Filed 1/27/ 23 In re S.K. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re S.K. , a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. D.K., Defendant and Appellant. F084582
(Super. Ct. No. 03CEJ300077

- 2)



### OPINION

THE COURT *
APPEAL from order s of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Todd Eilers, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Paul A. Swiller , under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Daniel C. Cederborg , County Counsel, and Carlie Fla ugher , Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

- ooOoo

-

* Before Hill, P. J., Franson, J. and Peña, J.2

. INTRODUCTION D.K. (mother) and M.R. (father) are the parents of S.K. (born September 2017). Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 360. 1 Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the Fresno County Department of Social Services (the department) and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law because
mother and extended family members were not asked about S.K.’s Indian ancestry. 2 The department concedes error, but argues mother was not prejudiced because proceedin gs are ongoing and the error can be cured without disturbing the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders. Alternatively, the department submits to a limited remand for compliance with ICWA. For the reasons discussed herein, we accept the depa rtment’s concession of error. However, c onsistent with our recent decisions in In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566 ( K.H. ) and In re E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 123 ( E.C. ) , we conclude “the error is prejudicial because neither the [department] nor the cour t gathered information sufficient to ensure a reliable finding that ICWA does not apply and remanding for an adequate inquiry in the first instance is the only meaningful way to safeguard the rights at issue. ([ In re A.R. (2021)] 11 Cal.5th [234,] 252

– 254 [( A.R. )].) Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, as set forth herein.” ( K.H. , at p. 591; accord,
E.C. , at p p

. 157

– 158.)

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are preferred by many.” ( In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)3

. FACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3
I. Petition On April 27, 2022, the department filed a petition on behalf of S.K. pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect). S.K. had already been detained and placed with Melissa G . who was her former foster mo ther and a long

- time friend of mother. The petition contained an Indian Child Inquiry Attachment (ICWA

- 010(A)) form indicating a social worker conducted an ICWA inquiry with father and he gave no
reason to believe S.K. was or could be an Indian child.
II. Detention The detention report stated ICWA may or may not apply. Father denied Indian ancestry, but it was unknown whether mother had Indian ancestry. An ICWA inquiry had not been made with mother because she was hospitalized. The department noted that in a prior dependency case ICWA had been found inapplicable a nd it would provide further information in the jurisdiction report. On April 28, 2022, the juvenile court held the detention hearing. Father was present, but mother was no t. The court asked father if he had Indian ancestry. Father responded, “Not that I know of.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found S.K.’s continued detention was necessary.
I II. Jurisdiction and Disposition The jurisdiction and disposition report stated ICWA did not apply. Father had denied Indian ancestry. 4 The department recommended that the juvenile court find that ICWA did not apply.

3 Because the sole issue on appeal concerns ICWA, we restrict our facts to those bearing on that issue or helpful for clarity.
4 The report also contained an erroneous statement that mother orally denied Indian ancestry at the detention hearing. However, at the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the department informed the court that mother was not present at the detention hearing and struck the comment from the report.4

.

On June 14, 2022, the juvenile court held a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Neither pa rent was present. The court found ICWA did not apply and sustained the allegations. On June 29, 2022, mother filed a notice of appeal. DISCUSSION
I. ICWA
A. Background
“ ‘ ICWA is a federal law giving Indian tribes concurrent jurisdiction over state

cour t child custody proceedings that involve Indian children living off of a reservation ’ [citations] , in furtherance of ‘ federal policy “ ‘ that, where possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian community ’ ” ’ [citations]. ‘ ICWA establishes minimum federal standards, both procedural and substantive, governing the removal of Indian children
from their families ’ [citations] , and ‘ [w]hen ICWA applies, the Indian tribe has a right to intervene in or exercise jurisdiction over the proceeding .’ ” ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 594, fn. omitted; accord, E.C. , supra , 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 138, fn. omitted.) “ ‘In 2006, California adopted various procedural and substantive provisions of ICWA.’ [Citations.] The Legislature’s ‘primary objective ... was to i ncrease compliance with ICWA. California Indian Legal Services (CILS), a proponent of the bill, observed that courts and county agencies still had difficulty complying with ICWA 25 years after its enactment, and CILS believed codification of [ICWA’s] requirement s into state law would help alleviate the problem. [Citation.]’ ” ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 595; accord, E.C. , supra , 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 138

– 139.) “ ‘In 2016, new federal regulations were adopted concerning ICWA compliance. [Citation.] Foll owing the enactment of the federal regulations, California made conforming amendments to its statutes, including portions of the Welfare and Institutions Code related to ICWA notice and inquiry requirements. [Citations.] Those changes
became effective Ja nuary 1, 2019 ....’ [Citation.] Subsequently, the Legislature5

.

amended section 224.2, subdivision (e), to define ‘reason to believe,’ effective September 18, 2020.” ( K.H ., supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 595

– 596, fn. omitted; accord,
E.C. , supra , 85 Cal.App.5 th at p. 139.)
B. Summary of Duties of Inquiry and Notice “[W]hether a child is a member, or is eligible for membership, in a particular tribe is a determination that rests exclusively with the tribe, and neither the [department] nor the court plays any r ole in making that determination. [Citations.] ‘ “Because it typically
is not self

- evident whether a child is an Indian child, both federal and state law mandate certain inquiries to be made in each case.” ’ ” ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 596;

acc ord, E.C. , supra , 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 139

– 140.) “In California, section 224.2 ‘codifies and elaborates on ICWA’s requirements of notice to a child’s parents or legal guardian, Indian custodian, and Indian tribe, and to the [Bureau of Indian Affairs].’ ” ( In re A.R. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 197, 204.) Cal ifornia law imposes “an affirmative and continuing duty [on the court and the county welfare department] to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under [s]ection 300, ... may be or has been filed, is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “The [state law] duty to inquire begins with the initial contact, including, but not limited to, asking the party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that the child may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “If a child is placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to [s]ection 306 ... the county welfare department ... has a duty to inquire whether that
child is an Indian child. Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, p arents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custod ian is domiciled.”6

.

(§ 224.2, subd. (b).) 5 Additionally, “[a]t the first appearance in court of each party, the court shall ask each participant present in the hearing whether the participant knows or
has reason to know that the child is an Indian child. The court shall instruct the parties to inform the court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) “If the initial inquiry provides ‘reason to believe’ that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding

— that is, if the court or social worker ‘has information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe’

—

then the court or social worker ‘shall make f urther inquiry’ regarding the child’s possible Indian status as soon as practicable.” ( In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 999 ( Ezequiel G. ), citing § 224.2, subd. (e).) “Further inquiry ‘includes, but is not limited to, all of the following: [ ¶] (A) Interviewing the parents, Indian custodian, and extended family members[;] [¶] (B) Contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the State Department of Social Services[; and] [¶] (C) Contacting the tribe or tribes and any other person that may reason ably be expected to have information regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or eligibility.’ ” ( Ezequiel G. , at
p. 999.) “If there is ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child, the agency shall provide notice to the relevant tribes and ag encies in accordance with section 224.3,
subdivision (a)(5).” ( Ezequiel G. , supra , 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 999, citing § 224.2,

5 “Courts have recognized it is somewhat inaccurate to refer to the agency’s

‘ “ ‘initial duty of inquiry’ ” ’ [citation] because the duty ‘ “begins with the initial contact” (§ 224.2, subd. (a)) and continues throughout the dependency proceedings’ [citation]. However, in this case, like many others, an ICWA inquiry w as made only of the parents and after the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply at the detention hearing, no further information was gathered. Given that our discussion on error ... focuses on the first step of the inquiry and does not involve the duty of further inquiry or notice, we use the term duty of initial inquiry.” ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 597, fn. 10.)7

.

subd. (f).) “There is ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child if any one of six statutory
criteria is met

— i.e., if the court is advised that the child ‘is an Indian child,’ the child’s or parent’s residence is on a reservation, the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court, or either parent or the child possess an identification card indicating membership or
citizenshi p in an Indian tribe.” ( Ezequiel G. , at p. 999, citing § 224.2, subd. (d).)
I I
. Analysis
A. Summary of ICWA Inquiry Here, the record reflects that the department and the juvenile court only conducted an ICWA inquiry with father. The department had been unable to inquire of mother because she had been hospitalized. The department noted that in a previous dependency case ICWA had been found not to apply but failed to provide further information. Neither is there any indication that Melissa, who had plac ement of S.K., was inquired of. Nevertheless, the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply. Mother argues that remand is required with instructions for the department to conduct a proper inquiry. The department acknowledges that only father was inquired of and concedes error, but argues no prejudice occurred because the proceedings are ongoing and the error can be cured without disturbing the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders . Alternatively, the department agrees to a limited remand fo r compliance with ICWA. Recently, in K.H. and E.C. , we addressed ICWA error at the inquiry stage. There, we explained our decision not to follow the approaches articulated by other appellate courts for determining whether ICWA error requires reversal and concluded that the Supreme Court’s decision in A.R. supplies the appropriate framework for assessing prejudice in this context. ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 607

– 608 , citing A.R. , supra , 11 Cal.5th at pp. 252

– 254; accord, E.C. , supra , 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 152 .) Applying the standards we articulated in K.H. and E.C. , as we will discuss below, we8

.

conclude the department’s error is prejudicial and remand for the department to conduct a proper, adequate, and duly diligent inquiry is necessary

. B. Standard of Review “The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to the proceeding rests on two elemental determinations, ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.’ ” ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601 , quot ing § 224.2, subd. (i)(2)); accord, E.C. , supra , 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 142

– 143 .) First, “[t]he court must find there is ‘no reason to know whether the child is an Indian child,’ which is dependent upon whether any of the six circumstances set forth in sub division (d) of section 224.2 apply.” ( K.H. , supra , at p. 601 , quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C. , supra , at p. 143 .) Second, “[t]he juvenile court must ... find a ‘proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence ....’ ” ( K.H. , at p. 601 , quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2)); accord, E.C. , at p. 143 .) Under the substantial evidence standard, “ ‘a reviewing court should “not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” [Citation.] The determinat ions should “be upheld if ... supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.” ’ [Citations

. ] The standard recognizes that ‘[t]rial courts “generally are in a better position to evaluate and weigh the evidence” than appellate courts’ [ citation ] , and ‘an appellate court should accept a trial court’s factual findings if they are reasonable and supported by substantial
evide nce in the record’ [citation] . ‘[I]f a court holds an evidentiary hearing, it may make credibility determinations, to which an appellate court would generally defer.’ ” ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601 ; accord, E.C ., supra , 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 143 .) The juvenile court’s finding on the second element, however, “is ultimately discretionary because it requires the juvenile court to ‘engage in a delicate balancing of’ various factors in assessing whether the agency’s inquiry was proper and adequate wit hin the context of ICWA and California law, and whether the agency acted with due9

.

diligence.” ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601 , quoting In re Caden C. (2021) 11
Cal.5th 614, 640; accord, E.C. , supra , 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 143 ; Ezequiel G. , supra , 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1004

– 1005.) Therefore, we employ a hybrid standard and review the court’s determination for substantial evidence and abuse of discretion. ( K.H. , at p. 601 ; accord, E.C. , at pp. 143

– 144 ; Ezequiel G. , a t pp. 1004

– 1005.)

“ ‘Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different [from review for substantial evidence], focused not primarily on the evidence but the application of a legal standard. A court abuses its discretion only when “ ‘ “the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal
di scretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” ’ ” [Citation.] But “ ‘ “[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of t he trial
court” ’ ” [Citations.] [¶] While each standard here fits a distinct type of determination under review, the practical difference between the standards is not likely to be very pronounced.’ ” ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; accord, E.C. , supra , 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 143

– 144.) “Review of the juvenile court’s findings under the foregoing standards is deferential, but ‘ “an appellate court [nevertheless] exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of l aw.” ’ [Citations

. ] Where the material facts are undisputed, courts have applied independent review to determine whether ICWA’s requirements were satisfied.” ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; accord,
E.C. , supra , 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 144.) C. Depa rtment and Juvenile Court Erred
1. Duties As previously mentioned, “[a]t the first appearance in court of each party, the

court shall ask each participant present in the hearing whether the participant knows or
has reason to know that the child is an Indi an child. The court shall instruct the parties to10

.

inform the court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) Moreover, when “a child is placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare department ..., the county welfare department ... has a duty to inquire whether [the] child is an Indian child. Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, oth ers who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) Extended family members inc lude adult grandparents, siblings, brothers

- or sisters

- in

- law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and first or second cousins. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).) “If the court[ or the department] has reason to believe that an Indian child is
invol ved in a proceeding, but does not have sufficient information to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child, the court[ or the department] shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) “There is reason to believe a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child whenever the court, social worker, or probation officer has information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.” ( Id

. , subd. (e)(1).) County welfare department s “ must on an ongoing basis include in its filings a detailed description of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all information received pertaining to the child ’ s Indian status, as well as evidence of how and when this information was provided to the relevant tribes. Whenever new information is received, that information must be exp editiously provided to the tribes.” ( Cal

. Rule s of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5) .) 6

6 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.11

. 2. Juvenile Court’s Finding Unsupported by Substantial Evidence Here, the department inquired only of father, which fell short of complying with the plain language of section 224.2, subdivision (b). “ We recognize the frustration with the sheer volume of cases suffering from this fundamental defect given that the vast majority of inquiries will not result in a finding that a child is or may be an Indian child. However, ‘ [t]he judiciary, in reviewing statutes enacted by the Legislature, may not undertake to evaluate the wisdom of the policies embodied in such legislation; absent a constitutional prohibition, the choice among competing policy considerations in enacting
laws is a legislative function. ’ [Citation

. ] [County welfare departments] and lower courts are, by now, on very clear notice of the problems caused when little to no inquiry
is made. While we are not persuaded that compliance with section 224.2 will prove

onerous once [county welfare departments] provide a record of their efforts for the juvenile court to review, we may not interpret the law to relieve either one of the burden of complying with the plain directives of the statute. ” ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 619

– 620, fn. omitted.) “[T] he law demands more than merely inquiring of ... [f]ather” ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 620, citing In re Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 43 1 ; accord, In
re M.M. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 61, 74, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S276099 (dis. opn. of Wiley, J.) ), a point the department does not dispute. There may be cases in which there is no one else to ask, but if that is so, the record must be developed to reflect th at fact and supported by documentation. (Rule 5.481(a)(5).) “On a well

- developed record,
the court has relatively broad discretion [in such cases] to determine [that] the [department’s] inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific fact s of the

case. ” ( K.H. , at p. 589; accord, E.C. , supra , 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 157.) Under these circumstances, the department did not fulfill its statutory duty of inquiry. (§ 224.2, subds. (b) & (e).) As a result, the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA12

.

did not apply was not supported by substantial evidence, and its contrary conclusion was an abuse of discretion. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
D. Prejudice “Where, as here, the deficiency lies with [a department’s] duty of initial inquiry and a juvenile c ourt’s related finding of ‘proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence’ (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2)), the error is one of state law ( [ In re ] Benjamin M. , supra , 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742). Under the California Constitution, ‘ [n] o judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an ex amination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)” ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 606 ; accord, E.C. , supra , 8 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 151 .)

“ ‘[T]o be entitled to relief on appeal from an alleged abuse of discretion, it must clearly appear the resulting injury is sufficiently grave to manifest a miscarriage of justice’ [citations] , and California law generally interpr ets its constitutional miscarriage of justice requirement ‘as permitting reversal only if the reviewing court finds it reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but
for the error

. ’ ” ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p p. 606

– 607; accord , E.C. , supra , 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 151

– 152.) However, in A.R. , the Supreme Court “recognized that while we generally apply a
Watson [ 7 ] likelihood

- of

- success test to assess prejudice, a merits

- based outcome

- focused

test is not always appropriate because it cannot always adequately measure the relevant
harm. [Citation

. ] In other words, where the injury caused by the error is unrelated to an outcome on the merits, tethering the showing of prejudice to such an outcome mis places

7 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.13

.

the measure, at the expense of the rights the law in question was designed to protect.” ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609, italics omitted.) As we explained in K.H. , “ ‘ICWA compliance presents a unique situation ....’ ” ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.Ap p.5th at p. 608 .) “ICWA is not directed at reaching, or protecting, a specific outcome on the merits.” ( Id

. at p. 609 ; accord, E.C. , supra , 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 154.) Rather, “ ‘[t]he purpose of ICWA and related California statutes is to provide notice to the tribe sufficient to allow it to determine whether the child is an Indian child, and whether the tribe wishes to intervene in the proceedings’ [citation] , and an adequate initial inquiry facilitates the information gathering upon which the court’s
IC WA determination will rest.” ( K.H. , at p. 60 8 ; accord, E.C. , at pp. 152

– 153 .) Yet, “while the appealing party is usually a parent, parents do not bear the burden of gathering information in compliance with ICWA [citations] , and parents may raise the claim of error for the first time on appeal.” ( K.H. , at p. 608 ; accord, E.C. , a t p. 153 .) Further, the ultimate determination whether a child is an Indian child rests with the tribe, not with a parent, the department, or the juvenile court. ( K.H. , at p. 590 ; accord, E.C. , at pp. 139

– 140.) “Although the duty of inquiry is a continui ng one (§ 224.2, subd. (a)), as we have seen in countless cases, including here, if the inquiry is inadequate at the outset, the likelihood that the opportunity to gather relevant information will present itself later in the proceeding declines precipitous ly.” ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609 ; accord,
E.C. , supra , 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 154 .) “Thus, ‘the relevant injury under ICWA is not tied to whether the appealing parent can demonstrate to the juvenile court or a reviewing
court a likelihood of suc cess on the merits of whether a child is an Indian child[, under a
standard Watson analysis]. The relevant rights under ICWA belong to Indian tribes and they have a statutory right to receive notice where an Indian child may be involved so that they may m ake that determination. It necessarily follows that [in the context of
ICWA and consistent with A.R. ,] the prejudice to those rights lies in the failure to gather14

.

and record the very information the juvenile court needs to ensure accuracy in determining w hether further inquiry or notice is required, and whether ICWA does or does not apply. Many cases do not proceed beyond the inquiry at the first stage in the compliance process and, therefore, ensuring adequacy and accuracy at this step is critical’ ” ( E. C. , at p. 154, quoting K.H. , at p. 591) , and “ ‘requiring adequacy as the law directs “is generally the only meaningful [ ] way to safeguard the statutory right[s]” as intended under ICWA and related California law [citation]. If this step is disregarded, the protection Congress and the state Legislature intended to afford tribes goes unrealized

. ’ ” ( E.C. , at p. 154, quoting K.H. , at p. 609.) As we explained in K.H. , “where the opportunity to gather the relevant information critical to determining whether the child is or may be an Indian child is lost because there has not been adequate inquiry and due diligence, reversal for correction is generally the only effective safeguard.” ( K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 610, citing
A.R. , supra , 11 Cal.5th at pp. 252

– 254; accord, E.C. , supra , 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 155.) Here, the department’s inquiry, limited only to father , “ ‘fell well short of that required to gather the information needed to meaningfully safeguard the rights o f the tribes, as
intended under ICWA and California law’ ” ( E.C. , at p. 156 , quoting K.H. , at p. 620) , and “[a] finding of harmlessness on this record would necessarily require speculation and ‘is at odds with the statutory protections that ICWA and California law intend to afford
India n children and Indian tribes

. ’ ” ( E.C. , at p. 155 , quoting K.H. , at p. 611. ) Therefore,
the error is prejudicia l and reversal is required

. We recognize that mother is appealing from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and disposition al findings and order s , and that the d epartment and juvenile court “have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child ... is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) However, the error in this case, left uncorrected, is prejudicial; and in K.H. and E. C. , we explained that “ ‘if the inquiry is inadequate at the outset, the likelihood that the opportunity to gather relevant information will present itself15

.

later in the proceeding declines precipitously.’ ” ( E.C. , supra , 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 154 , quoting K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609.) Accordingly , the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is conditionally reversed and the matter is remanded . T he juvenile court is instructed to
ensure the d epartment conducts “ ‘a proper, adeq uate, and duly diligent inquiry under
section 224.2, subdivision [s] (b) [and (e)] , and document its inquiry in the record in compliance with rule 5.481(a)(5).’ ” ( E.C. , supra , 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 157, quoting
K.H. , supra , 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 621.) “ ‘T his should not be interpreted as requiring an exhaustive search for and questioning of every living relative of [ S.K. ]’ but ‘[w]e leave that determination for the juvenile court in the first instance because it is better positioned
to evaluate the evidence provided by the [ d ] epartment. So long as the court ensures the inquiry is reasonable and of sufficient reach to accomplish the legislative purpose underlying ICWA and related California law, the court will have an adequate factual foundation upon which t o make its ICWA finding. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)’ ” ( E.C. , at
p. 157, quoting K.H. , at p. 621.) DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is conditionally reversed,
and th e matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to order the department to comply with the inquiry provisions set forth in section 224.2, subdivisions (b) and (e), and the documentation provisions of rule 5.481(a)(5). If, after determining that an adequate inquiry was made consistent with the reasonin g in this opinion, the court finds that ICWA applies, the court shall vacate its existing order and proceed in compliance
with ICWA and related California law. If the court instead finds that ICWA does not apply, its ICWA finding shall be reinstated. In all other respects, the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders are affirmed.