This opinion will be unpublished and 

may not be cited except as provided by 

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016). 

STATE OF MINNESOTA 

IN COURT OF APPEALS 

A16-1156 

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Jesse Tyler Schafer, 

Appellant. 

Filed February 21, 2017 

Affirmed 

Schellhas, Judge 

Meeker County District Court 

File No. 47-CR-14-823 

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

Brandi L. Schiefelbein, Meeker County Attorney, Thomas Boenigk, Assistant County 

Attorney, Litchfield, Minnesota (for respondent) 

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) 

 Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Schellhas, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N 

SCHELLHAS, Judge 

Appellant challenges his probation revocation, arguing that (1) the district court 

lacked jurisdiction over his case based on the juvenile court’s certification of the case to 

adult court; (2) the district court committed reversible error by finding appellant in 
2 

violation of a condition regarding unsupervised contact with minors; and (3) the evidence 

was insufficient to show that the need for appellant’s confinement outweighs the policies 

favoring probation. We affirm. 

FACTS 

On November 1, 2013, when appellant Jesse Schafer was 17 years old, he had sexual 

intercourse with a 14-year-old girl. Respondent State of Minnesota initially filed a 

delinquency petition against Schafer in juvenile court, charging him with third-degree 

criminal sexual conduct. The juvenile court certified Schafer to stand trial as an adult,1

 and 

the state then filed a complaint in adult court, charging Schafer with one count of thirddegree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (2012) 

(complainant at least 13 but less than 16 years of age and actor more than 24 months older 

than complainant). 

At a plea hearing on October 6, 2014, Schafer pleaded guilty to one count of thirddegree criminal sexual conduct. The district court stayed adjudication for four years, 

conditioned on Schafer’s full compliance with terms of probation, which included, among 

other things, that any contact by Schafer with females under age 16 be supervised and 

approved in advance by Schafer’s corrections agent. In less than a year, Schafer signed 

four probation agreements that, in pertinent part, prohibited him from (1) using or 

 

1

 Although the addendum to Schafer’s appellate brief includes a copy of the certification 

order, the record before us does not include the delinquency petition filed in juvenile court, 

Schafer’s waiver of a certification hearing in juvenile court, or the juvenile court’s 

certification order. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (“The documents filed in the trial 

court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any, shall constitute the record 

on appeal in all cases.”). 
3 

possessing alcohol or mood-altering chemicals, except as prescribed; (2) owning or 

possessing “any computer (or anything with computer capabilities such as iphones, smart 

phones, ipads, tablets, watches, etc) that does not have installed pornographic filters and 

social media filters”; (3) having “unsupervised contact with females under the age of 16. 

Supervised contact is approved through sex offender treatment therapist and supervising 

Corrections Agent”; and (4) possessing or using “any pornographic/sexually explicit 

material.” 

 On April 13, 2015, Schafer admitted to violating his probation by using 

methamphetamine and marijuana, by not putting a pornography filter on his phone, and by 

viewing pornography. The district court revoked the stay of adjudication, stayed imposition 

of the sentence, and continued Schafer on probation for four years from the date of the 

hearing with terms of probation as previously imposed. The court also ordered Schafer to 

register as a sex offender. 

 On June 16, 2015, Schafer again admitted that he violated his probation by using 

marijuana and by using the Internet to access Facebook. Among other things, the district 

court vacated the stay of imposition, imposed a prison sentence of 36 months, and stayed 

execution of the sentence. On September 4, 2015, after Schafer committed another 

probation violation, the court imposed sanctions on him. 

 On April 14, 2016, Schafer appeared at another admit-deny probation-violation 

hearing. The district court explained the alleged probation violations on the record as 

follows: 
4 

THE COURT: The violation report — I’m just going to go over 

the violations with you to make sure you understand ‘em. [I]t’s 

alleged that you violated the following. Condition—special 

condition number fourteen, not to use or possess alcohol or 

mood-altering chemicals except as prescribed. The specifics of 

that are that you did admit to having a few beers and some pills, 

and admitted to that around April 13. 

[A]lso it’s alleged that you violated special condition 

number nineteen, not to access or use of internet without 

approval. That on April 6 you admitted you had possession of 

a cell phone that you did turn over to your agent at that time, 

and there was a confirmation the proper filters weren’t in place. 

[A]nd that you also admitted there was a second cell phone 

which was returned to your mother. 

There’s another allegation that you violated special 

condition number twenty. That you were not to have 

unsupervised contact with females under the age of sixteen and 

that there were numerous pictures of you having contact with 

females that appeared to be under sixteen in that phone. 

Special condition number twenty-two is alleged to be in 

violation, not to use or possess any pornographic or sexual 

explicit material, and after review of the phone it showed that 

there were two sexually explicit pictures and one video. Do you 

understand the allegations? 

THE DEFENDANT: Ah, yes, Your Honor. 

Schafer denied the allegations, and the court conducted a contested probation-violation 

hearing. On April 18, 2016, after the contested probation-violation hearing, the court found 

that Schafer violated probation, that his probation violations were serious, not technical, 

and went directly to the underlying offense, and that Schafer’s confinement was 

appropriate because probation was no longer sufficient to protect public safety. The court 

revoked the stay of execution and committed Schafer to the Minnesota Department of 

Corrections for 36 months. 

This appeal follows. 

 
5 

D E C I S I O N 

I 

Schafer argues that his conviction and sentence are void because the adult court that 

convicted and sentenced him never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over his case. 

Schafer argues that the juvenile court’s certification order was insufficient to confer 

subject-matter jurisdiction on the adult court because the juvenile court transferred the case 

to adult court based on his waiver and the parties’ plea agreement, not on public safety. 

This court “review[s] the juvenile court’s decision to certify a child to adult court for an 

abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of J.H., 844 N.W.2d 28, 34 (Minn. 2014). We “review 

questions of law de novo, and . . . findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard.” 

(citation omitted). Id. at 34–35. “A finding is clearly erroneous only if there is no 

reasonable evidence to support the finding or when an appellate court is left with the 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” Id. at 35 (quotation omitted). 

 We construe Schafer’s subject-matter jurisdiction argument to be a challenge to the 

validity of the juvenile court’s certification order. Because the record before us does not 

include Schafer’s waiver of a certification hearing in juvenile court or the juvenile court’s 

certification order, the record is insufficient to conduct a review of the validity of the 

certification order. Based on our reading of the certification order included in the 

addendum to Schafer’s appellate brief, even if we were to consider Schafer’s challenge to 

the validity of the certification order, Schafer would not prevail. Schafer attacks the 

certification order on the basis that it does not contain a required finding that certification 

would serve public safety. But the certification order in Schafer’s addendum complies with 
6 

the requirements applicable to an order issued following a waiver of the right to a 

certification hearing and stipulation to the certification order. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 

18.07, subds. 1 (outlining the requirements for a certification order following a waiver and 

stipulation, which do not include a requirement that such an order contain public-safety 

findings), 2 (requiring a certification order issued after a contested certification hearing to 

contain public-safety findings); see also Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.01, subd. 1 (stating 

that Rule 18 of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure applies when, as 

here, “the prosecutor moves for certification and a child is alleged to have committed, after 

becoming fourteen (14) years of age, an offense that would be a felony if committed by an 

adult”). 

II 

Schafer argues that the district court committed reversible error by finding that he 

violated a condition regarding unsupervised contact with minors, contending that his 

probation conditions did not require him to obtain his corrections agent’s advance approval 

of his contact with females under age 16, as long as an adult supervised the contact. He 

claims that he fully complied with his probation conditions because his adult girlfriend 

supervised his contact with her female children under age 16. 

Before revoking probation, a district court must determine on the record (1) if a 

specific condition of probation was violated and (2) whether that violation was intentional 

or inexcusable. State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 606 (Minn. 2005) (citing State v. 

Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980)). If the court finds clear and convincing 

evidence of an intentional or inexcusable violation, the district court also must evaluate 
7 

whether the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. Id.; see also 

Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 2(1)(c)b (requiring proof of a probation violation by clear 

and convincing evidence before probation can be revoked). “A district court has broad 

discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation and should be 

reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Ornelas, 675 N.W.2d 74, 

79 (Minn. 2004) (quoting Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 249−50) (quotation marks omitted). 

Schafer’s argument that he complied with the terms of his probation fails because 

the terms of his probation required him to get advance approval from his corrections agent 

before having supervised contact with females under age 16. 

Schafer also argues that his probation revocation violates due process because 

the written terms of his probation did not afford him fair notice that he must obtain 

agent approval before having supervised contact with females under age 16. “When 

sentencing a defendant, a court shall state the precise terms of the sentence.” Id. at 80 

(quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(A)) (quotation marks omitted). “In imposing a 

probationary sentence, if noncriminal conduct could result in revocation, the trial court 

should advise the defendant so that the defendant can be reasonably able to tell what lawful 

acts are prohibited.” Id. (quotation omitted). “It is an essential component of due process 

that individuals be given fair warning of those acts which may lead to a loss of liberty.” Id. 

(quotation omitted). “This is no less true whether the loss of liberty arises from a criminal 

conviction or the revocation of probation.” Id. (quotation omitted). “When the acts 

prohibited by the probation conditions are not criminal, due process mandates that the 

petitioner cannot be subjected to a forfeiture of his liberty for those acts unless he is given 
8 

prior fair warning.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Whether a defendant has been denied due 

process of law is a question of law that [this court] review[s] de novo.” State v. Beaulieu, 

859 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Minn. 2015). 

At his sentencing hearing, the district court specifically clarified the meaning of the 

advance-approval probation condition and Schafer acknowledges that, “[b]ack in 2014, the 

court did state that he needed such approval.” Moreover, the probation condition was 

included in each of the four probation agreements that Schafer signed, and we reject 

Schafer’s suggestion that the wording in the probation agreements is ambiguous. His past 

conduct was consistent with an understanding that he was required to receive agent 

approval before having adult-supervised contact with females under age 16. On at least one 

occasion, he asked his corrections agent to approve his mother to supervise him when he 

had contact with females under age 16. 

Schafer also argues that he did not have fair notice that he needed agent approval 

before having adult-supervised contact with females under age 16 because he received 

mixed messages from the district court. After a careful review of the record, we are not 

persuaded. The record contains sufficient evidence that Schafer had fair notice that he 

needed approval from his corrections agent before having supervised contact with females 

under the age of 16. We conclude that his probation revocation therefore did not violate his 

due-process rights. 

III 

Schafer argues that clear and convincing evidence does not show that the need for 

confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. Even if the facts allow probation 
9 

revocation, “policy considerations may require that probation not be revoked.” Modtland, 

695 N.W.2d at 606 (quotation omitted). “[T]he purpose of probation is rehabilitation and 

revocation should be used only as a last resort when treatment has failed.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). “When determining if revocation is appropriate, courts must balance the 

probationer’s interest in freedom and the state’s interest in insuring his rehabilitation and 

the public safety, and base their decisions on sound judgment and not just their will.” Id. 

at 606–07 (quotations omitted); see also State v. Rottelo, 798 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. App. 

2011) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked probation 

because Rottelo did not remain in contact with probation officers, had multiple offenses in 

his history, and showed a pattern of noncompliance with probation), review denied (Minn. 

July 19, 2011). A court should only revoke probation if the court finds 

on the basis of the original offense and the intervening conduct 

of the offender that: 

(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from 

further criminal activity by the offender; or 

(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment 

which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or 

(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the 

violation if probation were not revoked. 

Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607 (quotation omitted). 

We conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting the 

district court’s finding that “the need for confinement [was] outweighed by the public 

policy that favors it.” The district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Schafer’s 

probation. 

Affirmed.