J-S10018-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ANGELA RIGGS AND JOSEPH RIGGS, 

W/H 

Appellants

v.

MARTIN MAIN LINE HONDA,SCOTT 

IMPORTS, INC., AVORIC REAL 

ESTATE, LLC, AND 123 E. 

LANCASTER AVE., LLC

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2310 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered July 7, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): December Term, 2016 No. 2908

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MAY 11, 2018

Appellants, Angela Riggs and Joseph Riggs, appeal from the order 

entered on July 7, 2017 sustaining preliminary objections filed by Martin 

Main Line Honda, Scott Imports, Inc., and 123 E. Lancaster Ave., LLC1

(collectively Appellees) and transferring this case from Philadelphia County 

to Montgomery County. Upon review, we affirm. 

The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

____________________________________________

1

 Avoric Real Estate, LLC was originally named as a defendant, but was 

dismissed by stipulation on March 24, 2017. They are not a party to the 

instant appeal.
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On October 11, 2017, [Appellants] were visiting [] Martin Line 

Honda’s premises, located at 123 Lancaster Avenue, Ardmore, 

Pennsylvania, when Ms. Riggs [] allegedly fell because of a 

defective condition on the floor, sustaining serious injuries to her 

shoulder, neck, and brain. [Appellants] are a married couple 

who are residents of Flourtown, Montgomery County, 

Pennsylvania. [Appellees] are Pennsylvania corporations with 

their primary places of business in Ardmore, Montgomery 

County, Pennsylvania. 

On February 23, 2017, [Appellants] filed a [f]irst [a]mended 

[c]omplaint setting forth claims for negligence and loss of 

consortium against all [Appellees]. [Appellees] filed 

[p]reliminary [o]bjections for improper venue on March 9, 2017, 

and [Appellants] filed a response on March 28, 2017. On April 3, 

2017, [the trial c]ourt ordered the parties to conduct discovery 

limited to the issue of venue and submit supplemental briefs by 

June 2, 2017. On July 7, 2017, [the trial c]ourt entered an 

[o]rder sustaining [Appellees] [p]reliminary [o]bjections and 

transferring the case to Montgomery County. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/13/2017, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted). This timely 

appeal resulted.2

On appeal, Appellants present the following issue for our review:

Whether the [trial c]ourt erred when it sustained [] preliminary 

objection[s] to venue and transferred this case from Philadelphia 

County to Montgomery County where the record reflects that []

Scott Imports, Inc. regularly conducted business in Philadelphia 

at all relevant times?

Appellants’ Brief at 5.

____________________________________________

2 On July 10, 2017, Appellants filed a notice of appeal. On July 19, 2017, 

the trial court ordered Appellants to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellants 

complied on August 8, 2017. On September 13, 2017, the trial court issued 

an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 
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Appellants claim that the trial court erroneously transferred venue to 

Montgomery County because Scott Imports, Inc. regularly conducts business 

in Philadelphia County. Id. at 9. Appellants argue that because they 

initiated the lawsuit, the trial court should have given their choice of forum 

great weight and hesitated to change venue. Id. at 13-14. Appellants 

contend that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that storing 

and inspecting vehicles at two Philadelphia warehouses were not acts “of 

sufficient quality and quantity to warrant a finding of proper venue there.” 

Id. at 14. For support, Appellants point to the deposition of the 

Vice-President of Scott Imports, Inc., William Camp. Id. at 15-17. 

Appellants maintain Camp testified that the Montgomery County facility 

holds approximately only “20 vehicles and that employees regularly move 

vehicles back and forth between there and the Philadelphia inspection and 

storage site[s].” Id. at 15. The two Philadelphia facilities hold 

approximately 200-375 vehicles. Id. At one of the Philadelphia facilities, 

employees perform pre-delivery inspections of the new vehicles for sale. Id.

In sum, Appellants contend that the Philadelphia properties are used to 

regularly conduct business because they “are critical to the business and 

directly further the corporate objectives” and are used “on a weekly and 

sometimes daily basis.” Id. at 16-17. Accordingly, Appellants aver that 

Scott Imports, Inc. failed to meet its burden of establishing that venue was 

improper in Philadelphia County and the trial court abused its discretion or 

erred in transferring venue to Montgomery County. Id. at 17. 
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Our standard of review is as follows:

A trial court's ruling on venue will not be disturbed if the decision 

is reasonable in light of the facts. A decision to transfer venue 

will not be reversed unless the trial court abused its 

discretion. A plaintiff's choice of forum is given great weight, 

and the burden is on the party challenging that choice to show it 

is improper.

However, if there exists any proper basis for the trial court's 

decision to grant the petition to transfer venue, the decision

must stand. The Rules of Civil Procedure make specific provision 

for venue in pertinent part as follows:

Rule 1006. Venue. Change of Venue

(a) Except as otherwise provided by Subdivisions (b) and (c) 

of this rule, an action against an individual may be brought 

in and only in a county in which the individual may be 

served or in which the cause of action arose or where a 

transaction or occurrence took place out of which the 

cause of action arose or in any other county authorized by 

law.

(b) Actions against the following defendants, except as 

otherwise provided in Subdivision (c), may be brought in 

and only in the counties designated by the following rules: 

... corporations and similar entities, Rule 2179.

(c) An action to enforce a joint or joint and several liability 

against two or more defendants, except actions in which 

the Commonwealth is a party defendant, may be brought 

against all defendants in any county in which the venue 

may be laid against one of the defendants under the 

general rules of Subdivisions (a) or (b).

Pa.R.C.P. 1006.

[Moreover, when] corporations are party defendants, Rule 2179 

is also applicable. That Rule provides in relevant part as follows.

Rule 2179. Venue
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(a) Except as otherwise provided by an Act of Assembly or by 

subdivision (b) of this rule, a personal action against a 

corporation or similar entity may be brought in and only in

(1) the county where its registered office or principal 

place of business is located;

(2) a county where it regularly conducts business;

(3) the county where the cause of action arose; or

(4) a county where the transaction or occurrence took 

place out of which the cause of action arose.

Pa.R.C.P. 2179(a). 

* * *

Our Supreme Court's decision in Purcell v. Bryn Mawr 

Hospital, 579 A.2d 1282 (Pa. 1990), provides substantial 

guidance for [the] resolution of [what conduct constitutes

“regularly conducted business” under Pa.R.C.P. 2179(a)]. 

In Purcell, the Court reviewed the question of whether venue in 

that medical malpractice suit was properly laid in Philadelphia 

County where Bryn Mawr Hospital, the situs of the alleged 

negligence, was located in Montgomery County. That 

determination turned on whether Bryn Mawr Hospital's contacts 

with Philadelphia County were sufficient to compel it to defend 

itself there. The Court explained that such business contacts 

must be evaluated based on their quality and quantity. Id. at 

1285. Quality of acts means those directly, furthering or 

essential to, corporate objects; they do not include incidental 

acts. Quantity means those acts which are so continuous and 

sufficient to be general or habitual. Id. For corporate acts, those 

in aid of a main purpose are collateral and incidental, while those 

necessary to its existence are direct. Id.

The Supreme Court further explained that each case must rest 

on its own facts. Id. The plaintiff in Purcell asserted the 

following as evidence that Bryn Mawr conducted business in 

Philadelphia County: it had contractual relations with residency 

programs of Philadelphia teaching hospitals, recruited and 

employed medical students from those teaching hospitals, 

advertised in Philadelphia telephone directories and a 

Philadelphia newspaper, purchased goods and services from 
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Philadelphia County businesses, and derived a percentage of its 

income from Philadelphia residents. Bryn Mawr did not, however, 

have a branch clinic or other such presence in Philadelphia 

County. After consideration of the nature of these business 

contacts, the Supreme Court concluded that venue was not 

proper in Philadelphia County because none of the contacts was 

more than incidental.

Krosnowski v. Ward, 836 A.2d 143, 146–147 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc)

(footnote and parentheticals omitted); see also Goodman v. Fonslick, 844 

A.2d 1252, 1255 (Pa. Super. 2004) (Two small satellite physicians' offices 

located in Philadelphia did not constitute sufficient business contacts to 

support venue in Montgomery County when all hospital treatment for 

referrals was conducted at the Montgomery County hospital facility and, 

thus, the branch offices were incidental to its main goal of providing hospital 

care in Montgomery County).

Here, the trial court determined:

As a preliminary matter, [Appellants] do not contest that the 

[Appellees’] main corporate objective is to sell vehicles in their 

showroom in Montgomery County, and have failed to put forward 

evidence that the storage of cars in Philadelphia is anything 

more than “in aid of” that objective. Furthermore, [Appellants] 

overlook [] Superior Court [precedent,] which clearly 

establish[es] that the crux of “regularly conducting business” 

rests on where business is actually occurring. Here, [Appellants] 

operate a place of business only in Montgomery County; they 

interact with customers only in Montgomery County; and, 

perhaps most importantly, they make sales only in Montgomery 

County.[3] Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 2179(a), it simply cannot be 

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3

 The trial court also recognized that “[t]here is no evidence of record that 

customers travel to the Philadelphia facilities to purchase or pick up vehicles, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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that [Appellees’] mere possession of two leased storage 

properties, which serve an incidental purpose to their corporate 

objective, creates a venue in Philadelphia. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/13/2017, at 4-5 (emphasis in original). 

Upon review, we agree. The contacts here were insufficient to compel 

Appellees to defend themselves in Philadelphia County. Appellees’ main, 

corporate objective is selling vehicles in Montgomery County, not storing 

vehicles in Philadelphia County. The storage of vehicles in Philadelphia 

County aids the business in Montgomery County, but is incidental and 

collateral to its core purpose.4 We discern no abuse of discretion or error of 

law in transferring venue to Montgomery County.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/11/18

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

nor is there any evidence that [Appellees] have ever even applied for a 

license to conduct business in Philadelphia.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/13/2017, 

at 4.

4

 William Camp testified that the storage facilities could be located 

anywhere and, in fact, there is another facility located in Bala Cynwyd in 

Montgomery County. See N.T. 5/8/2017, at 41. 
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