### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A pr il 19, 200 6 S es sio n

JONA THON CH RIST OPH ER HOOD v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for F ranklin County No. 15655 Bud dy D. P err y, Judge

No. M2005- 01310-CCA -R3-P C - F iled Jun e 9, 2006

This is an appea l from t h e denial of post-conviction re lief. The Petitioner, Jonathon Christopher Hood, enter ed a be st-interest g uiltyplea to fe lony rec kless endang erme nt an d
, p u rsuant to a plea ag reem en t , was sente nced to one y ear imprisonment with a relea se elig ibilit y date of 30%. The Petitioner filed for and was de nied post-conviction re lief. The Petitioner now appe als the denia l of post-conviction re lief, cla iming his trial counse l provided ineff ec tive assistance of counse l which resulted in an involuntary g uiltyplea. We af

firm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., deliv er ed t h e opinion of the c ourt, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Robert Huskey , Manche ster, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, J onathon Christopher Hood.

P au l G

. S u m m e r s , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l a n d R e p o r t e r ; M ark A

. F u l k s, As sis ta n tA t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ; J. Mic ha e l T a y lor , D ist

ri c t A tto rn e y

G e n e r a l ; an d

S t e v eM

. B l o un t, A ssi stant D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F AC TS

The fa ct s underlying the conviction at issue in this case w ere stipulated at the Petitioner’s ple a a c c e ptanc e he ari ng a s f

oll ow s:
The proo f wo u ld be that on the date alleg ed in that criminal information of fi c e rs we re dis patc he d to a lo c a tio n at Cu mbe rl a ndVi e w A pa rt me nts . T he y

wo uld testify that [t he Petitione r] was there that ther e we re othe r people there that g ave various st atements. The long and the short of it is they would testify , Your Honor
,T h e re c o rd a lso re v e a ls tha t o the r u n sp e c ifi e d c h a rg e s w e re no t p u rs u e d in e x c h a n g e fo r th e P e tit io n e r’s 1

a c c e p ta n c e o f t h e p le a a g re e m e n t.

-2- that Mr. Hood assaulted these people a nd in the courseof that pulled a w eapon and made thre ats, which would constitute rec kless endang erme nt w ith a deadly wea pon.

Th e re c or d f

urthe r r e ve a ls that th e De fe nd a nt co mmi tte d this of fe ns e on Oc tob e r 8, 200 3, in Frank lin C o u n t y.

I n J anuary

of 2004, the P et i t i o n er w aived his rig ht to a g rand jury and ele cted to proc eed ba se d o n th e c ri min a l in fo rm a tio n. Th e Pe tit ion e r a c c e pte d a ple a a g re e me nt wh e re by

he wo uld

en t era b es t -i n t er es tgu i l t y p l ea t o o n e c o u n to f C l as s E fe l o n y re ck l es s en d an ger m en ti n ex ch an ge for a sentenc e of one y ear

as a Rang e I

offe nder w ith a 30% re lease elig ibili t ydate. At the 1 Petitioner’s plea a cce ptance hearing, the Petitioner admitted he re ad, under stood and signe d his plea notice and wa iver of rights form. The trial court conducted a thoroug h plea c olloquy , during which the Pe tit ion e r a c kn ow le dg e d h e un de rs too d th e ri g hts he wa s w a ivi ng a ndwa s e ntering his be stinterest g uiltyplea voluntari l y

. T h e P eti tioner further indicated that he unde rstood that his plea ag ree ment would result in a one- y ea r s en t ence , which would be se rved c onsecutive to a two-y ear sentenc e he w as alre ady

serving at that time. The Petitioner, throug h counsel, stated f or the re cord that he was entering a best-interest plea because of hi s prior conviction and the “number ” of c harg es he would fa ce if

he we nt to trial. At t h e co n clus ion of the hea ring , the trial court found the Petitioner knowing ly

waived his rig hts and voluntaril y enter ed a be st-interest g uiltyplea. Ac c or din g ly , th e tr ia l c ou rt a c c e pte d th e Pe tit ion e r’ s p le a, ent ered a c on vic tio n f

or re c kle ss

e nd a ng e rm e nt, a ndse nte nc e d th e Pe tit ion e r p ur su a nt t o th e ple a a g re e me nt.

At some point subsequ en t to sentencing , the Petitioner learned that by pleading g uiltyand

acc epting the one- y ear

sentenc e, he w as disqualified fr om determinate rele ase on his prior two- y ear sentenc e. See T enn. C ode Ann. § 40-35-501( a)( 3). I n Aug ust of 2004, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-c onviction relief a lleg i n g i n ef fe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel and a n involuntary plea. The trial court f

ound the Petitioner prese nted a c olorable c laim, appointed counse l, and allowed the Petitioner thirty day s to submit an ame nded post-convic tion petition. The Defe ndant ultimately

reta ined counse l, and a post-conviction evidentiary hearing was conduc ted in Marc h of 2005.

At the hea

ring , Ms. Gail McKnig ht, an employ ee w ith the T en n essee Depa rtment of Probation and Parole, te stified that prior to the convic tion and sentenc e at issue in thi s case , the Def endant’ s exi sting two-y ear sentence wi t h determinate re lease would have r equire d only 30% service , or seve n months and twenty -four day s. Howeve r, bec ause of his J anuary 2004 g uiltyplea

an d co n v i ct i o n , h e w as n o tel i gi b l e f o r a u t o m at i c d et er m i n at e r el ea s e an d wo u l d b e re q u i re d t o go befor e the parole board. Ms. McKnig ht stated t hat as of t he date of t he hearing
, the Petitioner wasT h e P e tit io n e r b e g a n se rv ing his o rig ina l t w o -yea r se n te n c e in O c to b e r o f 2 0 0 3 . T h e re fo re , b e c a u se o f his 2
January 2 0 0 4 co nvi ct i o n and one

- y ear s ent ence, whi ch d i squali f i ed hi m f rom de t erm i nat e rel ease, as o f t he d at e o f

t he
p o st-co n v ic tio n he a rin g he w a s sc h e d u le d to se rv e a to ta l o f ap p ro x im a te ly t w o ye a rs a n d six m o n ths

.
-3- sc he du le d f

or pa ro le in Ap ri l of 200 6, a lth ou g h th is d a te “ mov e s” so me wh a t du e to c re dit s. Ms. 2 McKnig ht further

testified that the Petitioner had two minor disciplinary infrac tions on his record, but opined t hat neither

was seve re e noug h to have pr eclude d him from determinate re lease had he
not rec eived a nother c onviction.

Th e Pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t he wa s n ot g uil ty of re c kle ss e nd a ng e rm e nt a nd e nte re d his be stinterest plea to this char g e only beca use his tria l c ounsel informed him that he would only g et “a n

a dd iti on a l th re e mon ths ” a s a re su lt o f the ple a a g re e me nt. Th e Pe tit ion e r f urthe r e xpla ine d th a t hi s

c ou ns e l in fo rm e d h im that it wa s “ c ha nc y ” to g o to tria l con sid e ri ng his prior c on vic tio n. B e c aus e he wa s u nd er th e imp re ssi on that th e ple a a g re e me nt w ou ld a ddon ly thr e e or fo ur mon ths to h is

c ur re nt s e nte nc e , f

or a tot a l of no mor e than te n o r e le ve n mo nth s, he a g re e d to e nte r a be st- int e re st plea. The P etitioner further testi fied that his attorney never discussed wit h him the effe ct his new
sentenc e would have on the sche duled determinate re lease from his prior sentenc e. The Petitioner stated that he c erta inly

would have not e ntere d a plea of g uilty if he had known i t would require he

serve approximately

two y ear s instead of the te n or ele ven months he wa s led to believe.

The Petitioner’s tria l counsel (“C o u n s el”) testified that he ha d been pr acticing law since 1970, g raduated first i n his class at the University of Tennessee Coll eg e of L aw, was Orde r of the Coif, and editor of the L aw Revie w. As to the Petitioner’s ca s e, Counsel stated that he did not pr omi se a sp e c if

ic re le a se date , bu t rathe r inf orme d the Pe tit ion e r o f the Sta te ’s “ take -i t- or -l e a ve -i t” off e r o f o n e y e ar w ith a r e le a s e e li g ib il it y d a te o f 3 0 %

. Co u n s e l c la r if ie d th a t h e n e v e r

told the Petitioner that rele ase would be “automatic,” rather he i nformed him, as he does all his clients, that he would bec ome “e ligible” for relea se on the re lease elig ibilit y date, but ac tual “re lease would be determined by

the par ole boar d.”

On cr oss-examination, Couns el testified that the Petitioner had i n fo rm ed him early in the p r o c e e d i n g s t h a t h e w a s n o t g u i l t y a n d h a d i n i t i a l l y m e n t i o n e d h e k n e w o f w i t n e s s e s wh o c ou ld support his defense theory . Howeve r, the Petitioner ele cted to ac cept the State’s o ff er r ather than f a c e “ e v e r y t h i n g ” t h a t h e w a s c h ar g e d w i t h

. C o u n s e l a l s o n o t e d t h a t t h e P e t i t i o n e r h a d r e c e ntl y elec ted to tak e a case to trial on simil ar c harg es and lost. Howe ver, Counsel a dmitted he did not advise the Petitioner of

the eff ect the plea ag ree ment would have on his determinate se ntence from a prior c onviction nor did he think the Petiti oner w ould end up serving a total of twe nty months or

more.

At the conc lusion of the hearing, the trial court ag ree d with the Petitioner that his sentence

seeme d “excessive” and that it “ didn’t seem fair on its face .” Ne verthe less, the court rec og nized the issue at h a n d w a s s imp ly “ w h e th e r it ’ s a k n o w in g ly

e n te r e d p le a

if y o u d o n ’ t d is c u s s w ith y our attorney whether or not the par ole boar d decide s to relea s e y ou or not rele ase y ou.” The court

c on c lud e d th a tT he t r i al court a l so n o t ed t hat t he P et i t i oner ’ s des i r ed r es ul t woul d cr eat e t he “ addi t i onal r equi r ement ” t hat 3

at t orn ey s mus t “ hav e a di s cus s i on wi t h e ach of t he defendan t s in rega r d t o t he act i ons of t he parol e board. ” T he t r i al

c o u rt o p ine d : “T h a t m a y b e a g o o d th ing , a n d m a yb e o u g h t to b e d o n e a s a p a rt o f th e p le a p ro c e ss, b u t I d o n ’t thin k it ’s i ncu mb ent upon me t o s et t hat pol i cy , may be t he C our t of Ap peal s coul d s et t hat s t andar d i f t hey ch oo s e t o do i t

. ”

T h e P e tit io n e r’s “M o tio n to W ithd ra w P le a a n d M o tio n fo r N e w T ria l” m a y b e inte rp re te d a s a n a w k w a rd ly 4

w o rd e d p e tit io n to re h e a r h is p o st-co n v ic tio n p e tit io n . In this m o tio n , the P e tit io n e r sim p ly ra ise d the sa m e a rg u m e n ts h e p re se n te d a t t h e p o st-co n v ic tio n he a rin g a n d the n c h a llen g e d the trial c o u rt’s d e n ia l o f p o st-co n v ic tio n re lief.

-4- in effe ct [ruling for

the Petitioner] is me saying to de fendants that y ou have a rig ht
to assume that when y ou enter a plea that a one y ear

sentenc e, a two y ear

sentenc e,

or a three y ear sentenc e doesn’t rea lly mean that it means something le ss and y ou a h av e ari gh tt o as s u m e t h ati t ’s s o m et h i n g l es s

. I ’m n o t go i n g t o m ak e t h at fi n d i n g. 3

Acc ording ly
, the trial court denied the Petitioner’s pe tition for post-conviction relief . This appea l followed.

AN AL YSI S On app e a l, the Pe tit ion e r a sse rt s th a t th e trial cou rt erre d in de nying his c la im f or po stc on vic tio n r e lie f b e c aus e he re c e i v e d i n e f f e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l, w hic h a lso re nd e re d h is g uil ty plea involuntary . To support this claim, the Petitioner ar gu es t h at his counsel provide d defic ient

re pr e se ntatio n b y

mis inf ormin g him

that hi s p le a a g re e me nt w ou ld a ddthr e e or fo ur mon ths to h is

s e n te n c e w h e n th e a c tu a l r e s u lt w a s d is q u a li f ic ati o n f r o m d e te r mi n a te r e le a s e a n d th e s e rvice of substantial additional time incarc erated. Furth er more, the Petitioner a sserts that but for the defic iency i n h i s co unsel’s re prese ntation, he would have followed throug h with his trial, and there fore his guilty

plea wa s not knowing ly and volunt arily enter ed. The State arg ues that the a ppeal should be dismissed because the Petitioner’s notice of appea l was untimely , and in the alternative, the trial court did not er

r in denying post-c onviction relief be cause the Petitioner rec eived e ffe ctive

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d e n t e r e d h i s p l e a v o l u n t ar i l y.

I. Dism issal of

Appeal The State a

rg ues that this Court s h o u l d d ismiss this appeal be cause the Petitioner’s notice of appe al was untimely

and the Petitioner “ has not demonstrate d t hat the timeliness require ment should be waive d in the interest of justice.” A notice of a ppeal is re quired to be f

iled with the cler

k of the trial c ourt within thirtyday s after the date of

entry of the judgment or order f rom which re lief is sought. See T enn. R. App. P. 4(a) . A timely filing of a motion to withdraw a g uiltypl ea or a motion for new t rial tolls this period until entry of the orde r denying or

g ranting the motions. S ee Tenn. R. App. P. 4(c) . Howeve r, in the present ca se, the Petitioner’s motions to withdraw his plea and for a new trial wer e filed more than thirty day s afte r entry of the orde r denying post-c onviction

re lie f andthe re fo re did no t toll the thi rty -d a y pe ri od fo r fi lin g a no tic e of app e a l. Se e State v. Da vis
, 4 74 8 S.W.2 d 206 , 207 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 87 ). Ad dit ion a lly , th is C ou rt ha s p re vio us ly

he ld that a mot ionto r e he ar a

po st- c on vic tio n p e tit ion do e s n ot t oll the thi rt y -d a y tim e pe ri od in w hic h to fi le-5-

a n o ti c e o f ap p e a l. Se e T h o ma s E d w ar d Re d d ic k v

. St a te , N o

. E 2 0 0 3

- 0 0 5 7 8

- CC A

- R3

- PC
, 2 0 0 4 WL 572347, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App., Knox ville, Mar. 23, 2004).

I n this c ase, the Petitioner filed his notice of a ppeal on June 1, 2005, bey ond the thirty -day period fr om the entry of t he order deny ing post-conviction relief on Marc h 24, 2005. Rule 4(a) of the Tenne ssee Rules of A p p el l ate Procedure provides that the notice of appe al document is not jurisdictional and that timely filing may

t h er ef o re b e waived in the inter est of justice. We have de te rm ine d to e xer c ise ou r d isc re tio n a ndwaive the tim e ly fi lin g of the no tic e of app e a l in o rd e r t o consider the Petitioner’s issue in the interest of justice

.

II. Inef fective Assistance of Cou nsel To sustain a petition for post-c onviction reli ef
, a d ef endant must prove his or he r fa ctual alleg ations by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e at an evidentiary hearing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-110(f ); Momon v. State, 18 S.W .3d 152, 156 (Tenn. 1999) . Upon re view, this Court will not reweig h or re -eva luate the e vidence below; all questions conce rning the cre dibilit y of witnesses, the weig ht and value to be g iven their testimony , and the f actua l issues raised by

the evidenc e ar e to be resolved by

the trial j udg e, not the appellate courts. See Mom on, 18 S.W .3d at 156; Henley v. State, 96 0 S. W.2 d 5 72 , 5 78 -7 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 7)

. Th e tr ial ju dg e ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t ona pe tit ionfo r p os tconviction re lief ar e af

forde d the weig ht of a jury v er d i ct an d ar e conclusive on appe al unless the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst those finding s. See Mom on, 18 S.W .3d at 156; Henley , 960 S.W .2d at 578.

Both the Six th Amendment to the United States Constit ution a nd Article I
, Section 9 of the Tenne ssee Constitution guar antee a criminal de fendant the rig ht to repre sentation by counsel. See State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999); Ba x ter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)

. Both the U nited States Supreme Court and the Tenne ssee Supreme Court have rec og nized that the rig ht to such repr esentation includes the right to “re asonably eff ective” assistance , that is, within t he rang e of competenc e demande d of attorney s in criminal case s. See Strickland v. Washing ton, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); B urns, 6 S.W.3d at 461; Baxt er, 523 S.W.2d at 936.

A l a w y e r ’ s a s s i s t a n c e t o h i s o r h e r c l i e n t i s i n e f f e c t i v e i f t h e l a w y e r ’ s c on du c t “ so undermined the proper

functioning of the a dversa rial p roce ss that the trial ca nnot be re lied on as having produce d a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. This over all standard is c omprised of
tw o c omp on e nts : de fi c ie nt p e rf orma nc e by

th ed e f e n d an t ’ s l a w y e r anda c tua l pr e jud ic e to the de fe ns e

cause d by the def icient per formanc e. See id. at 687; Burns, 6 S .W.3d at 461. The defendant bear s the burde n of establishing both of these c omponents by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 110(f) ; Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 461. Th e d ef en d an t’s failure to prove e ither defic iency

or pre judice is a suff

icient basis upon which to deny relief on an inef

fec tive assistance of counsel c laim. See B urns, 6 S.W.3d at 461; Goad v. State, 938 S.W .2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996)

.

Th is t wo -p art

stand ardof

me a su ri ng ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l a lso app lie s to c la ims arising out of a g uiltyplea. See Hill v. L ockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). The prejudice component is modified su ch that the de fendant “must show that there is a r easona ble proba bilitythat, but for-6-

counsel’s e rror s, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insist ed on g oing to trial.” I d. at 59; see a lso Hicks v. State, 983 S.W .2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

.

I n e v a lu a ti n g a la w y e r ’ s p e r f o r man c e , th e r e v ie w in g c o u r t u s e s a n o b je c ti v e s tan d ard of “re asonable ness.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 462. The re viewing court must be highly

defe rential to counsel’s choice s “and should indulg e a strong presumption that counsel’s co n d u ct falls within the wide rang e of r easona ble profe ssional assistance.” Burns, 6 S.W .3d at 462; see a lso St rickland, 466 U .S. at 689. The court should not u s e t h e b en ef it of hindsight to secon d -gu es s trial strateg y or to criticize counse l’s tactics, see Hellar d v. State, 629 S.W .2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982) , and counse l’s alleg ed er rors should be judg ed in light of all the fa cts and circ umstances a s of the time they wer e made , see Strickland, 466 U .S. at 690; Hicks v. State, 983 S.W .2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

.

A trial court’s determination of an i neff ective assistance of

counsel c laim presents a

mix ed qu e sti on of

la w andfa c t onapp e a l. S e e F ie lds v. Sta te , 4 0 S. W.3 d 45 0, 45 8 (T e nn . 2 00 1) . T his Court review s the trial court’s finding s of fa ct with reg ard to the e ffe ctiveness of counsel unde r a de novo standard, ac co m p anied with a presumption that those findings a re c orre ct unless the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is otherwise. See id. “ Howeve r, a tria l court’s c onclusions of law-- such as whe ther c ounsel’s per formanc e wa s deficie nt or whethe r t hat deficiency was pre judicial--a

re revie wed unde r a pur ely d e n o v o s t andard, with no presumption of cor rec tness g iven to the trial court’s c onclusions.” I d.

Ad dit ion a ll y , o u r

s u p r e m ec o u r

t , i ns e tti ng fo rth th e stand ardfo r i de nti fying a c on sti tut ion a lly valid g uil ty p le a , h a s n o te d th a t “ b e f o r e a tria l ju d g e c a n a c c e p t a g u il ty p le a , th e r e must be an aff irmative showing that it wa s g iven intellige ntly and voluntarily .” State v. Pettus, 986 S.W .2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999) (citing to Boy kin v. Alabama
, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)) . Our hig h court further noted that “a plea is not ‘voluntary ’ i f i t is the product of ‘[i] g norenc e, incompre hension, coe rcion,
terror , inducements, [or] subt le or blata nt threats,’” Bla nkenshi p v

. S tate, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (T e nn . 1 99 3) (q uo tin g B oy kin , 3 95 U. S. at 2 42 -4 3) , o r i f the de fe nd a nt i s “ inc omp e te nt o r o the rw ise not in control of his mental fac iliti es” w hen the plea was e ntere d. I d.

I n this case, the trial court found that there w as no fa ctual dispute: neither the Petitioner nor his tr ia l c ou ns e l a nti c ipate d th a t th e a c tua l c on se qu e nc e s o f a c c e pti ng the on e -y e ar s e nte nc e wo uld have the eff

ect of signific antly

extending his period of in ca rc er at i o n for a

prior convic tion. Nonethele ss, despite noting the Petitioner’s ag g reg ate se ntence may ap p ear to be “e x cessive,” the trial court c oncluded that Counsel’s f ailure to an t i ci p at e the dec isions of the parole boa rd and

acc urate ly

predic t ear ly

rele ase dates did not amount to de ficient repr esentation. Af ter c onsidering the arg ume nts pr e se nte d to us on app e a l, we c on c lud e that the Pe tit ion e r ha s faile d to d e mon str a te that he re c e ive d in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l.

Contrary to the Petitioner’s asser tions, we conc lude Counsel did not provide defic i ent

re pr e se ntatio n. Whe n a

pe tit ion e r’ s c la im i s o ne of ina de qu a te a dv ic e , as it is in thi s c a se , c ou rt s g ener ally distinguish betwee n failure to inform of direct and indire ct conse quence s of a g uiltyplea.-7-

See B autista v. State, 160 S.W .3d 9 1 7 , 921 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) . As a g ener al rule, a n attorney ’s fa ilure to inform a c riminal d ef endant of the “dire ct conse quence s of a g uiltyplea may constitute ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel,” while “failure to inform of indi rec t conseque nces of a g uil ty ple a no rm all y do es not. ” I d. ; se e a lso Ad kin s v . St a te , 9 11 S.W. 2d33 4, 35 0 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1994). This distinction often “turns on whe ther the r esult repr esents a de finite, immediate and larg ely automatic ef

fec t on the rang e of the defe ndant’s punishment.” Adkins, 911 S

. W

. 2 d at 350 (quoting Torre y

v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 236 ( 9th Cir. 1988)). Furthermore
, this Court has held that

[a]n y failu re of c ou ns e l to a dv ise a s to a ny c oll a te ra l c on se qu e nc e s of a ple a do e s n ot,

u n d e r t h e s e au t h o r i t i e s , f

a l l b e l o w t h e r a n g e o f

c o m p e t e n c e d e m a n d e d o f a t t o r n e ys in criminal ca ses. Misadvice on the issue might have war rante d relief ; and, while a fine distinction, silen ce b y co u n s el does not. I n short, a sin of commission might

me ri t r e lie f w hil e the sin of omi ssi on do e s n ot.

Bautista, 160 S.W .3d at 921 (quoting Adkins, 911 S.W .2d at 350).

As to the conviction and se ntence in this case, contr ary to the testimonyof the Petitioner, Counsel testified that he did not promise a spe cific r elea se date

. R at h er , C o u n s el stated that he ad v i s ed t h e P et i t i o n ert h ath e w o u l d b ec o m e “ el i gi b l e” fo r r el ea s e a ft er s er v i n g a c er t ai n p er ce n t age of his sent ence, bu t a c tua l r e le a se wo uldbe de te rm ine d b y the pa ro le bo ard . A s n ote d a

bo ve , a ll q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f w i t n e s s e s , t h e w e i g h t a n d v a l u e t o b e g i v e n t h e i r t e s t i m o n y,

a ndthe fa c tua l is su e s r a ise d b y the e vid e nc e are re so lve d by the tr ia l judg e , not the app e llate c ou rt s. See Momon, 18 S.W .3d at 156.

We decline to hold that the failure of Counsel to inform t he P etitioner of the neg ative ef fec t his plea ag ree ment would have on a determinate sentenc e fr o m a prior convic tion constitut es defic ient repr esentation. I nitially , we note that the “failure” to advise on the c ollatera l conseque nces of his plea wa s at most an omission, and not mi sinformation. S ee Ba u t i s t a, 160 S.W .3d at 921. Even more signific antly , we c onclude Counsel’s f ailure to a dvise on the collate ral e ffe ct t he plea

a g re e me nt wo uld ha ve on a prior se nte nc e , a s w e ll a s h is f

a ilu re to anti c ipate the a c tio ns of the pa ro le bo ard , h a d “ no de fi nit e , im me diate , a ndlarg e ly auto ma tic e ff

e c t” on the Pe tit ion er’s pu nis hme nt. I d. The collater al conseque nces the Petitioner fac ed wer e not automatic or de finite; the Petitioner was simply

require d to appea

r bef ore the parole board for early rele ase from his prior sente nce r ather than re ceiving determinate release. We conclude that the P etitioner’s counsel, while not advising him of the indirect, collater al eff ects of his ple a on a prior sentenc e, did not misinform the Petitioner, and ther efor e wa s not deficient in his repr esentation.

I n su m, the Pe tit ion e r ha s faile d to de mon str a te that his tr ia l c ou ns e l’ s re pr e sent ati on fel l outside the wide rang e of r easona ble profe ssional assistance to whic h he wa s entitled. Having found

no me ri t in the c laim o f i ne ff e c tiv e a ssistanc e of

c ou ns e l, w e a lso c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt did

no t e rr in f ind ing the Pe tit ion e r’ s g uil ty ple a wa s kno wi ng ly a nd vo lun tari ly e nte re d. Th is i ssu e is wi tho ut m e ri t.-8- CO NC LU SION F ind ing no e rr or , the jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt de nying the Pe tit ion e r’ s p e tit ion fo r p os tconviction re lief is aff

irmed.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE