[Cite as State v. Cockroft, 2014-Ohio-1644.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 13AP-532 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 03CR-6715) 

Anthony Cockroft, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on April 17, 2014 

 

 

Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Kimberly M. Bond, 

for appellee. 

Anthony Cockroft, pro se. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

O'GRADY, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Anthony Cockroft, appeals from a judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying his March 4, 2013 motion for 

resentencing. Because postrelease control was not properly imposed, we reverse and 

remand this matter for resentencing in accordance with the law and this decision. 

I. BACKGROUND 

{¶ 2} In 2003, appellant was indicted for aggravated robbery, in violation of R.C. 

2911.01, aggravated murder with specifications, in violation of R.C. 2903.01, attempted 

murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02, and tampering with evidence, in violation of R.C. 

2921.12. A jury found appellant guilty as charged in the indictment. 
No. 13AP-532 2 

{¶ 3} The trial judge orally pronounced appellant's sentence on May 13, 2004. 

Pertinent to this appeal are the following comments regarding postrelease control: 

I do have to advise you with respect to at least when you are 

released from the institution, you will have a period of postrelease control. 

If there is a period of post-release control, which I believe 

there will be, if you commit any violations while you are on 

post-release control, the sentence could be extended 

administratively as part of that sentence. The extension 

would be for a maximum of one-half the prison term 

depending on what the post-release control will be at that 

time. 

If you commit any felony offenses while you are on postrelease control, any sentence that court would impose would 

run consecutive. 

(Tr. Vol. IV, 163.) A judgment entry journalizing appellant's sentence was filed on May 19, 

2004, stating in pertinent part, "[a]fter the imposition of sentence, the Court notified the 

Defendant, orally and in writing, of the applicable periods of post-release control 

pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c), (d) and (e)." (R. 154.) The record does not reflect that 

appellant received a "Prison Imposed" notice. That notice advises a defendant of the 

imposition of postrelease control. It includes details such as the length of the term, 

whether the term is mandatory, and the consequences for violating postrelease control.1 

The only other document in the record from 2004 that refers to postrelease control is a 

"Disposition Sheet," which is signed by the trial judge and dated May 13, 2004, but is not 

signed by appellant or appellant's trial counsel. On that form, a check mark appears next 

to the indication: "Defendant notified of Bad Time and Post Release Control In [sic] 

writing and orally." (R. 162.) The words "Post Release Control" are circled. 

{¶ 4} Appellant filed a direct appeal to this court. He did not raise, nor did this 

court consider, any issues regarding the postrelease control portion of appellant's 

sentence. We affirmed the trial court's judgment in 2005. State v. Cockroft, 10th Dist. 

 

1 See State v. Williams, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1135, 2011-Ohio-6231, ¶ 4-6, for a description of the "Prison 

Imposed" notice used in practice before the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. The notice may be 

signed by a defendant on the date of sentencing. See id. at ¶ 4-5; State v. Williams, 195 Ohio App.3d 505, 

2011-Ohio-4653, ¶ 4 (10th Dist.); State v. Ragland, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-451, 2014-Ohio-798, ¶ 16.
No. 13AP-532 3 

No. 04AP-608, 2005-Ohio-748 ("Cockroft I"). Subsequently, in In re Criminal 

Sentencing Statutes Cases, 109 Ohio St.3d 313, 2006-Ohio-2109, ¶ 35, the Supreme Court 

of Ohio remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing pursuant to State v. 

Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856. 

{¶ 5} On June 1, 2006, the trial court held a new sentencing hearing pertaining to 

the aggravated robbery, attempted murder, and tampering with evidence charges. The 

trial court imposed the same sentences that it originally imposed. The trial judge did not 

mention postrelease control during the hearing. A judgment entry journalizing 

appellant's sentence was filed on June 16, 2006. That entry began by restating the 

contents of the May 19, 2004 sentencing entry in its entirety.2 The only language 

regarding postrelease control was the above-quoted language from 2004. There is no 

other documentation in the record referencing postrelease control. 

{¶ 6} Following the resentencing, appellant again appealed to this court and we 

affirmed. State v. Cockroft, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-752, 2007-Ohio-2217 ("Cockroft II"). No 

issues regarding the postrelease control portion of appellant's sentence were raised or 

considered. Id. The Supreme Court refused the discretionary appeal. State v. Cockroft, 

115 Ohio St.3d 1412, 2007-Ohio-4884. 

{¶ 7} On March 4, 2013, appellant filed a motion for resentencing with the trial 

court arguing the court failed to impose a mandatory term of postrelease control during 

the 2006 resentencing. The trial court denied appellant's motion. From that judgment, 

appellant filed the instant appeal. 

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶ 8} Appellant presents us with the following assignment of error for our review: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED 

APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR RE-SENTENCING: WHERE 

THEREIN IT WAS SHOWED THAT A MANDATORY TERM 

OF POST-RELEASE CONTROL HAD NOT BEEN IMPOSED. 

III. DISCUSSION

{¶ 9} Initially, we note appellant is proceeding pro se and "Ohio courts hold pro 

se litigants to the same rules and procedures as those litigants who retain counsel." 

 

2 The trial court changed some of the language from present to past tense. 
No. 13AP-532 4 

Williams v. Lo, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-949, 2008-Ohio-2804, ¶ 18, citing Whitehall v. 

Ruckman, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-445, 2007-Ohio-6780, ¶ 21. With that in mind, we must 

address the inconsistency between appellant's merit brief and his reply brief. In 

appellant's merit brief, he argues the trial court failed to properly impose postrelease 

control during the 2006 resentencing. Thus, he requested the following relief: 

Appellant respectfully request [sic] that this Appellate Court 

vacate the trial court's denial of Appellant's Motion For Resentencing and remand this matter to the trial court for de 

novo sentencing. 

(Appellant's brief, 3.) 

{¶ 10} In his reply brief, appellant argues that the June 16, 2006 sentencing entry 

is not a final appealable order. He changed his request of this court to the following: 

Clearly the trial court's June 16th re-sentencing journal entry 

does not constitute a final appealable order: therefore this 

appeal must be dismissed, with an accompanying order to the 

trial court ti [sic] issue a final appealable order: Where 

appellant is entitled to be present in accordance with 

Crim.R.43(A). 

(Appellant's reply brief, 3.) 

{¶ 11} The appealability of the June 16, 2006 sentencing entry is not at issue in 

this appeal. Furthermore, the arguments in appellant's reply brief are confusing and they 

fall outside the parameters of his assignment of error. "[T]his court rules on assignments 

of error only, and will not address mere arguments." Ellinger v. Ho, 10th Dist. No. 08AP1079, 2010-Ohio-553, ¶ 70, citing In re Estate of Taris, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1264, 2005-

Ohio-1516, ¶ 5. Accordingly, the arguments in appellant's reply brief will not be 

considered. 

{¶ 12} Pursuant to his single assignment of error, appellant argues that the 

June 16, 2006 judgment entry journalizing his June 1, 2006 resentencing is void because 

the trial court failed to properly impose a mandatory term of postrelease control at 

resentencing. Thus, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for 

resentencing. We agree that error occurred. 

{¶ 13} We recognize, "when a judge fails to impose statutorily mandated 

postrelease control as part of a defendant's sentence, that part of the sentence is void and 
No. 13AP-532 5 

must be set aside." (Emphasis sic.) State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 

¶ 26 Furthermore, "a void postrelease control sentence is not precluded from appellate 

review by principles of res judicata and may be attacked at any time." State v. 

Quintanilla, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-388, 2013-Ohio-5711, ¶ 10, citing State v. Billiter, 134 

Ohio St.3d 103, 2012-Ohio-5144, ¶ 10. 

{¶ 14} In this district, we have "applied a 'totality of the circumstances' test to 

determine whether or not the defendant was properly notified of post-release control." 

State v. Boone, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1054, 2012-Ohio-3653, ¶ 25, quoting State v. 

Williams, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1135, 2011-Ohio-6231, ¶ 23; State v. Jordan, 10th Dist. No. 

13AP-666, 2014-Ohio-1193, ¶ 10. Based on that approach, we have concluded "the trial 

court sufficiently fulfilled its statutory obligations when, taken as a whole, its oral and 

written notifications, including those at the sentencing hearing, properly informed the 

defendant of post-release control." State v. Wilcox, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-402, 2013-Ohio4347, ¶ 4, citing State v. Clark, 2d Dist. No. 2012 CA 16, 2013-Ohio-299, ¶ 59, citing 

Boone at ¶ 18, citing State v. Mays, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-113, 2010-Ohio-4609, and State 

v. Townsend, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-983, 2011-Ohio-5056; Jordan at ¶ 10. 

{¶ 15} After reviewing our precedent in this area, we find that the circumstances in 

this case are substantially similar to the circumstances in State v. Williams, 195 Ohio 

App.3d 505, 2011-Ohio-4653 (10th Dist.), such that our analysis in that case guides our 

actions here. In Williams, we concluded that the trial court did not properly impose 

postrelease control. As in this case, the original sentencing entry in Williams stated, " 

'[a]fter the imposition of sentence, the Court notified the Defendant, orally and in writing, 

of the applicable periods of post-release control pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c), (d) 

and (e).' " Id. at ¶ 2. During the sentencing hearing, the trial judge orally advised the 

defendant of a mandatory period of postrelease control, but did not tell him the length of 

that period or inform him of the potential sanctions for violating postrelease control. Id. 

Additionally, the record did not reflect that the defendant received a standard "Prison 

Imposed" notice, which would have advised him of the imposition of postrelease control, 

the length of the term, and the consequences for violating postrelease control. See id.; see 

also Williams, 2011-Ohio-6231, at ¶ 4-6 (describing the "Prison Imposed" notice). 
No. 13AP-532 6 

{¶ 16} The trial court subsequently held a resentencing hearing but did not orally 

advise the defendant about postrelease control. Williams, 2011-Ohio-4653, at ¶ 4, 16. 

The judgment entry issued following resentencing stated, " '[t]he Court previously notified 

the Defendant, orally and in writing, of the applicable periods of post-release control 

pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c), (d), and (e).' " Id. at ¶ 5. The record did not reflect 

that the defendant signed a "Prison Imposed" notice at the resentencing hearing. Id. at 

¶ 4. Following our review of the law and the record, this court concluded that the trial 

court in Williams did not properly impose postrelease control at either the original 

sentencing or the resentencing. We remanded the case for resentencing limited to 

properly imposing postrelease control. 

{¶ 17} In the case at bar, the original sentencing entry has the exact same language 

pertaining to postrelease control as the original sentencing entry in Williams, 2011-Ohio4653. The content of the judgment entries commemorating both individual's resentencing 

is substantially similar. Appellant's entry restates, verbatim, the "applicable periods" 

language from the original entry. Williams' entry harkened back to the original 

sentencing and quoted the "applicable periods" language from the original entry in part. 

Neither appellant nor Williams received an oral notification regarding postrelease control 

during resentencing, and neither record contains a "Prison Imposed" notice. 

{¶ 18} The oral notification appellant received during his original sentencing is 

different than the notification Williams received. Appellant was advised that he would be 

subject to postrelease control following his release from prison. However, at the original 

sentencing, the court was unclear about the mandatory nature and term of postrelease 

control. Furthermore, at his resentencing, the court made no pronouncement regarding 

the mandatory nature of postrelease control and the terms. As this court noted in 

Williams, citing the Supreme Court of Ohio's opinion in State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 

200, 2009-Ohio-2462, "when [the] trial court failed to notify the offender of the 

mandatory nature of the post-release control term and of the length of that term and to 

incorporate such notification into its sentencing entry, 'the court failed to satisfy the most 

basic requirement of R.C. 2929.191 and our existing precedent.' " Williams, 2011-Ohio4653, ¶ 15, fn. 2, quoting Bloomer at ¶ 69. The Williams court went on to note the 

significance of a "Prison Imposed" notice: 
No. 13AP-532 7 

As an alternative to an oral notification made during the 

course of the hearing in which the trial court personally 

advises the offender of postrelease control, this court has 

sometimes relied upon the use of the "Prison Imposed" notice 

to meet the requirement that appellant be notified at the 

sentencing hearing of the imposition of postrelease control 

* * *. See State v. Mays, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-113, 2010-Ohio4609; State v. Chandler, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-369, 2010-Ohio6534; State v. Easley, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-505, 2011-Ohio2412; and State v. Cunningham, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-452, 

2011-Ohio-2045. We have also determined that this same 

notice can work in conjunction with the judgment entry to 

provide the required notice. 

Id. at ¶ 16. One of our more recent decisions shows this remains true. Jordan at ¶ 11-13. 

{¶ 19} The same cannot be said about the "Disposition Sheet" that appears in the 

record in this case. We have identified a disposition sheet in past cases; however, it has 

not been relied on in determining whether a defendant was properly notified of 

postrelease control to the same extent as the "Prison Imposed" notice. Compare Jordan

and Williams, 2011-Ohio-4653, to Mays and State v. Addison, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-554, 

2011-Ohio-2113, ¶ 16-17; see also Boone. Moreover, although the "Disposition Sheet" in 

this case indicates, via a check mark and the trial judge's signature, that appellant was 

notified of postrelease control in writing and orally, that statement is not supported by the 

record as a whole. See Williams, 2011-Ohio-4653, at ¶ 18. Therefore, we conclude that 

the trial court failed to properly impose postrelease control at either appellant's original 

sentencing or at resentencing. That part of appellant's sentence is void and must be set 

aside. 

{¶ 20} The state contends "there is no 'void' sentence problem" in this case because 

both the 2004 and 2006 sentencing entries notify appellant of the "applicable periods" of 

postrelease control. (Appellee's brief, 4.) The state misapplies our precedent with regard 

to "applicable periods" language. It is established in this district that "post-release control 

may be properly imposed when * * * 'applicable periods' language in the trial court's 

sentencing entry is combined with other written or oral notification of the imposition of 

post-release control." (Emphasis added.) State v. Ragland, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-451, 

2014-Ohio-798, ¶ 17, citing State v. Darks, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-578, 2013-Ohio-176, ¶ 12, 
No. 13AP-532 8 

citing State v. Myers, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-909, 2012-Ohio-2733, ¶ 11; Townsend at ¶ 7-

14; State v. Holloman, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-454, 2011-Ohio-6138, ¶ 11. The other written 

and oral notifications in this case are simply deficient. 

{¶ 21} As a result, appellant contends that he is entitled to de novo resentencing. 

He is mistaken. Both appellant's original sentencing and resentencing occurred before 

July 11, 2006, which was the enactment date of R.C. 2929.191. R.C. 2929.191 "provides 

courts with a procedure to correct post-release control errors. * * * In 2009, the Supreme 

Court held that R.C. 2929.191 only applies retrospectively to those offenders sentenced 

after its July 2006 enactment." Wilcox at ¶ 6. Thus, R.C. 2929.191 does not apply to 

appellant. In Wilcox, we observed:

In Fischer, the [Supreme Court of Ohio] considered sentences 

lacking post-release control notification that were imposed 

prior to the effective date of R.C. 2929.191. In so doing, the 

court determined that such sentences were only partially void, 

and could be corrected to properly impose post-release 

control with a limited sentencing hearing. * * * Therefore, a 

sentence lacking post-release control notification does not 

entitle a criminal defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing; 

rather, the defendant is entitled to be resentenced only on the 

post-release control portion of his or her sentence. 

Id. at ¶ 7, citing Fischer at ¶ 10, 28-29. Accordingly, appellant is only entitled to be 

resentenced regarding the postrelease control portion of his sentence. 

{¶ 22} Finally, we note "that an individual sentenced for aggravated murder is not 

subject to post-release control because that crime is an unclassified felony to which the 

post-release control statute does not apply." Id. at ¶ 10, citing State v. Clark, 119 Ohio 

St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 36, citing R.C. 2967.28. However, "[w]hen a defendant has 

been convicted of both an offense that carries mandatory post-release control and an 

unclassified felony to which post-release control is inapplicable, the trial court's duty to 

notify of post-release control is not negated." Id., citing State v. Brown, 8th Dist. No. 

95086, 2011-Ohio-345, ¶ 8, citing State v. Taylor, 2d Dist. No. 20944, 2006-Ohio-843.

IV. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 23} Accordingly, appellant's assignment of error is sustained to the extent 

explained above, and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is 
No. 13AP-532 9 

reversed. We remand this case for resentencing limited to properly imposing postrelease 

control as part of appellant's sentence consistent with the mandates of the law and this 

decision. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded with instructions. 

BROWN and DORRIAN, JJ., concur.