UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MARY SCHAEFFER, 

Plaintiff,

Case No. 08-15000

-vs- Hon: AVERN COHN

TRACTOR SUPPLY COMPANY,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an employment discrimination case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. with pendent state law claims. Defendant

Tractor Supply Company (Tractor Supply) sells farm and ranch equipment throughout

the country and has a number of stores in Michigan. Plaintiff Mary Schaeffer

(Schaeffer) was employed by Tractor Supply as a multi-store manager in central

Michigan. Schaeffer claims that Tractor Supply discriminated against her by replacing

her as area manager while she was on non-FLMA medical leave and by creating a

hostile work environment based on gender. 

The complaint is in eight counts:

(I) Violation of Title VII – Sex Discrimination/Disparate Treatment 
2

(II) Violation of the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), Mich.

Comp. Laws § 37.2201 et seq. – Sex Discrimination/Disparate Treatment, 

(III) Violation of Title VII – Sex Discrimination/Hostile Work Environment,

(IV) Violation of the ELCRA – Sex Discrimination/Hostile Work Environment,

(V) Violation of the ADA – Disability Discrimination

(VI) Violation of the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act

(PWDCRA), Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1101 et seq. – Disability

Discrimination

(VII) Violation of Title VII – Retaliation for Protected Activity

(VIII) Violation of ELCRA – Retaliation for Protected Activity

Now before the Court is Tractor Supply’s motion for summary judgment on

grounds that it did not discriminate against Schaeffer on the basis of her sex or disability

but replaced her as area manager because her medical leave had extended into its

busy season. Schaeffer says that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether

Tractor Supply’s proffered reason for replacing her as area manger was pretextual. For

the reasons that follow, Tractor Supply’s motion will be granted.

II. FACTS

Tractor Supply operates retail stores throughout the country. Each store has a

manager. Stores are further divided into districts or areas and each has a manager,

called a multi-store manager. 

On July 9, 2007 Schaeffer began working at Tractor Supply as an area manager

in training. Schaeffer had previously worked as a multi-store manager for JoAnn Fabric. 

George Van Eron (Van Eron), a regional vice president, was Schaeffer’s supervisor and
3

John Ordus (Ordus) was her mentor. 

Schaeffer was one of two female multi-store managers at Tractor Supply. She

says that the male store and multi-store managers in Michigan resented the fact that

Van Eron had hired a female without their input and in place of the male store managers

who were seeking promotions. She says that these co-workers created a hostile

working environment. The specific instances of hostility that Schaeffer cites will be

addressed in the discussion of Schaeffer’s hostile work environment claim.

On September 30, 2007 Schaeffer was promoted to the position of area manager

and was assigned six stores: Lansing West, Lansing North, Charlotte, Ionia, St. Johns,

and Owosso. The six stores had previously been part of the Eastern and Western

Michigan districts. Schaeffer contends that she was assigned the lowest performing

stores in the region. Tractor Supply says that it accommodated Schaeffer’s personal

needs by assigning her the stores that were close to her home.

In October, 2007 Van Eron was promoted to Divisional Vice President and Moira

Corcoran-Giles (Giles) succeeded him as Regional Vice President. After that time

Schaeffer and the other multi-store managers in Michigan reported directly to Giles. 

On January 31, 2008 Schaeffer requested and was granted non-FMLA medical

leave. She was informed that she was not eligible for FMLA medical leave. She was

also informed that Tractor Supply’s non-FMLA medical leave policy does not include job

security. If an employee on non-FMLA medical leave is replaced, she may not return to

her previous job, but is permitted to reapply to any open jobs within the company. 

Schaeffer extended her medical leave several times, providing a variety of reasons

including the flu, high blood pressure, sciatica, and depression. 
4

On February 22, 2008 Schaeffer submitted a note extending her leave from

February 25, 2008 until March 31, 2008. In the middle of February, 2008 Giles decided

to fill Schaeffer’s area manager position. March, April, and May are Tractor Supply’s

busiest months and it asserts that Schaeffer was replaced for this reason. Dale Torbet

(Torbet) was promoted from the position of store manager to area manager and

managed the same stores that Schaeffer had previously managed. 

Schaeffer remained on medical leave until July 30, 2008 when she had

exhausted the six months of non-FMLA medical leave provided by Tractor Supply. At

that time she was administratively terminated. Prior to her termination, and while

maintaining that she was medically unable to work, Schaeffer began working at Party

City. Schaeffer completed an employment application for the job at Party City on July

14, 2008 and was offered employment the same day. She submitted a statement to

Party City saying that she worked 9.5 hours in the pay period ending on July 19, 2008. 

She did not inform Tractor Supply that she was employed elsewhere.

Schaeffer filed two complaints with the EEOC. On May 5, 2008 she filed a

complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and sex. She said that she

was discharged on March 5, 2008 after taking medical leave due to her disability. On

December 14, 2008 she filed a second complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of

sex and gender and retaliation. She said that she was discharged on July 30, 2008

while on sick leave and believed that the discharge was in retaliation for her first EEOC

complaint.
1

Schaeffer relies solely on circumstantial evidence to support her claims. 

Therefore the Court will not address legal standards related to direct evidence of

discrimination.

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence submitted shows that

“there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56©. “A party claiming relief may move,

with or without supporting affidavits, for summary judgment on all or part of the claim.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Accordingly, the movant bears the initial responsibility of

informing the court of the basis for its motion, and identifying what it believes

demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and

supported, an opposing party must set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for

trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). All facts and inferences should be viewed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59

(1970).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The Law

1. Title VII Sex Discrimination: Disparate Impact

Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. To

establish a claim of disparate treatment under Title VII a plaintiff must prove, either through

direct or circumstantial evidence, that an employer’s decision was the product of intentional

discrimination. Sybrandt v. Home Depot, 560 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir. 2009).1

 When a
6

plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, the court must follow the McDonnell Douglas

burden shifting framework. See e.g., Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 335

(6th Cir. 2003). Under this framework a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of

discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a non-discriminatory

reason for its action, and the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered

reason was merely a pretext for prohibited discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).

To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must

show that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position,

(3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) she was “either replaced by

someone outside the protected class or treated differently than similarly situated, non

protected employees.” Noble v. Brinker Intern, Inc., 391 F.3d 715, 728 (6th Cir. 2004). 

Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of sex discrimination, the burden

shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action.

Grosjean, 349 F.3d at 335. The defendant only bears a burden of production; the burden

of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29

F.3d 1078, 1082 (6th Cir. 1994) 

After a defendant has provided a non-discriminatory reason, the plaintiff must

“demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for the

[employment action] were in fact a coverup for a discriminatory reason.” McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805. The Sixth Circuit has noted that “[p]retext is a commonsense

inquiry: did the employer fire the employee for the stated reason or not?” Chen v. Dow

Chemical Corp., 580 F.3d 394, 400 n.4 (6th Cir. 2009). Pretext can be shown directly by
7

proving that an employer’s decision was more likely motivated by a discriminatory purpose

or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered reason is not credible. Manzer, 29

F.3d at 1082. When making a case based on the credibility of an employer’s explanation,

a plaintiff must demonstrate that the proffered explanation (1) has no basis in fact, (2) did

not actually motivate the adverse action, or (3) was insufficient to motivate the adverse

action. Macy v. Hopkins County School Board of Education, 484 F.3d 357, 366 (6th Cir.

2007); Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084.

To show that a defendant’s proffered reason has no basis in fact, a plaintiff must

prove that proffered reason is “factually false.” Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084. A plaintiff can

demonstrate that a defendant’s proffered reason was insufficient by showing that similarly

situated employees who are outside of the protected class were not subject to the adverse

employment action. Id. (“The third showing is also easily recognizable and, ordinarily,

consists of evidence that other employees, particularly employees not in the protected

class, were not fired even though they engaged in substantially identical conduct to that

which the employer contends motivated the discharge of the plaintiff.”).

Under the second showing, the plaintiff admits that the defendant’s proffered reason

could motivate the adverse action, but says that the illegal motivation is more likely than

the proffered reason. Id. Under this theory of pretext, a plaintiff relies on the “sheer weight”

of the circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Id. However, the amount of circumstantial

evidence required is substantial:

If the barebones elements of a plaintiff’s prima facie case were

sufficient to make this showing, however, the entire “burden

shifting” analysis of McDonnell Douglas and its successors

would be illusory. No case could ever be culled out after the

prima facie stage and every case would have to be determined
8

by a jury. We do not believe that this was the intent of

Congress or the outcome envisioned by the Supreme Court in

its long line of cases implementing employment discrimination

legislation. Accordingly, we hold that, in order to make this

type of rebuttal showing, the plaintiff may not rely simply on his

prima facie evidence but must, instead, introduce additional

evidence of . . . discrimination.”

Id. 

2. ELCRA Sex Discrimination: Disparate Treatment

When an ELCRA claim of sex discrimination is based on circumstantial evidence,

the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework is applied. Wilcoxan v. Minnesota

Mineral & Manufacturing Co., 235 Mich. App. 347, 359 (1999). To establish a prima facie

case, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: “(1) the plaintiff’s membership in a

protected class, (2) an adverse employment action, (3) the defendant was predisposed to

discriminating against members of the plaintiff’s protected class, and (4) the defendant

actually acted on that predisposition in visiting the adverse employment on the plaintiff.”

Id. at 360-61. If a defendant responds with a non-discriminatory reason for its action, a

plaintiff must show that the defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason was not the true

reason for the adverse action and that the plaintiff’s protected status was a motivating

factor in the defendant’s decision in order to establish pretext. Town v. Michigan Bell

Telephone Co., 455 Mich. 688, 697 (1997).

3. Sex Discrimination: Hostile Work Environment

An employee can also assert a claim of sex discrimination if she was subjected to

a hostile work environment based on sex. Discrimination in this form occurs “[w]hen the

workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is
9

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and

create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21

(1993). To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of

a protected class, (2) she was subject to unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment was

based on her sex, (4) the harassment created a hostile work environment, and (5) there is

a basis for employer liability. Clark v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 400 F.3d 341, 347 (6th

Cir. 2005). The prima facie elements under the ELCRA largely track the federal standard,

but the defendants’ conduct must be inherently sexual in nature. See Gilbert v.

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 470 Mich. 749, 791 n.67 (2004). 

To establish the existence of a hostile work environment a plaintiff must meet both

a subjective and objective standard. Bowman v. Shawnee State University, 220 F.3d 456,

463 (6th Cir. 2000) (“The conduct must be severe and pervasive enough to create an

environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive and the victim must

subjectively regard that environment as abusive.”). To determine whether a hostile work

environment exists, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances rather than

examining specific incidents or classes of incidents in isolation. Williams v. General Motors

Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 562 (6th Cir. 1999). A court should consider a number of factors

including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably

interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. However, the

Sixth Circuit has cautioned that “Title VII was not meant to create a ‘general civility code’

and the ‘sporadic use of abuse language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing’ are

not sufficient to establish liability. Clark, 400 F.3d at 352 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca
10

Raton 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). In addition, a plaintiff cannot rely on alleged harassment

that was not based on the plaintiff’s protected status. Bowman, 220 F.3d at 464 (refusing

to consider alleged acts of harassment that were not based on plaintiff’s status as a male).

When an employee is harassed by co-workers rather than supervisors, “[a]n

employer is only liable if it knew or should have known of the charged sexual harassment

and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action.” Clark, 400 F.3d at 348.

4. Americans With Disabilities Act

When an ADA claim of disability discrimination is based on circumstantial evidence,

the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework is applied. See Brenneman v.

MedCentral Health System, 366 F.3d 412, 417-18 (6th Cir. 2004). To establish a prima

facie case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) she is disabled; (2) she is otherwise

qualified for the position with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) she suffered an

adverse employment decision; (4) her employer knew or had reason to know of her

disability, and (5) her position remained open.” Id. at 417. The standards for establishing

a non-discriminatory reason and pretext do not differ from those under sex discrimination

claims under Title VII. 

5. Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act

When a PWDCRA claim of disability discrimination is based on circumstantial

evidence, the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework is applied. Bachman v. Swan

Harbor Ass’n, 252 Mich. App. 400, 436 n.26 (2002). To establish a prima facie case, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) he is ‘disabled’ as defined by the statute, (2) the

disability is unrelated to the plaintiff’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job, and (3)
2

Schaeffer does not appear to claim that her eventual discharge was the result of

sex discrimination. Moreover, there is insufficient evidence in the record to establish a

prima facie case of sex discrimination. Because Schaeffer says that she was replaced

when her area manager position was filled, she cannot also say that she was replaced

by someone outside of the protected class at the time of her administrative termination. 

In addition, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Tractor Supply treated her

differently than any other employee who exhausted the six-month non FMLA medical

leave that the company provided.

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the plaintiff has been discriminated against in one of the ways set forth in the statute.”

Chiles, 238 Mich. App. at 473. The standards for establishing a non-discriminatory reason

and pretext do not differ from those under sex discrimination claims under Title VII.

6. Retaliation

Both Title VII and the ELCRA prohibit retaliation against employees who complain

about discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2701(a). When a

claim of retaliation is based on circumstantial evidence, the McDonnell Douglas burden

shifting framework is applied. Chen, 580 F.3d at 402. To establish a prima facie case of

retaliation, a plaintiff must establish that (1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII,

(2) the exercise of her civil rights was known to the defendant, (3) the defendant took

adverse action against the plaintiff, and (4) there is a causal connection between the

protected conduct and adverse employment action. Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d

559, 630 (6th Cir. 2000). The standards for establishing a non-discriminatory reason and

pretext do not differ from those under sex discrimination claims under Title VII.

B. DISCUSSION

1. Title VII Sex Discrimination

Schaeffer claims that Tractor Supply violated Title VII when it replaced her as area

manager while she was on medical leave.2

 She has established a prima facie case of
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discrimination. As a female, she is a member of a protected class. She previously held the

position of area manager and there is nothing in the record suggesting that she was no

longer qualified. She was replaced by Torbet, a male who is outside of the protected class.

Although she continued to receive her salary and benefits after being replaced as area

manager, Schaeffer suffered an adverse employment action. Upon return from medical

leave, Schaeffer would have been required to apply for other available jobs and could have

obtained another position only by accepting a demotion to a single store manager position

or by relocating to a different area or district. 

Tractor Supply has provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for replacing

Schaeffer as area manager. First, its non-FMLA medical leave policy does not provide job

security while the employee is on leave. Schaeffer was aware of this policy. Schaeffer’s

leave also coincided with Tractor Supply’s busy spring season. Tractor Supply says that

it decided to replace Schaeffer as area manager because of the added demands that the

company faces during March, April, and May.

Schaeffer says that Tractor Supply’s proffered reason is pretextual because it could

have temporarily assigned her stores to other multi-store managers until she returned to

work. Although Tractor Supply could have made a different business decision regarding

the management of the stores in Schaeffer’s area, this does not establish pretext. As noted

above, pretext involves the inquiry: “did [Tractor Supply] fire [Schaeffer] for the stated

reason or not?” Chen, 580 F.3d at 400 n.4. Schaeffer merely says that Tractor Supply

could have made a decision that would not have been adverse to her. That is true

whenever an adverse action is taken against an employee. To establish pretext, Schaeffer

must show that Tractor Supply had a discriminatory motive, not that it made a poor
3

Schaeffer cites a number of other facts which are not relevant to her assertion of

pretext. She says that Ordus encouraged Torbet to apply for the area manager

position. However, Ordus’ encouragement occurred after Giles made the decision to

replace Schaeffer as area manager. Further there is no indication that Ordus played

any role in the decision to replace Schaeffer. Schaeffer also asserts that the area she

managed was custom made for her. Tractor Supply’s prior accommodation of

Schaeffer’s needs is not relevant to a claim of pretext and its decision to maintain the

same area after Torbet became manager is merely a business decision that does not

suggest pretext. 

13

business decision. By asserting that Tractor Supply could have temporarily reassigned her

stores, she asks the Court to second-guess Tractor Supply’s business decision rather than

to assess the credibility of its proffered motive. Challenging Tractor Supply’s business

judgment does not create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to pretext.

Moreover, Schaeffer’s assertion of pretext does not fit within any of the three

categories described above. First, she cannot say that the reason has no basis in fact

because she admits that her extended medical leave coincided with Tractor Supply’s busy

seasons. Second, she does not say that she was treated differently than other employees

under similar circumstances. While she stated in her deposition that a male area manager

was not replaced despite an extended medical leave, he was not similarly situated because

his medical leave did not extend into the busy season. 

Finally, Schaeffer has not shown that a discriminatory motivation was more likely

than Tractor Supply’s proffered reason. The only relevant evidence that Schaeffer cites to

establish pretext is the fact that the person who replaced her as area manager was a

male.3

 As noted above, an indirect showing of pretext relies on the sheer weight of

circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. Restating a prima facie case is not

enough. The fact that she was replaced by an individual outside the protected class is an
14

essential element of Schaeffer’s prima facie case and is not sufficient, standing alone, to

support a finding of pretext. As noted in Manzer, to find otherwise would preclude any

possibility of summary judgment once a plaintiff established a prima facie case. Because

Schaeffer is unable to raise an genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tractor

Supply’s proffered non-discriminatory reason is pretextual, summary judgment is

appropriate on her disparate treatment claim of gender discrimination under Title VII.

2. Failure to Establish Pretext

Schaeffer and Tractor Supply dispute whether Schaeffer has established a prima

facie case with respect to her ELCRA, ADA, PWDCRA, and retaliation claims. However,

the Court need not resolve these issues because Schaeffer cannot establish a genuine

issue of material fact as to pretext. Chen, 580 F.3d at 402 (declining to address plaintiff’s

prima facie case of retaliation after determining that defendant was entitled to summary

judgment on another count based on analysis of pretext). As explained above, Schaeffer

is unable to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tractor Supply’s proffered

reason for replacing her as area manager was pretextual. Because she has provided no

additional support for her assertions of pretext, Tractor Supply is entitled to summary

judgment on Schaeffer’s ELCRA, ADA, PWDCRA, and retaliation claims as well. 
4

Because Tractor Supply is moving for summary judgment, the Court must

construe the facts in a light most favorable to Schaeffer. To the extent that Tractor

Supply’s denials create credibility issues, the Court will accept Schaeffer’s version of the

facts for the purposes of this motion.

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3. Sex Discrimination: Hostile Work Environment

a.

Schaeffer says that she was subjected to a constant stream of sex-based

harassment that created hostile work environment. She relies solely on her own deposition

testimony to establish that a hostile work environment existed. Tractor Supply denies many

of incidents that Schaeffer cites and says that others were gender-neutral.4

 Schaeffer relies

on the following incidents to establish that she was subjected to a hostile work environment

on the basis of her gender.

In July 2007 Schaeffer traveled to a training session in Nashville with several other

managers from Michigan. Schaeffer says that, despite the airline’s open seating policy, the

other managers refused to let her sit with them. She also says that the other managers

questioned her background at JoAnn Fabric and how it correlated to Tractor Supply. When

they arrived for the meetings, Schaeffer says that the other managers all sat together at

one table, forcing her to sit alone at a different one. 

In August 2007 Schaeffer participated in a ride-along with Ordus. Schaeffer says

that Ordus told her that she should have accepted a job at GAP because it would have

suited her better. She also says that Ordus responded to her comment regarding the lack

of female managers by stating that there were one or two previous female managers who

“were pushed out” and “didn’t last long.” 

In September 2007 Schaeffer traveled with Brian Steinberg (Steinberg). She says
16

that he told her that there had never been a female district manager in Michigan. She also

says that he referred to JoAnn Fabric as a “female store” and said that she had a “sewing

background.” In addition she says that he stated that females do not fit in at Tractor

Supply.

In October 2007 the Michigan multi-store managers attended a meeting in Detroit.

Schaeffer says that all of the other managers sat together on one side of a table, forcing

her to sit alone on the other side. She also says that Brian Blausey made fun of the

colored cover sheet that she included in a presentation that she gave. 

During a January 2008 managers meeting, Schaeffer says that she overheard Ordus

say that a high salary was required to get good men to come in and run his stores.

After running a charity race, Brent McKellar (McKellar), a store manager, sent an email to a number of Tractor Supply employees including Schaeffer and a 17-year old

female cashier. The e-mail included a picture in which he was only wearing gym shorts and

asked how he looked. Although Schaeffer replied to McKellar by congratulating him on his

achievement and for donating his time to the cause, she says that she considered the

picture to be offensive.

Schaeffer also says that Van Eron continued to have weekly calls with the other

multi-store managers after his promotion, but never called her.

Finally, Schaeffer says that the other male managers denied her the opportunity to

receive training and feedback because they were slow to return her e-mails, did not return

her calls, and did not answer job related question.
17

b.

Based on these incidents, Schaeffer has established the first three elements of a

prima facie case of a hostile work environment under Title VII. First, as a female, she is

a member of a protected class. Second, the incidents described above were unwelcome

and harassing. Third, a reasonable jury could conclude that the incidents were genderbased and would not have occurred had she been male. However, Schaeffer has not

established a prima facie case under the ELCRA because the none of the incidents were

inherently sexual in nature. Therefore, Tractor Supply is entitled to summary judgment with

respect to Schaeffer’s claim of a hostile work environment under the ELCRA.

The presence of unwelcome harassment that is based gender is not sufficient to

establish a prima facie case. Schaeffer must also show that gender-based harassment

created a work environment that was both subjectively and objectively hostile. Schaeffer’s

complaints to her supervisors are sufficient to establish the subjective prong. Giles noted

after a meeting that Schaeffer felt like “a female in their territory.” This statement shows

that Schaeffer felt that she was subjected to gender-based hostility which was severe

enough to report to a supervisor. Further, she says that the hostile work environment

caused her increased blood pressure and required her to take medical leave.

However, Schaeffer has not provided sufficient evidence of gender-based hostility

to satisfy the objective prong of the inquiry. Although Schaeffer has cited a number of

incidents, they occurred sporadically when she met with other multi-store managers. Such

meetings were infrequent and do not appear to have been a significant aspect of her job.

In addition, the severity of the incidents was slight. The majority were mere offensive

utterances, some of which were arguably more inquisitive than harassing. While the
18

incidents of exclusion included a physical component, they cannot be characterized as

threatening or humiliating. The only incident which could be characterized as humiliating

is Blausey’s statements regarding the color cover sheet she included in her presentation.

The only incident which could be considered threatening is McKellar’s e-mail, which was

sent to Schaeffer’s personal account. However Schaeffer’s response and the fact that the

e-mail was part of a mass distribution suggest that it should be characterized as poor

judgment rather than a threat against Schaeffer. These incidents, while bothersome, are

not so severe and pervasive that they should interfere with an employee’s work

performance. As noted above, “Title VII does not create a general civility code, and the

sporadic use of abuse language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing are not

sufficient to establish liability” Clark, 400 F.3d at 352. When compared to the incidents

described in prior Sixth Circuit cases, Schaeffer’s allegations are simply not substantial

enough to satisfy the prima facie showing. Therefore, Tractor Supply is entitled to

summary judgment with respect to Schaeffer’s Title VII claim of a hostile work environment.

c.

Even if Schaeffer were able to establish a prima facie case of a hostile work

environment under Title VII, Tractor Supply would be still entitled to summary judgment

because Schaeffer failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before raising this issue

in federal court. A court can only consider Title VII claims that are explicitly included in an

EEOC complaint or that are reasonable expected to grow out of such a complaint. Strouss

v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 250 F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 2001). Schaeffer’s

EEOC complaints allege disparate treatment discrimination based on her discharge while
19

on medical leave. Her claim of a hostile work environment was not included in the EEOC

complaints and is sufficiently distinct from a claim of gender-based discharge that it cannot

be reasonably expected to grow out of the complaints that she filed. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Tractor Supply’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED. The case is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

 S/Avern Cohn 

AVERN COHN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: June 9, 2010

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to the attorneys of record

on this date, June 9, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

 S/Julie Owens 

Case Manager, (313) 234-5160