COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Humphreys, Clements and Senior Judge Coleman 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

MICHAEL LEE SAMMONS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0089-00-2 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS 

 MAY 29, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

John F. Daffron, Jr., Judge 

 D. Gregory Carr (Bowen, Bryant, Champlin & 

Carr, on brief), for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Appellant Michael Lee Sammons was convicted in a bench trial 

of first degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of 

murder, robbery, and use of a firearm in the commission of 

robbery. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying 

his motion to suppress inculpatory statements he gave to police. 

Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this 

case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential 

value, this opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of this appeal. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
 Specifically, Sammons asserts on appeal that the police, over 

a lengthy period of time in a cramped room, made numerous promises 

of leniency, applied psychological pressures, threatened to 

prosecute members of his fiancee's family, and led him to believe 

that his freedom or life depended on his cooperation with them. 

His inculpatory statements, he argues, were not voluntary and it 

was error, therefore, on the part of the trial court to deny his 

motion to suppress them. 

 On appeal from a trial court's denial of a motion to 

suppress, the burden is on the appellant to show that the denial 

of the motion constituted reversible error. See Fore v. 

Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731, cert. 

denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980). We review the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to the Commonwealth 

all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from it. E.g., 

Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 

48 (1991). 

 "The Commonwealth has the burden to prove, by a preponderance 

of the evidence, that a defendant's confession was freely and 

voluntarily given." Bottenfield v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 316, 

323, 487 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1997). The voluntariness issue is a 

question of law requiring an independent determination on appeal. 

E.g., Wilson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 549, 551, 413 S.E.2d 

655, 656 (1992). "In assessing voluntariness, the court must 

determine whether 'the statement is the product of an essentially 

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free and unconstrained choice by its maker, or . . . whether the 

maker's will has been overborne and his capacity for 

self-determination critically impaired.'" Roberts v.

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 554, 557, 445 S.E.2d 709, 711 (1994) 

(quoting Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 140, 314 S.E.2d 

371, 381 (1984) (internal quotations omitted)). In making that 

independent determination, "we are bound by the trial court's 

subsidiary factual findings unless those findings are plainly 

wrong." Wilson, 13 Va. App. at 551, 413 S.E.2d at 656. 

"Conflicts in evidence present factual questions that are to be 

resolved by the trial court," which "'must evaluate the 

credibility of the witnesses, resolve the conflicts in their 

testimony and weigh the evidence as a whole.'" Mills v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 459, 468, 418 S.E.2d 718, 723 (1992) 

(quoting Albert v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 734, 738, 347 S.E.2d 

534, 536 (1986)). 

 In determining voluntariness, we look to the "'totality of 

all the surrounding circumstances,' including the defendant's 

background, experience, mental and physical condition and the 

conduct of the police." Commonwealth v. Peterson, 15 Va. App. 

486, 488, 424 S.E.2d 722, 723 (1992) (citation omitted). In 

considering the conduct of the police, we "must consider the 

interrogation techniques employed, including evidence of trickery 

and deceit, psychological pressure, threats or promises of 

leniency, and duration and circumstances of the interrogation." 

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Terrell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 285, 291, 403 S.E.2d 387, 390 

(1991). 

 Here, Sammons was arrested and taken into custody by 

Chesterfield County police on January 16, 1998, for unrelated 

charges in a "church burglary." After Sammons signed a waiver of 

his Miranda rights, he was interviewed by Detectives Truehart and 

Baker. Truehart told Sammons, 

I expect you to tell me the truth. I told 

you I'd be square with you and I'd help you 

to the fullest, didn't I? If I catch you in 

a lie, I'm gonna hammer you. And you got a 

baby coming here, be due, in what, a couple 

months. 

 

 After the officers questioned Sammons about the unrelated 

"church burglary," the interview shifted to the murder of James 

Lambrecht. Sammons first asked what was going to happen to him, 

whether he would be going to jail or would "get off." Truehart 

told Sammons he had no control over whether Sammons went to jail, 

but he would put in a "very good word" for him with the 

Commonwealth's attorney. Truehart implored Sammons to tell him 

the truth, and Baker told Sammons it would help him a lot if he 

told them about the murder. Truehart reminded Sammons again about 

the baby Sammons was expecting and told Sammons he needed to think 

of himself. Thereafter, Sammons gave a version of the murder that 

implicated solely his codefendant, Jason Gregory. 

 Later during the same interview, Sammons asked for the 

officers' help, reminding them that he had a baby on the way. 

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Truehart responded that he was going to help Sammons and that 

Sammons had to look out for himself. Truehart also told Sammons 

that the more he did for the officers, the more they would do for 

him. Truehart further advised Sammons, "[Y]our life depends on 

you this moment and you got to tell us everything you know." 

 Later in the interview, Baker and Sammons engaged in the 

following exchange: 

 Baker: Mike, we will help you out the 

best we can. We'll go to the Commonwealth's 

attorney and help you out the best we can. 

But we're going to need your help on this, 

too. 

 Sammons: I will go to court and testify 

for you all, but I cannot go to jail. I will 

not be able to handle that mentally. Not 

again. 

 Baker: Well, we can't tell you that 

you're not going to go to jail. Okay. 

That's not up to us. That's not our shot. 

You know what will happen. Right here today 

you'll have to go in front of the magistrate. 

And we can, we, Detective Truehart and I, 

will both go to the magistrate and tell that 

you've cooperated with us. But we can't make 

any promises to you. You know that. 

Baker also implored Sammons to be totally honest and assured him 

that they knew Gregory was the "bad guy" and that they were "not 

looking to hammer" Sammons. 

 During the interview, the officers twice offered Sammons a 

drink and permitted him to go to the restroom when he requested to 

do so. Throughout the interview, Sammons blamed Gregory for the 

murder, insisting that Gregory had acted independently and that 

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Sammons was unaware of Gregory's intention to rob or kill 

Lambrecht. 

 Subsequently, Baker and Detective Steve Smith interviewed 

Sammons. Smith began the interview by accusing Sammons of having 

lied to the officers earlier. He told Sammons that Gregory had 

accused Sammons of shooting Lambrecht. Smith also implied that, 

if Sammons did not tell the truth, the police might have to 

involve Sammons's future father-in-law in the murder investigation 

and charge Sammons's fiancee's sister, who was in the car after 

the murder, as an accessory after the fact. 

 When Sammons refused to change his version of what happened, 

Smith, who knew from other evidence that Sammons was involved in 

the killing, told Sammons: 

Let me tell you something, son. You're 

lying. I'm telling you that straight up. 

Now do you want to face a capital murder 

charge, robbery, and death in result of a 

robbery? . . . Now let me tell you one more 

time. You better start telling the truth. 

If you don't, you're going to be the worst 

guy in this whole scenario. 

Smith further told Sammons that a jury would not believe his 

inconsistent story and that he had better start "singing," because 

he was "digging [his] hole deeper." 

 When Smith and Baker suggested to Sammons that they knew 

where to get the gun Sammons used to shoot Lambrecht, Sammons 

confessed his part in the robbery and murder and apologized for 

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lying to the officers. At no time did Sammons seek to terminate 

the interview or talk to an attorney. 

 The record in this case contains a transcript of the initial 

interview with Sammons; an audiotape, videotape, and transcript of 

the second interview; and brief testimony of Detectives Smith and 

Baker regarding the second interview. Other than what is revealed 

in the transcript of the first interview, we have no record of the 

circumstances of that interview. Nor can we ascertain from the 

record when the second interview occurred or how long it 

continued, although the videotaped portion of that interview 

lasted no more than two hours, including breaks in the 

questioning. Sammons is seen smoking a cigarette during that 

interview. 

 At the suppression hearing, the trial court determined that, 

while the police "were alternately leaning on [Sammons], 

challenging his statements, telling him he was lying on matters, 

and . . . making other [vague and oblique charges] as to his 

[fiancee's] sister, to his potential father-in-law and to what may 

happen with him vis-à-vis the co-defendant," the police did not as 

a matter of law, overbear the will of the accused. Thus, the 

trial court concluded, even though it was the result of a 

"spirited interrogation," Sammons's confession was voluntary. We 

agree. 

 From our independent review of the record, we conclude that 

Sammons made no inculpatory statements to the police during the 

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first interview. He was advised of his Miranda rights and chose 

to talk to the officers. He was given breaks and a drink upon 

request. At various points during the interview, the officers 

expressed their opinion that Sammons's cooperation and 

truthfulness would help him. They advised Sammons that they would 

speak to those in authority on his behalf if he cooperated and 

told the truth. But they further indicated they had no authority 

themselves to make any promises regarding the nature of the 

charges or their outcome. In telling Sammons that he needed to 

think about his unborn child and himself, the detectives, who were 

unaware at the time of Sammons's role in the killing, were, it 

could reasonably be surmised, simply warning Sammons that he 

needed to take the interview seriously, as his answers would have 

an important effect on his and his future family's lives. 

 By the time the second interview commenced, the officers had 

obtained Gregory's version of the events, which incriminated 

Sammons. The officers then used that information, along with 

other information from their investigation, to encourage Sammons 

to reveal his true involvement in the crimes. In asking Sammons 

if he wanted "to face a capital murder charge," the police were, 

we believe, advising, rather than threatening, Sammons that 

Gregory, the suspected triggerman, was fingering Sammons as 

Lambrecht's killer. Without the truth from Sammons, Gregory's 

version of the facts might prevail and Sammons might be prosecuted 

for capital murder. The police further advised Sammons that, in 

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weighing his credibility, a jury might disbelieve him because he 

was telling so many versions of what occurred. Furthermore, the 

officers knew that one of the guns involved in the murder belonged 

to Sammons's future father-in-law and that Sammons's fiancee's 

sister, Victoria DeMaio, was a passenger in the car with Sammons 

and Gregory after the killing. This knowledge formed the basis of 

the officers' claims that Sammons, because he was being 

untruthful, was "dragging [his future father- and sister-in-law] 

into this." 

 Thus, in considering the totality of the circumstances, we 

hold that the officers merely persuaded, rather than coerced, 

Sammons to confess and that, as evidenced by Sammons's apology to 

the officers for his previous lies, Sammons's confession was 

voluntary. Hence, the trial court did not err in refusing to 

suppress Sammons's inculpatory statements. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling denying 

Sammons's motion to suppress his confession and affirm appellant's 

convictions. 

 Affirmed. 

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