Not Reported in F.Supp.2d
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 3088543 (W.D.Ky.)
(Cite as: 2005 WL 3088543 (W.D.Ky.))

typically covered by Medicaid (DN 16, p. 2).

EN7. In an. earlier pleading, DN 9, the
plaintiff speaks. of U of L's violating the
Fair Housing. Act. Because this claim was
not discussed in the plaintiff's explanation
of claims he seeks to pursue, the court con-
strues it as abandoned and will not con-
sider it in this review.

The plaintiff also. charges U of L employees Pam
Miller and Donald Barnett and Kentucky Vocation-
al Rehabilitation Center employees Nina Stiglitz
and Pam Jarboe, with violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1692et seq., for improperly taking money from his
student account that was earmarked for rent and ap-
plying it to a debt owed to the Kentucky Vocational
Rehabilitation Center. And he charges that U of L
conspired to deprive him of his Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to due process “by knowingly and wan-
tonly evicting plaintiff-under the pretext of rules
goveming student housing.”(DN 16, p. 4)

The plaintiff wants the court to direct U of L to
provide him with the keys to the university apart-
ment from which he was evicted (DN 10, p. VIII).

Ul. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The federal in forma pauperis statute mandates that:
a trial court shall dismiss a civil action at any time,
if the court determines that an action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetaty relief from a de-
fendant who is immune from such relief. See28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an argu-
able basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Willi-
ams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104
L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). The court may, therefore, dis-
miss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an in-
disputably meritless legal theory or where the fac-
tual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490

Page 5 of 9

Page 4

U.S. at 327. When determining whether a plaintiff
has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted,
the court must construe the complaint in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the
factual. allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burn-
side, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir.2002). A com-
plaint, or portion thereof, should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, “only if it appears beyond a doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim that would entitle him to relief.” Brown v.
Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir.2000).

*4 While a reviewing court must liberally construe
pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 USS.
364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982) (per
curiam), a plaintiff is required to plead more than
bare legal conclusions. Lillard v. Shelby County Bd.
of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir .1996); see also
Morgan v, Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d (0, 12
(6th Cir.1987). Therefore, the complaint must con-
tain either direct or inferential allegations respect-
ing all the material elements to sustain a recovery
under some viable legal theory. Scheid v. Fanny
Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th
Cir. 1988).

IV. ANALYSIS

‘A. Claims against.U of Land its employees

1. ADARehabilitation Act. claims: remaining in
student housing .

The plaintiff claims that U of L, a state institution,
violated Title If of the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act by denying his request for an accommodation
to remain in student housing notwithstanding the
fact that he was not a student enrolled at the uni-
versity. The ADA prohibits discrimination on the
basis of disability. Title I! of the ADA provides:
“{s]ubject to the provisions of this subchapter, no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reas-
on of such disability, be excluded from participa-

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Not Reported in F.Supp.2d
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 3088543 (W.D-Ky.)
(Cite as: 2005 WL 3088543 (W.D.Ky.))

USC. §§ 405(g) and 405(h).Section 405(g)
provides, in part:

FN8. When the SSA suspended his parti-
cipation in PASS, the decision also termin-
ated his eligibility to receive SST (DN 17,
Ex. B).

Any individual, after any final decision of the Com-
missioner of Social Security made after a hearing to
which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in
controversy, may obtain a review of such decision
by a civil action commenced within sixty days after
the mailing to him of notice of such decision or
within such further time as the Commissioner of
Social Security may allow. Such action shall be
brought in the district court of the United States for
the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides...
Section 405(h) specifically bars any review of the
decision “by any person, tribunal, or governmental
agency except as herein provided.”This section,
therefore, requires those contesting the decisions of
the Commissioner of Social Security to present
their claims to the agency and to exhaust avenues of
administrative relief before filing an action in fed-
eral court. BP Care, Inc. v. Thompson, 398 F.3d
503, 508 (6th Cir.2005).

Chapter Ifl, Title 20, of the Code of Federal Regu-
lations (“C.F.R.”) sets forth the proper administrat-
ive procedure for challenging the SSA's decision to
terminate benefits. Following the initial determina-
tion, a dissatisfied claimant may seek reconsidera-
tion, which is deemed the “first step in the adminis-
trative review process."See20 C.F.R. § 416.1407.
After reconsideration, the claimant may request a
hearing before an administrative law judge
(“ALJ").20 C.F.R. § 416.1429, After the ALJ has
issued a decision, further review may be sought be-
fore the Appeals Council. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1467.
Only after the Appeals Council has issued a de-
cision is there a “final decision” by the Commis-
sioner within the meaning of § 405(g), and the
claimant may seek review of that decision in a fed-
eral district court. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1481; Willis v.
Sullivan, 931 F.2d 390, 396 (6th Cir.1991).

Page 8 of 9

Page 7

*7 in reviewing the plaintiff's various documents, it
is clear that the plaintiff has not exhausted his, rem-
edies with the SSA. He sought reconsideration in
December 2004 (DN 17, Ex. F). On March 14,
2005, the Social Security Administration issued a
notice of reconsideration, which denied his request
to reinstate his PASS benefits. /d. at Ex. B. A week
later, the SSA issued a notice to the plaintiff, ex-
plaining that he was no longer eligible for SSI be-
nefits. /d. at C. That notice, too, explained to the
plaintiff how he could appeal this decision. It is un-
clear whether he has pursued those remedies. In fil-
ing this civil action, he noted that exhaustion would
be futile and that he would suffer irreparable harm
were he forced to exhaust before seeking redress of
his grievance.

The plaintiff may be entitled to waiver of the ex-
haustion requirement. A court may determine that a
waiver is appropriate where exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies would be futile, Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522
(1975), or the claimant's legal claims are collateral
to the demand for benefits, Oakland Med. Group v.
Sec'p of Health & Human Serv, 298 F.3d 507 (6th
Cir.2002), or that the claimant would suffer irrepar-
able harm pending exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Because the plaintiff essentially claims
waiver is warranted for all three reasons, the court
will allow this particular challenge to go forward at
this time.

2. Retaliation claims against employees Cathy
Miller and Randall Griffin

Finally, the plaintiff claims that certain SSA em-
ployees, Cathy Miller and Randall Griffin, termin-
ated his benefits in retaliation for his complaints
about their handling of his case. The plaintiff asser-
ted his claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.
Neither of these statutes provides the basis for the
causes of action the plaintiff seeks to assert.

Section 1983 provides a statutory remedy where a
plaintiff claims that he was deprived of a right,

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Not Reported in F.Supp.2d
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 3088543 (W.D.Ky.)
(Cite as: 2005 WL 3088543 (W.D.Ky.))

the $1152.00 from your Social Security benefit on
approved PASS expenses.

Qn 12/21/04, we requested that you send us evid-
ence oe school attendance for 08/04 to the

fiscortaa ‘we must determine that because
not follow your PASS beginning 08/04,
your PASS is suspended effective 08/04,

(DN 17, Ex. B). The SSA is also recouping what it
deems to be SSI overpayments made to him for the
PASS program.

The plaintiff claims that the benefits were wrongly
terminated because he complied with the require-
ments for participating in the PASS program. He
also claims that he was deprived of the benefits
without the requisite due process protections. It ap-
pears, however, that he is still involved in the ap-
peal process of this decision for his petition states
that “complete exhaustion of remedies is not always
necessary.”And he further claims that “pursuit of
further remedies would be fruitless” (DN 16, pp.
1-2). With respect to this claim, the plaintiff main-
tains that the court possesses subject matter juris-
diction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 5 U.S.C.
§ S5let seg. He also claims that SSA employees
Cathy Miller and Randall Griffin retaliated against
him by denying benefits in violation of 42 U.S.
§§ 405(g), 1983 and 1985, and 5 U.S.C. § 551 be-
cause he complained about how they handled his
case.

*3 The plaintiff wants the court to issue injunctive
telief that directs the “SSA (Secretary) [to] stop the
collection of unwarranted overpayments” (DN 10,
p. Vill), The plaintiff lists other forms of injunctive
relief he seeks, but because his language is fre-
quently disjointed, the court cannot determine what
other form of injunctive relief he may be seeking.

Bi Claiinis involving U of Land its employees and
employees of Kentucky Vocational Rehabilitation

Page 4 of 9

Page 3

“Center

FNS. In DN 16 (in which the plaintiff was
to clarify his claims and specifically identi-
fy the defendants), on page 3 he refers to a
Marian Barger as a defendant. He also
bolds the names of Cathy Pathus and Dale
Billingsley. However, he failed to specific-
ally identify his claims or set forth the
facts to support any particular claim

against them. The court will therefore not
undertake a review of claims purportedly
brought against these U of L employees.

was not a registered student
celled his _PASS benefits.

permission to stay i 1 university Tae ati the
summer school session began. denied his re+
it locked hirn: ont of his apart-
the locks, Because U of L re-
est, he charges U- of
ins with Disabilities
tation Act: He also

: evicting him and taking his
property. in’ vidlation: ‘of the Fourteenth: Amend-
ments: guarantees of due process-and: equal protec-
tion of the laws"And, he brings official. capacity.
claims vagainst unidentified’ university employees
for depriving him of due process and equal: protec-
tlon of the laws,

FN6. The plaintiff also claims that he has
lost training opportunities, Medicaid bene-
fits, and SSI payments, and was required to
spend personal funds to cover medication

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Not Reported in F.Supp.2d
Not Reported in F,Supp.2d, 2005 WL 3088543 (W.D.Ky.)
(Cite-as: 2005 WL 3088543 (W.D.Ky.))

tion in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be sub-
jected to discrimination by any such entity."42
U.S.C. § 12132. To state a claim of disability dis-
crimination under Title H of the ADA, the plaintiff
must allege that (1) he has a disability; (2) he is
otherwise qualified; and (3) he is being excluded
from participation in, being denied the benefits of,
or being subjected to discrimination under the pro-
gram solely because of his disability. Jones v. City
of Monroe, 341 F.3d 474, 477 (6th Cir.2003). A
plaintiff must allege the same elements to state a
claim under the Rehabilitation Act. Mahon v.
Crowell, 295 F.3d 585, 589 (6th Cir.2002).

The facts al
cognizable
pean did

ve do not establish a

2. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal
Protection claims

The plaintiff claims that U of L violated his Four-
teenth Amendment rights to due process and equal
protection when it evicted him from student hous-
ing and took his property without providing him a
pre-deprivation hearing. He brought the same
claims against university officials in their official
capacities. Because he failed to identify the specific
employees who purportedly violated these rights,
the court can only consider the claim as asserted
against U of L,

The Sixth Circuit does not recognize direct consti-
tutional claims because 42 U.S.C. § 1983“is the ex-
clusive remedy for the alleged constitutional viola-
tions” by state actors. Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d
496, 499 (6th Cir.1987) ([I]n cases where a
plaintiff states a constitutional claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, that statute is the exclusive remedy

Page 6 of 9

Page 5

for the alleged constitutional violations.”), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 488 U.S. 1036,
109 S.Ct, 859, 102 L.Ed.2d 984 (1989); see also
Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 913 F.2d
704 (9th Cir.1992) (*[A] litigant complaining of a
violation of a constitutional right must utilize 42
US.C. § 1983.”).

*5 To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege that
a “person” acting under color of state law deprived
the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution
or federal law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149, 155-57, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978).
The University of Louisville is a state institution.
Martin v. Univ. of Louisville, 541 F.2d 1171 (6th
Cir.1976); compare Hutsell v. Sayre, 5 F.3d 996
(6th Cir.1993) (holding that the University of Ken-
tucky is an arm of the state). States, state agencies,
and state officials sued in their official capacities
for money damages are not “persons” subject to
suit under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Po-
lice, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45
(1989). Moreover, under the Eleventh Amendment
to the United States Constitution, this court is de-
prived of jurisdiction over claims asserted directly
against the Commonwealth. Edelman y. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 678, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662
(1974). Accordingly, the court will dismiss these
claims.

3. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

The plaintiff claims that U of L Bursars Office em-
ployees Pam Miller and Donald Barnett violated the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA") by
improperly deducting money from his student ac-
count to pay a debt owed to the Kentucky Voca-
tional Rehabilitation Center. He claims that the U
of L Bursar's Office refused to properly credit his
account once he brought this fact to its attention.
He also charges Kentucky Vocational Rehabilita-
tion Center employees Nina Stiglitz and Pam Jar-
boe with this same violation.

The purpose of the FDCPA is “to eliminate abusive

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Not Reported in F.Supp.2d
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 3088543 (W.D.Ky.)
(Cite as: 2005 WL 3088543 (W.D.Ky.))

privilege, or immunity secured by the Federal Con-
stitution or laws of the United States, which was
caused by a person while acting under color of state
law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57,
98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978). Miller and
Griffin are federal officers, not state actors. As for
his § 1985 claim, the primary purpose of that stat-
ute is to provide a remedy for a plaintiff who claims
that two or more persons conspired to deprive him
of equal protection of the laws. The plaintiff
charges these defendants with retaliation, not with
conspiring to deprive him of equal protection of the
laws involving a class-based, invidious discriminat-
ory animus. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,
102-03, 91 S.Ct, 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971);
Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1078. (6th
Cir.1998).

While the plaintiff does cite Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) to
show that the court has jurisdiction over his case
and possibly these claims, see DN 17, the Supreme
Court has foreclosed a Bivens-type claim for a
plaintiff, who has alleged that a government em-
ployee violated his due process rights in the hand-
ling of his Social Security request for benefits. See
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 108 S.Ct.
2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988). There, the Supreme
Court held that the remedies for violations of the
Social Security Act are provided for by the elabor-
ate scheme devised by Congress and “when the
design of a Government program suggests that
Congress has provided what it considers adequate
remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations
that may occur in the course of its administration,
we have not created additional Bivens remedies.”
Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423;see also Bivens, 403
U.S. at 397 (noting that a Bivens remedy would not
be available in cases of “explicit Congressional de-
claration” creating an alternative scheme).
Moreover, the Social Security Act itself appears to
preclude a Bivens remedy for the plaintiff. See §
405(h) which states that “[nJo action against the
United States, the Secretary, or any officer or em-

Page 9 of 9

Page 8

ployee thereof shall be brought under sections 1331
or 1346 of title 28 to recover on any claim arising
under [Title [1].” Because the plaintiff's claims are
foreclosed by statutory and case law, they will be
dismissed.

*8 The court will enter orders consistent with this
memorandum opinion.

W.D.Ky.,2005.

Stewart v. Bamhart

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 3088543
(W.DKy.)

END OF DOCUMENT

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EXHIBIT
18



Not Reported in F.Supp.2d
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 3088543 (W.D.Ky.)
(Cite as: 2005 WL 3088543 (W.D.Ky.))

debt collection practices by debt collectors, to in-
sure that those debt collectors who refrain from us-
ing abusive debt collection practices. are not com-
petitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent
State action to protect consumers against debt col-
lection abuses.”15 U.S .C. § 1692(e). Wright v. Fin.
Serv. of Norwalk, 22 F.3d 647, 650 (6th Cir.1994).
The FDCPA ‘applies only to “debt collectors,”
which the statute defines as “any person who uses
any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the
mails in any business the principal purpose of
which is the collection of any debts, or who regu-
larly collects or attempts to collect, directly or in-
directly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed
or due another."15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2000)
(emphasis added); see alsoS.Rep. No, 95-382, at 3
(1977) [T]he term ‘debt collector,’ ... coverfs] all
third persons who regularly collect debts for oth-
ers[, and] the primary persons intended to be
covered [by the FDCPA] are independent debt col-
lectors.”), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695,
1697. And “[t]he requirement that debt collection
be done ‘regularly’ would exclude a person who
collects a debt for another in an isolated instance,
but would include those who collect for others in
the regular course of business.”’/d.

The plaintiff does not allege that the named em-
ployees of U of L, a public university, or the Ken-
tucky Vocational Rehabilitation program, a state
agency, regularly engage in the collection of debts
owed to another or that the entities themselves
primarily engage in collecting debts owed to anoth-
er party. In fact, U of L's primary purpose is “
give instruction at the college level...."Ky. Rev. St.
Ann. § 164.300. And the primary purpose of the
Kentucky Department of Vocational Rehabilitation,
a department within the Workforce Development
Cabinet as set forth in Ky. Rev. St. Ann. § 12.020,
Sec. I, (9)(c), is to “improve the vocational rehab-
ilitation of citizens of the Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky with physical and mental disabilities in order
that they may increase their social and economic
well-being and the productive capacity of the Com-
monwealth and the nation."Ky. Rev. St. Ann. §

Page 7 of 9

Page 6

151B.180. Accordingly, the court will dismiss the
FDCPA claims.

4, Conspiracy to deny civil rights

*6 In response to the court's direction to clarify his
claims, the plaintiff accuses U of L of conspiring to
deprive him of his constitutional right to due pro-
cess by evicting him without a hearing (DN 16, p.
4). He claims it did so because he registered com-
plaints about actions taken by some of its employ-
ees,

To set forth a private conspiracy in violation of the
first clause of § 1985(3), a plaintiff must prove: 1) a
conspiracy involving two or more persons; 2) for
the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, a
person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws; 3) and an act in furtherance of the con-
spiracy; and 4) which causes injury to a person or
property, or a deprivation of any right or privilege
of a citizen of the United States. Smith v. Thorn-
burg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1078 (6th Cir.1998); Collyer
vy. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 223 (6th Cir.1996). The
plaintiff must also show that the conspiracy was
motivated by racial, or other class-based, invidi-
ously discriminatory animus. Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29
L.Ed.2d 338 (1971); Smith, 136 F.3d at 1078. Here,
by the plaintiffs own admission, he claims that U
of L conspired to deprive him of his constitutional
rights because he registered complaints, not be-
cause it was “motivated by racial, or other class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” The
plaintiff failed to state a cognizable conspiracy
claim against U of L, and the court will dismiss the
claim.

B. Claims against the SSA and its employees
1, Termination of benefits
The plaintiff seeks review of the SSA's decision to

terminate his PASS and SSI benefits." *Judicial
review of the plaintiffs claim is governed by 42

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Westlaw,

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 3088343 (W.D.Ky.)
(Cite as: 2005 WL 3088543 (W.D.Ky.))

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court,
W.D. Kentucky.
Rodney STEWART Plaintiff
v.

Joanne BARNHART University of Louisville, De-
fendants
No. Civ.A, 305CV314S.

Nov. 14, 2005.

Rodney Stewart, Louisville, KY, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SIMPSON, J.

L INTRODUCTION

*1 The plaintiff, Rodney Stewart, filed this pro se
civil action, seeking declaratory and injunctive re-
lief. He has also filed motions to amend (DN 4) and
to supplement (DNs 9 and 17), which are GRAN-
TED.

The complaint is before the court for review under
28 U.S.C. § 1915 and McGore v. Wrigglesworth,
114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.1997). Reviewing the mul-
tiple documents filed in this case was no easy task,
The plaintiff filed a 42-page petition, followed by a
40-page “motion to replace” the petition along with
52 pages of exhibits (DN 4). He then filed a 9-page
supplement followed by a 37-page petition (DNs 9
and 10).FN!

FNI. The plaintiff also filed two motions
for a hearing (DNs 12 and 13), a motion
for emergency relief (DN 18), and a mo-
tion for prospective injunctive relief (DN
19), which will not be considered in re-
viewing his claims under 28 U.S.C. §

Page 2 of 9

Page |

Many of the documents contain nothing more than
quotations and analyses of case law and references
to important documents such as the Magna Carta
without any explanation or discussion as to why the
plaintiff inserted them in his various filings. Inter-
spersed between the quotations are references to the
particular situations which caused the plaintiff to
file suit in this court. In an attempt to provide the
plaintiff with a fair and thorough review of his
claims, the court directed him to file a clarification
with the court which specifically set forth the basis
of this court's jurisdiction, the identity of the de-
fendants he wanted to sue, and the particular claims
he wanted to bring against each one of the defend-
ants. Unfortunately, his response only marginally
clarified the claims he sought to pursue and the
identity of the persons he wanted to hold legally ac-
countable.

What follows is this court's best attempt at unravel-
ing the plaintiffs claims. It believes that it has ar-
rived at the heart of the plaintiff's grievance, to wit,
the Social Security Administration's decision to
suspend certain benefits and recoup overpayments
it made to him. The court will dismiss all other
claims with the exception of that particular chal-
lenge. And because the plaintiff is challenging the
decision to terminate his benefits, the court will
transfer the case to the docket of the Hon. Edward
H. Johnstone, Senior Judge, U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Kentucky, for further re-
view pursuant to our cours General Order
No.2004-1.

Il. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS

In summarizing the plaintiff's claims, the court first
turns to the clarification of claims and identification
of defendants as set forth in docket entries 16 and
17. It then reviews his amended petition (DN 4) and
supplements (DNs 9 and 10) to fill in the factual

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Not Reported in F.Supp.2d
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 3088543 (W.D.Ky.)
(Cite as: 2005 WL 3088543 (W.D.Ky.))

contours of his claims. Though the plaintiff extens-
ively quotes case and statutory law to support his.
various claims, the court primarily focuses on the
factual allegations contained in those documents.

The plaintiffs document clarifying his case is di-
vided into five sections with the following headers:
Social Security Administration, University. of
Louisville, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
American[s} with Disabilities Act, and Conspiracy
to Deny Civil Rights. See DN 16. In his motion to
supplement his clarification (DN 17), the plaintiff.
adds a sixth section entitled Subject Matter Juris-
diction, The court has divided its discussion of
these six sections into two sections. The first out-
lines the claims: involving the Social Security Ad-
ministration and its employees; the second outlines
the claims against the University of Louisville and
its employees.

A. Claims involving the Social Security Adminis-
tration (“SSA”) and its employees.

*2 The crux of the plaintiff's complaint arises from
the SSA's decision to suspend his participation in
the Plan for Achieving Self-Support (‘PASS”).6*
In July 1994, the plaintiff began receiving Social
Security Disability Income (“SSDI”). Because the
payments were too high, he was not eligible for
Supplement Security Income (“SSI”), In May 2002,
he applied for and was accepted into the PASS pro-
gram. With this acceptance, certain SSDI benefits
were not counted toward his eligibility for SSI, and
any SSI benefits he received were to be used to at-
tend the University of Louisville.

FN2. The SSA has adopted a program un-
der which a claimant develops and pursues
a vocational plan, a PASS, aimed at elim-
inating or significantly reducing the
claimant's reliance on disability benefits.
20 CFR. §§ 416.1180, 416.1181. PASS
allows income that would otherwise be
counted against a disabled individual's SSI
eligibility to be set aside if needed to fur-

Page 3 of 9

Page 2

ther the plan. /d.

The plaintiff notes that the SSA suspended his
PASS benefits on more than one occasion. On Au-
gust 21, 2004, the SSA reinstated’ the plaintiffs eli-
gibility for PASS, effective August 2004 through
December 2004 (DN 4, Attach.). The SSA ‘set forth
his responsibilities in order. to continue receiving
the benefits./d. On November 28, 2004, the SSA
terminated his SSI payments because his other So-
cial Security benefits were increasing (DN 17, Ex.
A)FS} On December 23, 2004, the SSA termin-
ated his PASS benefits (DN 17, Ex. D). It
based its decision on the fact that the plaintiff failed
to file the requisite documentation to show compli-
ance with the PASS program; he sought reconsider-
ation. On March 14, 2005, the SSA sent the
plaintiff a letter in response, which reads, in part:

FN3. Pages 2 and 4 of this exhibit are
missing.

FN4. The plaintiff provided only the first
page of this letter.

You do not agree with our 12/23/04 decision that
your PASS is suspended effective 01/05. The sus-
pension of your PASS also ends your eligibility to
SSI payments.

We have determined that you did not follow your
PASS beginning 08/04 and that your PASS will be
suspended effective 08/04. We have corrected your
record to show that your PASS ends 08/04 instead
of 01/05.

On 8/21/04 your PASS was reinstated effective
08/04 because you would again be working toward
your work goal of Criminal Justice. You would at-
tend school again in 08/04 and would use $1152.00
of your Social Security each month to. pay for or
save for your approved PASS expenses (save for a
car and pay for schoo] related expense). Vocational.
Rehabilitation would pay for tuition and books.

To be following your plan, you would have to both
be in school making academic progress and using

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