COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

ALBERT RAMIREZ,

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 Appellee.

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No. 08-12-00010-CR

Appeal from the

171st District Court 

of El Paso County, Texas 

(TC# 20090D03210) 

O P I N I O N

Albert Ramirez (“Ramirez” or “Appellant”) appeals a ruling of the trial court that Ramirez 

was not indigent for the purposes of court-appointed counsel to represent him on appeal, Case No. 

08-11-00298-CR, and a trial transcript at county expense. Ramirez brings two issues: (1) error 

by the trial court in determining Ramirez was not indigent in spite of evidence to the contrary and 

in violation of Article 26.04(p) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure; and (2) denying Ramirez

the right to court-appointed counsel to handle his appeal prejudices his rights under the 6th and 

14th Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Texas 

Constitution. For the reasons set out below, we reverse and render.

BACKGROUND

Ramirez was indicted by the El Paso County Grand Jury on July 14, 2009. Subsequently, 
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he applied for a court-appointed attorney on two separate occasions and it was determined he 

qualified based on his financial condition. The El Paso County Public Defender’s Office 

(“PDO”) was appointed to represent Ramirez on January 13, 2011. Ramirez was convicted by a 

jury of three counts of Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child. Ramirez was sentenced to 

ninety-nine years’ incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice on October 5, 2011. 

At that time, he was credited with 321 days in jail. Ramirez filed a notice of appeal on October 

11, 2011. The same day, Ramirez also filed a motion for a reporter’s record at county expense in 

which he alleged he was indigent.

On November 7, 2011, the trial court held an indigence hearing. Ramirez was the sole 

witness. He testified he had not been working since he was in jail and had no job. Ramirez 

referred to his girlfriend as his fiancée and common-law wife during the hearing, and testified she 

was not working as she was attending community college. When asked if he had any financial 

resources that would enable him to pay for an attorney and also pay for the record, he replied “No, 

ma’am.”

The State had no questions for Ramirez. The trial court then began questioning Ramirez. 

Ramirez testified during the three months he was not in custody, he had not been working. When 

the trial court asked where he and his wife lived, Ramirez answered they were living in a motel and 

her parents were helping to pay for those accommodations. Ramirez admitted he has had

occasional odd-jobs and mechanic work he performed which paid $60 to $80 per job. As a result, 

he testified, he had been unable to save any money and had no savings account. The trial court 

inquired about a car owned by Ramirez: “You had a beautiful car that you were going to sell that 
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you could sell for 6,000, for 7,000, for $8,000, a hot rod show model. What happened to that?”1 

When Ramirez answered that he still had the car, the court stated “[w]ell, then he can sell that.” 

The court asked if the car was still worth around $6,000 and Ramirez answered “yes.” Ramirez 

stated his wife could not sell the car because she did not know anything about it. The trial court 

questioned Ramirez’s credibility and veracity during his testimony. No exhibits were introduced 

at the hearing either by Ramirez or the State.

The trial court determined Ramirez was not indigent and therefore, not entitled to either

court-appointed counsel or a reporter’s record at county expense. Ramirez’s trial counsel, the 

PDO filed a motion to reconsider and a motion for written order clarifying the court’s ruling. On 

December 21, 2011, this Court abated the original appeal and ordered the trial court to enter an 

order regarding Ramirez’s indigence status so that he could appeal the indigence ruling. The trial 

court rendered an order finding Ramirez not indigent and an order denying the motion to 

reconsider. Ramirez appealed the indigence ruling.

DISCUSSION

Ramirez brings two issues: (1) error by the trial court in determining Ramirez was not 

indigent in spite of evidence to the contrary and in violation of TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 

26.04(p); and (2) denying Ramirez the right to court-appointed counsel to handle his appeal 

prejudices his rights under the 6th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution and 

Article I, sec. 10 of the Texas Constitution.2

The State alleges that because Ramirez failed to attach the required affidavit with his 

 

1 Apparently, the car had been mentioned in a prior hearing.

2

In his brief, Ramirez advises that because these issues are related, they are argued as a single issue. Further, 

Appellant failed to brief the second issue as to the Texas Constitution separately, therefore, it is waived. See Heitman 

v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 n.23 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) and subsequent authority including from this Court.
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motion for the transcript, that he has waived this issue. See TEX.R.APP.P. 20.2. However, in the 

interest of justice, and because there was no objection on this basis raised at the trial court, we will

consider Ramirez’s arguments.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

A defendant may be indigent if the defendant is “not financially able to employ counsel” or 

is unable to “pay or give security for the appellate record.” See TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 

1.051(b)(West Supp.2012); TEX.R.APP.P. 20.2; McFatridge v. State, 309 S.W.3d 1, 5 

(Tex.Crim.App. 2010). Whether a defendant is indigent for appointment of counsel and 

obtaining a free record are separate issues and may be resolved differently but involve 

consideration of the same factors. See McFatridge, 309 S.W.3d at 5-6. It is possible for a 

defendant to be indigent in one context but not the other. Whitehead v. State, 130 S.W.3d 866, 

878 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004), citing Castillo v. State, 595 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.Crim.App. 

1980)(noting that the defendant had managed to retain counsel but determining that defendant 

could not pay for a transcription of the court reporter’s notes).

Indigence determinations are made at the time the issue arises and on a case-by-case basis. 

McFatridge, 309 S.W.3d at 5. Factors relevant to consider are the defendant’s income, sources of 

income, assets, property, outstanding obligations, necessary expenses, number and age of 

dependents, and spousal income available to the defendant.3See TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 

26.04(m)(West Supp.2012); McFatridge, 309 S.W.3d at 6.

In making its indigence determination, the trial court should employ a two-step process. 

First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of indigence. McFatridge, 309 S.W.3d at 

 

3 Whether a defendant has posted or is capable of posting bail is not a consideration except to the extent it reflects the 

defendant’s financial circumstances as measured by the other factors. See TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 26.04(m); 

Whitehead, 130 S.W.3d at 875.
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6. If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of indigence, the burden then shifts to the State 

to show the defendant is not indigent. McFatridge, 309 S.W.3d at 6. Unless there is some basis 

in the record to find the defendant’s prima facie showing of indigence is inaccurate or untrue, the 

trial court should accept it as sufficient and find the defendant indigent. Id. Once the defendant 

has been determined indigent for the purposes of court appointed counsel, he is presumed to 

remain indigent for the duration of the case unless there is a material change in his financial 

circumstances. See TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 26.04(p).

The trial court’s indigence determinations are reviewed on appeal for an abuse of 

discretion. See Newman v. State, 937 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). A trial court abuses its 

discretion if it acts without reference to any rules or guiding principles, Montgomery v. State, 810 

S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990), or if its ruling goes beyond the zone of reasonable 

disagreement. Walker v. State, 300 S.W.3d 836, 844 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d).

If a defendant establishes a prima facie showing of indigence, an appellate court will 

uphold a determination that the defendant is not indigent only if the record contains evidence 

supporting that determination. McFatridge, 309 S.W.3d at 6. The trial court is not completely 

free to disbelieve the defendant’s assertions concerning his financial status, but it may disbelieve 

the defendant’s assertions “if there is a reasonable, articulable basis for doing so, either because 

there is conflicting evidence or because the evidence submitted is in some manner suspect or 

determined by the court to be inadequate.” Whitehead, 130 S.W.3d at 876.

As the reviewing appellate court, it is not our role to determine whether the appellant is 

indigent for purposes of appeal. See McFatridge, 309 S.W.3d at 9. Rather, our role is to 

determine if the evidence produced at the indigence hearing supports the trial judge’s 
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non-indigence determination. See McFatridge, 309 S.W.3d at 9. Moreover, as the reviewing 

appellate court, we may not consider facts that were not developed in the record. Id. at 6.

For purposes of a free record, an appellate court will uphold a trial court’s finding of 

non-indigence if there is credible evidence in the record supporting such a finding. Id. at 6. For 

the purpose of determining entitlement to a free record, a defendant is considered indigent if he 

“cannot pay or give security” for the appellate record. TEX.R.APP.P. 20.2. For purposes of 

appointed appellate counsel, an appellate court will uphold the determination of non-indigence if 

the trial court reasonably believed, based on the record evidence, the defendant was not indigent. 

See McFatridge, 309 S.W.3d at 6. In the appointment of counsel context, a defendant is indigent 

if he is financially “without means to employ counsel” of his own choosing. TEX.CODE 

CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 26.04(o).

We are faced with two distinct considerations: (1) whether Ramirez is entitled to an 

attorney on appeal because he is indigent; and (2) whether Ramirez is entitled to a free record at 

county expense: The Court of Criminal Appeals notes this in Whitehead:

It is important to recognize that the trial court’s duty diverges for the two indigence

questions, i.e. indigence for the purpose of a free record and indigence for the 

purpose of free counsel. To obtain a free record, the defendant must exercise due 

diligence in asserting his indigence and must sustain his allegations at the hearing.

By contrast, the right to an attorney is a ‘waivable-only’ right, and absent a waiver, 

the courts have an affirmative obligation to ensure that an indigent appellant has 

counsel.

Whitehead, 130 S.W.3d at 876-77.

INDIGENCE

According to Ramirez’s sworn testimony, he has no job and no financial resources that 

would enable him to hire an attorney or obtain a record. Ramirez did admit he had occasional 
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work as a mechanic during the three months he was released on bond, but that the pay for such 

work was minimal. Ramirez borrowed money from his “wife’s” parents to pay for the motel he 

resides in, and his “wife” is not employed.4 Ramirez, as of October 2011, had spent a total of 321 

days in jail, and the evidence regarding his income referenced a three month period when he was 

out on bond. The trial court raised the issue of the vehicle owned by Ramirez, however the scant 

record affirmatively indicates the trial court was aware of this vehicle from prior testimony. So 

we cannot presume this is a “surprise” asset, even though the vehicle does not appear on either of 

the motions seeking appointed counsel. Ramirez describes this as a “show car” with a value of 

$6,000. The State had full opportunity to present evidence in this matter but did not.

COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL

In McFatridge, the Court of Criminal Appeals held the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by determining McFatridge was not indigent. See McFatridge, 309 S.W.3d at 8-9.

There, McFatridge’s monthly income was $550, and her monthly expenses totaled $484. Id. at 3.

However, she owned $3,000 worth of antiques and nonexempt real property valued at $6,670. Id. 

at 7-8. The court first deducted the $3,000 estimated cost of the reporter’s record and noted that 

McFatridge “would have at least $6,670 worth of assets left over to devote to the cost of an 

appellate attorney.” Id. at 9. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s determinations that 

McFatridge was not indigent for purposes of obtaining a free record or for the appointment of 

appellate counsel. McFatridge, 309 S.W.3d at 9.

 

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The testimony regarding Ramirez’s girlfriend and the fact her parents’ are paying for the hotel help paint the picture 

of Ramirez’s current situation, however the trial court “must consider only the defendant’s personal financial 

conditions, not those of his parents, other relatives, friends or employers.” Snoke v. State, 780 S.W.2d 210, 213 

(Tex.Crim.App. 1989), citing Rosales v. State, 748 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987). “The ability of the 

defendant to borrow funds is something that may be taken into account in considering how the defendant’s assets and 

property relate to the ability to pay.” Whitehead, 130 S.W.3d at 878, citing Goffney v. Lowry, 554 S.W.2d 157, 159 

(Tex. 1977). However, “a defendant should not be required to borrow money that can never be repaid except by 

depriving the defendant of the necessities of life.” Id.
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At trial, the trial court found Ramirez to be indigent and appointed the public defender to 

represent him. Thus, the record reflects the trial court determined Ramirez to be indigent and he 

is presumed to remain indigent for the remainder of the proceedings unless a material change in his 

financial circumstances occurs. See TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 26.04(p). Ramirez 

testified that he was unemployed with the exception of occasional odd jobs which paid $60 to $80. 

Based on the previous presumption and sworn testimony at the indigence hearing, Ramirez made a 

prima facie showing that he was indigent. McFatridge, 309 S.W.3d at 6. The burden then 

shifted to the State to show that Ramirez was in fact, not indigent. The State presented no 

evidence and asked no questions. We find the State did not meet its burden.

Here, the trial court made its determination without reference to the “guiding principles” 

set out for indigence determinations in El Paso County. In El Paso County, all indigence

determinations are based on a formula set out in the “El Paso Plan.”5 Under the “El Paso Plan,” a 

person is deemed indigent so long as the individual does not possess “net liquid assets worth over 

$2,500, excluding the value of one vehicle . . . .” Therefore, in El Paso County, a defendant is 

deemed to be indigent in spite of the ownership of a vehicle. There is no indication in the record

these guidelines were applied by the trial court in making its determination. Furthermore, the trial 

court was not completely free to disregard Ramirez’s testimony about his financial status, 

particularly in light of the previous indigence determinations made by the court, which gave rise to 

 

5

See http://www.epcounty.com/councilofjudges/Documents/ElPasoPlan.pdf :

A person is ‘indigent’ and thus qualifies for appointed counsel in this county if the income of the 

person and the person’s spouse totals less than 150% of the federal poverty level for the family, or 

the person’s dependents currently receive food stamps, public housing, Temporary Assistance for 

Needy Families (TANF), or Medicaid, unless the person has net liquid assets worth over $2,500, 

excluding the value of one vehicle, pursuant to current Texas TANF guidelines.

Rule 5.01, Local Rules of Amdinistration for the Courts of El Paso county, Texas - The Standards and Procedures for 

Appointment of Council for Indigent Defendants, El Paso District and County Courts Plan, adopted 12/22/2009.
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a continuing presumption of indigence. Based on the record and the application of the “El Paso 

Plan,” Ramirez is indigent for the purposes of appointed counsel.

Therefore, we must conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that 

Ramirez was not entitled to counsel on appeal. Further, the court’s determination goes against the 

general principle behind the burden-shifting analysis noted above; “to protect the truly indigent 

defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel.” Whitehead, 130 S.W.3d at 874, citing

Snoke, 780 S.W.2d at 213. Absent a reasonable, articulable basis for doing so, the trial court is 

not completely free to disbelieve the defendant’s allegations concerning his own financial status. 

Id. at 876.

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT AT COUNTY EXPENSE

Ramirez’s post-trial motion for a reporter’s record at county expense is unsworn and 

unaccompanied by an affidavit.6 As noted previously, during the hearing, the State failed to 

object to the unsworn motion and the lack of an affidavit. However, Ramirez presented sworn 

testimony at the hearing, which was considered and forms the basis of the trial court’s finding of 

non-indigence.

In contrast to McFatridge, the Court of Criminal Appeals in Whitehead found the 

defendant was not indigent for purposes of appointment of counsel, but the estimated cost of the 

trial record raised a “serious question” about whether the defendant was capable of paying for the 

record. Whitehead, 130 S.W.3d at 878-79. The court reporter estimated the record would cost 

$65,000. Id. at 870. But as the defendant only produced an unsworn motion and affidavits 

which were not before the trial court at the time it made its indigence determination, the Court of 

 

6

In concluding whether a defendant is entitled to a free record, only sworn allegations are to be considered. See 

Whitehead, 130 S.W.3d at 873-74.
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Criminal Appeals was unable to conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying the 

request for a free record. Whitehead, 130 S.W.3d at 879.

In the instant case, the trial court focused on Ramirez’s sole asset, a vehicle. At the time 

of the hearing, Ramirez had been incarcerated for nearly a year, unemployed, no income or 

savings, and no other identifiable assets. The trial court had found Ramirez indigent at least two 

times previously, even after consideration and knowledge of the vehicle. Other than that solitary 

asset, there are no other resources from which Ramirez could pay or give security for the trial 

record. Unlike Whitehead, in which the trial record was estimated to be $65,000, here the record 

is silent as to the potential cost of the trial record. In addition, there is no evidence to indicate 

whether the vehicle was encumbered or even if, indeed, Ramirez had the right to sell the vehicle. 

Further, in indigence determinations, one vehicle is allowed under the “El Paso Plan.”

Based on the record before us, Ramirez’s first issue is sustained.7

CONCLUSION

Having sustained Ramirez’s first issue, we reverse the trial court’s order and render an

order finding Ramirez indigent, for the purposes of a trial transcript at county expense and 

appointed counsel to represent him on appeal.

May 31, 2013

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Rodriguez, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

 

7 Having sustained Ramirez’s first issue, we need not address his constitutional arguments. See TEX.R.APP. P. 47.1