NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0228n.06 F iled: Marc h 28, 2007 No. 06-3365 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

DARLENE K. K

ING , Plaintif f-Appellant ,

v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-

Appellee

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C O U R T F O R THE N O RT H E RN D I ST RI CT OF O H IO O P I N I O N

BEFORE: MARTIN, BATCHELDER, McK EAGU E, Circuit Judges. McK EAGU E, Circuit Judge. Appellant Da rlene Kin g ap peals the district c ourt’s denia l of her “Motion to Amend or Alt er” the order deny ing he r application for attorne y ’s fe es under the Equal Ac cess to J u s tice Ac t. For the following rea sons, we re verse and re mand for c onsideration of the mer its of the application. I. BACKG ROUND On De c e mbe r 20 , 19 99 , a pp e lla nt fi le d an a

pp lic a tio n fo r su

pp le me nta l se c ur ity

inc ome be fo re an A dmi nis tr a tiv e L aw Jud g e (t he “ AL J”) . T he AL J den ie d b e ne fi ts, and thi s d e nia l be c a me the final de cision of the Commissi oner of Social Security (the “Commi ssioner”) on Marc h 13, 2002. Appe l l an t ap p ea led this decision to the district court, which on Ma rch 15, 2004, r ever sed and

rema nded the Commissioner’s dec ision because it was not supported by substantial evidence

.No. 06-3365

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Attorney ’s fe es under

the EAJA are de termined by mag istrates. See J

ankovic h v. Bowen , 1 86 8 F .2 d 8 67 , 8 68 -6 9 ( 6th Cir . 1 98 9)

. P roce edi ngs b e fo re and de c isi on s b y

the ma g ist

rate wi ll here inafter

be re fer red to a s befor e and by

the district court. - 2 - On M ay 2 4 , 2 0 0 4 , ap p el l an tfi l ed an ap p l i ca t i o nb ef o re t h e U n i t edS t at es M agi s t ra t e J u d ge 1 f o r a tt o r n e y ’ s f e e s u n d e r th e E qu a l A c c e s s to Ju s ti c e A c t, 2 8 U

. S. C. § 2 4 1 2 ( th e “EAJA”). The Commi ssioner filed a response opposing the application on the g rounds that the “position of the United States was substantially justified” under

§ 2412(d)( 1)(A) , and appe llant filed a re ply to that resp o n s e . O nN o v e mb e r 2 , 2 0 0 5 , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt d e n ie d th e a p p li c ati o n , o nth e b a s is th at

a pp e lla nt’ s c ouns e l w a s a

pp lyingfo r f

e e s o n h e r o wn

be ha lf , r a the r t ha n o n b e ha lf

of a pp e lla nt. Appellant ap p ar en tly

beca me awa re of the denial only

on November

21, 2005. She then filed a Motion t o Am en d o r Al ter Judgment on De cembe r 1, 2005, which the district court denie d in a marg inal order

on Dec ember

5, 2005. Appellant filed a notice of appea l of t hat decision on Fe bruar y 3, 2006. II. TIMELI NESS OF NOTICE OF AP P EAL With ou t a tim e ly fi le d n oti c e of

a pp e a l, t his c ourt la c ks jur isd ic tio n to e nte rt a in a n a pp e a l. Rh od e n v . Ca mp be ll , 153 F.3d 773, 774 ( 6th Cir. 1998). “Whether this Court has subject-matter jur isd ic tio n is a

qu e sti on of law that th is C ourt

re vie ws de novo .” Col es v . G ra nv ill e , 448 F.3d 853, 860 (6th Cir. 2006). The timeliness of this appea l de pends on whether it is taken f rom the district court’ s order

o f N o v e mb e r 2 , 2 0 0 5 , d e n y in g a p p e ll an t’ s a

p p li c a ti o n f

o r a tt o r n e y ’ s f e e s u n d e r th e E A JA, or the marg inal order of Decembe r 5, 2005, denying appellant’s Moti on to Amend or A lter. I f the a ppealNo. 06-3365

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Ap pe lla nt’ s D e c e mbe r 1 mot ion

may be c on str ue d a lte rn a tiv e ly

a s a mot ion

un de r F e d. R. 2 Civ. P . 60(b) o r F e d

. R. Ci v . P. 5 9 ( e ) , a s e xp la in e d in p art I I I o f th is o p in io n . O n ly a ti me ly filed mot ion wi ll t oll the perio d for fi li ng a no tic e of a pp e a l. F e d. R. A

pp . P. 4( a )( 4) (A ); Browder v. Director, De

p’t of Corrections , 4 3 4 U

. S. 2 5 7 , 2 6 9 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , s u p er s eded in part by statute on other grounds , 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rul e 5, as recognized in Uk awabutu v. Morton , 997 F. Supp. 605, 608 (D.N.J. 1998). A m otion under Rule 59(e) is untimely if filed “later than 10 da

y s after entry of the jud g me nt. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 9( e ). Al tho ug h th e tim e lim it f or fi lin g a mot ion un de r R ule 60 (b ) i s longe r, such a mot ion only tolls t he per iod for filing notice of a ppeal if it is “filed no later than te n day s after the judg ment is entere d.” F ed. R. App. P. 4(a) (4)( A)(vi)

. No t c ounti ng Sa tur da

y s, Sun da y s, or fe de ra l ho lid ay s, wh ic h are no t c ounte d if an a llo wa ble 3 time period is few er tha

n eleve n day s. Fe d. R. Civ. P . 6(a)

.

- 3 - is from the orde r of Nove mber 2, 2005, it is untimely . Under Fe dera l Rule of Appellate Proc edure 4(a) (1)( B) , in liti g ation to which an ag ency of t he United States is a par ty , notice of a

ppeal must be filed “w ithin 60 day s afte r the judgme nt or order appea led from is e ntere d.” Appellant’s F ebrua ry 2, 2006, notice of a

ppeal wa s filed on the ninety -third day aft er t h e en t ry

of the initial order

on November

2, 2005. Ap pe lla nt ar g u e s t h a t t h e s i xty - d ay t i m e l i m i t w a s t o l l e d b y t h e f i l i n g o f h e r M o t ion to Am e nd or Al te r, fi le d on De c e mbe r 1, 20 05 . H ow e ve r, the fi lin g of a po st- jud g me nt m oti on

on ly tolls t he per iod for filing a notice of appea l if t h e motion is filed within ten day s of the entr y of judgme nt. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a )(4) (A). Appellant’s moti on was filed on the ni netee nth day afte r the 2 entry of judg ment, and ther efor e ca nnot act to toll the period for filing notice

. 3 Appellant further arg ues t hat her motion should have been construed as timely beca use the court fa iled to provide her with notice of the November 2 order until November 21, 2005; the Motion to Amend or Alter

was filed se ven day s later. Howeve r, under the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e, “[l] ack of notice of the entry

[of an order

or judg ment] by

the cler k does not affect t he ti me to appealNo. 06-3365

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- 4 - or re lie ve or a uth or ize the c ourt

to r e lie ve a

pa rt y fo r fa ilure to a

pp e a l wi thi n the tim e a llo we d, ” wi th an exception not applicab l e her e. F ed. R. Civ. P. 77(d) (emphasis adde d). L ikewise, the c lerk’s failure to notify a party of the entry of judg ment does not aff

ect the time to file a

motion under Fe d. R. Civ. P. 59(e). FHC Equities, L.L .C. v. MBL Life Assur. Cor p. , 188 F.3d 678, 682 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (q u o t i n g Derrington-Bey

v. D.C. De

p’t of Corrections , 3 9 F .3 d 1 22 4, 12 25 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 4) ). Thus , reg ardle ss of whethe r the c lerk fa iled to give appellant the notice require d under Rule 77(d),

a pp e lla nt’ s mo tio n und e r R

ule 59 (e ) wa s un tim e ly , and c ou ld no t tol l the ru nn ingof the tim e to f

ile a notice of

appea l. There fore , if the instant a ppeal is f rom the district court’s or der of November

2, 2005, it is unt imely , and the c ourt ca nnot enterta in it. Fed. R. App. P. 26(b). Howeve r, this appea l may also be c onstrued as taken fr om t h e d i s t ri ct court’s order of Dec ember

5, 2005, denying a

ppell an t ’s M o tion to Amend or Alter Judgment without opinion. I ndeed, the notice of a

ppeal e x pressly

states that the appe al is taken “ from the Or der [denying the ] Moti o n t o Amend or A lter Judgment enter ed in this action on the 5th day of De cembe r, 2005.” B e c a us e the no tic e of

a pp e a l w a s f

ile d o n th e sixtie th d ay

a ft e r t he e ntr y of that or de r, it i s ti me ly under F ed. R. App. P. 4(a) (1)( B)

. III . A BU SE OF DI SCRETIO N A district court’s r

uling on a Rule 60(b) motion is reviewe d for abuse of discretion. Agostini v. Fe lton , 521 U.S. 203, 238 (1997). Unde r this standard, reve rsal is war rante d if the re viewing court has “‘ a def

inite and firm convic tion that the trial court commit ted a clea r error of judgme nt.’” Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trs. of the UMW A Combined Bene

fit Fund , 249 F.3d 519, 524 ( 6th Cir. 2001) (q u o t i n g Davis v. J

ellico Community Hosp., Inc

. , 912 F.2d 129, 133 ( 6th Cir. 1990)).No. 06-3365

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Ap pe lla nt c ha ra c te ri zes it on a

pp e a l a s a

mot ion “ purs ua nt t o a ny /a ll F e de ra l Civ il 4 Procedur al Rules including 52, 54, 59, a nd 60.” Appe llant’s Br ief at 1. - 5 - T h e m ar g i n a l o r d e r

d e n yi n g a

p p e l l an t ’ s M o t i o n t o A m e n d o r A l t e r J u d g m e n tr e a d s o n l y,

“ MO TI ON DENI ED .” As a pp e lle e po int s out, a

pp e lla nt’ s motio n did n ot c ite the pr oc e dura l r ule under w hich it was filed. I ts tit le, howeve r, m ak es ap p ar ent refer ence to the “Motion to Alter or A m e n d J u d g m e n t ” p r o v i d e d

f o r i nR u l e 5 9 ( e )

. S u c h a

m o t i o n“ s h a l l b e f

i l e d n o l a t e r t h an1 0 d a ys afte r entry of t he judgment.” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 59(e) . As noted above , appellant’ s motion was filed

on the nin e te e nth

da y a ft e r e ntr y of the or de r d e nyinga tto rn e y ’s fe e s, and the re fo re wa s n ot t ime ly for pur poses of Rule 59(e ). Appellant’s motion of De cembe r 1, 2005, could a lternatively be re gar d ed as a motion for “Relief f rom J udg ment or Order” under Rule 60(b). “Where a party ’s Rule 59 motion is not filed 4 within the mandatory 10-day period, it is appropr iate for a court to consider the motion as a motion pursuant to Rule 60 for r elief f rom judg ment.” Feathers v . Chevron USA , 1 41 F .3 d 2 64 , 2 68 (6 th Cir. 1998). Under

Rule 60(b), On motion and upon such terms a s are just, the court may relieve a par

ty or a pa rty ’s leg al re prese ntative from a final judg ment, o rd er , or proc eedingfor the f ollowing re a so ns: (1) mis take , in a dv e rt e nc e , s ur pr ise , o r e xcu sa

ble ne g le c t; ( 2) ne wl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e wh ic h b y du e dil ig e nc e c ou ld n ot h a ve be e n d isc ov e re d in tim e to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fra ud

. . . , misrepre sentation, or other misconduct of an a dverse party ; ( 4) the judgme nt is void; (5) the judgme nt has bee n satisfied, re lease d, or dischar g ed, or a prior judg ment upon which it is based has be en re ve rs e d o r o the rw ise va c a te d, or it is no long e r eq uit a ble that the jud g me nt s ho uld have pr ospective a

pplicatio n ; o r (6) a

ny other re ason justify ing r elief f rom the operation of the judg ment.No. 06-3365

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- 6 - Fe d. R. Civ. P . 60(b). “ I n revie wing an orde r deny ing Rule 60(b ) relief,” appe llate cour ts do not “re view the unde rly ing judg ment,” in this case, the denial of the application for attorne y ’s fe es, but

“ me re ly inq uir e a s to wh e the r on e of the sp e c if ie d c ir c ums tanc e s e xists in w hic h [th e a pp e lla nt] i s entitled to reope n the merits of his under ly ing c laims.” Fe ath e rs , 141 F.3d at 268. Th e “ mis take , ina dv e rt e nc e , s ur pr ise , o r e xcu sa

ble ne g le c t” wh ic h p e rm it r e lie f u nd e r R ule 6 0 (b )( 1) include a

mistake of law in the judg ment or orde r fr om which re lief is soug ht. J a la p eno Prop. Mgmt., LLC v. Dukas , 265 F.3d 506, 515 n.1 (6th Cir. 2001)

. Appellant argued in her Motion to A me nd or Al te r, and

argue s o n a

pp e a l, t hat th e dis tr ic t c ourt

e sse nti a lly

ma de a mis take of

law i n its denial of attorne y ’s fe es, bec ause the case s cited by the district c ourt in the November 2 order are not applicable to the situation in this case. I n this c ase, the pleading s rea d as a w hole establish that appe llant’s attorney is seeking fee s on behalf of her client; the cases cited in the district court’s Nove mber 2 orde r all apply the rule that

u n d e r t h e E A J A , a t t o r

n e y ’ s f e e s c anb e aw ar d e d

o n l y o nb e h a l f

o f t h e p art y , n o tt h e a t t o r

n e y . In Brown v. General Motors Corp. , 722 F.2d 1009, 1011 (2d Cir. 1983), the Sec ond Circuit affir med the denial of

attorney ’s fe es under the Civil R ights Attorne y ’s Fe es Awa rds Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, beca use the attorney

applied for fee s “in his ow n name as the rea l party in interest,” having be en fire d by the ac tual party

some time previously . The c ourt noted additionally that fee s wer e not war

rante d be c a us e the a tto rn e y ha d be e n “ dis c ha rg e d by [the pa

rt y ] b e c a us e of the la tte r’ s d iss a tis fa c tio n w ith his re pr e se ntatio n, ” and that if c ourt s a llo we d f

e e s in su c h s itu a tio ns , “ c lie nts ’ c on tr ol o ve r t he ir litigation would be subjec t to a veto by former attorney s no longe r under an oblig ation of loy alty

and perha ps ag g rieve d by the circ umstances of their dischar g e.” Id. By contra st, in this case, a ppellant’sNo. 06-3365

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- 7 - counsel did not apply

for f ees as the real party in interest; rather, as she clarifies seve ral times in her brief, she filed the a

pplication on behalf of appellant. Moreove r, appellant had not discharg ed her counsel; counse l stil l r epre sented appellant when appellant applied for attorney ’s fe es, and c ontinues to do so on appea l. I n Knight v. U

nited States , 982 F.2d 1573, 1583-84 (Fed. Ci r. 1993), althoug h the application was pa rtial l y i n t h e n ame of the party , the cour t affir med the denia l of attorney ’s fe es bec ause the fe es we re a c t u a l l y

i n cu rr edd

u ri n g t h e a t t o rn ey s ’ e ff

o rt s t o co l l ec tt h ei r f

ee s , n o ti ns ec u ri n g a favor able judg ment for the pa rty . Her e, the attorney ’s fees s oug ht wer e incurred in the unde rly ing litigation, namely , in seeking supplemental sec urity income for

appellant, a s d et ai led in the

“ Sc he d u l e o f A t t o r

n e y S e r v i c e s ” a p p e l l an t s u

b m i t t e d w i t h h e r o r i g i n a l E A JA a p p l i c a t i o n . Th us , neither Br own nor Knight applies to the situation here , in which fe es ar e soug ht on b ehalf of appellant f

or work done to promote her inter ests. The EAJA provides that “a court shall award to a preva iling par

ty other than the United S t at es fe es an d

o t h er ex p en s es . . . i n cu rr edb y

t h at p ar t y i nan y ci v i l ac t i o n. . . i n cl u d i n g p ro ce ed i n gs for judicial r eview of

ag ency action, . . . unless the c ourt finds that the position of the United States was substantially

justified .

. . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)( A). In Commissioner v. Je an , 496 U.S. 154 (1990), the Supre me Court explained that under the EA J A, elig ibilit y for a fee awa

rd in any civil action re quires: (1) that the claimant be a

“ pr e va ili ngpa

rt y ” ; ( 2) tha

t th e Go ve rnme nt’ s p os iti on was no t “ su bs tanti a lly justified”; (3) th at n o “special circ umstances make an aw ard unjust”; and, ( 4) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412( d)(1) (B ), that any fee application be submitted to the court within 30 day s of final judgment i n the action and be supported by an itemized statement.No. 06-3365

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T h e s i tu a t i o ni s d i f

f e r e n tw h e r e a

c o u rth a s aw ar d e d

a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s un de r b o t h t h e E A JA 5 and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), in w hich case the attorne y must give the smaller of the two awa rds to the client. Jankov ich , 868 F.2d at 871 n.1. - 8 - Id. at 158. The Co u rt o f

A p p e a ls f

o r th e F e d e r a l C ir c u it

c le ar ly e xp la in e d

th e r e le v an c e o f

th e w o rds “aw ard to a

preva iling par

ty ” in Phillips v. General Serv ices Administration , 924 F.2d 1577 ( Fe d. Cir. 1991). The c ourt held t hat under the s tatute, “any fee awa rd i s made to the ‘pre vailing pa rty ,’

no t th e a tto rn e y . T hu s, [the ] attor ne y c ou ld n ot d ir e c tly

c la im o r b e e nti tle d to th e awa rd . I t ha d to be re quested on be ha lf o

f th e pa rty .” Id. at 1582 (e mphasis added)

. Ho we ve r, a pa

rt y c ann ot re qu e st an awa

rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s unle ss h e is r e qu ir e d to pa y tho se fee s to his attorney . As the Phillips court e x plained, [T] o be “incurre d” withi n the m eaning of a fee shifting statute, there must also be an expre ss or implied agreeme nt that the f ee a w a rd will

be paid ove r to the legal r e p r esentative . T he statut e do e s n ot c on te mpl a te that a fe e awa rd may be ma de to a pa rt y to be re ta ine d. Thus , we have he ld in an ana log ou s sit uatio n that a par

ty ac t i n g pro se is not entitl ed to an attorney fee awa rd. Id. at 1583 (empha sis added). Thus, c onsistent with Br own and Knight , an attorne y cannot br ing a

n independe nt action for attorney ’s fe es. Howe ver , att orney ’s fe es aw arde d under the EAJA are pay able to the attorney ; they are awa rded for the benef

it of the party , but the money is not the party ’s to keep. The c ases c ited by the Commiss ioner on a

ppeal a ll affirm this principle. 5 The pra ctice of Six th Circ uit c ourts is also consistent with this fac t. I n W illis v. Sullivan , 931 F.2d 390, 394 (6th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added) , “Willi s [t he party ] filed a petition for attorney fee s

un de r t he EA JA,” and

“ the ma g istrate iss ue d a

re po rt and re c ommend ati on a dv isi ngtha t W ill is’No. 06-3365

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- 9 - attorney rec eive EAJA attorney fee s.” This court a ffirme d the award of fee s with a minor re duction in the hours for which fees were a war ded. Id. at 400-02. L ikewise, in Hull v. Bowen , 748 F. Supp. 51 4, 52 6 (N. D. Oh io 1 99 0) (e mph a sis a dd e d) , the dis tr ic t court he ld that “ c ou ns e l is entitled to a fee

awa rd for all compensa

ble hours under

the EAJA assuming that the S ec re tary ’s [of Health and Human Servic es] posit ion was not substantially justified, which this Court holds i t was not.” See als o Gia rd

a v. Se c ’y of He alt

h &Hu ma n S

e rv s. , 72 9 F . Su

pp . 5 72 , 5 75 (N .D . O hio 19 89 ); Gaffney v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec

. , No. 00-cv- 10336, 2004 U.S. D ist. L EXI S 9279, at *6 (E.D. Mic h. J an. 13, 2004) (r eport of ma g istrate judg e), rejec ted i n part on other grounds , No

. 00 -c v- 10 33 6, 20 04 U. S. Dist. L EXI S 9278 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 26, 2004). The Commissioner appar ently was aware of this prac tice only three y ear s ag o. I n Martin v. Com mi ssi on e r of

So c ial Se c ur ity , 82 F. App’ x 453, 456 (6th Cir. 2003) (e mphasis added) , this court stated that “[ c ] ounsel for Martin ha s re qu e ste d pay me nt of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s und e r the Eq ua l A c c e ss to Jus tic e Ac t . .

. . Th e Com mis sio ne r a g re e s th a t Ma rti n’ s c ou ns e l i s e n t i t l e d

t o an aw ar d

o f E A JA fe e s . . . . ” N e v e rt h e l e s s , h e r e t h e C o m m i s s i o n e r ar g u e s o na

p p e a l t h a tt h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtp r o p e r ly denied a ppellant’s fe e application becaus e t h e application conta ined the wor ds “Now c omes Plaintiff’s attorney” and reque sted that the fee s be paid dire ctly to the attorney . As discussed above , howeve r, attorne y ’s fe e awa rds are nece ssarily pay able to the attorney , either dire ctly or throug h the hands of the pr evailing party

. Con sid e ri ngan a

rgume nt s imi lar t o th e Com mis sio ne r’ s h e re , th e Se c on d Circ uit de c ide d to

a dd re ss t he me ri ts o f a

fe e a pp lic a tio n b e c a

us e a lth ou g h “ the or ig ina l a pp lic a tio n . . . wa s ma de in the name of

. . . counsel,” appar ently

without clarification before the district court, the client “filedNo. 06-3365

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- 10 - notice of this appe al in his own name.” Ogua c hu ba v . I NS , 706 F.2d 93, 97- 98 (2d Cir. 1983). The court he ld that “doubt may rea sonably

exis t as to whether

this subst itution cures the d ef ec t i n the ini tia l a pp lic a tio n f

or fe e s, ” bu t “ tr e a t[e d th e pa rt y ’s ] . . . a

pp e a l a s r e tr oa c tiv e ly

a do pti nghis counsel’s a

pplication for f

ees.” Id. at 98. I n th is c a s e , o n ly th e w o r d s “ N o w c o me s Pl a in ti f f ’ s a tt o r n e y ” s u p p o rt th e c o n c lu s ion tha t

c ouns e l a pp lie d f or fe e s o n h e r ow n be ha lf

, and thi s w or din g may

we ll h a ve be e n in a dv e rt e nt. Th e se words mig ht also simply convey that counsel wa s repr esenting appellant i n h er application for attorney ’s fe es rather than substituting he rself a s the rea l pa rty in interest. I

n any case , the name of the par ty in interest is indicated by the fact that the application is captioned in the name of appellant as plaintiff a

nd signe d by

counsel a s “Attorne y

for Plaintiff”; that a

ppellant’s re ply

to the C o m m i s s i o n er ’s re s p o n s e t o t h e ap p l i ca t i o n p ro p er l y b egi n s , “N o w c o m es P l ai n t i ff , b y an d t h ro u gh her c ounsel”; and that the Commi ssioner’s re sponse i tself begins, “This matter is befor e the Court

o nP l ai n t i ff

’s ap p l i ca t i o nfo r a t t o r n e y f ee s . ” T h u s , ap p el l an tcl ar i fi edt h e m at t er i ns ev er al fi l i n gs be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt , b e g inn ingsig nif ic antl y be fo re the a

pp lic a tio n wa s de nie d. F ina lly , n ot o nly appellant’ s appea l, but also her Mot ion to Amend or A lter in the district court, wa s broug ht in her own name; in both, she plaintively and rep ea t ed l y

explains t hat the application was not made by

c ouns e l a s th e re a l pa

rt y in i nte re st, bu t w a s “ on be ha lf o f th e Plain tif

f .” Unlike the applica

nt in Oguachuba , a

pp e lla nt di d not m a ke a

do ub tf ul l a st- min

ute substitut ion of herse lf as the r eal part y i n i n t ere st; rather, be g inning be fore her a pplication was de nie d a nd c e rt a inl y be fo re he r a

pp e a l, sh e c lari fi e d re pe a te dly that sh e wa s the re a l pa rt y in i nte re st. Thus, she did not merely

“re troac tively

adopt” c ounsel’s application for fe es on appe al; rathe r, theNo. 06-3365

Kin g v . Co mm iss ion e r o

f So c ial Se c ur ity

- 11 - application wa s alway s appellant’s, a lthough inar tfully sty led. Be cause the district court’s or der of No ve mbe r 2 , 2 00 5, is s up po rt e d b y no a uth or ity ho ldi ng that su c h le ss- tha n- art fu l w or din g sh ou ld result in a denia l of attorney ’s fe es wher e they are otherwise appropr iate under the EAJA, the order was ba sed on a mistake of law, entitling a

ppellant to relief

u n d er R u l e 6 0(b)( 1). Since one of the circ umstances spe cified in R u l e 60(b) e x ists under which a ppellant was e ntitled to have her underlying application for attorney ’s fee s reope ned, Fe ath e rs , 141 F.3d at 268, this court need not

rea ch the que stion of whether the circ umstances spe cified in 60(b) (2)–60( b)(6) also exist here

. Al tho ug h th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r o f No ve mbe r 2 , 2 00 5, de nyinga tto rn e y ’s fe e s e vid e ntl y

w a s in e r r o r , th is c o u rt’ s r e v ie w is li mi te d to th e d e n ia l o f a p p e ll an t’ s M o ti o n to A me n d or Alter under Rule 60( b). That de nial is rever sible only if it entailed an a

buse of discr et i o n . The district court’s f ailure to re cog nize from appellant’ s Motion to Amend or Alter that the a

uthority cited in the November

2 order does not support the denia l of fees requested by a party and payable to the pa rty ’s att orn ey wa s a

“ c le ar e rr or

of jud g me nt. ” Th e re fo re , th e de nia l of a pp e lla nt’ s mo tio n und e r R

ule 60(b) wa s an abuse of discre tion. IV . C ON CL USI ON There fore , we RE VE RS E the denial of appellant’ s Motion to Amend or Alter, and REMAND for de termination of whe ther a ppellant is otherwise e ligible for an awa rd of f ees unde r the test in Commissioner v. Je an .