Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-508 | September 23, 2016 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Timothy J. Burns

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Christina D. Pace

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael Cunagin,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

September 23, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1603-CR-508

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Linda E. Brown, 

Judge

The Honorable Allan Reid, 

Commissioner

Trial Court Cause No.

49G10-1508-CM-30797

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-508 | September 23, 2016 Page 2 of 7

Case Summary

[1] Michael Cunagin (“Cunagin”) was convicted of Battery, as a Class A 

misdemeanor.1 He now appeals his conviction. We affirm. 

Issues

[2] Cunagin raises two issues for review:

I. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support his 

conviction; and

II. Whether the State rebutted his self-defense claim.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Cunagin and Ashley Reynolds (“Reynolds”) were in a romantic relationship 

and lived together in Marion County, Indiana. Sometime around August 16, 

2015, Cunagin and Reynolds ended their relationship. Following the break up, 

Cunagin agreed to move out. He signed an agreement removing himself from 

the lease. Cunagin also agreed to move his belongings out of the residence by

August 29, 2015.

[4] On that day, Cunagin was removing his belongings when Reynolds and her 

sister Ashley Kranning “Kranning” arrived. An argument ensued. As

 

1

 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(b)(1) (2015).
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Kranning walked to the door, Cunagin slammed the door shut. Kranning 

opened the door, which swung open. Cunagin then pushed Kranning up 

against the door. Cunagin held Kranning against the door by placing his hand 

or forearm against Kranning’s neck, causing her pain. Reynolds, who was 

walking to her bedroom, turned and observed Cunagin yelling at Kranning as 

he held her against the door. When Reynolds approached Cunagin, he let 

Kranning go. Someone placed a call to 911 and Officer Jack Tindall (“Officer 

Tindall”) of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department came to the 

residence. Kranning told Officer Tindall that Cunagin battered her, and 

Cunagin told Officer Tindall that he pinned Kranning against the door. Officer 

Tindall observed marks on Kranning’s neck.

[5] On August 30, 2015, the State charged Cunagin with Battery, as a Class B 

misdemeanor.2 The trial court conducted a bench trial on February 22, 2016 

and found Cunagin guilty. Cunagin now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Sufficiency of the Evidence

[6] Cunagin contends there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction.

 

2

 I.C. § 35-42-2-1(b)(1) (2015).
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[7] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we 

neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. Drane v. 

State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). Accordingly, “[t]he evidence . . . and 

all reasonable inferences drawn from it are viewed in a light most favorable to 

the conviction.” Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). We affirm the 

conviction unless “‘no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the 

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146 (quoting 

Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).

[8] To convict Cunagin of Class B misdemeanor battery, the State was required to 

prove that Cunagin knowingly or intentionally touched another person in a 

rude, insolent, or angry manner. I.C. 35-42-2-1(b)(1). Here, the evidence most 

favorable to the judgment establishes that Cunagin pinned Kranning against a 

door. Cunagin did so by pushing his hand or forearm against Kranning’s neck, 

causing pain and marks. Here, Cunagin admits he made contact with Kranning

but argues that any contact was inadvertent as he attempted to close and lock 

the door.

[9] Cunagin’s argument is essentially a request to reweigh the evidence, which we 

decline. The evidence is sufficient to support Cunagin’s battery conviction.

Self-defense Claim

[10] Cunagin argues in the alternative that the State failed to rebut his claim of selfdefense.
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[11] When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a claim of 

self-defense, the standard of review is the same standard used for any claim of 

insufficient evidence. Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000). Thus, 

we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.

[12] Self-defense is a legal justification for an otherwise criminal act. Id. Indiana 

Code Section 35-41-3-2(c) provides that “[a] person is justified in using 

reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person 

from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful 

force.” To prevail on a claim of self-defense, a defendant must have acted 

without fault, been in a place where he had a right to be, and been in reasonable

fear or apprehension of bodily harm. Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ind. 

2003). A defendant’s belief that he is being threatened with the imminent use of 

unlawful force must be reasonable and in good faith. White v. State, N.E.2d 

630, 635 (Ind. 1998). Moreover, a defendant’s reaction to that belief must be 

reasonable based upon the surrounding circumstances. Id. A claim of selfdefense will fail if the person “‘uses more force than is reasonably necessary 

under the circumstances.’” Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 883 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2014), trans. denied (quoting Sudberry v. State, 982 N.E.2d 475, 481 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2013)).

[13] When a defendant raises a claim of self-defense, the State has the burden of 

rebutting at least one of the necessary elements. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 

799, 800 (Ind. 2002). The State may meet its burden by offering evidence 

directly rebutting the defense, by affirmatively showing that the defendant did 
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not act in self-defense, or by relying upon the sufficiency of the evidence from 

its case-in-chief. Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. 1999). If the 

defendant is convicted despite a claim of self-defense, this Court will reverse 

only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the 

prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801-02.

[14] In asserting his self-defense claim, Cunagin testified that Kranning was running 

toward him and that he believed he was being attacked. He stated that he put 

his forearm up in a defensive manner to block Kranning. The State, however, 

presented evidence of a different interaction between Cunagin and Kranning, 

which the trier of fact was free to accept. Indeed, the evidence favorable to the 

verdict establishes that Kranning verbally alerted Reynolds that she was 

entering Reynolds’s residence, and Reynolds approved. Cunagin admits he 

heard Kranning say she was coming inside. (Tr. 31.) Then, as Kranning 

walked to the door, Cunagin slammed the door shut. Kranning opened the 

door, at which point Cunagin pinned Kranning against the door by her neck.

[15] Based on the State’s case-in-chief, it was reasonable for the trier of fact to 

conclude that Cunagin was not justified in believing that force was necessary to 

protect himself. Moreover, the State’s case-in-chief also supports the reasonable 

determination that Cunagin’s force used in reaction to Kranning’s entry—

pinning her against the door by her neck, holding her there, and yelling at her—

was unreasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances. Thus, Cunagin’s 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.
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Conclusion

[16] We find the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and the State

properly negated Cunagin’s self-defense claim.

[17] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Barnes, J., concur.