NO. 4-01-0256

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

           Plaintiff-Appellee,

           v.

BILLY HUGHES, JR.,

           Defendant-Appellant.	)

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)	  Appeal from

  Circuit Court of 

  Logan County

  Nos. 98CM384

       98DT78

       99CF72

  Honorable

  David L. Coogan,

  Judge Presiding.

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		JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court:

		Defendant, Billy Hughes, Jr., appeals from a March 2001

order of the circuit court of Logan County denying his

postconviction petition.  He asserts the trial court should have

granted the petition because he did not receive effective assis

tance of counsel due to his trial counsel's failure to file a

motion to reduce sentence.  We affirm.

	I. BACKGROUND

		In April 1999, the State charged defendant with calcu

lated criminal drug conspiracy (720 ILCS 570/405(b) (West 1998)),

unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS

570/401(a)(2)(B) (West 1998) (text of section as amended by Pub.

Act 90-674, §5, eff. January 1, 1999 (1998 Ill. Laws 3492, 3498- 502))), unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(B) (West 1998) (text of section as amended by Pub.

Act 90-655, §162, eff. July 30, 1998 (1++998 Ill. Laws 2123, 3033-

37) and Pub. Act 90-674, §5, 3eff.m January 1, 1999) (1998 Ill. Laws at 3489-98-502) )), calculated criminal cannabis conspiracy (720 ILCS 550/9(b) (West 1998)), unlawful delivery of cannabis on school grounds (720 ILCS

550/5(d) (West 1998)), and unlawful possession of cannabis (720

ILCS 550/4(d) (West 1998)) for his role in an April 3, 1999,

incident.  The State also charged him with driving while under

the influence (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(3) (West Supp. 1997)) and

unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(a) (West 1998))

for his actions on May 26, 1998.

		In July 1999, defendant and the State entered into a

plea agreement, under which defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful

delivery of a controlled substance and unlawful delivery of

cannabis, and the State dismissed the other six charges.  The plea was open as to sentencing.  After an August 1999 hearing,

the trial court sentenced defendant to 12 years' imprisonment for

unlawful delivery of a controlled substance to run concurrent to

5 years' imprisonment for unlawful delivery of cannabis.

		In July 2000, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, asserting he was denied effective assistance of counsel

during all proceedings.  Defendant further asserted his counsel

was ineffective because counsel (1) promised defendant he would

receive a nine-year sentence and (2) never attempted to raise the

entrapment defense.  In August 2000, the trial court appointed

the public defender to represent defendant on his postconviction

petition.  In March 2001, the public defender filed a certifica

tion pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (134 Ill. 2d R.

651(c)), stating he had examined defendant's case and made any necessary amendments to defendant's pro se petition.

		In March 2001, the trial court held an evidentiary

hearing on defendant's petition.  At the hearing, defendant also

asserted his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to

file a motion to reduce his sentence.  Defendant testified that

after his sentencing hearing, his trial counsel, Scott Sabin,

told defendant he was going to file a motion for a sentence

reduction that day.  Defendant stated he had asked Sabin to file

a motion to reduce sentence.  Upon learning no motion was filed,

defendant sent a letter dated December 3, 1999, to Sabin, asking

why he did not file the motion.  Sabin sent a letter dated

January 17, 2000, to defendant in response.    

		Sabin's letter to defendant was admitted into evidence

at the hearing.  In the letter, Sabin stated he did not file the

motion to reduce sentence.  Sabin offered the following explana

tion:

		"After carefully reviewing the provisions of

your sentence, there appeared to be no good[-]

faith basis for seeking your sentence reduc

tion.  There was no additional mitigating

evidence which I could present to the court,

nor any change in circumstances which could be

offered to the court, as a basis for a reduc

tion of sentence."

		Sabin testified defendant wanted him to file a motion

to reduce sentence.  Sabin admitted he did not file the motion to reduce sentence or a notice of appeal.  He also acknowledged

receiving the December 1999 letter from defendant.  Sabin further

testified his opinion about filing the motion had not changed

since his January 2000 letter to defendant.		

		At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court

denied defendant's petition.  As to the motion to reduce sen

tence, the trial court noted it did not believe anything new was

presented that it would consider, and the offense was significant

due to the amount of cocaine.  This appeal followed.

	II. ANALYSIS

		Defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying his

postconviction petition.  He contends he was denied effective

assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not file a

motion to reconsider.

		When a trial court has denied defendant's

postconviction petition after an evidentiary hearing, we will

apply a manifestly erroneous standard.  See People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1074 (1998); People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 174, 730 N.E.2d 32, 35 (2000).  A ruling is manifestly erroneous if it contains error that is

clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.  People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 384-85, 686 N.E.2d 574, 582 (1997).

		We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).  S; see People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93, 708 N.E.2d 1158, 1163 (1999).  To obtain reversal under Strickland, a defendant must prove (1) his counsel's performance failed to meet an objective standard of

competence, and (2) counsel's deficient performance resulted in

prejudice to the defendant.  Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 93, 708 N.E.2d at 1163.  The Strickland cCourt noted when a case is more easily decided on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, rather

than that counsel's representation was constitutionally defi

cient, the court should do so.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.  

		Defendant asserts, citing People v. Moore, 133 Ill. 2d 331, 339, 549 N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (1990), prejudice need not be

shown where counsel fails to perfect a defendant's appeal. 

However, even if prejudice is presumed, a defendant still must

show counsel's deficient performance "'actually cause[d] the

forfeiture of the defendant's appeal.'"  People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 252, 757 N.E.2d 442, 450 (2001), quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484, 145 L. Ed. 2d 985, 999, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 1038 (2000).  As defendant points out, Flores-Ortega holds that a pro se defendant cannot be required to demonstrate how his appeal would have been successful to establish he was

prejudiced by his attorney's failure to pursue a requested

appeal.  Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 253, 757 N.E.2d at 450. 

		In this case, defendant was not pro se.  The trial court appointed counsel that reviewed defendant's case and

represented him at the evidentiary hearing.  Thus, Flores-Ortega and Edwards are distinguishable from this case. 

		In limiting its holding to the dismissal of a defen

dant's petition at the first stage of the postconviction process,

the Supreme Court of Illinois in Edwards noted that after the appointment of counsel, the defendant would need to make a

substantial showing that he told his trial counsel to file athe

motion to withdraw his guilty plea and counsel was constitution

ally ineffective for failing to do so.  See Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 257-58, 757 N.E.2d at 453.  Such a showing would necessarily

entail some explanation of the grounds that could have been

presented in the motion to withdraw the plea.  Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 258, 757 N.E.2d at 453.  

		Accordingly, defendant was required to present evidence

of the grounds that could have been raised in the motion to

reconsider to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.   At

the hearing, defendant did not assert any grounds for a reduced

sentence, and Sabin testified he found no such grounds.  Thus,

defendant failed to meet his burden as to the prejudice prong. 

Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was not manifestly

erroneous.

	III. CONCLUSION

		For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's

judgment.

		Affirmed.

		TURNER, J., withCOOK and STEIFGMANN, JJ,., concur.