If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

DREMA KALAJIAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

January 12, 2023

v No. 360082

Wayne Circuit Court

MICHAEL PANOFF, LC No. 20-014816-NO

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and O’BRIEN and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this tort action, plaintiff appeals by right the trial court’s order granting defendant’s 

motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). We 

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from a bicycle collision between plaintiff and defendant in which plaintiff 

was injured. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the parties began biking together for exercise. On 

the day of the incident, plaintiff met defendant at defendant’s house, and they discussed the route 

they would ride together. Plaintiff was an avid bicyclist and had participated in several biking 

clubs in her life. Defendant was familiar with bicycling and had ridden bicycles since he was a 

child; however, defendant was less experienced at bicycling than plaintiff, and he said that he had 

never been taught any biking etiquette rules about signaling for turns before the incident occurred. 

From this point on, the parties’ accounts of the incident were not consistent. However, this case 

is the result of a grant of summary disposition for defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), and 

therefore we must view the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff.

Plaintiff testified that defendant told her that he would lead down Muir Street and then 

make a right turn onto Mack Avenue. During the bike ride, plaintiff was riding behind defendant 

and to defendant’s right side. Plaintiff testified that she was approximately 6 to 10 feet behind 

defendant when he made an abrupt right turn onto Ridge Road, causing plaintiff to collide with 

defendant as he turned in front of her. Plaintiff testified that defendant turned without signaling, 

either verbally or with a hand signal, and he did not look to see where plaintiff was located when 
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he turned into her lane of travel. Plaintiff stated that, although she was paying attention to where 

defendant was riding and applied her brakes when defendant turned, she could not stop herself in 

time to avoid the collision. Plaintiff collided with defendant’s rear tire, fell from her bicycle, and 

suffered injuries to her leg and knee.

Plaintiff also testified that she was aware that, when riding with other bicyclists, if the 

leader does not signal a turn, then “you’re going to have multiple bikes going down.” Additionally, 

plaintiff stated that she stays alert while bicycling with others because “[w]hen someone turns in 

front of you without a signal and without a warning, [a collision is] going to happen.” Plaintiff 

also stated that she was aware that defendant was not as experienced of a bicyclist as herself, and

that she did not discuss with defendant what she expected from defendant as a lead rider.

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendant was liable for her injuries under an 

ordinary negligence standard of care. In support of her negligence claim, plaintiff alleged that

defendant violated MCL 257.648(1), (2), and (4) of the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.1 et 

seq. Defendant eventually moved for summary disposition, arguing that he did not owe plaintiff 

a duty under ordinary negligence. Defendant argued that a reckless-misconduct standard of care

applied as the parties were coparticipants in a recreational activity, colliding into another bicyclist 

was an inherent risk of bike riding, and there was no genuine issue of material fact that defendant’s 

conduct was not reckless. Plaintiff’s response to defendant’s motion argued that (1) the parties 

were not engaged in a “recreational activity” because they were “simply . . . two people riding 

their bikes down the street,” and as such, this case is governed by the Michigan Vehicle Code, (2) 

even if the parties were engaged in a “recreational activity,” the risk of one bicyclist colliding with 

another is not an inherent risk to riding a bike, and (3) even if colliding with another bicyclist is 

an inherent risk to riding a bike, there is a question of fact whether defendant’s conduct was 

reckless. In his reply to plaintiff’s response, defendant maintained that bicycling is a recreational 

activity regardless of where the activity occurs, and that plaintiff failed to establish that defendant’s 

conduct was reckless.

At the summary disposition hearing, both plaintiff and defendant argued consistently with 

their written submissions. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition. In 

its ruling, the trial court held that the reckless-misconduct standard of care applied because the 

parties were engaged in a recreational activity and colliding with another bicyclist was “very much 

[a] reasonably foreseeable” risk. The court reasoned that plaintiff admitted in her deposition 

testimony that “this is a risk, that she was riding with an inexperienced rider,” and the court opined 

that, regardless, “anybody from riding a bike from childhood to adulthood can reasonably 

anticipate running into another bike rider’s bike[.]”

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We “review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.” ElKhalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). When considering 

a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), “a trial court must consider all evidence submitted by the 

parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Id. at 160. Only when there 

is no genuine issue of material fact may the motion be granted. See id. “A genuine issue of 

material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might 

differ.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, the “general standard of care is 
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a question of law for the courts, and thus subject to review de novo.” Sherry v East Suburban 

Football League, 292 Mich App 23, 27; 807 NW2d 859 (2011).

III. APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by applying the reckless-misconduct standard of 

care instead of the ordinary negligence standard. We disagree.

Although negligence is the ordinary standard of care in most tort cases, when the parties 

are coparticipants in a recreational activity, the applicable standard is the heightened standard of 

reckless misconduct. See Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 89; 597 NW2d 517 

(1999). “But this standard only applies to injuries that arise from risks inherent to the activity.” 

Bertin v Mann, 502 Mich 603, 609; 918 NW2d 707 (2018). Inherent risks of an activity are defined 

by what is reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances. See id. at 613. “Whether a risk was 

foreseeable is a question of fact; we resolve the question using an objective test, focusing on what 

risks a reasonable participant would have foreseen under the circumstances.” Composto v 

Albrecht, 328 Mich App 496, 503; 938 NW2d 755 (2019). See also Bertin, 502 Mich at 620.

Plaintiff first contests the trial court’s conclusion that riding bicycles is a recreational 

activity. Plaintiff reiterates the argument she made in the trial court—that “we simply have two 

people riding their bikes down a public street,” that two persons in such a situation would generally 

be subject to an ordinary standard of care and thus subject to the Michigan Vehicle Code, and that 

whether the parties in this case were riding their bikes on the street for exercise or transportation 

should not change the duty owed to one another. There are several problems with this argument. 

First, our caselaw is unanimous that the pertinent question concerns whether the parties were 

engaged in a recreational activity, not where they were engaged in that recreational activity. This 

flows into the second, related problem. Ritchie-Gamester held that “coparticipants in a 

recreational activity owe each other a duty not to act recklessly.” Ritchie-Gamester, 461 Mich at 

95 (emphasis added.) This follows the general rule that the existence of duty is based on the 

parties’ relationship to one another. See Clark v Dalman, 379 Mich 251, 260-261; 150 NW2d 755 

(1967). While where an injury occurs may be relevant in making this determination in some 

instances,1 it has never been held to be determinative as plaintiff suggests. Regardless, there is no 

question that where the injury occurred is not relevant in this case—the parties were indisputably 

engaged in a recreational activity (biking for exercise) together.

Plaintiff insists that even if they were engaged in a recreational activity, colliding with 

another bicyclist is not an inherent risk—meaning it is not reasonably foreseeable—when riding a 

bicycle. Relevant factors in determining whether a risk is reasonably foreseeable include the 

participants’ “relationship to each other and to the activity and their experience with the sport.” 

Bertin, 502 Mich at 621.

 

1 For instance, in Composto, this Court emphasized that the parties “were engaged in using a 

shared, multiuse trail, and thus were ‘coparticipants’ in the activity of using the trail.” Composto, 

328 Mich App at 501-502.
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We conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the risk of 

plaintiff and defendant colliding with each other while bike riding together was reasonably 

foreseeable. Plaintiff and defendant voluntarily rode their bicycles together for exercise. Plaintiff 

is a seasoned bicyclist who has biked her whole life and participated in multiple biking clubs. 

Plaintiff and defendant had biked together before, and plaintiff was aware that defendant was not 

as experienced at bicycling as plaintiff. Plaintiff also acknowledged that she was aware of the risk 

of collisions when riding with other bicyclists. From this evidence, particularly that plaintiff is a 

seasoned bicyclist and was aware that defendant was not as experienced, we conclude that plaintiff 

knew or should have known about the risk of colliding with defendant when riding together. 

Moreover, we agree with the trial court’s general acknowledgment that “anybody from riding a 

bike from childhood to adulthood can reasonably anticipate running into another bike rider’s bike, 

is an ordinary risk. It’s reasonably foreseeable.” Accordingly, the trial court did not err by 

applying the reckless-misconduct standard of care because bike riding is a recreational activity and

a collision between two bike riders is an inherent risk of the activity.

IV. RECKLESS MISCONDUCT

Plaintiff argues that even if the reckless-misconduct standard applies, there is a genuine 

issue of material fact whether defendant’s conduct was reckless. We disagree.

As this Court explained in Behar v Fox, 249 Mich App 314, 319; 642 NW2d 426 (2002), 

in the context of participants in a recreational activity:

One who is properly charged with recklessness or wantonness is not simply 

more careless than one who is only guilty of negligence. His conduct must be such 

as to put him in the class with the wilful doer of wrong. The only respect in which 

his attitude is less blameworthy than that of the intentional wrongdoer is that, 

instead of affirmatively wishing to injure another, he is merely willing to do so. 

The difference is that between him who casts a missile intending that it shall strike 

another and him who casts it where he has reason to believe it will strike another, 

being indifferent whether it does so or not. [Quotation marks and citation omitted.]

Plaintiff argues that defendant was reckless because he never looked behind him before 

turning and never gave any warning that he was going to turn. Viewing the facts in a light most 

favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact that defendant’s 

conduct was not reckless. Defendant’s failure to look behind him and to use a hand signal or give 

a verbal warning before turning did not rise to the level of reckless misconduct in this case. 

Plaintiff did not present evidence that defendant willfully intended to injure plaintiff or was 

indifferent to injuring plaintiff by failing to look behind him and turning in front of her without 

signaling. In Ritchie-Gamester, 461 Mich at 89-90, the Court concluded that an individual skating 

backwards without looking where she was skating was not enough to establish reckless 

misconduct. Similarly, we conclude that defendant’s failure to look behind him and signal before 

he turned amounted to mere carelessness. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that, even 

drawing all inferences in favor of plaintiff, defendant’s conduct did not rise to the level of reckless 

misconduct. Therefore, there is no question of fact that defendant’s conduct was not reckless.
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Plaintiff also argues that defendant violated various provisions of the Michigan Vehicle 

Code and that these violations support a conclusion that there is a question of fact regarding 

whether defendant’s conduct was reckless. “[W]hen a statute imposes a legal duty, violation of 

that statute creates a ‘rebuttable presumption of negligence.’ ” Randall v Mich High Sch Athletic

Ass’n, 334 Mich App 697, 721; 965 NW2d 690 (2020). Violations of the Michigan Vehicle Code

may create rebuttable inferences of negligence, but the applicable standard in this case is that of 

reckless misconduct. Under Behar, 249 Mich App at 319, evidence of negligence is not enough 

to establish reckless misconduct. Plaintiff must instead provide evidence that defendant was 

willing to injure plaintiff or was indifferent towards injuring her. Id. Thus, even if defendant 

violated the Michigan Vehicle Code, evidence of a violation, without more, is insufficient to 

support a finding that defendant acted with reckless misconduct. Therefore, we conclude that 

plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant’s conduct 

was reckless and the trial court properly granted summary disposition in favor of defendant.

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

/s/ Michelle M. Rick