UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

STANLEY LOWE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 08-15186

MICHAEL COX, et al.,

Defendants.

/

ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL

Plaintiff Stanley Lowe, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the G. Robert

Cotton Correction Facility in Jackson Michigan, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is proceeding without prepayment of the filing

fee in this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After careful consideration, the court

will summarily dismiss the complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

I. BACKGROUND

On December 17, 2008, Plaintiff filed the instant action against Defendants

Michael Cox, Michigan Attorney General; Jay B. Rising, Michigan State Treasurer;

Patricia Caruso, Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections; and Michael R.

Smith, Hillsdale County Circuit Court Judge. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants have confiscated ninety percent of his income in violation of federal and

state constitutions and laws. (Pl.’s Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff receives monthly income in

the form of long-term disability payments from the State of Michigan, paid by third-party

administrator, Citizens Management, Inc. (Pl.’s Compl. Attach. “Final Order.”)

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Pursuant to the State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act (“SCFRA”), Mich.

Comp. Laws §§ 800.401, et seq., Defendant State Treasurer Rising filed a state court

action against Plaintiff in Hillsdale County Circuit Court, which Plaintiff attached to his

Complaint. Under SCFRA, 

if it appears that [a] prisoner has any assets which ought to be subjected

to the claim of the state under this act, the court shall issue an order

requiring any person . . . having custody of those assets to appropriate

and apply the assets or a portion thereof towards reimbursing the state as

provided for under this act. 

Mich. Comp. Laws § 800.404(3). The term “‘[a]ssets’ means property . . . including

income or payments to [a] prisoner from social security, worker’s compensation,

veteran’s compensation, pension benefits, previously earned salary or wages, bonuses,

annuities, retirement benefits, or from any other source whatsoever,” Mich. Comp. Laws

§ 800.401a, and is used for the purposes of paying a prisoner’s cost of care while

incarcerated, Mich. Comp. Laws § 800.404(8), not to exceed ninety percent of a

prisoner’s assets, Mich. Comp. Laws § 800.403(3). Defendant Judge Smith accordingly

entered an order authorizing the appropriate officials to secure reimbursement from

Plaintiff for his cost of care while in the correctional facility, not to exceed ninety percent

of Plaintiff’s assets. State Treasurer v. Lowe, et al., No. 08-472-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept.

26, 2008) (“State Court Order”). Plaintiff attached the State Court Order and other state

court pleadings and orders to his Complaint.

Plaintiff requests injunctive relief from this court and restitution of the funds

previously confiscated from him, including interest. (Pl.’s Compl. at 3.)

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II. STANDARD

Civil rights complaints filed by a pro se prisoner are subject to the screening

requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 866 (6th Cir.

2000). Section 1915(e)(2) requires district courts to screen and to dismiss complaints

that are frivolous, fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2); McGore v. Wigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997).

A complaint is frivolous and subject to sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e) if it

lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325

(1989). A plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, when, 

construing the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepting all the

factual allegations as true, the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support

of his claims that would entitle him to relief. Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194,

197 (6th Cir. 1996); Kline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1996); Wright v.

MetroHealth Med. Ctr., 58 F.3d 1130, 1138 (6th Cir. 1995). 

In addition, “a district court may, at any time, dismiss sua sponte a complaint for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated,

unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v.

Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,

536–37 (1974)).

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III. DISCUSSION

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have illegally confiscated his

payments from long-term disability benefits for the payment of his cost of care while

incarcerated. (Pl.’s Compl. at 3.) However, Plaintiff also attaches several pleadings

and court orders from a state court proceeding. These proceedings terminated in

Defendant Judge Smith’s State Court Order, which ordered the reimbursement by

Plaintiff for his cost of care, not to exceed ninety percent of his monthly income,

pursuant to SCFRA. State Treasurer v. Lowe, et al., No. 08-472-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct.

Sept. 26, 2008); (Pl.’s Compl. Attach. “Final Order.”).

Because Plaintiff now seeks to recover the funds which were explicitly the

subject of the state court adjudication and the State Court Order, the court must

examine whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff’s instant suit. Under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, inferior federal courts lack authority to perform appellate

review of state court decisions. See, e.g., Hart v. Comerica Bank, 957 F. Supp. 958,

968-70 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (describing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). The RookerFeldman doctrine originated in two Supreme Court cases, Rooker-Fidelity Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

462 (1983). The doctrine holds that lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to

review challenges to state court decisions, because such reviews may only be had in

the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Tropf v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co.,

289 F.3d 929, 936 (6th Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine in Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), holding that the doctrine

applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state2:08-cv-15186-RHC-MKM Doc # 6 Filed 12/31/08 Pg 4 of 7 Pg ID 44
1 The Sixth Circuit has held in certain circumstances that the anti-alienation

provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001,

et seq., preempt SCFRA. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cox, 447 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2006)

(holding that ERISA’s anti-alienation provision preempts SCFRA’s provision requiring a

prison warden to notify a pension plan fiduciary to redirect pension payments to a

prisoner’s prison address), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007). But see

State Treasurer v. Abbott, 660 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 2003) (holding that ERISA does not

preempt SCFRA), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1112 (2004). However, the Sixth Circuit stated

that its decision did not render “the state incapable of seeking reimbursement using a

prisoner’s pension benefits.” DaimlerChrysler Corp., 447 F.3d at 976.

In any event, the Sixth Circuit’s cases involving ERISA do not foreclose RookerFeldman’s application in the instant case because an ERISA-covered employer did not

pay Plaintiff’s disability payments; the State of Michigan, which is exempted from ERISA

privisions, paid Plaintiff’s benefits. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1); (Pl.’s Compl.

Attach. “Final Order”). Consequently, ERISA’s preemptive capabilities do not affect

SCFRA’s application to Plaintiff, and do not preclude the court from undertaking an

ordinary Rooker-Feldman analysis.

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court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id. at 282-86. Furthermore, the

Sixth Circuit has held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to the orders of lower

state courts. Pieper v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003). 

Plaintiff’s action fundamentally appeals the State Court Order, which Defendant

Judge Smith made pursuant to SCFRA.1

 This is precisely the situation in which RookerFeldman precludes a federal district court review of a state court decision. See Exxon

Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 293. Here, the State Court Order, and successive actions

taken in pursuance of it, constitute the exact injury of which Plaintiff complains. See id.;

(Pl.’s Compl. at 3). Plaintiff seeks restitution of the specific funds which the State Court

Order authorized Defendants to secure for purposes of reimbursement of Plaintiff’s cost

of care and injunction against further confiscation of the funds. (Pl.’s Compl. at 3.) 

Plaintiff was the “state-court loser[]” and now seeks to appeal in federal district court. 

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See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 293. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, acts

as a bar to this court’s jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s Complaint, and therefore this court

lacks the subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s Complaint. See Abbott v.

Michigan, 474 F.3d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 2007); Tropf, 289 F.3d at 936.

Because this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim, Plaintiff

cannot maintain even an arguable basis for subject-matter jurisdiction, as required to

survive the court’s screening under § 1915(e). Without subject-matter jurisdiction, 

§ 1915(e)(2) requires the court to screen and to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint because

he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2); McGore, 114 F.3d at 604 (6th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the court will dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Complaint [Dkt.

# 1] is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the “Order directing service without prepayment

of cost and authorizing US Marshal to collect costs after service is made” [Dkt. # 4] is

VACATED as moot.

 S/Robert H. Cleland

ROBERT H. CLELAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: December 31, 2008

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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record

on this date, December 31, 2008, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

 S/Lisa Wagner

Case Manager and Deputy Clerk

(313) 234-5522

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