In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-3675

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Edgar C. Richmond, Jr.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 99-CR-47--Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.

Argued May 8, 2000--Decided July 24, 2000

 Before Posner, Chief Judge, and Bauer and Diane P.

Wood, Circuit Judges.

 Bauer, Circuit Judge. On July 1, 1999, a jury

returned a verdict of guilty against Edgar

Richmond, Jr. on one count of conspiracy for

making false statements to obtain a firearm in

violation of Title 18, United States Code,

Section 371 and six counts of aiding and abetting

the making of a false statement to obtain a

firearm in violation of Title 18, United States

Code, Section 922(a)(6). Richmond was sentenced

to a 37-month term of imprisonment as to each

count, to run concurrently, followed by three

years of supervised release and a $100 special

assessment as to each count.

 Richmond purchased a total of nine guns from

Badger Guns, which were later recovered by police

from third parties. For each purchase, Richmond

would state on Federal Form 4473 that he was the

actual purchaser of the weapon when in fact he

was not. In a practice called straw purchasing,

he would buy the guns and then sell them to

individuals who could not legally purchase guns.

In this case, Richmond sold the guns to either

Charles Holley or Robert Mallette. 

 Richmond raises two arguments on appeal. First,

that the district court abused its discretion in

denying his motion for a continuance based on

pretrial publicity. Richmond argues that the pre-
trial publicity inflamed and confused the jury

making it impossible for him to receive a fair

trial. Second, he argues that the district court

abused its discretion in admitting evidence

regarding the criminal circumstances surrounding

the recovery of the guns.

 The newspaper articles in the weeks preceding

the trial focused on the problems of straw

purchasing and recent school shootings.

Approximately ten articles ran between May 9 and

May 18 when Richmond filed a motion for a

continuance based on pretrial publicity, which

was denied on May 27, 1999. Specifically, the

defendant refers to the May 16, 1999, article in

the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel in which Mallette

discussed the conspiracy. The article mentions

that both would stand trial on June 1, 1999, on

federal charges that they were straw buyers. The

other articles only generally refer to the

crackdown on straw purchasers and the need for

more stringent prosecution and stricter laws.

Neither Richmond nor the trial were mentioned in

any of those articles.

 We will only reverse a district court’s denial

of a motion to continue for an abuse of

discretion. United States v. Depoister, 166 F.3d

292, 294 (7th Cir. 1997). An abuse occurs when

the district judge makes a decision not within

the "range of permissible options" afforded him

under the given circumstances. Id. 

 Initially, the court denied the motion to

continue finding that there was no evidence that

the publicity was so inflammatory that an

impartial jury could not be selected. Because of

scheduling conflicts, the trial was ultimately

postponed for four weeks to June 29, 1999. On the

morning of the trial, Richmond renewed his motion

for a continuance and again it was denied. In

support of his motion, he presented an article

which appeared in that morning’s paper titled

"State Pounces on Thwarted Weapons Sale." The

article discusses another straw purchaser but at

no time refers to Richmond or the trial. The

court stated that:

"It’s getting to the point where the emphasis in

the media on weapons is such that articles in the

paper are appearing just like articles on sexual

assaults. And it’s becoming so commonplace that

I think the effect--any prejudicial affect is the

same as reporting on sexual assaults, or armed

robberies, or bank robberies, or something like

that. It’s becoming so commonplace."

The court conducted voir dire to ensure the

selection of an impartial jury and to get any

biases out in the open. The court then instructed
the jury on three separate occasions that they

were only to consider the evidence presented in

the courtroom.

 The Supreme Court found in Irvin v. Dowd that

to have an impartial jury does not mean the

jurors must be completely ignorant of the issues

and events of the case as long as they can put

aside their impressions and render a fair

verdict. 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642,

6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). The defendant must show

that actual prejudice resulted from the pretrial

publicity. Id. at 723. In this case, Richmond has

failed to demonstrate that the pretrial publicity

denied him a fair trial.

 The district court conducted an extensive voir

dire of the jurors and cautioned them several

times on the importance of listening only to the

evidence presented at trial. Further, only one

article related to the specifics of this case; it

mentioned Richmond, the charges against him, and

statements from Mallette that were not so

inflammatory as to have denied him a fair trial.

Richmond speculates as to the overwhelming

community prejudice to guns and gangs but offers

no actual proof of it. Finally, the case was

ultimately continued for a month despite the

denial of the original motion. The district court

acted within the range of permissible options

under the circumstances and did not abuse its

discretion.

 Richmond next argues that the district court

abused its discretion in admitting evidence that

was irrelevant and highly prejudicial.

Specifically, evidence regarding the recovery of

the firearms and his association with gang

members. Evidence is admissible to complete "the

story of the crime on trial" or when it is "so

blended or connected that it tends to prove any

element of the charged crime." United States v.

Akinrinade, 61 F.3d 1279, 1285 (7th Cir. 1995).

In other words, evidence that is so intricately

related to the conspiracy is admissible provided

the probative value outweighs the prejudicial

value. United States v. Zarnes, 33 F.3d 1454,

1468 (7th Cir. 1994).

 While the district court allowed the government

to present the circumstances under which the

weapons were found, a detailed examination of

those crime scenes was not allowed. The evidence

established that the firearms purchased by

Richmond were recovered at several crime scenes,

including three associated with Charles Holley.

One gun was found lying next to Holley’s body

after he had been shot to death. The fact that

the firearms were found at several different

crime scenes is probative of the fact that
Richmond was purchasing guns for others. Some of

the guns were recovered by police shortly after

they were bought, destroying Richmond’s theory

that they were stolen from him at one time. The

circumstances of the recovery of the firearms

linked the government’s case together. It

provided the jury with the complete story of the

crime and explained the circumstances surrounding

the relationships of the people involved in the

conspiracy. The recovery of the weapons was so

completely related to the conspiracy that the

district court admitted the testimony.

 Evidence of gang involvement must be considered

carefully to avoid undue prejudice. United States

v. Rodriguez, 925 F.2d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir.

1991). The court must consider whether the

probative value of the evidence outweighs its

prejudicial value. Cook v. Hoppin, 783 F.2d 684,

689 (7th Cir. 1986). Gang membership has been

admissible in cases where the interplay between

the people is central to proving the elements of

the conspiracy. United States v. Thomas, 86 F.3d

647, 652 (7th Cir. 1996).

 The testimony of Mallette, a co-conspirator,

established the reasons Richmond purchased the

guns. Richmond purchased handguns for Mallette

and Holley, members of the Brothers of Struggle

(BOS) street gang. Both were under 21 and could

not buy handguns themselves. The BOS were

involved in a war with the rival street gang, the

2-4’s, and needed guns. While Richmond was not

apart of the BOS, Mallette testified that he used

the BOS handshake with Mallette’s BOS friends.

Evidence of their associations was necessary to

explain that Richmond purchased the firearms to

assist Mallette and Holley in their war against

the 2-4’s. The probative value of this evidence

outweighs its prejudicial value and establishes

an important link needed to establish the

elements of the conspiracy.

 Finally, the admission of the circumstances of

the recovery of the guns and the gang connection

was supported by an audio tape of Richmond

indicating that he purchased guns for other

people. The district court did not abuse its

discretion in the admission of the above

evidence.

Affirmed.