United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 19, 2011*

Decided May 19, 2011

By the Court:

No. 10-3796

JOHN WALTER GERMAINE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARIKA NYMAN ST. GERMAIN, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 10-cv-515-bbc

Barbara B. Crabb,

Judge.

O R D E R

After the death of his brother, John Germaine filed this suit in the Eastern District of

Wisconsin. His complaint is difficult to parse but appears to attack his brother’s Florida

divorce judgment and to allege that the contentious proceedings caused his brother’s death.

Germaine names as defendants his brother’s ex-wife, her lawyer, and other parties whose

roles are tough to pin down. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, but first

Judge Stadtmueller sua sponte ordered the suit transferred to the Western District of

Wisconsin, explaining that Germaine resides there in Dane County and that none of the

defendants has any apparent ties to the Eastern District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); Muldoon v.

Tropitone Furniture Co., 1 F.3d 964, 965-66 (9th Cir. 1993); Carver v. Knox County, 887 F.2d

1287, 1291 (6th Cir. 1989); Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1989). Once

Judge Crabb took on the case, she granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, reasoning

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Germaine’s efforts to challenge the Florida divorce

judgment and that Germaine does not have standing to pursue his wrongful-death claim.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).
No. 10-3796 Page 2

On appeal, Germaine argues that Judge Crabb “erred in thinking that there was any

jurisdictional obstacle to this suit.” We agree that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine poses no

obstacle. The doctrine, which holds that the lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to review

the decision of a state court in a civil case, D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482

(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); Gilbert v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 591

F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 2010), cannot be invoked against a litigant who was not a party to the

state-court proceeding, Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1006 (1994); Riehm v. Engelking,

538 F.3d 952, 965 (8th Cir. 2008); Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1234-36 (10th

Cir. 2006); Leaf v. Supreme Court, 979 F.2d 589, 598 (7th Cir. 1992). And Germaine was not a

party to his brother’s divorce suit.

Nevertheless, we conclude that the suit properly was dismissed for want of subjectmatter jurisdiction. We see no hint of a federal claim in Germaine’s complaint; the only

discernible claim is a wrongful-death action. And like Judge Crabb, we harbor serious

doubt whether Germaine successfully states a claim under either Florida law, FLA. STAT.

§§ 768.16-.26; Wagner, Vaughn, McLaughlin & Brennan, P.A. v. Kennedy Law Grp., No. SC08-

1525, 2011 WL 1304921, at *3-*4 (Fla. Apr. 7, 2011), or Wisconsin law, WIS. STAT. § 895.03;

Johnson v. ABC Ins. Co., 532 N.W.2d 130, 133-34 (Wis. 1995). Only the decedent’s personal

representative is authorized to bring a wrongful-death action under Florida law, FLA. STAT.

§ 768.20; Wiggins v. Estate of Wright, 850 So. 2d 444, 446 (Fla. 2003), but Germaine does not

allege that he is his brother’s personal representative. In fact, Germaine could not even

recover unless he was dependent on his brother for support, see FLA. STAT. §§ 768.20,

768.18(1); Thompson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 670 So. 2d 1070, 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1996), another allegation that is missing from his complaint. As for Wisconsin law, any

person entitled by statute to recover for a wrongful death may sue directly—even though he

is not the decedent’s personal representative—but a brother can recover only if the decedent

is not survived by lineal heirs. WIS. STAT. §§ 895.04(1), (2), 852.01(1)(d); Day v. Allstate Indem.

Co., 784 N.W.2d 694, 698 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010). Germaine does not make that allegation

either. Nor does he allege any substantial act or omission occurring in Wisconsin that

“caused” or contributed to his brother’s death. See WIS. STAT. § 895.03; Schnabl v. Ford Motor

Co., 195 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Wis. 1972).

We must cut short this discussion of the merits, however, because the complaint

suffers from a defect that is both obvious and fatal: It does not allege diversity of citizenship

among the parties, as it must to support federal jurisdiction over Germaine’s state-law

claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); McMillian v. Sheraton Chi. Hotel & Towers, 567 F.3d 839, 845

n.10 (7th Cir. 2009); McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 890-91 (7th Cir. 2006); Casio, Inc. v.

S.M. & R. Co., 755 F.2d 528, 529-30 (7th Cir. 1985). Germaine fails to identify the citizenship,

as opposed to the residence, of the individual defendants, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1);
No. 10-3796 Page 3

Meyerson v. Harrah’s E. Chi. Casino, 299 F.3d 616, 617 (7th Cir. 2002); McMahon v.

Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir. 1998); Guar. Nat’l Title Co. v. J.E.G. Assocs.,

101 F.3d 57, 58-59 (7th Cir. 1996), and he neglects to say where any of the corporate

defendants is incorporated or has its principal place of business, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1);

Smoot v. Mazda Motors of Am., Inc., 469 F.3d 675, 676 (7th Cir. 2006); Wild v. Subscription Plus,

Inc., 292 F.3d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 2002); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. E. Atl. Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 742, 747

(7th Cir. 2001). Because of these omissions, the complaint properly was dismissed for want

of subject-matter jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED.