This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A16-1156 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Jesse Tyler Schafer, Appellant. Filed February 21, 2017 Affirmed Schellhas, Judge Meeker County District Court File No. 47-CR-14-823 Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Brandi L. Schiefelbein, Meeker County A ttorney, Thomas Boeni gk, Assistant County Attorney, Litchfield, Minne sota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Jesson, Pres iding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Schellhas, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N SCHELLHAS , Judge Appellant challenges his probation revocati on, arguing that (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction over his case based on the j uvenile court’s certification of the case to adult court; (2) the district court committe d reversible error by finding appellant in2 violation of a condition regard ing unsupervised contact with minors; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to show that the need for appellant’s conf inement outweighs the policies favoring probation. We affirm. FACTS On November 1, 2013, when appellant Jesse Schafer was 17 years old, he had sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old girl. Respo ndent State of Minnes ota initially filed a delinquency petition against Scha fer in juvenile court, char ging him with third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The j uvenile court certified Schafer to stand trial as an adult, 1 and the state then filed a complain t in adult court, charging Scha fer with one count of thirddegree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (2012) (complainant at least 13 but less than 16 year s of age and actor more than 24 months older than complainant). At a plea hearing on October 6, 2014, Scha fer pleaded guilty to one count of thirddegree criminal sexual conduct. The district court stayed adjudication for four years, conditioned on Schafer’s full co mpliance with terms of proba tion, which included, among other things, that any contact by Schafer wi th females under age 16 be supervised and approved in advance by Schafer’s corrections agent. In less than a year, Schafer signed four probation agreements that, in pertin ent part, prohibited him from (1) using or

1 Although the addendum to Schafer’s appellate brief includes a copy of the certification order, the record before us does not include th e delinquency petition filed in juvenile court, Schafer’s waiver of a certificat ion hearing in juvenile cour t, or the juvenile court’s certification order. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (“ The documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases.”).3 possessing alcohol or mood-altering chemical s, except as prescr ibed; (2) owning or possessing “any computer (or anyt hing with computer capabilitie s such as iphones, smart phones, ipads, tablets, watches, etc) that does not have inst alled pornographic filters and social media filters”; (3) having “unsupervis ed contact with females under the age of 16. Supervised contact is approved through sex o ffender treatment therapist and supervising Corrections Agent”; and (4) possessing or us ing “any pornographic/sexually explicit material.” On April 13, 2015, Scha fer admitted to violati ng his probation by using methamphetamine and marijuana, by not putti ng a pornography filter on his phone, and by viewing pornography. The district court revoked the stay of adjudica tion, stayed imposition of the sentence, and continued Schafer on pr obation for four years from the date of the hearing with terms of probation as previously imposed. The court also ordered Schafer to register as a sex offender. On June 16, 2015, Schafer again admitted that he viol ated his probation by using marijuana and by using the Inte rnet to access Facebook. Amon g other things, the district court vacated the stay of imposition, imposed a prison sentence of 36 months, and stayed execution of the sentence. On September 4, 2015, after Schafer committed another probation violation, the cour t imposed sanctions on him. On April 14, 2016, Schafe r appeared at another admit-deny probation-violation hearing. The district court explained the al leged probation violati ons on the record as follows:4 THE COURT: The violation repo rt — I’m just going to go over the violations with you to make sure you understand ‘em. [I]t’s alleged that you violated th e following. Condition—special condition number fourteen, not to use or possess alcohol or mood-altering chemicals except as prescribed. The specifics of that are that you did admit to ha ving a few beers and some pills, and admitted to that around April 13. [A]lso it’s alleged that yo u violated special condition number nineteen, not to access or use of internet without approval. That on April 6 y ou admitted you had possession of a cell phone that you did turn over to your agent at that time, and there was a confirmation the pr oper filters weren’t in place. [A]nd that you also admitted there was a second cell phone which was returned to your mother. There’s another allegation th at you violated special condition number twenty. That you were not to have unsupervised contact with females under the age of sixteen and that there were numerous pictur es of you having contact with females that appeared to be under sixteen in that phone. Special condition number twenty -two is alleged to be in violation, not to use or po ssess any pornographic or sexual explicit material, and after review of the phone it showed that there were two sexually explicit pictures and one video. Do you understand the allegations? THE DEFENDANT: Ah , yes, Your Honor. Schafer denied the allegations, and the cour t conducted a contested probation-violation hearing. On April 18, 2016, after the conteste d probation-violation hearing, the court found that Schafer violated probation, that his prob ation violations were serious, not technical, and went directly to the underlying offense, and that Schafer’s confinement was appropriate because probation was no lo nger sufficient to protect public safety. The court revoked the stay of execution and committed Schafer to the Minnesota Department of Corrections for 36 months. This appeal follows.5 D E C I S I O N
I Schafer argues that his conviction and senten ce are void because the adult court that convicted and sentenced him never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over his case. Schafer argues that the juvenile court’s cer tification order was insufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the adult court be cause the juvenile cour t transferred the case to adult court based on his waiver and the pa rties’ plea agreement, not on public safety. This court “review[s] th e juvenile court’s decision to certify a child to adult court for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of J.H. , 844 N.W.2d 28, 34 (M inn. 2014). We “review questions of law de no vo, and . . . findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard.” (citation omitted). Id. at 34–35. “A finding is clearly erroneous only if there is no reasonable evidence to support th e finding or when an appella te court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” Id. at 35 (quotation omitted). We construe Schafer’s subject-matter juri sdiction argument to be a challenge to the validity of the juvenile court’ s certification order. Because th e record before us does not include Schafer’s waiver of a certification hear ing in juvenile court or the juvenile court’s certification order, the record is insufficient to conduct a review of the validity of the certification order. Based on our reading of the certification orde r included in the addendum to Schafer’s appellate brief, even if we were to consider Schafer’s challenge to the validity of the certification order, Schafe r would not prevail. Schafer attacks the certification order on the basis that it does not contain a require d finding that certification would serve public safety. But the certificati on order in Schafer’s addendum complies with6 the requirements applicable to an order issued following a waiver of the right to a certification hearing and stipulation to the certification order. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.07, subds. 1 (outlining the re quirements for a certification order following a waiver and stipulation, which do not include a requirement that such an order contain public-safety findings), 2 (requiring a certificat ion order issued after a contes ted certification hearing to contain public-safety findings); see also Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.01, subd. 1 (stating that Rule 18 of the Minnesota Rules of Juven ile Delinquency Procedure applies when, as here, “the prosecutor moves for certification a nd a child is alleged to have committed, after becoming fourteen (14) years of age, an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult”).
II Schafer argues that the district court commi tted reversible error by finding that he violated a condition regarding unsupervised contact with mi nors, contending that his probation conditions did not require him to obt ain his corrections agen t’s advance approval of his contact with females under age 16, as l ong as an adult supervised the contact. He claims that he fully complied with his pr obation conditions because his adult girlfriend supervised his contact with her female children under age 16. Before revoking probation, a di strict court must determine on the record (1) if a specific condition of probation was violated and (2) whether that violation was intentional or inexcusable. State v. Modtland , 695 N.W.2d 602, 606 (Minn. 2005) (citing State v.
Austin , 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980)). If the court finds clear and convincing evidence of an intentional or in excusable violation, the distri ct court also must evaluate7 whether the need for confinement outwe ighs the policies favoring probation. Id. ; see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 2(1)(c)b (requir ing proof of a probati on violation by clear and convincing evidence before probation can be revoked). “A district court has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficien t evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Ornelas , 675 N.W.2d 74, 79 (Minn. 2004) (quoting Austin , 295 N.W.2d at 249

− 50) (quotation marks omitted). Schafer’s argument that he complied with the terms of his probation fails because the terms of his probation required him to get advance approval from his corrections agent before having supervised contac t with females under age 16. Schafer also argues that his probation revocation violates due process because the written terms of his probation did not afford him fair notice that he must obtain agent approval before having supervis ed contact with females under age 16. “When sentencing a defendant, a court shall st ate the precise terms of the sentence.” Id. at 80 (quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4( A)) (quotation marks om itted). “In imposing a probationary sentence, if noncriminal conduct could result in revocation, the trial court should advise the defendant so that the defendant can be reasonably able to tell what lawful acts are prohibited.” Id. (quotation omitted). “It is an esse ntial component of due process that individuals be given fair warning of those acts which ma y lead to a loss of liberty.” Id. (quotation omitted). “This is no less true whether the loss of liberty arises from a criminal conviction or the revocation of probation.” Id. (quotation omitted). “When the acts prohibited by the probation conditions are not criminal, due process mandates that the petitioner cannot be subjected to a forfeiture of his liberty for those acts unless he is given8 prior fair warning.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Whether a defendant has been denied due process of law is a question of law that [this court] review[s] de novo.” State v. Beaulieu , 859 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Minn. 2015). At his sentencing hearing, the district court specifically clarified the meaning of the advance-approval probation c ondition and Schafer acknowledges that, “[b]ack in 2014, the court did state that he needed such a pproval.” Moreover, the probation condition was included in each of the four probation agreements that Scha fer signed, and we reject Schafer’s suggestion that the wo rding in the probation agreemen ts is ambiguous. His past conduct was consistent with an understandi ng that he was required to receive agent approval before having adult-su pervised contact with females under age 16. On at least one occasion, he asked his corrections agent to a pprove his mother to supervise him when he had contact with females under age 16. Schafer also argues that he did not have fair notice that he needed agent approval before having adult-supervised contact with females under age 16 because he received mixed messages from the district court. After a careful review of th e record, we are not persuaded. The record contains sufficient evid ence that Schafer had fair notice that he needed approval from his corrections agent befo re having supervised contact with females under the age of 16. We conclude that his pr obation revocation theref ore did not violate his due-process rights.
III Schafer argues that clear and convincing ev idence does not show that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring prob ation. Even if the facts allow probation9 revocation, “policy considerations may require that probation not be revoked.” Modtland , 695 N.W.2d at 606 (quotation omitted). “[T]he purpose of probation is re habilitation and revocation should be used only as a la st resort when tr eatment has failed.” Id. (quotation omitted). “When determin ing if revocation is appropriate, courts must balance the probationer’s interest in freedom and the stat e’s interest in insuri ng his rehabilitation and the public safety, and base their decisions on sound judgment and not just their will.” Id. at 606–07 (quotations omitted); see also State v. Rottelo , 798 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. App. 2011) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discre tion when it revoked probation because Rottelo did not remain in contact with probation offi cers, had multiple offenses in his history, and showed a pattern of noncompliance with probation), review denied (Minn. July 19, 2011). A court should only revoke probation if the court finds on the basis of the original offe nse and the intervening conduct of the offender that: (i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity by the offender; or (ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment which can most effectively be pr ovided if he is confined; or (iii) it would undul y depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.
Modtland , 695 N.W.2d at 607 (quotation omitted). We conclude that the record contains cl ear and convincing evidence supporting the district court’s finding that “the need for confinement [was] outweighed by the public policy that favors it.” The district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Schafer’s probation. Affirmed

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