### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

444444444444444444 ON REMAND

444444444444444444

NO. 03-03-00287- CR NO. 03-03-00288- CR NO. 03-03-00289- CR NO. 03-03-00290- CR NO. 03-03-00291- CR NO. 03-03-00292- CR NO. 03-03-00293- CR NO. 03-03-00294- CR

The St at e of Te xa s, App e lla nt

v. RobertBlan kensh ip, App ellee

F ROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY NOS. 62 4903 , 6 2490 4, 6249 05, 62 4906 , 6 2490 7, 6249 08, 62 4909 & 62 4910 HO NORAB LE J. DAVID PH ILLIP S, JUDGE PRESI DING

O P I N I O N
T h i s ap p ea l b y

t h e S t at e o f T ex as i n v o l v es ei gh t j u d g m en t s , n o s . 6 2 4 9 0 3 th ro u gh 624910, enter ed in the County Court at L aw No. 1 of

Travi s C o u n t y , eac h of which r ever sed a judgme nt of conviction in the municipal cour t of rec ord of the City

of Austin.Ol iv o v . S tate , 918 S.W .2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 1 Sh utev . S

tate , 744 S.W .2d 96, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). 2 2 On orig inal submissi on, this Court concluded that it was conf ronted with a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l qu e s t i o ni nl i g h to f t h e am e n d e d

n o t i c e o f a p p e a l f i l e db y ana s s i s t an tc i ty a t t o r n e y. Prior to November

1987, there was a

traditional prohibition ag ainst the State’s rig ht to appea l in a criminal ca se. Se e Pi ttm an v . S tate , 8 2 9 S
. W
. 2 d

8 9 7 , 8 9 8 ( T e x . A p p . — A u s t i n 1 9 9 2 , n o p e t
. )
. In 19 87 , th e c iti zen s o f T e xas v ote d to ame nd the State Con sti tut ion to re a d: “ Th e State is e nti tle d to appea l in criminal case s as authoriz ed by g ener al l aw.” Tex. Const. art. V, § 26. A rticle 44.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedur e was amende d to g rant the State an ex tremely limit ed rig ht of appe al in cer tain desig nated circ umstances, including when a cour t order “ arr ests or modifies a judg ment.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.01(a)(2) (West Supp. 2004-05). The statute provided that the “prose cuting attorney” may not “make” an appe al later than the 15th day

afte r the date on which the court’s or der, r

uling, or sentenc e wa s entere d. Art. 44.01(d)
. Th e statut e fu

rt he r p ro vid e s: (i) I n this article, “pr osecutingattorney” mea ns t h e county

attorney , district attorney , or cr iminal dist rict attorne y who has the pr imary

responsibili ty

of prosec uting c ases in the c ourt hea ringthe ca se and doe s not include an a ssistant prosec uting attorney
. Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 44.01(i) (West Supp. 2004-05).

I t is clear f

rom the statut e t hat a duly authorized subordinate of the “pr osecuting
a tto rn e y ” may no t “make ” an ap pe a l. An d w e kn owthat “ in o rd e r f or a State ’s no tic e of

a pp e a l to invoke t he C ourt of Appeals’ j urisdiction, it must be ti mely , it must be in writing , and it must be 1 2State v. Mue ller , 829 S.W .2d 805, 811-12 (Te x . Crim. App. 1992). 3 Ar tic le 45 .2 01 pr ov ide s: 4 (a) All prosecutions in a municipal c ourt shall be conduc ted by the city attorney of the municipality

or by a deputy city attorney
. ( b ) T h e c o u n t y a t t o r

n e y o f t h e c o un ty i nw h i c hth e mun i c i p a l i ty i s s i tu a t e d m ay, if th e c o u n ty a tt o r

n e y s o d e s ir e s , a ls o r e p r e s e n t th e s tate in suc h prosec utions. I n such cases, t he county attorney is not entitl ed to re ceive any fee s or other c ompensation for those se rvice s. (c) Wit h the conse nt of the county attorney , appea ls f rom municipal court to a county court, c ounty

court at law, or a

ny appellate court may

be prose cuted b y t h e c i t y a t t o r

n e y o r a d e p u ty c i ty a t t o r

n e y. (d) I t is the primary duty

of a municipa l prosecutor not to convict, but to see that justice is done. Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 45.201 (West Supp. 2004-05). 3 ‘ m a d e ’ b y t h e e l e c t e d p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y. State v. Rieiue , 13 S.W .3d 408, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 3 2000). Th e no tic e of a pp e a l in the ins tant c a se wa s si g ne d a nd e xec ute d by

an a ssi sta nt c ity at t o rn ey an d co n t ai n edt h e f

o l l o wi n g:
I V. The County

Attorney has consented t o the City

Attorney prosec uting this appe al under a rticle 45.201 of the Code of Criminal Procedur e. 4
The State’s br ief a cknowledg es that the for eg oing se nten ce i s “ambiguous.” The notice wa s signe d by

a per son not connec ted to the c o unty attorney ’s offic e. I t did not reflec t the
nam e of the c ounty

a tto rn e y or the c ounty

and ma de e xpre ss r e fe re nc e to a rt ic le 45 .2 01 but no t toAr tic le 45 .0 19 (c ) ( Re qu isi te s o f C omp la int ) p ro vid e s: 5
4 art ic le 44 .0 1, wh ic h g ov e rn s th e “ makin g ” of the State ’s no tic e of a pp e a l. Art ic le 45 .2 01 (c ) p e rm its the c ity a tto rn e y to p ro se c ute a

pp e a ls f ro m munici pa l c ourt

on ly “ wi th t he c on se nt o f t

he c ounty
a tto rn e y .” Th e statut e ha s n o ti me lim itatio ns and do e s n ot r e qu ir e the re qu e st o r c on se nt t o b e in writing . I t would appea

r to apply to appea ls that have be en per fec ted. For the rea sons set forth in Sta te v . B lan k e ns hip , 123 S.W. 3d

99 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 2003), t h i s C o u rt found that the notice was not “ma de” by the county

attorney and that this Court lacke d jurisdiction to entertain the appea l. The State’s petition for discre tionary revie w was g rante d. Our judg ment was reve rsed and the cause rema nded for further

proce eding s. Sta te v . B lan k e ns hip , 146 S.W .3d 218, 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The Court of C ri minal Appeals found the city ’s
asser tion in the not ice of appea l was a written ex press personal authoriz ation by the county attorney and found the asser

tion sim ultaneously

complied with article 44.01 as to the notice of appea l and with article 45.201( c) a s to authorizing the city attorney to pr osecute the appea l. Id . at 218-20. Since the Court of Criminal Appea ls found that this Court had jurisdiction t o hear the State’s appe al, we tur n to the on ly

po int of e rr or be fo re thi s Co ur

t.
Bac kgr ound On Ap ri l 24 , 20 02 , thi rt e e n c omp la int s w e re fi le d a g a ins t B lank e ns hip in t he Au sti n Municipal Court of Recor d char g ing him with violations of cer tain city ordinanc es. Eac h complaint
a lle g e d th a t th e of

fe ns e oc c ur

re d in the te rr ito ri a l lim its of the c ity of Au sti n a s re qu ir e d b y art ic le 45.019(c) of the Code of

Criminal Proc edure
. Trial by jury was wa ived and B lankenship ente red 5A c omp la int fi le d in mun ic ipa l c ourt mu st alleg e that the offe nse wa s committed in the territoria l limi ts of the municipality in which the complaint wa s made. Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 45.019(c ) (West Supp. 2004-05) (e mphasis added) . Act of Ma y 30, 1999, 76th L eg ., R.S., vol . 5, ch. 1545, § 16, 1999 Te x . Gen. L aws 5314, 5317. 5 a plea of not g uilty in e ach case . The case s wer e hear d on J uly 17, 2002. Bla nkenship filed pre trial motions to quash eac h complaint on the basis that the complaints alleg ed all the offe nses occ urre d in the territoria l limit s of t he city when in fact the off enses oc curr ed outside the c ity or its territorial lim its . T he mot ion s w e re c a lle d to the tr ial cou rt ’s atte nti on on the da y of tr ia l. A ft e r s ome discussion as to the date of filing, the motions were ove rruled a s being untimely “under local rule s.” Se e als o Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt . 4 5. 01 9( f) (We st Su

pp . 2 00 4- 05 ); c

f. Tex. Code Crim. P roc. Ann. ar t. 4.14(b) (West 2005) (r elating to indictments and informations). The motions to quash are not in the appellate r ecor d.

After the State re sted its case, B lankenship moved for an i n structed judg ment of acquittal in ea ch ca se, inte r a lia , on the basis that the S tate had failed to prove the alleg ation that the offe nses occ urre d in the t err itorial limit s of t he city but in fac t had proved without dispute that the
o ff en s es h ad occurre d outside the terr itorial limi ts of the city . The trial c ourt asked f or “written
argume nts .” We fi nd no ru lin g on the mot ion s f

or ins tr uc te d ju dg me nts of

a c qu itt a l. B lank e ns hip testified and pr esente d his defense
. The muni cipal court acquitted Blanke nship of five of the thirteen char g es and took the othe r ca ses under advisement. On August 22, 2002, the municipal cour t found B lank e ns hip g uil ty

of fi ve of fe ns e s o f d e ve lopi ng or chang ingthe us e of pr op e rt y wi tho ut f

ir st ob ta ini nga sit e pla

n a pp ro va l and re le a se by the c ity of Au sti n. B lank e ns hip wa s a lso fo un d guil tyI n order to perfe ct an a

ppeal f rom a municipal c ourt of re cord, a n appella n t m u s t fi le a 6 motion for new tria l setting for th “the points of er

ror of which he complains.” SeeTex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 30.00014(c ) (West 2004). 6 of three offe nses of failing to observe a st op-work order posted at t he si te of the property involved. The trial c ourt assesse d a $1,000 fine in eac h of the e ight c ases.

Bla nkenship filed a motion for ne w trial setting forth, inte r a lia , a “point of error ” 6 complaining the State fa iled to prove ve nue as a lleg ed in e ach complaint. The motion was over ruled. Notice of appea l was g iven to County Court at L aw No. 1 of

Travis County
. In his appellate br ief in county court, B lankenship ag ain ra ised the conte ntion that venue had not been proven as alleg ed. On appe al, the County

Court at L aw No. 1 of

Travis County considere d only one of Bla nkenship’s points of err or—that beingthe fa ilure of the State to pr ove its alleg ation i n eac h complaint that the offe nses occur red in the territoria l limi ts of the city of Austin. The c ounty

court in its opi nion sustained Bla nkenship’s conte ntion, rever sed the eig ht convictions, and did not rea ch Bla nkenship’s other points of e rror .

The c ounty

co u rt fo u n d that the evidenc e showe d and the pa rties ag ree d that the
a c tio ns g ivi ng ri se to the a lle g e d o ff e ns e oc c ur

re d o uts ide the te rr ito ri a l li mit s o f t he c ity of Au sti n but inside th e ci t y o f Au stin’s ex trater ritorial jurisdiction as provided in Chapter 42 of the Te x as L ocal Gove rnment Code. SeeTex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. §§ 42.001, .021(5) ( West 1999).

I t is clear that the Austin Municipa l Court of Record had orig inal exclusive criminal jurisdiction to try

violations of cer

tain city ordinanc es both within the territorial limits of the city andA mu n i c i p a l c o u rto f r e c o r d h a s c r i m i n a l j ur i s d i c t i o n o v e r m i s d e m e an o r s p un i s h a

b l e b y a 7 fin e only
. SeeTex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. arts. 4.01, 4.14 (West 2005); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 29.003(a) , 30.00005(a) , (b) ( West 2004). I t is observed that said section 30.00005(a) , (b) provides a municipa l court of r ecor d the jurisdiction provided by g ener al law f

or a r egu l ar , nonrec ord municipal court a

nd jurisdiction over cr iminal cases a rising unde r ordinanc e author ized by sect io n s 2 1 5
. 0 7 2 , 2 1 7
. 0 4 2 , 3 4
. 1 9 0 3 , an d 4 0 1
. 0 0 2 o f th e T e xa s L o c a l G o v e r n me n t Co de. See ge ne ra lly Thr e ad gil l v . S tate , 275 S.W .2d 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954).

7 outside those limit s but w ithin a ge og raphic al ar ea loc ated within the extraterr itorial jurisdiction of the city
. The issue is not one of jurisdiction, but failure to prove ve nue as la id.

7 The c ounty

court re cog nized the require ment of a r ti c le4 5
. 0 1 9 ( c ) but concluded it wa s “nonsense ” to ar g ue the c omplaint must alleg e the of fense occur

red w ithin the territorial limits of
a city when “the truth of the matter is that the offe nse, if any , occur red in E TJ [ex tra ter

ritorial jurisdiction] of the c ity .” The county court’s opinion di scussed how in its opinion eac h complaint should have a lleg ed venue as beingin the extraterritorial jurisdiction and the ba sis for extending the court’s r eac h beyond the terr itorial limi ts of the city such as r efe re n cing sec tion 401.002(a) of the Te xas L oc a l Go ve rnme nt Cod e or oth e r a pp lic a ble law. Th e c ounty c ourt c on c lud e d th a t “ be c a

us e the prosec ution did not prove an esse ntial element of its ca se, this prosecution must fail.”

I n light of B lankenship’s point o f err or, the issue wa s not whether e ach c omplaint pr op e rl y c ha rg e d a n o ff e ns e . Ea c h co mpl a int did c ha rg e an off e ns e and wa s su ff ic ie nt o n it s f

a c e to invoke the jurisdiction of the Austin Municipal Court of Recor d. Fur ther, the issue w as not the p ro p er ma

nner of pleadingeac h offe nse. The sole issue is the conseque nce of the fa ilure of the prosec ution to prove venue as laid under the par ticular c ircumstance s of these c ases.8 The State ha s appea led the judgme nts of reve rsal to this Court. The State c oncede s the failure to pr ove the venue alleg ation but c ontends that the err or was harmless a nd the convictions must stand.
Ve nue

Venue is disti nct from jurisdiction. Sk ill e rn v. S tate , 8 9 0 S. W. 2 d 8 4 9 , 8 5 9 ( T e x. App.—Austin, 1994, pet. ref ’d). The terms are not sy

nony mous. Ma rti n v . S

tate , 385 S.W .2d 260, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964). J urisdiction is the authority or powe r co n fe rr ed u p on a cour t by the constitution and laws of the State that a llows a co u rt t o hear and try a ca se. Ri e we , 13 S.W .3d at 41 0; Ol iv o v . S

tate , 9 18 S.W. 2d

51 9, 52 2 ( Te x. Cr im . App . 1 99 6) ; Ex parte W atson , 601 S.W .2d 35 0, 35 1; Sk

ill e rn , 890 S.W .2d at 859. Venue means the pla ce where the ca se may be tried. So liz

v . S tate , 9 7 S. W.3 d 1 37 , 1 41 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ); Tho ma s v . S tate , 6 9 9 S. W. 2 d

8 4 5 , 8 5 4 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 75 ); Sk

ill e rn , 890 S.W .2d at 859. At common law, ve nue mea nt the neig hborhood, place , or county

in which the injury

is declar ed to have been done or i n fac t declar ed to have ha pp e ne d. B la c k’ s L aw D ic tio na ry 15 57 (6 th e d. 19 91 ); So liz , 97 S.W .3d at 141. Venue denotes locality , and its preva iling meaning is the place of trial, the g eog raphic al location in which an ac tion or proc eedingshould be broug ht to trial. 92 C.J .S. Venue§ 2.

Venue is not a constituent element of the offe nse cha rg ed. Sk ill e rn , 890 S.W .2d at 86 0; s e e a l

s o H e n l e y v . Sta te , 98 S.W. 3d

73 2, 73 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —Wa c o 2 00 3, pe t. r e f’ d) ; 40 Di x § 2
. 8 2 (c i t i n g Fa irf

ie ld v . S tate , 610 S.W .2d 771, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) ). Ve n u e m u s t be proved only

by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt . 1 3. 17 (We st 20 05 ); Ba nk

s v . S tate , 5 30 S.W. 2d

94 0, 94 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 75 ); Go nz ale s v . S tate , 734 S.W .2dThe pre sumption i s clea rly not applicable in the instant c ase. 8 I n Go lli ha r v . S

tate , 465 S.W .3d 243 (Tex. Crim. A p p . 2001), the c ourt cre ated a 9 dich o t o m y b etwee n fede ral a nd state re view. Se e Sm ith v . S tate , 1 3 5 S. W. 3 d

2 5 9 , 2 6 2 ( T e x. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.). In Fu lle r v . S tate , 93 S.W .3d 250, 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), the Court of C riminal Appea ls rec og nized that the Gollihar standard w as cle arly

not the same a s the 9 140, 142 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no pet.). The f ailure of proof of venue by the prosecution does not neg ate the gu i l t o f t h e acc used. Fa irf ie ld , 610 S.W .2d at 779. I t is presumed that venue was p ro v ed at trial unless disputed at trial or the r ecor d aff irmatively

shows the contra

ry . See T e x. R. App. 44.2(c )(1)
. I t m u s t be re membere d, howeve r, that if the issue of venue is timely

raised, 8
reve rsible err or may result from the failure to pr ove venue as laid in the cha rg ing instrument. See Blac k v . S tate , 6 45 S.W. 2d

78 9, 79 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 83 ); c f. S an de r v . S tate , 52 S.W .3d 909, 917 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 2001, pet. re f’d)
.

Wit h this backg ro u n d , we turn to the varia nce be tween the venue a lleg ed and the venue pr oven. The failure to prove ve nue as laid in e ach complaint was err or. Was it harmless err or
or re versible e rror ? The State re lies upon Go lli ha r v . S tate , 46 S.W .3d 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001), claiming that there was only an immateria l varianc e that did not pr ejudice B lankenship’s substantial rig hts. Id . at 248
. Th e State a c kn ow le dg e s th a t th e ve nu e a c tua lly pr ov e d w a s o uts ide the c ity lim its but in a g e og ra ph ic a l are a

wi thi n th e e xtrate rr ito ri a l juri sd ic tio n o f t he c ity in T ra vis County , St a te of Texas, and ove r which the Austin Municipal Court of Record ha d exclusive criminal jurisdiction to try violations of certain city ordinanc es. Henc e, the varia nce betwee n the venue alleg ed and the venue pr oven wa s immaterial re g ardingBla nkenship’s substantial rig hts. N o r ma ll y , v ar ia

n c e c la im s ar e tr e a te d a s s u f f ic ie n c y o f th e e v id e n c e p r o b le ms. Id
. a t 24 7. A state re vie w of the su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e is m e a sure d b y the e le me nts of

the of fe ns e 9J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 44 3 U. S. 30 7, 31 9 ( 19 79 ) s tand ard of me a suri nge vid e nc e su ff ic ie nc y a g a ins t the substantive eleme nts of the cr iminal offense as def ined by state law. 10 as def ined by the hy pothetically co rrect cha

rg e for the ca se. Id
. at 2 5 3 (c i t i n g Ma lik v . S tate , 953 S.W .2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)). The Malik te st is als o ap pli c a ble to non -j ur

y or be nc h tr ia ls. Ma lik, 953 S.W .2d at 240.

As ob se rv e d e a

rl ie r, ve nu e is n ot a

c on sti tue nt e le me nt of

the of fe ns e . It ne e d o nly be prove d by

the prepondera

nce of the evidence, and the fa ilure to prove ve nue does not ne g ate the g uilt of the defe ndant. The Gollihar construct doe s not apply

to the issue here prese nted. We reje ct the State’s ar g ument that it does.

Bla nkenship relies upon Blac k v . S tate , 645 S.W .2d 789, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) for the pr oposition t hat when ve nue is made a n issue in the trial co u rt , the fa ilure to prove ve nue
co n s t i tutes reve rsible er

ror. The failure to prove ve nue in Smith C ounty as laid in the B lack indictment r esulted in a

summary reve rsal of the conviction. Black ha s b e e n r e pe a te dly

c ite d w ith approva l, e.g. , Ed

war ds v . S tate , 9 7 S. W.3 d 2 79 , 2 85 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 20 03 , p e t.
re f’ d) ; Sa nd

e r v . S tate , 5 2 S. W.3 d 9 09 , 9 17 (T ex . App .— B e a umo nt 2 00 1, pe t. r e f’ d) ; W illiams v. Sta te , 92 4 S .W. 2d

18 9, 19 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 96 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; Six ta v . S tate , 875 S.W. 2d 17 , 1 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 94 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; O’ Ha ra v . S tate , 837 S.W .2d 139, 1 4 2 -4 3 (T ex . Ap p . —

Au s t i n1 9 9 2 , p et
. re f’ d ). Inm o s tca s es ci t i n g Black, howeve r, venue was proven a s alleg ed by

direc t or circ umstantial evidenc e or venue was presumed under Rule 44.2( c)( 1) of the Te x as Rules of Appe llate Proce dure. We have not found in recent ca ses a discussion of Blac k ’s summary

reve rsal appr oach.11 Black was de cided be fore the adopt io n of the Te x as Rules of Appe llate Proce dure a nd its ha rm le ss e rr or

ana ly sis pr ov isi on s. Rul e 44 .2 (a ), (b ) p ro vid e : (a) Co n s t itutional

Error
. I f

th e a p p e l l a t e r e c o r d

i na c r i m i n a l c a s e r e v e a ls c on sti tut ion a l e rr or

that is su bje c t to ha

rm le ss e rr or re vie w, the c ourt of a pp e a ls must rever se a judg ment of convic tion o r p u n i shment unless the court deter mines bey ond a re asonable doubt that the err or did not contribute to the conviction or punishment. (b) Ot he r E rro rs . Any

other e rror , defe ct, i rr egularity , or var iance that does not aff ect substantial rig hts must be disreg arde d. Tex. R. App. P . 44.2(a) , (b).

I n Cai n v . S

tate , 9 4 7 S
. W.2d 262 (Tex. C rim. App. 1997), the Court of Criminal Appea ls wrote:
Exc e pt f or c e rt a in f e de ra l c on sti tut ion a l e rr or s la be le d b y the Un ite d St a te s Su

pr e me Court as “struc tural,” no error , whether it relates to jurisdiction, voluntariness of a plea, or any other mandatory

require ment, is categ orica lly immune to a h a

r ml e s s err or analy sis. . . . [ A]ppellate courts should not autom atically fore close the a

pplication of the ha rm le ss er ro r te st to ce rt a in cate g or ie s of er ro r. Whe re an e rr or

is s ho wn to be harmless, it is not a g round for reve rsal, reg ardle ss of the cate g ory o r l ab el attache d to that particular err or.
Id . at 264. I t is clear that the failure to prove ve nue when the issue is raised at trial is now subject to a harm analy sis rathe r t han an automatic re versa l of the convic tion. I s the err or in failingto prove
v e nu e in th e in s ta n t c a s e a c o n s ti tuti o n a l o r n o n - c o n s ti tuti o n a l e r r o r f o r h ar m a n a ly s is p ur

p o s e s ? We be lie ve that Ba th v . S

tate , 951 S.W .2d 11 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, pet. ref’d) answe rs the question:“Vicina g e” means “1. vincinity ; pr ox imity
. 2. The plac e whe re the crime is committed, 10 or a tria l is he ld; the place from which jurors are to be drawn for trial use, the locale from which the acc used is entitled to have juror s selecte d.” B lack’ s L aw Dic tionary 7th ed. at 1561. 12 Th e “ vic ina g e” pr ov isi on of the Sixth A me ndme nt s tip ulate s th a t in a ll 10 criminal prose cutions, the ac cused sha ll be tried by an impartial jury of the State “and district where in the crime shall have been committ ed, which district shall have be en previously

asce rtained by

law. . .
. ” U. S . Const., amend. VI . Neither fede ral nor state a uth or iti e s, ho we ve r, c ur

re ntl y re qu ir e a

pp lic a tio n o f t

his cla us e to s tate prosec utions. Se e Coo k

v . M orril l , 783 F .2 d 5 93 , 5 95 (5 th C ir . 1 98 6) ; Ma rti n v . B e to , 397 F.2d 741, 748 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. de nied , 3 9 4 U
. S
. 9 0 6 , 8 9 S
. C t
. 1 0 0 8 , 2 2 L. Ed . 2 d 2 16 (1 96 9) ; Sta te v . P aiz , 8 17 S.W. 2d 84 , 8 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); but see Pa iz , 817 S.W .2d at 86 (a ssuming, arguendo , that it did a pp ly ). We t he re fo re ho ld that no err or in relation to the vicina ge p ro v i s i on of the Six th Amendment was comm i t t ed in the tra

nsfer of appe llant’s case from Webb to Nuec es County . Point of er ror ten is ove rruled.
Id. at 19. See als o G ar

za v . S tate , 974 S.W .2d 251, 259 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. ref ’d). We must determine the harm of the non-c onstitut ional err or on the ba sis of whether it affe cted B lankenship’s subst antial rig hts. SeeTe x. R. A pp . P. 44 .2 (b ). A s ub sta nti a l r ig ht i s aff ecte d when the e rror

had a substantial a

nd injurious e ffe ct or influence in determining the jury ’s verdic t or the fa ct-finde r’s de cision. Se e Kin g v . S tate , 953 S.W .2d 266, 2 7 1 (T ex . Crim. App. 19 97 ); Ra nk

in v . S tate , 995 S.W .2d 210, 215 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Di s t
. ] 1 9 9 9 , pet. re f’d)
. A c ri min a l c on vic tio n sh ou ld no t be ov e rt ur ne d fo r no n- c on sti tut ion a l e rr or if the re vie wi ngc ourt , a ft e r e xami nin g the re c or d a s a wh ole , ha s a fa ir a ssu

ra nc e that the e rr or

did no t in fl ue nc e the fa c tfinder, or had slig ht effe ct. J

o h n s o n v . Sta te , 967 S.W .2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Le mm on s v . S

tate , 75 S.W .3d 513, 525 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. ref ’d).13 I n our har m a naly sis, we examine c erta in f actor s which are not exclusi ve. See O rana
v . S tate , 791 S.W .2d 125, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The sourc e of the err or wa s article 45.019( c) wh ic h ma nd a tor ily re qu ir e d th e pr os e c uti on

to a lle g e the of

fe ns e oc c ur

re d w ith in t

he te rr ito ri a l li mit s of the municipality . The nature of the err or was the failure to pr ove venue a s laid. Each c omplaint expressly ref err ed to the State of Te x as, Tra vis County , and the City

of Austin. Each complaint contained a

leg al desc ription of t he property involved. The de scription place d the prope rty outside the city limit s but within t he extraterr itorial are a of the city of Austi n over which g eog raphic al ar ea in T ra v i s County

the Austin Municipal Court of Recor d had sole c riminal jurisdiction to t ry
v i o lations of cer

tain city ordinanc es. Such leg al desc ription should have aler ted B lankenship and g iven notice that the offense s conce rningthe prope rty occur red outside the c ity . Bla nkenship’s counsel filed motions to quash the complaints o n the basis of misalleg ation of venue . Counsel argued that if a

ny witn es s testified the prope rty was within the city

limit s, the witness would be gu i lty of per jury . The motions were overr uled as be ing untimely

filed. I t does not appea r B lank e ns hip wa s mis le d b y the imp ro pe r v e nu e a lle g a tio n. Th e State ’s wi tne sse s and B lank e ns hip all testified the prope rty

was outside the c ity

limit s. The State did not emphasize the er ror. There is no showing that B lankenship wa s preve nted from pr es en t i n g a def ense, including his own de s ignated “ 1704” def ense that the proper

ty had bee n “g randf

ather ed in” by

ear lier law and w as exempt from the application of city ordinanc es. F ur ther, ho ldi ngthe e rr or

ha rm le ss w ill no t e nc oura g e the State to r e pe a t w ith impunity
. The S tate is burdene d with article 45.019(c) until a leg islative revision occ urs. The issue of ve nu e is n ot a

n e le me nt o f t

he of fe ns e s a lle g e d a

nd fal ls outsi de the pr ote c tio n o f t he Do ub le14

J eopar dy Clause. I f there was a reve rsal here for the failure to prove ve nue as a lleg ed, no prohibition exis ts ag ainst repr osecution. Se e Ma rti n , 1 35 S.W. 2d a t 26 1; O’

Ha ra , 83 7 S.W. 2d a t 14 3; 4 0 D ix § 2.83. A re versa l would not accor d Bla nkenship protec tion from a re trial. An examination of the rec ord as a whole in t his bench trial g ives us fair a ssuranc e that the er ror did not influ en ce t h e trial judge. Se eSc ag gs v . S tate , 1 8 S. W. 3 d

2 7 7 , 2 9 0 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref ’d). L ike the County Court a

t L aw No. 1 of Travis County , we find that there was e rror in the failure to prove ve nue as la id, but unlike that court, we ha ve per formed a

harm a naly sis and have c oncluded that the non- constitutional error is ha rmless. SeeTex. R. App. P . 44.2(b). The judgments of the C ounty Court at L aw No. 1 of Travis County are reve rsed a nd the ca uses ar e re manded to that cour t for conside ration of B lankenship’s other points of error
.

J ohn F. Onion, Jr., J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Puryear and Onion * Reverse d and Remande d Filed: June 29, 2005 Pub lis h

Be fore J ohn F. Onion, Jr., Presiding Judge (re tired), Court of Crimi n al Appeals, sitti ng by * assig nment. SeeTex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.003(b) ( West 1998).