UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

RAYMOND L. BANKSTON, 

Petitioner, Case No. 09-cv-10223 

v. District Judge John Corbett O’Meara 

 Magistrate Judge Virginia M. Morgan 

CARMEN PALMER, Warden, 

Respondent. 

_________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER 

DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

Petitioner, a Michigan prisoner, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state court convictions and sentences for unarmed robbery, 

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.530, and possession of less than 25 grams of heroin, Mich. 

Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.7403(2)(a)(v). For the reasons set forth below, the petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus is denied. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Petitioner was tried in a bench trial before the Honorable Ulysses W. Boykin in the Third 

Judicial Circuit Court. Petitioner was sentenced as a third offense habitual offender, pursuant to 

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 769.11, to prison terms of 6 – 36 years for his unarmed robbery 

conviction and 1 - 8 years for his possession of heroin conviction. 

Petitioner appealed as of right to the Michigan Court of Appeals, which affirmed his 

convictions on September 13, 2007, in an unpublished per curiam opinion. On January 8, 2008, 
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the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. On January 21, 2009, Petitioner filed the 

present petition, raising the following issue:1

 APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE 

ROBBERY CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 

II. FACTS 

A. Trial Facts 

The charges in this case arose out of an incident at a Lowe’s Home Improvement store. 

The facts recited in People v. Bankston, 2007 WL 2684010 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2007), 

affirming Petitioner’s conviction, are sufficient to address the legal issues raised by Petitioner 

and are entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Schiro v. 

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007) (holding that factual determinations by state courts are presumed 

correct and may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence). The facts are reproduced 

here: 

The loss prevention officer of a Lowe’s Home Improvement store testified that 

defendant entered the store and placed a drill in his shopping cart. He went to 

another aisle where he removed the drill from its box and stuffed it down the front 

of his pants. Defendant returned to the tool department and placed the empty box 

back on the shelf. Defendant then left the store with the concealed drill. The loss 

prevention officer and the store manager went outside to confront defendant. 

When he tried to run away, they grabbed him and a struggle ensued. During the 

struggle, defendant head-butted the manager, who sustained a laceration below 

one eye. The police arrived and eventually subdued defendant. The drill was 

recovered from defendant’s right pants leg. As defendant was being searched, a 

plastic bag containing 14 folded up lottery tickets fell out of defendant’s pants leg. 

Each of the packets contained a brown powder. The contents of one packet tested 

positive for heroin. 

People v. Bankston, 2007 WL 2684010 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2007). 

                                                           

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 The issue presented in this petition has been fully exhausted in the Michigan state courts, as 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). 
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B. State Court Opinions on Direct Review 

The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain 

Petitioner’s robbery conviction. The opinion stated: 

The prosecutor’s evidence showed that defendant took a drill and left the store 

without paying for it, then struggled with store employees in an attempt to escape 

after leaving the store. He threw his arms and head to try to break free and struck 

the store manger in the face with the back of his head. Such evidence was 

sufficient to sustain defendant’s robbery conviction and defendant presented no 

evidence to the contrary. There is nothing to indicate that the verdict was more 

likely the result of causes outside the record, such as passion, prejudice, 

sympathy, or some other extraneous influence. While there were minor 

discrepancies in the witnesses’ testimony, the circumstances were not so 

exceptional as to warrant a new trial. 

People v. Bankston, 2007 WL 2684010 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2007) (citations 

omitted). 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 governs habeas corpus 

review by federal courts of state court decisions. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) requires: 

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the 

adjudication of that claim - - 

1) Resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved in 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

2) Resulted in a decision that was based on unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding. 

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000), the United States Supreme Court 

articulated the standard of review under § 2254(d), holding that a federal court must find a 

violation of law “clearly established” by holdings, as opposed to dicta, of the Supreme Court. 
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Clearly established law is defined by the Supreme Court as “the governing legal principle or 

principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). The Court in Williams further held that a state 

court decision is “contrary to” federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to 

that reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than 

this court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

Additionally, the Court in Williams held that the “unreasonable application” clause requires an 

objective test of reasonableness and that 

an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect 

application of federal law. . . . Under § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application 

clause’, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court decision 

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that 

application must also be unreasonable. 

Id. at 410-11. 

IV. ANALYSIS 

Petitioner claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because the verdict was against the 

great weight of the evidence. However, a federal court does not have the power to grant habeas 

relief on this basis. See Dell v. Straub, 194 F.Supp.2d. 629 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Cukaj v. Warren, 

305 F.Supp.2d. 789 (E.D. Mich. 2004). This is because a great weight of the evidence claim “is 

not of constitutional dimension, for habeas corpus purposes, unless the record is so devoid of 

evidentiary support that a due process issue is raised.” Dell, 194 F.Supp.2d. at 648. Thus, the 

proper inquiry for habeas relief is whether there is any evidence to support the conviction. 

Construing Petitioner’s claim as one challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, it still 

fails. A federal court’s review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim is governed by the Supreme 
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Court’s holding in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), requiring a federal court to 

inquire “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” In this review, the federal court must determine whether the state court’s application of 

the Jackson standard was reasonable. Malcum v. Burt, 276 F.Supp.2d. 664, 683 (E.D. Mich. 

2003). 

The state court’s application of the Jackson standard was reasonable in the instant case. 

The Michigan Court of Appeals, in upholding Petitioner’s conviction, held that the prosecution’s 

evidence showing that the defendant stole a drill from a store and assaulted a store employee 

while trying to escape after exiting the store was sufficient to sustain his conviction for unarmed 

robbery under Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.530. This offense requires the prosecution to 

prove that in the course of committing a larceny, Petitioner used force against another person. 

Based on the testimony presented at trial, a rational trier of fact could find that Petitioner 

committed each of the essential elements of this crime. Therefore, Petitioner’s sufficiency of the 

evidence claim fails. 

V. CONCLUSION 

It is hereby ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be DENIED. 

Date: August 5, 2010 s/John Corbett O’Meara

 United States District Judge 

I hereby certify that on August 5, 2010 a copy of this Opinion and Order was served upon counsel of record 

using the ECF system, and upon Petitioner by first-class mail. 

 s/William Barkholz

 Case Manager