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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Moises Hernandez-Cerna, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Carla Hacker-Agnew, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-18-00397-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

Pending before the court is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of 

Magistrate Judge James F. Metcalf (Doc. 14) regarding petitioner’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). The R&R recommends that 

the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. The Magistrate Judge advised the 

parties that they had fourteen days to file objections to the R&R. (R&R at 21 (citing Rule 

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings). No objections were filed. 

 Because the parties did not file objections, the court need not review any of the 

Magistrate Judge’s determinations on dispositive matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003); 

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (“[Section 636(b)(1)] does not . . . require any 

review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an objection.”). The absence of a 

timely objection also means that error may not be assigned on appeal to any defect in the 

rulings of the Magistrate Judge on any non-dispositive matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (“A 

party may serve and file objections to the order within 14 days after being served with a 
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copy [of the magistrate’s order]. A party may not assign as error a defect in the order not 

timely objected to.”); Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 

1996); Phillips v. GMC, 289 F.3d 1117, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Notwithstanding the absence of an objection, the court has reviewed the R&R and 

finds that it is well taken. The court will accept the R&R and dismiss the Petition. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (stating that the district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in 

whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate”). 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Report and Recommendation of the 

Magistrate Judge (Doc. 14) is accepted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court enter judgment denying 

and dismissing petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) with prejudice. The Clerk shall terminate this action. 

 A request for a certificate of appealability is denied because appellant has not 

shown that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Gonzalez v. 

Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). 

 Dated this 22nd day of August, 2018.
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 130 (Friday, July 5, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 35214-35215]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-17094]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 35215]]

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM


Change in Bank Control Notices; Acquisitions of Shares of Banks 
or Bank Holding Companies

    The notificants listed below have applied under the Change in Bank 
Control Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)) and Sec.  225.41 of the Board's 
Regulation Y (12 CFR 225.41) to acquire a bank or bank holding company. 
The factors that are considered in acting on the notices are set forth 
in paragraph 7 of the Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)(7)).
    The notices are available for immediate inspection at the Federal 
Reserve Bank indicated. Once the notices have been accepted for 
processing, they will also be available for inspection at the offices 
of the Board of Governors. Interested persons may express their views 
in writing to the Reserve Bank indicated for that notice or to the 
offices of the Board of Governors. Comments must be received not later 
than July 26, 1996.
    A. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (Genie D. Short, Vice President) 
2200 North Pearl Street, Dallas, Texas 75201-2272:
    1. Marble Falls National Bank 401(K) Employee Stock Ownership Plan; 
to acquire a total of 13.47 percent of the voting shares of Marble 
Falls National Bancshares, Inc., and thereby directly acquire Marble 
Falls National Bank, all of Marble Falls, Texas.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 28, 1996.
Jennifer J. Johnson,
Deputy Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 96-17094 Filed 7-3-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210-01-F
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.1
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of EchoStar DBS Corporation;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:
 a)
    
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls
and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by
others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;b)
    
    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls
and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; andc)
    
    disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the
registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control
over financial reporting;
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
 a)
    
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;
andb)
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
  /s/ Charles W. ErgenChairman and Chief Executive Officer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

NORTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

Case Number 09-20023-BC

Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

 v.

D-6 DIONTE RAMONE HUNTER,

Defendant.

_______________________________________/

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, ACCEPTING

DEFENDANT’S PLEA OF GUILTY AS TO COUNT ONE OF THE FOURTH

SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT, AND TAKING THE RULE 11 PLEA AGREEMENT

UNDER ADVISEMENT

A plea hearing was conducted on March 11, 2010, by United States Magistrate Judge Charles

E. Binder pursuant to the defendant’s consent. The magistrate judge issued his report on March 12,

2010, recommending that this Court accept the defendant’s plea of guilty as to count one of the

fourth superseding indictment. As of today’s date, no party has filed any objections to the

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The election to not file objections to the magistrate

judge’s report releases the Court from its duty to independently review the record. Thomas v. Arn,

474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation [Dkt.

# 180] is ADOPTED.

Case 1:09-cr-20023-TLL-PTM ECF No. 202, PageID.949 Filed 04/02/10 Page 1 of 2
-2-

It is further ORDERED that the defendant’s plea of guilty as to count one of the fourth

superseding indictment is ACCEPTED, and the Rule 11 Plea Agreement [Dkt. # 178] is taken

UNDER ADVISEMENT.

s/Thomas L. Ludington 

THOMAS L. LUDINGTON

United States District Judge

Dated: April 2, 2010

PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served

upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first

class U.S. mail on April 2, 2010.

s/Tracy A. Jacobs 

TRACY A. JACOBS

Case 1:09-cr-20023-TLL-PTM ECF No. 202, PageID.950 Filed 04/02/10 Page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

THAL FLAM WENDROW, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 08-14324

v.

Hon. John Corbett O’Meara

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 

HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

ORDER DENYING MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT

OF HUMAN SERVICES’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the court is the Michigan Department of Human Services’ motion for

summary judgment, which has been fully briefed. Pursuant to L.R. 7.1, the court

did not hear oral argument.

The Michigan Department of Human Services (“DHS”) seeks summary

judgment on Plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims and Persons with Disabilities

Civil Rights Act claim. The court has previously ruled upon these issues and

discerns no procedural or other legal basis to revisit them now. See March 30,

2011 Opinion and Order (Docket No. 288) at 18-19, 42-43; March 27, 2012

Opinion and Order (Docket No. 313) at 5-7. DHS continues to press its claim that

5:08-cv-14324-JCO-MAR Doc # 372 Filed 03/05/14 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 13035
it is entitled to immunity with respect to Plaintiffs’ state constitutional tort claim;

however, the Sixth Circuit ruled in this case that “Plaintiffs sufficiently allege a

constitutional tort claim for which immunity is not available for DHS under

Smith.” Wendrow v. Michigan Dept. of Human Servs., 534 Fed. Appx. 516, 526

(6th Cir. Aug. 28, 2013). Nothing in the Sixth Circuit’s opinion suggests that

reconsideration of the state constitutional tort claim or the PWDCRA claim is

appropriate.

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that DHS’s motion for summary

judgment is DENIED.

s/John Corbett O’Meara 

United States District Judge

Date: March 5, 2014

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon

counsel of record on this date, March 5, 2014, using the ECF system.

s/William Barkholz 

Case Manager

-2-

5:08-cv-14324-JCO-MAR Doc # 372 Filed 03/05/14 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 13036
EXHIBIT 31.2

SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTING OFFICER



I, Christopher P. Chambers, certify that:

1.

I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q/A of Evolution Resources, Inc.

2.

Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;

3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4.

I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:

a)

designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

b)

evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this quarterly report (the Evaluation Date); and

c)

presented in this quarterly report my conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on my evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

5.

I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a)

all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrants auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

b)

any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal controls

6.

I have indicated in this quarterly report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of my most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Date: July 27, 2009

| |                                                                 
| | ----------------------------------------------------------------
| | /s/ Christopher P. Chambers                                     
| | Christopher P. Chambers                                         
| | Title: Executive Vice President and
Principal Accounting Officer
1Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-20657

Summary Calendar

MICHAEL BOHANNAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

TDCJ-INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION; ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

(H-95-CV-1435)

August 20, 1998

Before DAVIS, DUHÉ, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:1

Michael Bohannan, Texas inmate # 366986, appeals the district

court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants in his civil

rights suit filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also has filed

a motion for leave to file a reply brief which was filed out of

time. His motion to file the reply brief is GRANTED.

Bohannan alleged that he was denied access to the courts

because he was deprived of an adequate law library while he was
2

incarcerated at the San Saba Transfer Facility in Texas. He argues

that none of the defendants, all public officials, were entitled to

immunity from suit. We have reviewed the record and parties’

briefs and AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment

for essentially the same reasons set forth by the district court.

Bohannan v. TDCJ, No. H-95-CV-1435 (S.D. Tex. June 25, 1997).

Bohannan argues that the district court failed to address his

claim regarding the lack of adequate medical care. He abandoned

that claim, however, when he submitted in his first more definite

statement that he had since received the medical treatment and that

he was not interested in obtaining injunctive relief for the same.

He also argues that the district court failed to address his claim

that the defendants interfered with his legal mail. Even if

Bohannan properly raised the claim in the district court, the fact

that this court reversed the district court’s dismissal of his suit

for failure to provide a second more definite statement indicates

that the alleged interference did not prejudice him as a litigant.

See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Last, Bohannan

argues that the district court failed to address his claim that he

was retaliated against for filing the instant law suit. Bohannan

never sought to amend his complaint to add this claim.

Additionally, Bohannan’s argument that he was entitled to the

appointment of counsel fails. See Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d

209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

April 12, 2024 SC-2024-0140 Ex parte Tavarus Jerome Jackson PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Tavarus Jerome Jackson v. State of Alabama) (Jefferson Circuit Court: CC-17-2070; Criminal Appeals: CR-2022-1032).

CERTIFICATE OF JUDGMENT WHEREAS, the petition for writ of certiorari in the above referenced cause has been duly submitted and considered by the Supreme Court of Alabama and the judgment indicated below was entered in this cause on April 12, 2024: Writ Denied. No Opinion. Cook, J. -- Parker, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Stewart, JJ., concur. NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 41, Ala. R. App. P., IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this Court's judgment in this cause is certified on this date. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, unless otherwise ordered by this Court or agreed upon by the parties, the costs of this cause are hereby taxed as provided by Rule 35, Ala. R. App. P.

I, Megan B. Rhodebeck, certify that this is the record of the judgment of the Court, witness my hand and seal.

Clerk, Supreme Court of Alabama
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 20 (Tuesday, January 30, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Page 3001]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-1726]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
[I.D. 012396D]


South Atlantic Fishery Management Council; Public Meeting

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of public meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The South Atlantic Fishery Management Council (Council) will 
convene a public meeting of its Snapper-Grouper Assessment Group.

DATES: The meeting will be held on February 5, 1996, from 1:00 p.m. 
until 5:00 p.m. and continue on February 6, 1996, from 8:30 a.m. until 
12:00 noon.

ADDRESSES: The meetings will be held at the Council office. One 
Southpark Circle, Suite 306, Charleston, SC 29407-4699.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Susan Buchanan, Public Information 
Officer; telephone: (803) 571-4366; fax: (803) 769-4520.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The purpose of the meeting is to review 
biological and fishery date on the condition of wreckfish (Polyprion 
Americanus) in the management unit, and to make recommendations to the 
Council for wreckfish framework actions (e.g. 1996-97 wreckfish total 
allowable catch).

Special Accommodations

    The meeting is physically accessible to people with disabilities. 
Requests for sign language interpretation or other auxiliary aids 
should be directed to the Council office (see ADDRESSES) by January 31, 
1996.

    Dated: January 24, 1996.
Richard W. Surdi,
Acting Director, Office of Fisheries Conservation and Management, 
National Marine Fisheries Service.
[FR Doc. 96-1726 Filed 1-25-96; 1:27 pm]
BILLING CODE 3510-22-F
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 961 Engrossed in House (EH)]

H. Res. 961

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                     December 10, 2009.
    Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to 
consider the conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 3288) making 
appropriations for the Departments of Transportation and Housing and Urban 
Development, and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2010, 
and for other purposes. The conference report shall be considered as read. All 
points of order against the conference report and against its consideration are 
waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the conference 
report to its adoption without intervening motion except: (1) one hour of 
debate; and (2) one motion to recommit.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
#### Ex parte John E. CHOICE.

No. 70671.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.

May 10, 1989.

John E. Choice, pro se.

David Brabham, Dist. Atty., William K. Gleason, Asst. Dist. Atty., Longview, and Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Applicant filed in the convicting court a pleading entitled “Motion for Remand” which it and we accepted as a postconviction petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to Article 11.07, Y.C.A.C.C.. Essentially his claim is that in the punishment phase the trial court erroneously submitted to the jury an improper instruction on the parole law mandated by Article 37.07, § 4, V.A.C. C.P. See *Rose v. State,*752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Cr.App.1987, 1988).

More particularly, applicant contends the jury assessed his punishment at confinement for life “by a criminal procedure which is null and void, in part,” and thus he “has not had a fair and impartial trial;” he requests that judgment of the trial court be “reversed.” Petition, at 9.

We ordered his petition filed and set contemporaneously with like petitions by applicants similarly situated, to determine whether such a claim may be raised and pursued in a postconviction habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to Article 11.07. Regardless of a prior direct appeal presenting a point of error challenging validity of the sentence and concomitantly the judgment of conviction, for reasons set forth in *Ex parte Truong,*770 S.W.2d 810 (Tex.Cr.App. delivered this day), we have concluded that his *Rose*claim is not cognizable in a postconviction habeas corpus proceeding under Article 11.07. *Id.,*at-(Slip opinion at 1 and 8).

Accordingly, the petition for relief on habeas corpus is ordered dismissed.

TEAGUE, J., dissents for the reason stated in the dissenting opinion that he filed in *Ex parte Truong,*770 S.W.2d 810 (Tex.Cr.App. delivered this date).