1 ... T he H o no rable M i chael P ed en, presi d i ng judge o f t he 2 8 5 t h Jud i ci al D i st ri ct C o urt , s i gned t he judgm ent a t i ssu e in this a p p e a l. T h e H o n o ra b le K a re n P o z z a is t h e p re sid ing ju d g e o f t h e 4 0 7 th J u d ic ia l D istric t C o u rt. i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No. 04-09-00118- CV Ti mot hy Jame s HOUTCHENS , J r., Appellant
v. Dar la Michelle CRAWF ORD ,

Appellee Fr om the 288th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2007-CI -18297 Honora ble Michae l Peden, J udg e Presiding 1 Opinion by : Sandee B ry an Mar ion , J ustice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: J anuar y 6, 2010 AFF I RMED In this appeal from the t rial court’s Final Decr ee of Divorce , appellant asserts the trial c ourt
a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

de te rm ini nghis a

pp e a l w a s f

ri vo lou s. We a ff

ir m.04
- 09
- 00 11 8- CV

- 2- BACK GR OUND On Dec ember

7, 2007, appellee filed an O rig inal Petition for Divorce , which wa s assig ned to the 288th J udicial District Court of B exar County , Texas (“the 288th”). Approxim ately one hour later, a ppell e e f il e d an Or igina l Petiti on to Terminate Par ent-Child Relationship, which was assig ned to the 407th Judicial District Court of Be x ar County , Texas (“the 407th” ). On De cembe r 8, 2008, the t er m i nation proce eding s, althoug h assig ned to the 407th, commenc ed bef ore the 288th. Appellant, who is inc arc erated but attended the pr ocee ding via telephone c onfer ence , inquired about his understandingthat the same c ourt should he ar both the termination proce eding and the divorc e pr oc e e din g . Wh e n a

pp e lle e ’s atto rn e y state d sh e wa s pr e pa re d to g o fo rw ard wi th bo th p ro c e e din g s,
a pp e lla nt a sk e d f or an a dd iti on a l sixty -e ig ht d ay s f or the purp os e of

c or re sp on din gand

vis iti ngwi th appellee . The trial c ourt denied the reque st and proc eede d to hear both the petition to terminate the pare nt-child relationship and the petition for divorce. After first hear ing evidence in the termination pr oc e e din g , th e tr ia l c ourt te rm inate d a

pp e lla nt’ s p aren ta l r ig hts . T he “ 40 7th Judic ia l D istri c t” appe ars in the caption of the ter mination order. The court then he ard e vidence in the divorce pr oc e e din gand , o n D e c e mbe r 1 5, 20 08 , th e tr ia l c ourt signe d th e di vo rce dec re e . T he “ 28 8th Judic ia l D istri c t” a

pp e ars in t

he c a pti on of the div or c e de c re e . Four day s late r, a pp e lla nt f ile d h is
no tice o f ap pe a l in

the div or c e c a se and , a

bo ut o ne month l ate r, he fi le d a De c lara tio n o f I na bil ity to P ay Cos ts. Ap pr oximate ly

fi ve months a ft e r s ig nin gthe div or c e de c re e , th e tr ia l c ourt e nte re d it s fin d in g s o f

f a c t a n d c o n c lu s io n s o f

la win w h ic hth e c o urt f

o un d a p p e ll an t’ s a

p p e a l i nth e d iv o r ce
c a se to b e fr ivo lou s.04
- 09
- 00 11 8- CV

2 ... Appe l l an t f

i l ed a mot i on t o t r an s f

er i n t h e t er mi n at i on pr oce edi n g c aus e num b er . T h e t er mi n at i on of appel l ant ’ s par ent al r i gh t s i s t he s ubj ect of an ot her appeal p endi ng b ef ore t hi s co ur t
. T he cl er k’ s r ecor d i n t hat appeal co nt ai ns t he m o t i o n t o t rans f er.

- 3-

DI SCU SSIO N On a pp e a l, a pp e lla nt a sse rt s th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in fin din g his a pp e a l to be fr ivo lou s b e c a us e the 40 7th la c ke d s ub

je c t- matte r j ur isd ic tio n o ve r t he div or c e p r o c e e d i n g . A

p p e lla nt a lle g e s th e 40 7th improper l y t ra n s fe rre d the divorce proce edingfrom the 288th to the 407th. The pr emise of appellant’ s argument is that the 288th J udicial District Court should have he ard t h e termination proce edingas we ll as the divorce proce edingpendingbefor e it. Although the rec ord in this appe al does not c ontain a motion to t ransf er, 2 an order on any motion to transfe r, or an order consolidating the two proc eeding s, both procee d i n gs we re , in fac t, hear d in the 288th. The “288th Judicial Di str ic t” a

pp e ars in the c a

pti on of the F ina l D ivo rc e De c re e . H ow e ve r, the “ 40 7th Judic ia l D istri c t” appea rs in the ca

ption of the Orde r of Te rmination, and it is this caption that may be the source of some confusion on a

ppellant’s par

t. “[T] he District Judges may exchang e districts, or hold cour ts for each other when they may d e e m it e xp e d ie n t an d s h a ll d o s o w h e n r e qu ir e d by law.” T EX . C O N ST . art. V, § 11. The Texas Gover nment Code expressly

g rants the B exar Coun t y d istrict courts conc urre nt jurisdiction. See T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE ANN . § 24.139(c) (Ve rnon 2004). A district court judg e may hear and dete rmine a matter pendingin any

district court in the county and may sign a judgme nt or order in any of the courts re g ardle ss of whethe r the c ase is tra nsfer red. Id. § 7 4. 09 4( a ) ( Ve rn on 20 05 ). Th e se provisions also form the basis of the Be x ar County local rules that provide for a ce ntralized, rotating04
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3 ... A lso , a fter the tria l c o u rt info rm e d a p p e llan t it w o u ld g ra n t the P e tit io n to T e r m in a te P a re n t-C h ild Rel at i on s h i p, t h e cou r t a s k ed appe l l an t i f t h er e wa s a n y t h i n g e l s e h e wa n t ed t o t el l the co urt
. Appel l an t r es pon ded,
“ M i gh t as wel l do t he di vor ce now, t oo , an d we’ r e done. ”

- 4- docket sy stem for non-jur y civil matters. See L ocal Rul e 3.A. Her e, the r eporte r’s re cord f rom the hear ing indicates both the divorce and ter mination procee ding took plac e bef ore same judg e, sitting in the 288th, who signe d both the Orde r of Te rmination and the F inal Divorce Dec ree . 3 CO NC LU SION We c on c lud e tha

t be c a us e the 28 8th ha d jur isd ic tio n to he ar bo th pr oc e e din g s and did , in fa c t, he ar b oth pr oc e e din g s, a

pp e lla nt’ s argume nts on a

pp e a l ar e wi tho ut me ri t. T he re fo re , w e ov e rr ule
a pp e lla nt’ s is su e s o n a

pp e a l and a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

Sandee B ryan Mar ion , J ustice