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Filed 3/12/24 Chino Basin Municipal Water District v. City of Chino CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

CHINO BASIN MUNICIPAL WATER 

DISTRICT,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF CHINO, et al.,

Defendants and Appellants;

CHINO BASIN APPROPRIATIVE 

POOL, et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

CHINO BASIN WATERMASTER,

Objector and Respondent.

E079052

(Super.Ct.No. RCVRS51010)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Stanford E. 

Reichert, Judge. Affirmed.

Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, Michael G. Colantuono, Michael D. Campion 

and Conor W. Harkins, for Defendant and Appellant City of Chino.
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Nossaman, Frederic A. Fudacz, Jennifer L. Meeker and Gina R. Nicholls, for 

Defendants and Appellants, City of Ontario, Monte Vista Water District and Monte Vista 

Irrigation Company.

Horvitz & Levy, Lisa Perrochet, Mitchell C. Tilner; and John J. Schatz for 

Defendant and Respondent, Appropriative Pool.

Egoscue Law Group, Tracy J. Egoscue and Tarren A. Torres, for Defendant and 

Respondent, Chino Basin Overlying (Agricultural) Pool Committee.

Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Scott S. Slater, Bradley J. Herrema, Matthew L. 

Hofer and Laura K. Yraceburu, for Objector and Respondent, Chino Basin Watermaster.

In 1978, defendants and appellants City of Chino (Chino), City of Ontario 

(Ontario), Monte Vista Water District and Monte Vista Irrigation Company (collectively, 

Monte Vista), along with several other parties, stipulated to a judgment (Judgment),

which manages competing water rights in the Chino Groundwater Basin (Basin). The 

Judgment established the Basin’s governance structure, provided judicial oversight via 

continuing jurisdiction provisions, and created the Watermaster. The Judgment further 

organized the parties into three “Pools” (Overlying (Agricultural or Ag) Pool, Overlying 

(Non-agricultural or Non-Ag) Pool, and Appropriative (Ap or App) Pool) to administer 

and allocate responsibility for various aspects of the Judgment and the adopted physical 

solution to groundwater management. Appellants are members of the Ap Pool.

In 2000, the Ap Pool and the Ag Pool executed the Peace Agreement (sometimes 

referred to as the Agreement) which governs, inter alia, responsibility for certain Basinrelated expenses. Subsequently, a dispute arose between these two Pools over the extent
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of the Ap Pool’s obligation to pay for the Ag Pool’s legal expenses. Following the 

Ag Pool’s unsuccessful attempt to obtain a court order requiring the Ap Pool to pay, 

appellants filed motions seeking reimbursement of the legal expenses paid for fiscal years 

2019-2020 and 2020-2021. Simultaneously, the Pools sought resolution of their dispute,

and over appellants’ objection, they entered into a settlement agreement (Terms of 

Agreement or TOA) which committed the Ap Pool members to pay a portion of the legal 

expenses they were contesting. Appellants’ motions were heard on April 22, 2022; the 

superior court denied them as moot based on the TOA. The court found that the Pools 

had authority under the Judgment to settle their inter-Pool disputes (here through the 

TOA) and appellants are bound by the Pools’ action. 

On appeal, appellants challenge the superior court’s denial of their reimbursement 

motions via separate briefing. Ontario and Monte Vista contend the “central question in 

this appeal is whether a committee of parties with appropriative water rights formed 

under the Judgment, specifically, the [Ap Pool], holds the power to bind individual 

members of the [Ap Pool] to a contract without the consent or approval of the parties 

purportedly bound.” In particular, they argue the court erred by (1) determining the TOA 

moots the monetary claims asserted by individual appellants, and (2) misreading the

Judgment and Peace Agreement. Separately, Chino contends the court’s order “holds 

Chino to an implied contract forbidden by controlling authority, established by 

unspecified evidence.” It argues this appeal raises a question of law, namely, whether the 

court “properly conclude[d] a majority of the [Ap Pool] Committee could settle Chino’s 

[reimbursement] motion over Chino’s objections.”
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As we explain, we conclude the superior court correctly interpreted the Judgment 

and the Peace Agreement in denying appellants’ motions for reimbursement on the 

grounds the TOA resolved the dispute between the two Pools.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS

In 1975, Chino Basin Municipal Water District (CBMWD) initiated this action

against several parties to adjudicate their rights and obligations with respect to 

groundwater in the Basin. Three years later, the parties stipulated to the Judgment which 

established a “physical solution” and allowed the superior court to retain and exercise 

jurisdiction. The Judgment, including all amendments, was restated and reentered in 

2012; this restated judgment is “the official and legally operative copy of the Judgment in 

[this] case.”1 Appellants are signatories to the Judgment.

The Judgment established the rights of three “Pools” of parties with water interests 

in the Basin: They include (1) the Ag Pool (the State of California and all overlying 

producers who produce water for other than industrial or commercial purposes); (2) the 

Non-Ag Pool (overlying producers who produce water for industrial or commercial 

purposes); and (3) the Ap Pool (owners of appropriative water rights not appurtenant to 

land ownership, principally public entities and water companies who pump water for 

municipal customer uses). Each Pool has a committee that administers its internal affairs, 

employs its own separate counsel, may seek judicial review of any Watermaster action or 

1

 Unless otherwise indicated, all further references and citations to the judgment 

are to the 2012 restated judgment.
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failure to act, and—along with an Advisory Committee—provides advice and assistance 

to Watermaster on the administration of the Judgment. Each Pool has a Pooling Plan that 

controls its respective operations. Under the Ap Pool’s Pooling Plan, “[a]ffirmative 

action of the [Pool] Committee shall require a majority of the voting power of members 

in attendance, provided that it includes concurrence by at least one-third of its total 

members.”2

Watermaster administers and enforces the Judgment and any subsequent 

instructions or orders of the superior court. Watermaster is authorized to assess the Pools 

for its general administrative expenses, as defined, and to assess a specific Pool for its 

special project expenses, as defined, if certain conditions are satisfied. Initially, plaintiff 

CBMWD was appointed as Watermaster; however, in 1998, the superior court replaced 

CBMWD with a nine-member Board, comprised of representatives of the parties to the 

Judgment, including at least one representative from each Pool. Also in 1998, the court 

directed Watermaster to prepare an Optimum Basin Management Program (OBMP) to 

address water quality issues.

The OBMP was divided into two phases: Phase I (the report) was adopted in 

1999, and Phase II (implementation plan) was submitted to the court for approval in 

2000. The OBMP was subject to intensive settlement negotiations that led to various 

2

 The “voting power” of the Pool Committee consists of 1,000 total votes. Of that 

total, 500 votes are allocated to members proportionally to their percentage shares in the 

Basin’s water, as specified elsewhere in the Judgment, and 500 votes are allocated to 

members “proportionally on the basis of assessments paid to Watermaster during the 

preceding year.” “Action by affirmative vote of a majority of the entire voting power of 

any Pool Committee . . . shall constitute action by such committee.”
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parties to the Judgment (including appellants) executing the Peace Agreement in June 

2000. The Peace Agreement resolved the parties’ disputes regarding “a number of 

matters pertaining to the power and authority of the Court and Watermaster under the 

Judgment . . . .” It addresses implementation of the OBMP for the Basin and allows 

Watermaster to administer transfers, recharge, and storage/recovery of water. On July 

13, 2000, the superior court accepted the Peace Agreement and ordered Watermaster to 

proceed in accordance with its terms.

To avoid overtaxing the Basin, the Judgment set its initial safe yield at 140,000 

acre-feet per year (AFY). The “safe yield” is “‘the maximum quantity of water which 

can be withdrawn annually from a ground water supply under a given set of conditions 

without causing an undesirable result.’ The phrase ‘undesirable result’ is understood to 

refer to a gradual lowering of the ground water levels resulting eventually in depletion of 

the supply.” (City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199, 278, 

disapproved on other grounds in City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency (2000) 23 

Cal.4th 1224, 1248.) In 2017, the superior court reset it to 135,000 AFY.

Pursuant to the Judgment, unproduced Ag Pool water is made available for 

reallocation to members of the Ap Pool on a five-year schedule. According to Traci 

Stewart, a former Chief of Watermaster Services for the Basin, the Peace Agreement 

accelerated this schedule by making unproduced Ag Pool water available for reallocation

to members of the Ap Pool on an annual basis (Early Transfer). Because members of the 

Ap Pool are only entitled to share in the remaining safe yield of water after satisfaction of 

overlying rights and the rights of the State of California, a reduction in the safe yield 
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means a reduction only in the remaining share of the safe yield of water that the members 

of the Ap Pool are entitled to. The Early Transfer of the Ag Pool’s unproduced share of 

safe yield is an economic benefit to the Ap Pool and the consideration for its agreement 

to pay the Ag Pool’s expenses. This arrangement was formalized in the Peace 

Agreement.

Significant to the issue presented in this appeal is the language in section 5.4(a) of

the Peace Agreement wherein the Ap Pool agrees to pay “all assessments and expenses of 

the Agricultural Pool Committee . . .[, including but not] limited to OBMP Assessments, 

assessments pursuant to Paragraphs 20, 21, 22, 30, 42, 51, 53, 54 both General 

Administrative Expenses and Special Project Expenses, 55, and Exhibit F (Overlying 

Agricultural Pool Pooling Plan) of the Judgment. . . .”

3

 Stewart explains this language 

formalized the Ap Pool’s practice of paying the Ag Pool’s assessments and expenses, 

3

 This same language was the subject of a prior dispute that was resolved via a 

Special Joint Pool Committee. According to that resolution, documented in the 2009 

Memorandum of the Joint Special Pool Committee (the “2009 Memo”), “[T]he 

Agricultural Pool agrees to participate in the regular Watermaster Budget Process and 

present an annual budget in the same form and fashion as the other Pools. This will 

include: legal fees, consultant fees, meeting fees and projects. All of the budgets will be 

reviewed through the Pool process, approved and submitted by the Advisory Committee 

to the Watermaster. [¶] Only Watermaster is authorized to undertake Special Project 

expense under Judgment Section 54 and Section 27. Such expense can only be allocated 

to a specific Pool if the Pool agrees or the court so orders, but this is not an authorization 

for the Pool to undertake such expense on its own initiative. (See e.g. Judgment section 

54 and Peace Agreement Section 5.4(a).) Under Section 38 (a) Pool Committees are 

limited to ‘developing policy recommendations for administration of its particular Pool.’ 

Special Project expense necessarily must be part of the Physical Solution which is under 

the control of the Court and its Court appointed Watermaster. While the Pool 

Committees are there to provide advice and assistance to Watermaster they may not 

supplant Watermaster’s Physical Solution authority under Section 41.”
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including legal fees. According to Joseph S. Joswiak, Watermaster’s Chief Financial 

Officer, this practice continued uninterrupted and without controversy, and the Ap Pool

members—including appellants—were assessed to cover those costs.

Between 2010 and 2017, the Ag Pool’s annual legal expenses never exceeded 

$300,000; however, for fiscal year 2019-2020, its expenses increased to $529,009. In 

September 2020, the Ag Pool increased its 2020-2021 budget for legal expenses to 

$500,000. This increase prompted certain Ap Pool members, including appellants, to file 

a motion seeking a judicial determination to limit the expenses the Ap Pool will be 

required to pay on behalf of the Ag Pool under the Peace Agreement. The moving parties 

also sought a refund of legal expenses previously paid relating to an action initiated by 

the Ag Pool to challenge certain Ap Pool members’ applications for local water storage 

(Storage Contests).

On May 28, 2021, the superior court ruled that section 5.4(a) of the Peace 

Agreement does not obligate the Ap Pool to pay unlimited Ag Pool expenses “without 

knowledge of the nature of the expenses.” Instead, the court established a default 

procedure (when the parties could not agree on the payment of the legal expenses) that 

the Ag Pool had to follow to recoup its legal expenses. Specifically, the Ag Pool had to 

demonstrate the legal expenses incurred were for services that benefitted it and were not 

adverse to the Ap Pool, and the Ag Pool could not redact its attorney’s bills so as to make 

them meaningless for review by opposing counsel and determination by the court. The

May 28, 2021 order did not rule out settlement as another procedure or method of 

accomplishing payment of the Ag Pool’s legal expenses. Further, the court deferred 
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ruling on the moving parties’ claim for refund of Storage Contests payments to allow the 

Ag Pool the opportunity to seek recovery of those expenses using the sanctioned legal 

procedure.

Subsequently, principals of both the Ag Pool and the Ap Pool held a series of five 

meetings wherein they were unsuccessful in resolving the Ag Pool’s request for payment 

of its legal expenses. Thus, in August 2021, the Ag Pool filed a motion to require the Ap 

Pool to reimburse the Ag Pool’s legal expenses exceeding $563,000.4 Appellants and 

other Ap Pool members opposed the motion, arguing it failed to comply with the 

requirements set forth by the superior court. They also sought reimbursement of 

$746,830 previously paid in the preceding two fiscal years. The Ag Pool’s motion was 

denied on December 3, 2021, on the grounds it had not satisfied the default procedure

established by the May 2021 order. Also, the court authorized Chino to file “a motion as 

to the procedure for reimbursement of any assessments . . . that may be due to the paying 

party.” The Ag Pool appealed the court’s order.

In January 2022, appellants (separately) moved for reimbursement of $483,202.55 

in legal expenses the Ap Pool paid to the Ag Pool in fiscal years 2019-2020 and 2020-

2021 (reimbursement motion). Appellants argued the conditions established in the May 

4

 The Ag Pool claimed the Ap Pool was required to pay legal expenses of 

$460,723.63 directly to the Ag Pool and $102,557.12 to the Watermaster Administrative 

Reserve Account (the fees related to the Storage Contests incurred in fiscal year 2020-

2021). According to Robert Feenstra, chair of the Ag Pool, the increase in the Ag Pool’s 

legal fees started in 2014 and was a “direct result of the actions of the [Ap] Pool that were 

adverse to the Basin and Watermaster’s efforts towards safe Basin management – starting 

with the Safe Yield Reset process in 2014.”
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2021 order applied retroactively and the Ag Pool had not satisfied them in fiscal years 

2019-2020 and 2020-2021. Also, appellants asserted the Ag Pool should reimburse 

Watermaster the sum of $102,557.12 that it advanced in fiscal year 2020-2021 for the

Ag Pool’s legal expenses. In response, the Ag Pool argued appellants have waived, or 

were estopped to assert, any right to reimbursement of legal expenses previously paid 

without objection or reservation. The Ap Pool also weighed in to indicate it supported

the superior court’s determination of the issues raised by appellants. Watermaster’s reply

sought “to clarify and provide context to certain issues raised” to assist the court in 

reaching a ruling.

Before the superior court could hear the appellants’ motions, principals of the 

Ap Pool and the Ag Pool reached a settlement, the TOA. A majority of the Ap Pool’s 

voting power (59.363%) approved the TOA, which was signed by the Ap Pool’s chair. 

According to the TOA, the two Pools agreed to abide by the court’s May 2021 order 

imposing conditions on the Ag Pool’s right to recoup legal expenses. Toward that end, 

the Ag Pool agreed to submit all attorney’s invoices for which it sought payment to 

Watermaster in a form that would allow the Ap Pool to determine whether the invoiced 

expenses benefitted the Ag Pool and were not adverse to the Ap Pool. The Ag Pool also 

agreed (1) to dismiss its appeal from the December 3, 2021 order denying its motion for 

legal expenses (case No. E078377), and (2) to dismiss its Storage Contests. In return, the 

Ap Pool agreed—as authorized by a majority vote of its members—to pay the Ag Pool 

$370,000 as a compromise of the disputed legal expenses. The Ag Pool would, in turn, 

use some of that money to repay Watermaster the disputed $102,557.12 previously 
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advanced from its administrative reserves. The Ag Pool’s agreement to repay that sum

was one of the principal demands in appellants’ motion. The Ap Pool also agreed to pay 

specified Ag Pool expenses from fiscal year 2021-2022 through the end of the initial 30-

year term of the Peace Agreement.

On March 24, 2022, representatives of the two settling Pools submitted the “Joint 

Statement Regarding Settlement Agreement Between Appropriative Pool and 

Agricultural Pool Regarding Peace Agreement 5.4(a),” which notified the superior court 

of the settlement and included a copy of the TOA. At the court’s request, the settling 

Pools refiled the document on April 11, 2022. All interested parties thereafter filed 

supplemental briefs, along with supporting declarations, addressing the impact of the 

TOA on appellants’ pending motion and related issues. Watermaster’s general manager, 

Peter Kavounas, declared that each Pool “has acted in a representative capacity in 

accordance with its respective Pooling plan, where it has been necessary or convenient.” 

Examples of the type of Pool activity sanctioned via representative capacity include: 

retention of legal counsel and direction to Watermaster in the proper way to invoice 

members for paying such counsel, direction on the manner in which members fund 

recharge improvement projects, and entering into agreements with other Pools or parties 

to the Judgment.

On April 22, 2022, the superior court denied appellants’ reimbursement motions

on multiple grounds, including (1) the TOA settlement is valid; (2) the doctrines of 

waiver and laches apply because the Ap Pool previously paid the Ag Pool’s legal 

expenses without objection; and (3) there is an implied-in-fact contract under which the 
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Ap Pool members agreed to be bound by a majority decision of the voting power. On 

appeal, appellants challenge the court’s denial of their motions, along with its finding that 

they are bound by the TOA.

II. DISCUSSION

According to appellants, the superior court’s April 2022 order approving the TOA 

gives power to other groundwater appropriators, and carte blanche authority to the 

Ap Pool, to impose its agreements on public entities and to spend their ratepayers’ 

money. They contend the TOA is not valid and binding on all members of the Ap Pool

because (1) the Ap Pool lacked authority to execute the TOA, and (2) the TOA is 

inconsistent with the Judgment, the Peace Agreement, and the court’s May 28 and 

December 3, 2021 orders. Appellants further assert the court’s affirmance of the TOA 

holds them to an implied contract forbidden by controlling authority. We are not 

persuaded.

A. The Ap Pool was Authorized to Execute the TOA. 

Citing the Judgment, appellants maintain the functions of the Pools are limited to 

advising and assisting Watermaster in the “administration of, and for the allocation of 

responsibility for, and payment of, costs of replenishment water and other aspects of [the] 

Physical Solution.” They add the Judgment incorporates a “pooling plan” for each Pool 

which controls the Pool’s operations and may be modified only by amending the 

Judgment “pursuant to the Court’s continuing jurisdiction.” Accordingly, appellants 

argue the Ap Pool is not authorized to usurp the power and authority held by individual 

members—such as government entities—and enter into contracts such as the TOA.
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1. The Judgment establishes a collective decision-making governance structure.

“When interpreting the stipulated judgment, we use ordinary contract principles 

and, in the absence of extrinsic evidence, we may interpret it as a matter of law. 

[Citation.]” (Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 750, 758.) 

“‘[T]he primary object of all interpretation is to ascertain and carry out the intention of 

the parties.’” (City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 232, 238.)

Here the Judgment directs Watermaster to “cause committees of producer 

representatives to be organized to act as Pool Committees for each of the several pools 

created under the Physical Solution.” Paragraph 43 established three separate Pools as 

entities with rights and obligations separate from their members. Each Pool has a 

committee of representatives (the Pool Committee) that acts on its behalf. Contrary to 

appellants’ assertion, the functions of the Pool Committees are not limited to “developing 

policy recommendations for administration of its particular pool,” seeking trial court 

orders, challenging Watermaster action, and employing counsel for litigation. Rather, 

they include the power to take action. (See Robings v. Santa Monica Mountains 

Conservancy (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 952, 964 [“in the absence of express restrictions, 

implied powers may arise as well from the purposes for which the agency was created”]; 

see also id. at p. 966 [affirming trial court finding that recognized entity’s status is 

separate from its constituent members].) Paragraph 38(a) of the Judgment provides, “All 

actions and recommendations of any Pool Committee which require Watermaster 

implementation shall first be noticed to the other two pools.”
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Additionally, Pool Committees pay Watermaster’s assessments of the costs of 

water replenishment or supplementation. According to paragraph 54, the expenses of 

administration of the physical solution are categorized as either general Watermaster 

administrative expenses, or special project expenses. Special project expenses include 

litigation expenses and must “be allocated to a specific pool, or any portion thereof, only 

upon the basis of prior express assent and finding of benefit by the Pool Committee, or 

pursuant to written order of the Court.” As the Ap Pool notes, the Judgment granted each 

Pool a measure of control over its obligation to pay litigation expenses incurred by other 

Pools or Watermaster (see paragraph 54(b)), the power and responsibility to pay the costs 

of replenishment water and other enumerated expenses (see paragraph 43), and the power 

to seek judicial review (see paragraph 15).

Pool Committees are composed as specified in their respective pooling plans,

which also dictate their voting power; each Pool’s pooling plan is attached to the 

Judgment. According to paragraph 35, “[a] majority of the voting power” of a Pool 

Committee constitutes a quorum for transaction of the Pool Committee’s affairs, and 

“[a]ction by affirmative vote of a majority of the entire voting power of any Pool 

Committee or the Advisory Committee shall constitute action by such committee.” 

Moreover, “[a]ny action . . . of a Pool Committee . . . shall be transmitted to Watermaster 

in writing, together with a report of any dissenting vote or opinion.”

As relevant here, the pooling plan for the Ap Pool authorizes the Ap Pool 

Committee to take action on behalf of its members pursuant to a “majority of the voting 

power of members in attendance, provided that it includes concurrence by at least one-
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third of its total members.” By agreeing to the Judgment, members of each Pool accepted 

the possibility that implementation of the OBMP through the collective decision-making 

of their Pool may result in taking action they (individually) do not support. As the 

superior court observed, “chaos would ensue” if the Pools employed a decision-making 

process untethered to the majority rule voting system.

Similarly, the Peace Agreement acknowledged and affirmed the Ap Pool’s power

to resolve disputes over the Pool’s obligations via a majority vote. In executing the 

Agreement, appellants stated their desire “to resolve issues by consent under [its] express 

terms and conditions.” Section 1.1(gg) defines “[p]arty or [p]arties” as a party to the 

Judgment and/or a party to the Agreement; appellants are parties to the Judgment, and 

Chino, Ontario, Monte Vista Water District, and the Ap Pool are parties to the 

Agreement. Section 1.2(a)(v) defines “includes” and “including” as “not limiting.” 

Section 5.4(a) identifies the Ap Pool as the sole party responsible for paying the Ag

Pool’s expenses: “During the term of this Agreement, all assessments and expenses of 

the Agricultural Pool including those of the Agricultural Pool Committee shall be paid by 

the Appropriative Pool.” Because section 5.4(a) did not specify any other payor, the

superior court correctly concluded that the “App Pool, qua pool,” bore the obligation. 

Also, section 8.4 provides the Ap or Ag Pool “(as a Pool only and not the individual 

members of either Pool)” each with the unilateral right to extend the term of the Peace 

Agreement for an additional 30 years, prior to the end of the 25th year. Consequently, 

the Ap Pool possessed the authority, with a majority of its members’ consent, to take 

action such as extending the term of the Agreement or resolving disputes over its 
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contractual obligations, including payment of the Ag Pool’s legal expenses. Such 

resolution could be via non-binding mediation or settlement negotiations. (Robings v. 

Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 964 [“in the absence 

of express restrictions, implied powers may arise as well from the purposes for which the 

agency was created”].)

In short, the governance structure embodied within the Judgment, coupled with the 

Peace Agreement, enables administration of the Judgment through collective decision 

making by each Pool.

2. The Pools’ longstanding practice recognized their ability to take binding 

representative action.

For more than 40 years, the Pools have taken actions in a representative capacity 

on behalf of their members. Watermaster notes the following examples of such actions: 

(1) retaining of counsel and consultants; (2) directing Watermaster in the proper way to 

invoice Pool members for paying legal counsel; (3) directing refinancing of Watermaster 

debt; (4) determining of manner in which members fund groundwater recharge 

improvement projects in the Basin; (5) determining representatives on the Advisory 

Committee and Watermaster Board; (6) appealing superior court orders; and (7) initiating 

storage contests. The parties’ conduct and extensive course of dealing clarify any 

uncertainty in whether the Pools may act in a representative capacity. (Alameda County 

Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. v. Department of Water Resources (2013) 213 

Cal.App.4th 1163, 1202-1203 [“assuming plaintiffs have tendered an ambiguity 

regarding allocation of the proceeds or value of system power pool sales or trades, the 
17

long course of dealing between the parties clarifies that ambiguity against them”]; 

Orange Cove Irrigation Dist. v. Los Molinos Mutual Water Co. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 1, 

12-13 [“‘The mutual intention to which the courts give effect is determined by objective 

manifestations of the parties’ intent, including the words used in the agreement, as well as 

extrinsic evidence of such objective matters as the surrounding circumstances under 

which the parties negotiated or entered into the contract; the object, nature and subject 

matter of the contract; and the subsequent conduct of the parties.’”]; see Moreno Mutual 

Irrigation Co. v. Beaumont Irrigation Dist. (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 766, 783-784 [passage 

of time and course of dealing bar subsequent assertion of public policy and constitutional 

claims under a contract for stipulated judgment].) Moreover, the Peace Agreement was 

specifically approved and executed by the Pools acting in their representative capacity. 

In the resolution approving the Agreement, the Ap Pool “authorize[d] the Chairman to 

execute the Peace Agreement on behalf of the Appropriative Pool.”

Given the 40-plus year history of representative actions by the Pools, coupled with 

appellants’ consent or acquiescence, we reject appellants’ characterization of its Pool’s 

role as a powerless “administrative and advisory” body. As Watermaster aptly notes, a 

single representative voice from each Pool is “wise, balanced, and useful in optimizing 

the efficient use of water in the Basin, facilitates compromise, and affords all individual 

parties a voice in the process while preserving their remedy to challenge Watermaster 

actions.”
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B. The TOA is Consistent with the Judgment, the Peace Agreement, and the 

Superior Court’s Orders.

Appellants contend the TOA is inconsistent with the Judgment, the Peace 

Agreement, and the court’s May 28 and December 3, 2021 orders because it alters the 

extent of the Ap Pool members’ obligation under section 5.4(a) of the Agreement and the 

methodology for ascertaining the amount of that obligation.

As previously noted, the Judgment, the Peace Agreement, and the parties repeated 

acquiescence in the representative actions by the Pools, acknowledged each Pool’s right 

to act upon the consent of a majority of its members. The Peace Agreement established 

the Ap Pool’s commitment to pay the Ag Pool’s legal expenses. As parties to the 

Agreement, appellants consented to such commitment. For decades, they fulfilled this 

commitment, spending public funds to do so. However, when the Ag Pool’s legal 

expenses nearly doubled, appellants challenged the amount requested via judicial 

intervention. On May 28, 2021, the superior court found merit in their challenge and 

ruled that section 5.4(a) of the Peace Agreement does not obligate the Ap Pool to pay 

unlimited Ag Pool expenses “without knowledge of the nature of the expenses.” Rather, 

when challenged, the Ag Pool must demonstrate that the expenses were for services that 

benefitted it and were not adverse to the Ap Pool. However, nothing in the May 28, 2021

order proscribed settlement of the disputed amount as a means of resolution.

Nonetheless, Ontario argues the TOA violates due process as determined in the 

May 28, 2021 order by committing the Ap Pool to pay legal expenses that may not have 

complied with the procedure prescribed by the superior court. Not so. As the Ap Pool 
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notes, this procedure applies only “[i]f the parties cannot come to an agreement 

themselves (as the court states they may do in paragraph 7).” Paragraph 7, in relevant 

part, provides, “Judgment ¶54 and Peace I § 5.4(a) mean that, of course, the Ag Pool and 

the [Ap] Pool can agree to a determination to [sic] about payment of ‘litigation 

expense.’” In reaching the TOA, the parties employed the procedure contemplated by the 

court in its May 28 order. The TOA states that it is “in furtherance of and without 

abrogation of the provisions of the May 28, 2021, San Bernardino Superior Court Order 

(the Order)[,]” and that it is “made for purposes of settlement within the interpretational 

parameters of the Order. These Terms of Agreement and the Order shall be construed 

together.” Moreover, the TOA included the same conditions on payment the court had 

described in its May 28 order. Thus, the TOA is consistent with the May 28, 2021 order.

Likewise, the TOA is not inconsistent with the superior court’s December 3, 2021 

order denying the Ag Pool’s motion for attorney fees. The court denied the motion “in its 

entirety, on the basis that all fees sought by the [Ag] Pool are either for activities that 

were adversarial to the [Ap] Pool or, in the alternative, the Court could not determine 

whether the claimed fees were fair, reasonable, appropriate, and consistent with the 

Court’s May 28, 2021 Order, due to the level of redaction of the invoices supporting such 

claimed fees.” Specifically, the court “found redactions to be so extensive to make most 

of the bills meaningless for review by the opposing counsel and a determination by The 

Court.” Like the May 28, 2021 order, nothing in the December 3, 3021 order proscribed 

settlement of the disputed amount as a means of resolution. Again, the TOA manifests 

the agreement between the two Pools regarding the amount of 2020-2021 legal expenses 
20

the Ap Pool was obligated to pay the Ag Pool according to the terms of the Peace 

Agreement. It does not impose any additional obligation on appellants, or require them 

to pay any expenses they had not already agreed to pursuant to the Peace Agreement.

C. Appellants’ Remaining Arguments are Nothing More Than Red Herrings.

Appellants’ remaining arguments challenging the superior court’s denial of their 

motions for reimbursement include: (1) A majority of the Ap Pool may not bind a public 

agency; (2) There is no implied contract authorizing the Ap Pool to bind appellants5; 

(3) The equities do not support a quasi-contract; (4) Imposition of the TOA violates 

public policy and denies appellants their right to seek judicial review; and (5) The court 

erroneously relied on equitable doctrines to preclude appellants’ reimbursement motions. 

As we explain, these arguments amount to nothing more than red herrings. 

Appellants are parties to the Judgment and the Peace Agreement, both of which set 

forth their rights and obligations. Nothing in the TOA imposed any additional financial 

obligation on any public agency that it had not already agreed the Ap Pool would pay 

(funded by its members) according to the Peace Agreement. However, since the annual 

amount of this obligation was not specified nor limited in the Peace Agreement, 

appellants rightly sought judicial intervention when the Ag Pool sought $563,000 in fees 

(including more than $102,000 to reimburse Watermaster’s administrative reserves). In 

5

 Having found the TOA to be consistent with the Judgment, the Peace 

Agreement, and the superior court’s prior orders, we reject appellants’ challenge to the 

finding of an implied contract that authorizes the Ap Pool to bind them by the majority 

vote on its decisions. Moreover, as the Ap Pool points out, the implied contract theory 

was an alternative ground cited by the court in support of its ruling.
21

response, on May 28, 2021, the superior court ruled that section 5.4(a) of the Peace 

Agreement does not obligate the Ap Pool to pay unlimited Ag Pool expenses “without 

knowledge of the nature of the expenses.” Rather, the Ag Pool must show that the 

claimed fees are fair, reasonable, and appropriate. If the Ag Pool satisfies this showing, 

the Ap Pool pays the amount requested. If not, the two Pools may negotiate an 

acceptable amount. If negotiations are unsuccessful, then the Ap Pool may seek judicial 

intervention where the Ag Pool will have to prove to the court its right to the requested 

fees. 

Here, although the two Pools engaged in settlement discussions throughout 2021,6

when no settlement was reached, the Ag Pool sought judicial intervention. The superior 

court denied the Ag Pool’s request for fees, and it appealed. In response, the Pools

continued to seek a resolution of their dispute. Simultaneously, appellants filed their 

motions for reimbursement. By the time their motions were heard by the court, the Pools 

had reached a compromise. According to the TOA—which was approved by a majority 

vote of each Pool’s membership according to the Judgment—the Ap Pool agreed to pay 

$370,000 of the disputed $563,000. Of the $370,000, the Ag Pool would pay 

$102,557.12 to reimburse Watermaster’s administrative reserves. In exchange for the Ap 

Pool’s agreement to pay $370,000, the Ag Pool agreed to dismiss its appeal. 

6

 According to John Bosler, General Manager of the Cucamonga Valley Water 

District (a member of the Ap Pool) and Chair of the Ap Pool in 2021, the Ap Pool, the 

Ag Pool, and other representatives (including from Ontario) met several times from May 

through September 2021, to engage in good faith discussions regarding potential terms 

and conditions of a comprehensive settlement agreement to resolve the Ag Pool’s 

disputed expenses.
22

Additionally, the TOA clarified the Peace Agreement—specifically the Ap Pool’s 

obligation to pay for the Ag Pool’s legal expenses—by defining the procedures for

processing the Ag Pool’s requests going forward. 

Contrary to Chino’s assertion, the TOA has not denied them their right to judicial 

review. In denying appellants’ reimbursement motions, the superior court reviewed the 

relevant documents and considered appellants’ arguments. Nonetheless, it concluded the 

TOA was valid, binding on all Ap Pool members, and resolved all issues raised. 

Appellants have appealed the court’s order, and, after reviewing the record and 

considering the parties’ arguments, we conclude the superior court correctly denied their 

motions. There has been no denial of any party’s right to judicial review.

Likewise, we do not agree the TOA violates public policy or rises to an unlawful 

gift of public funds. Appellants are liable for their share of the Ag Pool’s expenses as 

members of the Ap Pool. The issue was not whether the Ap Pool must pay the Ag Pool’s 

request of $563,000, but how much it must pay. Facing the Ag Pool’s appeal of the 

superior court’s order denying its request for payment, the Ap Pool engaged in settlement 

discussions and was able to resolve the good faith dispute via the TOA. As the Ap Pool 

notes: “The settlement of a good faith dispute between the State and a private party is an 

appropriate use of public funds and not a gift because the relinquishment of a colorable 

legal claim in return for settlement funds is good consideration and establishes a valid 

public purpose.” (Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 

450; id. at pp. 450-451 [unlawful gift where attorneys had no colorable claim to fees in 

excess of $18 million]; see Orange County Foundation v. Irvine Co. (1983) 139 
23

Cal.App.3d 195, 200-201 [holding that, when state funds are used to satisfy “wholly 

invalid claim[s]” “no ‘public purpose’ is achieved].)

Finally, the superior court did not erroneously rely on equitable doctrines to 

preclude appellants’ reimbursement motions. As respondents aptly note, it is not the 

delay in the filing of appellants’ reimbursement motions that gives rise to laches. Rather, 

it is the late change in their position regarding their responsibility for paying the Ag 

Pool’s legal expenses (which they have done for 20 years), along with their acquiescence 

in the representative structure of the Pools for more than 40 years. As the superior court 

stated, “the length of time that the parties/dissenters have failed to raise their qualitatively 

legal objections in court to the [Ap] Pool’s payment of the Ag Pool’s legal expenses has 

the following consequences: [¶] a. They are barred by laches. [¶] b. They are waived.” 

(In re Marriage of Fogarty & Rasbeary (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1359 [“Laches is an 

equitable defense to the enforcement of stale claims. It may be applied where the 

complaining party has unreasonably delayed in the enforcement of a right, and where that 

party has either acquiesced in the adverse party’s conduct or where the adverse party has 

suffered prejudice thereby that makes the granting of relief unfair or inequitable.”].) 

Similarly, appellants may not challenge the amount of any prior payment (2019-2020) by 

the Ap Pool to the Ag Pool, which was assessed, reviewed, approved, and paid without 

objection. Since appellants failed to raise a timely objection, the court correctly found 

that they had waived any challenge. 
24

D. Conclusion.

For more than 40 years, disputes over Watermaster decisions, Pool actions, and 

party actions have fallen within the superior court’s continuing jurisdiction, and they 

continue to do so. Here, appellants have used their dispute over the propriety of the 

Ag Pool’s invoices—sanctioned by the Peace Agreement—to challenge the Ap Pool’s 

authority to act in a representative capacity under the Judgment. In denying their

reimbursement motions based on a finding that the Pools executed a valid settlement, the 

TOA, the superior court correctly concluded that neither the Judgment nor the Peace 

Agreement requires the Ap Pool to obtain unanimous consent of its members to act. To 

hold otherwise would disrupt the efficient management of the Basin as provided for in the 

Judgment.

III. DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Respondents are to recover costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

McKINSTER

Acting P. J.

We concur:

MILLER

J.

CODRINGTON

J.