1

Filed 6/29/23; certified for publication 7/27/23 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

JANE DOE #21 (S.H.) et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

CFR ENTERPRISES, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 A163543 

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. 19CIV00392)

JANE DOE #4 (D.T.),

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

DESERT VENTURES SOUTH, 

LLC,

Defendant and Respondent.

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. 19CIV04095)

JANE DOE #9 (J.C.) et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

RME CLINICS, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. 19CIV05035)

In 2019, several dozen plaintiffs sued Massage Envy Franchising, LLC 

(a franchisor) and Massage Envy franchisees alleging that as adults they 

were sexually assaulted by massage therapists at Massage Envy locations in 
2

California between August 2003 and November 2014. This is an appeal by 18 

of those plaintiffs from judgments entered against them after demurrers were 

sustained without leave to amend on the ground that the applicable statutes 

of limitations barred all their claims. Just as the appellate briefing was 

about to be completed, the Governor approved Assembly Bill No. 2777, which 

amended section 340.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure to revive certain 

claims that relate to sexual assault. (Stats. 2022, ch. 442, § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 

2023.) After plaintiffs argued in their reply brief that the new statute 

revived all their claims, we asked for and received supplemental briefing 

from the parties on the effect of the new law.

It is clear that the new law revives some, if not all, of plaintiffs’ claims. 

But it is impossible for us to fairly say more at this point, because the 

operative complaints and the demurrers at issue were drafted before the 

revival statute was enacted. We shall reverse the judgment of dismissal and 

remand to the trial court for further proceedings to give plaintiffs the 

opportunity to amend their complaints if necessary, and to give defendants 

the opportunity to make further arguments, if they so choose, regarding the 

effect of the revival statute on each of the causes of action brought by each of 

the plaintiffs in this case.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaints

Three separate complaints are at issue in this appeal, which is brought 

by 18 of the original plaintiffs.1 In one of the complaints, the plaintiffs 

1 The appellants are Jane Doe Nos. 21 (S.H.), 23 (A.H.), 25 (M.H.), 27 

(R.L.), 28 (A.L.), 30 (M.M.), 33 (A.M.), 37 (M.S.), and 38 (E.L.) in superior 

court case No. 19CIV00392; Jane Doe No. 4 (D.T.) in case No. 19CIV04095; 

and Jane Doe Nos. 9 (J.C.), 10 (E.D.), 11 (T.S.), 12 (A.H.), 15 (J.M.), 16 (T.R.), 

18 (L.N.), and 19 (M.M.) in case No. 19CIV05035. The contours of this appeal 
3

alleged in general terms that the defendants were aware of a “rampant 

problem of sexual assaults occurring at Massage Envy locations,” and 

concealed or suppressed information about the assaults, intending that 

plaintiffs would buy massage services that defendants knew were unsafe. 

Defendants allegedly “actively prevent[ed] sexual assault . . . from being 

reported to law enforcement and/or state massage therapy boards,” or to the 

public at large. And although defendants allegedly knew that their security 

screening of massage therapists was deficient, their background checks were 

below industry standards, and their massage therapists were not trained or 

supervised, defendants concealed this information from plaintiffs and 

deliberately represented the opposite, including that they had a “zero 

tolerance” policy relating to sexual misconduct by massage therapists, and 

that their massage therapists were psychologically fit, properly screened, and 

safe. Plaintiffs alleged they reasonably relied on defendants’ false assurances 

that the massage services they offered were safe and free of inappropriate 

touching, and had no way to discover that the assurances were false, because 

have been in some flux. Initially, there were 23 plaintiffs/appellants and 

numerous defendants/respondents. Only one of the respondents, Massage 

Envy Franchising, LLC, was common to all the plaintiffs. Before the opening 

brief was filed, three plaintiffs dismissed their appeals, leaving 20 plaintiffs. 

After respondents’ brief was filed, another plaintiff dismissed her appeal in 

its entirety and the remaining 19 plaintiffs dismissed their appeals as to the 

common defendant. According to a letter filed by plaintiffs’ counsel on May 

30, 2023, 13 named defendants remained in the appeal as respondents. At 

oral argument, appellants’ counsel informed us that one of the 19 remaining 

plaintiffs had settled her case and would be dismissing her appeal. The 

dismissal has since been entered, leaving 18 plaintiffs/appellants.
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of defendants’ misrepresentations, omissions, and acts of cover-up, which 

were designed to obtain the plaintiffs as customers.2 

Each plaintiff in each of the three cases alleged nine causes of action: 

(1) negligence; (2) premises liability; (3) intentional infliction of emotional 

distress; (4) sexual battery (Civ. Code, § 1708.5); (5) violation of the Ralph 

Civil Rights Act of 1976 (Ralph Act, Civ. Code, § 51.73); (6) negligent 

misrepresentation; (7) fraud, intentional misrepresentation, concealment, 

false promise; (8) violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA, Civ. 

Code, § 1750 et seq.); and (9) fraudulent and unfair business practices in 

violation of the unfair competition law (UCL, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et 

seq.). 

Demurrers and Judgments

Defendants demurred to the complaints based on the then-applicable 

statutes of limitations. They contended that plaintiffs’ claims for negligence, 

premises liability, intentional infliction of emotional distress, sexual battery, 

and negligent misrepresentation were subject to a two-year limitations period 

governing “[a]n action for assault, battery, or injury . . . caused by the 

wrongful act or neglect” (Code Civ. Proc.,4 § 335.1), and that the Ralph Act 

2 The three operative complaints are lengthy: one is 170 pages long, 

one is 100 pages, and one is 34 pages. In their appellate briefs, to the limited 

extent plaintiffs cite to specific allegations in the complaints, they rely 

primarily on just one of the three complaints. Plaintiffs assert that “identical 

or similar passages may be found” in the other complaints, but they do not 

provide citations to those passages by page number, as they are required to 

do by rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) of the California Rules of Court. 

3 The Ralph Act sets forth “the right to be free from any violence, or 

intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons” on 

account of their sex. (Civ. Code, §§ 51.7, subd. (b)(1); 51, subd. (b).)

4 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise stated.
5

claims were subject to a three-year limitations period (§ 338, subd. (n); see 

also Civ. Code, § 52.4, subds. (b) & (c)), as were the claims for fraud (§ 338, 

subd. (d)) and violation of the CLRA. (Civ. Code, § 1783). Defendants argued 

that the longest applicable statute of limitations was four years, for claims of 

fraudulent and unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17208), and 

that because each of the plaintiffs was allegedly assaulted more than four 

years before the actions were filed, the statutes had run and the claims were 

time-barred.5 

After complicated pretrial proceedings not relevant for our purposes, 

case management orders were issued that sustained all of defendants’ 

demurrers without leave to amend on the basis of the applicable statutes of 

limitations.6 Judgments were entered in favor of defendants, and plaintiffs 

timely appealed.7 While this appeal was being briefed, plaintiffs dismissed 

their appeals as to Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, leaving only the 

franchisees as respondents. 

Plaintiffs’ Appeal and the Subsequent Amendment of Section 340.16 to Revive 

Lapsed Claims

In their opening brief on appeal, plaintiffs argued that they adequately 

pleaded delayed discovery in connection with their fraud claims, with the 

5 None of the appellants alleged an assault after November 2014, and 

each of the lawsuits was filed in 2019. 

6 The court concluded that the applicable limitations period for 

plaintiffs’ causes of action for the negligent misrepresentation period, like the 

limitations periods for fraud, was three years; and the limitations period on 

the negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and CLRA claims began to run at the 

time of the alleged sexual assaults. 

7 The parties stipulated that all of the judgments, which were issued on 

the same statute of limitations grounds by the same trial court judge, could 

be appealed through a single notice of appeal. 
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result that the statute of limitations was tolled as to all their claims. And 

they argued that section 340.16, as enacted in 2018 and subsequently 

amended through 2020, established a 10-year statute of limitations for sexual 

assault claims in actions filed after January 1, 2019, which rendered their 

claims timely. 

In their respondents’ brief, defendants argued that section 340.16 did 

not apply to plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants claimed that section 340.16 

prospectively enlarged the statute of limitations for tort claims arising from 

sexual assault, but did not revive any of the plaintiffs’ claims, all of which 

had accrued and lapsed before section 340.16 took effect, including the fraud 

claims, which, defendants argued, accrued on the dates of the alleged 

assaults.8 Defendants relied on section 3, which provides that “[n]o part of 

[the Code of Civil Procedure] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared”; on 

the absence of any statutory language in section 340.16 that would revive 

plaintiffs’ claims; and on case law holding that “lapsed claims are not 

considered revived without express legislative language of revival.” (Quarry 

8 Defendants acknowledged that the Legislature had amended section 

340.16 in 2019 and 2020 to revive certain limited classes of claims pertaining 

to student health centers or to UCLA that would otherwise be barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations; these amendments had no effect on 

plaintiffs’ claims. (See Stats. 2019, ch. 462, § 1, effective Oct. 2, 2019

[amending former subd. (c) (now subd. (c)(1)) to revive until Dec. 31, 2020, 

claims seeking to recover more than $250,000 “arising out of a sexual assault 

or other inappropriate contact, communication, or activity of a sexual nature 

by a physician occurring at a student health center between January 1, 1988, 

and January 1, 2017”]; Stats. 2020, ch. 246, § 1, effective Jan. 1, 2021 [adding 

subd. (d) to revive until Dec. 31, 2021 claims “seeking to recover damages 

arising out of a sexual assault or other inappropriate contact, communication, 

or activity of a sexual nature by a physician [associated with certain facilities 

owned and operated by UCLA] between January 1, 1983, and January 1, 

2019”].) 
7

v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 953; see also Doe v. Roman Catholic 

Archbishop of Los Angeles (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 953, 962 [“[t]he only time a 

court will apply a limitations period enacted after the underlying wrong 

occurs is when the pre-amendment limitations period has not yet expired 

(because, in that situation, the plaintiff’s claim is still viable and the new 

limitations period is not being applied retroactively) or . . . when the 

Legislature ‘expressly’ declares its intent to revive expired claims”].) 

Then, in September 2022, after respondents filed their brief on appeal, 

but before appellants filed their reply, Governor Newsom approved Assembly 

Bill No. 2777 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which amended section 340.16 to revive 

claims that seek to recover “damages suffered as a result of a sexual assault” 

occurring on or after a plaintiff’s 18th birthday, provided that the claims had 

not been litigated to finality or compromised by a written settlement 

agreement before January 1, 2023. (§ 340.16, subds. (a), (b)(3), (e)(6); Stats. 

2022, ch. 442, § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2023.) In their reply brief, filed in November 

2022, plaintiffs now had an entirely new argument. They contended that the 

judgments below should be reversed because their cases would still be 

pending on January 1, 2023, and Assembly Bill No. 2777 rendered all their 

claims timely. 

We requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties 

addressing the effect of Assembly Bill No. 2777. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

On an appeal from a judgment of dismissal based on an order 

sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, we apply the de novo 

standard of review. (Honig v. San Francisco Planning Dept. (2005) 127 

Cal.App.4th 520, 524.) We assume that all material factual allegations in the 
8

complaint are true. (Ibid.) “A demurrer is properly sustained without leave 

to amend where the pleading discloses on its face that the action is barred by 

the applicable statute of limitations.” (Ibid.)

In determining whether section 340.16, as amended, renders plaintiffs’ 

claims timely, we must “ ‘determine the Legislature’s intent so as to 

effectuate the law’s purpose.’ (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.) 

‘We begin by examining the statutory language, giving it a plain and 

commonsense meaning. [Citation.] We do not, however, consider the 

statutory language in isolation; rather, we look to the entire substance of the 

statutes in order to determine their scope and purposes. [Citation.] That is, 

we construe the words in question in context, keeping in mind the statutes’ 

nature and obvious purpose. [Citation.] We must harmonize the various 

parts of the enactments by considering them in the context of the statutory 

[framework] as a whole. [Citation.] If the statutory language is 

unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. If, however, the language 

supports more than one reasonable construction, then we may look to 

extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the 

legislative history.’ ” (Skidgel v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. 

(2021) 12 Cal.5th 1, 14.) 

B. Analysis

Since October 2, 2019, section 340.16 has provided that “[i]n any civil 

action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of sexual assault, where 

the assault occurred on or after the plaintiff’s 18th birthday, the time for 

commencement of the action shall be the later of the following: [¶] (1) Within 

10 years from the date of the last act, attempted act, or assault with the 

intent to commit an act, of sexual assault against the plaintiff. [¶] (2) Within 

three years from the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have 
9

discovered that an injury or illness resulted from an act, attempted act, or 

assault with the intent to commit an act, of sexual assault against the 

plaintiff.” 9 (§ 340.16, subd. (a); Stats. 2019, ch. 462, § 1; Stats. 2020, ch. 246, 

§ 1; Stats 2022, ch. 442, § 3.) “Sexual assault” is defined to mean any of a 

number of crimes described in the Penal Code, assault with the intent to 

commit any of those crimes, or an attempt to commit any of those crimes. 

(§ 340.16, subd. (b)(1); Stats. 2019, ch. 462, § 1; Stats. 2020, ch. 246, § 1; Stats 

2022, ch. 442, § 3.)

Effective January 1, 2023, section 340.16 was amended in two respects 

to revive certain claims seeking to recover damages suffered as a result of a 

sexual assault that would otherwise be barred by application of a statute of 

limitations. (Stats. 2022, ch. 442, § 3.) The relevant revival provisions are in 

subdivisions (b)(3) and (e) of section 340.16, to which we now turn. 

1. Section 340.16, subdivision (b)(3)

As amended in 2022, section 340.16 “applies to any action described in 

subdivision (a) that is based upon conduct that occurred on or after January 

1, 2009, and is commenced on or after January 1, 2019, that would have been 

barred solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired. 

Such claims are hereby revived and may be commenced until December 31, 

2026. This subdivision does not revive any of the following claims: [¶] (A) A 

claim that has been litigated to finality in a court of competent jurisdiction 

9 Section 340.16 was first enacted in 2018 and took effect on January 1, 

2019. From January 1, 2019 through October 1, 2019, the 10-year and threeyear periods were defined with reference to an “act, attempted act, or assault 

with intent to commit an act, of sexual assault by the defendant against the 

plaintiff.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 939, § 1; italics added.) October 2, 2019 was the 

effective date of the amendment to section 340.16 that enlarged the statute of 

limitations for civil claims against defendants who were not alleged to have 

committed sexual assault. (Stats. 2019, ch. 462, § 1.) 
10

before January 1, 2023. [¶] (B) A claim that has been compromised by a 

written settlement agreement between the parties entered into before 

January 1, 2023.” (§ 340.16, subd. (b)(3) (§ 340.16(b)(3)), italics added.)

There is no dispute that section 340.16(b)(3) revives the causes of 

action for sexual battery brought by the 16 plaintiffs in this case who allege 

they were sexually assaulted after January 1, 2009.10 But while the plaintiffs 

assert that the amendment revives all their causes of action, defendants 

argue that only the sexual battery causes of action are revived. 

Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive because it rests on their view 

that section 340.16(b)(3), as they put it, applies only to “any [sexual 

assault/battery] action described in subdivision (a).” But the words “sexual 

assault/battery” have been inserted by defendants; they do not appear in 

section 340.16(b)(2), which by its terms “applies to any action described in 

subdivision (a) that is based upon conduct that occurred on or after January 

1, 2009 . . . .” (§ 340.16(b)(3), italics added.) Subdivision (a) is not limited to 

causes of action for sexual assault/battery: it applies to “any civil action for 

recovery of damages suffered as a result of sexual assault.”11 (§ 340.16, subd. 

(a), italics added.) Defendants recognized this in their respondents’ brief, 

where they observed that when section 340.16 was enacted, it enlarged the 

two- and three-year statutes of limitations for “tort claims arising from 

sexual assault occurring after a plaintiff’s 18th birthday,” including the 

Ralph Act. And, as defendants admitted in their respondents’ brief, leaving 

10 Only two of the 18 plaintiffs allege they were assaulted before 

January 1, 2009. Jane Doe No. 18 alleges she was assaulted in March 2008, 

and Jane Doe No. 19 alleges she was assaulted in August 2003. 

11 Further, the causes of action permitted under subdivision (a) include 

“causes of action against persons or entities other than the alleged person 

who committed the” alleged sexual assault or battery. (§ 340.16, subd. (b)(2).)
11

aside the causes of action for violation of the UCL, all of the plaintiffs’ causes 

of action, “regardless of the legal theory alleged,” sought “damages as a result 

of sexual assault.”12 As defendants explained in their respondents’ brief, 

“[e]ach plaintiff alleged that she experienced damages from sexual assault . . . 

under multiple legal theories, from negligence to fraud.” 

Although it is clear that section 340.16(b)(3) revives at least some of the 

causes of action alleged by the 16 Jane Doe plaintiffs who allege they were 

sexually assaulted on or after January 1, 2009, we are not prepared to hold 

that all their causes of action are revived, because the parties’ supplemental 

briefs do not address the application of the amended statute to each of the 

causes of action alleged by each of the plaintiffs. In particular, the parties 

say nothing about whether section 340.16(b)(3) revives plaintiffs’ causes of 

action under the UCL.

In the absence of an analysis by the parties in their appellate briefs of 

the application of section 340.16(b)(3) to each of the causes of action alleged 

by the plaintiffs who allege assaults on or after January 1, 2009, we remand 

the matters for the trial court to address the issue in the first instance. 

2. Section 340.16, subdivision (e)

In addition to reviving claims by the application of newly enacted 

subdivision (b)(3), the 2022 amendment of section 340.16 added subdivision 

(e) (§ 340.16(e)), which establishes a one-year window reviving claims seeking 

damages suffered as a result of sexual assault where the plaintiff alleges that 

the defendant or defendants “engaged in a cover up or attempted a cover up 

12 Damages are not available under the UCL. (Korea Supply Co. v. 

Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144 [“[a] UCL action is 

equitable in nature; damages cannot be recovered”].) 
12

of a previous instance or allegations of sexual assault by an alleged 

perpetrator of such abuse.” (§ 340.16(e)(2)(C); Stats 2022, ch. 442, § 3.) 

By its terms, section 340.16(e) applies when a plaintiff alleges that they 

were sexually assaulted (§ 340.16(e)(2(A)); that one or more entities13 are 

“legally responsible for damages arising out of the sexual assault,” 

(§ 340.16(e)(2)(B)); and that “[t]he entity or entities, including but not limited 

to, their officers, directors, representatives, employees, or agents, engaged in 

a cover up or attempted a cover up of a previous instance or allegations of 

sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator of such abuse.” (§ 340.16(e)(2)(C).) 

“Legally responsible” is defined as meaning that “the entity or entities are 

liable under any theory of liability established by statute or common law, 

including, but not limited to, negligence, intentional torts, and vicarious 

liability.” (§ 340.16(e)(4)(C).) “Cover up” is defined as “a concerted effort to 

hide evidence relating to a sexual assault that incentivizes individuals to 

remain silent or prevents information relating to a sexual assault from 

becoming public or being disclosed to the plaintiff, including, but not limited 

to, the use of nondisclosure agreements or confidentiality agreements.” 

(§ 340.16(e)(4)(A).)

Unlike the revival provision in section 340.16(b)(3), section 340.16(e) 

applies to claims regardless of when the alleged sexual assault occurred: for 

plaintiffs who plead the requisite statutory allegations of a cover-up, section 

340.16(e) revives until December 31, 2023 “any claim seeking to recover 

damages suffered as a result of a sexual assault that occurred on or after the 

plaintiff’s 18th birthday that would otherwise be barred before January 1, 

13 “Entity” is defined as “a sole proprietorship, partnership, limited 

liability company, corporation, association, or other legal entity.” 

(§ 340.16(e)(4)(B).) 
13

2023, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had 

expired.”14 (§ 340.16(e)(1).) And section 340.16(e) by its terms revives “any 

related claims, including, but not limited to, wrongful termination and sexual 

harassment, arising out of the sexual assault that is the basis for a claim 

pursuant to this subdivision.” (§ 340.16(e)(5).)

For purposes of this appeal, this means that the claims of Jane Doe No. 

18 and Jane Doe No. 19, who allege they were assaulted before January 1, 

2009, are potentially subject to revival under section 340.16(e) even though 

those claims are not revived by section 340.16(b)(3). And the claims of the 

other remaining plaintiffs who allege they were assaulted on or after January 

1, 2009 are also potentially subject to revival by section 340.16(e), as well as 

section 340.16(b)(3). The revival of claims under 340.16(e) depends upon 

whether plaintiffs have alleged a “cover up” under section 340.16(e)(2)(C). 

In arguing on appeal that section 340.16(e) applies to them and revives 

their claims, plaintiffs simply assert in their supplemental brief that they 

alleged “knowledge and cover-up of previous sexual assaults by the 

franchisee defendants.” But plaintiffs do not discuss the definition of “cover 

up” in section 340.16(e)(4)(A) and do not demonstrate how each plaintiff 

alleged a “cover up” as defined in that subdivision with respect to the 

particular defendant entity or entities that each plaintiff claims is liable for 

her assault. Nor do plaintiffs demonstrate that each plaintiff has alleged 

that the relevant entity’s “cover up” (as defined in section 340.16(e)(4)(A)) 

predated her alleged assault as required by section 340.16(e)(2)(C). Instead, 

14 Under section 340.16(e)(1), “a cause of action may proceed if already 

pending in court on January 1, 2023, or, if not filed by that date, may be 

commenced between January 1, 2023, and December 31, 2023.” It is 

undisputed that the complaints at issue in this appeal were all pending in 

court on January 1, 2023.
14

plaintiffs point to paragraphs in two of the operative complaints that are not 

specific as to time and that primarily concern Massage Envy Franchising, 

LLC, who is no longer a party to this appeal. As a result, we cannot discern 

whether each plaintiff has alleged that the defendant or defendants allegedly 

liable for her injuries “engaged in a cover up or attempted a cover up of a 

previous instance or allegations of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator of 

such abuse,” as the newly amended statute requires.15 (§ 340.16(e)(2)(C).)

None of this is particularly surprising. That is because, as we have 

noted plaintiffs’ complaints were drafted before the 2022 amendment of 

section 340.16, and the amendment was enacted in the course of appellate 

briefing. The parties’ appellate briefs include very few citations to the actual 

allegations in the lengthy operative complaints. Even the supplemental 

briefing does not differentiate among the plaintiffs as to the elements of the 

revival statute. For these reasons, the question whether plaintiffs’ 

complaints survive demurrers based on the now-applicable statute of 

limitations and its pleading requirements is better left to the trial court to 

address in the first instance. 

For the guidance of the trial court on remand, we briefly address 

defendants’ assertion that plaintiffs’ claims are not revived by section 

340.16(e). Defendants point to section 340.16(e)(2)(C), which requires a 

plaintiff to allege that the legally responsible entity “engaged in a cover up or 

attempted a cover up of a previous instance or allegations of sexual assault 

by an alleged perpetrator of such abuse” (italics added), and urge us to 

15 Defendants assert broadly and without citation to specific passages 

in the complaints that the only allegations of cover ups describe actions 

allegedly taken after the plaintiffs were assaulted. The plaintiffs dispute 

that assertion, but do not point us to any allegation of a cover up that clearly 

predated a plaintiff’s alleged assault. 
15

interpret it to require plaintiff to allege a cover up of a previous instance or 

allegations of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator of such abuse who is 

also the perpetrator of the abuse that is the basis for a claim pursuant to this 

subdivision. 

Defendants’ argument is conclusory: defendants offer no discussion, 

analysis, or authority to support their position. We do not find it persuasive, 

because nothing in the language of the statute requires that the alleged cover 

up involve a previous instance of sexual assault by the same individual who 

later assaulted the plaintiff. The statutory language requires only that the 

plaintiff allege a cover up of a previous instance or allegations of sexual 

assault by “an alleged perpetrator of such abuse.” (§ 340.16(e)(2)(C), italics 

added.) Defendants’ interpretation would require adding words to the 

statute, which we will not do. 16 (California Cannabis Coalition v. City of 

Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 939; see § 1858 [in construing a statute the role 

of the court “is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in 

substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or omit 

what has been inserted”].) 

In any event, it is not clear that defendants’ position as to the meaning 

of section 340.16(e)(2)(C) need be reached. It may be that each plaintiff has 

alleged, or can allege, that the entity who is allegedly liable to her engaged in 

16 Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants claim that the statutory 

language is ambiguous, and we do not find it ambiguous. We granted 

plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice of certain portions of the legislative 

history (Assem. Bill No. 2777 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), as filed with the 

Secretary of State, as well as Assem. Floor and Sen. Floor Analyses of Assem. 

Bill No. 2777, dated Aug. 11, 2022). We find nothing in those documents that 

suggests the Legislature intended section 340.16(e) to require a plaintiff to 

allege that defendants sought to cover up a prior assault committed by the 

same perpetrator who later allegedly assaulted the plaintiff. 
16

a cover up of a previous incident of sexual abuse by her alleged assailant. In 

that case, defendants’ argument about the interpretation of the statute will 

be moot. 

DISPOSITION

The judgments are reversed. The matters are remanded to the trial 

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The parties shall 

bear their own costs on appeal.
17

_________________________

Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Stewart, P.J.

_________________________

Richman, J.

A163543, Doe v. CFR Enterprises, Inc.; Doe v. Desert Ventures South, LLC; 

Doe v. RME Clinics Inc.
1

Filed 7/27/23 after nonpublished opinion filed 6/29/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

JANE DOE #21 (S.H.) et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

CFR ENTERPRISES, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 A163543 

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. 19CIV00392)

JANE DOE #4 (D.T.),

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

DESERT VENTURES SOUTH, 

LLC,

Defendant and Respondent.

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. 19CIV04095)

JANE DOE #9 (J.C.) et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

RME CLINICS, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. 19CIV05035)

 ORDER GRANTING 

 PUBLICATION

BY THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on June 29, 2023, was 

not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause and 
2

pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105, it now appears that the 

opinion should be published in the Official Reports, and it is so ordered.

Dated: _______________________ ________________________________

Stewart, P.J.

A163543, Doe et al. v. CFR Enterprises, Inc., et al., Desert Ventures South, 

LLC, RME Clinics, Inc., et al.
3

Court: San Mateo County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Marie S. Weiner

Thompson Law Offices, Robert William Thompson; Law Office of Valerie T. 

McGinty, Valerie Tallant McGinty; Laffey, Bucci & Kent, Brian T. Kent, 

Stewart Ryan; ADZ Law, Jessica A. Dayton, for Plaintiffs and Appellants 

Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Laurie Hepler, Jeffrey Gurrola, for 

Defendants and Respondents Massage Envy Franchising, LLC and ME SPE 

Franchising LLC

Stone & Associates, Colette F. Stone, for Defendant and Respondent OC Spa 

Group, Inc.

CMBG3 Law, W. Joseph Gunter, Rebecca A. Bellow, Jonathan Sayre, for 

Defendant and Respondent Eight Hands Four Hearts, Inc.

Chapman Glucksman Dean & Roeb, Gregory K. Sabo, Chelsea L. Zwart, for 

Defendant and Respondent John Choi

Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, David A. Serrano, Tara Santosuosso, for 

Defendant and Respondent Hau’Oli Ohana Oi’, LLC

Bremer, Whyte, Brown & O’Meara, Eileen J. Gaisford for Defendants and 

Respondents Coastal Massage Channel Islands Harbor LLC, RME Clinics 

Inc., WMC Clinic Development and Marina Clinic Development, Inc.

A163543, Doe et al. v. CFR Enterprises, Inc., et al., Desert Ventures South, 

LLC, RME Clinics, Inc., et al.
4

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Christopher J. Nevis, Steffanie A. Malla, 

Jeffrey A. Miller, for Defendants and Respondents Coastal Massage Ventura 

LLC and CFR Enterprises, Inc.

Perry, Johnson, Anderson, Miller & Moskowitz, David F. Beach, Oscar A. 

Pardo, Daphne A. Beletsis, for Defendants and Respondents Desert Ventures

South, LLC and Jackal Nandan, LLC dba Massage Envy Dana Point

A163543, Doe et al. v. CFR Enterprises, Inc., et al., Desert Ventures South, 

LLC, RME Clinics, Inc., et al.