Filed 7/13/22 In re Beautifull C. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re BEAUTIFULL C., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

B315748

 

(Los Angeles County

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

PRICILLA R., et al.

Defendants and Appellants.

Super. Ct. No. 20LJJP00482A)

 

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Stephanie M. Davis, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.

Annie Greenleaf, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Pricilla R.

Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Johnny C.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Pricilla R. and Johnny C. appeal from the juvenile court’s 

orders under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 

terminating their parental rights to their daughter, Beautifull C.

1 

They contend that the court abused its discretion in denying their 

requests for a contested hearing and that the Department’s 

unclean hands barred it from arguing they did not have a 

sufficient bond with Beautifull. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Beautifull Tests Positive for Methamphetamine at 

Birth; the Department Files a Petition Under Section 

300, Subdivisions (b)(1) and (j); and the Juvenile 

Court Sustains the Petition and Removes Her

When Pricilla gave birth to Beautifull in July 2020, they 

both tested positive for methamphetamine. Pricilla denied 

abusing drugs and claimed a friend gave her a cup of coffee that 

“must have been spiked with [m]ethamphetamines.” Johnny 

denied seeing Pricilla use drugs. One week later, the Los Angeles 

County Department of Children and Family Services filed a 

petition under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), alleging that 

Pricilla’s substance abuse placed Beautifull at risk of serious 

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code.
3

physical harm and interfered with Pricilla’s ability to provide 

regular care for Beautifull, that Johnny failed to protect 

Beautifull from Pricilla’s substance abuse, and that Johnny’s 

substance abuse interfered with his ability to provide regular 

care for Beautifull. The Department also alleged under section 

300, subdivision (j), that Beautifull’s older sister, Jaylene C., was 

a dependent child of the court due to Pricilla’s and Johnny’s 

substance abuse and that Pricilla’s and Johnny’s substance abuse 

endangered Beautifull’s physical health and safety. The juvenile 

court detained Beautifull, granted the Department custody for 

placement, and ordered monitored visitation for Pricilla and 

Johnny.2 

The social worker gave Pricilla the contact information of

Beautifull’s caregivers so that Pricilla could “set up visitation”

three times a week. Pricilla told the social worker to give the 

caregivers the following message: “‘Don’t get comfortable.’” The 

social worker gave Johnny (and Pricilla again) the same 

information and encouraged him to “arrange for in person visits” 

three times a week. 

On September 23, 2020 the court sustained the allegations 

in the petition and found Beautifull was a person described by 

section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). For the disposition hearing

one month later, the Department reported that both Pricilla and 

Johnny failed to complete the drug testing ordered by the court. 

At disposition, the court removed Beautifull from Pricilla and 

Johnny. The Department informed the court that, in a separate 

dependency case involving Jaylene, the court had terminated

2 At the time of the detention hearing, Beautifull was still in 

the neonatal intensive care unit with a sepsis infection and 

feeding difficulties. Since her discharge from the hospital, 

Lourdes A. and Hildebrando A. have cared for Beautifull. 
4

Pricilla’s and Johnny’s reunification services and their parental 

rights to Jaylene. The court in this case denied Pricilla and 

Johnny reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision 

(b)(10) and (b)(11),

3 and set a selection and implementation 

hearing under section 366.26. The court granted Pricilla’s 

request to continue visiting Beautifull a minimum of three times 

a week for three hours per visit. 

B. Pricilla and Johnny Did Not Consistently Visit with 

Beautifull

In a February 2021 report the Department stated its 

investigator had not been able to locate Pricilla or Johnny since 

December 2020. Over the next two months, the investigator

repeatedly tried to serve Pricilla and Johnny with notices of the 

hearing under section 366.26. When the investigator finally 

3 Section 361.5, subdivision (b), provides that reunification 

services “need not be provided” to a parent or guardian in 

specified circumstances, including where “the court ordered 

termination of reunification services for any siblings or half 

siblings of the child because the parent or guardian failed to 

reunify with the sibling or half sibling” and the “parent or 

guardian has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat 

the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling ”

and where “the parental rights of a parent over any sibling or 

half sibling of the child had been permanently severed, and

. . . [the] parent has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to 

treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half 

sibling.” (See § 361.5, subd. (b)(10) & (11); see also § 361.5, subd. 

(c)(2).) Section 361.5, subdivision (f), provides that, if the court 

does not order reunification services, the court must determine 

whether to set a hearing under section 366.26. (See In re M.S. 

(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 568, 587; In re Jonathan P. (2014) 

226 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1257.) 
5

spoke to Pricilla and Johnny on the phone in May 2021, they 

provided a mailing address, but refused to disclose where they 

lived or to meet with the investigator. The investigator did not 

learn where Pricilla and Johnny lived until a social worker in 

another case contacted the investigator in July 2021 and said 

that Johnny and Pricilla recently had another baby, Logan C.,

and that they lived with the maternal grandmother.4 During 

these months, Pricilla and Johnny did not visit with Beautifull, 

in person or virtually.

For the selection and implementation hearing on 

October 15, 2021, the Department summarized the history of 

Pricilla’s and Johnny’s visitation with Beautifull. In the 14 

months of the dependency case, Pricilla participated in six virtual 

visits, four in 2020 and two in 2021, while Johnny participated in

one virtual visit in 2020.5 The social worker arranged for an inperson visit, but Pricilla did not show up. The social worker also 

offered Pricilla “consistent in-person visits on Saturdays” and 

additional virtual visits, but Pricilla either “did not respond” or 

did not confirm the visits. Pricilla asked to visit approximately 

seven additional times, but either did not confirm the visit or

failed to show up. On one occasion Pricilla said she missed the 

visit because she had technical difficulties with the 

videoconference platform, and on another occasion she said she 

had a scheduling conflict.

4 Two months later, in a separate dependency case, the 

juvenile court detained Logan after Pricilla tested positive for 

methamphetamine. 

5 A previous report documented one additional virtual visit 

Pricilla attended. The report indicated Johnny was “reported to 

be present” during three virtual visits, but the report did not 

state to what extent he participated in the visits. 
6

C. The Court Denies Pricilla’s and Johnny’s Requests for 

a Contested Hearing and Terminates Their Parental 

Rights 

At the hearing under section 366.26, Pricilla and Johnny 

asked the court to set the matter for a contested hearing. 

Counsel for Pricilla argued Pricilla and Bernadette L., a maternal 

great aunt, “could offer testimony with respect to . . . the parentchild bond, as well as the sibling bond.”6 Counsel stated Pricilla 

could also testify about “a bond that was interrupted” by the 

Department’s failure “to comply with a minimum visitation 

order,” the “unfortunate circumstances with COVID because of 

lack of in-person visits,” and “the caregivers’ own desire to adopt 

[Beautifull] even from the very beginning.” Counsel for Pricilla 

asserted “it would be a miscarriage of justice for the Department 

to argue a lack of bond based on [the] forces which interrupted 

the ability for [Pricilla] to form a bond.” Counsel for Pricilla also 

argued the Department presented “contradictory information” on 

visitation because the February 2021 report indicated “there was 

no contact between the parents and the caregiver,” but the most 

recent last minute information indicated “numerous entries” of 

“attempts at visitation, as well as some of the barriers that 

existed.” Counsel added that Pricilla would provide “information 

as to the circumstances of these barriers, as well as the specific 

information about how those visits that did occur, in fact, went 

6 The court denied Pricilla’s request to continue the hearing 

to allow the Department to complete the assessment of

Bernadette as a placement option. An investigation revealed 

Bernadette suffered a criminal conviction in 2019, the nature of 

which, according to the social worker, was “concerning.” The 

court found it would not be in the best interest of Beautifull to 

delay the proceedings on the slim likelihood Bernadette could 

obtain a criminal waiver. 
7

with respect to [Beautifull’s] connection with [Pricilla].” Counsel 

for Pricilla argued Beautifull would lose “her ability and 

opportunity to know her biological family, . . . including siblings 

that are placed with relatives.” Finally, counsel stated that, if 

the court did not terminate Pricilla’s parental rights, Beautifull 

would enjoy “stability” and “continued family connection.” 

Counsel for Johnny argued that, “with respect to a sibling 

bond exception,” he wanted Beautifull “to grow up with and 

around Logan.” Counsel stated that, “with respect to . . . the offer 

of proof for the parent bond,” Johnny “was having difficulties 

with any type of in-person visits because of COVID.” Counsel for 

Johnny asserted that, even though the Department could not 

locate Johnny in February 2021, after Logan was born in July 

2021 the Department had Johnny’s contact information, and 

Johnny had been “trying to work with the social worker since 

[the] summer to try to get his visits in.” Finally, counsel for 

Johnny claimed that Johnny’s visits “have been stymied or 

stopped by the Department” and that, “[o]nce the Department 

does allow [Johnny] to have his visits, . . . he does want to 

continue to have a strong bond with Beautifull.” 

The juvenile court denied the request for a contested 

hearing. The court ruled: “There’s been absolutely no evidence 

presented with respect to there being a reason to set the matter 

for a hearing regarding the sibling exception to adoption” because 

the sibling bond “has to already exist for the exception to apply. 

It does not apply in the hopes and happenstance that a sibling 

relationship will form.” The court found the offers of proof on the 

parental-benefit exception “presented very little facts and a whole 

lot of argument, which is not what an offer of proof is supposed to 

do.” The court agreed with the Department that, based on “the 

totality of the reports,” there was “no contradictory evidence.” 

The court concluded Pricilla’s and Johnny’s offers of proof “failed 
8

to provide the necessary information justifying a contested 

[section 366.26] hearing” because both offers of proof “were 

basically projections about what would happen. . . . They were 

arguments about the law, not presenting facts.” The court found 

that Beautifull was adoptable, that it would be detrimental to 

return her to Pricilla or Johnny, and that no exception to 

adoption applied. The court terminated Pricilla’s and Johnny’s 

parental rights, selected adoption as the permanent plan, and 

designated Lourdes A. and Hildebrando A. as Beautifull’s 

prospective adoptive parents. Pricilla and Johnny timely 

appealed.

DISCUSSION

Pricilla and Johnny argue the court abused its discretion in 

denying their requests to present evidence at the selection and 

implementation hearing. Because the offers of proof did not 

sufficiently specify the evidence Pricilla and Johnny would 

present, however, the court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying their request for a contested hearing. Pricilla and 

Johnny also argue the doctrine of unclean hands precluded the 

Department from arguing they did not have a sufficient bond or 

attachment with Beautifull. Pricilla and Johnny, however,

forfeited this argument and, in any event, they have not shown 

the doctrine applies.
9

A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 

Denying a Contested Hearing on the Parental-benefit 

Exception

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“If the court cannot safely return a dependent child to a 

parent’s custody within statutory time limits, the court must set 

a hearing under section 366.26.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 

11 Cal.5th 614, 630; see §§ 361.5, subd. (f), 366.22, subd. (a)(3); 

In re M.S. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 568, 580; In re Jonathan P. 

(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1257.) The goal at the section 

366.26 hearing “is ‘specifically . . . to select and implement a 

permanent plan for the child.’” (Caden C., at p. 630; see In re 

A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 973, 992.) Statutory exceptions 

“‘permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to 

choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.’” 

(Caden. C., at p. 631; see In re A.G., at p. 992.) 

The parental-benefit exception under section 366.26, 

subdivision (c)(1)(B), applies where “‘[t]he court finds a 

compelling reason for determining that termination would be 

detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following 

circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular 

visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit 

from continuing the relationship.’” (In re Caden C., supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 631; see In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197, 

206.) To prove the exception applies, the parent must show 

“regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into account 

the extent of visitation permitted”; “the child has a substantial, 

positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of 

attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing 

the relationship”; and “terminating that attachment would be 

detrimental to the child even when balanced against the 
10

countervailing benefit of a new adoptive home.” (Caden C., at 

p. 636; see In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 854.)

“The burden is on the parent asserting the parental 

[benefit] exception to produce evidence establishing that 

exception.” (In re A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 996; see 

§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 635.) The juvenile court “may require, without violating due 

process, that the parent provide an offer of proof in support of the 

adoption exception before setting a contested hearing.” 

(In re A.G., at p. 998; see In re Grace P. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 605, 

612 [“‘The trial court can . . . exercise its power to request an offer 

of proof to clearly identify the contested issue(s) so it can 

determine whether a parent’s representation is sufficient to 

warrant a hearing involving presentation of evidence and 

confrontation and cross-examination of witness.’”]; In re 

Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1124 [“due process does 

not preclude the trial court from requiring an offer of proof before 

a parent offers evidence on a contested issue at a section 366.26 

hearing”].)

The offer of proof “must address two components of the 

parental [benefit] exception, namely, the parent’s regular contact 

with the child, and the existence of a beneficial parent-child 

relationship.” (In re A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 982.) “The 

parent’s offer of proof ‘must be specific, setting forth the actual 

evidence to be produced, not merely the facts or issues to be 

addressed and argued.’” (In re Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 612; see In re A.G., at pp. 996-997 [“‘“The judge may properly 

reject a general or vague offer which does not indicate with 

precision the evidence to be presented and the witnesses who are 

to give it”’”; a “proper offer of proof must identify the substance of 

the evidence to be presented, not merely contain a recitation of 

facts.”].) We review the juvenile court’s order denying a request 
11

for a contested hearing for abuse of discretion. (In re A.G., at 

p. 1003; see Grace P., at p. 611.)

2. The Offers of Proof Did Not Warrant a 

Contested Hearing on the Parental-benefit 

Exception

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Pricilla’s and Johnny’s requests for a contested hearing on the 

parental-benefit exception because their offers of proof did not 

identify, with precision or otherwise, the specific evidence they 

would present at such a hearing. Pricilla’s and Johnny’s offers of 

proof did not include specific evidence they had maintained 

regular and consistent visitation with Beautifull; indeed, neither 

counsel for Pricilla nor counsel for Johnny even argued Pricilla 

and Johnny regularly visited Beautifull. Nor did either counsel 

describe specific evidence Beautifull had a significant emotional 

attachment to Pricilla or Johnny. 

As discussed, a parent’s offer of proof must address “regular 

visitation” and “the existence of a beneficial parent-child 

relationship.” (In re A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1005; see 

In re Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at pp. 613-614.) The offers of 

proof by Pricilla and Johnny addressed neither. Pricilla’s offer of 

proof consisted of a vague assertion there was a parent-child 

bond, a recitation of circumstances (including the restrictions 

imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic) that purportedly interfered 

with creating or maintaining that bond, and references to 

portions of the social worker’s reports that counsel claimed were 

contradictory. None of these descriptions provided specific 

evidence on the elements Pricilla and Johnny had to prove: that 

they regularly visited Beautifull and that Beautifull developed 

strong, positive, emotional attachments to them such that it 

would be beneficial for her to continue the relationships. (See 
12

In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 632, 636.) For example, 

Pricilla’s assertion she would testify about “how those visits that 

did occur, in fact, went with respect to [Beautifull’s] connection 

with [Pricilla]” did not address whether Pricilla visited with 

Beautifull consistently or whether the visits were a positive 

experience that created a substantial emotional connection. (See 

Caden C., at p. 632 [in evaluating the significance of the parentchild bond, “courts often consider how children feel about, 

interact with, look to, or talk about their parents”].) 

Johnny’s offer of proof, which consisted largely of excuses 

for not visiting, also failed to provide any specific details. Even 

his accusation the Department “stymied” his efforts to visit 

Beautifull lacked substance. For example, counsel for Johnny did 

not set forth specific evidence of Johnny’s attempts to contact the 

social worker or the caregivers to set up visitation, nor did 

counsel describe how the Department impeded those efforts. 

And, like Pricilla’s offer of proof, Johnny’s did not address the 

elements he needed to prove under the parental-benefit 

exception. (Compare In re A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1013 

[mother’s offer of proof partially complied with the specificity 

requirement by stating she would testify that she maintained 

continuous contact with her child and that the child said he 

wanted to return home with her, and by indicating she would 

submit photographs and videotapes showing they had a close 

relationship]; In re Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at pp. 610, 615

[juvenile court abused its discretion in denying a father’s request 

for a contested hearing, where counsel’s offer of proof stated that 

the father would testify he consistently and regularly visited his 

children, who called him “papa,” and that the oldest child would 

testify she “‘would be sad if he were not her father’”].) 

The record in fact demonstrated both parents’ visitation 

with Beautifull was minimal: Over the course of 14 months, 
13

Pricilla participated in five virtual visits in 2020 and two virtual 

visits in 2021; Johnny participated in one virtual visit in 2020—

hardly regular or consistent, given that the court had approved 

visits at the rate of three times per week. (See In re Caden C., 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [“[t]he question is just whether 

‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent 

permitted by court orders’”]; In re A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 1010 [“parent’s failure to set forth specific evidence, especially 

with a record negating the parent’s regular visitation of the 

minor, will justify the denial of a hearing”]; In re Grace P., supra,

8 Cal.App.5th at p. 614 [“evidence of the nature of the visits 

would be ineffective in proving a beneficial parent-child 

relationship, where the parent failed to maintain consistent and 

frequent contact with the child”]; In re Jeanette V. (1998) 

68 Cal.App.4th 811, 817 [juvenile court did not err in denying the 

father an opportunity to cross-examine a social worker about the 

father’s visitation “during an unspecified earlier period” because 

he had not visited his child for more than one year before the 

section 366.26 hearing].) The record also showed a pattern of 

missed scheduled visits and unanswered messages from the 

social worker to arrange visits. 

Pricilla and Johnny argue counsel for Pricilla “set forth 

actual evidence to be produced,” namely, “testimony of [Pricilla] 

and [Bernadette] of the parent-child bond,” the “Department’s 

failure to comply with a minimum visitation order,” “Covid 

preventing the lack of in-person visits,” and “the caregivers’ 

desire to adopt [Beautifull] from the beginning.” These 

statements were not evidence of the elements under section 

366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), that Pricilla and Johnny had the 

burden to prove. (Compare In re A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 1012-1013 [mother’s offer of proof “included matters that 

were unquestionably relevant to the parental relationship 
14

exception,” such as testimony about the activities she shared with 

her child and the child’s wishes]; In re Grace P., supra, 

8 Cal.App.5th at p. 610 [father’s offer of proof included a 

description of his activities and conversations with his children 

during his weekly visits].)

And to the extent any obstacles to visitation Pricilla and 

Johnny faced were relevant to the section 366.36 hearing, 

Pricilla’s offer of proof still lacked specificity. Counsel for Pricilla

did not identify any (let alone specific) evidence Pricilla would 

present to substantiate the conclusory allegation the Department 

did not comply with the visitation order. For example, neither 

Pricilla nor Johnny pointed to any proposed testimony that the 

social worker ignored calls to set up visits in the months when 

the investigator could not locate the parents or that the social 

worker frequently cancelled visits either parent had scheduled. 

(See In re A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 997 [an “‘offer of proof 

should identify the specific evidence being offered (e.g., “Witness 

X will testify that he heard the defendant state . . .”); and that 

evidence must be admissible’”].)

Finally, Pricilla and Johnny argue Pricilla’s offer of proof 

stated she “would testify that the . . . report about visitation was 

incorrect and contradictory.” However, counsel for Pricilla did 

not describe any specific evidence of Pricilla’s contrary version of 

the frequency or quality of the visits. For example, Priscilla and 

Johnny did not offer any evidence to contradict the social 

worker’s reports showing a string of missed visits, such as a 

visitation log indicating they actually showed up for those visits. 

And, as the juvenile court commented, even if the social worker’s 

reports contained inconsistent information, any such 

inconsistencies would be a matter of argument, not evidence. 

(See In re A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 996 [“The ‘“evidence”’ 
15

in an offer of proof shall consist of ‘“testimony, writings, material 

objects, or other things presented to the senses.”’”].)

B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 

Denying a Contested Hearing on the Siblingrelationship Exception 

The sibling-relationship exception applies where “[t]here 

would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling 

relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of 

the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child 

was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child 

shared significant common experiences or has existing close and 

strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in 

the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional 

interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through 

adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v); see In re Celine R. (2003) 

31 Cal.4th 45, 54; In re I.R. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 201, 213; 

In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 951.) “The purpose of 

the sibling exception is to preserve long-standing sibling 

relationships that serve as ‘anchors for dependent children whose 

lives are in turmoil.’” (In re Elizabeth M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 

768, 781.) 

“The parent has the burden of proving the statutory 

exception applies.” (In re Elizabeth M., supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 781; see In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 251-252.) 

“‘To show a substantial interference with a sibling relationship 

the parent . . . must show the existence of a significant sibling 

relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the 

child. Many siblings have a relationship with each other, but 

would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended. If the 

relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause detriment on 

termination, there is no substantial interference with that 
16

relationship.’” (Elizabeth M., at p. 781; see In re L.Y.L., supra, 

101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952.) The juvenile court has discretion to 

require the parent seeking a contested hearing on the siblingrelationship exception to make “‘an offer of proof to clearly 

identify the contested issue(s)’ prior to determining whether a 

hearing is warranted.” (In re Earl L. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 

1050, 1053.)

As with the parental-benefit exception, Pricilla’s and 

Johnny’s offers of proof on the sibling-relationship exception 

lacked substance and specificity. Counsel for Pricilla described 

the proposed testimony in the most general terms: witnesses 

“could offer testimony with respect to . . . the sibling bond 

between Beautifull and her siblings.” Counsel for Johnny did not 

argue that a sibling bond existed, only that Johnny wanted

Beautifull and Logan to grow up together. And neither counsel 

stated the “‘“content of the answer to be elicited”’” (In re A.G., 

supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at pp. 996, 1007) from proposed witnesses

on any of the issues the court needed to consider to determine 

whether the sibling-relationship exception applied. (See In re 

L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952 [“To determine the 

significance of the sibling relationship, the court considers the 

factors set forth in section 366.26, subdivision [(c)(1)(B)(v)].”].) 

The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pricilla and 

Johnny a contested hearing on the sibling-relationship exception.

C. Pricilla and Johnny’s Unclean Hands Defense Is 

Forfeited and Meritless

Pricilla and Johnny also argue the doctrine of unclean 

hands barred the Department “from arguing a lack of bond.”

Pricilla and Johnny assert that in their offers of proof they said 

they “were often unable to get visits with [Beautifull] due to the 

Department’s failure to comply with the minimum number of 
17

visits ordered by the juvenile court” and that the Department did 

not attempt “to set up a single visit between any of the siblings.” 

Pricilla and Johnny’s unclean hands argument is both forfeited

and meritless.

“Generally, the equitable doctrine of unclean hands applies 

when a plaintiff has acted unconscionably, in bad faith, or 

inequitably in the matter in which the plaintiff seeks relief. 

[Citations.] ‘“The misconduct which brings the clean hands 

doctrine into operation must relate directly to the transaction 

concerning which the complaint is made, i.e., it must pertain to 

the very subject matter involved and affect the equitable 

relations between the litigants.”’ [Citation.] If the required 

showing is made, unclean hands may be a complete defense to 

legal as well as equitable causes of action.” (Salas v. Sierra 

Chemical Co. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 407, 432; accord, Teacher v. 

California Western School of Law (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 111, 

139.) By not raising this argument in the juvenile court, Pricilla 

and Johnny forfeited it. (See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 

1293 [“a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge 

to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in 

the trial court,” and “the appellate court’s discretion to excuse 

forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting 

an important legal issue”]; In re C.M. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 376, 

385 [“A party may not assert theories on appeal which were not 

raised in the trial court.”]; see also In re A.K. (2017) 

12 Cal.App.5th 492, 500 [father forfeited his contention the child 

protective agency and the juvenile court failed to assess the 
18

paternal grandmother’s request for placement because he failed 

to raise the issue in the juvenile court].)7

Even if they had not forfeited the argument, Pricilla and 

Johnny have not demonstrated the unclean hands doctrine

applies. The Department was not seeking legal or equitable

relief; Pricilla and Johnny were seeking to prove a statutory

exception to the termination of their parental rights applied. 

(Cf. People v. Palacios (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 184, 195 [unclean 

hands doctrine, which “applies to bar plaintiffs from seeking 

relief,” did not apply where the People “were not seeking relief 

under the proffer agreement,” but instead, the “defendant . . . was 

seeking to specifically enforce the proffer agreement”].) In any 

event, even if the doctrine applied in this context, the record does 

not support a finding the Department prevented Pricilla or

Johnny from visiting Beautifull. To the contrary, the record 

shows Pricilla and Johnny often failed to request visits, refused 

to disclose their whereabouts or to meet with the investigator, 

and stopped visiting altogether for a five-month period after 

disposition and then for another three-month period before the 

7 Pricilla and Johnny assert counsel for Pricilla “raised this 

defense when she argued that it would be a miscarriage of justice 

for the Department to argue that the parents were unable to 

demonstrate the parent-child bond due to both COVID-19 

protocols that prevented in-person visitation and third parties 

preventing [Pricilla] from visiting with her child.” The record 

does not reflect counsel for Pricilla stated that the Department 

had unclean hands or that the Department’s wrongdoing 

precluded it from arguing the parental-benefit exception did not 

apply. The record also does not reflect counsel for Pricilla stated 

the Department’s failure to set up sibling visitation precluded it 

from arguing the sibling-relationship exception did not apply. 
19

selection and implementation hearing. Pricilla sometimes 

cancelled or did not show up to scheduled visits.

Finally, any error the juvenile court may have committed 

in allowing the Department to argue Pricilla and Johnny did not 

have a bond with Beautifull was harmless. (See Cal. Const., 

art. VI, § 13; In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 59-60 

[reversal permitted “only if the reviewing court finds it 

reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to 

the appealing party but for the error”]; In re T.S. (2020) 

52 Cal.App.5th 503, 517-518.) Pricilla and Johnny did not offer 

or say they could offer evidence that they had visited consistently 

or that Beautifull formed a significant attachment to them. (See 

In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders terminating Pricilla’s and 

Johnny’s parental rights to Beautifull are affirmed.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

FEUER, J.