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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES MICHAEL GLEATON,

Defendant.

 /

Case No. 09-20136

Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS[12]

At a hearing held on June 15, 2009, this matter came before the Court on

Defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made to the police. The statements

were made while Defendant, James Michael Gleaton, was at the police station being

questioned by Detective Christopher Boulter of the Blackman Township, Michigan

Police Department. Defendant was not informed of his right to remain silent prior to his

statements, and therefore argues that they must be suppressed. See Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (ruling that all persons subject to custodial

interrogation must be informed of their right to remain silent). The government

responds that Defendant was not in police custody when he made the statements; and

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thus, Miranda warnings were not required. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s

motion to suppress is DENIED.

I. Facts

Defendant James Michael Gleaton lent his personal computer to Michael

Cadwallader. (Gov’t Resp. at 2). Cadwallader found pornographic images of children

on Defendant’s computer and, on October 10, 2008, reported this discovery to the

police. (Id.). On October 15, 2008, Defendant reportedly attempted to enter

Cadwallader’s house to retrieve Defendant’s belongings. (Id.). Cadwallader informed

Defendant that he had discovered pornographic images of children on Defendant’s

laptop and had reported this finding to the police. (Id.). Cadwallader told Defendant

that he did not want to see him again, and Cadwallader’s wife called the police. (Id.).

The officers who arrived on the scene instructed Defendant to return later that day to

the Cadwallader home to collect his belongings. (Id.). At approximately 1:00 p.m. on

October 15, 2008, Detective Boulter arrived at the Cadwalladers’ home in response to a

dispatch requesting an officer’s presence while Defendant removed his belongings.

(Id.). At that time, Boulter advised Defendant that he needed to talk to him about the

images found on his computer. (Id.). Defendant, not in handcuffs, rode to the police

headquarters in the front seat of Boulter’s unmarked vehicle. (Id.). At the police station,

Boulter interviewed Defendant, who, without having been read his Miranda rights,

admitted to downloading and possessing child pornography. (Id. at 3). 

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II. Analysis

The issue in this case is whether Defendant’s interview was a custodial

interrogation which would require Miranda warnings, or noncustodial which would not

require them. Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the

evidence that the interview was a custodial interrogation. See United States v. Smith,

783 F.2d 648, 650 (6th Cir. 1986) (“The burden of production and persuasion rests on

the person seeking to suppress evidence.”). 

A. Miranda Warnings

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in part, “No

person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”

U.S. Const. amend. V. In order to provide a safeguard to secure the privilege against

self-incrimination, the Supreme Court has decided that all defendants subject to

custodial interrogation must be informed of their right to remain silent. See Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444. Any statement made by Defendant stemming from a

custodial interrogation without the use of such a safeguard may not be used by the

prosecution. Id.

Defendant argues that Boulter considered him to be the only suspect, and

therefore he should have been read his Miranda rights. This argument is without merit.

The custodial determination “depends on the objective circumstances of the

interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or

the person being questioned.” Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 632 (6th Cir. 2003)

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(citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (per curiam)). Boulter’s

unexpressed subjective belief is irrelevant. That Defendant was the only suspect is

likewise irrelevant. Rather, it is the “compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, and

not the strength or content of the government’s suspicion at the time the questioning

was conducted” that is important. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346–47

(1976) (quoting United States v. Caiello, 420 F.2d 471, 473 (2d Cir. 1969)). In

Beckwith, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the use of the “focus test” in

determining whether Miranda warnings were required. See Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 347.

B. Determining Custody 

The Supreme Court has defined the custodial interrogation that triggers the need

to give Miranda warnings as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a

person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in

any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. If a person is not in custody, any

statement made may be used by the prosecution. See id.; see also Oregon v.

Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). Accordingly, the court must determine whether

Defendant was in custody at the time he made the challenged statements. 

Although facts specific to a given case influence the custody determination, the

Supreme Court has observed that “the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a

formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a

formal arrest.” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004) (quoting California v.

Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam)). To determine whether Defendant

was in custody when he was being interviewed, it is necessary to look at the totality of

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the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. United States v. Harris, 611 F.2d 170,

172 (6th Cir. 1979). Factors that guide that inquiry include “the location of the interview,

the length and manner of questioning, whether the individual possessed unrestrained

freedom of movement during the interview, and whether the individual was told she

need not answer the questions.” United States v. Panak 552 F.3d 462, 465 (6th Cir.

2009).

C. Application of “Totality of Circumstances” Test

1. Location of Interview

Defendant’s interrogation took place at the police station, but this alone is

insufficient to require Miranda warnings. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495

(declaring that the requirement of Miranda warnings is not imposed “simply because the

questioning takes place in the station house.”); see also Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d at

632 observing that questioning at “a police station does not necessarily constitute

custodial interrogation.”). That Defendant was questioned at the police station, although

an important factor, is not dispositive to the custodial determination. 

2. Length of Questioning

The interview lasted no longer than thirty minutes. One factor the Court found in

Mathiason to support the conclusion that the defendant in that case was not in custody

was the fact that the interview only lasted a thirty minutes. 429 U.S. at 495. Because

the interview here did not last longer than the interview in Mathiason, this supports a

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finding that Defendant was not in custody when he admitted to possessing child

pornography.

3. Manner of Questioning

The government asserts that the manner of the questioning was not threatening,

aggressive, or otherwise coercive, and Defendant does not posit a contrary view.

During the interview, Defendant asked for and received a beverage, was able to send

and receive text messages, and was left unattended on multiple occasions. (Pl.’s Ex. B,

videotaped interview of Def.) Neither the nature nor the tone of the interview was

aggressive.

4. Unrestrained Freedom of Movement During Interview

Defendant was not physically restrained in any way prior to making incriminating

statements to the police. (Id.). Defendant had complete freedom of movement during

the interview, was never handcuffed or otherwise physically restrained, was not told he

was under arrest, threatened with arrest, or told to remain where he was. (Id.). In

United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943, 950 (6th Cir. 1998), the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals used these factors to conclude that a defendant was not in custody.

Additionally, Defendant was free to end the questioning and leave. The door to the

interview room was open during the entire interview, and Defendant was left

unsupervised multiple times. (Pl.’s Ex. B). Defendant was able to use his phone to

send and receive text messages. (See id.). At one point while Defendant was left

unsupervised, he walked to the door of the interrogation room to talk to Detective

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Boulter, who was somewhere in the hallway. (See id.). Defendant was not physically

restrained in any way. 

5. Defendant Not Under Arrest When Questioned

At no time did Detective Boulter state or imply that Defendant was under arrest or

for any other reason not free to leave. At one point during the interview, Defendant

asked, “Am I in trouble for [possessing child pornography]?” (See Pl.’s Ex. B).

Detective Boulter responded, “At this point in time, no.” (See id.). This is constructively

the same as Boulter telling Defendant that he was not under arrest. In determining

whether a defendant is in custody, advising the defendant that he is not under arrest is

arguably the most significant factor. See Salvo, 133 F.3d at 951. This, along with the

freedom of movement afforded to Defendant, is “compelling evidence” that Defendant

was not in custody when he made his incriminating statements. See id.

6. Other Relevant Factors 

Police responded to a call around 4:30 a.m. when Defendant was allegedly trying

to enter into Cadwallader’s home. At this time, it had already been reported to the

police that child pornography had been discovered on Defendant’s computer.

Nonetheless, the police let Defendant leave and instructed him to return later to collect

his belongings from Cadwallader’s house. The interview at issue here took place after

Defendant returned to Cadwallader’s house for his belongings. 

Plaintiff argues that there were locations other than the police station that the

questioning could have taken place. However, the existence of alternative locations is

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not determinative of the “in custody” question. The government responds that the

questioning most likely would have taken place at Cadwallader’s house if Cadwallader

had not insisted on Defendant being removed from his property. Furthermore,

Defendant conceded at the hearing that he voluntarily agreed to ride with Detective

Boulter to the police station. Defendant also conceded that he was not handcuffed and

rode in the front seat of Detective Boulter’s unmarked police car with the doors

unlocked. The relevant inquiry is not how Defendant got to the police station, but rather

whether he went there voluntarily. See Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d at 632 (observing

that the mode in which the defendant is transported for questioning is irrelevant). In

Mason, the court concluded that the defendant was not in custody despite the fact that

he was driven to the police station in a police car. Cf. United States v. Orozco-Torres,

Nos. 06-6070, 07-5335, 2008 WL 4963194, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2008) (finding that

the defendant’s “inculpatory statements were freely and voluntarily given” based upon

his admissions that “he agreed to go . . . to the bureau station,” that he was not told he

was under arrest, “that he was never handcuffed, and that he rode in the front seat of

the agent’s car to and from the station.”).

The only “key players” for the purpose of the custodial determination in the present

case are Detective Boulter and Defendant. Detective Boulter was calm and friendly the

entire interview. Defendant does not contend that Detective Boulter was aggressive,

hostile, or confrontational at any time. Defendant’s demeanor was also calm, and gave

no indication that he thought he could not leave. (Pl.’s Ex. B). 

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III. Conclusion

Because Defendant has not shown that he was in custody when he made

incriminating statements, his motion to suppress is DENIED. 

s/Nancy G. Edmunds 

Nancy G. Edmunds

United States District Judge

Dated: June 16, 2009

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties

and/or counsel of record on June 16, 2009, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Carol A. Hemeyer 

Case Manager

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