*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 19, 2005*

Decided January 10, 2006

Before

Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

 Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 05-2949

RONNIE L. MCATEE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

ALAN M. UCHTMAN,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of

Illinois

No. 02-1100-JLF

James L. Foreman,

Judge.

O R D E R

Inmate Ronnie McAtee appeals the denial of his petition for habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. McAtee seeks relief from three decisions by the Illinois

Department of Corrections Administrative Review Board (ARB) that affirmed a

series of disciplinary convictions. We affirm the district court’s denial of the

petition.

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-2949 Page 2

Over a roughly four-month period in 1998, prison officials cited Ronnie

McAtee for committing disciplinary infractions on at least thirteen separate dates. 

The alleged infractions included insubordination, threatening corrections officers,

covering his cell door and covering the light in his cell to inhibit surveillance,

sabotaging the sprinkler head in his cell and causing minor flooding, refusing to

surrender a meal tray, refusing to remove his arm from the hatch in his cell door

and jamming the lock on that hatch, and stealing a book from the prison law

library. A hearing committee of the Illinois Department of Corrections, meeting on

multiple occasions throughout this period, found McAtee guilty of almost every

charge and, among other administrative sanctions, revoked a total of 37 months of

good-time credit. 

McAtee filed three separate grievances with the ARB seeking the restoration

of his good-time credits. The ARB reviewed the hearing committee’s records and

recommended that each grievance be denied because it was “reasonably satisfied

that the inmate committed the infractions.” McAtee filed an action for mandamus

in the state court, asking that his credits be reinstated because they had been

revoked in violation of his due process rights and the Department of Corrections’

regulations. The state court held that he had not stated a viable claim and

dismissed his action. Without appealing his case to the Illinois Appellate Court,

McAtee petitioned in district court for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254. The

district court found that McAtee had not procedurally exhausted his state remedies

and denied the petition, and we affirmed that denial. See McAtee v. Cowan, 250

F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 2001). 

McAtee proceeded to exhaust his state remedies, taking his case to the

Illinois Appellate Court. There he argued that the trial court erred by dismissing

his complaint, that his disciplinary hearing was not fair and impartial, that he was

denied due process, and that there was insufficient evidence on the record to

support his disciplinary sanctions. The state appellate court disagreed,

determining that his conduct hearing was fair and impartial and that the trial

court’s decision was supported by adequate evidence and an adequate written

record. McAtee petitioned for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, but

was denied. 

Following this denial, McAtee filed a second petition under § 2254 in the

district court. He alleged again that there was insufficient evidence on the record to

sustain the disciplinary findings, that he was not given notice of the charges

underlying those findings, that there was an insufficient written record to sustain

the decisions, and that the hearing committee’s deficient process violated state

laws. Upon the magistrate judge’s recommendation the district court denied the

petition. McAtee appeals that decision.
No. 05-2949 Page 3

As a preliminary matter, we note that because McAtee is appealing the

administrative revocation of good-time credits, he was not required to obtain a

certificate of appealability in order to proceed on appeal. See Walker v. O’Brien, 216

F.3d 626, 637 (7th Cir. 2000). The respondents ask that we overrule Walker and

require a certificate of McAtee and future appellants. We decline to do so.

We review the district court’s denial of McAtee’s petition de novo. See Horton

v. Litscher, 427 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2005). Because his claim was adjudicated on

the merits in an Illinois court, we may not grant McAtee’s petition unless the state

court’s decision was contrary to or misapplied Supreme Court precedent, or was

based on an unreasonable reading of the facts in light of the evidence. See id.; 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). Insofar as McAtee’s petition is based on asserted violations

of Illinois law, there is no relief available under § 2254; federal habeas relief “is only

available to a person in custody in violation of the United States Constitution or

laws or treaties of the United States.” See Dellinger v. Bowen, 301 F.3d 758, 764

(7th Cir. 2002). McAtee alternatively characterizes his arguments on appeal as due

process arguments, and we will address them as such.

McAtee first argues that he was denied due process stemming from the

prison’s failure to provide a fair and impartial hearing committee. He contends that

the two committee members who issued the decisions in each of his disciplinary

hearings intentionally misrepresented the statements of one of his witnesses,

Randy Ryder-El. The committee reported that Ryder-El testified that he heard

McAtee make insubordinate and derogatory comments to a correctional officer,

while McAtee submitted an affidavit from Ryder-El denying that he gave such

testimony. 

McAtee has a due process right to an impartial decisionmaker in a prison

disciplinary hearing. See Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003), citing

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). The decisionmakers are entitled to a

presumption of “honesty and integrity,” and thus “the constitutional standard for

impermissible bias is high.” Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). 

McAtee does not explain how the variance between Ryder-El’s reported testimony

and his subsequent affidavit shows bias on the part of the hearing committee,

especially given the presumption of honesty and integrity that we afford the

adjudicators. “The requirements of due process are considerably relaxed in the

setting of prison discipline.” Eads v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2002). The

Illinois Appellate Court determined on the same record that McAtee had not shown

that his hearing committee was biased, and he has not demonstrated here any error

in that holding.

McAtee next contends that the hearing committee’s decisions are not

adequately supported by a written record. He cites Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d
No. 05-2949 Page 4

1105, 1114-15 (7th Cir. 1983), for the proposition that a disciplinary committee

violates an inmate’s due process rights when it provides only a conclusory

statement of reasons for its ruling. In that case, the record of the committee’s

decision said only, “All evidence presented has convinced the committee the

resident is guilty” of the alleged infractions. Id. at 1108. We held that the

committee’s statement in that case was so broad that a reviewing court could not

adequately discern whether the committee was impartial or its actions were

arbitrary. Id. at 1116. 

Redding is distinguishable, however, from a case like this in which the

committee specifies a basis for its decision, even when that explanation is cursory. 

In Saenz v. Young, 811 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir. 1987), we observed that the

deficiency with the hearing in Redding was that the committee explained that it

relied on “all evidence,” which was effectively the same as no explanation at all. Id. 

Even an extremely brief summary, such as the statement of the committee in Saenz

that the correctional officer’s “written statement supports the finding of guilt,” will

suffice so long as there “is no mystery about [the committee’s] reasoning process.” 

Id. at 1173, 1174. See Moffat v. Boyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Here, the Illinois Appellate Court properly found that the committee had

sufficiently explained its reasons. Each hearing committee report includes a

heading entitled “Basis for Decision”, and in each report that heading precedes a

short but adequate summary of the testimony against McAtee along with his

history of prior similar offenses. For example, one committee report reads, “Based

on the observation of the reporting employee that McAtee popped tha [sic] cap off

his fire sprinkler in the back of his cell which flooded the gallery, positive

identification made by gallery chart, past history [of five citations for a related

offense code]. This committee is satisfied the inmate is guilty as charged.” 

This summary was more specific than simply citing “all evidence presented,” as the

committee did in Redding. Because McAtee’s evidence was limited to his own

testimony and that of other inmates, the only question before the committee was

one of credibility. Even a “curt explanation” was therefore adequate. Moffat, 288

F.3d at 981 (noting in dicta that when the dispute is over “a curt explanation may

suffice when it was evident to all involved that the only question was one of

credibility, so that to find the prisoner guilty at all is to reveal how the core dispute

has been resolved.”).

McAtee raises additional arguments that the committee’s written record was

inadequate, asserting that it was unreasonable to rely on past offenses that were

dissimilar to the instant offenses or that the hearing committee violated his rights

by not calling favorable witnesses. But he fails to make any argument as to how

the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision that found the record adequate falls short of

the highly deferential standard of § 2254(d). See Pannell v. McBride, 306 F.3d 499,
No. 05-2949 Page 5

502 (7th Cir. 2002). The Illinois Appellate Court did not misapply Supreme Court

precedent or make any unreasonable factual findings of fact in resolving this issue. 

Finally, McAtee contends that the hearing committee violated his due process

rights by finding him guilty of the disciplinary infractions without sufficient

evidence. He asserts that the committee relied on nothing more than the

disciplinary reports against him and the testimony of the prison staff submitting

those reports. There must be "some evidence" to support the hearing committee's

findings in order to provide the due process of law. See Superintendent, Mass. Corr.

Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786

(7th Cir. 1999). As noted, the evidence the committee cited for each infraction

consisted of testimony, generally that of the correctional officer reporting the

infraction, and a list of McAtee’s prior, similar infractions. The officers’ reports, as

submitted to the committee, are included in McAtee’s pleadings, and are the sort of

evidence that we have found to meet the “some evidence” standard. McPherson, 188

F.3d at 786 (concluding that brief conduct report was sufficient evidence so long as

cited behavior violated the prison rule). 

AFFIRMED.