J-S01018-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION, ET AL

v.

B. JAY BAGDIS, PAMELA BAGDIS 

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B. JAY BAGDIS

v.

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION

APPEAL OF: B. JAY BAGDIS

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1783 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered May 17, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County,

Civil Division at No(s): 2013-07035.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: Filed: March 17, 2020

Appellant, B. Jay Bagdis, a former attorney proceeding pro se, filed one 

notice of appeal from an order granting summary judgment to JPMorgan 

Chase. However, he listed two docket numbers: one for this appealed, quiettitle case (Bagdis v. JP Morgan Chase) and one for a consolidated, 

mortgage-foreclosure case (JP Morgan Chase et al. v. Bagdis and Bagdis)

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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that he did not appeal. The foreclosure case is still under the trial court’s 

jurisdiction. Preliminarily, we must decide (1) whether the summaryjudgment order was interlocutory and (2) whether Mr. Bagdis’ inclusion of the 

foreclosure’s docket number on his notice of appeal requires us to quash under 

Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018). We conclude that

Walker does not apply and affirm.

The trial court accurately related the facts and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

In February of 2003, [Mr.] Bagdis and his wife 

executed a promissory note secured by a mortgage to 

Washington Mutual Bank . . . in order to secure a loan taken 

to purchase property . . . (hereinafter referred to as “the 

Property”). Five years later, on September 25, 2008, due 

to insolvency, Washington Mutual was closed by the United 

States government. The Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation became the receiver of all of Washington 

Mutual’s assets. On that same date, [Defendant], Chase 

purchased all the loans of Washington Mutual from the 

FDIC.

The Bagdises defaulted on the mortgage loan in April 

of 2012. On April 3, 2013, Chase filed a mortgage 

foreclosure lawsuit, captioned as Montgomery County Court 

of Common Pleas 2013-07035, (hereinafter referred to as 

“the foreclosure lawsuit.”). At the time this lawsuit was 

filed, Chase had possession of the original Note and 

Mortgage . . . [Following several assignments, Wilmington 

Savings Fund Society (“WSFS”)] is currently in possession 

of the original note and mortgage signed by Mr. and Mrs. 

Bagdis.

On December 17, 2015, Bagdis filed an action to quiet 

title in Montgomery County. This lawsuit, captioned as 

Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas 2015-32345, 

(hereinafter referred to as “the quiet-title lawsuit”) seeks to 

determine the current holder of the note for the Bagdises 
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loan. In the complaint in this quiet-title lawsuit, [Mr.] 

Bagdis acknowledged that he and his wife had signed the 

original note and taken out the mortgage. [Mr.] Bagdis also 

pleads that the assignment of the mortgage from the FDIC 

to Chase and the assignment from Chase to FNMA were 

recorded. This lawsuit was consolidated with the mortgage 

foreclosure lawsuit.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/2/19, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted). 

On January 24, 2018, Chase moved for summary judgment to dismiss

the quiet-title lawsuit against it. Chase argued that, having assigned the 

mortgage and the note to another entity, it no longer had any interest in the 

property and thus the quiet-title action against it was moot. The trial court 

agreed, granted Chase summary judgment, and dismissed docket number

2015-32345. 

Three weeks later, Mr. Bagdis filed a notice of appeal. He captioned it 

as follows:

______________________________________________

:

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, National Association, et al : Civil Action – Foreclosure

Plaintiffs :

v. : No. 2013-07035

:

B. JAY BAGDIS :

PAMELA BAGDIS, :

Defendants :

______________________________________________:

B. JAY BAGDIS, :

Plaintiff : Civil Action – Quiet Title

v. :

: No. 2013-07035

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, National Assocation, : (consolidated from 2015-32435)

Defendant :

______________________________________________:

Bagdis’ Notice of Appeal at 1.
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On appeal, Mr. Bagdis raises three claims of error, contending that the 

trial court should not have granted summary judgment to JPMorgan Chase. 

Preliminarily, however, we must first resolve two procedural issues:

1. Whether Mr. Bagdis has prematurely appealed from 

an interlocutory order?

2. If Mr. Bagdis’ appeal is ripe, whether his inclusion of 

two docket numbers on the notice of appeal requires 

us to quash the appeal under Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 341(a) Note and the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Walker?

Although Mr. Bagdis takes no position on either of these issue in his 

brief, Chase does. Chase contends the appealed-from order is not 

interlocutory. In its view, the summary-judgment grant was a final order in

Mr. Bagdis’ quiet-title action. Chase asserts that that action is severable from 

the foreclosure matter for appellate purposes. It therefore believes that the 

quiet-title case is properly within our appellate jurisdiction. Regarding the 

second issue, Chase asks us to quash, because it believes that Mr. Bagdis 

violated Walker, supra. 

We discuss each issue in turn.

We first consider whether this appeal is premature i.e. whether the order 

on appeal was a final order. Although neither party raised this issue, we may 

“raise the issue sua sponte, because it affects the jurisdiction of the court.” 

Brickman Group, Ltd. v. CGU Ins. Co., 829 A.2d 1160, 1163 (Pa.Super. 

2003).
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“Jurisdiction is purely a question of law; the appellate standard of review 

is de novo, and the scope of review plenary.” Barak v. Karolizki, 196 A.3d 

208, 215 (Pa.Super. 2018).

An appellate court only “has jurisdiction to entertain appeals taken (1) 

as of right from a final order; (2) from interlocutory orders by permission; (3) 

from certain interlocutory orders as of right; and (4) from certain collateral 

orders.” Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria City v. Int'l Ins. Co., 685 A.2d 

581, 585 (Pa.Super. 1996) (citations omitted). Hence, if the order granting 

summary judgment to Chase is not within those four categories, we lack 

appellate jurisdiction. “An order is final if it disposes of all claims and all 

parties, and an order is interlocutory when it does not effectively put a litigant 

out of court.” Koken v. Colonial Assurance Co., 885 A.2d 1078, 1101 

(Pa.Cmwlth. 2005) (citation omitted), affirmed per curiam, 893 A.2d 98 (Pa. 

2006).

Here, the trial court consolidated two cases, because they both involved 

the same parcel of land, presented similar questions of law, and involved 

identical parties. It later terminated one of those actions (the quiet-title case) 

through a grant of summary judgment. However, as the trial court observed 

in its Rule 1925(a) Opinion, and as the judicial records of the trial court 

indicate, the foreclosure is currently proceeding before the trial court. See

Trial Court Opinion, 7/2/19, at 5.

When consolidation of cases occurs and the trial court later grants 

summary judgment in one action, the summary-judgment grant may be a 
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final order that is immediately appeal under Malanchuk v. Tsimura, 137 

A.2d 1283 (Pa. 2016). In Malanchuk, a plaintiff sued two defendants in 

separate actions, even though all of his injuries arose from the same event. 

The trial court consolidated the two lawsuits “for purpose of discovery, 

arbitration, and . . . trial.” Id., 137 at 1284 (quoting trial court’s consolidation 

order). One of the defendants won summary judgment as to all claims against 

him; the other defendant did not. The plaintiff immediately appealed the grant 

of summary judgment.

This Court, sitting en banc, quashed the appeal. The Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania reversed and explained that, when a trial court consolidates 

separate civil actions, “in every other respect the actions remain distinct and 

require separate verdicts and judgments.” Malanchuk v. Tsimura, 137 A.3d 

at 1286 (quoting Azinger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 105 A. 87, 88 (Pa. 1918)). 

Indeed, “complete consolidation between actions involving non-identical 

parties, subject matter, issues and defenses, is simply untenable.” Id. 

Therefore, “whether a separate-judgment rule pertains hinges upon whether 

. . . consolidated actions merge, thereby erasing the separate identities of the 

actions.” Id. Merger only occurs under Azinger and Malanchuk when there 

is “complete identity of parties and claims . . . .” Id. at 1288.

In the matter at bar, there is not complete identity of parties between 

this quiet-title action and the foreclosure action. For instance, Appellant’s 

wife, Pamela Bagdis, is a defendant in the foreclosure action, but she is not a 

party to the quiet title action.. Additionally, Chase is no longer a party in the 
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mortgage-foreclosure action, because other banks have substituted 

themselves as plaintiffs. We therefore conclude that the trial court’s order of 

consolidation did not merge the two cases, so as to extinguish their separate 

identities under Azinger and Malanchuk.

Accordingly, the order dated May 17, 2019 granting summary judgment 

in the quiet-title action in favor of Chase is a final order in a separate, 

unmerged action. We therefore have appellate jurisdiction over this appeal

from that final order.

Next, we must decide whether Mr. Bagdis violated Pa.R.A.P. 341(a) Note 

and Walker, supra. As mentioned, Chase contends that Walker and its 

progeny, e.g., Commonwealth v. Creese, 216 A.3d 1142 (Pa.Super. 2019),1

control, and that this Court must quash Mr. Bagdis’ appeal. We disagree.

When interpreting a procedural rule, we face “a question of law . . . our 

standard of review is de novo, and our scope is plenary.” Commonwealth 

v. Far, 46 A.3d 709, 712 (Pa. 2012). 

In Walker, the Commonwealth attempted, with one notice of appeal, 

to challenge the suppression of evidence regarding four co-defendants. The 

trial court entered one order, at all four docket numbers, because the cases 

were consolidated in that court. This Court applied the Note to Pa.R.A.P. 

341(a) and quashed the Commonwealth’s appeal, because the order of 

____________________________________________

1

In Commonwealth v. Johnson, Nos. 1620, 2045, 2046, 2047 EDA 2018, 

this Court en banc will soon reconsider the holding from Commonwealth v. 

Creese, 216 A.3d 1142 (Pa.Super. 2019).
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suppression “resolved issues arising on more than one docket.” See Walker, 

185 A.3d at 973 (quoting Superior Court decision) (quotations omitted).

On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed and held “that, prospectively, 

(i.e. after June 1, 2018) where a single order resolves issues arising on more 

than one docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed for each case.” See 

Walker at 971.2 The Court said this is “a bright-line mandatory instruction 

to practitioners to file separate notices of appeal.” Walker at 976-77. 

We must now decide whether this rule applies when an appellant only 

appeals a single case from a consolidated docket. Applying the Note’s plain 

language, we conclude it does not. The Note is limited to circumstances where 

an order “resolves issues arising on more than one docket or relating to 

more than one judgment . . . .” Pa.R.A.P. 341, Official Note (emphasis 

added). Here, the trial court only entered one judgment on one docket – i.e., 

the quiet-title action filed by Mr. Bagdis. That order did not resolve issues 

arising on more than one docket or relating to more than one judgment. 

As we observed above, the foreclosure action involving the same 

property remains pending before the trial court. As such, this appeal differs 

____________________________________________

2 The Walker Court’s analysis stemmed from a sentence in the Note to 

Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341(a) provides, 

“an appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of a government unit 

or trial court.” The Note to that Rule dictates that, when “one or more orders 

resolves issues arising on more than one docket or relating to more than one 

judgment, separate notices of appeal must be filed.” Pa.R.A.P. 341, Official 

Note.
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vastly from the quadruple appeal that the Commonwealth attempted in 

Walker.

Additionally, although Mr. Bagdis included two numbers on his notice of 

appeal, he actually only appealed from one case, the quiet-title action. As 

such, we find that Creese, supra, does not apply. See Creese, 216 A.3d at 

1144 (finding each notice of appeal must contain only one docket number).

Thus, we will not quash this appeal.

Before addressing Mr. Bagdis’ challenges to the trial court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of to Chase, we note that the trial court dismissed 

Mr. Bagdis’ quiet-title action, as a matter law, on procedural grounds, namely

that the action was moot and that Mr. Bagdis lacked standing. 

The trial court opined:

Chase is no longer the mortgage holder on the Property. All 

such interests were assigned by Chase to FNMA, which in 

turn assigned these interests to WSFS. WSFS has shown it 

currently is in possession of this original note. The 

assignment chain of the mortgage from Washington Mutual 

to Chase (through the FDIC) to FNMA to WSFS has been 

established by the evidence submitted. Chase has no 

interest in the mortgage, in the note, or in the Property. 

Likewise, Chase has been replaced as a party in the 

mortgage foreclosure lawsuit.

The only reason [Mr.] Bagdis put forth to keep Chase

in this lawsuit is his questioning of the validity of the 

assignment of the mortgage from Washington Mutual to 

Chase. However, [Mr.] Bagdis lacks standing to attack this 

assignment. See Ira G. Steffy & Son, Inc. v. Citizens 

Bank of Pennsylvania, 7 A.3d 278, 287 (Pa.Super. 2010) 

. . . .

The dismissal of the quiet-title lawsuit was proper, as 

the credible evidence establishes that Chase has no interest 
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in the Property . . . There is no evidence or any valid reason 

to keep Chase involved in this mortgage dispute when the 

evidence fully established that [it] has no interest in the 

Property.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/2/19, at 4-5 (footnotes omitted).

Mr. Bagdis failed to challenge the trial court’s procedural determinations 

of mootness or standing on appeal. Instead, the three issues in his brief 

address substantive issues – (1) whether the trial court erred as a matter of 

law because there are unresolved questions of material fact regarding the 

merits; (2) whether the trial court resolved those disputed questions of 

material fact in favor of Chase; and (3) whether those resolutions of material 

fact were an abuse of discretion. See Mr. Bagdis’ Brief at 4.

Conspicuously absent from those issues, and Mr. Bagdis’ briefs in 

general, is a claim that the trial court erred by ruling that the quiet-title action 

was moot. There is also no allegation that the trial court erred when it found 

that Mr. Bagdis lacked standing under Ira G. Steffy & Son, Inc. v. Citizens 

Bank of Pennsylvania, 7 A.3d 278, 287 (Pa.Super. 2010).

Because Mr. Bagdis has failed to appeal either of the trial court’s grounds 

for granting Chase summary judgment, he has waived any claim that the trial 

court erred in those regards. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 

A.3d 1001, 1003–1004 (Pa.Super. 2014) (observing that an appellant’s failure 

to raise an issue in the brief’s statement of questions involved on appeal 

waives issue). Under Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), “No question will be considered 
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unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested 

thereby.”

Nothing in Mr. Bagdis’ statement of questions on appeal involves or 

suggests that this matter is not moot or that Mr. Bagdis has standing to bring 

a quiet-title action to challenge Chase’s assignment of his mortgage. His brief 

does not even mention the word “moot.” And the few references to “standing” 

pertain to whether Chase had standing to bring the foreclosure action that

remains unresolved below. 

“It has long been the rule in Pennsylvania that [our courts] will not 

decide moot questions.” In re Gross, 382 A.2d 116, 120 (Pa. 1978). Also, 

“Standing is a core jurisprudential requirement that looks to the party bringing 

a legal challenge . . . as a prerequisite before the court will consider the 

merits of the legal challenge itself.” Com. ex rel. Judicial Conduct Bd. v. 

Griffin, 918 A.2d 87, 93 (Pa. 2007) (emphasis added). 

Because this quiet-title action is moot and Mr. Bagdis lacks standing, we

may not address the substantive issues Mr. Bagdis’ raised in this appeal. No 

appellate relief is due.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/17/20