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THE ACTION. 
RENDERED: DECEMBER 14, 2023

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2022-SC-0411-MR

CHASE ALLEN SIMMONS APPELLANT 

V. 

ON APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JAMES A. WETHINGTON, JUDGE

NO. 19-CR-01377

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

A jury of the Daviess Circuit Court found Appellant Chase Simmons 

guilty of two counts of murder and one count of assault in the second degree. 

The jury recommended consecutive sentences of thirty years on each of the 

murder convictions, together with a concurrent sentence of five years on the 

second-degree assault conviction, for a total sentence of sixty years. The trial 

court sentenced Simmons in accordance with that recommendation. Simmons 

now appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). 

Following a careful review, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 31, 2019, high school sophomore Bailey Eubanks threw an endof-the-school-year party in a barn at her mother’s home in Whitesville. 
2

Eubanks and her friends spread news of the party via social media, resulting in 

as many as one hundred people attending.

On the same evening, Appellant Chase Simmons, then seventeen years 

old, and his friend Andrew Pierce smoked marijuana together in Owensboro. 

Around 11:30 p.m., Pierce and Simmons left in Pierce’s car to head to the 

party. Simmons, who was wearing a black zip-up hoodie and black pants, 

called his friend Savannah Helm and told her he had learned Jasper “Rex” 

Brown was at the party. Helm testified there was bad blood between Simmons 

and Brown because Simmons believed Brown had robbed one of his friends.

When Pierce and Simmons arrived at the party around midnight, 

Simmons asked Pierce to wait in the car. A few minutes later, numerous 

gunshots rang out. One witness testified the shooter was a white male dressed 

in black. Another testified the shooter was wearing a black hoodie and had 

white hands, while a third witness told police the shooter was Black.1 Three 

teenage boys—Brown, Amarius “Mari” Winstead, and Tyler Glover—were shot. 

Brown and Winstead died soon after, while Glover had surgery and survived 

without long-term injuries. 

Simmons returned to Pierce’s car soon after the shootings and told him 

to “go, go, go!” While Pierce did not recall seeing Simmons with a gun on the 

way to the party, he testified he saw Simmons holding a Glock on the ride back 

to Owensboro. 

1 Simmons is Caucasian.
3

While returning to Owensboro, Simmons called Helm via FaceTime and 

told her he had killed Brown. Helm’s friends could hear the conversation 

because the call was played over the car’s speakers. One of those friends 

thought Simmons sounded “messed up” during the call. Another recalled 

Simmons texting Helm that evening, saying he was on acid. Helm testified she 

observed during the call that Simmons was wearing a black zip-up hoodie. 

Simmons told Pierce he did not want to go back home and ultimately 

directed Pierce to the St. Anthony trailer park where April Rednour lived. 

Pierce testified that when they arrived at Rednour’s residence Simmons put a 

Glock in a baggie on the counter, though Rednour did not see Simmons with 

any type of weapon. 

Rednour did recall that Simmons was “tripping acid” and that he said 

something about shooting someone. Rednour described Simmons as hyper, 

energized, intense, and “bouncing off the walls.” She explained that he and 

Pierce were talking to one another, and that the energy was that of two teenage 

boys interacting. Rednour eventually directed Simmons, Pierce, and 

Simmons’s brother Andrew, who had arrived in the meantime with a rifle, to 

leave. A few days later Simmons returned to Rednour’s residence to pick up a 

backpack he’d left behind. Rednour gave Simmons the keys to her shed where 

the backpack was but did not go with him to retrieve it.

On June 6, 2019, police arrested Simmons and seized a backpack which 

contained, among other items, a cellphone. Analysis of the cellphone 

confirmed Helm’s testimony regarding Simmons’s calls to her and placed 
4

Simmons at both the party and Rednour’s residence. The phone also included 

photos of Simmons with a handgun with a clear clip and other firearms. 

On June 7, 2019, police went to the trailer park where Rednour lives 

after receiving an anonymous tip. There, under a shed close to Rednour’s 

trailer but not belonging to her, they located a baggie containing a Glock with a 

clear clip. Ballistics analysis later linked the Glock with shell casings found at 

the scene of the shootings and identified it as the gun used in those crimes. 

However no fingerprints were found on the gun or baggie, and Simmons could 

not be included as a contributor to the partial DNA profiles of three people 

found on the weapon.

A grand jury indicted Simmons on two counts of murder and one count 

of second-degree assault. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced over 

Simmons’s objection four of the photos found on his cellphone. Two of the 

photos showed Simmons posing for the camera with a handgun with a clear 

clip, along with other weapons. In one of the photos the gun was in Simmons’s 

pocket, and in the other he held the gun in his hand. The remaining two 

photos showed only firearms, including a handgun with a clear clip. The trial 

court excluded other photographs from trial, including a photograph of 

Simmons with a marijuana-leaf themed blanket. 

Simmons also requested a voluntary intoxication instruction, which the 

trial court declined to give. The jury ultimately convicted Simmons of two 

counts of murder and one count of second-degree assault. The trial court 

imposed the sixty-year sentence recommended by the jury.
5

ANALYSIS

Simmons raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the cellphone 

photographs of him with firearms were properly authenticated; (2) whether 

those photos were admissible under KRE2 404(b); and (3) whether the trial 

court erred in denying his request for a voluntary intoxication instruction. We 

review each issue in turn, providing additional facts as necessary.

I. The Cellphone Photographs Of Simmons With Firearms Were 

Properly Authenticated. 

Simmons first argues that the trial court erred in admitting the firearms 

photos retrieved from his cellphone because those photos were not properly 

authenticated. More particularly, Simmons contends the photos were not 

authenticated because the Commonwealth could not say when the photos were 

taken, whether they were taken with the phone or downloaded from another 

source, or if they contained metadata. Simmons preserved this argument by 

raising these objections during an in-chambers hearing regarding the photos. 

KRE 103(a)(1). We therefore consider whether the trial court’s admission of the 

photographs was an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 134 

S.W.3d 563, 566 (Ky. 2004). That is, we ask “whether the trial judge’s decision 

was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” 

Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

KRE 901 requires evidence to be authenticated by proof “sufficient to 

support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” 

2 Kentucky Rule of Evidence.
6

KRE 901(a). The Rule sets forth some forms such proof may take, including 

testimony of a witness with knowledge “that a matter is what it is claimed to 

be,” “[c]omparison by the trier of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens 

which have been authenticated,” and “[a]ppearance, contents, substance, 

internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with 

circumstances.” KRE 901(b)(1), (3), & (4). To satisfy KRE 901, “a party seeking 

to introduce an item of tangible evidence need not satisfy an ‘absolute’ 

identification requirement, and evidence is admissible if the offering party’s 

evidence reasonably identifies the item.” Grundy v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 

76, 80 (Ky. 2000).

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of the 

photographs as properly authenticated. At trial the Commonwealth presented 

proof that police discovered a Glock with a clear clip beneath a shed near 

Rednour’s property. The Commonwealth further presented ballistics proof 

linking that same clear-clip Glock with shell casings found at the scene of the 

shootings and identifying it as the murder weapon. The Commonwealth thus 

sought to introduce the photographs from Simmons’s cellphone of him with a 

clear-clip firearm to establish that the murder weapon was his.

 The proof at trial was sufficient to authenticate the photographs for that 

purpose, i.e., to support a finding that the photographs were in fact what the 

Commonwealth claimed—images of Simmons with the gun used in the 

shootings. First, Simmons’s mother was a person with knowledge who testified 

that he was in the photos. This was sufficient to support a finding that the 
7

person in the photos was Simmons. KRE 901(b)(1). Second, the jury was 

shown photographs of the Glock with a clear clip found beneath the shed and 

confirmed by ballistics analysis to be the murder weapon. As finder of fact, the 

jury could compare that weapon with the gun in the cellphone photographs to 

determine whether they were the same firearm. KRE 901(b)(3). In addition, 

the clear clip shared by both the murder weapon and the gun in the cellphone 

photographs was sufficiently distinctive to support a finding that the gun in the 

photograph was the murder weapon. KRE 901(b)(4). The proof at trial was 

thus sufficient to support a finding that the evidence was what the 

Commonwealth claimed, i.e., photos of Simmons with the murder weapon. 

Finally, we disagree with Simmons’s contention that proper 

authentication required the Commonwealth to prove when the photos were 

taken, how they ended up on his phone, or whether metadata existed. None of 

those showings were required to establish what the Commonwealth sought to 

prove, i.e., that Simmons was in possession of the murder weapon before or at 

the time of the killings. Simmons’s cellphone was seized by law enforcement 

shortly after the shootings, and thus it was clear the photographs were taken 

before or near in time to the crimes. Any further detail regarding when the 

photographs were taken was not necessary to establish what the 

Commonwealth sought to show, i.e., that Simmons had been in possession of 

the murder weapon. Nor was it necessary to show how the photographs came 

to be on Simmons’s phone, or that metadata existed for the photographs, to 
8

make that showing. As such, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

determination that the photographs were properly authenticated.

II. The Cellphone Photographs Were Admissible Under KRE 

404(b).

Simmons also argues admission of the cellphone photographs violated 

KRE 404(b). Simmons’s particular arguments are that the photos were not 

relevant because it could not be determined when they were taken, whether 

they were taken by him, or if they included the actual weapon used in the 

crimes. Simmons also contends the photos were also not relevant insofar as 

they included additional weapons besides the single Glock used in the crimes. 

Simmons further asserts the photos were not probative and were substantially 

prejudicial. Simmons objected both before and during trial to admission of the 

photographs under KRE 404(b), and thus his objection is preserved. KRE 

103(d).

KRE 404(b) governs the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, 

or acts. It provides that such evidence is “not admissible to prove the 

character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” 

However, the Rule also provides two circumstances in which evidence of other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible. First, such evidence may be 

admissible if “offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 

mistake or accident.” KRE 404(b)(1). Second, such evidence may also be 

admissible if it is “so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to 
9

the case that separation of the two (2) could not be accomplished without 

serious adverse effect on the offering party.” KRE 404(b)(2). 

In determining whether to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 

acts under KRE 404(b), a trial court must consider the three factors of 

relevance, probativeness, and prejudice set forth in Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 

S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1994). That is, the trial court must consider 1) whether the 

proffered evidence is relevant for some purpose other than to prove the 

defendant’s criminal disposition, 2) whether evidence of the other crime, wrong, 

or act is sufficiently probative of its commission by the defendant, and 

3) whether the potential prejudice from admission of the proffered evidence 

substantially outweighs its probative value. Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 889-91. In 

considering these factors, the trial court “must apply [KRE 404(b)] cautiously, 

with an eye towards eliminating evidence which is relevant only as proof of an 

accused’s propensity to commit a certain type of crime.” Id. at 889. We review 

a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under KRE 404(b) for abuse of 

discretion. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007).

Here, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding 

the cellphone photographs admissible under KRE 404(b). First, as to the Bell 

factor of relevance, the photographs were relevant to establishing Simmons’s 

identity as the shooter and his opportunity to commit the crimes. Simmons’s 

theory of the case was that the shootings were not perpetrated by him but 

rather by someone else. This theory thus placed the identity of the shooter at 

issue in the trial. The photographs depicted Simmons with a firearm similar to 
10

that identified by ballistics as the murder weapon. Moreover, both the murder 

weapon and the gun in the photographs had a distinctive clear clip. As such, 

the photographs were relevant to establish both Simmons’s identity as the 

shooter and his opportunity to commit the shootings. See Thurman v. 

Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 888, 898 (Ky. 1998) (holding that evidence 

defendant was in possession of firearm similar to murder weapon “was relevant 

evidence.”).

The relevance of the photographs was not undermined by the absence of 

proof of when they were taken, particularly given that the cellphone was seized 

near the time of the murders. Nor was the relevance of the evidence dependent 

on how the photographs came to be on Simmons’s phone or where related 

metadata was. Finally, it was not necessary for the Commonwealth to 

establish with certainty that the firearm in the photographs was the same 

weapon used in the murders. The murder weapon and the firearm in the 

photographs were sufficiently similar that a reasonable jury could conclude 

they were the same gun. That determination was for the jury, and Simmons of 

course was free to point out the lack of definite proof that the gun in the 

photographs was the murder weapon. Ultimately, however, the photographs 

were relevant to prove identity and opportunity and thus were relevant for 

permissible purposes under KRE 404(b). 

The second Bell factor requires a trial court to consider whether the 

evidence is sufficiently probative of the defendant’s commission of the other 

alleged crimes, wrongs, and acts, i.e., whether “the jury could reasonably 
11

conclude that the act[s] occurred and that the defendant was the actor.” Davis 

v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 709, 724-25 (Ky. 2004). The photographs at 

issue were retrieved from Simmons’s cellphone and his mother testified that it 

was him in the pictures. This evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable 

conclusion that Simmons appeared in the photographs. Thus the 

probativeness factor of Bell was also satisfied.

Finally, we do not find an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

determination that the prejudicial effect of the photographs did not 

substantially outweigh their probative value. This factor requires the trial 

court to ask whether “the tendency of the evidence [is] so strongly to lead the 

jury into improper character inferences that that tendency ‘substantially 

outweigh[s] [the evidence’s] probative value’ with regard to its proper uses.” 

Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 496 S.W.3d 435, 457 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Bell, 875 

S.W.2d at 890). The cellphone photographs were highly probative of 

Simmons’s identity as the shooter and his opportunity to commit the crimes, 

given that they showed him with a firearm with a distinctive clear clip similar 

to the murder weapon. Admittedly, the photographs were also prejudicial, not 

only because they showed Simmons with a firearm similar to the murder 

weapon but also with a variety of other firearms as well. Nonetheless, there 

was nothing particularly shocking about the photographs, which ultimately 

were little more than mundane photographs of the defendant showing his 

guns. As such, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the prejudicial 

effect of the photographs did not substantially outweigh their probative value. 
12

There was no abuse of discretion in the admission of the photographs under 

KRE 404(b).

III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Declining 

Simmons’s Request For A Voluntary Intoxication Instruction.

Finally, Simmons argues that the trial court erred in declining to give a 

voluntary intoxication instruction. Simmons notes that the trial court 

discussed jury instructions with counsel “informally” and off the record, a 

practice we have observed with increasing frequency. We advise trial courts 

that discussions with counsel regarding the crafting of jury instructions should 

take place on the record. Absent such a record, we are often left to speculate 

as to the parties’ arguments and the trial court’s reasoning in reaching a final 

set of instructions.

Nonetheless, because the Commonwealth acknowledges that Simmons 

requested a voluntary intoxication instruction and because the trial court made 

reference to that request in the course of other recorded portions of the trial, 

we will treat the issue as preserved. See Brafman v. Commonwealth, 612 

S.W.3d 850, 857 (Ky. 2020). We therefore review the trial court’s denial of 

Simmons’s request for a voluntary intoxication instruction for abuse of 

discretion and harmless error. Id.

Voluntary intoxication is a defense to crimes whose elements include the 

forming of a specific intent, i.e., specific-intent crimes. KRS 501.080(1). 

However, a voluntary intoxication instruction is warranted only if the proof is 

sufficient to support a reasonable finding that the voluntary intoxication 

completely prevented the defendant from forming the requisite intent. McGuire
13

v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Ky. 1994) (“Intoxication, whether 

voluntary or involuntary, is a defense to an intentional crime if the effect of the 

intoxication is to completely negate the element of intent . . . .”) (emphasis 

added). Mere evidence that the defendant was intoxicated is not sufficient to 

warrant such an instruction. King v. Commonwealth, 513 S.W.3d 919, 923 

(Ky. 2017). That is, mere proof of “‘impairment of judgment and/or physical 

control that commonly leads intoxicated persons to do things they would not 

ordinarily do’” does not, without more, suffice for the giving of a voluntary 

intoxication instruction. Hargroves v. Commonwealth, 615 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Ky. 

2021) (quoting Conyers v. Commonwealth, 530 S.W.3d 413, 432 (Ky. 2017)). 

Rather, the proof must be reasonably sufficient “to prove that the defendant 

was so [intoxicated] that he did not know what he was doing.” Harris v. 

Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 40, 50 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Fredline v. 

Commonwealth, 241 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Ky. 2007) (emphasis added)).

We have recently spoken to considerations relevant to a trial court’s 

determination of whether to provide a voluntary intoxication instruction:

A criminal defendant has a basic constitutional right to 

present a defense, and this entitles the defendant to jury 

instructions that give effect to a defendant’s theory of the case. 

From this right, a duty is correspondingly imposed on the trial 

court to instruct on the whole law of the case. Indeed, “a trial 

court is required to instruct the jury on affirmative defenses and 

lesser-included offenses if the evidence would permit a juror 

reasonably to conclude that the defense exists or that the 

defendant was not guilty.”

While instructing the jury in a particular way is a 

discretionary function of the trial court, a trial court must be 

especially inclined to give instructions that go to the defendant’s 

state of mind, such as mistake or intoxication. “Intoxication . . . is 
14

a defense to an intentional crime if the effect of the intoxication is 

to completely negate the element of intent; it causes the 

defendant’s mental state to equate with insanity. Voluntary 

intoxication negate[s] specific intent.”

Brafman, 612 S.W.3d at 858 (citations omitted). We have also noted that it is 

well-established a voluntary intoxication instruction “is to be rejected if the 

evidence does not warrant it.” Harris, 313 S.W.3d at 50. 

The charges at issue here, murder and second-degree assault, are both 

specific-intent crimes. Murder generally requires a specific intent to cause the 

death of another person. KRS3 507.020. Thus, if the proof is sufficient to 

support a reasonable finding that a defendant’s voluntary intoxication 

completely prevented him from forming an intent to cause the death of another 

person, he is entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction. Similarly, seconddegree assault generally requires a specific intent to cause serious physical 

injury, or to cause physical injury by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous 

instrument. KRS 508.020(1)(a), (b). Thus, if the proof is sufficient to support a 

reasonable finding that a defendant’s voluntary intoxication completely 

prevented him from forming an intent to cause serious physical injury or 

physical injury by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, he is 

entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction.4

3 Kentucky Revised Statute.

4 A wanton state of mind, rather than specific intent, may also suffice to support 

a conviction for murder or second-degree assault. See KRS 507.020(1)(b) & KRS 

508.020(1)(c). Voluntary intoxication of course is not a defense to crimes requiring only 

a wanton or reckless state of mind. McGuire, 885 S.W.2d at 934 (“Voluntary intoxication 

does not negate culpability for a crime requiring a culpable mental state of wantonness 

or recklessness . . . .”). 
15

Here, Simmons asserts a voluntary intoxication instruction was 

warranted because 1) Pierce testified Simmons smoked marijuana before the 

shootings, 2) two witnesses testified Simmons was tripping on acid that 

evening, 3) Rednour described Simmons as energetic, intense, and “bouncing 

off the walls,” and 4) one of Helm’s friends stated Simmons sounded “messed 

up” during his FaceTime call with Helm after the shootings. This proof could 

certainly support a reasonable conclusion that Simmons was under the 

influence of multiple drugs at the time of the shootings, but it falls short of the 

necessary showing that he was so intoxicated he did not know what he was 

doing. Absent such proof, there could be no reasonable finding that Simmons’s 

voluntary intoxication rendered him unable to form the intent necessary to 

commit the crimes of murder and second-degree assault.

Moreover, other proof at trial flatly contradicts any suggestion Simmons 

was so intoxicated as to be unable to form an intent to kill or injure. For 

example, immediately after the shootings Simmons had the mental capacity to 

decide not to go home, to decide upon Rednour’s residence in Owensboro as an 

alternative destination, and to give Pierce physical directions to the St. Anthony 

trailer park where Rednour lived. See Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 

868 (Ky. 2004) (noting defendant’s ability to locate a residence was not the 

action “of a man so intoxicated that he did not know what he was doing”). 

Additional proof further demonstrating that Simmons had mental control and 

was aware of his actions include 1) his direction to Pierce to stay in the car 

when they arrived at the party, 2) his quick return to the car after the 
16

shootings, 3) his order to Pierce to “go” when he jumped back in the car, and 4) 

his confession to Helm shortly after the shootings that he had killed Brown. 

See Harris, 313 S.W.3d at 51 (holding that defendant’s memory of and boasting 

about killing shortly after committing the crime did not “permit a finding that 

at the time of the offense [he] was so intoxicated that he did not know what he 

was doing”). Finally, while Rednour described Simmons as energetic and 

“bouncing off the walls,” she also further clarified that Simmons was 

interacting with Pierce at the time and that his energetic demeanor was typical 

of interactions between teenage boys.

Thus, while the proof at trial showed that Simmons was intoxicated and 

excitable, it did not show that his intoxication rose to a level such that he did 

not know what he was doing or could not form an intent to commit the crimes 

charged. As such, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial 

of Simmons’s request for a voluntary intoxication instruction. See Hargroves, 

615 S.W.3d at 9 (“[W]hile [defendant] may have consumed alcohol, the proof 

does not show he was so drunk he did not know what he was doing. Therefore, 

we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by declining to instruct 

jurors on voluntary intoxication.”). 

CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the 

Daviess Circuit Court.

All sitting. All concur.
17

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Kayla D. Deatherage

Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel J. Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Jenny L. Sanders

Assistant Attorney General