COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

July 16, 2024

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2023AP21 Cir. Ct. No. 2021FA149

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

ROMERO COLEMAN,

 PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

 V.

REBECCA A. COLEMAN,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Brown County: 

THOMAS J. WALSH, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part and cause 

remanded with directions. 

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2023AP21

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Rebecca Coleman appeals a judgment of divorce

from her former spouse, Romero Coleman.

1

 Rebecca raises seven arguments 

regarding the circuit court’s determination of child support and its division of the 

parties’ property.

¶2 We reject each of Rebecca’s arguments regarding the property 

division, and we therefore affirm the circuit court’s judgment in part. We agree 

with Rebecca, however, that the court erred by failing to explain why it calculated 

child support using an annual income of $63,300 for Rebecca, rather than $50,000. 

We therefore reverse that portion of the judgment setting Romero’s child support 

obligation, and we remand for the court to readdress that issue. We also agree 

with Rebecca that the court erred by failing to address which party would be 

permitted to claim the parties’ minor child as a dependent for income tax purposes, 

and we direct the court to address that issue on remand.

BACKGROUND

¶3 The parties were married in October 2004. Romero petitioned for 

divorce on February 22, 2021. At the time of filing, the parties had two minor 

children, ages seventeen and fourteen.

¶4 A contested final divorce hearing took place over three days during 

June, August, and September of 2022. By that time, the parties’ older child was 

no longer a minor. The parties reached an agreement as to the legal custody and 

physical placement of their remaining minor child, and the circuit court adopted 

 

1

 Because the parties share a surname, we refer to them by their first names throughout 

the remainder of this opinion. Although Romero was initially represented by counsel in the 

circuit court, both parties are self-represented on appeal.
No. 2023AP21

3

that agreement. The disputed issues at the contested hearing pertained to 

maintenance, child support, and the division of the parties’ property.

¶5 The circuit court entered a written decision and order addressing 

those issues on December 15, 2022, and it subsequently entered a judgment of 

divorce incorporating that decision. As relevant to this appeal, the court ordered 

Romero to pay Rebecca $124 per month in child support, commencing on 

January 1, 2023. The court equally divided the parties’ assets and debts and

ordered Romero to make an equalization payment of $48,304.25 to Rebecca.

¶6 Rebecca now appeals, arguing that the circuit court erred in seven 

ways with respect to calculating the amount due to her for child support and the 

division of the parties’ property. Additional facts are included below as necessary

to our discussion of Rebecca’s arguments.

DISCUSSION

¶7 Both the division of property at divorce and the setting of child 

support are committed to the circuit court’s discretion. Modrow v. Modrow, 2001 

WI App 200, ¶9, 247 Wis. 2d 889, 634 N.W.2d 852. “We will uphold the circuit 

court’s discretionary decision if the court makes a rational and reasoned decision 

and applies the correct legal standard to the facts of record.” Id. 

I. Down payment for the marital home

¶8 The circuit court awarded the parties’ marital home to Romero in the 

property division. Rebecca contends that when the parties purchased the marital

home, they used as a down payment the proceeds from the sale of a different 

residence, which Rebecca had purchased prior to the marriage. Rebecca asserts
No. 2023AP21

4

that the court should have awarded the entire amount of that down payment to her

in the property division.

¶9 The circuit court specifically addressed and rejected Rebecca’s 

argument regarding the down payment. The court correctly noted that the funds 

that Rebecca received from the sale of the prior home were “clearly marital”—i.e., 

subject to division. See WIS. STAT. § 767.61(2)-(3) (2021-22) (providing that all 

property, whether acquired before or during the marriage, is subject to a 

presumption of equal division at divorce, except property acquired by gift or 

inheritance or property purchased with funds acquired by gift or inheritance).2

¶10 Although a circuit court may deviate from the presumption of equal 

division based on, among other things, “[t]he property brought to the marriage by 

each party,” see WIS. STAT. § 767.61(3)(b), the court declined to do so here. The 

court reasoned that: (1) the prior residence was sold in 2008, “which was 

approximately four years after the parties had been married and [were] sharing 

their household”; and (2) the check from the sale of the prior residence was made 

out to both Rebecca and Romero. Under these circumstances, the court stated it 

was “satisfied that [the sale proceeds were] joint money and no unequal division 

will occur as a result.” The court’s refusal to deviate from the presumption of 

equal division was not an erroneous exercise of discretion.

 

2

 There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Rebecca acquired the prior residence 

by gift or inheritance or purchased that residence using funds acquired by gift or inheritance, nor 

does Rebecca argue that she did so.

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2023AP21

5

II. Rebecca’s 401(k)

¶11 The circuit court divided Rebecca’s 401(k) equally between the 

parties via a qualified domestic relations order. Rebecca contends that “[d]uring 

the divorce process, both parties agreed to no changes to the [401(k)],” and “[a]ll 

property division sheets turned [in to] the court by both parties throughout the 

entire duration of this case show the [401(k)] staying whole and with Rebecca.” 

Rebecca therefore asserts that “[t]his issue was agreed upon and did not require 

ruling from the court.” In response, Romero asserts that there was “never any 

agreement to this plan” and that the division of the 401(k) “was considered a 

contested issue.”

¶12 The record supports Romero’s position. Although Romero’s 

property division worksheet assigned the full value of the 401(k) to Rebecca, his 

worksheet, overall, reflected an equal division of the parties’ assets and debts, 

resulting in an equalization payment from him to Rebecca. There is nothing in the 

record indicating that Rebecca and Romero reached any specific agreement with 

respect to the division of the 401(k) or that they informed the circuit court of any 

agreement regarding that asset.

¶13 Regardless, Rebecca cites no legal authority in support of the 

proposition that a circuit court is required to follow the parties’ agreement 

regarding the division of a particular asset. Nor does Rebecca cite any legal 

authority in support of her claim that the circuit court erred by equally dividing the 

401(k), particularly given the presumption of equal division set forth in WIS.

STAT. § 767.61(3). We need not consider arguments that are unsupported by 

references to legal authority. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 

N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).
No. 2023AP21

6

III. Dave’s Auto Repair debt

¶14 Rebecca’s property division worksheet listed a debt to Dave’s Auto 

Repair in the amount of $2,741.68. Rebecca’s worksheet divided that debt equally 

between the parties. In its written decision, the circuit court did not divide the 

Dave’s Auto Repair debt, stating instead that it was “already paid using marital 

funds.” Rebecca asserts that this statement was inaccurate because her father paid 

the Dave’s Auto Repair debt and expects to be repaid for that amount. Notably, 

however, Rebecca does not provide any record citations in support of this 

argument.

¶15 In response, Romero asserts that while Rebecca listed the Dave’s 

Auto Repair debt on her property division worksheet, she did not “present[]” this 

issue “in court or on record.” Romero also argues that the debt was for repairs 

made to Rebecca’s “personal vehicle,” that there was “no discussion of or any 

verbal or written agreement between him, Rebecca ... and her father ... regarding 

repairs or any advancement of funds for those repairs,” and that Romero is “not 

responsible for any funds Rebecca ... may have received from her father ... and/or 

any arrangement that may have been made between” Rebecca and her father.

¶16 In her reply brief, Rebecca “maintains [that] the auto repair bill 

should be split between both parties as it is a debt that is owed and was incurred 

on marital property during the marriage.” Rebecca also asserts that her “true 

argument” regarding the auto repair bill is that the circuit court’s decision “stated 

[the bill] was previously paid off by marital funds [but it] was not. It was paid by 

[Rebecca’s father] as a loan so the primary vehicle could be returned.”

¶17 We conclude that Rebecca forfeited her current argument regarding 

the Dave’s Auto Repair debt by failing to adequately raise that argument in the 
No. 2023AP21

7

circuit court. See Tatera v. FMC Corp., 2010 WI 90, ¶19 n.16, 328 Wis. 2d 320, 

786 N.W.2d 810 (“Arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally 

deemed forfeited.”). Our review of the record shows that Rebecca attached to her 

property division worksheet two photographs of what appear to be two pages of an 

invoice from Dave’s Auto Repair. The second page of the invoice includes a 

handwritten notation stating, “Paid $3,000.” We can find no other evidence in the 

record regarding this invoice. There is nothing in the record to support Rebecca’s 

current argument that the invoice was paid with funds loaned to her and Romero 

by her father. Thus, the only evidence before the circuit court regarding the 

Dave’s Auto Repair debt consisted of Rebecca’s property division worksheet 

stating that the debt existed and the attached photographs of the invoice showing 

that the debt had been paid.

¶18 To preserve an issue for appellate review, a litigant must raise the 

issue “with sufficient prominence such that the [circuit] court understands that it is 

being called upon to make a ruling.” Bishop v. City of Burlington, 2001 WI App 

154, ¶8, 246 Wis. 2d 879, 631 N.W.2d 656. Rebecca failed to do so here. Instead, 

she submitted evidence to the circuit court showing that the debt to Dave’s Auto 

Repair had been paid. Rebecca never presented any evidence—or raised any 

argument—that the debt was paid using funds loaned by her father for which he 

expected repayment. Under these circumstances, we decline to consider 

Rebecca’s argument regarding the Dave’s Auto Repair debt. See State v. 

Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 144, 569 N.W.2d 577 (1997) (“As a general rule, 

this court will not address issues for the first time on appeal.”).
No. 2023AP21

8

IV. Contempt finding

¶19 In March 2021, a court commissioner entered a temporary order 

finding that, because the parties continued to live together in the marital residence, 

“they should split household bills and other marital expenses” during the pendency 

of the divorce proceedings. The temporary order required both parties to deposit 

their paychecks into a joint account and required Rebecca to pay specified marital 

bills out of that account.

¶20 Rebecca asserts that between March 16, 2021, and October 12, 2021, 

Romero “shorted” $20,122.36 from the joint account by failing to deposit his 

paychecks as ordered. As a result, Rebecca contends that Romero was “found in 

contempt” on October 12, 2021. Due to this contempt finding, Rebecca asserts

that the circuit court should have ordered Romero to repay her $20,122.36. In 

response, Romero asserts that the court commissioner did not find him in 

contempt.

¶21 The record shows that on October 12, 2021, the court commissioner 

entered an order amending the March 2021 temporary order. The amended order 

provided that the parties were no longer required to deposit their paychecks into 

the joint account, and it made each party responsible for the payment of specified 

household expenses. The amended order further stated: “Husband is in contempt 

for disobeying the Temporary Order entered on March 31, 2021. He shall purge 

the contempt by making all payments as outlined in this Amended Temporary 

Order.” Rebecca does not develop any argument—or cite any evidence 

showing—that Romero did not satisfy the purge condition by failing to make the 

payments required by the amended temporary order.
No. 2023AP21

9

¶22 Thus, while the October 12, 2021 order shows that the court 

commissioner did find Romero in contempt, the court commissioner did not order 

Romero to pay back any funds that he had failed to deposit into the joint account. 

In her reply brief, Rebecca concedes that the court commissioner did not order 

Romero “to pay back the funds.” She asserts, however, that the court 

commissioner “clearly stated at the end of the hearing [that] this contempt finding 

would be resolved at the end of the divorce proceedings,” and that Rebecca

therefore expected the issue to be addressed in the circuit court’s final order.

¶23 Again, we conclude that Rebecca forfeited this argument by failing 

to adequately raise it in the circuit court. During the first day of the contested 

hearing, when the court asked Rebecca whether there was “anything else about 

this case that you want to tell me,” Rebecca informed the court of Romero’s 

purported violation of the March 2021 temporary order. When the court asked 

Rebecca for documentation corroborating her assertions, Rebecca provided a 

“summary” that she had prepared and presented to the court commissioner, in 

which she asked the court commissioner to order Romero “to pay $20,122.36 back 

into the account by Friday, October 15, 2021.” In response to the court’s follow 

up question—“Where can I go to find the order that ordered him to pay 

$20,122.36 into an account?”—Rebecca confirmed that Romero had never been 

ordered to pay that money back. She further stated, “[T]hat was my desired 

outcome for the day.”

¶24 The circuit court then stated: “So I’m not sure that I understand 

what you’re saying then, because you said he was ordered to deposit a certain 

amount of money and didn’t do it. What happens to that money? I think that’s 

how you launched into this. What happens to that?” Rebecca responded, “Yeah,” 

and she and the court then moved on to discuss another topic. Rebecca never 
No. 2023AP21

10

followed up on her argument regarding Romero’s purported violation of the 

temporary order. 

¶25 On this record, we conclude that Rebecca failed to raise this issue 

with sufficient prominence that the circuit court understood that it was being 

called upon to make a ruling, and we therefore do not address the issue further.

3

See Bishop, 246 Wis. 2d 879, ¶8. In addition, Rebecca has failed to develop a 

cohesive argument on this issue in her appellate briefs. See Papa v. DHS, 2020 

WI 66, ¶42 n.15, 393 Wis. 2d 1, 946 N.W.2d 17 (declining to address an 

underdeveloped argument).

V. Student loans

¶26 The record shows that at the time of divorce, Rebecca had two 

outstanding student loans—a Great Lakes loan and a Navient loan. In her 

brief-in-chief, Rebecca asserts that the circuit court intended to divide these loans 

equally between the parties, but the property division balance sheet attached to the 

court’s decision has an “X” under only the “Wife” column for the Great Lakes 

loan. According to Rebecca, Romero “is interpreting the order that he is not 

accountable for the Great Lakes loan due to the missing ‘X’” in the “Husband” 

 

3

 While Rebecca asserts that the court commissioner “clearly stated” at the end of the 

October 12, 2021 hearing that “this contempt finding would be resolved at the end of the divorce 

proceedings,” the appellate record does not contain a transcript of that hearing, and we therefore 

have no way to verify the veracity of Rebecca’s assertion. It is the appellant’s burden to ensure 

that the record is sufficient for us to review the issues he or she raised on appeal, and we assume 

that any missing materials support the circuit court’s decision. See State Bank of Hartland v. 

Arndt, 129 Wis. 2d 411, 423, 385 N.W.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1986). In any event, even if the court 

commissioner told Rebecca that this issue would be addressed in the circuit court’s final decision, 

it was incumbent upon Rebecca to raise the issue with sufficient prominence such that the court 

understood that Rebecca expected it to make a ruling. See Bishop v. City of Burlington, 2001 WI 

App 154, ¶8, 246 Wis. 2d 879, 631 N.W.2d 656. As explained above, Rebecca failed to do so.
No. 2023AP21

11

column. Rebecca asks this court to “update the order to clearly show 

Romero ... is 50% accountable for the Great Lakes loan.”

¶27 Romero disputes Rebecca’s assertion that the circuit court intended 

to divide the student loans equally, and he instead contends that the court ordered

an unequal division of the student loan debt. Romero is correct. In its written 

decision, the court expressly stated that it “chose to divide up the student debt 

unequally.” Consistent with that statement, the property division balance sheet 

attached to the court’s decision shows that the court chose to split the Navient loan 

equally between the parties but to make Rebecca solely responsible for the

Great Lakes loan. Thus, the court clearly ordered an unequal division of the total 

amount of the student loan debt. Rebecca’s argument that the court intended to 

divide the student loan debt equally therefore fails.

¶28 In her reply brief, Rebecca appears to argue for the first time that the 

circuit court erred by dividing the student loan debt unequally. We need not 

address arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. See A.O. Smith Corp. 

v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 492, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998).

¶29 Regardless, Rebecca’s argument on this point is undeveloped. See 

Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 646-47 (court of appeals need not address undeveloped 

arguments). The circuit court provided multiple reasons for dividing the student 

loan debt unequally, noting that: (1) Rebecca will continue to benefit from her 

education following the divorce, whereas “[a]ny benefit [Romero] gets from this 

education will end with the divorce”; (2) Rebecca is eleven years younger than 

Romero; (3) Rebecca’s earning capacity is increasing, due in part to her education; 

and (4) Romero will likely retire sooner than Rebecca, and “her ability to take her 

education and use it over a period of years to increase her earnings is greater than 
No. 2023AP21

12

his.” Thus, the court provided a reasoned explanation for its decision to divide the 

student loan debt unequally, and Rebecca has failed to present a developed 

argument showing how the court erroneously exercised its discretion.

VI. Child support

¶30 On the first day of the contested hearing in June 2022, Rebecca 

submitted a financial disclosure statement showing an annual gross income of 

approximately $63,300. Thereafter, on the final day of the contested hearing in 

September 2022, Rebecca testified that her annual salary had been reduced by 

$13,000 as of August 1, 2022. She asked the circuit court to take note of that fact 

for purposes of its decision. However, when calculating child support, the court 

used $63,300 as Rebecca’s annual income. Rebecca asserts that the court erred in 

this regard because it “did not take [her] income change into account.”

¶31 In response, Romero does not dispute that Rebecca’s income was 

reduced to approximately $50,000 per year shortly before the final day of the 

contested hearing. Instead, he asserts—without any supporting citations to the 

record—that the circuit court properly calculated child support using an annual 

salary of $63,300 for Rebecca because: (1) Rebecca’s work history, work 

experience, and “the degrees earned from her education” show that she is capable 

of earning more than $50,000 per year; and (2) Rebecca “willingly accepted” a

change of position from her employer with a reduced salary one month before the 

last day of the contested hearing, such that her change in income was “by her 

choice.” In her reply brief, Rebecca disputes these assertions—again, without any 

citations to the record—claiming that she was forced by her employer to either 

accept a lower-paying job or be terminated.
No. 2023AP21

13

¶32 Our review of the record shows that no evidence was presented to 

the circuit court regarding the reasons for Rebecca’s reduction in income. 

Rebecca merely testified that her annual income had decreased by $13,000, and 

she asked the court to take note of that fact for purposes of its decision. The court 

did not find Rebecca’s testimony regarding her reduction in income to be 

incredible. Instead, when addressing the parties’ respective incomes for purposes 

of determining maintenance, the court simply stated that it was using the income 

amounts shown on the parties’ respective financial disclosure statements. The 

court further stated, “Each party provided testimony about their current earnings 

and the court is satisfied that each party is currently employed and working at a 

level that is productive and appropriate.” Yet, the court did not explain why it 

discounted Rebecca’s testimony regarding her reduction in income.

¶33 When setting child support, a circuit court must consider “the 

circumstances existing at the time of the divorce.” Wallen v. Wallen, 139 Wis. 2d 

217, 223, 407 N.W.2d 293 (Ct. App. 1987). Here, there was evidence in the 

record that Rebecca’s actual income at the time of the divorce was approximately 

$50,000 per year, and Romero does not dispute that Rebecca’s income decreased 

to that amount shortly before the final day of the contested hearing. The court, 

however, used Rebecca’s previous, higher income when calculating child support, 

without any explanation for its decision to do so. The court did not, for instance, 

conclude that it should use Rebecca’s earning capacity rather than her actual 

income when calculating child support based on a determination that Rebecca was 

“shirking.” See Chen v. Warner, 2005 WI 55, ¶20, 280 Wis. 2d 344, 695 N.W.2d 

758.
No. 2023AP21

14

¶34 Under these circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court 

erroneously exercised its discretion when calculating child support.4 We therefore 

reverse that portion of the court’s judgment setting Romero’s child support 

obligation and remand for the court to readdress that issue. On remand, the court 

should specifically consider the amount of Rebecca’s income at the time of the 

parties’ divorce. If the court decides to use Rebecca’s earning capacity, rather 

than her actual income, it must explain its reasons for doing so.

5

 

4

 At the end of its written decision, the circuit court stated:

Many other assertions and claims were made during the course 

of the trial in this matter. As referenced above, each party was 

afforded an opportunity to submit a balance sheet outlining their 

various claims upon the marital estate. Any other claims by 

either party that the court has not addressed herein [are] denied 

based upon an insufficient record to support such claims. The 

court will not address each insufficient claim specifically, but 

references them here generally.

This statement—which appears to reference claims made by the parties specifically with 

respect to the property division—does not excuse the court’s failure to explain why it discounted 

Rebecca’s testimony regarding her reduction in income. “[T]he proper exercise of discretion 

contemplates that the circuit court explain its reasoning.” Randall v. Randall, 2000 WI App 98, 

¶7, 235 Wis. 2d 1, 612 N.W.2d 737. Although we may search the record to determine whether it 

supports a discretionary decision, see id., here, there is nothing in the record to suggest why the 

court may have discounted Rebecca’s testimony.

5

 On appeal, Rebecca also argues that the circuit court erred by ordering that Romero’s 

child support obligation would commence on January 1, 2023. Rebecca contends that Romero 

paid no child support from March 16, 2021, through December 31, 2022, and she argues that she 

is entitled to back child support for that time period.

(continued)
No. 2023AP21

15

VII. Claiming the parties’ minor child as a dependent for tax purposes

¶35 Finally, Rebecca asserts that the parties had a “verbal agreement” 

that they would alternate claiming their minor child as a dependent for income tax 

purposes, beginning with Rebecca claiming the child as a dependent in 2020. 

Rebecca contends, however, that the circuit court did not address this issue in its 

decision and that, since the divorce, Romero has refused to comply with their 

verbal agreement. In response, Romero asserts that there was no verbal agreement 

as to who would claim the minor child as a dependent.

¶36 During the first day of the contested hearing, Romero testified that 

he and Rebecca had agreed that he would claim their minor child as a dependent in 

odd years and Rebecca would claim the child as a dependent in even years. 

Rebecca, in turn, testified that she did not agree with Romero’s recitation of their 

“agreement,” but she wanted the circuit court to order that the parties would claim 

the minor child as a dependent in alternating years, and she had no preference as to 

whether she claimed the child in odd or even years.

¶37 The circuit court did not address which party would be permitted to

claim the minor child as a dependent for tax purposes, and we agree with Rebecca 

that the court erred by failing to do so. See WIS. STAT. § 767.511(1)(b) (requiring 

 

Rebecca forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the circuit court. See Tatera v. 

FMC Corp., 2010 WI 90, ¶19 n.16, 328 Wis. 2d 320, 786 N.W.2d 810. Notably, during the 

pendency of the divorce proceedings, both parties continued residing in the marital residence, and 

a court commissioner entered two temporary orders addressing each party’s responsibility for 

various financial obligations. Neither temporary order required either party to pay child support. 

Rebecca never sought de novo review of either temporary order, nor did she argue to the circuit 

court during the contested hearing that Romero should have been ordered to pay child support 

during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. As noted above, this court need not consider 

arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 144, 569 

N.W.2d 577 (1997).
No. 2023AP21

16

a circuit court to “ensure that the parties have stipulated which party, if either is 

eligible, will claim each child as an exemption for” tax purposes and, in the 

absence of such an agreement, to “make the decision in accordance with state and 

federal tax laws”). Consequently, we direct the court to address this issue on 

remand.

CONCLUSION

¶38 In summary, we affirm that portion of the circuit court’s judgment 

addressing the division of the parties’ marital estate. However, we reverse that 

portion of the judgment setting Romero’s child support obligation, and we remand 

for the court to readdress that issue, specifically considering the amount of 

Rebecca’s income at the time of the divorce. On remand, the court shall also 

address which party may claim Rebecca and Romero’s minor child as a dependent 

for income tax purposes.

¶39 No costs to either party.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part and cause 

remanded with directions.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.