Interim Decision #2368 

MATTER OF GUERRA AND SANCHEZ 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-19930408 

• A-20525160 ' 

Decided by Board March 28, 1975 

Respondents' due process hearing rights were not violated by the immigration judge's 

denial of their request to be represented in proceedings by individual lay persons who 

were not in any way connected with respondents or affiliated with a recognized 

organization as an accredited representative. Lay individuals who represent aliens 

before the Service as reputable individuals under 8 CFR 292.1(b) must do so on a case 

by case basis and requires the permission of the hearing officer to participate in the 

proceedings. 

CHARGES: 

Order: Act of 1952—Sectiun 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)] Entered without inspection (Guerra) 

Act of 1952--Section 241(a)(2) (8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2))—After admission as a 

nonimmigrant, remained longer than permitted (SanchezMelendez) 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE 

Albert F. Moreno, Esquire Irving A. Appleman, Esquire 

PubliF ,Advocates, Inc. Appellate Trial Attorney 

483 Turk Street 

San Francisco, California 94102 

At separate hearings before different immigration judges, at which 

they were unrepresented by counsel, respondents Guerra and 

Sanchez-Melendez were found deportable as charged on March 14, 1973 

and June 11, 1973, respectively. Both were granted the privilege of 

voluntary departure. Respondent Sanchez-Melendez appealed the decision of the immigration judge, and on April 12, 1973 we ordered that the 

record in respondent Guerra's ca-se be certified to this Board pursuant to 

8 CFB, 3.1(c). Respondent Sanchez-Melendez's appeal will be dismissed 

and the decision of the immigration judge with respect to respondent 

Guerra will be affirmed. 

The two cases were consolidated for oral argument and briefed jointly 

by counsel? In both cases it is contended that the respondents were 

A supplementary brief was filed on behalf of respondent Sonchea–Melendez reuarding 

an issue not specifically presented by respondent Guerra's ease. We believe, however, 

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denied due process of law by the immigration judge's refusal to permit 

their chosen representatives from appearing on their behalf as "reputable individuals," pursuant to the provisions of 8 CFR 292.1(b). Our 

review of the record and briefs, as well as the contentions advanced at 

oral argumenr„ satisfies us that the immigration judges properly exercised their discretion in determining that the respondents' chosen representatives did not qualify under the applicable regulations. 

We find that in neither case has a sufficient showing of prejudice been 

made, since both respondents are concededly deportable and have been 

afforded the maximum form of discretionary relief for which they were 

qualified, namely, voluntary departure. The allegation that a greater 

period of voluntary departure time might have been effectively urged 

by their chosen representatives is not supported by these records. In 

any event, an adequate remedy in that regard is still available thrOugh 

an application to the district director under 8 CFR 244.2. We therefore 

conclude that the immigration judges committed no prejudicial error 

which would warrant a remand for further hearing. 

We further find that, notwithstanding the foregoing, the pertinent 

regulation does not warrant the interpretation urged by counsel. The 

history underlying the amended regulations in 1952 is persuasive that 8 

CFR 292.1(b) contemplates representation by a reputable individual 

only on an ad hoc basis, and by a person who is connected in some way to 

the subject of the proceedings. It was not designed to permit a layman, 

who is not affiliated with a recognized organization as its accredited 

representative 2, and who is thus not subject to discipline, to engage in 

the wholesale representation of aliens who are strangers to him. 3 

 Further, the regulations clearly state that such representation Inuit be 

with the permission of the presiding officer of the Serviee, or this 

Board, 8 CFR 292.1(b). 

Approval by this Board of the representation of aliens by reputable 

individuals under 8 CFR 292.1(b) has always been on a case by case 

basis. To permit, as counsel urges, the "blanket" representation of 

aliens by lay persons, however familiar they are with immigration law 

and procedure, would, in our view, distort the intention of 8 CFR 

292.1(b) and render meaningless the procedures outlined in 8 CFR 292.2 

regarding the requirements for the recognition of accredited organizations. 

that the thrust of this decision warrants consolidated treatment of all issues raised by 

counsel. 

2 See 8 CFR 292.1(c) and 8 CFR 1.1(j). 

3 In each, of the present cases the respondents elected to be represented by individuals 

who had been asszciated with social service organizations that were not recognized by this 

Board under 8 CDT 292.2. As lay persons, these individuals had entered appearances as 

"reputable individuals" under 8 CFR 292.1(b), although they made no claim to being 

personally acquainted with the respondents. 

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We recognize the importance of adequate representation of aliens in 

immigration proceedings, and we can agree with counsel that the aim of 

8 CFR 292 is to expand and facilitate the opportunities for such representation. We are not insensitive to the difficult problems to which the 

issues in these cases draw attention. However, we cannot adopt counsel's premise that the immigration judges' actions in these cases constitute abuses of the discretion committed to them by 8 CFR, 292.1(b), so 

as to amount to denials of due process. Their decisions are consistent 

with the past practices of this Board, and were adequately supported by 

the records before them. Accordingly, the following orders will be 

entered. 

ORDER: Respondent Sanchez—Melendez's appeal is dismissed. 

Further order: Pursuant to the immigration judge's order, respondent Sanchez—Melendez is permitted to depart from the United States 

voluntarily within 61 days from the date of this order or any extension 

beyond that time as may be granted by the district director, and in the 

event of failure so to depart, respondent Sanchez—Melendez shall be 

deported as provided in the immigration judge's order. 

Further order: The decision of the immigration judge with respect to 

respondent Guerra is affirmed. 

Further order: Pursuant to the immigration judge's order with respect to respondent Guerra, she is permitted to depart from the United 

States voluntarily within 21 days from the date of this order or any 

extension beyond that time as may be granted by the district director; 

and in the event of failure so to depart, respondent Guerra shall be 

deported as provided in the immigration judge's order. 

Irving A. Appleman, Board Member, abstained from consideration of 

this ease. 

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