I . 

JIM MAl-rOX 

Attorney General 

Supreme Court Building 

P. 0. Box 12546 

Austin. TX. 76711. 2546 

5121475-2501 

Telex 9101674.1367 

TRlecoPier 5121475.0266 

714 Jackson. Suite 700 

Dallas. TX. 75202.4506 

2141742.0944 

4824 Alberta Ave., Suite 160 

El Paso. TX. 799052793 

91515333464 

1001 T.X.8. suite 700 

liouston. TX. 77002.311 t 

713l223.5666 

SC8 Broadway. Suite 312 

Lubbock. TX. 79401.3473 

6C61747.5238 

4309 N. Tenth. SUM B 

kA116n. TX. 76501.1665 

5121682.4547 

2@.l Main Plaza. Suite 400 

San Antonio. TX. 162052797 

5121225.4191 

An Ewal OpportunityI 

Aftirmative Action ErptoycThe Attorney General of Texas 

Oc:tojer 26, 1984 

Ronorable Mike Driscoll 

Harris County Attorney 

1001 Preston, Suite 634 

Opinion No. JM-221 

Re: Whether section 11.431 of 

Houston, Texas 77002 the Tax Code permits refunds of 

taxes for homestead exemptions 

not filed in time 

Dear Mr. Drlscoll: 

You ask the following question: 

May the Harris County tax assessor-collector 

accept an application for a residence bonestead 

for the yei~r 1981 which is submitted to the tax 

assessor-collector prior to February 1, 1983, or 

within one year after the 1981 taxes on said 

residence were paid, whichever is earlier. and 

refund to the applicant the difference between the 

amount pa:Ld and the amount that would have been 

due if the homestead application had been submitted prfor to May 1. 19812 

Section 11.43 ‘,:I the Tax Code requires Initial applications for 

residence homestead exemptions to be filed prior to May 1. The 

section also permits a 60-day extension. In 1981, the legislature 

amended the Tax Code, by adding section 11.431, which provides: 

(a) T1.e chief appraiser shall accept and 

approve or deny an application for a residence 

homestead exemption after the deadline for filing 

it has paszsed if it is filed not later than one 

year after the date the taxes on the homestead 

were paic, or became delinquent, whichever is 

earlier. 

(b) If’ a late application is approved after 

approval elf the appraisal records by the appraisal 

review boz.rd, the chief appraiser shall notify the 

collector for each unit In which the residence is 

located. The collector shall deduct from the 

person’s ls,x bill the amount of tax imposed on the 

exempted ilmount if the tax has not been paid. If 

D. 992 
Eonarable Mike Driscoll - Pa(:e! 2 (JM-221) 

the tax has been paid. the collector shall refund 

the amount of tax imposed on the exempted amount. 

The effective date of sectian 11.431 was January 1, 1982. Acts 1981, 

,67th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 13, 5168. at 182. You wish to know whether 

section 11.431 permits late applications for residence homestead 

exemptions beginning with the 1981 tax year or the 1982 tax year. 

Since you raise no constlt,utlonal issue, we raise nz here. We 

conclude that section 11.431 permits the filing of late applications 

beginning vith the 1982 tax year. 

The guiding principl~r of statutory interpretation is the 

ascertains&t of-legislative! intent. State v. Shoppers World, Inc., 

380 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1972); State v. Jackson, 376 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 

1964). We conclude for two different reasons that the legislature 

clearly intended for sectilan 11.431 of the Tax Code to become 

effective beginning with the 1982 tax year. 

First, the legislature clearly could not have intended for only 

one section of the Tax Code’s administration of exemptions provisions 

to take effect and reach tares implied in a year earlier than that in 

which the remaining sections take effect. Subsection (a) of section 

11.431 requires the chief appraiser to accept and approve or deny an 

application for a residence homestead exemption If it is filed within 

a specified time. Subsection (b) provides that, if a late application 

is approved after approval of the appraisal records by the appraisal 

review board, the chief apI,raiser must notify the collector for each 

affected taxing unit. The collector Is then required to recalculate 

the taxpayer’s tax liability If the tax has not yet been paid; if the 

tax has been paid, the coll.ector is required to refund the amount of 

tax on the exempted amount. 

It would make no sense for us to conclude that section 11.431 

would reach the 1981 tar: year, because tax appraisal districts 

administered by chrappr;r!;sers came into being on January 1, 1982 

with the beginning of the 1982 tax year. Acts 1979, 66th Leg., ch. 

841. 53, at 2313. 

.-- 

Chief appraisers never had authority to accept 

exemption applications for the 1981 tax year. Applications in 1980 

and 1981 were submitted to the tax assessor-collectors for the 

respective taxing units offering them. Appraisal review boards did 

no; review and approve sapraissl records for the 1981 tax year; 

appraisal review boards were created beginning with the 1982 tax year. 

Such records were reviewed in 1981 by local boards of equalization 

who, unlike the appraisal re’view boards created after January 1, 1982, 

did not possess the authority to review and approve or reject the 

granzg of exemptions by ,:he local tax assessor-collectors. Compare 

repealed V.T.C.S. art. 72(16 (and cases decided thereunder) and Tax 

Code 1541.01, 41;02. The legislature could not have intended that 

appraisal review boards rer::lew and approve appraisal records in 1982 

of 1981 tax rolls which ha*rc: already been approved by local boards of 

equalization. Rather, the 1,egislature intended for section 11.431 to 

P. 993 
Ilonorable Mike Driscoll - Page 3 (m-221) 

reach only tax years beginning with 1982, Just as it intended the 

reaalnder of the administration of exemptions provisions, A. 

subchapter C of chapter 11 c~f the code, to reach only those tax years 

beginning with 1982. By the ve:ry terms which the legislature employed 

.in section 11.431. it is clear that the legislature intended the 

prevision to become effecti,ve and reach those taxes imposed in the 

sase year in which the rest: of the new code became effective. I.e., 

1982. 

Second, we must ‘construe s’:atutes in a manner which is not forced 

or strained, but is supporl:ei: by the words of the statute. See 

Rai,lroad Commissj.on of Tex,ls ‘1. Miller, 434 S.W.2d 670, 672 (TK 

19t8). We shculd, if posXle, give effect to every part of a 

statute, Cerst v. Oak Cliff Sa’rings and Loan Association, 432 S.W.2d 

702 (Tex. 1968). and avoid Tz.pting a construction that will render 

any part inoperative or superfluous. Spence v. Fenchler, lE0 S.W. 597 

(Tc.x. 1915). 

In our opinion, concluding that section 11.431 of the Tax Code 

permits the filing of late applications for the 1981 tax year would 

eff’ectively render the section superfluous. We believe the legislature could only have intended for the section 11.431 application 

extension to apply to the 1581 tax year if there was applicable during 

that year some filing deadline which section 11.431 could validly or 

effectively extend. There was in 1980 and 1981, however, no statutory 

deadline. And because we co,nclude that the “administrative” deadline 

discussed in Attorney General Opinion MU-259 (1980) would snot permit 

the filing of an application for the 1981 tax year as late as January 

of 1982, we conclude that there was no non-statutory deadline which 

could have been extended past the January 1, 1982 effecti.ve date of 

section 11.431. Sfnce therr? ws.8 no deadline, statutory or otherwise, 

for claiming homestead exemptions for the 1981 tax year which could 

have been extended into 198.1, section 11.431 cannot apply to that tax 

year. To conclude otherwi:,e is to conclude that section 11.431 

expanded a deadline when, in 1981, there~ was no legal principle upon 

wh;ch it could validly operate to produce this effect. 

In 1978. the voters of Texas added subsections (c) and (d) to 

article VIII, section l-b of: the Texas Constitution. Subsection (c) 

created a self-executing asl valorem tax exemption of $5,000 of the 

market value of residence homesteads from elementary and secondary 

public school taxes. It al!lo permitted the legislature by general law 

to exempt from elementary aud secondary public school taxes $10,000 of 

the market value of residerze homesteads of persons who are disabled 

as defined by article VIII. section l-b(b) of the constitution and who 

are 65 years of age or olde!r. 

In 1979. during the same session in which the Tax Code was 

passed, Acts 1979. 66th Leg., ch. 841, .at 2217 [hereinafter Senate 

Bi:Ll No. 6211, the legjslature passed implementing legislation 

creating the disabled and the elderly residence homestead exemptions. 
Honorable Mike Driscoll - Page 4 (JM-221) 

Acts 1979, 66th Leg., ch. 302, art. 7, II, at 690 [hereinafter House 

Bill No. 10601. Both bills contemplated annusl filing requirements; 

however, Senate Bill No. li2l’s effective date provision section 

provided that subchapter C of chapter 11 of the Tax Code, the 

subchapter setting forth the administration of exemptions provisions, 

was not to become effective until January 1, 1982. even though the 

portions of Senate Bill No. 621 creating the exemption became 

effective on January 1, 1990. -.--w See Senate Bill No. 621, supra. at 

231.3-2315. In 1981, the legislature amended subchapter C of chapter 

11 by providing essentially for a one-time-only application; this 

amendment became effective ou January 1, 1982. Acts 1981, 67th Leg., 

1st C.S., ch. 13, 9540, 168,, at 131, 182. During the same session, 

section 11.431 was also added to subchapter C. Id. 142, at 132. 

- 

The thrust of the foregoing is that the original implementing 

legislatfon, coupled with the Tax Code, created three periods during 

which different requirements for filing applications for residence 

homestead exemptions existed. In 1979, House Bill No. 1060 controlled 

and required that application,s be flied yearly. House Bill No. 1060 

was repealed effective January 1, 1980, however, and was replaced by 

the Tax Code. The code Implemented the constitutional exemption 

beginning on January 1, 19M. but it contained filing application 

requirements which became effective on January 1, 1982. As noted 

above, these requirements wel’e amended in 1981. Acts 1981. 67th Leg., 

1st C.S.. ch. 13. 540, at 1.31. In 1980 and 1981. therefore. there 

were no specific statutorr provisions requiring the filing of 

applications for exemptions, nor were there any .provisions imposing a 

deadline for filing. 

It would make sense tc. conclude that the legislature intended 

that section 11.431 permits late application for residence homestead 

exemptions for the 1981 ta:c year only if an applicant could have 

applied for such exemption M late as January 1. 1982. If such an 

application was possible, then it would arguably make sense to 

conclude that the legislature ~intended for the deadline extension to 

also apply to the 1981 tax year. We conclude, however, that such was 

not the case; whatever the C,eadline was for application for the 1981 

tax year, January 1, 1982 war; too late. 

I 

It has heen suggested that Attorney General Opinion Mu-259 (1980) 

effectively created an “admlu%strative” filing deadline. This opinion 

addressed the effect of a taxpayer’s failure to timely apply for a 

residence homestead exemption during 1980 and 1981. when there were no s - 

statutory filing requirement:%;;, it concluded that a taxpayer may become 

estopped to claim the exemption if his delay makes its recognition 

“administratively impractlcab3.e.” 

Attorney General Opinion MW-259 relied inter alla on Gragg v. 

Cayuga Independent School District, 539 S.W.?d 861 (Tex. 19761, appeal 

dlsm’d, 429 U.S. 973 (1976); Moore v. White, 569 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Civ. 

APP. - Corpus Christi 1978, rGmref’d.1; and Jay v. Devers, 563 
. 

I 

Honorable Mike Dtiscoll - Page 5 (JM-221) 

S.W.Zd 880 (Tex. Civ. App. ‘- Eastland 1978, no writ). These cases 

concerned applicants for special ad valorem valuation of land under 

the “agricultural use” prov::sions of article VIII, section l-d of the 

Texas Constitution. Articlsr VIII, section l-d is self-executing and 

contains no language regal,d,ing its administration or establishing 

.deadlines for filing affidavits therefor. In each of the three cases 

cited above, however, the cc’urts determined, by considering the entire 

enactment, that applicationr, deemed “untimely” were not intended to be 

allowed. In Moore v. White,, =ra at 536, the court declared that an 

application for special vcl,uatG under article ‘VIII, section l-d 

filed in December was not timely and should not be accepted by the 

taxing jurisdiction, becaurie the applicant “waited until after the 

[taxing jurisdiction’s] plans of taxation were put into effect before 

filing her claim for exemption.” In Gragg v. Cayuga Independent 

Sch,>ol District, supra at E’rO, the supreme court held that a taxpayer 

G not entitled to special valuation under article VIII, section l-d, 

because the applicant “sat by and permitted the assessments to be 

madma, the tax . . . to be prepared, and this suit for taxes to be 

fil.ad against him before challenging the refusal by the tax assessor 

to give his land ths agricultural use designation.” See a@, Jay v. 

Devars, supra; Attorney Genc!ral Opinion H-988 (1977). 

-- 

Where the constitution does not by its own terms exempt a 

particular kind of property but merely permits its exemption without 

prescription, the legislature may ordinarily prescribe reasonable 

conditions for the exemption’s receipt. Dlckison v. Woodmen of the 

World. Life Insurance Socies!, 280 S.W.Zd 315 (Tex. Civ. App. - San 

Antonio 1955. writ ref’d). Bet in this instance, as with article 

VIII, section l-d, the. :isgislature prescribed no dead:llnes for 

application during 1980 and 1.981. We are therefore left wi.th the rule 

set -forth in a, Moore, ;nld il -- namely, that taxpayers may estop 

themselves through tardiness from claiming the benefits conferred by 

the constitution and statutes. In Attorney General Opinion Mu-259 

this office declared that a “taxpayer may become estopped to claim the 

exemption if his delay makes its recognition administratively 

impracticable” (emphasis adcled). The opinion did not, however, define 

what constitutes “administ~cstively impracticable,” saying only that 

each case would turn on Its own facts. 

In our opinion, the cases cited above; coupled with the statutes 

in effect during 1980 and 1981, i.e.. V.T.C.S. articles 7111. 7112 

(governing the authority ard responsibilities of a board of equalizadon), indicate that in alt l.ikelihood. granting an exemption at any 

point after the board of ec,ualization has certified the values on the 

tax roll would be “administratively impracticable.” It was a rule of 

long standing under now-repealed articles 7111 and 7112 that once the 

valuation of property had heen determined and entered upon the roll, 

the board of equalization had no power to increase or reduce such 

valuation. Bass v. Aransas County Independent School District, 389 

S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1, Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.1; 

Chicago R.I. (L G. Railway CD. v. State, 241 S.W. 255 (Tex. Civ. App. - 

n. 996 
Honorable Mike Drlscoll - Pa@! 6 (JM-221) 

Texarkana 1922). aff’d 263 S.W. 249 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1924, judgmt 

adopted); Attorneyzral Opinion H-988 (1977). At the very least, 

relying on Gragg. Moore, and %, we believe we can safely state that 

an application is xely :.i’ it is filed as late as December of the 

tax year in which the benef:lt is sought. In this instance, then, we 

conclude that an applicant who filed for a residence homestead 

exemption for the 1981 tax Irear as late as January of 1982 would not 

be entitled to receive the benefits of the exemption for 1981. 

Accordingly, since the granting of any application for a residence 

homestead exemption for 1981 would, at least after December 31. 1981, 

be “administratively impracticable,” we conclude that the legislature 

could not have intended for the section 11.431 application extension 

to apply to the 1981 tax yes. Thus, section 11.431 of the Tax Code 

could reasonably permit only the granting of refunds and the filing of 

late applications for residence homestead exemptions beginning with 

the 1982 tax year. 

.SUMMARY 

Section 11.431 of the Tax Code p.ermits the 

granting of refunds and the filing of late 

applications for residence homestead exemptions 

beginning with the 1982 tax year. 

Attorney General of Texas 

TOM GREEN 

First Assistant Attorney Cereral 

DAVID R. RICHARD8 

Executive Assistant Attorney, General 

RICK GILPIN 

Chairman. Opinion Committee 

Prepared by Jim Moellinger 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMNITTEE 

Rick Gilpin. Chairman 

Susan Garrison 

Jim Hoellinger 

Nancy Sutton