UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WARRIOR SPORTS, INC., and ATHLETE’S

CONNECTION, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC

ASSOCIATION,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 08-14812

HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON

THE PLEADINGS

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s

(“NCAA”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. 7). Plaintiffs Warrior Sports and

Athlete’s Connection filed a complaint alleging that the NCAA’s act of changing the rules

regarding the type of lacrosse sticks that are permitted in collegiate play gave rise to

claims of (1) a federal antitrust law violation, (2) tortious interference with business

relationships and expectancies, and (3) promissory estoppel. (Doc. 1). For the reasons

that follow, the Court GRANTS the NCAA’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

This is a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(c). Accordingly, because the Court, in deciding such a motion, must take

2:08-cv-14812-MOB-MKM Doc # 16 Filed 03/11/09 Pg 1 of 11 Pg ID 379
2

all of the opposing party’s well-pleaded allegations as true, the following facts are taken

from Plaintiffs’ complaint. See Rawe v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 521, 526

(6th Cir. 2006).

This is a case involving the NCAA’s rules regarding the lacrosse stick heads that

may be used in collegiate play. Plaintiffs allege that these rules are particularly

influential because they not only govern the sticks that may be used in collegiate

lacrosse, but they are also adopted by most of the sports’ governing bodies, such as the

National Federation of High School Sports. 

Before September 2006, the NCAA had used the same rules regarding the

allowable dimensions of lacrosse stick heads for 30 years. Manufacturers, including

Warrior Sports, were able to submit their sticks to the NCAA to obtain confirmation that

their sticks complied with the lacrosse rules, and Warrior Sports specifically notes that it

did so in 2000. The pre-September 2006 rule only required that lacrosse heads be at

least 6.5” at their widest point and 10” from top to bottom. In September 2006, the

NCAA rules committee changed the rules (“2006 Rule Change”), effective January 1,

2009, as follows:

Measurement from throat of crosse Minimum distance between narrowest

point on the crosse

1.25” 2.75” (all measurements)

3” 3.25” (all measurements)

5” 4.25” front and 3.5” back

The widest point 6.5” front and 6” back

2:08-cv-14812-MOB-MKM Doc # 16 Filed 03/11/09 Pg 2 of 11 Pg ID 380
3

The NCAA claimed that it was changing the dimensions of the lacrosse stick head in

order to promote free dislodgment of the ball during play. This rule would have

rendered the vast majority of all current men’s lacrosse heads illegal, including 14 of

Warrior Sports’ 15 lacrosse heads. Warrior Sports initiated a lawsuit over this rule

change, but it subsequently withdrew the suit when the NCAA agreed to reconsider the

2006 rule change.

In September 2007, the NCAA rules committee adopted the following rules

(“2007 Rule Change”), to be effective January 1, 2010:

Measurement from throat of crosse Minimum distance between narrowest

point on the crosse

1.25” 3” (all measurements)

3” 3” (all measurements)

5” 4” front and 3.5” back

The widest point 6.5” front and 6” back

This rule also would have rendered almost all current lacrosse heads illegal and, in

particular, would have rendered all of Warrior Sports’ heads illegal. In addition, the

aforementioned specifications tracked designs patented by Warrior Sports. The NCAA

claims that it discovered these patents after it adopted the 2007 Rule Change. 

Accordingly, the NCAA asked Warrior Sports whether it would be willing to license its

intellectual property rights to other lacrosse manufacturers in connection with the 2007

Rule Change. The NCAA also asked to know the terms under which Warrior Sports

would grant such licensing rights. Plaintiffs allege that this letter was an implicit threat

that the NCAA would change the rules again to Warrior Sports detriment if Warrior

2:08-cv-14812-MOB-MKM Doc # 16 Filed 03/11/09 Pg 3 of 11 Pg ID 381
4

Sports did not cooperate. Warrior Sports responded by claiming that it was

inappropriate for the NCAA to be brokering deals between it and its competitors. 

Warrior Sports went on to indicate that it could not make a decision to license its

intellectual property rights in the abstract because it made those decisions on a caseby-case basis. 

The NCAA subsequently implemented the following rule change in February

2008 (“2008 Rule Change”), to be effective January 1, 2010:

Measurement from throat of crosse Minimum distance between narrowest

point on the crosse

1.25” 3” (all measurements)

3” 3” (all measurements)

5” 3.5” - 4” front and 3.5” back

The widest point 6” - 6.5” front and 6” back

This rule also would render all of Warrior Sports current lacrosse stick heads illegal. 

Plaintiffs claim that the NCAA enacted this rule in collusion with Warrior Sports’

competitors. Plaintiffs allege that the rule changes by the NCAA will significantly inhibit

competition and innovation in the lacrosse head market. In addition, Plaintiffs contend

that the rule change will force lacrosse manufacturers to scrap their inventory, accept

return of products from retailers, and retool their manufacturing process to produce new

sticks. 

2:08-cv-14812-MOB-MKM Doc # 16 Filed 03/11/09 Pg 4 of 11 Pg ID 382
5

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court will grant a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings “when no

material issue of fact exists and the party making the motion is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Rawe, 462 F.3d at 526 (citation omitted). In reviewing such a motion,

the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, accepts

the complaint’s factual allegations as true, and determines whether the plaintiffs can

prove no set of facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to relief. Id.

IV. ANALYSIS

1. Antitrust Claims

The NCAA argues that Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims fail because the lacrosse stick

head rules are not commercial in nature and, therefore, not subject to antitrust scrutiny.

Section 1 of the Sherman Act states, “Every contract, combination . . . or

conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign

nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. The Sixth Circuit has held that the

actions of the NCAA are subject to the Sherman Act when the actions are “commercial

in nature.” Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA (Worldwide Basketball),

388 F.3d 955, 958 (6th Cir. 2004). For example, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ.

of Okla., the Supreme Court held that the NCAA’s restriction of the number of televised

football games violated the Sherman Act. 468 U.S. 85, 120. The Court also noted,

however, “It is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA

are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and

therefore procompetitive because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate

2:08-cv-14812-MOB-MKM Doc # 16 Filed 03/11/09 Pg 5 of 11 Pg ID 383
6

athletics.” Id. at 117. The court went on to distinguish the restriction on television

broadcasts, which was at issue in that case, from, among other things, the “rules

defining the conditions of the contest.” Id. Likewise, in Worldwide Basketball, the Sixth

Circuit held that an NCAA rule limiting the number of preseason tournaments that a

school’s basketball team could participate in was commercial in nature because the rule

“has some commercial impact insofar as it regulates games that constitute sources of

revenue for both the member schools and the Promoters.” 388 F.3d at 959. 

The Sixth Circuit also recently reaffirmed this principle when it held that the

NCAA’s imposition of sanctions, which made it difficult for a coach to obtain

employment with NCAA schools, as a result of the coach’s violation of NCAA recruiting

and academic rules, did not constitute an antitrust violation. Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d

426, 429 (6th Cir. 2008). In that case, the Sixth Circuit indicated that it agreed with the

district court’s conclusion that the NCAA’s enforcement of the rules at issue was not

commercial activity because the rules “were intended to ensure fair competition in

intercollegiate athletics.” Id. at 433.

In order to establish a violation of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must prove that the

defendant unreasonably restrained trade in a relevant market. NHL Players’ Ass’n v.

Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 2003). The

reasonableness of a trade restraint is assessed using either a “per se rule” or a “rule of

reason.” Id. In this case, Warrior Sports does not contend that the per se rule applies. 

(See doc. 13 at 12). The rule of reason uses a burden-shifting framework that requires

the court to analyze the history of the restraint and the restraint’s effect on competition. 

See NHL Players’ Ass’n, 325 F.3d at 718. 

2:08-cv-14812-MOB-MKM Doc # 16 Filed 03/11/09 Pg 6 of 11 Pg ID 384
7

First, the plaintiff must establish that the restraint produces significant

anticompetitive effects within the relevant product and geographic

markets. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant must come

forward with evidence of the restraint’s procompetitive effects to establish

that the alleged conduct justifies the otherwise anticompetitive injuries. If

the defendant is able to demonstrate procompetitive effects, the plaintiff

then must show that any legitimate objectives can be achieved in a

substantially less restrictive manner.

Id. (quotation and citations omitted).

The NCAA’s rule regarding the type of lacrosse equipment that may be used

during play appears not to be subject to antitrust scrutiny, in and of itself, because, it is

not “commercial in nature.” Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 958. In particular, the

rule does not directly relate to the NCAA’s commercial or business activities. See

Bassett, 528 F.3d at 429. As such, the rule is only directed towards increasing the

quality of play in college lacrosse and, thereby, enhancing interest in intercollegiate

lacrosse. See Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 117 (stating that most of

the NCAA’s regulations are a “justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur

athletic teams, [which] enhance[s] public interest in intercollegiate athletics.”); Bassett,

528 F.3d at 429 (holding that the NCAA’s enforcement of rules that were intended to

insure fair competition in intercollegiate athletics was not commercial activity).

This case is analogous to Adidas America, Inc. v. NCAA, where the district court

found that a NCAA bylaw prohibiting manufacturer’s logos that were larger than a

specified size was noncommercial. 40 F.Supp.2d 1275, 1286 (D.Kan. 1999). The court

first stated that the bylaw had noncommercial purposes and objectives. Id. The court

went on to find that the bylaw did not confer any direct economic benefit upon the NCAA

2:08-cv-14812-MOB-MKM Doc # 16 Filed 03/11/09 Pg 7 of 11 Pg ID 385
8

because, even though the bylaw did not restrict “NCAA Football” logos, there was no

evidence that the NCAA was a competitor in the sports apparel market. Id.

Like the rule in Adidas America, Inc., the rule relating to lacrosse stick heads has

a noncommercial purpose—to promote free dislodgment of the ball. In addition,

Plaintiffs do not allege that the NCAA is a competitor in the lacrosse stick market or that

the rule at issue in this case confers any commercial benefit upon the NCAA. 

Accordingly, because the rule, in and of itself, is not commercial in nature, it is not

inherently subject to challenge under the Sherman Act. See Worldwide Basketball, 388

F.3d at 958. 

In this case, however, Plaintiffs allege that the 2008 Rule Change was enacted in

collusion with Warrior Sports’ competitors. Accepting this allegation as true, the 2008

Rule Change would be commercial in nature because Warrior Sports’ competitors

presumably sought to enact the rule in order to benefit commercially. To violate the

Sherman Act, however, the 2008 Rule Change also must restrain trade or commerce. 

See 15 U.S.C. § 1. As will be shown, the 2008 Rule Change does not constitute such a

restraint.

Plaintiffs allege that only the 2008 Rule Change was enacted in collusion with

Warrior Sports’ competitors. The only way the 2008 Rule Change differed from the

2007 Rule Change was that it reduced the minimum dimension for the front of the stick

head. Therefore, any stick that was permitted under the 2007 Rule Change is still

permitted under the 2008 Rule Change. Furthermore, some sticks that were not

previously permitted under the 2007 Rule Change will now be permitted under the 2008

Rule Change’s reduced minimum dimensions. As such, the 2008 Rule Change does

2:08-cv-14812-MOB-MKM Doc # 16 Filed 03/11/09 Pg 8 of 11 Pg ID 386
9

not violate the Sherman Act because it does not restrict trade or commerce. See 15

U.S.C. § 1. Thus, Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claim fails due to the fact that the 2006 and

2007 Rule Changes were not subject to the Sherman Act, and the 2008 Rule Change

does not restrict trade or commerce.

2. Tortious Interference claim

The elements of the tort of interference with an advantageous business

relationship are (1) a valid business relationship or expectancy (2) known to the

defendant who (3) engaged in intentional conduct (4) causing the disruption or

termination of that relationship or expectancy resulting in (5) damages. Ass’n Research

& Dev. Corp. v. CNA Fin. Corp., 123 Mich. App. 162, 169 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); N.

Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Henderson Bros., Inc., 83 Mich. App. 84, 93 (1978). In

order to make out such a claim, a plaintiff must show either an act that is per se

unlawful or a lawful act done with a malicious and unlawful purpose. CMI Int’l, Inc. v.

Intermet Int’l Corp., 251 Mich. App. 125, 131 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (quotation omitted).

Although Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA colluded with Warrior Sports’

competitors in adopting the 2008 Rule Change, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not show that

the adoption of the 2008 Rule Change was done with a malicious and unlawful purpose,

because the only effect of the 2008 Rule Change was to increase the number of sticks

that would be allowed under the NCAA’s rules. Furthermore, as Plaintiffs do not allege

that the NCAA adopted either the 2006 or 2007 Rule Changes in collusion with Warrior

Sports’ competitors, Plaintiffs’ allegations also do not show that these rule changes

2:08-cv-14812-MOB-MKM Doc # 16 Filed 03/11/09 Pg 9 of 11 Pg ID 387
10

were adopted with a malicious and unlawful purpose. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ tortious

interference claim fails. See id.

3. Promissory Estoppel

The NCAA argues that Warrior Sports’ claim fails because it has not alleged that

the NCAA promised not to change the lacrosse stick dimension rules.

The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are:

(1) a promise,

(2) that the promisor should reasonably have expected to induce action of

a definite and substantial character on the part of promisee, 

(3) which in fact produced reliance or forbearance of that nature, and 

(4) in circumstances such that the promise must be enforced if injustice is

to be avoided.

Ardt v. Titan Ins. Co., 233 Mich. App. 685, 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).

Warrior Sports claims that the NCAA’s act of allowing manufacturers to submit

equipment for review constitutes a promise that approved equipment will be legal for

play. This claim fails because the NCAA’s act of reviewing proposed lacrosse sticks is ,

at most, a promise that approved sticks complied with the rules in effect at that time.

The NCAA was not promising never to change its rules in a way that would make a

previously approved stick illegal. Therefore, Warrior Sports’ promissory estoppel claim

fails. See id.

2:08-cv-14812-MOB-MKM Doc # 16 Filed 03/11/09 Pg 10 of 11 Pg ID 388
11

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings is GRANTED. 

s/Marianne O. Battani 

MARIANNE O. BATTANI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: March 11, 2009

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served upon counsel of record on this date by ordinary

mail and/or electronic filing.

 s/Bernadette M. Thebolt

 DEPUTY CLERK

2:08-cv-14812-MOB-MKM Doc # 16 Filed 03/11/09 Pg 11 of 11 Pg ID 389