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******************************************************STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RUFFINO FERNANDEZ (AC 38088)
DiPentima, C. J., and Keller and West, Js. Argued October 25—officially released December 27, 2016 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Kwak, J.)
Richard S. Cramer, for the appellant (defendant). Kathryn W. Bare, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s attorney, and John F. Fahey, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).Opinion KELLER, J. The defendant, Ruffino Fernandez, appeals following his conviction of one count each of risk ofinjury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2), sexual assault in the second degree in violationofGeneralStatutes § 53a-71 (a) (1), andsexual assaultinthe fourth degree inviolation ofGeneral Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1) (B). The defendant claims that (1)thetrialcourtabuseditsdiscretionbynotpermitting himto make amissingwitness argument during closing remarks; (2) the state committed prosecutorial impropriety by basing part of its closing argument on facts not in evidence; and (3) he was deprived of his rights to an impartial tribunal and a fair trial when the trial courtmade comments infront ofthejurythatbolstered the credibilityofthevictim. We disagreewiththe defendant and affirm the judgment of conviction.
The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. During the relevant time period, the defendant owned and operated Keithbel Market, a grocery store
on Zion Street in Hartford. Nearby lived J,1 then twelve to thirteen years old, along with her family. A family friend, Wilnelia ‘‘Wendy’’ David, also lived withJ’s familyforaperiodoftime, and, thereafter, inanotherapartment in the same building.
Prior to the events in question, David developed an arrangement with the defendant whereby she had sex with him in the basement of the market in exchange for cash or diapers for her son. Between September and December, 2012, David brought J along with her during visits to the market. On approximately four of these occasions, the defendant brought J down to the basement of the market and sexually assaulted her. David observed at least one of these assaults. During
some or all of these incidents, the defendant touched and kissed J’s breasts under her clothes; touched her buttocks over her clothes; and digitally penetrated her vagina. Afteratleastsome ofthese incidents, the defendant gave J money. David was charged as an accessory to risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2). In exchange for a sentence of five years in prison and five years of special parole (the maximum time to which she was exposed was twenty years), David testified against the defendant.
Afterafourdaytrial, thejuryconvictedthe defendant of the three counts set forth previously. The court, Kwak, J., sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence offorty years to serve, followed by five years of special parole, and registration for life as a sex offender. Additionalfacts willbe setforthas necessary. I
The defendant first claims that the court abused itsdiscretion by not permitting him to make a missing witness argument during his closing remarks. We are not persuaded.
The following additional facts are relevant to our discussion. Attrial, Davidtestifiedthat on one occasion she ‘‘lost track’’ of J during one of their visits to the defendant’s store. At the time, David wasjoined by J’s sister. David andJ’s sister called out forJ in an attempt to locate her. David and J’s sister eventually observed J, followed by the defendant, coming up the basement staircase of the market.
The defendant requested leave from the court to make a missing witness argument during closing remarks. See State v. Mungroo, 104 Conn. App. 668, 677, 935 A.2d 229 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 908, 942 A.2d 415 (2008). Specifically, the defendant wished to argue thatthe state’s failure to callJ’s sisterto testify in corroboration of David’s testimony that both observed J and the defendant ascending the basement staircase suggested thatJ’s sister’s testimony would be detrimental to the state’s case. The defendant argued thatbecauseDavidhad, inthedefendant’swords, ‘‘credibility issues,’’ it would have been natural for the state to call J’s sister to bolster David’s testimony. Thus, accordingtothedefendant, heshouldhavebeenpermitted to ask the jury to draw an adverse inference from the absence of such testimony. The court denied the defendant’s request, reasoning that the defendant’s offer of proof was mere speculation.
The following legal principles govern our resolution ofthis claim. ‘‘We review the court’s decision allowing the [defendant] to include a missing witness argument in [his] closing argument for abuse of discretion.

. . . It is within the discretion of the trial court to limit the scope of final argument.

. . . The broad discretion vested in trial courts by [State v

. Malave, 250 Conn. 722, 737A.2d 442 (1999) (setting forth requirements for making missing witness argument), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1170, 120 S. Ct. 1195, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1099 (2000)] mirrorsthe general standards regardingthetrial court’s ability to limit closing argument. [T]he scope of final argument lies within the sound discretion of the court

. . . subject to appropriate constitutional limitations.

. . . We first determine whether the trial court abused its discretioninlightoftheinformationbeforethe court when itruled onthe motion. Ifthere was such an abuse of discretion, the reviewing court must determine whether the defendant has established that, in light of the totality of evidence at trial and the trial court’s subsequent instructions to the jury, the impropriety constituted harmful error.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Campbell, 149 Conn. App. 405, 419, 88 A.3d 1258, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 907, 93 A.3d 157 (2014). ‘‘Under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to theUnited States constitution, a criminal defendant has
a constitutionally protected right to make a closing argument. That right is violated not only when a defendant is completely denied an opportunity to argue before the court or the jury after all the evidence has been admitted, but also when a defendant is deprived of the opportunity to raise a significant issue that is reasonably inferable from the facts in evidence.

. . . ‘‘In [State v

. Malave, supra, 250 Conn. 739], our Supreme Court abandoned, in criminal cases, the [rule of Secondino v

. New Haven Gas Co., 147 Conn. 672, 165A.2d 598 (1960)], also knownasthe missingwitness rule, which sanctioned, under certain circumstances, a juryinstructionthatanadverseinferencemaybe drawn from the failure of a party to produce a witness. Although ourSupreme Court abandonedtheSecondino rule, it did not intend to prohibit counsel from making appropriate comment, in closing arguments, about the absence ofaparticularwitness, insofar as thatwitness’ absence may reflect on the weakness of the opposing party’s case.

. . . Comments in closing argument that do not directly exhortthejuryto draw an adverse inferencebyvirtueofthewitness’absencedonotnecessarily fall under the ambit ofSecondino

. . . and accordingly
are not forbidden by Malave. Our Supreme Court further provided that [o]f course, the trial court retains wide latitude to permit or preclude such a comment, and may, in its discretion, allow apartyto adduce additional evidence relative to the missing witness issue.

. . . ‘‘It is within the discretion of the trial court to limit the scope of final argument to prevent comment on facts that are not properly in evidence, to prevent the jury from considering matters in the realm of speculation and to prevent the jury from being influenced by impropermattersthatmightprejudice its deliberations.

. . . While we are sensitive to the discretion of the trial court in limiting argument to the actual issues of the case, tight control over argument is undesirable when counsel is precluded from raising a significant issue.

. . . ‘‘Amissingwitnessargumentisappropriateinlimited circumstances. Counselmayonlyinvitethejuryto draw reasonable inferences on the basis offacts in evidence, and the court’s exercise of discretion as to whether to permit such argument is dependent on the facts made knownto it. Forthis reason, itis necessaryfor counsel, throughfacts andargument, tojustifyarequesttomake
amissingwitnessargument. Ourdecisionallawreflects, for example, that defense counsel should explain how the state’s decision not to call [a person as a witness] exposedaweaknessinthe state’scaseandshouldmake
an offer ofproofregarding the substance of [such person’s] potential testimony.

. . . Stated otherwise, counselmustdemonstratethatsuchwitnesswasavail-able to testify, setforth the substance ofthe testimony that such witness would havegiven had he been called to the witness stand and explain how his testimony would have been detrimental to the state’s case

. Evidence thatwouldhave been merely cumulative or ofno consequence to a reasonable assessment ofthe state’s case, for example, would not warrant such an argument.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Statev. Mungroo, supra, 104 Conn. App. 675–77.
Thedefendantarguesonappealthatthecourtabused its discretion by precluding his missing witness argument because he established at trial that J’s sister was available to testify, and that he sufficiently articulated the substance ofsuchtestimony andhowitwouldhave been detrimental to the state’s case. See id., 677. We disagree for the reasons set forth below.
As to J’s sister’s availability as a witness, the defendant argued before the trial court that ‘‘the law as it stands suggests that she was apparently available to both sides, and I could have called her if I wished to raise this point.’’ In denying the defendant’s request to make the missing witness argument, the court did not specifically address the issue ofJ’s sister’s availability. On appeal, the defendant points to the fact that ‘‘[J’s sister] was still a teenager at the time oftrial and lived in the same apartment building as her mother, who testified, and as [J].’’ The defendant continues: ‘‘As a family member, there should be little doubt that the state either knew or could have readily found this witness through the cooperation of [J], her brother, also
a witness, or [J’s] mother or father who also testified. Defendant, in order to secure his right to make the argument, neednotshowthathehimselfknows exactly where this witness was at the time of trial. The state allegedly did not know. But there was no question it could have readily found that out.’’
We emphasize that, in order to succeed on a request to make a missing witness argument, ‘‘it is necessary for counsel, through facts and argument, to justify [such] request

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Mungroo, supra, 104 Conn. App. 677. We conclude that the defendant’s offer of proof at trial did not sufficiently establish that J’s sister was available to testify. The defendantpresented nothing to the trial court concerning the availability ofJ’s sister other than a conclusory statementthatshe was available andthatthe defendant ‘‘could have called her if I wished to raise this point.’’ The defendant points now to evidence of J’s sister’s livingarrangementsatthetimeoftheassaultstosuggest that the state could have obtained her testimony without difficulty, but that is simply not the argument that the defendant made before the trial court.2 In light of such dearth of information, we reject the defendant’s argument that his offer of proof adequately demon-strated that J’s sister was available to testify.
We are likewise not persuaded that the defendant adequately set forth the substance of J’s sister’s testimony and how it would have been detrimental to the state’s case. As previously explained, the defendant’s argument to the court appears to have proceeded as follows: David, it is claimed, had serious credibility problems as a witness; therefore, the state needed to bolster her credibility by presenting J’s sister as a corroboratingwitness; consequently, the factthatthe state did notpresentJ’s sister’s testimony suggests that such testimony would have harmed the state’s case. The defendant, as he must, argues much the same upon appeal. See Janusauskas v. Fichman, 264 Conn. 796, 807, 826 A.2d 1066 (2003) (‘‘a party may not try its
case on one theory and appeal on another’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).
The court did not abuse its discretion by precluding the defendant’s missing witness argument on the groundthathis offerofproofwasbasedonmere speculation. Aside from hypothesizing that J’s sister’s testimonywouldnotbe ‘‘helpful’’ to the state, the defendant provided no actual information as to the expected content of the testimony or its prejudicial impact on the state’s case. ‘‘Where, as here, a defendant’s claimed entitlement to make a missing witness argument rests
on mere speculation, the court’s exercise of discretion in denyingpermissionto make such argument does not reflect an abuse of its discretion.’’ State v. Mungroo, supra, 104 Conn. App. 678–79; see alsoStatev. Graham, 67 Conn. App. 45, 49, 787 A.2d 11 (2001) (trial court did not abuse discretion in precluding missing witness argument because defendant ‘‘offered only a blanket statement that [the witness’] failure to testify demonstrated a weakness in the state’s case’’), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 911, 789 A.2d 996 (2002).
Put simply, the defendant’s argument that the state’s failure to put forth the testimony ofJ’s sister suggests that such testimony would have been harmful to the state’s case does not appear to us to be a ‘‘reasonable inference’’ based on the record. See State v. Mungroo, supra, 104 Conn. App. 677 (‘‘[c]ounsel may only invite the jury to draw reasonable inferences on the basis of facts in evidence’’). We conclude so for two reasons. First, contrary to the defendant’s contention, we do not view David’s testimony as particularly in need of corroboration. The defendant asserts that David ‘‘testified with considerable baggage’’ and that ‘‘[h]er testimony was replete with inconsistencies and admitted discrepancies.’’ The defendant, however, did not identify any alleged inconsistency or discrepancy at trial,
nor does he do so on appeal. The defendant does point to the fact that David testified against the defendant in exchange for a more lenient sentence as damaging to her credibility. He elides the fact, however, that wereDavid to lie during her testimony, pursuant to her plea agreement with the state, she would have faced up to twenty years in prison. The existence of the plea agreement alone does not appear to us to warrant concludingthatthe testimony ofJ’s sisterwouldhave been harmful to the state’s case. Second, wedonotseetheparticularimportofcasting doubt on the event that David described—namely, that she and J’s sister observed J and the defendant ascending the market’s basement staircase. In other words, such event was simply not so central to the state’s case thatafailure to callJ’s sisterto corroborate it suggests thathertestimonywouldhave beenharmful to the state. For one, David’s testimony about the staircase scene did not describe any sexual acts by the defendant. Additionally, David recounted an entirely separate incident duringwhich she observedthe defendant licking J’s breasts. There is no indication that J’s sister was present during that event. Finally, J testified that the defendant assaulted her approximately four times inthe basement ofthe market, further suggesting that discrediting David’s testimony about the staircase
scene (which, again, did not describe any sexual contact) would not have cut to the heart of the state’s

case. In light of the foregoing, we fail to see how the defendant’s argument that J’s sister’s testimony would have been harmful to the state’s case is a ‘‘reasonable inference’’ based on the record. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding such argument.3
II
The defendant next claims that the state committed prosecutorial impropriety by basing part of its closing argument on facts not in evidence. We find no error with respect to this claim.
The following additional facts are relevant to our discussion. As previously noted, the defendant was charged with and convicted of, inter alia, one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2). Section53-21 (a) provides, inrelevantpart: ‘‘Anyperson who

. . . (2) has contact with the intimate parts

. . . of a child under the age of sixteen years or subjects a child under sixteen years of age to contact with the intimate parts ofsuch person, in a sexual and indecent
manner likely to impair the health or morals of such child

. . . shall be guilty of

. . . (C) a class B felony

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
At trial, the state called as an expert witness Audrey Courtney, apediatricnursepractitionerat SaintFrancis Hospital. Courtney testified that she had performed child abuse evaluations since 1990 and had examined child abuse victims who reported digital penetration. Courtney further testified that she had observed sexually transmitted diseases among children who hadreported solely digital penetration. During closing remarks, the state, in arguing for conviction under § 53-21 (a) (2), stated: ‘‘[T]he last element of [§ 53-21 (a) (2)] is that it’s likely to impair the health
or morals of a child.

. . . Morals, that’s for you to decide in the more general sense of a fifty-something year old man doing this to a thirteen year old child. ‘‘But with respect to health, I would say you had actually some more specific information, which [was] Audrey Courtney coming in and talking about the idea that even through digital penetration there is a likelihood—she has seen cases where there’s been a disclosure of simply digital penetration which resulted in gonorrhea, HIV, herpes, the like, sexually transmitted diseases among children. Again, the state doesn’t have to show she has any of those diseases, just that the actions of the defendant are such that the impairment of health would be likely based on his actions.’’
The defendantarguesthatthe state committedprosecutorial impropriety because Courtney’s testimony did not support the state’s contention that digital penetration by itself would likely result in the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases. According to the defendant, ‘‘Courtney’s testimony did not state there was a likelihood nor even implied it nor was there any basis forthejury to infer it. All thejury knew was that ofthe thousands of cases, some of the children had sexually transmitted diseases.’’ We conclude that the state’s comment did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
As a preliminary matter, we note that the defendant did not object to the preceding statements at trial. ‘‘It is well established law, however, that a defendant who fails to preserve claims of prosecutorial [impropriety] neednotseektoprevailunderthespecificrequirements ofStatev. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567A.2d 823 (1989), and, similarly, it is unnecessary for a reviewing court to apply the four-pronged Golding test.

. . . Our Supreme Court has explained that the defendant’s failure to object at trial to

. . . the [occurrence] that he
now raises as [an instance] of prosecutorial impropriety, thoughrelevantto ourinquiry, is notfatalto review of his [claim].

. . . This does not mean, however, that the absence of an objection at trial does not play a significant role in the determination of whether the challenged statements were, in fact, improper.

. . . To the contrary, we continue to adhere to the well established maxim that defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s argument when it was made suggests that defense counsel did not believe that it was [improper] inlightoftherecord ofthe case atthetime.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Maner, 147 Conn. App. 761, 782, 83 A.3d 1182, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 936, 88 A.3d 550 (2014).
The following legal principles concerning prosecu-torial impropriety govern our resolution of this claim. ‘‘Ourjurisprudence concerning prosecutorial impropriety during closing argument is well established. [I]n analyzing claims of prosecutorial [impropriety], we engage in a two step analytical process. The two steps
are separate and distinct: (1) whether [impropriety] occurred in the first instance; and (2) whether that [impropriety] deprived a defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. Put differently, [impropriety] is [impropriety], regardless of its ultimate effect on the fairness ofthe trial; whether that [impropriety] caused
or contributed to a due process violation is a separate and distinct question

. . . . [O]ur determination of whether any improper conduct by the state’s attorney violated the defendant’s fair trial rights is predicated
on the factors set forth inStatev. Williams, [204 Conn. 523, 540, 529 A.2d 653 (1987)], with due consideration of whether that [impropriety] was objected to at trial.

. . . These factors include the extent to which the [impropriety] was invited by defense conduct or argument, the severity of the [impropriety], the frequency ofthe [impropriety], the centrality ofthe [impropriety] to the critical issues in the case, the strength of the curative measures adopted, and the strength of the state’s case.

. . . ‘‘Aprosecutormayinvite thejuryto drawreasonable inferences from the evidence; however, he or she may not invite sheer speculation unconnected to evidence.

. . . Moreover, when a prosecutor suggests a fact not in evidence, there is a risk that the jury may conclude that he or she has independent knowledge offacts that could not be presented to thejury.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carrasquillo, 290 Conn. 209, 222, 962 A.2d 772 (2009). Assuming, without deciding, that the state’s mention of the ‘‘likelihood’’ of contracting sexually transmitted diseases through digital penetration constituted prosecutorial impropriety, we conclude that the comment did not deprive the defendant ofhis right to a fair trial. The Williams factors guide our decision. See id. While the comment was not invited by defense counsel or argument, we find that the rest of the factors weigh in the state’s favor. The severity of the comment was minimal—the stateimmediatelycorrecteditselfbystating that Courtney had merely observed cases in which child victims reporting solely digital penetration also suffered from sexually transmitted diseases. The frequency of the remark—it occurred once—was also minimal.
The remark was not critical to the state’s case because thejury could have found the defendant guilty under § 53-21 (a) (2) on the alternative ground that his actions were likely to impair J’s morals

. See State v. Romero, 269 Conn. 481, 493, 849 A.2d 760 (2004) (‘‘[o]nce thejury determined that

. . . intercourse andmutual sexual touching took place

. . . it is difficult to imagine a finding that this conduct could not be deemed likely—in the context of probably—to impair [the nine year old victim’s] morals’’ [emphasis in original]). In its closing remarks, the state explicitly argued for a guilty verdict based on the impairment of morals prong of § 53-21 (a) (2). The court instructed the jury
as to this prong as well. ‘‘The jury [is] presumed to follow the court’s directions in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Negron, 221 Conn. 315, 331, 603 A.2d 1138 (1992).
As to curative measures taken by the court, while the court did not provide a curative instruction specifically in response to the state’s comment because the defendantdidnot objecttotheremarkattrial, the court instructed the jury that the statements and arguments of the attorneys were not evidence, and that ‘‘[i]f the facts as you remember them differ from the way the lawyers have stated them[,] your memory of them controls.’’ Finally, as to the strength of the state’s case, we conclude that it was ‘‘sufficiently strong so as to not be overshadowed by the [state’s comment].’’ State v. Angel T., 292 Conn. 262, 293, 973 A.2d 1207 (2009). While the state’s case as to the impairment of health prong of § 53-21 (a) (2) appears to us not to be particularly strong,4 as previously explained, the jury could have found the defendant guilty under the statute on the alternative ground that his abuse ofJ was likely to impair her morals. Although the defendant argues that thejurycouldnothave convictedhimunderthe impairment ofmoralsprongbecause the state’s argument and the trial court’s instructions as to that prong were, for various reasons, inadequate,5 we find that not to be the
case. Again, in closing argument, the state argued for conviction under both the health and morals prongs of § 53-21 (a) (2), and the judge instructed the jury as to both bases of liability as well. As to the evidence presented by the state, thejury heard the testimony of two eyewitnesses—J and David—who attested to the sexual abuse. J’s father and brother testified as constancy of accusation witnesses. Three police officers who investigated the case also testified for the state. One officer testified that J accurately identified the defendantandDavidinphotographicarrays. Theofficer also testified as to the defendant’s statements and behaviorduring aninterviewthe officerconducted during the investigation. According to the officer, although the defendant denied the allegations against him in the interview, he indicated that he had brought adult
women down to the store’s basement for sex. When the officershowedthe defendantapicture ofDavid, the officerobservedthe defendant’shandtremble. Another officertestifiedthat, duringhis investigation ofthe allegations, he took photographs of the market, includingof the market’s basement. Those photographs were enteredastrialexhibits. Certainphotographsbore similarities to a picture J drew of the basement during an interview at Saint Francis Hospital about the allegations. In light of such evidence, the defendant himself acknowledged in his appellate brief that ‘‘the jury had sufficient evidence fromwhich it couldhave foundthat the defendant’s actions were likelyto impairthe child’s morals

. . . .’’ The state’s case for the impairment of morals under § 53-21 (a) (2)—sexual contact with a twelve to thirteen year old andpaying her money afterwards—was strong enough to withstand the alleged impropriety. For the foregoing reasons, the Williams factors are unavailing to the defendant. Accordingly, the defendant cannot prevail on his claim of prosecutorial impropriety.
III Finally, the defendant claims that he was deprived of his rights to an impartial tribunal and a fair trial when the trial court made comments in front of the jury that bolstered the credibility of the victim. We do not agree. The following additional facts are relevant to our discussion. The state called J as a witness during the trial. When the state asked J where on her body the defendant had touched her, J was unwilling or unable to respond verbally, and was instead allowed to write certain anatomical terms on a piece of paper. When J failedto respondverballyto one suchquestion, thetrial court told J, ‘‘Take your time; I know this is difficult’’ and ‘‘You don’t have to be nervous.’’ Later in J’s testimony, the court again told her, ‘‘I know it’s difficult for you’’ and ‘‘I know this was very difficult.’’6 All ofthese statements were made in front of the jury. The defendant did not object to them during the trial. He argues
on appeal that these statements deprived him of a fair trial and impartial tribunal because they bolstered J’s credibility. Accordingtothe defendant, thecourt’s comments conveyed to the jury that it believed J’s allegations because the only reason it would be ‘‘difficult’’ for her to testify was ifthe allegations were true. ‘‘[I]n showing compassionto awitness and empathizingwith the great difficulty which she had in testifying about herordeal,’’ the defendant argues, ‘‘[the court] blatantly enhanced her credibility in the minds of the jury.’’ As the defendant did not object to the court’s statements at trial, he pursues reliefunderState v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 233. We do not find the defendant’s argument persuasive. ‘‘To prevail on his unpreserved constitutional claim, the defendant must satisfy all four conditions set forth inGolding

. Hemustshowthat(1)therecordisadequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional viola-tion

. . . exists and

. . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness ofthe alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . Failure to satisfy any ofthe four conditions will cause the defendant’s claim to fail.

. . . The appellate tribunal is free, therefore, to respond to the defendant’sclaimbyfocusingonwhicheverconditionismost relevant in the particular circumstances.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Eason, 116 Conn. App. 601, 603–604, 976A.2d 797, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 902, 982 A.2d 646 (2009); see also In
re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015) (modifyingthirdprong ofGolding). Inthepresent case,
we conclude that the record is adequate to review the claim and that the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging violation of a fundamental right. We therefore proceed to Golding’s third prong. The following legal principles pertaining to the judge’s role in conducting a criminal trial guide our analysis. ‘‘While no precise theorem can be laid down,
we have held that it is proper for a trial court to

. . . [intervene] where the witness is embarrassed, has a language problem or may not understand a question.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Iban C., 275 Conn. 624, 652, 881 A.2d 1005 (2005); see also State

v. Graham, 21 Conn. App. 688, 692–93, 575 A.2d 1057 (‘‘[a] trial court has a discretionary right to intervene in theexaminationofwitnesseswheresuchinterventionis necessary to clarify confusing testimony, restrain an obstreperous witness, or elucidate a witness’ understanding of a question’’), cert. denied, 216 Conn. 805, 577A.2d 1063 (1990). ‘‘Ifthejudge chooses to intervene inacriminaltrial, suchinterventionmustreachasignificant extent and be adverse to the defendant to a substantial degree before risking impaired functioning of the finder of fact or the appearance of an impartial judge.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Eason, supra, 116 Conn. App. 605.
While there are perhaps more neutral ways of obtaining cooperation from a reluctant witness whose testimony is key to the case than stating ‘‘I know this is difficult’’ and ‘‘You don’t have to be nervous’’ in the presenceofthejury,wecannotsaythatsuchstatements
were so significant, and the harm to the defendant so substantial, as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial and an impartial tribunal. In ourview, the court’s statements did not imply that the court found J a credible witness orthatthe defendanthaddone anythingwrong, but were, rather, an attempt by the court to elicit testimony from a young witness who was noticeably nervouswhiletestifying. Moreover, initsinstructionstothe jury, the court cured any potential misapprehensions by stating that ‘‘[y]ou should not be influenced by my actions during the trial

. . . in questions to witnesses

. . . . You are not to take my actions as any indicationof my opinion as to how you should determine the issues offact.’’ As previously explained, ‘‘[t]hejury [is] presumedtofollowthecourt’sdirectionsintheabsence ofaclearindicationtothecontrary.’’ (Internalquotation marks omitted.) State v. Negron, supra, 221 Conn. 331. Consequently, we conclude that these comments did not deprive the defendant of his rights to a fair trial and an impartial tribunal.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the otherjudges concurred.

1 In accordance with our policy ofprotecting the privacy interests ofthe victims of the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

2 Forthisreasonwe alsorejectthe defendant’s analogytoStatev.Daniels, 180 Conn. 101, 429 A.2d 813 (1980). In Daniels, the defendant objected to the state’s missing witness argument on the ground that the availability of the witness was not established. Id., 107. On trial for sexual assault, the defendant inDaniels testified in his own defense that he was asleep in bed with another woman at the time the assault was alleged to have occurred. Id. During cross-examination of the defendant, the state asked if he knew where this purported alibi witness was. Id., 110. The defendant responded, ‘‘She’s home, I guess.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Our Supreme Court concluded that such testimony was sufficient to support a finding by thejury that the missing witness was available to testify. Id. The defendant inthe present appeal argues thatDaniels establishes that ‘‘the party seeking permission to make the missing witness argument need not show certainty of the availability of the witness when a family is involved.’’ In the present case, the defendant not only failed to show, in his words, ‘‘certainty’’ that J’s sister was available to testify, but failed to provide any factual basis at all in support of such conclusion. Daniels, therefore, is unavailing to the defendant.

3 We briefly dispose of two ancillary arguments made by the defendant: The defendant first argues that ‘‘[t]he state’s claim that [J’s] sister would be cumulative to the testimony of [David] is simply no basis for the court to have denied the motion.’’ The premise of this argument is belied by the record. The trial court did not deny the defendant’s request because it concluded thatJ’s sister’s testimony would be cumulative. Rather, the court denied the request because the defendant’s offer of proof was speculative. The defendant’s reliance onStatev. Saunders, 114 Conn. App. 493, 969 A.2d 868, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 917, 973 A.2d 1277 (2009), is misplaced. In Saunders, this courtdeclinedtoreviewthemerits ofthe defendant’smissing witness argument claim, concluding that it was unpreserved. Id., 504. We decline to revisit Saunders here. Second, the defendant argues that J’s sister’s testimony was critical to the state’s case, andtherefore merited amissing witness argument, because there was evidence adduced at trial that, during a police interview with the defendant prior to trial, the defendant explicitly denied that any minors had been in the market’s basement. The defendant argues in part: ‘‘It would appear

. . . that the only witness who could

. . . partially refute the defendant’s exculpatory statement was [J’s] sister.’’ This argument fails for two

reasons. First, the defendant did not make this particular argument before the trial court. Second, the defendant’s interview statement is a peripheral matter. The defendant was not charged and convicted for merely bringing J down to the basement, but for sexually assaulting her there. It therefore does not appearto us to have been criticalto corroborate David’s testimony that she and J’s sister observed J and the defendant ascending the market’s basement staircase.

4 Nothing from Courtney’s testimony suggests to us that contraction of a sexually transmitted disease is a likely consequence of child sexual assault by means of digital penetration. At most, the testimony conveyed that a subset of children—whether it is 1 percent or 99 percent is unclear— reporting abuse solely in the form of digital penetration whom Courtney observed also suffered from a sexually transmitted disease.

5 The defendant argues that the state’s comment on the likelihood of contracting sexually transmitted diseases by means of digital penetration

so dominatedthe state’s closing argumentthatthejurycouldhave convictedthe defendant under § 53-21 (a) (2) only on the basis of the impairment of J’s health. The defendant also claims that the court’s instructions to the jury were insufficient to apprise them of the impairment of morals prong of§ 53-21 (a) (2). Thedefendantfurthercontendsthatthecourt’sinstructions to the jury that they were ‘‘the sole judges of the facts’’ were insufficient because they did not convey that ‘‘statements by the prosecutor as to his recollection of the facts was not to be relied on.’’ (Emphasis added.) For the reasons previously set forth in this opinion, we conclude that these arguments lack merit.

6 The defendant asserts in his appellate briefthat the trial court also told J that it ‘‘understood why she was ‘nervous and distressed’

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Although, as noted previously in this opinion, the trial court did tell J, ‘‘You don’t have to be nervous,’’ our review of the trial transcripts does not disclose, and the defendant has not identified through citation to the transcripts, an instance in which the court used the word ‘‘distressed’’ in this context.