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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

v.

Joye Vaught,

Defendant.

 CR-2018-0422-SMB

MOTION TO SEVER

NOW COMES the Defendant, Joye Vaught, by and through her counsel of 

record, Joy Bertrand, to ask this Court to sever this matter from the trial of her

codefendants. As further grounds therefore, the Defendant submits the 

following:

UNDERLYING FACTS

The Government sought indictment of Ms. Vaught for one count of 

conspiracy and fifty counts of violation of the Travel Act for allegedly facilitating 

prostitution. The Indictment describes Ms. Vaught as Backpage’s “assistant 

Joy Bertrand, Esq.

PO Box 2734

Scottsdale, Arizona 85252-2734

Telephone: 480-656-3919

Fax: 480-361-4694

joyous@mailbag.com

www.joybertrandlaw.com

Arizona State Bar No. 024181

ATTORNEY FOR: DEFENDANT

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operations manager,” but does not describe her day-to-day work duties. (ECF 

Doc. 3 at 2)

Much of the conduct that the Government alleges against Ms. Vaught 

involves her being copied on emails sent by others. (ECF Doc. 3 at 10-11, 14, 15, 

19, 21, 22, 24, 25,27) In its 61-page indictment, the Government sites one instance 

where Ms. Vaught sent an email with any directive, telling the moderator to 

remove links to “sex for money” web sites. (ECF Doc. 3 at 26) In another email, 

the Government alleges Ms. Vaught stated to moderators, “As far as I’m aware, 

we are no longer removing ads for GFE [girlfriend experience].” (ECF Doc. 3 at 

28)

The Government does not allege in the Indictment that Ms. Vaught created 

any of the posting policies for Backpage. The Government does not allege that 

she had any power to change any of Backpage’s operations. The Government 

also does not allege that Ms. Vaught received any of the profits from Backpage. 

Rather, the Government attempts to lump Ms. Vaught in with the 

powerful, wealthy men who ran Backpage.com. To try her with her 

codefendants creates the real risk that the Government’s proof against her 

codefendants will also envelop her. To try her with her codefendants also 

prevents her from defending herself at trial. She likely will not be able to cross 

examine her codefendants after the Government presents their prior statements 

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to the jury. She also likely will not be able to present their testimony, which is 

one of the only ways she will be able to show the jury that she was not part of the 

larger scheme.

ARGUMENT

This case presents four bases that, viewed independently, support 

severance of the Defendants’ trials. Collectively, the give no choice – Ms. Vaught 

must be severed from her codefendants. First, Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 8 and Ninth 

Circuit case law, joinder is inappropriate in a circumstance such as the case at bar 

where the Defendants’ acts are starkly different. Second, under Fed. R. Evid. 403, 

the evidence proffered against the Defendants may be unfairly prejudicial 

against Ms. Vaught, their cases must be severed. Third, the Government likely 

will use the statements of her codefendants at trial, though they may not testify, 

also requiring severance. Fourth, the codefendants may have exculpatory 

information that assists Ms. Vaught’s defense. If the codefendants do not testify, 

then Ms. Vaught will not be able to call them as witnesses at a joined trial, in 

violation of Ms. Vaught’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. 

I. Fed. R. Evid. 8 Requires Severance of Ms. Vaught from her CoDefendants.

Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 8(b) provides, “The indictment or information may 

charge 2 or more defendants if they are alleged to have participated in the same 

act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an 

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offense or offenses. The defendants may be charged in one or more counts 

together or separately. All defendants need not be charged in each count..”.

The circumstances of the present case are similar to those in United States v. 

Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1977). In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that a 

defendant, who only participated in two of the five robberies set forth in the 

indictment, was improperly joined with his codefendant, who committed all five 

of the robberies. The Ninth Circuit wrote, “Other logical relationships might also 

be sufficient to establish that a group of offenses constitutes a ‘series of acts or 

transactions,’ but a mere showing that the events occurred at about the same 

time, or that the acts violated the same statutes, is not enough.” Id. at 1344, citing 

United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 1971).

Here, the Government accuses Ms. Vaught and her codefendants of 

dozens of counts of violating the Travel Act – although the Indictment does 

nothing to differentiate how each defendant knowingly committed each of the 

crimes. In the same Indictment, the Government also charges Ms. Vaught with 

eleven counts of money laundering, with which Ms. Vaught was not involved. 

It is clear from the Indictment, that Ms. Vaught’s involvement in the 

activities was significantly less than that of her codefendants. Much like the

defendant in Satterfield, whom the Government alleged to be involved in only a 

small portion of a large series of events, Ms. Vaught cannot be roped in with her 

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codefendants and receive a fair trial, “[a]t a joint trial, where one defendant is 

charged with offenses in which the other defendants did not participate, the 

detailed evidence introduced to establish guilt of the separate offenses may shift 

the focus of the trial to the crimes of the single defendant. In such cases, 

codefendants run a high risk of being found guilty merely by association” Id. at 

1346. 

II. Fed. R. Evid. 403 Requires Severance

Because the evidence regarding the codefendants’ alleged misdeeds could 

be unfairly prejudicial against Ms. Vaught, severance also is appropriate. Rule 

403, provides, “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 

the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 

time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Evidence is relevant if it 

has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 401.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals aptly describes Rule 403’s analysis:

Evidence is considered unfairly prejudicial, not merely because it damages 

the opposing party's case, but its admission makes it likely that the jury 

will be induced to decide the case on an improper basis, commonly an 

emotional one, rather than on the evidence presented on the crime 

charged. 

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United States v. Connelly, 874 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir.1989).

Here, requiring Ms. Vaught to defend herself at a trial with her 

codefendants risks of the unfair prejudice described by the Seventh Circuit. The 

Government will devote a large amount of time in its case-in-chief to the 

codefendants’ conduct and its evidence against them. That evidence includes 

public and private statements by her codefendants that jurors may interpret as 

callous and indifferent to the protection of human trafficking victims. 

Additionally, the Government fills significant portions of the Indictment 

with emotionally-charged, tragic descriptions of women who were killed by 

pimps and johns, after they were in Backpage advertisements.1 Government is 

trying tries to implicate a massive company valued in the hundreds of millions 

and its powerful, wealthy owners. The Indictment’s charges against Ms. Vaught, 

however, appear to be almost an afterthought, or an effort by the Government to 

cajole Ms. Vaught into telling it what it wants to hear in its efforts to convict the 

codefendants.

If Ms. Vaught is forced to defendant a joint trial with her codefendants, 

then this highly prejudicial evidence would be presented ostensibly only against

1 Ms. Vaught addresses the surplusage of these descriptions in a separate 

motion. 

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the codefendants. At the least, it would be quite confusing for the jury to sort out 

which portions of the evidence apply to which defendant. Even the Indictment 

cannot make those distinctions. The risk that the jury will not discern between 

the evidence against only the codefendants and not against Ms. Vaught requires 

separate trials for these Defendants.

III. Bruton Requires Severance

The sixth amendment’s confrontation clause prevents the use of ex parte 

affidavits and depositions in lieu of available witnesses in criminal trials.1 In 

Bruton v. United States, the United States Supreme Court expanded that principle, 

holding that a defendant’s confrontation rights are violated when a nontestifying codefendant’s incriminating statements are introduced at a joint trial. 

391 U.S. 123 (1968). The violation exists, because there is a substantial risk that 

the jury will disregard a judge's limiting instructions and consider the 

1 Sir Walter Raleigh was charged with endorsing a treasonous plot to replace 

King James with Lady Arabella Stuart. The prosecution relied primarily on 

depositions and letters by Lord Cobham, Raleigh's alleged co-conspirator. 

Knowing that Cobham's confessions had probably been extracted through 

coercion and that Cobham had since retracted the confessions, Raleigh 

repeatedly demanded the opportunity to face his accuser and cross-examine him. 

The judges refused to force the prosecution to produce Cobham, relying on the 

principle that "so many horsestealers may escape, if they may not be condemned 

without witnesses." Raleigh was convicted on November 17, 1603 and beheaded. 

Howell, A Complete Collection of State Trials 15-16 (London 1816); see also W.O. 

Douglas, An. Almanac of Liberty 144 (1954). 

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extrajudicial confession of one conspirator when determining the guilt of a coconspirator. Id. at 124.

Bruton’s joint trial for armed postal robbery resulted in the conviction of 

Bruton and his codefendant, Evans. Neither defendant took the stand at trial, 

but a postal inspector testified that Evans had orally confessed to committing the 

robbery with Bruton. The trial judge instructed the jury to disregard Evans' 

confession for purposes of determining Bruton's guilt or innocence. Id. The 

Supreme Court reversed Bruton's conviction stating that his confrontation rights 

had been violated because he was unable to cross-examine his codefendant 

concerning the incriminating confession which had been presented to the jury. 

Id. at 126. 

Here, the record is replete with the Government’s citations to the 

statements of the codefendants. Ms. Vaught cannot address these statements 

unless she can cross-examine her codefendants. If they choose not to testify at 

trial, she will be unable to cross-examine them. 

A. Bruton and its Progeny

The Ninth Circuit reviews claimed violations of the Confrontation Clause 

e novo. United States v. Orellana-Blanco, 294 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2002). Even 

a redacted statement that does not explicitly name a co-defendant, is forbidden 

if it makes the naming of the co-defendant obvious to the jury. Gray v. Maryland, 

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523 U.S. 185, 192 (1998). The Ninth Circuit has held that there can be an 

inadmissible inference that a non-testifying co-defendant’s names a co-defendant 

based upon evidence previously admitted at the trial. United States v. Mayfield, 

189 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1999). 

While the trial court can deliver a curative instruction, as the Ninth Circuit 

noted in Parks, that instruction may act “as an additional catalyst, providing the 

jury with a reason for the redaction –i.e., the co-defendant is the person named in 

the redacted portion – and making it difficult for the jury to consciously and 

unconsciously follow its instruction. Id. at 1187.

B. Because the Government Likely will Present the Statements of Mr. Lacey, Mr. 

Larkin, and Mr. Padilla (to Name a Few) at a Joint Trial, Bruton Requires Severance.

The Bruton rule applies to testimony by a witness concerning a 

codefendant’s out-of-court statement that implicates a defendant. Monachelli v. 

Warden, 884 F.2d 749, 753 (3rd Cir. 1989). Here, the Government’s case-in-chief is 

nearly guaranteed to include the statements of Mrss. Lacey, Larkin, and Padilla. 

Indeed, the Indictment discusses their public and private statements at length. 

Meanwhile, it is unclear at this time whether or not any of the codefendants will 

testify at trial. In that circumstance, failure to sever Ms. Vaught from her 

codefendants creates constitutional error. 

IV. The Sixth Amendment Requires Severance

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In assuring the right to a fair trial in a criminal trial, the sixth amendment 

provides that the accused as a right to “compulsory process in procuring 

witnesses in his favor.” U.S. Const. Amend. VI. That right is meaningless if the 

witness cannot testify once he is in court:

The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their 

attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the 

right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the 

prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an 

accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the 

purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own 

witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due 

process of law.

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). 

Here, Ms. Vaught expects that her codefendants would testify about her 

lack of involvement, for example, in any decision-making at Backpage, any 

structuring of Backpage’s advertising, and any share of Backpage’s profits. 

These codefendants – Backpage’s former owners and her former supervisor – are 

the only people with the knowledge of her limited role at the company. To try 

Ms. Vaught with her codefendants forecloses and Ms. Vaught from calling these 

critical exculpatory witnesses and denies her a fair trial. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant respectfully asks this Court to 

grant her Motion to Sever.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on October 19, 2019.

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s/Joy Bertrand

Joy Bertrand

Attorney for Defendant

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On October 18, 2019, I, Joy Bertrand, attorney for the Defendant, Joye 

Vaught, filed the Defendant’s Motion to Sever with the Arizona District Court’s 

electronic filing system. Based on my training and experience with electronic 

filing in the federal courts, it is my understanding that a copy of this request will 

be electronically served upon opposing counsel and codefendant counsel upon 

its submission to the Court.

Respectfully submitted this Eighteenth day of October, 2019.

s/Joy Bertrand

Joy Bertrand

Attorney for Defendant

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