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IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL

(Memorandum Web Opinion)

YOST V. YOST

NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION

AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).

JEFFERY R. YOST, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE,

V.

SHELLEY A. YOST, NOW KNOWN AS SHELLEY A. BAXTER, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT.

Filed June 7, 2022. No. A-21-479.

Appeal from the District Court for Otoe County: JULIE D. SMITH, Judge. Affirmed as 

modified.

Donald A. Roberts and Justin A. Roberts, of Roberts Law, L.L.C., for appellant.

Gregory D. Barton, of Barton Law, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.

PIRTLE, Chief Judge, and BISHOP and WELCH, Judges.

WELCH, Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Jeffery R. Yost appeals from portions of the Otoe County District Court’s order governing 

his motion to find Shelley A. Yost, now known as Shelley A. Baxter, in contempt for failing to 

follow the court’s amended dissolution decree and Shelley’s objection to his management of a 

business account following the court’s entry of the decree. Shelley cross-appeals from portions of 

the court’s order governing her objections to Jeffery’s management of the business account. For 

the reasons set forth herein, we affirm as modified.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On June 10, 2019, the Otoe County District Court entered a decree dissolving Jeffery and 

Shelley’s 29-year marriage. The court divided the parties’ marital property and awarded Shelley 

$1,400 in monthly alimony. As relevant to this appeal, the court awarded the marital home to 
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Jeffery along with an office, shop, and certain farmland located on that property; awarded shares 

in the family owned business known as B-Y Excavating, Inc., to Jeffery subject to his obligation 

to liquidate certain business assets, deposit the proceeds in a designated checking account located 

at First Nebraska Bank (the Business Account), pay certain authorized expenditures, and then 

equally divide the net proceeds with Shelley; instructed Shelley to sell a certain motorcycle and 

baseball cards and divide the proceeds with Jeffery; and required Jeffery to pay Shelley an 

equalization payment in the amount of $234,176.75.

Shelley timely filed a motion for new trial and motion to alter or amend the decree. 

Following a hearing on the motion, the court ordered a new trial on the sole issue of how certain 

tax liabilities owed by Shelley should be treated in the marital property division and amended the 

decree by (1) prohibiting Jeffery from continuing to pay his $175,000 salary from the Business 

Account and (2) finding that Jeffery’s payment of attorney fees from the Business Account was 

unauthorized and included the unauthorized $56,152.98 payment as a “marital asset awarded to 

[Jeffery] on his side of the balance sheet.” Following the new trial on the issue of how to treat 

Shelley’s tax liability, the court entered a final amended decree on October 4, 2019, which adopted 

the prior decree, in part, but added a provision requiring Jeffery to pay Shelley $46,650 which 

represented Shelley’s portion of prior business income taxes. After factoring in the $56,152.98 

marital asset assigned to Jeffery relating to his unauthorized payment of attorney fees, the court 

recalculated Jeffery’s court-ordered equalization payment, revised the payment obligation to 

$262,253.24, added the $46,650 tax obligation, and ordered Jeffery to pay Shelley a final 

equalization payment of $308,793.24. At the time the amended decree was entered, Jeffery 

remained subject to his future obligation to liquidate the business assets, deposit the proceeds in 

the Business Account, and split the proceeds with Shelley. Shelley remained obligated to sell a 

motorcycle and baseball cards and split the proceeds with Jeffery. Neither party appealed from the 

amended decree despite language in the decree stating that it was a final order.

On October 23, 2019, Jeffery filed a complaint to modify the alimony award. In December, 

Jeffery filed a motion to show cause why Shelley should not be held in contempt for leaving the 

home in a damaged condition, for improperly removing a shed from the property, and for failing 

to sell a motorcycle and baseball cards in the manner specified in the decree and divide the 

proceeds with him. On May 14, 2020, Shelley filed a motion to compel Jeffery to submit a final 

accounting from the Business Account following Jeffery’s court-ordered sale of assets. The court 

ordered Jeffery to file a final accounting by July 10. Following Jeffery’s filed accounting, on July 

20, Shelley filed a formal objection to the accounting claiming Jeffery had dissipated marital assets 

in connection with his court-ordered management of the Business Account.

Over 3 days in September, November, and December 2020, the court held a trial on 

Jeffery’s complaint to modify, Jeffery’s motion for an order to show cause, and Shelley’s motion 

objecting to Jeffery’s final accounting of the Business Account. On January 30, 2021, the court

entered an order finding that the alimony award should be eliminated; that Jeffery had improperly 

dissipated certain funds from the Business Account; that Jeffery was entitled to a credit for certain 

boat motors which should not have been treated as liquidated business assets; that Shelley was in 

contempt for writing profanity on the staircase of the home but was not otherwise in contempt for 

other property damage; that Shelley was obligated to reimburse Jeffery $9,000 representing the 
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value of the shed she was not authorized to remove; and that Shelley was not in contempt for 

failing to sell the motorcycle and baseball cards as instructed but awarded the cards to Jeffery.

Following the entry of the court’s order, Shelley timely filed a motion for a new trial and 

to alter or amend the judgment arguing, among other things, that the court erred in failing to include 

additional dissipated funds in its calculation of the Business Account. On May 16, 2021, the district 

court amended its January 30 order, in part, finding that there were additional funds dissipated by 

Jeffery in connection with his use of the Business Account and recalculated Jeffery’s payment 

obligation to Shelley. Jeffery has appealed, and Shelley has cross-appealed, from the court’s May 

16, 2021, order.

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Jeffery’s assigned errors, renumbered and restated, fall into two categories. The first 

category relates to the court’s findings governing Jeffery’s motion to find Shelley in contempt for 

violating the amended decree. As to that portion of the order, Jeffery assigns that the court abused 

its discretion in failing to hold Shelley in contempt of court for (a) causing smoke and paint damage 

to the property awarded to Jeffery; (b) removing property from the marital home awarded to him 

including (i) a fabricated shed, (ii) blinds and mirrors, and (iii) a shop heater; (c) failing to properly 

administer the sale of a Honda motorcycle; (d) failing to sell the baseball cards as ordered by the 

court; and (e) that the court erred in its findings as to the value of the shed and in ordering Shelley 

to pay that value rather than ordering her to return it.

The second category of assigned errors relates to the court’s findings governing Shelley’s 

objection to Jeffery’s final accounting of the Business Account in which Jeffery contends that the 

court erred in (a) finding Shelley’s objections to Jeffery’s final accounting of the Business Account 

were timely; (b) finding Jeffery improperly dissipated assets from the Business Account by (i) 

paying his personal health insurance premium, (ii) purchasing a $12,000 pickup he was required 

to sell in the decree, and (iii) paying unauthorized attorney fees to Dvorak Law for its 

representation of B-Y in a separate civil suit against Shelley; and (c) in failing to give Jeffery credit 

against his payment obligation for the sale of a boat that was separately awarded to him but sold 

as part of the business auction and the proceeds deposited in the Business Account.

In her cross-appeal, Shelley’s assigned errors all relate to her objections governing the final 

accounting of the Business Account. She asserts that the district court erred in (a) allowing Jeffery 

to retain, without any offset, the benefit of $132,153.22 in “Payroll Expenses” consisting of 

Jeffery’s salary in excess of $115,000 paid to Jeffery from the Business Account between 

November 2018 and August 2019 and the payment of Jeffery’s payroll taxes; (b) failing to order 

Jeffery to pay Shelley an amount paid from the Business Account to the Lutz accounting firm; (c) 

failing to order Jeffery to pay Shelley certain other miscellaneous funds paid from the Business 

Account which were used to pay Jeffery’s recurring personal monthly bills; (d)refusing to place a 

value on the Business Account in order to assess her entitlement to the residue; and (e) failing to 

order Jeffery to pay Shelley 50 percent of the residue in the Business Account.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a civil contempt proceeding where a party seeks remedial relief for an alleged violation

of a court order, an appellate court employs a three-part standard of review in which the trial court's 
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(1) resolution of issues of law is reviewed de novo, (2) factual findings are reviewed for clear error, 

and (3) determinations of whether a party is in contempt and of the sanction to be imposed are 

reviewed for abuse of discretion. Becher v. Becher, 311 Neb. 1, 970 N.W.2d 472 (2022).

V. ANALYSIS

1. EFFECT OF JEFFERY’S PAYMENT

Before addressing the merits of Jeffery’s appeal and Shelley’s cross-appeal, we first 

address Shelley’s argument that the issues argued by Jeff were rendered moot by his voluntary 

payment of the January 2021 judgment against him. Shelley contends that because many of Jeff’s 

assignments of error are based on the court’s resolution of issues from the January 2021 order and 

because Jeffery made payment in response to that order, his assigned errors relating to that payment 

obligation should be rendered moot and we need not consider them further.

Generally, an appellant may not voluntarily accept the benefits of part of a judgment in the 

appellant’s favor and afterward prosecute an appeal or error proceeding from the part that is against 

the appellant. Liming v. Liming, 272 Neb. 534, 723 N.W.2d 89 (2006). But the acceptance of 

benefits rule has exceptions. Id. For instance, a spouse who accepts the benefits of a divorce 

judgment does not waive the right to appellate review under circumstances where the spouse's 

right to the benefits accepted is conceded by the other spouse, the spouse was entitled as a matter 

of right to the benefits accepted such that the outcome of the appeal could have no effect on the 

right to those benefits, or the benefits accepted are pursuant to a severable award which will not 

be subject to appellate review. Id.

The record here reveals that following the entry of the January 2021 order, Shelley filed a 

motion to alter or amend which tolled the time for the filing of an appeal from that order. 

Thereafter, following the entry of the order on the motion to alter or amend, Jeffery appealed. 

However, prior to his appeal, Jeffery made various payments on his multiple court-ordered 

obligations. According to Shelley, these actions should be considered a voluntary acceptance of 

the ultimate judgment and prohibit prosecution of his appeal. Whether some of Jeffery’s payments 

could be considered a voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a prior judgment is a matter we need 

not decide because, as we explain in the next section of the opinion, we reject each of Jeffery’s 

assignments of error, and resolution of this argument is not necessary to our disposition of this 

appeal.

2. JEFFERY’S APPEAL

Jeffery’s appeal contains two categories of assignments of error. The first relates to issues 

regarding the district court’s failure to hold Shelley in contempt. The second relates to Jeffery’s 

accounting of the sale of certain business assets and subsequent deposit of the proceeds into the 

Business Account.

(a) Contempt

Jeffery argues that the court abused its discretion (i) in failing to hold Shelley in contempt 

for property damage to the marital home; (ii) for removing property from the marital home which 

had been awarded to him in the dissolution decree; (iii) for failing to sell the Honda motorcycle in 

a commercially reasonable manner; (iv) for failing to make reasonable efforts to sell the baseball 
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cards as ordered in the original and amended decrees, and (v) in ordering Shelley to pay Jeffery 

$9,000 for the shed and not ordering that she return it.

Civil contempt proceedings are instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private 

parties to a suit when a party fails to comply with a court order made for the benefit of the opposing 

party. McCullough v. McCullough, 299 Neb. 719, 910 N.W.2d 515 (2018). A court's continuing 

jurisdiction over a dissolution decree includes the power to provide equitable relief in a contempt 

proceeding. Id. Contempt proceedings may both compel obedience to orders and administer the 

remedies to which the court has found the parties to be entitled. Id. Where a situation exists that is 

contrary to the principles of equity and which can be redressed within the scope of judicial action, 

a court of equity will devise a remedy to meet the situation. Id.

Civil contempt requires willful disobedience as an essential element. Id. “Willful” means 

the violation was committed intentionally, with knowledge that the act violated the court order. Id. 

If it is impossible to comply with the order of the court, the failure to comply is not willful. Id.

Willfulness is a factual determination to be reviewed for clear error. Id. Outside of statutory 

procedures imposing a different standard or an evidentiary presumption, all elements of contempt 

must be proved by the complainant by clear and convincing evidence and without any 

presumptions. Id.

(i) Property Damage to Marital Home

Jeffery first argues that the district court erred in failing to hold Shelley in contempt for 

smoke and paint damage she caused to the marital home in violation of the original and amended 

decrees which required her to leave the premises in good condition and not cause property damage.

This claim stems from the district court's October 14, 2019, amended decree which 

specified, in relevant part:

[Shelley] has been on notice since June 10, 2019, that [Jeffery] was awarded the marital 

home. . . . [Shelley] should vacate the premises no later than October 20, 2019. [Shelley] 

should give notice through her attorney to [Jeffery’s] attorney on the date that she vacates 

the premises. [Shelley] should leave the premises in good condition and not cause any 

property damage. . . . Any items which are fixtures (i.e. items permanently attached to the 

structure or which cannot be removed by simply unplugging the item) must remain with 

the property, including but not limited to all remodeling performed by Magee Remodel, 

Inc. [Shelley] should not remove anything from this real property not specifically awarded 

to her in this Decree.

At the contempt hearing, Jeffery testified that there was smoke damage in the master 

bedroom and the walls were poorly painted two different colors. In furtherance of his claim, Jeffery 

provided photographic evidence depicting the smoke damage and called an expert to testify as to 

its possible cause as well as the cost to repair the damage. The expert stated that the smoke damage 

appeared to be caused by candles or a fire outside of the master bedroom which occurred when the 

master bedroom door was open. Jeffery testified that the fire damage was likely caused by 

Shelley’s use of a firepit during a November 2018 party. Shelley did not dispute having a party in 

November 2018 and using the firepit during that time. The district court found that, because the 

smoke damage likely occurred prior to June 2019, the date Shelley was first placed on notice 
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Jeffery would be awarded the home, and prior to the October 4, 2019, final decree, Jeffery failed 

to prove that Shelley willfully or maliciously violated the decree. We agree.

Based on the record, including both parties’ statements regarding the likelihood that the 

smoke damage occurred in November 2018, we find no clear error in the court’s factual 

determination that the smoke damage occurred prior to the entry of the original June 2019 

dissolution decree, the date Shelley learned Jeffery would be awarded the home. Because there 

was no evidence presented that the smoke damage occurred after the dates of either the June 2019 

original decree or the October 2019 amended decree, we find the court did not err in failing to hold 

Shelley in contempt for willfully causing smoke related damage to the property in defiance of the 

court’s order.

Next, we consider Jeffery’s claim that the court erred in failing to hold Shelley in contempt 

for intentionally painting two of the walls different colors in violation of the court’s order. Shelley 

testified that in 2017, prior to the entry of the initial decree, she intentionally painted the walls but 

did not have a chance to finish painting. Again, because the district court found that Shelley’s 

conduct predated both the original decree and amended decree, the court found Jeffery failed to 

satisfy his burden to show that Shelley willfully or maliciously disobeyed the court’s order. We 

agree with the district court. Because we find no clear error in the court’s factual findings, we find 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion for failing to hold Shelley in contempt in 

connection with Jeffery’s claims that Shelley intentionally and maliciously left the property in a 

state of disrepair in violation of the court’s decree. This assignment of error fails.

(ii) Removal of Property From Marital Home

Second, Jeffery contends that the district court erred in failing to hold Shelley in contempt 

for her removal of a fabricated shed, blinds and mirrors, and a shop heater from the marital home. 

Jeffery asserts that Shelley’s removal of these items directly violated the court’s amended decree 

which provided:

Any items which are fixtures (i.e. items permanently attached to the structure or which 

cannot be removed by simply unplugging the item) must remain with the property, 

including but not limited to all remodeling . . . [Shelley] should not remove anything from 

this real property not specifically awarded to her in this decree.

a. Removal of Fabricated Shed

Jeffery contends that the district court erred in failing to hold Shelley in contempt for 

removing the fabricated storage shed from the marital property.

In the court’s temporary order, Shelley was awarded temporary exclusive possession of the 

marital home; however, the temporary order did not mention the shed located on the property. 

Thereafter, the court’s original and amended dissolution decrees ultimately awarded the marital 

home to Jeffery but again did not specifically mention the shed. The court awarded Shelley 

“household and lawn furniture” some of which was contained inside the shed. The original decree 

provided Shelley with 45 days to vacate and ordered her to leave the premises in “good condition 

and not cause any property damage.” After Shelley vacated the marital home, Jeffery filed a motion 

to determine damages and a motion for contempt based on Shelley’s removal of the shed.
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Shelley testified at the contempt hearing that she believed that she was awarded the shed 

as part of the award of “household and lawn furniture.” She further testified that she clarified with 

her attorney that the shed was included in her award since the lawn furniture and other items 

awarded to her were contained within the shed. In contrast, Jeffery argued that the decree explicitly 

set forth that Shelley was not to remove anything from the marital home or property that had not 

been specifically awarded to her and that, since the shed was not specifically awarded to her, her 

removal of the shed amounted to a willful and malicious violation of the original and amended 

decrees.

In the January 2021 order, the district court determined that Jeffery failed to meet his 

burden to show that Shelley’s removal of the shed was in willful or malicious disobedience of the 

court’s order. The court found that although Shelley’s belief that she was awarded the shed was 

misguided, the court found that the evidence did not support an order of contempt. 

Notwithstanding its findings, the court ordered Shelley to reimburse Jeffery for the full value of 

the shed which value the court determined to be $9,000 and awarded the shed to Shelley.

Giving weight to the fact that the trial court heard and observed the witnesses and the 

evidence, we find that the court did not clearly err by accepting Shelley’s testimony as true. Having 

determined that the court did not err in finding that Shelley was only mistaken in her belief and 

did not willfully disobey the court’s order, we find the court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding Shelley was not in contempt of the court’s prior decree. This assignment fails.

b. Removal of Blinds and Mirrors

Jeffery next asserts that the court erred in failing to hold Shelley in contempt for removing 

window blinds and bathroom vanity mirrors from the marital home. We note that the district court 

did not determine whether the blinds or mirrors were fixtures; instead, the court found that Jeffery 

failed to satisfy his burden to establish that the removal of those items was willful or malicious.

Although Shelley admitted to removing blinds from the home, she testified that she had 

purchased the blinds after the parties’ separation and provided receipts of the purchase. Shelley 

also testified that the bathroom mirrors were purchased after the parties’ separation and were just 

hung on the wall by a nail and therefore were not fixtures. The district court found that, since 

Shelley acquired the blinds and the bathroom mirrors after the parties’ separation and provided 

evidence of her purchase of the blinds, that evidence did not support a finding that Shelley’s 

decision to remove them constituted a willful violation of the court’s order instructing her not to 

remove property fixtures.

Whether the blinds and mirrors constitute fixtures we need not decide. We find no clear 

error in the court accepting Shelley’s version of the facts; that is, that Shelley purchased the items 

she eventually removed after the parties’ separation subject to her understanding that the property 

was hers and she had the right to remove them. In light of that finding, we cannot say that the court 

abused its discretion in finding Shelley was not willfully disobeying the court’s order based on her 

understanding of her rights to the specific property, not specifically mentioned in the decree, which 

she purchased herself after the parties’ separation. This assignment fails.
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c. Removal of Shop Heater

Jeffery next contends that the district court erred in failing to hold Shelley in contempt for 

her removal of a shop heater from the marital property. Jeffery asserts that the district court should 

have found Shelley in contempt because, combined with her “obvious dislike” of Jeffery, she 

provided no evidence that the heater was not working, did not return the heater, and could not 

recall where she put the heater.

At trial, Shelley testified that she removed the heater, which was not working, to determine 

if it could be repaired. After being advised that the heater could not be repaired, she did not return 

the heater to the shop and believed she stored it. The court found that Jeffery failed to meet his 

burden of proof to establish that Shelley was in willful contempt. Again, where the evidence is in 

conflict, we give weight to the fact that the district court observed and heard the witnesses. Weaver 

v. Weaver, 308 Neb. 373, 954 N.W.2d 619 (2021). Therefore, we find no error in the court’s factual 

determination that Shelley’s removal of the broken heater did not amount to willful disobedience 

of the court’s order and no abuse of discretion in failing to hold her in contempt for its removal.

(iii) Sale of Honda Motorcycle

Jeffery next contends that the district court erred in refusing to hold Shelley in contempt 

for failing to sell the Honda motorcycle in a commercially reasonable manner as required under 

the decree which required Shelley to “sell on eBay or some similar site, the 1986 Honda GL 1200 

[motorcycle] and the baseball cards owned by the parties. [Shelley] shall account to [Jeffery] by 

supplying documents showing the sale of these items and the parties shall each receive 50% of the 

net sale proceeds.”

A commercially reasonable sale is an attempt to sell the property in the manner which will 

bring the best price for the property. In re Estate of Failla, 278 Neb. 770, 773 N.W.2d 793 (2009).

Jeffery contends that, despite the motorcycle being valued at $5,000 on their property 

statement, Shelley sold it for $900. Jeffery asserts that Shelley demonstrated no legitimate reason 

for selling the motorcycle below its value; that the transaction was a sham; and that the conduct is 

right out of the movie “First Wives Club.” Brief of appellant at 20. At trial, Shelley testified that 

she had originally listed the motorcycle for sale for $2,500 on Facebook Marketplace, but later 

decreased the price after negotiating with the buyer. Shelley offered into evidence the messages 

that took place between her and the buyer. In the communication between Shelley and the buyer 

on Facebook, she advised the buyer that the motorcycle had not been started for over a year, but 

that it worked prior to that. Shelley sold the motorcycle for $900 and split the proceeds with 

Jeffery.

Here, although the price obtained for the motorcycle was below the parties’ original 

valuation, the motorcycle was 34 years old, and Shelley accepted what she described as the only 

offer for the motorcycle. The district court found that, due to the motorcycle’s age and condition, 

and based upon Shelley’s testimony, it was sold in a commercially reasonable manner and that 

Jeffery did not satisfy his burden of proof to show that Shelley willfully and maliciously violated 

the court’s order. When evidence is in conflict, we give weight to the fact that the district court 

heard and observed the witnesses. Weaver v. Weaver, 308 Neb. 373, 954 N.W.2d 619 (2021). We 

find that the court did not clearly err in accepting Shelley’s version of the facts over Jeffery’s, and 

when applying those facts, we find no clear error in the court’s finding that Shelley’s actions were 
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not in willful disobedience of the court’s order. Therefore, we find that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in failing to hold Shelley in contempt for selling the motorcycle below the 

parties’ originally estimated value.

(iv) Failure to Sell Baseball Cards

Jeffery next argues that the district court erred in failing to find Shelley in contempt for 

neglecting to sell baseball cards as required under the original and amended decrees. He contends 

that Shelley made no reasonable efforts for over a year to sell the cards and that her failure to do 

so amounted to a willful disobedience of the court order.

Shelley testified that the baseball cards she was ordered to sell belonged to her father and 

there were hundreds of cards contained in a binder and thousands of cards contained in a box. 

Shelley testified that she contacted a baseball card collector who stated that he already had most 

of the cards she was selling and that there was a flood in the market for her specific cards. Shelley 

stated that she also priced out some of the baseball cards on eBay and found that each card was 

worth between 59 and 95 cents. At the hearing on the motion for contempt, Shelley indicated that 

she was willing to give Jeffery the baseball cards. The court then awarded the cards to Jeffery. As 

a result, the district court found that Shelley was not in contempt since the evidence established 

that Shelley had attempted to sell the cards but was unable to do so.

We find no error in the court’s factual determination that Shelley took steps to comply with 

the court order but was unsuccessful. Further, the court awarded the baseball cards to Jeffery. The 

court is permitted to enforce its order with a remedy that is equitable under the circumstances. See 

McCullough v. McCullough, 299 Neb. 719, 910 N.W.2d 515 (2018). We find no abuse of 

discretion in the court’s findings here. This assignment of error fails.

(v) Value and Return of Shed

Jeffery next assigns that the district court erred in failing to order Shelley to return the 

fabricated shed she removed from the marital property and in valuing the shed at $9,000. Jeffery 

contends that, because Shelley did not hire an expert to testify to the value of the shed to refute his 

valuation, the court abused its discretion in valuing the shed at $9,000 dollars. He also asserts that 

the court abused its discretion in failing to order Shelley to return the shed.

As stated above, the district court determined that Shelley was not in contempt for her 

removal of the shed finding that her belief that she was awarded it was simply misguided. 

However, because she mistakenly removed the shed, the court ordered Shelley to pay Jeffery 

$9,000 for the shed’s value. At the trial, although Jeffery testified that the shed was valued between 

$11,000 and $15,000, Shelley testified that she did not believe the shed was worth over $10,000. 

As the Nebraska Supreme Court noted in Jeffres v. Countryside Homes, 220 Neb. 26, 367 N.W.2d 

728 (1985), “the law is well settled that the owner of personalty is qualified to express an opinion 

of its value solely because of her status as owner.” Although the rule differs to some degree 

regarding the value of real estate, values for this property were obtained from both parties and 

Jeffery did not assign error to any such rulings governing their admissibility.

Here, the parties’ testimony conflicted as to the type and value of the shed. Jeffery 

contended the shed was custom whereas Shelley stated that the shed was purchased for $500 and 

was not customized. The district court adopted a valuation which struck a balance between the 
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values urged by both parties. Jeffery’s counsel appeared to accept the appropriateness of this award 

as during the hearing on Shelley’s motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment, 

Jeffery’s counsel acknowledged that the court “put the number for the [shed] in the middle [of the 

parties’ valuations.] I don’t see any problem with that.” Where, as here, the evidence is in conflict, 

we give weight to the fact that the district court heard and observed the witnesses and find no error

in the court’s adoption of a value which struck a balance between the values properly admitted 

into evidence.

Second, as to Jeffery’s argument that the court should have ordered Shelley to return the 

shed, Jeffery fails to cite to any case law which would entitle him to its return as opposed to, or in 

addition to, an award of the shed’s full value. As we stated earlier, in a contempt proceeding, a 

court’s continuing jurisdiction over a dissolution decree includes the power to provide equitable 

relief. Also, where a situation exists that is contrary to the principles of equity and which can be 

addressed within the scope of the judicial action, the court is permitted to devise a remedy to meet 

the situation. See McCullough v. McCullough, 299 Neb. 719, 910 N.W.2d 515 (2018). The record 

establishes that the court devised an equitable remedy by ordering Shelley to pay for the full value 

of the shed which the court determined was $9,000. Awarding Jeffery both the shed and the $9,000 

value of the shed would be providing Jeffery a windfall. We find the court did not abuse its 

discretion in ordering Shelley to pay the value of the shed she removed from the marital property, 

as opposed to returning the shed. Therefore, this assignment of error fails.

(b) Accounting

Jeffery’s second category of assigned errors relates to his accounting of the sale of certain 

business assets and subsequent deposit of the proceeds into the Business Account. The issues relate 

to that portion of the October 2019 amended decree wherein the court stated as follows:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, by the Court that [Jeffery] is awarded all right, title 

and interest in and to [B-Y] free and clear of any interest of [Shelley]. Provided, however, 

that the following items shall be sold in a commercially reasonable manner through the 

entity known as “Auction Time,” with such sale to be completed within six (6) months 

after the Decree is entered:

Sea Ark 21′ boat and trailer

Munson 18′ boat and trailer

Sea Ark 28′ boat and trailer

Rough neck flat bottom boat

Monarch 21′ boat and trailer

Kann 20′ boat Ranger boat & trailer

Grove 85 T Crane

Caterpillar paving machine

(4) 40′ storage units

30′ freight container

10 storage containers

20′ semi container trailer

2 Hotsy steam cleaners

Tools, tool boxes, welders, lathes
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Vermeer tree spade

2009 GMC Acadia

2014 Ford F-250

2009 Gimma Tractor

All proceeds from the sale of the equipment shall be deposited into Account No. XXX9956 

at First Nebraska Bank. [Jeffery] shall provide to [Shelley] a monthly accounting of the 

sale of these assets, and a monthly accounting of the monies held in Account No. 

XXX9956, including a list of all operating expenses incurred to prepare the equipment for 

sale, to pay accounting and actual expenses, together with expenses incurred by Auction

Time. Once the sale of all of the equipment listed above is complete, [Jeffery] shall provide 

a final accounting of the sale and Account No. XXX9956 to [Shelley]. [Shelley] shall have 

thirty (30) days thereafter to make any specific objections to the accounting. Absent any 

objections, all remaining proceeds in that account, shall forthwith be divided equally 

between the parties.

Shelley eventually filed an objection to the accounting provided by Jeffery. Jeffery assigns 

numerous errors in connection with the court’s findings governing Shelley’s objections to his 

accounting of the Business Account. Jeffery asserts that the district court erred in finding that 

Shelley’s objection to the final accounting of the Business Account was timely; in finding that he

improperly dissipated assets when he used the business account to pay his health insurance 

premium, purchase a pickup truck, and pay certain attorney fees; and in failing to give him credit 

against the amount payable to Shelley for proceeds he placed in the Business Account after selling 

a boat he was separately awarded.

Before addressing Jeffery’s assigned errors in connection with Shelley’s contest to 

Jeffery’s accounting, we must first identify the nature of the proceeding itself. We believe that the 

nature of the proceeding was identified by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Johnson v. Johnson, 

308 Neb. 623, 956 N.W.2d 261 (2021), wherein the court held:

The district court's authority to enforce the decree was not limited by the fact that [the 

mother] initiated contempt proceedings. Civil contempt proceedings are instituted to 

preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to a suit when a party fails to comply with 

a court order made for the benefit of the opposing party. McCullough v. McCullough, 299 

Neb. 719, 910 N.W.2d 515 (2018). A court's continuing jurisdiction over a dissolution 

decree includes the power to provide equitable relief in a contempt proceeding. Id. 

Contempt proceedings may both compel obedience to orders and administer the remedies 

to which the court has found the parties to be entitled. Where a situation exists that is 

contrary to the principles of equity and which can be redressed within the scope of judicial 

action, a court of equity will devise a remedy to meet the situation. Id. Although the district 

court apparently concluded that [the father] did not willfully violate the decree by not 

paying [the daughter’s] automobile and college expenses, and therefore did not hold him 

in contempt for failing to do so, it still had authority to enforce the decree by compelling 

him to follow it.
- 12 -

Here, although Shelley did not identify her challenge to Jeffery’s accounting as a contempt 

action, we find the proceeding as one instituted to preserve and enforce Shelley’s rights when she 

believed Jeffery failed to comply with a court order made for her benefit. As such, we find the 

proceeding to be a contempt proceeding seeking to enforce the court’s order in the decree and we 

apply the standard of review for contempt proceedings set forth earlier in this opinion. We now 

proceed to address Jeffery’s assigned errors independently.

(i) Timeliness of Objection to Final Accounting

Jeffery first argues that the court erred in finding that Shelley timely filed her objection to 

his final accounting of the Business Account following his presentation of that final accounting. 

As to that finding, the record establishes that, during discovery in December 2019, Jeffery provided 

certain documents relating to the Business Account and the sale of the equipment. The parties then 

disputed whether all the documents were provided. In March 2020, Shelley’s counsel sent an email 

inquiring about when Shelley would expect to receive a final accounting. In April, Jeffery provided 

supplemental discovery responses to Shelley’s prior request for production of documents. In his 

response, Jeffery indicated that his December 2019 responses and March 2020 supplemental 

responses constituted his final accounting. In response, Shelley filed a motion to compel Jeffery 

to file a compliant final accounting which motion was granted by the district court. The court found 

that Jeffery had not provided the final accounting through his initial and supplemental discovery 

and that the 30-day period for Shelley to file her objection had not been triggered and granted 

Jeffery until July 10 to file a final accounting. Following the court’s order, Jeffery timely filed and 

served the final accounting, and 10 days later, Shelley filed her objection alleging improper 

expenditures from the Business Account which she alleged resulted in a dissipation of the Business 

Account that the parties were required to divide equally. Following a hearing thereon, the district 

court found that Shelley’s objection was timely. Jeffery assigns error to that finding. We disagree.

After reviewing the record associated with Jeffery’s disclosures, the court’s rulings 

thereon, and the court’s ultimate conclusion that Shelley’s final objection was timely filed, we 

cannot say that the court clearly erred in finding that Shelley timely filed her objection or that the 

court abused its discretion in determining that Shelley complied with the court’s order. Jeffery’s 

assignment that the court erred in its determination of the timeliness of Shelley’s objection fails.

(ii) Dissipation of Marital Assets

Jeffery next argues that the district court erred in finding that he failed to comply with the 

court’s order governing certain payments he made from the Business Account. More specifically, 

Jeffery argues that the district court erred in finding that he improperly disbursed payments from 

the Business Account relating to the payment for his personal health insurance premiums, the 

purchase of the 2014 Ford pickup, and for his payment of certain attorney fees to Dvorak Law. 

We will discuss those findings independently.

a. Health Insurance Premiums

Jeffery first argues that the district court erred in finding that he improperly disbursed funds 

from the Business Account for his personal health insurance premiums. He argues that, because 

the terms of the temporary order ordered him to maintain health insurance through October 4, 
- 13 -

2019, payments made from the Business Account utilized for that purpose complied with the 

court’s order. The court found that Jeffery’s utilization of the Business Account for this purpose 

violated the decree because “[Jeffery’s] personal health insurance premium obviously does not 

constitute an ‘operating expense incurred to prepare the equipment for sale.’ [Jeffery] shall 

reimburse [Shelley] for half of the $11,144.40 (or $5,572.20) which he dissipated from the 

Business account to pay his health insurance.”

Shelley testified that, as of July 31, 2017, Jeffery was no longer providing insurance 

coverage for her as she had obtained her own insurance through her employer. She argues that 

Jeffery’s $11,144.40 payment for his personal health insurance premiums in November 2018 from 

the Business Account constituted an improper use of the funds because it was unrelated to expenses 

authorized by the decree. Jeffery contends that, because he was otherwise awarded B-Y’s business 

in the decree, he was permitted to use the account for personal expenses. We disagree.

Although we agree that the court’s May 2016 stipulated order required Jeffery to “assume 

the monthly premium for [the parties’] joint health coverage during the pendency of this action 

and until further order of the court,” the order did not provide that Jeffery could pay the health 

insurance premiums from the Business Account. Further, although the court’s June order awarded 

Jeffery “the exclusive possession” of B-Y, he was otherwise specifically instructed that as to the 

Business Account, Jeffery was to sell certain business assets; deposit the funds in the Business 

Account; utilize the account proceeds for operating expenses associated with preparing the 

equipment for sale, accounting, and actual expenses including those of Auction Time; provide a 

full accounting of those transactions; and divide the remaining proceeds in that account with 

Shelley.

We agree with the district court that under the decree, the Business account was to be used 

by Jeffery as a repository for the business assets sold with expenses paid only relating to the sale 

and accounting relating to that function with the remaining proceeds to be split between Jeffery 

and Shelley. Because Jeffery was not authorized to pay personal health insurance premiums from 

the Business Account under the specific terms of the decree, we find that the court did not err in 

finding that this was an unauthorized disbursement from the Business Account. This assignment 

fails.

b. 2014 Ford Pickup

Jeffery next argues that the district court erred in finding that he made an unauthorized 

payment from the Business Account by purchasing his 2014 Ford pickup. He claims that the court 

erred in finding that he purchased the vehicle with proceeds from the Business Account rather than 

his own personal funds.

The 2014 Ford pickup was one of B-Y’s assets that the court ordered should be sold with 

the proceeds to be split between the parties. The record shows that on November 20, 2019, Jeffery 

paid a sum of $12,000 from the Business Account to a company that was auctioning off some of 

B-Y’s business equipment. Jeffery argues that he reimbursed the Business Account with his own 

personal funds. The court, in its May 2021 order on the motion to alter or amend stated that “it 

was improper for [Jeffery] to use $12,000 from [the B-Y account] to buy the pickup truck for 

himself. He shall pay [Shelley] $6,000.”
- 14 -

From our review of the record, check number 1890 was written from the B-Y account to 

Jeffery for $12,000. The auction company’s representative testified that Jeffery sent a check for 

$12,000 for the pickup. Jeffery’s accounting expert testified that the last sale or deposit of the 

equipment for the Business Account occurred in November 2019 which corresponded with the 

date of the payment for the pickup.

Pursuant to the decree, Jeffery was to use the Business Account as a repository for the sale 

of designated assets of B-Y with the net proceeds of the sale to be split between the parties. Jeffery 

testified that he did use the Business Account to pay certain personal expenses. However, Jeffery’s 

accounting expert stated that certain of those payments were then booked as an account receivable 

of the company to be paid by Jeffery. Although he testified that some of the receivables were 

reimbursed by Jeffery, he acknowledged that the receivable balance was not fully reimbursed. 

William Strain, Shelley’s accounting expert, testified that had B-Y booked an account receivable 

balance to correspond with Jeffery’s personal expenditures paid through the Business Account, it 

would have been depicted as an asset on B-Y’s balance sheet. He testified that there was not an 

accounts receivable from Jeffery shown on B-Y’s balance sheet which meant that Jeffery’s 

personal expenses were either paid back or forgiven and based on the records, he believed that the 

expenses were forgiven and never paid back into the Business Account.

After reviewing this testimony, the district court concluded that Jeffery had not reimbursed 

the Business Account for his $12,000 payment to acquire the 2014 Ford pickup truck. Following 

our de novo review of the record, after giving weight to the determination of the district court 

judge who heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over another, 

we find that the court did not clearly err in its determination that Jeffery improperly utilized the 

Business Account to purchase the vehicle and did not reimburse the Business Account. Jeffery’s 

assignment of error fails.

c. Attorney Fees

Jeffery next argues that the district court erred in finding that he improperly used the 

Business Account to pay attorney fees to the Dvorak law firm.

Following the entry of the initial dissolution decree, Shelley filed a motion for a new trial 

or to alter or amend the judgment asserting that Jeffery had improperly used funds in the Business 

Account that were to be divided with Shelley. In its August 2019 order on the motion for a new

trial, the court agreed with Shelley and found that Jeffery wrote checks on the Business Account 

totaling $58,752.98 for legal fees to three different law firms. The court found that, although 

Jeffery testified that there was a separate civil lawsuit involving the parties in this case, $56,152.98 

of legal fees had been paid to two law firms that had not represented B-Y in the separate civil 

lawsuit. Because the court was “not satisfied with [Jeffery’s] vague explanation as to why he paid 

their attorneys’ fees using the [Business Account],” $56,152.98 of attorney fees paid out of the 

Business Account were treated as a martial asset awarded to Jeffery on his side of the balance 

sheet.

Thereafter, in July 2020, Shelley filed an objection to the final accounting filed by Jeffery 

asserting that Jeffery had dissipated nearly all the funds held in the Business Account that were

supposed to be split equally between the parties and that Jeffery failed to establish the expenses 

which were used to prepare B-Y’s equipment for sale. In its January 2021 order relating to the 
- 15 -

objection to the final accounting, the district court ordered Jeffery to reimburse Shelley for one-half 

of $17,633.08 in additional legal fees paid to another law firm out of the Business Account. The

court stated:

There is simply no way that payments made to [Dvorak] for representing B-Y in the civil 

suit against [Shelley], which B-Y dismissed on its own motion . . . could possibly constitute 

“operating expenses incurred to prepare the equipment for sale.” [Jeffery] shall reimburse 

[Shelley] for half of the $17,633.08 (or $8,816.54) which he dissipated from the B-Y 

account to pay [Dvorak].

Under our de novo review of the record, there is no dispute that Dvorak law firm 

represented B-Y in a civil suit against Shelley for damages and in another civil suit against his 

stepdaughter related to property awarded to Shelley. The question then is whether the payment of 

attorney fees from the Business Account to the Dvorak law firm in its representation of B-Y in a 

suit against Shelley was a permitted expense.

Jeffery contends that, although B-Y’s case against Shelley was dismissed, he should not 

have been required to reimburse Shelley for that half of the attorney fees because the fees 

represented an “actual cost” of the parties and not a personal expenditure. Shelley contends that 

Jeffery failed to show how attorney fees paid to Dvorak law firm amounted to an expense incurred 

to prepare the equipment for sale since that lawsuit was irrelevant to such sale.

As it related to how the Business Account was to be used in connection with the decree, 

the district court stated:

The Court further finds that [the Business Account] . . . is the account [Jeffery] has been 

utilizing during the divorce proceeding, to fix up and prepare equipment for sale, to pay 

accounting expenses and to pay his salary. This account has continued to be used after the 

last date of trial. The Court finds that [Jeffery] should continue to utilize that account for 

such purposes and all proceeds from the auction sale of the equipment set forth above, 

should be deposited into this account and [Jeffery] should continue to provide monthly 

accountings to [Shelley].

As it related to the accounting to be provided, the court originally ordered:

All proceeds from the sale of the equipment shall be deposited into [the Business Account]. 

[Jeffery] shall provide to [Shelley] a monthly accounting of the sale of these assets, and a 

monthly accounting of the monies held in [the Business Account], including a list of all 

operating expenses incurred to prepare the equipment for sale, to pay [Jeffery’s] salary and 

accounting expenses, together with expenses incurred by Auction Time.

Thereafter, in its August 2019 amended order, the district court modified the aforementioned 

paragraph to provide:

All proceeds from the sale of the equipment shall be deposited into [the Business Account]. 

[Jeffery] shall provide to [Shelley] a monthly accounting of the sale of these assets, and a 

monthly accounting of the monies held in [the Business Account], including a list of all 

operating expenses incurred to prepare the equipment for sale, to pay [Jeffery’s] salary and 

accounting and actual expenses, together with expenses incurred by Auction Time.
- 16 -

Following the court’s amended decree, which neither party appealed, Jeffery was permitted 

to use the account to prepare the equipment for sale, as a repository for liquidated assets, and to 

pay the associated sale and accounting expenses. The attorney fees paid by Jeffery to the Dvorak 

law firm were not associated with the business assets designated for sale or associated sale and 

accounting expenses. Accordingly, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding 

that Jeffery’s payment of these fees from the Business Account were an unauthorized expenditure 

and should be reimbursed. This assignment fails.

(c) Lifetyme Boat

Jeffery next argues that the district court erred in failing to give him credit for his sale of 

the “Lifetyme boat” which proceeds were deposited into the Business Account even though it was 

an asset awarded to him under the decree and not a business asset of B-Y ordered to be sold and 

the proceeds deposited.

The trial held by the district court over 3 days in September and November 2020 was in 

response to Shelley’s motion objecting to the accounting of the Business Account administered by 

Jeffery. As described before, this issue presented to the court was identified as an unauthorized 

expenditure by Jeffery from the Business Account. Both before and during the trial, Jeffery never 

requested a credit to be awarded to him for the sale and subsequent deposit of the proceeds from 

that sale for the Lifetyme boat. Jeffery only mentioned the boat at the hearing in relation to the sale 

of certain business assets to a particular company without affirmatively requesting a credit. 

Following the court’s order governing the trial, Shelley filed a motion for a new trial or to alter or 

amend that order. The Lifetyme boat was once again discussed, but a credit was not requested by 

Jeffery.

On appeal, Jeffery now asserts that he should have been entitled to a credit for the Lifetyme 

boat since it was personally awarded to him and that he deposited the funds from its sale into the 

Business Account. However, as we have often said, a district court cannot commit error in 

resolving an issue never presented and submitted to it for disposition. In re Interest of Rosso, 270 

Neb. 323, 701 N.W.2d 355 (2005). This assignment of error fails.

3. SHELLEY’S CROSS-APPEAL

Shelley’s cross-appeal is directed only at issues decided in connection with her objections 

to Jeffery’s accounting of the Business Account. She specifically assigns that the court erred in 

finding Jeffery did not make unauthorized salary withdrawals from the Business Account from 

November 2018 to August 2019; did not make unauthorized personal withdrawals for certain 

miscellaneous utility-type services; that the court erred in not identifying a starting value for the 

Business Account; and that the court erred in not requiring a division of the remaining proceeds in 

the Business Account. We will discuss each of these issues independently.

(a) Salary Expense

Shelley first argues that Jeffery’s salary withdrawals from the Business Account in the 

amount of $132,153.22 from November 2018 to August 2019 were unauthorized.

In the court’s original decree entered on June 10, 2019, the court awarded the B-Y business 

shares to Jeffery but ordered that certain business assets shall be sold, and the proceeds deposited 
- 17 -

in the Business account; that Jeffery could withdraw certain limited expenses associated with the 

sale of the assets including a salary; and that the net proceeds would be divided between Jeffery 

and Shelley. After entering that decree, Shelley filed a motion for new trial or to alter or amend 

the decree. That motion included a challenge to Jeffery for having taken a salary from the Business 

Account. Following a hearing on that motion, the court entered an order amending its original 

decree and finding, in part, that Jeffery was prohibited from drawing his salary from the Business 

Account because “B-Y is no longer in business. It is not reasonable for [Jeffery] to continue to 

draw a $175,000.00 annual salary to prepare the assets for sale. Doing so would constitute a 

dissipation of marital assets and would be inequitable.”

As part of the court’s rationale for originally allowing the salary, the court made reference 

to a statement during the dissolution trial where Shelley’s counsel indicated counsel had no 

objection to Jeffery continuing to take a salary. Notwithstanding the remark, the court reversed its 

decision on allowing a continuing salary and removed the provision for that salary from the 

original decree. The court later cited Jeffery’s lack of continuing salary as a justification for 

removing Jeffery’s obligation to provide alimony to Shelley. Neither party disputes the fact that 

Jeffery did not provide himself with a salary after the court amended its decree in August 2019. 

Following a new trial on the limited issue of a disputed tax allocation, the court issued a final 

amended decree on October 14, 2019, wherein the court incorporated language removing Jeffery’s 

right to pay himself a salary. But, unlike the unauthorized reduction for attorney fees discussed 

before, the court did not list salary paid during the pendency of the prior order as an asset on 

Jeffery’s side of the ledger. Neither party appealed from the findings set forth therein.

Shelley now attempts to dispute salary payments made by Jeffery from the Business 

Account from November 2018 to August 2019 in connection with the accounting proceeding. 

There is no question that Jeffery was authorized to pay himself a salary at the time he paid it but 

was prohibited after August 2019 when the court first amended the decree. The question is, can 

Shelley now object to the salary payments under the auspices of the objection proceeding reserved 

by the court based upon an amended decree when the salary was authorized at the time it was 

taken. The district court found that the salary deduction could not be contested because, when the 

payments were made, the payments were not in contravention of the then current court order. We 

agree for two separate reasons.

First, although the August 2019 order prohibited Jeffery from taking any further salary 

from the Business Account, the June 10, 2019, decree specifically authorized it. As we stated 

earlier, Shelley’s objection to Jeffery’s accounting of the Business Account is a contempt 

proceeding designed as a remedy for noncompliance with a court’s order. Because when Jeffery 

removed his salary prior to August 2019, he was not violating the court’s order, we find that the 

court did not err in finding that the removal of the salary was not prohibited. Second, if Shelley 

believed she was entitled to an additional marital asset based upon Jeffery’s conduct in connection 

with his salary which was analyzed by the court at the time the court entered its final amended 

decree on October 10, 2019, she could have appealed from that decree. She did not. That amended 

decree contemplated a future right for Shelley to contest an accounting of the Business Account 

for activities not resolved by the amended decree but not as a mechanism to resolve matters that 

were already decided and not appealed. This assigned error fails.
- 18 -

(b) Payments to Lutz Accounting Firm

Shelley next argues that the district court erred in failing to find that certain payments to 

the Lutz accounting firm from the Business Account were unauthorized under the decree. Shelley 

argues that the court’s decree limited Jeffery to paying expenses associated with preparing the 

equipment for sale. She argues that because payments to Lutz do not fit within that framework, 

those payments, in the amount of $7,772.89, were unauthorized. The district court found there was 

insufficient evidence presented to establish whether these payments were, in fact, contemplated by 

the order. As we stated before, the decree allowed Jeffery to pay “[Jeffery’s] accounting and actual 

expenses, together with expenses incurred by Auction Time.” As such, payments by Jeffery to the 

Lutz accounting firm appear to at least meet the description of an accounting expense. The district 

court found that there simply was not sufficient evidence provided to consider these accounting 

payments unauthorized. In a civil contempt preceding, the burden to prove all elements of civil 

contempt are on the complainant who must prove those elements by clear and convincing evidence. 

Becher v. Becher, 311 Neb. 1, 970 N.W.2d 472 (2022). After reviewing the conflicting testimony 

governing the source of these payments to the accounting firm, we cannot say that the court abused 

its discretion in finding that Shelley failed to prove these payments were unauthorized under the 

decree. This assigned error fails.

(c) Jeffery’s Personal Monthly Expenses

Shelley asserts that the district court erred in finding that the evidence was insufficient for 

the court to conclude payments for certain garbage, rent, telephone, and utility expenses in the 

total amount of $12,653.15 were unauthorized payments from the Business Account under the 

decree. The district court found “it was without sufficient information as to whether payments for 

garbage service, rent, telephone, and utilities were necessary operating expenses incurred with 

official B-Y business in wrapping up the business and preparing equipment for sale.” We disagree 

in part.

We agree it is at least arguable that the garbage, telephone, and utility fees could be 

expenses associated with the sale of the business assets and we cannot say that the court abused its 

discretion in so finding. However, the records indicate that $6,300 in rental payments were made 

to Jeffery’s brother. In the amended decree, Jeffery was awarded the shop and business office for 

B-Y and had no reason to incur rental costs associated with selling the business assets and he 

provided no legitimate reason why these rental payments to his brother constituted authorized 

expenditures under the decree. Having provided no legitimate explanation as to how this expense 

is associated with the sale of business equipment, we find that the court erred in finding that it was 

an authorized payment from the Business Account. We will discuss the impact of this finding in 

the court’s order in the remaining sections of this opinion.

(d) Beginning Value of Business Account

Shelley next argues that the court erred in not adopting the Business Account value of 

$194,697.60 for purposes of its dissipation analysis. She argues this resulted in a significant marital 

asset being unvalued in contravention of Nebraska law.

As we stated before, the court entered its amended decree on October 4, 2019. In its balance 

sheet, it did not include the Business Account. Instead, the decree referred only to the Business 
- 19 -

Account as the conduit for the future sale of certain business assets, the net value of which would 

be split among the parties. There was no appeal taken from that decree. To the extent Shelley is 

arguing the court erred in failing to assign value to the account in connection with the amended 

decree, that issue should have been raised in an appeal from that amended decree.

That said, the decree did contemplate a future sale of certain business assets, a deposit of 

funds in the Business Account, authorization for certain limited expenses, and then a division of 

the net proceeds. The court required Jeffery to account monthly for the Business Account 

following the issuance of the initial and amended decrees, required a final accounting be submitted, 

and provided a procedure by which Shelley could contest that accounting. Jeffery ultimately did 

provide an accounting relating to the Business Account retroactive to November 1, 2018. And as 

demonstrated by Exhibit 300, Shelley was able to contest any and all transactions made from the 

account during that relevant period. The court made findings governing all contested transactions 

spanning between November 2018 and the date of the trial on November 9, 2020, (at which time 

$7,772.89 remained in the account) and the court entered a final payment obligation after 

performing that analysis. The court’s amended decree required Jeffery to maintain the Business 

Account in a specified manner and then split the remaining proceeds with Shelley upon the 

conclusion of his official duties. It separately provided Shelley with a remedy to contest Jeffery’s 

administration of those duties. Inherent in the court’s decree is a specified period of time that the 

proceeds in the account would be maintained and then evenly split. In order to determine the split, 

it was essential to have a beginning date and ending date where the proceeds could be monitored 

and so that the split of the proceeds could be determined. Even though the court did not expressly 

set the starting date of the account or its value, it is clear from the record that the court analyzed 

all disputed transactions commencing as of November 1, 2018, through the date of the trial. 

Equally clear is that Shelley had an opportunity to and did contest entries made during that relevant 

period.

Although the court did not expressly state it, we find that the proceeding did fairly allow 

Shelley to contest the expenses from the Business Account during relevant periods as contemplated 

by the court’s amended decree. As such, we find as to Shelley’s particular assigned error, that the 

court failed to adopt a beginning value of the Business account, fails because it is refuted by the 

record based on the court’s analysis. We will further discuss the impact of that adoption in 

connection with Shelley’s final assignment.

(e) Remaining Balance in B-Y Account

Shelley finally argues the court erred in failing to order Jeffery to pay Shelley one-half of 

the proceeds remaining in the Business Account following its findings governing all other

transactions disputed by Shelley.

It is true that the court’s order required Jeffery to split one-half of the net proceeds in the 

Business Account following the sale of the business assets. As stated above, the court did review 

all challenged transactions from November 2018 to November 2020 except those already raised in 

connection with the entry of the amended decree, and the court ordered Jeffery to pay one-half of 

all unauthorized expenditures. Shelley argued that in addition to paying her one-half of the 

unauthorized expenditures, Jeffery should be ordered to pay Shelley one-half of the $7,772.89 

remaining in the account as of November 2020.
- 20 -

In the court’s amended decree, it ordered Jeffery to pay Shelley a combined equalization 

payment in the amount of $308,793.24. It also required Jeffery to later liquidate assets, place the 

proceeds into the Business Account, and split the net proceeds with Shelley. As such, the total 

amount paid to Shelley under the amended decree was to be a combination of those obligations. 

During the course of the proceedings, Jeffery paid sums to Shelley to partially satisfy these 

obligations. The total value owed from the combined obligations will only be determined when 

this matter becomes final. As it relates to this specific assignment, Shelley argues that part of the 

obligation should include one-half of the remaining sum in the Business Account. In order to 

determine if that is correct, that required a computation of what has already been paid to Shelley 

from the combined obligations stated above. The court concluded that from the evidence presented, 

the evidence was insufficient to conclude whether Shelley has been paid in full relating to the 

obligations set forth in the decree.

The purpose of the objection to the accounting proceeding was to reserve Shelley’s right 

to contest Jeffery’s management of the Business Account as ordered by the court in its amended 

decree. That involved determining its starting value, analyzing contested payments, and 

determining its proper final value so that the value could be properly split between Jeffery and 

Shelley. When coupled with the equalization payment, the combined amounts represent Jeffery’s 

obligations under the decree. In order to determine the final Business Account value to be split, 

we must first determine the amount which would have been in the Business Account but for 

Jeffery’s unauthorized payments to himself and others. One-half of that value, when combined 

with the equalization payment, would be Jeffery’s total obligation under the decree. Once that 

number is determined only then could the parties determine whether Jeffery has made all payments 

required or whether monies are still due and owing. The issue is complicated by the fact that Jeffery 

made an $85,000 payment from the Business Account which was designated as a payment to 

satisfy a portion of his equalization payment obligation. However, the issue before this court is not 

whether Shelley has been paid in full for both obligations. It is only what is due to be paid under 

the Business Account. We agree with the district court that the evidence was insufficient to simply 

say Jeffery must pay Shelley one-half of the remaining balance in the Business Account because 

of the lack of evidence of what was still owed. That said, it is clearly part of the computation that 

must be made in deciding how much from the Business Account was required to be paid to Shelley. 

That issue was relevant to this proceeding and is captured by this assignment of error. For the sake 

of clarity, then, we provide the final computation of that account as directed by the district court’s 

order and our holdings herein.

Rather than the approach taken by the district court, we approach the determination of what 

Jeffery owed Shelley under the Business Account as follows:
- 21 -

Unauthorized Reductions for Payments

(Per the court’s orders and our findings)

Based on our review of the court’s calculations, we find that the court’s January 2021 order 

contained a mathematical error in its calculation. The court ordered Jeffery to pay to Shelley 

$39,668.74. However, using the numbers provided by the court for determining that value, we find 

that the correct sum is $39,688.74. Our calculation reflects that correction. In addition, we find 

January 2021 Order

1. Dvorak Law $17,633.18 

2. Payment to Shelley for Equalization $85,000.00 

3. Personal Health Insurance Premium $11,144.40 

4. Witness Fees $1,100.00 

Total Dissipated $114,877.58 

5. Reimbursement for Boat Motors ($8,000.00)

Total After Credit $106,877.58 

Shelley's 1/2 $53,548.79 

6. Reimbursement for Shed and Fees ($9,750.00)

Shelley's 1/2 Entitlement from Business 

Account less her payment obligation for 

the shed and fees

$43,688.79 

May 2021 Order

1. Pickup Truck $12,000.00

2. Additional Attorney Fees $30,431.52

3. Credit Card $26,678.67

4. Insurance Payment $12,302.92

5. Treasurer $ 5,403.64

6. Rent $ 6,300.00

Total Dissipated $93,116.75

Shelley's 1⁄2 Entitlement From Business 

Account

$46,558.36

Shelley's Total Entitlement (Both 

Orders)

$90,247.15

Total Remaining in Account $ 7,772.89

Shelley's 1/2 Entitlement $ 3,886.46

Total Owed to Shelley $94,133.61
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that the court erred in its crediting of the boat motors. To ensure that Jeffery receives the full value 

of that asset, it should be subtracted from the total amount dissipated from that January order prior 

to being divided between the parties.

Following our analysis, we conclude that Jeffery was required to pay Shelley $94,133.61 

for her one-half share of the Business Account after applying the proper reduction for her required 

reimbursement of the shed and fees. When combined with the $308,793.24 equalization previously 

ordered by the district court, Jeffery’s full payment obligation under the amended decree is 

$402,926.85. We make no findings as to what has been paid to Shelley in relation to those 

obligations as that issue is not presently before us.

VI. CONCLUSION

In sum, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold Shelley in 

contempt of court on certain matters, finding that Jeffery had dissipated assets, or in failing to give 

Jeffery a credit for his boat. Further, we find that the district court did not err in its determination 

that Jeffery did not improperly expend funds from the Business Account to pay his salary or for 

his payments to Lutz accounting firm. Additionally, we find that the record refutes Shelley’s claim 

that the court did not adopt a beginning value on the Business Account. We affirm as modified the 

order as it relates to Jeffery’s personal expenditures from the Business Account for rental payments 

to his brother. Finally, we affirm as modified the court’s calculation of improper expenditures from 

the Business Account for which Jeffery is obligated to pay Shelley.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.