### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 20

- 00160

- CR

The State of Texas, Appellant

v. Robert Brandon Minatra, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF COMAL COUNTY NO. 2018CR0338, HONORABLE CHARLES A. STEPHENS II , JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The State of Texas appeals the trial court ’s order granting a motion to suppress
evidence filed by Robert Brandon Minatra, who was charged with the offense of int erference
with a public s ervant

. See Tex. Code C rim. P roc. art. 44.0 1(a) (5) ; Tex. Penal Code § 38.15 (a)(1)

. M inatra argued that the charge was based on an illegal entry by police into a hotel

room to arrest him

. T he State contends that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the
motion to suppress and alternatively, that additional findings of fact and conclusions of law are
necessary
. We wi ll reverse th e trial court ’ s order and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.2 B ACKGROUND During the February 4, 2020 suppression hear ing, the trial court heard evidence
that a hotel manager and the spouse of a guest 1 at the Howard Johnson h otel in New Braunfels
called police with compl aints about the behavio r of a nother guest , later identified a s Minatra

. A
former fron t

- desk c lerk , Debra Lynn Smith , testified that during her 3 :00 p.m. to 11 :00 p.m. shift
at the hotel on November 13, 2017 , she saw a “ disrespectful ” and “ obnoxious ” hotel guest who

“ had been drinking ” and looked like Minatra

. S mith further testified that “ m y manager s live upstairs and watch the cameras ” and that one of the hotel manager s called police that night

. Smith denied receiv ing guests ’ complaints or calling police herself . S he also denied knowing
whether the hot el had a written polic y on eviction s , but she stated tha t a hotel guest could be
evicted for “ bothering the other guests. ” Sergeant Jeff Meier and Officer Matthew Burdick , both of the New Braunfels Police Department , resp onded to the scene

. Sergeant Meier arrived at 11:56 p .m., and Officer
Burdick arrived s hortly aft er midnight . Ser g eant Meier ’ s body mic and dash cam recording from his patrol vehicle was admitted into evidence

. 2 He entered the hotel lobby and greeted a woman
at the front desk

. 3 On the recordi ng

— o ve r the hotel phone ringi n g

— the woman told Sergeant
Mei er that “ t he customer in 213 , ” is “ drunk , ” and is “ dist urbing his neighbors , ” and “ they ’ ve

1 T he sp ou se exp l aine d that she called on her h usband ’ s behalf bec ause of her greater profi ciency wi th speaking English.

2 T he video camera from Sergeant Meier ’ s parked patrol car remained pointed toward a corner of the hotel , showing the exter ior entrance and win do ws o f the l obby

.
3 The woman at the front desk was no t Smith , whose shift ended at 11:0 0 p

. m.3 been calling

. ” She then sa id , “ T his is the key. ” Sergeant Meier ask ed if it wa s the key “ to 213 , ”
and she ag reed before stop p ing th e c onversation to answer a phone call from a hotel guest

. Then a m an who identified himself a s hotel manager Amish Patel greet ed Sergeant Meier and sp oke with hi m
. Patel identified Mi n atra as a hotel guest who drank too
much , woke up o the r cus tomer s , a nd st a rted “calling over here” and arguing. Patel s aid that he
moved four customers to other rooms because of Minatra ’ s behavior

. Sergeant Meier asked if
Patel wanted Minatra “ k icked o ut ” of the hotel , and Patel said , “ Y ea h, ” noti n g that he ha d
alrea dy receiv e d mu l tiple complaints

. Patel reported that Minatra was the only guest in room
213 and was staying for just one night

. Patel then gave the police a room key. 4
Se rgeant Meier and Officer Burdick went upstairs to Minatr a ’ s hotel room

. Se rgea n t Meier knoc ke d on the door with his fist and the n with a metal fla shlight, announced his presence as police, asked Minatra to open the door , and said that they needed to talk

. There was no response, but Sergea nt Meier heard what s ounded like furnitu re be ing moved be hi n d the door. Using the k ey card provided by the hotel staff , Sergeant Meier unlock ed the door , which opened only partially because the chain lock was engaged

. Sergea nt Meier saw M inatra , who appeared intoxicated “ [b ] ased up on the smel l of intoxican ts o n his breath ” and his

“ bloodshot, watery eyes. ” H e t old Minatra that “ management want[ed] him gone

. ” Sergea nt
Meier testified that he “was giving [Minatra] n otice to leave the premises” but that “ [Minatra ]
wanted to t alk over me and try to a rgue. ”
Se rge a nt Meier re peated to Minatra , “Mana gement does not want you here

. ” Sergeant Meier s aid that he would close the door and that Minatra should unlock the chai n lock

4 The recording does not refle ct whether thi s was the same key that th e wo man at the front desk offered Sergeant Meier earlier

.4 an d open the door

. After wait ing “ a lot longer than it would [take] to normally remov e a ch ain
from the d oor , ” Sergeant Meie r used the key card to ope n the door a second time . This time , he
found that Minatr a had wrapped the e lectrical cord from an iron around the door handle and the sink faucet to prevent entry. W hen Sergea nt Meier aske d M ina tra to t ake it off the door , Minatra replied, “ You figure i t out

. ” Sergea nt Meier denied that Minatra ever gave any indication that he was going to l eave after receiving notice that mana gement did not want him there. L ean ing into
the door to break t he el ectr ical cord, Sergeant Meier entered the room and arrested Minatra for

“ i nterference with p ublic d uties

. ” Officer Burdick ’ s testi mony at th e suppression he a ring provided a similar account of the e vents leading to Minatra ’ s ar rest

. M inatra testifie d b rie fly as
to his understanding that the key card he received entitled him to privacy in his hotel room for
the evening

. After th e evidence closed and counsel concluded their argument s , the trial court
noted that this Court rul ed f or a defendant in a case t hat dis cuss ed “ prett y muc h everything we
have ta lked about tod ay , ” although the trial co urt also noted that the Court of Crimin al Ap p e als had gra nted a petition for discretionary review

. See generally Tilghman v. State , 576 S.W.3 d 449 (Tex. App.

— Austin 20 19 ) , re v ’ d , 624 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) . T he trial court
stated , “ U nder that case I think I hav e to grant the M otion to S uppress. ” A written order issued
reflect ing that ruling.

T h e State filed its notice of appeal a nd requested that the tria l cou rt m ake findings
of fa ct and conclusions of law

. The State then moved to abate this appea l for e ntry of those findings and conc lusions and l ater s ought additional findings and conc lusions

. See State

v. Minatra , No. 03

- 20

- 0016 0

- CR, 2020 Tex. App. LEX IS 46 27, at *1 (Tex. App.

— A ustin
June 23, 2020 , order ) ; State v. Minatra , No. 03

- 20

- 00160

- CR, 2 020 Tex. App. LEXIS 3317, at5 *2 (Tex. App.

— Austin Apr. 21, 2020 , order )

. On remand, the trial cou rt made its init ial findings
of fact an d conclusions of law, fo ll owe d by its add itional fi ndings and conclusions

. Minatra reli es on a subset of the tria l court ’ s fact findings in support of his appellate arguments:
Fi n dings of F act

• The parties stipulated that it was a warrantless arrest.

• A p erson contacted 911 abou t a g ue st being disruptive t o other guests at the hotel. The person who called 91 1 was n ot staying at the hotel.

• Ms. Smith was not aware of a hotel po l icy regarding notice of termination and eviction of hotel guests and did not re view one, if it existed,
w ith g ue sts.

• Upon their a rrival, Off icers asked Mr. Patel if he wanted Mr. M inatra removed, and Mr. Patel agreed with the suggestion of the Officers. Mr. Pa tel did not request law enforcement assistance to evict Mr. Minatra until after eviction was sugg es ted b y the Officers. No other hotel employee requested Mr. Minatra be evict e d prior to the suggestion by law enforcement.

• Officer Meier was provided a key to Room 213 by an employee of the hotel.

• Up on approaching the hallway an d door to r o om 213, ther e was n o disturbance and th e area was quiet. No further action was taken by a hotel employee until after Mr. Minatra was arrested.

• Officers knocked on the door to room 213 and asked Mr. Minatra to “ open up ” the door and identified the msel v es as law enfor ce men t. The Officers
annou nced that they needed to talk with Mr. Minatra.

• Officer Meier utilized the room key that had been given to him to make entry into Mr. Minatra ’ s hotel room. After openin g the door, Officers found the door ch ai n to be engaged beh in d t he d oor
.

• Officer Meier stated to Mr. Minatra “ Open up

. . . here ’ s the deal, management doesn ’ t want you here anymore

. ”6 • There was no credi ble evidence that a crime had been comm it ted by Mr. Minatra at the time law enforcement sought to evict Mr. Min at ra, n or when they forcefully opened his door.

• Law enforcement t ook no steps to ascertain the terms of the cont [r] act for stay between Mr. Minatra and the How ard Johnson hotel, and the contract was not offered into evidence.

• Prior to the officer arrivin g at th e r oom occupied by the Defen dant, there had been no attempt to give notice of termination of the Defendant ’ s right to remain in the hotel room by the hotel staff.

• Prior to the officer arriving at the room occupied by the Defe ndant , there had been n o attem pted eviction of the Defenda nt.

• No eviden c e was presented regarding the hotel policies related to disturbances made by hotel guests.

• No evidence was presented regarding whether the Defendant had paid
some [,] all [,] or none of the amount due for occup ancy o f the r oom.

• No evidence was pre s ented regarding whether the D efendant had ever been contacted regarding the alleged disturbance caused by the Defendant.

The tria l court’ s conclu sions of law stated :
Conclusions of Law

• T he Fourth Amendment gua ra ntees t he righ t of t he people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.

• A search, conducted without a warrant, is per se unreasonable, subject to certain ‘ jealously and caref ully drawn ’ excep tions. Georgia v. R and olph , 547 U.S. 103, 109, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006).

• The Fourth Amendment extends to hotel rooms. Moberg v. State , 810 S.W.2d 190, 194 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

• The rights protected by the Fourth A me ndment are not to be eroded by
s train ed a

pplications of the law of agency or by unrealistic doctr i nes of

“ apparent authority” such as a hotel clerk or manager. Stoner
v. California , 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964).7 • A guest in a hotel room is entitled to cons ti tutio na l prot e ctio n against unreasonable se arches and seizures and that t his protection would disappear if it were left to depend upon the unfettered discretion o f an employee of the hotel. S toner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964).

• Thi s Court further based its decisi on on the cases presented b y counsel including Tilghman v. State, 576 S.W.3d 449, 454 (Tex. App. —Austin 2019, pet. granted) and Stoner v. Californi a , 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964).

• Voekel v

. St ate , 717 S. W.2d 314 (Tex. Cr. App. 1986), cited by the State, is di stinguishable primarily because in Voekel the hotel manager had notified the occupant thr ee times over a period of time t hat she would have to leave by 1:00 p.m. the next day, and she h ad not le ft by 3:00 [] pm the next day. Id

. at 315

. Additionally, the h ot el manager, not the police entered the room and told the occupant to leave. Id. Finally, the basis for the reduced expectatio n of privacy mentioned in the o pini on was based upon the fa c t t h at the man ager ha d told the occupant she would not be allowed to s tay after 1 :00 pm the following day. Id

. None of these facts exist in the present case.

• At the time of law enforcement ’ s e ntry into the room, no probabl e caus e existed that Mr. Min at ra had com mitte d the cr ime of criminal trespass, as no notice had be en given by any hotel personnel that Mr. Minatra ’ s occupancy had or would be terminated. Nor was their probable cause that Mr. M inatra had committed the crimes of disturbing the peace, or inte rf ere nce w ith public duty.

• At the time of l aw enforcement ’s entry into Mr. Minatra ’ s hotel room, Mr. Minatra still had occupancy rights.

• The term of occupancy for Mr. Minatra ’ s hotel room had not yet expired at the time the police opened the door an d fo rc efully m ade entry t o Mr. Minatra ’s room.

• No probable cause existed that a crime was being committed.

• Without further proof, the hotel did not have the right to evict Mr. Minatra at the time officers forceful ly entered Mr. M inatra ’s room.

• Mr. M inat ra h ad a subjec tive and objective expectation of pri va cy in his hotel room and that expectation was r easonable.8 • Mr. Minatra ’ s expectation of privacy in the hotel room was not diminished
nor extinguished at th e time of the officer ’ s forceful entry.

• Law e n forc em ent viola ted Mr. Minatra ’ s Fourth Amendm en t right s.

• Law enforcement ’ s entry was not j ustified by any exception to the warrant re quirement

.

• The De fenda nt ’s Fou rth Amendment rights were violated when the hotel manager gave the key to the officer f or the ro om occupi ed by the Defenda nt, who then u nlocked the door and attempted e ntry without
a warrant.

• The entry was not justi fi ed by exigent ci rcumsta nces or any other exception to the requirement of a warrant.

• The opening of the door to the room cons ti t uted a search a nd seizure prohibit ed by th e Fourth Amendmen t.

• Defenda nt ’ s term of occupancy had not expired at the time the door
was opened

.

• Th e Texas Legislature has not passed any statute relating to the eviction of hotel guests

.

After the trial c o urt fi led its f i ndings and con c l usions , the Court of Criminal Ap peals issued its opinion in Tilghman re versing our opinion and judgment and addres sing when a person loses his reasonable expectation of pr ivacy in a hotel room and may be evicted

. See
624 S

. W.3d a t 80 7, 8 10

- 11.

D ISCUSSION
W e review a trial court ’ s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated

s tandard

. Id. a t 80 6

. We afford almost total deference to th e trial court ’ s determination of
historical facts. Id

. When a tria l court makes e x p r ess fi ndin gs of fact, we must exam ine the
record i n the light most favorabl e to the rulin g and uphold those fact findings so lon g as they are9 supported by the record. Id

. W e then apply a de novo standard of review in determin ing t he leg al significanc e o f tho se fac ts. Id.

Fourt h Amendme nt and right to privacy in hotel room s
The Fourth Amendmen t to the U nited Sta te s Constitution guarantees people the righ t “ to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreaso nabl e search es and

se iz u res
. ” U.S

. Const. a mend. IV. Th u s, subject to certain exceptions, law enforcement must
obtain a search warrant before searching or seizing any place or t hing in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Tilghman , 62 4 S. W.3d at 806 (citi ng Kent uc ky v

. King , 563 U.S. 452, 45 9 (2011) )

. This privacy rig ht has been extended to hotel guests in their room s.
Id. (citing Stoner v. California , 376 U .S. 483, 490 (1964)). However, h o tel guests lose th e expectation of privacy in their hotel ro om w he n the ir oc c upancy is scheduled to e nd or upo n their
evicti on from the room by the hotel

. Id. at 807. If hotel management needs assistance with carrying out a hotel guest ’ s eviction (for example, based on expiration of the occupan cy period

or f or a viol at i on o f hotel policies), police are allo wed to assist with facilitating the eviction, and
that is not consid ered a violation of the person ’ s Fourth Ame ndment rights. Id.

H otel g uests who violat e hotel policies can lose reasonable ex pectation of privacy in room s
I n response to the Stat e ’ s challenge to t he suppression order , M inatra contends
that he was not lawfully evicted fro m the ho tel because : (1) his term of occupa ncy had not expired and he had not been evi cted when police opened his door ; (2) the re wa s no ev id ence of
the specific s of a hotel po lic y on evictions ; (3) no notice of eviction was provided to him before police opened his door; and (4) the re was no evidence that he was engaged in illegal activity
when police arri ved. M inatra points to the tr i al c ou rt ’ s f act find ings on who r eport ed his10 disruptiv e behavior to police , whether the hot el had policies about notice to and eviction of disruptive gu ests , who requested his eviction , whether a disturbance was ongoing or a crime h ad
been committed whe n p olic e ap proached his room and car ried out his eviction , whether he was provided notice that his behavior was disruptive and that the hotel wanted him evicted , whether police a s c ert a ined the terms of the contract between him and the hotel , and whether he h a d pa id

a ny portion of the amount due for occupancy of the room

. W e a pply a de novo standard of
review to determine the leg al significanc e of those facts. Id. at 80 6. The Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that hotel guests lose the expectation of

pr iv a cy i n th eir hote l room upon their eviction from the room by the hotel and that h otel
management may obtain police assistance in carrying out an eviction of a hotel guest for a violation of hotel policies without violati n g the hotel guest ’ s Fourth Amendm en t rig ht s. See i d

. Further , “ [i] f a hotel decides to evict a guest for violation of a hotel policy, a person loses his reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room ‘ as soon as the hotel staff t akes affirmative
steps to reposses s the room. ’ ” Id.

H o tel s t af f took affirmative steps to repossess Minatra ’ s room and evict him
H ere, the hotel staff took affirmati ve steps to repossess Minatra ’ s room and evict
him by calling the police department , reporting to police t he extent of M i natra ’ s dis ruptive
b eh a vi or a nd its ef fect on other guests, and providing a room key to assist with Minatra ’ s
eviction

. E vidence from the suppression he aring showed that h otel staff call ed the police department about Minatra ’ s disruptive beh avior

. Smith , t he hotel desk cler k o n duty u ntil
11 :00 p.m. , testified that a hotel manager called police. Thus, the trial court ’ s finding that11 someone who was not staying at the hotel called police is not a legally significant fact. The t rial

court specifically fou nd that “ Debra Smith wa s a cre di ble wit ness. ”
W hen police responded around midnight , the hotel staff provid ed further det ail s
about Minatra ’ s disruptive behavior , drunken dem eanor , and bothering the other guests

. On Sergeant Meier’s r ecording, a w oman at the front desk report ed that “ t he customer in 213,” is

“ drunk, ” and is “ disturbing his neighbors,” and that “t hey’ve been calling.” T he recording also
reflects that the hotel manager , Patel , identified Minatra as a hotel guest who drank too much,

wo ke up other customers, and s t art ed “callin g over here” and arguing. Patel further said that he
moved four customers to other rooms because of Minatra’s behavior. These descriptions of
Minatra ’ s behavior and appearance were consistent with Smith ’ s testimo ny about seeing a “disrespec t ful ” a nd “obn oxious” hotel guest who “had been drinking” a nd looked like Minatra.
A n d a l t h o u g h Smi th denied knowing whether the hotel had a written policy on evictions, she
testified that a hotel guest could be evicted if they are “ bothering the other gu e sts .” Finally , the
hotel s taff provided a room key to police to assist with Minatra’s eviction. Immedi a tely a fter reporti ng t hat “the customer in 213 ” was “ drunk ” and “ disturbing his neighbors , ” who proceeded

to call the hotel staff , the woman a t the fr o nt d es k told S erg eant Meier unprompted, “This is the key.” Patel subsequen tly confirmed that Minatra was in room 213 and that he wanted Minatra
“kicked out” of the hotel , noting that he had already received multiple complaints.
A lthough Minatra contends t hat he could n ot have been lawfully evicted be fore
h is term of occupancy expired and w ithout evidence proving the hotel ’ s policy on evictions , notice of his eviction, and on going illegal activity , Tilghman shows otherwise. See id. at 8 10

- 11

. In Til ghm an , th e C o urt determined that12 [a] hotel has a right to evict a guest immediately, without actual notice, if the guest engages in behavior that violates the hotel ’ s polici es. And the hotel has the right to call the police for assi stance with the eviction

. T o h o ld otherwise would potentially place hotel staff at risk of unreasonable harm by requiring them to attempt a physical eviction without police assistance. Although we recognize that hotel guests generally have an expectation of privacy in their hot el r oom s , a guest who is engaging in behavior that he reasonably should know is in violation of hotel policy, even if that policy is not provided to him in writing, should als o reasonably know that he may be evicted for engaging in such prohibited conduct
onc e th e h o tel staff becomes aware of it. Such an individual can no longer contend that he maintains an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the
room. (And this is particularly true where the pro hibited conduct is of s uch a nature that hotel sta f f i s v e ry likely to discover it, such as the rowdy behavior at issue in Molsbarger [ )

. ]

Id. ; see United States v . Molsbarger , 551 F.3d 809, 811 (8th Cir. 2009) ( “ Disruptive,
unauthorized conduct in a hotel room invites interven tion from management and te r min a ti o n of the rental agreement. ” )

. Minatra reasonably should have know n that his disruptive behavior , which was

e nough to cause multiple complaints f rom other hotel guests to hot el staff (who then relocated four guests) , was in violation of hotel p o li c y
. “ [ A ] n innkeeper has no duty to keep a guest indefinitely and has the right to evict a guest for any number of reasons. ” Tilghman , 624 S.W.3d
at 8 0 7

- 08 . Moreover, for the reasons discussed in the Tilghman ex c erpt above , the fact findings
that Minat ra poin t s t o

— conce rning whether the hotel had policies about notice to and eviction of disruptive guests, whether a disturbance was ongoing or a crime h ad been committed when police approached his room and carried out his eviction, whether he was provided no t ice t h at his behavior was disruptive and that the hotel wanted him evicted, whether police ascertained the
terms of the contract between t he hotel and him , and whether he had paid any portion of the amount due for occupancy of th e room

— are not legal ly s ig n ific a n t facts. See id. at 806.13 On this reco rd, Minatra’s expectation of privacy in his hotel room was extinguished by the hotel staff’s taking affirmative steps to evict him

. The hotel allowed the
evict ion of a guest for “bothe ring the other guests , ” an d Min a t ra ’ s “disruptive” and “obnoxious”
behavior at the hote l after he had been drinking too much resulted in multip le guests ’ comp lain ts
to hotel staff

. C o ntrol of room 213 reverted to the hotel upon the staff’s taking affirmat ive steps
to evict M inatra , who n o longer had an expectation of privacy in th e hotel room by the time of the police officers’ entry. See id. at 811. Thus, th at entry did not infringe upon Minatra ’ s Fourth Amendment rights. See id. Because the police of ficers ’ e nt ry to eff ectuat e the h ot e l eviction did
not violate Min atra ’ s Fourth Amendment rights , s ee id. at 8 11

- 12 , w e c onc l ude that the trial

cou rt a bused its discretion by g ranting the m otion to s uppress evidence

. We sustain the State ’ s
fir st i ssue. 5

C ONCLUSION
W e rever se t he tria l co urt ’ s or der granting Minatra ’ s motion to suppress evidence
and remand this cause for further proceedings co ns i stent with this opinion.

__________________________________________ Darlene Byrne , Chief Justice
Before Chief J ustice Byrne, J ustices Baker and S m ith
Revers ed and Re manded
Filed : June 2, 2022
Do Not Publish

5 B ecause we h ave sustained the S tate ’ s first issue, we n eed not addr ess the State ’ s alternative second issue

. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.