SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1535-15T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

HAMEED S. BROOKS,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________

Submitted March 28, 2017 – Decided July 6, 2017

Before Judges Messano and Grall.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, 

Indictment No. 14-12-3721.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Stefan Van Jura, Deputy Public 

Defender, II, of counsel and on the brief).

Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Jason Magid, 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

Following a jury trial, defendant Hameed S. Brooks was found 

guilty of third-degree escape, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5(a), and sentenced 

to a five-year term of imprisonment with a two-and-one-half-year 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
2 A-1535-15T3

period of parole ineligibility. The evidence adduced by the State 

revealed that on January 31, 2014, defendant was a resident of 

Hope Hall, a "transitional" halfway house in Camden. Hope Hall 

is operated by a non-profit agency and accepts prisoners from the 

Department of Corrections (the DOC), providing them with 

counseling and employment services in a residential setting. 

Defendant entered Hope Hall on January 7, having previously 

been incarcerated at Bayside State Prison. Upon entering the 

facility, defendant was advised of its rules and regulations, one 

of which prohibited any "[e]scape or unauthorized absence from 

work assignment or the facility." Defendant signed a copy of 

these rules and regulations.1

Hope Hall's program manager explained that the facility's 

alarm sounded at 12:45 a.m. on January 31, 2014, signaling an 

emergency exit side door had been opened. A count of the residents 

revealed defendant was missing. A search of defendant's room 

indicated his personal belongings were gone. 

Although a one-and-one-half-story-high fence surrounded the 

facility, one gate was always kept open. Hope Hall maintained a 

midnight curfew, and, while residents were sometimes granted 

furloughs to work, and there were frequent comings and goings from 

 

1 The document was admitted into evidence at trial but is not part 

of the appellate record.
3 A-1535-15T3

the facility, defendant was not eligible for furlough because he 

had been at Hope Hall for such a short time. He was not permitted 

to leave the facility at all. Hope Hall contacted DOC, which 

issued a warrant for defendant’s arrest. Defendant never returned, 

and the Camden County Police Department apprehended him on April 

1. 

Defendant elected not to testify. During the charge 

conference, defense counsel requested the judge charge the jury 

on obstructing the administration of law or other governmental 

function by flight. See N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) ("A person commits 

an offense if he purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts the 

administration of law or other governmental function or prevents 

or attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully performing 

an official function by means of flight . . . ."). Defense counsel 

acknowledged that obstruction was not a "lesser-included" offense 

of escape. Rather, he argued the jury could reject the State's 

contention that defendant was in custody, while at the same time 

concluding defendant's absence "shut down the facility for a while 

and so he obstructed [its] ability to function as a government 

agency." 

The judge determined there was "no rational basis" for the 

charge "based on the facts" of the case. She denied the request.
4 A-1535-15T3

In summation, defense counsel argued, among other things, 

that defendant may not have "kn[own] he was in custody," or simply 

missed curfew. He argued the written rules of the facility were 

ambiguous, and DOC imposed administrative discipline on defendant 

for his unauthorized absence, suggesting defendant was unaware he 

could be subject to criminal charges.

The judge's jury instructions essentially followed verbatim 

Model Jury Charge (Criminal), "Escape, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5a" (2006). 

The jury found defendant guilty of the sole count in the indictment 

charging him with escape.

 Before us, defendant argues in a single point:

THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS DECISION TO DENY 

DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR A JURY CHARGE ON THE 

LESSER OFFENSE OF OBSTRUCTION REQUIRES 

REVERSAL OF THE ESCAPE CONVICTION.

Having considered this contention in light of the record and 

applicable law, we affirm.

"Whether an offense is an included offense of another charge 

requires a comparison of the statutory elements of each charge." 

State v. Thomas, 187 N.J. 119, 129 (2006). Defendant acknowledges 

obstruction is not a lesser-included offense of the crime of 

escape. 

"In contrast, related offenses are those that 'share a common 

factual ground, but not a commonality in statutory elements, with 
5 A-1535-15T3

the crime[] charged in the indictment.'" State v. Maloney, 216 

N.J. 91, 107 (2013) (quoting Thomas, supra, 187 N.J. at 132). "A 

court may instruct on a related offense when 'the defendant 

requests or consents to the related offense charge, and there is 

a rational basis in the evidence to sustain the related offense.'" 

Id. at 108 (quoting Thomas, supra, 187 N.J. at 133). "The evidence 

must present adequate reason for the jury to acquit the defendant 

on the greater charge and to convict on the lesser." State v. 

Brent, 137 N.J. 107, 118-19 (1994).

In pertinent part, an actor commits the disorderly persons 

offense of obstruction if he "purposely obstructs, impairs or 

perverts the administration of law or other governmental function 

. . . by means of flight." N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) (emphasis added). 

In this case, to justify charging the jury on obstruction, the 

evidence must have supported the jury's finding beyond a reasonable 

doubt that defendant fled Hope Hall, for the purpose of obstructing 

a governmental function and, his flight, actually obstructed a 

governmental function. Model Jury Charge (Criminal), "Obstructing 

Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function, N.J.S.A.

2C:29-1" (2000). 

Under our Criminal Code, "[a] person acts purposely with 

respect to the nature of his conduct or a result thereof if it is 

his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to 
6 A-1535-15T3

cause such a result." N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1). "Where an offense 

requires purpose, the result must be the kind of result designed 

by the actor[.]" Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, 

comment 4 on N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3 (2016-17).

Here, there was no evidence to rationally support the 

conclusion that defendant's "conscious object" in fleeing Hope 

Hall was to obstruct the operation of the facility. Instead, 

after being in the facility only a few short weeks, defendant left 

during the early morning hours through a side entrance, took all 

his belongings with him and never returned. All the evidence 

pointed to defendant's singular purpose being his escape, without 

concern for what, if any, effect it would have on Hope Hall or its 

staff. Moreover, there was scant evidence that the operation of 

the facility was impaired in any significant way, or that 

defendant's escape impacted other residents of Hope Hall. 

In short, we agree there was no "rational basis in the 

evidence to sustain the related offense" of obstruction by flight. 

Maloney, supra, 216 N.J. at 108 (quoting Thomas, supra, 187 N.J.

at 133). The judge, therefore, did not err by refusing to give 

jury instructions on that offense.

Affirmed.