SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3477-18

REGINALD VENABLE, a/k/a

REGGI MONEY, and

REGINALD MONEY,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT 

OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

___________________________

Submitted March 8, 2021 – Decided May 14, 2021

Before Judges Mayer and Susswein.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of 

Corrections.

Reginald Venable, appellant pro se. 

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Stephanie R. Dugger, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Appellant, Reginald Venable, is an inmate at East Jersey State Prison. He 

appeals from the February 26, 2019 final agency decision by the Department of 

Corrections (Department) finding him guilty of the asterisk offense 1 of 

possession of materials associated with a security threat group (STG). See

N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1 *011. Venable contends the material was of a religious 

nature related to the Nation of Islam and that he is not affiliated with a gang. 

After carefully reviewing the record, the arguments of the parties, and the 

applicable legal principles, we affirm the Department's decision.

Venable is currently serving a fifty-year prison sentence with a twentyyear period of parole ineligibility for his conviction for first-degree robbery and 

unlawful possession of a handgun. The disciplinary hearing was conducted on 

February 25, 2019, at which Venable requested and was granted the assistance 

of substitute counsel. Venable pled guilty to the charged offense but requested 

consideration. Venable did not testify, produce evidence, or avail himself of the 

opportunity afforded to him and his substitute counsel to cross-examine the 

Department's witness.

1

 Under the Department's regulations on inmate discipline, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1, 

"[a]sterisk offenses" are prohibited acts considered to be the most serious 

violations, resulting in the most severe sanctions.
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According to the evidence presented by the Department at the disciplinary 

hearing, on February 19, 2019, Corrections Officer Madore discovered written 

materials in a bin under Venable's bed. Officer Madore testified based on his 

training and experience that the confiscated material included lessons from the 

STG known as the Five Percenters.

2

After hearing the Department's testimony, the Hearing Officer found 

Venable guilty and imposed 100 days of administrative segregation, twenty days 

of loss of recreation privileges, and ten days of loss of commutation time. 

Venable immediately appealed the decision. On February 26, 2019, an associate 

administrator upheld the Hearing Officer's decision. 

Venable raises the following arguments for our consideration:

POINT I

THE FINDING OF GUILT IN THIS CASE WAS NOT 

BASED UPON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE 

RECORD AND CANNOT BE SUSTAINED. (Not 

Raised Below).

POINT II

THE NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE 

2

 In Hetsberger v. Dep't of Corr., 395 N.J. Super. 548 (2007), we had occasion 

to discuss this STG, which is also known as the "Five Percent Nation" and "the 

Nation."
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HOW THE DOCUMENTS FOUND IN VENABLE'S 

CELL WERE STG RELATED MATERIAL. (Not 

Raised Below).

POINT III

APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF 

LAW BY THE FAILURE OF THE PRISON 

ADMINISTRATION TO WHOM THIS CASE WAS 

FIRST APPEALED TO CONSIDER THE GROUND 

FOR APPEAL URGED BY APPELLANT. (Not 

Raised Below).

A. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF DUE 

PROCESS ARE NOTICE, HEARING, AN 

OPPORTUNITY FOR REVIEW, AND ABIDING 

BY ONE'S OWN STATED RULES AND 

REGULATIONS. (Not Raised Below).

B. BY FAILING TO ADEQUATELY CONSIDER 

APPELLANT'S APPEAL NOTICE, THE 

OPPORTUNITY FOR REAL REVIEW WAS 

DENIED APPELLANT AT THE INSTITUTIONAL 

LEVEL. (Not Raised Below).

In Avant v. Clifford, the New Jersey Court explained the procedural 

protections afforded to inmates charged with institutional infractions. 67 N.J. 

496 (1975). Inmates facing serious discipline must be provided notice of the 

charge, a reasonable period to prepare a defense, a hearing before a neutral 

hearing officer or adjustment committee, the right to present witnesses and 

evidence, and the right to confront and cross-examine Department witnesses or 

to obtain the hearing body's reasoning for denying such confrontation and cross-
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examination. Id. at 525–33; see also McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188 (1995); 

Jacobs v. Stephens, 139 N.J. 212 (1995). As the Supreme Court noted in 

McDonald, the regulatory framework for adjudicating charges "strike[s] the 

proper balance between the security concerns of the prison, the need for swift 

and fair discipline, and the due process rights of the inmates." 139 N.J. at 202. 

The scope of our review is narrow. As a general matter, we will disturb 

an agency's adjudicatory decision only upon a finding that the decision is 

"arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable," or is unsupported "by substantial 

credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 

N.J. 571, 579–80 (1980) (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Service, 39 N.J. 556, 

562 (1963)). In determining whether an agency action is arbitrary, capricious, 

or unreasonable, a reviewing court must examine:

(1) [W]hether the agency's action violates express or 

implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency 

follow the law; (2) whether the record contains 

substantial evidence to support the findings on which 

the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying 

the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly 

erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably 

have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.

[In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007) (quoting Mazza 

v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).]
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Our deference to the adjudicatory decisions made by the Department is 

especially appropriate in view of its important mission to safeguard prison safety 

and security. See Blanchard v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 461 N.J. Super. 231, 238–39

(App. Div. 2019) (cautioning that a reviewing court should "not substitute its 

own judgment for the agency's"). In Blanchard, we emphasized that "prisons 

are dangerous places, and the courts must afford appropriate deference and 

flexibility to administrators trying to manage this volatile environment." Id. at 

238 (quoting Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 324 N.J. Super. 576, 584 (App. Div. 

1999)). 

Furthermore, we are deferential to an agency's expertise. See Murray v. 

State Health Benefits Comm'n, 337 N.J. Super. 435, 442 (App. Div. 2001) 

("[W]here there is substantial evidence in the record to support more than one 

regulatory conclusion, it is the agency's choice which governs.") (quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting In re Vineland Chemical Co., 243 N.J. Super. 285, 307 

(App. Div. 1990)). In this instance, we recognize that the Department not only 

has a compelling interest in preventing criminal street gangs and other STGs 

from recruiting or indoctrinating inmates, but also has developed expertise in 

identifying those organizations and the materials that are associated with them. 
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In an appeal from a final decision of the Department in a prisoner 

disciplinary matter, we consider whether there is substantial evidence in the 

record to support the Department's decision that the inmate committed the 

prohibited act. Blanchard, 461 N.J. Super. at 237–38 (citing Henry, 81 N.J. at 

579–80 (1980)). Substantial evidence has been defined alternately as "such 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion," and "evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for the agency's 

action." Ibid. (quoting Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192, 

(App. Div. 2010)) (citations omitted); see also N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a) ("A 

finding of guilt at a disciplinary hearing shall be based upon substantial evidence 

that the inmate has committed a prohibited act."). However, we note that "our 

review is not 'perfunctory,' nor is 'our function . . . merely to rubberstamp an 

agency's decision.'" Ibid. (quoting Figueroa, 414 N.J. Super. at 192). Rather, 

"[w]e are constrained to engage in a 'careful and principled consideration of the 

agency record and findings.'" Ibid. (quoting Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. 

Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000)).

We are satisfied that the Department in this case presented substantial 

evidence that Venable possessed the materials found under his bed, that those 

materials relate to the Five Percenters, and that the Fiver Percenters is an STG. 
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This evidence was sufficient to establish that Venable possessed STG materials 

in violation of institutional regulations. As we have noted, Venable declined the 

opportunity that was afforded to him to testify, call witnesses, produce evidence, 

or cross-examine the Corrections Officer who testified for the Department. 

Based on the information presented at the disciplinary hearing, the Department's 

affirmance of the Hearing Officer's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or 

unreasonable. 

We also reject Venable's contention that he was denied the right to 

administratively appeal the Hearing Officer's decision. The record clearly 

shows that the Associate Administrator considered and denied Venable's 

administrative appeal, explaining "[i]t has been a long-established rule that STG 

Material is not permitted for retention. Possession of this material jeopardizes 

security."

To the extent we have not specifically addressed them, any remaining 

arguments raised by Venable in this appeal lack sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(d).

Affirmed.