J-S13009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v. 

JAQUAN WOODEN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2502 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 30, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0000521-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v. 

JAQUAN WOODEN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2504 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 30, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0000522-2020

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JULY 24, 2023

Appellant Jaquan Wooden appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered following his conviction for third-degree murder and related offenses. 

Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion and imposed an 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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excessive aggregate sentence without adequate consideration of the 

applicable sentencing factors. After review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual background of this matter as 

follows:

At trial the Commonwealth presented the testimony of 

Philadelphia police officers Padraic Feeney, Jerald Furey, 

Jacqueline Brennan, Christine Hilbert, and Paul Ward; Philadelphia 

police detectives Paul Scarinci, Thorsten Lucke, Peter Marrero, Jr., 

and Danielle Slobodian; Philadelphia police sergeant Matthew 

Lowe; Philadelphia chief medical examiner Dr. Albert Chu; civilian 

Milton Abreu; and, by stipulation, forensic scientists Lissette Vega 

and Tarah Helsel. [Appellant] presented no evidence. Viewed in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict 

winner, the evidence established the following:

At approximately 7:57 p.m., on November 19, 2019, Jose 

Espinosa-Molina was walking down the 6100 block of Castor 

Avenue in Philadelphia. After Espinosa-Molina crossed the street, 

[Appellant] drove up behind Espinosa-Molina in a black vehicle. 

As the vehicle approached Espinosa-Molina, [Appellant], as well 

as other individuals in the vehicle, fired multiple gunshots at 

Espinosa-Molina. Espinosa-Molina was struck in the back of the 

head by a .380 caliber bullet and collapsed onto the ground. 

The police arrived at approximately 8:04 p.m. and found 

Espinosa-Molina laying on the ground and unresponsive. The 

police immediately transported Espinosa-Molina to Aria Torresdale 

Hospital, where he was pronounced dead two days later. Dr. Chu,

the chief medical examiner, concluded that the death was a 

homicide caused by complications of a gunshot wound to the

head. 

The police recovered four fired cartridge casings (“FCCs”) from the 

scene, as well as two bullet fragments. One of the FCCs was a 

.380 caliber, while the other three were all 9mm. 

Two days after the Espinosa-Molina shooting, on November 21, 

2019, at approximately 8:21 p.m., [Appellant] was standing with 

a group of individuals outside the Abreu Super Deli on the corner 

of Castor Avenue and Benner Street. [Appellant’s] black Honda 

Accord was parked outside of the deli, and [Appellant] was 
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wearing dark clothing, a baseball hat, and yellow sneakers. A

vehicle approached the group and fired gunshots. [Appellant]

then ran down the street chasing the vehicle while firing multiple 

gunshots in the direction of the fleeing vehicle. 

When the police arrived, responding to the sound of gunshots, 

they found [Appellant] assisting an injured individual out of the 

backseat of a vehicle. As the police attended to the injured 

individual, who had been shot, [Appellant] left and went inside the 

Abreu Super Deli. [Appellant] went to the back of the deli, where 

he encountered Milton Abreu, whose family owned the deli. 

[Appellant] handed Mr. Abreu his gun. Mr. Abreu then took the 

gun to the basement and placed it on top of a ceiling panel. 

The Philadelphia Police Department has a Real Time Crime Center 

(the “Crime Center”) where police officers can monitor video 

surveillance recorded on cameras connected to the Crime Center. 

Because a Crime Center camera was posted outside of the corner 

where the shooting occurred, the police at the Crime Center were 

able to view footage of the shooting and relay a description of one 

of the shooters to the officers on the scene. Those officers 

observed that the description of the shooter provided by the Crime 

Center matched [Appellant]. Police then viewed surveillance 

video from inside the Abreu Deli, which showed [Appellant] inside 

of the store. The officers then placed [Appellant] under arrest. 

Afterwards, Mr. Abreu informed the police where he had hidden 

[Appellant’s] gun, and the police recovered it from the basement. 

While [Appellant] was in custody at Curran-Fromhold Correctional 

Facility (“CFCF”), police received information from the National 

Integrated Ballistic Information Network (“NIBIN”) linking the 

ballistics recovered from the November 19, 2019 shooting of Jose

Espinosa-Molina to the firearm [Appellant] used on November 21, 

2019, to fire down the street at the fleeing car.[FN3] After receiving 

this information from the NIBIN, Detectives Slobodian and 

McKenna picked up [Appellant] from CFCF and drove him back to

the Philadelphia Police Department Homicide Unit for an interview. 

Following Miranda[1] warnings, [Appellant] gave a statement to 

police wherein he confessed to the murder of Jose Espinosa-Molina 

and described in-detail the events leading to the murder.

[FN3] NIBIN is a service run by the ATF, in which a computer 

looks for matches of FCCs entered into the computerized

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1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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system. A match from NIBIN of two or more FCCs would be 

a preliminary indication that the FCCs were fired from the 

same firearm. After a NIBIN match, a trained ballistician 

would examine the actual ballistics to confirm the match. 

Trial Ct. Op., 12/1/22, at 2-5 (some formatting altered and citations omitted).

Following a waiver trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of one 

count each of third-degree murder, possession of a firearm by a prohibited 

person, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a firearm on a public 

street or public property in Philadelphia, and possessing an instrument of 

crime (PIC) at Docket No. 521-2020.

2

 See N.T., Trial, 3/15/22, at 145. At 

Docket No. 522-2020, the trial court found Appellant guilty of one count each 

of carrying a firearm without a license, possession of a firearm by a prohibited

person, carrying a firearm on a public street or public property in Philadelphia, 

and recklessly endangering another person (REAP).3 See id. 

On June 30, 2022, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. At Docket 

No. 521-2020, the trial court imposed an aggregate term of twenty-six and 

one-half to fifty-three years’ incarceration.4 At Docket No. 522-2020, the trial 

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2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 6108, and 907(a), 

respectively. 

3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106(a)(1), 6105(a)(1), 6108, and 2705, respectively. 

4 At Docket No. 521-2020, the trial court sentenced Appellant to consecutive 

terms of twenty for forty years of incarceration for third-degree murder, one 

to two years of incarceration for carrying a firearm by a prohibited person, 

three and one-half to seven years for carrying a firearm without a license, one 

to two years of incarceration for carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, 

and one to two years of incarceration for PIC. See N.T., Sentencing, 6/30/22, 

at 49-50.
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court imposed an aggregate term of five and one-half to eleven years of 

incarceration.5 The trial court ordered the sentence at Docket No. 522-2020 

to run consecutive to the sentence at Docket No. 521-2020, resulting in a total 

aggregate sentence of thirty-two to sixty-four years of incarceration. See 

N.T., 6/30/22, at 49-50. 

Appellant filed post-sentence motions at both trial court dockets which 

the trial court denied. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal at each trial 

court docket, and both the trial court and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.

6

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue:

Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant to 

an aggregate sentence [of] 32 to 64 years of incarceration 

because the sentencing court did not adequately consider 

appropriate retribution, Appellant’s rehabilitative needs . . . , and 

specific and general deterrence and there were multiple statutory 

maximum sentences for Murder in the Third Degree and VUFA § 

6106 without adequate justification of guideline maximums 

thereby effectively making Appellant’s sentence a life sentence 

also without adequate justification?

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5 At Docket No. 522-2020 , the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of 

one to two years of incarceration for carrying a firearm by a prohibited person, 

three and one-half to seven years of incarceration for carrying a firearm 

without a license, and one to two years of incarceration for REAP. See id. at 

50. The trial court also imposed a sentence of one to two years of 

incarceration for carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, to run 

concurrently with Appellant’s sentence for carrying a firearm without a license. 

See id.

6 Appellant filed a motion to consolidate the appeals at 2502 EDA 2022 and 

2504 EDA 2022 on October 18, 2022, which this Court granted. See Order, 

1/3/23. 
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Appellant’s Brief at 4.

“[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle 

an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987, 

991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Before reaching the merits of such 

claims, we must determine: 

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved 

his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for 

allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of 

sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a

substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the 

sentencing code. 

Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

omitted). “To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an 

appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion. 

Issues not presented to the sentencing court are waived and cannot be raised 

for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 

1251 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) 

(stating that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be 

raised for the first time on appeal”). Here, Appellant filed a timely postsentence motion, a timely appeal, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in 

his brief. Accordingly, we must next determine whether Appellant has raised 

a substantial question for review. Corley, 31 A.3d at 296. 

“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Battles, 169 A.3d 
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1086, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). “A substantial question 

exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the 

sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific 

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms 

which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d 

793, 816 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

We note that “an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an 

assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a 

substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. 

Super. 2015) (en banc) (citations omitted). Further, this Court has held that 

an appellant’s “challenge to the imposition of his consecutive sentences as 

unduly excessive, together with his claim that the court failed to consider his 

rehabilitative needs and mitigating factors upon fashioning its sentence, 

presents a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 

340 (Pa. Super. 2015).

In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant argues that the sentence was 

manifestly excessive. Appellant asserts that that the trial court failed to 

consider mitigating factors and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs, abused its 

discretion by imposing consecutive sentences, and imposed “an effective life 

sentence.” See Appellant’s Brief at 9-11. We conclude that Appellant has 

raised a substantial question for our review. See Swope, 123 A.3d at 340; 

Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 770. Accordingly, we will review the merits of 

Appellant’s underlying claim.
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Our well-settled standard of review is as follows:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). Additionally, “[w]e cannot re-weigh the sentencing factors and 

impose our judgment in the place of the sentencing court.” Commonwealth 

v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). 

“When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the 

factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), [including] the protection of the public, 

[the] gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and community, and 

[the] rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 

A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted and formatting altered).

“[T]he trial court is required to consider the particular circumstances of 

the offense and the character of the defendant[,]” including the defendant’s 

“prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics, and potential for 

rehabilitation.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. 

Super. 2009) (citation omitted). This Court has held that “where the 

sentencing judge had the benefit of a [PSI report], it will be presumed that he 

or she was aware of the relevant information regarding the defendant’s 

character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory 
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factors.” Id. (citation omitted). This Court may only disturb a standard-range 

sentence if we find that the circumstances of the case rendered the application 

of the guidelines “clearly unreasonable[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2).

It is well settled that “Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court 

discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other

sentences being imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed.”

Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). Further, this Court has explained that “defendants convicted of 

multiple offenses are not entitled to a ‘volume discount’ on their aggregate 

sentence.” Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416, 434 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. 

Felder, 269 A.3d 1232 (Pa. 2022). 

Here, at sentencing, the trial court stated as follows:

Thank you. All right. The first thing I’m going to do is say what 

I’m going to take into account in determining an appropriate 

sentence. I’ll take into account everything presented during the 

history of this case, everything presented during the trial,

everything presented during the sentencing hearing, all of the 

materials that I received in preparation for sentencing, including 

the [PSI] report, the investigation, the prior record score and the 

mental health evaluation.

I’ll take into account the statements that I heard today from 

[Appellant], [Appellant’s] father and his two friends who are in the

courtroom. I’ll take into account the statement that I heard from 

the mother of the decedent in this case. I’ll take into account and 

consider carefully the sentencing guidelines, all of the mitigating 

factors that were highlighted by [Appellant’s counsel] on behalf of 

[Appellant].

There are statutory factors I’m required to consider. One is the 

need for the protection of the public. I have grave concerns. The 
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problem is that I think [Appellant] summed it up how a typical 

person would react that may explain what happened on the 21st, 

but what happened on the 19th was a drive-by shooting in your 

car. You drove up and fired guns out of a window at a young man

walking down the street who was shot in the head and killed and 

that I hope is not the typical way that people in the city will react

to any kind of a threat and that’s never okay no matter what’s 

going on in your neighborhood to react with a drive-by shooting.

What happened the next day I think was terrible, but nothing like 

what happened two days before that and what happened the next 

two days was terrible because people with ordinary sensibilities 

even after they’re threatened don’t fire off a gun down the street 

when it is a commercial corridor, whereas I have seen in my 

practice here you have people waiting at a bus stop or people 

crossing the street or a three-year-old in a carriage who winds up

getting killed because someone thinks it’s okay to go out into the 

street and fire off their gun like you’re in the wild west at 

somebody whose car is down the road. That’s not how people can 

react in a civilized society, so because you think that’s okay, I 

have concerns for the protection of the public.

Also, the gravity of the offense in relation to its impact by the 

victim and the community, I’ll start with the community. This kind 

of senseless use of guns -- I’m not talking about carrying a gun 

that’s unlicensed. That’s bad. All right. I’m talking about using 

a gun, pulling it out and shooting at somebody, that is the kind of 

thing that has had a horrible impact on our community and you

contributed to that with your behavior on two different days in this 

case, also, its impact on the gravity of the offense, its impact on

the victim and the family.

This is a special young man who’s gone. He’s gone forever. 

Whatever happened to you, he doesn’t get another day on this 

earth and that’s a result of what you did in this case, and that’s 

just a terrible -- I’m also going to take into account your 

rehabilitative needs. There are some aggravating factors that I 

think are present in this case. 

This is not I think what I would consider to be garden variety thirddegree murder, a drive-by shooting where a decedent takes a

bullet in the head. That is the kind of shooting where this is a 

case that had this gone to a jury very well may have proven firstdegree murder. It did not and I understand that’s not an issue in 

this case. You weren’t convicted of that.
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I’m just saying ordinarily typical third-degree murder cases we 

don’t see a bullet to the back of somebody’s head. Whether you

fired it or not, you were part of the team of people who pulled up 

in your car and fired bullets out -- you fired more than they did. 

You fired three times, he shot once, that’s an aggravating factor 

as well.

Also, you did this while you were on probation for robbery 

adjudication while you were under the supervision of the court. 

You still thought it was okay to walk around with a gun with an 18 

round magazine and pull it out and use it. That’s an aggravating 

factor to me, the fact that you were on probation.

There are mitigating factors here, too. I was moved by the 

support you have which I believe was sincere from your father 

who I think is a victim here almost as much as – not as much, but 

almost as much as a lot of the other people in this room because 

he has suffered and will suffer as a result of your behavior. Okay. 

But when he tells me it’s situational, as I said before, I’ll say it

again: A drive-by shooting is never situational. It just doesn’t 

apply here. I’m going to take that into account and consider

whatever is appropriate. . . . 

Every sentence I’m going to impose is in the standard range of 

the sentencing guidelines starting with the transcript for 

November 19, 2019 -- before I forget, I’m going to order

restitution in the amount of $1,641 to be paid in accordance -- I 

should say to the victims outlined on the paperwork which has 

been handed up. That will be paid in accordance with [Appellant’s] 

ability to pay which will be determined by the Department of 

Corrections and that should be imposed on the murder transcript.

N.T., 6/30/22, at 43-49. 

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court further explained:

Here, in fashioning an appropriate sentence, the court explicitly 

considered everything presented throughout the history of the 

case, during the trial and at the sentencing hearing. The court 

also explicitly considered the [PSI] report, the investigation of 

[Appellant’s] prior record score, his mental health evaluation, and 

the sentencing guidelines. The court took into account statements 

from [Appellant], [Appellant’s] father, [Appellant’s] two friends, 

and the victim impact statement from the decedent’s mother. The 

court also considered all of the mitigating evidence that was
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presented on behalf of [Appellant]. In addition, the court 

reviewed and analyzed the required statutory sentencing factors, 

including the need for the protection of the public, the gravity of 

the offense in relation to the impact on the victim and on the 

community, and [Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs. In addition, 

the court delineated and weighed both the mitigating and 

aggravating factors in the case. 

The sentences imposed by the court were manifestly reasonable. 

Contrary to [Appellant’s] averment in the Statement of Errors, 

every sentence imposed by the court was within the standard 

range of the sentencing guidelines. Moreover, the magnitude of 

[Appellant’s] criminal behavior establishes that the court was well 

within its discretion in running most of the sentences 

consecutively. In particular, and as the court noted in imposing 

sentence, this was not a typical third-degree murder case. 

[Appellant] participated in a drive-by shooting and fired multiple 

gunshots at the decedent, one of which killed the decedent by 

striking the back of his head. Moreover, [Appellant] participated 

in this murder while on probation for a robbery adjudication. 

Additionally, two days following the murder, after being fired upon 

by a group of individuals in a vehicle, [Appellant] chased the 

vehicle down the street of a commercial corridor and fired multiple

gunshots down a busy public street, endangering many lives. 

Accordingly, the record demonstrates that the court’s aggregate 

sentence was fully commensurate with [Appellant’s] criminal 

conduct and in no way unreasonable. Finally, [Appellant’s] 

contention that the court’s sentence was “effectively . . . a life

sentence” is frivolous. [Appellant] was 21 years old when 

sentenced, and therefore will be eligible for parole when he is 53 

years old. Clearly, that is not a de facto life sentence. No relief 

is due.

Trial Ct. Op., at 6-8 (formatting altered and footnotes and citations omitted).

After review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court. See 

Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253. The record reflects that the trial court thoroughly 

considered the facts of this case, Appellant’s background, the PSI report, the 

appropriate sentencing factors, and the mitigating evidence presented at the 

sentencing hearing. See Ventura, 975 A.2d at 1135. The trial court 
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concluded that an aggregate sentence of thirty-two to sixty-four years of 

incarceration was appropriate in light of the context of this drive-by murder 

case. See Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8. On this record, we have no basis upon which 

to conclude that the trial court’s application of the guidelines was “clearly 

unreasonable” or that the trial court abused its discretion in structuring 

Appellant’s sentences consecutively.7 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2); Foust, 

180 A.3d at 434; Austin, 66 A.3d at 808. For these reasons, Appellant is not 

entitled to relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

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7 As noted above, due to the consecutive nature of the sentences, Appellant 

claims that the trial court imposed an effective life sentence. Appellant’s Brief 

at 10. We find this claim meritless. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bradley, 

237 A.3d 1131, 1140-41 (Pa. Super. 2020) (explaining that a defendant who 

was forty-seven years old at the time of sentencing and who would be eligible 

for parole at age sixty-four, fourteen years before he reaches the average life 

expectancy of seventy-eight and one-half years, did not receive a de facto life 

sentence). Here, Appellant asserts that his life expectancy is seventy-one and 

three-fourths years. Appellant’s Brief at 10. However, as the trial court 

explained, Appellant will be fifty-three years old when he becomes eligible for 

parole, see Trial Ct. Op., at 8, and therefore, we agree with the trial court’s 

conclusion that Appellant did not receive a de facto life sentence. See id.; 

Bradley, 237 A.3d 1140-41. Moreover, to the extent that Appellant briefly 

mentions that the trial court should have considered his maximum release 

date rather than his minimum parole date, see Appellant’s Brief at 14, 

Appellant fails to develop this argument in any meaningful way, and we 

conclude that the issue is waived. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 

A.2d 915, 924-25 (Pa. 2009) (stating that “where an appellate brief fails to 

provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority[,] or fails 

to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that 

claim is waived. It is not the obligation of this Court, . . . to formulate [an 

a]ppellant’s arguments for him.” (citations omitted)).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/24/2023