alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-15-00552-CV

Grant Rawston Headifen, Appellant

v.

Vanessa Harker, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 261ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-FM-13-001842, HONORABLE ORLINDA NARANJO, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

On August 28, 2015, appellant Grant Rawston Headifen filed a notice of appeal. 

Appellee Vanessa Harker filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that

the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

Headifen appeals from a final judgment signed by the trial court on May 7, 2015. 

Headifen timely filed a motion for new trial on June 8, 2015. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 4, 306a, 329b(a). 

Headifen’s motion for new trial extended his deadline for filing a notice of appeal until 90 days after

the judgment was signed, making the deadline August 5, 2015. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a)(1). That

deadline might have been extended until August 20, 2015, if Headifen had filed either a notice

of appeal with the trial court or a motion for extension of time with this Court within 15 days

after the deadline for filing the notice of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.3; Verburgt v. Dorner,

959 S.W.2d 615, 617-18 (Tex. 1997) (“[O]nce the period for granting a motion for extension of time
under Rule 41(a)(2) [now Rule 26.3] has passed, a party can no longer invoke the appellate court’s

jurisdiction.”). Headifen’s August 28, 2015 notice of appeal is untimely, and we therefore lack

jurisdiction over this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b) (providing that filing notice of appeal

invokes appellate court’s jurisdiction), id. R. 2 (establishing that appellate court may not alter time

for perfecting appeal in civil case).

Upon review of the trial-court clerk’s record, the Clerk of this Court sent Headifen

a letter informing him that the Court appears to lack jurisdiction over the appeal for the reasons

stated above and requesting a response informing us of any basis that exists for jurisdiction. In

response, Headifen asserted that he set his motion for new trial for hearing on the earliest date that

the trial court allowed and that he would have immediately filed his appeal if his motion for new trial

had been denied sooner. The date that the motion for new trial is heard or decided has no bearing

on the deadline for filing a notice of appeal. Once the motion is filed, the only date that matters for

the purpose of the deadline for filing a notice of appeal is the date that the judgment was signed. See

id. R. 26.1(a)(1).

Accordingly, we grant Harker’s motion and dismiss the appeal for want of

jurisdiction. See id. R. 42.3(a).

__________________________________________

Cindy Olson Bourland, Justice

Before Justices Puryear, Goodwin, and Bourland

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: November 17, 2015

2
I

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3735

To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to reauthorize the Development

Fund for Africa under chapter 10 of part I of that Act.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 27, 1996

Mr. BEREUTER (for himself, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida,

Mr. HOUGHTON, Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey, and Mr. HASTINGS of Florida) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on International Relations

A BILL

To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to reauthorize

the Development Fund for Africa under chapter 10 of

part I of that Act.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. REAUTHORIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT FUND

4 FOR AFRICA.

5 Section 497 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

6 (22 U.S.C. 2294) is amended—

7 (1) by inserting after the section heading the

8 following:
2

•HR 3735 IH

1 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be ap2 propriated to carry out this chapter $539,300,000 for

3 each of the fiscal years 1997, 1998, and 1999.’’; and

4 (2) by striking ‘‘Funds appropriated’’ and in5 serting the following:

6 ‘‘(b) AVAILABILITY.—Funds appropriated’’.

Æ
111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1211 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 60 School Street, Orchard Park, New York, 

as the ‘‘Jack F. Kemp Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

†S 1211 ES

1 SECTION 1. JACK F. KEMP POST OFFICE BUILDING. 

2 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

3 Postal Service located at 60 School Street, Orchard Park, 

4 New York, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Jack 

5 F. Kemp Post Office Building’’. 

6 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg7 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

8 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

9 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Jack F. Kemp Post 

10 Office Building’’. 

Passed the Senate August 4, 2009. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1211 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postfice Building’’. Park, New York, as the ‘‘Jack F. Kemp Post Of- al Service located at 60 School Street, Orchard
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order
Lansing, Michigan

March 29, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice 129506 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 129506 COA: 244066 Wayne CC: 01-010970 NATHAN JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, th e application for leave to appeal the Ju ly 26, 2005 judgment of the Court of Appeals is cons idered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

C AVANAGH and K ELLY , JJ., would grant leave to appeal.

p0322 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 29, 2006

Clerk
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Sept. 29, 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 09-10837

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 08-00392-CR-T-26-TBM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

REGINALD BUCHANAN

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

for the Middle District of Florida

_________________________

(September 29, 2009)

Before BIRCH, HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:

Adam Tanenbaum, appointed counsel for Reginald Buchanan in this direct

criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant,
because, in his opinion, the appeal is without merit. Counsel has filed a brief

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493

(1967).

Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment

of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the

entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is

GRANTED, and Buchanan’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.

2
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

March 24, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

135287 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 135287 

 COA: 280449 

Wayne CC: 06-012436-01

06-012437 

JAMES WILLIAM VARNER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 10, 2007 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

s0317 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

March 24, 2008 

 Clerk
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

VICTOR ROSS,

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

____________________ 

2011-7025 

______________________

 

 Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 09-963, Judge Alan G. Lance, Sr. 

______________________ 

JUDGMENT 

______________________ 

MATTHEW J. DOWD, Wiley Rein LLP, of Washington, 

DC, argued for the claimant-appellant. With him on the 

brief were ROBERT J. SCHEFFEL and ADRIENNE JOHNSON. 

RENEE A. GERBER, Attorney, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondentappellee. With her on the brief were TONY WEST, 

Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, 

Director, and KIRK T. MANHARDT, Assistant Director. Of 

counsel on the brief was JONATHAN TAYLOR, Attorney, 

United States Department of Veterans Affairs, of 

Washington, DC. 

______________________ 
THIS CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED: 

 PER CURIAM (LINN, DYK, and PROST, Circuit Judges). 

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36. 

 ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

 January 18, 2012 /s/ Jan Horbaly

 Date Jan Horbaly 

 Clerk
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 131 (Monday, July 8, 1996)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 35705]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-17024]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR PART 425

[FRL-5530-7]
RIN 2040-AC48


Leather Tanning and Finishing Effluent Limitations Guidelines 
Pretreatment Standards New and Existing Sources

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Proposed regulation.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: EPA is proposing to modify the pretreatment standards for 
existing and new sources applicable to certain facilities in the 
leather tanning and finishing point source category that conduct 
unhairing operations and that discharge process wastewater to publicly 
owned treatment works (``POTW''). In the final rules section of this 
Federal Register, EPA is promulgating these changes as a ``direct'' 
final rule because the Agency does not expect significant adverse or 
critical comments. EPA also wants to provide prompt implementation of 
the rule to minimize any potential hazards to worker safety and health 
that may occur in the absence of this rule.

DATES: Comments on the proposed rules must be received by September 6, 
1996.

ADDRESSES: Send comments in triplicate on this proposal to Mr. Ed 
Terry, Engineering and Analysis Division (4303), U.S. EPA, 401 M St. 
S.W., Washington, DC 20460.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Ed Terry, Engineering and Analysis 
Division (4303), U.S. EPA, 401 M St., S.W., Washington, DC 20460, or 
telephone 202-260-7128.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: See the information provided in the direct 
final action which is located in the rules section of this Federal 
Register.

List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 425

    Leather, leather tanning and finishing, water pollution control, 
wastewater treatment and disposal, pretreatment standards for existing 
and new sources.

    Dated: June 26, 1996.
Carol M. Browner,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 96-17024 Filed 7-5-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.4


                    CHASE MANHATTAN MARINE OWNER TRUST 1997-A
                           ANNUAL ISSUER'S CERTIFICATE

                            COMPLIANCE WITH INDENTURE

         The undersigned certifies that he is an Authorized Officer of
Wilmington Trust Company, as Owner Trustee for Chase Manhattan Marine Owner
Trust 1997-A and that he is duly authorized to execute and deliver this
certificate on behalf of the Issuer in connection with Section 3.9 of the
Indenture between the Issuer and Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A. formerly
Norwest Bank Minnesota, National Association, as Indenture Trustee, dated as of
October 1, 1997 (the "Indenture"). All capitalized terms used herein without
definition shall have the respective meanings specified in the Indenture and the
Agreement.

         The undersigned further certifies that a review of the activities of
the Issuer for the preceding calendar year has been made under his supervision,
and to the best of his knowledge, the Issuer has fulfilled its obligations under
the Indenture for the 2003 calendar year.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed hereto my signature as of
this 30th day of March 2004.

                                      CHASE MANHATTAN MARINE
                                      OWNER TRUST 1997-A
                                      BY: WILMINGTON TRUST
                                      COMPANY, as Owner Trustee


                                      s/ Linda C. Mack
                                      Name:  Linda C. Mack
                                      Title: Financial Services Officer

The CIT Group/Sales Financing, Inc., as Servicer, hereby requests that
Wilmington Trust Company execute the above Issuer's Certificate and deliver it
to Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A., as Indenture Trustee.

                                      THE CIT GROUP/SALES
                                      FINANCING, INC., as Servicer


                                            /s/ William L. Schumm
                                      -------------------------------
                                      Name:  William L. Schumm
                                      Title: Executive Vice President
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1182 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1182

 To amend the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 to eliminate the 
     offset in per country numerical level required under that Act.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              June 4, 2009

Mrs. Gillibrand introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 to eliminate the 
     offset in per country numerical level required under that Act.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ELIMINATION OF OFFSET IN PER COUNTRY NUMERICAL LEVEL.

    Section 2 of the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 (8 U.S.C. 
1255 note) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``subsection (e)'' and 
        inserting ``subsection (d)'';
            (2) by striking subsection (d); and
            (3) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (d).
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. Section 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Amended Quarterly Report ofSino Charter Inc.(the "Company") on Form 10-QSB/A-1 for the period ended February 28, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date here of (the "report"), I, Bradley W. Miller, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |    
| | (2) | The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| |    

Dated this 12thday of December, 2007.

BRADLEY W. MILLERBradley W. MillerChief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer








































---
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

_____________________________ 

KRISTOFFER CORNELIUS, Case No: 2:09-cv-10254 

 Hon: Paul D. Borman 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. 

SHERIFF BOB BEZOTTE, 

COUNTY OF LIVINGSTON, a municipal entity and 

DEPUTY SHERIFF DAVID KLEIN,

In his individual capacity, 

 Defendants, 

_________________________________________________________________________/ 

KENNETH D. FINEGOOD P36170 

KENNETH D. FINEGOOD, P.L.C. 

Attorney for Plaintiff 

29566 Northwestern Hwy, Suite 120 

Southfield, MI 48034 

248-351-0608 

THOMAS A. MATTHEWS (P28414) 

Attorney for Def. Klein, only 

2000 Grand River Annex 

Suite 200 

Brighton, MI 48114 

810 227 7878 

ANN McCLOREY McLAUGHLIN (P40455) 

CUMMINGS, McCLOREY, DAVIS, & 

ACHO, P.L.C. 

Attorneys for County of Livingston and Sheriff 

Bezotte, only 

33900 Schoolcraft 

Livonia, MI 48150 

734-261-2400 

_________________________________________________________________________/ 

REPLY TO AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF DEFENDANT KLEIN

 

NOW COMES plaintiff, KRISTOFFER CORNELIUS, by and through his attorney, 

Law Office of Kenneth D. Finegood, P.L.C., by Kenneth D. Finegood and in reply to 

Affirmative Defenses filed by the defendant, Deputy Sheriff David Klein, hereby denies any and 

all affirmative defenses set forth therein for the reason that same are untrue. 

2:09-cv-10254-PDB-VMM Doc # 16 Filed 03/20/09 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 58
S/ Kenneth D. Finegood 

 Kenneth D. Finegood, P.L.C. 

 Attorney for Plaintiff 

 29566 Northwestern Hwy Ste 120 

 Southfield, MI 48034 

 248-351-0608 

 KDFesq44@AOL.com 

 (P36170) 

Dated: March 20, 2009 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on March 20, 2009, I electronically filed this certificate of service regarding 

service of PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF DEFENDANT DEPUTY 

SHERIFF DAVID KLEIN with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system which will send 

notification of such filing to the following: 

ANN McCLOREY McLAUGHLIN 

CUMMINGS, McCLOREY, DAVIS, & ACHO, P.L.C. 

Attorneys for County of Livingston and Sheriff 

Bezotte, only 

33900 Schoolcraft 

Livonia, MI 48150 

734-261-2400 

amclaughlin@cmda-law.com

(P40455) 

Thomas A. Matthews 

Attorney for Def. Klein 

2000 Grand River Annex 

Suite 200 

Brighton, MI 48114 

810 227 7878 

tmatthew@aol.com

(P28414) 

S/ Kenneth D. Finegood 

 Kenneth D. Finegood, P.L.C. 

 29566 Northwestern Hwy Ste 120 

 Southfield, MI 48034 

 248-351-0608 

 KDFesq44@AOL.com 

 (P36170) 

2:09-cv-10254-PDB-VMM Doc # 16 Filed 03/20/09 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 59
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JULY 23, 2014

NO. 03-12-00721-CV

Raymond K. Oukrop, DDS, P.C., Appellant

v.

Ronald Wayne Tatsch, Appellee

APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, ROSE, AND GOODWIN

AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSE

This is an appeal from the judgment signed by the trial court on September 20, 2012. Having 

reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error 

in the trial court’s judgment. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment. The 

appellant shall pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and the court below.
#### Wendy CHURITCH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 05-93-00295-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Nov. 14, 1994.

Keith Jagmin, Dallas, for appellant.

Pamela Sullivan Berdanier, Dallas, for ap-pellee.

Before LAGARDE, CHAPMAN and MORRIS, JJ.

OPINION

LAGARDE, Justice.

Appellant Wendy Churitch appeals her conviction for the promotion of obscene material. The trial court found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at five days in jail and a $1500 fine. Appellant brings one point of error contending that the trial court erred in denying her motion to declare unconstitutional sections 43.21 and 43.23 of the Texas Penal Code. We overrule appellant’s point of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

TEXAS PENAL CODE SECTIONS 43.21 & 43.23

Appellant argues that sections 43.21 and 43.23 of the Texas Penal Code violate article one, section eight of the Texas Constitution. She acknowledges that these sections have historically been held constitutional in the face of claims that the obscenity statutes violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. *See West v. State,*514 S.W.2d 433, 438 (Tex.Crim.App.1974); *McMahon v. State,*630 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, pet ref'd), *overruled on other grounds, Davis v. State,*658 S.W.2d 572, 580 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); *cf. Rent v. State,*771 S.W.2d 723, 730 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989) (legislature can regulate obscenity without violating First Amendment), aff*'d,*838 S.W.2d 548 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (op. on reh’g). The court of criminal appeals has expressly declined to set a different standard for reviewing obscenity laws under article one, section eight of the Texas Constitution, even though it has the power to do so. *See Andrews v. State,*652 S.W.2d 370, 383 (Tex.Crim.App.1983).

Appellant urges this Court to conduct a separate analysis under article one, section eight of the Texas Constitution. *See Davenport v. Garcia,*834 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.1992). This Court may not apply a separate test in criminal cases that is in conflict with the pronouncements of the court of criminal appeals. *See Abdnor v. Ovard,*653 S.W.2d 793, 793 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (orig. proceeding). Thus, we decline appellant’s invitation to conduct a separate analysis under article one, section eight of the Texas Constitution. We overrule appellant’s point of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.