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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

September 14, 2017

v No. 332421

Wayne Circuit Court

DONELL DESHAWN JACKSON, LC No. 15-003076-01-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and CAVANAGH and SWARTZLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of first-degree felony murder,

MCL 750.316(1)(b), armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and possession of a firearm during the 

commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison 

without parole for the murder conviction, life in prison with parole for the armed robbery 

conviction, and two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 9, 2014, Terry Collins was murdered while walking down Atkinson Street in 

Detroit. Defendant, and his friend, David Williams, were walking down Third Street near 

Atkinson when defendant was talking about “hitting a lick.” At one point, Williams stopped to 

talk to someone he met while on Third, but defendant continued and turned down Atkinson. 

Williams followed shortly after, bumping into a postal service worker, Darius Jackson, on his 

route. A confrontation broke out between defendant and Collins when defendant reached for 

Collins’s backpack. According to Jackson, Collins started swinging his backpack and saying, 

“[G]et off me.” At this point, defendant pulled a firearm from his waistband, shot Collins, and 

walked off with Collins’s backpack. Collins died from the gunshot wound.

Williams and defendant left the scene, and when they made their way a few streets over, 

defendant gave Williams the cellular phone that Collins was carrying. The police were able to 

track the cellular phone to Williams a few days later, and Williams eventually admitted that not 

only did he get the cellular phone from defendant, but defendant shot Collins. Bernicea Stovall, 

Mercedes Moultrie, and Alexus Perkins first told the police and then testified at trial that, while 

they were all at a friend’s house the day after the shooting, defendant admitted to shooting 

Collins. Antonio Jordan testified that he was defendant’s cellmate in jail, and in November of 

2015, defendant told Jordan that he shot Collins. 
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Williams was charged with first-degree felony murder for his part in the incident. Before 

trial, however, Williams signed an agreement for special consideration that provided that

Williams would “provide complete and truthful testimony” against defendant in exchange for a 

sentence of 12 to 30 years’ imprisonment. The document also indicated that Williams would 

violate the agreement by giving “false, incomplete, or misleading testimony or information,” in 

which event his sentence agreement would be cancelled, and the first-degree murder charges 

reinstated. 

At trial, the prosecution called Williams to testify. When asked if he saw the shooting, 

Williams answered, “No.” The prosecutor immediately requested to speak outside the presence 

of the jury. After the jury was escorted out of the courtroom, the prosecutor informed the trial 

court that Williams had entered a special consideration agreement, but “right now he’s not, he’s 

not complying with that order. So I just want to let him know that if he doesn’t tell the truth 

about what happened, that agreement is off and he’s going to go on trial for first-degree murder, 

also.” The trial court decided to wait to recommence Williams’s testimony until he could speak 

to an attorney. The next day, Williams’s appointed counsel addressed the trial court and 

indicated that Williams had reviewed his police statement and “wish[ed] to continue with his 

testimony.” Williams took the stand again and testified that defendant attempted to rob Collins, 

but when Collins resisted, “[defendant] shot him.” 

As indicated above, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree felony murder, armed 

robbery, and felony-firearm. 

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant Has Not Proven Prosecutorial Misconduct. Defendant first argues that he was 

denied a fair trial because the prosecution threatened Williams at trial and forced him to testify 

that defendant was the shooter. We review defendant’s unpreserved claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Cooper, 309 Mich 

App 74, 88; 867 NW2d 452 (2015). “Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error 

resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affected 

the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of defendant’s 

innocence.” People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 448-449; 669 NW2d 818 (2003).

Our courts have “forcefully condemned the prosecutorial intimidation of witnesses.” 

People v Lopez, 316 Mich App 704, 707; 892 NW2d 493 (2016). Generally, issues pertaining to 

witness intimidation are analyzed under the framework of prosecutorial misconduct, and the 

ultimate question is whether, after examining the “statements and actions in context, the 

defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People v Hill, 257 Mich App 126, 135; 667 

NW2d 78 (2003). The propriety of a prosecutor’s conduct depends on the specific facts of each 

case. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 30; 650 NW2d 96 (2002). 

Defendant argues that the prosecution engaged in misconduct by intimidating Williams 

into testifying that defendant was, in fact, the shooter who robbed and murdered Collins. 

Defendant relies almost entirely on this Court’s recent decision in Lopez. Lopez, however, is 

inapposite to the legal and factual circumstances at issue here. In Lopez, the prosecution 

believed that its witness was going to testify differently from his preliminary examination 
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testimony. Lopez, 316 Mich App at 709. Therefore, the prosecution warned the witness, before 

he was actually called to testify, that if he lied on the stand, he would be charged with perjury 

and possibly face life in prison. Id. at 709-710. As a result of the prosecutor’s warning, the 

witness invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and the prosecution 

sought to introduce the witness’s preliminary examination testimony pursuant to the hearsay 

exception under MRE 804(1) involving unavailable witnesses. Id. at 711. 

This Court held that the “prosecutor’s statements exceeded mere advisement, and crossed 

into the realm of threat and intimidation.” Id. at 720. The Court highlighted that “the prosecutor 

lacked any reasonable basis to suspect that [the witness] would lie on the witness stand,” id. at 

723, and stated that the better avenue would have been to request the trial court to exercise its 

discretion to warn the witness of the ramifications of testifying untruthfully, id. at 720. Instead, 

the prosecutor’s preemptive error denied the defendant his right to confront the witnesses against 

him, which, in turn, violated his right to a fair trial, and a new trial was warranted. Id. at 724-

725.

The instant case is distinguishable from Lopez. Unlike the witness in Lopez, Williams 

had already taken the stand and had started to testify at odds with his earlier version of events

when the prosecution informed the Court and Williams of the consequences of that testimony. 

Further, unlike Lopez, Williams did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right, and, after consulting 

with appointed counsel, opted to continue his testimony in accordance with the agreement for 

special consideration. Accordingly, the main concern present in Lopez—that the prosecution’s

preemptive conduct caused the absence of a witness—is not present here. In the end, Williams 

already knew that if he testified inconsistently with the agreement he would face a charge and 

possible conviction for first-degree murder. 

There has never been a blanket prohibition against informing a witness of the potential 

consequences of making false statements. See People v Layher, 238 Mich App 573, 587; 607 

NW2d 91 (1999). Indeed, Williams’s own conduct in this case left the prosecution with little

alternative but to advise Williams of his obligations under the agreement. That the prosecutor 

did so outside of the presence of the jury, and the trial court granted Williams time to consult 

with an attorney, further demonstrate that the situation was properly handled below. Moreover, 

even if we were inclined to find the prosecutor’s statements improper, defendant would still be 

entitled to no relief. Four witnesses testified that defendant admitted he shot Collins, and a fifth

witness actually observed the criminal act. Even had Williams testified that he did not witness 

defendant shoot Collins, the overwhelming evidence would still support the jury’s verdict. 

Defendant has proven no error, yet alone an error affecting his substantial rights, and is not 

entitled to relief.

Defense Counsel Was Not Ineffective. Defendant also argues the he was denied his Sixth 

Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to crossexamine Williams about an inconsistency in his testimony. We review defendant’s unpreserved 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for errors apparent on the record. People v Matuszak, 

263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).

“To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both 

that counsel’s performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the 
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defense.” People v Riley (After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 140; 659 NW2d 611 (2003). 

Concerning the first prong, counsel’s performance is deficient when it falls below an objective 

standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Id. Moreover, a defendant 

must overcome the presumption that the challenged action might be considered sound trial 

strategy. People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 52; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). Regarding the 

second prong, a defendant is prejudiced if there is a reasonable probability that, “but for defense 

counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v Heft, 299 

Mich App 69, 81; 829 NW2d 266 (2012). “Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the 

defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.” People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 

663; 683 NW2d 761 (2004). 

At trial, the prosecution asked Williams why he eventually told police the truth despite 

originally denying the fact that defendant shot Collins. The following exchange occurred:

[Prosecutor]: Why did you not tell the jury -- why did you not tell the 

police the correct story of what happened first?

[Williams]: It was just an instinct I guess not to just tell them. The only 

reason I basically came true was because I found out [Stovall] and [Moultrie] and 

[Perkins] had already got on the stand and told them what happened anyway.

Prosecutor: So you believe other people had told the police what had 

really happened?

Williams: Yeah, they had already told. I had got a phone call.

Prosecutor: And then based on you believing that the police knew what 

had already happened, that’s when you decided to tell the police the truth?

Williams: Yes.

Defendant claims that this testimony is inconsistent and that defense counsel should have 

revealed that inconsistency through cross-examination. According to defendant, Stovall, 

Moultrie, and Perkins, did not tell the police that defendant was the shooter until after Williams 

confessed, and therefore Williams could not have been motivated to tell the truth based on their 

stories. 

Defendant has failed to show an actual inconsistency in Williams’s testimony. First, 

defendant has not proven when Williams confessed to police in relation to when the three 

witnesses provided their statements. Second, defendant mischaracterizes Williams’s testimony. 

Williams testified that he believed that the three witnesses had already revealed the truth by the 

time of his confession. Whether the three witnesses actually had made their statements by the 

time Williams confessed does not detract from Williams’s belief that the truth had already come 

out, and does not impeach Williams’s motivation to tell the truth. 

Moreover, we must note, again, that four witnesses testified that defendant admitted to 

the crime, and a fifth witness testified that he actually observed defendant’s commission of the 

crime in progress. Accordingly, even had an inconsistency been revealed in Williams’s 
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testimony, the overwhelming evidence would still support the jury’s verdict. Defendant has not 

shown his counsel was deficient nor has he shown that any deficient performance affected the 

outcome of the proceedings. 

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael F. Gadola

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle