COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

PAUL HOLLAND 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0664-96-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 FEBRUARY 25, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 

Walter J. Ford, Judge 

 Timothy G. Clancy (Cumming, Hatchett & 

Jordan, on brief), for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Paul Holland (defendant) was convicted in a bench trial for 

possession of both marijuana and cocaine with intent to 

distribute, and related possession of a firearm. On appeal, he 

contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he 

possessed the offending drugs. We disagree and affirm the 

convictions. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal. 

 In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, 

we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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deducible therefrom. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 

443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The judgment of a trial court, 

sitting without a jury, is entitled to the same weight as a jury 

verdict and will be disturbed only if plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it. See id. The credibility of a witness, 

the weight accorded the testimony, and the inferences to be drawn 

from proven facts are matters to be determined by the fact 

finder. See Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 199, 379 

S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). The fact finder is not required to 

believe the entire testimony of a witness, but may find portions 

believable, while rejecting the balance as implausible. See, 

e.g., Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 82, 92, 428 S.E.2d 

16, 24 (1993). 

 [P]ossession of a controlled substance may be 

actual or constructive. "To support a 

conviction based upon constructive 

possession, 'the Commonwealth must point to 

evidence of acts, statements, or conduct of 

the accused or other facts or circumstances 

which tend to show that the defendant was 

aware of both the presence and character of 

the substance and that it was subject to his 

dominion and control.'" 

McGee v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 317, 322, 357 S.E.2d 738, 740 

(1987) (quoting Drew v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 471, 473, 338 

S.E.2d 844, 845 (1986)) (other citations omitted). In resolving 

the issue, the court must consider "the totality of the 

circumstances disclosed by the evidence." Womack v. 

Commonwealth, 220 Va. 5, 8, 255 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1979). 

 Circumstantial evidence of possession is sufficient to 
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establish possession, provided it excludes every reasonable 

hypothesis of innocence. See, e.g., Tucker v. Commonwealth, 18 

Va. App. 141, 143, 442 S.E.2d 419, 420 (1994). However, "[t]he 

Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence 

that flow from the evidence, not those that spring from the 

imagination of the defendant." Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. 

App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993). Whether a hypothesis of 

innocence is reasonable is a question of fact, see Cantrell v. 

Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 269, 290, 373 S.E.2d 328, 339 (1988), 

and a finding by the trial court is binding on appeal unless 

plainly wrong. See Martin, 4 Va. App. at 443, 358 S.E.2d at 418. 

 Here, defendant acknowledged that he "stay[ed]" at the 

subject residence with his "girlfriend" and their infant daughter 

and admitted ownership of numerous items seized at the premises, 

including electronic scales hidden with the drugs in the "master" 

bedroom and five firearms,1 his current military identification 

card, two cellular telephones, a pager, title to an automobile 

registered to defendant, and $852.65 in cash, all also found in 

the bedroom. Additionally, defendant admitted ownership of cash, 

receipts, and other documents discovered in a safe in the bedroom 

closet. When defendant claimed this property from police, he 

refused to "discuss" ownership of the drugs, but denied 

possession during trial testimony. 

 

 1These firearms included a loaded .357 magnum handgun, 

hidden beneath clothing in a baby cradle, and ammunition. 
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 The only reasonable hypothesis flowing from the evidence was 

that defendant resided at the residence and constructively 

possessed the drugs secreted with his scales in the bedroom, 

together with other of his property, including articles 

consistent with drug distribution.2

 "Although none of [the] 

circumstances, standing alone, would have sufficiently proved 

that defendant possessed the drugs, the facts combined to support 

the finding that the narcotics discovered were subject to 

defendant's informed 'dominion and control.'" Hetmeyer v. 

Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 103, 111-12, 448 S.E.2d 894, 899-900 

(1994). Notwithstanding defendant's protestations of innocence, 

the court was entitled to conclude that defendant was untruthful 

to conceal his constructive possession of the drugs in the 

bedroom. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. 

 Affirmed. 

 

 2Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the 

evidence to prove intent to distribute. Although evidence of 

possession may coincide with evidence of intent to distribute, 

the "circumstantial proof of [the accused's] intent [to 

distribute]" has not "[been] used to 'bootstrap' proof of the 

predicate fact that he actually or constructively possessed [the 

drugs]" in this instance. Scruggs v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 

58, 62, 448 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1994); see Burchette v. 

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 432, 437, 425 S.E.2d 81, 85 (1992) ("It 

does not follow . . . that because . . . drug dealers frequently 

own guns, cellular telephones, or beepers, [the accused], who 

owned a handgun and cellular telephone, was a drug dealer and, 

therefore, . . . knowingly possessed the marijuana found in his 

parked vehicle.").