UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

NASSER ALJALHAM, 

Plaintiff, No. 08-14043

Hon. Gerald E. Rosen

v. Mag. Donald A. Scheer

AMERICAN STEAMSHIP COMPANY,

Defendant and 

Third-Party Plaintiff,

v.

ALLOUEZ MARINE SUPPLY,

Third-Party Defendant.

_____________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING 

ALLOUEZ MARINE SUPPLY’S MOTION TO STRIKE 

AMERICAN STEAMSHIP’S THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT

At a session of said Court, held in

the U.S. Courthouse, Detroit,

Michigan on April 29, 2010 

PRESENT: Honorable Gerald E. Rosen

Chief Judge, United States District Court 

I. INTRODUCTION

This Jones Act case is before the Court on Third-Party Defendant Allouez Marine

Supply’s Motion to Strike Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff American Steamship

Company’s Amended Third-Party Complaint. American Steamship Company has filed a

response in opposition. Having reviewed the parties’ written submissions in support of
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and opposition to Allouez Marine Supply’s motion, the accompanying exhibits, and the

record as a whole, the Court finds that the pertinent facts and legal contentions are

sufficiently presented in these materials, and that oral argument would not assist in the

resolution of this motion. Accordingly, the Court will decide Defendants’ motions “on

the briefs.” See Local Rule 7.1(e)(2), U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan. 

This opinion and order sets forth the Court’s rulings on the motion.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This otherwise unremarkable case has the dubious distinction of having a

remarkably protracted procedural history. Because the Court has detailed the salient facts

in prior orders, it will simply summarize them here. Plaintiff Nasser Aljalham filed this

suit on September 19, 2008 against his employer, American Steamship Company (ASC). 

He claims that the back injury he suffered on an ASC ship on September 27, 2005, while

employed as a crewmember and second cook, was a result of ASC’s negligent acts or

omissions. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he was injured while unloading a box of

groceries because the box was too heavy and/or he was not properly warned or provided

sufficient aid in moving it.

After the close of discovery, ASC sought to join Allouez Marine Supply (AMS) as

a third-party defendant. AMS was the supplier of the boxed groceries. ASC alleges that,

because AMS failed to either pack the groceries under recommended weight guidelines or

label the box as heavy, it was partly or wholly responsible for Plaintiff’s injury. After

denying ASC’s requests twice, the Court eventually permitted ASC to file a third-party
1

 AMS also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 60) on April 1, 2010. Two

motions in limine (Dkt. #39, 40) filed by ASC in January are pending.

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complaint in the context of a re-opened discovery period. ASC filed a Third-Party

Complaint, impleading AMS on August 18, 2009. The Court extended the re-opened

discovery to December 14, 2009. In January 2010, AMS and ASC filed motions for

summary judgment. Upon reviewing the motions, the Court found that ASC’s ThirdParty Complaint was procedurally defective insofar as it was filed pursuant to Rule 14(c)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As the Court explained in its March 4, 2010

Order and Opinion, Rule 14(c) applies exclusively to claims that have been formally

designated as sounding in admiralty or maritime law under Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Because Plaintiff’s Complaint, which raised both Jones Act and

maritime law claims, did not formally designate the claims as sounding in admiralty or

maritime law, the Court concluded that impleader was only appropriate under Rule 14(a),

which governs general impleader. Based on this finding, the Court ordered the ThirdParty Complaint dismissed, but granted ASC leave to file an Amended Third-Party

Complaint, reformulating its claims under Rule 14(a) “to cure the procedural defect.” 

(Dkt. # 55.) ASC filed the Amended Third-party Complaint on March 12, 2010. 

Through the present motion filed on March 22, 2010, AMS seeks to have the Amended

Third-Party Complaint stricken.1
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III. ANALYSIS

A. Standards Applicable to Third-Party Defendant’s Motion

Under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court may strike

from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Although the action of striking a pleading

should be used sparingly by the courts, motions to strike are generally granted where the

allegations are clearly immaterial to the controversy or would prejudice the movant. 

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953). 

Ultimately, the decision to strike a pleading is firmly within the discretion of the court. 

Ameriwood Industries Intern. Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 961 F. Supp. 1078, 1083

(W.D. Mich. 1997) (citing cases). Furthermore, pursuant to Rule 14(a)(4) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a]ny party may move to strike the third-party claim, to sever

it, or to try it separately.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(4). 

B. The Amended Third-Party Complaint Shall Not Be Stricken Because It

Restates Allegations Made in the Original Complaint, Albeit in Greater

Detail.

The original Third-Party Complaint in this action was seven paragraphs long. It

alleged, inter alia, that: 

if the Plaintiff has suffered any loss or injury as a result of the incident of

September 27, 2005, the loss was proximately caused by the failure of the

agents, representatives, and employees of Third-Party Defendant to

properly perform the duties and obligations imposed upon it, and said loss,

if any was proximately caused by conditions or circumstances for which the

Third-Party Defendant is liable and responsible.
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(Third-Party Compl. ¶ 5.) ASC also sought contribution and/or indemnification. The

First Amended Third-Party Complaint, filed after this Court found the original ThirdParty Complaint procedurally defective, is twenty-seven paragraphs long and sets out in

greater detail three separate counts for negligence, contribution and Ryan indemnity. 

AMS claims that the Amended Complaint exceeds the scope of the Court’s leave “to cure

the procedural defect.” While ASC has clearly exploited its own procedural misstep to

refine and elaborate on its original Third-Party Complaint, the Court declines to strike the

pleading for the reasons set forth below.

AMS argues that ASC’s Amended Complaint should be stricken for adding claims

and theories against AMS that were not alleged in the original Third-Party Complaint. 

Specifically, AMS contends that it will be prejudiced if ASC’s Amended Complaint is

allowed to stand since “[n]o discovery was conducted into the issue of whether AMS was

negligent as this was not a theory alleged against AMS until the filing of the amended

third-party complaint.” (AMS Mot. to Strike 3.) In addition, AMS argues that it has

conducted no discovery into the Ryan indemnity claim. ASC counters that the Amended

Complaint merely “‘repackaged’ the [negligence] claim for clarity’s sake.” (ASC Resp.,

Br. in Support 4.) ASC further argues that the Ryan indemnity claim is the same relief

sought in the original Complaint.

With respect to the negligence allegations in ASC’s Amended Third-Party

Complaint, the Court finds that AMS was sufficiently on notice during the discovery

period that it would have to defend against allegations of negligence. Although AMS did
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not use the term “negligence” in the original Third-Party Complaint, negligence could be

inferred from ASC’s allegations that Plaintiff’s injury was proximately caused by AMS’s

failure to “properly perform the duties and obligations imposed upon it.” Moreover,

because the Third-Party Complaint was brought under Rule 14(c), ASC’s original ThirdParty Complaint incorporated all of Plaintiff’s claims for negligence—irrespective of the

fact that Rule 14(c) was an improper procedural mechanism for impleader. That is, ASC

sought judgment against AMS in favor of Plaintiff, effectively transferring Plaintiff’s

negligence allegations onto AMS, as is uniquely permitted under Rule 14(c). Thus,

Plaintiff’s allegations, combined with ASC’s allegations, which sound in negligence,

were well known to AMS during the discovery period. AMS had ample opportunity to

explore the factual issues surrounding its alleged duty, breach and negligence vis-à-vis

both Plaintiff and ASC. It will not be prejudiced if ASC’s lengthier and more detailed

allegations outlining the nature of the alleged negligence are permitted to stand.

With respect to ASC’s claims for Ryan indemnity, the Court similarly finds that

the underlying claim of indemnity is the same as was stated in simpler terms in the

original Third-Party Complaint. In maritime and admiralty cases, the common law rule of

joint and several liability applies, such that concurrent tortfeasors are each liable in full

for the damages sustained by a tort claimant. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale

Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 260, 99 S. Ct. 2753, 2756 (1979), reh’g denied, 444 U.S.

889, 100 S. Ct. 194 (1979). Contribution requires each torfeasor to pay its proportional

share, while indemnity permits one party to shift the entire amount of the loss (including
2

 Ryan indemnity is a doctrine that was established by the Supreme Court in a 1956

landmark decision, Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.

Ct. 232 (1956). The doctrine was developed in part to address the messy intersection of

two loss-allocation mechanisms: strict liability for unseaworthiness claims against

shipowners under general maritime law and the workers’ compensation scheme

established for longshoremen through the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'

Compensation Act (LHWCA). In Ryan, which involved a longshoreman injured in the

course of unloading a ship, the Court considered whether the shipowner, which was liable

for damages on the longshoreman’s claim of unseaworthiness, could seek indemnity from

the longshoreman’s employer, a stevedoring company. The longshoreman had already

collected the statutorily limited award from his employer for his injuries and was barred

from suing the employer directly for either negligence or unseaworthiness. The Court

found that the shipowner could collect from the stevedoring company on a theory that the

latter had breached an implied warranty of workmanlike performance in the stevedoring

contract. Id. at 133. Federal courts went on to apply this doctrine to a wide variety of

marine contracts—including contracts to perform services, repair ships, and other

offshore service contracts. 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Mar. Law § 5-8. 

However, subsequent Supreme Court decisions and 1972 amendments to the LHWCA

significantly reduced the application of the Ryan doctrine. Id. In spite of these changes,

the Ryan doctrine has never been directly overruled. The Sixth Circuit has applied the

Ryan doctrine in Jones Act personal injury actions. See Oglebay Norton Co. v. CSX

Corp., 788 F.2d 361, 364-65 (6th Cir. 1986). Yet, the court has declined to apply the

doctrine where the key elements—a shipowner liable without fault for a seaman’s

personal injuries and harm caused by a stevedoring or marine services contractor with

which the shipowner has a relationship—are absent. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stokes

Oil Co., Inc., 863 F.2d 1250, 1256-58 (6th Cir. 1988).

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attorneys’ fees) from one party to another. In admiralty, parties may seek three kinds of

indemnity: contractual indemnity, implied contractual indemnity under the Ryan doctrine,

or tort indemnity. 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Mar. Law § 5-18 (4th ed.)2

 In

the original Third-Party Complaint, ASC stated only that it sought “indemnity,” but it did

not specify the legal nature of that request. It has now narrowed its allegations to Ryan

indemnity, specifically alleging that AMS owes ASC a duty to perform its work in a

“workman like manner.” The Court finds that it does not unduly prejudice AMS to
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permit these allegations to stand. AMS had the opportunity to explore indemnity

issues—whether contractual, implied under the Ryan doctrine or tort-based—during the

extended discovery period. Moreover, the newly refined allegations in the Amended

Third-Party Complaint limit ASC’s theory of indemnity and thus potentially work in

AMS’s favor.

AMS further argues that Ryan indemnity is unavailable to ASC as a matter of law. 

First, AMS contends that ASC’s claim of indemnity and/or contribution does not sound in

maritime or admiralty law and thus Ryan indemnity, which is a maritime law doctrine, is

inapplicable. Second, AMS argues that Ryan indemnity is solely available to shipowners

seeking indemnification from stevedores, wharfingers, dock owners or other similar

marine services contractors. AMS argues that it does not qualify as such a marine

services contractor and thus cannot be found liable for indemnification under the Ryan

indemnity doctrine. ASC counters that because the nature and character of the contract

between ASC and AMS is related to a maritime service, admiralty law applies. It does

not address AMS’s arguments with respect to the applicability of the Ryan indemnity

doctrine to a grocery supplier. 

The Court finds that admiralty law governs ASC’s claim of contribution and/or

indemnity from ASC. Where the underlying action raises question of general maritime or

admiralty law, maritime rather than state law controls claims of contribution and/or

indemnity. See Oglebay Norton Co. v. CSX Corp., 788 F.2d 361, 363-65 (6th Cir. 1986)

(affirming magistrate judge’s finding that maritime law controls shipowner’s claim of
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indemnity and that the Ryan indemnity doctrine applies, even where underlying action

was a Jones Act case, but reversing decision to award indemnity because magistrate

improperly considered comparative fault); Sims v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 520

F.2d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 1975). This Court’s finding that Plaintiff did not invoke admiralty

jurisdiction for purposes of Rule 14(c) impleader does not render maritime law

inapplicable in adjudicating the contribution and indemnity claims—particularly where

those claims are premised on Plaintiff’s underlying allegations brought concurrently

under the Jones Act and general maritime law.

Finally, the Court finds that AMS is not unduly prejudiced by the invocation of

Ryan indemnity, even if the applicability of the doctrine in this context is perhaps

doubtful. AMS has raised several difficult questions regarding the application of Ryan

indemnity to it as a shore-based supplier of groceries and whether there are any claims

under which ASC may be found liable without fault. However, although these arguments

may ultimately be valid, they are best addressed in a motion for judgment on the record as

a whole, rather than in the context of a motion to strike a pleading, particularly where the

parties have not sufficiently briefed the issues in the present motion. Finally, the Court

finds that AMS has not shown that ASC’s Ryan indemnity pleadings constitute

“redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter,” warranting the severe act of

striking the pleading from the docket.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons,
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Third-Party Defendant’s 

March 22, 2010 motion to strike Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff’s amended third-party

complaint [Dkt. #57] is DENIED.

s/Gerald E. Rosen 

Gerald E. Rosen

Chief Judge, United States District Court

Dated: April 29, 2010

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on

April 29, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Ruth A.Gunther 

Case Manager

(313) 234-5137