UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

CHARLES BLUNT, 

 Petitioner, 

 Case No. 08-CV-14808 

v. 

 HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

MARY BERGHUIS, 

 Respondent. 

 / 

OPINION AND ORDER 

GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME (Dkt. 29) AND 

DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Dkt. 30) 

 Petitioner Charles Blunt filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his convictions for bank robbery, two counts of armed robbery, 

felon-in-possession of a firearm, carrying a concealed weapon, second-degree fleeing a police 

officer, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Pet. (Dkt. 1). The Court 

denied the petition on April 5, 2011. 4/5/11 Order (Dkt. 13). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the 

Court’s decision on November 20, 2012. Blunt v. Woods, 505 F. App’x 569 (6th Cir. 2012). 

Petitioner then filed a motion for relief from judgment (Dkt. 26), which the Court denied, see 

10/15/13 Order (Dkt. 27). This matter is once again before the Court on Petitioner’s motion for 

extension of time (Dkt. 29) and motion for reconsideration (Dkt. 30). 

 Petitioner seeks an extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration of 

the Court’s order denying the motion for relief from judgment. He filed the motion within 14 

days of the Court’s denial of his motion for relief from judgment. The Court finds that the 

4:08-cv-14808-MAG-CEB Doc # 31 Filed 06/09/14 Pg 1 of 4 Pg ID 494
2 

request is made in good faith, grants the motion, and considers the motion for reconsideration as 

timely filed. 

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is governed by Local Rule 7.1(h)(3). Under that 

Local Rule, this Court will not grant a motion for reconsideration that merely presents “the same 

issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication.” E.D. Mich. L.R. 

7.1(h)(3). The movant must (i) demonstrate a “palpable defect” by which the court and the 

parties have been “misled,” and (ii) show “that correcting the defect will result in a different 

disposition of the case.” Id. A “palpable defect” is an error that is “obvious, clear, unmistakable, 

manifest, or plain.” United States v. Cican, 156 F.Supp. 2d 661, 668 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 

 Here, Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration relates to his motion for relief from 

judgment, wherein Petitioner sought relief from judgment under Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 60(d)(3) and 60(b)(6). Petitioner claimed that the Michigan Court of Appeals, in 

affirming his convictions, erroneously concluded that, contrary to Petitioner’s representations to 

the trial court, he had not successfully represented himself previously. Pet’r Mot. at 1-2 (Dkt. 

26). Petitioner argued that he did, in fact, obtain an acquittal in 1994, while representing himself 

against armed robbery charges. He also argued that the Michigan Attorney General, in its 

response to his habeas petition, perpetrated a fraud against this Court by repeating the mistaken 

argument that he had not successfully represented himself. Id. 

The Court denied Petitioner’s motion because he failed to present clear and convincing 

evidence that he was not represented by counsel in that proceeding. 10/15/13 Order. In 

particular, the Court observed that the docket sheet submitted by Petitioner in support of his 

motion showed that he had a court-appointed attorney discharged on April 20, 1994, but that it 

also showed that a new court-appointed attorney was assigned on May 6, 1994. Id. at 3 (citing 

4:08-cv-14808-MAG-CEB Doc # 31 Filed 06/09/14 Pg 2 of 4 Pg ID 495
3 

Pet’r Ex. C (cm/ecf Pg ID 470)). The Court also noted that trial commenced on September 12, 

1994, and the jury acquitted Petitioner one week later, but that Petitioner did not reference the 

appointment of counsel on May 6, 1994. Id. (citing Pet’r Ex. D (cm/ecf Pg ID 471)). The Court 

found that Petitioner had failed to present clear and convincing evidence because the docket 

sheet indicated that Petitioner was represented by counsel when he was acquitted. Id. 

Consequently, the Court rejected the premise upon which Petitioner based his allegations of a 

fraud upon the Court and denied Petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment. Id. 

 In his motion for reconsideration, Petitioner argues that he has obtained clear and 

convincing evidence that he represented himself at the 1994 trial — a copy of the trial court’s 

April 20, 1994 order discharging his attorney and allowing Petitioner to represent himself. Pet’r 

Mot. for Recon. at 2 (Dkt. 30). This order does not demonstrate that the Court committed a 

“palpable defect” that was “obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest, or plain.” Cican, 156 

F.Supp. 2d at 668. The trial court’s April 20, 1994 order fails to address the subsequent docket 

entry indicating that a new court-appointed attorney was assigned on May 6, 1994. Pet’r Ex. C 

(cm/ecf Pg ID 470). 

In addition, Petitioner’s new evidence does not meet the standard for a motion for relief 

from judgment based on a fraud on the court. “Fraud on the court consists of conduct: 1) on the 

part of an officer of the court; that 2) is directed to the judicial machinery itself; 3) is 

intentionally false, willfully blind to the truth, or is in reckless disregard of the truth; 4) is a 

positive averment or a concealment when one is under a duty to disclose; and 5) deceives the 

court.” Johnson v. Bell, 605 F.3d 333, 339 (6th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citations 

omitted). Petitioner bears the burden of proving existence of fraud upon the court by clear and 

convincing evidence. Id. 

4:08-cv-14808-MAG-CEB Doc # 31 Filed 06/09/14 Pg 3 of 4 Pg ID 496
4 

Petitioner has not provided clear and convincing evidence of Petitioner’s selfrepresentation because the April 20, 1994 order fails to address the subsequent docket entry 

indicating that a new court-appointed attorney was assigned on May 6, 1994. Pet’r Ex. C 

(cm/ecf Pg ID 470). Even assuming that Petitioner did represent himself in that proceeding, he 

has not shown that the Michigan Attorney General’s statements to the contrary were 

“intentionally false, willfully blind to the truth, or in reckless disregard of the truth” so as to 

constitute fraud on the court. Johnson, 605 F.3d at 339. In fact, the ambiguity regarding the 

question of self-representation arising from the trial court record supports a finding that the 

Michigan Attorney General did not intentionally disregard the truth. 

Accordingly, the Court denies the motion for reconsideration (Dkt. 30). 

 SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 9, 2014 s/Mark A. Goldsmith 

 Flint, Michigan MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

 United States District Judge 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record 

and any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First Class 

U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on June 9, 2014. 

 s/Deborah J. Goltz 

 DEBORAH J. GOLTZ 

 Case Manager 

4:08-cv-14808-MAG-CEB Doc # 31 Filed 06/09/14 Pg 4 of 4 Pg ID 497