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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DAVE ANTHONY RICHARDS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 5:08-CV-13720

v. HONORABLE JOHN CORBETT O’MEARA

KATHLEEN MACDONALD, et al.,

Defendants.

______________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT

AND CONCLUDING THAT AN APPEAL CANNOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH

I. Introduction

Dave Richards (“Plaintiff”), a Michigan prisoner currently confined at the Boyer Road

Correctional Facility in Carson City, Michigan, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, as well as a motion for a preliminary injunction. He has paid the filing fee for

this action. In his complaint, Plaintiff challenges the State’s seizure of 90% of his pension

benefits as reimbursement for the cost of his incarceration, which was done pursuant to the

Michigan State Correctional Facilities Reimbursement Act (“SCFRA”). According to Plaintiff,

the Wayne County Circuit Court entered it final order on August 15, 2008. Plaintiff does not

indicate whether he is appealing that judgment in the state courts. Plaintiff names Wayne

County Circuit Judge Kathleen MacDonald, Assistant Attorney General Deborah Benedict

Waldmeir, and State Treasurer Robert J. Kleine as defendants in this action. He seeks injunctive

relief, including an order precluding the seizure of his pension benefits, as well as other
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remedies. Having reviewed the complaint, the Court dismisses it for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and on the basis of immunity. The Court also denies Plaintiff’s motion for a

preliminary injunction. Lastly, the Court concludes that an appeal cannot be taken in good faith.

II. Discussion

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)

(“PLRA”), the Court is required to sua sponte dismiss a complaint seeking redress against

government entities, officers, and employees which it finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks relief from a defendant who is immune

from suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in

law or in fact. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 325 (1989).

To state a federal civil rights claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant is a

person who acted under color of state or federal law, and (2) the defendant’s conduct deprived

the plaintiff of a federal right, privilege, or immunity. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,

155-57 (1978); Brock v. McWherter, 94 F.3d 242, 244 (6th Cir. 1996). A pro se civil rights

complaint is to be construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jones

v. Duncan, 840 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 1988). Despite the liberal pleading standard accorded

pro se plaintiffs, the Court finds that the complaint is subject to summary dismissal.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine, see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia

Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), which “holds that lower federal courts lack subject
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matter jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of state court proceedings or to adjudicate

claims ‘inextricably intertwined’ with issues decided in state court proceedings.” Peterson

Novelties, Inc. v. City of Berkley, 305 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Hutcherson v.

Lauderdale County, Tenn., 326 F.3d 747, 755 (6th Cir. 2003). As the United States Supreme

Court has explained, “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal courts from

exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’ challenging ‘state-court

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis, 546

U.S. 459, __, 126 S. Ct. 1198, 1199 (2006) (per curiam) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi

Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies “when a

plaintiff complains of injury from the state court judgment itself.” Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d

853, 858 (6th Cir. 2006). Thus, “[i]n determining the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, federal courts cannot simply compare the issues involved in the state-court proceeding

to those raised in the federal-court plaintiff’s complaint, but instead must pay close attention to

the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff.” Hood v. Keller, 341 F.3d 593, 597 (6th Cir.

2003) (internal quotation omitted). “If the source of the injury is that state court decision, then

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would prevent the district court from asserting jurisdiction. If

there is some other source of injury, such as a third party’s actions, then the plaintiff asserts an

independent claim.” McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006). The doctrine

applies to attempts to relitigate state court judgments entered before the federal suit was filed; it

does not abrogate concurrent jurisdiction in federal and state courts, nor is it analogous to a

preclusion doctrine. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292.

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a rule of federal jurisdiction.” Frederickson v. City of
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Lockport, 384 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2004). Consequently, it may be raised sua sponte. See

Saker v. National City Corp., 90 Fed. Appx. 816, 818 n.1 (6th Cir. 2004). When a claim is

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a court must dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction. 

See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte

McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)).

Applying the foregoing principles to the present complaint, the Court finds that it lacks

subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Plaintiff does not bring a general challenge to the SCFRA. Rather, he challenges its application

in his case. The injury complained of is the taking of his pension funds, and that injury is

directly and solely traceable to the state court judgment permitting the State to take those funds. 

In other words, Plaintiff has “repaired to federal court to undo the [Michigan] judgment,” Exxon

Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293, and each of his claims “rests on the premise that the state court entry of

[judgment] was invalid.” Thompkins-El v. Wells Fargo Bank Minn., No. 05-CV-74715, 2006

WL 2433438, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2006) (Battani, J.); see also Yee v. Michigan Sup. Ct.,

No. 06-CV-15142, 2007 WL 200952, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2007) (Rosen, J.). Such claims

are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Abbott v. Michigan, 474 F.3d 324, 329 (6th Cir.

2007) (holding that prisoners’ challenges to the applicability of the SCFRA to them and claims

of specific injuries arising from the taking of their pension benefits under the SCFRA were

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Gale v. General Motors, No. 06-CV-15710, 2007 WL

2875251, *3-4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2007). Because Plaintiff seeks to prevent the taking of his

pension benefits, which is the direct and immediate product of the state-court judgment, his

claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
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Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s federal claims are barred even if they were

not specifically presented in the state court. A federal claim which calls into question the

validity of the state court judgment is inextricably intertwined with the judgment even if the

federal claim was not presented in the state court proceeding; all that is required is that the

federal plaintiff have had the opportunity to present the issues involved to the state court. See

Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2002); Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge,

211 F.3d 194, 201 (4th Cir. 2000); Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 1992), quoted

with approval in Wilde v. Ohio Veterinary Med. Licencing Bd., 31 Fed. Appx. 164, 166 (6th Cir.

Feb. 21, 2002). Plaintiff had the opportunity to present his claims in the state SCFRA action. 

He can also appeal the state court decision to the Michigan appellate courts, and ultimately the

United States Supreme Court, if necessary. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, this

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his current claims.

B. Absolute Immunity

The Court also finds that Wayne County Circuit Court Judge Kathleen MacDonald is

entitled to absolute immunity in this case. Judges and judicial employees are entitled to absolute

judicial immunity on claims for damages. See Mireles v Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (per

curiam) (judge performing judicial functions is absolutely immune from suit seeking monetary

damages even if acting erroneously, corruptly or in excess of jurisdiction); Collyer v. Darling, 98

F.3d 211, 221 (6th Cir. 1996). Moreover, the 1996 amendments to § 1983 extended absolute

immunity for state judges to requests for injunctive or equitable relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(“in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s

judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated
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or declaratory relief is unavailable”); see also Kipen v. Lawson, 57 Fed. Appx. 691 (6th Cir.

2003) (discussing federal judges’ immunity); Kircher v. City of Ypsilanti, et al., 458 F. Supp. 2d

439, 446-47 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (Rosen, J.); accord Asubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3rd

Cir. 2006); Hass v. Wisconsin, et al., 109 Fed. Appx. 107, 113-14 (7th Cir. 2004); Bolin v. Story,

225 F.3d 1234, 1240-42 (11th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s challenges to the SCFRA proceedings

involve the performance of judicial duties. Defendant MacDonald is absolutely immune from

suit for such conduct and the claims against her must also be dismissed on that basis.

Additionally, the Court notes that Assistant Attorney General Deborah Benedict

Waldmeir is absolutely immune from suit given that Plaintiff challenges her decision and actions

in pursuing the state court action to take his pension benefits. It is well-established that

prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for conduct intimately associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). Such

immunity has been extended to cover any activities undertaken “in connection with [one’s]

duties in functioning as a prosecutor.” Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2002);

see also Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 798 (6th Cir. 2003) (looking to whether

prosecutor acts as an advocate). The immunity extends beyond the criminal process to conduct

in civil proceedings where a government attorney initiates judicial proceedings, Cooper v.

Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 947 (6th Cir. 2000), or defends a civil suit, Al-Bari v. Winn, No. 89-5150,

1990 WL 94229, *1 (6th Cir. July 9, 1990). Absolute prosecutorial immunity exists even when a

prosecutor acts wrongfully or maliciously. See Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th

Cir. 1989). Because Defendant Waldmeir acted as an advocate for the State in the SCFRA

proceedings, she is entitled to absolute immunity for such conduct.
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III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s claims arising from the state court judgment authorizing the taking of his pension

benefits under the SCFRA. Additionally, defendants MacDonald and Waldmeir are absolutely

immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s

complaint. Given this determination, the Court also DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for a

preliminary injunction.

Lastly, the Court concludes that an appeal from this order would be frivolous and cannot

be taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d

601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/John Corbett O’Meara 

United States District Judge

Date: September 17, 2008

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties of record on

this date, September 17, 2008, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/William Barkholz 

Case Manager