### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON H eardin Me m

phi s N ove m be r 9, 200 4 S es sio n STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. D ETR ICK C OLE App e al b y pe r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 01-01221 Joseph B. Dailey, Jud ge

No. W2002-01254-SC- DDT-DD - F iled Janu ary 20, 2005

A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., J

. , co n cu rr i n g an dd i s s en t i n g.
I c on c ur in the c on c lus ion of the ma jority that Col e ’s c on vic tio n sh ou ld be a ff irme d. As to the sentenc e of death, however , I have two conce rns. First, I am uncomfortable with the majority ’s analy sis reg arding the application of ag g ravating c ircumstance(i)(2) (pre vious conviction of one or
mo r e f e l o n i e s w h o s e s t atu t o ry e l e m e n t s i n v o l v e th e u s e o f v i o l e n c e t o th e p e r s o n )

. T he ma jor ity
a c kn o w l e d g e s th atth e s t atu t o ry e l e m e n t s o f th e p r e v i o u s c o n v i c t i o n s r e l i e do ni n th i s c a s e : r o b b e ry, kidnapping , rec kless endang erme nt and attempted r ape, may or maynot involve the use of violenc e. Therefo re, the underlying f acts of thoseprior off

enses must be analy zed to determine whe ther vio le nc e wa s in vo lve d. Citi ng to State v. Sims , 4 5 S. W.3 d 1 (T e nn . 2 00 1) , andthemor e re c e nt c a se app lying Sims , St ate v. Pow e rs , 1 01 S.W. 3d38 3, 40 0- 40 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) , th e ma jority ho lds that a judgemay

singly make the de terminatio n whether violence w as involved in the prior c ases and instruct the jury

acc ording ly . In so holding, the majority char acte rizes this decision as a “leg al,” not “fa ctual” one

. Both Sims and Powers, of c ourse, pr ece ded the landmark caseof B lakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, ___, 124 S.Ct

. 2531, 2536 (2004), in which the Supre me Court clarified unequivoc ally that the jur y , n ot thejud g e , mu st f

inda ny fa c ts that wi ll be us ed to i nc re a se thepe na lty fo r a c ri me bey ond the pre scribed statutory maxi mum. ( The Court had pre viouslyheld in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 5 84 , 6 09 (2 00 2) , th at A pp re nd i a pp lie d to re qu ir e that a

jury fi nda g g ravatin g fa c tor s th a t w ill be used to justify

a death sentence ). By char acte rizing t he decision whether a prior offe nse involved violence a s a “leg al” a s opposed to “fa ctual” one , the majority eff ectively avoids the conse quence s of theAp pr e nd i andB lake ly ho ldi ng s. I

be lie vethat thi s c on c lus ion is le ss c e rt a in than thema jority implies, although the Supre me Court has y et to addre ss this narr ow issue. I would hold that in light of theAppre ndi, Ring and B lakely holdings, any additional fac tual finding s nece ssary for a pplication of the prior

violent felony

ag g ravator “be y ond the bar e fa ct that a prior conviction exists ,” includingI have urg ed adop t i ng a prot ocol i n whi ch eac h cas e woul d be com pare d t o f act ual l y s i mi l ar ca s es i n w hi ch 1 eit h er a l i fe s ent enc e or ca pi t al puni s hment was i mp ose d to det er mi ne whe t her t he cas e i s mo r e c ons i s t ent wi t h “ l i fe”
cases o r “ d eat h” cases. Se e Stat e v. M cK i nney, 74 S.W

. 3 d at 32 1 (B i rch, J. , co ncurri ng and dis sent i ng). T he current p rotoco l al l o ws a f

i nd i ng pro p o rt i o nal i t y i f t he case is si m i l ar t o exi st i ng deat h pen al t y c a se s. In o the r w o rd s, a c a se is di s propo r t i onat e onl y i f t he cas e u nder r evi ew “ i s pl ai nl y l ack i ng i n c i r cums t anc es cons i s t ent wi t h t hos e i n s i mi l ar ca s es i n w hi ch t he d e a th p e n a lty has b een i m p o sed.” B l and , 95 8 S.W

. 2 d at 66 5 (emp hasi s ad d ed ).

In m y vie w , ex c lud ing fro m c o m p a riso n tha t gr o u p o f ca se s in w h ic h the S ta te d id no t se e k the d e a th p e n a lty, 2

o r i n w hich no ca p i t al senten cing he aring wa s held , f rustrates an y m ea ningful co m p ariso n f o r p ro p o rti o na l i t y pu rp o ses. Se e B l an d, 958 S. W

. 2d a t 679 ( B i r ch , J

. , di s s en t i n g )

. T h i s c as e, i n par t i cu l ar , i s a pr i me ex ampl e of t h e ar bi t r ar i n es s of this p ro to c o l.

As I s t at ed i n my c on cu r r i n g / di s s en t i n g opi n i on i n St at e v
. G ods ey , “ [ t ] h e s cope of t h e an al y s i s e mpl oy ed by 3
t he major i t y appear s t o be ra t her amorphous an d undef i ned–expan di ng , cont r act i ng , and s hi f t i ng as t he ana l y s i s mo ves f rom case t o case. ” 60 S.W

. 3 d 75 9 , 79 7 (T enn. 20 0 1 ) ( B i rch, J. , co ncurri ng and dis sent i ng). -2- whether the eleme nts of the prior conviction are “violent,” must be madeby a jury . Acc ord, Arizona v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 939 (Ariz. 2003) (on remand f rom the U.S. Supreme Court).
As for the second conce rn, I continue to a dhere to my views, pre viouslyexpressed in a long line of dissents, that the compar ative proportionalityrevie w protocol c urre ntly embra ced by

the majority is inadequateto shield defendants from the arbitrary and dis proportionate imposi tion of the de ath p e na lty . Se e Te nn . Co deAn n. § 3 9- 13 -206 (c )( 1) (D ) ( 19 95 Sup p. ). I ha vere pe a te dly expressed my

displeasurewith the curr ent protocol sincethe time of its adoption in St ate v. B land, 958 S.W .2d 651 (Tenn. 1997) . See State v. Robinson, 146 S.W .3d 469, 529 (Tenn. 2004) (B irch, J ., concur ring and dissenting) ; State v. L eac h, 148 S.W .3d, 42, 68 (Tenn. 2004) (B irch, J., concurring
a n d d is s e n ti n g ) ; St ate v
. D a v is , 1 4 1 S. W. 3 d 6 0 0 , 6 3 2 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 4 ) ( B ir c h , J. , c o n c urring and dissenting) ; State v. B erry , 141 S.W .3d 549, 589 (Tenn. 2004) (B irch, J ., concur ring and dissenting ); State v. Holton, 126 S.W .3d 845, 872 (Tenn. 2004) (B irch, J ., concur ring and dissenting ); State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600, 629-36 (Tenn. 2003) ( Birc h, J ., dissenting) ; State v. Carter, 114 S.W.3d 895, 910-11 (Te nn. 2003) (B irch, J., dis senting ); State v. Reid, 91 S.W .3d 247, 288-89 (Te nn. 2002) (B irch, J., concurring and dis senting ); State v. Austin, 87 S.W .3d 447, 467-68 (Tenn. 2002) (B irch, J ., dissenting) ; Stat e v
. S tevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 852 (Tenn. 2002) ( Birc h, J ., concur ring and dissenting) ; State v. McKinney , 74 S.W .3d 291, 3 2 0 -2 2 (Tenn. 2002) (B irch, J., concurring and dissenting) ; State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 4 1 1 , 431-32 (Te nn. 2001) (B irch, J., concurring and dissenting) ; State v. Stout , 46 S.W .3d 689, 720 (Tenn. 2001) (B irch, J ., concur ring and dissenting ); Terry v. State, 46 S.W .3d 147, 167 (Tenn. 2001) (B irch, J., dis sent i n g); State v. Sims , 45 S.W .3d 1, 23-24 (Te nn. 2001) (B irch, J., concur ring and dissenting ); State v. Kee n, 31 S.W .3d 196, 233-34 (T e nn . 2 00 0) (B ir c h, J., d iss e nti ng ). As pr e vio us ly dis c us se d, I be lie vethat th e thr e e ba sic pr ob le ms with the curr ent proportionality analy sis a re that: (1) the proportionality test is ove rbroa d, (2) the 1 po ol o f c a se s u se d f

or c omp ari so n is ina de qu a te , a nd(3 ) r e vie w i s to o su bje c tiv e
. I ha vepr e vio us ly 2 3 discussed, in d epth, m y perc eption that these fla ws undermine thereliability of the c urre nt proportionality

protocol. See State v. G odsey , 60 S.W .3d at 793-800 (B irch, J., concurring and dissenting)

. I continue to a dhereto my view that the c urre nt comparative proportionality protocol is woefully

inadequate to protec t defe ndants from the a rbitrary or disproportionate imposition of theI a lso no te tha t i n a re c e n t stu d y o n the c o sts a n d the c o n se q u e n c e s o f the d e a th p e n a lty c o n d u c te d b y the S ta te 4 C o m p tro ller , o n e o f t h e c o n c lus io n s w a s tha t p ro se c u to rs a c ro ss th e s ta te a re inc o n siste n t i n the ir p u rs u it o f t h e d e a th p enal t y , a fact t hat al so co nt ri b ut es t o arbi t rari ness i n t he i m p o si t i o n o f th e de at h pe nal t y
. See Jo hn G

. M o rgan, C o m p tro ller o f t h e T re a su ry, T e n n e sse e ’s D e a th P e n a lty: C o sts a n d C o n se q u e n c e s 1 3 (J u ly 2 0 0 4 ), avai l abl e at
w w w .c o m p tro ller.s ta te .tn .u s/o re a /rep o rts

. -3- death pe nalty

. Acc ording ly , I respe ctfully

dissent from that portion of the majority opinion 4 aff irming theimposit ion of the death penalty in this case.

___________________________________ AD OLPHO A. B I RCH , JR.