Page 4

1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22982, *

represented by more than one attorney in
this case

"If fee applicants do not exercise billing
judgment, courts are obligated to do it for them,
to cut the amount of hours for which payment
is sought, pruning out those that are ‘excessive,
redundant or otherwise unnecessary." Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Barnes, 168
F.3d 423, 428 (11th Cir. 1999) [*9] (quoting
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S. Ct. at
1939-40). The magistrate judge properly disal-
lowed attorney McNeil's hours. McNeil's ob-
jection fails.

Regarding McNeil's contention that the
magistrate judge erred when he determined
McNeil's billing records to be inadequate, the
Court notes that the magistrate judge afforded
attorney McNeil an opportunity to supplement
his records. Attorney McNeil declined to sup-
plement his records citing the "inordinate
amount of time" that he would be required to
devote to such an endeavor. The Court cannot
accept McNeil's "excuse," and his objection is
denied.

Attorney McNeil further complains that his
rate of compensation should not have been re-
duced from his demand of $ 150.00 per hour to
the magistrate judge's determination of $
140.00 per hour. "Courts properly have re-
quired prevailing attorneys to justify the rea-
sonableness of the requested rate." Blum, 465
US. at 895 n.11, 104 S. Ct. at 1547 nl. A
reasonable rate is one that is the prevailing rate
in the forum market, for a civil rights attorney
of comparable skill and experience to that of
the attorney making the fee motion. Ramos,
713 F.2d at 555. [*10]

In support of his demand for $ 150.00 per
hour "McNeil produced a 1997 Michigan Bar
Journal study and 3 Affidavits form [sic] attor-
neys who have no interest in this matter which
state that a billing rate of $ 150.00 per hour is
reasonable.” * (McNeil's Obj. to R&R at 8-9).
However, the affiant must have reviewed the

attorney's work in the case for which the fee is
sought in order to opine regarding the reasona-
bleness of the rate. See Wells v. New Chero-
kee Corp., 58 F.3d 233, 239-40 (6th Cir. 1995).
Although attorney McNeil submitted affidavits
in support of his demand for $ 150.00 per hour,
the affidavits fail to demonstrate that the af-
fiants performed any review of McNeil's work
in the instant case.

5 Attorney McNeil only provided the
Court with two affidavits, attached as
Exhibit 3 to his motion for attorney fees.

Further, attorney McNeil has supplied this
Court with absolutely no evidence that he has
ever received $ 150.00 per hour as his fee for
litigating a civil rights matter. * Accordingly,
[*11] the Court finds attorney McNeil's objec-
tion to be without merit.

6 The Court notes that attorney
MeNeil's resume fails to indicate any
experience in civil rights litigation.

As his next objection, attorney McNeil ar-
gues that the "Magistrate's conclusion that ex-
penses should be excluded is abuse of discre-
tion." (McNeil's Obj. to R&R at 9). Reasonable
expenses incurred while representing a civil
rights plaintiff may be included in the attorney
fees award if such expenses are customarily
billed in addition to the attorney's hourly rate.
Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, Johnson
County, Kan., 157 F.3d 1243, 1257 (10th Cir.
1998) (citing Ramos, 713 F.2d at 559). The at-
torney requesting the expenses bears the burden
of establishing: 1) that they are compensable,
and 2) the reasonableness of the amount
sought. Id.

MeNéeil states in his objections that he sub-
mitted a "fax log,” "copy log," and "a receipt
from Kinkos for copies and mounting.”
(McNeil's Obj. to R&R at 9). However, [*12]
what attorney McNeil failed to provide the
Court, was an explanation that expenses in-
curred for copying and faxing were reasonable



Page 3

1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22982, *

his supplement suffers from the same deficien-
cy as his original motion -- it employs block
billing. His supplement fails in its duty to pro-
vide the Court with contemporaneous and me-
ticulous billing records. See Grendel's Den,
Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 952 (1st Cir.
1984); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 553
(10th Cir. 1983). Attorney Reide has failed to
meets his obligation, and his objection is
therefore unavailing.

Attorney McNeil's Objections

Attorney William A. McNeil asserts that
the "Magistrate failured [sic] to consider the
impact on the attorney's practice." (McNeil's
Obj. to R&R at 5). McNeil attests that after he
was recruited to join the Childress litigation
team, he "spent very little time in his single
man practice." (/d. at 6). McNeil cites the Court
to Tasby v. Wright, 550 F. Supp. 262 (N.D.
Tex. 1982), for the proposition that the [*6]
Court should recognize the "hardship" that liti-
gation imposes upon counsel. The Court fails to
see how Tasby, a school desegregation case
that was litigated for more than ten years, lends
any support to plaintiff, who was involved in
the instant litigation for just over five months
and was one of four lawyers working on behalf
of plaintiff. No one forced McNeil to abandon
his "single man" practice to take up the cause
of plaintiff Childress; nor does this Court be-
lieve that plaintiff's cause could not have been
adequately pursued by the remaining lawyers.

Moreover, the attorney fees provision of 42
U.S.C. § 1988 was put in place to aid the civil
rights plaintiff; it was "not designed as a form
of economic relief to improve the financial lot
of attorneys, nor [was it] intended to replicate
exactly the fee an attorney could earn through a
private fee arrangement with his client." Penn-
sylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council
for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S. Ct.
3088, 3098, 92 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1986). There-
fore, Attorney McNeil's objection is rejected.

Attorney McNeil complains that the magi-
strate judge's "assertion that hours [*7] _ex-
pended, tasks performed, and expenses were
excessive, and the records thereof were inade-
quate is an abuse of discretion." (McNeil's Obj.
to R&R at 6). He also takes issue with the ma-
gistrate judge's "assertion that the quantity of
hours expended does not impact the quality of
work and the ultimate outcome of the case.”
(McNeil's Obj. to R&R at 9). The magistrate
judge properly reduced the number of hours
claimed by McNeil, due to the number of at-
torneys representing plaintiff in this matter.
This Court agrees with the magistrate judge
that a substantial amount of time spent and
documents produced were not necessary to es-
tablish that which plaintiff ultimately prevailed
upon -- that defendant Williams acted wrong-
fully and that plaintiff suffered injuries as a re-
sult.

This Court has presided over numerous
cases equally, if not more, complex than this
case, in which a plaintiff received excellent re-
presentation through the efforts of one
well-qualified attorney. This Court accepts the
fact that a plaintiff has a right to have more
than one attorney representing her and in many
cases representation by more than one attorney
is appropriate; * however, the presence of mul-
tiple attorneys, [*8] particularly three or four
attorneys, often leads to an unnecessary ex-
penditure of time, e.g, attorneys conferring
with each other, and often results in a duplica-
tion of time billed. The Court believes that the
magistrate judge, in reaching his conclusion
with respect to the appropriate fees to be
awarded, has accurately pointed out the con-
cers of the Court with respect to multiple at-
torneys representing a single client. "The more
lawyers representing a side of the litigation, the
greater the likelihood will be for duplication of
services." Ramos, 713 F.2d at 554.

4 This Court does not suggest that it
was not proper for plaintiff to be



Page 5

1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22982, *

as required. See Case, 157 F.3d at 1257. The
objection is unavailing.

Attorney McNeil also objects that the ma-
gistrate judge's R&R was not "clear." (McNeil's
Obj. to R&R at 10). McNeil apparently takes
issue with the magistrate judge's reductions of
his numerous block billing entries. McNeil
complains that "one cannot tell form [sic] the
Magistrate's report which date, which services,
or the number of hours that were reduced on a
given date or for a given service." (/d. at 11).
However, the magistrate judge is not required
to identify and/or justify each and every disal-
lowed hour. Case, 157 F.3d at 1250. Hence,
MeNeil's objection fails. 7

7 McNeil further posits that: "An inor-
dinate amount of time would be ex-
pended if one were to track the amount
of time one spent each day on each spe-
cific task." (McNeil's Obj. to R&R at 11).
The Court notes that keeping track of
one's time, usually to the tenth of the
hour, is an integral part of the art of la-
wyering, as well as being professionally
responsible to one's client, and does not
require "an inordinate amount of time" to
complete, if undertaken contempora-
neously.

[*13] Lastly, attorney McNeil complains
that the magistrate judge should not have cha-

racterized the instant matter as a "simple, one
incident case." (McNeil's Obj. to R&R at 11).
McNeil also suggests that a "four member
team" was required to litigate the Childress
matter because "over 50,000 dollars [sic] were
produced in this matter." (/d.). The Court will
address both objections together.

However, as McNeil stated in his objec-
tions, and as stated in this Opinion, supra, the
perceived "complexity" of an issue is not "an
appropriate factor in determining whether to
increase the basic fee award." Blum, 465 U.S.
at 898-99, 104 S. Ct. at 1549. Therefore, attor-
ney McNeil cannot rely upon his perception
that Childress was a complex, 50,000 document
case as a basis for increasing his fee. Hence, his
objection fails.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above
and for the reasons set forth by the magistrate
judge in the R&R, the motions for attorney fees
filed by attorneys Raheem, Eickemeyer,
McNeil, and Reide, shall be granted in the
amounts recommended by the magistrate judge
in the R&R.

An Order consistent with this Opinion shall
issue forthwith.

OCT 28 1999
[*14] PATRICK J. DUGGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE



EXHIBIT 1



® . + ©
@ LexisNexis

Page 1

LEXSEE 1999 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 22982

SHARON CHILDRESS, Plaintiff, v. DAVID WILLIAMS, Defendant.

CASE NO.: 97-CV-72335-DT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DIS-
TRICT OF MICHIGAN, SOUTHERN DIVISION

1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22982

October 28, 1999, Decided
October 28, 1999, Filed

PRIOR HISTORY: Childress v. Williams,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22983 (E.D. Mich., Ju-
ly 12, 1999)

DISPOSITION: [*1] Motions for attor-
ney fees filed by attorneys Raheem, Eickemey-
er, McNeil, and Reide, granted in the amounts
recommended by the magistrate judge.

COUNSEL: For SHARON CHILDRESS,
plaintiff: William A. McNeil.

For SHARON CHILDRESS, plaintiff: Antoi-
nette R. Raheem, Antoinette R. Raheem As-
soc., Southfield, MI.

For SHARON CHILDRESS, plaintiff: Jerome
L. Reide, Detroit, MI.

For SHARON CHILDRESS, plaintiff: Rachel
K. Eickemeyer, West Bloomfield, MI.

For DAVID WILLIAMS, defendant: Frederick
L. Schmoll, TI, Michael W. Edmunds, Gault,
Davison, Flint, MI.

For DAVID WILLIAMS, defendant: Marcia L.
Howe, Johnson, Rosati, Farmington Hills, MI.

For FLINT, CITY OF, defendant: Karen L.
Folks.

For FLINT, CITY OF, defendant: Patrick L.
Rose, Lansing, MI.

For FLINT, CITY OF, garnishee: Patrick L.
Rose, Lansing, MI.

For FLINT, CITY OF, garnishee:
Fletcher, Jr., Fletcher, Wolf, Flint, MI.

Loyst

JUDGES: PATRICK J. DUGGAN, UNITED
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

OPINION BY: PATRICK J. DUGGAN

OPINION

This matter is before the Court on four sep-
arate motions for attorney fees filed by various
attorneys for plaintiff. ' The Court referred
these matters to Magistrate Judge Donald A.



Page 2

1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22982, *

Scheer. [*2] On July 12, 1999, Magistrate
Judge Scheer issued a report and recommenda-
tion ("R&R"), recommending that this Court
grant all four motions, but reduce the amount to
be awarded from that requested by counsel.
Objections to this recommendation were filed.
Therefore, this Court reviews de novo those
portions of the R&R that the attorneys find ob-
jectionable. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers, Local 231,
829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).

1 The Court received motions from
Antoinette R. Raheem, Esq., Rachel K.
Eickemeyer, Esq., William A. McNeil,
Esq., and Jerome L. Reide, Esq.

Attorney Reide's Objections

Attorney Jerome L. Reide objects that "the
award of compensatory and punitive damages
call for a finding of fact and conclusion of law
that there was an abuse of discretion here."
(Reide's Obj. to R&R at 6). In support of his
objection attorney Reide states, in toto:

Following the reasoning in
Loggins v Delo (1994, CA8 Mo)
999 F.2d 364 [*3] , [sic] the
Report and Recommendation con-
stitute [sic] an abuse of discretion
under 42 USCS § 1988, Sec. 153
[sic]. In Loggins, the District court
did not abuse its discretion in re-
ducing fee award from $ 34,000 to
$ 25,000 where plaintiff failed to
obtain amount of actual damages
requested and also failed to obtain
punitive damages, and court also
considered adequacy of compensa-
tion to counsel and public benefit
of litigation.

(id.). The Court is at a loss to construe the pre-
cise nature of attorney Reide's objection based
on the foregoing. Further, the Court is unable to

discern from attorney Reide's "objection," the
purported error of the magistrate judge. Accor-
dingly, attorney Reide's objection is rejected.

Attorney Reide further objects that "the
unambiguous victory here does not merit the
imposition of the negative multiplier.” (/d.). In
fact, attorney Reide argues that the lodestar
should be increased. * Reide believes the lodes-
tar should be increased because he entered into
a contingent fee agreement with plaintiff.
However, a contingent fee agreement may not
serve as a basis for the enhancement of the lo-
destar. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S.
557, 567, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2643-44, 120 L. Ed.
2d 449 (1992). [*4]

2 The "lodestar calculation" is the
"number of hours reasonably expended
on the litigation multiplied by a reasona-
ble hourly rate." Wayne v. Village of
Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 531 (6th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 433, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 40 (1983).

Reide also complains that the lodestar
should have been increased due to the "docu-
ment intensity" of the case. > However, the per-
ceived "complexity" of an issue is not "an ap-
propriate factor in determining whether to in-
crease the basic fee award." Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 898-99, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1549,
79 L. Ed, 2d 891 (1984). Accordingly, attorney
Reide's objection fails.

3 The Court declines attorney Reide's
invitation for in camera review of the en-
tire file in the case sub judice. The Court
notes that the file is a matter of public
record.

[*5] Lastly, attorney Reide objects that
the magistrate judge failed to accord weight to
his supplemental motion that, "details the pur-
pose of conferences with co-counsel contrary to
the Report and Recommendation." (/d. at 8).
However, attorney Reide fails to recognize that