J-S14016-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RYAN WILSON,

Appellant No. 802 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of February 19, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005803-2012

BEFORE: DONOHUE, OLSON AND MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MAY 06, 2015

Appellant, Ryan Wilson, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on February 19, 2014 in the Criminal Division of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the undisputed facts in this case as follows:

On April 27, 2012, Philadelphia police officer Deborah Grooms 

and her partner[,] police officer Nelson[1,] were patrolling in the 

area of the 6900 block of Forrest Avenue, Philadelphia, in 

response to a report of a home invasion a few blocks over. The 

home invasion report was received at 11:10 a.m. and was in 

reference to 1966 West 73rd Avenue. The flash information for 

the suspects was two black males, 18 to 20 years old. One of 

the males was described as having dark skin, a thin build, a thin 

moustache, and wearing a black track jacket.

____________________________________________

1 Officer Nelson’s first name is not located in the certified record.
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Two hours later, at 1:19 p.m., Officer Grooms observed 

[Appellant] traveling northbound in the southbound lane of 

Forrest Avenue while on a bicycle. Seconds later, [Appellant] 

turned to look back at [Officers Groom and Nelson] who were 

travelling 40 to 50 feet behind [Appellant] in their police car. 

Upon observing the officers, [Appellant] grabbed the front of his 

waistband and crossed to the other side of the street, while still 

riding his bicycle. Based upon her experience, Officer Grooms 

believed that [Appellant] was trying to conceal a weapon when 

he grabbed his waistband.

Officer Grooms attempted to ride up next to [Appellant] in the[] 

police car. When [Appellant] was near the front-passenger tire 

of the police car, Officer Nelson ordered [Appellant] to “stop.” 

The officers wanted to stop [Appellant] for the investigation 

because they believed he met the flash [information] from the 

earlier home invasion. [Appellant] is a young black male with a 

beard, and he was wearing a black hooded sweatshirt and black 

Nike track pants with a white stripe.

In response to Officer Nelson instructing [Appellant] to stop, 

[Appellant] took off at a high rate of speed on his bicycle into the 

alleyway of 6900 Forrest Avenue. As Officer Grooms pursued 

[Appellant], she observed him jump off the bicycle, slam it to the 

ground, and then throw an object to the ground. When the 

object hit the ground, it made a clicking sound that Officer 

Grooms believed — based upon her experience — was consistent 

with a firearm. [Appellant] was arrested shortly after he exited 

the alleyway. Officer Grooms went back to the alleyway and 

recovered a firearm, which was a Glock handgun with an 

extended clip loaded with 27 bullets and one in the chamber.

Based upon her five years of experience as a police officer in the 

area, Officer Grooms regarded the area of the 6900 block of 

Forrest Avenue as a high crime area known for shootings, 

robberies, and home invasions. Officer Grooms typically 

recovers five to ten firearms from the front waistband area. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/14, at 1-2.

On May 24, 2012, the Commonwealth filed an information charging 

Appellant with possession of firearms prohibited, firearms not to be carried 
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without a license, carrying firearms on the public streets of Philadelphia, and 

possession of an instrument of crime (PIC).2 On July 9, 2012, Appellant 

moved to suppress the firearm seized by Officer Grooms. On November 21, 

2013, the trial court convened a hearing on Appellant’s motion and heard 

testimony from Officer Grooms. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion on 

December 13, 2013 and, on that same day, Appellant proceeded to a 

stipulated bench trial based on the factual record developed at the 

suppression hearing. At the conclusion of trial, the court found Appellant 

guilty of possession of firearms prohibited, firearms not to be carried without 

a license, and carrying firearms on the public streets of Philadelphia.3 On 

February 19, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term 

of 48 to 96 months’ incarceration. This appeal followed.4

Appellant’s brief raises the following question for our review:

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 6108, and 907(A). The record 

also reflects that a criminal complaint charged Appellant with knowing and 

intentional possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) under 35 P.S. 

§ 780-113(a)(16). A disposition on this offense was entered on May 24, 

2012 before the magistrate.

3

The district attorney nolle prossed the PIC charge.

4 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on March 13, 2014. Thereafter, on 

March 25, 2014, the trial court directed Appellant to file a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). After 

seeking an extension of time, Appellant filed a concise statement on July 29, 

2014. The trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on August 15, 2014. 
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[Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress 

since the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant 

and the abandonment of the handgun was therefore coerced]?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

Appellant challenges an order denying his motion to suppress physical 

evidence. In reviewing such claims, we apply a well-established standard of 

review.

In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress 

physical evidence, this Court must determine whether the record 

supports the trial court's factual findings and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn therefrom are free from error. In so doing, 

we may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so 

much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted 

when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the 

record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are 

bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in 

reaching its legal conclusions based upon the facts.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 980 A.2d 667, 670 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal 

denied, 990 A.2d 730 (Pa. 2010).

In this case, Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it 

concluded that Officer Grooms had reasonable suspicion to conduct an 

investigative detention. We begin our analysis of this claim by identifying 

the precise point at which Appellant’s detention commenced. Once we have 

fixed the point at which Appellant’s detention arose, we then consider 

whether the facts available to Officer Grooms before that time, and any 

reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, were sufficient to establish 

reasonable suspicion and, hence, justify Appellant’s detention. 
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Traditionally, we have identified three categories of interaction 

between citizens and the police. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 662 A.2d 

1043, 1047 (Pa. 1995). 

The first of these is a “mere encounter” ... which need not be 

supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official 

compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an “investigative 

detention” must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it 

subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does 

not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the 

functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial 

detention” must be supported by probable cause.

Williams, 980 A.2d at 671, quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 681 A.2d 

778, 782 (Pa. 1996) (citations omitted). An investigative detention occurs 

where police conduct, under the totality of the circumstances, would cause a 

reasonable person to believe that he was not free to leave. Williams, 980 

A.2d at 671. The factors relevant to this analysis include, but are not limited 

to, the following: the number of officers present during the interaction; 

whether the officer informs the citizen they are suspected of criminal 

activity; the officer's demeanor and tone of voice; the location and timing of 

the interaction; the visible presence of weapons on the officer; and, the 

nature of any questions asked or any commands that are issued. 

Commonwealth v. Beasley, 761 A.2d 621, 624-625 (Pa. Super. 2000), 

appeal denied, 775 A.2d 801 (Pa. 2001). We conclude that, when Officer 

Grooms and her partner approached Appellant on his bicycle and advised 

him to stop, a reasonable person in Appellant’s position would not have felt 

free to depart. Commonwealth v. Ranson, 103 A.3d 73, 77 (Pa. Super. 
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2014) (appellant subjected to an investigative detention when uniformed 

officers commanded appellant to stop). Thus, an investigative detention 

commenced at that moment.

Having fixed the point at which Appellant was detained for 

investigatory purposes, we consider whether the facts available to Officer 

Grooms before that time were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. 

Relevant to this determination, we have said:

A police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct an 

investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the 

individual is engaging in criminal conduct. This standard, less 

stringent than probable cause, is commonly known as 

reasonable suspicion. In order to determine whether the police 

officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the 

circumstances must be considered. In making this 

determination, we must give due weight to the specific 

reasonable inferences the police officer is entitled to draw from 

the facts in light of his experience. Also, the totality of the 

circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination 

of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, 

even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may 

warrant further investigation by the police officer.

Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357, 360 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal 

denied, 990 A.2d 727 (Pa. 2010).

A defendant’s presence in a high crime area is one factor supporting a 

determination that reasonable suspicion exists. Foglia, 979 A.2d at 361. 

Moreover, if the defendant engages in hand movements which the police 

associate, based on their experience, with the concealment of a weapon, 

those movements support a valid search for weapons in the location where 
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the movements occurred. Id., citing In Interest of O.J., 958 A.2d 561 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc), appeal denied, 989 A.2d 918 (Pa. 2010).

In this case, Officer Grooms testified that she and her partner were on 

a vehicular patrol near 6900 Forrest Avenue in response to a home invasion 

that occurred at approximately 11:10 a.m. Officer Grooms was familiar with 

the area since she had worked there for about five years. She described the 

area as having a high volume of criminal activity, including drug-trafficking, 

gun violence, robberies, and home invasions. Officer Grooms testified that, 

based upon her experience with armed suspects, individuals often conceal 

weapons in the waistband of their pants. 

Before detaining Appellant for investigative purposes, Officer Grooms 

believed that Appellant loosely fit the description of one of the home 

invasion suspects because of his facial hair and dark clothing. Thereafter, 

Officer Grooms and her partner began to follow Appellant in a marked police 

vehicle as he peddled his bicycle. As the officers approached Appellant, 

Officer Grooms observed Appellant turn his head to look at the officers and 

then adjust the waistband of his pants in a manner she perceived to be 

consistent with the concealment of a firearm. N.T., 11/21/13, at 10 

(“[Appellant grabbed t]he front of his waistband as soon as he observed 

police, which I believe he was trying to conceal a weapon.”). Immediately 

afterwards, Officer Grooms’ partner instructed Appellant to stop but 

Appellant took off down an alley and threw down his bicycle and a firearm.
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We conclude that, based upon her experience and observations, 

Officer Grooms articulated sufficient, individualized facts to support 

Appellant’s detention for investigative purposes. See Commonwealth v. 

Grahame, 7 A.3d 810, 816 (Pa. 2010) (protective search for weapons 

justified where officer articulates individualized, objective basis for 

perceiving threat of armed violence). Since the Commonwealth established 

reasonable suspicion to support Appellant’s detention, his abandonment of a 

firearm in this case was not coerced by unlawful police activity and the trial 

court correctly concluded that suppression was not warranted. 

Commonwealth v. Boyd, 987 A.2d 786, 790-794 (Pa. Super. 2008). Thus, 

no relief is due.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/6/2015