[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 19-11232

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:18-cr-00492-JDW-JSS-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

BREANNA KNIGHTS, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(April 6, 2020)

Before JILL PRYOR, LAGOA and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Breanna Knights appeals her 36-month sentence, which the district court 

imposed after she pled guilty to one count of having distributed and possessed 

heroin with the intent to distribute it and one count of having distributed and 

possessed cocaine base with the intent to distribute it. On appeal, Knights argues 

that the district court made two errors in calculating her sentence: first, the court 

applied a two-level enhancement to her offense level under the Sentencing 

Guidelines for possessing a dangerous weapon, and second, the court refused to 

apply a two-level reduction to her base offense level for her minor role in the 

transactions. After careful review, we reject both of Knights’s challenges. We 

thus affirm her sentence. 

I. BACKGROUND

A grand jury issued an 11-count indictment against Knights, Donald Dussell, 

and another co-defendant. Knights alone was charged in Counts Two and Seven of 

the indictment. Knights pled guilty to Count Two, which charged her with 

knowingly and intentionally distributing and possessing with intent to distribute a 

mixture containing a detectable amount of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). Knights also pled guilty to Count Seven, which 

charged her with knowingly and intentionally distributing and possessing with 

intent to distribute a mixture containing a detectable amount of cocaine base in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). 

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In preparation for sentencing, a probation officer prepared the Presentence 

Investigation Report (“PSR”), which set forth the following facts regarding the two 

transactions for which Knights pled guilty and two related transactions with which 

she was involved. This case arises out of transactions in which Knights and 

Dussell, her live-in boyfriend, sold drugs, weapons, and ammunition to a 

confidential informant (“CI”) and an undercover agent from the Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”). Before the first transaction, 

the CI informed the ATF agent that Dussell had offered to sell heroin. The CI and 

the ATF agent met Knights and Dussell at a residence in Hudson, Florida to 

purchase drugs and a firearm. During the transaction, Knights retrieved a bag of 

heroin from her shirt and handed it to Dussell. After Knights handed over the 

drugs, the CI paid Dussell $80. During the same transaction, Dussell sold the CI 

and the ATF agent a stolen 9mm pistol for $600. This transaction was the basis for 

Count Two of the indictment. 

Before the second transaction, Dussell texted the CI that he had a shotgun 

and some police gear for sale. When the CI and ATF agent met Dussell for a 

second time in Port Richey, Florida, Knights again was present. During this 

transaction, the ATF agent bought two pistols, a shotgun, ammunition, and 

assorted police equipment for $1,100. The ATF agent also bought cocaine base for 

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$1,000; Knights handed the agent the drugs. This transaction was the basis for 

Count Seven of the Indictment. 

During the third transaction, the CI and the ATF agent met Dussell at a 

motel in New Port Richey, Florida, where they bought a revolver and ammunition 

for $250. Knights entered the motel room during the transaction, and the four 

individuals discussed the possibility of the CI and the ATF agent collecting drug 

debts for Dussell. Knights produced a list of Dussell’s debtors, identified specific 

customers and complaints she had about them, and commented on the potential 

collection of the drug debts. 

The CI and ATF agent met Dussell and Knights at the same motel for the 

fourth transaction. When the ATF agent asked what type of drugs Dussell had for 

sale, Knights answered “ice cream,” slang for methamphetamine. As Dussell and 

the ATF agent negotiated the price for the methamphetamine, Knights noted that 

the price would have been different if she and Dussell were in a different financial 

situation. Dussell sold the CI and ATF agent two pistols, ammunition, and 

methamphetamine for $1,600. Knights later admitted that she had known about 

Dussell’s drug and firearm business but claimed that she was not a participant in it.

Based on the quantity of drugs involved in the two transactions, the 

probation officer calculated a base offense level of 18. The probation officer 

suggested a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) because a 

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firearm was present during the transactions and a three-level reduction under 

U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1(a) and 3E1.1(b) for Knights’s timely acceptance of 

responsibility, bringing her total offense level to 17. Based on a criminal history 

category of IV, the resulting advisory guidelines range was 37-46 months’ 

imprisonment. The district court adopted the facts as set forth in the PSR.

At the sentencing hearing, Knights objected to the two-level enhancement

for possession of a firearm during the offense, arguing that at no point did she

possess a weapon. The district court overruled the objection, finding the 

enhancement applicable because: (1) the sale of the drugs were combined with the 

sale of the weapons and were part of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, (2) 

the sale of the weapons furthered the drug transactions, (3) Knights knew Dussell

sold both drugs and guns, (4) Knights participated in the drug sales, and (5) 

Knights could have reasonably foreseen that Dussell would possess guns in 

connection with the drug sales.

At the sentencing hearing Knights also argued for a reduction in her offense 

level under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) based on her minor role in the transactions.

Knights characterized her role in the transactions as limited to serving as a “human 

safe, at Dussell’s request.” Doc. 40 at 27.1 She noted that she did not organize or 

plan the criminal activity and that the evidence failed to show that she benefited 

1 “Doc. #” refers to the numbered entry on the district court’s docket. 

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directly from the transactions. The district court denied the minor role reduction.

The court reasoned that Knights failed to show she was substantially less culpable 

than Dussell because: (1) she possessed the drugs sold to the CI and ATF agent, 

(2) she was intimately familiar with the deals because she produced the customer 

list and knew details about the customers, (3) she informed the ATF agent that 

Dussell had “ice cream” for sale during one of the transactions, and (4) during the 

discussions about the price of methamphetamine she used terms such as “us” and 

“we.” Doc. 51 at 18-21. The court also pointed out that Knights conceded that her 

living with Dussell reasonably supported the inference that she benefited from the 

drug sales, and that her concerns about customer debts and her interactions with 

customers suggested that she helped plan and exercised some decision-making 

authority regarding the drug sales.

The district court sentenced Knights to 36 months in prison. This appeal 

followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, 

we review “purely legal questions de novo, a district court’s factual findings for 

clear error, and, in most cases, a district court’s application of the guidelines to the 

facts with ‘due deference.’” United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d 1134, 

1136-37 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “Due deference” in this context is 

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tantamount to clear error review. See United States v. White, 335 F.3d 1314, 1318-

19 (11th Cir. 2003). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when, upon review of 

the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been 

made.” United States v. Dimitrovski, 782 F.3d 622, 628 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation 

omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The District Court Did Not Clearly Err in Enhancing Knights’s 

Sentence for Possessing a Dangerous Weapon in Connection with Her 

Crime. 

The district court applied to Knights’s offense level a two-level 

enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon in connection with the drug sales, 

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). Knights challenges the increase in offense 

level, claiming that she never possessed the gun herself. We conclude that the 

district court did not clearly err in attributing Dussell’s gun possession to Knights

and affirm the court’s application of the enhancement. 

We review whether a defendant possessed a firearm for purposes of 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), a factual finding, for clear error. United States v. 

Stallings, 463 F.3d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 2006).

Section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level

enhancement “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed” in 

connection with a conspiracy to possess and distribute drugs. U.S.S.G. 

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§ 2D1.1(b)(1). An application note clarifies that “[t]he enhancement should be 

applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon 

was connected with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11. The government 

must show that the firearm had “some purpose or effect with respect to the drug 

trafficking crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or 

coincidence.” Stallings, 463 F.3d at 1220 (citations omitted). “Once the 

government shows that a firearm was present, the evidentiary burden shifts to the 

defendant to show that a connection between the firearm and the offense is clearly 

improbable.” United States v. Fields, 408 F.3d 1356, 1359 (11th Cir. 2005)

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

A co-conspirator’s possession of a firearm may be attributed to a defendant 

for the purpose of applying the enhancement if: “(1) the possessor of the firearm 

was a co-conspirator, (2) the possession was in furtherance of the conspiracy, 

(3) the defendant was a member of the conspiracy at the time of possession, and 

(4) the co-conspirator possession was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.” 

United States v. Pham, 463 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (citation omitted). “There is a frequent and overpowering 

connection between the use of firearms and narcotics traffic. To that end, we have 

found it reasonably foreseeable that a co-conspirator would possess a firearm 

where the conspiracy involved trafficking in lucrative and illegal drugs.” Id. at 

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1246 (citations omitted). The offense need not be charged as a conspiracy to 

attribute the relevant conduct of someone else to the defendant so long as they 

were engaged in jointly undertaken criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt.

n.3(A). Jointly undertaken criminal activity is defined as any “criminal plan, 

scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with 

others.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.3(A). 

The district court found that Dussell possessed a firearm, the drug sales and 

weapon sales were related and part of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, the 

sale of the weapons furthered the drug transactions, Knights knew that Dussell sold 

both guns and drugs, Knights participated in the drug sales at which guns were

present, and Knights could have reasonably foreseen that Dussell would possess 

guns in connection with the drug sales. None of these factual findings was clearly 

erroneous. Knights admitted to the probation officer who prepared the PSR that 

she knew about Dussell’s drugs and firearm business. She pled guilty to 

knowingly and intentionally distributing and possessing with intent to distribute 

both cocaine and heroin. Knights and Dussell jointly undertook criminal activity 

to sell these drugs, allowing Dussell’s possession of the firearms to be attributable 

as relevant conduct to Knights under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. The scope of the agreedupon activity included the two instances in which Knights held the drugs on her 

person, for which she pled guilty. It was during these two transactions that Dussell 

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possessed firearms and sold the CI and ATF agent both drugs and firearms. 

Dussell’s possession of the firearms during the transactions was in furtherance of 

the drug sales because selling firearms at the same time as drugs created 

convenience for buyers.

Further, Dussell’s possession of the firearms was reasonably foreseeable 

given Knights’s knowledge of the scheme. Our precedent makes clear that where, 

as here, a defendant participated in jointly undertaken criminal activity involving 

trafficking in lucrative and illegal drugs, she reasonably could have foreseen that 

her co-conspirator would possess firearms. See Pham, 463 F.3d at 1246. Knights 

admitted that she was aware that Dussell was engaged in both the drug and firearm 

businesses, making it foreseeable that guns would be present at any transaction. 

Knights did not demonstrate that the firearms’ connection to the drug sales was 

clearly improbable. 

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s application of the two-level 

enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon. 

B. The District Court Did Not Clearly Err in Declining to Reduce 

Knights’s Sentence Based on a Minor Participant Reduction. 

Knights argues that the district court erred in denying her a two-level 

reduction in offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) because of her minor role in 

the offense. We review a district court’s determination of a defendant’s role in the 

offense, a factual finding, for clear error. United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 

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175 F.3d 930, 937 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). But a “district court’s choice 

between two permissible views of the evidence as to the defendant’s role in the 

offense will rarely constitute clear error so long as the basis of the trial court’s 

decision is supported by the record and does not involve a misapplication of a rule 

of law.” United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182, 1192 (11th Cir. 2016) 

(alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). We 

cannot say that the district court’s determination that Knights played more than a 

minor role was clearly erroneous. 

The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level reduction to a 

defendant’s offense level if she was a minor participant in the criminal activity. 

See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). A minor participant is a person “who is less culpable 

than most other participants in the criminal activity, but whose role could not be 

described as minimal.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.5. The question of whether a 

defendant is entitled to a minor-role reduction is “based on the totality of the 

circumstances and involves a determination that is heavily dependent upon the 

facts of the particular case.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.3(C). The defendant has the 

burden of proving her minor role in the offense by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d at 939. 

Two principles guide the determination of whether a defendant played a 

minor role in a criminal scheme: (1) “the defendant’s role in the relevant conduct 

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for which she has been held accountable at sentencing,” and (2) “her role as 

compared to that of other participants in her relevant conduct.” Id. at 940. The 

fact that a defendant’s role is less than other participants is not dispositive of the 

defendant’s role in the offense because “it is possible that none are minor” 

participants. Id. at 944. Commentary to § 3B1.2 provides additional guidance on 

when a minor role reduction is appropriate, directing district courts to consider: 

(1) the degree of the defendant’s understanding of the scope and structure of the 

crime; (2) the degree of the defendant’s participation in the planning or 

organization of the crime; (3) the degree of the defendant’s decision-making 

authority; (4) the nature and extent of the defendant’s participation in the crime, 

including the acts she performed and how much discretion and responsibility she 

had; and (5) how much the defendant stood to benefit from the crime. U.S.S.G. 

§ 3B1.2, cmt. n.3(C). 

Here, the district court did not clearly err when it found that Knights had

more than a minor role. The court pointed out that Knights actually possessed the 

drugs sold to the CI and ATF agent during the two transactions for which she was 

charged, she was intimately familiar with Dussell’s drug sales because she had 

personal knowledge about transactions with specific customers, she knew which

drugs Dussell had for sale, and she referred to herself and Dussell as “us” and “we” 

in reference to the drug transactions. Doc. 51 at 18-21. Given Knights’s 

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knowledge of the drug deals and her possession of the drugs, we are not left with a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made when the district court denied 

her request for a minor role reduction. See Dimitrovski, 782 F.3d at 628.

Knights nonetheless argues that she was entitled to a minor-role reduction 

because her conduct was minor when compared to Dussell’s larger role of

organizing and planning the criminal activity. It is true that Dussell, and not 

Knights, planned the transactions and accepted the buyers’ payments. But the fact 

that Dussell played a larger role than Knights does not mean that she played a 

minor role; we have recognized that for some schemes none of the participants will 

qualify as a minor participant. See Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d at 944. Further, 

Knights acknowledged that her living with Dussell supported the inference that she 

benefitted from the drug sales, and that her concerns about customer debts and

interactions with customers suggested that she helped plan and exercised some 

decision-making authority over the drug sales.

We therefore affirm the district court’s decision not to reduce Knights’s 

guidelines range under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b).

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED. 

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