*

Honorable James M. Burns, Senior U.S. District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by

designation. 

 1After carefully considering the other issues raised on appeal, we affirm the district court's

grant of summary judgment. See 11th Cir. Rule 36-1. 

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 96-6060.

Lynda CRAWFORD, as Administratrix of the Estates of Lois Vivian Parker Kelley and James

Wayne Kelley, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant,

Cynthia Lucas, as Mother and next friend of Jonathon Lucas, a minor child, Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW SYSTEMS, INC., Dwayne Davis, Defendants-Appellees.

Aug. 15, 1997.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. (No. 93-P-840-

San C. Pointer, Jr., Judge.

Before BLACK, Circuit Judge, RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BURNS*

, Senior District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant challenges the district court's holding that an unauthorized judgment does not start

the clock for a Rule 59(b) motion for new trial. We hold that the 10-day period contemplated by

Rule 59(b) does not begin to run until after the entry of a valid judgment and affirm the district

court.1

I. BACKGROUND

Dwayne Davis was driving a van on an interstate highway while towing an empty flat-bed

trailer. The trailer separated from the van, crossed the median, and struck a vehicle traveling in the

opposite direction. That automobile was occupied by Lois and Wayne Kelley and their infant

grandson, Jonathon Lucas. The collision killed the Kelleys and injured Jonathon. Lynda Crawford,

Administratrix of the Kelleys' estates, and Cynthia Lucas, Jonathon's mother, sued under Alabama

state law to recover for the injuries inflicted. Specifically, Crawford and Lucas brought tort claims

against Davis and his employer, Andrew Systems, Inc. (Andrew Systems), based on negligence,
respondeat superior, and negligent entrustment. The trial court severed the negligent entrustment

claim so that the same jury could hear it in a second trial. Pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, at the end of the testimony in the first trial, Crawford and Lucas moved for

judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability under respondeat superior. The district court

granted the motion. Thereafter, the jury returned verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding the

estates of Lois Kelley and John Kelley $2,250,000 each in punitive damages and Jonathon Lucas

$100,000 in compensatory damages.

During the trial on the claim of negligent entrustment, the court admitted additional evidence

of Davis' driving record, training, and habits. Andrew Systems did not move for judgment as a

matter of law at the close of its case, and the court submitted the issue of negligent entrustment to

the jury without objection. The court instructed the jury that it could either reconfirm its earlier

verdict or adjust its earlier assessment of damages. The jury elected to increase its punitive damage

award on each of the two wrongful death claims to $4,000,000. The parties made no post-trial

motions at that time. After dismissing the jury, the trial court, sua sponte, set aside this second

verdict for insufficient evidence, effectively reducing each of the punitive damage awards from

$4,000,000 to $2,250,000.

In accordance with the district court's ruling, Andrew Systems paid the judgment and

appellants withdrew $4,612,407.71, representing the judgment of the first verdict plus accrued

interest. Appellants appealed to this Court, maintaining that the district court lacked the authority

to sua sponte set aside the second verdict for insufficient evidence. This Court agreed and

"reverse[d] the order granting that judgment and remand[ed] the case for further proceedings." See

Crawford v. Andrew Systems, Inc., 39 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir.1994).

Within 10 days of the entry of judgment on remand, Andrew Systems filed a motion for a

new trial on the negligent entrustment claim. The trial court granted that motion. Andrew Systems

then moved for summary judgment on the negligent entrustment claim. The trial court granted that

motion as well. The present appeal concerns only the negligent entrustment claim on which the

court granted summary judgment after remand.
 2

We note that until the March 29, 1995, judgment was entered, no judgment existed that was

adverse to Andrew Systems' interests. Thus, as a practical matter, there was no reason for

Andrew Systems to file a motion for new trial until the judgment was entered on remand. 

II. ANALYSIS

Appellants argue that the Appellee's motion for a new trial was time barred under Rule 59(b).

They maintain that the pre-appeal judgment of the district court was not void, and, even if it were,

time runs from all judgments, whether void or not. We find this argument unpersuasive. It is clear

from this Court's decision in Crawford that the district court's initial judgment was unauthorized.

See id. at 1154 (the district court "had no authority to grant a judgment notwithstanding a verdict").

We think it self-evident that when a court of appeals reverses a judgment on the ground that it was

unauthorized, the case is left without a judgment until the district court enters one that is authorized

by the law.

Under Rule 59(b), "[a]ny motion for new trial shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry

of the judgment." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(b). This Court voided the original judgment entered on January

14, 1994. As a result, no valid judgment existed on Appellant's negligent entrustment claim until

the district court entered judgment on remand. The latter judgment—the first valid judgment entered

by the district court—triggered the Rule 59(b) clock. The district court entered that judgment on

March 29, 1995. Accordingly, when Andrew Systems filed its successful motion for new trial on

March 31, 1995, it was within the 10-day period provided for by Rule 59(b).2

AFFIRMED.