J-A03019-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS THE 

TRUSTEE FOR THE REGISTERED 

HOLDERS OF THE GE BUSINESS LOAN 

TRUST CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-2

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

PREMIER HOTELS GROUP, LLC

Appellant No. 941 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered May 10, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County

Civil Division at No: 2015-05776

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JULY 10, 2017

Appellant, Premier Hotels Group, LLC (“Premier”), appeals from the 

May 10, 2016 order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna 

County, granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A., as the Trustee for the registered holders of the GE Business Loan trust 

Certificates, Series 2005-2 (“Wells Fargo”). For the reasons that follow, we 

remand for issuance of an opinion in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

The record reveals that in September 2005 Premier executed a 

promissory note and mortgage in favor of General Electric Capital 

Corporation (“GECC”) in the amount of $4,400,000.00 for property located 

at 200 Tigue Street, Dunmore, Pennsylvania (“the Property”). GECC 
J-A03019-17

- 2 -

assigned the mortgage and other loan documents to Wells Fargo by 

assignment recorded on June 27, 2012. 

In its capacity as Trustee, Wells Fargo filed a complaint on September 

30, 2015, alleging that Premier was in default under the loan documents; 

that Premier had sold the Property in response to a foreclosure action 

initiated by Wells Fargo in federal court and had remitted the proceeds of the 

sale to Wells Fargo; that the proceeds were insufficient to satisfy the note in 

full; and that Wells Fargo was entitled to collect from Premier the sum of 

$1,772,957.371 plus interest in the amount of $275.50 per diem from the 

date of the filing of the complaint. Complaint, 9/30/15, at ¶¶ 6-16. In 

Count I of the complaint, styled “Breach of Note,” Wells Fargo incorporated 

its allegations of default and asserted it was entitled to recover the amounts 

due as well as attorney fees and other expenses as agreed upon under the 

terms of the note. Id. at ¶¶ 17-24. 

Premier filed its answer and new matter on December 2, 2015. 

Premier denied it was in default; acknowledged it sold the property and 

remitted the proceeds in exchange for which the mortgage was released; 

denied the proceeds were insufficient to satisfy the note in full; and denied 

any principal, interest, fees or other balance was due to Wells Fargo. 

____________________________________________

1 The sum claimed consisted of $1,260,246.64 of unpaid principal, 

$446,174.78 in accrued interest, and $66,535.95 in accrued late fees and 

return items fees. Complaint, 9/30/15, at ¶ 16.
J-A03019-17

- 3 -

Answer and New Matter, 12/2/15, at ¶¶ 3-24. Premier also raised several 

affirmative defenses. Id. at ¶¶ 25-41. However, from the record it appears 

Premier did not endorse its answer and new matter with a notice to plead. 

Therefore, the pleadings were closed at that time.2

On February 12, 2016, before the parties engaged in discovery, Wells 

Fargo filed a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum in support, 

contending there was “no genuine issue of material fact as to the 

enforceability of the Note, [Premier’s] breach, and the obligations due the 

Trustee, nor does [Premier’s] Answer raise any issue of material fact.” 

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 2/12/16, at 4. 

Attached to Wells Fargo’s motion was an affidavit of Wells Fargo Assistant 

Vice President Mark Farr (“Farr Affidavit”) representing that the relevant 

electronic loan payment records were voluminous and that Farr based the 

sums claimed in the complaint on his review of those documents. Farr 

Affidavit at ¶¶ 41-42. Farr further represented that the summary of amount 

claimed was “prepared from ‘duplicates’ (see Pa.R.Evid. 1001(e)) of the 

electronic loan records previously produced in discovery.” Id. at ¶ 43.3 He 

____________________________________________

2 Wells Fargo did not file a reply to Premier’s new matter. 

3 Recognizing the parties to this action did not undertake discovery, we can 

only surmise that the mention of discovery in the Farr Affidavit was either 

made in error or was a reference to discovery in a similar action between the 

parties filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A03019-17

- 4 -

suggested that “[t]he summary should be admissible as the best evidence 

thereof pursuant to Pa.R.Evid. 1002[,]” and as relevant under Pa.R.Evid. 

402. Id. at ¶¶ 43-44. 

Premier filed a response to Wells Fargo’s motion and a brief in 

opposition, asserting inter alia that the motion for summary judgment was 

based entirely upon the Farr Affidavit and should fail based upon the NantyGlo rule.4

 Response to Summary Judgment Motion, 3/29/16, at ¶ 1. 

Further, Premier argued that genuine issues of material fact existed; claimed 

it had not defaulted under the terms of the note or mortgage; denied it 

failed to make payments under the note; and contended Wells Fargo failed 

to substantiate sums it claimed were owed by Premier. Id. at ¶¶ 4-12.5

On May 10, 2016, the trial court signed Wells Fargo’s proposed order 

granting summary judgment and awarding the sums requested in Wells 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Pennsylvania in which that court denied Wells Fargo’s motion for summary 

judgment, concluding there were genuine issues of material fact as to 

whether Premier defaulted under the mortgage or the note. See Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Premier Hotel Group, LLC, 2015 WL 404549, at *8-

*9 (M.D. Pa. January 29, 2015). 

4 Borough of Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co. of New York, 163 A. 

523 (Pa. 1932). “The Nanty–Glo rule means the party moving for 

summary judgment may not rely solely upon its own testimonial affidavits or 

depositions, or those of its witnesses, to establish the non-existence of 

genuine issues of material fact.” DeArmitt v. New York Life Insurance 

Company, 73 A.3d 578, 595 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

5 We have taken the liberty of correcting the numbering of Premier’s “¶ 21” 

to “¶ 12.”
J-A03019-17

- 5 -

Fargo’s complaint. Trial Court Order, 5/10/16, at 1. Premier filed both a 

motion for reconsideration, which was denied by operation of law for failure 

of the trial court to address it, and a timely notice of appeal. The trial court 

did not direct Premier to file a Rule 1925(b) statement of errors complained 

of on appeal, nor did the trial court issue a Rule 1925(a) opinion or 

statement in lieu thereof, despite this Court’s August 5, 2016 directive to do 

so on or before August 19, 2016. Letter from Superior Court Deputy 

Prothonotary, 8/5/16, at 1. 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) states, in relevant 

part, that

upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the judge who entered the 

order giving rise to the notice of appeal, if the reasons for the 

order do not already appear of record, shall forthwith file of 

record at least a brief opinion of the reasons for the order, or for 

the rulings or other errors complained of, or shall specify in 

writing the place in the record where such reasons may be 

found.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) (emphasis added). “The purpose of this rule is to provide 

the appellate court with a statement of reasons for the order so entered in 

order to permit effective and meaningful review of the lower court 

decisions.” Commonwealth v. Hood, 872 A.2d 175, 178 (Pa. Super. 

2005). 

Our Supreme Court has explained that:

[w]hen considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial 

court must take all facts of record and reasonable inferences 

therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. In 

so doing, the trial court must resolve all doubts as to the 
J-A03019-17

- 6 -

existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving 

party, and, thus, may only grant summary judgment where the 

right to such judgment is clear and free from all doubt. 

Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997 A.2d 1152, 1159 (Pa. 2010) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted). On appeal from the grant of 

summary judgment, this Court must “determine whether the trial court 

abused its discretion or committed an error of law[,] and our scope of review 

is plenary.” Rodriguez v. Kravco Simon Co., 111 A.3d 1191, 1193 (Pa. 

Super. 2015) (citation omitted). In the absence of any statement of reasons 

for the trial court’s order granting summary judgment, we cannot properly 

review the trial court’s determinations, as we simply cannot guess as to the 

basis for the trial court’s ruling.

Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to 

file an opinion compliant with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) within 30 days of this 

Memorandum. Upon receipt of the trial court's Rule 1925(a) opinion, the 

parties may file supplemental briefs with this Court within 30 days of the 

filing of the trial court’s opinion. 

Case remanded. Jurisdiction retained.

Judge Dubow joins the memorandum.

Judge Lazarus files a dissenting memorandum.