J-S31027-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF R.A.W.A.

APPEAL OF: L.J.E., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 101 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Order August 26, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County 

Orphans’ Division at No(s): 54 of 2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., DUBOW, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MAY 17, 2017

L.J.E. (“Father”) appeals from the Order entered on August 26, 2016, 

terminating his parental rights to R.A.W.A. (“Child”), born September 2012.1 

We affirm.

The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Court 

adjudicated the Child dependent on November 27, 2013, due to Mother’s 

drug abuse and housing concerns. Father was incarcerated at the time.2 

Mother retained physical custody of the Child, and when Mother moved to 

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1 Mother’s parental rights were also terminated but she is not part of this 

appeal.

2

Father’s paternity was established after a paternity test.
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Westmoreland County, the matter was transferred to Westmoreland County 

for disposition. 

On March 3, 2014, after a hearing, the Westmoreland County court 

adjudicated the Child dependent due to Mother’s drug addiction, housing 

concerns, and her inability to supervise the Child properly. The court 

immediately transferred legal and physical custody of the Child to the 

Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau (“WCCB”), and directed Father to 

contact the WCCB to be assessed for services. WCCB placed the Child in the 

same foster home as his two older siblings,3and developed a permanency 

plan with a concurrent goal of return to parent and adoption.

The court held a permanency review hearing on September 15, 2014, 

in which it noted that Father had been provided notice of the review hearing 

at prison, but he had apparently been released and had not provided the 

WCCB with an address. The court further noted that Father never 

participated in any prior hearings. See Permanency Review Order, dated 

9/15/14, at 1. The court again ordered Father to contact the WCCB to be 

assessed for services. Id. at 3. The Child remained in foster care due to 

Mother’s minimal compliance with the permanency plan and her continued 

drug use.

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3 Child’s two siblings have been in foster care since December 2011.
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After a permanency review hearing held on December 22, 2014, which 

Father did not attend, the court noted that Father had had successful 

supervised visits with the Child in October 2014, but had since moved to a 

different halfway house and had not contacted WCCB to arrange visits or 

services. The court ordered the WCCB to offer Father supervised visits with 

Child twice per month, and directed Father to complete parenting classes, 

comply with random drug screens, and obtain and maintain housing and a 

legal source of income. 

After a permanency hearing on March 16, 2015, which Father did not 

attend, the court observed that Father had minimally complied with the 

permanency plan in that he did have his own housing and legal employment, 

but he had missed some random drug screens. Further, the court observed 

that Father had attended only two visits with the Child during the threemonth review period. 

On June 8, 2015, the WCCB filed Petitions to Involuntary Terminate 

both Mother’s and Father’s Parental Rights. Both Mother and Father were

served with the Petitions to Terminate their parental rights.

After a permanency review hearing on June 22, 2015, the court found 

that Father had not had any communication with the WCCB since mid-May 

2015. Prior to mid-May 2015, Father had visited with the Child only 

sporadically. The court also noted that Father had not complied with 

random drug screens, and that his housing and income were uncertain. 

Further, the parole department had issued a warrant for Father’s detention.
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On September 3, 2015, January 4, 2016, and April 27, 2016, the court 

held additional permanency review hearings, none of which Father attended. 

After each, the court noted that Father had had no contact with the WCCB in 

the review periods, and had not complied with the permanency plan. 

On April 27, 2016, and July 14, 2016, the court held a hearing on the 

Petitions to Terminate Parental Rights. Father did not appear. Emily 

Surace, the family’s caseworker at the WCCB, testified that (1) Father has 

never had custody of or lived with the Child; (2) from October 2014 to May 

2015, Father had attended only 11 supervised visits with the Child although 

WCCB encouraged one visit per week; and (3) since May 2015, Father had 

not seen or communicated in any manner with the Child. See N.T. Hearing 

7/14/16, at 22-23. Ms. Surace further testified that Father plays no role in 

the Child’s life and there would be no harm to the Child’s needs and welfare 

in terminating Father’s parental rights. Id.

4

 

Ms. Surace further testified that the Child is doing very well with the 

foster/pre-adoptive parents where, at the time of the hearing, he had lived 

for twenty-eight of the forty-five months of his life. The CASA5 worker 

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4 Ms. Surace also testified that Father had not attended any review hearings 

or the adjudication hearing and at the time of the termination hearing, there 

was a bench warrant for his arrest for failure to pay child support.

5 Court Appointed Special Advocate.
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informed the court that the Child “is thriving now. He has stability and he is 

doing quite well.” Id. at 31. 

On August 26, 2016, the court entered an Order terminating Father’s 

parental rights to the Child based on 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)(5), and (8) 

and (b). 

On October 28, 2016, Stephen M. Crevak, Esq., filed a Petition on 

Father’s behalf seeking Leave to File a Motion for Reconsideration. Counsel 

averred that he had been appointed to represent Father in connection with a 

permanency review hearing on July 26, 2016, and that it was not until 

October 17, 2016, that he and Father learned that Father’s parental rights 

had been terminated in August 2016. The court scheduled a hearing on the 

Petition for Reconsideration and appointed Eric Dee, Esq., as counsel. 

On January 4, 2017, after a hearing, the court granted Father twenty 

days to file a Notice of Appeal nunc pro tunc from the August 26, 2016 Order 

“due to a breakdown in court operations, whereby Father did not receive 

notice of the order terminating [his] parental rights.” Order of Court, 

1/4/17. Father filed his Notice of Appeal on January 11, 2017, together with 

a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, as required by 

Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(2) and Pa.R.A.P. (a)(2)(i). The trial court filed a Rule 

1925(a) Opinion. 

Father presents the following issue for our review:

Whether the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing 

evidence that the Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau met 
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its burden, under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), that the best interest of 

the Child is met by terminating Father’s parental rights?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.6

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires 

appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations 

of the trial court if they are supported by the record.” In re Adoption of 

S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012). “If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion.” Id. We may reverse a decision based on an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of “manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. We may not reverse, however, 

merely because the record would support a different result. Id. at 826-827. 

The Orphans’ Court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and 

resolve conflicts in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. 

Super. 2004). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of 

parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 

2009). We have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing 

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6

In his Rule 1925 statement, Father challenged the court’s findings made 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a). However, Father has abandoned those 

challenges as they are not raised in his appellate Brief. Challenges to the 

trial court’s subsection(a) findings are, thus, waived. 
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evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citations 

omitted).

A parent must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles 

placed in the path of maintaining the parent child relationship: 

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively 

with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every 

problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship 

to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult 

circumstances. A parent must utilize all available 

resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must 

exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed 

in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. 

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations 

omitted).

Most importantly, “parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a 

more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities 

while others provide the child with her physical and emotional needs.” Id.

Father avers that “a bonding assessment was not performed nor was 

there any testimony offered regarding the bond or lack thereof between the 

[C]hild and Father.” Father’s Brief at 6. He then acknowledges that the 

court was not required to conduct a bonding assessment before stating “the 

record should not be devoid of any testimony regarding whether a bond 

exists between Father and child.” Id. 
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As Father has abandoned his challenge to the statutory grounds 

provided in Section 2511(a) supporting the termination, his appeal 

implicates only the trial court’s finding regarding the child’s needs and 

welfare. 

Section 2511(b) provides:

The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not 

be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such 

as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect 

to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the 

court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent 

to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

This Court has stated:

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” 

In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence 

of a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to 

infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762–

63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bondeffect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances 

of the particular case. Id. at 763. 

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010) (emphasis 

added).
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In addition, “the trial court should consider the importance of 

continuity of relationship and whether any existing parent-child bond can be 

severed without detrimental effects on the child.” In re Adoption of 

C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

Contrary to Father’s implication, there was testimony presented that 

demonstrated that there is no relationship between Father and the Child. 

The testimony, as summarized above, was that (1) Father had minimal, 

sporatic, supervised contact with the Child over one six-month period 

immediately following Father’s release from incarceration; (2) Father sent no 

cards or letters to the Child and made no attempt to contact the Child by 

phone; and (3) Father provided no financial support for the Child. 

Moreover, Father does not dispute that he has never lived with or 

cared for the Child. He also does not dispute that he had only eleven visits 

with the Child during the review period, and has not seen the Child since 

May 2015. Further, he does not dispute that he has not provided any 

financial support for the Child. 

It is, thus, reasonable to infer under the facts of this case that no bond 

exists between Father and the Child.7 Hence, terminating Father's parental 

rights would not harm the child's developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare.

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7 The testimony also demonstrated that the Child was thriving in his preadoptive home where he has lived most of his life with his siblings. 
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Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/17/2017