UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WAUKEEN R. SPRAGGINS,

Petitioner,

v. CASE NO. 09-cv-10960

HONORABLE NANCY G. EDMUNDS 

GREGORY McQUIGGIN,

Respondent.

______________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE HABEAS CORPUS PETITION,

DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, BUT

GRANTING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

Petitioner Waukeen R. Spraggins is a state prisoner at Kinross Correctional Facility

in Kincheloe, Michigan. He has filed a pro se habeas corpus petition challenging his pleabased convictions for larceny by false pretenses, uttering and publishing, and passing a

false title to a motor vehicle. He alleges that the state sentencing guidelines were

improperly scored, that he is entitled to withdraw his plea or be re-sentenced, and that his

trial attorney was ineffective. Having reviewed the pleadings and record, the Court finds

no merit in Petitioner’s claims. Consequently, the habeas petition will be denied.

 I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged with several crimes in Macomb County, Michigan. On

January 16, 2007, he pleaded no contest to the following four counts in Macomb County

Circuit Court: one count of larceny by false pretenses of an item worth $20,000 or more,

Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.218(5)(a); two counts of uttering and publishing, Mich. Comp.

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1 Pursuant to People v. Cobbs, 505 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1993), judges may

participate in sentencing discussions in the following manner:

At the request of a party, and not on the judge's own initiative, a judge

may state on the record the length of sentence that, on the basis of the

information then available to the judge, appears to be appropriate for the

charged offense.

. . . . 

The judge's preliminary evaluation of the case does not bind the

judge's sentencing discretion, since additional facts may emerge during

later proceedings, in the presentence report, through the allocution

afforded to the prosecutor and the victim, or from other sources. 

However, a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere in reliance

upon a judge's preliminary evaluation with regard to an appropriate

sentence has an absolute right to withdraw the plea if the judge later

determines that the sentence must exceed the preliminary evaluation.

Id. at 212.

2

Laws § 750.249; and one count of passing a false title to a motor vehicle, Mich. Comp.

Laws § 257.254. Petitioner also agreed to pay a towing charge of $275.00 and $21,703.56

in restitution.

In return for Petitioner’s plea, the prosecutor agreed not to charge Petitioner with

certain auto theft related crimes, not to prosecute Latrese Hunt, and not to charge

Petitioner and others with obstruction of justice or subornation of perjury that occurred in

jail. Additionally, the prosecutor reduced a charge of habitual offender, fourth offense, to

habitual offender, third offense. The parties and the trial court agreed to a sentence within

the sentencing guidelines range of twelve to thirty-six months.1

 Additional terms of the plea

agreement called for the return of two vehicles, certain documents, and a cell phone to the

proper parties. 

At the sentencing on March 8, 2007, the prosecutor and defense attorney

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 The sentencing guidelines range applies only to the minimum sentence; the

maximum sentence is set by statute. People v. Claypool, 684 N.W.2d 278, 286 n.14

(Mich. 2004). 

3

 Appellate Judge Stephen L. Borrello voted to grant Petitioner’s motion to

remand the case for a hearing and to deny his other motions. 

3

acknowledged that the recommended sentencing guidelines range was actually sixty to

eighty-four months. In light of the modified sentencing guidelines, the trial court agreed to

sentence Petitioner to a minimum sentence of forty-eight months instead of thirty-six

months.2 The trial court then sentenced Petitioner to imprisonment as follows: 48 to 240

months (four to twenty years) for larceny by false pretenses; 43 to 336 months (three years,

seven months to twenty-eight years) for each uttering and publishing count; and 43 to 240

months (three years, seven months to twenty years) for passing false title. The trial court

ordered the sentences to run concurrently with each other, but consecutively to Petitioner’s

sentence for violating parole.

Both Petitioner and his appellate attorney filed motions to withdraw the no-contest

plea and for re-sentencing. The trial court granted Petitioner’s request for two days of jail

credit, but denied Petitioner’s other requests. The Michigan Court of Appeals subsequently

denied leave to appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented. See People v.

Spraggins, No. 282912 (Mich. Ct. App. July 9, 2008).3 

Petitioner then applied for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. In lieu

of granting leave to appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded Petitioner’s case to the

trial court for correction of the presentence report and the judgment of sentence to reflect

two days of sentence credit. The state supreme court denied leave to appeal in all other

respects because it was not persuaded to review the remaining issues. See People v.

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4

 Justice Marilyn Kelly voted to remand the case for rescoring of offense

variables nine and thirteen.

4

Spraggins, 758 N.W.2d 281 (Mich. 2008).4

Petitioner filed his habeas petition on March 16, 2009. As noted, he raises issues

about his plea, sentence, and trial attorney.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The statutory authority of federal courts to issue habeas corpus relief for persons

in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).” Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, __, 131

S. Ct. 770, 783 (2011). Pursuant to § 2254, state prisoners are not entitled to the writ of

habeas corpus unless the state court’s adjudication of their claims on the merits 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceedings. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “[W]here factual findings are challenged, the habeas petitioner has

the burden of rebutting, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption that the state

court’s factual findings are correct.” Goodwin v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 301, 308 (6th Cir.

2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) and Landrum v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 905, 914 (6th Cir.

2010)). 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question

of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set

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of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An

“unreasonable application” occurs when “a state-court decision unreasonably applies the

law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner’s case.” Id. at 409.

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief

so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s

decision.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. To obtain a writ of habeas corpus from a federal

court, state prisoners must show that the state court’s ruling on their claims “was so lacking

in justification” that it resulted in “an error well understood and comprehended in existing

law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-87. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Sentencing Guidelines

Petitioner’s first claim alleges that the state sentencing guidelines were scored

inaccurately and that the trial court relied on erroneous information in violation of his right

to due process. The contention that the sentencing guidelines were incorrectly scored

lacks merit because a state court’s application of its sentencing laws and guidelines is a

matter of state concern only, Howard v. White, 76 F. App’x 52, 53 (6th Cir. 2003), and

“federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.

764, 780 (1990). Therefore, Petitioner’s challenge to the scoring of the Michigan

sentencing guidelines is not a cognizable claim on habeas corpus review. McPhail v.

Renico, 412 F. Supp. 2d 647, 656 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Robinson v. Stegall, 157 F. Supp. 2d

802, 823 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 

Petitioner nevertheless maintains that the trial court relied on erroneous information

in calculating the guidelines. A sentence violates due process of law if the trial court relied

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on “extensively and materially false” information, which the defendant had no opportunity

to correct through counsel. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948). 

Petitioner claims that certain information regarding his marital status, his mother’s

name, and his mental health were inaccurately reported in his presentence information

report. Petitioner has not shown that the trial court relied on these relatively minor personal

matters when sentencing him, and the alleged misinformation does not rise to the level of

“constitutional magnitude.” United States v. Tucker, 404 US. 443, 447 (1972). Therefore,

Petitioner has no right to be re-sentenced on the basis of the allegedly false personal

information in the presentence report.

Petitioner also challenges the scoring of offense variables nine and thirteen. The

prosecutor agreed during post-conviction proceedings that offense variable nine (number

of victims) should be assessed zero points. The trial court, however, stated in its order on

Petitioner’s post-conviction motions that it would impose the same minimum sentence

regardless of the scoring of offense variable nine. Consequently, the alleged error in

scoring offense variable nine did not prejudice Petitioner or violate his right to due process.

As for offense variable thirteen (continuing pattern of felonious criminal activity),

Petitioner disputes the use of one or more Ohio offenses to score the offense variable. The

trial court determined on post-conviction review that the presentence report was accurate

as to the number of Petitioner’s convictions and that offense variable thirteen was correctly

scored. Even if the trial court erred in its calculation of the offense variable, the corrected

guidelines score would be nineteen to fifty-seven months, according to Petitioner. His

minimum sentence of forty-eight months falls within that range. 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the allegedly incorrect information “had an

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ascertainable and ‘dramatic’ impact on the sentencing authority.” Zant v. Stephens, 462

U.S. 862, 903 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The Court therefore concludes that the

trial court did not rely on extensively and materially false information, which Petitioner had

no opportunity to correct through counsel. 

B. The Plea and Sentencing Agreement

In a related claim, Petitioner alleges that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea

or be re-sentenced because the plea and sentencing agreement was based on incorrectly

scored sentencing guidelines. Petitioner further alleges that his plea was involuntary

because he pleaded no contest in reliance on a promise of a minimum sentence of thirty-six

months. Petitioner also contends that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement that the

minimum sentence would be no more than thirty-six months. 

The Supreme Court stated in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971),

that, “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the

prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such

promise must be fulfilled.” But there is no constitutional right to withdraw a knowing and

voluntary guilty or no-contest plea. Martuzas v. Reynolds, 983 F. Supp. 87, 90 (N.D.

N.Y.1997); Freeman v. Muncy, 748 F. Supp. 423, 429 (E.D. Va. 1990); Williams v. Smith,

454 F. Supp. 692, 696 (W.D. N.Y. 1978). And the contention that the sentencing guidelines

were inaccurately scored is not cognizable on habeas review. McPhail v. Renico, 412 F.

Supp. 2d at 656; Robinson v. Stegall, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 823. 

Although Petitioner contends that his plea was involuntary, a plea is voluntary if it

is done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). The defendant must appreciate the

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consequences of his plea, waive his rights without being coerced, and understand the

rights that he is surrendering. Ruelas v. Wolfenbarger, 580 F.3d 403, 408 (6th Cir. 2009),

cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010). The voluntariness of a plea is determined

by considering all the relevant circumstances surrounding the plea. Brady, 397 U.S. at 749.

Petitioner was thirty-four years old at his plea, and he had the equivalent of a high

school diploma. He was informed of the plea agreement, the maximum possible sentences

for his crimes, and certain rights that he was waiving by pleading no contest. He assured

the trial court that he was pleading no contest freely and voluntarily because it was his

choice to plead no contest. 

At the subsequent sentencing, the prosecutor explained that, although initially the

parties thought the minimum sentence would be no more than thirty-six months, the

sentencing guidelines had been re-calculated and were actually sixty to eighty-four months.

The trial court acknowledged that, during discussions in chambers, it had agreed to

sentence Petitioner to a minimum sentence of forty-eight months in prison. Defense

counsel then informed the trial court that Petitioner wanted to go forward with sentencing.

(Tr. Mar. 8, 2007, at 4.) 

The Court concludes from the record that Petitioner’s plea was voluntary. Petitioner

agreed to plead no contest with full awareness of the consequences of his plea. Although

the prosecutor subsequently recommended a higher minimum sentence in light of the

altered sentencing guidelines, he did so in consultation with defense counsel and the trial

court. He did not breach the plea agreement. Petitioner then opted to go forward with the

proceedings without objecting to the change in the sentencing agreement. In fact, when

the trial court asked him whether he had anything to tell the court before sentencing,

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Petitioner stated that he regretted what he had done and was ashamed of it. (Id. at 11.)

Under the circumstances, Petitioner is not entitled to withdraw his plea. 

C. Trial Counsel

Petitioner’s third and final claim alleges that trial counsel was ineffective. Petitioner

contends that trial counsel miscalculated the sentencing guidelines and failed to object to

the prosecutor’s re-scoring of the guidelines and breach of the plea agreement. Petitioner

further alleges that trial counsel did not advise him of the content of the discussion in the

judge’s chambers regarding the change in the sentencing guidelines.

1. Clearly Established Federal Law

Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), an attorney is ineffective

if “counsel’s performance was deficient” and “the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense.” In guilty plea cases, the “performance” prong requires showing that defense

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or was outside

the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Hill v. Lockhart, 474

U.S. 52, 56-59 (1985). 

The “prejudice” prong “focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective

performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Id. at 59. The petitioner must

demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id.

2. Application 

Defense counsel’s advice to plead no contest did not constitute deficient

performance, because the plea agreement called for a reduction in the habitual offender

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charge and a promise not to charge Petitioner with additional crimes. Petitioner could have

been sentenced to a more severe sentence if he had gone to trial and been convicted.

Even if trial counsel underestimated the sentencing guidelines, Petitioner received a

favorable plea bargain, and his sentence fell within the guidelines range as he calculated

it.

 As for Petitioner’s remaining contentions, the record indicates that the prosecutor

did not breach the plea agreement; instead, the parties re-negotiated the sentencing

portion of the agreement, and the trial court approved the agreement. The record further

indicates that trial counsel informed Petitioner of the modified plea agreement prior to

sentencing. Although defense counsel is quoted in the sentencing transcript as saying that

he did not convey the content of the discussion in chambers to Petitioner, he went on to

say that Petitioner was inclined to go forward with sentencing and had only one correction

to make in the pre-sentence report. (Tr. Mar. 8, 2007, at 4-5.) It appears from the context

of trial counsel’s comment that counsel either misspoke or that his comments were

transcribed incorrectly when he stated that he did not convey the parties’ discussion to

Petitioner. 

The Court concludes that defense counsel’s performance was not deficient and that

counsel’s alleged deficiencies did not affect the outcome of the plea process. Therefore,

trial counsel was not ineffective. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The state courts’ opinions and orders were not contrary to federal law, unreasonable

applications of federal law, or unreasonable determinations of the facts. Accordingly, the

petition for a writ of habeas corpus [Dkt. #1] is DENIED. 

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The Court declines to grant a certificate of appealability because reasonable jurists

would not debate the Court’s resolution of Petitioner’s claims, and the claims are not

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

483-84 (2000). Petitioner nevertheless may proceed in forma pauperis on appeal because

his claims are not entirely frivolous, and an appeal could be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3). 

s/Nancy G. Edmunds 

Nancy G. Edmunds

United States District Judge

Dated: October 3, 2011

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record

on October 3, 2011, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Carol A. Hemeyer 

Case Manager

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