United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-10434

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Steven Riad Jalloul, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:19-CR-94-1

Before King, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Steven Riad Jalloul pleaded guilty to two counts of preparing false tax 

returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). At sentencing, the district court 

ordered him to pay $14,100,029.87 in restitution to the IRS. Jalloul did not 

object. He now challenges that restitution order, arguing it is a criminal 

monetary penalty that exceeds the maximum statutory sentence because it is

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 6, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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neither authorized by the statute of conviction, nor agreed to in the plea 

agreement. Because the restitution order was authorized by the statute and 

Jalloul agreed to it in his plea agreement, we AFFIRM.

* * *

The Government first argues that Jalloul’s appeal is barred by the 

appeal-waiver provision in his plea agreement. But this appeal falls within the 

agreement’s exception for a direct appeal of “a sentence exceeding the 

statutory maximum.” See United States v. Kim, 988 F.3d 803, 811 (5th Cir. 

2021) (holding “an otherwise valid appeal waiver is not enforceable to bar a 

defendant’s challenge on appeal that his sentence, including the amount of a 

restitution order, exceeds the statutory maximum”), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 

225 (2021). Nevertheless, Jalloul’s appeal ultimately fails. 

“Because a restitution order that exceeds the court’s statutory 

authority is an illegal sentence, which always constitutes plain error, we 

review de novo the legality of a restitution order, regardless of whether the 

defendant raised this objection at sentencing.” United States v. Penn, 969 

F.3d 450, 458 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2526 (2021); see also

United States v. Swenson, 25 F.4th 309, 322 (5th Cir. 2022). The Government 

seeks leave to file a supplemental brief arguing that plain-error review applies. 

Although some cases have applied plain-error review, we need not here 

resolve which standard of review applies because Jalloul’s arguments fail 

even under the more lenient one. See United States v. Pursley, 22 F.4th 586, 

591 (5th Cir. 2022). Therefore, the Government’s motion for leave to file a 

supplemental brief is DENIED as moot.

A district court may impose restitution only as authorized by statute. 

Penn, 969 F.3d at 458. Restitution is generally not statutorily authorized for 

Title 26 offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663. But 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) allows a 

district court to “order restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed 

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to by the parties in a plea agreement.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3); United States 

v. Stout, 32 F.3d 901, 905 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting § 3663(a)(3)). We treat 

plea agreements like contracts, considering a defendant’s reasonable 

understanding of the agreement and construing ambiguities against the 

Government. See United States v. Escobedo, 757 F.3d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 2014); 

United States v. Story, 439 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 2006). 

Jalloul’s plea agreement stated that the district court could impose 

“restitution to victims or to the community, which may be mandatory under 

the law, and which the defendant agrees may include restitution arising from 

all relevant conduct, not limited to that arising from the offense of conviction

alone.” Further, the paragraph detailing the defendant’s agreement 

stipulated, “The defendant fully understands that any financial obligation 

imposed by the Court, including a restitution order and/or the 

implementation of a fine, is due and payable immediately. . . . The defendant 

understands that the defendant has a continuing obligation to pay in full as 

soon as possible any financial obligation imposed by the Court.”

Jalloul argues that the plea agreement’slanguage is ambiguous, and he 

did not explicitly agree to pay restitution. We held in United States v. Miller

that identical plea language unambiguously constituted an agreement to pay 

restitution. 406 F.3d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 2005). Jalloul contends this line was 

dicta, but he is wrong. See United States v. Wallace, 964 F.3d 386, 390 (5th 

Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 910 (2020) (noting that alternative holdings 

are binding and not dicta); United States v. Segura, 747 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 

2014). Because Jalloul agreed to pay restitution, the criminal monetary 

penalty was authorized by law. See § 3663(a)(3); Stout, 32 F.3d at 905 n.5.

AFFIRMED.

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