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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, CASE NO. 08-20669-08

v. HON. ROBERT H. CLELAND

REGINALD STATOM,

Defendant.

 / 

United States’ Response Opposing

the Defendant’s Motion for Compassionate Release

Defendant Reginald Statom is currently serving a sentence of 205 months in 

prison after he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute more than 5 

kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.SC. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. (R. 142: 

Judgment, 426). Statom began serving this sentence on February 23, 2010. He now 

moves for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). His motion 

should be denied.

First, since January 2020, the Bureau of Prisons has been preparing for 

Covid-19, implementing strict precautions to minimize the virus’s spread in its 

facilities. Following two recent directives from the Attorney General, the Bureau 

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of Prisons is also assessing its entire prison population to determine which inmates 

face the most risk from Covid-19, pose the least danger to public safety, and can 

safely be granted home confinement. This process necessarily requires the Bureau 

of Prisons to identify the best candidates for release, ensure that their homes are 

suitable for home confinement, and arrange a way to quarantine each of them for 

14 days. As of May 17, 2020, these directives have already resulted in at least 

2,783 inmates being placed on home confinement. See BOP Covid-19 Website.

Second, Statom does not qualify for compassionate release. Because Statom 

has not sought compassionate release from the Bureau of Prisons based on Covid19, as required under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the Court does not have 

jurisdiction to address his Covid-19-based argument until he exhausts his 

administrative remedies. Nor, in any event, does Statom satisfy the statutorily 

mandated criteria for compassionate release. Because § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires that 

release be “consistent with” the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements, 

Statom’s failure to meet the criteria in USSG § 1B1.13 alone forecloses relief. 

Even when Covid-19 is taken into account, Statom’s age and medical conditions—

asthma and an enlarged prostate--do not satisfy the requirements in § 1B1.13(1)(A) 

& cmt. n.1. Statom has an inhaler to control his asthma and takes medication for an 

enlarged prostate. His offense and criminal history also make him a danger to the 

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community, see USSG § 1B1.13(2), because of his recidivism and failure while 

under supervision. And the § 3553(a) factors—which the Court must also consider 

under § 3582(c)(1)(A)—likewise do not support release because of the seriousness 

of his offenses and the need to protect the public from further crimes.

Background

Statom is now serving his second federal prison sentence for drug 

distribution. Statom previously pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a 

controlled substance and was sentenced to 84 months in prison, followed by 48 

months of supervised release. United States v. Peterson et al, No. 1:99-CR-20018-

16 (E.D. Mich.) (R. 659: Judgment). Statom was still on supervised release when 

he was again involved in a drug conspiracy to distribute at least 5 kilograms of 

cocaine, 50 grams of cocaine base, 50 grams of heroin, and marijuana. (R. 89: 

Superseding Indictment). He pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a 

single count of possessing with the intent to distribute more than 5 kilograms of 

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. (R. 142: Judgment, 426; R. 112: 

Plea Agreement). Statom faced mandatory life imprisonment because of two prior 

controlled substance offense convictions, but received a reduced sentence on the 

government’s motion for his cooperation against a co-defendant. (R. 92: 

Information, 176; R. 118, Transcript, 311-312). Statom’s sentence was within the 

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guideline range recommended by the government in exchange for his cooperation. 

(R. 112: Plea Agreement).

Statom began serving his prison sentence on February 23, 2010, and is 

currently incarcerated at FCI Terre Haute. He is 51 years old, and his projected 

release date is May 17, 2024. His only underlying medical conditions are asthma of 

an unspecified severity, which is treated with an inhaler as needed, and an enlarged 

prostate. Nevertheless, Statom has moved for compassionate release, citing his 

medical conditions and the Covid-19 pandemic. Statom has not requested 

compassionate release from the Bureau of Prisons so he has not fully exhausted his 

administrative rights.

Argument

I. The Bureau of Prisons has responded to Covid-19 by protecting inmates 

and increasing home confinement. 

A. The Bureau of Prisons’ precautions have mitigated the risk from 

Covid-19 within its facilities. 

The Bureau of Prisons has reacted quickly to confront Covid-19’s spread 

within its facilities. For over almost a decade, the Bureau of Prisons has maintained 

a detailed protocol for responding to a pandemic. Consistent with that protocol, the 

Bureau of Prisons began planning for Covid-19 in January 2020. 

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On March 13, 2020, the Bureau of Prisons began modifying its operations to 

implement its Covid-19 Action Plan and minimize the risk of Covid-19 

transmission into and inside its facilities. See BOP Covid-19 Modified Operations 

Website. Since then, as the worldwide crisis has evolved, the Bureau of Prisons has 

repeatedly revised its plan. The current plan, which is in effect until May 18, 2020,

requires that inmates in every institution be secured in their assigned cells or 

quarters for at least 14 days to stop the spread of the disease. Only limited group 

gathering is allowed, and social distancing is maximized. Staff and inmates are

issued face masks to wear in public areas. See BOP FAQs: Correcting Myths and 

Misinformation. And the movement of inmates and detainees between facilities is

severely restricted, with exceptions only for medical treatment and similar 

exigencies. 

Every newly admitted inmate is screened for Covid-19 risk factors and 

symptoms. Asymptomatic inmates with risk of exposure are placed in quarantine 

for a minimum of 14 days or until cleared by medical staff. Symptomatic inmates 

are provided with medical evaluation and treatment and are isolated from other 

inmates until testing negative for Covid-19 or being cleared by medical staff under

the CDC’s criteria. In areas with sustained community transmission, all staff are 

screened for symptoms. Staff registering a temperature of 100.4 degrees Fahrenheit 

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or higher are barred from the facility on that basis alone. A staff member with 

other symptoms can be placed on leave by a medical officer. 

Other access to the facilities has likewise been restricted. Contractors are 

only permitted access if performing essential services, and any contractor who 

requires access is screened for symptoms and risk factors. Social and legal visits 

have been suspended to limit the number of people entering the facility and 

interacting with inmates. But to ensure that relationships and communication are 

maintained throughout this disruption, the Bureau of Prisons has increased 

inmates’ telephone allowance to 500 minutes per month. Legal visits are permitted 

on a case-by-case basis after the attorney has been screened for infection. 

Like all other institutions, penal and otherwise, the Bureau of Prisons has not 

been able to eliminate the risks from Covid-19 completely, despite its best efforts. 

But the Bureau of Prisons’ measures will help federal inmates remain protected 

from Covid-19 and ensure that they receive any required medical care during these 

difficult times.

B. The Bureau of Prisons is increasing the number of inmates who 

are granted home confinement. 

The Bureau of Prisons has also responded to Covid-19 by increasing the 

placement of federal prisoners in home confinement. New legislation now 

temporarily permits the Bureau of Prisons to “lengthen the maximum amount of 

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time for which [it] is authorized to place a prisoner in home confinement” during 

the Covid-19 pandemic. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act 

(CARES Act) § 12003(b)(2), Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281, 516 (Mar. 27, 

2020). The Attorney General has also issued two directives, ordering the Bureau of 

Prisons to use the “various statutory authorities to grant home confinement for 

inmates seeking transfer in connection with the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic.” (03-

26-2020 Directive to BOP, at 1; accord 04-03-2020 Directive to BOP, at 1). The 

directives require the Bureau of Prisons to identify the inmates most at risk from 

Covid-19 and “to consider the totality of circumstances for each individual inmate” 

in deciding whether home confinement is appropriate. (03-26-2020 Directive to 

BOP, at 1). 

The Bureau of Prisons’ efforts on this point are not hypothetical. Over 2,783

federal inmates have been granted home confinement since the Covid-19 pandemic 

began, and that number continues to grow. BOP Coronavirus FAQs. As the 

Attorney General’s directives have explained, these home-confinement decisions 

have required evaluating several criteria: 

1.) Each inmate’s age and vulnerability to Covid-19;

2.) Whether home confinement would increase or decrease the 

inmate’s risk of contracting Covid-19; and

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3.) Whether the inmate’s release into home confinement would risk 

public safety.

(03-26-2020 Directive to BOP; 04-03-2020 Directive to BOP). 

These criteria not only make sense, but also fit the realities of the Covid-19 

pandemic far better than any other solution does. The Bureau of Prisons cannot 

open its facilities’ gates indiscriminately and unleash tens of thousands of 

convicted criminals, en masse. It must focus on the inmates who have the highest 

risk factors for Covid-19 and are least likely to engage in new criminal activity. 

This is true not just to protect the public generally, but to avoid the risk that a 

released defendant will bring Covid-19 back into the jail or prison system if he 

violates his terms of release or is caught committing a new crime. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3624(g)(5); 34 U.S.C. § 60541(g)(2). The Bureau of Prisons’ home-confinement 

initiative thus appropriately focuses on the inmates who will most benefit from 

release and whose release is least risky.

The Bureau of Prisons must also balance another important consideration: 

how likely is an inmate to abide by the CDC’s social-distancing protocols or other 

Covid-19-based restrictions on release? Many inmates—particularly those who 

have been convicted of serious offenses or have a lengthy criminal record—been 

already proven unwilling to abide by society’s most basic norms. It is more than 

reasonable to evaluate whether a particular inmate would adhere to release 

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conditions, social-distancing protocols, and stay-at-home orders during the 

pandemic. And if a prisoner would be unlikely to take any Covid-19 restrictions 

seriously, he would also be far more likely than the general public to contract and 

spread Covid-19 if released. 

The Bureau of Prisons also must account for the current strain on society’s 

first responders. Police departments in many cities have stretched to their limits as 

officers have either contracted Covid-19 or been placed in quarantine. Some cities, 

including Detroit, have seen spikes in shootings and murders. Child sex predators 

have taken advantage of bored school-aged kids spending more time online. 

Covid-19-based fraud schemes have proliferated. There are real risks to public 

safety, and those risks will only increase if communities are faced with a sudden 

influx of prisoners. That is just one reason, among many, why the Bureau of 

Prisons must focus on releasing inmates who are the most vulnerable to Covid-19

and whose release will least endanger the public.

Finally, the Bureau of Prisons’ home-confinement initiative allows it to 

marshal and prioritize its limited resources for the inmates and circumstances that 

are most urgent. For any inmate who is a candidate for home confinement, the 

Bureau of Prisons must first ensure that his proposed home-confinement location is 

suitable for release, does not place him at an even greater risk of contracting 

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Covid-19, and does not place members of the public at risk from him. It must 

assess components of the release plan, including whether the inmate will have 

access to health care and other resources. It must consider myriad other factors, 

including the limited availability of transportation right now and the probation 

department’s reduced ability to supervise inmates who have been released. All of 

those decisions require channeling resources to the inmates who are the best 

candidates for release. 

Those types of system-wide resource-allocation decisions are difficult even 

in normal circumstances. That is why Congress tasked the Bureau of Prisons to 

make them and has not subjected the decisions to judicial review. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3621(b) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a designation of a place 

of imprisonment under this subsection is not reviewable by any court.”); United 

States v. Patino, No. 18- 20451, 2020 WL 1676766, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 

2020) (“[A]s a general rule, the Court lacks authority to direct the operations of the 

Bureau of Prisons.”). It is especially true now, given the Bureau of Prisons’ 

substantial and ongoing efforts to address the Covid-19 pandemic.

II. The Court should deny Statom’s motion for compassionate release.

Statom’s motion for a reduced sentence should be denied. A district court 

has “no inherent authority . . . to modify an otherwise valid sentence.” United 

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States v. Washington, 584 F.3d 693, 700 (6th Cir. 2009). Quite the contrary: a 

district court’s authority to modify a defendant’s sentence is “narrowly 

circumscribed.” United States v. Houston, 529 F.3d 743, 753 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008). 

Absent a specific statutory exception, a district court “may not modify a term of 

imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Those statutory 

exceptions are narrow. United States v. Ross, 245 F.3d 577, 586 (6th Cir. 2001).

Compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) is equally narrow.

First, as this Court has previously recognized, compassionate release 

requires exhaustion. United States v. Walls, No. 92-80236, 2020 WL 1934963 at 

*2 (E.D. Mich. April 22, 2020); United States v. Austin, No. 15-CR-20609, R. 657 

at 5687 (finding that a failure to exhaust administrative appeals “forecloses 

Defendant’s ability to bring his own motion for compassionate release.”). If a 

defendant moves for compassionate release, the district court may not act on the 

motion unless the defendant files it “after” either completing the administrative 

process within the Bureau of Prisons or waiting 30 days from when the warden at 

his facility received his request. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Raia, 

954 F.3d 594, 595–96 (3d Cir. 2020). Because this requirement is a statutory one 

and not judicially crafted, it is mandatory. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856–57 

(2016); Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 738, 751 (6th Cir. 2019).

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Second, even if a defendant exhausts, he must show “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons” for compassionate release, § 3582(c)(1)(A), and release must 

be “consistent with” the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. As with the 

identical language in § 3582(c)(2), compliance with the policy statements 

incorporated by § 3582(c)(1)(A) is mandatory. See Dillon v. United States, 560 

U.S. 817 (2010); United States v. Jackson, 751 F.3d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 2014). To 

qualify, a defendant must have a medical condition, age-related issue, family 

circumstance, or other reason that satisfies the criteria in USSG § 1B1.13(1)(A) & 

cmt. n.1, and he must “not [be] a danger to the safety of any other person or to the 

community,” USSG § 1B1.13(2).

Third, even if a defendant is eligible for compassionate release, the district 

court may not grant the motion unless the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support 

release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); USSG § 1B1.13. As at sentencing, those 

factors require the district court to consider the defendant’s history and 

characteristics, the seriousness of the offense, the need to promote respect for the 

law and provide just punishment for the offense, general and specific deterrence, 

and the protection of the public. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

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A. The Court is barred from granting release because Statom has not 

exhausted his administrative remedies.

The Court must dismiss Statom’s motion because he has not satisfied the 

exhaustion requirement for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Until recently, only the Bureau of Prisons could move for 

compassionate release. The First Step Act of 2018 amended the statute, permitting 

defendants to move for it too. First Step Act § 603(b), Pub. L. No. 115-319, 132 

Stat. 5194, 5239 (Dec. 21, 2018). But the provision permitting a defendantinitiated motion includes an exhaustion requirement. Id. A district court may not 

grant a defendant’s motion for compassionate release unless the defendant files it 

“after” the earlier of (1) the defendant “fully exhaust[ing] all administrative rights 

to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s 

behalf” or (2) “the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the 

warden of the defendant’s facility.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. 

Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 595 (3d Cir. 2020).

Statutory exhaustion requirements, like the one in § 3582(c)(1)(A), are 

mandatory. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856–57 (2016). As the Sixth Circuit 

has explained, there is a “sharp divide” that “separates statutory from prudential 

exhaustion.” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 738, 751 (6th Cir. 2019). 

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Unlike judicially crafted requirements, statutory requirements may not be excused, 

even to account for “special circumstances.” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1856–57. 

Section 3582(c)(1)(A) is likely even a jurisdictional bar on the Court’s

authority to consider a motion for compassionate release. The Sixth Circuit has 

labeled § 3582(c)’s limitations “jurisdiction[al].” Williams, 607 F.3d at 1125. The 

statute “speak[s] to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of 

the parties.” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994). And it 

delineates “when, and under what conditions,” a court may exercise its 

“‘adjudicatory authority.’” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212–13 (2007) 

(quoting Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 16 (2005)). But even if 

§ 3582(c)’s requirements were not considered truly jurisdictional, they would still 

be mandatory claim-processing rules that must be enforced when a party “properly 

rais[es]” them. Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 19 (2005). Thus, regardless of how it is 

labeled, § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement is mandatory. See Ross, 136 S. 

Ct. at 1856–57; United States v. Marshall, 954 F.3d 823, 826–29 (6th Cir. 2020).

The only court of appeals to address this question has agreed. In United 

States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 595–97 (3d Cir. 2020), the Third Circuit held that the 

Covid-19 pandemic does not permit inmates or district judges to bypass 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement. Rather, “[g]iven BOP’s shared desire 

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for a safe and healthy prison environment, . . . strict compliance with 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement takes on added—and critical—

importance.” Id. at 597. 

The majority of district courts to decide this question nationwide, including 

many in our district, have similarly held that a “failure to exhaust” under 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) “cannot be excused, even in light of the Covid-19 pandemic.”

United States v. Alam, No. 15-20351, 2020 WL 1703881, at *2–*3 (E.D. Mich. 

Apr. 8, 2020); accord United States v. Shah, No. 16-20457, 2020 WL 1934930, at 

*2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2020); United States v. Mathews, No. 14-CR-20427-02, 

2020 WL 1873360, at *2–*3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 15, 2020). As one of the those 

decisions has explained, the few courts that have excused exhaustion under 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) have mistakenly relied on cases addressing judge-made exhaustion 

requirements, not statutory exhaustion requirements. Mathews, 2020 WL 1873360, 

at *2–*3.

Congress’s reasons for § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement apply with 

even greater force during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Bureau of Prisons is 

already responding to the pandemic—not just through heightened safety measures, 

but by evaluating its entire prison population for home confinement. By requiring a 

defendant to exhaust, § 3582(c)(1)(A) gives the Bureau of Prisons the opportunity 

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to gather his medical documentation and other records, evaluate his request, and 

decide in the first instance whether it justifies either compassionate release or some 

other form of relief. 

Statom did not pursue any administrative remedies, much less exhaust them. 

BOP has no record of any request by Statom for compassionate release. Statom has 

therefore not satisfied § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s mandatory exhaustion requirement. 

B. There are no extraordinary and compelling reasons to grant 

Statom’s compassionate release. 

Even if Statom had exhausted his administrative remedies, compassionate 

release would be improper. Compassionate release must be “consistent with 

applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Congress tasked the Sentencing Commission with “describe[ing] 

what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for [a] sentence 

reduction” under § 3582(c)(1)(A), as well developing “the criteria to be applied 

and a list of specific examples” for when release is permitted. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). 

Because the Sentencing Commission has fulfilled Congress’s directive in 

USSG § 1B1.13, that policy statement is mandatory. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s 

reliance on the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements mirrors the language 

governing sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for retroactive 

guideline amendments. Compare § 3582(c)(1)(A) with § 3582(c)(2). When 

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Congress uses the same language in the same statute, it must be interpreted in the 

same way. Marshall, 954 F.3d at 830. In both contexts, then, the Sentencing 

Commission’s restraints “on a district court’s sentence-reduction authority [are] 

absolute.” United States v. Jackson, 751 F.3d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 2014); accord 

Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 830 (2010). 

The First Step Act did not change that. It amended only who could move for 

compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). It did not amend the substantive 

requirements for release. United States v. Saldana, No. 19-7057, 2020 WL 

1486892, at *2–*3 (10th Cir. Mar. 26, 2020); United States v. Mollica, No. 2:14-

CR-329, 2020 WL 1914956, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 20, 2020). Section 1B1.13 

remains binding. 

Section 1B1.13 cabins compassionate release to a narrow group of 

defendants who are most in need. That policy statement limits “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons” to four categories: (1) the inmate’s medical condition; (2) the 

inmate’s age; (3) the inmate’s family circumstances; and (4) other reasons “[a]s 

determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,” which the Bureau of Prisons 

has set forth in Program Statement 5050.50. USSG § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1. As the 

Tenth Circuit recently explained, a district court “lack[s] jurisdiction” to grant 

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compassionate release when a defendant’s circumstances do not fall within those 

categories. Saldana, 2020 WL 1486892, at *3.

Statom relies on his medical condition, but he is not eligible for 

compassionate release on that basis. He is not suffering from any terminal illness, 

serious impairment, or deteriorating health from the aging process. Statom has 

been prescribed an inhaler for his asthma and his enlarged prostate has been 

monitored and treated with medication for years without incident. Neither of these 

conditions “substantially diminish[]” his ability to provide self-care while in prison 

USSG § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1. 

Nor is Statom’s correct in suggesting that the Covid-19 pandemic should 

alter this analysis here. Even assuming, in other cases, that a defendant’s risk from 

Covid-19 might make the difference in his eligibility for release under § 1B1.13, 

Statom’s circumstances do not satisfy that standard. There is no record that he 

suffers from moderate to severe asthma and has only an inhaler for use as needed. 

His medical conditions do not place him at greater risk for contracting Covid-19 or 

for complications if he did, nor does his age. As Statom’s prior conduct shows, he 

would also be unlikely to follow basic restrictions on release—much less the 

CDC’s social-distancing protocols or a stay-at-home order. So it is hardly clear that 

Statom faces a greater risk now than he would if released. 

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Nor does the Covid-19 pandemic by itself qualify as the type of inmatespecific reason permitting compassionate release. As the Third Circuit explained, 

“the mere existence of Covid-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread to 

a particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate release, 

especially considering BOP’s statutory role, and its extensive and professional 

efforts to curtail the virus’s spread.” Raia, 954 F.3d at 597. The Bureau of Prisons

has worked diligently to implement precautionary measures reducing the risk from 

Covid-19 to Statom and other inmates. Nothing in the statute or USSG § 1B1.13 

supports the unbounded interpretation of § 3582(c)(1)(A) that he now asks this 

Court to adopt. See Raia, 954 F.3d at 597.

Statom is also ineligible for compassionate release for another reason: he 

remains a danger to the community. Section 1B1.13(2) only permits release if a 

defendant is “not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community.” 

Statom is serving his second federal sentence for drug distribution. He first served 

84 months in prison and then conspired to distribute at least 5 kilograms of cocaine 

while on supervised release. He avoided a mandatory life sentence only by 

cooperating against a co-defendant. He is still relatively young, healthy, and 

physically capable of returning to drug dealing, just as he did before. His sentence 

to 205 months in prison reflected his recidivism and the need for a lengthy term of 

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incarceration to protect the community from future crimes. This factor, too, 

forecloses relief here. 

Statom is not eligible for compassionate release. 

C. The factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) strongly weigh against 

compassionate release. 

Even when an inmate is statutorily eligible for a sentence modification based 

on “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” compassionate release is not 

necessarily appropriate. Before ordering relief, the Court must consider the factors 

set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and determine that release is still appropriate. So 

even if the Court were to find Statom eligible for compassionate release, the 

§ 3553(a) factors should still disqualify him. 

Statom’s sentence reflected the seriousness of his offense, the need for just 

punishment, and his history and characteristics. Statom was not deterred by his 

prior 84-month federal prison sentence or being on supervised release at the time 

he joined the conspiracy. The conspirators moved large quantities of cocaine, 

crack, and heroin from Mexico to Detroit for distribution through a hair salon and 

other places. (PSR, ¶10--24). They maintained at least two stash houses and 

defended them with firearms. (Id.). Statom was a distributor of multi-kilogram 

quantities of cocaine. (PSR, ¶ 16). When stopped with 5 kilograms of cocaine in 

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his car, Statom rammed the agent’s vehicle, hit a bystander’s car, and escaped by 

driving across the median of I-94. (Id.). 

Statom faced a mandatory life sentence which he avoided by cooperating 

against his co-defendants. In addition, Statom was categorized as a career offender 

because of his repeated drug offenses. (PSR, ¶36). His sentence was the midpoint 

of the recommended guidelines range under the plea agreement. (PSR, ¶ 91). His 

term of imprisonment was necessary to protect the public against future crimes and 

his motion raises nothing to diminish that. Statom’s sentence was sufficient and 

reasonable under these circumstances. 

III. If the Court were to grant Statom’s motion, it should order a 14-day 

quarantine before release.

If the Court were inclined to grant Statom’s motion despite the government’s 

arguments above, the Court should order that he be subjected to a 14-day 

quarantine before release.

Conclusion 

Statom’s motion should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

MATTHEW SCHNEIDER

United States Attorney

Case 2:08-cr-20669-RHC-MKM ECF No. 289 filed 05/18/20 PageID.2148 Page 21 of 23
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s/Thomas Franzinger

Assistant United States Attorney

211 W. Fort Street, Suite 2001

Detroit, MI 48226

Phone: (313) 226-9774

E-Mail: thomas.franzinger2@usdoj.gov

Dated: May 18, 2020 

Case 2:08-cr-20669-RHC-MKM ECF No. 289 filed 05/18/20 PageID.2149 Page 22 of 23
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Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on May 18, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing 

document with the Clerk of the Court Eastern District of Michigan using the ECF 

system, which will send notification of such filing to all users of record.

I further certify that I have caused the foregoing document to be emailed to 

the Bureau of Prisons, FCI Terre Haute, who will hand-deliver a copy to the 

defendant.

s/Thomas Franzinger

Assistant United States Attorney

211 W. Fort Street, Suite 2001

Detroit, MI 48226

Phone: (313) 226-9774

E-Mail: Thomas.franzinger2@usdoj.gov

Case 2:08-cr-20669-RHC-MKM ECF No. 289 filed 05/18/20 PageID.2150 Page 23 of 23