The Honor able Samuel H. Ma y s, J r., United S tates Dist rict J udg e for the Western District * of Tenne ssee, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0572n.06 No. 09-1566 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA P laintif f-App ellee,

v. STANLE Y THOMAS BRAZIL, JR. Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L FR OM THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COU R T F OR

TH E EAST ERN DISTRICT OF MICHIG AN O P I N I O N

BEF OR E: CO LE a nd M c KEA G UE , C ir c uit Judg e s; MAYS, Distr ict Judge. * McK EAGU E, Circuit Judge. Fo l l o wi ng investigations in 2005 and 2007 of drug traff icking by the Sunny side Gang in Sag inaw, Mi chig an, prosecutors obtained g uilty pleas fr om and convictions ag ainst numerous g angmembers. St anley Br azil, J r., one of

the g angleade rs, who wa s convicted a

nd sentenc ed to se rve two concur rent 380-month terms, now appea ls both his conviction

and his se nte nc e . We a ff

ir m. I. Over the cour se of se vera l y ear s the Sunny side Gangsold crac k coca ine on the South Side (or “S u n n y s i de” a

rea ) of Sag inaw, Michig an. In 2005, the g overnme nt arre sted, indicted, and

c on vic te d s e ve ra l g angmemb e rs , a nd in 2 00 7 la

un c he d a se c on d w a ve of

inv e sti g a tio ns . T his second wave ultimately resulted in the November 14, 2007, indictment of ten individuals, including B ra zil. Th e su

pe rc e din g ind ic tme nt c ha rg e d B ra zil w ith : ( 1) c on sp ir a c y to d ist ri bu te and

po sse ssNo. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 2 - with intent to dis tribute fifty g rams or more of coc aine ba se in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (Count 1); (2) togethe r wit h Wil lie Floy d J ackson distribut ing a nd aiding and abe tting in the dis tr ibutio n o f f

if ty g ra ms o r m or e of

c oc a ine ba se on Se pte mbe r 13, 20 07 , in vio la tio n o f 2 1 U .S. C. §§ 841(a) (1) a

nd (b)( 1)(A) (iii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 19); (3) tog ether with Kevi n Stephens distributing and a iding a

nd ab et t i ng in the distribution of fifty g rams or more of coc aine ba se on October 1, 2007, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)( 1) and ( b)(1) (A)( iii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 21). On Septembe r 15, 2008, the day befor e trial, the g overnme nt moved to dismi ss Count 1 of the superc eding indictment, the char g e of c onspiracy , in order to “nar row the issues prese nted at trial a nd

conser ve judicial re source s.” Br azil’s trial b ega n o n September 16, 2008. The prosec ution’s first witness, called on September 17, w as De tective Ser g eant Scott L . Woodard of the Michig an State Police. Woodard testified that as of September 13, 2007, he had be en assig ned to the B ay Are a Na rcotics Enf

orce ment Te a m (B AY AN ET ) to inv e sti g a te dr ug c on sp ir a c y c ri me s in Sa g ina w, Mic hig an. Al on g with Michig an State Troope r Ne al Br y ant Sommers a

nd ATF Ag ents Tom Bowde n and Paul Wade, he had work ed t o s et up “controlled purcha ses” of narc otics from B razil by the g overnme nt’s

con fi den tial i nf

or mant, Th oma s D anc e y . Wo od ard te sti fi e d th a t on

Se pte mbe r 1 3, 20 07 , th e date of the fir st controlled purc hase, he first sear ched D ance y to make sure that Danc ey was not ca rry ing money , wea

pons, or nar cotics, and the n g ave D ance y a dig ital aud i o re co rd er and $2,500 to buy drug s from B razil. W oodard a nd his team kept Da

ncey un d er surveillance while Danc ey walked back to his house; Danc ey then met up with his brother, who wa s unawa re of Danc ey ’s par

ticipation in t he c on tr oll e d p ur c ha se , and Dan cey ’s br oth e r d ro ve Da nc e y to m e e t B ra zil. F oll ow ingthi sNo. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 3 - meeting , Woodard retr ieved the r ecor ding de vice f rom and ag ain sea

rche d Danc ey . Five hour s later, as Woodard watched with a vide o came ra, Bra zil drove to Danc ey ’s apa rtment in a pickup truc k and Willi e Jac ks on

e me rg e d f

ro m the pa sse ng e r se a t. Ja c ks on and Da nc e y the n w a lke d u

p th e sta ir s in to Da nc e y ’s a pa rtmen t, whe re the y

re ma ine d f

or fi ve min ute s. On c e Jac ks on

le ft , Wo od ard

and his team sea rche d Danc ey , and re trieved a bag g ie of c rac k coca ine. Over the cour se of severa l day s near the end of S eptember 2007, at the enc ourag ement of the inv e sti g a tor s, Da

nc e y re pe a te dly c a lle d B ra zil to tr y to se t up ano the r d

ru g purc ha se . A c c or din g to Woodard, Danc ey

left a me ssag e indicating : “ Hey , g et with me

. I want y ou to sell me that car for $3,000. You know that car that y ou have.” (Tria l Tr. I :39.) Over a def ense obje ction, the district court then pe rmitted Woodard to testify that Danc ey “told [hi m] that Mr. Brazil did not have a car for sale, but that w as street lang uag e or code for $3,000 worth of drug s. His expl anation for that was in case someone wa s listening to the convers at ion, he did not want them to know it was a dr ug transac tion.” (

Id. at 40-41.) T he following day , the district court a nnounced that it had c oncluded that this testim ony

was inadmissible, and the c ourt i s s ued a limiting instruction to the jury stating that th e y sh ou ld n ot c on sid e r i t. Woodard testified that the Oc tober 1, 2007, c ontrolled purcha se proc eede d in roug hly the same fa shion as had the Septembe r 13 pu rc h as e: the ATF ag ents sear ched D ance y and then g ave Danc ey $3,000. Woodard then con d u ct ed surve illance of the store in Sag inaw whe re B razil had direc ted Danc ey

to meet him. Woodard took se vera l pic tures of Br azil’s truc k drivinginto the store parkinglot. After ten minutes, Da ncey and h i s brother dr ove aw ay from the pa

rking lot, and Woodard met up with D ance y to a g ain sear ch him. Woodard found that Danc ey was not ca rry ingNo. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 4 - any drug s, and no long er ha d the money

. Woodard then testified that he continued to monitor the situati o n b y p o l i ce r adio as Da ncey met with Bra zil ag ain, and that the two A TF a g ents picked Danc ey up following the meeting

. (Other prosec ution witnesses, including B owden a nd Wade, testified re g ardingthe drug delivery portion of the Oc tober 1 c ontrolled purcha se.) On cr o s s - e xa mi n a ti o n , Wo o d ar d te s ti f ie d th a t D an c e y h a d a

p p r o a c h e d th e p o li c e w ith the idea of targ eting Br azil, and that he knew that Dance y had bad f

eeling s ag ainst Br azil. W oodard

conce ded that he ha d n o t s ea rc h ed Danc ey ’s brother on September 13, nor

had he se arc hed a

ne ig hb or wi th who m Danc e y sp ok e br ie fl y

be fo re me e tin g Jac ks on

and B ra zil at hi s a

pa rtme nt. Woo da rd a lso a dmi tte d that he su sp e c te d th a t D anc e y wa s se lli ngdr

ug s o n th e sid e e ve n w hil e

wo rk ingwi th the po lic e , an d tha t he co nf ro nte d Danc e y in May

of 20 07 , b ut u lti ma te ly

de c ide d to pay Danc ey more money

for e ach c ontrolled purcha se so that Danc ey could af ford to live. Da

ncey was ultimately

paid betwe en $50 and $300 f or ea ch purc hase. The prose cution’s sec ond witness was S ommers, t he st ate trooper who, along with Woodard,

was a lso assigne d to B AYANE T at the time of these c ontrolled purcha ses. Sommers testified that he had he lped kee p Danc ey under surveillance during the September 13 controlled purc hase, a

nd that he had w atche d Danc ey , driven by Danc ey ’s b ro t h er (t h e “unw itting par ty ”), g o to meet B razil at Br azil’s house (“3200 F lamingo” ). On c ross-examination, Sommers clar ified that on September 13 he had se en Willi e Jackson g et out of t h e p as s en ger side of a pickup truc k and g o into Dance y ’s apar tment. Somm ers then sa

w Danc ey leave his residenc e and briefly meet with his neig hbor bef ore bicy cling off to mee t Woodard.No. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 5 - The prose cution’s third witness was B owden, the ATF ag ent l eading the team investig ating the Sunny sid e Ga

ng . Bo wd e n tes tif

ie d tha t as part of thi s in ve sti g a tio n h e ha d w or ke d c los e ly

wi th Danc ey , who had made a total of 40 c o n t ro l l ed purcha ses from Apr il 3, 2007, through O ctober 3, 2007. B o w d e ne xp la in e d th a t o nth e mo r

n in g o f Se p te mb e r

1 3 , 2 0 0 7 , h e h a d

id e n ti f ie d a c ar belong ing to a

g irlfriend of

Br azil’s outsi de of 3200 F lamingo. H e then told Woodard and Sommers to c on ta c t D anc e y and se t up a c on tr oll e d p ur c ha se fr om B ra zil. B ow de n te sti fi e d th a t, a s it wa s a long distanc e from Da

ncey ’s re sidence (“1623 H ess”) to 3200 Flaming o, which wa s in a suburb of Sag inaw, the investigators a g ree d that (to avoid ra ising suspicions) it would be be st to have an

“ un wi tti ngind ivi du a l ” ( Da nc e y ’s br oth e r) dr ive Da

nc e y . A lso to a

vo id a ro us ingB ra zil’ s su sp ic ion s, Bow den explained, t he investig ators had be en putting out a story that Danc ey

had re ceive d $35,000

a s a leg a l set tle me nt af

te r br ing inga

laws uit ba se d o n b e ingha

rm e d w hil e wo rk ingwi th a sb e sto s. Bow den conf

irmed that on Sep t em b er 13, 2007, the investigators met with and sea rche d Da nc e y , g a ve Dan cey th e mon e y , a nd the n tr a c ke d D anc e y

a s D anc e y

and his br oth e r d

ro ve to Br azil’s house. Danc ey

spent approximately

nine minutes in Bra zil ’s house, a nd then Danc ey

and his br oth e r d

ro ve to a g a s statio n. B ow de n and Som me rs se t up surv e ill anc e a t D anc e y ’s ho us e to wait for the drug delivery . Whil e wa iting, B owden ha d Danc ey call B razil four times to chec k to see that th e de liv e ry

wa s g oin g to t ake pl ace; th os e c a lls we re ta pe d, and we re int ro du c e d at tr ia l. B ow de n tes tif

ie d tha t he saw B ra zil an d J a c ks on dr ive up , an d D anc e y c ome ou tsi de and

me e t w ith J ackson. O nce B razil and J ackson le ft, Bow den adde d, he sawDanc ey leave the house, talk to two

near by individuals, and then g et on his bike to me et with Woodar d. Bow den testified that he was able to kee p visual contac t with Danc ey “one hundred perce nt from the time he ex ited the apa rtmentNo. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 6 - to the t ime he met up with us at t he road commission.” ( Id. at 101.) Ac cordingto Bowde n, Danc ey

came no closer tha

n 3-4 fe et from the f

irst individual he spoke with afte r leaving his house; B owden saw the second indi vidual hand Da ncey a slip of pape r. When Bow den and the others sea rche d Danc ey , they

retrie ved a ba g containing approximately two and a ha lf ounce s of coc aine ba se. Bo wd en al s o t es t i fi ed at l en gt h re gar d i n g t h e Oc t o b er 1 co n t ro l l ed p u rc h as e. T h at m o rn i n g, Danc ey met with law enf

orce ment and was sea

rche d and provide d with an audio re corde r and $3,000 of buy money . Danc ey

then ag ain re ceive d a ride from his brother , who w as s t i l l an unwitt ing participa nt, to meet with Bra zil . Following the meeting , Danc ey returne d home t o 1623 Hess, whe re Bow den ag ain sea

rche d him. At this point, Dance y rec eived a

call fr om Br azil, and learned that he

wa s su pp os e d to p ick the dr

ug s u p at “ the Du

b, ” wh ic h w a s th e nic kn a me fo r 3 27 5 So uth Washington. F or this delivery , Danc ey wore an audio-visual rec order ; the resulting recordingwas also shown to the jury . The video shows B razil wi p i n g off a plastic bag g ie with his shirt, and insisti ng that the bagcontains the c orre ct number of ounces. A fter D ance y

returne d from the Dub, he hande d the police a

pproxi mately

71 g rams of c ocaine base. I n a dd iti on to te sti fy

ing a bo ut the tw o c on tr oll e d purc ha se s, B ow de n te sti fi ed ex te ns ive ly about his relationship with Danc ey , about Danc ey ’s role in the inve stigatio n , an d about the B AY AN ET te a m’ s con cern s w he n th e y le arn e d in

May of 20 07 that D anc e y

wa s e ng a g e d in unauthorized side drug deals. Ultimately , the team confr onted Danc ey . As Bow den later testified: I nitially , Mr. Danc ey was very nervous and upset. After speaking to him for about ten minutes, he ca lmed down and pr ovided full information. He state d he had ma de several de als with three individuals, and ide ntified them either by name or nic kn a me . He state d he ha d be e n doin g so duri ngthe tim e pe ri od sh or tlyNo. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 7 - afte r a c ontrolled purcha se we had made from one of those individual s . . . . He descr ibe d o nth o s e o c c a s io n s h e a c te d e it h e r a s a mi d d le ma

no r w o u ld s o me times fee l compelled to purc hase c rac k coca ine in or der to document the cove r story that he had put out at our

instruction that he was, quote , back in the g ame, e nd quote, and was ba ck into selling c ocaine , powder ed coc aine a nd cra ck coc aine. An d h e state d th e mos t amou nt h e ha d e ve r p ur c ha se d w a s a pp ro xima te ly

$1 50 wo rt

h and he did so on . . . s ix dif

fe re nt o c c a sio ns . (Tria l Tr. I I :19-20.) B owden state d that the gover nment was able to make c ases a g ainst Danc ey ’s

source s, but determi n ed t h at , d ue to a lac k of evide nce, the y could not prosec ute Danc ey himself. I nstead, B owden testified, the investigators soug ht to ex erc i s e g reater c ontrol over Da ncey : they incorpora ted a se cond informa

nt to monit or Da

ncey , and dec ided to provi d e Da n ce y with more money per c ontrolled purcha se. On cr oss-examination, after a scer taining that Dancey

had bee n the one to appr oach la w enfor ceme nt about the pos sibili ty of workingon controlled purc hases, B razil’s attorney then ra ised

an e ntr a pme nt d e fe ns e , a lle g ing (w ith ou t a dmi tti ngthat B ra zil h a d c omm itt e d a c ri me ) t hat B ra zil would never

have e ng ag ed in any

criminal ac tivity had the police not soug ht to e ntrap him. Br azil’s

a tto rn e y sp e c if

ic a lly su g g e ste d to Bo wd e n tha t Danc e y wa s a ng ry a t B ra zil, and

wa s p os sib ly

a lso attempting to take down member s of the Sunny side Gangas par t of a drug turf war . Havingraised this defense , Br azil opened the door f or the gove rnment t o demonstrate that Bra zil was pre disposed to commit the crime of dr ug traff icking . Br azil’s attorney acknow ledg ed as muc h, stating: “ Iknow I ’ve ope ned up the door

to other infor

mation that the ag ent may have a bout Mr. Br azil and drug dealing .” (

Id. at 56.) On redirect, Bowde n in response testified reg ardingthe investig ations into the S u n n y s i d e G an g an d , t o s o m e e x t en t , Br az i l ’s ro l e i nt h at gan g.No. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

J ust before J ackson te stified, in acc ordanc e with the Jencks Act, 1 8 U.S .C. § 3500, the 1 g overnme nt provided B razil with information about J ackson, inc luding the f ull t ra n s cr i p t of an int e rv ie w b e tw e e n Jac ks on and B ow de n o n Se pte mbe r 1 5, 20 08 , th e da y be fo re tr ia l. The prose cution then soug ht to impeach its own witness by asking J ackson w hether he had 2 chang ed his story betwee n meeting with Bow den to discuss the ca se on June 19, 2008 and meeting - 8 - During a bre ak in B owden’ s testimony , the prosec ution called two police c rime lab drug analy sts, who testified that the substance s rec overe d from Da ncey f o ll o w in g th e controlled purc hases

wer e 60 g rams and 68.1 g rams of c ocaine base r espec tively

. Following Bow den’s testimony , the prosec ution called Michig an State Police De tective Ser g eant J ames Young , who testified re g arding his e nh anc e me nt o f t

he vid e o p re se nte d at tr ia l. Y oung ’s te sti mony e nd e d th e se c on d d ay

of tr ia l. On September

19, 2008, the third day

of trial, the g overnme nt c alled Willi e F loy d J ackson, who had a lrea dy

pled g uilty

to his invol vement in the September 13, 2007, controlled purc hase. 1 J ackson, w ho at the ti me of the t rial was 55 and who had rece ntly suffe red a stroke, testified that he met Br azil in the ear ly 1990s, when he started purcha sing cra ck coca ine from Br az i l

. J ackson testified that “of

f and on in the e arly

nineties to 2007,” he worke d as B razil’s live-in help, a job he took over from Danc ey . J ackson stated that on September 13, 2007, he sawDanc ey come out to the ho us e a t 32 00 F lamin g o a nd me e t w ithB ra zil, and

that th e n late r t

hat da y B ra zil dr ov e him

ov e r t o Dancey ’s h o use and told him to give Danc ey a brow n paper

bagcontaining what he thoug ht was

s o m e c ra ckco ca i n e. J ac k s o nt es t i fi edt h at h e w en ti n t o Da n ce y ’s h o u s e a n d gav e D an ce y

t h e b ag, and then we nt out to the porch, eventua lly followed by Danc ey . After a short conve rsation, J ackson added, D ance y

direc ted J ackson to g o back inside a nd, as a g ift, take some c rac k coca ine from a bag Da nc e y ha d h idd e n b e hin d th e toi le t. 2No. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

ag ai n wi t h Bo wden on Septembe r 15, 2008. Jackson ag ree d that at the June 19 meeting he neve r me nti on e d r e c e ivi ngc oc a ine fr om D anc e y , a nd a t th e Se pte mber 15 me e tin g he fo r t he fi rs t ti me made this claim. On redire ct, t he prosecution ag ain t ried to show that J ackson w as lying w hen he stated that Da

ncey had g iven him cra ck coc aine. Af ter listening to the audio re cordingfrom Da nc e y ’s a pa rtme nt, Jac ks on

a g re e d th a t he a sk e d f

or c oc a ine , a

nd that D anc e y had not si mpl y offe red a ny . J ackson c ontinued to maintain that Dance y had provide d him with drugs. - 9 - On cr oss-examination, J ackson te stified that he had rec eived coca ine from Danc ey “a lot of times,” and that on Septembe r 13, Da ncey g ave him coc aine that “wa sn’t the same” as the c ocaine that J ackson ha d just delivered. J ackson a lso stated that, in the two months before the September 13 delivery , he had be en at Dance y ’s apartment and seen “some” coca ine t here

. On t he day of the Se p t e mb e r

1 3 d e l i v e r

y , Ja c k s o na d d e d , h e w a s a c tu a l l y g o i n g t o D an c e y ’ s h o u s e an y w ay b e c a u se Danc ey had invited him to party . J ackson e x plained that, in ex chang e for his testimony , he mig ht

rec eive a five-y ear sentenc e instead of

a mandatory

minimum ten y ear s in prison. F oll ow ingJac ks on ’s te sti mony , the pr os e c uti on c a lle d Ro xie B ur

ton to t e sti fy (i n r e sp on se t o Br az i l ’s ra i s i n g o f t h e en t rap m en t d ef en s e) t o Br az i l ’s p re d i s p o s i t i o nt o en gage i ndru g t ra ff i ck i n g. Bur ton had pre viously

pled g uilty

to a drugtraff

icking char g e, and was ser ving a sentenc e of 180 months. Burton, who wa s 29 y ear s old, testified that he had known B razil since he wa s 14 or 15, and that he ha d b e e n purc ha sin g “ fr om sma ll qu anti tie s to larg e qu anti tie s” of c ra c k c oc a ine fr om h im

ever y couple of day s since that time in order to rese ll. Eventually , Bur ton stated, he was buy

ing a nd

se lli ng fr om fo ur to nin e ounc e s of c oc a ine (w or th b e tw e e n $ 2, 80 0 a

nd $5 ,5 00 ) at a

tim e fr om B ra zil. (B urton was late r re called f or additional cr oss-examination, and ag ain testified that he ha d purcha sed signific ant amounts of coc aine f rom Br azil.)No. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 10 - As its final witness, the prosec ution called ATF Ag ent Paul Wade, who testified to assisting with th e September 13 a

nd October

1 controlled purc hases. Wade stated that he ha d encour ag ed Danc ey to mak e t h e phone ca lls to Brazil on September 27 and 28, 2007, attempting to set up the October 1 controlled purc hase. Wade then testified re g ardingthat controlled purc hase: he stated that he had be en with Danc ey

befor e and a fter both the buy and the drug delivery , and that he ha d either

sear ched o r w it n e s s e d th e s e ar c h o f

D an c e y b e f o r e th e p u r c h a s e , a f

te r th e p u r c h a s e , an d

a f te r the delivery . Wade also testified that, while w aiting w ith Dance y afte r th e purcha se but befor e the de liv e ry , h e he ard part of a ph on e c on ve rs a tio n in wh ic h B ra zil, on

the oth e r e nd

of the lin e , to ld Danc ey to go to a house whe re D ance y

eventua lly

rec eived the dr

ug s. Wade descr ibed for the jury one of the prosec ution’s exhi bi t s, which wa s a still picture of B razil, who “appe ars to be holding something throug h his T- shirt, a white sandw ich bagand the c rac k coca ine.” ( Trial Tr. I I I :122-23.) On cr oss-examination, W ade c onfirmed that at various point s the ATF ag ents lost sight of D ance y duri ngthe c on tr oll e d p ur c ha se , b ut t hat D anc e y

wa s w e ari ngan a

ud io- vis ua l re c or de r a t th os e tim e s. Br azil called no witnesses of his own. The jury beg an its deliberation s o n September 22, 2008, and the f

ollowing da

y delivere d its ve rdict, finding Br azil g uilty on Counts 19 and 21 of the superse ding indictment. F ollowing the jury verdic t, the district court on September 23, 2008, signe d an orde r g ranting the g overnme nt’s motion to di smiss C ount 1. Prior to tr ial, the g overnme nt ha d indicated that it was se eking a pena lty enhanc ement under 21 U.S.C. § 851 on the basis of Br azil’s 1998 state conviction in Michiga n for possession of unde r 25 grams of coca ine . In p re pa ratio n f or se nte nc ing , B ra zil f

ile d a n o bje c tio n to the us e of thi s

c o n v i c t i o na s a

p e n a l t y e n h an c e m e n t o n t h e g r o un d s t h a ts u c h u s e w o u l d c o n s t i tu t e d o u

b l e j e o p a r dy.No. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 11 - Br azil also filed a sentenc ing me morandum objec ting to var ious points i n the Presente ncing I nvestig ation Report (PSR) prepar ed by the United States Probation Offic e. The combined we ight of c ra c k c oc a ine inv olv e d in the tw o c ounts up on

wh ic h B raz il w a s c on vic te d w a s 1 28 .1 2 g ra ms. The PSR, however, in a ddressing Br azil’s releva nt conduct an d t ak i n g into account a sy nopsis of pr of fe rs fr om f

ive c oo pe ratin g de fe nd ants (T ho ma s D anc ey , Dem etr iou s Ro bin so n, Te rr y B ur t, Rox ie B urton, and Rober

t L ouis Bell), r ecommende d holding Bra zil responsible for a total of 14.201 kil og ra ms of po wde r c oc a ine and 13 .3 12 kil og ra

ms o f c oc a ine ba se . In h is m e mor and um, B ra zil

c ha lle ng e d th is c a lc ulatio n, and a lso c ha lle ng e d b oth

the us e of the pr ior c on vic tio n to e nh anc e his penalty and the r ecommenda

tion in the PSR that the court apply a two-leve l Sentencing Guidelines incre ase on a ccount of

Br azil’s leader ship role. B razil filed a supplementa l memorandum ar g uing t h a tt h e c o u rti ns e n t e n c i n g h i m w a s v i o l a t i n g h i s r i g h t s t o a j u r y t r i a l an d a g a i n s td o u

b l e j e o p a r dy. The district cour

t held a sente ncing hear ing on A pril 13, 2008, and continued the hear ing on April 19, 2008. Over

the cour se of these two d ay s , t h e court heard e x tensive testimony from Bow den re g ardinginformation B owden ha d rec e iv e d f r o m t h e c o o p e r ating defe ndants about B razil’s his tor y of dr ugtr a ff ic kin g . U lti mat ely , th e c ourt de nie d B ra zil’ s se nte nc ingob je c tio ns , a

nd , in considering Br azil’s r eleva nt c onduct, held that Bow den’s testimony established by a pre pondera

nce of the e vid e nc e that B ra zil w a s re sp on sib le fo r 2 0. 1 k ilo g ra ms o f p ow de r c oc a ine and 12 .2 kio g ra

ms of cr ack c ocaine . Using this figur e, and apply ing both the sentenc ing inc rea se for Br azil’s role and the pena lty

enhanc ement for

Br azil’s prior state con v i ct ion, the court sente nced B razil to two

c on c ur re nt 3 80 -m on th t e rm s. This appea l followed.No. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 12 - II. B ra zil’ s f ir st a rgume nt is tha t the g ov e rnme nt v iol a te d h is r ig ht t o d ue pr oc e ss b y

fa ili ngto d is c lo s e in f

o r mati o n in v io lati o n of Brady v. M aryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963). While alleg ed violations of Brady would ordinarily be re viewed de novo , see, e .g. , Con e v . B e ll , 129 S. Ct . 1769, 1 7 8 4 (2 0 0 9 ), as B razil in thi s case had the oppor tunity to object at trial a

nd failed to do so, the g ov e rnme nt a

rgue s th a t w e sh ou ld r e vie w fo r pla in e rr or . Pla in e rr or re vie w i nv olv e s f our p ro ng s: First, ther e must be an e rror or defe ct – some sort of “ [d] eviation from a leg al rule” – that has not bee n intentionally relinquished or a

bandoned .

. . . Second, the leg al err or must be clea

r or obvious, rather than subjec t to rea sonable disput e. Third, the e rr or mus t ha ve a ff e c te d the a

pp e lla nt' s su bs tanti a l r ig hts , w hic h in

the or din ary

c a se means he must demonstrate that it “af fec ted th e o utcome of the district court proce eding s.” Puck ett v. United States , --- U.S. -

--- , 129 S.Ct

. 1423, 1429 (2009). Four th, if these thre e prong s are satisfied, then the c ourt “ha s the discretion to remedy the er ror – discr etio n wh i ch oug ht to be exercised only

if the er ror ‘ser iously

aff ect[s] the fa irness, integ rity or public re putation of judicial proce eding s.’” Id. (empha sis in orig inal). Ultimately , howeve r, either de novo or pla in error

revie w y ields the same r esults. As the prosec ution provided the mater ial in ques t i o n i n the fa shion pr e sc ri be d b y

the Jenk s A c t, 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 00 , th e pr os e c uti on did no t vi olate B ra zil’ s d ue pr oc e ss rig hts and that the district court ther efor e committed no er ror. Br azi l alleg es that the prose cution committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose, in a timely fashion, the statement of W illie J ackson taken by Bow den on September

15, 2008 (the da

y befor e the tria l started). B razil maintains in part that this st atement dem onstrates that law

en f o r c e m e n t kn ew t h at Da n ce y wa s co n t i n u i n g t o en gage i nu n au t h o ri z ed s i d e d ru g s al es t h ro u ghNo. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 13 - at least Oc tober of 2007 – de spite the fac t that Bow den had sug g ested in his testimony that Danc ey had stopped a ll unauthor i z ed s al es in May of 2007. The pr osecution provided a full transcr ipt of J ackson’ s statement t o the defense on September 19, 2008, the third day of trial, just befor e Jackson te sti fi e d b ut a ft e r t e sti mony fr om Wood ard , Somme rs , an d Bo wd e n. Ha vin g re c e ive d th is m a te ri a l, Br azil’s attorney

stated for this rec ord hi s objections to the constitutionality of the Jencks Act, but added that “under

the cur rent state of the law and the constitutionalit y of the J enks Ac t, the United States Attorney

has complied fully

with the law as it now stands.” (Tria l Tr. I I I :2-3.) As t h e Supreme Court concluded in Brady , 373 U.S. at 87, “[t] he suppre ssion by the prosec ution of evidenc e fa vorable to an ac cused upon r equest v i o l at es due pr ocess whe re the evidenc e is materia l either to g uilt or to punishm ent, i rre spective of the g ood faith or ba d faith of the prosec ution.” Brady , 373 U.S. at 87. “The re are three components of a true Brady violation: The

e vid e nc e a t is su e mus t be fa vo ra ble to t he a c c us e d, e ith e r b e c a

us e it is e xcu lpator

y , o r b e c a us e it i s i mp e a c h i n g ; t h a te v i d e n c e m u s t h a v e b e e ns u p p r e s s e d b y t h e S t a t e , e i t h e r

w i l l f u l l y o r i n a d v e rt e n t l y; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. G reene , 52 7 U. S. 2 63 , 2 81 -8 2 ( 19 99 ). Ev ide nc e is materia l under Brady “whe n there is a rea sonable probability that, had the e vidence been disc losed, the re sult of the proce eding wo u l d have be en diffe rent.” Cone , 1 2 9 S

. C t

. at 1 7 8 3 (c i t i n g United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). Brady also applies in the context of non- disclosure of evidenc e which impac ts upon the cre d i b i l i t y “o f a witness whose ‘re liability may . . . be deter minative of g uilt or innocence .’” United States v. Kuehne , 547 F.3d 667, 698 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (q u o t i n g Giglio v. United States , 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972))

.No. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 14 - Whil e B razil and the g overnme nt present va rious arguments reg ardingwhether the J ackson state me nt c on sti tut e s Brady materia l, whether i t does is ultimately

irrele vant, bec ause the g ov e rnme nt i n pro vid ing the state me nt to the de fe ns e be fo re Jac ks on te sti fi e d c omp lie d f

ull y wi th the re qu ir e me nts of

the Jenk s A c t, 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 00 . A c c or din g to t he Jenc ks Ac t: (a) I n any criminal prosec ution br oug ht by the United States, no statement or re port in the pos session of t he United States which was made by a Gove rnment witness or prospec tive Gover

nment witness (ot h er than the defe ndant) shall be the subject of sub p o e n a , d is c o v e r

y , o r in s p e c ti o nu n ti l s a id

w it n e s s h a s te s ti f

ie d o ndirec t examination in t he trial of the case . (b) Af ter a witness called by

the United States has testified on dir ect e x amination, the court shall, on motion of the defe ndant, order the United States to p ro d u ce any statement (as h er ei nafte r def ined) of the witness in the possession of the United States which re lates to the subject matter as to which the w itness has testified. 18 U. S.C. § 3 50 0( a )- (b ). Th e te rm “ state me nt” inc lu des any “tr ansc ri pti on . . . w hic h is a substantially

verbatim recital o f an oral stateme nt made by said witness and re corde d contempora

neously with the making of such oral statement.” Id . at § 3500(e )(2) . The tra nscript of B ow de n’ s in te rv ie w w ithJac ks on , a te sti fy ingwi tne ss, wa s c le arl y

wi thi n th e a mbi t of

the Ac t. As we ha ve stated r epea

tedly , “[w]hen Brady materia l soug ht by a defe ndant is c overe d by the J encks A ct . .

. the t erms of that Act gover n the timing of the g overnme nt's disclosure .” United Sta te s v . D av is , 306 F.3d 398, 421 ( 6th Cir. 2002) (q u o t i n g United States v. Benc s , 28 F.3d 555, 561 (6 th C ir . 1 99 4) ). “ I f imp e a c hme nt ev ide nc e is within the a mbi t of the Jenc ks Ac t, the n the e xpre ss provisions of the J encks Act contr ol discovery of that kind of evide nce. . . . the g overnme nt may not be compe lled to disclose J encks A ct mater ial befor e trial.” United St ates v. Presse r , 844 F.2d 1275, 12 83 (6 th C ir . 1 98 8) . Pu t ano the r w ay : the Jenk s A c t tr ump s Brady wher e impeac hment evidenc eNo. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

Ev e n if the st ate men t wer e no t Jen c ks Ac t mate ri a l, m or e ov e r, B ra zil w ou ld b e un a ble to 3 demo n s t ra t e a Bradyviolation because he ca n not demonstrate pr ejudice. See Strick ler , 5 27 U. S. at 281-82. “

Bradyg ener ally

does not apply

to delay ed disclosure of exc u l p atory information, but only to a complete f

ailure to disclose.” Kuehne , 5 4 7 F. 3 d at 6 9 8 (q u o t i n g Bencs , 28 F.3d at 560-61).

“ [A] ‘ de lay

on ly vio late s Brady when the de lay itself cause s prejudice .’” Id. Her e, B razil maintains that th e g ov e rnme nt’ s p ro du c tion of the state me nt o n th e thi rd da y of tr ia l ha mpe re d h is a

bil ity to cross-e x amine other

witnesses, including Bow den. F ollowingp r o d u c ti o n o f the statement, howe ver, B ra zil h a d th e op po rt

un ity to a sk the c ourt to r e c a ll B ow de n, bu t c ho se no t to do so . T he Sixth Circuit has routinely

rec og nized that permitting t he defense to r eca ll a witness for c ross-examination can c ure pr ejudice c aused by the delay ed produc tion of Brady o r Je n c k s A c t mate r ia l. S ee, e .g., J os e ph v . Co y le , 469 F .3 d 441 , 4 72 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; Un ite d S tat es v . B lac k

we ll , 459 F.3d 739, 759 (6th Cir. 2 0 0 6 ) ( h o ld in g th a t, w h e r e d e f e n d an t w a s g r an te d an o p p o rtu n it y to r e - c r o s s e xa mi ne a witness afte r def

endant r ece ived Brady documents follo wi n g t h e testi mony of the witness, “ any pr e jud ic e re su lti ngfr om D e fe nd ant’ s f a ilure to [r e -c ro ss e xami ne the wi tne ss] is not att ri bu ta ble to the g overnme nt’s violation of the principles se t forth in Brady ” ); Un ite d S tat es v . S pr y , 238 F. App’ x 142, 148-49 (6th Cir. 2007). - 15 - is Jencks Act materia l. A s the Bencs court noted, “ Presser discounted t he li kelihood that a def endant could be pr ejudiced by

the produc tion of witness statements during trial, as permitted by the J encks Act, noting that even the Bradydo c tr ine re qu ir e s o nly the pr od uc ti on of ma te ri a l in

tim e fo r i ts eff ective use at trial.” Bencs , 28 F.3d at 561. The Jackson statement cle arly fell wit hin the ambit of t he J encks Act, and so was not subject to co mpe lle d d isc los ur e – e ve n if it w a s Brady m a t e r i a l – p r i o r t o J a c k s o n ’ s t e s t i m o n y. 3 Ac c or din g ly , w e fi nd

tha t th e pr os e c uti on

in p ro du c ing

the Jac ks on state me nt d id n oth ingto v iol a te Br azil’s due proce ss rig hts and that the district court ther efor e committed no er ror. III . B ra zil’ s se c on d argumen t is tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

vio la te d h is Si xth A me ndme nt r ig ht t o

co n front witnesses as rec og nized in Crawf ord v. W ashington , 5 4 1 U

. S. 3 6 ( 2 0 0 4 ) , b y p ermitting Bow den to testify

reg ardingstatements alleg edly made by Danc ey , who himself did not te stify andNo. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 16 - was not subject to cr oss-examination. Bra zil objects to two statements to which B owden testified: the first was Danc ey ’s statement that a messag e Danc ey left on Br azil’s voice mail s t at i n g t hat Da nc e y wa nte d to bu y B ra zil’ s c ar f

or $3 ,0 00 wa s cod e fo r wa nti ngto b uy

$3 ,0 00 wo rt

h o f d ru g s; the sec ond was Da

ncey ’s re sponse when a ccuse d by Bow den in May of 2007 of de aling drug s on the side. Confrontation Clause issues are revie wed de novo , Un ite d S tat es v . P owe rs , 500 F.3d 500, 504 (6th Cir. 2007) , and are subject to ha rmless err or ana ly sis, United States v. Martinez , 588 F.3d 301, 31 3 ( 6th Cir . 200 9)

. On dir e c t cr imi na l a pp e a l, a Con fr on ta tio n Cl a

us e vio la tio n is ha

rm le ss o nly if the court is a

ble to de clar e a be lief that the violation was ha rmless “be y ond a re asonable doubt.” De law ar e v . V

an Ar sd all , 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) ; C ha pm an v . Ca lif

or nia , 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Whe the r s uc h a

n er ro r is h arm le ss i n a

pa rt ic ula r c a se de pe nd s u

po n a ho st o f f a c tor s, all rea dily acc essible to revie wing courts. The se fa ctors i n cl u de the importanc e of the witness’ test i m o n y i n the prosec ution’s case , whether the testimony

was cumulative, the prese nce or absenc e of evidenc e corr oborating or contra dicting the testimony of the witness on mate rial points , the extent of cross-e x amination otherwise pe rmitted, and, of c ourse, the ove rall streng th of the prose cution’s ca se. Va n A rsd all , 4 75 U. S. at 68 4; see also Earhart v. Konteh , 589 F.3d 337, 345 ( 6th Cir. 2009). The Confrontation Clause of the Six th Amendment states, “I n all criminal prose cutions, the

acc used shall enjoy

the rig ht . . . to be confr onted wit h t h e wi t n es ses ag ainst him.” U.S. C O N ST . amend. VI . I n 2004, the Supreme Court c oncluded that the Clause bar s “admission of testimonial sta te me n ts o f a w it

n e s s w h o d id n o t a

p p e ar a t tr ia l u n le s s h e w a s u n a v a il a b le to te s ti f

y , an d the defe ndant had had a prior opportunity for c ross-examination.” Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 53-54. “To trig g er a violation of the Confrontation Clause, an admitted statement must be testimonial in nature, and must be hea

rsay .” Un ite d S

tat es v . D e itz , 5 77 F .3 d 6 72 , 6 83 (6 th C ir . 2 00 9) . Astate me nt i sNo. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 17 - testimonial where a

rea sonable pers on would anticipate that his or her stateme nt would be used “ag ainst the accused in investigating a nd prosec uting the c rime.” United States v. Cromer , 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004). A. Dancey’ s Statem ents Regar din g the “Car for Sal e” Br azil maintains t he district court viol ated his Six th Amendment rig hts by permitting B ow de n t o t e s t i f

y r e g ar d i n g D an c e y ’ s s t a t e m e n tt h a ta v o i c e m a i l m e s s a g e D an c e y l e f tf o r B ra zil reg ardingwanting to buy

Br azil’s car f

or $3000 wa s in f

act code for wanting to buy $3000 worth of dr u g s . As t h e d is tr ic t c o u rt u lt im a te ly ( b u t n o t in it ia ll y ) r e c o g n iz e d , B o wden’ s testimony was testimonial hearsa

y . The Six th Circuit has held that “stateme nts of . . . confide ntial informant[s] are testimonial in nature, and ther efor e may not be offe red by the g overnme nt to establish the g uilt of

an ac cused a

bsent an opportunity

for the a ccused t o cross-examine the informant.” Cromer , 389 F .3 d at 67 0- 71 ; se e als o D e itz , 577 F.3d at 683 (“[T]he fact that the de clar ant was a confide ntial informant make s his statements testimoni al . . . .”) . I n this inst an ce, moreover , the statement wa s offe red to prove the truth of the matter asser ted: that the messag e Danc ey left for Br azil was in fact

a c od e d p art

of on e of the c on tr oll e d drug purc ha se s. Whil e the dis tr ic t c ourt ini tia lly ru le d in response to a def

ense obje ction that the stat em en t was admissible to expl ain context, the court chang ed its mind the nex t day . Upon conve ning f or the sec ond day

of trial, the c ourt stated: [Y] ou hear d testimony

from Serge ant Woodard re g ardinga conve rsation that took place with Thomas Danc ey on or about September 2 8 , 2 0 0 7 . Part of that conver sation involved a voice messag e to the def endant f rom Mr. Da

ncey indicating t h at M r. Dancey

wanted to buy

a ca r for $3,000. Serg eant Woodard, ove r an objection that was r aised, wa s allowed to testify reg ardingMr. Danc ey ’s explanation of that phra se.No. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 18 - Iwant to ch an ge my

ruling on that particula

r issue. I ’m not g oing to a llow that portion, Serg eant Woodard’s testimony conce rning the explanation that was given by Mr . D anc e y

int o e vid e nc e . I dir e c t that that te sti mony be str ic ke n, a nd y ou sh ou ld not consider that e vidence admitted in the case

. (Tria l Tr. I I :3.) Gi ve n th a t B ow de n’ s st a te me nt wa s te sti mon ia l he ars ay , the c ourt c le arl y e rr e d in ini tia lly admitting B owden’ s testimonial hearsay ; any violation of the C o n frontation Clause wa s rende red harmless, howe ver, by

the fa ct that the evide nce aga i n s t Br azil was so strong that he would have been convicted even if the state ments had not bee n admitted. Cf. United States v. Lawson , 535 F.3d 434, 439 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008) (findinga Confrontation Cl ause e rror harmless on direc t appea l where the evidenc e of the defe ndant’s g uilt was overwhe lming). I n addit i o n to direct testimony from Woo d ard, Som mers, B owden, a nd Wade re g ardingthe controlled pur chase s Danc ey made f rom Br azil, the prosecution pre sented audio re cording s of neg otiations between D ance y and B razil for drug s, a video of the drug distributions from Jackson and Br azil to Danc ey on September 13, 2007,

an d a v i d eo o f t h e c o n t ro l l edp u rc h as e o nOc t o b er 1 , 2 0 0 7 , wi t h a sc en e of Br az i l wi p i n g a p ac k age of f o n h is s hir

t bef or e ha nd ingit t o D anc e y . T he pr os e c uti on a lso pr e se nte d th e te sti mony of Willi e J ackson, B razil’s associate , who conf irmed t hat Brazil had sol d Danc ey the drugs described in the two rele vant co u nts of the superc eding indictment. On top of this overwhe lming evide nce of Br azil’s guilt, moreove r, the jury hear d the cour

t issue a limiti ng instruction. Ac cording ly , we f

ind that, while the district court pe rmitted the jury to hear testimonial hear say in violatio n o f t h e S i x th Amendment, as the district c ourt soug ht to cure the err or with aNo. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 19 - limit ing instruc tion and as the prose cution prese nted over whelming evidenc e of B razil’s g uilt, the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s e rr or

wa s h arm le ss b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. B. Dancey’s State m ents Regar din g Unauthorized Drug Sales Br a zi l a ls o ma in ta in s th e d is tr ic t c o u rt v io late d h is Si xth A me n d me n t r ig h ts b y

p e r mi tt ing Bow den to testify

reg ardingDanc ey ’s statements made afte r B owden c halleng ed Da ncey and

acc used Da

ncey in May of 2007 of se lling drug s on the side. I t is not entirely clea r to what a spect of B ow de n’ s te sti mony

B ra zil is ob

je c tin g . H e wr ite s: “ [B ow de n] te sti fi ed th a t D anc e y , w hil e initially nervous a

nd upset, ca lmed down and g ave f ull information. He testified that Danc ey made

a fe w b uc ks a s a mid dle man in tr ans a c tio ns to k e e p h is s tor y up and that po lic e ma de c a se s a g a ins t the thr e e pe op le he de a lt w ith .” (B ra zil B r. a t 33 .) I n othe r wo rd s, B ra zil s e e ms t o b e ob je c tin g to

any te sti mony

re g ard ingDa

nc e y ’s re sp on se s w he n a c c us e d o f m a kin g un a uth or ize d s a le s. Whil e the state ments of conf idential informants ar e alway s testimonial, “[t ]he Confrontation Cla us e ‘d oe s n ot b ar t

he us e of te sti mon ia l st a te me nts fo r p ur po se s o the r t

ha n e sta bli sh ingthe tr

uth of the matter

asser ted.’” De itz , 5 7 7 F. 3 d

at 6 7 6 (q u o t i n g Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 59 n.9). “[E]vi dence that is ‘p ro vid e d me re ly

by wa y of ba c kg ro un d’ or

is o ff e re d o nly to ‘ e xpla in[ ] h owc e rt a in e ve nts

came to pass or why

the offic ers took the a ctions they did,’ is not offe red for the tr uth of the matter

asser ted.” United States v. W

arman , 5 7 8 F. 3 d 3 2 0 , 3 4 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Cromer , 389 F.3d at 676). In United States v. Gibbs , 506 F.3d 479, 486- 87 (6th Cir. 2007), m o re o v er , we f ound no Cra wfo rd violation because the cha lleng ed testi mony “[d] id not bear on” any element of the cha rg es ag ainst the defe ndant and “ was a miniscule part of [the witness’s] overall testimony .” He re, B owden testified about Da

ncey ’s re sponses to expl ain how he a nd the other la

w enf orce ment personne lNo. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 20 - investigating the Sunny side Gang addre ssed their c oncer ns that Danc ey

was makingunauthorized drug deals and to de scribe the measure s the team took to ensure the secur ity of i t s co n t rolled purc ha se s. Th e de fe ns e , mo re ov e r, ha d a lr e a dy qu e sti on e d Wo od ard

a t le ng th o n e xac tly

thi s qu e sti on , o f w hat D anc e y sa id w he n c on fr on te d a

bo ut m a kin g un a

uth or ize d d

ru g de a ls. As Da nc e y ’s un a

uth or ize d dru g de a lin g in May of 20 07 ha d littl e re le va nc e to B ra zil’ s sa le of drug s to Dance y

in September a

nd October

of 2007, we find that Bow den’s testimony did not bear

on any element of

the cha rg es, wa s a minuscule par t of Bow den’s ove rall testimony , and ther efor e

wa s n ot o ff

e re d f or the tr uth of the ma tte r a sse rt ed. Ac c or din g ly , w e fi nd that a dmi ssi on

of thi s testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause. IV. Br azil’s nex t argument is that he “wa s denied due proces s o f l aw b y the use of the confide ntial informant ag ainst him, failur e to properly monitor the controlled purc hases, a nd improper bolst ering the i nformant and purcha ses he conducte d.” (B razil Br. at 35.) The g overnme nt sug g ests that Br azil is actua lly making three arguments: (1) sufficie ncy of the e vidence ; (2) improper bolstering ; and (3) a

rea ssertion of the Bradyc la im. I n f a c t, B ra zil is makin g on ly tw o a rgume nts :No. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

Rather than ma

king a sufficie ncy of the evidenc e claim, Br azil is simply re- prese nting the 4 evidenc e and a

rg uing that the j ury should have de cided the c ase diff ere ntly . Even if B razil is making a suff iciency claim, moreove r, his argument clea rly fails. On appe al from a criminal conviction, we ask “w hether , afte r viewingthe evidenc e in a lig ht most favorable to the g overnme nt, any rational trier of fac t could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond a re asonable doubt.” United States v. Je nkins , 593 F.3d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 2010)

. As we stated previously , the prosec ution here pr e se nte d o ve rw he lmi nge vid e nc e of B ra zil’ s g uil t. Br azil appear s to think t hat there is some disti nction betwee n his earlier Bradyargume nt 5 and a “due pr o c e s s ” ar g u me n t p r e mi s e d o n“ th e f a c t t h a t t h e U n it e d St a te s A tt o r

n e y th e nd id not pre s ent Dancey

to allow cross e x amination of him” and on the timing of the g overnme nt’s production of the J ackson statement. (B razil B r. at 39.) B razil cites no authority for the pr emise that the g ov e rnme nt vio late s d ue pr oc e ss w he n it

fa ils to p ro du c e a

c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ant f or c ro sse xami na tio n at tr ia l; i nd e e d, the re is n o r e qu ir e me nt t hat th e pr os e c uti on

c a ll s uc h a

n in fo rm a nt t o testify . Br azil’s second pre mise is, as the g overnme nt argues, simply a re statement of h i s initi al Bradyclaim, which is fully addre ssed by

our discussion of the Jencks Act. Whil e def

endants usually

alleg e that the pr osecution has bolstere d the testimony of a 6 witness, in this case B razil seems to be arg uing that the prosecution “bolstere d the us e of D ance y ”, who did not testify , or of the purc hases themse lves. Br azil cites no authority for the pr oposition t hat a prose cutor e ven could bolster the cr edibility of a non- testify ing c onfiden t i al i nformant or of controlled drug purcha ses. Br azil must instead presumably be arguing that the prosec ution bolst ere d B o w d e n ’ s t e s t i m o n y regarding Da nc e y and the c on tr oll e d p ur c ha se s. - 21 - (1) de nial of due p rocess premised on a Brady violation; and (2) improper bolstering

. We have

4

a dd re sse d th e du e pr oc e ss c la im at le ng th, and it r e ma ins on ly

fo r us to a dd

re ss h is b ols te ri ngc la im. 5 Br az i l ar gu es t h at p ro s ec u t i o ni mp ro p er l y b o l s t er edDa n ce y ’s cr ed i b i l i t y , es p ec i al l y t h ro u gh Bow den’s testimony . “B olstering occur s when the prosec utor implies that the witness’s testimony is corrobor ated by

evidenc e known to the g overnme nt but not known to the jury .” United States v. Fran c is , 1 70 F .3 d 5 46 , 5 51 (6 th C ir . 1 99 9)

. I n o rd e r t o avo id b ols te ri ng , “ if a pr os e c uto r a sk s a 6 g ov e rnme nt a g e nt w he the r t he a g e nt wa s a

ble to c or ro bo rate inf

or ma tio n p ro vid e d b y

an in fo rm a nt, the prosec utor must introduce to the jury how that information wa s corr oborate d.” United States v.No. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 22 - Martinez , 253 F.3d 251, 254 ( 6th Cir. 2001). Where, as here , a defe ndant makes no objec tion at trial to prosecutor ial misconduct, we r eview f or plain er

ror. Un ite d Stat es v . H

e nr y , 545 F.3d 367, 376 (6th Cir. 2008). At trial, Bow den testified e x tensively on bo t h d irec t and cr oss-examination reg arding Danc ey ’s role in the inve stigation of the Sunny side Ga n g. Bow den testified, f or example, that he ha d w ork e d w i t h D an c e y a l m o s t d a i l y b e t w e e n A p r i l an d O c t o b e r o f 2 0 0 7 , d u r i n g w h i c h ti me Da nc e y ma de a tot a l of 40 c on tr oll e d p ur c ha se s. B ow de n a lso te sti fi e d r e g ard ingDa nc e y ’s re sp on se wh e n B ow de n c on fr on te d D anc e y in M ay of 20 07 a bo ut D anc e y ’s un a

uth or ize d s e lli ngof

dr ug s. B ra zil n owargue s th a t “ [t]he e nti re lin e of qu e sti on ing of B ow de n c on c e rn ingc or

ro bo ra tin g the us e of Da ncey was im proper bolstering imply ing corrobor ation from the extent of the investig ation and use of the inf

ormant in other tra

nsactions without providing those tr ansac tions on the recor d.” (B ra zil B r. a t 38.) F or thi s pro po sit ion , Br a zil c ite s Martinez , 253 F.3d at 253, in which we f ound that a prose c u to r

h a d im p r o p e r ly b o ls te r e d

th e te s ti mo n y

o f th e p r o s e c u ti o n ’ s ma in

w it n e s s by soliciting fr om a testifying narc otics deputy the unsupported a nd uncorr oborate d statement that “the information [the witness has] provi d ed h as al way s been c redible, it’s be en ac curate and truthful.” Martinez , howeve r, is clea rly distinguishable: in this case, ne ither the prosec ution nor Bow den eve r

s u g g e s t e d t h a tD an c e y ’ s c r e d i b i l i t y h a d b e e nd e m o n s t r a t e d

b y e v i d e n c e n o tk

n o w nt o t h e j u r

y . If any thing, by testify ing reg ardingDanc ey ’s unauthorized dea ling, B owden detracted from Da ncey ’s

c re dib ili ty a nd tr

us tw or thi ne ss. Th e fa c t that Da nc e y pa rt ic ipate d in 40 c on tr oll e d p urcha se s,

moreove r, say s nothing a bout Dance y ’s cre dibilit y or the truth of B owden’ s testimony – only the

e x t e n to f B o w d e n ’ s i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h D an c e y.No. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

Braz i l also argues that in examining B owden the pr osecution “e ng ag ed in a leng thy 7 prese ntation to the J ury

. . . to pa rade information conce rning fac ts to bolster and vouch f or Da ncey in c on du c tin g the a lle g e d p ur c ha se s w ith De fe nd ant. ” (B ra zil B r. a t 40 .) Whil e B ra zil c ite s n o c a se law and doe s not develop this claim, it is possible to r ead this stateme nt a s also making a vouching ar g u me n t. I mp r o p e r v o u c h in g o c c u r s “ w h e n a p r o s e c u to r s u p p o rts th e c r e d ib il it

y o f a w it n e s s by indicating a per sonal belief in the witness’s cre dibilit y there by placing the prestig e of the offic e of the United States Att orney behind that witness.” Fran c is , 1 70 F .3 d at 55 0. He re , B ra zil p oin ts t o no statements made or questions a sked by the prosec utor that would fall within this definition. Even h adBr az i l fu l l y

m ad e t h i s ar gu m en t , t h en , i two u l d s i m i l ar l y b e u n av ai l i n g. - 23 - As Br azil has not identified any way in which the prose cutor implied that Bow den’s testimony was c orrobor ated by

evidenc e not known to t he jury , we f ind that the prosec ution did not i mp r o p e r l y b o l s t e r

B o w d e n ’ s t e s t i m o n y o r

D an c e y’ s c r e d i b i l i t y. 7 IV. Br azil’s fourth argument is that his trial counsel rende red ine ff ec t i v e as sistance by

raising an entra p me n t d e f

e n s e a n d s o o p e n in g th e d o o r

to d e tr im e n ta l t e s ti mo n y f r o m R o xie Burton reg ardingBr azil’s predisposition t o eng ag e in drug traff icking

. To demonstrate that his counsel’s perf ormanc e wa s con s ti tu

ti o n a ll y d e f ic ie nt, Bra zil must show that it “fell below an obje ctive standa rd of rea sonablene ss” and that it pr ejudiced the defe nse. Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 688, 688- 89 (1 98 4) . Su c h a

c la im i s o rd ina

ri ly de fe rr e d unti l po st- c on vic tio n pro cee din g s und e r 2 8 U .S. C. § 2255, when a

n evidentiar

y hear i n g can be held to asce rtain whe ther c ounsel’s conduc t was motivated by

sound strateg y . See W

arman , 578 F.3d at 348 (“A s a gene ral rule, a def endant may

not raise ine ffe ctive-a ssistance-of -counse l claims for the first time on direc t appea l, since there has not been an oppo rtu

n it y to d e v e lo p a n d

in c lu d e in

th e r e c o r d

e v id e n c e b e ar in g o nth e me r it s o f theNo. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 24 - al l ega t i o n s . ”) (q u o t i n g United States v. Martinez , 4 3 0 F

. 3 d 3 1 7 , 3 3 8 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 5 ) )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, we dismiss this claim; s hould he choose to do so, Bra zil may bring it under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. V. Br azil’s fifth argument is that the cumulative eff ect of the errors he alleg es occurre d at trial rende red his trial funda

mentally unfair. “Err ors that might not be so pre judicial as to amount to a de pr ivatio n o f d

ue pr oc e ss w he n c on sid e re d a lon e , ma y c umu la tiv e ly

pr od uc e a tr ia l se tti ng that is fundamentally

unfair.” United States v. Hughe s , 505 F.3d 578, 597- 98 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting W alk e r v . E ng le , 703 F.2d 959, 963 ( 6th Cir. 1983)). Except for p er m i tting the jury to hear testimonial hearsa

y in violation of Br azil’s rig ht of conf rontation, howeve r – which e rror we have found har mless in light of t he overwhelming evidenc e of Br azil’s g uilt presented at trial – the court committed no other er

ror. In other words, Br azil “ha s failed to ide ntify any other e rror

committed by the district court whic h could be c ombined with this harmless e rror in order to support a

finding of cumulative err or and which w ould rise to the level of fundame ntal unfairne ss.” United States v. Tru jil lo , 3 7 6 F. 3 d

5 9 3 , 6 1 4 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . R iv e ra , 900 F.2d 1462, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that “a cumulative-e rror analy sis should evaluate only the ef fec t of matters deter mined to be er

ror, not the c umulativ e effect of non-er rors.” )). Ac cording ly , we f ind that Br az i l ’s cu m u l at i v e e rr o r a rgu m en ti s u n av ai l i n g. VI . Br azil’s f inal argument is that the court in se ntencing him violated hi s S i x t h Am endment ri g ht t o a jur

y tr ia l and to co nf

ro nt the wi tne sse s ag a ins t him and his F if th A me ndme nt r ig ht a g a ins tNo. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 25 - d o u b l e j eo p ar dy . W e r ev i ew p re s er v ed co n s t i tu t i o n al ch al l en ges t o s en t en ci n g de novo

. See U nited States v. Johnson , 440 F.3d 832, 847 ( 6th Cir. 2006). A. Right to a Jury Trial Br azil arg ues first that the district co u rt at s entencing violate d his Si x th Amendment rig ht to a jury trial as re cog nized in A

p p r e n di v

. Ne w J

e r sey , 5 3 0 U. S

. 4 6 6 (2000). Instead of holding Br azil responsible on l y for the 128.12 g rams involved in the tra nsactions for w hich he wa s convicted, the court, in consider ing w hat “releva nt conduct” to take into acc ount and af ter he aring additional testimony

from B owden, ultimately held B razil acc ountable for traff icking in 12.2 kilogr ams of cr ack c ocaine and 20.1 kilog rams of pow der c ocaine . Br azil maintains t hat the cour t

wa s in e ff e c t c ir c umv e nti ngthe ba sic re qu ir e me nt t hat “ fa c ts that mu st be found in orde r for a sentenc e to be law ful . . . must be found by the jury b ey o n d a reasonable doubt in orde r to g ive in te ll ig ib le c o n te n t to th e r ig h t o f ju r y tr ial.” S

ee R i t a v. United States , 551 U.S. 338, 373 (2007) (Scalia, J. concurr ing)

. Br azil’s arg ument is premised upon a misunder standing of Apprendi . Acc ording t o the Apprendi Court , “[o]th e r tha n the fa c t of a

pr ior c on vic tio n, any

fa c t that incre ases the penalty for

a crime beyond the pre

scribed statutory maximum must be submitt ed to a jury , and prove d bey ond

a re asonable doubt.” Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490 (empha sis added)

. As the S upreme Court observed in 2007, moreover , the Six th Amendment i s not violated so long a s judicial fac t-finding did not result in a sente nce gr eate r t han the maxi mum established by plea or verdic t. Ri ta , 551 U.S. at 352 (“The Six th Amendment question . . . is whether the law forbid

s a judg e to incre ase a

defe ndant’s sentenc e unless the judg e finds fa cts that the jury did not find (and the offe nder did not concede ).”)

.No. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 26 - The jury found B razil guilty

of two counts of tra ffickingin mor e than 50 g rams of coca ine base; the statutory maxi mum for eit her c ount is li fe imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)( A)(iii). The

cou r t’ s f a c t- f in d in g ( wh ic h s u p p o rted c oncurr ent 380-month sentenc es) thus did not increa se B razil’s penalty bey ond t h e statutory

maxi mum, see Appre ndi , 530 U.S. at 490, and so the c ourt did not vio la te B ra zil’ s SixthAm e ndme nt r ig ht t o a jur y tr ia l. B. Right to Conf

ront Witnesses Braz i l ar gu es that, by

permitting B owden to testify at the sente ncing hear ing r eg arding

su mma ri e s o f w hat va

ri ou s in div idu a ls h a d s a id re g ard ingB ra zil’ s p a st d ru g tr a ff ic kin g a c tiv iti e s, the dis tr ic t court de pr ive d Br a zil of his Sixth Ame ndme nt r ig ht t o c on fr on t th e wi tne sse s a g a ins t hi m in violation of Cra wfo rd , 5 41 U. S. 3 6. As we have re pe a te dly he ld, ho we ve r, “ c on fr on ta tio n r ig hts do not apply

in sentencinghear ings a s at a trial on the question of guilt or innocence

. . . . [S ]entencing does not mandate confr ontation and cr oss-exa mi n a tion on infor

mation submit ted to the

co u rt t h ro u gh t h e p re s en t en ce re p o rt s an d l aw en fo rc em en ts o u rces.” U n ite d States v. Silverman , 976 F.2d 1502, 1510 (6th Cir. 1992) ( en banc ); see also United States v . Brika, 48 7 F .3 d 4 50 , 4 57 (6 th Cir. 2007) (“[N]eithe r t h e rules of evidenc e nor the rig ht to confront witnesses a pplies at

s en t en ci n g. ”) (c i t i n g United States v. Katzopoulos , 437 F.3d 569 ( 6th Cir. 2006)). The c ourt i d e n t i f i e d t h i s r u l e att h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e ar i n g , an d , f o l l o w i n g B o w d e n ’ s t e s t i m o n y, made the nece ssary

independe nt determination that B owden’ s statements had at least the nec essar y “minimum indi cia of

reliability ” to per

mit their use in determining rele vant conduct. As Bow den had no conf

rontation rig hts at sentencing , the cour t nece ssarily

did not violate them. C. Right against Doub le JeopardyNo. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

Br az i l ’s d o u

b l e j eo p ar dy

ar gu m en ti s p re m i s edu p o nt h e b el i ef t h at t h e c o n s p i ra cy

ch ar ge 8 in Count 1 was no t d i s m i s s ed until after jeopa rdy had attac hed. While the court sig ned the or der g ranting the g overnme nt’s motion to di smiss on S ep tember 23, 2008 ( following the ver dict), h o we v er , the district court c lear ly believed that it had dismi ssed this charg e prior to tria l. ( See 4/1 3/0 9 Se nte nc ingTr . R. 24 5 at 21 (“ I wo uld a lso a dv anc e the a dd iti on a l r a tio na le that in thi s instance I do not be lieve that the double jeopar dy provisions furnish the def endant with additional ar g u m e n tt o t h e e x t e n t t h a t C o u n t O n e w a s i n d e e d d i s m i s s e d

b e f o r e t h e j u r

y w a s a s s e m b l e d

. ” )

. ) It a l s o s e e m s c l e ar

t h a tt h e p art i e s a l s o u n d e r s t o o d , p r i o r t o t r i a l , t h a tC o u n t1 h a d

b e e nd i s m i s s e d

. In its ope n ing statement, for e x ample, the pr osecution stated that, “ [a] s we talke d about bef ore, the defe ndant is char g ed in counts 19 and 21 of the indictment. .

. . Do not conce rn y ourself w ith what h a p p e n e d i n1 t h r o u g h 1 8 o r

2 1 t h r o u g h 2 6 , t h a th a s n o b e ar i n g o n t h i s c a s e . ” ( T r i a l T r . I: 2

- 3

. ) In the final, a g ree d-to, jury

instru ct i o n s , m o reove r, the c ourt only discussed Counts 19 and 21, and provided no instruction as to Count 1. - 27 - Br azil maintains t hat, i n enhanc ing his sentenc e pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 on the basis of

a pr ior 19 98 dr ugc on vic tio n, the dis tr ic t court vio la te d his Fi ft h Ame ndme nt ri g ht ag a ins t do ub le jeopar dy beca use the conduct that led to that c onviction “ was prec isely the conduct upon which the Gover nment chose to dismiss” the con s pirac y char g e in Count Iof the indictment. (B razil Br. at 47.) Br azil specifically

maintains the court’ s use of the 1998 conviction, “which occur red dur ing 8 the c ours e of

the c on du c t a lle g e d a g a ins t D e fe nd ant i n the dis mis se d Co un t and no t pr ior the re to, is barr ed by the prohibition a g ainst multipl e punishments f or the same offe nse.” ( Br azil Br. at 47- 48.) Whil e B razil is certainly

corr ect that a defe ndant may not be punished twice f or committing the same of

fense , Br azil’s arg ument is without merit. “I t is well established that prior c onvictions can be used to enha

nce a defe ndant’s sente nce” without impl icating the Double Jeopardy Cl ause. United States v. F

lowal , 163 F.3d 956, 963 ( 6th Cir. 1998). I n 1998, Br azil was convicted in the 10th J udicial Circuit of Michig an for possession of less than 25 g rams of coc aine. As the sentenc ing tr ans c ri pts make c le a

r ( and a s B ra zil’ s la

wy e r c on c e de d) , in de te rm ini ng that B ra zil s ho uld be he ldNo. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 28 - acc ountable for

12.2 kilogr ams in this case, the district c ourt did not include in its calculations the

c oc a ine that f

or me d th e ba sis of

the 19 98 c on vic tio n. No r, fo r t hat matte r, did

the cou rt base i ts

re le va nt c on du c t de te rm inatio n o n the di sm is sed c on sp ir a c y c ount: ins te a d, the c ourt ba se d it s deter mination on evidence of spec ific drugtransac tions between Br az i l an d five c ooperating de fe nd ants , n on e of

wh om w e re c ha

rg e d o r e ve n me nti on e d in the dis mis se d c ount. Th a t B ra zil w a s c on vic ted of po sse ssi ngdr ug s d ur inga pe ri od duri ngwh ic h h e a lso (ac cording to t he dismissed Count 1) eng ag ed in a c onspiracy with nine others to sell drug s is not dispositi ve to the double jeopa rdy question. I n United States v. Hughe s , 9 24 F .2 d 1 35 4, 13 58 (6 th Cir. 1991), for e x ample, we reje cted a simil ar a rg ument, in which a defe ndant m aintained that the dis tr ic t c o u rt c o u l d n o t c o n s i d e r a p r i o r s t a t e dr u g c o n v i c t i o n i n s e n t e n c i n g “ s i n c e t h e fa c ts surrounding his pr evious state conviction occur red during the course of the conspira cy to which he ple d guil ty

in t he ins tant c a se .” We o bs e rv e d: [A]t the tim e of his of

fe ns e , Hug he s had a pr ior fe lony dr ugc on vic tio n w hic h a

ro se from a se parate cr iminal episode . . . . An episode is a n incident that is part of a series, but for

ms a s ep arate unit within the whole. Although r elated to the e ntire course of eve nts, an episode is a punctuated occur renc e with a limit ed duration. The criminal eve nts that constitute the bases for Hug hes’ c onviction for p o ssession of c oc a ine and

his su bs e qu e nt c on vic tio n f

or c on sp iracy do not r e pr e se nt a sin g le criminal episode. Id. a t1 3 6 1

- 6 2

. H e r e , s i m i l ar l y, e v e ni f j e o p ar dy a t t a c h e d

t o t h e d i s m i s s e d

c o u n to f c o n s p i r a c y, B ra zil’ s 19 98 c on vic tio n aro se fr om a se pa ra te c ri min a l e pis od e , and wa s n ot o the rw ise fa c tor e d in to the district court’s r eleva

nt conduct dete rmination. Acc ording ly , we f

ind that the district court did not subject B ra z i l t o d ouble jeopar dy by enhanc ing his sente nce in lig ht of his prior conviction for drug possession.No. 09-1566

US A v . B razil

- 29 - VI I. Whil e B razil is corr ect that the di strict court c ommitt ed an e rror at trial – initially

permitting the jury to he ar testimonial he arsa y befor e ultimately issuing a limit ing instruction – that err or wa s clea rly harmless in lig ht of the over whelming evidenc e of guilt that the prosecution presented throug h the testimony of law enf orce ment personne l and B razil’s own associate and throug h video

and a ud io r e c or din g s o f B razi l partici patin g in d ru g sa le s. De sp ite his argume nts re g ard inghis sentenc ing, mor eover , the district court c ommitt ed no er ror in hea ring ad d i t ional testimony from Bow den re g ardingrele vant conduc t and in enhanc ing B razil’s sentence on the basis of a prior conviction for dr

ug possession. Accor dingly , we AF F IRM the conviction and se ntence

.