UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ARTHUR SUMERLIN,

Petitioner, Civil No. 09-CV-10459

Honorable George Caram Steeh

v. 

BLAINE LAFLER,

Respondent.

 /

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION

FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT [Dkt. # 13]

Before the court is Petitioner's motion for relief from judgment. On June 6,

2011, this Court issued an opinion and order denying the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. In part, the Court found that some of the Petitioner’s claims were barred

from review because Petitioner had defaulted them under Michigan Court Rule

6.508(D)(3). Petitioner’s motion asserts that he did not default his claims. 

Rule 60(b) allows a party relief from judgment, order or other proceeding for

the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence, that, with reasonable diligence, could

have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),

misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

-1-

2:09-cv-10459-GCS-CEB Doc # 14 Filed 07/23/13 Pg 1 of 4 Pg ID 1568
(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based

on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying

it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 

Petitioner moves for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), which may

be used to relieve a party from judgment only in extraordinary circumstances which

are not addressed by the first five subsections of Rule 60(b). Ford Motor Co. v.

Mustangs Unlimited, Inc., 487 F. 3d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 2007). The Sixth Circuit has

stated that: "Courts . . . must apply subsection (b)(6) only as a means to achieve

substantial justice when something more than one of the grounds contained in Rule

60(b)'s first five clauses is present. The something more . . . must include unusual

and extreme situations where principles of equity mandate relief." Id. (internal

citations and quotations omitted). Petitioner's arguments do not demonstrate that

an unusual or extreme situation exists that warrants relief from judgment. 

Petitioner’s motion asserts that the trial court adjudicated the claims raised in

state post-conviction review motion on the merits. He argues that the claims were

therefore not defaulted under the authority of Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286,

291-92 (6th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Under Guilmette, a habeas court must "look

through" the unexplained orders of the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan

Supreme Court to the state trial court's decision to determine the basis for the denial

-2-

2:09-cv-10459-GCS-CEB Doc # 14 Filed 07/23/13 Pg 2 of 4 Pg ID 1569
of state post-conviction relief. If the trial court's decision was based on the merits,

then the claims raised in the motion for relief from judgment are not procedurally

defaulted. Id. However, if the trial court relied on a procedural basis for denying

relief, such as a defendant's failure to satisfy the "good cause and actual prejudice"

standard of Rule 6.508(D)(3), then review of the claims raised in the motion are

barred from review. See McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 697-98 (6th Cir. 2004). 

Here, the state trial court found that the claims were barred from review:

Defendant has not shown "good cause" under Michigan Court Rule

6.508(D)(3) as to why the issues presented in this motion were not

previously raised on appeal. Further, he has not proven actual

prejudice.

Opinion and Order Denying Motion for Relief from Judgment, at 4. Consistent with

Guilmette, brief references like this by a state trial court to a Petitioner’s failure to

show “good cause” under Rule 6.508(D)(3) have routinely and correctly been

interpreted as the invocation of a procedural default. See, e.g., Miller v.

Romanowski, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90292 ( E.D. Mich. June 27, 2013); Feliciano

v. McKee, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72873 ( E.D. Mich. May 23, 2013); Bentley v.

Howes, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70715 ( E.D. Mich. May 20, 2013); Slusser v.

Wolfenbarger, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59714 ( E.D. Mich. Apr. 26, 2013); Daniels v.

Palmer, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57767 ( E.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 2013).

Accordingly, Petitioner's arguments do not demonstrate that an unusual or

extreme situation exists that warrants relief from judgment. 

-3-

2:09-cv-10459-GCS-CEB Doc # 14 Filed 07/23/13 Pg 3 of 4 Pg ID 1570
 Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion

for Relief From Judgment [Dkt. # 13] is DENIED.

Dated: July 23, 2013

s/George Caram Steeh 

GEORGE CARAM STEEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on

July 23, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail and also to

Arthur Sumerlin #498164, Ryan Correctional Facility,

17600 Ryan Road, Detroit, MI 48212.

s/Barbara Radke

Deputy Clerk

-4-

2:09-cv-10459-GCS-CEB Doc # 14 Filed 07/23/13 Pg 4 of 4 Pg ID 1571