1

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13-3366

___________

EARL A. PONDEXTER,

Appellant

v.

PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION; GOVERNOR OF 

PENNSYLVANIA; GERALD S. ROBINSON, Chairman; JOANN L. EDWARDS, 

Executive Director; LYLE M. WOOD, PHRC Representative; DIANE BLANCETT 

MADDOCK, Assistant Chief General Counsel/PHRC; THE ALLEGHENY COUNTY 

HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al; FRANK AGGAZIO, Executive Director; JOHN 

JOYCE, General Counsel; THOMAS MCPOYLE, Assistant General Counsel; JAMES 

BULLS, Director of Housing Operations; JAMES T. ZAPF, Assistant Director of 

Housing; DEBRA BREITENSTEIN, Legal Assistant/HR Department

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-00732 )

District Judge: Honorable Nora B. Fischer

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 20, 2014

Before: FUENTES, GREENBERG and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 21, 2014 )

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM
2

Earl A. Pondexter, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the 

District Court’s orders dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 

denying his motion for reconsideration. For the reasons below, we will affirm. 

I.

Prior to this case, in July 2011, Pondexter filed a pro se civil rights complaint in 

the District Court against the Allegheny County Housing Authority (“ACHA”), James T. 

Zapf, Frank Aggazio, Thomas McPoyle, and John Joyce (the “Original Defendants”). 

Pondexter v. Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth., No. 11-cv-00857 (W.D. Pa.). Pondexter 

asserted that his housing application was unlawfully denied on account of his race and

mental disability. Id. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In August 

2012, the District Court granted the Original Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 

and denied Pondexter’s motion. The District Court relied, in part, on an affidavit 

executed by James Bulls (the “Affidavit”), the ACHA Director of Housing ManagementOperations Department, who averred that Pondexter had never filed a housing 

application. The District Court, noting that Pondexter submitted no evidence to 

contradict the Affidavit, found that ACHA did not deny Pondexter’s application (as none 

existed) and that therefore it did not discriminate against him. Pondexter appealed, and 

we summarily affirmed the District Court’s judgment. See 12-3954. 

Pondexter then initiated this new case, asserting that the Affidavit was a “sham 

affidavit.” He appeared to be arguing, in essence, that the District Court should not have 

granted the Original Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in the 2011 case. In the 

new complaint, in addition to the Original Defendants, Pondexter also named the 
3

Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”), Lyle Wood, James Bulls, and 

Debra Breitenstein as defendants and referenced them in the body of his complaint. 

Pondexter further named Gerald Robinson, Joann Edwards, and Diane Maddock (all 

affiliated with PHRC) and Governor Thomas Corbett as defendants, though he did not 

refer to them in the body of his complaint. Pondexter asserted that the PHRC has the

authority to investigate a complaint of unlawful discrimination in housing, and that 

Wood, an employee of PHRC, was prevented from performing his duties due to the 

Affidavit. Pondexter further asserted that Bulls and Breitenstein (the notary public who

notarized the Affidavit) conspired to harm him. Pondexter did not specify what relief he 

was seeking, but a liberal reading of his complaint suggests that he was seeking at most

the reinstatement of his 2011 complaint. 

The District Court concluded that Pondexter was seeking to reinstate his 2011

complaint, and it dismissed the new complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The 

District Court also noted that res judicata/collateral estoppel precluded reconsideration of 

Pondexter’s claim. In June 2013, Pondexter filed a motion for reconsideration, 

reiterating his prior arguments, which the District Court denied. Pondexter timely 

appealed both orders.

II.

We exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de 

novo a district court's determination of its own subject matter jurisdiction and its decision 

to apply res judicata. Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 110 (3d Cir. 2010); Jean 

Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 2006) (issue
4

preclusion). We review the denial of Pondexter’s motion for reconsideration for abuse of 

discretion. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010).

III.

The District Court correctly dismissed Pondexter’s complaint for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction and on res judicata grounds. As to subject matter jurisdiction, as 

Pondexter was seeking to relitigate a previously decided (and appealed) action, the 

District Court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a new,

collateral challenge over the final judgment. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291; Olcott v. Del.

Flood Co., 327 F.3d 1115, 1123 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that § 1291 divests district 

courts of jurisdiction over matters that, if wrong, should be corrected on appeal).

1

As noted, Pondexter’s new complaint named additional defendants, making it 

more difficult to classify the new action – as to them, anyway – as necessarily a 

“collateral” attack on the District Court’s original judgment. To the extent, if any, that 

Pondexter’s new complaint intended to bring new claims against those defendants, 

however, the District Court appropriately rejected the attempt. Pondexter’s claims 

against the new defendants all rely on his assertion that the Affidavit was a “sham.”2 

 

1 While the District Court is permitted to provide relief from final judgment, see Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 60, Pondexter did not seek such relief. Had Pondexter sought such relief from the 

District Court, it is unlikely he would have been successful. Pondexter’s claim, in 

essence, is that the Affidavit was fraudulent, which he would have had to establish with 

clear and convincing evidence. See Arnold v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 627 F.3d 716, 722 

(8th Cir. 2010); Brown v. Pa. R.R. Co., 282 F.2d 522, 527 (3d Cir. 1960). Pondexter’s 

unsupported statements that the Affidavit was a “sham affidavit” fail to meet this 

standard. 

2

The only new defendants actually discussed in the body of Pondexter’s complaint were 

Bulls, Breitenstein, and Woods. Even a liberal reading of Pondexter’s complaint only 
5

However, Pondexter’s claim, that the Affidavit is a “sham,” was previously litigated in 

the 2011 case. In his motion for reconsideration of the District Court’s 2011 judgment, 

Pondexter argued that, despite the averments in the Affidavit, he did submit a housing 

application, and that Bulls had reason to lie in his Affidavit. The District Court, in 

denying Pondexter’s motion for reconsideration, found that the Affidavit was supported 

by additional evidence showing that Pondexter failed to submit a housing application, 

and that Pondexter was unable to provide any countervailing evidence in support of his 

claims. Accordingly, issue preclusion bars re-litigation of the veracity of the Affidavit 

and whether Pondexter filed a housing application. See R & J Holding Co. v. 

Redevelopment Auth. of Cnty. of Montgomery, 670 F.3d 420, 429 (3d Cir. 2011).

We discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denying Pondexter’s 

request for reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is a limited vehicle used “to 

correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Max's 

Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In his motion, Pondexter presented the same 

arguments that the District Court had previously rejected; the District Court properly 

 

suggests that he intended to assert claims against Bulls and Breitenstein. Indeed, the 

complaint actually suggests that Pondexter believes that Woods was wrongfully 

prevented from performing his official duties as a result of the “sham affidavit.” 

Accordingly, Pondexter’s claims and factual assertions appear largely directed at the 

alleged wrongful conduct of Bulls and Breitenstein. However, in his brief in support of 

his appeal, Pondexter asserts, for the first time, that his complaint is actually directed at 

Woods (as opposed to the Original Defendants or Bulls and Breitenstein) for his failure to 

investigate Pondexter’s unlawful discrimination claims due to his reliance on the 

Affidavit. For purposes of this opinion, we will construe the complaint to also include 

claims against Bulls, Breitenstein, and Woods.
6

refused to allow Pondexter to relitigate issues that it had already decided. See Lazaridis, 

591 F.3d at 669.3

For these reasons, and in light of our overall examination of the record, we will 

affirm the judgment of the District Court. Pondexter’s motions for default judgment, 

summary affirmance, and to expedite disposition of his appeal are denied. 

 

3

Pondexter also questioned Judge Fischer’s impartiality. Pondexter previously filed a 

petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court, which sought to compel Judge Fischer to 

recuse herself based upon Pondexter’s perception of judicial bias. See C.A. No. 13-3451. 

We found no support for Pondexter’s assertions in that case, and he has failed to assert 

any additional facts which lend support to his bias claims.