UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOHN ALDON CORRION,

Plaintiff,

v. Case Number: 08-CV-15272

Honorable Victoria A. Roberts

HONORABLE STANLEY J. LATREILLE,

Defendant.

______________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING 42 U.S.C. §1983 CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT

AND CONCLUDING THAT AN APPEAL CANNOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH

I.

John Aldon Corrion (“Plaintiff”), a state inmate, currently confined at the St. Louis

Correctional Facility in St. Louis, Michigan, has filed a pro se Civil-Rights Complaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Complaint, Plaintiff challenges a civil action, where the Livingston

County Circuit Court entered a Default Judgment, awarding $995,000 to the other party. 

According to Plaintiff, the Judgment was entered on August 25, 2008. Plaintiff does not indicate

whether he is appealing that Judgment in the state courts. Plaintiff names Livingston County

Circuit Court Judge Stanley J. Latreille as the Defendant in this action. Plaintiff is asking this

Court to set aside the Circuit Court’s August 25, 2008, Default Judgment, and requests that the

Court order the Circuit Court to restore him to the status quo. Having reviewed the Complaint,

the Court dismisses it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and on the basis of absolute

immunity. Finally, the Court concludes that an appeal cannot be taken in good faith.

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II.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)

(“PLRA”), the Court is required to sua sponte dismiss a complaint seeking redress against

government entities, officers, and employees which it finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks relief from a defendant who is immune

from suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in

law or in fact. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 325 (1989).

To state a federal civil rights claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant is a

person who acted under color of state or federal law, and (2) the defendant’s conduct deprived

the plaintiff of a federal right, privilege, or immunity. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,

155-57 (1978); Brock v. McWherter, 94 F.3d 242, 244 (6th Cir. 1996). A pro se civil-rights

complaint is to be construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jones

v. Duncan, 840 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 1988). Despite the liberal pleading standard accorded

pro se plaintiffs, the Court finds that the Complaint in this case is subject to summary dismissal.

A.

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine, see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia

Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), which “holds that lower federal courts lack

subject[-]matter jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of state[-]court proceedings or to

adjudicate claims ‘inextricably intertwined’ with issues decided in state[-]court proceedings.” 

Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. City of Berkley, 305 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2002); see also

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Hutcherson v. Lauderdale County, Tenn., 326 F.3d 747, 755 (6th Cir. 2003). As the United

States Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal

courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’ challenging ‘statecourt judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis,

546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (per curiam) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies “when a plaintiff complains of

injury from the state[-]court judgment itself.” Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 858 (6th Cir.

2006). Thus, “[i]n determining the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts

cannot simply compare the issues involved in the state-court proceeding to those raised in the

federal-court plaintiff’s complaint, but instead must pay close attention to the relief sought by

the federal-court [P]laintiff.” Hood v. Keller, 341 F.3d 593, 597 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal

quotation omitted) (emphasis in the original) (citing Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 900

(9th Cir. 2003). “If the source of the injury is that state[-]court decision, then the RookerFeldman doctrine would prevent the district court from asserting jurisdiction. If there is some

other source of injury, such as a third[-]party’s actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent

claim.” McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006). The doctrine applies to

attempts to relitigate state[-]court judgments entered before the federal suit was filed; it does not

abrogate concurrent jurisdiction in federal and state courts, nor is it analogous to a preclusion

doctrine. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292.

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a rule of federal jurisdiction.” Frederickson v. City of

Lockport, 384 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2004). Consequently, it may be raised sua sponte. See

Saker v. National City Corp., 90 Fed. Appx. 816, 818 n.1 (6th Cir. 2004). When a claim is

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barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a court must dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction. 

See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte

McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)).

Applying the foregoing principles to the present Complaint, the Court finds that it lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

The injury complained of is the Default Judgment against Plaintiff, which is solely traceable to

the state-court judgment. In other words, Plaintiff has “repaired to federal court to undo the

[Michigan] judgment,” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293, and his claim “rests on the premise that

the state court entry of [judgment] was invalid.” Thompkins-El v. Wells Fargo Bank Minn., No.

05-CV-74715, 2006 WL 2433438, at 3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2006) (Battani, J.); see also Yee v.

Michigan Sup. Ct., No. 06-CV-15142, 2007 WL 200952, at 5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2007) (Rosen,

J.). Such claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Because Plaintiff seeks to have the

Default Judgment set aside, which is the direct and immediate product of the state-court

judgment, his claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s federal claim is barred even if it were not

specifically presented to the state court. A federal claim which calls into question the validity of

the state-court judgment is inextricably intertwined with the judgment even if the federal claim

was not presented in the state-court proceeding; all that is required is that the federal plaintiff

have had the opportunity to present the issues involved to the state court. See Kropelnicki v.

Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2002); Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 201

(4th Cir. 2000); Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 1992), quoted with approval in

Wilde v. Ohio Veterinary Med. Licencing Bd., 31 Fed. Appx. 164, 166 (6th Cir. Feb. 21, 2002). 

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Plaintiff can appeal the state-court decision to the Michigan appellate courts, and ultimately the

United States Supreme Court, if necessary. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, this

Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over his current claim.

B.

The Court also finds that Defendant Livingston County Circuit Court Judge Stanley J.

Latreille is entitled to absolute immunity in this case. Judges and judicial employees are entitled

to absolute judicial immunity on claims for damages. See Mireles v Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10

(1991) (per curiam) (judge performing judicial functions is absolutely immune from suit seeking

monetary damages even if acting erroneously, corruptly or in excess of jurisdiction); Collyer v.

Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 221 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Kipen v. Lawson, 57 Fed. Appx. 691 (6th Cir.

2003) (discussing federal judges’ immunity); Kircher v. City of Ypsilanti, et al., 458 F. Supp. 2d

439, 446-47 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (Rosen, J.); accord Asubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3rd

Cir. 2006); Hass v. Wisconsin, et al., 109 Fed. Appx. 107, 113-14 (7th Cir. 2004); Bolin v. Story,

225 F.3d 1234, 1240-42 (11th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s challenge to the proceedings involve the

performance of judicial duties. Defendant Judge Latreille is absolutely immune from suit for

such conduct and the claim against him must also be dismissed on that basis.

III.

For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s claims arising from the state-court judgment authorizing a Default Judgment. 

Additionally, Defendant Livingston County Circuit Court Judge Latreille is absolutely immune

from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint.

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Finally, the Court concludes that an Appeal from this Order would be frivolous and

cannot be taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/Victoria A. Roberts 

Victoria A. Roberts

United States District Judge

Dated: January 8, 2009

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this

document was served on the attorneys of record

and John Aldon Corrion by electronic means or

U.S. Mail on January 8, 2009.

s/Carol A. Pinegar 

Deputy Clerk

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