COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Chafin, Russell and AtLee 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

CARNELL CARRINGTON

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 0628-17-2 JUDGE RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR. 

 JANUARY 23, 2018 

AQUATIC COMPANY AND 

 INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE 

 OF PENNSYLVANIA 

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

Michael J. Beste (Reinhardt/Harper/Davis, PLC, on brief), for 

appellant. 

John C. Johnson (Frith Anderson & Peake, P.C., on brief), for 

appellees.

 

Carnell Carrington appeals a decision of the Commission denying his request for 

disability benefits. We find no error, and affirm the decision. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On appeal of Commission decisions, “the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may 

be drawn from that evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the party prevailing 

below.” UPS v. Prince, 63 Va. App. 702, 704, 762 S.E.2d 800, 801 (2014) (quoting Snyder v. 

City of Richmond Police Dep’t, 62 Va. App. 405, 408, 748 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2013)). The 

Commission found in favor of Aquatic Company and Insurance Company of the State of 

Pennsylvania (collectively “employer”). The facts were as follows. 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

UNPUBLISHED 
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 Aquatic Company hired Carrington in 1992. At the time of the hire, Aquatic Company 

knew that Carrington suffered from polycystic kidney disease.1 In 2013, Carrington suffered a 

compensable injury to his left arm. The injury was unrelated to his polycystic kidney disease. 

The Commission entered a medical award in 2014 for the injury to his arm. In 2015, Carrington 

sought temporary total disability, beginning October 2, 2014 and continuing. The Commission 

summarized the facts surrounding Carrington’s claim as follow: 

He missed three weeks from work following his initial surgery and 

then returned to light duty with the employer, working 40 hours

per week, using his right arm, beginning in November 2013. The

parties agree the claimant has permanent work restrictions 

attributable to his left arm injury. 

The claimant worked light duty for the employer through 

October 2, 2014. On that date, he was admitted to the hospital

with kidney failure, a complication of his underlying polycystic 

kidney disease. He remained hospitalized through February 2015

and after discharge, he received two months of home health care. 

On cross-examination, the claimant agreed that prior to his 

August 2013 work accident, he was working without any 

restrictions. He was taking medication for elevated blood pressure 

and for his kidneys. He had no other health concerns. He agreed 

that “even though you had this kidney disease, you weren’t 

disabled from it” and “[i]t had not manifested itself until the

following year when [he] had to go back to [the hospital].” 

(Citation omitted) (alterations in original). The parties submitted written stipulations, including 

that Carrington had “been unable to work from October 2, 2014 and continuing due to polycystic 

kidney disease, while at the same time partially disabled due to his work-related left arm injury.” 

 1

 This disease did not affect the type of work Carrington did for Aquatic Company, 

although it did require him to miss work on occasion. Per the Commission, the disease required 

that Carrington “undergo treatment every two weeks, missing work during this treatment. In 

2006, the claimant underwent a kidney transplant, and he missed approximately four months 

from work in connection with that surgery. He continued to undergo treatment for his kidney 

condition after the transplant, attending appointments every three months.” 
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Employer defended on the ground that Carrington’s disability was caused not by a work-related 

injury, but by his unrelated kidney problem. 

 The deputy commissioner awarded Carrington the requested benefits. Employer 

requested review by the Full Commission, which reversed the deputy commissioner. The 

Commission reasoned as follows: 

Viewed broadly, the claimant’s ultimate disability was due to the 

progression of a kidney disease which predated the accident. . . . 

Though the kidney disease predated his accident, it was not 

disabling and did not restrict the claimant’s ability to accept the 

light duty work. What ultimately compelled the claimant’s 

hospitalization and corresponding refusal of employment was 

kidney failure, a condition that manifested after the accident. . . . 

Considering the facts before us, we find the claimant’s 

kidney failure to be a condition which arose since his accident and 

is responsible for his disability. . . . Relevant to our conclusion is 

the claimant’s two-plus decades of working for the employer with 

kidney disease but without associated restrictions. We cannot 

ignore that the condition did not prevent the claimant’s acceptance 

of the light duty work. Only after many months of steady 

employment in the light duty position did the disease progress to 

the point that it compelled the claimant to discontinue his 

employment. 

 We must also acknowledge the claimant’s concession that, 

but for his kidney failure, he would have remained employed. . . . 

When dealing with job refusals for unrelated conditions, we 

are mindful of the wisdom of classifying as unjustified only those 

which result from causes arising since the accident. But for this 

qualification, an unprincipled employer could manufacture an 

unjustified refusal by offering light duty work incompatible with 

an employee’s pre-existing physical limitations. In such a 

scenario, an injured employee would be placed in the untenable 

position of either accepting work they were unable to perform or 

risk[ing] the loss of disability benefits by refusing the job. 

However, our holding in the present case does not implicate this 

policy or invite employer misconduct as the claimant had no 

pre-accident restrictions associated with his longstanding kidney 

condition. His ultimate hospitalization and corresponding 

unemployment was occasioned by an event, kidney failure, which 
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did not exist when he was injured or when his light duty job was 

offered. 

(Footnote omitted). Carrington then noted this appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS 

Carrington assigns the following errors: 

1. The Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission erroneously 

held that Mr. Carrington refused selective employment despite 

being totally disabled in connection with polycystic kidney 

disease that the employer knew pre-existed the work accident 

and partially disabled in connection with work-related left arm

injuries. 

2. The Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission erroneously 

rejected the parties’ stipulations that Mr. Carrington remains 

totally disabled in conneciton [sic] with pre-existing polycystic 

kidney disease. 

(Capitalization altered). 

“A claimant [before the Commission] must prove his case by a preponderance of the 

evidence.” Pro-Football Inc. v. Paul, 39 Va. App. 1, 10, 569 S.E.2d 66, 71 (2002) (quoting 

Bergmann v. L & W Drywall, 222 Va. 30, 32, 278 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1981)). 

Furthermore, “decisions of the [C]ommission as to questions of 

fact, if supported by credible evidence, are conclusive and binding 

on this Court.” Allen & Rocks, Inc. v. Briggs, 28 Va. App. 662, 

672, 508 S.E.2d 335, 340 (1998). Evidence to the contrary in the 

record “is of no consequence if there is credible evidence to 

support the [C]ommission’s findings.” Russell Loungewear v. 

Gray, 2 Va. App. 90, 95, 341 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1986). The 

consideration and weight to be given to the evidence, including

medical evidence, are within the sound discretion of the 

[C]ommission. 

Id. at 10-11, 569 S.E.2d at 71. However, “conclusions of the Commission on questions of law, 

or mixed questions of law and fact, are not binding on review.” McKellar v. Northrop Grumman 

Shipbuilding, Inc., 290 Va. 349, 354, 777 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2015). 
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A. Cause of Disability 

Carrington argues that he was entitled to benefits because of a concept known as the “two 

causes rule,” which “provides that a condition which has two causes, one related to a work 

injury, and one not, is compensable and the treatment of that condition will be the responsibility 

of the employer.” Haftsavar v. All Am. Carpet & Rugs, Inc., 59 Va. App. 593, 600, 721 S.E.2d 

804, 808 (2012) (quoting Papco Oil v. Farr, 26 Va. App. 66, 75, 492 S.E.2d 858, 862 (1997)). 

Although the two causes rule provides the general framework for analysis, the Supreme Court 

recognized an exception to the rule in American Furniture Co. v. Doane, 230 Va. 39, 334 S.E.2d 

548 (1985). In that case, the Commission had “ruled that an employee was justified in refusing 

selective employment because of a physical impairment arising after and unrelated to the 

industrial accident for which compensation had been awarded.” Id. at 41, 334 S.E.2d at 549. 

The Supreme Court reversed, and held that “[a]n employer . . . is absolved of liability for 

compensation if the employee refuses selective employment because of a physical condition 

unrelated to the original industrial accident and arising since the accident.” Id. at 43, 334 S.E.2d 

at 550. A contrasting factual scenario was presented in James v. Capitol Steel Construction Co., 

8 Va. App. 512, 382 S.E.2d 487 (1989). There, a panel of this Court observed that Doane did not 

“compel[] the conclusion that employment suitable to the employee’s residual capacity does not 

require consideration of a condition which pre-existed the injury by accident and which was 

obvious to the employer when the employee was hired.” Id. at 516, 382 S.E.2d at 489. 

Carrington notes that his polycystic kidney disease, while unrelated to his work injury, 

pre-existed that injury. He also observes that Aquatic Company knew for decades that he 

suffered from polycystic kidney disease. Thus, Carrington argues, the Doane exception to the 

two causes rule does not apply. We disagree. 
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Here, the Commission found that, while Carrington did suffer from a condition that 

predated his employment with Aquatic Company, the ultimate reason Carrington was unable to 

work was a progression and worsening of that condition. As the Commission observed, 

“[t]hough the kidney disease predated his accident,” the condition that “ultimately compelled the 

claimant’s hospitalization and corresponding refusal of employment was kidney failure, a 

condition that manifested after the accident.” (Emphases added). 

When a non-work-related disability prevents a partially disabled 

employee from returning to his or her pre-injury work or from 

accepting selective employment, for purposes of the [Workers’ 

Compensation] Act, the unrelated disability is not justification for 

the employee to refuse or not to perform selective employment 

. . . . Thus, the inability of a disabled employee to do selective 

work . . . due to an unrelated disability is equivalent to an 

unjustified refusal of selective employment. 

Eppling v. Schultz Dining Programs, 18 Va. App. 125, 130, 442 S.E.2d 219, 222 (1994) (citation 

omitted). We agree with the Commission that an award of the requested benefits under these 

circumstances would risk “converting the Act into a form of health insurance or imposing 

liability for a condition unrelated to the employee’s work.” As such, the Commission did not err 

when it found that the two causes rule did not apply and when it declined to award Carrington 

the requested benefits. 

B. The Parties’ Stipulation 

 Carrington also argues that the Commission wrongly rejected the parties’ factual 

stipulation that he had “been unable to work from October 2, 2014 and continuing due to 

polycystic kidney disease, while at the same time partially disabled due to his work-related left 

arm injury.” He asserts that the Commission’s factual findings directly contradicted that 

stipulation, specifically its finding that Carrington’s “ultimate hospitalization and corresponding 

unemployment was occasioned by an event, kidney failure, which did not exist when he was 

injured or when his light duty job was offered.” 
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 Assuming that the Commission, as a factfinder, is not free to reject a stipulation of the 

parties,2 we conclude that acceptance of the stipulation did not require the Commission to find in 

Carrington’s favor. 

 Here, the Commission considered the stipulation that Carrington had “been unable to 

work from October 2, 2014 and continuing due to polycystic kidney disease, while at the same 

time partially disabled due to his work-related left arm injury.” However, the Commission 

observed, “[t]hough the kidney disease predated his accident,” the condition that “ultimately 

compelled the claimant’s hospitalization and corresponding refusal of employment was kidney 

failure, a condition that manifested after the accident.” (Emphases added). This finding was not 

contrary to the stipulation, rather it was a narrower, more specific finding than the general 

conclusion contained in the stipulation. Even assuming, without deciding, that the Commission 

was bound to accept the parties’ factual stipulation, it was not required to accept such a 

stipulation in a vacuum, or to blinker itself against other related evidence. We find that it was 

not a rejection of the parties’ stipulation when the Commission found, essentially, that 

Carrington’s inability to work was due to polycystic kidney disease which resulted in kidney 

failure, a distinct event and consequence which occurred after the work-related accident. 

 Carrington would have us read the stipulation to mean that employer agreed to the 

compensability of the claim when it entered into the stipulation. Given that employer 

consistently defended against the claim, it is clear that this was not employer’s intention. Like 

the Commission, we read the stipulation as a piece of evidence to be weighed against all of the 

 2

 Although “a party agreeing to a stipulation must be bound by it,” King William Cty. v. 

Jones, 65 Va. App. 536, 548, 779 S.E.2d 213, 219 (2015) (en banc) (emphasis added), at oral 

argument, Carrington conceded that he was unaware of any case stating that the Commission 

was required to accept such a stipulation. Oral Argument Audio at 6:54-7:20 (Nov. 14, 2017). 

However, we need not resolve that question, because we find that here, the Commission did not 

reject the parties’ stipulation, but rather, considered it along with the other evidence. 
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other evidence, no more dispositive in Carrington’s favor than Carrington’s testimony that, but 

for his kidney failure, he would have remained employed, is dispositive in employer’s favor. 

The Commission was required to consider both pieces of evidence (and all of the other evidence) 

in making its determination. Because there is evidence to support the Commission’s factual 

conclusion regarding the disability, that conclusion is binding on appeal. Paul, 39 Va. App. at 

10-11, 569 S.E.2d at 71. 

III. CONCLUSION 

The Commission did not err when it found that the two causes rule did not apply, nor did 

the Commission reject the stipulation of the parties as to the cause of Carrington’s inability to 

work. 

Affirmed.