STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

ALBIN LITTELL, INDIVIDUALLY, AND
 

AS TRUSTEE OF THE LITTELL COAL INTEREST TRUST,
 FILED 

Plaintiff Below, Petitioner April 28, 2016 

released at 3:00 p.m. 

RORY L. PERRY, II CLERK vs.) No. 15-0364 (McDowell County No. 08-C-178) SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

STEVE MULLINS AND DONALD HICKS,
 

CLERK OF THE COUNTY COMMISSION OF MCDOWELL COUNTY,
 

Defendants Below, Respondents
 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

The petitioner herein and plaintiff below, Albin Littell, individually (“Mr. Littell”), 

and as Trustee of the Littell Coal Interest Trust (“Littell Coal Trust”),1 by counsel Derrick 

W. Lefler, appeals from an order entered March 25, 2015, by the Circuit Court of McDowell 

County. By that order, the court determined that the April 26, 2006, tax deed issued to the 

respondent herein and defendant below, Steve Mullins (“Mr. Mullins”), by counsel Philip 

A. LaCaria, was valid and enforceable. On appeal to this Court, Mr. Littell contends that the 

additional respondent herein and defendant below, Donald Hicks (“Mr. Hicks”), Clerk of the 

County Commission of McDowell County,2 should not have issued the subject tax deed 

conveying Mr. Littell’s 2/9 undivided interest in Parcel 7 to Mr. Mullins because Mr. Mullins 

failed to comply with the notice requirements provided by W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19(a)(1) 

(1998) (Repl. Vol. 2005).3 

1

Where the context does not require a distinction between Albin Littell, individually, 

and as Trustee of the Littell Coal Interest Trust, both parties will be referred to collectively 

as “Mr. Littell.” 

2

Mr. Hicks has not made an appearance in the instant proceeding before this Court. 

3

Since the occurrence of the events at issue herein, many of the relevant statutory 

provisions have been amended bythe Legislature. Nevertheless, we will applythose versions 

of the pertinent statutes that were in effect at the time of the conduct giving rise to the instant 

proceeding. 

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Upon our review of the parties’ arguments, the appendix record, and the pertinent 

authorities, we conclude that Mr. Mullins did not provide notice of the right to redeem to the 

co-owners of Parcel 7 as required by the governing statutes. Accordingly, we reverse the 

circuit court’s March 25, 2015, order and remand this case with directions to set aside the 

April 26, 2006, tax deed to Mr. Mullins upon Mr. Littell’s satisfaction of the payment 

provisions of W. Va. Code § 11A-4-3(a) (1994) (Repl. Vol. 2010). Because this case does 

not present a new or significant issue of law, and for the reasons set forth herein, we find this 

case satisfies the “limited circumstances” requirement of Rule 21(d) of the West Virginia 

Rules of Appellate Procedure and is proper for disposition as a memorandum decision. 

Mr. Littell’s predecessor in title, his grandmother Nancy Doonan (“Ms. Doonan”), 

was a resident of Arizona when she died in 1989. At the time of her death, she owned a 2/9 

undivided interest in the subject Parcel 7, which consists of a 279 acre tract in the Big Creek 

District of McDowell County, West Virginia. Ms. Doonan had acquired this undivided 

interest in Parcel 7 through inheritance, and, upon her death, her will transferred her interest 

in Parcel 7 to a Residuary Trust (“Trust”), the proceeds of which eventually were distributed 

to the Trust’s sole beneficiaries, Ms. Doonan’s daughter, Letticia Louise Littell (“Ms. 

Littell”), and grandson, Mr. Littell. In 1999, upon their receipt of this 2/9 undivided interest 

in Parcel 7, Ms. Littell and Mr. Littell formed the Littell Coal Interest Trust (“Littell Coal 

Trust”), with their interest in Parcel 7 as the Littell Coal Trust’s principal. None of these 

transfers of Ms. Doonan’s undivided interest in Parcel 7, either through her will to the Trust, 

from the Trust to its beneficiaries, or from Ms. Littell and Mr. Littell to the Littell Coal Trust, 

were recorded in the McDowell County land records. Although Ms. Doonan’s will was 

probated in Arizona, it was not recorded in McDowell County. 

Also in 1999, the various Parcel 7 co-owners began to receive separate assessments 

for the McDowell County property taxes due on their individual, undivided interests in said 

property.4 The co-owners of Parcel 7 include, but may not be limited to, the Littell Coal 

Trust, Hall Mining Company(“Hall Mining”), W.F. Harman heirs, and Judith Wadosky. The 

tax tickets for the Littell Coal Trust’s 2/9 undivided interest in Parcel 7 were listed in the 

name of Nancy Doonan Estate and were sent to an address in Tucson, Arizona, which was 

the address of Mr. Littell’s accountant. Mr. Littell’s accountant received and paid the taxes 

due on the Littell Coal Trust’s interest in Parcel 7 through 2002. No taxes were paid for tax 

year 2003 or subsequent tax years, and Mr. Littell has indicated that he is not certain why his 

accountant ceased paying such taxes. Following notice of the delinquent taxes, and no 

payment thereof, the Littell Coal Trust’s 2/9 undivided interest was sold at a sheriff’s tax sale 

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It appears that certain of the parcel’s co-owners requested that the taxes on the 

several interests receive separate assessments. 

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to Mr. Mullins on November 16, 2004. The parties do not dispute that the sheriff’s tax sale 

and the pre-sale notice of delinquency were conducted in accordance with the statutory 

procedures therefor. 

As a prerequisite to the issuance of a tax deed, Mr. Mullins searched the property and 

tax records in McDowell County and submitted a document to Mr. Hicks, Clerk of the 

McDowell County Commission, stating “No Known Heirs” as his list of individuals entitled 

to notice of right to redeem the subject property required by W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19(a)(1). 

On February 26, 2006, Mr. Hicks sent a notice of right to redeem addressed to “Nancy 

Doonan Estate” at the last known address for the subject property’s owner, which was Mr. 

Littell’s accountant’s address, but the notice was returned “Addressee Not Known”; this is 

the same address to which prior tax tickets had been sent and from which they had been paid. 

Mr. Hicks also published a notice of right to redeem for three consecutive weeks in the local 

newspapers of McDowell County, West Virginia. 

On April 26, 2006, Mr. Hicks, in his capacity as County Commission Clerk, issued 

a tax deed conveying Nancy Doonan Estate’s 2/9 undivided interest in Parcel 7 to Mr. 

Mullins. Thereafter, in 2008, Mr. Littell filed the instant proceeding seeking to set aside said 

tax deed conveying his family’s interest in Parcel 7 to Mr. Mullins. By order entered March 

25, 2015, the circuit court upheld Mr. Mullins’ tax deed for the subject undivided interest in 

Parcel 7. In summary, the circuit court concluded that (1) Mr. Mullins used reasonable 

efforts to find and provide actual notice to Mr. Littell and (2) failure to provide notice of the 

right to redeem to Hall Mining does not give Mr. Littell grounds for setting aside the tax deed 

because Hall Mining is not a party to the instant proceeding and has not attempted to assert 

its right to redeem. Moreover, the circuit court found that provision of notice to Hall Mining, 

as a co-owner of Parcel 7, would not necessarily have resulted in Hall Mining’s provision of 

actual notice to Mr. Littell. 

From this adverse ruling, Mr. Littell appeals to this Court. 

In the instant proceeding, Mr. Littell contends that the circuit court erred in its 

interpretation and application of W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19(a)(1) and related statutes 

pertaining to a tax sale purchaser’s duty to provide notice to redeem to those parties entitled 

to such notice. We previously have held that, “[w]here the issue on an appeal from the 

circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply 

a de novo standard of review.” Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 

S.E.2d 415 (1995). Accord Syl. pt. 1, Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep’t of West 

Virginia, 195 W. Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995) (“Interpreting a statute or an administrative 

rule or regulation presents a purely legal question subject to de novo review.”). 

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On appeal to this Court, Mr. Littell assigns as error the trial court’s refusal to set aside 

the tax deed issued to Mr. Mullins because (1) Mr. Mullins failed to comply with the notice 

requirements of W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19(a)(1); (2) Mr. Littell was denied due process under 

both the United States and West Virginia Constitutions; and (3) Mr. Littell did not receive 

sufficient notice of his right to redeem. Mr. Mullins responds by asserting that the circuit 

court committed no error and properly upheld the tax deed issued to him for his purchase of 

Mr. Littell’s 2/9 undivided interest in Parcel 7. 

This case presents a straightforward application of the statutes governing the notice 

a purchaser of property at a tax sale is required to give, and to whom, in order to secure the 

deed to said property. Mr. Mullins purchased Mr. Littell’s undivided interest in Parcel 7 at 

a tax sale in November 2004 that ostensibly was conducted in accordance with W. Va. Code 

§ 11A-3-5 (2000) (Repl. Vol. 2010). Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19(a)(1) (1998) 

(Repl. Vol. 2005), as a prerequisite to receiving a deed to the tax sale property, Mr. Mullins 

was required to “[p]repare a list of those to be served with notice to redeem and request the 

clerk to prepare and serve the notice . . . .” W. Va. Code § 11A-3-23(a) (1998) (Repl. Vol. 

2005) provides that, 

[a]fter the sale of any tax lien on any real estate pursuant to section five 

[§ 11A-3-5] of this article, the owner of, or any other person who was entitled 

to pay the taxes on, any real estate for which a tax lien thereon was purchased 

by an individual may redeem at any time before a tax deed is issued for the real 

estate. . . . 

We previously have construed these two statutory provisions together, holding that 

[t]he persons entitled to notice to redeem in conjunction with a 

purchaser’s application for a tax deed, pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11A-3­

19(a)(1) (1994) (Repl. Vol. 1995), are those persons who are permitted to 

redeem the real property subject to a tax lien or liens, as contemplated by 

W. Va. Code § 11A-3-23(a) (1995) (Repl. Vol. 1995), which persons include 

“the owner” of such property and “any other person who was entitled to pay 

the taxes” thereon. 

Syl. pt. 4, Rollyson v. Jordan, 205 W. Va. 368, 518 S.E.2d 372 (1999). 

Several individual owners each possess an undivided interest in the subject real 

property, Parcel 7, including Mr. Littell and Hall Mining Company. While their interests in 

the entirety of the parcel are undivided, their individual tax obligations thereon are assessed 

separately and have been assessed separately since 1999. According to W. Va. Code § 11A1-9 (1941) (Repl. Vol. 2010), “[a]ny co-owner of real estate whose interest is subject to 

separate assessment shall be allowed at his election to pay the taxes either on his own interest 

alone or in addition thereto upon the interest of any or all of his co-owners.” Thus, it is 

apparent that, because the interests of Hall Mining and the other co-owners of Parcel 7 were 

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all subject to separate assessment, each of Parcel 7’s co-owners was entitled to pay the taxes 

on either their own portion or on their own portion and those of any or all other co-owner(s), 

including Mr. Littell. As such, all of the co-owners of Parcel 7 were entitled to notice of the 

right to redeem stemming from Mr. Littell’s tax delinquency. See W. Va. Code § 11A-3­

19(a)(1); W. Va. Code § 11A-3-23(a); Syl. pt. 4, Rollyson v. Jordan, 205 W. Va. 368, 518 

S.E.2d 372. 

It is undisputed that Mr. Mullins conducted searches in the land and tax records of 

McDowell County to determine the individuals required to be given notice under W. Va. 

Code § 11A-3-19(a)(1). Mr. Mullins knew that the interest that he had purchased in Parcel 

7 at the tax sale was an undivided interest, and, during his research, Mr. Mullins discovered 

that Hall Mining also held an undivided interest in Parcel 7. However, when he prepared his 

list of those persons entitled to notice to redeem, he noted only that there were “no known 

heirs” to the last record owner of the interest he had purchased, i.e., that no heirs to the Estate 

of Nancy Doonan were found in the McDowell County land and tax records, presumably 

because neither Mr. Littell, his mother, nor the Littell Coal Interest Trust had recorded their 

interest in such property in the McDowell County land records or changed the taxpayer 

information in the county tax records. Based upon Mr. Mullins’ purported compliance with 

the notice requirements of W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19(a)(1), the Clerk of the McDowell 

County Commission issued a deed, dated April 26, 2006, to Mr. Mullins for his tax sale 

purchase of Mr. Littell’s undivided interest in Parcel 7. 

While Mr. Mullins’ “no heirs” statement is accurate based upon the dearth of 

information in the McDowell County records to associate the interest he purchased at the tax 

sale with Mr. Littell, Mr. Mullins’ list of those entitled to notice is not complete because he 

failed to include any of the other co-owners of Parcel 7. Mr. Mullins was on notice that 

Parcel 7 had other co-owners because he knew that the interest he had purchased was an 

undivided interest, and he learned the identity of at least one of the other co-owners, i.e., Hall 

Mining, when he conducted his records research upon which his “no heirs” representation 

was based. The same statute that requires a tax sale purchaser to prepare a list of persons 

entitled to notice to redeem also states that, “[f]or failure to meet these requirements, the 

purchaser shall lose all the benefits of his or her purchase.” W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19(a). 

Accord Syl. pt. 13, State ex rel. Morgan v. Miller, 177 W. Va. 97, 350 S.E.2d 724 (1986) (“In 

the case of noncompliance with West Virginia Code § 11A-3-20 (1983 Replacement Vol.) 

[predecessor to current W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19], the law is clear: ‘For failure to meet these 

requirements, the purchaser shall lose all the benefits of his purchase.’ W. Va. Code § 11A-3­

20 (1983 Replacement Vol.).”). Moreover, this Court has held that “‘[p]ersons seeking to 

obtain complete title to property sold for taxes must comply literally with the statutory 

requirements.’ Syl. pt. 1, Cook v. Duncan, 171 W. Va. 747, 301 S.E.2d 837 (1983).” Syl. 

pt. 2, State ex rel. Morgan v. Miller, 177 W. Va. 97, 350 S.E.2d 724. Therefore, Mr. 

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Mullins’ failure to notify the additional co-owners of Parcel 7 who were entitled to pay the 

taxes thereon, and, thus, were persons who were entitled to notice to redeem, requires that 

the tax deed issued to Mr. Mullins be set aside. 

Furthermore, Mr. Littell is authorized to bring the current action to set aside the tax 

deed issued to Mr. Mullins by W. Va. Code § 11A-4-3(a) (1994) (Repl. Vol. 2010): 

Whenever the clerk of the county commission has delivered a deed to 

the purchaser after the time specified in section twenty-seven [§ 11A-3-27] of 

article three of this chapter, or, within that time, has delivered a deed to a 

purchaser who was not entitled thereto either because of his failure to meet the 

requirements of section nineteen [§ 11A-3-19] of said article three, or because 

the property conveyed had been redeemed, the owner of such property, his 

heirs and assigns, or the person who redeemed the property, may, before the 

expiration of three years following the delivery of the deed, institute a civil 

action to set aside the deed. No deed shall be set aside under the provisions of 

this section, except in the case of redemption, until payment has been made or 

tendered to the purchaser, or his heirs or assigns, of the amount which would 

have been required for redemption, together with any taxes which have been 

paid on the property since delivery of the deed, with interest at the rate of 

twelve percent per annum. 

Accord Syl. pt. 12, in part, State ex rel. Morgan v. Miller, 177 W. Va. 97, 350 S.E.2d 724 

(“The right of a landowner to have the mandatory provisions of West Virginia Code § 11A-3­

20 (1983 Replacement Vol.) [predecessor to current W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19] complied with 

literally before he is deprived of his land is fundamental[.]”). In the case sub judice, Mr. 

Littell instituted the instant civil action seeking to set aside Mr. Mullins’ deed in 2008, well 

within the statutory three-year period that began when the County Commission Clerk issued 

the tax deed to Mr. Mullins on April 26, 2006. Accordingly, not only must the tax deed be 

set aside based upon Mr. Mullins’ failure to comply with the notice requirements of W. Va. 

Code § 11A-3-19(a)(1), but Mr. Littell, as the divested owner of said property, is a proper 

party to bring the instant proceeding under W. Va. Code § 11A-4-3(a).5 

For the foregoing reasons, the March 25, 2015, order of the Circuit Court of 

McDowell County is hereby reversed, and this case is remanded with directions to set aside 

the April 26, 2006, tax deed to Mr. Mullins upon Mr. Littell’s satisfaction of the payment 

provisions of W. Va. Code § 11A-4-3(a). 

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Because our resolution of the first issue raised by Mr. Littell is dispositive of the case 

sub judice, we need not address his remaining assignments of error which set forth alternate 

grounds upon which to set aside Mr. Mullins’ tax deed. 

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Reversed and Remanded. 

ISSUED: April 28, 2016 

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Menis E. Ketchum 

Justice Robin Jean Davis 

Justice Brent D. Benjamin 

Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Allen H. Loughry II 

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