C ite as 26 I&N Dec. 895 (BIA 2016 ) Interim Decision #38 83



### 895 

## Matter of Miguel Angel ALVARADO

, Respondent

Decided December 29 , 2016

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration A ppeals

(1) The g eneric definition of “ perjury ” in section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (2012)

, requires that an offender ma k e a material false statement knowingly or willfully while under oath or affirmation where

an oath is authorized or required by law.

(2) The crime of p erjury in violation of section 118(a) California Penal Code is categorically an offense relating to perjury und er section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act

.

FOR RESPONDENT: Edgardo Quintanilla , E squire, Sherman Oaks, California

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Cindy C. Yu

, Assistant
Chief Counsel

BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS and CREPPY

, Board Members ; GELLER

, Temporary Board Member.

MALPHRUS

, Board Member :



### In a decision dated December 1, 2014, we dismissed the respondent’s appeal from an Immigration Judge’s decision after conclud ing that his conviction for perjury in violation of section 118(a) of the California Penal Code is categorically a conviction for a n aggravated felony that renders him ineligible for relief from removal

. On January 13, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remand ed this case to us to further
consider whether the respondent’s perjury conviction under Californ ia law
is for an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (2012) . Both parties filed
briefs on remand . The respondent’s appeal will be dismissed.



## I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The respondent is a native and citizen of Guatemala who entered the United States without inspection on or about March 3, 1985. On June 1, 1993, he was convicted of perjury in violation of section 118(a) of the
California Penal Code and was sentenced to 2 years of incarceration. T he Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings onC ite as 26 I&N Dec. 895 (BIA 2016 ) Interim Decision #38 83



### 896 

### Febr uary 3, 2004, chargin g him with inadmissib ility under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012) , as an alien
who is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. During the proceedings , the respondent conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Act,

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2012)

, special rule cancel lation of removal under
section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (“NACARA”), Pub. L. No. 105

- 100, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193, 2196 (1997), amended by Pub. L. No. 105

- 139, 111 Stat. 2644 (1997)

, and suspension of deportation under former section 244(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) ( 1994) . Relying on Matter of Martinez

- Recinos

, 23 I&N Dec. 175 (BIA 2001) (en banc)

, the Immigration Judge concluded that the respondent’s perjury conviction is for a n aggravated felony that renders him ineligible for relief from removal pursuant to section 101(a)(43)(S) of the

Act

. We affirmed the Immigration Judge’s conclusion in this regard. The respondent filed a petition for review in the Ninth Circuit , which granted an unopposed motion to remand

. We have been asked to further
consider our previous determination in Matter of Martinez

- Recinos that
18 U.S.C. § 1621 ( 1994 ) provides the generic definition of perjury for purposes of section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act. 1



## II. ANALYSIS

T he definition of the term “ aggravated felony ” include s “an offense relating to . . . perjury . . . for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.” Section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act. In Matter of Martinez

- Recinos

, 23 I&N Dec. at 177, we held tha t a violation of section 118(a) of the
California Penal Code is categorically an aggravated felony perjury
offense

. 2 

### Because neither the language of the Act nor prior case law

1 Because the record was remanded for this purpose only, no other issues are before us

, including the denial of the respondent’s applications for relief

. 2 At all relevant times, section 118(a) of the California Penal Code has provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

Every person who, having taken an oath that he or she will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly before any competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any of the cases in which the oath may by law of the State of California be administered, willfully and contrary to the oath, states as true any material matter which h e or she knows to be false, and every person who testifies, declares, deposes, or certifies under penalty of perjury in any of the cases in which the testimony, declarations, depositions, or certification is permitted by law of the State of California unde r (continued . . .)C ite as 26 I&N Dec. 895 (BIA 2016 ) Interim Decision #38 83



### 897 

### described the Federal generic definition of aggravated felony perjury at that time, we looked to 18 U.S.C. § 1621, the Federal statute defining perjury,

to define the generic crime

. Comparing the elements of section 118(a) to those in § 1621, we concluded that “the provisions of each statute are essentially the sa me ” and therefore that section 118(a) matches the generic definition of perjury

. Id.

In so holding , we did not explain why we relied on § 1621 for the generic definition of perjury. Upon further consideration, we conclud e that 18 U.S.C. § 1621 alone does not provide the generic definition of perjury for purposes of section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act. I nstead , we find it appropriate to adopt a generic definition based on how the crime of perjury was commonly defined at the time section 101(a)(43)(S) was enacted. W e therefore look first to the definition of the term “ perjury ” that Congress contemplated when it added the offense to the Act in 1996. See Taylor

v. United States , 495 U.S. 575, 592, 598 (1990) ( constru ing an offense’s generic definition in accordance with its “contemporary usage,” or the
“sense in which the term is . . . used in the criminal codes of most S tates” );

Perrin v. United States , 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (look ing “ to the ordinary meaning of the term ‘ bribery ’ at the time Congress enacted the statute ” ); see also Matter of M

- W

- , 25 I&N Dec. 748, 751

– 52 (BIA 2012)

. Accordingly, w e will survey the definitions codified in State and Federal statutes, the Model Penal Code, and the scholarly commentary that
existed in 1996 to determine the contemporary usage of the term “perjury” at the time section 101(a)(43)(S) was enacted . This approach will
allow us to articulate a “uniform definition [of perjury] independent of the labels employed by the various States’ cri minal codes.” Taylor , 495 U.S. at 592; see also United States v. Garcia

- Santana , 774 F.3d 528, 53 3

– 3 4 (9th Cir. 2014) ( citing Taylor and describing the appropriate method for determining the contemporary usage of a term). 3 

### W e will withdraw from

Matter of Martinez

- Recinos to the extent that it conflicts with this new analysis

. 4

_______________________________ penalty of perjury and willfully states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, is guilty of perjury.

3 We recognize that the Ninth Circuit has applied the current versions of State statutes when determining the generic definition of an offense. See Garcia

- Santana

, 774 F.3d at
535 n.4. However

, because we do not discern a ny meaningful difference between St ate perjury statutes in 1996 and contemporary provisions , this would not a ffe ct the outcome of our analysis.

4 Although Matter of Martinez

- Recinos was rendered by the Boar d en banc and this

case is being decid ed by a three

- member panel, a majority of the permanent Board

members ha ve designated this decision for publication

, and it will serve as precedent (continued . . .)C ite as 26 I&N Dec. 895 (BIA 2016 ) Interim Decision #38 83



### 898 

### A. Survey of Perjury Statutes

The offense of perjury, which has a long history in American jurisprudence, has not diverged significantly from its common law roots.
United States v. Norris , 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937) (stating that perjury has
been a common law crime since at least the 17th century and “the conception embodied in the common law definition of perjury has been embodied in statutes”); cf. Matter of M

- W

- , 25 I& N Dec. at 751 (looking to common law to discern the generic definition of the crime of “murder

, ” which we found had “not diverged significantly from its common

- law roots”) . At common law, perjury was defined as “ a crime committed when
a lawful oath is adm inistered, in some judicial proceeding, to a person who swears willfully, absolutely, and falsely, in a matter material to the issue or point in question.” 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 136

– 37 (1769)

. S ee generally United Sta tes v. Wells , 519 U.S. 482, 504 n.6 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the common law definition of perjury). The Model Penal Code slightly expanded the common law definition of perjury by proscribing false statements made “in any official proc eeding,”

not just those made in “judicial” proceeding s

. Model Penal Code § 241.1 (1) (1 98 5 )

. Consequently

, under the Model Penal Code, a perjury
offense may occur “before any legislative, judicial, administrative or other governmental agency or official authorized to take evidence under oath.” Model Penal Code § 240.0 (4) (defining the term “official proceeding” for purposes of section 241.1 of the Model Penal Code)

. The States’ perjury laws have many similarities to the common law and
Model Penal Code d efinitions. W hen the term “ perjury ” was added to section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act in 1996 , the majority of States agreed that perjury must at least include (1) a material (2) false statement (3) made knowingly or willfully 5 

### (4) while under oath, affirmation, or under penalty of perjury.

_______________________________ going forward. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2016) (“ B y majority vote of the permanent Board members, selected decisions of the Board rendered by a three

- mem ber panel or by the Board en banc may be designated to serve as precedents in all proceedings involving

the same issue or issues. ”).

5 Some States ha d a “knowing” mens rea in their perjury statutes , while others included a “willful” requirement. However

, these states of mind are not meaningfully distinguishable because courts have uniformly interpreted the willfulness requirement of perjury to mean that the defendant knowingly made the false statement. See Bronston

v. United States , 409 U.S. 352, 359 (1973) (stating that for purposes of the Federal perjury statute, “the state of mind of the witness is relevant only to the extent that it bears

on whether ‘ he does not believe (his answer) to be true ’ ”); see also Matter of Esqueda

, (continued . . .)C ite as 26 I&N Dec. 895 (BIA 2016 ) Interim Decision #38 83



### 899 

### I n 1996

, many State perjury laws

, as well as the Federal statute

, 6 

### included language reflecting that a false statement must be made under oath

at a “ proceeding ” before it will be considered perjur y . While some State statutes did not clearly include this requirement, 7 

### the majority of States, the Model Penal Code, and the Federal statute required that the witness take the oath in an “official proceeding,” 8 

### or in a proceeding where an oath was

_______________________________ 20 I&N Dec. 850, 858 (BIA 1994) (stating that the word “willful” generally means that “a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears” (emphasis in original) (quoting Unit ed

States v. Hoyland , 914 F.2d 1125 , 1129 (9th Cir. 1990) ) ); Model Penal Code § 2.02(8);

2

- 48 Modern Federal Jury Instructions

— Criminal § 48.01.

6 At the time when Congress enacted section 101(a)(43)(S), the Federal perjury statute
at 18 U.S.C. § 1621 set forth the following comprehensive definition of perjury:

Whoever

—

(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, d eclare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or

(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of perju ry . . . .

7 See, e.g

., Alaska S tat . A nn . § 11.56.200 ( West 1996); A riz . R ev . S tat . A nn . § 13

- 2702 (1996); N.Y. P enal L aw § 210.15 ( McKinney 1996); O r . R ev . S tat . A nn . § 162.065 ( West 1996); R.I. G en . L aws A nn . § 11

- 33

- 1 ( West 1996); T enn . C ode A nn . § 39

- 16

- 702 ( West 1996); V a. C ode A nn . § 18.2

- 434 ( West 1996).

8 See, e.g

. , A la . C ode § 13A

- 10

- 101 (1996) (proscribing perjury in the first degree); A rk

. C ode A nn . § 5

- 53

- 102 ( West 1995); C olo . R ev . S tat

. Ann. § 18

- 8

- 502 ( West 1996) (criminalizing perjury in the first degree); C onn . G en . S tat . A nn . § 53a

- 156 ( West 1996);

F la . S tat . A nn . § 837.02 ( West 1996) (proscribing perjury in official proceedings); H aw

. R ev . S tat

. Ann. § 710

- 1060 ( West 1996); K y . R ev . S tat . A nn . § 523.020 ( West 1996) (criminalizing perjury in the first degree); M e . R ev . S tat . A nn . tit. 17

- A, § 451 (1996);

M o . A nn . S tat . § 575.040 ( West 1996); M ont . C ode A nn . § 45

- 7

- 201 ( West 1996);

N eb

. R ev . S tat

. Ann. § 28

- 915 ( West 1996); N.H. R ev . S tat . A nn . § 641:1 (1996); N.J.

S tat . A nn . § 2C:28

- 1 ( West 1996); N.M. S tat . A nn . § 30

- 25

- 1 ( West 1996); N.D. C ent

. C ode A nn . § 12.1

- 11

- 01 ( West 1995); O hio R ev . C ode A nn . § 2921.11 ( West 1996);

18 P a

. Stat. and C ons . S tat . A nn . § 4902 ( West 1996); U tah C ode A nn . § 76

- 8

- 5 02 ( West 1996) (proscribing false or inconsistent material statements); W ash . R ev . C ode A nn

. § 9A.72.020 ( West 1996) (criminalizing perjury in the first degree).C ite as 26 I&N Dec. 895 (BIA 2016 ) Interim Decision #38 83



### 900 

### either “ required or authorized by law. ” 9 

### For our purposes, w e see no meaningful distinction between an official proceeding and one where an
oath is authorized as part of the proceeding

. See Model Penal Code § 240.0 (4) ( i n cluding within an “official proceeding ” a proceeding that is
heard before an official wh o is “authorized to take evidence under oath ” )

. Because “removal proceedings are a function of Federal law,” we also rely to a “significant degree” on 18 U.S.C. § 1621

— the Federal perjury

statute at the time that section 101(a)(43)(S) was enacted

— to discern the
elements of generic perjury

. Matter of M

- W

- , 25 I&N Dec. at 752 n.5 (quoting Matter of Rodriguez

- Rodriguez , 22 I&N Dec. 991, 994

– 95 (BIA 1999)). The roots of § 1621 dat e back to at least the Perjury Statute
of 1563

, and the statute has “remained unchanged in its material respects for over a century.” United States v. Dunnigan , 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993).

W e therefore presume that Congress was familiar with 18 U.S.C. § 1621 when it enacted section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. , 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (“ We assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation. ”). The Supreme Court has clarified that a witness violates this statute when, while testifying under oath or affirmation, he or she “ gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” Du n nigan

, 507 U.S. at 94

. 10 

### This definition is consistent with
the central elements of perjury set forth in the majority of State statutes , the Model Penal Code, and the common law. See id. (r ecognizing that

18 U.S.C. § 1621 “parallels typical state

- law definitions of perjury” and has “gained general acceptance” as the acknowledged definition of perjury )

.

9 I owa C ode A nn . § 720.2 ( West 1996); see also, e.g

. , D.C. C ode § 22

- 2 511 ( West 1996); I daho C ode A nn . § 18

- 5401 ( West 1996); 720 I ll . C om p . S tat . A nn . 5/32

- 2 ( West 1996); K an . S tat . A nn . § 21

- 3805 ( West 1996); M ass . G en . L aws A nn . ch. 268, § 1 ( West 1996); N ev . R ev . S tat . A nn . § 199.120 ( West 1996); N.C. G en . S tat . A nn . § 14

- 209 ( West 1996); S.D. C odified L aws § 22

- 29

- 1 (1996); W yo . S tat . A nn . § 6

- 5

- 301 ( West 1996).

10 The majority of the circuit courts have adopted this articulation of the elements of

18 U.S.C. § 1621. See, e.g.

, United States v. Thompson , 808 F.3d 190, 194 (2d Cir. 2015) ( per curiam ) ; United States v. Waters , 799 F.3d 964, 974 (8th Cir. 2015); United States

v. Rodebaugh , 798 F.3d 1281, 1300 (10th Cir. 2015) ( per curiam ) ; United States

v. Fermin , 771 F.3d 71, 81 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Riney , 742 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Watkins , 691 F.3d 841, 851 (6th Cir. 2012); United States

v. Armstrong , 620 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Singh , 291 F.3d 756,

763 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Sarihifa rd , 155 F.3d 301, 306 (4th Cir. 1998);

United States v. Como , 53 F.3d 87, 89 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Rose , 215 F.2d 617, 622

– 23 (3d Cir. 1954).C ite as 26 I&N Dec. 895 (BIA 2016 ) Interim Decision #38 83



### 901 

### Based on the above , we conclude that the generic definition of the term

“ perjury ” in section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act requires that an offender ma k e a material false statement knowingly or willfully while under oath or
affirmation where an oath is authorized or required by law

. See Taylor , 495 U.S. at 598; Garcia

- Santana

, 774 F.3d at 534 ; see also United States

v. Esparza

- Herrera , 557 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that a consensus among 33 States regarding the elements of aggravated assault was sufficient to establish the elements of the generic definition of th at crime). 11



### Because the majority of States, the Model Pe nal Code, and the Federal statute included the foregoing elements in their definition of perjury when Congress enacted section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act, we conclude that this definition also embodies the level of criminal liability that Congress
intended w hen it added the offense of perjury to the Act in 1996. See Torres v. Lynch , 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1628 (2016) (refusing to construe section 101(a)(43) of the Act so as to produce the “haphazard” result of including
some serious State offenses while excluding others); Matter of H. Estrada

, 26 I&N Dec. 749, 752

– 53 (BIA 2016) (rejecting an interpretation of the Act that “frustrate[s] the manifest purpose of the legislation by rendering it inapplicable in the clear majority of the States”).

B

. California Perjury Statute

Comparing the elements of section 118(a) of the California Penal Code to the generic definition of perjury , we conclude that the respondent’s
conviction is categorically for an offense “relating to” perjury under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act. W e ha ve consistently ascribed an expansive meaning to the phrase “relating to” under the Act

. Matter of Oppedisano

, 26 I&N Dec. 202, 204 (BIA 2013) (stating that a “relating to” parenthetical
in the Act is “widely und erstood to have a descriptive import” ( quoting
United States v. Harrell , 637 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2011)) ) ; Matter of Gruenangerl , 25 I& N Dec. 351, 356 (BIA 2010) (concluding that the phrase “relating to” in section 101(a)(43)(R) of the Act “encompasses a broad range of conduct”); see also Mellouli v. Lynch , 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1990 (2015) (recognizing that the phrase “ ‘ relating to ’ [is] ‘ bro ad ’ and

‘ indeterminate ’ ” ( citation omitted) ).
Section 118(a) criminalizes both oral and written perjury. See Rivera

v. Lynch , 816 F.3d 1064, 1072 (9th Cir. 2015). T he Ninth Circuit has held
that oral perjury under section 118(a) requires proof of “a willful statement,

11 Mirroring the Federal statute and many State statutes, this generic definition incorporates fal se statements made orally and in writing under penalty of perjury.C ite as 26 I&N Dec. 895 (BIA 2016 ) Interim Decision #38 83



### 902 

### under oath, of any material matter which the witness knows to be false.”
Id. (quoting Chein v. Shumsky , 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004)). S uch an
oath must also be provided “ under circumstances in which the oath of the
State of Cali fornia lawfully may be given .” Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2016 edition), CALCRIM No. 2640 . Written perjury under section 118(a) mirrors oral perjury as to materiality and willfulness, but it also requires that a false statement be provided “under penalty of perjury” in circumstances “ permitted by law. ” Id. ; see also

Rivera

, 816 F.3d at 1072. 12



### Because a person who violat es section 118(a) must make a material false statement knowingly or willfully while under oath or affirmation where an oath is authorized or required by law, t he elements of the respondent’s State statute of conviction match those of the generic
definition o f perjury. 13 

### T he California statute substantially emulates the
Federal crime of perjury proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 1621 , which has its
roots in common law and i s general ly accept ed as the acknowledged definition of perjury. 14 

### See Dunnigan

, 507 U.S. at 94. We therefore infer that Congress intended a conviction under section 118(a) of the California
Penal Code to categorically fall within the generic definition of an offense

12 In Rivera

, 816 F.3d at 1075, the Ninth Circuit held that a violation of section 118(a) of

the California Penal Code is not categorical ly a crime involving moral turpitude, contrary

to our determination in Matter of Martinez

- Recinos

, 23 I&N Dec. at 178. T he court
found that section 118(a) does not require an intent to defraud and encompasses conduct that is not base, vile, or depraved . Howe ver , those findings are not relevant to whether

the offense is an aggravated felony . Therefore, the court’s conclusion in this regard is not dispositive of whether a violation of section 118(a) is categorically an offense related to perjury under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act

. See Matter of Abdelghany , 26 I&N Dec. 254, 262

– 63 (BIA 2014) ( noting that an offense that renders an alien deportable as an aggravated felon may not render him or her inadmissible as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude).

13 As noted

, the generic definition of perjury incorporates both written and oral perjury. It therefore covers State statutes, like section 118(a) of the California Penal Code

, that criminalize written perjury provided “under penalty of perjury.” See Rivera

, 816 F.3d at 1072 (stating that “written perjury, by contrast, requires only that the false statement be in writing under penalty of perjury”).

14 While we agree with the Ninth Ci rcuit that section 118(a) of the California Penal Code is broader than the common law definition of perjury, our aggravated felony analysis concerns the generic definition of the offense based on the commonly understood meaning of perjury at the time secti on 101(a)(43)(S) was enact ed, which may diverge

from the common law. See Rivera

, 816 F.3d at 1074; see also Taylor

, 495 U.S. at 59 4 (declining “to follow any rule that a statutory term is to be given its common

- law meaning, when that meaning is obsolete or inconsistent with the statute’s purpose”);

Perrin

, 444 U.S. at 48

– 49.C ite as 26 I&N Dec. 895 (BIA 2016 ) Interim Decision #38 83



### 903 

### “relating to

. . . perjury ” when it enacted section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act

. 15



### Given that the respondent pled guilty to an offense relating to the generic definition of perjury and was sentenced to more than 1 year of imprisonment, his conviction is categorical ly for an aggravated felony
under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act.



## I II

. CONCLUSION

W e conclude that the crime of perjury in violat ion of section 118(a) of
the California Penal Code is categorically an offense relating to perjury
under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act . It is therefore an aggravated felony
that renders the respondent in eligib le for the relief he s eeks . Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be dismissed

. 

## ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

15 The respondent argues on remand that section 118(a) of th e California Penal Code is not a categorical match to 18 U.S.C. § 1621 because the Federal statute includes as an element “subscribing or having a legal document subscribed.” The respondent also states that § 1621 can be violated when a person “does not b elieve a statement is true,” while

section 118(a) requires that the person state as true a matter that “he knows to be false.”

We need not decide whether these distinctions are meaningful because both of the respondent’s assertions contemplate that the Fe deral statute is broader than the California

statute . Thus, they do not persuade us to alter our conclusion that all conduct punishable

under the California statute falls within the Federal definition of perjury. See Mathis

v. United States , 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016) (stating that a crime of conviction is regarded as a categorical match if its elements are “t he same as, or narrower than , the relevant generic offense ” (emphasis added)).