UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

NICHOLAS EDMUNDS,

Plaintiff,

v.

BOARD OF CONTROL OF EASTERN

MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY, LIZBETH

STEVENS, SARAH GINSBERG, WILLIE

CUPPLES, CAROLE WOOD GORENFLO,

RONALD HOODIN, and LIDIA LEE,

Defendants.

 /

Case No. 09-11648

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

OPINION AND ORDER

 At a session of said Court, held in the U.S.

District Courthouse, Eastern District 

of Michigan, on December 23, 2009.

PRESENT: THE HONORABLE PATRICK J. DUGGAN

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

On April 30, 2009, Plaintiff Nicholas Edmunds filed the present lawsuit against the

Board of Control of Eastern Michigan University (“EMU”), Dr. Lizbeth Stevens, Dr. Sarah

Ginsberg, Dr. Willie Cupples, Dr. Carol Wood Gorenflo, Dr. Ronald Hoodin, and Dr. Lidia

Lee. In his complaint, Edmunds alleges that, while he pursued a graduate degree in SpeechLanguage Pathology (“SLP”), EMU discriminated against him on the basis of disability and

gender. Edmunds also alleges that the individually named defendants—all faculty members

of the SLP program—violated his constitutional right to due process and engaged in First

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1

Edmunds’s complaint also includes a claim that all of the defendants violated public

policy. (Compl. ¶¶ 117-25.) Edmunds has since agreed to the dismissal of that claim. (Pl.’s

Resp. ¶ 6.)

2

In the briefing of the present motion, the parties refer to three different semesters

without explicitly defining those terms. When read in context, however, it appears that EMU has

a “winter” semester running from January to April, a “spring/summer” semester running from

2

Amendment retaliation.1 Presently before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment from

all of the defendants filed on November 13, 2009. The motion has been fully briefed and the

Court held oral argument on December 22, 2009. For the reasons set forth below, the Court

grants defendants’ motion.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This lawsuit arises out of events that occurred while Edmunds pursued a master’s

degree in SLP at EMU. According to representations made by counsel at the December 22

hearing, the facts of this case are not in dispute. Prior to enrolling at EMU, Edmunds had

obtained his bachelor’s degree in Spanish and German and a master’s degree in the Art of

Teaching, both from Wayne State University. While pursuing the master’s in teaching,

Edmunds was also employed as a high school teacher. In January 2005, Edmunds began

taking courses for the SLP program at EMU. A student who pursues the SLP Master’s

Degree at EMU on a full-time basis without failing any classes could potentially graduate

after three full years of study. (See Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 2 ¶ 4.)

By January 2006, however, Edmunds had failed three courses and was placed on

academic probation. (Edmunds’s Dep. at 38-39.) After retaking those three courses in the

Winter 2006 semester, Edmunds enrolled in Clinical I, the first of two required on-campus

clinicals, in the Spring/Summer semester.2

 (See Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 4 at 10.) Edmunds failed

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May to August, and a “fall” semester running from September to December.

3

Failing a course more than once can result in expulsion from the SLP graduate program. 

(See Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 4 at 5.)

4

At the time of these events, Tonkovich was in some kind of dispute with other SLP

faculty and clinical supervisors. (See Defs.’ Mot. at 4 n.3; Pl.’s Resp. Ex.7.) Tonkovich took a

leave of absence from the SLP program beginning in the Fall 2007 and, when he returned to

EMU, was prohibited from rejoining the SLP program. (Pl.’s Resp. Ex. 18.)

3

that course as well and re-enrolled in the Fall semester. At mid-term of the Fall semester,

Edmunds learned that he was failing Clinical I for the second time.3

 Edmunds’s clinical

supervisor suggested and Edmunds agreed to the formation of a faculty support team that

would provide assistance and strategies for moving forward. (Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 5.) At a

meeting of the faculty support team on November 10, 2006, Edmunds agreed to a multi-part

remediation plan whereby he would withdraw from the clinic, refrain from enrolling in

classes in the Winter 2007 semester, and use that time to practice his skills and gain exposure

to the practice of speech pathologists outside the clinical setting. (Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 6.)

As part of the remedial plan, Edmunds volunteered during the Winter 2007 semester

at the Detroit Institute for Children (“DIC”). At some point during that time, Edmunds

discussed with his faculty supervisor, Dr. John Tonkovich,4

 the possibility of completing

Clinical I at the DIC. (Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 6.) Tonkovich apparently informed Edmunds that the

alternative off-campus placement had been approved but there was no formal record of any

approval, Edmunds did not enroll in Clinical I or any other credit-earning course, and

Edmunds kept the alternative arrangement a secret to avoid what he suspected would be

“chaos” regarding the atypical arrangement. (Edmunds’s Dep. at 83-88; Pl.’s Resp. Ex. 7.)

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After completing the work he believed necessary to satisfy the requirements of Clinical

I at the DIC, Edmunds sent a letter dated June 25, 2007, to the Dean of EMU’s College of

Education, Dr. Vernon Polite. Therein, Edmunds touted his success and experiences at the

DIC, expressed frustration with the on-campus clinical, complained that his clinical

supervisor had not intervened earlier in his struggle with Clinical I, and requested that his

clinical files be investigated. Edmunds also e-mailed the letter to Tonkovich, Defendant

Stevens (then the SLP Program Coordinator), and Dr. Lynne Rocklage (Department Head

of Special Education). (Pl.’s Resp. Ex. 9.) At some point in the Fall 2007 semester,

Edmunds was awarded credit for Clinical I based on the work he completed at the DIC.

(Edmunds’s Dep. at 104; Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 7 ¶ 7.)

Also during the Fall 2007 semester, Edmunds began inquiring about the possibility of

completing Clinical II off-campus in the Winter 2008 semester. In early October, Edmunds’s

new academic advisor, Defendant Ginsberg, informed Edmunds that he would have to put

his request for off-campus placement in writing for consideration by the SLP faculty.

Edmunds raised the issue again in a November 5, 2007, e-mail to Ginsberg wherein he

requested to be allowed to make an oral presentation regarding his request at a faculty

meeting. Ginsberg responded that Edmunds should submit his request in writing and

encouraged him to submit his request as quickly as possible to allow for its consideration

before the Winter 2008 semester. (Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 10.) In a November 12, 2007, e-mail,

Edmunds again raised the issue of making an oral presentation and expressed fear of

retaliation for having challenged the on-campus clinical. Ginsberg did not specifically

respond to those points but again implored Edmunds to submit his written request in a timely

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In his deposition for this lawsuit, Edmunds testified that his clinical supervisor was

generally helpful, always provided assistance when requested to do so, and gave constructive

feedback on each of his self-evaluations. (Edmunds’s Dep. at 53-54, 57.)

5

manner. (Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 11.)

In a letter dated November 12, 2007, Edmunds made his written request for an offcampus placement for Clinical II. Edmunds recounted his two failed experiences in the oncampus clinical for Clinical I, described his clinical supervisor as neglectful of his academic

needs, complained that his clinical supervisor only offered negative feedback and criticism,5

and asserted that the clinical supervisor was assigning grades based on subjective, personal

feelings. Edmunds contrasted this with his experience at the DIC. Edmunds described the

variety of clients he was exposed to at the DIC and detailed the amount and type of work he

did there. Edmunds praised the assistance and support he received from his DIC supervisor

and explained that he felt less stress and anxiety in that placement. Edmunds concluded his

letter by requesting that the SLP faculty approve the off-campus placement in the interest of

his academic growth and expressed fear that he would be subject to retaliation if forced to

enroll in the on-campus clinical. (Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 12.)

On the same date as Edmunds’s request letter, Edmunds visited EMU’s Ombudsman’s

Office to express his concerns about the on-campus clinical. The Ombudsman’s Office

referred Edmunds to the Access Services Office (“ASO”). Edmunds’s advocate at the ASO

arranged for Edmunds to undergo a psychological evaluation for the purpose of identifying

possible learning disabilities that might require accommodation. Edmunds was ultimately

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It is noteworthy that, during his retake of Clinical I in Fall 2006, Edmunds wrote in a

self-evaluation:

When I have confidence in something, I can do it. If I am not

confident, I may do it poorly. I, however, never become anxious

or nervous thinking about being observed. It does not worry me

that I am being observed: either by parents, my supervisor or other

student clinicians. I hear this reported constantly from other

students, that they are agitated that others are watching them. 

What concerns me is, to be honest, if my client perceives that I am

unprepared, nervous, uninterested, apathetic, insecure, or scared. 

It seems that, at least, 50% of the clinical experience in clinic 1 is

about being knowledgeable, competent, professional, following

proper procedures, etc.

(Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 3.)

6

diagnosed with a learning disorder and anxiety.6 (See Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 14.)

Before being notified of Edmunds’s disabilities, the SLP faculty decided to deny

Edmunds’s request for off-campus placement. In a letter dated December 18, 2007, the SLP

faculty explained their denial by referring to the requirements of the SLP handbook and

noting that Edmunds had not requested the off-campus placement on the basis of a

substantiated disability. The faculty promised to reconsider Edmunds’s request if he

provided substantiation of a disability but also observed that many disabilities can be

accommodated within the on-campus clinical setting and are analyzed on a case-by-case

basis. The faculty also suggested that Edmunds consider enrolling in the on-campus clinical

for the Winter or Spring 2008 semesters with the promised assistance of a faculty support

team. (Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 13.)

In early January 2008, after the start of the Winter 2008 semester, Edmunds provided

the SLP faculty with a letter from the ASO that provided notice of Edmunds’s documented

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disabilities. In addition to required accommodations regarding extra time and more favorable

testing conditions, the ASO letter requested that the SLP program “please allow the student

to complete his practicum, internships, and related [sic] in alternative settings on or off

campus . . . .” (Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 14.) The letter went on to make detailed suggestions

regarding the structure of any clinical experience. (Id.)

Shortly after receiving Edmunds’s ASO letter, the SLP faculty again denied Edmunds’s

request for off-campus placement for Clinical II. Having considered Edmunds’s

accommodation requirements the faculty continued to believe that the on-campus clinical

presented the best environment for Edmunds. The faculty also expressed concern that they

could not ensure the recommended structure of Edmunds’s clinical experience if he

completed the requirement off-campus. (See Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 15.) Edmunds’s continued to

strongly disagree with the faculty’s assessment. To resolve the continued disagreement,

Edmunds and the SLP faculty embarked on an interactive process whereby they considered

various on-campus alternatives and modifications to the typical clinical experience. (Defs.’

Mot. Exs. 16-19.) Failing to reach a consensus, the SLP faculty ultimately granted

Edmunds’s request for an off-campus placement on April 24, 2008. (Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 20.)

In the Spring/Summer 2008 semester, Edmunds completed Clinical II in an off-campus

placement. By the end of the Winter 2009 semester, Edmunds completed the SLP degree

requirements and graduated from the program. A few days after graduation, Edmunds began

working part-time at Futures HealthCore. (Edmunds’s Dep. at 18-19, 133; Defs.’ Mot. Ex.

21.) About two months later, Edmunds accepted full-time employment at Lakeshore

Communication Disorders Center (“Lakeshore”). (Edmunds’s Dep. at 18-19; Defs.’ Mot.

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Ex. 22.) In February 2009, Edmunds had received an offer of employment from the DIC that

would not begin until September 2009. Because he was employed with Lakeshore by

September, Edmunds did not accept the DIC’s offer. (See Edmunds’s Dep. at 156-57.)

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). The central inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement

to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a

matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505,

2512 (1986). After adequate time for discovery and upon motion, Rule 56(c) mandates

summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential

to that party’s case and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986).

The movant has an initial burden of showing “the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.” Id. at 323. Once the movant meets this burden, the non-movant must come forward

with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita Electric

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). “[The]

opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading . . . .” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). To demonstrate a genuine issue, the non-movant must present sufficient

evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find for the non-movant; a “scintilla of

evidence” is insufficient. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S. Ct. at 2512. 

The court must accept as true the non-movant’s evidence and draw “all justifiable

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inferences” in the non-movant’s favor. See id. at 255. The inquiry is whether the evidence

presented is such that a jury applying the relevant evidentiary standard could “reasonably

find for either the plaintiff or the defendant.” See id.

III. Procedural Due Process

In his first claim, Edmunds asserts that the individual defendants violated his

constitutional right to due process of law by failing to immediately approve his request for

off-campus placement in Clinical II. More specifically, Edmunds asserts that the initial

denial delayed his graduation and that the delay was caused by an arbitrary and capricious

decision made before Edmunds had the opportunity to personally appear at a hearing. To

succeed on this claim, Edmunds must establish a denial of due process in conjunction with

the deprivation of an interest “encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of

liberty and property.” Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S. Ct.

2701, 2705 (1972). Edmunds argues that he had a protected property interest in graduating

“on-time.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 10-11.)

The property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment “may take many forms”

and can arise by way of statute, administrative standards, or contract. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576,

92 S. Ct. at 2708-09. In any case, however, “[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a

person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than

a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”

Id.

Beyond his own conclusory assertions, Edmunds fails to present any evidence or

authority in support of his claimed property interest in “on-time” graduation. It remains

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Edmunds attempt to distinguish the educational program at issue in Paoli from the

degree program in this case does nothing to demonstrate an affirmative interest or entitlement to

on-time graduation.

8

The handbook does place a six year time imitation on completion of the degree

requirements, though a student may apply for extensions. (Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 4 at 10.) Edmunds

completed his requirements after about four and a half years.

9

Were the Court to continue its analysis of this claim, it would fail for at least two other

reasons: (1) the individual defendants afforded Edmunds the requisite procedural due process by

providing him with an opportunity to submit his request in writing, and (2) if Edmunds has a

right to “on-time” graduation and he was denied procedural due process as to the that right, the

individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the right to “on-time”

graduation is not clearly established. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,

10

unresolved in the Sixth Circuit whether a student even has an interest in continued enrollment

at a post-secondary institution, let alone whether there is a further interest in graduating from

a post-secondary institution at a certain time. McGee v. Schoolcraft Cmty. Coll., 167 Fed.

Appx. 429, 437 (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 2006). Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded at the

December 22 hearing that there is no case law in support of Plaintiff’s claimed interest in ontime graduation. When presented with a similar claim, another district court observed:

[T]here is no authority for the proposition that a student enjoys an absolute

right to complete a program of study within the “usual” time period. Some

students take less time and others require more to complete satisfactorily

graduation requirements. The accepted rules and understandings about

secondary education in this country do not require students to complete

their programs of study in a definite, inflexible amount of time. 

Paoli v. Univ. of Del., 695 F. Supp. 171, 173-74 (D. Del. 1988) (footnote omitted).7

 This

corresponds with the SLP handbook associated with Edmunds’ degree; the handbook fails

to include an estimated duration for the program. (Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 4.)8

 Because there is no

evidence or authority to support Edmunds’s claimed interest in “on-time” graduation,

Edmunds’s procedural due process claim fails as a matter of law.9

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546, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1495 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727,

2738 (1982).

10To succeed on a Rehabilitation Act claim, a plaintiff must also establish that the

relevant program is receiving federal financial assistance. Doherty v. S. Coll. of Optometry, 862

F.2d 570, 573 (6th Cir. 1998). That element is not in dispute in this case.

11EMU also contends that Edmunds is not disabled, that his request for an off-campus

placement for Clinical II was unreasonable, and that EMU’s decisions regarding modifications to

substantial degree requirements are entitled to judicial deference.

11

IV. Disability Discrimination

In his second claim, Edmunds argues that EMU engaged in disability discrimination

against him in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. To succeed on this claim,

Edmunds must show that he is “(1) disabled under the statute, (2) ‘otherwise qualified’ for

participation in the program, and (3) being excluded from participation in, denied the benefits

of, or subjected to discrimination under the program by reason of his . . . disability.” S.S. v.

E. Ky. Univ., 532 F.3d 445, 453 (6th Cir. 2008).10 A program that fails to provide reasonable

accommodations for disabled persons may be liable for disability discrimination. Alexander

v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300-01, 105 S. Ct. 712, 719-20 (1985). EMU argues that

Edmunds’s claim for disability discrimination must fail for a number of reasons, including

the fact that it ultimately granted Edmunds’s request for an off-campus placement for

Clinical II.11 Edmunds responds that EMU’s delay in granting his request is actionable in

and of itself, especially when considered in conjunction with his earlier success in an offcampus placement.

Although a delay in granting a reasonable accommodation may support a disability

discrimination claim, the delay must be unreasonable for it to be actionable. See Hurston v.

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12Edmunds’s prior requests for off-campus placement were not based on his alleged

disabilities and, therefore, do not give rise to disability discrimination claims.

13EMU was not responsible for Edmunds’s failure to present the request until after the

Winter 2008 semester began.

14EMU was not required to provide the accommodation immediately. See Gerton, 145

Fed. Appx. at 168-69. Therefore, it is largely irrelevant that Edmunds asserts that he could have

arranged for an off-campus placement for the Winter 2008 semester had EMU immediately

approved his request in early January.

12

Butler County Dept. of Jobs & Family Servs., No. 1:01-CV-313, 2005 WL 2416566, at *8

(S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2005); see also Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1262

(10th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). In analyzing the delay, courts “consider the length of the

delay, the reasons for the delay, whether the [program] has offered any alternative

accommodations while evaluating a particular request, and whether the [program] has acted

in good faith.” Hurston, 2005 WL 2416566, at *8 (quoting Selenke, 248 F.3d at 1262-63).

A delay is not considered unreasonable when it results from internal processing or events

outside the program’s control. Gerton v. Verizon S. Inc., 145 Fed. Appx. 159, 168 (6th Cir.

Aug. 18, 2005).

The three-month delay in this case between Edmunds’s request for off-campus

placement on the basis of his disability and EMU’s grant of that request cannot be said to be

unreasonable. EMU first became aware of Edmunds’s demand for accommodation when it

received the ASO letter in early January,12 after the Winter 2008 semester had already

begun.13 Edmunds’s accommodation letter suggested, but did not require, that Edmunds be

permitted to complete his clinical in an alternative setting “on or off campus.” (Defs.’ Mot.

Ex. 14.) Although EMU initially denied the request for off-campus placement,14 it proceeded

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15The initial denial of Edmunds’s request did not give rise to an automatic violation of the

Rehabilitation Act; it merely acted as the first step in the interactive process between the parties. 

See Nichols v. Harford County Bd. of Educ., 189 F. Supp. 2d 325, 337 (D. Md. 2002).

13

to engage in an interactive process with Edmunds whereby various on-campus alternatives

were explored.15 In April 2008, EMU decided to grant Edmunds’s original request, even

though it still considers the request unreasonable. The granting of the request came in time

for Edmunds to arrange for an off-campus placement in the Spring/Summer 2008 semester,

the semester immediately following his initial request. There is no evidence of bad faith on

the part of EMU in this process and, to the extent there was a delay, it was not unreasonable

under the circumstances. Therefore, EMU is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

V. First Amendment Retaliation

In his third claim, Edmunds asserts that the individual defendants retaliated against him

because of his exercise of his free speech rights under the First Amendment of the

Constitution. To prove a First Amendment retaliation claim, it must be established that:

(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was

taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness

from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal

connection between elements one and two-that is, the adverse action was

motivated at least in part by the plaintiff's protected conduct.

Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999). In this case, Edmunds claims that

the individual defendants retaliated against him because of his letter to the Dean of the

College of Education and because of statements he made in support of his request for an offcampus placement in Clinical II. Edmunds alleges that, based on that First Amendment

activity, the individual defendants initially denied his request for off-campus placement and

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14

delayed his graduation. 

Under the circumstances of this case, Edmunds cannot show adverse action that would

deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in protected free speech

activities. The student handbook for Edmunds’s degree program explicitly requires that

students complete two on-campus clinical courses and Edmunds knew that off-campus

placements were atypical and could cause chaos in the department. (Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 4 at 10;

Edmunds’s Dep. at 8.) By initially denying Edmunds’s request for an off-campus placement,

the individual defendants did not interfere with or adversely affect Edmunds’s ability to

complete his degree program in the ordinary manner. Indeed, the initial denial letter suggests

that Edmunds enroll for the Winter 2008 on-campus clinical, as required by the student

handbook, with the promised assistance of a faculty support team. (Defs.’ Ex. 13.) Simply

put, this means that Edmunds faced the same performance requirements both before and after

he engaged in protected activity. Furthermore, the individual defendants ultimately granted

Edmunds’s request for off-campus placement and Edmunds got exactly what he wanted after

only a limited delay. Such consequences would not deter an ordinary person or an ordinary

post-secondary education student from expressing dissatisfaction with program requirements

or making requests for variances therefrom. Because Edmunds cannot establish the second

element of his First Amendment retaliation claim, the individual defendants are entitled to

summary judgment.

VI. Gender Discrimination

In his fourth claim, Edmunds argues that EMU engaged in gender discrimination

against him in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681.

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Because Title IX itself fails to provide an analytical framework for gender discrimination

claims, the Sixth Circuit has opted to apply the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis

used in Title VII employment discrimination cases. Ivan v. Kent State Univ., No. 94-4090,

1996 WL 422496, at *2 (6th Cir. July 26, 1996). Therefore, Edmunds must first establish

a prima facie case by showing (1) his membership in a protected class, (2) adverse action by

EMU, (3) his qualification for the opportunity that was denied, and (4) that a comparable

non-protected person received better treatment. Id. at *2 n.9. If Edmunds meets that burden,

EMU must “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse . . . action taken.

The burden of production then reverts to [Edmunds] to rebut the reason given as pretextual.”

Id. at *2. Edmunds alleges that the initial denial of his request and the resulting delay in his

graduation amounted to impermissible gender discrimination.

Like his other claims, Edmunds’s gender discrimination claim fails as a matter of law.

For the reasons discussed above in Sections IV and V regarding the requirements of

Edmunds’s degree program, the reasonableness of the delay, and the ultimate granting of

Edmunds’s request, the Court concludes that there was no adverse action in this case. And,

even if the initial denial of Edmunds’s request is considered adverse action, Edmunds still

cannot show that a comparable non-protected person received better treatment. While there

is evidence that a female student was granted off-campus placement for clinical after an email exchange between two professors, (Pl.’s Ex. 5), that student was not similarly situated

to Edmunds. Edmunds sought to avoid the on-campus clinical for his own convenience and

because of his own discomfort and disabilities; the other student was incapable of serving the

clientele of the on-campus clinic at EMU because of a foreign accent. Rather than leaving

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16Another female student was permitted to complete an internship outside the normal

geographical area for Edmunds’s degree program. (See Defs.’ Ex. 7 ¶ 16.) This situation is not

comparable to Edmunds’s situation, however, because all internships are completed off-campus.

17Even if the evidence in this case supports a prima facie case of gender discrimination,

Edmunds cannot show that EMU’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for initially denying

Edmunds’s request—concerns regarding the academic standards of the program—were mere

pretext.

16

the academic environment altogether, however, the other student satisfied her clinical

requirements by serving in a clinical area at a nearby university. There is no other evidence

that a comparable non-protected student received better treatment than Edmunds.16 Because

Edmunds cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination,17 EMU is entitled to summary

judgment.

VII. Conclusion

Although there was a limited delay between the time Edmunds requested an off-campus

placement for Clinical II and the granting of that request, Edmunds ultimately received the

exact variance he requested and graduated from his degree program. For the reasons

discussed above, Edmunds’s due process, discrimination, and retaliation claims fail as a

matter of law.

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

A judgment consistent with this order shall enter.

s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Marlo D. Smith, Esq.

Debra McCulloch, Esq.

Claire S. Harrison, Esq.

2:09-cv-11648-PJD-PJK Doc # 20 Filed 12/23/09 Pg 16 of 16 Pg ID 452