UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CHARLES BLUNT,

Petitioner, Case Number: 4:08-CV-14808

vs.

HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH

MARY BERGHUIS,

Respondent.

_______________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner Charles Blunt filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2254. Currently in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections, Petitioner challenges

his convictions for bank robbery, two counts of armed robbery, felon in possession of a firearm,

carrying a concealed weapon, second-degree fleeing a police officer, and possession of a firearm

during the commission of a felony, on the grounds that his convictions violate the Double

Jeopardy Clause and that he was denied his right to self-representation. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court denies the petition.

I. Facts

Petitioner’s convictions arise from a bank robbery at Citizen’s Bank in Livonia on

October 27, 2005. 

Pamela Persha testified that on October 27, 2005, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Petitioner

entered the bank. After making several inquiries about making a withdrawal, Petitioner

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approached Persha’s desk, took out a gun and told her that he would blow her co-worker’s “head

off” if he was not given the bank’s money. Persha did not have a key to any money drawers. 

The co-worker, Carrie Coqswell, opened the money drawers with her key and gave Petitioner

money. Coqswell placed bait money and a dye pack with the money she provided to Petitioner. 

Perhsa testified that Petitioner then went to her co-worker Gerri Kirkpatrick’s office and

took money from Kirkpatrick’s bank drawers. Kirkpatrick testified that Petitioner did not take

any of her personal money. 

Carrie Coqswell testified that Petitioner entered the bank on the day of the robbery,

approached her and Persha, pulled out a gun and demanded that she give him money. Coqswell

removed money from the desk drawer, together with a dye pack. Petitioner did not take any of

her personal money.

Michael Kingsbury testified that he is a police officer for the City of Livonia. On

October 27, 2005, he responded to a radio report that an off-duty lieutenant had seen a vehicle

that matched the description of the vehicle involved in the bank robbery. Officer Kingsbury

located the vehicle. He and several other marked police vehicles attempted to surround

Petitioner’s vehicle as it was proceeding down the road. Petitioner’s vehicle struck Officer

Kingsbury’s. Officer Kingsbury was able to see into Petitioner’s vehicle and identified

Petitioner as the driver. Officer Kingsbury and other officers continued to attempt to stop

Petitioner’s vehicle. Ultimately, Petitioner was involved in an accident, which resulted in his

vehicle landing on top of Officer Kingsbury’s vehicle. Petitioner climbed out of his vehicle and

fled on foot. Officer Kingsbury chased Petitioner and ultimately apprehended him. Officer

Kingsbury found money stuffed in Petitioner’s pants. Officer Kingsbury also found with

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Petitioner a dye pack and the bait money from Citizen’s Bank.

Petitioner testified in his own defense. He admitted using a gun to take money from a

bank, but denied taking any bank employees’ or customers’ personal money from them. 

II. Procedural History

Following a bench trial in Wayne County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of bank

robbery, two counts of armed robbery, felon in possession of a firearm, carrying a concealed

weapon, second-degree fleeing a police officer, and possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony.

Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals raising two issues: (i)

his convictions for both armed robbery and bank robbery constitute double jeopardy, and (ii) the

trial court violated his constitutional right to self-representation. The Michigan Court of Appeals

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. People v. Blunt, 2007 WL 2549867 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 6,

2007). Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, raising

the same two claims listed above. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People

v. Blunt, 743 N.W.2d 22 (Mich. 2008).

Petitioner then filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He raises the same

two claims raised in state court.

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Petitioner’s claims are reviewed against the standards established by the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA). The

AEDPA provides:

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An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless

the adjudication of the claim –

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceedings. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Section 2254(d)(1) limits habeas review to a determination of whether the state court’s

decision “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases] or .

. . confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme]

Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [this] precedent.” Mitchell v. Esparza,

540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted). This statute “does not

require citation of [Supreme Court] cases – indeed, it does not even require awareness of

[Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision

contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[W]hile the principles of ‘clearly

established law’ are to be determined solely by resort to Supreme Court rulings, the decisions of

lower federal courts may be instructive in assessing the reasonableness of a state court’s

resolution of an issue.” Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2007).

To satisfy the “unreasonable application” prong of the statute, “the state court’s decision

must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s application must have been

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‘objectively unreasonable.’” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (internal quotations

omitted). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief

so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 789 (Jan. 19, 2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541

U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). “Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against

extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error

correction through appeal. . . . As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a

state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal

court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended

in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-87 (internal

quotations omitted). Moreover, Section 2254(e)(1) requires that a federal habeas court presume

the correctness of state court factual determinations, rebuttable only with clear and convincing

evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998).

B. Double Jeopardy Claim

Petitioner argues that his convictions for both armed robbery and bank robbery arising

out of the same offense violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that a person may not “be

subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. Amend. V. 

This clause affords defendants protection against three basic harms: second prosecution for the

same offense after acquittal, second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and

multiple punishments for the same offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). 

“Because the substantive power to prescribe crimes and determine punishments is vested with

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the legislature, the question under the Double Jeopardy Clause whether punishments are

‘multiple’ is essentially one of legislative intent.” Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984)

(internal citations omitted). Where “a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment

under two statutes for the same conduct, regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the

‘same’ conduct. . . , a court’s task of statutory construction is at an end and the prosecutor may

seek and the trial court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a

single trial.” Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983). In determining whether the

legislature has intended to authorize cumulative punishments, the habeas court is “bound by a

state court’s determination of the legislature’s intent.” Banner v. Davis, 886 F.2d 777, 780 (6th

Cir. 1989).

The Michigan Court of Appeals has concluded that convictions for bank robbery and

armed robbery do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the legislature intended to

impose multiple punishments. People v. Ford, 687 N.W.2d 119, 128 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). 

“[B]ecause the armed robbery statute and the bank, safe, or vault robbery statute are intended to

protect different social norms, the statutes can generally be viewed as separate and amenable to

permitting multiple punishments.” Id. at 127 (internal quotations omitted).

The Michigan Court of Appeals found further support for the conclusion that the

legislature intended to impose multiple punishments in the legislative sentencing guidelines. 

Though both offenses are punishable by up to life in prison, armed robbery is a class A offense

and bank robbery a class C offense, resulting in a greater recommended sentence under the

guidelines for armed robbery than for bank robbery. Id. “This disparate sentencing treatment

supports the conclusion that the Legislature’s primary focus in the bank robbery statute was the

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type of property targeted by the offender rather than that the offense be committed by assaulting

a person.” Id. 

The Ford panel also held that the statutes satisfied the “same elements” test set forth in

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). In Blockburger, the Supreme Court held that

“where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the

test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each

provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Id. at 304. Applying Blockburger,

the Ford panel concluded: 

[A]rmed robbery lacks an element necessary to violate the

bank, safe, or vault robbery statute: the intent to steal

property from “any building, bank, safe, vault or other

depository of money, bonds, or other valuables.” 

Similarly, the offense of armed robbery contains elements

never required to prove bank, safe, or vault robbery: the use

of “a dangerous weapon, or any article used or fashioned in

a manner to lead the person so assaulted to reasonably

believe it to be a dangerous weapon” and the taking of

property from or in the presence of a person.

Ford, 687 N.W.2d at 128 (internal citations omitted). Based on the foregoing, the Ford panel

held that the Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated.

Accepting, as the Court must, the state court’s interpretation of legislative intent, the

Court finds that Petitioner’s convictions do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. As

evidenced by the decision in Ford, the Michigan courts have ruled that the Michigan Legislature

intended to impose multiple punishments where a defendant engages in conduct that amounts to

both bank robbery and armed robbery. In Petitioner’s appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals

faithfully applied the Ford decision, as well as the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

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Blockburger. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim for habeas relief based on double jeopardy must

be rejected. 

C. Right to Self-Representation

Second, Petitioner argues that his right to self-representation was violated because the

trial court denied his request to represent himself. 

The Sixth Amendment grants a criminal defendant the right to represent himself in

criminal proceedings. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). This right, however, is not

unqualified. First, the accused must “knowingly and intelligently” waive the right to counsel

and “be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record

will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes wide open.” Id. at

835 (internal quotation omitted). Second, the accused must be “able and willing to abide by

rules of procedure and courtroom protocol.” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984). 

Numerous cases confirm the right of self-representation may be overridden to protect the

integrity and efficacy of the legal process. “The right of self-representation is not a license to

abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of

procedural and substantive law.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46. Thus, “a trial court may

terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and

obstructionist misconduct.” Id. This dictum has been applied to deny the right of self

representation to disruptive defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Osuna, 232 F.3d 657,

665 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a trial court may refuse a defendant’s request to represent

himself when he is unable or unwilling to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol);

United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Faretta right to self8

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representation is not absolute, and the government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and

efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.”)

(internal quotation omitted); United States v. Brock, 159 F.3d 1077, 1079 (7th Cir. 1998) (“when

a defendant’s obstreperous behavior is so disruptive that the trial cannot move forward, it is

within the trial judge’s discretion to require the defendant to be represented by counsel”).

In response to Petitioner’s request to represent himself, the trial court engaged in a long

and thoughtful colloquy with Petitioner, following which the trial court held that Petitioner’s

request to represent himself was not intelligently made and would be unduly burdensome to the

court based upon Petitioner’s behavior. The trial court explained as follows:

Mr. Blunt has certainly expressed an interest in

representing himself, and I do think that it is curious that

there is no real strongly stated reason why. . . . I think

certainly it’s voluntarily made, but in terms of this request

being an intelligent waiver, I have very real concerns. I

mean in this particular case Mr. Blunt, who has a tenth

grade education, clearly just in the dialogue that we had

this morning did not seem to have a real grasp as to the

basis for evidence and under what circumstances the case

might be dismissed. 

He did not even seem to have a complete grasp on the

accurate notion of the plea offer and sentence agreement,

how that applied with regard to the guidelines with regard

to the total offer. And then also how it applied to the bank

robbery charge alone, there certainly was a serious

misapprehension. 

I also take into account for purposes of this analysis . . . I

have to consider whether or not it will disrupt, unduly

inconvenience, or burden the Court and the Court’s

business.

This is a matter in which Mr. Blunt initially had been sent

to the Forensic Center on a request by the defense, the

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request on the issue of competency. That did come back,

and it did in fact reflect a belief on the part of the Forensic

Center personnel that Mr. Blunt was malingering and that

he was in fact manufacturing particular false issues of

mental illness.

He also sort of manifested, I think, in terms of I remember

a Pretrial we had here where Mr. Blunt had requested the

Court’s assistance in requiring help. 

One of the witnesses he wanted to have in securing a

defense witness to testify on his behalf was Sadam

Hussein, and that to me is certainly consistent with the

notion of being burdensome to the Court and unduly

inconvenienced. 

And this morning we had a circumstance where as we were

preparing this matter for trial and getting this matter ready

for trial, Mr. Blunt had refused to initially change out into

civilian clothes and had come over here in jail greens, once

again delaying the matter causing a burden and taking a

while for his counsel and even I think my staff to try to talk

to Mr. Blunt and to try to persuade him that, you know,

when going to trial appearing in jail greens is not in his best

interest from a tactical standpoint. 

But once again it does cause a disruption to the orderly

progress of this particular case, and it would be an

inconvenience to all personnel involved.

. . . I’m going to deny the request to represent himself.

Tr., 7/25/06, at 14-17. 

The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s decision to deny Petitioner’s

request to represent himself did not violate Petitioner’s constitutional rights. The Michigan

Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly considered Petitioner’s behavior and how it

would impact the court proceedings. Petitioner’s history of being a malingerer, seeking to call

Saddam Hussein as a witness, and unfamiliarity with the rules of court proceedings, justified the

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denial of self-representation. 

Faretta does not require a trial court to grant a request for self-representation when that

self-representation is likely to be disruptive to ongoing proceedings. The charges in this case

were serious and Petitioner was neither highly-educated nor trained in the procedures of the

courtroom. Petitioner also exhibited disruptive behavior during the pre-trial process. Given

such circumstances, the Court finds that the state court’s decision that Petitioner’s right to selfrepresentation was not violated was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Faretta.

There is, therefore, no basis for habeas relief as to that claim.

IV. Certificate of Appealability

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not proceed unless a

certificate of appealability is issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Rule 11 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings now requires that the Court “must issue or deny a certificate of

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” 

A certificate of appealability may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). A petitioner must show

“that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should

have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal

citation omitted). In this case, the Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not debate the

conclusion that the petition has failed to establish any entitlement to habeas corpus relief. 

Therefore, the Court denies a certificate of appealability.

V. Conclusion

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For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

denied and the matter is dismissed with prejudice.

It is further ordered that a certificate of appealability is denied. 

Dated: April 5, 2011 s/Mark A. Goldsmith

MARK A. GOLDSMITH

United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record

and any unrepresented parties via the Court=s ECF System to their respective email or First Class

U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on April 5, 2011.

s/Lisa Wagner for Deborah J. Goltz

DEBORAH J. GOLTZ

Case Manager

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