Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 131 / Monday, July 8, 1996 / Proposed Rules 35693

been eliminated, the request should include

specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To prevent improper operation of the nose

landing gear (NLG) door and consequent

inability to extend the NLG due to a reduced

stroke of the spring bungee, accomplish the

following:

(a) Within 90 days after the effective date

of this AD: Perform a one-time inspection of

the spring bungee assembly of the NLG to

ensure proper torque of the collar and correct

clearance between the collar and the body of

the bungee; in accordance with Canadair

Regional Jet Alert Service Bulletin A601R–

32–037, Revision ‘A,’ dated December 2,

1994 (for Model CL–600–2B19 series

airplanes); or Canadair Challenger Service

Bulletin 601–0454, dated May 15, 1995, as

amended by Service Bulletin Information

Sheet 601–0454, dated July 14, 1995 (for

Model CL–600–2B16 series airplanes); as

applicable.

(b) If improper torque of the collar is

found, or if incorrect clearance between the

collar and the body of the bungee is found:

Prior to further flight, replace the spring

bungee assembly with a serviceable (new or

reworked) unit that has been inspected in

accordance with Canadair Regional Jet Alert

Service Bulletin A601R–32–037, Revision

‘‘A’’, dated December 2, 1994 (for Model CL–

600–2B19 series airplanes); or Canadair

Challenger Service Bulletin 601–0454, dated

May 15, 1995, as amended by Service

Bulletin Information Sheet 601–0454, dated

July 14, 1995 (for Model CL–600–2B16 series

airplanes); as applicable. Accomplish the

replacement in accordance with the

applicable service bulletin.

(c) As of the effective date of this AD, no

person shall install a spring bungee assembly

having part number 600–86115–1 (for Model

CL–600–2B16 series airplanes) or 600–

86115–5/70 (for Model CL–600–2B19 series

airplanes) on any airplane unless that

assembly has been inspected and reworked,

as necessary, in accordance with paragraph

(a) of this AD.

(d) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, New York

Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA,

Engine and Propeller Directorate. Operators

shall submit their requests through an

appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then

send it to the Manager, New York ACO.

Note 2: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the New York ACO.

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 1,

1996.

S. R. Miller,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 96–17218 Filed 7–5–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 95–CE–103–AD]

Airworthiness Directives; Aerospace

Technologies of Australia Pty Ltd.

(formerly Government Aircraft Factory)

Models N22B, N24A, and N22S

Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes to

adopt a new airworthiness directive

(AD) that would apply to Aerospace

Technologies of Australia Pty Ltd.

(ASTA) Models N22B, N24A, and N22S

airplanes that are not equipped with a

part number (P/N) 1E/N–12–57 fuselage

stub fin plate (MOD N759). The

proposed action would require

replacing the existing fuselage stub fin

plate with one of improved design, P/N

1E/N–12–57. Several reports of cracks

along the forward flange of the fuselage

stub fin plate in the area of Rib Water

Line (WL) 138.87 prompted the

proposed action. The actions specified

by the proposed AD are intended to

prevent structural failure of the fuselage

area caused by a cracked stub fin plate,

which, if not detected and corrected,

could result in loss of control of the

airplane.

DATES: Comments must be received on

or before September 6, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Central Region,

Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 95–CE–

103–AD, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street,

Kansas City, Missouri 64106. Comments

may be inspected at this location

between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday

through Friday, holidays excepted.

ADDRESSES: Service information that

applies to the proposed AD may be

obtained from Aerospace Technologies

of Australia Pty Ltd., ASTA DEFENCE,

Private Bag No. 4, Beach Road Lara

3212, Victoria, Australia. This

information also may be examined at

the Rules Docket at the address below.

Send comments on the proposal in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Central Region,

Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 95–CE–

103–AD, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street,

Kansas City, Missouri 64106. Comments

may be inspected at this location

between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday

through Friday, holidays excepted.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.

Ron Atmur, Aerospace Engineer, FAA,

Los Angeles Aircraft Certification

Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard,

Lakewood, California 90712; telephone

(310) 627–5224; facsimile (310) 627–

5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications

should identify the Rules Docket

number and be submitted in triplicate to

the address specified above. All

communications received on or before

the closing date for comments, specified

above, will be considered before taking

action on the proposed rule. The

proposals contained in this notice may

be changed in light of the comments

received.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report that

summarizes each FAA-public contact

concerned with the substance of this

proposal will be filed in the Rules

Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice

must submit a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket No. 95–CE–103–AD.’’ The

postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this

NPRM by submitting a request to the

FAA, Central Region, Office of the

Assistant Chief Counsel, Attention:

Rules Docket No. 95–CE–103–AD, Room

1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City,

Missouri 64106.

Discussion

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority

(CASA), which is the airworthiness

authority for Australia, recently notified

the FAA that an unsafe condition may
35694 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 131 / Monday, July 8, 1996 / Proposed Rules

exist on certain ASTA Models N22B,

N24A, and N22S airplanes. The CASA

reports several incidents of cracks along

the forward flange of the fuselage stub

fin plate in the area of Rib Water Line

(WL) 138.87. Investigation has revealed

fretting and fatigue of this plate, part

number (P/N) 1D/N–12–57. These

conditions, if not detected and

corrected, could result in structural

failure of the fuselage area, which could

result in loss of control of the airplane.

ASTA has issued Nomad Service

Bulletin (SB) ANMD- 53–13, Revision 3,

dated October 24, 1995, which specifies

procedures for installing a fuselage stub

fin plate of improved design, P/N 1E/N–

12–57.

The CASA of Australia classified this

service bulletin as mandatory and

issued FCAA AD/GAF-N22/63,

amendment 1, dated July 1994, in order

to assure the continued airworthiness of

these airplanes in Australia.

This airplane model is manufactured

in Australia and is type certificated for

operation in the United States under the

provisions of section 21.29 of the

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.29) and the applicable bilateral

airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to

this bilateral airworthiness agreement,

the CASA of Australia has kept the FAA

informed of the situation described

above. The FAA has examined the

findings of the CASA of Australia,

reviewed all available information

including the service information

referenced above, and determined that

AD action is necessary for products of

this type design that are certificated for

operation in the United States.

Explanation of the Provisions of the

Proposed AD

Since an unsafe condition has been

identified that is likely to exist or

develop in other ASTA Models N22B,

N24A, and N22S airplanes of the same

type design that are registered in the

United States and are not equipped with

a P/N 1E/N–12–57 fuselage stub fin

plate (MOD N759), the proposed AD

would require replacing the existing

fuselage stub fin plate with one of

improved design, P/N 1E/N–12–57.

Accomplishment of the proposed

installation would be in accordance

with Nomad SB ANMD-53–13, Revision

3, dated October 24, 1995.

Cost Impact

The FAA estimates that 15 airplanes

in the U.S. registry would be affected by

the proposed AD, that it would take

approximately 22 workhours per

airplane to accomplish the proposed

action, and that the average labor rate is

approximately $60 an hour. Parts cost

approximately $150 per airplane. Based

on these figures, the total cost impact of

the proposed AD on U.S. operators is

estimated to be $22,050 or $1,470 per

airplane. This figure is based on the

assumption that no affected owner/

operator of the affected airplanes has

accomplished the proposed

replacement.

ASTA has informed the FAA that it

has no records of parts distribution. The

FAA believes that several of the affected

airplanes already have the proposed

replacement incorporated, which would

reduce the cost impact upon the public.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein

would not have substantial direct effects

on the States, on the relationship

between the national government and

the States, or on the distribution of

power and responsibilities among the

various levels of government. Therefore,

in accordance with Executive Order

12612, it is determined that this

proposal would not have sufficient

federalism implications to warrant the

preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I

certify that this action (1) is not a

‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under

Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a

‘‘significant rule’’ under DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44

FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if

promulgated, will not have a significant

economic impact, positive or negative,

on a substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft

regulatory evaluation prepared for this

action has been placed in the Rules

Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by

contacting the Rules Docket at the

location provided under the caption

ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration proposes to amend part

39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations

(14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40101, 40113,

44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by

adding a new airworthiness directive

(AD) to read as follows:

Aerospace Technologies of Australia PTY

Ltd: Docket No. 95–CE–103–AD.

Applicability: Models N22B, N24A, and

N22S airplanes (all serial numbers),

certificated in any category, that are not

equipped with a part number (P/N) 1E/N–12–

57 fuselage stub fin plate (MOD N759).

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability

provision, regardless of whether it has been

modified, altered, or repaired in the area

subject to the requirements of this AD. For

airplanes that have been modified, altered, or

repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the

owner/operator must request approval for an

alternative method of compliance in

accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD.

The request should include an assessment of

the effect of the modification, alteration, or

repair on the unsafe condition addressed by

this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not

been eliminated, the request should include

specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required within the next 100

hours time-in-service after the effective date

of this AD, unless already accomplished.

To prevent structural failure of the fuselage

area caused by a cracked stub fin plate,

which, if not detected and corrected, could

result in loss of control of the airplane,

accomplish the following:

(a) Replace the fuselage stub fin plate with

one of improved design, P/N 1E/N–12–57

(MOD N759), in accordance with the

ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS

section of Nomad Service Bulletin ANMD–

53–13, Revision 3, dated October 24, 1995.

(b) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

(c) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an equivalent level of safety may be

approved by the Manager, FAA, Los Angeles

Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 3960

Paramount Boulevard., Lakewood, California

90712. The request shall be forwarded

through an appropriate FAA Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then

send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

Note 2: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.

(d) All persons affected by this directive

may obtain copies of the document referred

to herein upon request to Aerospace

Technologies of Australia Pty Ltd., ASTA

DEFENCE, Private Bag No. 4, Beach Road

Lara 3212, Victoria, Australia; or may

examine this document at the FAA, Central

Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel,

Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City,

Missouri 64106.
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 131 / Monday, July 8, 1996 / Proposed Rules 35695

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on June

25, 1996.

James E. Jackson,

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate,

Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 96–17295 Filed 7–5–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 96–CE–30–AD]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Raytheon

Aircraft Corporation (formerly Beech

Aircraft Corporation) Models 1900C,

1900D, and 2000 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes to

adopt a new airworthiness directive

(AD) that would apply to certain

Raytheon Aircraft Corporation

(Raytheon) Models 1900C, 1900D, and

2000 airplanes. The proposed action

would require inspecting (one-time) the

fuel filter assemblies to detect any

bypass valve that is glued shut. If a

bypass valve is glued shut, the proposal

would require replacing the associated

fuel filter assembly. Three in-flight

occurrences where the low fuel pressure

light illuminated prompted the

proposed action. In each of the

instances, a bypass valve on the affected

engine was glued shut with anaerobic

thread lock adhesive and when the fuel

filter became clogged, proper fuel flow

to the engine was not obtained. The

actions specified by the proposed AD

are intended to prevent lack of fuel to

the engine and eventual engine

shutdown caused by a clogged fuel filter

and a contaminated fuel filter by-pass

valve.

DATES: Comments must be received on

or before September 6, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Central Region,

Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 96–CE–30–

AD, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street,

Kansas City, Missouri 64106. Comments

may be inspected at this location

between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday

through Friday, holidays excepted.

Service information that applies to the

proposed AD may be obtained from the

Raytheon Aircraft Corporation, P.O. Box

85, Wichita, Kansas 67201–0085. This

information also may be examined at

the Rules Docket at the address above.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.

Karl Schletzbaum, Aerospace Safety

Engineer, FAA, Wichita Aircraft

Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road,

Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas

67209; telephone (316) 946–4146;

facsimile (316) 946–4407.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications

should identify the Rules Docket

number and be submitted in triplicate to

the address specified above. All

communications received on or before

the closing date for comments, specified

above, will be considered before taking

action on the proposed rule. The

proposals contained in this notice may

be changed in light of the comments

received.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report that

summarizes each FAA-public contact

concerned with the substance of this

proposal will be filed in the Rules

Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice

must submit a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket No. 96–CE–30–AD.’’ The

postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this

NPRM by submitting a request to the

FAA, Central Region, Office of the

Assistant Chief Counsel, Attention:

Rules Docket No. 96–CE–30–AD, Room

1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City,

Missouri 64106.

Discussion

The FAA has received three reports of

in-flight occurrences involving Ratheon

Model 1900 D airplanes, where the low

fuel pressure light illuminated.

Fortunately, the airplane landed safely

in these incidents. In each of the

instances, a bypass valve on the affected

engine was glued shut with anaerobic

thread lock adhesive and when the fuel

filter became clogged, proper fuel flow

to the engine was not obtained. Further

investigation has revealed that some

fuel filter assemblies were contaminated

with anaerobic thread lock adhesive

during the manufacturing process.

Raytheon reports that the following

airplane models and serial numbers

could have fuel filter assemblies

contaminated with anaerobic thread

lock adhesive:

Models Serial numbers

1900C ........................ UC–1 through UC–

174

1900C (C–12J) .......... UD–1 through UD–6

1900D ........................ UE–1 through UE–

205

2000 .......................... NC–4 through NC–53

Raytheon has issued Service Bulletin

(SB) No. 2677 (for Model 2000), dated

March, 1996; and Beechcraft SB No.

2678 (for Models 1900C and 1900D),

dated May, 1996. These service

bulletins specify procedures for (1)

inspecting the fuel filter assemblies to

detect any bypass valves glued shut; and

(2) replacing the fuel filter assembly.

After examining the circumstances

and reviewing all available information

related to the incidents described above,

including the referenced service

information, the FAA has determined

that AD action should be taken to

prevent lack of fuel to the engine and

eventual engine shutdown caused by a

clogged fuel filter and a contaminated

fuel filter by-pass valve.

Explanation of the Provisions of the

Proposed AD

Since an unsafe condition has been

identified that is likely to exist or

develop in other Raytheon Models

1900C, 1900D, and 2000 airplanes of the

same type design that were

manufactured during the period when

the fuel filter assembly bypass valves

were susceptible to anaerobic thread

lock adhesive contamination, the FAA

is proposing AD action. The proposed

AD would require inspecting (one-time)

the fuel filter assemblies to detect any

bypass valve that is glued shut. If a

bypass valve is glued shut, the proposal

would require replacing the fuel filter

assembly. Accomplishment of the

inspection and replacement (if

necessary) would be in accordance with

Raytheon SB No. 2677 (for Model 2000),

dated March, 1996; or Beechcraft SB No.

2678 (for Models 1900C and 1900D),

dated May, 1996, as applicable.

Cost Impact

The FAA estimates that 379 airplanes

in the U.S. registry would be affected by

the proposed AD, that it would take

approximately 2 workhours per airplane

to accomplish the proposed inspection,