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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE MOHAMED ABDELKADIR, Appellant,

v. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Respondent. No. 69736-6-1

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: March 3, 2014 Verellen, J. — Mohamed Abdelkadir appeals from a superior court order affirming a Washington Employment Security Department (Department) commissioner's decision denying his request for training benefits. The commissioner determined that Abdelkadir was ineligible to receive training benefits because he failed to file his application within the 60-day deadline and because he did not meet the statutory definition of a "dislocated worker." Because the commissioner's findings are supported 

### by substantial evidence and the commissioner correctly applied the law, we affirm.
FACTS 

### On February 19, 2009, Abdelkadir filed a claim withthe Departmentfor unemployment benefits. Although the commissioner initially denied Abdelkadir'sNo. 69736-6-1/2 

### request, the Department later stipulated that he was eligible to receive unemployment benefits.1 On October 11, 2011, Abdelkadir submitted his application for training benefits to the Department. Abdelkadir planned to enroll in an automotive service training program that was scheduled to begin in January 2012. Inthe application, Abdelkadir identified 

### theoccupation of"driver" as his "mainjob."2 His most recentwork experience included approximately seven years as a driver for various employers. The Department denied Abdelkadir's request for training benefits. Itdetermined that he was ineligible because his primary occupation as a driver was considered "in 

### demand," according to theWorkforce Development Council.3 TheDepartmentalso determined that he was ineligible because he failed to submit his training application within the 60-day statutory period. Abdelkadir appealed the Department's decision to the Office ofAdministrative Hearings. Following an administrative hearing, the administrative lawjudge (ALJ) affirmed the Department's decision. Abdelkadir then petitioned the commissionerto review the ALJ's order. The commissioner adopted the ALJ's findings offacts and conclusions of law and affirmed the ALJ's order. Abdelkadir appealed to King County Superior Court, which affirmed the commissioner's decision.


### 1Afterthe superior courtaffirmed the commissioner'sdecision denying Abdelkadir's request for unemployment benefits, Abdelkadirfiled a notice ofappeal with this court. Following settlement negotiations, the parties moved to withdraw the appeal pursuant to RAP 18.2 and stipulated to the reversal ofthe commissioner's decision. 

### 2Certified Appeal Board Record (CABR) at 103, 105. 3 CABR at 86.No. 69736-6-1/3 Abdelkadir appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

### The Washington Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA), chapter 34.05 RCW, governsjudicial review of a final administrative decision ofthe commissioner of the 

### Department.4 In reviewing such adecision, we sitin the sameposition as thesuperior court and apply the standards ofthe WAPA directly to the administrative record that was 

### before the agency.5 Thus, wereview the commissioner's decision, not theALJ's 

### decision or the superiorcourt's ruling.6 Acommissioner's decision isconsidered "prima facie correct."7 Theparty asserting invalidity of an agency action—in this case, Abdelkadir— carries the burden of 

### proving theinvalidity.8 Relieffrom anagency decision will begranted ifthereviewing court determines that the commissioner has erroneously interpreted or applied the law, the order is not supported by substantial evidence, or the order is arbitrary or 

### capricious.9 

### Wereview findings offact for substantial evidence.10 Substantial evidence is evidence that would persuade a fair-minded person ofthe truth or correctness ofthe



### 4Tapper v. Emp'tSec. Dep't. 122 Wn.2d 397, 402, 858 P.2d 494 (1993). 

### 5Id.: Daniels v. Emp't Sec. Dep't. 168Wn. App. 721, 727, 281 P.3d 310,review denied. 175 Wn.2d 1028 (2012). 

### 6Verizon Nw.. Inc. v. Wash. Emp't Sec. Dep't. 164 Wn.2d 909, 915, 194 P.3d 255 (2008). 

### 7Anderson v. Emp'tSec. Dep't. 135 Wn.App. 887, 893, 146 P.3d 475 (2006). 

### 8RCW 34.05.570(1 )(a); RCW 50.32.150. 9RCW 34.05.570(3)(d),(e),(i); Tapper. 122Wn.2d at 402. 10 Smith v. Emp'tSec. Dep't. 155 Wn.App. 24, 32, 226 P.3d 263 (2010).No. 69736-6-1/4 

## matter.11 We review anagency's interpretation orapplication ofthe law denovo, giving substantial weightto the agency's interpretation of the statutes itadministers.12
DISCUSSION 

### As an initial matter, we note thatAbdelkadir, representing himself, fails to comply with our rules on appeal. His briefdoes not contain assignments oferror and issues 

### pertaining to theassignments oferror.13 And he does not support his assertions with citations toapplicable legal authority.14 Butevenignoring these deficiencies, his arguments are not persuasive. Abdelkadirfirst contends that the commissioner erred in denying his request for training benefits because, he asserts, the commissioner improperly concluded that he failed to satisfy the timing requirement prescribed in RCW 50.22.150(2)(d). We disagree. Chapter 50.22 ofthe Employment Security Act establishes a training benefits program to "provide unemployment insurance benefits to unemployed individuals who 

### participate in training programs necessaryfor their reemployment."15 RCW 50.22.150- applicable toindividuals like Abdelkadirwith claims effective before April 5, 200916—

11 King County v. Cent. Puqet Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 142 Wn.2d 543,553, 14P.3d 133(2000). 

### 12 Smith, 155Wn. App. at 32; Honesty in Environmental Analysis &Legislation v. Cent. Puqet Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 96 Wn. App. 522, 526, 979 P.2d 864 (1999).

### 13 RAP 10.3(a)(4). 14 RAP 10.3(a)(6). 15 RCW 50.22.130. 

### 16 The "effective date" of an unemployment claim is the Sunday of the calendar week in which the application for benefits is filed. WAC 192-100-035. Abdelkadir submitted his application for unemployment benefits on February 19, 2009.No. 69736-6-1/5
sets forth the criteria under which an individual is eligible to receive training benefits. According to the statute, a claimant is eligible if, among otherthings, he or she submits
an individual training program to the commissioner "within sixty days after the individual 

### is notified bytheemployment security department oftherequirements ofthis section."17 Here, the commissioner found that "[w]hen the claimant opened his claim for benefits in 2009, [t]he department sent him an Unemployment Claims Kit on February 

### 20, 2009. The pamphlet contained information about [training [bjenefits."18 This finding is supported by substantial evidence inthe record. Atthe 

### administrative hearing, the ALJasked Abdelkadir, "When you opened your claim for 

### unemployment benefits, did they send you anything in the mail about how to file your 

### claim?"19 Abdelkadir responded, "They send me how to—no. They send to mehow to 

### file, but—howtofile for benefits, yeah, they send tome."20 Moreover, among the 

## exhibits presented to theALJ was adocumententitled "Date Calculator."21 This document indicates that the pamphlet was mailed on February 20, 2009. Accordingly, the commissioner did not err in finding that the Department mailed Abdelkadir the Unemployment ClaimsKit on February 20, 2009. 

### Abdelkadir argues that no evidence shows that he actually received a pamphlet 

### notifying him of the 60-day deadline. Although the commissionerfound that the Accordingly, the effectivedate is February 15, 2009. Because this effective date precedes April 5, 2009, RCW 50.22.150 applies. 

### 17 RCW 50.22.150(2)(d). 

### 18 Clerk's Papers at 63. 19 CABR at 58. 20 CABR at 58. 21 CABR at 136.No. 69736-6-1/6 

### Department mailed the kit including the pamphlet to Abdelkadir, he did notexpressly find that Abdelkadir received it. Nevertheless, Abdelkadir's testimony that he received information about how to file claims is entirely consistent with his receipt of the kit 

### including thepamphlet ontraining benefits.22 Abdelkadir did not submit his application for training benefits until October 11, 

### 2011, more than two years beyond the 60-day deadline setforth in RCW 50.22.150(2)(d). 

### Therefore, the commissioner properly concluded that Abdelkadir did not satisfy the timing requirement necessary to establish eligibility for training benefits. But even ifAbdelkadir satisfied the timing requirement, he failed to establish his eligibility as a dislocated worker. RCW 50.22.150(2)(a) requires that the claimant be "a dislocated worker as defined in RCW 50.04.075." Pursuant to RCW 50.04.075(1), a "dislocated worker" is a person who: (a) Has been terminated or received a notice of termination from employment; (b) Is eligible for or has exhausted entitlement to unemployment compensation benefits; and (c) Is unlikely to return to employment in the individual's principal occupation or previous industry because ofa diminishing demandfor their 

### skills in thatoccupation orindustryr.[23]



### 22 See WAC 192-120-010(3) ("Each person who ismailed a copy ofthe information booklet will be responsible for filing claims in accordance with its instructions." (emphasis added)); WAC 192-270-035(1) ("Information about training benefits willbe included in the claimant information booklet mailed to you at the time you file your application for unemployment benefits (see WAC 192-120-010).
... [T]he claimant information booklet is considered your notification of the eligibility requirements for the training benefits program."): see also WAC 192-120-010(1), (2), (5), (7). Abdelkadir provides no authority that the Department is required to use certified or return receipt requested mail. 

### 23 (Emphasis added.)No. 69736-6-1/7 

### Here, the commissioner found that "Truck Drivers, Light or Delivery Services
... is a demand occupation in the Seattle King County Workforce DevelopmentArea and in 

### theSnohomishWorkforce Develpment [sic] areas."24 Alluding toRCW 50.04.075(c), the commissioner concluded that Abdelkadir "has training in a 'demand' occupation," and "is not eligible for training benefits because he is not a dislocated worker as he has 

### work experience in a demand occupation."25 The commissioner's finding—that the occupation oftruck driver constitutes a demand occupation— is supported by substantial evidence. Exhibits inthe record 

### reflect that the occupation of "Truck Drivers, Light or Delivery," qualified as a "demand" occupation inthe Seattle King County and Snohomish County workforce development areas.26 Abdelkadir contends that his occupation as a driver was not in demand because 

### he was unable to find a job as a driver. He points to his "Job Search Log," an exhibit demonstrating that he applied to numerous driver positions between December 2010 

### and October2011,27 But a commissioner's assessment ofwhetherajob orskill is in demand may also include, as it did here, consideration of local labor market and 

### economic data.28 Thecommissionerwasentitled toweigh suchevidence in the

24 Clerk's Papers at 64. 25 Clerk's Papers at 67. 26 CABR at 109-10. 27 CABR at 114-31. 28 See RCW 50.22.150(2)(c), (11).No. 69736-6-1/8 

### Department'sfavor. Wewill not substitute our judgment for that of the agency regarding 

### theweight ofthe evidence.29 In light ofthese findings, the commissioner did not commit legal error by concluding that Abdelkadir was not a dislocated worker. Based upon the finding that his occupation was deemed to be indemand, the commissioner correctly concluded that Abdelkadir did not meet the definition of a dislocated worker. 

### Abdelkadir contends, finally, that he was entitled to defaultjudgment against the Department because his employer's representative did not appear at the administrative 

### hearing. ButAbdelkadir is mistaken. "Ifa party fails to attend or participate in a hearing
or other stage of an adjudicative proceeding,
... the presiding officermay serve upon 

### all parties a default or otherdispositive order."30 Thus, the ALJ was authorized—but not required—to find the Department in default. She also had the discretion to reach the merits ofthe matter. The ALJ properly exercised her discretion by choosing not to enter

a default order. Affirmed.

WE CONCUR: 

### OV\

29 Smith, 155Wn. App. at 35. 30 RCW 34.05.440(2) (emphasis added). 

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