UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

 SOUTHERN DIVISION 

WILLIAM ROY BLOOMFIELD, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

JEFFREY WOODS, 

Respondent. 

 / 

 

Case No. 09-cv-11087 

HONORABLE MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

AND DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner William Roy Bloomfield is currently on parole, having served the minimum term of 

a sentence of four years to seven and one-half years.1 The sentence resulted from a Livingston 

County Circuit Court conviction of operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor – third 

offence (“OUIL 3rd”), and a subsequent parole violation. Petitioner challenges his confinement on 

the following grounds: 

A 35-month departure beyond the sentencing guideline=s recommended minimum of 0 to 

13 months for a probation violation in Livingston County is disproportionately severe 

and an abuse of discretion especially considering that Petitioner already served five 

months on tether in Livingston County and was sentenced to 16 months to five years out 

of the same incident that occurred in Crawford County on September 17, 2006. 

Habeas Petition, Appendix A (Dkt. 1). 

Respondent argues in response that the petition must be denied because the single claim in the 

Petition concerns only the ability of the trial court to exceed State law guidelines and is not 

 

 1Because the Petitioner is on parole, he meets the “in custody” requirement of 28 U.S.C. ' 2241. 

Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). 

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cognizable on habeas review. Because the Court agrees with Respondent, the petition will be 

denied. 

I. Background

The Petitioner pled guilty on January 9, 2004 in the Livingston County Circuit Court to an 

OUIL 3rd violation. He was sentenced on March 8, 2004 to five years’ probation with an initial jail 

sentence of 180 days. While serving this probation, the Petitioner had an alcohol-related, single car 

accident in Crawford County on or about September 17, 2006. Following the accident, the 

Petitioner told his Livingston County probation officer that he drank alcohol in violation of his 

Livingston County probation. On October 23, 2006, the Petitioner pled guilty to violating his 

probation by drinking alcohol while on probation and was sentenced to six months tether for 

drinking alcohol. 

The September 2006 car accident also resulted in the Petitioner being charged in Crawford 

County with OUIL 3rd. The Petitioner went to trial in Crawford County, lost, and was sentenced in 

Crawford County on October 1, 2007 to 16 months to 5 years imprisonment. After this conviction, 

the Petitioner was again charged, on November 8, 2007, with violating his probation for the 

Livingston County OUIL 3rd charge, this time based on his Crawford County conviction for OUIL. 

On November 14, 2007, the Petitioner pled guilty to violating his Livingston County probation by 

being convicted of OUIL in Crawford County, and was sentenced to 4 to 7.5 years imprisonment on 

the original 2004 OUIL 3rd conviction. This sentence was an upward departure from the guidelines=

sentence of 0 to 13 months imprisonment. The trial court’s stated reasons for the upward departure 

were that the Petitioner violated his probation and posed a danger to the public. 

The Petitioner filed, through counsel, a delayed application for leave to appeal. In this 

application for leave to appeal, the Petitioner asserted the same grounds for relief asserted in the 

present habeas petition, that the trial court abused its discretion in upwardly departing from the state 

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sentencing guidelines. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied the delayed application “for lack of 

merit in the grounds presented.” People v. Bloomfield, No. 286166 (Mich. App. July 30, 2008). 

The Petitioner then filed with the Michigan Supreme Court a pro se application for leave to appeal, 

raising the same grounds for relief raised with the appellate court. The Michigan Supreme Court 

denied leave to appeal on November 25, 2008 on the grounds that the court was not persuaded that 

the question presented should be reviewed by that court. People v. Bloomfield, 757 N.W.2d 475 

(2008). 

The Petitioner timely filed his federal habeas petition on March 25, 2009. 

II. Discussion 

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for claimed errors of state law. Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). Instead, a federal habeas court reviewing a state court conviction 

and sentence is limited to deciding whether the conviction or sentence violated the Constitution, 

laws, or treaties of the United States. Id. at 68. Therefore, a claim that a trial court improperly 

departed from state sentencing guidelines presents an issue of state law only and is not cognizable on 

federal habeas review. Cheatham v. Hosey, No. 93-1319, 1993 WL 478854, *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, 

1993). Petitioner’s sole claim for habeas relief is that the state trial court exceeded the applicable 

sentencing guidelines in resentencing him to four to seven and one half years for his OUIL 3rd

conviction following his parole violation. He does not assert that the sentence violated the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Accordingly, Petitioner’s habeas claim is noncognizable. 

To the extent that the Court interprets the Petitioner’s claim to be that his sentence violates the 

Constitution’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment, the 

Petition fails to state a claim for habeas relief. Generally, a sentence within the maximum set by a 

statute does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Austin v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 298, 302 (6th 

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Cir. 2000). Because Petitioner does not assert that his sentence was beyond that authorized by the 

applicable statute, Petitioner cannot sustain an Eighth Amendment claim. Furthermore, although 

unconstitutionality may be found where a sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offence for 

which it is imposed, “[t]he gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for 

only the extraordinary case.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003). In Rummel v. Estelle, 

445 U.S. 263 (1980), the Supreme Court found that it does not violate the Eighth Amendment for a 

state to sentence a three-time offender to life in prison with the possibility of parole, where the 

offender’s offences were all non-violent property crimes with little monetary value. In Lockyer, 538 

U.S., the Supreme Court held that a state court decision upholding two consecutive terms of 25 years 

to life for stealing approximately $150 in videotapes did not unreasonably apply Rummel. Applying 

Supreme Court precedent to the instant case, the four-year minimum sentence imposed in 

Petitioner’s case for his third conviction for operating a vehicle under the influence is not so grossly 

disproportionate to the crime as to violate the federal Constitution. 

III. Certificate of Appealability 

A petitioner must receive a certificate of appealability (“COA”) in order to appeal the denial of 

a habeas petition for relief from either a state or federal conviction. 28 U.S.C. '' 2253(c)(1)(A)-(B). 

 A court may issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(2). When a federal district court rejects a habeas claim on 

the merits, the substantial showing threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable 

jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claim debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-485 (2000). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his 

constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve 

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encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (citation 

omitted). 

In this case, the Court finds that jurists of reason would not debate the conclusion that the 

Petitioner has failed to establish an entitlement to habeas relief. The Court thus declines to issue a 

certificate of appealability. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, it is ordered that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied. 

It is further ordered that the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. 

 SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 28, 2011 s/Mark A. Goldsmith 

 Flint, Michigan MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

 United States District Judge 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and 

any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. 

mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on October 28, 2011. 

 s/Deborah J. Goltz 

 DEBORAH J. GOLTZ 

 Case Manager 

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