RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3414- 22 I.O., Defendant-Appellant,

v. S.A.B., Plaintiff-Respondent.

_______________________

Argued July 9, 2024

– Decided Ju ly 16, 2024 Before Judges Smith and Paganelli. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County, Docket No. FV- 11

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- 23. Janine Danks Fox argued the cause for appellant (Szaferman, Lakind, Blumstein & Blader, P.C., attorneys; Janine Danks Fox of counsel and on the briefs). Scott Alan Krasny argued the cause for respondent (Furlong & Krasny attorneys; Scott Alan Krasny on th e brief).
PER CURIAM NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 3414

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Defendant S.A.B. 1 appeals the trial court's entry of a final restrai ning order (FRO) issued against her in an action brought by pl aintiff I.O. under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (the Act), N.J. S.A. 2C:25- 17 to -35. She contends the trial court erred when it: failed to consider certain facts in the record probative on the issue of I.O.'s credibility ; found that S.A.B.'s phone calls to I.O. and his mother, and a social media posting, constituted predicate acts under the Act; and found that S.A.B. committed prio r acts of domestic violence against I.O. We affirm

. The parties were married on February 20, 2011. Two children were born of the marriage: they are currently nine and seven y ears old. Prior to and during the divorce action the parties filed multiple domestic violence complaint s against each other. The complaints resulted in vol untary dismissals, except for one matter, which the parties resolved by agreeing to a consent order establishing civil restraints. On July 25, 2022, the trial court entered a final j udgment of divorce (FJOD)

. Shortly after entry of the FJOD, I.O. obtained a t emporary restraining order (TRO) against S.A.B. on August 26, 2022

. In his complaint, I.O. alleged , among other things, that S.A.B. called him on Augus t 17, 2022, and told him

1 To protect privacy interests, we use initials pur suant to Rule 1:38 -3(d).3 A- 3414

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that she would : "ruin [his] mother's life"; that she "would dig up something about his father"; and that she had enough cash on hand to "make trouble for [I.O.]." I.O. amended his complaint on September 1 , 2022. He alleged S.A.B. called his mother, G.Z., with a purpose to harass by disparagi ng him. I.O. also alleged S.A.B. contacted his grandmother with a pur pose to cause alarm by telling his grandmother that I.O. was physically violent towar ds S.A.B. The FRO hearing took place on May 10, 2023. Th re e witnesses testified: plaintiff, his mother G.Z., and defendant. In an oral decision, the court found: I.O. was credible overall , including his testimony about S.A.B.'s prior acts o f domestic violence; I.O.'s explanation for why he le ft out of his complaint S.A.B.'s demand that he "leave [her] alone" was " not believable"; and I.O. never saw his mother or grandmother's reactions to S.A.B. 's phone calls. The court also found G.Z. credible. The court next found S.A .B. admitted to the telephone calls, and to making a Facebook post referencing I. O. , his girlfriend, and her children. The court found no material dispute between the par ties concerning the August 17 phone call. The court found that S.A.B.'s separate call to plai ntiff's grandmother did not rise to a predicate act, but re jected S.A.B.'s "blanket" denials of her prior acts of domestic violence agai nst I.O.4 A- 3414

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The trial court found the civil restraints were not dispositive on the question of whether I.O. proved the predicate act o f harassment

. Instead, the court cited paragraph 1.1 of the FJOD, which stated in pertinent part, "Each party agrees not to trouble the other." The court found S.A.B.'s phone calls to I.O. and G.Z. were violations of paragraph 1.1 of the FJOD. The court further found that S.A.B. showed an intent

to "a larm, annoy, or intimidate " in her calls to both victims. The court rejected, as not supported by a preponderance of credible evi dence, S.B's argument that she called I.O. out of frustration to prevent him f rom harassing her. The court next addressed S.A.B.'s Facebook posting: The [FJOD] permits and encourages communication between the parties that impacts the general welfar e of the children. Instead of contact[ing] [I.O.] direc tly about her questions concerning his new girlfriend a nd [her] kids . . . [and] access to the parties' children, she chose to make a social media post, . . . to reach t hem directly under circumstances known to her that the type of communication would be harassing to [I.O.]. The trial court issued the FRO, finding that I.O. h ad proven the predicate act of harassment as to two of the phone calls and the Facebook posting, and had also proven S.A.B.'s prior history of domestic viol ence . The court also made5 A- 3414

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Silver 2 prong two findings, determining that an FRO was ne eded to prevent further harassment. S.A.B. appealed. 3 "In [appellate] review of a trial court's order ent ered following trial in a domestic violence matter, we grant substantial defe rence to the trial court's findings of fact and the legal conclusions based up on those findings." J.D. v. A.M.W., 475 N.J. Super. 306, 312- 31 3 (App. Div. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 596 (Ap p. Div. 2013)). "We defer to the credibility determinations made by the trial court because the trial judge 'hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, a nd hears them testify,' affording it 'a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a witness.'" Id. at 31 3 (quoting Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) ). "We also recognize because of 'the family courts' s pecial jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate courts shoul d accord deference to family court factfinding.'" Ibid. (quoting Cesare v. Cesa re, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998))

. "However, we do not defer to the judge's legal conc lusions if 'based upon a

2 Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006)

3 After S. A. B. perfected her appeal, on September 26, 2023 we granted her motion to supplement the record, subject to our con sideration of the relevance and weight, if any, to be given to the supplemental material.6 A- 3414

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misunderstanding of . . . applicable legal principl es. '" Ibid. (quoting T.M.S. v. W.C.P., 450 N.J. Super. 499, 502 (App. Div. 2017)). We conclude S.A.B.'s arguments are without merit, a nd we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the coge nt oral opinion of Judge Lawrence P. DeBello. We add the following brief co mments. We defer to the findings of the trial court on witn ess credibility and facts supported by the record. Ibid. Given this well-settled principle, we are

un persuaded by S.A.B.'s argument that the trial court failed to consider the record concerning I.O's credibility. The record sh ows the opposite. Judge DeBello found I.O. not credible on a single issue, the reasons for his omission of S.A.B.'s "leave me alone" statement from the dom estic violence complaint. However, the judge found I.O. generally credible wh en considering his overall testimony. Next, we defer to Judge DeBello's findi ng that S.A.B. committed three predicate acts of harassment, and his finding that sh e committed prior acts of domestic violence against I.O. The record conta ins ample credible evidence to support the judge's findings, and we discern no substantive basis to disturb them. Finally, we have considered the supplemental material submitted by S.A.B., and we conclude that it does not warrant re versal. Affirmed.