alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GEORGE POTTS, Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant - Appellee. No. 08-36020 D.C. No. 3:07-cv-00701-HA
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Ancer L. Haggerty, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 4, 2009 Portland, Oregon Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, FISHER and PAEZ, Circuit Judges. When the Commissioner conducts a continuing disability review to determine if a claimant is still eligib le to receive disability benefits, the Commissioner must determine whether ther e has been “any decrease in the medical severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s) which was present at the time of the 

# FILED
NOV 18 2009 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALSmost recent favorable medical decision th at [the claimant was] disabled or continued to be disabled.” 20 C.F. R. § 404.1594(b)(1), (f)(3). Here, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) incorr ectly used the February 1995 decision finding Potts to be disabled as the comparison point for improvement. As the Commissioner conceded in briefing and in oral argument, the correct comparison point was Potts’ continuing disability re view in March 2000. Because the ALJ’s findings were based on legal error, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this memoradum. Smolen v. Chater , 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). Upon remand, Potts’ benefits may be reinstated consistent with the provisions of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1597a(i)(6). REVERSED and REMANDED.
Exhibit 10.06    January 9, 2011  AGREEMENT TO EXTEND TERM OF PROMISSORY NOTE TO APRIL 9, 2011   By this Agreement, POWRtec International Corp., a Delaware corporation ("Maker") and The Management AB ("Creditor"), do hereby extend the term of that certain Promissory Note dated  July 9, 2010 (Note) to become due April 9, 2011 on the same terms and conditions as set forth in that Note with the sole exception of the due date.  A copy of the Note is attached hereto as Exhibit A.   POWRtec International Corp.    By: /s/ Grant Jasmin Grant Jasmin, President  Agreed: The Management AB   By:  /s/ Anders Sagadin Anders Sagadin   POWRtec Corporation 745 Camden Ave., Suite D Campbell, CA 95008 408-374-1900
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

NORTHERN DIVISION

KENNETH KERNSTOCK, 

Plaintiff,

Case Number 08-14500-BC

v. Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

COUNTY OF ARENAC, et al.,

Defendants,

and

AMY S. LYNCH,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF ARENAC, et al.,

Defendants,

and 

GAIL SEDER,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF ARENAC, et al.,

Defendants.

______________________________________ /

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND TO

STAY DISCOVERY AND MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA

On February 12, 2009, Defendant Robert J. Lesneski filed a motion to dismiss and for

summary judgment accompanied by a twenty-one page brief, which all Defendants join. Dkt. # 24.,

1:08-cv-14500-TLL-CEB Doc # 33 Filed 03/16/09 Pg 1 of 3 Pg ID 213
-2-

29 Defendant asserts, inter alia, qualified immunity because Plaintiffs’ complaints do not allege a

violation of a clearly established constitutional right. On February 20, 2009, Defendant filed a

motion for a protective order and to stay discovery. Dkt. # 28. Defendant asserts that all discovery

should be stayed until resolution of the qualified immunity issue. Plaintiffs did not file a response.

On March 9, 2009, Defendant filed a related motion to quash Plaintiffs’ subpoena to depose

Defendant. 

Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

When a defendant asserts qualified immunity, “a ruling on that issue should be made early in the

proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive.”

Id. Here, Plaintiffs allege violations of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. If qualified immunity is applicable in this instance, then the Court’s

subject matter jurisdiction may be affected with respect to Plaintiffs’ pendant state-law causes of

action. Consequently, the Court will grant Defendant’s motions, stay all discovery pending

resolution of the threshold qualified immunity issue, and quash the subpoena. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

45(c) (subpoena may be quashed if “subjects a person to undue burden”). 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant Robert J. Lesneski ’s motion for protective

order and staying discovery [Dkt. # 28] and motion to quash subpoena [Dkt. # 31] are GRANTED.

Discovery with respect to all Defendants is STAYED until further order of this Court. 

1:08-cv-14500-TLL-CEB Doc # 33 Filed 03/16/09 Pg 2 of 3 Pg ID 214
-3-

It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s subpoena of Defendant Robert J. Lesneski is

QUASHED.

s/Thomas L. Ludington 

THOMAS L. LUDINGTON

United States District Judge

Dated: March 16, 2009

PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served

upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first

class U.S. mail on March 16, 2009.

s/Tracy A. Jacobs 

TRACY A. JACOBS

 

1:08-cv-14500-TLL-CEB Doc # 33 Filed 03/16/09 Pg 3 of 3 Pg ID 215
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

GREGORY HOXIE, 

Plaintiff,

Case No. 09-CV-10725

vs.

HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH

LIVINGSTON COUNTY, et al,

Defendants.

_____________________________/

ORDER GRANTING LIVINGSTON COUNTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO FILE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE [DOC. #s 165 AND 167]

This matter came before the court on Livingston County defendants’ motion for

enlargement of time to file motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff objects to granting

defendants an enlargement of time to file their dispositive motion, and has also filed a

motion to strike defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Doc. # 166] as untimely. While

defendants lack a persuasive excuse for missing the dispositive motion deadline, there is

no prejudice to plaintiffs due to the delay. Now, therefore,

Defendants’ motion for enlargement of time to file motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s motion to strike Livingston County defendants’ untimely motion for

summary judgment is DENIED.

Plaintiff’s response to the motion for summary judgment shall be filed 21 days from

the date of this order.

2:09-cv-10725-GCS-MKM Doc # 171 Filed 01/27/11 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 2554
2

So ordered.

Dated: January 26, 2011

S/George Caram Steeh 

GEORGE CARAM STEEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on

January 26, 2011, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

S/Josephine Chaffee

Deputy Clerk

2:09-cv-10725-GCS-MKM Doc # 171 Filed 01/27/11 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 2555
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, September 04, 2024. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, September 04, 2024 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A25I0020. NAVARRO A. LANE v. RENALDO PARKES.
Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of this order. The Clerk of State Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
LC NUMBERS: 23A00228
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</TABLE>
1 

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-24-00058-CR

__________________

LAWRENCE PAUL DAVENPORT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 435th District Court

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 20-02-02517-CR

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The trial court sentenced Lawrence Paul Davenport on October 10, 2023. 

Davenport did not file a motion for new trial within 30 days after the date in which 

the trial court imposed sentence. See Tex. R. App. P. 21.4(a). Notice of appeal was 

due to be filed on November 9, 2023. Davenport’s time for filing a motion for 

extension of time to perfect his appeal expired on November 27, 2023. On December 

19, 2023, the District Clerk received and filed a pro se notice of appeal dated 

December 13, 2023. On February 21, 2024, the Clerk of the Court notified the parties 
2

that the notice of appeal has been filed outside the time for which an extension of 

time may be granted for filing notice of appeal, and warned the parties that the appeal 

would be dismissed unless grounds were shown for continuing the appeal.

Davenport, through his appointed appellate counsel, obtained additional time to 

respond to the Clerk’s notice, but Davenport did not file a response that identifies a 

valid basis for this Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction over his appeal.

When a defendant appeals from a conviction in a criminal case, the time to 

file a notice of appeal runs from the date sentence is imposed or suspended in open 

court. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a). An appellate court may extend the time to file the 

notice of appeal if, within 15 days after the deadline for filing the notice of appeal, 

the defendant files a notice of appeal in the trial court and files a motion for extension 

of time in the appellate court. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.3. Davenport failed to file a 

notice of appeal and a motion for an extension of time within the time permitted by 

the rule. See id.

“Timely filing of a written notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to 

hearing an appeal.” Castillo v. State, 369 S.W.3d 196, 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 

“If a notice of appeal is not timely filed, the court of appeals has no option but to 

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. Davenport does not argue that he 

obtained an out-of-time appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeals. We dismiss the 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).
3

APPEAL DISMISSED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on April 30, 2024

Opinion Delivered May 1, 2024

Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3613 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 3613

 To require the Secretary of the Army to acquire permanent flowage and 
   saturation easements over land that is located within the 10-year 
  floodplain of the James River, South Dakota, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 11, 1996

 Mr. Johnson of South Dakota introduced the following bill; which was 
     referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To require the Secretary of the Army to acquire permanent flowage and 
   saturation easements over land that is located within the 10-year 
  floodplain of the James River, South Dakota, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ACQUISITION OF EASEMENTS OVER LAND NEAR JAMES RIVER, SOUTH 
              DAKOTA.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of the Army shall acquire, from 
willing sellers, permanent flowage and saturation easements over land 
that is located within the 10-year floodplain of the James River, South 
Dakota.
    (b) Scope.--
            (1) In general.--The easements acquired by the Secretary of 
        the Army under subsection (a) shall include the right, power, 
        and privilege of the Federal Government to submerge, overflow, 
        percolate, and saturate the surface and subsurface of the land 
        and such other terms and conditions as the Secretary of the 
        Army considers appropriate.
            (2) Haying and grazing.--The Secretary of the Army shall 
        permit haying and grazing on the land subject to the easements.
    (c) Payment.--In acquiring the easements under subsection (a), the 
Secretary of the Army shall pay an amount based on the unaffected fee 
value of the land subject to the easements. For the purpose of this 
subsection, the unaffected fee value of the land is the value that the 
land would have if the land were unaffected by rising ground water and 
surface flooding associated with the James River.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out this section $40,000,000, to remain available 
until expended.
                                 <all>
```
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-7685
JAMES L. FIELDS, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus FRANKLIN FREEMAN, Secretary of North Carolina Department of Corrections; MARY LOU ROGERS, Programer III, North Carolina Department of Corrections, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, District Judge. (CA-95-254-5-BR) Submitted: January 11, 1996 Decided: January 25, 1996 Before RUSSELL, HALL, and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James L. Fields, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Fields v. Freeman , No. CA-95-254-5-BR (E.D.N.C. Sept. 8, 1995). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
APPELLEE CLASSIC AMERICANA’S UNOPPOSED MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR FILING OF APPELLEE’S BRIEF Page 1 of 2 NO. 05

- 15

- 00528

- CV

LINDA FITZERMAN

Appellant

v.

CLASSIC AMERICANA, LLC

Appellee

___________________________________________________

APPELLEE CLASSIC AMERICANA’S UNOPPOSED MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR FILING OF APPELLEE’S BRIEF

Appellee Classic Americana fil es this unopposed motion to extend time for

the filing of Appell ee ’s Brief under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 10.5(b)

and 38.6(d) and would show the Court as follows:

1. The current deadline for Appellee’s Brief is September 28 , 2015.

2. Appellee requests a new deadline of October 12 , 2015.

3. Appellee seeks this extension because lead counsel for Appellee has

continuing medical issue s that have required u nanticipated time out of the office

and h ave precluded counsel ’ s ability to work.

R espectfully submitted,

_ /s/ David B. Miller

__ David B. Miller Texas Bar No. 00788057 Peter C. Hall Texas Bar No. 24044224 ACCEPTED 05-15-00528-CV FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS

DALLAS, TEXAS 9/25/2015 9:27:19 AM

LISA MATZ CLERKAPPELLEE CLASSIC AMERICANA’S UNOPPOSED MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR FILING OF APPELLEE’S BRIEF Page 2 of 2 Schneider & Miller, P.C. 300 N. Coit Road, Suite 1125 Richardson, Texas 75080 (97 2) 479

- 1112 Telephone (972) 479

- 1113 Telecopy

Attorneys for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF C ONFERENCE

I certify that on September 2 4 , 2015 , I spoke to counsel for Appellant, Eric Redwine, and he s tated that he agrees to Appellee ’ s request for an extension

.

_

/s/ David B. Miller

__

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of this document was served upon all
counsel of record on this the 25th day of September , 2015, as follows:

VIA EMA IL John F. Redwine Bennett, Weston, LaJone & Turner, P.C. 1603 LBJ Freeway, Suite 280 Dallas, TX 75234

VIA EMAIL J. Michael W eston Bennett W eston, L ajone & T urner PC 1603 L yndon B J ohnson FWY S te

. 280 Dallas, TX 75234

/s/ David B. Miller

________ _____ David B. Miller
Exhibit E

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 516-5 Filed 04/02/19 Page 1 of 2
> Thanks Lacey. 

> 

> Tony, Re: Detroit Free Press, and your guidance on how we should best 

> use this play: 

> 

> I suppose Suskin could encourage her to ask DPD why they held a press 

> conf on Monday to single out Backpage -- and then have SAT on issuing 

> any public warnings re: these 22 other websites for now, 2 or 3 days? 

> 

> The risk is be careful what we ask for. DPD could feel compelled to 

> respond w/ info they are otherwise not giving out. Like "we have texts 

> or computer or other evidence that it was the BP sites that were 

> actually used to contact these victims". 

> 

> Obviously, we're much better off just muddying the waters out there 

> today with the news of the 22 websites ... And not putting DPD on the 

> spot, re: making them feel compelled to justify why they didn't issue 

> the other 22 names. 

> 

> So, this analysis makes me think that, as you enter your own edits, we 

> should tone down anything re: DPD. We just need to get the reality of 

> the 22 websites out there. 

> 

> 

> 

> 

> Edward E. McNally 

> Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman LLP 

> 1633 Broadway 

> New York, New York 10019 

> Tel. (212) 506-1708 

> Fax (212) 835-5279 

> EMcNally@kasowitz.com 

> 

> -----Original Message-----

> From: Michael Lacey [mailto:michael.lacey@villagevoicemedia.com] 

> Sent: Thursday, December 29, 2011 9:51 AM 

> To: Edward E. McNally 

> Cc: Jim Larkin; Tony Knight; Steve Suskin; Mike Sitrick; Carl Ferrer 

> Subject: Re: List of 22 other websites -- draft statement by 

> Backpage.com (priv + cont) 

> 

> folks 

> 

> attached suggested edits ( prepared to be corrected re importance of 

> tech data) lacey 

> 

> On 12/29/11, Edward E.McNally<EMcNally@kasowitz.com> wrote: 

> > priv & conf -- atty-client comms & work product 

>> 

>> Larkin, Lacey, Steve and Tony --

4 

Highly Confidential BP-AZGJ_01110671 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 516-5 Filed 04/02/19 Page 2 of 2
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-12-00775- CR

F rank Arre valo, Appellan t

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F B ELL COUNTY , 27TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. 694 26, H ONO RAB LE MARTH A J. TRUDO , JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Fr ank Arre valo is attempting to appea l from a judgme nt of conviction for the offe nse of injury to an elder ly person. The district court imposed sentenc e on August 27, 2012, and no motion for new trial was filed. Thus, the deadline for perf ecting appea l was September 26, 2012. Arre valo filed a pro se notice of appea l on November 15, 2012, asser ting that his a

ppointed trial counsel failed t o tim el y fi l e a n otice of appea l on his behalf
. Subsequently , the di strict court appointed appellate cou n s el t o repr esent Arreva lo, and counsel filed an amende d notice of appea l on November

26, 2012. Absent a timely filed notice of appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction to dispose of this appeal in any

manner other than by

dismiss ing it for want of jurisdiction. See Slaton v. State ,981 S.W .2d 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Olivo v. State , 918 S.W .2d 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

Acc ording ly , we dismiss the appea l for wa nt of jurisdiction. 1

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton and Rose Dismissed for Want of J urisdiction Filed: June 21, 2013 Do Not Publish

Any reme dy Arre valo may have for a late-f iled notice of appea l would be soug ht throug h 1 a post-conviction writ of habea s corpus returna ble to the Texas Co u rt of Criminal Appea ls. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. a

rt. 11.07. 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ORDER ESTABLISHING TRIAL DOCKET FOR THE MONTHS OF NOVEMBER AND

 DECEMBER, 2009, BEFORE THE HONORABLE PATRICK J. DUGGAN*

Listed below are the cases on this Court's trial docket for the months of November and

December, 2009. Counsel will be notified when their case reaches No. 5. After such

notice, counsel should be prepared to begin trial any time on 48 hours notice. It is

counsel's responsibility in all cases after they have been so notified to contact my clerk,

Marilyn Orem, at 234-5147, to ascertain the status of the trial docket. Unless otherwise

notified, this Court commences trial at 8:45 a.m. PLEASE BE PROMPT!

1. 09-10525 TRUSTEES OF THE BRICKLAYERS PENSION TRUST FUND, ET.AL V. 

 DESANTIS CONSTRUCTION CO.

2. 09-10832 ARNOLD V. CITIZENS FIRST BANCORP

3. 09-10347 HASSAN V. AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING

4. 09-11282 DANIEL V. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO.

5. 07-10805 HUMPHRIES V. OAKLAND COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION

6. 08-14467 FLANAGAN V. STEWART, ET.AL

7. 08-14291 MILLS V. RODABAUGH, ET.AL

 09-10921 

8. 08-14886 PENNSYLVANIA LIFE INSURANCE CO. V. CITY OF RIVER ROUGE

9. 09-11691 CLEVELAND V. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS

s/Patrick J. Duggan 

Patrick J. Duggan

United States District Judge

Dated: October 1, 2009

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record

on October 1, 2009, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Marilyn Orem 

Case Manager

*PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT TRIAL WILL NOT BEGIN BEFORE THE FINAL

PRETRIAL CONFERENCE DATE.

IF THERE IS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PENDING, FINAL PRETRIAL

CONFERENCE WILL BE RESCHEDULED APPROXIMATELY 10 DAYS AFTER ANY

DECISION ON SUCH MOTION.

2:08-cv-14291-PJD-VMM Doc # 32 Filed 10/01/09 Pg 1 of 1 Pg ID 483