## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Suprem e Court

Julie Q. v. Department

of Childr en & Fam ily Service s , 2013 IL 113783

Caption in S upreme Court: J ULI E Q., Appellee
, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF CHI L DREN AN D FAMI LY SERVI CES et al. , Appellants.

Docke t No. 113783

Filed
Rehea ringdenied Marc h 21, 2013

May 28, 2013

Held ( Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Under the Abused an d Neg lected Child Reporting Act, which calls for
repor ts of suspected child abuse or neg lect and compilation of a reg istry of persons found t o have abused or neg lected a child, an adminis trative law j udg e’s 2009 finding of a mother’s neg lect based on injurious environment was proper ly reve rsed wher e the le g is la tu r e had remove d the injurious environment languag e from the Act in 1980 and did not restore it unti l 2012; and administrative rules promulg ated during this period

wer e beyond statut o ry authority wher e they included injurious environment in the de finition of neg lect.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Ap pellate Court for the Second District; hear d in that
court on appea l fr o m t h e Circuit Court of L ake County
, the Hon. Ray mond J . McKoski, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l L isa Madig an, Attorney Gene ral, of Springf ield (Michae l A. Scodro, Solicitor Gene ral, J ane Elinor Notz, Deputy Solicitor Gene ral, and J an E. Hughes and Nadine J

. Wichern, Assistant Attorney s Gene ral, of Chicag o, of counse l), for a

ppellants.

Michae l T. Br ody and Precious S. J acobs, of J enner & Bloc k, and Diane Redleaf and Melissa L . Staas, all of Chicag o, for a ppellee.

Steven L . Pick, Miriam Hallbauer , Colleen A. Connolly and Richar d T. Coz zola, all of Chicag o, for amici curiaeLAF et al.

J ustices J USTI CE GARMAN delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
C h i ef J ustice Kilbride and J ustices Fr eema n, Thomas, Kar

meier, and Theis conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.
J ustice B urke took no pa

rt in the dec ision.

OP INION

¶ 1 Plaintiff J ulie Q. filed an administrative revie w action ag ainst the I llinois Depa rtment of Children and Fa

mily Service s (DCFS) appea ling DCFS’s indicated finding of child neg lect. The indicated finding resulted from an incident occur ring at plaintiff’s home on J anuar y 29, 2009. DCFS based its finding on its Alleg ation No. 10/60 titled “Substantial Risk of Phy sical Injury /Environment Injurious to Health and Welfa re” (Alleg ation 60). ¶ 2 The circ uit court of L ake County found that the finding was not ag ainst th e m an i fe s t weight of the evidenc e, upheld the validity of Alleg ation 60, and conclude d that the hear ing

was timely held within 90 day s pursuant to DCFS rules. The appellate court re v ersed, concluding that Alleg ation 60 was void and that the finding was ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e. 2011 I L Ap p (2 d ) 100643. The appellate court did not consider the timeliness issue. We g rante d DCFS’s petition for leave to appea l. I ll. S. Ct. R. 315 (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010). F or the followingrea sons, we af firm the judg ment of the a ppellate c ourt.

¶ 3 BA CKGROUND ¶ 4 On Fe bruar

y 17, 20 0 9
, J u l i e Q. re ce i v ed a phone call from L aver n Robinson, an investigator with D CFS. Robinson informe d J ulie Q. that DCFS was investigating a repor t of poss ible child abuse or neg lect by J u l ie Q. for her actions toward her daughte r M.Q. on J anuar y 29, 2009. J ulie Q.’s husband and M.Q.’s fathe r, Chris Q., made the repor t to DCFS afte r M.Q. informed him of events taking place o n t h e evening of J anuar y 29, 2009. M.Q.
repor tedly told Chris Q. that her mother, who had a history of alcoholism, had been drinking

-2-and locked M.Q. in her room and preve nted her from making phone calls. At that time Chris

Q. and Juli e Q. we re separated and Chris Q. wa s not livi ngat J ulie Q.’s home. ¶ 5 DCFS i n v es t i gated the repor t and indicated J ulie Q. for neg lect due to her history of drinking in the home, the injurious environment it cre ated, and the substantial risk of injury
to M.Q. On Marc h 13, 2009, DCFS enter ed its initial indicated find i n g o f n eg lect ag ainst J ulie Q. based on Alleg ation 60. Alleg ation 60 is found in title 89, section 300.Appendix B (her einaf ter, Appendix B) of the I llin o i s Ad m i nistrative Code. Appendix B lists specific incidents of har

m, one of whic h must be alleg ed bef ore D CFS will acce pt a re port of child abuse or neg lect. Under Alleg ation 60 a specific incident of neg lect occu rs wh en an individual “plac [es] a child in an environment that is injurious to th e child’s health and welfa re.” Appendix B then lists examples of fa ctors to be c onsidered in determining if the child has been place d in an environment injurious to his or her health. J ulie Q. filed a notice of appea l on Marc h 27, 2009. The hearing was delayed on multipl e occa sions due to continuance s, the ca

uses of whic h are disputed by the par ties. ¶ 6 The ad m i n i s tra t i v e h earing beg an on J une 23, 2009. The J une 23, 2009, hearing date provided insufficient time for t h e parties to prese nt their evidenc e, and the hearing was continued until J uly 20, 2009. J ulie Q. first testified that she was a rec overing alcoholic and that she had participated in inpatient substance abuse programs on two occa sio n s. She acknow ledg ed two prior arr ests for driving under the influence

. In 2004, she was acquitted of driving under the influence
, and in 2005 she pled guilty to the same char g e. J ulie Q. also testified that the police wer e called to her home in 2005 for a call of domestic violence afte r she was drinking and slammed the door on Chris Q.’s leg

. J ulie Q. stated that she had been sober since J anuar

y 29, 2006. DCFS then asked J ulie Q. about t h e ev ents taking place on J anuar y 29, 2009. J ulie Q. acknow ledg ed that she had a disag ree ment with M.Q. afte r M.Q.
repe atedly g ot out of her bed betwee n 9 and 11 p.m. that day

. Whil e stating that she restric ted M.Q. to her be droom, she denie d preve nting M.Q. f rom using the phone. ¶ 7 Robinson then testified as the p ri m ar y i n v es t i gat o r fo r DCFS. DuringRobinson’s testimony
, DCFS was permitted to admit DCFS’s investigation file. J ulie Q. objected to the admission of the file as hear say beca use the file included notes written b y another investigator, Analia Cobrda, reg arding Cobrda’s meeting with M.Q. Cobrda was not called to testify at the hea

ring

. Robinson admitted that she had not met with Cobrda, but that she used Cobrda’s notes when rea ching her conclusion that J ulie Q. should be indicated for
neg lect. Specifica lly
, Cobrda’s notes included statements made by M.Q. to Cobrda that J ulie Q. had been drinking on J anuar y 29, 2009, and that she knew this beca use her mom’s speec h

was slurred. M.Q. also told Cobrda that her mother was angry and made M.Q. stay in her

room. Robinson then testified that the fac tors listed in Alleg ation 60 led her to rec ommend

an indicated finding

. She specific ally ref err ed to the history of J ulie’s past alcohol abuse and the cr edible stateme nts made by M.Q. ¶ 8 DCFS also introduced testimony by two office rs who had been called to J ulie Q.’s home

on previous occa sions. This testimony was admitted over objection by J ulie Q. Offic er L isa Davidson testified that on J uly 26, 2008, she re sponded to a call made by M.Q. saying that she could not wake up her mother and that she w as fr ighte ned. Upon a rrivingto J ulie Q.’s home, M.Q. showed Offic er Davidson a g lass containing a clea r liquid smelling like alcohol.

-3-Offic er Davidson testified that J ulie Q.’s speech was slurred and that she refused to take a

portable Br eatha ly

zer test. These statements wer e corr oborate d by Offic er Keith L andy
, who

was also called to the scene

. Offic er L andy testified that in addition to slurred speec h, J ulie Q. had g lassy

eyes and a

ppear ed intox icated. H e also stated tha t he believe d J ulie Q. had a drinking problem and that this drinking problem put M.Q. in an envi ro n ment injurious to M.Q.’s hea lth and wellness. ¶ 9 Offic er Davidson also testified t o events taking plac e in May 2009 when officer s wer e called ba ck to Julie Q.’s home. Ar rivingat t he home, Offic er D avidson testified that M.Q.

was visibly upset and told the office r that her mom wa s drinking and that she was afr aid of her mom. Acc ording to Offic er Davidson, M.Q. said that her mom threw a g lass at her. J ulie Q. ag ain denied drinking and agree d to take a portable Br eatha ly zer test, but one was not g iven because the office rs receive d another serious call. Offic er Davidson t estified that he did not smell a lcohol on J ulie Q. but that another office r repor ted that he did sme ll a lcohol

on J ulie Q.’s breath. Finally
, Offic er Davidson noted that they took M.Q. to the police station to wait for he r father to take her home

. ¶ 10 DCFS also questioned Dr. Fr ance s Pachec o , a co u rt-appointed evaluator. Dr. Pac heco

was ap p ointed to provide an evaluation reg arding the couple’ s custody dispute in their dissoluti on action. Dr. Pachec o testified that s h e h ad i n t ervie wed Chris Q., J ulie Q., and M.Q. She stated t hat s he r ec o mmended C hris Q. be awa rded sole custody due to conce rns of J ulie Q.’s drinkingand stateme nts made by M.Q. that she wa s afr aid of being left alone with her mother. Dr. Pachec o also testified that she did not believe that M.Q. had issues with telling the tr

uth. ¶ 11 At the hearing, J ulie Q. prese nted testimony by Dr. David Gates, a private thera pist. Dr

. Gates counsele d J ulie Q. from Dec ember 2008 until sever al months befor e the hearing. Dr. Gates testified that during that time he met with J ulie Q. wee kly and that she tested neg ative for alcohol at eac h random alcohol test administered during this time. He also stated that it was highly unlikely that J ulie Q. was able to drink int ermittently due to the severity of her alcoholism and that he had no rea son to be lieve that J ulie Q. had not be en honest with him

conce rningher sobr iety

. ¶ 12 Ann R amos, a counselor wit h the Northern I llinois Council on Alcohol and Subs tan ce Abuse (NI CASA) also testified for J ulie Q. Ramos stated that she met with J ulie Q. in Marc h and April 2009 and that eac h alcohol test administered to J ulie Q. during this time came back
neg ative. J ulie Q.’s Alcoholics Anony mous sponsor, Magrit Bur ke, testified next. She stated that she was J ulie Q.’s sponsor for three y ear s and that during this time she spoke to J ulie daily

. Acc ording to Bur

ke, J ulie Q. has shown no indication of drinki n g and has attended twice we ekly

Alcoholics Anony

mous meeting s throug hout her sponsorship. ¶ 13 Finally
, a social worke r from M.Q.’s school, J ennife r Perlis-Goassman, t es t i fi ed t hat M.Q. told her that she did not fee l safe with her mother in November and Dec ember of 2007 beca use J ulie Q. would drink and then pass out. Perlis-Goassman stated that M.Q. had

occa sionally made false statements in the past, but that it was limit ed to small white lies that

wer e “e x tremely

common with kids.” ¶ 14 On August 13, 2009, the Administrative L aw J udg e (AL J ) issued a rec ommendation and

-4-opinion. The AL J conclude d that “[a] preponde ranc e of the evidenc e reve als that [J ulie Q.]

cre ated an environment injurious to health and welfa re of the minor.” In rea chin g t h is conclusion, the AL J found Dr. Pachec o and both offic er s t o b e credible witnesses in their

corr oboration of M.Q.’s statements, but that J ulie Q. was not cre dible when she claimed she had been sober since 2006. There fore
, the AL J rec ommended that DCFS had carri ed its burden of proof with re g ard to Alleg ation 60. ¶ 15 On October 2, 2009, J ulie Q. filed a complaint for administrative revie w arguing that the AL J ’s finding was ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e, and that the indicated finding was in violation of the Abuse d and Ne g lected Child ReportingAct (A ct) (325 I L CS 5/1 et seq. (West 2008)). The trial court found that the AL J ’s finding was not ag ainst the manifest

we i gh t of the evidenc e, upheld the validity of Alleg ation 60 pursuant to the Ac t , an d conclude d that the finding was timely issued wi t h i n 90 day s of J ulie Q.’s reque st for a hearing. ¶ 16 The ap p el l ate court reve rsed, finding that the AL J ’s decision was ag ainst the manife st weight of the evidenc e as the court had improperly admitted the investigation file containing hear say evidenc e and the collater al evidenc e relating to the events o f J uly 2008 and May 2009. The appellate court also held that Alleg atio n 6 0 ex ceeded the statutory authority
g rante d to DCFS under the Act. The appellate court did not addre ss whether the hearing was timely held.

¶ 17 ANALYSI S ¶ 18 DCFS argues that it was within its authority under the Act to promulg ate Alleg ation 60. It maintains that it was within its express authority under the Act to define neg lect using the “envir onment injurious” languag e. In the alternative, DCFS main tain s tha t Alleg ation 60 was wi t hin its implicit authority under its power to make all rules nece ssary to eff ectuat e i t s statutory authority

. DCFS also argues that the AL J ’s finding was not ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e as the evidenc e relating to the J uly 2008 and May 2009 incidents was ad m i s sible as substantive evidenc e as to whether J ulie Q. neg lected M.Q. Finally
, DC FS
argues that Jul ie Q. has no dueproce ss c laim as to the untimeliness of the hea ringbeca use J ulie Q. failed to asser

t a due proce ss interest and, further more, any delay s in the case wer e not DCFS’s responsibility

. ¶ 19 J ulie Q. argues that DCFS exceede d its statutory authority in promulg atingAlleg ation 60. She notes that prior to this case , the l eg islature specifically remove d the “environment injurious” language fr o m i t s definition of neg lect in the Act. J ulie Q. also argues that the findin g was ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e as the AL J improperly relied on hear say and collater al bad acts evidenc e in rea ching its finding

. Finally
, J ulie Q. argues that her due proce ss rig hts were violated as DCF S failed to rende r a de cision within 90 day s of her r equest for

a hea ringas re quired by

DCFS rules. ¶ 20 The scop e o f p o we rs conferr ed on an adminis trative ag ency by its enablingleg islation is a question of statutory interpre tation which we revie w de novo

. Genius v. County of Cook
, 2011 I L110239, ¶ 25. ¶ 21 T h e p ar t i es i n i t i al l y d i s p u t e wh et h er DCFS exceede d its statutory authority in

-5-promulg atin g Alleg ation 60. The Act direc ts DCFS to protec t the health, safe ty , and best

interests of a child afte r rec eiving a repor t of possible c hild a

buse or neg lect. 325 I L CS 5/1
et seq. (West 2008). The Act provides a list of mandatory repor ters and authorizes DCFS to maintain a re g istry

of per sons found to have a bused or ne g lected a

child. ¶ 22 Section 3 of the Act provides the definition of a “neg lected child.” I n 2 0 0 9 wh en the i n cidents rele vant to this case took place
, the Act listed four circ umstances constituting a neg lected child: (1) a child not rec eiving adequate medical car e or “other car e nece ssary for his or her well-be ing including adequate food, clothing, and shelter;” (2) a child abandone d by his or her pare nts; (3) a child who has been provided with interim cr i s i s i n t erve ntion service s under the J uvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 I L CS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2008)), and whos e pare nts ref

use to allow the child to return home; and (4) a newbor n born wi t h a controlled substance in her sy stem. 325 I L CS 5/3 (West 2008). P ri o r t o 1 980, the Act included additional languag e in its definition of neg lect, occur ring when the child was place d in “an environment injurious to the child’s we lfare .” Pub. Act 79-65 ( eff . J uly 1, 1975). In 1980, this languag e was deleted

. P ub

. Ac t 81-1077 (ef f. J uly 1, 1980). In 2012, afte r this

case , the leg islature reinser ted simil ar environment-injurious languag e. Pub. Act No. 97-803 (ef f. Jul y 13, 2012). ¶ 23 In addition to the express power s g rante d to DCFS under the Act, sec t i o n 4 o f t h e C hildren and Family Service s Act provides DCFS with the power “[t] o make all ru l es

nece ssary for the execution of its power s.” 20 I L CS 505/ 4 (W es t 2008). Pursuant to this authority
, DCFS promulg ated Appendix B to descr ibe the “spec ific incidents of harm” that constitute abuse or neg lect. 89 I ll. Adm. Code 300.Appendix B (2011). T he Alleg ations of harm are cate g orized as resulting either from abuse or neg lect. Alleg ation 60 is titled “Substantial Risk of P h y sical Injury /Environment Injurious to Hea lth and Welfare ” and includes “situations tha

t pla ce a child at substantial risk of harm due to the eff ects of being subjected to participa

tion in or the witnessingof the phy sical for ce or restra int of another ”

as an example of an incident placing the child i n an environment injurious to his or her welfa re. A lleg ation 60 also lists factors to be c onsidered by DCFS in rea chingits finding. ¶ 24 An administrative ag ency has no g ener al or common law power s. Alvarado v. Industrial Comm’n
, 216 I ll. 2d 547, 553 (2005). The ag ency is limit ed to those power s grante d to it by the leg islature in its enabling statute. Id. An act that is una uthorized is beyond the scope of the ag ency ’s jurisdiction. Id. at 553-54. When the ag ency rende rs a decision that it is without statutory authority to make, it is without j urisdiction and the dec ision is voi d. Id

. ¶ 25 DCFS argues that Alleg ation 60 does not exceed DCFS’s authority under the Act. First, it arg ues that Alleg ation 60 falls within the Act’s definition of neg lect. DCFS also notes its authority to make all rules nece ss ar y to execute its power s under the Children and Family Service s Act. In response , J ulie Q. arg ues that DCFS exceede d its authority in promulg ating Alleg ation 60. Acc ording to J ulie Q., t he legislat u re specific ally deleted the “envir onment injurious” definition of neg lect in 1980, an d DC FS was without authority to add this definition back into the Ac t as it did with All eg ation 60. ¶ 26 DCFS maintains that Alleg ation 60 falls within the Act’s de finition of neg lected child. Specifica lly
, DCFS points to the plain languag e of the Act and the ref ere nce in section 3 to

-6-a child who is not rec eiving “o t her car e nece ssary for his or her well-be ing, including

ad eq uate food, clothing and s helter.” 325 I L CS 5/3 (West 2008). According to DC FS
, t h e Act’s use of the word “including ” indicates that the subsequent list is not exhaustive. Instead, DCFS argues that this languag e authorizes DCFS to cre ate its own list of what qualifies as “other car e nec essar

y” for the child’s we ll-being

. ¶ 27 In People v. Perry
, 224 I ll. 2d 312, 328 (2007), this court noted that the word “ including” “whe n followed by a listi ng of items, means that the prec eding g ener al term encompa sses the listed items, but the list i s n o t ex haustive.” Rather, “[t] he prec eding g ener al term is to be construed as a g ener al descr iption of the listed items and other simil ar items.” Id

. This court held that this rule applies even when the word “including ” is not followed by the phrase “but is not limit ed to.” There fore
, DCFS is corr ect that beca use the Act uses the word “including ,” the subsequent list is not to be read a s exhaustive. ¶ 28 In addition to its e x press authority under the Act, DCFS also argues that it ha d implicit

au t h o ri ty to promulg ate Alleg ation 60 as DCFS had the authority under the Childr en an d Family Service s Act to make all rules nece ssary to perf orm its power s. 20 I L CS 505/4 (West 2008). Wide latitude is g iven to administrative ag encie s to fulfill their statutory duties. Lake County Board of

Rev iew v. Property Tax Appeal Board
, 119 I ll. 2d 419, 428 (1988). But, as discussed above, the ag ency is limit ed to the power s g rante d to it in the enabling statute. There fore
, even as we conclude that the list in section 3 is not exhaustive, we m u s t still deter mine whether DCFS reta ined authority to promulg ate Alleg ation 60 afte r the leg islature deleted the environment-injurious def inition of neg lect fr om section 3. ¶ 29 When the Act was enac ted in 1975, its definition of neg lect included “subjec ting a child
to an environment injurious to the child’s welfa re.” Pub. Act 79-65 (ef

f. J uly 1, 1975). Howeve r, this languag e was remove d from the definition of neg lect by Public Act 81-1077, eff ective J uly 1, 1980. Public Act 81-1077 was introduced as Senate Bill 973. In the House, i t was an amendment to that bill, Amendment No. 8, which remove d the environment

i njurious languag e from the Act. It is this 1980 version of the Act that g overns this case

. Alleg ation 60 first took eff ect on October 12, 2001, near ly 20 year s afte r the legi s l at u re

remove d the environment-injurious languag e. See 25 I ll. Reg. 12,781, 12,781-91 (ef f. Oct. 1, 2001). ¶ 30 “Where the leg islature amends an exis ting statute, the presumption is that the leg islature intended a material c hang e in the law.” In re K.C

. , 186 I ll. 2d 542, 549 (1999). “When the leg islature amends an unambiguous statute by deleting cer tain languag e, it is presumed that the leg islature intended to c hang e the law in that respe ct.” Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Board of

Education of the City of Chicago
, 2012 I L 112566, ¶ 21. This presumption, h o weve r, may be rebutted by evidenc e of a contra ry leg islative intent. State of Illino is v. Mikusch , 138 I ll. 2d 242, 252 (1990). ¶ 31 There fore
, we next consider the leg islative history

. During the floor debate in the House of Repre sentatives, the sponsor of Amendment No. 8 state d that
“Amendme nt #8 is ag ain an att em p t to rea ch an agree ment betwee n the various associations and groups that have come into play in working on this compre hensive ref orm of the Act. What Amendment #8 would do is to remove fr om the definition

-7-of neg lected child the words ‘sub j ec t ed to an environment injurious to his or her welfa re’ and the rea sons we are removing that is the conce rn over the interpre tation of what environment injurious may mean. We a re fea rful that it may end up in a lot of litigation, a lot of misunderstandin gs and until such time that we can arr ive at a

more clea rer , concise kind of definition to addre ss this kind of problem, we think it’s better to remove this from the Bill.” 81st I ll. Gen. Assem., House Procee dings, J une 22, 1979, at 100 (stateme nts of Represe ntative Peters)

. ¶ 32 Represe ntative Peters’ statements show that the environment-injurious l an gu age was

remove d due to conce rns reg arding its am b iguity

. The leg islature was conce rned with the possible various interpre tations of the environment-injurious languag e. Fur thermore
, the leg islature indicated that it was removing this languag e with the intent to rea ch a clea rer and

more c oncise de finition in t he future

. ¶ 33 DC FS ac kn o wledg es that the phrase was remove d due to conce rns of ambigu i t y an d possible confusion. Howeve r, DCFS arg ues that while the leg islature remove d the languag e, it did not indicate that it was an improper definition o f neg lect. Fur thermore
, DCFS notes that the languag e was remove d at DCFS’s reque st. As noted by Senator Buzbee on the Senate floor, “[t] he [D] epar

tment had reque sted some tightening up languag e in House Amendment 6 and 8 which we acc epted.” Whil e the floor debate indicates that DCFS was involved in
neg otiating the final amendment, t h e n otion that DCFS “re quested some tightening up languag e” does not support DCFS’s argument. Amendment No. 8 did no t m er el y “tig hten up” the languag e, but expressly deleted one definition of neg lect. ¶ 34 DCFS also notes t h at t h e l eg islature remove d this languag e with the intent to cre ate a “more clea

rer , concise kind of definit i o n t o addre ss this kind of problem.” Acc ording to DCFS, Alleg ation 60 serve d this leg islative intent by offe ring a clea rer definit i o n of “envir onment injurious” by listi ngsever al examples and fa ctors for DCFS to consider. ¶ 35 Even if, as DCFS argues, the leg islature remov ed t h e l an gu age du e t o conce rns of ambiguity
, this does not chang e the fac t that the leg islature deleted this definition and failed
to reinser t the environment-injurious languag e until 2012. As DCFS is limit ed by the power s g rante d to it in t he ena

bling statute, D CFS was without authority to reinser t a definition of
neg lect into the Act that had been deleted by the leg islature. When the leg islature stated that it was removing the environment-injurious languag e “until such time that we can arr ive” at

a clea rer definition, it was ref

err ing to a time when it, the leg islature, arr ived at the definition. It was not g rantingDCFS the authority to cre ate a

definition on its own. ¶ 36 The leg islature did in fac t reinser t environment-injurious languag e into the Act in 2012. The leg islature ame nded sec tion 3 of the Act to expand the definition of neg lected child to include a child “who is subjected to an environment which is injurious insofar as (i) the child’s environment cre ates a likelihood of harm to the child’s health, phy sical well-be ing,

or welfa re and (ii) the likely harm to the child is the result of a blatant disreg ard of pare nt or

car etake r responsibilities.” Pub. Act No. 97-803 (ef f. J uly 13, 2012). DCFS arg ues that this amendment was the result of the appellate court decision in this case and that this shows the leg islature supported the “envir onment injurious” definition of neg lect. Fur thermore
, DCFS
notes that since Alleg ation 60 was promulg ated in 200 1
, t h e l eg islature had chosen not to

-8-undo Alleg ation 60, even though it had the power to do so. ¶ 37 The fac t that the leg islature sawthe nee d to amend the statute in 2012 by including the environment-injurious definition, howeve r, shows that this definition was not prese nt in the prior version of the Act. In 1980, the leg islature indicated that it intended to provide a clea rer definition of environment injurious and it did so in 2012. The 2012 decision to reinser t this l an guag e only reinfor ces our conclusion that the environment-injurious definition wa s

remove d from the 1980 ve rsion of the statute, whic h g overns this ca se. ¶ 38 DCFS als o ar gu es t h at t h e ap p el l at e co urt ’s ru ling will lead to absurd r esults. Specifica l l y , DCFS maintains that this result is in conflict with the J uvenile Court Act, as that act includes environment-injurious languag e in its definition of a neg lected minor. 705 I L CS 405/2-3(1)(b) (W est 2010) (“any minor under 18 y ear s of ag e whose environment is injurious to his or her welfa re” ). Acc ording to D CFS, it would be inconsistent for a person to be found to have ne g lected a child under the J uvenile Court Act, while D CFS could not issue an indicated finding under the Abused and Neg lected Child Reporting Act for the same conduct. In support of this a rgument, DCFS argues that under section 7.16 there is no rig ht
to a hearing under the Act if there has been a court finding of neg lect. 325 I L CS 5/7.16 (West 2008). ¶ 39 The Act and the J uvenile Court A ct serve differ ent purposes. The Act is a repor ting act and requires that cer

tain individuals repor

t suspected child abuse or neg lect to DCFS. The
purpose of the J uvenile Court A ct, on the other hand, is to “ensur e that the best interests of the minor, the minor’s family
, and the community are serve d.” In r e J.J.
, 142 I ll. 2d 1, 8 (1991). Procee d i n gs under the J uvenile Court Act are civil, nonadver sarial proce eding s wher e the court deter

mines whether th e child has been abused or neg lected. Id. The civil rules of evidenc e apply

. Id. Under the Act, a pare nt who is found to have abused or neg lected his child is place d on the State Central Reg ister, but under the J uvenile Court Act, the court may terminate pare ntal rig hts. 705 I L CS 405/2-21(5) (West 2008). Be fore such a finding can be made under the J uvenile Court Act, howeve r, the court m u s t fi nd that the child was abused or neg lected by a preponde ran ce o f th e evidenc e. 705 I L CS 405/2-21(5)( ii) (West 2008). ¶ 40 Due to the differ ent purposes and rights at stake under eac h act, the leg islature could have
proper ly decide d to cast a more narr ow defini t i o n o f n eg lect under the Act. Under the J uvenil e Court Act, the court formalities provide due proce ss protec tions and the court’s finding must be supported b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Due to these added protec tions, once the court has made a finding of neg lect, it is rea sonable for DCFS to issue

a nonappea lable finding of neg lect under section 7.16 reg ardle ss of the trial court’s basis for i t s fi n d i ng of negle ct. Under the Act, howeve r, t he finding i s not made by a court, and t h e same due proce ss protections ar e not offe red. ¶ 41 The leg islature’s decision to use cer tain languag e in one instance and differ ent languag e in another indicates that the leg islature intended diffe re n t results. Colli ns v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen’

s Annuity & Bene

fit Fund
, 155 I ll. 2d 103, 113 (1993). By deleting the environment-injurious languag e in 1980, the leg islature chose to use differ ent languag e in the Act’s definition of neg lected child than that included in the J uvenile Court A ct. This

-9-indicates that the le g islature spec ifically intended these differ ent def initions , and we reje ct DCFS’s ar gument reg ardingabsurd r esults. ¶ 42 The environment-injurious definition of neg lect was remove d from the statute in 1980. Whil e the leg islature expressed the intent to reinser t a clea rer version of this de finition at a later time, it did n o t d o so until 2012, well afte r this case

. There fore
, DCFS was without authority to include a definition of neg lect in Alleg ation 60 that th e leg islature expli citly

remove d from the Ac t and to apply that definition in the prese nt case

.

¶ 43 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 44 Not ever

y Alleg ation promulg ated by DCFS needs to follow the exact languag e provide d by the leg islature’s d ef

i n i t i o n o f neg lect under section 3 of the Act. But here
, when the leg islature has specific ally remove d the environment-injurious languag e from its definition of neg lect, DCFS was without authority to ree stablish the environment-injurious definition of neg lect. The ref

ore, A lleg ation 60 exceeds DCF S’s scope of a uthority under the Act and it is void. Be cause we deter mine that Alleg ation 60 is void, we need not addre ss whether the finding was ag ainst the m anife st weight of the evidence or whether J ulie Q.’s du e p ro cess rig hts were violated. ¶ 45 The judg ment of the a ppellate c ourt is affir

med.

¶ 46 Affir

med.

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