### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE THE CITY OF SEATTLE, aWashington 

### ) No. 79002-1-I municipal corporation, and THE 

### ) SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, 

### ) ) Respondents, 

### ) v. 

### ) $19,560.48 in UNITED STATES 

### ) CURRENCY, 

### )

In Rem Defendant, 

### ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION REBEKAH SHIN, 

### ) ) FILED: March 9, 2020 Intervening Claimant/Appellant. 

### ) __________________________________________________________________________________) VERELLEN, J.

— Rebekah Shin raises two due process challenges to the forfeiture of$19,560.48 to the City ofSeattle. First, she contends inaccuracies in the notice ofseizure and intended forfeiture rendered the notice inadequate. But she fails to establish the notice was not reasonably calculated to apprise her ofthe pendency ofthe action and afford heran opportunityto present her objections. And she fails to establish any prejudice because afterthe city served notice, Shin filed a timely claim ofownership and removed the matterto district court, where she received a full adversarial hearing.No. 79002-1-1/2

Second, Shin challenges the adequacy ofthe service ofthe notice. The forfeiture statute allows service by mail and does not require personal service. The city served the notice by certified mail at 77 South Washington. This is a homeless shelterwith a mail receiving service. Although Shin is homeless and was living in a recreational vehicle (RV) atthe time ofthe seizure, a diligent search showed that Shin frequently and recently used that as her mailing address. Shin provides no authoritythat police were compelled to give notice bytelephone ortrace the current location ofthe RVto perform personal service. Therefore, we affirm. FACTS On November 17, 2015, Detective Rudy Gonzales, an officerwith the Drug EnforcementAgency on loan to the Seattle Police Department (SPD), arrested Shin forsuspected violation ofthe uniform controlled substances act.1 Atthattime, the police seized $19,560.48. On November 19, 2015, the detective gave a notice of seizure and intended forfeiture to Shin’s boyfriend, Kiel Krogstadt. And on November24, 2015, Detective Donald Hardgrove mailed the forms to Shin atthe 77 South Washington address. On December30, 2015, Shin filed a claim with the city and then removed the matterto district court. Before trial, Shin moved forsummaryjudgment, arguing the seizure form misstated the statutorytime and manner requirements forfiling a claim.

1 Ch. 69.50 RCW.

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Shin also challenged the service ofthe notice. The court denied Shin’s summary judgment motion. The district court held afull adversarial hearing on June 20, 2017. Aftera bench trial, the courtforfeited the $19,560.48 to the city. Shin filed a timely RALJ appeal to the superior court. The superior court affirmed the district court. Shin moved this courtfordiscretionary review. A commissionerofthis court granted review under RAP 2.3(d)(3). ANALYSIS Shin contends herdue process rights were violated because portions ofthe notice ofseizure form were inconsistentwith RCW 69.50.505 and because the city did not complywith the service of process requirements. The superior court’s review ofa district court decision is governed by RALJ 9.1. Under RALJ 9.1(a), “[t]he superior court shall reviewthe decision ofthe court of limitedjurisdiction to determine whetherthat court has committed any errors of law.” With regard to factual challenges, “[t]he superior court shall acceptthose factual determinations supported by substantial evidence in the record (1) which were expressly made bythe court of limited jurisdiction, or (2) that may reasonably be inferred from thejudgment ofthe court of limitedjurisdiction.”2 Our review is also governed by RALJ 9.1.~ And unchallenged findings offactare verities on appeal.4

2 RALJ 9.1(b).

~ State v. Ford, 110 Wn.2d 827, 829, 755 P.2d 806 (1988).

~ Cowiche Canyon Conservancyv. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 808, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).

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Here, in the order on summaryjudgment, the district court concluded, “The notice provided in this case satisfies constitutional due process requirements regarding notice,” and “[m]isstatements made in the notice do not go tojurisdiction.”5 Afterafull adversarial hearing on the intended forfeiture, the district court entered findings offacts and conclusions of law. The courtfound it hadjurisdiction
over both the subject matterand the parties pursuantto RCW69.50.505. The court concluded, “SPD’s effortto determine Shin’s address were adequate and

. . . SPD made a good faith search to determine her address.”6 The court also concluded, “All statutory requirements of Notice of Hearing have been satisfied

. . . pursuantto RCW69.50.505.”~ The court ordered the “defendant in rem U.S. currency shall be forfeited to the City ofSeattle and the Seattle Police Department.”8 Shin filed a timely RALJ appeal to the superior court. The superior court affirmed the district court. The court determined Shin “failed to carrythe burden of showing thatthe trial court’s Findings of Facts are not supported by substantial evidence.”9 The court determined there was no violation ofdue process. Before the superior court, Shin did not challenge the district court’s finding that Detective Hardgrove mailed notice to 77 South Washington. The court determined the detective performed an adequate address search and the service of process requirements were satisfied when the detective mailed the notice. And as to the

~Appellant’s Motion for Discretionary Review, Appendix at 26. 6Appendix at 35.

~Appendix at 33. 8Appendix at 36.

~ Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 571.

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notice form, the court concluded “the inconsistencies

. . . do not invalidate the due process and notice requirement under RCW 69.50.505 [and tjhe inconsistencies did not deprive Ms. Shin of notice and the opportunityto be heard.”1° First, Shin argues the district court and subsequently, the superior court, did not have the “authorityto renderjudgment” because the form “materially misstated the statutory ‘time-and-manner’ requirements.”11 The city concedesthere are discrepancies between the notice form and RCW69.50.505 but argues these inconsistencies do not amountto a due process violation. Here, the form provides (1) a claimant must send a claim ofownership “via certified mail,” (2) the time period forfiling a claim starts on “the date thatthe property was seized,” and (3) a claim ofownership “must be received bythe Seattle Police Departmentwithin 45 days” ofthe seizure.12 In contrast, the statute provides (1) a claimant may serve a claim ofownership “by any method authorized by law orcourt rule including, but not limited to, service byfirst-class mail,” (2) the time period for filing a claim starts upon “service ofthe notice ofseizure in the case,” and (3) a claim ofownership, ifserved by mail, “shall be deemed complete upon mailing.”13 The United States Constitution and theWashington Constitution guarantee an individual’s rightto due process.14 “[DJue process generally affords an individual

10Appendix at42 (finding 5). 11 Appellant’s Br. at21, 19. 12 Appendix at 10. 13 RCW 69.50.505(5). 14 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950); Yim v. City ofSeattle, 194 Wn.2d 682, 688, 451 P.3d 694 (2019).

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notice and an opportunityto be heard when the government deprives the individual of
a life, liberty, or property interest.”15 Although the State concedes some details in the form were inconsistentwith the statute, not every defect constitutes a denial ofdue process; ‘minor procedural errors do not necessarily rise to the level ofdue process violations.”16 In State v. Storhoff, the Department of Licensing (DCL) sent each defendant a written notice of license revocation.17 Subsequently, the State charged each defendantwith driving while license suspended. The defendants argued the notice violated their rightto due process because it misstated the time to request a hearing. Our Supreme Courtdetermined: To establish aviolation ofdue process, Defendants must at least allege thatthe incorrect DCL revocation notices deprived them of notice and/oran opportunityto be heard. Butthe Defendants

. . . have not explained how DOL’s errordeprived them of notice oftheir license revocations ortheiropportunityto request aformal hearing. Furthermore, due process does not require express notification ofthe deadline for requesting a formal hearing as long as the order of revocation cites the statute that contains the applicable time limit.[18~ The court held the notices did notviolate the defendants’ due process rights “[ijn the absence ofany suggestion thatthe erroneous DOL revocation notices deprived Defendants of notice oran opportunityto be heard.”19

15 Tellevikv. Real Projerty Known as 31641 W. Rutherford St. Located in City of Carnation, Wash., 125 Wn.2d 364, 370-71, 884 P.2d 1319 (1994).

16 State v. Storhoff, 133 Wn.2d 523, 527, 946 P.2d 783 (1997). 17 133 Wn.2d 523, 526, 946 P.2d 783 (1997). 18 kI. at 527-28 (internal citation omitted). Id. at 528.

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Similarto Storhoff, Shin fails to explain howthe discrepancies in the notice of seizure form deprived herof notice and/oran opportunityto be heard. Rather, Shin argues a forfeiture is a “special proceeding” subjectto heightened due process protection.2° She cites Putnam v. Wenatchee Valley Medical Center, P.S.21 forthe proposition that “[a]ll purely statutory actions are ‘special proceedings,’ deserving of heightened due process protection.”22 In Putnam, our Supreme Court considered whether medical malpractice proceedings are special proceedings and therefore exemptfrom certain civil rules. Even ifa forfeiture action is a special proceeding, Shin fails to provide any authorityto support her proposition that all special proceedings are subjectto heightened due process protection. Putnam addresses the application ofthe civil rules to special proceedings and does not mention heightened due process protection. Shin also relies on Trulyv. Heuft23to argue “[a] tribunal does not have the authorityto renderjudgment in a special proceeding unless the notices, summonses, and similar methods of process strictly complied with the statute.”24 In Truly, the landlord, Truly, brought a residential unlawful detainer action against his tenant, Heuft, for nonpayment of rent. The residential unlawful detainer statute required the

20Appellant’s Br. at 20. 21166 Wn.2d 974, 216 P.3d 374 (2009). 22Appellant’s Br. at20. 23 138 Wn. App. 913, 158 P.3d 1276 (2007), abrogated by MHM & F, LLC v. Pryor, 168 Wn. App. 451, 277 P.3d 62 (2012). 24Appellant’s Br. at21.

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plaintiffto allowthe defendantto answer by personal delivery, mail, orfax.25 In Truly, the summons did not complywith these statutory requirements. This court acknowledged the case presented an issue offirst impression, “whethera court has jurisdiction to enterjudgment in a residential unlawful detaineraction when the plaintiff-landlord fails to use [the unlawful detainerstatute] summons language allowing a defendant-tenantto answer not only by personal delivery but also by mail
orfacsimile.”26 Ultimately, this court held that “the lowercourt lackedjurisdiction overthis unlawful detainer action because the summons did not strictly complywith [the unlawful detainerstatute].”27 In part, the court relied on case lawthat provided “[i]n the context ofa residential unlawful detaineraction, the summons must complywith the [unlawful detainerstatute] to confer both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.”28 The court determined a tenant’s available method ofanswering a summonswas a “manner requirement,” and as a result, “required strict compliance.”29 Shin’s analogyto the unlawful detainer statute is not compelling. The details of howand when to file a claim ofownership, underthe forfeiture statute, are notthe equivalent ofthe strictjurisdictional statutorysummons dictated bythe unlawful detainerstatute and accompanying case law. Although forfeiture is purely

25 Truly, 138 Wn. App. at 916 (citing LAWS OF2005, ch. 130, 

### § 3). 26k1.at918. 27 Id. at 923. 28 ki. at 918 (emphasis added). 29 kI. at 920-21.

8No. 79002-1-119

statutory,3° Shin fails to establish thejurisdiction rule from Truly extends to a forfeiture proceeding. Shin does not establish the district court lacked the authorityto renderjudgment. We do not condone the city’s failure to update the seizure form to complywith the 2009 amendments to RCW69.50.505. When the city served Shin in this case, sixyears had passed since the legislature enacted the amendments. Using forms consistentwith the statute is not an undue burden. But on this briefing, Shin fails to establish thatthe discrepancies in the notice ofseizure form deprived herof notice and/or an opportunityto be heard. And even ifthe discrepancies in the notice form constituted a due process violation, other cases recognize the need for prejudice. In State v. Getty, the 17- year-old defendantwas arrested, and the arresting officer issued an adult “Citation/Complaint Form.”31 The officersentthe citation tojuvenile court. Several months later, the State filed an information injuvenile court, charging Gettywith first degree malicious mischief. Getty moved to dismiss, arguing the initial adult citation commenced an action in Renton municipal court and the subsequent information initiated an action in King Countyjuvenile court, in violation ofdoublejeopardy. This court acknowledged that “even ifthe use ofthe adultform constituted a violation ofGetty’s due process rights, dismissal is inappropriate because Getty suffered no prejudice” because the municipal court did not attemptto proceed on the

30 State v. Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 799-801, 828 P.2d 591 (1992). 31 55 Wn. App. 152, 153, 777 P.2d 1(1989).

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adult citation.32 “Underthe harmless errortheory, a violation of Getty’s constitutional rights does notwarrant dismissal ifthe State proves beyond a reasonable doubtthat the violation did not prejudice Getty.”33 Here, Detective Gonzales arrested Shin on November 17, 2015. Atthattime, the police seized $19,560.48. On November 19, 2015, the detective gave a notice of seizure and intended forfeiture to Krogstadt, Shin’s boyfriend. On November 24, 2015, Detective Hardgrove mailed the notice to Shin at her last known mailing address. Additionally, Shin’s attorneytestified: I send out public disclosure requests regularlyto law enforcement agencies all across the state. And I pick and choose ones that I wantto work on and write letters and asked them, hey, ifyou don’t have counsel, I’d love to help. And that’s what I did with her. And she called me by phone and said, “Absolutely. I have been calling attorneys, and nobodywants to take this case.”~341 The parties dispute how Shin received the notice, butthe record reflects Shin had notice ofthe pending forfeiture no laterthan December30, 201 535 On that date, Shin filed a timely claim with the city and then removed the matterto district court. The district court held a full adversarial hearing on June 20, 2017. Underthe harmless errortheory, dismissal ofthe forfeiture is notwarranted because any defect in the notice form did not prejudice Shin. Shin fails to establish that inaccuracies in the form warrant any reliefon appeal.
32kLat 155. 33 Id. at 155-56.

~ OP at452-53 (emphasis added).

~ Appendix at 33 (finding 28) (“When Morelli contacted Shin, Shin was alreadyaware thatthe defendant in rem property had been seized.”) Shin does not challenge this finding.

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Second, Shin argues herdue process rights were violated because the city failed to “attempt in good faith orwith due diligence to ascertain Ms. Shin’s current mailing address priorto mailing out its [notice].”36 Due process requires notice that is ‘“reasonably calculated, underall the circumstances, to apprise interested parties ofthe pendency ofthe action and afford them an opportunityto presenttheir objections.”37 Additionally, service of process must complywith statutoryservice requirements.38 Under RCW69.50.505(3), notice ofseizure of personal property “may be served by any method authorized by law or court rule including but not limited to service by certified mail with return receipt requested.” Here, on November24, 2015, Detective Hardgrove mailed the notice of seizure and intended forfeiture to Shin by certified mail at 77 South Washington,39 which is the address ofa homeless shelterwith a mail acceptance service. Before mailing the notice forms, Detective Hardgrove checked the general offense report, the SPD records management system, and a current car registration for Shin. All of those sources listed heraddress as 77 South Washington.

36Appellant’s Br. at26.

~ Bruettv. Real Property Known As 18328 11th Ave. N.E., 93 Wn. App. 290, 298, 968 P.2d 913 (1998) (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314). 38j4 at 299 (quoting Weiss v. Glemp, 127 Wn.2d 726, 734, 903 P.2d 455 (1995)).

~ Appendix at 32 (finding 24) (“On November24, 2015, Detective Donald Hardgrove senttwo notices ofseizure and intended forfeiture to Rebekah Shin by both certified and regular mail; one notice was forthe $1 9,560 seizure

. . . . Detective Hardgrove sentthe notices to the address of77 South Washington Street.”) Shin does not challenge this finding.

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Shin does not dispute these facts and argues, in orderto complywith RCW69.50.505, Detective Hardgrove was required to search further, including DOL records. But Shin does not provide any authority or meaningful argument to support this proposition. And notably, there is no evidence in the record thatthe address in DCL records was in fact a valid mailing address for Shin when the forfeiture was commenced. Although mailing the notice to an outdated residential address may not be reasonably calculated to give notice to a homeless person in some circumstances, SPD’s mailing to the address identified by Shin frequently and recently is reasonably calculated to give her notice. Detective Hardgrove’s diligent inquiry and subsequent certified mailing was sufficientto satisfy due process and the service of process requirements of RCW69.50.505(3). To the extent Shin suggests the city should have personally served or attempted to contact her bytelephone, RCW 69.50.505(3) does not require personal service ortelephone notice.4° The citywas aware Shin slept in an RV parked at various locations along a city street, and the city had Shin’s telephone number. However, that information does not mean thatsending the notices by mail, as provided for in RCW 69.50.505(3), to the mailing address Shin frequently and recently used was not reasonably calculated to give Shin notice ofthe forfeiture proceeding. We conclude Shin’s due process rights were notviolated.

40 It is undisputed Detective Gonzales left a second set offorms addressed to Shin with Shin’s boyfriend and directed him to give the documents to Shin. Because the city clarified on RALJ appeal that itwas not relying on the delivery ofthe notice to the boyfriend addressed to Shin, we do not address the impact ofthat delivery.

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Shin requestsfees on appeal under RCW69.50.505(6). The statute allows for
an award of reasonable attorneyfees “where the claimant substantially prevails.” Because Shin has not prevailed on appeal, we deny her requestforfees. Therefore, we affirm. 

# I~J, V ,,f~ P’~ WE CONCUR:

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