Present: All the Justices 

PAUL PATTERSON 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 981185 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

April 16, 1999 

DANA BRUCE PATTERSON, EXECUTOR 

OF THE ESTATE OF ERNESTINE 

PATTERSON, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 

Arthur W. Sinclair, Judge Designate 

In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court 

properly determined that a certificate of deposit registered in 

the joint names of a husband and wife with right of survivorship 

was the sole property of the wife and, upon her death, became 

part of her estate. 

BACKGROUND

On May 1, 1995, nineteen days before her death, Ernestine 

J. Patterson was informed by her husband, Paul Patterson, that 

he had found a bank in Richmond that was paying a higher 

interest rate than she was currently receiving on money she had 

on deposit with Crestar Bank in Charlottesville. Ernestine 

Patterson, accompanied by her daughter Carolyn Dale Patterson, 

went to Crestar Bank and endorsed for payment a $100,000 

certificate of deposit (the Crestar certificate) registered in 

her name alone. Crestar Bank issued a cashier’s check payable 

to Ernestine Patterson in the face amount of the certificate. 

Ernestine Patterson endorsed this check and permitted Paul 
Patterson to take the check to Citizens Federal Bank in 

Richmond. 

On that same day, Paul Patterson deposited the funds in 

Citizens Federal Bank and obtained a $100,000 certificate of 

deposit (the Citizens Federal certificate) titled “*PAUL 

PATTERSON OR ERNESTINE PATTERSON JTWROS*.” Ernestine Patterson 

never signed a signature card or otherwise ratified the creation 

of a joint interest in the Citizens Federal certificate. 

Ernestine Patterson died testate on May 20, 1995. By her 

will, she devised her separate real property to Carolyn 

Patterson and Dana Bruce Patterson, her son. The residue of her 

estate was divided and distributed two-thirds to Janet P. 

Steppe, another daughter, and one-third to Paul Patterson. Dana 

Patterson qualified as executor of his mother’s estate on May 

23, 1995. 

This suit originated as a bill of complaint filed by Paul 

Patterson on November 27, 1995, seeking an accounting of his 

deceased wife’s augmented estate in order to determine his 

elective spousal share of that estate. Code § 64.1-16.1. The 

bill of complaint named Paul and Ernestine Patterson’s three 

children as respondents; however, only Dana Patterson and Janet 

Steppe (hereafter, the respondents) entered appearances. In 

addition to their answer, the respondents filed a cross-bill on 

behalf of the estate seeking return of the $100,000 proceeds 

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from the Crestar certificate plus the accrued interest, 

asserting that the transfer of these funds to the Citizens 

Federal certificate was the result of undue influence and 

coercion by their father. In the alternative, they contended 

that the transfer did not constitute a valid gift. 

On May 14, 1997, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss 

the bill of complaint asserting that a prior order extending the 

time in which Paul Patterson could make an election to take a 

spousal share had not been timely entered. The trial court 

sustained the motion and dismissed the bill of complaint with 

prejudice.1 The cross-bill remained pending on the trial court’s 

docket. 

On August 11, 1997, the trial court held a hearing on the 

cross-bill. At that hearing, Carolyn Patterson testified about 

the extended estrangement between Paul Patterson and the 

Pattersons’ children. She further testified that her mother had 

been in poor health and had suffered from Parkinson’s disease, 

cancer, and glaucoma. These infirmities interfered with 

Ernestine Patterson’s ability to transact her affairs, so that 

Carolyn Patterson had to assist her mother in paying bills and 

writing letters. 

 

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Paul Patterson has not assigned error to this aspect of the 

trial court’s judgment. 

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Carolyn Patterson further testified that on May 1, 1995, 

her father told her to drive her mother to a branch of Crestar 

Bank where they would meet him to transact some business. On 

the way to the bank, Ernestine Patterson told her daughter “to 

‘watch and see what [I] sign[].’” When they arrived at Crestar 

Bank, Paul Patterson met them in the parking lot and had 

Ernestine Patterson endorse the Crestar certificate, which he 

then took into the bank. A short time later he returned with 

the cashier’s check for the proceeds, which Ernestine Patterson 

also endorsed. Paul Patterson then left in his own vehicle, and 

Carolyn Patterson drove her mother home. 

Dana Patterson testified that his mother’s parents had 

transferred real property to his mother during their lifetimes 

as her separate estate. He further testified that she had 

received monetary inheritances from her parents upon their 

deaths. Neither Dana Patterson nor Paul Patterson was able to 

testify about the amount of these inheritances. 

Mary Catherine Wheeler, a friend and former co-worker of 

Ernestine Patterson’s, testified that “Ernestine was afraid of 

Paul. She also loved him very much.” Shortly before her death, 

Ernestine Patterson told Wheeler “that she wanted her property 

to go to her children and that she had a certificate and she 

wanted her children to have that.” Wheeler further testified 

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that Ernestine Patterson told Wheeler that “Paul had forced her 

to go to the bank and sign the certificate over to him.” 

Paul Patterson testified that he and his wife maintained 

separate checking accounts and divided responsibility for their 

living expenses. He further testified that he controlled the 

couple’s investments and that he would “invest a hundred 

thousand dollars ($100,000) in my name and then I would put 

money in Ernestine’s name in the same institution . . . [s]o 

that they would be insured” up to the maximum FDIC insurance on 

each account. He conceded that Ernestine Patterson had 

inherited money, in addition to real estate, from her parents 

and testified that “I have no idea” of the amount involved. 

Regarding the May 1, 1995 transactions, Paul Patterson 

testified that on the prior evening when the couple was alone 

Ernestine Patterson “told me [that] I might as well get [the 

Crestar certificate] and put it in my own name.” He further 

testified that he “would not take Ernestine’s name off” a new 

certificate of deposit, so he used the proceeds of the Crestar 

certificate to obtain the Citizens Federal certificate in their 

names jointly with right of survivorship. 

In an opinion letter dated February 3, 1998, the trial 

court reiterated a prior ruling, which had not to that point 

been incorporated into the record, that there was insufficient 

evidence to prove that Paul Patterson had obtained the Citizens 

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Federal certificate from Ernestine Patterson through undue 

influence, coercion, or duress. The trial court further found, 

however, that Paul Patterson’s own evidence established that the 

Crestar certificate was his wife’s sole property. That being 

so, the trial court concluded that “Mrs. Patterson endorsed the 

[Crestar] certificate for the sole purpose of permitting her 

husband to reinvest the proceeds for a better yield and that no 

gift was involved.” Accordingly, in the final order, 

incorporating by reference the reasoning of its opinion letter, 

the trial court entered judgment for the respondents and awarded 

$100,000 plus the accrued interest from the Citizens Federal 

certificate to the estate. We awarded Paul Patterson this 

appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Paul Patterson first maintains that the trial court erred 

in finding that the Crestar certificate of deposit was Ernestine 

Patterson’s sole property. Rather, he asserts that the evidence 

supports his contention that the certificate was a marital asset 

and that Ernestine Patterson was merely a “nominal holder.” 

Swan v. Swan’s Ex’r, 136 Va. 496, 519, 117 S.E. 858, 865 (1923). 

We disagree. 

Although the burden was on the respondents to show that the 

funds originally deposited in Ernestine Patterson’s name in 

Crestar Bank were her sole property, the trial court looked 

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principally to Paul Patterson’s own testimony to establish that 

fact. Specifically, the trial court found his testimony that 

his wife told him that she wanted him to have the money on 

deposit at Crestar Bank “leaves no doubt as to the ownership of 

the Crestar certificate.” “No litigant can successfully ask a 

court or jury to believe that he has not told the truth. His 

statements of fact and the necessary inferences therefrom are 

binding upon him.” Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 462, 114 

S.E. 652, 656 (1922). Thus, while Paul Patterson may have 

sought to establish that his wife was merely a nominal holder of 

a marital asset, his case cannot rise above his own testimony 

that the Crestar certificate was solely subject to the control 

and wishes of his wife. This evidence, in conjunction with the 

evidence presented by the respondents, supports the trial 

court’s determination that the Crestar certificate was Ernestine 

Patterson’s sole property. 

Paul Patterson next contends that Code § 6.1-125.5 mandates 

reversal of the trial court’s decision because under that 

statute “[s]ums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to 

a joint account belong to the surviving party or parties as 

against the estate of the decedent unless there is clear and 

convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the 

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account is created.”2 He further cites Code § 6.1-125.3 which 

provides that “a joint account between persons married to each 

other shall belong to them equally . . . unless . . . there is 

clear and convincing evidence of a different intent.” Relying 

on these statutory provisions, he argues that in the absence of 

clear and convincing evidence to the contrary he is entitled to 

a presumption that his wife intended the Citizens Federal 

certificate to belong to him at her death. He argues that 

because the trial court found no undue influence, coercion, or 

duress, there necessarily was no clear and convincing evidence 

that his wife did not intend for the certificate to belong 

solely to him at her death. 

Paul Patterson’s reliance upon these statutes is misplaced. 

These statutes, and particularly the presumption they provide 

which he seeks to assert here, are not applicable under the 

facts of this case because there is no evidence in the record 

that Ernestine Patterson was ever aware of the nature of the 

Citizens Federal certificate. She did not sign a signature card 

or otherwise ratify the creation of a joint interest in this 

certificate. Moreover, there is simply no evidence in the 

record that Ernestine Patterson was aware of the existence of 

 

2

Code § 6.1-125.1(1) provides that “‘Account’ means a 

contract of deposit of funds between a depositor and a financial 

institution, and includes a . . . certificate of deposit.” 

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this certificate even though the proceeds of her Crestar 

certificate were used to create it. Thus, the dispositive issue 

before the trial court was whether Ernestine Patterson made a 

gift of all or part of her Crestar certificate to her husband. 

Absent such a gift, Paul Patterson has no right to the Citizens 

Federal certificate. 

The elements necessary to make a gift inter vivos of 

personal property are well established. See generally Taylor v. 

Smith, 199 Va. 871, 874, 102 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1958). Here, the 

critical issue in dispute, whether Ernestine Patterson intended 

to make a gift to her husband, was one of fact to be determined 

by the trial court. In such instances, great deference is 

accorded a trial court’s factual findings. This is so because 

the judge, as fact finder, sees and hears the witnesses and, 

therefore, is better able to determine their credibility and 

weigh their testimony. Tuomala v. Regent University, 252 Va. 

368, 375, 477 S.E.2d 501, 505-06 (1996). Accordingly, we hold 

that the trial court’s determination that Ernestine Patterson 

did not intend to make a gift to her husband when she endorsed 

for payment the check representing the proceeds from her Crestar 

certificate is not plainly wrong or without adequate evidence to 

support it and, thus, will not be disturbed on appeal. Code 

§ 8.01-680; Tauber v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 445, 452, 499 S.E.2d 

839, 843 (1998). 

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CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 

court awarding $100,000 plus accrued interest to the estate. 

Affirmed. 

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