In the United States Court of Federal Claims

(Pro Se)

STANLEY E. KORNAFEL,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

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 No. 21-1821C

 (Filed: March 18, 2022)

Stanley E. Kornafel, Pro Se, Prospect Park, PA.

Ebonie I. Branch, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Commercial 

Litigation Branch, Washington, DC, with whom were Elizabeth M. Hosford, Assistant Director, 

Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, and Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, for 

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

KAPLAN, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff in the above-captioned case, Stanley Kornafel, proceeding pro se, filed a

complaint alleging the commission of various statutory and constitutional violations, as well as 

asserting tort and contract claims, against both the United States and a retired state court judge 

whom he also named as a defendant. See Compl. at 1, Docket No. 1.1 Although his complaint is 

not entirely clear, he appears to argue that unfavorable outcomes in state and federal district 

court proceedings were the result of a conspiracy between the United States and the state court 

judge to deprive him of certain rights. The government filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to 

rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”), 

arguing that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Mr. Kornafel’s complaint and 

that he failed to state a claim. See Def.’s Corrected Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”), Docket No. 

9. For the reasons discussed below, the government’s motion is GRANTED and Mr. Kornafel’s 

complaint will be DISMISSED.

1 Along with his complaint, Mr. Kornafel filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”). Docket No. 2. For purposes of granting the government’s motion to dismiss the case for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s IFP application is GRANTED.
2

BACKGROUND2

Mr. Kornafel asserts that his rights were violated during an allegedly unfair Pennsylvania 

state court proceeding against a car dealership concerning an allegedly defective car he bought in 

2015. Compl. at 1–3 (describing the state court litigation which he characterizes as the “wrongful 

actions of the defendant state judge”). Mr. Kornafel brought an unsuccessful suit in state court,

see Pl.’s Exs. A–E, Docket No. 1-1,

3 and several unsuccessful suits in federal district court, see

Kornafel v. Del Chevrolet, 788 F. App’x 895, 897 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam).4

Mr. Kornafel filed the instant suit on September 3, 2021, claiming that he was denied due 

process and that there was collusion and bias in the handling of his state court case following the 

affirmance of summary judgment for the defendant. See Compl. Specifically, he alleges that both 

the state court judge and the United States committed violations of the First, Fifth, Thirteenth, 

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 9 U.S.C. 

§ 10, the Pennsylvania Constitution, and numerous torts, as well as asserting a breach of contract

claim. Compl. at 1. He seeks “[c]ompensatory damages for careless and negligent decision 

making,” “damages for breach of contract,” and “[p]unitive damages for reckless and careless 

negligence” on the part of the state court. Compl. ¶ 5. 

On December 2, 2021, the government filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Kornafel’s 

complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”), Docket 

No. 9. Mr. Kornafel filed his response on December 27, 2021, Pl.’s Answer to Def.’s Mot. 

(“Pl.’s Resp.”), Docket No. 10, and the government filed its reply in support of its motion on 

January 10, 2022, Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Resp. (“Def.’s Reply”), Docket No. 11.5

2 These facts are based on allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint and attached exhibit, which the 

Court accepts as true solely for purposes of ruling on the pending motion to dismiss. For 

purposes of background, the Court also includes jurisdictional facts drawn from the 

government’s motion. See Rocovich v. United States, 933 F.2d 991, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 

(explaining that the Court may go outside of the pleadings when ruling on a motion to dismiss 

under RCFC 12(b)(1) and “inquire into jurisdictional facts” to determine whether it has 

jurisdiction).

3 Plaintiff attached to his complaint an appendix which contains six hand-paginated Exhibits, and 

the Court refers to the Exhibits’ pagination accordingly. 

4 Mr. Kornafel has previously filed at least three lawsuits in the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concerning the same state court litigation he seeks to 

challenge here. See Kornafel v. Del Chevrolet, No. 20-CV-4991, 2021 WL 26969, at *1 (E.D. 

Pa. Jan. 4, 2021) (imposing a pre-filing injuction “against him based on his prior conduct of 

submitting repetitive baseless lawsuits about his purchase of a car from Del Chevrolet and state 

court litigation relating to the car”). 

5 On January 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a “Motion in Limine to Vacate Defendant’s Reply in 

Support of its Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 60(b), 59 and Biased Prejudice.” Docket. 

No. 12. On February 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a second motion with the same title. Docket No. 14. 
3

DISCUSSION

In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court 

accepts as true all undisputed facts in the pleadings and draws all reasonable inferences in favor 

of the plaintiff. Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

The Court may, however, “inquire into jurisdictional facts” to determine whether it has 

jurisdiction. Rocovich v. United States, 933 F.2d 991, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Further, while it is 

well established that complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are held to “less stringent standards 

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), even pro 

se plaintiffs must persuade the Court that jurisdictional requirements have been met, Harris v. 

United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 290, 292 (2013); see also Zulueta v. United States, 553 F. App’x 983, 

985 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he leniency afforded to a pro se litigant with respect to mere 

formalities does not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements.” (quoting Kelley v. 

Sec’y, United States Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987))).

The Tucker Act grants the United States Court of Federal Claims the power “to render 

judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any 

Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied 

contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding 

in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a). It serves as a waiver of sovereign immunity and a jurisdictional 

grant, but it does not create a substantive cause of action. Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed. 

Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008). A plaintiff must therefore establish that 

“a separate source of substantive law . . . creates the right to money damages.” Id. (quoting 

Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc in relevant part)). Further, 

the Tucker Act does not confer jurisdiction over claims against any entity other than the United 

States. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941) (explaining that claims against 

parties other than the United States are not within this court’s Tucker Act jurisdiction); see also

Jaye v. United States, 781 F. App’x 994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“It is well established that the 

Court of Federal Claims only has jurisdiction to hear claims against the United States.”). 

In this case, Mr. Kornafel names as a defendant a retired state court judge. See Compl. at 

1. However, the United States is the only proper defendant in the Court of Federal Claims. 

Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588. Accordingly, to the extent that he does not state a claim against any 

federal agencies or officials, nor otherwise allege a claim against the United States, this Court 

has no jurisdiction over those claims.

Nor does it have jurisdiction over the constitutional violations he alleges were committed 

by the United States. Specifically, Mr. Kornafel contends that the government violated his rights 

under the First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 

the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Compl. at 1. It is, however, well settled that none of 

The Rules of this court do not provide for the court to vacate a party’s motion. Further, Plaintiff 

filed his motions without leave of court, even though such leave is a prerequisite to filing a 

sur-reply. Because the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over any of Plaintiff’s claims, it 

construes both filings as motions for leave to file a sur-reply, which are both DENIED as moot. 
4

these are money-mandating provisions which could bring Mr. Kornafel’s claim within the 

subject-matter jurisdiction of this Court. United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 

1983) (holding that the First Amendment “cannot be so interpreted to command the payment of 

money”); Le Blanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (observing that “the 

Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments [are not] a sufficient basis for 

jurisdiction because they do not mandate payment of money by the government”); Carter v. 

United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 898, 900 (1981) (observing that the Thirteenth Amendment “do[es] not 

grant a right to the payment of money”).

6

Mr. Kornafel’s statutory claims fare no better. He cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a civil rights 

statute that creates a cause of action against state and local officials, and 9 U.S.C. § 10, a 

provision of the Federal Arbitration Act. Compl. at 1. “Congress,” however, “has expressly 

committed jurisdiction over claims brought under civil rights statutes, like 42 U.S.C. § 1981 [and 

§ 1983], to the United States district courts,” Allen v. United States, No. 2020-2143, 2022 WL 

186067, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2022), and “[t]he Court of Federal Claims is not a district court 

of the United States,” Ledford v. United States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also

28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(1) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 

authorized by law to be commenced by any person . . . [t]o recover damages for . . . the 

deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States,” or “[t]o recover damages 

or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of 

civil rights . . . ”); Drake v. United States, 792 F. App’x 916, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Court of 

Federal Claims likewise does not have jurisdiction to entertain federal civil rights violations 

because the protections afforded by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1988 create liability only 

when injury occurs under state law.”).

Further, this Court “does not have jurisdiction to hear claims of wrongdoing by 

arbitrators [under 9 U.S.C. § 10], because jurisdiction over such claims is vested in the district 

courts.” Turner v. United States, 129 F.3d 134 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Jackson v. United 

States, 10 Cl. Ct. 691, 694 (1986) (noting that “jurisdiction under [9 U.S.C. § 10] rests in the 

district courts”); Mail Transp., Inc. v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 413, 417 (2017) (noting that 9 

U.S.C. § 10 permits “non-parties to an arbitration who are adversely impacted by an award” to 

“apply to a district court for relief from that award” (emphasis supplied)). 

Mr. Kornafel also asserts that this Court’s jurisdiction arises as a result of “[f]ederal 

questions,” but the Court of Federal Claims lacks the authority to exercise federal question 

6 To the extent that Mr. Kornafel’s complaint challenges the outcome of the proceedings 

presided over by the state court judge named in his complaint, it is axiomatic that this Court 

lacks the jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 440 F. 

App’x 916, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating that the Court of Federal Claims does not have 

jurisdiction to review state court decisions). Further, and in any event, as has been explained to 

Plaintiff before, “Judge MacElree is entitled to absolute immunity from [his] § 1983 claims 

because judges are entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights claims that are based on acts or 

omissions taken in their judicial capacity, so long as they do not act in the complete absence of 

all jurisdiction.” Kornafel v. Del Chevrolet, No. 20-CV-4991, 2020 WL 7335467, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 

Dec. 14, 2020) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978)). 
5

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original 

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States.” See Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (observing that the 

Court of Federal Claims “lacks the general federal question jurisdiction of the district courts”).

Plaintiff also alleges a violation of Article I, § 6 (right to jury trial) and Article I, § 17 

(impairment of contracts) of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Compl. at 1; see also Pl.’s Resp. at 1. 

“Claims founded on state law,” however (including those based on state constitutions), “are also 

outside the scope of the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.” Souders v. S.

Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 497 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)); 

United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 215–18 (1983) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1491 limits this 

Court’s jurisdiction to monetary claims founded upon the United States Constitution, federal 

statutes or regulations, or federal contracts).

As to Mr. Kornafel’s claims that sound in tort, see Compl. at 5–6 (alleging fraud, abuse 

of discretion, and conspiracy); id. at 10 (seeking “[c]ompensatory damages for careless and 

negligent decision making” and “biased misuse of authority”), the Tucker Act expressly excludes 

such claims from this Court’s jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (stating that the “Court of 

Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United 

States . . . in cases not sounding in tort ”); Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 214

(1993) (stating that “tort cases are outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims”). 

Claims against individual government or judicial actors, moreover, are also outside this Court’s 

jurisdiction. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating 

that plaintiffs may not “recover damages for unauthorized acts of government officials” in the 

Court of Federal Claims). 

Finally, Mr. Kornafel alleges “breach of contract by way of dissolving court’s duty of 

finding truth causing false result and abortion of justice.” Compl. at 10; see also Pl.’s Resp. at 7

(asserting that the United States Constitution is a contract). Although “[a] non-frivolous 

allegation that a contract exists between a plaintiff and the United States is sufficient to invoke 

the subject matter jurisdiction of [this] Court,” dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is 

nevertheless proper where “the claim is ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’” Ibrahim v. United 

States, 799 F. App’x 865, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 70 F.3d 597, 

602–04 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 

Further, contract claims in the Court of Federal Claims must be supported by 

well-pleaded allegations going to each element of a contract. See Crewzers Fire Crew Transp., 

Inc. v. United States, 741 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2014); RCFC 9(k) (“In pleading a claim 

founded on a contract . . . a party must identify the substantive provisions of the contract . . . on 

which the party relies.”). Plaintiff fails to allege any facts sufficient to show a contract with the 

United States, identify the terms of the contract or the provisions he claims have been breached, 

or otherwise set forth any nonfrivolous factual allegations from which the Court could plausibly 

conclude that Plaintiff had a contract with the United States. D&N Bank v. United States, 331 

F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (providing that “there needs to be something more than a cloud 

of evidence that could be consistent with a contract to prove a contract and enforceable contract 

rights”). Further, “the Constitution cannot be considered an express or implied-in-fact contract 
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concerning which a breach action may be maintained in [the Court of Federal Claims].” Griffith 

v. United States, No. 14-793C, 2015 WL 430285, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 30, 2015) (citing Taylor v. 

United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 171, 173 (2013)). Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed.7

CONCLUSION

The government’s motion to dismiss Mr. Kornafel’s complaint, Docket No. 9, is 

GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff’s motions for leave to 

file sur-replies, Docket Nos. 12, 14, are DENIED as moot. The Clerk shall enter judgment 

accordingly. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Elaine D. Kaplan 

ELAINE D. KAPLAN

Chief Judge

7 Further, and in any event, to the extent that Mr. Kornafel attempts to clarify or raise additional 

claims in his response, arguments not raised in a complaint cannot be raised in response to a 

motion to dismiss. Mendez-Cardenas v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 162, 166–67 (2009) (“[I]t is 

axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to

dismiss.”).