alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-22-00325-CV

J. G., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

FROM THE 274TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY

NO. C2021-0046C, THE HONORABLE DEBORAH WIGINGTON, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

J.G. (Father) appeals from the trial court’s final order in suit affecting the parentchild relationship and order of termination following a bench trial.1 See Tex. Fam. Code 

§ 161.001. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds for 

terminating his parental rights existed and that termination was in his child R.G.’s best interest. 

See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (P), (2).

On appeal, Father’s court-appointed attorney has filed a brief concluding that his

appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); 

Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646–47 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2005, pet. denied) (applying Anders procedure in appeal from termination of parental 

1 We refer to appellant by his initials or as Father and his child by the child’s initials. 

See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8. The parental rights of the child’s mother 

also were terminated in the final order, but she has not appealed.
2

rights). The brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of 

the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See

386 U.S. at 744; Taylor, 160 S.W.3d at 646–47. Father’s attorney has certified to this Court that 

he provided a copy of the Anders briefs to Father and informed his of his right to examine the 

appellate record and to file a pro se brief. To date, Father has not filed a pro se brief.

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of the 

proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 

80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record, including the Anders brief submitted on Father’s

behalf, and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. Our review included the 

trial court’s endangerment findings, see Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and we have 

found no issues that could be raised on appeal with respect to those findings, see In re N.G., 

577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019). We agree that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s final order.

2

__________________________________________

Melissa Goodwin, Justice

Before Justices Goodwin, Baker, and Kelly

Affirmed

Filed: August 31, 2022

2 We deny Father’s counsel’s motion to withdraw as attorney of record. See In re P.M., 

520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). If Father, after consulting with counsel, desires to 

file a petition for review, his counsel should timely file with the Texas Supreme Court “a petition 

for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See id. at 27–28.
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 127 (Monday, July 1, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Page 33956]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-16735]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------


DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

RTCA, Inc., Special Committee 185; Aeronautical Spectrum Planning 
Issues

    Pursuant to section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act 
(Pub. L. 92-463, 5 U.S.C., Appendix 2), notice is hereby given for a 
Special Committee 185 meeting to be held on July 17-19, 1996, starting 
at 9:00 a.m. The meeting will be held at NBAA Conference Room, 1200 
Eighteenth Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20036 on July 17 and at RTCA, 
1140 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 1020, Washington, DC 20036, on 
July 18-19.
    The agenda will be as follows: (1) Administrative Remarks; (2) 
General Introductions; (3) Approval of the Agenda; (4) Review and 
Approval of the Summary of the Previous Meeting; (5) Review and Resolve 
Comments on Draft Version 9 of SC-185 Report; (6) Consider/Approve 
Version 9 with Corrections for Distribution for Ballot; (7) Other 
Business; (8) Date and Place of Next Meeting.
    Attendance is open to the interested public but limited to space 
availability. With the approval of the chairman, members of the public 
may present oral statements at the meeting. Persons wishing to present 
statements or obtain information should contact the RTCA Secretariat, 
1140 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 1020, Washington, DC 20036; (202) 
833-9339 (phone) or (202) 833-9434 (fax). Members of the public may 
present a written statement to the committee at any time.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on June 24, 1996.
Janice L. Peters,
Designated Official.
[FR Doc. 96-16735 Filed 6-28-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-13-M
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, Case No. 06-cr-20465

Hon. Nancy G. Edmunds

v. 

D-37 ANTHONY CLARK,

Defendant.

 /

STIPULATION AND ORDER TO ADJOURN RESENTENCING

OF D-37 ANTHONY CLARK

NOW COME the parties, by an through their respective counsel, and hereby

stipulate to an adjournment of the resentencing of D-37 Anthony Clark, which is

presently scheduled for May 15, 2014, for a period of thirty (30) days, to a date and

time to be set by the Court. Defense counsel was appointed as substitute counsel for

the Defendant Anthony Clark by the Federal Defender Office on March 24, 2014.

Defendant’s counsel filed an appearance on March 28, 2014. Counsel has not yet

received a complete copy of prior counsel’s file, although she has been in contact with

prior counsel. Counsel has had email correspondence with Defendant Anthony Clark,

but because he is incarcerated at the Elkton Correctional Facility in Ohio, face to face

contact is not possible. Counsel is attempting to arrange telephone contact with

Defendant in order to discuss Defendant’s immediate concerns. Counsel will need

sufficient time to review the file, prepare objections to the amended presentence

2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM Doc # 2561 Filed 04/16/14 Pg 1 of 3 Pg ID 18669
report, if necessary, and file a sentencing memorandum.

Stipulated and agreed:

/s/Christopher Graveline (with consent) /s/Robyn B. Frankel 

Christopher Graveline (P69515) Robyn B. Frankel (P43629)

Assistant United States Attorney Attorney for D-37 Anthony Clark

211 W. Fort St., Suite 2001 26611 Woodward Avenue

Detroit, MI 48226 Huntington Woods, MI 48070

(313) 226-9155 (248) 541-5200

christopher.graveline2@usdoj.gov robyn720@comcast.net

Dated: April 11, 2014

2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM Doc # 2561 Filed 04/16/14 Pg 2 of 3 Pg ID 18670
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, Case No. 06-cr-20465

Hon. Nancy G. Edmunds

v. 

D-37 ANTHONY CLARK,

Defendant.

 /

ORDER GRANTING ADJOURNMENT OF RESENTENCING 

OF D-37 ANTHONY CLARK

Upon the stipulation of the parties and the Court being duly advised, and the

Court finding good cause for the adjournment of resentencing:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the resentencing of D-37 Anthony Clark be

adjourned from May 15, 2014 to June 17, 2014 at 2:30 p.m. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Nancy G. Edmunds 

NANCY G. EDMUNDS

United States District Court Judge

Dated: April 16, 2014 

2:06-cr-20465-NGE-MKM Doc # 2561 Filed 04/16/14 Pg 3 of 3 Pg ID 18671
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIAN ALFORD, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

 v.

DWIGHT NEVEN, Warden; ATTORNEY

GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF

NEVADA, 

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 17-16358

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00333-APG-NJK

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 13, 2019

San Francisco, California

Before: McKEOWN, W. FLETCHER, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

On December 30, 2007, Brian Alford engaged in a fight with Jerome Castro at

Castro’s trailer home in Reno, Nevada. During the fight, Alford beat Castro with his

gun, and a single shot was fired. The bullet grazed Castro’s head, causing a fatal

FILED

FEB 27 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
head injury. Nevada charged Alford with first-degree murder and advanced both

premeditated- and felony-murder theories at trial. The jury, in a general verdict,

convicted Alford of first-degree murder. The Nevada Supreme Court held that

sufficient evidence supported Alford’s conviction. On federal habeas corpus, the

district court agreed. We granted a Certificate of Appealability on the issue of

whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Alford’s first-degree murder

conviction based on a felony-murder theory.

A conviction is supported by insufficient evidence when no “rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). A court applying Jackson

must resolve any conflicting testimony in favor of the prosecution. Id. at 326. 

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which governs this case,

a federal court may overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the

evidence challenge “only if the state court decision was ‘objectively unreasonable.’”

Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (per curiam) (quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 565

U.S. 1, 4 (2011) (per curiam)).

The testimony at Alford’s trial, taken in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, revealed that after being closed out of Castro’s house, Brian Alford spit

on Castro and then “pushed in the door and started fighting with [Castro].” On the

2
basis of this evidence, a rational jury could conclude that Alford committed burglary

under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.060, the felony underlying the state’s felony-murder

theory, by entering Castro’s home with the intent to commit battery. The Nevada

Supreme Court’s decision that sufficient evidence supported Alford’s conviction for

first-degree murder was not objectively unreasonable.

AFFIRMED.

3
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996             DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996             DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                         208,912                 208,912
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  684,625                 684,625
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                       0
<INVENTORY>                                          0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,177,115               1,177,115
<PP&E>                                      80,816,228              80,816,228
<DEPRECIATION>                             (9,205,591)             (9,205,591)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              73,984,957              73,984,957
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          904,793                 904,793
<BONDS>                                     22,317,306              22,317,206
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                       735,747                 735,747
<OTHER-SE>                                  50,027,211              50,027,211
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                73,984,957              73,984,957
<SALES>                                      2,365,033               9,376,101
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,365,033               9,376,101
<CGS>                                          239,045                 733,351
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  239,045                 733,351
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                15,663                 499,006
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             238,695               1,385,512
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,092,324               4,040,809
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,092,324               4,040,809
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                 889,376
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,092,324               3,051,433
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .15                     .48
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .15                     .48
        

</TABLE>
#### In the Interest of: M.D. and A.C., Minors, v. B.D.K., et al., Respondents/Appellants.

Nos. 67370, 67371.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Two.

Feb. 13, 1996.

Patrick D. Billington, A. David Arand, Union, Gael D. Wood, Washington, for appellant.

*871Prudence Fink Johnson, Union, for Juvenile Officer.

John R. O’Connor, Union, guardian ad li-tem.

Before CRAHAN, P.J., and CRANDALL and DOWD, JJ.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Mother appeals the judgments of the trial court terminating her parental rights as to her children M.D. and A.C. Father appeals the judgments terminating his parental rights as to M.D. We affirm. The judgments of the trial court are supported by substantial evidence and are not against the weight of the evidence; no error of law appears. An extended opinion would have no precedential value. Rule 84.16(b).
### NUMBER 13

- 19

- 00 575

- CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI

- EDINBURG

GILBERT COLUNGA , Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee.

On a ppeal from the 2 14 th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.

ORDER TO ABATE

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Hinojosa Order Per Curiam

This cause is before the Court on the reporter ’ s failure to timely file a record. The

reporter’s record in this cause was due on January 6, 2020. On February 7 , 2020 , the

Clerk of the Court sent a late notice to the reporter

. The Clerk of Court has learned the

trial court reporter is on a medical leave until April , as such, no reporter’s record has been

filed

. However, the reporter has not filed a request for extension of time in this matter.2

This sequence of events requires us to effectuate our responsibility to avoid further

delay and to preserve the parties' rights. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 37.3(a)(1). Accordingly, this

appeal is ABATED and the cause REMANDED to the trial court.

In accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6 (b), the trial court is

directed to conduct a hearing or otherwise to determine : (1) if the appe llant has timely

request ed a reporter's record

, (2) when the reporter will return to work, and (3) the earliest

practical date the reporter’s record may be completed

. The trial court is directed to forward the record of the proceedings, including any

orders and findings, to this Court within forty

- five ( 45 ) days of the date of this order, or to

notify this Court within such period indicating a date by which the trial co urt can comply.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b).

D elivered and filed the 13 th day of March, 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman,

 Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen

Kurtis T. Wilder,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 

October 24, 2017

s1017

Order 

Clerk

October 24, 2017

155387 & (70)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 155387

COA: 328576

Montcalm CC: 2014-018953-FH,

2014-018954-FH

PAUL EUGENE NASEMAN,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 22, 2016 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion to 

appoint counsel is DENIED.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 38 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 H. R. 38

 To eliminate the disparity between the periods of delay provided for 
civilian and military retiree cost-of-living adjustments in the Omnibus 
                   Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 1995

  Mr. Moran (for himself, Mr. Spence, Mr. Montgomery, Mr. Evans, Mr. 
  Bilirakis, Mr. Boucher, Mr. Chapman, Mr. Filner, Mr. Pete Geren of 
 Texas, Mr. Goss, Mr. Hall of Texas, Mrs. Lincoln, Mr. Mollohan, Mrs. 
   Morella, Mr. Sanders, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Scott, Mr. Solomon, and Mr. 
   Waxman) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on National Security

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To eliminate the disparity between the periods of delay provided for 
civilian and military retiree cost-of-living adjustments in the Omnibus 
                   Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ELIMINATION OF DISPARITY BETWEEN EFFECTIVE DATES FOR 
              MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RETIREE COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS.

    Subparagraph (B) of section 1401a(b)(2) of title 10, United States 
Code, is amended--
            (1) in the heading, by striking out ``through 1998'' and 
        inserting in lieu thereof ``through 1996''; and
            (2) in clause (ii)--
                    (A) by striking out ``through 1998'' and inserting 
                in lieu thereof ``and 1996'';
                    (B) by striking ``of 1994, 1995, 1996, or 1997'' 
                and inserting in lieu thereof ``of 1994, or 1995''; and
                    (C) by striking out ``September'' and inserting in 
                lieu thereof ``March''.

SEC. 2. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act shall be called the ``COLA Equity Act''.
                                 <all>
```
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

GARY HUNTER, #135890,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL NO. 5:09-CV-10299

HONORABLE JOHN CORBETT O’MEARA

MICHIGAN DEPT. OF CORR., et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR REIMBURSEMENT

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s letter request for reimbursement of filing fees regarding his

2009 civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court granted his application to proceed

without prepayment of costs and fees, allowing him to pay the full filing fee in installments. The

Court has since dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and ruled that an appeal cannot be taken

in good faith. The Court has also previously denied Plaintiff’s request to relieve himself from

payment of the $350.00 filing fee until he has been released on parole due to limited prison

funds. In his motion, Plaintiff asserts that the Court is withdrawing more than 20% of his

account balance to cover the required installments.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner who qualifies to proceed in

forma pauperis in a civil rights action is liable for the $350.00 civil action filing fee and must

pay the fee through partial payments as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The PLRA requires an

indigent prisoner to pay an initial payment of 20% of the greater of the prisoner’s average

balance or the average deposits for the preceding six months. The prisoner is then required to

5:09-cv-10299-JCO-RSW Doc # 11 Filed 10/23/12 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 46
2

pay monthly installments of 20% of the income credited to his or her account in the previous

month until the whole filing fee is paid. The records attached to Plaintiff’s motion do not show

that this procedure has been violated. Plaintiff is not entitled to any reimbursement or refund

and is liable for the full filing fee. Plaintiff’s motion is therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/John Corbett O'Meara 

United States District Judge

Date: October 23, 2012

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties of

record on this date, October 23, 2012, using the ECF system and/or ordinary mail.

s/William Barkholz 

Case Manager

5:09-cv-10299-JCO-RSW Doc # 11 Filed 10/23/12 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 47
#### Ronnie LOFTON, Petitioner, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.

No. 94-0993.

Supreme Court of Texas.

March 30, 1995.

James C. Plummer, Houston, Larry Zinn, San Antonio, for petitioner.

Stephen P. Pate, William J. Boyce, Houston, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The sole issue in this case is whether, in the absence of a postmark or a certificate of mailing, an attorney’s uncontroverted affidavit may establish a date of mailing for compliance with Tex.R.App.P. 4(b), commonly known as the mailbox rule. A majority of the Court holds that it can.

This ease began when Lofton sued his insurance company for failing to provide insurance benefits. A jury returned a verdict in his favor. The trial court, allowing an offset in the amount of money Allstate had already paid on the claim, reduced the jury’s award. Lofton, desiring to reinstate the verdict, sought to appeal the trial court’s judgment; but in an order issued August 11, 1994, the court of appeals dismissed his appeal for want of jurisdiction, stating that “[ajppellant’s appeal bond was due to have been filed April 25,1994, but was in fact filed April 28, 1994.”

Lofton’s attorney filed a sworn affidavit stating that he mailed the appeal bond to the Montgomery County District Clerk on April 25, 1994, the last day for filing. Because no postmark or certificate of mailing exists, the court of appeals did not address whether Lofton complied with Tex.R.App.P. 4(b).1

While a postmark is *prima facie*evidence of mailing, no postmark is available in this case. In the absence of a proper postmark or certificate of mailing, an attorney’s uncon-troverted affidavit may be evidence of the *694date of mailing. This was the conclusion reached by the court of appeals in *Fellowship Missionary Baptist Church of Dallas, Inc. v. Sigel,*749 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, no writ).

Accordingly, the application for writ of error is granted. Pursuant to Tex.R.App.P. 170, and without hearing oral argument, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for consideration of the merits of Lofton’s appeal.

1

. There is no evidence in the record as to why no postmark exists on the documents Lofton claims to have mailed.