an injury-in-fact 

under the ADA). Moreover, the second and third elements of 

standing are uncontroversial: Panaderia España's alleged failure 

to comply with the ADA is the cause of appellants' injury and that 

injury would have been redressed by a favorable outcome requiring 

those violations to be remedied. 
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"specific facts"' regarding the elements of standing." (quoting 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561)); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 464 

(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The standing issue is obviously 

subject to different evaluation, depending upon the stage the 

litigation has reached. . . . [To] obtain or avoid summary 

judgment[, the] moving party must 'show that there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact,' and [the] nonmoving party cannot 

rest on 'mere allegations' to counter a properly supported motion, 

but must set forth 'specific facts' through affidavits or other 

evidence." (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56)).

In support of its contention that appellants did not 

actually visit the bakery, Panaderia España offers no more than 

its assertion that appellants fabricated the visits described in 

the complaint. Panaderia España fails to substantiate its

allegation or point to any supporting evidence in the record. Such 

speculation cannot support a challenge to standing at the summary 

judgment stage. Accordingly, we conclude that Panaderia España 

failed to meet its initial burden to challenge standing at the 

summary judgment phase and, like the district court, decline to 

afford any weight to the unsupported allegation that appellants 

lied about their visits to the bakery. 

In contrast, Panaderia España did proffer support in 

favor of its argument that appellants and their attorney are 

"testers" by offering the statements of appellants describing 
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themselves as testers. Panaderia España contends that, as testers, 

appellants are unable to establish an injury because their only

motivation in visiting the bakery was to detect ADA violations. 

We have not previously addressed the impact of a 

plaintiff's status as a "tester" on her ability to establish

standing under the ADA. However, the circuits that have considered 

this issue have uniformly concluded that an individual's "tester" 

status does not defeat standing.5 As the Eleventh Circuit 

explained in Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., the ADA 

guarantees the right of any individual to be free from "disability 

discrimination in the enjoyment of [public places of 

accommodation] regardless of [the individual's] motive for 

visiting the facility." 733 F.3d at 1332. Congress did not limit 

the protections of the ADA to "clients or customers" or otherwise 

impose a bona fide visitor requirement. Id. at 1332-34 

(contrasting 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a),6 and 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv),7 which 

5 See Mosley v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., 942 F.3d 752, 758 

(6th Cir. 2019); Griffin v. Dep't of Labor Fed. Credit Union, 912 

F.3d 649, 656 (4th Cir. 2019); Civil Rights Educ. and Enf't Ctr.

v. Hosp. Props. Tr., 867 F.3d 1093, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2017); Colo. 

Cross Disability Coal. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 765 F.3d 1205, 

1211-12 (10th Cir. 2014); Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 

F.3d 1323, 1332-34 (11th Cir. 2013). 

6 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), it shall be unlawful "[t]o 

refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer . . . 

to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial 

status, or national origin."

7 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv), three prohibited 

activities -- denial of a benefit, failure to provide an equal 
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do contain such requirements). Hence, such limitations should not 

be read into the ADA. Id. We agree with this analysis. 

Accordingly, we conclude that appellants' status as testers does

not defeat standing.8

B. Attorney's Fees

Parties in the United States "ordinarily [are] required 

to bear their own attorney's fees" absent explicit fee-shifting 

authority. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of 

Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001). The ADA contains 

such explicit authority: 

In any action or administrative proceeding 

commenced pursuant to this chapter, the court 

or agency, in its discretion, may allow the 

prevailing party, other than the United 

States, a reasonable attorney's fee, including 

litigation expenses, and costs . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 12205. 

opportunity to participate in a benefit, and failure to ensure 

disabled individuals are not segregated -- are limited to 

"clients[s] or customer[s] of the . . . public accommodation." 

8 The civil rights movement has a long history of using testers 

to uncover and illustrate discrimination. See Havens Realty Corp.

v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-75 (1982) (a tester sued a realtor 

for providing inaccurate or incomplete housing information); 

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 552-54 (1967) (a group of black 

clergymen testers challenged their removal from a segregated bus 

terminal in Jackson, Mississippi); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202, 

203-04 (1958) (black passenger tester challenged being barred from 

the white section of a segregated bus in Memphis, Tennessee). We 

recognize that appellee argues that appellants' attorney has 

abused that testing tradition in this and other ADA cases. We 

make no judgment about the merits of those allegations. They are 

not germane to the issues in this appeal. 
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To recover fees under the ADA's fee-shifting provision, 

a party must demonstrate that she has prevailed in the litigation. 

Id. The term "prevailing party" is a "legal term of art," 

Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603, and "[t]he concepts that shape th[at] 

term apply broadly to the entire universe of federal fee-shifting 

statutes." Hutchinson ex rel. Julien v. Patrick, 636 F.3d 1, 8 

(1st Cir. 2011). To qualify as a "prevailing party," the party 

seeking to recover fees must demonstrate (1) "a material alteration 

of the legal relationship of the parties" (2) that possesses the 

requisite "judicial imprimatur." Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604-05

(quoting Tex. State Tchrs. Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 

U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989)); see also Hutchinson, 636 F.3d at 8-9. 

We review a district court's determination as to "prevailing party" 

status de novo. Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 

2009). 

1. Material Change in Legal Relationship

We readily conclude that appellants have established the 

first requirement of prevailing party status -- that a material 

change occurred in the parties' legal relationship. A material 

change occurs when the plaintiff succeeds on "any significant issue

in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the [plaintiff] 

sought in bringing the suit." Tex. State Tchrs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 

at 789 (quoting Hensley v. Echerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
- 16 -

As a result of the instant litigation, Panaderia España 

hired a structural engineer to assess ADA compliance and made 

substantial -- albeit insufficient, according to appellants --

alterations to the bakery. Those changes, detailed in the report 

of Panaderia España's expert, addressed several of the concerns 

appellants outlined in their complaint, including the lack of 

accessible parking, the height of service and dining counters, and 

various structural issues in the accessible restroom. By causing 

Panaderia España to take substantial steps toward ADA compliance, 

Suárez-Torres and Medina-Rodriguez achieved at least some of the 

benefits sought in filing their suit and, therefore, a material 

change occurred in the legal relationship of the parties. 

2. Judicial Imprimatur 

The judicial imprimatur inquiry looks to the level of 

court involvement in the parties' changed relationship. 

Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605-06. A voluntary change in conduct by 

the defendant, "although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff 

sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial 

imprimatur" for prevailing party status. Id. at 605. In 

Buckhannon, the Supreme Court identified only two outcomes that 

necessarily satisfy the judicial imprimatur requirement: 

(1) "judgments on the merits" and (2) "settlement agreements 

enforced through a consent decree." Id. at 604. A narrow reading 

of Buckhannon limits a finding of judicial imprimatur to one of 
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those two circumstances. See, e.g., Smith v. Fitchburg Pub. Schs., 

401 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2005). 

We have held, however, that Buckhannon should not be 

read so narrowly as to require courts to "look exclusively at the 

label attached to a particular order." Hutchinson, 636 F.3d at 9; 

see also Smith, 401 F.3d at 26 ("[W]e do not foreclose the

possibility of a broad reading [of Buckhannon] . . . ."). Instead, 

"an inquiring court must consider 'whether the order contains the 

sort of judicial involvement and actions inherent in a "court 

ordered consent decree."'" Hutchinson, 636 F.3d at 9 (quoting 

Aronov, 562 F.3d at 90). To that end, we consider both the content 

and the context of the order by applying the following factors

identified in Hutchinson v. Patrick: (1) "whether the change in 

the legal relationship between the parties was 'court-ordered,'" 

(2) "whether there was 'judicial approval of the relief vis-à-vis 

the merits of the case,'" and (3) "whether there exists continuing 

'judicial oversight and ability to enforce the obligations imposed 

on the parties.'" Id. (quoting Aronov, 562 F.3d at 90). 

Suárez-Torres and Medina-Rodriguez initially contend 

that the district court's summary judgment ruling was functionally 

equivalent to a full and complete judgment on the merits and, 

therefore, makes them prevailing parties even under the narrow 

reading of Buckhannon. According to appellants, the court 

necessarily addressed Panaderia España's merits argument to 
- 18 -

conclude that, even in the absence of opposition,9 summary judgment 

was not warranted. But even if we were to assume that is so (and 

we do not decide that it is), plaintiffs point to no authority

indicating that an order denying summary judgment is equivalent to 

a "judgment[] on the merits" within the meaning of Buckhannon so 

as to automatically qualify plaintiffs as "prevailing parties." 

See 532 U.S. at 604; see also Aronov, 562 F.3d at 90 ("Buckhannon

contrasted final judgment on the merits . . . with . . . for 

example, securing the reversal of a directed verdict . . . .").10

Appellants also argue that the application of the 

Hutchinson factors demonstrates that the summary judgment order

contains the sort of judicial involvement and actions inherent in 

a "court ordered consent decree." We disagree. 

9 As we have already explained, appellants attempted to file 

an opposition to summary judgment, but it was stricken for failure 

to comply with the federal rules. 

10 We have not yet determined whether some interlocutory 

orders can satisfy the judicial imprimatur requirement of the 

prevailing party test. As appellants note, several circuits have 

answered that question in the affirmative, but only in the 

materially different context of an interlocutory decision awarding 

preliminary injunctive relief. See People Against Police Violence

v. City of Pittsburgh, 520 F.3d 226, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding 

that a preliminary injunction that addresses the merits and alters 

the status quo can confer prevailing party status); see also Kansas 

Jud. Watch v. Stout, 653 F.3d 1230, 1238 (10th Cir. 2011); 

Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519 F.3d 517, 524-26 (5th Cir. 2008); 

Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 

2002). 
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We first ask whether the change in the parties' legal 

relationship was "court-ordered." Hutchinson, 636 F.3d at 9. 

Appellants answer that question affirmatively. They contend that 

Panaderia España failed to proffer evidence of remedial measures 

until the court denied summary judgment, ordered Panaderia España

to submit evidence of "full[] complian[ce]," and enforced that 

order with a ninety-day deadline at the January 2018 status 

conference. According to appellants, the district court 

effectively "forced Panaderia España to do something it otherwise

would not have had to do -- namely, agree [to] become fully 

compliant with the ADA [] within 90 days."

The record, however, belies that assertion. In support 

of its motion for summary judgment, and prior to any of the 

judicial actions referenced by appellants, Panaderia España 

submitted a declaration by its owner stating that he had already 

hired a structural engineer to inspect the property and had 

recently remodeled "[in] compl[iance] with all ADA Standards." 

Panaderia España admitted voluntarily that its hired expert 

detected additional ADA violations that would be fully corrected 

"soon."

The court's subsequent order and imposition of the 

ninety-day deadline did not purport to require Panaderia España to 

do what it had already done. It simply directed Panaderia España

to substantiate its claims that its property was or would soon be 
- 20 -

"fully compliant with all applicable standards and guidelines 

under [the] ADA" to the extent it hoped to "make the plaintiffs' 

ADA claims moot at this stage." Such court involvement does not 

render the changed relationship "court-ordered" within the meaning 

of the first factor of the Hutchinson inquiry. See Aronov, 562 

F.3d at 92-93 ("A plaintiff does not become a prevailing party if 

the court merely recognizes what the [defendant] has voluntarily 

agreed to [do] . . . ." (citing Smith, 401 F.3d at 27)); see also

Hutchinson, 636 F.3d at 9. 

Turning to the second factor, we consider whether the 

district court "engaged in a sufficient appraisal of the merits,"

even in the absence of a judgment on the merits. Hutchinson, 636 

F.3d at 10. Appellants contend that the summary judgment order 

included an implicit acknowledgement that the bakery violated the 

ADA. According to appellants, the court would not have required 

Panaderia España to follow through on its promise to make certain 

structural changes and proffer evidence of full compliance with 

the ADA if such changes were not required by the ADA. 

Even if we agreed with appellants' view that the district 

court's ruling implicitly addressed the merits, the Supreme Court 

"ha[s] not awarded attorney's fees where the plaintiff . . . 

acquired a judicial pronouncement that [a] defendant has violated 

the [law] unaccompanied by 'judicial relief.'" Buckhannon, 532 

U.S. at 606 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987)); 
- 21 -

see also Aronov, 562 F.3d at 90 ("Buckhannon contrasted final 

judgments and court-ordered consent decrees with situations which 

failed to meet the judicial imprimatur test: for example . . . 

acquiring a judicial pronouncement that a defendant has violated 

the Constitution unaccompanied by 'judicial relief' . . . ." 

(quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605-06)). Hence, an implicit 

appraisal of the merits is insufficient under the second prong of

the Hutchinson test.

The third and final factor requires an assessment of 

whether the order imposes "an obligation to comply" and whether 

there exists "judicial oversight to enforce that obligation." 

Hutchinson, 636 F.3d at 10 (quoting Aronov, 562 F.3d at 91). It 

is well established that a trial court retains jurisdiction to 

enforce its judgments. See, e.g., Beckett v. Air Line Pilots 

Ass'n, 995 F.2d 280, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The third prong of the 

judicial imprimatur inquiry, however, requires more. 

In Hutchinson, we considered whether an order approving 

a settlement agreement made the plaintiffs prevailing parties. 

636 F.3d at 6. The order "expressly retained jurisdiction over 

the case," and it instructed that the "case not be closed and that 

judgment not enter pending compliance with the terms" of the 

underlying settlement agreement. Id. at 10 (internal citation 

omitted). The terms of the underlying agreement also outlined the 

parameters of the court's enforcement authority, which included 
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the use of "any appropriate equitable or remedial power" and 

required court approval for any revisions to the agreement. Id.

at 11 (internal citation omitted). We explained that the district 

court's explicit reservation of jurisdiction and the oversight 

provided by terms of the settlement agreement "distinguish[ed] the 

case at hand from the swath of cases in which a district court 

merely recognizes the fact of a settlement and dismisses the 

underlying action." Id. at 10-11.

Here, the court entered an order "noting" the 

plaintiffs' motion for judgment of dismissal, and, thereafter, 

entered judgment and closed the case even though defendants had 

not yet submitted any additional evidence of ADA compliance. The 

court did identify a mechanism for some judicial oversight, stating 

that Suárez-Torres and Medina-Rodriguez could "file a motion to 

reopen the case if the defendants fail[ed] to comply with the 

deadlines established at the [January 2018] status conference." 

In so informing the plaintiffs, the court did not commit to 

overseeing the execution of a settlement, suspend final judgment 

until compliance was achieved, or otherwise indicate that it would 

use equitable or remedial powers to enforce the terms of an 

agreement between the parties. 

Instead, the court identified the availability of a 

post-judgment remedy and indicated the ground upon which it would 

entertain a motion for such a remedy. That limited option for 
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further relief stands in stark contrast to the settlement 

enforcement in Hutchinson or the ongoing role of a court in the 

context of a consent decree. See, e.g., In re Pearson, 990 F.2d 

653, 658 (1st Cir. 1993) ("A consent decree is not simply a 

contract entered into between private parties seeking to 

effectuate parochial concerns. The court stands behind the decree, 

ready to interpret and enforce its provisions." (citations 

omitted)). Whereas a violation of settlement terms in the latter 

circumstances results in compliance proceedings in the enforcing 

court, Suárez-Torres and Medina-Rodriguez were entitled only to 

request that the court exercise its discretion to reopen the case

if Panaderia España failed to keep its promise.

In short, Panaderia España voluntarily agreed to make 

substantial changes in response to appellants' complaint, and 

appellants have failed to demonstrate the requisite judicial 

imprimatur on that outcome to make them prevailing parties.

C. Motion to Reopen

The finality of judgments is a basic tenet of our system 

of jurisprudence. United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 

F.2d 657, 660 (1st Cir. 1990). The decision to grant or deny a 

motion to disturb a final judgment is, therefore, committed to the 

"sound discretion of the trial court." Id. Accordingly, we review 

a district court's denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of 

discretion. Kinan v. Cohen, 268 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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Appellants contend that the district court erred in 

denying their motion to reopen, which alleged that (1) a newly 

designated accessible parking spot unlawfully obstructed a 

pedestrian walkway, and (2) Panaderia España continued to maintain 

a policy of leaving the accessible restroom locked to the public.11 

The district court denied the motion to reopen in a summary order, 

concluding that the allegations raised therein were "new and 

different" from those in the original action and, therefore, did 

not warrant reopening the case. 

With respect to the encroachment of the accessible 

parking spot on a public walkway, plaintiffs recognize that they 

did not raise this specific claim in their initial complaint. 

Indeed, they could not have included such an allegation because

the issue arose only after Panaderia España attempted to remedy 

the lack of accessible parking. Appellants nevertheless contend 

that their encroachment-based claim is captured within the 

complaint because, for purposes of the ADA, "the totality of 

barriers at the public accommodation constitute[s] the factual 

underpinnings of a single legal injury, namely, the failure to 

remove architectural barriers in violation of the ADA." 

11 Appellants also claimed in their motion to reopen that 

certain pipes in the newly renovated accessible restroom were not 

insulated or configured to protect against contact, but they do 

not renew that claim on appeal. 
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Several circuits have held that an ADA plaintiff who has 

filed suit after encountering a barrier in a place of public 

accommodation may challenge all other barriers on that property 

related to her disability, including those of which she was unaware

when she initially filed her complaint. See Doran v. 7-Eleven, 

Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Even if a disabled 

plaintiff did not know about certain barriers when the plaintiff 

first filed suit, that plaintiff will have a 'personal stake in 

the outcome of the controversy' so long as his or her suit is 

limited to barriers related to that person's particular 

disability." (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 

(2007)); see also Kreisler v. Second Ave. Diner Corp., 731 F.3d 

184, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports 

(U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 950 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Steger

v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 893-94 (8th Cir. 2000).

However, this case does not present that issue. It does 

not matter whether appellants could have pursued their 

encroachment claim if they had continued to litigate their case. 

The question before the district court was whether it should 

disturb final judgement based on a concededly new, although 

related, argument for noncompliance. We conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its broad discretion in answering that question 

in the negative.
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The district court similarly did not abuse its 

discretion in declining to reopen the case based on appellants' 

allegations that Panaderia España continues to maintain a 

discriminatory policy of leaving the accessible restroom locked. 

This claim was plainly raised in the initial complaint. The record 

shows, however, that the agreement between the parties resulting 

in dismissal was apparently limited to Panaderia España agreeing 

to remedy the identified structural violations, but not the 

restroom policy. 

In their motion for a judgment of dismissal, appellants 

expressed their satisfaction with Panaderia España's agreement to 

complete the "required changes or adjustments to the design of the 

locale," without mentioning an agreement regarding the accessible 

restroom policy. Similarly, in its motion certifying compliance 

with the 90-day deadline, Panaderia España stated only that its 

"facilities comply with all ADA Standards." Hence, the district 

court reasonably concluded that Panaderia España remedied "any and 

all alleged and supposed structural and design deficiencies raised 

in the ADA complaint," that the restroom policy was outside of the 

scope of the parties' settlement, and, thus, that the allegation 

regarding the operation of the accessible restroom did not justify 

disturbing final judgment. Accordingly, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion to reopen. 

Affirmed.