UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LARRY JEROME RHODEN,

Petitioner,

v. CASE NO. 09-12133

 HONORABLE NANCY G. EDMUNDS

MICHIGAN PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

______________________________/

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

I. Introduction

Petitioner Larry Jerome Rhoden has filed a pro se habeas corpus petition under

28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. He alleges that he was convicted of unarmed robbery in

1996 and sentenced to imprisonment as a habitual offender for four to twenty-two and a

half years. The Michigan Parole Board declined to release Petitioner on parole in 2005,

in 2007, and on April 30, 2009, even though Petitioner’s parole guidelines score

calculates to “a high probability of parole.” The Parole Board’s reasons for denying

parole were: Petitioner’s failure to understand his assaultive behavior and to internalize

principles of non-violence; his lack of remorse and lack of empathy for the victim; and

the fact that he still posed a “huge” risk to the public. Despite the Parole Board’s

articulation of these reasons for departing from the parole guidelines, Petitioner alleges

that the Parole Board failed to provide him with substantial and compelling reasons for

denying parole. According to him, the lack of substantial and compelling reasons for

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denying parole violates Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.233e(6) and his constitutional right to

due process. Petitioner also alleges that the Michigan Department of Corrections failed

to comply with the Michigan Administrative Procedures Act when enacting its

administrative rules and parole guidelines. 

II. Discussion

The contention that the Parole Board violated Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.233e(6)

lacks merit because “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” 

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). In conducting habeas review, a federal

court is limited to deciding whether the prisoner is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). 

Also without merit is Petitioner’s claim that the Michigan Department of

Corrections violated the Michigan Administrative Procedures Act when implementing its

administrative rules and parole guidelines. Even if Petitioner is correct, the State’s

failure “to follow its own policies and procedures does not amount to a constitutional

violation.” Coleman v. Martin, 363 F. Supp. 2d 894, 903 (E.D. Mich. 2005).

Petitioner’s constitutional argument is that the Parole Board’s failure to provide

substantial and compelling reasons for denying him parole violated his right to due

process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. The Supreme Court explained in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209

(2005), that

[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects

persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who

seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these

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interests is at stake. A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution

itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word “liberty,” or it may arise

from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies. 

Id. at 221 (internal and end citations omitted). 

There is no constitutional right to be released on parole, Greenholtz v. Inmates of

the Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), and in Michigan, “a

prisoner’s release on parole is discretionary with the parole board.” Mich. Comp. Laws

§ 791.234(11); see also Hopkins v. Michigan Parole Bd., 604 N.W.2d 686, 691 (1999)

(stating that “specific determinations whether to release prisoners on parole rest within

the Parole Board’s discretion”). Therefore, Michigan’s parole statute does not create a

protected liberty interest in release on parole. Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164-

65 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The fact that the State “holds out the possibility of parole

provides no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be obtained.” Greenholtz, 442

U.S. at 11 (emphasis in original). “Where an interest is not a protected one, there is no

cognizable harm to the individual when deprived of that interest.” Orr v. Hawk, 156

F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S.

454, 460 (1989)). Thus, Petitioner’s right to due process was not violated by the denial

of parole, and his petition for a writ of habeas corpus [Dkt. #1] is summarily DISMISSED

pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Courts.

s/Nancy G. Edmunds 

Nancy G. Edmunds

United States District Judge

Dated: August 27, 2009

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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of

record on August 27, 2009, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Carol A. Hemeyer 

Case Manager

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