United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted October 20, 2021 

Decided October 20, 2021 

Before 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge 

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

Nos. 20-3219 & 20-3311 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JAMAR JONES, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeals from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Indiana, 

Evansville Division. 

Nos. 3:17CR00002-001 & 3:13CR00004-001 

Richard L. Young, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Jamar Jones pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, 21 

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, while on supervised release for another drug conviction, 

see id. § 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced Jones to 240 months’ imprisonment for 

the conspiracy conviction (case number 17-cr-02) and a consecutive 24-month sentence 

upon revocation of Jones’s supervised release for the earlier drug conviction (case 

number 13-cr-04). Jones appeals both judgments. His appointed counsel asserts that all 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
Nos. 20-3219 & 20-3311 Page 2 

arguments in both cases would be frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We agree with counsel and therefore grant both 

motions to withdraw and dismiss the appeals. 

Jones does not have an unqualified constitutional right to counsel when 

appealing a revocation order, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789–91 (1983), so the 

Anders safeguards need not govern our review. Nonetheless our practice is to follow 

them. See United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). Counsel’s brief 

explains the nature of the case and addresses potential issues that an appeal like this 

would be expected to involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, we limit 

our review to the subjects that she discusses and that Jones raises in his response under 

Circuit Rule 51(b). See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Counsel first considers whether Jones could challenge the validity of his guilty 

plea for his conviction in case number 17-cr-02 and appropriately concludes that he 

could not. The transcript of the colloquy reflects that the district court substantially 

complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. See United States v. Blalock, 

321 F.3d 686, 688–89 (7th Cir. 2003). The court determined that Jones understood the 

charges against him, the trial and appeal rights that he was waiving, the maximum 

penalties, and the role of the Sentencing Guidelines. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1). The court 

further ensured that Jones’s plea was supported by an adequate factual basis and made 

voluntarily. See id. at 11(b)(2)–(3). Jones, for his part, argued at the sentencing hearing 

that the prosecutor ”forced his hand” by threatening not to withdraw the government’s 

information under 21 U.S.C. § 851 (proposing to increase Jones’s statutory minimum 

sentence from 10 to 15 years) if he did not sign the plea agreement. But, as counsel 

points out, a prosecutor’s offer of leniency in exchange for a guilty plea is not coercive if 

a defendant—like Jones—is subject to increased punishment based on his prior drug 

conviction. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); 

United States v. Spilmon, 454 F.3d 657, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Counsel and Jones both consider whether Jones could challenge the denial of his 

motion to withdraw his plea on grounds of innocence—that he had not participated in a 

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Jones maintains that all he did was agree to 

deliver a box of what he believed was marijuana (but what turned out to be 

methamphetamine). Counsel rightly concludes, however, that this challenge would be 

frivolous because Jones’s denial of guilt contradicted his earlier testimony at the 

change-of-plea hearing and therefore did not meet the standard of a “fair and just” 

reason to withdraw his plea. United States v. Collins, 796 F.3d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 2015) 
Nos. 20-3219 & 20-3311 Page 3 

(internal citations omitted). In that testimony, Jones admitted under oath that he “was a 

leader and supervisor of the conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to 

distribute methamphetamine,” that he obtained methamphetamine from “sources of 

supply in Arizona and Georgia” and that he distributed “pound quantities of 

methamphetamine in the southwestern Indiana area to mid-level distributors.” Even 

though Jones denied knowledge of delivering methamphetamine in one instance, these 

sworn admissions support the district court’s finding that he was not innocent of a 

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. 

Counsel next considers whether Jones could challenge his sentence on the 

conspiracy conviction but rightly concludes that his appeal waiver would foreclose any 

challenge. In his plea agreement, Jones expressly waived his right to appeal “all 

provisions of the guilty plea and sentenced imposed, including the length and 

conditions [of] supervised release.” An appeal waiver stands or falls with the 

underlying guilty plea. United States v. Nulf, 978 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 2020). As 

discussed above, Jones’s plea was valid, so his appeal waiver was also valid. Counsel 

also correctly rejects any argument that an exception to the waiver could apply. Jones’s 

240-month sentence was less than the statutory maximum of life imprisonment, 21 

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), and the court did not consider any constitutionally impermissible 

factors at sentencing. 

Counsel also considers challenging the district court’s authority to revoke Jones’s 

supervised release (in case number 13-cr-04), which was set to expire several months 

before the revocation hearing. But counsel properly regards this argument as frivolous 

because an ongoing term of supervised release is tolled by pretrial detention longer 

than 30 days that is later credited as time served for a new conviction, and nothing in 

the record suggests that Jones was not credited for that period of pretrial detention after 

his March 2017 arrest. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b); Mont v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1826, 

1832–33 (2019). 

Counsel also asks whether Jones could challenge the revocation of his supervised 

release, and correctly concludes that doing so would be frivolous. The court reasonably 

found that Jones violated his supervised release condition of not committing “another 

federal, state, or local crime” based on his guilty plea to conspiring to distribute 

methamphetamine. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), (e)(3); United States v. Flagg, 481 F.3d 946, 

948–49 (7th Cir. 2007) (admission of a supervised release violation satisfied the 

preponderance-of-the-evidence requirement). 
Nos. 20-3219 & 20-3311 Page 4 

Further, counsel considers whether Jones could challenge the length of his 

sentence, and rightly concludes that he could not. The court correctly calculated a range 

of 24 to 30 months’ imprisonment under the Guidelines’ Chapter Seven policy 

statements, based on Jones’s criminal history category (Category IV), and grade of 

violation (Grade A). U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4. Jones’s 24-month sentence falls within the policystatement range, so we may presume it to be reasonable. United States v. Wehrle, 

985 F.3d 549, 557 (7th Cir. 2021). Nothing in the record rebuts that presumption. The 

court properly addressed the applicable factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), alluding to 

the seriousness of Jones’s drug offenses and the need to promote respect for the law 

(“His conduct here in the courtroom today indicates that he has no remorse and does 

not understand the seriousness of these offenses”), the need to protect the public from 

Jones’s potential repeat offenses (“An additional 24 months will protect the public from 

further crimes of the defendant”), and the beneficial effect of vocational training and 

substance-abuse treatment for Jones (“I do believe the defendant is at risk of committing 

further crimes unless he learns a skill or a trade or vocation and has continued 

substance-abuse treatment”). 

Finally, counsel correctly concludes that an argument based on ineffective 

assistance of counsel would be frivolous. Such claims generally should be reserved for 

collateral review, at which point the defendant may develop a full record. See Massaro v. 

United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003). 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED and the appeal is DISMISSED.