SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

En Banc

JOSEPH E. HANCOCK and CHARLES B. ) Arizona Supreme Court 

SHERRILL, JR., ) No. CV-05-0381-AP/EL 

 ) 

 Appellees, ) Mohave County 

 ) Superior Court 

 v. ) No. CV2005-1323 

 ) 

ANDY BISNAR, KENNETH GRIFFIN and ) 

LEE MUSICK, ) 

 ) O P I N I O N

 Appellants. ) 

 ) 

__________________________________) 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County 

The Honorable James E. Chavez, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH 

INSTRUCTIONS

______________________________________________________________________________ 

COPPERSMITH GORDON SCHERMER OWENS & NELSON P.L.C. Phoenix

 By Andrew S. Gordon

 Lauren Jacqueline Weinzweig

Attorneys for Joseph E. Hancock and Charles B. Sherrill, Jr.

GAMMAGE & BURNHAM P.L.C. Phoenix

 By Lisa T. Hauser

 Michella Abner

Attorneys for Andy Bisnar, Kenneth Griffin, and Lee Musick

ROBERT S. LYNCH & ASSOCIATES Phoenix

 By Robert S. Lynch 

And

PAUL R. ORME Mayer

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Central Arizona Irrigation and 

Drainage District and Maricopa Stanfield Irrigation & 

Drainage District
2

WADE NOBLE Yuma

Attorney for Amici Curiae Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and 

Drainage District, Yuma Irrigation District, and North 

Gila Valley Irrigation and Drainage District

RYLEY CARLOCK & APPLEWHITE P.A. Phoenix

 By L. William Staudenmaier, III

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Roosevelt Water 

Conservation District 

DENNIS M. O’NEILL, CHANDLER CITY ATTORNEY Chandler 

 By Cynthia J. Haglin, Assistant City Attorney 

And 

DEBORAH J. SPINNER, MESA CITY ATTORNEY Mesa 

 By Charles L. Cahoy, Assistant City Attorney 

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Cities of Chandler and Mesa

______________________________________________________________________________ 

H U R W I T Z, Justice

¶1 This is an election contest challenging the 

qualifications of three individuals elected as directors of the 

Mohave Valley Irrigation and Drainage District (“MVIDD” or 

“District”) in a recall election. We hold that the challenged 

directors are not qualified to serve under the statutes 

governing irrigation districts. 

I. 

¶2 MVIDD is a political subdivision of the state and a 

municipal corporation. See Ariz. Const. art. 13, § 7; Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 48-2901 (2005). The District contains 

21,648 acres of land, of which 3273 are agricultural. At the 

time of the trial in this matter, 563 landowners had registered 

to vote in the District, only four of whom were agricultural 
3

landowners. Agricultural landowners use eighty-four percent of 

the water in the District and a combination of municipal, 

industrial, and domestic users consume the remainder. All 

landowners in the District are subject to annual assessments of 

$1.33 per acre. 

¶3 The District is composed of three divisions and is 

governed by a board of directors, with one director elected from 

each division. A.R.S. § 48-3011(A) (2005). District directors 

must be “qualified electors of the division of the district from 

which they are elected.” A.R.S. § 48-3011(B). MVIDD elections 

are conducted through a “personal and individual” (one elector, 

one vote) voting system, see A.R.S. §§ 48-3015 (2005), -3018 

(2005), as opposed to a “per acre” voting system, see A.R.S. §§ 

48-3041 (2005), -3043 (2005). 

¶4 A director is subject to recall under the laws 

governing recall of county officers, A.R.S. § 16-674 (1996), “by 

the vote of a majority of the qualified electors of the division 

which he represents,” A.R.S. § 48-3024 (2005). Recall petitions 

were filed with respect to the three incumbent directors of 

MVIDD, and the District held a recall election on September 13, 

2005. Because three other individuals received the most votes, 

the incumbent directors were each recalled. The Mohave County 

Board of Supervisors approved the canvass of the election on 

October 3, 2005. 
4

¶5 Four days later, one of the ousted directors and an 

elector (“Contestants”) filed this election contest, arguing 

that the newly-elected directors (“Electees”) are not eligible 

to serve because they do not own agricultural land in the 

District and therefore are not qualified electors under the rule 

in Post v. Wright, 37 Ariz. 105, 289 P. 979 (1930).1 In 

response, the Electees challenged the sufficiency of the 

Contestants’ statement of contest and argued that Post was 

wrongly decided and should be overruled. 

¶6 The superior court rejected the Electees’ challenges 

to the statement of contest. On the merits, the court held that 

it was bound by Post and that the Electees therefore were not 

qualified electors because they are not agricultural landowners. 

Because the Electees were not qualified electors, the superior 

court held that they were ineligible to serve as directors of 

the District. The court ordered “that the incumbent directors 

shall remain in office until their successors are appointed and 

qualify.”2

 

1

 The Contestants challenged only the qualifications of the 

Electees and did not challenge the ballots of the approximately 

550 other non-agricultural landowners who voted in the recall 

election. Nor had any challenge been raised to signatures of 

non-agricultural landowners on the recall petitions. 

2

 The superior court stayed this order “pending the Supreme 

Court’s ruling.” 
5

¶7 The Electees timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution 

and A.R.S. § 12-2101(B) (2003).3

II.

¶8 The Electees argue that the Contestants failed to 

plead jurisdictional facts necessary to maintain an election 

contest. Because these arguments, if correct, would dispose of 

the appeal, we address them first. 

A. 

¶9 The statutes governing irrigation districts permit 

districts to be subdivided into divisions, A.R.S. § 48-2913(B) 

(2005), and require that “[d]irectors representing a division 

shall be qualified electors of the division . . . from which 

they are elected,” A.R.S. § 48-3011(B). The Electees first 

assert that the statement of contest and its supporting 

 

3

 We have concurrent jurisdiction with the court of appeals 

over this case. Ariz. Podiatry Ass’n v. Dir. of Ins., 101 Ariz. 

544, 548-49, 422 P.2d 108, 112-13 (1966). We accepted 

jurisdiction because the central issue is the continued validity 

of this Court’s decision in Post. See State v. Smyers, 207 

Ariz. 314, 318 n.4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n.4 (2004) (“The courts of 

this state are bound by the decisions of this court and do not 

have the authority to modify or disregard this court’s rulings. 

Any other rule would lead to chaos in our judicial system.”) 

(internal quotation and citation omitted). In the ordinary 

course, appeals in elections contests should be to the court of 

appeals. If special circumstances exist that require that this 

Court hear the appeal directly, a motion for transfer may be 

filed under ARCAP 19. 
6

affidavits are insufficient because they do not allege in which 

MVIDD division the Contestants are qualified electors. 

¶10 Proceedings to recall the directors of an irrigation 

district “shall be in all respects as provided by the 

constitution and laws of the state for the recall of county 

officers.” A.R.S. § 48-3024. Contests of county elections, in 

turn, are made “on the same grounds and in the same manner as 

contests of election to a state office.” A.R.S. § 16-674(A). 

Section 16-673(A) (1996), which governs the requirements for a 

statement of contest for state elections, is thus the relevant 

statute.4

 Under that provision, a valid statement of contest 

requires: 

[A] statement in writing setting forth: 

1. The name and residence of the party contesting the 

election, and that he is an elector of the state and 

county in which he resides. 

2. The name of the person whose right to the office is 

contested, or the title of the measure, or 

constitutional amendment, or other proposition as it 

appeared upon the official ballot. 

3. The office the election to which is contested. 

4. The particular grounds of the contest. 

A.R.S. § 16-673(A). 

 

4

 In addition, A.R.S. § 16-642(B) states that a contest of an 

election held by “a special district as defined in title 48,” 

the title governing irrigation districts, is to be “as described 

in § 16-673.” 
7

¶11 Section 16-673(A)(1) requires only an allegation that 

the contestant is “an elector of the state and county in which 

he resides.” This Court interpreted the predecessor to this 

statute in the context of a local election in Kitt v. Holbert, 

30 Ariz. 397, 248 P. 25 (1926) (addressing Arizona Code ¶ 3061 

(1913)). Kitt involved challenges to the election of two Tucson 

city councilmen, and held that under the statute, “the right of 

contest of any election is granted to any elector of the 

particular political subdivision from which the officer whose 

election is contested is chosen.” Id. at 400, 248 P. at 26 

(emphasis added); see also Sorenson v. Superior Court, 31 Ariz. 

421, 426, 254 P. 230, 231 (1927) (holding that a school district 

is a political subdivision of the county for purposes of the 

recall statute). 

¶12 In the case of an election contest involving an 

irrigation district, the “political subdivision from which the 

officer whose election is contested is chosen,” Kitt, 30 Ariz. 

at 400, 248 P. at 26, is the district, not one of its divisions. 

Article 13, Section 7 of the Arizona Constitution establishes a 

district – not a division thereof – as a political subdivision 

of the state. See also A.R.S. § 48-2901 (providing that the 

district – not its divisions – is a municipal corporation). The 

Contestants alleged in this case that they were electors of the 

District, and that is all the recall statutes require. 
8

B. 

¶13 The Electees also argue that the statement of contest 

is defective because the “Contestants failed to allege . . . 

that they possessed property qualifications for 90 days prior to 

the recall election.” They base this argument on A.R.S. § 48-

2917(A), which establishes the qualifications of electors in 

irrigation districts. Section 48-2917(A) provides: 

No person shall be entitled to vote at any election, 

held under the provisions of this chapter unless: 

1. He is a holder of title or evidence of title, 

including receipts or other evidence of the rights of 

entry-men on lands under any law of the United States 

or this state, to land in the district, and has 

possessed such qualifications for ninety days 

immediately preceding the date of such election. 

2. He has resided continuously for six months 

immediately preceding the election in the county in 

which the district or a part thereof is located. 

3. He is at least eighteen years of age. 

4. He is registered as provided by § 48-3015. 

(Emphasis added.) 

¶14 This Court addressed this very argument in Schahrer v. 

Bell, 34 Ariz. 334, 271 P. 715 (1928). In that case, a 

contestant challenged an election of the Verde River Irrigation 

and Power District; the statement of contest “fail[ed] to show 

that the contestants possessed the [property] qualifications 

designated 90 days preceding the election.” Id. at 338, 271 P. 

at 716 (citing 1921 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 149, § 1 (codified as 
9

amended at A.R.S. § 48-2917). The Court held that “[i]n the 

absence of such [an] averment and proof thereof, the contestants 

would not be . . . competent to institute or prosecute this 

proceeding.” Id. at 339, 271 P. at 716. Electees argue that 

Schahrer controls the result here. 

¶15 Under the code form of pleading in place at the time 

of Schahrer, a party’s complaint was required to “set forth 

facts sufficient to state a cause of action.” Greenlee County 

v. Cotey, 17 Ariz. 542, 549, 155 P. 302, 305 (1916). Although 

code pleading “abandoned technical forms of actions,” it 

nonetheless required allegation of “all the material facts 

essential to constitute the particular cause of action relied 

on.” Id. at 550, 155 P. at 305 (Franklin, J., concurring); see 

also Button v. O.S. Stapley Co., 40 Ariz. 79, 87, 9 P.2d 1010, 

1012 (1932) (“One of the fundamental principles of common-law 

pleading also is that a plaintiff must allege in his complaint 

the existence of every fact which it is necessary for him to 

prove in order to sustain a judgment.”) (Lockwood, J., 

dissenting). 

¶16 More than a decade after the Schahrer opinion, 

however, this Court adopted rules of civil procedure. Under 

those Rules, a complaint need only provide “[a] short and plain 

statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction 

depends.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also Guerrero v. Copper 
10

Queen Hosp., 112 Ariz. 104, 106-07, 537 P.2d 1329, 1331-32 

(1975) (“In testing a complaint for a failure to state a claim, 

the question is whether enough is stated which would entitle the 

plaintiff to relief upon some theory to be developed at trial. 

The purpose of the rule is to avoid technicalities and give the 

other party notice of the basis for the claim and its general 

nature.”) (citing Mackey v. Spangler, 81 Ariz. 113, 115, 301 

P.2d 1026, 1027-28 (1956)). 

¶17 Here, the Contestants alleged that each was a 

“resident of Mohave County” and “a qualified elector of the 

District.” These allegations are sufficient under the notice 

pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) to establish the superior 

court’s jurisdiction to consider this election contest. By 

alleging that they were “qualified elector[s]” of the District, 

the Contestants gave sufficient notice that they claimed to meet 

all requirements of the statute defining qualified electors, 

including the requirement that they possessed title to land for 

more than ninety days prior to the election.5

III. 

¶18 In Post, this Court analyzed the requirements for 

qualified electors of irrigation districts set out in the 

 

5

 In their answer to the statement of contest, the Electees 

admitted that each of the Contestants was a “qualified elector 

somewhere within the District.” There is thus no claim that 
11

predecessor statute to A.R.S. § 48-2917. 37 Ariz. at 117-24, 

289 P. at 983-85 (addressing 1921 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 149, §§ 

1, 3). That statute required, in language materially 

indistinguishable from that in current § 48-2917(A)(1), that 

qualified electors be “‘the holders of title or evidence of 

title, including receipts or other evidence of the rights of 

entrymen on lands under any law of the United States or of this 

state to lands in any district.’” Id. at 120, 289 P. at 984 

(citing 1921 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 149, § 1). 

¶19 The Court started from the premise that, “taken 

literally,” the statutory language would permit all “holders of 

title to land in the district” to be electors. Id. Rather than 

relying solely on the statutory language, however, the Court 

determined that it “should look to the whole irrigation district 

law” to determine the qualifications for electors. Id. The 

Court noted: 

[T]he primary purpose of this law was to permit 

landowners to organize an irrigation district to 

obtain water for the irrigation of their agricultural 

lands, lands of little or no value without water but 

which the owners or possessors expect to make very 

valuable for the production of crops by the 

application thereto of water. 

Id. at 120-21, 289 P. at 984. The Court then examined case law 

analyzing California’s Wright and Bridgeford Acts, the source of 

_______________________________________ 

Contestants lacked the statutory qualifications to file an 

election contest. 
12

Arizona’s irrigation district laws. Id. at 121-23, 289 P. at 

984-85. Under that case law, persons signing a petition to 

organize an irrigation district were required to be “‘bona fide 

owners of agricultural land, desiring to improve the same by 

conducting water upon it.’” Id. at 123, 289 P. at 985 (quoting 

In re Cent. Irrigation Dist., 49 P. 354, 360 (Cal. 1897)). 

Given the purpose of the Arizona irrigation district laws and 

California’s interpretation of its similar statutes, the Court 

concluded that qualified electors also must be agricultural 

landowners. 

¶20 Under Post, the Electees, who do not own agricultural 

land in the District, cannot serve as MVIDD directors. The 

Electees therefore ask us to overrule Post, arguing that it “was 

wrongly decided because the Supreme Court should not have looked 

beyond a statute that was clear on its face to add additional 

requirements.” 

¶21 The Electees’ statutory interpretation argument has 

some appeal. However, we are not writing on a clean slate: 

Post was decided more than three-quarters of a century ago. 

Thus, we must decide not merely whether we would arrive at the 

same result today, but whether we should overrule such longstanding precedent. Principles of stare decisis counsel against 

such a result. 
13

¶22 The doctrine of stare decisis “‘is grounded on public 

policy that people should know what their rights are as set out 

by judicial precedent and having relied on such rights in 

conducting their affairs should not have them done away with by 

judicial fiat.’” Derendal v. Griffith, 209 Ariz. 416, 424 ¶ 33, 

104 P.3d 147, 155 (2005) (quoting White v. Bateman, 89 Ariz. 

110, 113, 358 P.2d 712, 713-14 (1961)); see also Galloway v. 

Vanderpool, 205 Ariz. 252, 256 ¶ 16, 69 P.3d 23, 27 (2003) (“The 

doctrine of stare decisis . . . seeks to promote reliability so 

that parties can plan activities knowing what the law is.”). 

The strength of that doctrine is at its apex “when prior 

decisions construe a statute.” Galloway, 204 Ariz. at 256 ¶ 16, 

69 P.3d at 27; see also State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, 201 ¶ 

38, 68 P.3d 418, 427 (2003) (noting that “in cases involving 

statutory interpretation the burden [required to overrule a 

prior decision] is highest”). This is because if we have 

“interpret[ed] the statute other than as the legislature 

intended, the legislature retains the power to correct us.” 

Galloway, 205 Ariz. at 256 ¶ 17, 69 P.3d at 27. Therefore, 

[i]t is universally the rule that where a statute 

which has been construed by a court of last resort is 

reenacted in the same or substantially the same terms, 

the legislature is presumed to have placed its 

approval on the judicial interpretation given and to 

have adopted such construction and made it part of the 

reenacted statute. 
14

Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 211 Ariz. 282, 288 ¶ 

19, 120 P.3d 1092, 1098 (2005) (quoting State v. Superior Court, 

104 Ariz. 440, 442, 454 P.2d 982, 984 (1969)). 

¶23 Since Post was decided more than seventy-five years 

ago, the legislature has amended A.R.S. § 48-2917 and its 

predecessor statutes nine times; none of those amendments 

addressed or sought to alter our holding in Post. We therefore 

presume that the legislature has relied upon and ratified our 

decision. See Galloway, 205 Ariz. at 256 ¶ 17, 69 P.3d at 27 

(“If the legislature amends a statute after it has been 

judicially construed, but does not modify the statute in a 

manner that changes the court’s interpretation, we presume the 

legislature approved of the court’s construction and intended 

that it remain a part of the statute.”); Cagle v. Butcher, 118 

Ariz. 122, 124 n.2, 575 P.2d 321, 323 n.2 (1978) (“Where a 

statute that has been construed by a court of last resort is 

reenacted in substantially the same terms, the legislature is 

presumed to have placed its approval on the judicial 

construction and adopted such construction for the reenactment 

of the statute.”). 

¶24 Our prior cases recognize that “we do not lightly 

overrule precedent and do so only for compelling reasons.” 

Wiley v. Indus. Comm’n, 174 Ariz. 94, 103, 847 P.2d 595, 604 

(1993). The Electees argue that “changes to the irrigation 
15

district laws” provide a compelling reason for overruling Post.6 

These changes, the Electees assert, have sufficiently changed 

the purposes of irrigation districts such that Post should not 

be followed. 

¶25 Although the powers of irrigation districts have 

changed somewhat since 1928, we do not find this a sufficiently 

compelling reason to overrule Post. The opinion of the Supreme 

Court of the United States in Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 

(1981), is instructive in this regard. In Ball, the issue was 

whether voting in the Salt River Project Agricultural 

Improvement and Power District (“SRP”) could constitutionally be 

limited to landowners in the district. Id. at 357. After 

holding that the “narrow primary purpose,” of SRP, to “store, 

conserve, and deliver water for use by [SRP] landowners,” id. at 

369, justified restricting the franchise to SRP landowners, the 

Court considered whether that purpose had been sufficiently 

changed by subsequent events to require a different result. 

Although SRP had “become the supplier of electric power for 

hundreds of thousands of people in an area including a large 

part of metropolitan Phoenix,” id. at 357, the Court nonetheless 

 

6

 The Electees point to a 1931 amendment to the irrigation 

district statutes granting the power to charge for domestic 

water, see 1931 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 98, § 2 (currently 

codified at A.R.S. § 48-2978), and to the 1940 adoption of 

Article 13, Section 7 of the Arizona Constitution, which 
16

held that the district’s original statutory purpose sufficiently 

justified restriction of the franchise, id. at 371-72. 

¶26 Any increase in the authority of irrigation districts 

similarly has not altered their primary purpose. We recently 

confirmed that, despite the increased urbanization of Arizona, 

the primary purpose of irrigation districts remains to “develop 

strong water systems to irrigate arid land.” Hohokam Irrigation 

& Drainage Dist. v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 204 Ariz. 394, 398 ¶ 

17, 64 P.3d 836, 840 (2003). Much as the transformation of SRP 

from a district devoted almost entirely to agriculture into an 

entity that provides electricity to hundreds of thousands of 

urban users was insufficient to require an alteration of its 

statutory voting scheme, the fact that MVIDD now delivers 

substantial amounts of domestic water and power does not change 

the nature of the District. Such changes do not “compel” us to 

overrule Post. See Wiley, 174 Ariz. at 103, 847 P.2d at 604. 

IV. 

¶27 Because Post remains the law, the superior court 

correctly held that the Electees are not qualified electors 

because they admittedly do not own agricultural land. The law 

requires that directors of the District “shall be qualified 

_______________________________________ 

established irrigation districts as “political subdivisions of 

the State.” 
17

electors,” A.R.S. § 48-3011(B), and the Electees therefore 

cannot serve as directors of the District. 

¶28 After finding that the Electees “are ineligible to 

serve as directors of MVIDD,” the superior court ordered that 

the “incumbent directors shall remain in office until their 

successors are appointed and qualify.” This was error. This 

Court has previously held that 

it is not possible for an incumbent to be recalled and 

at the same time be retained in the office . . . . 

Unless he receive[s] the highest number of votes, a 

vacancy automatically occurs when his successful 

opponent refuses to qualify. The paradox of being 

recalled and at the same time elected is not possible 

under our Constitution. 

Abbey v. Green, 28 Ariz. 53, 70, 235 P. 150, 156 (1925). Thus, 

the ousted directors cannot be returned to office and the 

superior court should not have so ordered. 

¶29 Under the Arizona Constitution, “[i]n the event that 

[a] successor shall not qualify within five days . . . the said 

office shall be vacant, and may be filled as provided by law.” 

Ariz. Const. art. 8, pt. 1, § 4; see also A.R.S. § 19-216(A) 

(2002) (“If the incumbent’s successor does not qualify within 

five days after the results of the election have been declared, 

the office shall be vacant, and may be filled as provided by 

law.”). Vacancies in District directorships are governed by 

A.R.S. § 48-3011(C), which provides as follows: 
18

If a vacancy occurs in the board of directors . . . 

the vacancy shall be filled by appointment made by the 

remaining members of the board of directors or, upon 

their failure or inability to appoint within thirty 

days after the vacancy occurs, upon petition of five 

electors of the district the board of supervisors of 

the county in which the office of the district is 

located shall by appointment fill the vacancy or 

vacancies. 

¶30 Here, because none of the Electees is qualified to 

serve as a director, there are no “remaining members of the 

board of directors” available to appoint new directors. A.R.S. 

§ 48-3011(C). The parties stipulated at the time of trial that 

there were then only four qualified electors, making it 

impossible for “five electors of the district” to “petition 

. . . the board of supervisors” to fill the vacancies. Id. 

Based on the parties’ submissions to this Court, however, it 

appears there now may be five or more qualified electors 

available to file such a petition, and the vacancies resulting 

from the decision below may thus be filled as provided by law. 

V. 

¶31 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the superior 

court’s judgment that the Electees cannot serve as directors of 

the MVIDD. We reverse the superior court’s judgment reinstating 

the ousted directors and remand with instructions to enter a 

judgment declaring the three offices vacant. 

 _______________________________________

 Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice
19

CONCURRING:

_______________________________________

Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice

_______________________________________

Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice

_______________________________________

Michael D. Ryan, Justice

_______________________________________

W. Scott Bales, Justice