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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 44367

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BRANDON WAYNE ESTES,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2017 Unpublished Opinion No. 664

Filed: December 14, 2017

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 

Falls County. Hon. Randy J. Stoker, District Judge. 

Order revoking probation, affirmed.

Brandon W. Estes, Boise, pro se appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

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GUTIERREZ, Judge

Brandon Wayne Estes appeals from the district court’s order revoking his probation and 

executing his previously suspended sentence after his termination from the mental health court. 

Estes alleges that he was terminated from the mental health court program without due process 

of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Estes was charged with felony domestic violence with a persistent violator enhancement. 

Estes reached a plea agreement with the State, wherein the State agreed to dismiss the persistent 

violator enhancement in return for Estes pleading guilty to felony domestic violence. The plea 

agreement also contained a sentencing recommendation, which included a unified six-year 

sentence with a two and one-half year determinate term, probation, and mental health court, 
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provided Estes was accepted. If however, Estes was not accepted into mental health court, the 

State would recommend the court retain jurisdiction. 

Estes subsequently qualified for and was accepted into the mental health court. Pursuant 

to the plea agreement, the State dismissed the persistent violator enhancement, and Estes pleaded 

guilty to felony domestic battery. The district court sentenced Estes to a unified term of six 

years, with a minimum period of confinement of two and one-half years, suspended the sentence, 

and placed Estes on supervised probation for a period of four years, with the stipulation that 

Estes complete the mental health court program. During Estes’ participation in the program, he 

violated several program rules and was sanctioned six times within four and one-half months. 

Estes was also evicted from his housing three months after being placed on probation, occupancy 

of which was a condition of probation. Less than a month after his eviction, Estes was 

terminated from the mental health court program. The termination was decided during a regular 

mental health court meeting, and a formal letter of termination was issued. Consequently, the 

State filed a motion to revoke Estes’ probation. 

After a two-day evidentiary hearing regarding revocation of his probation, the district 

court found Estes had violated various terms and conditions of the mental health court, that 

termination was proper, and as such Estes was in violation of his probation for both his eviction 

from his housing and his termination from mental health court. Therefore, the district court 

revoked Estes’ probation and imposed his suspended sentence. Estes timely appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Where a defendant claims that his or her right to due process was violated, we defer to 

the trial court’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 

712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). However, we freely review the application of 

constitutional principles to those facts found. Id. 

III.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Estes contends that the mental health court judge denied Estes the due process 

prescribed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when the judge 

terminated Estes from the mental health court program and that the district court’s factual 

findings were clearly erroneous. Estes first argues that he pleaded guilty as a condition to 
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entering the program and thus waived his right to assert his innocence in front of a jury. Estes 

therefore argues that he had a separate liberty interest in continuing participation in mental health 

court. Because he had a separate interest in continuing in the program, he was entitled to due 

process prior to being terminated from that program. The State argues that participation in the 

program was a term and condition of Estes’ probation, and he only had a liberty interest in 

continuing probation. The State argues, therefore, Estes was entitled to due process prior to 

having his probation revoked, which he was provided. 

It is well settled in Idaho that a defendant who pleads guilty in order to enter a 

diversionary program has a liberty interest in remaining in the program. State v. Rogers, 144 

Idaho 738, 741, 170 P.3d 881, 884 (2007). Moreover, the interest involved is analogous to that 

of probation or parole and, prior to revocation, the same process is due as in those proceedings. 

Id. at 742, 170 P.3d at 885. Thus, when the government seeks to terminate a parolee from 

parole, a probationer from probation, or a defendant from a diversionary program due process 

requires:

(a) a written notice of the claimed violations of parole [probationer or defendant]; 

(b) disclosure to the parolee [probationer or defendant] of evidence against him; 

(c) opportunity to be heard in person and present witnesses and documentary 

evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless 

the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); 

(e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a traditional parole board, 

members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written 

statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking 

parole [probation or diversionary program]. 

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); Rogers, 144 Idaho at 742-43, 170 P.3d at 

885-86.

This process is to be flexible and may be informal so long as the safeguards are provided. 

Rogers, 144 Idaho at 743, 170 P.3d at 886. It need not be equivalent to a separate criminal 

prosecution, and the drug court judge may preside over the termination proceedings. Id. 

Further, the neutral court may consider evidence which might not be admissible in a criminal 

trial, permitted the defendant is made aware of this evidence prior to the hearing. Id. 

Additionally, the evidence must be reliable and would assist the court in making its 

determination. Id. Finally, if the defendant is terminated subsequent to the termination hearing, 

the drug court judge may also serve as the sentencing judge. Id. (“[I]nformation from the 

termination proceedings would be admissible in a sentencing hearing.”). 
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Estes argues that his sentencing situation is identical to the defendant’s in Rogers, 

maintaining that his placement in mental health court was “placement in a diversionary 

program,” successful completion of which would result in the dismissal of his case. Conversely, 

the State argues that Estes’ participation in mental health court was not placement in a 

diversionary program with a promise that the case would be dismissed upon successful 

completion, but instead completion of mental health court was a term and condition of probation.

In Rogers, the defendant, after pleading guilty but prior to sentencing, was placed in drug 

court as a diversionary program. Id. at 739, 170 P.3d at 882. After various violations of the 

program’s rules, the defendant was terminated from the program without a formal hearing and 

immediately sentenced. Id. at 740, 170 P.3d at 883. The Rogers court reasoned that a defendant 

has a liberty interest in remaining in a diversionary program when he pleads guilty in order to 

enter the program because he is no longer able to assert his innocence if expelled from the 

program. Id. at 741, 170 P.3d at 884. Further, a defendant enjoys a cognizant liberty interest in 

remaining in a diversionary program, requiring due process, because prior to termination he lives 

in society, though subject to restrictions of complying with the program’s rules, and after his 

termination he is incarcerated. Id. at 742, P.3d at 885. Moreover, a defendant pleads guilty in 

order to participate in a diversionary program, and termination results in being criminally 

sentenced and having a felony conviction appear on his record. Id. 

Here, the record does not contain any evidence of Estes’ assertion that the State would 

dismiss the case after successful completion of mental health court. We have not been provided 

with the transcripts of the plea hearing and are therefore left with the written plea agreement and 

the district court’s findings of fact in the probation hearing. 

It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record 

upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error. State v. Beck, 128 

Idaho 416, 422, 913 P.2d 1186, 1192 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105, 803 

P.2d 1009, 1011 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873, 702 P.2d 910, 911 (Ct. 

App. 1985). Where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to 

support the actions of the trial court. State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541, 835 P.2d 1349, 1352 

(Ct. App. 1992). 

Insofar as the record reflects, the State agreed to dismiss the persistent violator 

enhancement in exchange for Estes pleading guilty to domestic violence and that successful 
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participation in mental health court was a condition of probation. Nothing in the record suggests 

that successful completion of the program would result in dismissal of the case in its entirety. 

Therefore, a guilty conviction would appear on Estes’ record regardless of his success or failure 

in mental health court. Additionally, Estes’ placement in mental health court was post-sentence, 

unlike the presentence placement in Rogers. Estes was not diverted from the court system but, 

instead, was sentenced within it. Moreover, the mental health court program was not a 

diversionary program, but instead treatment as part of his probation. Therefore, Estes was not 

entitled to due process before termination from mental health court. 

Estes also argues that the district court lacked authority to reinstate him into mental 

health court, and therefore the criminal proceeding in which his probation was revoked could not 

provide him due process. The State argues that because Estes was on probation his liberty 

interest was in continuing probation and not in continuing in mental health court. Therefore, he 

was entitled to due process prior to revocation of probation. State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 766, 

171 P.3d 253, 257 (2007). Estes’ argument confuses what liberty interest he had. Because there 

was no agreement to dismiss the case upon successful completion of the program, Estes did not 

have the same liberty interest as the defendant in Rogers. Instead, Estes had a liberty interest in 

continuing probation, entitling him to due process prior to revocation of probation. Id.

Prior to revoking probation, Estes was provided with written notice of the probation 

violation allegations. He was arraigned and appointed counsel. He had a two-day evidentiary 

hearing, in which witnesses were presented and adverse witnesses were cross-examined, and the 

district court made written findings of fact. Therefore, Estes was provided with the requisite due 

process. 

Finally, Estes argues the district court lacked substantial and competent evidence to 

substantiate the mental health court judge’s decision to terminate Estes from the program 

because one of the alleged violations occurred prior to sentencing. The State argues that the 

presentence missed appointment is relevant to whether Estes complied with the terms of his 

probation and was not the sole reason for termination from mental health court. 

The letter of termination from the mental health court references violations which 

occurred after Estes had been sentenced. The record reflects the district court considered the 

various violations testified to at the revocation proceedings. Further, testimony presented at the 

probation revocation proceedings supports the district court’s determination that revocation was 
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appropriate. Accordingly, there was substantial and competent evidence to support the decision 

to terminate Estes from mental health court. 

IV

CONCLUSION

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Estes pleaded guilty to domestic violence, was sentenced, 

had his sentence suspended, and was placed on probation with completion of the mental health 

court program as a term and condition of his probation. Dismissal of his case upon successful 

completion of mental health court was not a term of his plea agreement. Therefore, Estes had a 

protected liberty interest in continued probation only. After violating various mental health court 

conditions and termination from the program, Estes was provided due process prior to revocation 

of his probation. Therefore, Estes’ constitutional due process rights were not violated. 

Additionally, substantial and competent evidence presented at the revocation hearing supported 

the district court’s factual findings. Accordingly, the district court’s order revoking Estes’ 

probation is affirmed. 

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.