SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0169-17T4

JUAN C. GARCIA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MARIA F. GARCIA,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Submitted November 5, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Messano and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, 

Docket No. FM-09-1817-16.

Malcolm Blum, attorney for appellant.

Santo V. Artusa, Jr., attorney for respondent.

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 10, 2018
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A-0169-17T4

In this post-judgment matrimonial matter, defendant (mother) appeals 

from the provision of the August 2, 2017 Chancery Division order, emancipating 

the parties' daughter, J.G., born August 1996. We affirm.

The parties married in 1995 and divorced in 2016. The Dual Judgment of 

Divorce (DJOD) incorporated a property settlement agreement (PSA) that 

designated defendant the parent of primary residence and obligated plaintiff to 

pay child support for J.G., the parties' only child. When the parties signed the 

PSA, J.G. had "graduated from high school" and was attending "Hudson County 

Community College." According to the PSA, each party agreed to contribute 

fifty percent towards J.G.'s "tuition and college related costs."

Regarding emancipation, the PSA provided in pertinent part that "the child 

shall be deemed emancipated, and the parties' legal obligation to support her 

shall end, upon the first to occur of the following events:"

[1] The child engaging in or having the ability to 

engage in full-time employment and is therefore not 

[in] full-time attendance at college or a recognized

post-secondary educational/training program, unless 

for good cause shown, except and provided that:

(a) Engagement of the child in partial 

employment shall not be deemed an 

emancipating event[;]

(b) Engagement by the child in full[-]time 

employment during vacation and summer 
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periods shall not be deemed an 

emancipating event . . . .

[2] The completion of four . . . years of full-time 

undergraduate college studies or the attainment of a 

Bachelor's degree by the child, whichever shall occur 

first. It is the parties' intention that emancipation of the 

child shall only be deferred for four . . . consecutive 

years of college whether or not the child has graduated 

within that four year period[.] 

On June 9, 2017, plaintiff moved to emancipate J.G. and terminate child 

support, asserting that J.G. was "working full[-]time" and "not in school." In 

opposition, defendant certified that J.G. was only "working part[-]time," and her 

"work hours [varied] between [eight] to [twelve] hours per week." Further, 

according to defendant, J.G. was "taking a full[-]time curriculum towards an 

Associate Degree," after which "she intends to continue with her college 

education to obtain a four (4) year degree." In support, defendant provided a 

copy of J.G.'s grades from Hudson County Community College. However, the 

document indicated that for the Fall 2016 and Spring 2017 semesters, J.G. failed 

to maintain a full-time credit load, resulting in her receiving less than twelve 

credits per semester.

On July 7, 2017, the parties appeared for oral argument on the motion. 

The motion judge adjourned the motion to allow defendant to "provide an 

official transcript" for J.G. Upon receipt of the records, on August 2, 2017, the 
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judge granted the motion on the papers, emancipating J.G. effective the date 

plaintiff filed the motion. In a written decision accompanying the August 2 

order, the judge determined that defendant "ha[d] not met her burden of proof" 

and "failed to show [J.G.] ha[d] been attending Hudson [County] Community

College uninterrupted on a full[-]time basis" as required by the PSA. According 

to the judge, "if [J.G.] enrolled in the Fall of 2016, she should have [four] 

semesters of courses with [twelve] credits per semester." Instead, she "[did] not 

provide [proof of enrollment for] more than [two] semesters." This appeal 

followed.1

On appeal, defendant argues she adduced sufficient facts to meet her 

burden of proof and the judge erred in determining otherwise. In the alternative, 

defendant asserts that "[a]t a minimum, the facts presented . . . amounted to 

contested material facts," necessitating a plenary hearing. We disagree.

We generally defer to the Family Part's fact-finding because of the court's 

expertise in family matters and ability to make credibility determinations. N.J. 

 

1

 On October 17, 2018, we granted defendant's motion to supplement the record 

with J.G.'s transcript from Bergen County Community College where she 

apparently transferred for the Fall 2017, Spring 2018, and Fall 2018 semesters. 

We now conclude that the motion was improvidently granted because the motion 

judge adjudicated the motion that is the subject of this appeal without the benefit 

of those transcripts.
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Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012). We defer to 

a judge's findings of fact unless they lack support in the record or are 

inconsistent with the substantial, credible evidence. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. 

Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974). However, where "no hearing takes 

place, no evidence is admitted, and no findings of fact are made," we owe no 

deference to the trial court's conclusions. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.

v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 396 (2009). Likewise, we owe no special deference to a 

trial court's "interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from 

established facts." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 

N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

Here, defendant challenges the court's determination that J.G. was 

emancipated. There is a rebuttable presumption against emancipation for 

individuals under the age of eighteen. Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 543 

(1982); Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 17 (App. Div. 2006). While 

attaining the age of eighteen "establishes prima facie, but not conclusive, proof 

of emancipation," Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 543, emancipation "does not occur . . . 
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automatically, by operation of law, simply by reason of the dependent child 

reaching the age of" eighteen. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. at 17.2 

"Whether a child is emancipated at age [eighteen], with the correlative 

termination of the right to parental support," requires a fact-sensitive inquiry, 

Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 543, to determine if "the child has moved 'beyond the 

sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a parent and obtains an 

independent status of his or her own.'" Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. at 17-18 (quoting 

Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 308 (App. Div. 1997)). Thus, "[a] court's 

emancipation 'determination involves a critical evaluation of the prevailing 

circumstances including the child's need, interests, and independent resources, 

the family's reasonable expectations, and the parties' financial ability, among 

other things.'" Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207, 216 (App. Div. 

2015) (quoting Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. at 18).

 

2 Effective February 1, 2017, under N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67, "a child support 

obligation shall terminate by operation of law without order by the court when 

a child reaches [nineteen] years of age," N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67(a); however, "a 

custodial parent . . . [may] seek[] the continuation of child support beyond the 

date the child reaches [nineteen] years of age" by demonstrating that "the child 

is a student in a post-secondary education program and is enrolled for the 

number of hours or courses the school considers to be full-time attendance 

during some part of each of any five calendar months of the year[.]" N.J.S.A. 

2A:17-56.67(b)(1)(b).
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The court must also consider whether there is an agreement between "the 

parties to voluntarily extend the parental duty of support beyond the presumptive 

age of emancipation." Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. at 18. Where a parent 

"undertak[es] to support a child beyond the presumptive legal limits of parental 

responsibility[,]" the "parental obligation is not measured by legal duties 

otherwise imposed, but rather founded upon contractual and equitable 

principles." Ibid. (citations omitted). 

Indeed, "[s]ettlement of disputes, including matrimonial disputes, is 

encouraged and highly valued in our system." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44 

(2016). "Therefore, 'fair and definitive arrangements arrived at by mutual 

consent should not be unnecessarily or lightly disturbed.'" Ibid. "As contracts, 

PSAs should be enforced according to the original intent of the parties," J.B. v. 

W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 326 (2013), and "a court should not rewrite a contract or 

grant a better deal than that for which the parties expressly bargained." Quinn, 

225 N.J. at 45. Thus, "absen[t] . . . unconscionability, fraud, or overreaching in 

the negotiations of the settlement," Miller v. Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 419 (1999), 

"when the intent of the parties is plain and the language is clear and 

unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so

would lead to an absurd result." Quinn, 225 N.J. at 45.
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Here, the PSA extended J.G.'s emancipation beyond the presumptive age. 

The parties do not dispute that the PSA was entered into "by consensual 

agreement, voluntarily and knowingly," was "fair and equitable," and was 

therefore binding. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. at 18. Plaintiff sought a determination 

that J.G. was emancipated under the terms of the agreement. We are satisfied 

there was substantial, credible evidence supporting the judge's determination 

that J.G. did not attend four semesters of college with at least twelve credits per 

semester, and was therefore not a full-time college student as required under the 

PSA. Accordingly, the judge correctly concluded plaintiff established the 

agreed upon condition for the emancipation of J.G. under the PSA.

Affirmed.