[Cite as State v. Ruiz-Arias, 2011-Ohio-1198.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

 DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : 

 : Hon. Julie A. Edwards, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. 

 : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

-vs- : 

 : Case No. 10-CA-38 

JUAN MANUEL RUIZ-ARIAS : 

 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County Court of 

Common Pleas Case No. 09 CI 120058 

 

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: March 10, 2011 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: 

 

DAVID YOST 0056290 SUSAN E. MALLOY 0068121 

Delaware County Prosecutor 1799 West Fifth Avenue, Ste. 202 

140 N. Sandusky St., 3rd

 Fl. Columbus, Ohio 43212 

Delaware, Ohio 43015 

 

DOUGLAS DUMOLT 0080866 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

(Counsel of Record) 

 
[Cite as State v. Ruiz-Arias, 2011-Ohio-1198.]

Delaney, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Juan Manuel Ruiz-Arias, appeals from a judgment 

entered by the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, convicting him of one count 

of trafficking in heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2). 

{¶2} On November 17, 2009, Detective James Owens of the Columbus Police 

Department Strategic Response Bureau (“SRB”), received information from his sergeant 

that the Hardin County, Ohio Sheriff’s Department had information regarding a possible 

drug transaction that would be taking place at the Lake Club Apartments on Powell 

Road in Delaware County, Ohio. Detective Owens stated that SRB has received 

reliable information from the Hardin County Sherriff’s office at least three to five times 

prior to this incident. The officers did not know from whom the Hardin County 

authorities received the information. 

{¶3} Based upon the information regarding the possible drug transaction, 

Detective Owens, along with other members of SRB, set up surveillance of the Lake 

Club Apartments. According to the Hardin County Sheriff’s office, the car that was 

coming down from Hardin County was a green Grand Prix, with a license plate of CUH3508. 

{¶4} The officers waited approximately a half hour to forty-five minutes before 

they saw a green Grand Prix with the license plate number CUH-3508 pull into the 

parking lot and drive to the back of the lot before backing into a parking spot. The 

occupants of the vehicle stayed in the vehicle as though they were waiting for someone. 

{¶5} Several minutes later, a van pulled into the parking lot and drove around 

as if the occupants of the van were looking for someone. The driver of the Grand Prix 
Delaware County, Case No. 10-CA-38 3 

flashed his headlights and the van immediately drove up to the Grand Prix and the 

driver of the van parked nose to nose with the Grand Prix. A male, later determined to 

be Appellant, got out of the Grand Prix and got into the van. 

{¶6} At that time, officers were given the green light to approach the vehicles 

and to investigate the matter. Detective Russ Sorrell, who was driving an unmarked 

car, pulled behind the van, blocking it in. Detective Sorrell and Detective Ernest Rice 

quickly approached the vehicles with guns drawn and identified themselves as police. 

As Detective Sorrell approached the driver’s side of the van, he came upon Appellant’s 

co-defendant, Omar Raph Frias Carvajal, who was sitting in the driver’s seat with 350 

balloons of what appeared to be heroin in his lap, along with $1,835.00. The man who 

exited the Grand Prix, was Appellant, and he was sitting in the back of the van. Both 

men were arrested. 

{¶7} On November 17, 2009, Appellant and his co-defendant were charged in 

Delaware County Municipal Court with one count of possession of heroin, in violation of 

R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the second degree. On November 18, 2009, Appellant 

appeared for arraignment. Appellant was not represented by counsel. The trial court 

was informed by the deputy that a translator was needed as Appellant did not speak 

English. The trial court confirmed Appellant did not speak English and attempted to 

communicate with Appellant in Spanish with only limited success. The trial court then 

proceeded to conduct the arraignment in English. Appellant was advised of the 

charges against him and the court set bail at $50,000.00. The trial court stated it was 

appointing counsel and would note a translator was needed at the time of the 

preliminary hearing. 
Delaware County, Case No. 10-CA-38 4 

{¶8} On November 24, 2009, the Delaware Municipal Court held a preliminary 

hearing where Appellant was not represented by counsel. An interpreter was present 

for the hearing and translated what was being said by the court to Appellant as well as 

what was being said by Appellant to the court. After the hearing, the trial court found 

probable cause that Appellant committed a crime under R.C. 2925.11 and bound the 

case over to the Delaware County Common Pleas Court. 

{¶9} On December 4, 2009, the Delaware County Grand Jury indicted 

Appellant and his co-defendant on one count of Trafficking in Heroin, in violation of R.C. 

2925.03(A)(2), a felony of the second degree, and one count of Possession of Heroin, in 

violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), also a felony of the second degree. Both counts contained 

forfeiture specifications relating to the cash discovered during the arrest. 

{¶10} On December 14, 2009, Appellant was arraigned and he entered not 

guilty pleas to both counts of the indictment. 

{¶11} On January 25, 2010, Appellant’s attorney filed a Motion to Suppress 

evidence obtained as a result of the arrest. Appellant argued, inter alia, that the police 

officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the van and subsequently seize Appellant. 

The State of Ohio filed its response on February 9, 2010. On February 11, 2010, 

Appellant filed a supplemental motion to suppress statements. On February 23, 2010, 

Appellant’s case was consolidated with his co-defendant’s. The trial court held a 

suppression hearing on the co-defendant’s case on January 22, 2010, and denied his 

motion on February 1, 2010. Subsequently, both defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss 

for violating his right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 

United States Constitution by conducting a preliminary hearing without appointing 
Delaware County, Case No. 10-CA-38 5 

counsel to Appellant. The State of Ohio responded and the trial court denied that 

motion on April 9, 2010.1

{¶12} Subsequently, Appellant entered a no contest plea to Trafficking in Heroin, 

a violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a felony of the second degree and the attached 

forfeiture specification. The Possession of Heroin charge was dismissed. Appellant 

was then sentenced to three years in prison. 

{¶13} It is from this entry that Appellant appeals, raising two Assignments of 

Error: 

{¶14} Appellant raises two Assignments of Error: 

{¶15} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING APPELLANT’S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE RBTAINED [SIC] AS A RESULT OF THE 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEIZURE WHEN THE OFFICERS LACKED PROBABLE 

CAUSE TO ARREST APPELLANT OR REASONABLE SUSPICION TO ORDER HIM 

FROM THE VEHICLE. 

{¶16} “II. TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL BY FAILING TO ARGUE IN THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 

THAT THE OFFICERS LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST APPELLANT.” 

I. 

{¶1} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress because the officers lacked probable cause to 

arrest him and search the vehicle incident to arrest. We disagree. 

 

1

 A video recording of the initial arraignment and the preliminary hearing is included in Joint Exhibit 1, which is 

part of the appellate record for review. However, a transcript of the proceedings was not provided to this Court in 

compliance with App.R. 9(B). 
Delaware County, Case No. 10-CA-38 6 

{¶2} Appellate review of a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to 

suppress involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long (1998), 127 Ohio 

App.3d 328, 713 N.E.2d 1. During a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the 

role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to 

evaluate witness credibility. State v. Brooks, (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 661 N.E.2d 

1030. A reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are 

supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Metcalf (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 

142, 675 N.E.2d 1268. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must 

independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court’s 

conclusion, whether the trial court’s decision meets the applicable legal standard. State 

v. Williams (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 619 N.E.2d 1141. 

{¶3} The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 

guarantees each citizen a right to be free from unreasonable governmental searches 

and seizures. Specifically, it states: 

{¶4} “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 

seized.” 

{¶5} Even so, not all personal exchanges between policemen and citizens 

involves “seizures” of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or 

show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude 
Delaware County, Case No. 10-CA-38 7 

that a “seizure” has occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Terry v. 

Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, at fn. 16. 

{¶6} Under Terry, however, a police officer may constitutionally stop or detain 

an individual without probable cause when the officer has reasonable suspicion, based 

on specific, articulable facts, that criminal activity is afoot. Reasonable suspicion entails 

some minimal level of objective justification, that is, something more than an inchoate 

and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’, but less than the level of suspicion required 

for probable cause. State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, ¶ 35. 

{¶7} Blocking a person’s path or otherwise restraining movement is one 

indication that an investigatory stop has occurred. State v. Lewis, 179 Ohio App.3d 159, 

2008-Ohio-5805 (citations omitted). 

{¶8} An anonymous informant’s tip can give rise to a reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity. Alabama v. White (1990), 469 U.S. 325, 110 L.Ed.2d 301. Courts have 

generally identified three classes of informants: the anonymous informant, the known 

informant from the criminal world who has provided previous reliable tips, and the 

identified citizen informant. City of Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 299-300, 

1990-Ohio-68, 720 N.E.2d 507. Anonymous tips normally require suitable corroboration 

demonstrating “sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make 

the investigatory stop.” Florida v. J.L. (2000), 529 U.S. 266, 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 

L.Ed.2d 254. 

{¶9} It is also well settled that “the propriety of an investigative stop by a police 

officer must be viewed in light of the totality of circumstances.” State v. Bobo (1988), 37 

Ohio St.3d 177, 524 N.E.2d 489, at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
Delaware County, Case No. 10-CA-38 8 

{¶10} In the case below, the trial court determined that the initial interaction 

between the SRB detectives and Appellant was an investigatory detention, not an 

arrest. The trial court determined that no arrest occurred until after Detective Sorrell 

observed the suspected heroin and cash in plain view on Carvajal’s lap and in the van. 

{¶11} The period of time from which SRB was notified of the possible drug 

transaction to the time that the actual transaction occurred was short. When the 

sergeant at SRB received the tip, he conveyed to the detectives that the Hardin County 

Sheriff’s office informed him that the two individuals in the green Grand Prix were en 

route to the Polaris area of Delaware County to buy heroin. Detectives testified that 

they had previously relied on tips from Hardin County multiple times and that those tips 

had always been reliable. 

{¶12} As Detective Sorrell approached the van and the green Grand Prix in the 

parking lot of the apartment complex, he had his firearm drawn and had identified 

himself as a police officer. Immediately upon approaching the window on the driver’s 

side of the van, Detective Sorrell observed a bag containing numerous balloons 

consistent with how heroin is packaged on Carvajal’s lap. At that time, Detective Sorrell 

ordered Carvajal and Appellant out of the vehicle and detained them. 

{¶13} We agree that an investigatory detention occurred and that the 

circumstances described at the suppression hearing, taken as a whole, created a 

reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaged in illegal activity, and, therefore, the 

officers’ investigatory stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 

{¶14} Based upon the information conveyed to them by the Hardin County 

Sheriff’s office, as well as based on their independent observations of the green Grand 
Delaware County, Case No. 10-CA-38 9 

Prix with license plate number CUH-3508 pulling into the parking lot, backing into a spot 

and waiting in the car until a van appeared, and then flashing their lights at the van so 

that the van would pull up to them, we find that reasonable suspicion existed to support 

the investigatory stop and detention of Appellant. At the time the officers observed the 

suspected heroin in the Carvajal’s lap, they had probable cause to arrest Carvajal and 

Appellant for possession of drugs. 

{¶15} The officers’ initial intent was not to arrest the suspects; rather it was to 

approach the vehicles in order to investigate whether a drug transaction was occurring 

or had occurred. State v. Ulmer, 4th Dist. No. 09CA3283, 2010-Ohio-695, ¶20; see also 

State v. Payne (May 4, 1994), 2nd Dist. No. 13898, citing U.S. v. Hastomorir (1989), 

881 F.2d 1551, 1556-7; United States v. Glenna (1989), 878 F.2d 967, 971-973; United 

States v. Crittendon (1989), 883 F.2d 326, 329; United States v. Laing (1989), 889 F.2d 

281, 285; United States v. Miller (1992), 974 F.2d 953, 956-957. 

{¶16} We find the trial court appropriately denied the Motion to Suppress. 

{¶17} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

II. 

{¶18} To succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness, a defendant must satisfy a twoprong test. Initially, a defendant must show that his trial counsel acted incompetently. 

Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In assessing such 

claims, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within 

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must 

overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might 
Delaware County, Case No. 10-CA-38 10 

be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. at 689, quoting Michel v. Louisiana (1955), 350 

U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 164. 

{¶19} “There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given 

case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in 

the same way.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The question is whether counsel acted 

“outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. 

{¶20} Even if a defendant shows that his counsel was incompetent, the 

defendant must then satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test. Under this “actual 

prejudice” prong, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

{¶21} When counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness involves the failure to pursue a 

motion or legal defense, this actual prejudice prong of Strickland breaks down into two 

components. First, the defendant must show that the motion or defense “is 

meritorious,” and, second, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome would have been different if the motion had been granted 

or the defense pursued. See Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986), 477 U.S. 365, 375, 106 

S.Ct. 2574, 2583; see, also, State v. Santana (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 513, 739 N.E.2d 

798 citing State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 555 N.E.2d 293. 

{¶22} Based on our disposition of Appellant’s first assignment of error, his 

ineffective assistance argument regarding claim is without merit. 

{¶23} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled. 
Delaware County, Case No. 10-CA-38 11 

{¶24} For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s assignments of error are overruled. 

The judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

By: Delaney, J. 

Edwards, P.J. and 

Gwin, J. concur. 

HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS 

HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

 
[Cite as State v. Ruiz-Arias, 2011-Ohio-1198.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : 

 : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

JUAN MANUEL RUIZ-ARIAS : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : Case No. 10-CA-38 

 : 

 For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion on file, the 

judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs assessed 

to Appellant. 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN