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I note that Judge Zatkoff ended his service as Chief Judge in 2004.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

NORTHERN DIVISION

ALLAN KUEHNEMUND,

KUEHNEMUND POTATO FARMS,

K&T FARMS,

Plaintiffs, CASE NO. 08-CV-14647

v. DISTRICT JUDGE THOMAS L. LUDINGTON

MAGISTRATE JUDGE CHARLES E. BINDER

CROP PRODUCTION SERVICES,

INC.,

Defendant.

/

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY

(Dkt. 10)

This order is entered under the authority given to this Magistrate Judge in an

Order of Reference issued by District Judge Ludington pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(A).

I. Background

On December 1, 2008, Plaintiff Allan Kuehnemund filed a motion seeking my

disqualification. The motion also requests that a judicial misconduct inquiry be initiated

against me, that this case be remanded to the state courts, that all reports and recommendations

filed by this judicial officer in cases involving Plaintiff Allan Kuehnemund be reviewed, that

all prior orders issued by this judicial officer relating to said Plaintiff be vacated, and that a

misconduct report be filed with Chief Judge Lawrence Zatkoff.1

 Defendant responded in

opposition to the motion on December 2, 2008, asserting that this motion is another example of

Plaintiff Allan Kuehnemund’s frivolous filings. 
2

In support of his motion, Plaintiff cites litigation to collect payment on a $60,000 debt

between himself and George Jacobs. Mr. Jacobs is married to Ms. Tracy Jacobs, whom

Plaintiff states that I employ as a “legal assistant.” Plaintiff also refers to Ms. Jacobs as my

“legal advisor.” According to Plaintiff,

[t]he legal advisor to Judge Binder (Ms. Jacobs) has harbored resentment towards

the Plaintiff and this resentment and negative posture is obvious in the unfair and

unlawful rulings issued by Magistrate Judge Binder, (instigated by Ms. Tracy A.

Jacobs)[.])

(Dkt. 10 at 2.)

II. Motion Standards

Motions to disqualify are matters committed to the sound discretion of the assigned

judge. See In re M. Ibrahim Khan, P.S.C., 751 F.2d 162, 165 (6th Cir. 1984); Kelley v.

Metropolitan County Bd. of Ed., 479 F.2d 810, 811 (6th Cir. 1973). The Sixth Circuit has

explicitly determined that disqualification must be predicated upon extrajudicial conduct rather

than judicial conduct, and that allegations of bias “must be a personal bias as distinguished

from a judicial one, arising out of the judge’s background and association and not from the

judge’s view of the law.” Easley v. University of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351,

1355-56 (6th Cir. 1988). Similarly, in Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 114 S. Ct. 1147,

127 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that:

[f]irst, judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or

partiality motion. In and of themselves (i.e., apart from surrounding comments or

accompanying opinion), they cannot possibly show reliance upon an extrajudicial

source; and can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism

or antagonism required . . . when no extrajudicial source is involved . . . . 

Second, opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events

occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not

constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep seated

favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. 
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Id. at 555 (citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit clarified the meaning of “personal” bias in

Parker v. Sill, 1993 WL 87432 (6th Cir. 1993), as bias that “stem[s] from an extrajudicial

source and result[s] in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned

from his participation in the case.” Id. at *2.

In assessing whether such personal bias exists to warrant disqualification, the Sixth

Circuit standard is that disqualification is required “only if a reasonable person with

knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” Wheeler v. Southland Corp., 875 F.2d 1246, 1251 (6th Cir. 1989). This standard

is an objective one and “is not based on the subjective view of a party.” Id.

III. Discussion

Plaintiff’s motion must fail because it is based upon a complete factual error: Ms.

Jacobs has never worked for me. Plaintiff entirely misdescribed Ms. Jacobs’ position and

duties. She is neither a “legal assistant” nor a “legal advisor.” Furthermore, she is not

employed by this or any other judicial officer. Ms. Jacobs is a deputy clerk who was hired and

is paid by the Clerk of Court. Ms. Jacobs has never been assigned to the chambers of this

Magistrate Judge. She has, for years prior to this litigation, been assigned by the Clerk to serve

as a case manager in the chambers of the United States District Judge assigned to Bay City. 

She has never discussed with me any litigation, either criminal or civil, involving the Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff’s assertions entirely fail to constitute a basis justifying the requested disqualification. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify is DENIED.
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Review of this order is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), FED. R. CIV. P. 72, and E.D.

Mich. LR 72.1(d). 

 s/ Charles` E Binder 

CHARLES E. BINDER 

Dated: December 2, 2008 United States Magistrate Judge

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that this Order was electronically filed this date, electronically served on

Matthew Leitman, and served by first class mail on Allan Kuehnemund, #26225-039, FCI

McKean, P.O. Box 8000, Bradford, PA, 16701.

Date: December 2, 2008 By s/Jean L. Broucek 

Case Manager to Magistrate Judge Binder