We granted r eview of Appellant’s sole que stion: “Did the court of a ppeals e rr by 1 d i s re gar d i n g Thomas in prefe renc e of Me nd oza , whe n d e c idi ngwh e the r ‘ e gre g iou s h arm ’ resulted by

the trial cour

t’s failureto sua sponte instruct the jury pursuant to 38.22 and 38.23, wh e r e a f a c tu a l d i s p ut e e x i s t e d

r e g ar d i n gth e v o l unt ar i n e s s o f a p p e l l ant ’ s s t at e m e nt ?” 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS
N O . P D 1687- 06

C O D Y LE E O U R SBO U R N , A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS ON APP ELLANT ’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW

FROM THE FI RST CO URT O F AP PEALS

HA RRI S CO UNTY C OC HRAN , J., d e liv e re d th e o p in io n o f th e u n a n im o u s C o u rt. O P I N I O N W e gr ant ed r evi ew i n t hi s cas e t o cl ar i fy w hen a t r i al cour t has t he dut yt o i ns t r uctt he j ur y on t he vol unt ar i nes s of a defe ndant ’ s s t at ement i n t he abse nce of anyr eques t fors uch i ns t r uct i ons . W e hol d t hatw hen t he evi dence raises an i s s ue of t he “vol unt ar i nes s ” of a

1Oursbourn Pag e 2

T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 38.22, §§ 6-7. 2 Al ma nza v . S

tate , 686 S.W .2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). 3 Ou rsb ou rn v . S

tate , _ _ _ S
. W
. 3 d _ _ _ , N o . 0 1

- 0 5
- 0 0 1 4 1

- C R , 2 0 0 6 T e x . Ap p . LE X IS 4 8407, at *18 (Te x . App.–Houston [1 Dist.] Sept. 28, 2006). st defe nd ant’ s st at em ent unde r A rt i cl e 38
. 22 , t he tr i al j ud ge m ust give a gen eral vo l un t ari ness 2 in s tr u c tio n u n d e r S e c tio n s 6 a n d 7 o f th a t a rt ic le b e c a u s e it is th e “ la w a p p lic a b le to th e c a s e .” B ut w hen the d efe ndantdoes not r eques t t hi s s t atut or i l ym andat ed i ns t r uct i on, t he t r i al

co u rt ’s fa il u re to inc lud e itis r ev iew ed o n lyfo r “e g reg iou s h arm ” u n d er A l m anz a. In th is 3

ca se, a m ajorit yo f th e c o u rto f a p p ea ls he ld that, b ec au se ap p ell an t did n o t object t o the ju ry
c h a r g e o r r e q u e s t a n yi n s t r u c t i o n o n v o l u n t a r i n e s s , t h e r e w a s n o e r r o r i n t h e c h a r g e . We 4 concl u d e t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e d i d e r r , a n d t h e r e f o r e we r e v e r s e a n d r e ma n d t h e c a s e t o t he

co u rto f a p p ea ls t o d eterm ine if a p p ell an t suf fe red “e g reg iou s h arm ” u n d er A l m an za . I. T he B ackground F act s and P roce dural H i s t ory A . T h e F a cts Fr ance s R app dr ove herC hevyI m pal a t o a H ous t on ni ght cl ub off Ri chmond A venue one ni ght i n N ovember , 2003. H erfr i end, B r endon M ar t i n, w as w i t h her

. A s t heygot out of t he I mpa l a , t h e ywer e “ c a r - j a c k e d ” b ya l i g h t - s k i n n e d ma n wea r i n g d a r k c l o t h e s and g lo v e s a n d a b e a n ie o n h is h e a d . T h a t m a n a p p ro a c h e d th e m a n d p o in ted a se m i-a u to m a tic handgun ag ains t M s. R app’ s s t om ach a nd demanded hercarkey s . She compl i ed. T he gunm an then drove off i n her car , w hi ch w as equi pped w i t h “O nSt ar , ” a c om m uni cat i ons andOursbourn Pag e 3

tr a c k in g s e rv ic e . M s . R a p p c a lle d b o th th e p o lic e a n d “ O n S ta r.” A t about3: 30 a. m . tha t ni ght , “O nSt ar ” l ocat ed the I m pal a. H PD Ser geantD e Los Sant os w as di s pat ched t o t he l ocat i on–an apa r t m entcompl ex. H e w ai t ed unt i l s om eone got i nt o t he I m pal a and dr ove i t off, t hen he i ni t i at ed a tr aff i c s t op. B ut t he dr i ver , l at eri dent i fi ed

as appel l ant , di d not pul l over ; i ns t ead he s ped up, l eadi ng Sgt
. D e L os Sant os and t hr ee ot her pat r ol

- caruni t s on a s hor t chas e. A ppel lant d rov e sout hbound i n a nor t hbound l ane, t hen j um ped outof t he I m pal a and f l ed on foot

. W hen appe l l antt r i ed t o cr os s a bay ou, he s l i pped

o n a r o c k a n d h i t h i s h e a d

. T h e o f f i c e r s c a u g h t u p w i t h h i m a n d t o o k h i m i n t o c u s t o d y. B e c a u se a p p e llan t su f

f e re d a m in o r in

ju ry , h e w a s ta k e n to B e n T a u b H o sp ital. T he off i cer s t hen cont act ed M s . R app w ho came t o t he s cene and gave t hem p erm i s s i on t o s ear ch hercar . T he I m pal a w as undamaged, but herpur s e, C D s , D V D s , and

camer a w er e mi s s i ng. T he “O nSt ar ” man u al w as on t he pas s engers eat , and i t s cas i ng had been r emoved fr om t he uni t i n t he t r unk. G l oves l i ke t hos e w or n byt he ca r - j acke r w er e on t he cons ol e. T w o day s l at er , H PD I nves t i gat or C ol l een G ui dr ys how ed a phot o l i neup t o M s . R app, M r. M a rtin , an d a th ird w itn e ss , O liv ia M a rtin e z . A lth o u g h a p p e llan t’s p h o to g ra p h w a s in t he l i neup, al l t hr ee pi cked outot herpeopl e. Invest i gatorG uidr yt hen i nter view ed ap pell ant. S he read h i m his Mi r anda r i ght s , and he agr eed t o w ai ve t hem and m ake a vi deot aped s t at ement . I nves t i gat or G ui dr ydeni ed

m aki ng any pr om i s es or t hr eat s or us i ng coer ci on i n t aki ng t he s t at ement , and s he s ai d t hatOursbourn Pag e 4

appel l antneveras ked fora l aw y er . She al s o s ai d t hat he w as i nj ur ed and had a ne ck br ace on, w hi ch i m pai r ed hi s abi l i t yt o comm uni cat e s om ew hat , but ot her w i s e he had no phy s i cal p ro b le m s p e a k in g . H e d id n o t a p p e a r i n to x ic a te d

. A t fi r s t , appel l ant s ai d t hat he had been at a di ffe r ent ni ght cl ub t hateveni ng. T o get hi m t o “t el l t he t r ut h, ” Inve s t i gat or G ui dr yl i ed and s ai d t hat“s om e of t he w i t nes s es had pi cked hi m out of t he phot o s pr ead, ” and t hey s ai d t hat he had a gun. A ppel l antthe n admi t t ed t o t he ca r -

j acki ng, but s ai d t hathe di d not have a gun. H e ex p lai n ed t hatt he

w i t nes s es m i ght have t hought t hathe di d beca us e he i s not abl e t o fl ex hi s i ndex fi ngerand h e h ad d ark g lov es o n . A p p ell an t did n o t t ell Inv esti g ator G u idrythat h e w as b ipo lar. A w eek l at er , M s . R app and M r. M arti n vi ew ed a l i ve l i neup w hi ch i ncl uded app el l ant, bu t again t hey picked o ut ot her peo ple. Invest i gator G uidr ydescri bed al l of these id e n tif ic a tio n s a s “ te n ta tiv e ” a n d th u s “ u n re lia b le .” B . T he P roce dural H i s t ory 1. P ret ri al A ppel l ant w as i ndi ct ed for aggr avat ed r obber y . T he t r i al j udge or der ed a c om pet ency eval uat i on, and appe l l antw as i nt er vi ew ed on Ja n u ary 29, 2004, bya cour t - appoi nt ed p syc h o lo g ist, D r. E d w a rd P . F rie d m a n , w h o c o n c lu d e d th a t ap p e llan t w a s in c o m p e ten t to

s t and t r i al

. A ppel l an t w as admi t t ed t o N or t h T exas St at e H os pi t al forobs er vat i on and tre a tm e n t. L a ter th a t yea r, h e w a s d e c lar e d c o m p e ten t an d re tu rn e d to H o u sto n to sta n d trial. A ppel l antt hen fi l ed a m ot i on t o s uppr es s hi s vi deot aped st at ement , al l egi ng t hat“heOursbourn Pag e 5

Dr. F riedman e xplained: 5 As thevid e ota

pec ontin ue d a nd theint e rv ie w p ro gre sse d, hebe c ame inc re a sin g ly more ve rbal with her . He a ppear ed to not only

understand what the alleg ations we re , what th e c ha

rg e s w e rea g a ins t hi m, b ut h e a lso a pp e are d mo tiv ate d to prese nt his behavior in a wa y that sug g ested a

n alternative explanation for what he wa s c ha rg e d w ith , whic h to me me ant t hat hewa s at th at ti me mot ivate d to basica lly portray himself and his ac tions in a better light than those in which the of fe ns e repo rt

ha d p or tr aye d th e m. w a s n o t co m p e ten t to u n d e rsta n d h is rig h ts a n d k n o w in g ly a n d v o lu n tar ily w a iv e h is rig h ts t o m ake the s t at ement . ” H e not ed t hat t he t r i al cour t had pr evi ous l yfound hi m “i ncompet ent in th is c a se .” A t th e h e a rin g o n h is m o tio n to su p p re ss , th e S tate c a lled th re e w itn e ss e s: S g t. D e Los Sant os t es t i fi ed t o t he fa ct s of t he ar r es t ; I nves t i gat or G ui dr yt es t i fi ed aboutt aki ng app el l ant’ s st at em ent; and D r. F ri edm an tes t i fi ed ab ou t app el l ant’ s m ental st at us. D r. F rie d m a n sa id th a t, ba se d o n h is i n iti a l in ter v iew , a p p e llan t w a s n o t co m p e ten t to

s t and t r i al beca us e he w as depr es s ed and non- verbal

. A ppel l antw as “s o depr es s ed t hathe sim p lyw a sn ’t m o tiv a ted to sp e a k ” a n d “ m ig h t b e to o d e p re ss e d to b e m o tiv a ted to c o o p e ra te

w i t h defe ns e couns el

. ” D r . Fr i edman s ai d t hat he m et w i t h appel l ant t hr ee m or e t i m es dur i ng t he fol l ow i ng y ear and “fel t t hat he w as compet ent . ” H e w as comm uni cat i ve and “ w hathe

comm uni cat ed t o m e w as acc ur at e and i ndi cat ed t hat he di d have both .

. . an ade quat e and

an ac cur at e under s t andi ng of t he cr i m i nal j us t i ce s y s t em. ” D r . Fr i edman a l s o s t at ed t hathe t hought t hatappel l antw as compet entw hen he ga ve hi s vi deot aped c onfes s i on on N ovember 24, 2003, even t hough “i ni t i al l yhe w as fai r l yuncomm uni cat i ve w i t h t he pol i ce of fi cerw ho

w a s inte rv iew in g h im , ju st as h e h a d b e e n w ith m e .” D r. F rie d m a n a g re e d th a t p e rso n s w ith 5 bi pol ardi s or derm i ght “have t r oubl e eva l uat i ng t hei r cons t i t ut i onal r i ght s and m ak ing aOursbourn Pag e 6

The trial judg e aske d whether a per son with bipolar disorder c ould be both competent 6 an d i n co mp et en ti na s i n gl e 2 0 -m i nut e p er i o d

. Dr
. Fr i edm ans ai d n o , b ec au s e th e m o o d

s wi n gs jus t do n’ t oc c ur

“ that r a pidly .”Whe n a sk e d whe the r a bip ola r i nd ivi du a l in

a depr e sse d o r m anic state would be inc ompetent, Dr. F riedman sa id: “It might, but it doesn’t nece ssarily mean that.” The c ourt of appe als abated this appea l to the trial court to make thefinding s of fa ct and 7 conclusions of lawrequire d by art. 38.22, § 6. Ou rsb ou rn , __ S.W .3d at __, 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 8407, at *4. pr operchoi ce a s t o w hatt o do w i t h t hos e i n m i nd, ” but onl yi f t heyw er e s o depr es s ed t hat t hey di d not car e w hathappene d t o t hem. I n t hi s cas e, appel l antappea r ed depr es s ed att he b eg inn ing o f th e tap e, bu t he later ap p ea red “v erym o ti v ated to p rese n t him s e lf in a m o re f a v o ra b le lig h t,” w h ic h in d ic a te d th a t “ h e w a s n ’t th a t d e p re s s e d .” 6 D efe ns e couns el arg u ed t hatappel l ant ’ s s t at ement s houl d be s uppr es s ed bec aus e, “l ooki ng att he fi r s tpar t of hi s s t at ement w her e t he w ar ni ngs w er e gi ven, i s w hen he appea r ed t o be uncomm uni cat i ve and i n a depr es s ed s t at e. ” T he t r i al j udge deni ed t he mot i on t o s u p p r e s s wi t h o u t ma k i n g f i n d i n g s o f

f a c t a n d c o n c l u s i o n s o f

l a w. 7 2. T he T ri al A t t ri al, defe ns e couns el ar gued i n hi s openi ng s t at ement t hatappel l anthad made a “fa l s e conf

es s i on” t o pr ot ect h is g ir lfr i end’ s r el at i ves . W hen t he pr os ecut or offe r ed t he

s t at ement i nt o evi dence , defe ns e couns el r enew ed hi s obj ect i on “on t he gr ounds t hat i t ’ s not a vol unt ar ys t at ement . T he D efe ndant ’ s bi pol arand w as i ncompet ent t o gi ve conse nt . ” The t ri al j ud ge ov erruled t he o bject i on and adm i t t ed the st at em ent. A ft er t he S t at e res t ed, defe nse
couns el cal l ed appe l l ant ’ s m o ther, E li zabe t h St ephens on, t o t he s t and. M s . St ephens on t es t i fi ed t hatappel l ant w as di agnos ed as A D D i n el ement ar y s chool and w as put on R i t al i n.Oursbourn Pag e 7

H e w as di agnos ed as bi pol ar w hen he w as 14. She expl ai ned appe l l ant ’ s m ood s w i ngs and

s t at ed t haton Sat ur day , N ovember 22, 2003–t he day of t he offe ns e–he w as i n a mani c s t at e. S h e s a i d t h a t h e w a s s t i l l m a n i c w h e n s h e s a w h i m i n j a i l t h e f o l l o w i n g M o n d a y. T he St at e ca l l ed D r . F ri ed m an i n r ebut t al

. H e t es t i fi ed t hatappel l ants uffe r s fr om depr es s i on, and t hat , i f he i s bi pol ar , D r . Fr i edman has s een hi m onl yi n t he depr es s ed s t at e. T h e p ro se c u to r a sk e d D r. F rie d m a n a b o u t ap p e llan t’s s tate m e n t: Q D r . Fr i edman, have y ou r evi ew ed t he s t at ement gi ven t o t he pol i ce i n t hi s cas e? A I s aw t he v i deo t ape o f t he st at em ent t hat he gav e, y es. Q D o y o u think at t he t i m e t hatt he D efe ndantgave thatvi deot aped s t at ement t o t he pol i ce t hathe w as abl e t o vol unt ar i l ygi ve a s t at ement t o t he pol i ce? A I b e l i e v e s o . I t h i n k h e was d e p r e s s e d , b u t I t h i n k t h a t t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e v i d e o t ape m akes i t cl eart hathe w as aw ar e of w hathe w as doi ng and, y ou know , aw ar e of w hom he w as gi vi ng t he s t at ement t o. H e a c k n o w led g e d th a t o n Ja n u a ry2 9 , 2 0 0 4 , h e f o u n d th a t ap p e llan t w a s n o t co m p e ten t: Q W h yw a s th a t? A A t l eas t I had a s er i ous ques t i on abouthi s compet ence . B eca us e even t hough I s aw no s i gn t h at he w as , y ou know , del us i onal , hal l uci nat i ng or i n anyot herw ayout of t ouch w i t h r eal i t y , he w as acti n g so d ep res s ed att hatt i m e t hatI r eal l ycoul dn’ t get hi m t o comm uni cat e w i t h m e t o any m eani ngful ext ent . A nd I w as conce r ned t hathe w as so dep res se d that i f he c ou l dn ’tcom m un i cat e w i t h m e, perhap s he w as so d e p re ss e d h e c o u ld n ’t c o m m u n ica te w ith h is a tto rn e ya s w e ll. A nd fort hatr eas on, I r ecomm ended thathe be f oun d i ncompet entand c o m m itt e d to a sta te h o sp ital f o r tre a tm e n t. Q A nd w as t hatdone? A Y es.Oursbourn Pag e 8

Appellant cla imed that the trial judg e had a “sua sponte”duty

to include such a

n 8 ins tr uc tio n. Th e te rm

“sua sponte”in this contex t means simply that the applica

ble law r equire s thetria l ju dg e to i nc lud e su c h a n in str uc tio n und e r t

hea pp ro priate c ir c ums tanc e s. Th e te rm “sua Q A nd t he – hi s demeanor on t he vi deo i nt er vi ew w as di ffe r entfr om t he demeanorhe hel d w i t h y ou on J anuar yt he 29 ? th A Att h e v e r yb e g i n n i n g h e wa s s i mi l a r l y , y o u k n o w, k i n d o f s h u t d o wn a n d , y o u k n o w, act i ng w i t hdraw n. B ut w i t hi n a fe w m i nut es on t he vi deot aped i nt er vi ew w i t h t he p o lice o f f ice r h e b e g a n to talk v e rysp o n tan e o u sly , I th o u g h t. W hen I s aw hi m i n J anuaryof l as t y ear , I w as n’ t abl e t o g et h im t o t al k, y ou k n o w , as sp o n tan e o u sly a s h e h a d talk e d to th e p o lice o f f ice r i n th e v id e o tap e a c o u p le of m ont hs befor e. D r . Fr i edma n test ifi ed he t hen met w i t h appel l anton J ul y4 and J ul y30 and “f el t att hat th th tim e th a t h e h a d b e c o m e c o m p e te n t a s a re s u lt o f h is tr e a tm e n t a t th e s ta te h o s p ita l.” I n c l o s i n g a r g u me n t , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l a g a i n a r g u e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o n f e s s i on w as fal s e and s ugges t ed t hathe w as w i l l i ng t o m ake i t beca us e “a per s on w i t h bi pol ardi s or der

m ig h t n o t h a v e a s g o o d a n a p p re c iatio n f o r th e c o n se q u e n c e s o f

w h a t w o u ld h a p p e n to h im if h e p ro te c te d s o m e b o d y , s a y , w ith a f a ls e c o n f e s s io n .” T h e S tate , in its c lo sin g , arg u e d th a t th e b ip o lar e v id e n c e w a s a ra b b it t ra il: A n d d o n ’t y o u a lso k n o w th a t if h is b ip o la r d iso rd e r in a n yw a yf ig u re d in to w hathe di d her e, t hatt her e’ d be a doc t or up her e t o t el l us all abouti t . T he onl ydoct or y ou hear d fr om w as cal l ed by t he S t at e and he t ol d y ou t hatatt he tim e th e D e f

e n d a n t c o m m itte d th is c ri m e h e k n e w it w a s w ro n g .” T h e ju ryf

o u n d a p p e llan t g u ilt ya s c h a rg e d a n d se n ten c e d h im to 7 5 y e a rs’ im p riso n m e n t. 3. T he D i rec t A ppeal A ppel l antar gued on appe al t hatt he t r i al cour t er r ed i n fai l i ng t o i ns t r uctt he j ur yon t he l aw of vol unt ar i nes s of cus t odi al confe s s i ons . T he cou rt o f ap p ea l s , i n a t w o- t o- one 8Oursbourn Pag e 9

sp on te ” does not incre ase or modify the trial judg e’s r esponsibility to instruct the jury

on the applicablelaw. 158 S.W .3d 438, 443 & n.1 ( Tex. Crim . App. 2004). 9 T h e c o urto f

a p p e a l s s u g g e s t e d

th ato n e l i n e o f

c a s e s , r e p r e s e nt e d

b y Me nd oza v . S tate , 10 88 S.W .3d 236, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), require s the defe ndant to reque st an instruction on v o l unt ar i n e s s b e f

o r e any e r r o r c anb e f o un d

. T h e s e c o n d

l i n e o f c a s e s , r e p r e s e nt e d

b y Thomas v. Sta te , 723 S.W .2d 696, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), focuse s on the appe llate standard of re view for ha rm if the def

endant doe s not request such a n instruction. In Mendoza, the question befor e us wa s whether the trial cour

t properly included de fe nd ant’ s r e qu e ste d g e ne ra l in str uc tio ns on

vo luntari ne ss (ba se d o n a rt . 3 8. 22 ), wh ile excluding his others (ba sed on ar t. 38.23). 88 S.W .3d at 239. In Thomas , the question was whether the trial cour

t erre d in failingto include a properly worde d Article 38.23 instruc tion. Thomas had r equeste d an im prop e rly wo rd e d in str

uc tio n. We f

ound no e rror and op te d n ot t o decide“whe ther a

ppellant pre serve d any

asser ted jury charg e er ror.”723 S.W .2d at 707. 966 S.W .2d 57, 60-61 (Te x . Crim. App. 1998). 11 Ou rsb ou rn , ___ S.W .3d at ___, 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 8407, at *17-19. 12 Id. at ___, 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 8407, at *19-30 (Jennings, J., di ssenting)

. 13 d e c i s i o n , d i s a g r e e d

. T h e ma j o r i t yn o t e d t h e p o t e n t i a l l yc o n f l i c t i n g p r e c e d e n t s t h a t we

m ent i oned i n P e rr

y v . S ta te , about w het her t he t r i al cour t m us t i ns t r uct t he j ur y on the

9 vol unt ar i nes s of a c us t odi al confe s s i on. T he maj ori ty co n cl uded t hata cha l l enge t o t he 10

v o lun tari n ess of a co n fe ssion is a de fe n sive issue ; th u s, u n d er P o se y v . S ta te , t he d efen se

11

m us t r eques t a j ur yi ns t ruc ti o n befor e anyer r or can r es ul t . J us t i ce J enni ngs di s s ent ed, 12

s t at i ng t hat t he m aj or i t y had i ncor r ect l y found t hat t her e w as no er r or i n t he j ur ychar ge and t hati t fai l ed t o conductan A l m anz a “egregious harm ” analy si s. 13 II. T he P ert i nent L aw U n d e r A rticle 3 8 .2 1 , “A sta tem e n t o f a n a c c u se d m a yb e u se d in e v id e n c e a g a in st h imOursbourn Pag e 10

T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 38.21. 14 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 15 W olf ev . S tate , 917 S.W .2d 270, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 16 See41 G EORGE E. D I X & R OB E R T O. D AW S ON , T EX A S P RACT I CE : C RI M I N A L P RACT I CE 17 AND P ROCE D U RE § 1 3. 39 1 at 21 8 ( 2d e d. 20 01 ) ( “ Jury

su bmi ssi on of matte rs un de r a

rt ic le 38.23(a) may

be diffe rent from submiss ion under a rticle 38.22. The ref

ore, in some c ases c are must be taken to identify

the basis for thedefe ndant’s cla im that the jury should be instructed a s to a nee d to disreg ard a

self-inc riminating state ment.”). Se ePe rry , 1 58 S.W. 3d

at 44 6 ( de fe nd ant n ot e nti tle d to a ny jur y ins tr uc tio n und e r a

rt . 18 38.23(a) as evide nce of

his intox ication and injury “does not raise any

constitutional voluntariness issues bec ause this evidenc e does not involve a ny police coe rcion or othe r off icial i f i t appea r s t hatt he s ame w as fr eel yand vol unt ar i l ym ade w i tho u t co m p u ls i on or p e rsu a sio n [ .]” A d e f

e n d a n t m a yc laim th a t h is s tate m e n t w a s n o t f re e lya n d v o lu n tar ily 14

m ade and t hus m ay not be us ed as evi dence agai ns t hi m under s ever al di ffe r entt heor i es : ( 1) A rt icl e 3 8
. 2 2 , § 6

– g en era l vo lun tari n ess; (2) Mi r anda v. A r iz ona a s e x p a n d e d in A rticle 15 38. 22, §§ 2 and 3 ( t he Texas confe s s i on s t atut e) ; or ( 3) t he D ue Pr oces s C l aus e. I t m aybe 16 i nv olunt ary u n d e r o n e, t w o, or al l t hree t heo ri es. A st at em ent t hat i s “i nv olunt ary ” as a

m at t erof cons t i t ut i onal l aw i s al s o “i nvol unt ar y ” under A r t i cl e 38. 22, but t he conve r s e nee d not be t r ue. T he t heor yof i nvolun tari n ess det er m i nes w het herand w hatt ype of a n instruction m ay b e a p p rop ri ate. T h u s, the f ir st st ep in d ec iding u p o n a n ap p rop ri ate jury 17 i nst ruct i on i s i den t i fy i ng t he theoryof invo l un t ari ness. A . C l ai m s of

i nvo l unt ar i ne s s unde r t he D ue Pro c e s s C l aus e and Mi r anda A con fessi on m ay be i nv olunt ary un der t he D ue Process C l ause onl y w he n th e re is pol i ce ove r r eac hi ng. E ven i f a c onfes sion is n o t the pr oductof a meani ngful choi ce ( for 18Oursbourn Pag e 11

ov e r- re a c hin g .” ); Al

v arad o v . S tate , 912 S.W .2dd 199, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (statement involuntary

under f eder al due pr ocess “ only

if therewas off

icial, coe rciveconduct of such a natur e that any

state me nt o bta ine d th e reby wa s u nli ke ly to h avebe e n th e pr od

uc t of an e sse nti a lly fre e and unc onstrained c hoice by its maker”)

. 479 U.S. 157 (U.S. 1986). 19 Id . at 164. In Con ne lly , the def endant a pproac hed a D enver

police off

icer and said that 20 “he ha d come a ll the way from B oston to confess to the murde r of Ma ry Ann Junta, a youngg irl whom he had killed in De nver sometime during N ovember 1982.” Id . at 16 0. Un

be kn owns t to the police ( who scrupulously followed the dic tates of Miranda ), thede fe nd ant w a s a pp are ntl y obeying the“voiceof God”which had instruc ted him “to withdraw mone y from the ba

nk, to buy an air plane ticke t, and to fly

from B oston to Denver.” Id. at 161. Even though the evidenc e sh ow e d th at th e de fe nd ant w a s su ff e ri ngfrom “ c omm and

ha llu c inatio ns that inte rf e re d w ithhis vo lit ion a l a

bil iti e s; that is , h is a

bil ity to m akefr e e and

ratio na l c ho ic e s” and

“ hewa sn ’t

c a pa ble of makin ga ‘f re e de c isi on ’ t o w a ivehis Miranda rights,” his confe ssion was not involuntary under the Fifth Ame ndment. Id. at 161-64, 169-71. Id. at 164. 21 e x a m p le, w h e n it is m a d e in re sp o n se to h a llu c in a tio n s o r to a p riv a te p e rso n ’s th re a t), i t is nonet hel es s “vol unt ar y ” w i t hi n t he meani ng of t he D ue Pr oces s C l aus e abs ents om e coe r ci ve pol i ce act i vi t y . T he Supr eme C our t m ade thi s cl eari n C o lo ra d o v . C o n n e lly , w h e n it h e ld 19 th a t if th e re is n o p o lice c o e rc io n o r o v e rre a c h in g , the re is n o d u e -p ro c e ss v io latio n

– e v e n if

a s us p e c t i s s u f

f e r i n g f r o m c h r o n i c s c h i z o p h r e n i a a n d i s i n a p s y c h o t i c s t a t e f o l l o wi n g t he “voi ce of G od” at t he t i m e he confe s s es . A bs ent pol i ce mi s conductcaus al l yr el at ed t o t he 20 confe s s i on, t her e i s “s i m pl yno bas i s forconcl udi ng t hatanys t ate ac tor has depr i ved a

cr i m i nal defe ndantof due pr oces s of l aw . ” T he D ue Pr oces s C l aus e i s ai m ed atpr ot ect i ng 21

su sp e c ts f

ro m p o lice o v e rre a c h in g , n o t at p ro tec tin g p e o p le f ro m th e m se lv e s o r o th e r p riv a te act ors. T h e sam e i s tru e f o r M i r anda r i ght s and w ai ver s t hatappl yt o cus t odi al

- i nt er r ogat i onOursbourn Pag e 12

Id. at 170. 22 Id. at 170-71. 23 Rice v . Cooper , 148 F.3d 747, 750 ( 7th Cir. 1998). 24 479 U.S. at 164 n.1. 25 Mince y v. A rizona , 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 26 Gre e nwa ld v . W

isc on sin , 390 U.S. 519 (1968). 27 s t at ement s . A s t he Supr eme C our t expl ai ned i n C o n n e lly : “ M iranda p ro tec ts d e f e n d a n ts

a g a in st g o v e rn m e n t co e rc io n lea d in g th e m to su rre n d e r rig h ts p ro tec ted b yth e F if th A m end m ent; it g o e s n o furt her t han t hat. ” T hu s, t he d efen dan t ’s w ai ver of h i s Mi r anda 22

r i ght s , m ade unde r t he per cept i on of coer ci on fl ow i ng fr om t he “voi ce of G od,

. . . i s a mat t er t o w hi ch t he U ni t ed St at es C ons t i t ut i on does not s peak. ” A s J udge Pos nerhas expl ai ned: 23 T he s i gni fi canc e of t he pr i nci pl e of C on n e lly , t he pr i nci pl e t hatt he C ons t i t ut i on does n’ t pr ot ectt he susp ec t agai ns t hi m s el f, i s t hati f he under s t ands t he M i r anda w ar ni ngs y eti s m oved bya cr azyi m pul s e t o bl ur t out a conf es s i on, t he conf

es s i on i s admi s s i bl e bec aus e i t i s not a pr oductof coerci on . T he poli ce have gi ven him his Mi r anda w a rn in g s in a n in tellig ib le for m ; i t i s not t hei r faul t t hathe i s i m pul s i ve. 24 S tate m e n ts th a t have b ee n fo u n d to b e inv o lun taryu n d er Mi r anda or t he D ue P rocess C l aus e w er e col l ect ed i n C o n n e lly ; t heyi nvol ve t he cruci al el ement of pol i ce ove r r eac hi ng 25 and i nvol ve fac t s cena r i os s uch as t he fol l ow i ng: ( 1) t he s us pectw as s ubj ect ed t o a four

- hour in ter r o g a ti o n w h ile in c a p a c itate d a n d se d a ted in a n in ten siv e -c a re u n it; (2 ) th e su sp e c t, 26

w hi l e on m edi cat i on, w as i nt er r ogat ed foroverei ght een hour s w i t hout food, m edi cat i on, or sle e p ; (3 ) th e p o lice o f f ice rs h e ld a g u n to th e h e a d o f th e w o u n d e d su sp e c t to e x tra c t a 27Oursbourn Pag e 13

Bee cher v . Alabama , 389 U.S. 35 (1967). 28 Davis v. North Carolina , 384 U.S. 737 (1966). 29 Re c k v . Pate , 367 U.S. 433 (1961). 30 Culombe v. Connec ticut , 367 U.S. 568 (1961). 31 Paynev. Arkansas , 356 U.S. 560 (1958). 32 Ashcraft v. Tennesse e , 322 U.S. 143 (1944). 33 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167. 34 confe s s i on; ( 4) t he pol i ce i nt er r ogat ed t he s us pecti nt er m i t t entl y fors i xt een da y s us i ng

28

coer ci ve t act i cs w hi l e he w as hel d i ncomm uni cado i n a cl os ed cel l w i t hout w i ndow s and w as gi ven l i m i t ed food; ( 5) t he s us pectw as hel d forfourday s w i t h i nadequa t e food a nd m edi cal 29
at t ent i on unt i l he conf es s ed; ( 6) t he s us pectw as su bject ed t o fi ve day s of r epea t ed

30 q u e stio n in g d u rin g w h ich p o lice e m p lo y e d c o e rc iv e tac tics ; (7 ) th e su sp e c t w a s h e ld 31 i ncomm uni cado f

or t hr ee da y s w i t h l i t t l e food, and t he conf es sion w as o b t ai ned w hen offi cer s i nfor m ed hi m t hatt hei r chi ef w as pr epar i ng t o admi t a l y nch mob i nt o t he j ai l ; ( 8) 32 th e su sp e c t w a s q u e stio n e d b yre lays o f o f f ice rs f o r th irty -six h o u rs w ith o u t an o p p o rtu n ity fors l eep. 33 As i s e v i d e n t f

r o m t h e s e f

a c t s c e n a r i o s , d u e - p r o c e s s and Mi r anda cl ai m s of i nvol unt ar i nes s gener al l ydo not req u ir e “sw eepi ng i nqui r i es i nt o t he s t at e of mi nd of a

cr i m i nal defe ndantw ho has co nfes s ed. ” T heyi nvol ve an obj ect i ve as s es s m entof pol i ce 34 behavi or . T he C ons t i t ut i on l eave s vol unt ar i nes s cl ai m s bas ed on t he def endant ’ s s t at e ofOursbourn Pag e 14

Id. 35 State v. Terrazas , 4 S.W .3d 720, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“Ar ticle 38.22, Section 36 6, literally

applies to ‘all ca ses where a que stion is raised as to the voluntariness of a stateme nt of an ac cused.’ ”). In Terrazas , this court expli citly overr uled Ne nn o v . S

tate , 970 S.W .2d 549, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), to the ext ent that it held that Article 38.22, § 6 a pplied only

to custodial statements. Id. Howeve r, the Court conc luded in Terrazas that the trial cour t erre d, as a matter of law, in rulingthat the def endant’ s statement to a Department of Human Service s investigator could be c onsidered “ involuntary .” Id. at 726 (the inve stigator “telling[defendant] in a noncustodial setting ‘ what had to be ’ in her statement is not the ty pe of pr acticethat has bee n held to be inher ently

coercive a s to make a state ment involuntary”). m i nd “t o be r es ol ved bys t at e l aw s gover ni ng t he admi s s i on of evi dence

. ” I n T exas , t hat 35

s t at e l aw i s A r t i cl e 38. 22, t he Texas C onfes s i on St atut e. B . C laim s o f i n v o lun tar ine ss u n d er th e T ex a s C o n fession S tatu te A r t i cl e 38. 22 of t he C ode of Cri m i nal Pr ocedur e s et s o u t r ul es gover ni ng t he admi s s i b i l i t yo f

a n a c c u s e d ’ s wr i t t e n a n d o r a l s t a t e me n t s t h a t a r e t h e p r o d u c t o f c u s t odi al i nt er r ogat i on. U nder our pr ece dent s , how ever , Sect i on 6 of A r t i cl e 38. 22 appl i es t o b o th an
a c c u s e d ’ s c u s t o d i a l a n d n o n - c u s t o d i a l s t a t e m e n t s b e c a u s e i t p r o v i d e s t h a t o n l y “ v o l u n t a r y”

s t at ement s m aybe admi t t ed. Sect i ons 2 and 3 appl yt o an ac cus ed’ s cus t odi al

- i nt er r ogat i on 36 st at em ents and provide t hat onl y “w arned and w ai ved ” st at em ents m ay be ad m i t t ed. T hat i s,
an ac cus ed’ s cus t odi al

- i nt er r ogat i on s t at ement i s not admi s s i bl e unl es s , pr i or t o m aki ng t he stat em en t, h e re ce ived the w arn ing s p rov ided in A rt icl e 1 5
. 1 7 o r A rt icl e 3 8
. 2 2 , § 2 (a) o r § 3( a) ( w hi ch i ncorpor at e t he r equi r ement s of Mi r anda ) , and he know i ngl y , i nt el l i gent l y , and

vo l un t ari l yw ai ved t ho se r i gh t s. C l ai m s of i nvol unt ar i nes s under A r t i cl e 38. 22 can be, but need not be, pr edi cat ed onOursbourn Pag e 15

Con ne lly , 479 U.S. at 166-67. 37 T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . a rt . 3 8. 21 (“ A s tate me nt o f a n a c c us e d ma

y beus e d in 38 evidenc e ag ainst him if it appears that the sa me was f ree ly and voluntarily

made without compulsion or persua sion, under the r ules here afte r pre scribed.” ). Se e, e .g., Ro c ha v . S

tate , 16 S.W .3d 1, 19-20 (Te x . Crim. App. 2000) (trial c ourt’s 39 g eneral jury

instruction under a

rticles 38.21 and 38.22 c oncer ning voluntariness of statement suffice d for jury

to consider a

ny evidenc e of his illness and medication; no error in de nying instruction that specifica lly mentioned illness and medication as that would be a c omment on the weight of the evide nce)

. This has longbeen thecasein Texas. Se eCain v . S tate , 18 Tex. 387, 389-90 (1857) 40 (“B efor e conf

essions can berec eived in evide nce in a criminal ca se, it must be shown that they w e r e v o l unt ar

y. T h e y mu s tn o th av e b e e no b t a i n e d b y th e i n f

l u e n c e o f h o p e o r f e ar , a p p l i e d b y a third person to the prisone r’s mind.”). pol i ce ove r r eac hi ng, and t heycoul d i nvol ve t he “s w eepi ng i nqui r i es i nt o t he s t at e of m i nd of a c r i m i nal defe ndantw ho has confessed ” found i n C o n n e lly t hatar e notof t hemsel ves

r el evantt o due proc es s cl ai m s . A r t i cl e 38. 22 i s ai m ed at pr ot ect i ng s us pect s fr om pol i ce 37

over r eac hi ng. B ut Sect i on 6 of t hat ar t i cl e m ayal s o be cons t r ued as pr ot ect i ng peopl e fr om th e m se lv e s b e c a u se th e f o c u s is u p o n w h e th e r th e d e f e n d a n t v o lu n tar ily m a d e th e sta tem e n t. Per i od. D oes i t appea r–as A r t i cl e 38. 21 r equi r es –t hatt he s t atem entw as fr eel yand

vo l un t ari l ym ade w i t ho ut com pu l si on or pers uasi on ? O r, i n the case of a cu st od ial- 38 i nt er r ogat i on s t at ement , di d t he s us pect“know i ngl y , i nt el l i gent l y , and vol unt ar i l y ” w ai ve t he

r i ght s s etout i n A r t i cl e 38. 22 § 2( a) or § ( 3) ( a) ? T hes e i nqui r i es do not t ur n s ol el yon pol i ce
over r eac hi ng. T he beha vi or of t he pol i ce mayor m aynotbe a f act or . A confe s s i on gi ven under t he dur es s of hal l uci nat i ons , i l l nes s , m edi cat i ons , or even a pr i vat e thre at, for 39 exampl e, coul d be i nvol unt ar yunder A r t i cl e 38. 21 and t he T exas confe s s i on s t atut e. T he 40Oursbourn Pag e 16

Georg e E. Dix, “Vo lun tar ine ss”an d “I

nte lli ge nc e ” of Con fe ssi on s as “I

nd e pe nd e nt” 41 Te x as Law I ssu es, 20 T EX . T EC H L. REV . 1017, 1080, 1091 (1989). Ro c ha v . S

tate , 16 S.W .3d 1, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 42 Be ll v . S

tate , 5 82 S.W. 2d

80 0, 81 2 ( Te x. Crim. Ap p. 19 79 ); Cas iasv . S tate , 452 43 S.W .2d 483, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). Roge rs v . S

tate , 5 49 S.W. 2d

72 6, 72 9- 30 (T e x. Crim. Ap p. 19 77 ) ( fi nd ingre ve rs ibl e 44 error in trial cour

t’s ref usal to g ive jury

g eneral instruction on voluntariness of state ment when e vid e nc e raise d a

n is su e that de fe nd ant l a c ke d th e me nta l c a pa c ity to u nd e rs tand and wa ivehis rights beforeg iving his statement)

. Ri tc hiev . S

tate , 296 S.W .2d 551, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956). In Ri tc hie , the 45 evidenc e wa s undisputed that the defe ndant was intoxi cate d, but the trial judg e found that he was not so intox icated that he could not under stand what hewas doing

. Id. T h er ef o re , th e tri al j u d ge “ ins tr uc te d th e jur

y no t to c on sid e r t

he[state me nt] unle ss t

he y be lie ve d b e yon d a

re a so na ble defe ndanti n C o n n e lly d id n o t h a v e a v a lid f e d e ra l c o n stitu tio n a l in v o lu n tar in e ss c laim , b u t, had he c onfes s ed i n T exas , he mi ght have ha d a vi abl e cl ai m underA r t i cl es 38. 21 and 38. 22. A s Pr ofes s or D i x has not ed, “evi dence of a defe ndant ’ s ps y chol ogi cal abnor m al i t y ” ( s uch as C onnel l y ’ s evi dence of hal l uci nat i ons and fol l ow i ng G od’ s comm and) “has i t s ful l l ogi cal

r e l e v a n c e ” u n d e r T e x a s l a w. 41 U nd er A rt i cl es 38
. 21 and 38
. 22 and t heirpredecessors , fact scenari os t hat can rai se
a s t at e- l aw cl ai m of i nvol unt ar i nes s ( even t hough t hey do not r ai s e a fede r al cons t i t ut i onal cl ai m ) i ncl ude t he fol l ow i ng: ( 1) t he s us pectw as i l l and on medi cat i on an d t hatfac t m ay have r ender ed hi s confe s s i on i nvol unt ar y ; ( 2) t he sus pect w as m ent al l yr et ar ded and may 42 not have “ know i ngl y , i nt el l i gent l yand vol unt ar i l y ” w ai ved hi s r i ght s ; ( 3) t he s us pect 43 “l acke d t he ment al capa ci t y t o under s t and hi s r i ght s ”; ( 4) t he sus pect w as i nt oxi cat ed, and 44 he “di d not know w hathe w as s i gni ng an d tho ught i t w as an ac ci dentr epor t ”; ( 5) t he 45Oursbourn Pag e 17

doubt that, prior to makingthe statement, the a ppellant was duly

war ned, and that therea fter he voluntarily

and fr eely

made the sa

me and unde rstood and signed it.” This Court held that the trial court did not er

r in admitting the e videnceand instructingthe jury as he did. Id. ; se eals o Fo ste r v . S

tate , 101 S.W .3d 490, 497 (Tex. App.– Houston [1 Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (notingthat st “[l] ack of sleep for as longas 16 hours doe s not, in and of itself, re nder a confe ssion involuntary ,” and that “a pe rson’s illiterac y alone will not nece ssarily rende r his statement inadmissible.”). Ha min v . S

tate , 4 7 S. W. 6 56 (T e x. Crim. Ap p. 18 98 ). As Pr of e sso r D ix poi nts out, i n 46 these e arly

decisions, “It was simply beyond question that private c oerc ion rende red a confe ssion involuntary

and that eve n private de tention invoked the pre dece ssor to article 38.22.”Dix , 20 T EX . T EC H L. REV . at 1083. Afte r 1977, howe ver, theprovisions of Article 38.22 ( except for Sections 6 and 7) a

pply only to custodial interrog ations by law enf orce ment officia ls. See41 D IX & D AW S ON , su

pra note 17, § 13.31 at 33-35. W arre n v . S tate , 2 9 T e x. 36 9 ( 18 67 ); Se eals o Dix , 20 T EX . T EC H L. REV . at 1084. 47 Se eRoge rs , 5 49 S.W. 2d at 72 9- 30 ; Ri tc hie , 2 96 S.W. 2d at 55 4; see also Gray

son v. 48 Sta te , 438 S.W .2d 553, 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (upholding trial court’s r uling that state ment was a dmissibl e despite de fenda nt’s mental re tarda

tion and stating that jury

was g iven prope r instruction to redete rmine voluntariness; “Whether appellant ha d the mental compe tency or intelligenc e re quired to wa ive his right to remain silent and to havecounsel pre sent was f or the court a nd the jury . The issue wa s fairly prese nted and r esolved a g ainst appellant.” ). s us pectw as confr ont ed byt he br ot her

- i n- law o f h i s m ur dervi ct i m and bea t en; ( 6) t he 46

s u s p e c t was r e t u r n e d t o t h e s t o r e h e b r o k e i n t o “ f o r q u e s t i o n i n g b ys e v e r a l p e r s o n s a r m ed ‘w ith six-sh o o ters. ’” 47 I n s um , t he pot ent i al “i nvol unt ar y ” fa cts cena r i os encompas s ed byA r t i cl es 38. 21 and 3 8
. 2 2 are b roa d er in sc o p e tha n tho se c o v ere d b ythe D u e P ro c e s s C lau se o r Mi r anda

. A l t hough t hi s C our t has hel d thaty out h, i nt oxi cat i on, m ent al r et ar dat i on, and ot her di s abi l i t i es ar e us ual l ynot enough, byt hemsel ves , t o r ender a s t at ement i nadmi s s i bl e under A r ti c le 3 8 .2 2 , the ya re f a c to rs th a t a ju ry , arm e d w ith a p ro p e r in stru c tio n , is e n tit led to

co n side r. 48Oursbourn Pag e 18

225 S.W .3d 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 49 Id. at 544. 50 C . Jur y Subm i s s i on o f V ol unt ar i ne s s I ns t r uc t i ons U nderT exas s t atut or yl aw , t her e ar e t hr ee t ypes of i ns t r uct i ons t hatr el at e t o t he t aki ng
o f c o n f e ss io n s: (1 ) a “g e n e ra l” A rticle 3 8 .2 2 , § 6 v o lu n tar in e ss in stru c tio n ; (2 ) a “ g e n e ra l” A r t i cl e 38. 22, § 7 w ar ni ngs i ns t r uct i on ( i nvol vi ng w ar ni ngs gi ven under § 2 and § 3) ; and ( 3) a “s peci fi c” A r t i cl e 3 8
. 2 3 ( a) excl us i onar y - r ul e i ns t r uct i on. I n es s ence , t he Sect i on 6 “gene r al ” i ns t r uct i on as ks t he j ur y : “D o y ou bel i eve, bey ond a r eas onabl e doubt , t hatt he d ef en d an t’ s statem en t w as vo lun tari ly m ad e? If itw as n o t, d o n o t con side r t h e d ef en d an t’ s confe s s i on. ” The Sect i on 7 i ns t r uct i on s et s out t he re qui r ement s of 38. 22, § 2 or § 3 and as ks t he j ur yt o deci de w het heral l of t hos e req u i r ement s w er e met . T he A r t i cl e 38. 23( a) “s peci fi c” i ns t r uct i on i s fac t - bas ed: For exampl e, “D o y ou bel i eve thatO ffi cerO bi e hel d a g u n to the d ef

en d an t’ s h ea d to ex tr ac t his st atem en t? If so , d o n o t co n side r t h e d ef en d an t’ s
c o n f e s s io n .” A s w e n o ted in V

a sq u e z v . S ta te , co n fu sion ex ists ab o u t w h ich, i f a n y , jury 49 i ns t r uct i on i s appr opr i at e becaus e our cas e l aw “does not al w ay s di s t i ngui s h, and s om et i m es bl ur s , t he r equi r ement s forgett ing an i ns t r uct i on underar t i cl e 38. 22 and forget t i ng an in s tr u c tio n u n d e r t h e e x c lu s io n a ry ru le o f a rt ic le 3 8 .2 3 .” 50 W e agai n t r y t o cl ar i fy t he di s t i nct i on: D ue pr oces s and Mi r anda cl ai m s m ayw ar r ant b o th “ g e n e ra l” a n d “ sp e c if ic” v o lu n tar in e ss in stru c tio n s; T e x a s sta tu to ry c laim s w a rra n t o n lyOursbourn Pag e 19

See Ma dd

e n v . S tate , 242 S.W .3d 504, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 51 See State v. Terrazas , 4 S.W .3d 720, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (dec iding that 52 Ar tic le 38 .2 2, § 5 ’s pr ov isi on e xemp tin gno n- c us todia l st ate me nts from t hec ov e ra g e of

Ar tic le 38.22 did not apply

to § 6). a “ge ner al ” vol unt ar i nes s i ns t r uct i on. I t i s t he def endant ’ s r es pons i bi l i t yt o del i neat e w hi ch t ype o f “i nv olunt ari ness” he is cl ai m i ng –a general (per hap s subject i ve) l ack o f vo l un t ari ness
o r a sp ec ifi c p o li ce -co erc ed lac k o f v o lun tari n ess– b ec au se th e jury instruction is ve ry d if f e re n t d e p e n d in g u p o n th e typ e o f c la im

. O b v io u sly , the e v id e n c e m u st ra ise a “ v o lu n tar in e ss ” iss u e , an d th e d e f e n d a n t sh o u ld

r eques t a j ur yi ns t r uct i on t hatr el at es t o hi s t heor yof i nvol unt ar i nes s . B ut i f t he def endant

never pr es ent s a pr opos ed j ur y i ns t r uct i on ( or fai l s t o obj ectt o t he l ack of one) , anypot ent i al

erro r i n the c h arg e is rev iew ed o n lyfo r “e g reg iou s h arm ” u n d er A l m an za . 51 1. A r t i c l e 38 . 22 , § 6 ( G e ne r al V ol unt ar i ne s s ) I ns t r uc t i ons A r t i cl e 38. 22, § 6 i s a verydet ai l ed sec t i on t hat i s es s ent i al l y i ndepende nt of t he ot her sect i on s contai ned w i t hin A rt i cl e 38
. 22
. S ect i on 6 p rovi des: 52 In al l cases w her e a ques t i on is r ais ed as t o t he vol unt ar i nes s of a s t at ement of a n a c c u s e d , t he court m us tm ake an i ndepende ntf i ndi ng i n t he abs ence of t he j ur y as t o w hethert he s t at em ent w as m ade undervol unt ar y condi t i ons . I f t he sta tem e n t h a s b e e n f

o u n d to h a v e b e e n v o lu n tar ilym a d e a n d h e ld a d m iss ib le a s a m a t t e r o f l a w a n d f

a c t b y t h e c o u r t i n a h e a r i n g i n t h e a b s e n c e o f t h e j u r y, t he cour t m us t ent eran or ders t at i ng it s concl us i on as t o w het heror not t he s t at ement w as vol unt ar i l y m ade, al ong w i t h t he s peci fi c fi ndi ng of fa ct s upon w h ich th e c o n clus ion w as b ase d , w h ich o rde r sha ll b e fil ed am o n g the p ap ers of t he ca us e. Such or ders hal l not b e exhi bi t ed t o t he j ur ynor t he fi ndi ng th e re o f m a d e k n o w n to th e ju ry in a n ym a n n e r. U pon t he f i ndi ng by the j udge as a m at t er of l aw and f act t hat t he st at em ent w as vol unt ar i l y m ade, evi dence per t ai ni ng t o s uch m at ter m ay b e subm i t t ed t o t he j ur y and i ts hal lbeOursbourn Pag e 20

T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 38.22, § 6 (e mphasis added)

. 53 SeeT EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . arts. 38.22, § 7 (“ When the issue is raised by the evidenc e 54 . . . ”) a nd 38.23(a) (“wherethe leg al evidenc e ra ises an issue her eunder . . .”). Th e tria l ju dg e mus t a lso makewritt e n f inding s o f f

a c t and c on c lus ion s o f l aw i n 55 support of his ruling . T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art . 3 8
. 2 2 , § 6
. T h e n ee d fo r w ri tt enfi n d i n gs should alert the pa

rties and tria l judgeto the need f or a g eneral voluntariness jury instruction as i ns t r uct ed thatunl ess th e jury bel i eve s beyond a r eas onabl e doubt t hatt he s t at em ent

w as vol unt ar i l

y m ade, t he j ur

y s hal lnotcons i ders uch s t at em ent f or a ny p u rp o se n o r a ny e v id e n c e o b ta in e d a s a re su lt th e re o

f. In a n yca se w h ere a mo ti o n to s uppr es s t he s t at ement has been f i l ed and e vi dence has been s ubm i t t ed t o t he cour t on t hi s i s s ue, t he cour t w i t hi n i t s di s cr et i on m ay re c o n sid e r su c h e v id e n c e in h is f in d in g th a t th e sta tem e n t w a s v o lu n tar ily m ade a nd t he s ame evi dence s ubm i tt ed t o t he cour t att he hea r i ng on t he m o ti o n to su p p ress sh all b e m ad e a p art of the re co rd th e s a m e a s if i t w ere b e in g p re se n ted a t th e tim e o f trial. H o w e v e r, th e sta te o r th e d e f e n d a n t sh a ll be ent i t l ed t o pr es ent anynew evi dence on t he i s s ue of t he vol unt ar i nes s of t he st at em ent pr i or t o the cou rt ’s fi nal ruli ng and order s t at i ng i t s fi nd i ng s. 53 T he l anguage “w her e a ques t i on is ra ise d ” c o n tr ast s w ith th e lan g u a g e f o u n d in A rticle 38. 22, § 7 and A r t i cl e 38. 23 w hi ch s peaks of t he evi dence r ai s i ng an i s s ue. B eca us e r ai s i ng 54 a “que s t ion ” is w hatt r i gger s t he t r i al cour t ’ s dut yunderSect i on 6 t o conducta hea r i ng
o u tsid e th e p re se n c e o f th e ju ry , the o n ly rea so n a b le r e a d in g o f th is la n g u a g e is th a t a “ques t i on i s r ai s ed” w hen t he t r i al j udge i s not i fi ed by a par t y or r ai s es on hi s ow n an i s s ue aboutt he vol unt ar i nes s of t he conf es s i on. T hi s i s t he s eque n ce of eve nt s t hats eems t o be cont empl at ed bySect i on 6: ( 1) a par t y not i fi es t he t r i al j udge t hat t her e i s an i s s ue aboutt he vol u n tari nes s of t he conf es s i on ( or t he t r i al j udge r ai s es t he i s s ue on hi s ow n) ; ( 2) t he t r i al j udge hol ds a hear i ng out s i de t he pr es ence of t he j ur y ; ( 3) t he t r i al j udge dec i des w het hert he

c o n f e s s i o n w a s v o l u n t a r y; ( 4 ) i f t h e t r i a l j u d g e d e c i d e s t h a t t h e c o n f e s s i o n w a s v o l u n t a r y, 55Oursbourn Pag e 21

we ll. See Terrazas , su pra (§ 5 not applica

ble to § 6, g iven the spec ific provisions found in § 56 6). 96 6 S. W.2 d 5 7, 60 (T e x. Crim. Ap p. 19 98 ) ( a de fe ns iveiss ueis n ot “ law a pp lic a bleto 57 the ca se” unle ss the defe ndant timely reque sts the issue or objects to its omiss ion from the jury charg e). i t w i l l be admi t t ed, and a pa r t ym ayoffe r e v iden ce b ef or e t he j ur ys ugges t i ng t hatt he confe s s i on w as not i n fac t vol unt ar y ; ( 5) i f s uch evi dence i s offe r ed befor e t he j ur y , t he t r i al j udge s hal l gi ve t he j ur ya vol unt ar i nes s i ns t r uct i on. I t i s onl yaft ert he t r i al j udge i s not i fi ed of t he vol unt ar i nes s i s s ue ( or r ai s es i t on hi s ow n) t hat a chai n of ot herr equi r ement s comes i nt o pl ay , cul m i nat i ng i n t he def endant ’ s r i ght t o a j ur yi ns t r uct i on. A nd S ect i on 6 e x p re ss ly dict at es t he co ntent of that i nst ruct i on t o b e as foll ow s: “unl es s t he j ur ybel i eves bey ond a r eas onabl e doubtt hatt he s t at ement w as vol unt ar i l ym ade, t he jur yshal l no t con si der such st at em ent for anypu rpose no r anyevidence o btai ned as a

r es ul t t her eof. ” B eca us e Sect i on 6 cont ai ns i t s ow n j ur y - instruction pr ovi s i on, i t i s not gover ned byt he j ur y - i ns t r uct i on pr ovi s i o n found i n Sect i on 7. T he obvi ous purpos e of 56 Sect i on 7 i s t o aut hor i ze a nd r equi r e j ur y i ns t r uct i ons r egar di ng t he w ar ni ngs and s afe guar ds f o r w ritten a n d o ra l sta tem e n ts o u tli n e d in A rticle 3 8 .2 2 , § 2 & § 3 (w a rn in g s o n th e rig h t to

rem ain s il en t, ri g h t t o co u n sel, etc). C ons equent l y , a Sect i on 6 i ns t r uct i on becomes “l aw ap p li ca bl e t o t he ca s e” unde r P o se y v . S ta te onl yi f t he par t i es actual l yl i t i gat e a Sec t i on 6 vol unt ar i nes s i s s ue bef or e t he 57
tr ia l j u d g e. If su ch li ti g ati o n o cc u rs (on the a d m issi b il ityo f e v iden ce fo r ex am p le), a juryOursbourn Pag e 22

686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (“some ha rm” ve rsus “e greg ious harm”)

. 58 Vasq ue z v . S tate , 225 S.W .3d 541, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting that, although a 59 de fe nd ant m ay

bee nti tle d to an Art ic le 38 .2 2 ju ry ins tr uc tio n e ve n whe n th e e vid e nc e is undisputed, “[s] ome evidenc e must have be en pre sented to the jury that the def

endant’ s confe ssion was not g iven voluntarily .”). i ns t r uct i on need notbe s peci fi cal l yr eques t ed t o pas s t he P os ey gatew ay , al t ho ug h a request

w o u ld sti ll b e n ec essa ryto o b tai n the m o st be n ef ici al ha rm an aly sis un d er A lm a n za v . S ta te . 58 A n i nt erpr et at i on of Sect i on 6 t hat r equi r es s om e s or t of l i t i gat i on befor e i t becomes l aw appl i cabl e t o t he ca s e ac cor ds not onl y w i t h t he s t atut or yl anguage but al s o w i t h comm on
s ens e. T he br oad r ange of vol unt ar i nes s i s s ues cover ed bySect i on 6 coul d eas i l ybe i m pl i cat ed byevi dence t hatw oul d al s o be r el evantforot herpurpos es , and Sect i on 6 does not

even r equi r e t he exi s t ence of a fac t ual di s put e t hat m i ght at l eas t obl i quel y al ert t h e t r i al j udge t o t he nee d foran i ns t r uct i on. T he S ect i on 6 r equi r ement t hatvol unt ar i nes s be l i t i gat ed i n s om e manner befor e a j ur yi ns t r uct i on becomes nece s s ar yens ur es t hatt he t r i al j udge i s on not i ce thatt he i ns t r uct i on i s r equi r ed. 59 For exampl e, t he evi dence m aybe undi s put ed t hat t he defe ndant di d not s l eep f or 24 hour s , or has a l ow I
. Q
. , or w as “hi gh” on drugs att he t i m e he gav e h i s s t at ement . I f a

re a so n a b le ju ryc o u ld f in d th a t th e f

a c ts, d isp u ted o r u n d is p u te d , ren d e re d h im u n a b le to

m ake a vol unt ar ys t at ement , he i s ent i t l ed t o a gener al vol unt ar i nes s i ns t r uct i on w hen he ha s
ra is e d a q u e s tio n o f

th e v o lu n ta ri n e s s o f

h is s ta te m e n t. 2. A r t i c l e 38 . 22 , § 7 ( St at ut or y W ar ni ngs ) I ns t r uc t i ons If t he defen dan t m ade h i s st at em ent as t he resul t of cu st od i al i nter rogat i on , he is al soOursbourn Pag e 23

T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 38.22, § 7. 60 Se e, e .g., Me nd

oza v . S tate , 8 8 S
. W
. 3 d

at2 3 8 n . 1 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g a 61 portion of an Ar

ticle 38.22, § 7 jury

instruction). ent i t l ed–w hen t he i s s ue i s raised byt he evi dence –t o have the j ur ydeci de w het herhe w as adequa t el yw ar ned of hi s r i ght s and know i ngl yand i nt el l i gent l y w ai ved t hes e r i ght s . Sect i on 7 o f A rt i cl e 38
. 22 st at es: W h e n th e iss u e is rais e d b y th e e v id e n c e , th e trial j u d g e s h a ll a p p ro p ria tely in stru c t th e ju ry , g e n e ra lly , o n th e law p e rta in in g to su c h sta tem e n t. 60 T h e p h ra se “ th e iss u e ” re f e rs to c o m p lian c e w ith th e sta tu to ry w a rn in g s s e t o u t in b o th A r t i cl es 15. 17 ( D ut i es of A rresti ng O ffi cerand M agi s t r at e) and 38. 22, §§ 2 & 3, and t he vol unt ar i nes s of t he defenda nt ’ s w ai verof t he r i ght s . For i t t o be “r ai s ed byt he evi dence ” t h e r e mu s t b e a g e n u i n e f a c t u a l d i s p u t e , j u s t a s i s t r u e u n d e r Ar t i c l e 3 8
. 2 3 i s s u e s . Th e s a me p roc edur es –i ncl udi ng a hea r i ng out s i de t he pr es ence of t he j ur yand t he entr yof w r i t t en fi ndi ngs –t hatappl yt o a gene r al vol u n ta r i nes s chal l enge unde r Sect i on 6, al s o appl yt o a
c h a llen g e th a t is m a d e to th e su f f icie n c yo f

w a rn in g s a n d v o lu n tar yw a iv e r o f th e rig h ts

co m m u n icated b ytho se w arn ing s. A s w ith S ec tio n 6 , the tri al j u d g e’s S ec ti o n 7 jury i ns t r uct i ons ar e “ge ner al ” ones t hats etout t he per t i nent law and l egal r equi r ement s of S ec ti o n s 2 an d 3 (or, i n an ap p rop ri ate c ase , tho se o f A rt icl e 1 5
. 1 7 ). 61 B ut s uppos e t her e i s s om e evi dence that t he pol i ce he l d a gun t o t he hea d of t he defe ndant–w ho, unbeknow ns t t o t he p o li ce , had nots l eptfort w ent y - fourhour s –t o ext r act t he conf es s i on. I n t hatcas e, t he def endantm ayalso b e ent i t l ed t o a fa ct - s peci fi c,Oursbourn Pag e 24

T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 38.23. 62 Se eMu rp hy

v . S tate , 640 S.W .2d 297, 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). 63 242 S.W .3d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 64 Id. at 51 0; Se eals o H

olm es v . S

tate , 248 S.W .3d 194, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); 65 Pi e rc ev . S

tate , 32 S.W .3d 247, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). exclusi on ary -rule i nst ruct i on , i n ad dit i on t o the t w o g eneral vo l un t ari ness i nst ruct i on s. 3. A r t i c l e 38 . 23 ( Ex c l us i ona r y R ul e ) I ns t r uc t i ons A r t i cl e 38. 23 ( a) s t at es t hat ( a) N o evi dence obt ai ned byan off i ceror ot herperson i n vi ol at i on of any pr ovi s i ons of t he C ons t i t ut i on or l aw s of t he St at e of Texas , or of t he C o n stitu tio n o r la w s o f th e U n it e d S tate s o f

A m e ric a , sh a ll b e a d m itt e d in evi dence agai ns t t he ac cus ed on t he t r i al of anycr i m i nal cas e. In a n yc a se w h e re th e leg a l ev id e n c e ra ise s a n iss u e h e re u n d e r, th e ju rysh a ll be i ns t r uct ed t hati f i t bel i eves , or h as a r eas onabl e doubt , t hatt he evi dence w as obt ai ned i n violati on of t he pr ovi s i ons of t hi s A r t i cl e, t hen and i n s uch event , t he j ur ys hal l di s r egar d anys uch evi dence s o obt ai ned. 62 T he w or di ng i s abs ol ut e ( “t he j ur ys hal l be i ns t r uct ed”) , j us t as i t i s i n A r t i cl e 38. 22, but t he t r i gger i ng m echa ni s m i s m or e compl ex. A s w e r ece nt l yhel d i n M a dd e n v . S ta te , 63 64
t he s econd s ent ence of A r t i cl e 38. 23 r equi r es a j ur yi ns t r uct i on onl yi f t h ere i s a genui ne d isp u te a b o u t a m a ter ial f a c t. A d e f

e n d a n t m u st es tab lish th re e f o u n d a tio n re q u ire m e n ts to 65
t r i ggeran A r t i cl e 38. 23 i ns t r uct ion : ( 1) t he evi dence hear d byt he j ur ym us t r ai s e an i s s ue of fa ct ; ( 2) t he evi dence on t hatfac t m us t be af fi r m at i vel ycont es t ed; and ( 3) t he cont es t ed fac t ual i s s ue must be m at er i al t o t he l aw ful nes s of t he cha l l enged c onducti n obt ai ni ng t heOursbourn Pag e 25

242 S.W .3d 510. 66 Id. Se eals o 40 G EORGE E. D I X & R OB E R T O. D AW S ON , T EX A S P RACT I CE : C R I MI NAL 67 P R AC TI C E AND P ROCE D U RE , § 4.194, at 282 (2d. e d. 2001).

Madden , 242 S.W .3d at 513 nn. 22-23. 68 A f a c t- sp e c if ic , e xclu sio na

ry-r uleins tr uc tio n mi ght l oo k s ome thi nglik e thi s: 69 I f you find from the e videncethat Offic er O bie held a gun to the defe ndant’s hea d in an ef fort to make thedefe ndant g ive him a statement, or if you have a rea sonable doubt there of, you will disreg ard thedefe ndant’s videotape d statement and no t us e it f

or any purp os e wh atso e ve r d

uringyour d e lib e ratio ns . H ow e ve r, if you find from the e vidence , beyond a re asonabledoubt, that Office r Obie did not ho ld a gun to t hede fend ant’ s h e a d in

an e ff or t to makethede fe nd ant g ivehim a statement, then you may

consider thedefe ndant’s videotape d statement during your d e lib e ratio ns . s t at ement cl ai m ed t o be i nvol unt ar y . T he def endantm us t offe r evi dence t hat , i f cr edi t ed, 66

w ou l d creat e a reasonable dou bt as t o a spec i fi c factual m at t er es sent i al t o the voluntar i ness of t he s tat em en t. T hi s fac t ual di s put e ca n be r ai s ed onl ybyaff i r m at i ve evi dence , not by 67

m e re c ro ss -e x a m in a tio n q u e stio n s o r a rg u m e n t. 68 For exampl e, t he offi cer i n our hypot het i cal m aydeny , on cr os s - exami nat i on, t hathe hel d a gun t o t he defe ndant ’ s head t o ext r actt he conf es s i on. T he i m pl i cat i on bycouns el , t hat t he off i cerdi d p erf

o rm that act , does not , byi t s el f, r ai s e a di s put ed fa cti s s ue. B ut i f t he defe ndant( or s om e ot herw i t nes s ) t est i fi es t hatt he off i cerhel d a gun t o hi s head, t hen a di s put ed fa cti s s ue exi s t s . A nd t he j ur ym us t r es ol ve t hatdi s put ed fa cti s s ue. 69 I f t he j ur y fi nds t hat t he offi cer di d hol d a gun t o t he defe ndant ’ s head, t he s t at ement i s i nvol unt ar yas a mat t erof fe der al cons t i t ut i onal l aw . I f t he j ur y fi nds t he off i cerdi d not do s o, t he s t at ement i s not cons t i t ut i onal l yi nvol unt ar y . O f cours e, i f t her e i s no di s put edOursbourn Pag e 26

Con ne lly , 4 79 U. S. at 16 4 &n. 1; s ee also State v . Terrazas , 4 S. W. 3 d 7 2 0 , 7 2 7 ( T e x. 70 Crim. Ap p. 19 99 ) ( c iti ngNo te : Evidenc e-Criminal Law-Cons tituti onal Law -Due Process- Confessions-Judge and J ury-De termination of Preliminary Fact of Voluntariness of Confession , 3 B A Y LOR L .REV . 561, 563-65 (1951) (inhere ntly coercive pr actice s include: subjection to persistent and pr otrac ted questioning , threats of mob violence, unlaw ful detention incommunicado without adviceof counse l or frie nds, and takingat night to lonely and isolated place s for que stioning))

.

Se eMi le s v . S tate , 241 S.W .3d 28, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 71 fac t ual i s s ue–i f t her e i s a vi deo def i ni t i vel ys how i ng t hatt he off i cerdi d or di d not hol d a gun t o t he def

endant ’ s head–t he l egal i t yof t he conducti s det er m i ned byt he t r i al j udge al one, as
a q u e s t i o n o f

l a w . T h e l e g a l q u e s t i o n w o u l d n e v e r g o t o t h e j u r y. N or m al l y , “s peci fi c” e xcl usion ary - r ul e i ns t r uct i ons conce r ni ng t he maki ng of a

con fessi on are w arr anted on l y w here an officer uses i nh erent l y coerci ve p ract i ces l i ke those

s etout i n C o n n e lly

. I n T exas , i f t her e i s a di s put ed fa cti s s ue aboutw h ethe r th is t ype of 70

coer ci ve p r a c t i c e was e mpl o y e d

– b y e i t h e r a n o f f i c e r o r a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n

– t o wr i ng a 71

co n fe ssion out of a s us pectagai ns t hi s w i l l , a s peci fi c exc l us i onar y - r ul e i ns t r uct i on under A r t i cl e 38. 23 i s appr opr i at e. 4. E rror in the F ail u re to G i ve A p p rop ri ate V olun tari n ess I n st ru cti on s T h e q u e stio n th e n b e c o m e s: W h e n d o e s a trial ju d g e e rr in f a ili n g to g iv e a n A rticle 38. 22 or 38. 23 j ur y i ns t r uct i on? A s t he cour t of appeal s not ed, our cas es m i ght appea r t o be i n confl i cton w het hert her e ca n be anyer r or w hat s oever–atl eas t i n t he A r t i cl e 38. 23 cont ext–abs enta pr oper r eques t byt he def endant

. T he cour t of appe al s poi nt ed t o Mend oza , i n w hi ch w e s t at ed, “G ener al l y , w hen evi dence fr om any s our ce r ai s es a def ens i ve i s s ue andOursbourn Pag e 27

Me nd oza v . S tate , 88 S.W .3d 236, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 72 Indeed, theopinion indicates that the trial judg e shall instruct the jury whene ver a

fac t 73 issue is raised c oncer

ning theleg ality

of obtainingevidenc e. A little later in Me nd oza , we state d: Fur ther, a rt. 38.23(a) provides that in any casewher e a pa

rty raises a n issue reg ardingwhether

evidenc e wa s obtained in violation of the laws of T exas or the Un ite d St ate s, thejur

y sh a ll b e ins tr

uc te d th at if

it b e lie ve s, or

ha s a re a so na ble doubt, that the evidenc e wa s obtained bec ause of such a violation, then the jury shall disreg ard a

ny such evide nce. Id. at 239. Then w e stated: When the evidenc e pre sented at trial raises a fac tual issue as to whethe r a de fe nd ant h a d b e e n w arn e d o f h is rights and vo luntari ly

wa ive d th e m prior

to makinga stateme nt, he is entitled to an instruction on voluntariness of the c on fe ssi on . I

n s uc h c a se s, it i s p ro pe r t o in c lud e in t hejur y c ha rg e a sp e c if ic instruction informing thejury that, if it has a re asonabledoubt as to whether a defe ndant knowing ly , intelligently , and voluntarily waived his rights beforeg iving a conf ession, it mustdisreg ard theconfe ssion and not consider it for a ny purpose. Id. (citation omitted). We later state d: In any casein which the evide nce r aises an issue r eg ardingwhether evidenc e wa s ob ta ine d in

vio latio n o f t

helaws of

Te xas, thejur

y sh a ll b e ins tr

uc te d th at if

it believes, or

has a r easona

ble doubt, that the evidenc e wa s obtained in violation there of, then the jury

shall disreg ard a

ny such evide nce. T he ter

ms of art. 38.23(a) aremandatory . There fore , when a n issue of fa ct is raised a s to compulsion or persua sion in obtaining a c onfession, a de fenda nt has a statutory

right to have the j ur y c h ar g e d a c c o r d i n g l y. Id. (citation omitted). Nowhe re did wesay that this statutory

entitlement depends upon the defe ndant makinga prope r re quest for a jury instruction on “g eneral” voluntariness or a “spec ific” instruc tion on ill eg ally obtained evide nce. t he def endantpr oper l yr eques t s a j ur ychar ge on tha t is s ue, t he t r i al cour t m us t s ubm i t t he i s s ue t o t he j ur y . ” B ut t h at g ener al s t at ement does not i m pl yt he conve r s e–t hatt he t r i al 72

cour t need ne ver s ubm i t a j ur y i ns t r uct i on on a par t i cul ar defe ns i ve i s s ue unl es s t he def endant pr oper l y r eques t s one. T her e i s not hi ng i n t hat s ent ence or i n t he r es t of t he Mend oza opi ni on t hats t at es or hol ds t h at th e t r i al j udge s hal l i ns t r uctt he j ur yt o di s r egar d i l l egal l yobt ai ned evi dence o n ly i f t he def endantr eques t s a j ur ychar ge on t hati s s ue. 73Oursbourn Pag e 28

966 S.W .2d 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 74 Id. at 60. 75 T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . a rt . 3 6. 14 (s tatin g , in

pe rt ine nt p art , th at “ in e a c h f e lony c a se 76 and in ea ch misdemea

nor ca se tried in a c ourt of re cord, thejudgeshall, befor e the a rgument beg ins, deliver to the jury , except in pleas of guilty , wher e a jur y has bee n waived, a

written charg e distinctly

setting f orth the law a

pplicable to the c ase; not expressingany opinion as to the weight of the evide nce, not summingup the testimony , discussing thefac ts or using a ny argument in his charg e ca lculated to arouse the sy mpathy or excite the passions of the jury .”). 966 S.W .2d at 62-63. 77 T h e c o u r t o f

a p p e a ls’s a rg u m e n t f

o r c o n c lu d in g th a t a tria l ju d g e h a s n o d u tyto i ns t r uctt he j ur yon t he vol u nt ar i nes s of a de fenda nt ’ s s t at ement underei t herA r t i cl e 38. 22

or A r t i cl e 3 8
. 2 3 rests on t he pr emi s e t hatt he vol unt ar i nes s of a c onfes s i on i s a “de fens i ve issue

. ” A n d , u n d er P o se y v . S ta te , a t r i al cour t has no dut yt o i ns t r uctt he j ur yon

74

unr eques t ed def

ens i ve i s s ues –s uch as m i s t ake of fact

. A d ef

ens i ve i s s ue i s not “l aw 75

a p p lica b le to th e c a se ” f o r p u rp o se s o f

A rticle 3 6 .1 4 u n les s th e d e f e n d a n t ti m e lyre q u e sts 76
t h e i s s u e o r o b

j e c t s t o t h e o mi s s i o n o f t h e i s s u e i n t h e j u r yc h a r g e . An yo t h e r h o l d i n g , we
s ai d i n P os ey , w o u ld re n d e r A rticle 3 6 .1 4

– w h ich a lso re q u ire s a p a rtyto m a k e sp e c if ic obj ect i ons t o t he char ge–meani ngl es s , and “m i ght encour age a defe ndantt o r et r yt he ca s e on
a p p e a l u n d e r a n e w d e f e n s iv e th e o ry e f

f e c tiv e ly g iv in g h im tw o b ite s a t th e a p p le .” W e 77

s t at ed t hat t he r es ul t i n P os ey “i n n o w ayun dercut s or l i m i t s A l m an za ’s an aly ti ca l fram ew o rk i n cas es t o w hi ch A l m an za a p p l i e s ” b e c a u s e whe n “ A l m an za s peaks of ‘ er r or s ’ of

co m m issi o n an d o m issi o n in t h e co u rt ’s ch arg e, it sp ea k s o f issu es u p o n w h ich a tr ial co u rtOursbourn Pag e 29

Id. at 61 n.9. 78 De lga do v . S

tate , 235 S.W .3d 244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (footnote omitted). 79 For example, T EX . R. E V ID . 1 05 (a) e xplic itl y re c ognize s th at th ea dv oc ate s b e ar f ull 80 responsibility

for r equestingappropriate limiting instructions when they areentitled to them. The ru le state s: (a) Limiti ng Instruction. --When evide nce which is admissible as to one par ty or fo r o nepurp os e but no t a dmi ssiblea s to ano the r p art y or fo r a no the r p ur

po se is admitted, the cour

t, up on re qu est , shall restrict the e videnceto its proper scope and instruct the jury

acc ording ly ; but, in the absenceof such r equest the c ourt’s action in admitting suc h evidenc e without limit ation shall not be a ground for c omp la int on a pp e a l. T EX . R. E V ID . 105(a) (empha sis added). Trial judge s should be war y of g iving a

limit ing instruction under Rule 105(a) without a re quest bec ause a party might we ll intentionally

fore g o a limit ing instruc tion as part of its deliber ate strategy “to minimiz e the jury ’s re collection of the unfavor able e vidence .” United States v. J ohnson , 46 F.3d 1166, 1171 ( D.C. Cir. 1995). Posey , 966 S.W .2d at 60 & n.5. 81 h as a d u tyto instruc t w ith o u t a req u est o r objecti o n fro m eit h er p arty [.]” 78 T he pr i nci pl e i n P os ey i s t hatno r ul e ors t atut e r equi r es t he t r i al j udge t o gi ve i n s t r u c t i o n s o n t r a d i t i o n a l d e f e n s e s a n d d e f

e n s i v e t h e o r i e s a b s e n t a d e f e n d a n t ’ s r e q u e s t . As

w e r ece nt l ys t at ed i n D el gado : “The t r i al j udge has an abs ol ut e su a sp o n te d u tyto p rep are
a j ur y char ge t hat acc ur at el y s et s out t he l aw appl i cabl e t o t he s peci fi c off ens e cha r ged. B ut i t does not i nevi t abl yfol l ow t hathe has a s i m i l ar su a sp o n te d u ty to in stru c t th e ju ryo n a ll pot ent i al defe ns i ve i s s ues , l es s er - i ncl uded off ens es , or evi dent i ar y i s s ues . T hes e ar e i s s ues t hatfr equent l ydepend upon tr i al s t r at egyand t act i cs . ” T hes e ar e al so issue s o n w hi ch 79 in s tr u cti o n s are n o t m an d ated b yan ystat u te. T h u s, u n d er P os ey , i t i s onl y w hen a 80 “r equi r ement of [t he] var i ous s t atut or yp rov isi ons r efe r ence d i n A r t i cl e 36. 19 ‘ has been di s r egar ded, ’ ” t hatt he t r i al cour t er r s i n om i t t i ng i ns t r uct i ons r el at i ve t o t hats t atut e. 81Oursbourn Pag e 30

12 S.W .3d 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 82 Id. at 484. 83 Id. at 484 n.7 (c itations omi tted). As wa s noted by the Austin Court of Appea ls, the 84 s am e i s tr u e f o r i n s tr u c t i o n s o na c c o mp l i c e - w i tn e s s t e s t i m o ny: An ins tr uc tio n a s to thepr op e r e ff e c t of a c c omp lic e -w itn e ss t e sti mony . . . is no t a defe nsive issue. Unlike def ensive issues which a

re discr etionary , the nee d for c or ro bo ratin ge vid e nc e wh e n b a sin ga c onvic tio n o n a

n a c c omp lic e ’s te sti mony is codified by

our leg islature. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 38.14. Although deciding which def ensive issues to re quest is ty pically a strate g ic dec ision left to the lawyer a nd c lie nt, it i s d if

fi c ult to t hink o f a sit uatio n whe reany

re a so na bly c omp e te nt l awye r w ou ld B ut w her e a rul e ors t atut e r equi r es an inst ruct i on un der t he p art i cularci rcum st ances, th a t in stru c tio n is “ th e law a p p lica b le to th e c a se .” S u c h sta tu tes a n d ru les se t o u t an im p licit “If- t hen ” propo si t i on : If t he evi den ce r ai ses an is sue of [vo l un t ari ness, accom pli ce w i t ness, confi dent i al i nfor m ant , et c. ] , t hen t he t r i al cour t s hal l i ns t r uctt he j ur yt hat[w hat evert he

s t atut e orr ul e r equi r es ]
. I n H u iza r v . S ta te , for exampl e, w e hel d t hat A r t i cl e 37. 07 i s “t he 82 l aw appl i cabl e” t o al l non- capi t al puni s hm entp r o c e e d i ngs . T hus , t he t r i al j udge must i ns t r uct t he jur yat t he p un i shm ent phase con cerni ng t hat l aw , i ncludi ng t he fact t hat t he S t at e m ust pr ove anyext r aneous offe ns es bey ond a r eas on ab le d o ubt

. W e di s t i ngui s hed P os ey and 83 expl ai ned t he di ffe r ence bet w een i ns t r uct i ng t he j ur yon “def ens i ve” i s s ues and i ns t r uct i ng t hem on t he law t hat i s appli cable t o all cases: I n P os ey , w e hel d t hat “a defe ns i ve i s s ue i s not [l aw ] ‘ appl i cabl e t o t he ca s e’ forpurpos es of ar t i cl e 36. 14 unl es s t he defenda nt t i m el yr eques t s t he i s s ue or obj ect s t o t he omi s s i on of t he i s s ue i n t he j ur y ch arg e. ” I n cont r as t t o a “defens e” w hi ch depe nds on t he def endant ’ s t heor yof t he ca s e and the evi dence pr es ent ed, appl i cabi l i t yof ar t i cl e 37. 07 § 3( a) i s not cont i ngenton e ith e r p a rty ’s th e o ry o f th e c a se . R a th e r, ar ticle 3 7 .0 7 § 3 (a ) is a leg isla tiv e ly pr es cr i bed bur den of pr oof appl i cabl e t o ext r aneous offe ns e and ba d act e v id e n c e a d m itt e d a t p u n ish m e n t i n al lnon- capi t alcas es . 84Oursbourn Pag e 31

not seek a n acc omplice-witness instruction for strateg ic re asons. We find that the statutorily require d instruction reg ardingacc omplice-witness testimony , unlike defe nsive issues, is “law applica

ble to the ca se.” Afailureto instruct the jury that an ac complice’ s testimony must be corr oborate d by

other e videncetendingto connec t the defe ndant to the crime is er

ror. Ho war d v . S tate , 972 S.W .2d 121, 126 (Tex. App.–Austin 1998, no pet.).
We rec ently

reiter ated this duty

in Pi ck e ns v . S tate , 165 S.W .3d 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 85 2005): Ba sed upon our holdingin Al ma nza , su pra , that unobjected- to jury-cha rg e er ror war rants re versa l only

when the e rror

results in egreg ious harm, we ha ve held that the question of whe ther the de fenda nt has prese rved jury-cha rg e er ror is re levant Si m i l ar l y , A r t i cl es 38. 21- 3 8
. 23 ar e l egi s l at i vel ym andat ed pr ocedur es gover ni ng t he admi s s i on and cons i der at i on of a de fenda nt ’ s s t at ement s . A r t i cl e 38. 21 expl i ci t l ys t at es t hat vol unt ar ys t at ement s m aybe us ed i n evi dence “undert he rul es her eaf t erpr escr i bed” –t hat i s , A r t i cl e 38. 22 and A r t i cl e 38. 23. A r t i cl e 38. 22, § 6 i s “t he l aw appl i cabl e” t o anycas e i n w hi ch a “ ques t i on” i s r ai s ed and l i t i gat ed as t o t he “ge ner al ” vol unt ar i nes s of a s t at ement of an a ccus ed. A s not ed above , undert hats t atut e, t he t r i al j udge m us t t hen ( 1) m ake a n i ndepende nt det er m i nat i on t hatt he

s t at ement w as m ade un d er v o lun ta r ycondi t i ons ; and t hen ( 2) i ns t r uctt he j ur or s t hatt hey sh a ll n o t c o n sid e r th e sta tem e n t f o r a n yp u rp o se u n les s th e yb e liev e , b e y o n d a re a so n a b le d o u b t, th a t th e s ta te m e n t w a s m a d e v o lu n ta ri ly. A r t i cl e 38. 23 i s “t he l aw appl i cabl e” t o anycas e i n w hi ch a s peci fi c, di s put ed i s s ue
o f f ac t is raised co n ce rnin g the co n sti tuti o n al v o lun tari n ess o f th e m ak ing o f th e d ef en d an t’ s
s t at ement . T hes e ar e s t atut or i l y m andat ed i ns t r uct i ons and t he t r i al j udge m us t i ncl ude t hem i n t he j ur yi ns t r uct i ons w hen t he vol unt ar i nes s of a de fenda nt ’ s s t at ement i s ati s s ue. 85Oursbourn Pag e 32

only if thereis a deter

mination that error

actua lly occur red. Tho mas v . S

tate , 723 S.W .2d 696, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Tho mas a lso a c kn ow le dg e d th at Art ic le 38.23 provides in mandator y terms “that a

jury is to be instructed to resolve fac tual disputes over whe ther e videncewas illeg ally obtained and, the ref

ore, inadmissible.” Id. We have morerec ently reiter ated that “ an Ar

ticle 38.23 ins tr uc tio n mu st b e inc lud e d in thejur y c ha rg e on ly if the reis a fa c tua l di sp ute about how the e videncewas obtaine d.” Ga rza v . S tate , 1 2 6 S. W. 3 d

7 9 , 8 5 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2004). Thus, if a de fenda nt raises a fac tual dispute about whethe r e vid e nc e wa s il le g a lly

ob ta ine d, an Art ic le 38 .2 3 in str uc tio n mu st b e inc lud e d in the jury charg e. Id. at 680. Ou rsb ou rn , ___ S.W .3d at ___, 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 8407, at *13.

86 Id. 87 III .

A p p l i cati on of t h e L aw to T h i s C ase T he ques t i on r emai ns as t o w het herA rt icl e 38. 22 or A r t i cl e 38. 23 j ur yi ns t r uct i ons

w er e “the l aw appl i cabl e” t o t hi s par t i cul arcas e. T he cour t of appeal s not ed t hat“t her e w as evi dence pr es ent ed bef

or e t he j ur yt hat appel l antw as i n pai n, w as l i ed t o aboutt he evi dence

a g a in st h im , an d d isp layed c h a ra c ter istics o f b e in g in a v u ln e ra b le m e n tal s tate d u e to h is bipol ar dis order. ” T hat evidence w as suffici ent, according t o t he court of ap peals , “t o rai se 86 th e is s u e o f

v o lu n ta ri n e s s a n d to c re a te a f a c tu a l d is p u te a s to v o lu n ta ri n e s s .” 87 W e agree t o a cer t ai n ex t ent, bu t t his evidence rai sed on l ya “gen eral ” vo l un t ari ness ques t i on underA r t i cl e 38. 22, § 6, not a const i t ut i onal due- pr oces s cl ai m t hatt he s t at ement

w as i l l egal l yobt ai ned underA r t i cl e 38. 23. A ppel l ant ’ s cons i s t entcl ai m , a cl ai m w hi ch he had l i t i gat ed i n t he t r i al cour t , w as t hat he w as bi pol ar and i n a depr es s ed orm ani c s t at e and t her efor e he w as unabl e t o eff ect i vel yw ai ve hi s r i ght s . T her e w as evi dence i n t he r ecor d t hatOursbourn Pag e 33

See F razier v. Cupp , 394 U.S. 731, 737-39 (1969) (ref using to find that a

defe ndant 88 wh o c on fe sse s, a ft e r b e ingfa lse ly tol d th at hi s c od e fe nd ant h a s turn e d St ate ’s e vid e nc e , d oe s so inv olu nta ri ly ); Ro dr iqu e

z v . S tate , 934 S.W .2d 881, 890-91 (Te x . App.–Waco 1996, no pet.) (“ Th e fa c t th at th e int e rrog atin gof fi c e rs fa lse ly

state d to Rod

ri qu e z that th e vic tim , o n h is a p p e llan t, tw o m o n th s a f ter g iv in g h is c o n f

e ss io n , w a s d e c lar e d in c o m p e ten t to sta n d trial. T he St at e’ s ps y chol ogi s t w ho found hi m inco m pet entt o s t and t r i al t es t i fi ed t hathe w as
com petent w hen he gav e his con fessi on , bu t , as appe l l ant poi nts ou t , t hat s am e psy cho l og i st tes tifie d th a t ap p e lla n t w a s m a n if e stin g sy m p to m s o f

h is b ip o lar d iso rd e r d u rin g h is i nt er r ogat i on, es peci al l yatt he begi nni ng. A nd a p p e l l a n t ’ s moth ert es t i fi ed t hatappel l antw as i n a “mani c” s t at e s hor t l ybefor e and aft er hi s ar r es t . T he i s s ue of vol unt ar i nes s s houl d have been s ubm i t t ed t o t he j ur yunderA r t i cl e 38. 22, § 6, beca us e a r eas onabl e j ur ycoul d concl ude, bas ed on t hi s evi dence , t hat t he st at ement w as not vol unt ar y . T hi s i s a st atut or ycl ai m and focus es upon appel l ant ’ s s ubj ect i ve ment al s t at e. A ppel l antdi d not r ai s e anydi s put ed fa ctual i s s ue under A r t i cl e 38. 23 conce r ni ng t he l egal i t yof obt ai ni ng hi s s t at ement beca us e t her e w as no evi dence of t he t ype of pol i ce
coer ci on or over r eac hi ng envi s i oned by the Supr eme C our t i n C o n n e lly

. L i k e C o n n e l l y, appel l ant ’ s confe s s i on m ayhave been “i nvol unt ar y ” bec aus e of hi s ow n s ubj ect i ve ment al

s t atus , but not beca us e of i l l egal pol i ce conduct

. A l t hough appel l ant not es t hatI nves t i gat or G u id ry lied to h im a b o u t so m e w itn e ss e s h a v in g id e n tifie d h im in th e p h o to sp re a d , it i s w e ll

es t abl i s hed t hatl y i ng aboutt he s t at e of t he evi dence i s no t the so rtof “ove r r eac hi ng” t hat i m pl i cat es t he D ue Pr oces s C l aus e, as l ong as t he s ubt er fuge us ed i s not one l i kel yt o pr oduce

an u n t r u e s t a t e me n t . Fu r t h e r mor e , t h e r e was n o f a c t u a l d i s p u t e c o n c e r n i n g I n v e s t i g a t or 88Oursbourn Pag e 34

deathbe d, identified him as the assa ilant does not support a findingthat the conf ession was involuntarily

g iven. The voluntariness of a c onfession is not destroyed, and a confe ssion induced by deception or tricker

y , is not inadmiss ible, unless the method used wa s calc ulated to produc e an untr uth fu l c on fe ssi on

or wa s o ff e ns iveto d

uepr oc e ss. ” ); Sn ow v . S

tate , 721 S.W .2d 943, 946 (Tex. App.– Houston [1 Dist.] 1986, no pet. ) (“ voluntariness is not destroyed, and a confe ssion st ind uc e d b y de c e pti on

or tric ke ry is n ot i na dmi ssible , unle ss t heme tho d u se d w a s c a lc ulate d to pr od uc e an untr

uth fu l c on fe ssi on

or wa s o ff e ns iveto d

uepr oc e ss. ” ); see als o Holland v. Mc Ginn is , 963 F.2d 1044, 1051- 52 (7th Cir. 1992) (policeoffice r’s misrepr esentations c on c e rn ingthestr e ngth o f t hee vid e nc e a g a ins t th esu sp e c t “ int e rf e re d li ttl e , if

at a ll, wi th h is ‘fr ee a nd deliberate choice ’ of whe ther to conf ess, for it did not lead him to consider a ny thing beyond his own beliefs re g ardinghis actual guilt or innocence , his moral sense of right and wron g , a nd his judgme nt r e g ardingthelik e lih oo d th at th e po lic e ha d g arn e re d e no ugh v a lid evidenc e linking him to the crime. In other words, the dec eption did not interject the ty pe of extrinsi c conside rations that would overcome Holland’ s will by distorting an othe rwise r ational c ho ic e of wh e the r t o c on fe ss o r r e ma in s ile nt. ” ) ( c itatio n o mitte d) ; se ege ne ra lly , C.T. Drec hsler, Annotation, Admissibi lity of Conf ession as Affected by

Its Induce ment through Artifice, Dec eption, Trickery, or Fraud, 99 A.L .R.2d 772 (1965 & Supp. 1993). Under Al

ma nza , th e iss ueto a dd

re ss i s th e imp a c t of

theomi ssi on

of a “ g e ne ra l” 89 voluntariness instruction. See Ellis on v . S tate , 8 6 S. W.3 d 2 26 , 2 28 (T e x. Crim. Ap p. 20 02 ); see also Posey , 966 S.W .2d at 60 n.3

Al ma nza , 686 S.W .2d at 171. 90 G ui dr y ’ s conduct

. She l i ed about t he re s ul t of t he phot o l i ne- up. T hati s undi s put ed. T he tr ial jud g e w o u ld reso lve an y p u rpo rt ed d u e p roc ess c lai m as a m att er o f law b ec au se th ere

w as no fac t ual di s put e. T her efor e, a j ur yi ns t r uct i o n u n d er A r t i cl e 38. 23 i s not “t he l aw
a p p lic a b le ” to th is c a s e . A r t i cl e 38. 22, § 6 w as “t he l aw appl i cabl e” t o t hi s cas e; A r t i cl e 38. 23 w as not . B ut beca us e appe l l antneverr eques t ed an A r t i cl e 38. 22, § 6 “gene r al ” vol unt ar i nes s i ns t r uct i on, h e is en ti tl ed to rev iew o f th at error o n lyu n d er A l m an za ’ s “egr eg iou s har m ” s t andar d. 89 U n d er that s t andar d, r ever s i bl e err or i n t he omi s s i on of a r equi r ed j ur yi ns t r uct i on w i t hout

o b j e c t i o n o c c u r s o n l yw h e n a d e f e n d a n t h a s b e e n d e n i e d “ a f a i r a n d i m p a r t i a l t r i a l

. ” We 90Oursbourn Pag e 35

t her efor e r ever s e t he cour t of appeal s and re m and t hi s cas e for fur t her pr ocee di ngs cons i s t ent

w ith th is o p in io n . D el i ver ed: J une 4, 2008 P ub l i sh