[Cite as State v. Williams , 2021-Ohio-4469.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO Appellant

v. TYLER WILLIAMS Appellee C.A. No. 20CA011703

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO CASE No. 18CR099549
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: December 20, 2021

CARR, Judge. {¶1} Appellant, the State of Ohio, a ppeals the judgment of the Lorai n County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion to dismiss on speedy trial gro unds filed by Appellee, Tyler Williams. This Court re verses and remands.
I. {¶2} On October 25, 2018, the Lorain County Grand Jury indicted Will iams on one count of aggravated robbery and two additional counts of robber y in Case No. 18CR099549. A warrant for Williams’ arrest was issued at that time. {¶3} In February 2019, Williams was sentenced to three years in pris on in a separate case in Cuyahoga County. On March 7, 2019, Williams was transp orted from the Cuyahoga County Jail to the Lorain Correctional Institution (LCI). Upon his arrival at LCI, Williams was notified of the charges pe nding in Lorain County. Williams sou ght the assistance of the facility’s law library to complete a written notice and request for final disposition pursuant to R.C.2 2941.401. Williams repeated this process several times when he did not receive a response. Williams was ultimatel y transferred to a different facility. {¶4} Williams was arrested not long afte r being released from prison . On September 10, 2020, Williams was arraigned in Case. No. 18CR099549, at wh ich time he entered pleas of not guilty. Williams subsequently filed a motion to dismiss th e indictment on speedy trial grounds. The crux of Williams’ ar gument was that he had strict ly complied with R.C. 2941.401 by sending his written notice to the warden and that it was the warden who had failed to deliver the notice to the prosecuting a ttorney and the appropriate cour t. The State filed a brief in opposition to the motion and Willia ms replied thereto. The mat ter proceeded to a hearing. The trial court u ltimately issued a journal entry granting the moti on to dismiss. {¶5} On appeal, the State raise s one assignment of error.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED WILLIAMS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS WHERE HE DID NOT STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF R.C. 2941.401. {¶6} In its sole assignment of error, the State maintains that the t rial court erred in granting Williams’ motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds be cause he failed to strictly comply with R.C. 2941.401. This Court agrees. Background {¶7} In his motion, Williams argued th at he strictly complied with R .C. 2941.401 when he completed his written notice and request for final dispositi on and sent it to the warden at LCI. Williams attached several exhibits to this motion, including a letter from the records office at the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction addressed to t he Lorain County Sheriff’s3 Office, dated March 7, 2019, requesting a copy of the warrant f or Williams so that it could assist in placing a valid detainer. The letter stated that Williams “ ha[d] expressed an interest in disposing of these charges while incarcerated, and will be offe red the opportunity to file for a Quick and Speedy Trial if the char ges are for an untried indict ment.” {¶8} The trial court held a two-day hearing on the motion via Zoom. 1 Williams argued that when he learned about the p ending indictment upon his arri val at LCI, he worked with corrections officers to complete a written notice and request f or final disposition and that he promptly sent it to the warden. Williams pointed to a number o f cases in support of the proposition that this course of action constituted strict compl iance with R.C. 2941.401. In response, the State disputed W illiams’ claim that he had taken the necessary steps to deliver his written notice of availability to the warden. Furthermore, rel ying on this Court’s decision in
State v. McGowan , 9th Dist. Summit No. 19989, 2000 WL 799099 (June 21, 2000), t he State suggested that merely sending wr itten notice to the warden did not start the speedy trial clock pursuant to R.C. 2941.401. {¶9} Williams testified as follows. 2 On March 7, 2019, Williams was transported from the Cuyahoga County Jail to LCI. Not more than 30 minutes afte r being placed in his cell, Williams was informed that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest stemming from the charges in Lorain County. When Williams inquired as to what he could do about the warrant, a corrections officer informed him to go to the law library to co mplete a written notice and request for final disposition. Williams wen t to the law library where he completed the w ritten notice and

1 Both parties consen ted to conducting the he aring via Zoom due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 2 After hearing oral arguments on the first day of the hearing, the trial court extended the hearing to a second day in order to per mit Williams to te stify regardin g the measures he took to direct his written notice to the warden.4 addressed it to the warden. Williams explained that when he di d not hear anything within a week, he completed the proce ss a second time. Williams repeate d the process a third time about a month later. Williams was eventually transferred to the Rich land Correctional Institution (“RCI”). On cross-examinati on, Williams indicated that both a corrections officer in the law library and the language on the forms directed him to address t he written notice to the warden so that the warden could send the notice to the appropriate partie s. After completing the form, Williams placed it in the direct m ailbox to go to the warden. Although Williams acknowledged that he did not have copies of the notices he completed, he sug gested that he attempted to seek updates about the situ ation after being transferred to RCI. {¶10} The trial court subsequently issued a journal entry granting Wi lliams’ motion to dismiss. The trial court found that Williams strictly complied with R.C. 2941.401 when he provided his written notice to the warden and that the burden t hen shifted to the warden, and thereby the State, to complete the process. The trial court co ncluded that because the State failed to bring Williams to trial within 180 days of the date that he strictly complied with R.C. 2941.401, it was required to dismi ss the indictment on speedy t rial grounds. Discussion {¶11} The State raises two arguments in support of its position that the trial court erred in concluding that Williams took the necessary measures to star t the speedy trial clock pursuant to R.C. 2941.401. First, the State maintains that Williams pro vided no evidence that he actually sent written notice to the warde n, other than his uncorroborate d assertion that he did so. Second, the State argues that even if Williams did send notice to the w arden, that alone did not constitute strict compliance with R.C. 2941.401 because the statute requir es a defendant to show that written notice was delivered to both the prosecutor attorney an d the appropriate court. The State5

asserts that the trial court’s conclusion to the contrary ran a foul of this Court’s decision in
McGowan , 2000 WL 799099. 3 {¶12} When this Court reviews a tria l court’s order ruling on a motio n to dismiss based on speedy trial grounds, this Cour t applies a de novo standard of review to questions of law and the clearly erroneous standard o f review to questions of fact. State v. Miller , 9th Dist. No. 07CA0037-M, 2008-Ohio-1002, ¶ 6. {¶13} R.C. 2941.401 states as follows: When a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a corr ectional institution of this state, and when during the continuance of t he term of imprisonment there is pending in t his state any untried indictm ent, information, or complaint against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial wi thin one hundred eighty days after he causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court in which the matter is pending, written notic e of the place of his imprisonment and a request for a final disposition to be made o f the matter, except that for good cause shown in open court, with the prison er or his counsel present, the court may grant a ny necessary or reasonable contin uance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompa nied by a certificate of the wa rden or superintendent having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is bei ng held, the time served and rem aining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the tim e of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the adult par ole authority relating to the prisoner. The written notice and request for final disposition shall be g iven or sent by the prisoner to the warden or superi ntendent having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it with the certificate to the appropriate pro secuting attorney and court by registered or certifie d mail, return receipt reque sted. * * * If the action is not brought to tr ial within the time provided, subject to continuance allowed pursuant to this section, no court any long er has jurisdiction thereof, the indictment, inform ation, or complaint is void, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the action with prejudice. * * *.

3 The State suggests that the tri al court erred in relying on th e Eighth District ’s decision in State v. Gill , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82742, 2004-Ohio-1245.6
{¶14} “In its plainest language, R .C. 2941.401 grants an incarcerated defendant a chance to have all pending charges resolved in a timely manner, thereb y preventing the state from delaying prosecution until after the defendant has been release d from his prison term.” State v.
Hairston , 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, ¶ 25. This Court has held that strict compliance with the statute is required in o rder for a defendant to start the speedy trial clock. State v.
Williams , 9th Dist. Summit No. 29434, 2020-Ohio-472, ¶ 10-11. {¶15} In Williams , this Court highlighted the “sp ecific requirements” set forth in R.C.
2941.401. Williams at ¶ 6. R.C. 2941.401 sets forth a “straightforward and unamb iguous procedure for an inmate to invoke his statutory speedy trial ri ghts[.]” Williams at ¶ 7, quoting
State v. Gilbert , 9th Dist. Lo rain No. 14CA 010600, 2016-Ohio- 3209, ¶ 14 . “A ce rtification from the warden or superintendent with custody over the inmate must accompany the request for disposition, and that certificati on must state ‘the term of com mitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time served and remaining to be served on the s entence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the adult parole authority relating to the prisoner.’” Williams at ¶ 6 , quoting R.C. 2941.401. “The prisoner must send the request for disposition to the warden or superintenden t, who must in turn ‘promptly forward it with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court by registered or certified mail, return rec eipt requested.’” Williams at ¶ 6, quoting R.C. 2941.401. {¶16} The State’s initial contention that Williams failed to demonstr ate that he sent written notice to the warden is without merit. The State point s to this Court’s decision in State v.
Iacovone , 9th Dist. Wayne No. 96CA0060, 1997 WL 422771, *2 (July 16, 19 97), in support of its position that, when a defenda nt fails to produce a copy of his written notice, he cannot simply rely on his “own uncorroborated assertion” to prove that he sen t written notice to the warden.7

The instant case involves more than uncorroborated assertions. Williams gave detailed testimony at the hearing regardi ng the process by which he comp leted his written notice and sent it to the warden through direct m ail at LCI. Williams repeated this process on two additional occasions. The trial court determined that this testimony was credible when it “[found] that he did indeed file the appropriate p aperwork with the warden.” Wi lliams also produced a letter from the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction’s rec ord office which supported the conclusion that Williams had filed his written notice. Under t hese circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding that Williams sent written notic e to the warden was clearly

erroneous. {¶17} The State’s argument that Williams failed to strictly comply wi th R.C. 2941.401 is well taken. In McGowan , this Court held that in order to start the speedy trial clock pursuant to R.C. 2941.401, a prisoner “must first show that written noti ce was delivered to both the prosecuting attorney and t he appropriate court[.]” McGowan , 2000 WL 799099, at *4. (Emphasis in original.) “[I]f t hat defendant fails to serve wr itten notice on both the appropriate prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court, the State’s dut y under R.C. 2941.401 has not been triggered.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id . The record in this case is devoid of evidence that Williams’ written notice was delivered to the prosecuting attor ney and the appropriate court. Because the written notice was not delivered to the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court, the speedy trial clock ne ver started for the purposes of R.C. 2941.401, and thus the trial court erred in denying Williams’ motion to dismiss. {¶18} The State’s assignment of error is sustained.8

III. {¶19} The State’s assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and the cause remanded for fu rther proceedings consistent with this decision. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, direc ting the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitu te the mandate, pursuant to Ap p.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof , this document shall consti tute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Cour t of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the pa rties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket , pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellee.

DONNA J. CARR FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, P. J. CONCURS.9
CALLAHAN, J. DISSENTING. {¶20} This Court recently reiterated that the terms of R.C. 2941.401 are unambiguous.
State v. Williams , 9th Dist. Summit No. 29434, 2020-Ohio-472, ¶ 7, citing State v. Gilbert , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 14CA010600, 2016-Ohio-3209, ¶ 14-15. The plai n terms of the statute require a defendant to “cause[] to be delivered to the prosecuting atto rney and the appropriate court in which the matter is pending, written notice of the place of his imprisonment and a request for a final disposition to be made of the matter.” But the plain ter ms of R.C. 2941.401 also place responsibility on the warden of the correctional institution, u pon whom the statute places ultimate responsibility for sending the notice: “The written no tice and request for final disposition shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warde n or superintendent having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting attorney
and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.” ( Emphasis added.) R.C.
2941.401. {¶21} In light of the unambiguous langua ge of the statute, I conclude that in a case such as this, when the trial court finds credible evidence that the prisoner fulfilled the obligations imposed by R.C. 2941.401, failure of the warden to cause notice to be sent should not be attributed to the prisoner. See State v. Gill , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82742, 2004-Ohio-1245, ¶
14-17. {¶22} I respectfully dissent.

APPEARANCES: J. D. TOMLINSON, Prosecuting Atto rney, and LINDSEY C. POPROCKI, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellant. ROBERT H. WILLIAMS, Attorn ey at Law, for Appellee.