J. S15031/17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

DIANE R. GOCHIN, :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 Appellant :

:

v. : No. 2822 EDA 2016

:

RANDEE FELDMAN :

Appeal from the Order Entered August 4, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No. 2011-25251

BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J. AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 17, 2017

Diane R. Gochin appeals pro se from the August 4, 2016 order 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County that denied 

her motion to re-open or strike judgments. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the tortured procedural history of this case, 

noting that, “[f]or the sake of brevity, only the history relevant to the 

matters complained of on appeal will be discussed.” (Trial court opinion, 

10/27/16, at 1 n.1.)

[Appellant] commenced this action by filing a 

civil complaint against Randee Feldman, Esquire 

(“[appellee]”), her husband’s divorce attorney, on 

September 7, 2011. [Appellant] filed an Amended 

Complaint on October 19, 2011 alleging two counts 

of Abuse of Process and Tortious Interference with 

Contractual Relations, Abuse of Process and Fraud, 

Fraud upon the Court and Intentional Infliction of 

Emotional Distress to [appellant] and her Minor 
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Child.[Footnote 2] The counts alleging Abuse of 

Process and Fraud and Fraud upon the Court were 

stricken by the Honorable Wendy Demchick-Alloy by 

order dated April 27, 2012 which sustained 

[appellee’s] preliminary objections to those claims.

[Footnote 2] [Appellant’s] petition to 

join her minor child was denied on 

October 24, 2012. Therefore, [appellant] 

only has standing to assert this claim on 

her own behalf.

On May 16, 2012, [appellee] filed an Answer 

with New Matter with Counterclaim to [appellant’s] 

Amended Complaint alleging 107 paragraphs of 

additional facts and raising a claim for attorney’s 

fees and damages pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503. 

On June 11, 2012, [appellant] filed a Motion to 

Strike [appellee’s] New Matter with Counterclaim 

which was denied by order dated March 20, 2013. 

On April 17, 2015 [appellant] filed an “Answer to 

[appellee’s] Frivolous Counterclaim in the Nature of a 

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings” in which she 

failed to respond to any of the factual allegations set 

forth in [appellee’s] New Matter with Counterclaim. 

Instead, [appellant] cited Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 

Procedure 1034 regarding motions for judgment on 

the pleadings. [Appellant] set forth six paragraphs 

in which she alleged her complaint was given merit 

by the court’s denial of [appellee’s] preliminary 

objections and claimed [appellant] already addressed 

[appellee’s] counterclaim in the answers to 

preliminary objections and various memoranda. This 

motion was treated as a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings and was denied by the undersigned on 

June 25, 2013. On August 26, 2014, [appellant] 

filed a “Memorandum of Law in the Nature of a 

Second Motion to Dismiss [appellee’s] New Matter 

and Counterclaim” in which she argued the merits of 

her own complaint rather than answer [appellee’s] 

New Matter with Counterclaim. After oral argument, 

the court denied said Motion by order dated 

December 18, 2014. On January 30, 2015, 

[appellant] filed a “Third Motion to Dismiss 
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[appellee’s] Frivolous Counterclaim and Frivolous 

New Matter and Motion for Sanctions for Vexatious 

Filings.” On February 20, 2015, [appellee] filed a 

Motion to Dismiss [appellant’s] Third Motion to 

Dismiss. On February 25, 2015, [appellee] filed a 

Petition to Enter Default Judgment on [appellee’s] 

Counterclaim and Deem the Pleadings Closed. On 

March 22, 2015, [appellant] filed a Petition for Leave 

to file Joinder of Paul Troy as a Defendant. In this 

Petition, [appellant] accused Mr. Troy of abuse of 

process, making false statements, intentionally 

delaying the litigation, acting in bad faith, and 

violating attorney rules of conduct, the Pennsylvania 

rules of civil procedure and the laws of the 

Commonwealth. On April 8, 2015, [appellee] filed a 

third Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings.[Footnote 3]

[Footnote 3] The previous two, filed 

January 2, 2014 and July 28, 2014 were 

premature, because the pleadings did 

not close until January 8, 2015 at which 

time [appellant’s] answer to [appellee’s] 

New Matter and Counterclaim was due.

Oral argument was held before the 

undersigned on May 11, 2015 regarding nine 

outstanding motions and petitions, including the four 

at issue in the instant appeal. On June 23, 2015, the 

court entered the following orders regarding the nine 

outstanding motions and petitions:

1. Order denying [appellee’s] Motion for 

Reconsideration of the October 10, 2014 

Order Denying [appellee’s] Motion for 

Judgment on the Pleadings as moot.

2. Order denying [appellant’s] Petition for 

Leave to File Joinder of Paul Troy as 

Defendant[.]

3. Order denying [appellee’s] Motion to 

Dismiss [appellant’s] Amended 

Complaint Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 233.1[.]
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4. Order granting [appellant’s] Petition to 

Proceed In[ F]orma Pauperis.

5. Order granting [appellee’s] Motion for 

Judgment on the Pleadings.

6. Order denying [appellee’s] Motion for 

Sanctions Pursuant to 1023.1(c) and 

1023.2(b) Related to [appellant’s] Motion 

to Dismiss and for Sanctions (Again).

7. Order denying [appellant’s] Motion for 

Protective Order as moot.

8. Order granting in part and denying in 

part [appellee’s] Petition to Enter Default 

Judgment on [appellee’s] Counterclaim 

and Deem the Pleadings 

Closed.[Footnote 4]

[Footnote 4] The court 

denied as moot the portion of 

this petition which sought to 

have the pleadings deemed 

closed as they were already 

closed as a matter of law on 

January 8, 2015. See 

Newspaper Guild of 

Greater Philadelphia, 

AFL-CIO v. Philadelphia 

Daily News, Inc., 164 A.2d 

215 (Pa. 1960).

9. Order granting [appellee’s] Motion to 

Dismiss [appellant’s] (Third) Motion to 

Dismiss New Matter and Counterclaim 

and Request for Sanctions pursuant to 

Pa.R.C.P. 233.1.

[Appellant] filed a timely appeal of the 

following four orders only on July 14, 2015:
J. S15031/17

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a) Order denying [appellant’s] Petition for 

Leave to File Joinder of Paul Troy as 

Defendant[.]

b) Order granting [appellee’s] Motion for 

Judgment on the Pleadings.

c) Order granting in part and denying in 

part [appellee’s] Petition to Enter Default 

Judgment on [appellee’s] Counterclaim 

and Deem the Pleadings Closed.

d) Order granting [appellee’s] Motion to 

Dismiss [appellant’s] (Third) Motion to 

Dismiss New Matter and Counterclaim 

and Request for Sanctions pursuant to 

Pa.R.C.P. 233.1.

The undersigned filed of record its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion on September 11, 2015. On 

November 30, 2015, the Superior Court quashed 

[appellant’s] appeal because the court’s order 

granting default judgment on [appellee’s] 

counterclaim was not a final order.

On January 28, 2016, [appellee] withdrew

[his] counterclaim. On April 7, 2016, [appellant] 

then filed a Petition to Strike Judgments asking the 

court to “strike the Judgments entered on June 23, 

2015, granting a default on [appellee’s] Motion for 

Default Judgment on their Counterclaim and the 

Order granting [appellee’s] Motion to Dismiss 

[appellant’s] Motion to Dismiss that Counterclaim 

and for Sanctions. On that same day, [appellant] 

filed a Motion to Re-Open or Strike Judgments and 

asked the court to strike or re-open the orders which 

granted [appellee’s] Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings and Motion for Leave to Join Paul Troy. By 

orders dated August 4, 2016, the undersigned 

denied [appellant’s] Petition to Strike and the Motion 

to Re-Open or Strike.

[Appellant] filed a notice of appeal on 

August 17, 2016 of the order denying her Motion to 
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Re-Open or Strike only. The undersigned issued an 

order directing [appellant] to file a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal consistent with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). In response, [appellant]

submitted a nine-page narrative on August 22, 2016.

Trial court opinion, 10/27/16 at 1-4 (record citations omitted).

A concise statement on appeal must be specific enough for the trial 

court to identify and address the issue or issues that the appellant wishes to 

raise on appeal. In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 350 (Pa.Super. 2013).

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925 

provides that a Rule 1925(b) statement “shall 

concisely identify each ruling or error that the 

appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to 

identify all pertinent issues for the judge.” 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). “Issues not included in the 

Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the 

provisions of this [Rule] are waived.” 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).

This Court has considered the question of what 

constitutes a sufficient 1925(b) statement on many 

occasions, and it is well-established that “Appellant’s 

concise statement must properly specify the error to 

be addressed on appeal.” Commonwealth v. 

Hansley, 2011 PA Super 129, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. 

Super. 2011), appeal denied, 613 Pa. 642, 32 A.3d 

1275 (2011) (citation omitted). “[T]he Rule 1925(b) 

statement must be specific enough for the trial court 

to identify and address the issue an appellant wishes 

to raise on appeal.” Id. (brackets, internal quotation 

marks, and citation omitted). Further, this Court 

may find waiver where a concise statement is too 

vague. Id. “When a court has to guess what issues 

an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for 

meaningful review.” Commonwealth v. Dowling, 

2001 PA Super 166, 778 A.2d 683, 686 (Pa. Super. 

2001) (citation omitted). “A Concise Statement 

which is too vague to allow the court to identify the 
J. S15031/17

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issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of 

no Concise Statement at all.” Id. at 686-87.

Id.

Here, appellant’s nine-page “concise statement” begins with her 

contention that “[i]t is very easy to rig the outcome of a case,” continues 

with a rambling of various conspiracy theories as to how she lost the 

underlying action, and then ends with an allegation that the trial court’s 

“conduct is impeachable.” (Appellant’s concise statement pursuant to 

Rule 1925(b), 8/22/16.) Appellant’s “concise statement” is the functional 

equivalent of no statement at all. Therefore, appellant waives all issues on 

appeal.

Nevertheless, we note that we have reviewed appellant’s “brief” and it 

fails to include a statement of questions presented. We have recognized 

that the omission of a statement of questions presented is “particularly 

grievous since the statement . . . defines the specific issues this court is 

asked to review.” Smathers v. Smathers, 670 A.2d 1159, 1160 

(Pa.Super. 1996), quoting Commonwealth v. Maris, 629 A.2d 1014, 1016 

(Pa.Super. 1993). “When the omission of the statement of questions 

presented is combined with the lack of any organized and developed 

arguments, it becomes clear that appellant’s brief is insufficient to allow us 

to conduct meaningful judicial review.” Smathers, 670 A.2d at 1160.

Here, in addition to failing to include a statement of questions 

presented, appellant also failed to include a statement of jurisdiction, a copy 
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of the order in question, a statement of both the scope of review and the 

standard of review, and a statement of the case. Notably, appellant even 

failed to include an argument. Instead, appellant begins her submission to 

this court as follows:

Appellant is submitting this to stand as her Brief. 

[The trial court] was requested to recuse from this 

case, but has refused to do so, even though the 

following is the content of a federal lawsuit against 

him and [appellee]. There will be no more time, 

energy or money spent on trying to pursue justice in 

a system that is obviously nothing more than legal 

industry fueled by cronyism.

Appellant’s brief at 1. What follows appears to be the contents of the federal 

complaint that appellant claims to have filed against the trial court and 

appellee. After reviewing that, we wish to note that even if appellant did not 

waive her appellate issues for failure to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), the 

substantial defects in her “brief” would have nevertheless precluded us from 

conducting any meaningful judicial review, and we would have dismissed 

this appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. Rule 2101; see also Smathers, 670 A.2d at 

1160-1161.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/17/2017