1

Present: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 

JJ., and Russell and Koontz, S.JJ. 

RIVERSIDE OWNER, L.L.C., ET AL. 

v. Record No. 100347

CITY OF RICHMOND

OPINION BY

JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.

 June 9, 2011

CITY OF RICHMOND

v. Record No. 100703

RIVERSIDE OWNER, L.L.C., ET AL.

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND

Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge

The City of Richmond’s Tax Abatement for Rehabilitated 

Real Estate Program (Program) provides a partial exemption from 

real estate taxes for qualifying rehabilitated property. 

Richmond City Code§ 27-83(a).1

 To qualify for a partial 

exemption, a property must increase in value by at least 40 

percent because of rehabilitation no later than “December 31 of 

the third calendar year following the year in which [its

owner’s] application [for the Program] is submitted.” City 

Code § 27-83(b). The amount of the partial exemption is the 

difference between the property’s “base value” (assessed value 

 1 In 2004, the City revised the Program and recodified it 

in sections of Chapter 98 of the City Code. Because these 

appeals concern the Program before its revision and 

recodification, we cite the sections of former Chapter 27.
2

before rehabilitation) and its “initial rehabilitated assessed 

value.” City Code § 27-83(b)-(c), (g).

Since 1981, the City Assessor’s office has determined a 

property’s initial rehabilitated assessed value, not as of the 

date its rehabilitation is completed, but as of the date its 

owner’s application for the Program is submitted. The 

principal question presented by these consolidated appeals is

whether that policy is consistent with the requirements of City 

Code § 27-83 and its enabling statute, Code § 58.1-3221.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2000, City officials and a delegation of business 

leaders met with representatives of The Cordish Companies, a 

real estate development company, to propose several sites along 

the City’s historic Canal Walk for rehabilitation. After

inspecting the proposed sites, Cordish selected a site located 

on Brown’s Island, which consisted of two dilapidated power 

plants. It then formed Richmond Power Plant, LLC to 

rehabilitate the Brown’s Island site.

After nearly two years of negotiations, the City and 

Richmond Power Plant entered into a development agreement 

(Agreement) in 2003. The Agreement called for the construction 

of, among other things, a mixed-use building with a parking 

garage (Property). In exchange for Richmond Power Plant’s 

rehabilitation of the power plants, the City promised, among 
3

other things, that “the [Property] shall qualify for the full

benefit of the [Program].”

Richmond Power Plant applied for the Program in 2002. At 

that time, the City Assessor’s office determined that the power 

plants each had a base value of $500. Construction on the 

Property began in 2003 and was completed two years later at a

cost of approximately $63.8 million.

In August 2005, the Property was sold to Riverside Owner, 

L.L.C. for $85 million. One month later, the City Assessor’s 

office conducted its final inspection of the Property and 

determined that, based on the cost of the rehabilitation, its

office space had a value of $63.8 million. In May 2006, the 

City Assessor’s office revised that amount to roughly $45.2 

million for purposes of the Program. The difference in the two 

amounts was due to the application of the “Chandler policy.”

In 1981, former City Assessor Richard A. Chandler 

established a new policy for determining a property’s initial 

rehabilitated assessed value under the Program. Pursuant to

the policy, he explained in an internal memorandum, “[t]he 

final estimate of value for rehabilitation credit will be

determined as of the date of the application and computed only 

on the information which was available at the time the base 

value was established.” The purpose of the policy, he further 

explained, was “to eliminate from the final estimate of value 
4

any enhancement created by something other than rehabilitation 

or physical improvement.” The policy was not published in the 

Program’s materials until 2006.

So, in accordance with the Chandler policy, the City 

Assessor’s office took the value of the Property’s office space 

as of 2005, when the rehabilitation was completed, and 

backdated it to 2002, when the Property’s former owner, 

Richmond Power Plant, applied for the program.2 Because of this 

backdating, the value of the office space was reduced from

$63.8 million to approximately $45.2 million for purposes of 

the Program.

When Riverside Owner received its 2006 real estate tax 

bill for the Property, it discovered that it had not been 

awarded a partial exemption under the Program. The City later 

acknowledged that error and issued a revised tax bill that 

included a partial exemption based on the backdated value 

called for by the Chandler policy. Disagreeing with that 

value, Riverside Owner paid the revised tax bill under protest 

and appealed to the City Assessor, challenging the Chandler 

policy. The City Assessor denied the appeal, concluding that 

the Chandler policy was consistent with Code § 58.1-3221 and 

City Code § 27-83, and was therefore “correct and legal.”

 2 To backdate a property’s value for purposes of the 

Program, the City Assessor’s office uses “an indexing factor” 

provided by Marshall & Swift, a cost estimation service. 
5

In 2008, Riverside Owner and the Property’s anchor tenant,

Troutman Sanders LLP (collectively, Taxpayers), filed a 

“Complaint and Application for Relief from Erroneous 

Assessments of Taxes Upon Real Property” (Application),

pursuant to Code § 58.1-3984. Among other things, they alleged 

that the Chandler policy was “ultra vires and an improper 

usurpation of legislative power by the City Assessor, and such 

policy [was] an improper methodology for setting the assessed 

value of rehabilitated improvements, and otherwise illegal.” 

They sought a refund of the excess taxes that they paid because

of the application of the Chandler policy, interest on the

overpayments, and attorney’s fees.

The circuit court, in accordance with Code § 58.1-3984,

held a hearing on the Taxpayers’ Application. Because the 

Taxpayers and the City agreed on the post-rehabilitation values

of the Property’s office and retail spaces if the Chandler 

policy were applied and if it were not, the sole issue before 

the circuit court was whether the policy was “not uniform in 

its application, or . . . otherwise invalid or illegal.” Id.

During the hearing, the Taxpayers presented the testimony of 

several witnesses, including Robert P. Englander, Jr., who, 

over the City’s objection, was qualified as an “expert on real 

estate valuation and development and on the application of the 

[Program] to commercial and mixed use properties.”
6

In a letter opinion, the circuit court held that the 

Chandler policy “depart[ed] from the requirement[s]” of Code 

§ 58.1-3221 and City Code § 27-83, because it “relie[d] on 

values other than assessed ones” to determine the amount of the 

partial exemption “due to the [Taxpayers].”3 Accordingly, the

circuit court ruled in the Taxpayers’ favor.

At a later hearing on the final order, the Taxpayers

reminded the circuit court that it had not yet ruled on their 

claim for attorney’s fees and asked that it do so. They argued 

that, as the prevailing party, they were entitled to attorney’s 

fees under Section 9.5 of the Agreement. The circuit court 

disagreed, finding that the case was not brought pursuant to

the Agreement. It then entered the final order, awarding the 

Taxpayers relief for both the Property’s office and retail 

spaces for the tax years 2006 through 2008, in accordance with 

the post-rehabilitation values that the parties agreed on if 

the Chandler policy were not applied, but denying their claim 

for attorney’s fees. These consolidated appeals followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The City’s Appeal

 3 In its letter opinion, the circuit court states that the 

Chandler policy departs from the requirements of “the 

authorizing statute, Va. Code § 58.1-3984, and the ordinances 

enacted pursuant thereto.” We assume this to be a 

typographical error, since Code § 58.1-3221 is the enabling 

statute for City Code § 27-83.
7

The City assigns four errors. The first two concern the 

circuit court’s decision not to apply the Chandler policy. The 

third challenges the circuit court’s decision to admit the 

testimony of the Taxpayers’ expert, Englander. The last 

involves the circuit court’s decision to grant the Taxpayers 

relief for the Property’s retail space. We address each of 

these assignments of error in turn.

1. Chandler Policy

The City first contends that the circuit court erred in 

holding that the Chandler policy was inconsistent with Code 

§ 58.1 3221 and City Code § 27-83.

Whether the Chandler policy comports with the requirements 

of Code § 58.1-3221 and City Code § 27-83 is a question of 

statutory interpretation. As such, it “ ‘presents a pure 

question of law and is accordingly subject to de novo review by 

this Court.’ ” Warrington v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 365, 370, 

699 S.E.2d 233, 235 (2010) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 276 

Va. 121, 124, 661 S.E.2d 412, 414 (2008)).

As with any question of statutory interpretation, our 

primary objective is “ ‘to ascertain and give effect to 

legislative intent,’ ” as expressed by the language used in the 

statute. Commonwealth v. Amerson, 281 Va. 414, 418, 706 S.E.2d 

879, ___ (2011) (quoting Conger v. Barrett, 280 Va. 627, 630, 

702 S.E.2d 117, 118 (2010)). “ ‘When the language of a statute 
8

is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that 

language.’ ” Ford Motor Co. v. Gordon, 281 Va. 543, 549, ___ 

S.E.2d ___, ___ (2011) (quoting Conyers v. Martial Arts World 

of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 

(2007)). Because the words of a statute are chosen with care, 

“we will not read a legislative enactment in a manner that 

renders any portion of that enactment useless.” Antisdel v. 

Ashby, 279 Va. 42, 48, 688 S.E.2d 163, 166 (2010). Rather, “we 

will apply an act of the legislature by giving reasonable 

effect to every word used.” Id.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of

Code § 58.1-3221 and City Code § 27-83. As relevant here, Code 

§ 58.1-3221 provides:

A. The governing body of any county, city or 

town may, by ordinance, provide for the partial 

exemption from taxation of real estate on which any 

structure or other improvement no less than twenty 

years of age, or fifteen years of age if the 

structure is located in an area designated as an 

enterprise zone by the Commonwealth, has undergone 

substantial rehabilitation . . . subject to such 

conditions as the ordinance may prescribe. . . . The 

governing body of a county, city or town may 

establish criteria for determining whether real 

estate qualifies for the partial exemption authorized 

by this provision and may require the structure to be 

older than twenty years of age, or fifteen years of 

age if the structure is located in an area designated 

as an enterprise zone by the Commonwealth, or place 

such other restrictions and conditions on such 

property as may be prescribed by ordinance. . . .

B. The partial exemption provided by the local 

governing body may not exceed an amount equal to the 
9

increase in assessed value resulting from the 

rehabilitation . . . as determined by the 

commissioner of revenue or other local assessing 

officer. 

City Code § 27-83, which was adopted pursuant to Code 

§ 58.1-3221, in pertinent part, provides: 

(a) Exemption authorized. Partial exemption 

from real estate taxes is provided for qualifying 

property rehabilitated . . . if eligible according to 

the terms of the Constitution, the Code of Virginia 

and the provisions of this section and Section 27-86.

(b) When deemed rehabilitated. For the purposes 

of this section, commercial or industrial real estate 

shall be deemed to be substantially rehabilitated 

when a structure . . . has been so improved by 

renovation, reconstruction or replacement as to 

increase the assessed value of the structure by no 

less than forty (40) percent. . . . Upon receipt of 

an application for tax exemption, the Assessor shall 

determine the assessed value (hereafter referred to 

as base value) of the structure prior to commencement 

of rehabilitation. Such assessment shall serve as a 

basis for determining whether the rehabilitation

undertaken increases the assessed value of such 

structure by at least forty (40) percent. The 

application to qualify for tax exemption shall be 

effective until December 31 of the third calendar 

year following the year in which [the] application is 

submitted. . . . When it is determined that a fortypercent increase in assessed value . . . has 

occurred, the tax exemption shall become effective 

beginning on January 1 of the next calendar year.

. . . .

(g) Commercial or industrial structures in 

enterprise zones. Commercial or industrial 

structures that are . . . qualified under this 

section shall be entitled to a fifteen-year period of 

exemption in the full amount of the difference in 

taxes computed upon the base value and the initial 

rehabilitated assessed value of the property for each 

year of the fifteen (15) years.
10

According to City Code § 27-83(g), the amount of a partial

exemption awarded under the Program is to be determined based 

on the difference between a property’s base value (assessed

value before rehabilitation) and its initial rehabilitated 

assessed value. The City argues that “initial rehabilitated 

assessed value” does not mean the first assessed value after 

rehabilitation – or, in other words, the first value after 

rehabilitation that is determined by an appraiser for tax 

purposes. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1691 (9th ed. 2009)

(defining “assessed value” as “[t]he value of an asset as 

determined by an appraiser for tax purposes”); see also DKM 

Richmond Assocs. v. City of Richmond, 249 Va. 401, 408, 457 

S.E.2d 76, 80 (1995) (“[T]he word ‘assessment’ in [the] context 

[of City Code § 27-83] refers to the determination of the value 

of the property as a result of an appraisal.”). Instead, 

citing a parenthetical found in City Code § 27-86(b), the City

contends that the phrase means the “value attributable to 

rehabilitation.”

We disagree. As relevant here, City Code § 27-86(b)

provides: “The Director of Finance . . . shall cause to be 

prepared a credit in an amount equal to the difference in taxes 

as computed upon the base value and the initial rehabilitated 
11

assessed value (i.e., value attributable to rehabilitation).”4

Contrary to the City’s contention, the parenthetical in this

section does not define “initial rehabilitated assessed value,” 

but rather describes what remains when the base value is 

subtracted from the initial rehabilitated assessed value, which 

is then used to calculate the amount of the tax credit to which 

an owner is entitled under the Program. Accordingly, we read 

“initial rehabilitated assessed value” to mean what it says:

the first assessed value after rehabilitation.

As noted earlier, the Chandler policy does not use the 

first assessed value after rehabilitation to determine the

amount of a partial exemption. Instead, it uses a hypothetical 

value based on backdating, which is employed only for purposes

of determining the amount of a partial exemption. The Chandler 

policy thus effectively reads the word “assessed” out of City 

Code § 27-83.

The City submits that the Chandler policy’s departure from 

the language of City Code § 27-83 is permissible because Code 

§ 58.1-3221(B) provides that “the increase in assessed value 

resulting from the rehabilitation” is to be determined by the 

“local assessing officer.” We find this contention 

unpersuasive.

 4 The amount of the tax credit is the amount of the partial 

exemption multiplied by the City’s tax rate.
12

Code § 58.1-3221(A) gives the City Council — and not the 

City Assessor – the authority to establish by ordinance the 

Program’s “criteria.” Among the criteria the City Council

prescribed pursuant to that authority was the methodology for 

determining the amount of a partial exemption found in City 

Code § 27-83(g) – which, as described above, employs a 

property’s first assessed value after rehabilitation. The City 

Assessor was thus obligated to follow that methodology, even if

he believed that a different methodology using a hypothetical 

value based on backdating would better ensure that the amount 

of a partial exemption did not exceed “the increase in assessed 

value resulting from the rehabilitation.” Code § 58.1-3221(B).

The City also contends that, if the Chandler policy is not 

applied, and the initial rehabilitated assessed value is 

determined as of the date the rehabilitation was completed,

then the Taxpayers will receive a partial exemption that is 

greater than the increase in the Property’s assessed value 

resulting from the rehabilitation, in violation of Code § 58.1-

3221(B). That is so, it argues, because the partial exemption 

will include market appreciation.

While it is possible that determining a property’s initial 

rehabilitated assessed value as of the date the rehabilitation 

is completed might give an owner a partial exemption that is 

greater than the increase in assessed value resulting from the 
13

rehabilitation, there is no evidence of that in this case. 

Uncontroverted evidence established that the Property sold for 

$85 million one month before the City Assessor’s office 

conducted its final inspection. Instead of using the amount of 

that contemporaneous sale to determine the Property’s initial 

rehabilitated assessed value, the City Assessor’s office chose 

to apply the cost approach to valuation, determining the 

Property’s value in accordance with the cost of the 

rehabilitation — $63.8 million. The difference between the two 

amounts – almost $22 million – is, as argued by the Taxpayers, 

attributed to market appreciation. Thus, based on the evidence 

presented, the Property’s initial rehabilitated assessed value 

was limited to the cost of the rehabilitation and did not 

include market appreciation.

In sum, we hold that the circuit court did not err in 

holding that the Chandler policy was inconsistent with City 

Code § 27-83, because that ordinance requires that a property’s 

first assessed value after rehabilitation be used to determine 

the amount of a partial exemption. We further hold that the 

Taxpayers were not given a partial exemption that was greater 

than the increase in assessed value resulting from 
14

rehabilitation, because the first assessed value after 

rehabilitation did not include market appreciation.5

2. Admission of Expert Testimony

The City next claims that the circuit court erred in

admitting the testimony of Englander, the Taxpayers’ expert on 

real estate valuation and the application of the Program to 

mixed-use properties.

“The admission of expert testimony is committed to the 

sound discretion of the trial judge, and we will reverse a 

trial court’s decision only where that court has abused its 

discretion.” CNH America LLC v. Smith, 281 Va. 60, 66, 704 

S.E.2d 372, 375 (2011) (quoting Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. 

Smiley Block Co., 250 Va. 161, 166, 458 S.E.2d 462, 465 

(1995)). Hence, when reviewing a circuit court’s decision to 

admit expert testimony, we apply an abuse of discretion 

standard. Id.

Englander worked as a tax assessor in Texas for 4 years 

and as a licensed real estate appraiser in both Texas and 

Virginia for another 14 years. In 1995, he stopped working as 

an appraiser in order to become a real estate developer, and 

thus allowed his appraisal license to lapse.

 5 In light of these holdings, we need not address the 

Taxpayers’ assignment of cross-error regarding the City’s 

alleged failure to give notice of the Chandler policy before 

the Agreement was executed.
15

As a developer, Englander rehabilitated numerous 

commercial and residential properties in Richmond. In so 

doing, he became familiar with the Program, applying for and 

receiving a partial exemption for 7 or 8 of the properties he 

rehabilitated. He was also appointed to a committee “charged 

with making recommendations to City Council as to any changes 

that should be made to the program, if any, and whether to 

sunset the program altogether.” As a member of that committee, 

he heard presentations from several City departments, including 

the City Assessor’s office, which provided him and the other 

committee members with an overview “as to what the program was 

and how it was impacting the City.”

Englander testified that the City Assessor’s office had 

not applied the Chandler policy uniformly. He explained that 

with most of the properties he reviewed, the City Assessor’s 

office determined an initial rehabilitated assessed value that 

was within roughly 5 percent of the rehabilitation costs. But 

with the Property, he continued, it determined an initial 

rehabilitated assessed value that “originally was almost [a] 50 

percent different[ial]” and that “is now down to about 20 

percent.”

The City contends that the circuit court erred in 

admitting Englander’s testimony because it “was speculative, 

founded on assumptions that had no basis in fact, and/or failed 
16

to consider all the variables that bore upon the inferences to 

be deduced from the facts observed.” Moreover, the City 

argues, Englander was unqualified to offer an opinion on 

whether the City Assessor’s office had applied the Chandler 

policy uniformly because he was no longer a licensed appraiser

in Virginia, had no experience as an assessor in Virginia, and 

had not administered a tax abatement for rehabilitated real 

estate program in Virginia.

“Expert testimony,” we have said, “is admissible in civil 

cases to assist the trier of fact, if the testimony meets 

certain fundamental requirements, including the requirement 

that it be based on an adequate factual foundation.” 

Countryside Corp. v. Taylor, 263 Va. 549, 553, 561 S.E.2d 680,

682 (2002); see also Code §§ 8.01-401.1 and -401.3. Expert 

testimony is thus “inadmissible if it is speculative or founded 

on assumptions that have an insufficient factual basis.” John 

v. Im, 263 Va. 315, 320, 559 S.E.2d 694, 696 (2002). 

Additionally, “expert testimony is inadmissible if the expert 

fails to consider all the variables that bear upon the 

inferences to be deduced from the facts observed.” Vasquez v. 

Mabini, 269 Va. 155, 160, 606 S.E.2d 809, 811 (2005).

Assuming that the circuit court erred in admitting 

Englander’s testimony, we conclude that the error was harmless. 

Recently, in another erroneous assessment case, we held that,
17

“to the extent the circuit court erred in admitting [an 

expert’s] testimony into evidence, such error was harmless” 

because the testimony “could not have affected the result.” 

County of Albemarle v. Keswick Club, L.P., 280 Va. 381, 390, 

699 S.E.2d 491, 496 (2010).

So too here. As the City concedes, Englander’s testimony

was limited to whether the City Assessor’s office had applied 

the Chandler policy uniformly. But the circuit court did not 

address, much less decide, that issue in ruling in the

Taxpayers’ favor. Rather, as discussed earlier, the basis for 

the circuit court’s decision was that the Chandler policy was 

inconsistent with the requirements of Code § 58.1-3221 and City 

Code §§ 27-83, and that therefore the assessment on the 

Property was “otherwise invalid or illegal.” Code § 58.1-

3984(A). Thus, just as with the expert’s testimony in Keswick 

Club, Englander’s testimony “could not have affected the 

result.” 280 Va. at 390, 699 S.E.2d at 496. Accordingly, to 

the extent that the circuit court erred in admitting it, the

error was harmless.

3. Inclusion of the Property’s Retail

Space in the Final Order

Finally, the City contends that the circuit court erred in 

including the Property’s retail space (Parcel No. 1138) in the

final order because the Taxpayers allegedly failed to include 
18

that space in the Application. To support its argument, the 

City relies on our decision in Potts v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 

165 Va. 196, 181 S.E. 521 (1935), in which we said: “No court 

can base its decree upon facts not alleged, nor render its 

judgment upon a right, however meritorious, which has not been 

pleaded and claimed.” Id. at 207, 181 S.E. at 525.

What the City fails to mention, however, is that the

circuit court made a factual finding that the retail space was

at issue:

[COUNSEL]: Your honor, only thing I would say 

is that if you go back to [the Taxpayers’] Exhibit 

42, [the City Assessor’s] spreadsheet that 

memorialized the agreement [on values], there’s one 

parcel number there, 1014 . . . . That’s one of the 

two in our complaint. That’s for both spreadsheets, 

the office area and the retail area. The evidence is 

clear that it has always been the office area and the 

retail area that was part of the agreement and at 

issue in this case.

THE COURT: Well, I’m in agreement with that. I 

think it’s the office area and the retail area that’s 

indicated in the evidence and by the spreadsheet, and 

so that should be included in the order.”

(Emphasis added.)

Factual findings of a trial court are entitled to the same 

weight as a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless they 

are plainly wrong or without evidence to support them. Code 

§ 8.01-680; Transcontinental Ins. Co. v. RBMW, Inc., 262 Va. 

502, 510, 551 S.E.2d 313, 317 (2001). On the record before us, 

we cannot say that the circuit court’s factual finding that the 
19

retail space was at issue is plainly wrong or without evidence 

to support it. In addition to Exhibit 42, uncontroverted

testimony from Neil Kessler, a Troutman Sanders partner, 

established that the retail space was at issue and that it had 

been included in the parties’ agreement on post-rehabilitation 

values.

We therefore hold that the circuit court did not err in

including the retail space in the final order.

B. The Taxpayers’ Appeal

The Taxpayers assert that the circuit court erred in 

denying their claim for attorney’s fees under Section 9.5 of 

the Agreement. That section reads as follows:

If either the City or Developer brings suit or other 

legal proceedings or arbitration proceeding to 

enforce the provisions of this Agreement against the 

other, then the party prevailing in such suit or 

proceeding shall be reimbursed by the other for all 

reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation and/or 

arbitration costs and expenses incurred by the 

prevailing party in connection with such suit or 

proceeding.

The Taxpayers argue that they are entitled to an award of 

attorney’s fees under this section because they were the 

prevailing party in a “suit or other legal proceeding” to 

enforce the provisions of the Agreement — in particular, the 

provisions in which the City warranted that they would receive 

“the full benefit” of the Program.
20

We disagree. No doubt the Taxpayers make reference to the 

Agreement in the Application. But that does not mean that they 

brought this case under the Agreement. Indeed, in the very 

first paragraph of the Application, they say otherwise:

“Pursuant to Va. Code § 58.1-3984, [the Taxpayers] apply to 

this Court for relief from the erroneous assessments of taxes 

by . . . the City.” What is more, in another paragraph of the

Application – which appears under the heading “Applicable 

Relief” – they say:

This Court, pursuant to Virginia Code § 58.1-

3984, is empowered to correct the City’s erroneous 

assessments and to order a refund of the excess taxes 

paid by [the Taxpayers] as a result of such erroneous 

assessments. In addition, the Court, upon finding an 

overpayment of taxes in an action brought pursuant to 

Virginia Code § 58.1-3984, shall award interest on 

such overpayments, pursuant to Virginia Code § 58.1-

3916, at the same rate of interest charged by the 

City on delinquent taxes.

It is not until the second-to-last line of the final paragraph 

of the Application that they make any mention of their claim 

for attorney’s fees. And even there, they do not invoke

Section 9.5 of the Agreement.

Simply put, this case was not brought and litigated as a 

breach of contract case but as an erroneous assessment case

under Code § 58.1-3984. And it was so treated by the circuit 

court. In fact, there is no mention of the Agreement in either 

the letter opinion or the final order.
21

Accordingly, the Taxpayers are not entitled to an award of 

attorney’s fees unless Code § 58.1-3984 so provides. See

Nusbaum v. Berlin, 273 Va. 385, 400, 641 S.E.2d 494, 501 (2007) 

(“[O]rdinarily, attorneys’ fees are not recoverable by a 

prevailing litigant in the absence of a specific contractual or 

statutory provision to the contrary.” (quoting Lannon v. Lee 

Conner Realty Corp., 238 Va. 590, 594, 385 S.E.2d 380, 383 

(1989))). Because it does not, we hold that the circuit court 

did not err in denying the Taxpayers’ claim for attorney’s 

fees.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 

the circuit court.

Affirmed.