[Cite as In re M.H., 2014-Ohio-1050.] 

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Appeals Dismissed 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 21, 2014 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ernest Lee, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellant Hamilton County Department of Job and Family 

Services, 

Nathan Bell, for Appellant Guardian Ad Litem, 

Elizabeth Mitts, for Appellee Father. 

Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

IN RE: M.H. and L.S. 

 

 

 

:

: 

: 

APPEAL NOS. C-130703 

 C-130704 

TRIAL NO. F06-1277z 

 

 O P I N I O N.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2

FISCHER, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellants Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services 

(“HCJFS”) and the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for L.S. appeal an order of the juvenile 

court with respect to two children, M.H. and L.S. In the order, the juvenile court had 

rejected the decision of the magistrate, which had dismissed a complaint for dependency 

with respect to L.S., and had remanded the matter to the magistrate “for further 

disposition regarding [L.S.].” The juvenile court had also rejected the magistrate’s 

decision, which had adjudicated M.H. dependent, denied Leslie Scarborough’s petition 

for legal custody of M.H., and had granted temporary custody of M.H. to HCJFS. The 

juvenile court stated that it was “retaining jurisdiction to make appropriate dispositions 

regarding the placement of the child for her safety and award[ing] the petition of legal 

custody of [M.H. to Leslie Scarborough].” 

{¶2} On appeal, HCJFS argues that it should have been awarded 

permanent custody of both children. In her separate appeal, the GAL objects only to the 

juvenile court’s treatment of L.S. Appellee, the father of L.S., argues that the juvenile 

court’s order is not a final appealable order. 

{¶3} Prior to this court’s exercise of jurisdiction over an appeal, an order of 

a lower court must be a final, appealable order, and meet the requirements under R.C. 

2505.02(B), and if applicable, Civ.R. 54(B). In re Adams, 115 Ohio St.3d 86, 2007-

Ohio-4840, 873 N.E.2d 886, ¶ 27. Both HCJFS and the GAL argue that the trial court’s 

order in this case is final because it meets the requirements under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2). 

R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) provides that “[a]n order is a final order that may be reviewed, 

affirmed, modified, or reversed when it is * * * [a]n order that affects a substantial right 

made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after 

judgment.” 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

3

{¶4} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that custody hearings in juvenile 

court are special proceedings. Adams at ¶ 43; In re C.B., 129 Ohio St.3d 231, 2011-Ohio2899, 951 N.E.2d 398, ¶ 12. Thus, we must determine if the trial court’s order with 

respect to L.S. and M.H. affects a substantial right. See R.C. 2505.02. A substantial 

right is a “right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, 

the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.” R.C. 

2505.01(A)(1). “An order that affects a substantial right is generally one that ‘if not 

immediately appealable, would foreclose appropriate relief in the future.’ ” In re L.A., 

Q.T., J.T., A.T., T.T., 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-130701 and C-130702, 2014-Ohio894, ¶ 4, citing Adams at ¶ 44, quoting Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 67 Ohio St.3d 60, 

63, 616 N.E.2d 181 (1993). 

{¶5} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “[a] trial court’s order 

denying the motion of a children-services agency to modify temporary custody to 

permanent custody and continuing temporary custody is not a final, appealable order 

under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) or (2).” Adams at syllabus. The issue in Adams was 

whether a children-services agency could appeal the denial of its permanent-custody 

motion. Id. at ¶ 4. In analyzing the issue under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) and (2), the 

Supreme Court reasoned that the denial of permanent custody and continuation of 

temporary custody did not affect the agency’s “substantial rights” in the permanent 

custody of the children because the agency still had temporary custody of the 

children and was not foreclosed from seeking permanent custody or a different 

dispositional order under R.C. 2151.415(A) at a later date. Id. at ¶ 37 and 42-44. 

{¶6} In In re C.B., the Supreme Court held that a juvenile court’s order 

that “denies a children-services agency’s motion to modify temporary custody to 

permanent custody, terminates the placement of temporary custody with the agency, 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

4

and awards legal custody to a parent, * * * is [a] final and appealable [order] under 

R.C. 2505.02.” C.B. at syllabus. The Supreme Court held that the juvenile court’s 

order had determined the action and prevented any further judgment under R.C. 

2505.02(B)(1) because the disposition of legal custody was permanent and had 

ended the existing proceeding under R.C. 2151.42. Id. at ¶ 12. In determining 

whether the order had affected a “substantial right” under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) and 

(2), the Supreme Court focused upon the unique statutory role of a GAL in 

permanent-custody proceedings to ensure that the best interests of the child were 

considered before custody modifications were made. Id. at ¶ 14. The court concluded 

that the GAL could appeal an order terminating temporary custody with a childrenservices agency and awarding legal custody to a parent because the order had 

affected a “substantial right” of the GAL to ensure that the best interests of the child 

had been considered. Id. 

{¶7} Here, the trial court’s order with respect to L.S. is similar to the order 

in Adams. The trial court rejected the magistrate’s decision, which had dismissed 

HCJFS’s complaint for dependency with respect to L.S., and had remanded the matter 

to the magistrate “for further disposition regarding [L.S.].” Thus, the order does not 

foreclose the possibility of permanent custody to HCJFS. Nor does the order terminate 

interim custody to HCJFS. Furthermore, no legal custody determinations have been 

made with respect to L.S. Because the order does not “affect a substantial right,” we, 

therefore, have no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of the trial court’s order with 

respect to L.S. 

{¶8} We, likewise, conclude that the part of the trial court’s order 

pertaining to M.H. does not qualify as a final appealable order. While the trial court 

purported to award legal custody of M.H. to Leslie Scarborough, the trial court also 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

5

stated that it was “retain[ing] jurisdiction to make appropriate dispositions regarding 

the placement of the child for her safety.” The trial court’s statement that it was 

“retaining jurisdiction to make appropriate dispositions regarding the placement” of 

M.H. is inconsistent with an award of legal custody to Ms. Scarborough. Effectively, 

the trial court has not adjudicated the matter, which is still open to other motions 

regarding the custody of M.H. Therefore, HCJFS retains temporary custody of M.H., 

and thus we determine the trial court’s order to be distinguishable from the order in 

In re C.B. 

{¶9} Because no substantial rights have been affected with respect to the 

trial court’s order relating to L.S. and M.H, we lack jurisdiction to entertain the 

GAL’s and HCJFS’s appeals, and therefore, dismiss them. 

Appeals dismissed. 

HENDON, P.J, and DEWINE, J., concur.

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry this date.