NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CATHERINE CASTELLANOS; et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

 v.

CITY OF RENO; MICHAEL CHAUMP,

in his official capacity as Business

Relations Manager of Community

Development and Business Licenses for

the City of Reno,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 23-15692

D.C. No. 

3:19-cv-00693-MMD-CLB

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 13, 2023** 

San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, FORREST, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

FILED

NOV 16 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 
Plaintiffs-appellants (collectively “Castellanos”) appeal the district court’s

order (1) denying Castellanos’s renewed motion for a preliminary injunction; 

(2) dismissing all claims, except the Reno Municipal Code (RMC) §5.06.080(b)

damages claim, for lack of standing, and dismissing Plaintiff Brooks for lack of

standing; and (3) granting Defendants-appellees’ (collectively “the City”) motion

for reconsideration. We have jurisdiction to consider the appeal of the preliminary

injunction denial under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(a)(1), and we affirm. Because we lack

jurisdiction over the district court’s rulings regarding standing and the motion for

reconsideration, we reach only the preliminary injunction issue and dismiss the

remainder of the appeal.

1. The district court did not err by denying Castellanos’s renewed motion

for preliminary injunction. First, Castellanos’s motion was procedurally improper. 

Castellanos included the motion in her response to the district court’s Order to

Show Cause (OSC) as to standing, thus exceeding the scope of the OSC and

violating the district court’s requirement that a separate document be filed “for

each type of relief requested or purpose of the document.” D. Nev. LR. IC 2-2(b). 

District courts have discretion to reject filings that fail to comply with their local

rules. See Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The

district court has considerable latitude in managing the parties’ motion practice and

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enforcing local rules.”); see also United States v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471, 474 (9th

Cir. 1979) (“Only in rare cases will we question the exercise of discretion in

connection with the application of local rules.”). 

Second, the district court properly concluded that Castellanos did not carry

her burden of persuasion because her motion did not address the merits of granting

a preliminary injunction. A party seeking a preliminary injunction must carry the

burden of persuasion “by a clear showing.” Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072

(9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks, emphasis, and citation omitted). To do

so, she must establish that her claim satisfies the four “Winter factors”: “[1] that

[s]he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that [s]he is likely to suffer irreparable

harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in

h[er] favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Castellanos’s motion did not address the

Winter factors. Castellanos’s newly raised arguments discussing the merits of her

motion in her appellate briefing are considered waived. See Armstrong v. Brown,

768 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n issue will generally be deemed waived on

appeal if the argument was not raised sufficiently for the trial court to rule on it.”

(quoting Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 667 F.3d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 2012))). 

Accordingly, we affirm.

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2. We lack jurisdiction over the district court’s rulings regarding standing

and the motion for reconsideration. These rulings are not “final” judgments under

28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 because they preserve Castellanos’s damages claim

challenging RMC § 5.06.080(b). See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“[C]ourts of appeals ...

have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts”); see also

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 54(b) (providing that absent certification by the district court,

“any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all

the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the

action as to any of the claims or parties . . . .”); see also Prellwitz v. Sisto, 657 F.3d

1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he district court’s order was not final because it

did not dispose of the action as to all claims between the parties”). Nor are they

appealable interlocutory orders under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292. 

Castellanos’s argument that the standing ruling is reviewable as a component of the

preliminary injunction denial misstates the basis for the district court’s preliminary

injunction denial, which was not based on standing. In addition, we are

unpersuaded by Castellanos’s contention that “delay itself creates an appealable

order in First Amendment cases” because Castellanos has not provided any

showing of judicial delay. Accordingly, we dismiss Castellanos’s appeal as to all

issues except the preliminary injunction, due to lack of jurisdiction.

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AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.

 

 

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