COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

JUDY ANN WITT 

v. Record No. 0917-95-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

ROANOKE CITY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES NOVEMBER 7, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 

Diane McQ. Strickland, Judge 

 (Allen T. Wilson, on brief), for appellant. 

 (Alice L. Ekirch, Assistant Commonwealth's 

Attorney, on brief), for appellee. 

 Judy Ann Witt appeals the decision of the circuit court 

terminating her residual parental rights to her son, Kriss. Witt 

argues that the court did not apply the proper standard of law 

under Code § 16.1-283(B) and that the evidence presented by the 

Roanoke City Department of Social Services (Department) was 

insufficient to support a termination of her parental rights. 

Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude 

that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily 

affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. 

 "When addressing matters concerning a child, including the 

termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount 

consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests." 

Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). The trial court is vested with 

broad discretion to make the decisions "'necessary to guard and 

to foster a child's best interests.'" Id. (citation omitted). 

When the trial court's decision is based upon evidence heard ore

tenus, that decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Id.

Standard under Code § 16.1-283(B)

 Under Code § 16.1-283(B), clear and convincing evidence that 

the parent has not "responded to or followed through with 

appropriate, available and reasonable rehabilitative efforts 

. . . designed to reduce, eliminate or prevent" the underlying 

child neglect or abuse is prima facie evidence that the 

conditions which led to a child's entrustment placement cannot be 

substantially corrected within a reasonable period of time so as 

to allow the return of a child to his parent. Kriss was four 

months old when he was placed in foster care. He had a scratched 

cornea, two infected eyes, and several abrasions on his face. He 

also was very dirty. The Department's investigation disclosed 

that Witt left Kriss in the care of her roommate, a prostitute, 

while Witt served a jail sentence. The roommate then left Kriss 

in the home of a third person, who turned Kriss over to the 

Department. 

 The record establishes that Witt's lifestyle and method of 

parenting had not improved following earlier intervention efforts 

by the Department. Witt made virtually no effort to cooperate 
 3 

with the Department in its efforts to return Kriss to her 

custody. The evidence shows the trial court did not apply an 

incorrect standard of law and did not err in finding that the 

mother's unwillingness or inability to comply with the 

Department's offered services demonstrated that the conditions 

which led to Kriss' placement could not be substantially 

corrected within a reasonable period of time. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence

 Witt argues that there was insufficient evidence to support 

the trial court's decision to terminate her parental rights. 

Witt specifically argues that the Department failed to offer 

sufficient appropriate services to help her regain custody of 

Kriss. However, the record demonstrates that the Department 

offered Witt help in obtaining parenting classes, housing, 

employment, and social security payments. The Department also 

tried to impress upon Witt the need to establish stability in her 

life. In addition, Witt previously had received parenting 

training classes, residential assistance, job referrals, and 

additional support in connection with her older children. 

 Despite the Department's attempts to assist Witt, she was 

unwilling or unable to make any necessary changes. Witt 

contacted the Department several times while she was 

incarcerated. However, Witt waited a month following her release 

before she notified the Department. Witt then missed the first 

scheduled meeting with her year-old son, although she admitted 
 4 

she received notice of the visitation. In fact, Witt saw Kriss 

only once after his placement with the Department, despite 

Department efforts to coordinate biweekly visitation. Witt also 

made no attempt to follow up on any of the Department's offers of 

assistance, although she did apply for social security disability 

benefits through her parole officer. 

 Clear and convincing evidence established that the 

Department made appropriate and reasonable rehabilitative efforts 

to assist Witt reduce or eliminate the neglect and abuse suffered 

by Kriss, and that Witt was unwilling or unable to substantially 

correct or eliminate that neglect or abuse. 

 The evidence indicated that Kriss was "at an optimum age for 

adoption" and had been with the same foster parents since his 

placement in foster care at age four months. Kriss will be 

almost four years old before Witt could begin to establish a 

stable home for him. "It is clearly not in the best interests of 

a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out 

when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his 

responsibilities." Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Social 

Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.