NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________ No. 20

- 2508

______________ CHRISTOPHER COURTNEY MCCALLA , Petitioner

v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

______________ On Petition for Review of a n Order of t he Board of Immigration Appeals ( A09 7

- 553

- 556 )

______________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L

. A

. R

. 34.1(a) May 28 , 202 1

______________ Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges , and ROBRENO, District Judge

. * (Filed: June 11, 2021 )

____________

OPINION * *

______________

* The Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
* * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 ROBRENO , District Judge

. Christopher McCalla petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals ’ (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal

. McCalla argues a full and unconditional gubernatorial pardon extinguished the immigration consequences of his controlled substance conviction

. He also argues the applicable Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provisions violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection

. We disagree and will therefore deny the petition for review. I. Background McCalla, a native and citizen of Jamaica, was admitted to the United States in 1990 as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure and overstayed his visa

. He has a U.S. citizen spouse and U.S. citizen children. In 2005, McCalla was arrest ed by the Pennsylvania s tate
p olice for possession of marijuana

. H e pled guilty in state court to the offense

. McCalla was subsequently placed in removal proceedings as a result of his overstay. In 2008, he applied for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status pursuant to Section 240A(b)(1) of the INA , which permits the Attorney General to cancel removal and adjust the immigration status of aliens who, among other things, have been physically present in the Un ited States for at least ten years and whose removal would result in hardship to an immediate family member. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)

. However, McCalla’s marijuana conviction rendered him statutorily ineligible for cancellation relief or adjustment of status

. See id. § 1229b( b)(1) (C)

.3 In 2019, Pennsylvania G overnor Tom Wolf fully and unconditionally pardoned McCalla f or the controlled substance conviction. McCalla informed the BIA of the pardon and argued he was now eligible for cancellation of removal because he was no longer “convicted” of the offense

. The BIA disagreed, concluding th at McCalla’s conviction rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal despite the gubernatorial pardon. This timely appeal followed.
II. Discussion We have jurisdiction over final orders of the BIA pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We review legal questions concerning the interpretation of the INA de

novo. Roye v. Att’y Gen. , 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012). On appeal, McCalla raises two arguments. First, he argues the gubernatorial pardon extinguishes the immigration consequences of his controlled substance conviction

. Second, he argues the INA’s dispara te treatment of aliens convicted of drug possession offenses violates his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection

. We consider and reject t hese arguments in turn.
A. Gubernatorial P ardon McCalla’s argument that a gubernatorial pardon extinguishe s the immigration consequences of his conviction is foreclosed by t his Court’s recent opinion in Aristy

- Rosa v. Attorney General United States , 994 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 2021)

. Aristy

- Rosa involved a petitioner who was admitt ed to the United States as a lawful permanent resident. Id. at 113. Several years later, he was convicted of attempted4 criminal sale of cocaine , in violation of New York state law

. Id. He then received a
N otice to A ppear in the I mmigration C ourt, which charged him with being subject to removal under the INA because (1) he had committed a crime relating to a controlled substance , (2) the controlled substance conviction constituted an aggravated felony , and (3) he was inadmissible a t the time o f his application for adjustment of status

. Id. at 113

- 14. A fter New York Governor Andrew Cuomo pardoned his controlled substance conviction, the petitioner moved to reopen his removal proceedings, arg u ing the pardon eliminated the basis for his removal. Id. at 114. The I mmigration J udge denied the motion , t he BIA dismissed the appeal , and the petitioner petitioned this Court for review

. Id. On appeal, we no ted that th e INA contains an express provision addressing the effect of gubernatorial pardons on certain deportable aliens

. Id. at 11 5

. Pursuant to that provision, crimes of moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, and high

- speed flight cannot serve as the basis for remov ing an alien who has received a full and unconditional pardon by the President or a state governor for those crimes

. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) ). However, “ Congress did not explicitly provide that a full pardon for

a controlled substance conviction extinguishes the immigration consequences of that offense. ” Id. W e therefore concluded that , under the plain text of the statute, the petitioner’s pardon eliminated the aggravated felony ground for his removal but not the controlled substance ground. Id.5 Here, too, McCalla is ineligible for a waiver because the statute’s express waiver provision do es not apply to him

. First, like the petitioner in Aristy

- Rosa , McCalla was convicted of a controlled substance offense , which the pardon waiver provision does not

cover
. See id. Second, even if the waiver did cover a controlled substance offense, the provision applies only to immigrants who are deportable and would not waive the grounds for McCalla’s inadmissibility

. 1 See Balogun v. Att’y Gen. , 425 F.3d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 2005) (“ Section 1182 does not have a pardon provision like section 1227 does, and we believe that if Congress had intended to extend the pardon waiver to inadmissible aliens, it would have done so. ” ) ; see also Aguilera

- Montero v. Mukasey , 548 F.3d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[The petitioner’ s] state pardon does not entitle him to a waiver that does not exist in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)

. ” ). Accordingly, McCalla’s gubern atorial pardon did not extinguish the immigration consequences of his controlled substance conviction.
B. Fourteenth Amendment

1 Aliens are deportable if they “are either (1) eligible to enter when they arrive and are admitted, but become ineligible to remain b ecause of some later event, or (2)

. . . were admitted, but would not have been had their inadmissible status been known at the time of admission.” Aristy

- Rosa , 994 F.3d at 115 n.3 (quoting Balogun v. Att’y Gen. , 425 F.3d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 2005)). In contrast, “ i nadmissibility applies to those aliens who, for one reason or another, are ineligible to enter or re

- enter the United States in the first place.” Id. (quoting Balogun , 425 F.3d at 1362). McCalla ’s controlled substance conviction rendered him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)

.6 McCalla’s equal protection challenge to the applicable INA provisions fails because there is a rational basis for limiting the p ardon waiver to the categories of crimes enumerated in the statute

. As we noted in Aristy

- Rosa , “ [s] ome controlled substance offenses are also aggravated felonies,

. . . but not all aggravated felonies invo lve controlled substances. Congress could have rationally decided that controlled substance offenses warrant removal because of the impact such crimes have on the entire community.” 994 F.3d at 11 6 (citing In re Suh , 23 I. & N. Dec. 626 , 627

- 28 (B.I.A. 2003) ).
III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.