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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED In re KILDARE, Minors. April 28, 2015

Nos. 323418; 323419; 323420 Berrien Circuit Court Family Division LC Nos. 2014-000016-NA; 2012-000116-NA; 2012-000116-NA

Before: B ORRELLO , P.J., and K RAUSE and R IORDAN , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. In docket no. 323418, respondent m other and respondent father appeal as of right the trial court order terminating their parental rights to the minor chil dren EK2 and IK3, born in 2011 and 2013 respectively, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody). In docket no. 323419, respondent father appeals as of right the tr ial court order terminating his parental rights to the minor c hildren IK1, AK, EK1, and IK2, bo rn in 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009 respectively, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) (conditions of adjudication continue to exist), (g), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if children returne d to parent). In docket no. 323420, respondent mother appeals as of ri ght the trial court order ter minating her parental rights to the minor children IK1, AK, EK1, and IK2 under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) a nd (j). We affirm in all dockets.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2008, Child Protective Servi ces (CPS) received a complaint that respondent mother was not mentally capable of providing care to EK2 and IK3. The chi ldren were removed from respondent mother’s care and placed with respondent father. Ho wever, for reasons that are not apparent from the record, the ch ildren were later removed from respondent father’s care.

Respondent mother submitted to a psychological evaluation with Dr. Paul Kitchen (an expert in child custody and parenting time) and scored a 58, wh ich is considered to be in the “mentally deficient range.” Dr. Kitchen also noted that when a child had an average IQ, he or she was likely to manipulate a parent with a lower IQ. Respondent father, who was blind, also struggled with anger issues and poor parenting skills.

In 2012, a petition was filed regarding the parties’ four othe r children—IK1, AK, EK1, and IK2. The Department of Human Services (DHS) received a com plaint that AK had been-2- wearing the same dirty clothes t o school for three consecutive days. When no one arrived to pick AK and IK1 up from the bus stop they began biting, pinching, hi tting, and scratching bus staff. The police were contacted and respondent father indicated he be lieved the behavior was justified and “appropriate.” DHS received a report that the children wer e without proper supervision and “completely out of control.” Petitioner requested that IK1, AK , EK1 and IK2 be removed from respondent father’s care.

As these lengthy proceedings progressed in the lower court, it became apparent that neither respondent was benefitting from services. In fact, res pondents seemed to be regressing, as evidenced in an incident where respondent father physically assaulted AK during parenting time. Respondent father was subsequently convicted of domestic abuse. Moreover, DHS observed that EK2 had a hematoma on his head and IK3 had a blac k eye. It could not be determined when these injuries occurred. 1

Ultimately, the trial court found that termination of responde nts’ parental rights to IK1, AK, EK1, and IK2 was proper pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (g), and (j). 2 The court also found that termination of respondents’ rights to EK2 and IK3 wa s proper pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). The court found that termination was in all of the children’s best interests. Both respondents now appeal.

II. STATUTORY GROUNDS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must fi nd by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termina tion in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met.” In re VanDalen , 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). “We review the trial court’s determination for clear error.” Id. “A decision is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire ev idence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re B & J , 279 Mich App 12, 17-18; 756 NW2d 234 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. GROUNDS

MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) provides for termination when “[t]he parent , without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child a nd there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” A parent’s failure to benefit fr om a service plan “is evidence that the parent will not be able to provide . . . proper care and cu stody.” In re White , 710, 710; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).

C. DOCKET NO. 323418 (EK2 AND IK3)

1 Respondent mother became pr egnant again in early 2014.

2 MCL 712A.19b(c)( i ) applied only to re spondent father.-3- Respondents failed to provide proper care or custody of EK2 an d IK3. Both respondents failed to benefit from services offered to them in a 19-month p roceeding that involved the four older children, and they both la cked appropriate parenting skil ls at the time of termination in this
matter. 3 See In re White , 303 Mich App at 710.

However, respondents argue on appeal that the trial court impr operly terminated their parental rights to EK2 and IK3 wh ere no evidence of abuse or ne glect regarding EK2 and IK3 was presented. During a January 2014 parenting time session, respondent father physically assaulted AK. Respondent was arr ested and convicted of domesti c assault. “[H]ow a parent treats one child is certainly probative of how that parent may treat other children.” In re LaFrance Minors , 306 Mich App 713, 730; 858 NW2d 143 (2014) (quotation marks a nd citation omitted). Further, respondent mother failed to protect AK from respondent father, and this evidence is certainly probative of how she would treat the othe r children if they were in a situation where they were being physically abused. See id.

Moreover, during this alterca tion, respondent mother was behav ing in a volatile manner and attempted to push past a security guard while she was holdi ng EK2, causing the security guard to be concerned for EK2’s welfare. Further, when EK2 andIK3 entered care on January 30, 2014, they had injuries for which respondent mother did not provide an explanation. She was banned from the DHS building for a period of time after she acted inappropriately, angrily, and aggressively on February 6, 2014 , during parenting time.

Nor does the record support th at respondents would have been “ able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering” EK2 and IK3’s ages. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Given that respondents participated in a multi tude of services during the 19- month proceeding and still they f ailed to demonstrate a benefit from any of them, there is no indication that they would be abl e to provide pro per care and c ustody within a reasonable time. At the time of termination, EK2 was three years old and IK3 was 16 months old. They required permanency. The trial court’s findings in docket no. 323418 th at termination of respondents’ parental rights was proper pursuant to M CL 712A.19b(3)(g) does not leave us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re HRC , 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).

D. DOCKET NO. 323419 & 323420 (IK1, AK, EK1, AND IK2)

The trial court properly terminated respondent’s rights to IK1 , AK, EK1, and IK2 pursuant to MCL 712.19b(3)(g). Respondent father was unable to provide proper care or custody to IK1, AK, EK1, and IK2 when the proceeding began in N ovember 2012 because he

3 Respondent mother argues that the July 9, 2014 parenting time she had with the children demonstrated that she had benefitted from services. But, evide nce regarding the July 9, 2014 parenting time was not presented at the March 4, 2014 terminati on hearing regarding EK2 and IK3 and was therefore not before the trial court when it render ed its ruling. Moreover, the caseworker testified that respondent mother’s July 2014 parenti ng time did not demonstrate that she had benefitted given that she failed to meaningfully intera ct with the children.-4- lacked suitable housing and lacked proper parenting skills. Du ring the proceedings, respondent father was provided with counseling and multiple services direc ted toward improving his parenting skills. Yet, he continued to behave in a threatening manner at times with the children and with DHS staff members. Even though he showed some progres s in parenting, he often would revert back to improper behavior.

In fact, respondent father and AK got into a physical altercat ion during a parenting time session, for which respondent fathe r was convicted of domestic assault. Because of this assaultive behavior, his parenting time was suspended. At the termination hearing, respondent father called the incident a “ mistake” and typical of frustrati on that everyone experiences at some point. Despite participating in anger management services at the time of the hearing, he did not believe he had anger issues. The caseworker did not believe th at he gained any benefit from the services he was required to complete.

Respondent mother also was unable to provide proper care or cus tody to IK1, AK, EK1, and IK2. During a psychological evaluation, Dr. Kitchen said t hat respondent mother’s IQ would affect her ability to pare nt. He also believed that she had never possessed appropriate parenting skills despite the fact she was provided services in a 2008 child protective proceeding. Between April and July 2013, she failed to demonstrate that she could independent ly parent the children, and failed to stand up t o respondent father when he i nappropriately raised his voice during a parenting time. From August 2013 through January 2014 , respondent mother worked with a parenting coach, but failed to show any long term improv ement. She consistently allowed respondent father to “take the lead,” and never tried to stop h im when he was bei ng inappropriate in the children’s presence. She also continued her relationshi p with respondent father despite warnings from DHS that the child ren would not be returned to he r if she continued the relationship.

Respondent mother also failed to protect AK in January 2014, a nd this evidence is probative of how she would treat t he other children if they wer e in her care. In re LaFrance Minors , 306 Mich App at 730 (“[H]ow a parent tr eats one child is cert ainly probative of how that parent may treat other children.”). Contrary to respondent mot her’s arguments on appeal, the record does not support that she tried to protect AK from respo ndent father’s abuse on January 30, 2014, given that she brought AK to respondent father after the minor had disobeyed him. She also tried to keep the casew orker from intervening and indi cated that respondent father was permitted to discipline his child.

Further, in February 2014, respondent mother was inappropriate , angry, and aggressive during a parenting time and was escorted out of the DHS buildin g and told that she could not return. Her parenting time was later suspended for all of the children. As of February 2014, the parenting coach did not believe that respondent mother was able to independently care for the children or meet their emotional needs. In the months leading up to termination, respondent mother completed parenting skills training. However, she conti nued to lack insight and knowledge about parenting, and her performance in the parenting class did not reflect that she had participated in parenting tr aining in the past. On July 9, 2014, respondent mother had a onehour parenting time with all of the children. She only was abl e to care for their basic needs and did not interact with them in a meaningful manner. Although re spondent mother completed-5- services during the proceeding, the record does not support tha t she benefitted. In re White , 303 Mich App at 710.

There also is no evidence to s upport that respondents would be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonabl e time given that they faile d to benefit from any of the services offered to them over the course of the 19-month procee ding. At the time of termination, IK1 was ten years old, AK was n ine years old, EK1 was eight yea rs old, and IK2 was almost five years old. They had been in care for 19 months, and they all h ad either emotional or cognitive issues and the child ren needed consistency and permanency.

The trial court’s findings in docket nos. 323419 and 323420 th at termination of respondents’ parental rights was proper pursuant to MCL 712A.19 b(3)(g) does not leave us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re HRC , 286 Mich App at 459.

Because we have concluded that at least one ground for termina tion existed, we need not consider the additional grounds up on which the trial court base d its decision in docket nos. 323419 and 323420. Id. at 461.

III. BEST INTERESTS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Respondents next challenge the t rial court’s best -interests fi nding regarding IK3 and EK2.

“Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child’s best interests before it can term inate parental rights.” In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). “We review for cle ar error . . . the court’s decision regarding the child’s best inte rest under MCL 712A.19b(5).” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A trial court’s decision is clea rly erroneous if although there is evidence to support it, the revie wing court on the entire evide nce is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. at 41 (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted).

B. ANALYSIS

Respondents first argue that the best-interests finding was de ficient because the trial court failed to consider the factors outlined in In re Olive/Metts Minors . In In re Olive/Metts Minors
, 297 Mich App at 41-42, we held tha t “[i]n deciding whether term ination is in the child’s best interests, the court may consider the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parentin g ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the a dvantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” (Emphasis added; internal citations omitted). However, because the use of the word “may” reflects permissive action, Manuel v Gill , 481 Mich 637, 647; 753 NW2d 48 (2008), the trial court was not obligated to address every suggested fa ctor. Furthermore, the record supports that the trial court expressly considered EK2 and IK3’ s need for permanency and stability and respondents’ l ack of parenting skills.-6- Nevertheless, respondents argue that the trial court clearly e rred because it failed to consider the individual interests of EK2 and IK3 when deciding best interests. In In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App at 42, this Court held that “the trial court has a duty to decide the best interests of each child individually.” However, in In re White , 303 Mich App at 715-716, this Court held that “this Court’s decision in In re Olive/Metts stands for the proposition that, if the best interests of the individual children significantly differ, the trial court should address those differences when making its determination of the children ’s best interests.” (Emphasis in original). This Court further held that a trial court does not clearly err if it “fails to explicitly make individual and—in many cases—redundant factual findings co ncerning each child’s best interests.” Id. Here, the record establishes that the only significant differen ce between EK2 and IK3 at the time of termination was their ages and the fact thatEK2 had behavioral issues and IK3 did not. The trial court addresse d these differences when rend ering its ruling.

Respondents next argue that it was improper for the trial cour t to consider their performance in services in the proceeding involving IK1, AK, EK 1, and IK2 when deciding whether termination was in EK2 and IK3’s best interests. Becau se respondents failed to explain or rationalize this argument or cite supporting authority, it i s abandoned. Houghton ex rel Johnson v Keller , 256 Mich App 336, 339; 662 NW2d 854 (2003). Further, existin g authority does not support that this was erroneous.

Finally, respondents argue that the trial court made insuffici ent findings to support its determination that termination of their parental rights to IK3 and EK2 was in their best interests. However, the record establishes that the trial court made detai led findings of fact with respect to IK3 and EK2’s best interests, a nd we find that they were suffic ient to satisfy MCR 3.977(I)(1).

IV. CONCLUSION

The trial court properly found the statutory grounds for termi nation and that termination was in the minor children’s best interests. We affirm.

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello /s/ Amy Ronayne Krause /s/ Michael J. Riordan