SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2039-14T3

A-5032-14T3

A-5033-14T3

A-5034-14T3

MICHELE KRIEGMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TARA SAE-CHIN,

Defendant-Respondent.

________________________________________________________________

Submitted September 27, 2016 – Decided

Before Judges Espinosa and Suter.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, 

Docket No. FM-14-136-97.

Michele Kriegman, appellant pro se.

Respondent Tara Sae-Chin has not filed a 

brief.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff filed appeals from four post-judgment child support 

orders, dated October 15, 2014; January 23, 2015; March 23, 2015; 

and May 21, 2015. We have consolidated the appeals from the three 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is only binding on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

August 16, 2017
2 A-2039-14T3

orders entered in 2015 and consolidate plaintiff's appeal from the 

October 2014 order for the purpose of writing a single opinion. 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in 

part, and conclude plaintiff's appeal from the May 2015 order is 

moot.

I.

The parties have engaged in robust and extensive litigation 

since their divorce in 1998. They entered into a property 

settlement agreement (PSA) that governed their support obligations 

for their three children and custody. Originally plaintiff had 

sole legal and residential custody of all three children, Abigail, 

Elanya and Derek.

The PSA provides, in relevant part, that a child is deemed 

emancipated upon:

[t]he child reaching the age of twenty-two 

years or the completion of four continuous 

academic years of college education, whichever 

last occurs provided that the child takes no 

more than one year from graduation from high 

school prior to entry into college . . . .

Abigail graduated from college in May 2009. Elanya graduated 

from college in May 2013 and Derek was scheduled to graduate from 

college in May 2015.

There were several orders entered by the trial court, 

including a consent order, the validity of which are not in 
3 A-2039-14T3

dispute, that modify the parties' child support obligations under 

the PSA.

The March 2005 consent order designated defendant as having 

residential custody of Abigail and reduced his child support 

obligation. Plaintiff retained residential custody of Elanya and 

Derek. The order also directed the appointment of a certified 

public account (CPA) and identified the reason for his appointment 

and the scope of his assignment:

The parties have been unable to agree upon the 

arrears owed to one another, if any, relative 

to the unreimbursed medical expenses, with 

claims for the children, through December 31, 

2004. The parties appoint Barry Pierce, 

C.P.A. as a jointly appointed arbitrator to 

determine what amount, if any, unreimbursed 

medical expenses are owed to one another.

Based upon their 2005 income, Pierce determined the 

appropriate allocation for expenses to be: plaintiff 18%/defendant 

82%. Pursuant to the final judgment of divorce, this percentage 

was used to divide the cost of summer camp in 2006.

An October 2006 order established defendant's child support 

obligation while Abigail was away from home, and defined certain 

terms in the PSA. 

Among other things, the January 18, 2013 order (1) emancipated 

Abigail and terminated child support for her by consent of the 

parties, (2) ordered the parties to set up an escrow account to 
4 A-2039-14T3

fund college expenses as a percentage of their combined income at 

an amount/percentage to be determined, and (3) awarded plaintiff 

$2,451 for medical expenses and $2,472.30 for summer camp expenses 

to be paid by defendant.

On April 11, 2014, the court entered an order declaring Elanya 

emancipated by consent of the parties as of June 1, 2013. 

Defendant's child support payments were reduced. Furthermore, the 

order reflected the court's determination that the parties were 

to split Derek's college expenses, with plaintiff paying thirtyfive percent (35%) and defendant paying sixty-five percent (65%). 

Plaintiff was ordered to pay $500 and defendant to pay $927 of the 

then outstanding balance of Derek's tuition.

Thereafter, the trial court ordered a plenary hearing to 

resolve "a multitude of factual disputes" concerning child-related 

expenses. The first of the orders challenged on appeal constituted 

the trial judge's decision on the claims litigated in the plenary 

hearing. The remaining orders appealed from followed. 

II.

In reviewing orders regarding child support and related 

matters, we "examine whether, given the facts, the trial judge 

abused his or her discretion." Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super.

109, 116 (App. Div. 2012). Trial courts have "substantial 

discretion" in making such determinations. Foust v. Glaser, 340 
5 A-2039-14T3

N.J. Super. 312, 315 (App. Div. 2001). This is particularly true 

in the adjudication of matrimonial matters, where the evidence is 

primarily testimonial, "because the trial judge has 'a feel of the 

case' and is in the best position to 'make first-hand credibility 

judgments about the witnesses who appear on the stand.'" Elrom 

v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 433 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). 

Therefore, when this court "concludes there is satisfactory 

evidentiary support for the trial court's findings, its task is 

complete and it should not disturb the result." Ibid. (quoting 

Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 (1981) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

However, reversal is appropriate when "the trial court's 

factual findings are 'so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent 

with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as 

to offend the interests of justice . . . .'" Ibid. (quoting Rova 

Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 

(1974)). In other words, a trial court will have abused its 

discretion "when a decision is made without a rational explanation, 

inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an 

impermissible basis." Jacoby, supra, 427 N.J. Super. at 116 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
6 A-2039-14T3

While deference is accorded to the trial court as to factfinding, its "legal conclusions, and the application of those 

conclusions to the facts, are subject to our plenary review." 

Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013) (citing 

Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 

378 (1995)). As always, questions of law are reviewed de novo. 

Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Kafil, 395 N.J. Super. 597, 601 (App.

Div. 2007).

Finally, Rule 1:7-4 requires judges trying issues without a 

jury to include the findings of facts and conclusions of law in 

each determination they make. Compliance with Rule 1:7-4 is 

crucial because "[m]eaningful appellate review is inhibited unless 

the judge sets forth the reasons for his or her opinion." Salch 

v. Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441, 443 (App. Div. 1990).

This court has firmly established that "[n]aked conclusions 

are insufficient" and judges "must fully and specifically 

articulate findings of fact and conclusions of law." Heinl v. 

Heinl, 287 N.J. Super. 337, 347 (App. Div. 1996) (citing R. 1:7-

4). In short, a failure to comply with Rule 1:7-4 ordinarily 

results in remand. See Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 

310 (App. Div. 2008) (reversing and remanding a trial judge's 

child support award because it "failed to make the specific 
7 A-2039-14T3

findings of fact necessary to sustain its decision regarding the 

amount" contained in the award). 

We turn to review the challenged orders and the trial court's 

reasoning as to each.

III.

The opinion accompanying the October 15, 2014 order states 

the court awarded plaintiff $23,441.79 on their children's tuition 

and college expenses, Abigail's travel expenses, Derek's bar 

mitzvah expenses, and prior awards entered by the court. Plaintiff 

was ordered to pay Villanova, Derek's university, $6,277.95 for 

his tuition and late fees. Plaintiff's claims for withheld child 

support payments resulting from an incorrect calculation of 

Abigail's emancipation date and defendant's overnight parenting 

time were denied. The trial judge also denied some of plaintiff's 

claims for tuition, college expenses and all of her claims for 

other non-college/non-child support expenses. Defendant was 

awarded $36,958.24 for the overpayment of Elanya's child support 

and Derek's college tuition. After offsetting the award of 

$23,441.79 to plaintiff against an award of $36,958.24 to 

defendant, the trial judge's calculation resulted in an order that 

provide in pertinent part:

1. The Plaintiff shall reimburse the 

Defendant the sum of $13,516.45 within fortyfive (45) days.
8 A-2039-14T3

2. The Plaintiff shall take immediate steps 

to pay the balance of Derek's college tuition 

for Villanova of $6,277.95 plus any late fees 

($150).

Plaintiff challenges the trial judge's failure to 

retroactively emancipate Abigail and recalculate support 

obligations accordingly and argues his factual determinations 

regarding tuition, college and other expenses lack support in the 

record. She further contends the trial judge: used the wrong 

percentages to calculate defendant's obligation for Derek's bar 

mitzvah, omitted an award to her of expenses defendant agreed to 

pay, failed to apply a "reasonableness standard" in determining 

whether defendant should pay for certain expenses and erred in 

failing to credit her for defendant's unused overnight visitation.1 

We address each of these arguments in turn. 

Abigail's emancipation

Plaintiff argues the trial judge used an inconsistent 

methodology to determine the emancipation dates for Abigail and 

Elanya, resulting in an unfair advantage to defendant. She asserts 

that Abigail graduated from college before June 1, 2009 and that 

 

1 Plaintiff made other claims, that are not in dispute on appeal, 

of (1) $3,413.59 for Elanya and Derek's automobile expenses; (2) 

$10,000 tax credit plaintiff claimed defendant improperly received 

for claiming Elanya as a dependent; (3) $2,084.58 for Abigail's 

post-graduate courses; (4) $4,923.30 previously ordered by the 

court; and (5) $25,000 for counsel fees reimbursements. 
9 A-2039-14T3

"due to an oversight, she was not declared emancipated until" an 

order dated January 18, 2013. An order had been entered in April 

2014 that declared Elanya emancipated, retroactively, as of June 

1, 2013 and directed that child support be recalculated 

accordingly.2 

Plaintiff asserts she asked for a corresponding retroactive 

declaration of Abigail's emancipation and recalculation of child 

support credits. She also contends that defendant received a 

credit for Abigail for 185 weeks after her "de facto emancipation," 

and that this "resulted in improperly reduced child support" to 

plaintiff for the two younger children. She does not, however, 

provide citations to the record to support her statement that she 

made such a request or her conclusion that her child support was 

"improperly reduced" as a result.

The trial judge considered plaintiff's request as both a 

claim for "back child support for Abigail" and a claim for 

reimbursement or credit for the child support defendant did not 

have to pay for Abigail. The trial judge observed that plaintiff 

did not "truly have an affirmative claim for payment of child 

support. Her claim is that Defendant benefited financially by not 

having to pay child support for Abigail although Plaintiff did not 

 

2 Plaintiff states she consented to the retroactive emancipation 

and recalculation.
10 A-2039-14T3

pay child support either." He concluded plaintiff's claim had 

been waived because Abigail was declared emancipated by consent 

in January 2013.

Whether plaintiff has stated a claim for the payment of child 

support or waived such a claim are questions of law, subject to 

de novo review. See Reese, supra, 430 N.J. Super. at 568 (citing 

Dep't of Envtl. Prot., supra, 395 N.J. Super. at 601). Although 

we do not condone plaintiff's belated assertion of her claim, 

which resulted in unnecessary piecemeal litigation, we do not 

conclude her delay foreclosed consideration of her claim. 

Plaintiff provides the following rationale for her claim that 

she is entitled to $49,500 from defendant. When Abigail went to 

live with defendant, the March 2005 order lowered defendant's 

child support obligation by $315 per week. When Abigail went away 

to college, child support was modified, reducing the amount 

defendant was credited for his support of Abigail by $45 per week. 

As a result, she contends she was entitled to recover the $270 

weekly offset to defendant's support obligation for the 185 weeks 

from Abigail's graduation until the January 2013 order. 

The premise for plaintiff's argument is that defendant's 

child support payment to her would have automatically reverted to 

his child support obligation prior to March 2005. This overly 

simplistic premise is flawed. In essence, plaintiff requested a 
11 A-2039-14T3

change in child support based on the change in circumstances caused 

by Abigail's emancipation. Yet, her request is unsupported by the 

documentation required to obtain such relief. See R. 5:5-4(a). 

Her premise also ignores the fact that in the intervening years 

there were other changes in the parties' circumstances, including 

the younger children's attendance at college, that would have an 

impact on support obligations. In short, the record does not 

support plaintiff's contention that she was entitled to an 

automatic retroactive increase of the claimed amount based upon 

Abigail's belated emancipation. 

Nonetheless, because the trial judge dismissed plaintiff's 

claim on waiver grounds, the record fails to show that he 

considered the economic consequences of Abigail's retroactive 

emancipation for the parties' obligations and credits. Therefore, 

a remand is necessary for the trial judge to determine what 

credits, if any, are due plaintiff based upon the retroactive 

emancipation of Abigail.

Tuition and College expenses for Derek and Elanya

Plaintiff argues the trial judge erred in his determination 

of the parties' obligations and credits for payments made for 

tuition and college-related expenses for Derek and Elanya. She 

contends the judge's determinations lack support in the record, 

that the judge erred in calculating the award and overlooked 
12 A-2039-14T3

relevant evidence regarding her payment of expenses for Elanya and 

Derek. The trial judge's failure to provide an adequate factual 

basis and explanation for his determinations as well as 

irreconcilable discrepancies in his characterizations of the sums 

at issue, preclude a meaningful analysis of plaintiff's arguments. 

As a preliminary matter, we note the following discrepancies 

in the amounts the trial judge attributed to plaintiff's claims 

in his initial breakdown and his later listing of plaintiff's 

claims for reimbursements, and, for convenience, list the 

disposition of those claims.

Breakdown "Claims" Award

Elanya

$7,071.36 tuition $11,176.21 $7.071.36

$13,598.83 non-tuition $11,561.98 $3,800.15

college expenses

$2,976.30 non-college $ 3,083.32 Denied

expenses

Derek

$1,361.10 non-tuition $ 2,548.65 $1,1153

college expenses

$3,167.68 non-college $ 2,981.89 Denied

expenses

 

3 We infer this amount was credited to plaintiff because the 

statement of reasons says, "Defendant accepts liability for $1,115 

sought for Derek's college related expenses."
13 A-2039-14T3

 The disparity between the two iterations of plaintiff's 

claims is neither explained nor resolved in the judge's statement 

of reasons. The following constitutes the portion of the trial 

judge's October 2014 opinion that addresses the parties' awards 

and obligations for their children's college expenses: 

Defendant accepts liability for $1,115 sought 

for Derek's college related expenses. . . .

Plaintiff has established tuition payments for 

Elanya entitling her to reimbursement of 

$7,071.36. (P-2a). Plaintiff has established 

college expenses for Elanya entitled her to 

reimbursement of $3,800.15. (P-11). . . .

Defendant has established that he has 

paid his portion of Derek's tuition as 

required of $17,016.38. Most recently 

Defendant paid $11,659.05 towards Derek's 

$17,937 tuition bill and the Plaintiff has 

failed to pay. Plaintiff shall make immediate 

payment of $6,277.95 plus any late fees ($150) 

to Villanova to protect Derek's right to 

uninterrupted education. Defendant has also 

established payment of $77,000 towards 

Abigail's tuition. (D-2). Plaintiff 

therefore owes him $26,950.

As is evident from this excerpt, the trial judge provided no 

reasoning as to how he determined the amounts owed on each claim. 

Because his citations to trial exhibits (i.e., "P-2a" and "D-2") 

lack any description of their contents, it is not possible to 

determine what support, if any, exists in the record for his 

conclusions. For example, the trial judge acknowledged that 

plaintiff sought a $11,561.98 reimbursement for Elanya's college 
14 A-2039-14T3

expenses. He awarded her approximately one-third of that amount, 

but provides no explanation as to why the award was reduced so 

drastically. The sweeping statement, "Plaintiff has failed to 

prove by a preponderance the balance of her claims," fails to 

satisfy the requirement of Rule 1:7-4. See, e.g., Strahan, supra, 

402 N.J. Super. at 310. 

Plaintiff argues the trial judge omitted or overlooked 

exhibits that documented tuition expenses for Elanya. She asserts

she supported her claim regarding Elanya's college expenses with 

$12,165.47 in documented expenses and that the trial judge 

overlooked two exhibits in awarding only $3,800.15. Plaintiff 

argues the exhibit cited by the judge was only one of three 

exhibits that documented her payment of college expenses for 

Elanya. Because the trial judge provided no explanation for how 

he arrived at the amount awarded or why the other sums plaintiff 

asserts were documented were excluded, we cannot determine whether 

her argument has merit.

Plaintiff also argues the trial judge overlooked exhibits 

relating to her claim for Derek's college-related expenses. She 

contends she submitted a claim, supported by documented expenses, 

for $3,178.52. Although the judge initially listed this claim as 

$3,167.68, her claim for reimbursement is later listed as 

"$2,548.65." The only reference in the statement of reasons to 
15 A-2039-14T3

the trial judge's disposition of this claim is: "Defendant accepts 

liability for $1,115 sought for Derek's college related expenses." 

Again, this is insufficient to permit appellate review.

The trial judge denied what he termed "non-college expenses" 

for both Elanya and Derek, followed by the statement, "Plaintiff 

should have sought and obtained the consent of the Defendant as 

per the PSA and the 2005 Consent Order." The trial judge was 

required to make findings of fact regarding which of plaintiff's 

expenditures were appropriately considered "college costs and 

expenses," and, thus, subject to reimbursement by defendant.4 The 

October 2006 order defined the term "college costs and expenses" 

in the PSA as "tuition, room and board or rent if living off 

campus, books, school fees, travel to and from school for up to 

four times per year." However, the trial judge merely stated a 

series of dollar amounts without making the necessary preliminary 

factual determinations of whether plaintiff's expenses fell inside 

or outside the definition of "college costs and expenses." As a 

result, we cannot determine whether he correctly excluded "noncollege expenses" for Elanya and Derek.

 

4 We note that plaintiff has not appealed the court's denial of 

her claim for automobile expenses for Elanya and Derek totaling 

$3,413.59.
16 A-2039-14T3

The trial judge also failed to explain how he apportioned the 

college expense obligations between the parties. This issue is 

also governed by the PSA, which states the parties shall "share 

the expense of each child's college education in proportion to 

their respective financial circumstances at the time such children 

are in college." The term "financial circumstances" is defined 

in the October 2006 order as "income, assets, expenses, and the 

overall ability of each party to pay." Although crucial to 

properly allocating the parties' obligations, the trial judge made 

no factual determinations as to the parties' financial 

circumstances at the time Elanya or Abigail were in college.

There was an order in place that determined the parties' 

obligations for Derek's tuition. As noted, the October 15, 2014 

order required plaintiff to pay $6,277.95 in tuition plus late 

fees for Derek's tuition. The reasoning provided for this order 

is:

Defendant has established that he has paid his 

portion of Derek's tuition as required of 

$17,016.38. Most recently Defendant paid 

$11,659.05 towards Derek's $17,937 tuition 

bill and the Plaintiff has failed to pay.

Although the April 2014 order established the percentages of 

each party's responsibility, this reasoning is inadequate to 

explain what proofs the judge relied upon to determine these 

obligations.
17 A-2039-14T3

Such "naked conclusions" do not satisfy the Rule 1:7-4 

requirement and are "a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys, 

and the appellate court." Heinl, supra, 287 N.J. Super. at 347 

(quoting Kenwood Assocs. v. Bd. of Adj. Englewood, 141 N.J. Super.

1, 4 (App. Div. 1976)); see also Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 

570 (1980). As a result of the failure to provide such 

explanations, we are unable to determine the merit of plaintiff's 

arguments. Therefore, the trial judge's determinations of credits 

due and unmet obligations of the parties for Derek's and Elanya's 

tuition and college expenses must be remanded for reconsideration 

to enable the court to make the necessary findings of fact and 

conclusions of law required by Rule 1:7-4. See Strahan, supra, 

402 N.J. Super. at 310; Barnett & Herenchak, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't 

of Transp., 276 N.J. Super. 465, 471 (App. Div. 1994).

Abigail's tuition

The trial judge's calculation that defendant was due an award 

of $36,958.24 included his consideration of defendant's claim for 

contribution toward Abigail's tuition. He stated,

Defendant has also established payment of 

$77,000 towards Abigail's tuition (D-2). 

Plaintiff therefore owes him $26,950.

Plaintiff argues the trial judge erred in determining she 

owed money for Abigail's college tuition. She contends that her 

father paid 100% of her obligation for Abigail's tuition. In the 
18 A-2039-14T3

alternative, she states the percentage of the cost allocated to 

her should be 18%, the percentage determined by the CPA in 2006. 

To support her assertion that her tuition obligation was 

fully satisfied, plaintiff cites exhibits that reflect her 

father's voluntary assumption of her obligation for college 

expenses and statement in August 2009 that he and defendant had 

paid all of Abigail's college expenses. These exhibits relate to 

her father's promises to her but fail to support her contention 

the trial judge ignored proofs that established she had fulfilled 

her obligation for Abigail's college expenses. 

The trial judge's determination of plaintiff's obligation 

suffers, however, from failures to identify the factual basis for 

the award, what percentage of the expense was allocated to 

plaintiff and the basis for allocating that percentage. Abigail 

graduated in 2009, five years before the April 11, 2014 order 

allocated responsibility for Derek's college expenses at 35% to 

plaintiff and 65% to defendant. The trial judge did not explain 

why this percentage was appropriate when, in 2006, the CPA 

determined plaintiff should only be required to shoulder an 18% 

obligation based on 2005 income.

Derek's bar mitzvah

Plaintiff further argues the trial judge made a mathematical 

error in calculating defendant's obligation for Derek's bar 
19 A-2039-14T3

mitzvah by using the 65%/35% split based upon the percentages used 

in an April 11, 2014 order to allocate expenses for Derek's college 

expenses. The exhibits reflect that the bar mitzvah occurred in 

2005. Plaintiff contends the judge should have employed an 82%/18% 

allocation, using the percentages determined by the CPA based on 

the parties' 2005 income, resulting in an award of $5,361.57, a 

sum $1,111.57 more than the amount in the judgment.

Plaintiff is correct that the court-appointed CPA determined 

that the percentage of income for 2005 was eighty-two percent 

(82%) for defendant and eighteen percent (18%) for plaintiff. 

However, this apportionment was made specifically for the purpose 

of allocating responsibility for unreimbursed medical expenses as 

instructed in the March 2005 consent order and was also used for 

the division of camp costs. It was not made for the purpose of 

allocating the cost of Derek's bar mitzvah. Therefore, it is not 

conclusive, as plaintiff suggests, that the correct apportionment 

should have been an eighteen/eight-two percent (18%/82%) split. 

However, it is a fair benchmark for the allocation of 

responsibility for an expense incurred in 2005.

Although the judge did not explain why or how he determined 

that plaintiff was entitled to a sixty-five percent (65%) 

reimbursement from defendant, it appears he employed the 

allocation set forth in the April 2014 order for Derek's college 
20 A-2039-14T3

expenses. That allocation differs sharply from the determination 

by the court-appointed CPA as to the parties' respective incomes 

in 2005, the time when the bar mitzvah expenses were incurred. It 

was incumbent upon the judge to explain why it was appropriate to 

use a formula – devised for an entirely different purpose nine 

years later – that doubled plaintiff's responsibility. Again, his 

failure to support his determination with adequate findings of 

facts or conclusions of law is counter to Rule 1:7-4, and this 

court is "left to conjecture as to what the judge may have had in 

mind." Salch, supra, 240 N.J. Super. at 443.

We therefore conclude the trial judge's determinations 

regarding the parties' obligations for Derek's bar mitzvah 

expenses must be reversed and the issue remanded for 

reconsideration to enable the court to make the necessary findings 

of facts or conclusions of law as required by Rule 1:7-4. Strahan,

supra, 402 N.J. Super. at 310; Barnett & Herenchak, Inc., supra,

276 N.J. Super. at 471.

Obligations defendant agreed to pay 

Plaintiff next argues the trial judge failed to allocate a 

share of certain expenses to defendant that he agreed to assume 

during the trial, i.e., "the software [Derek] had to buy for his 

school," "AP exams," and expenses for the "Scholastic Aptitude 

Test."
21 A-2039-14T3

In his statement of reasons, the trial judge noted defendant 

"accepts liability for $1,115 sought for Derek's college related 

expenses. (P-10)" and then states "[n]on-college/non-child 

support related expenses are denied for both Elanya and Derek." 

Because there is no description of P-10 or other breakdown of the 

expenses that were included in the award or disallowed, it is 

impossible to discern whether the specific expenses that defendant 

agreed to contribute to are included in the award.

Denial of claims to which defendant did not consent

Paragraph 15 of an order dated March 28, 2005, states:

The parties agree to consult with one 

another in advance on all issues related to 

the health, welfare and education of the 

children, including extracurricular 

activities and extraordinary expenses. 

Neither party may incur any such extraordinary 

expenses without the other's prior written 

consent (via e-mail). Neither party shall 

unreasonably withhold their consent. In the 

event the parties cannot agree as to a 

particular issue or activity, the parties 

shall submit same to the therapeutic mediator.

Plaintiff contends the trial judge failed to apply this 

reasonableness standard to certain documented expenses and that, 

based upon an entirely different order (August 20, 2001) and topic 

(camp), she had the ultimate decision-making power. She contends 

the trial judge gave defendant "veto" power over whether he should 

contribute to "$9,730.87 for non-college/non-child support 
22 A-2039-14T3

expenses for the two younger children." Plaintiff concedes that 

mediation was not sought to resolve any dispute regarding these 

expenses. We recognize that plaintiff is self-represented and 

have attempted to decipher her argument. However, we are unable 

to discern exactly what expenses plaintiff claims defendant 

unreasonably withheld his consent to. As a result, she has failed 

to show that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying her 

the extent of the credit she claims she was entitled to receive.

Credit for overnight visitation not exercised

Plaintiff argues the trial judge failed to address the "issue 

of adjusting 36% credit to Defendant for overnights for Elanya and 

Derek." The trial judge's opinion states plaintiff "testified 

that she was entitled to $16,737.60 because the Defendant received 

credits against his child support obligation for overnights that 

he did not exercise." Plaintiff argues the trial judge 

misinterpreted her claim, thinking it related to Abigail when, in 

fact, it related to the two younger children. 

There is, however, no further discussion of this specific 

claim in the statement of reasons. Although the trial judge 

included the sentence, "[i]t is important to note that the 

Plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance the balance of 

her claims," that appears after a discussion of specific claims 

for reimbursements. We cannot discern whether the trial judge 
23 A-2039-14T3

decided a claim he acknowledged plaintiff had made or what reasons 

existed for a decision.

Plaintiff argues she is entitled to the credit defendant 

received toward his child support obligation for Elanya and Derek 

for unexercised overnight parenting time. Plaintiff points to the 

Child Support Guidelines Shared Payment Worksheet produced in 

March 2005 (Guidelines Worksheet), which reflects that defendant's 

child support obligation was calculated based on the fact defendant 

would have Elanya and Derek overnight roughly thirty-six percent 

(36%) of the year. Plaintiff claims defendant "ceased all 

overnights in February 2013." According to plaintiff, because the 

parenting time actually exercised by defendant was not reflected 

in calculating his child support obligation between February 1, 

2013 and June 1, 2015 (the date plaintiff claims Derek became 

emancipated), she is entitled to $8,218.40 to reimburse her for 

the credit defendant received during that time.

The trial judge denied plaintiff's claim for child support 

resulting from unexercised parenting time on the basis that she 

waived her claim because she did not raise it "well before the 

trial." As discussed above, a parent cannot waive a claim to 

child support, even due to the parent's own "negligence, purposeful 

delay or obstinacy." L.V. v. R.S., 347 N.J. Super. 33, 40 (App. 

Div. 2002); see also Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. Super. 405, 421
24 A-2039-14T3

(App. Div. 2010). Therefore, as a matter of law, the trial judge's 

determination that plaintiff waived her claim is unfounded.

Where there is a fair and equitable divorce settlement 

agreement between the parties that governs the allocation of child 

support obligations, courts are required to enforce such 

agreements in adjudicating child support disputes between the 

parties. See O.P. v. L.G.-P., 440 N.J. Super. 146, 156 (App. Div. 

2015); see also Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 194 (1999).

According to the PSA, when plaintiff had legal and physical 

custody of all three children, defendant's child support 

obligation was $750 per week. However, nothing in the PSA or in 

any post-judgment order reflects an agreement to modify child 

support obligations based upon unexercised parenting time. 

In the absence of any agreement between the parties to modify 

their child support obligations in the event either parent ceased 

overnight parenting time with their children, plaintiff lacks 

legal support for her claim. Therefore, we affirm the denial of 

this claim, despite the erroneous ground that was the basis of the 

trial judge's decision. See Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 

N.J. 191, 199 (2001) ("[A]ppeals are taken from orders and 

judgments and not from opinions, oral decisions, informal written 

decisions, or reasons given for the ultimate conclusion.").
25 A-2039-14T3

IV.

As a result of the consolidation of her appeals, plaintiff 

filed a single brief that incorporated her arguments regarding the 

orders entered in January, March and May 2015, which we now 

address.

Plaintiff filed a motion for a stay of the judgment entered 

October 15, 2014 pending appeal. Defendant filed a cross-motion 

for enforcement of the October 2014 order, asking the court to 

compel plaintiff to reimburse him $13,516.45, to compel plaintiff 

to pay Derek's fall tuition and late fees ($6,277.95 + $150) and 

his spring tuition, and to order probation to suspend his wage 

garnishment to offset the credits due him.5

The trial judge denied plaintiff's motion and granted 

defendant's motion by order entered on January 23, 2015, which 

stated in pertinent part: 

The Defendant's cross motion for enforcement 

of the provisions of the October 15, 2014 

order is granted. The probation department 

is directed to halt the wage garnishment 

against the Defendant until such time as the 

sum of $19,944.40 is recouped. In the event 

Plaintiff makes direct payment to the 

Defendant, Defendant shall as [sic] advise 

probation and cooperate in the processing of 

the probation account.

 

5 Defendant's cross-motion is not included in the record provided 

to us. We rely upon the trial judge's description of the relief 

sought included in his written statement of reasons. 
26 A-2039-14T3

The judge entered a Uniform Summary Support Order (USSO) that 

directed the deduction of $205 per week "from support sums paid 

by the defendant on behalf of Derek of $19,944.40." The USSO also 

directed, "Order of Support is hereby TERMINATED effective 

10/14/2014 as TO DEREK." Based upon the judge's description of 

the relief sought by defendant, this was not requested. There is 

no explanation provided in the written statement of reasons or on 

the USSO for the termination of child support.

The trial judge entered another order, dated March 25, 2015, 

which amended the January 2015 order, stating:

This Order will amend the Order dated 

1/23/2015. Derek will be emancipated 

effective 10/14/2014 and the Child Support 

obligation is terminated. There is an 

additional overpayment of $4627.14 as a result 

of this emancipation . . . . Probation is to 

close its case.

Again, there is no statement of reasons given for the 

termination of child support for Derek or the "additional 

overpayment of $4627.14."

Plaintiff argues the trial judge erred in retroactively 

emancipating Derek, effective October 14, 2014, and awarding 

defendant $4,627.14 for overpaid child support. She points out 

that, according to the PSA, Derek should have been considered 

emancipated as of May 16, 2015, his expected date of graduation. 

Thus, plaintiff argues "the amount of $4,627.14 should not be 
27 A-2039-14T3

taken from Plaintiff or if already taken relief in this amount is 

sought."

As defined in the PSA, emancipation could occur upon the 

later of the child turning twenty-two or completing "four 

continuous academic years of college education . . . provided that 

the child takes no more than one year from graduation from high 

school prior to entry into college." The record fails to show 

that defendant ever sought to have Derek declared emancipated or 

that emancipation was appropriate based on any circumstances in 

the case. To the contrary, it appears that Derek was scheduled 

to complete his college education in the spring of 2015. 

Therefore, pursuant to the terms of the PSA, he would not be 

emancipated as of October 2014.

Thus, the trial judge's determinations, emancipating Derek 

and terminating child support, not only lack any reasonable 

explanation, they are at odds with the relevant term of the PSA. 

The orders emancipating Derek as of October 14, 2014 and 

terminating child support are reversed.

V.

The final order that is the subject of this appeal, dated May 

21, 2015, was entered by a different judge on defendant's motion 
28 A-2039-14T3

to enforce litigant's rights and plaintiff's cross-motion for a 

stay of judgment pending appeal.6

The order stated, in pertinent part:

1. Plaintiff's request for a stay of the 

October 15, 2014 [order] is DENIED without 

prejudice;

2. Defendant's request for the issuance of 

an arrest warrant is DENIED without prejudice;

3. The Court shall modify the Court Order 

of October 15, 2014 to allow Plaintiff to pay 

the sum of $13,516.45 within six months of 

this Order. If Plaintiff fails to comply with 

the Court's Order, she may be subject to 

economic sanctions;

4. Any other request not mentioned above is 

DENIED without prejudice. 

In light of our disposition of plaintiff's appeals from the 

preceding orders, her appeal from the provisions of this order 

that affect her is now moot.

In sum, we affirm the trial court's decisions: to deny 

plaintiff credit for parenting time not exercised by defendant and 

to deny plaintiff's claim based on expenses for which she asserted 

defendant had unreasonably withheld his consent. We reverse the 

trial court's orders emancipating Derek as of October 2014 and 

terminating child support. As to the following issues, we reverse 

 

6 Plaintiff also asked the court to require defendant to reimburse 

Derek the sum of $12,670.90 for the fall 2014 and spring 2015 

college tuition fees.
29 A-2039-14T3

and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion 

and for the judge to comply with Rule 1:7-4 as to each 

determination:

1. the amount of credits, if any, due to plaintiff as a 

result of Abigail's retroactive emancipation;

2. the amount of credits due and unmet obligations of the 

parties for Derek's and Elanya's tuition and college 

expenses;

3. the parties' respective obligations for Abigail's 

tuition, including an identification of the factual 

basis for the award, what percentage of the expense was 

allocated to plaintiff and the basis for allocating that 

percentage; 

4. the determination of the appropriate allocation of 

obligations for Derek's bar mitzvah expenses;

5. the determination of obligations defendant agreed to 

pay.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part. The appeal of the May 

2015 order is moot. We do not retain jurisdiction.