_________________ 

_________________ 

(Slip Opinion) Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 1 

Per Curiam 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 18–280 

NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION, 

INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CITY OF 

NEW YORK, NEW YORK, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[April 27, 2020] 

PER CURIAM. 

In the District Court, petitioners challenged a New York

City rule regarding the transport of firearms. Petitioners 

claimed that the rule violated the Second Amendment. Petitioners sought declaratory and injunctive relief against 

enforcement of the rule insofar as the rule prevented their

transport of firearms to a second home or shooting range 

outside of the city. The District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ claim. See 883 F. 3d 45 (CA2 

2018). We granted certiorari. 586 U. S. ___ (2019). After 

we granted certiorari, the State of New York amended its 

firearm licensing statute, and the City amended the rule so 

that petitioners may now transport firearms to a second

home or shooting range outside of the city, which is the precise relief that petitioners requested in the prayer for relief 

in their complaint. App. 48. Petitioners’ claim for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the City’s old rule

is therefore moot. Petitioners now argue, however, that the 

new rule may still infringe their rights. In particular, petitioners claim that they may not be allowed to stop for coffee, 
2 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. 

CITY OF NEW YORK 

Per Curiam 

gas, food, or restroom breaks on the way to their second

homes or shooting ranges outside of the city. The City responds that those routine stops are entirely permissible under the new rule. We do not here decide that dispute about

the new rule; as we stated in Lewis v. Continental Bank 

Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 482–483 (1990): 

“Our ordinary practice in disposing of a case that has

become moot on appeal is to vacate the judgment with

directions to dismiss. See, e.g., Deakins v. Monaghan, 

484 U. S., at 204; United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 

340 U. S. 36, 39–40 (1950). However, in instances 

where the mootness is attributable to a change in the 

legal framework governing the case, and where the

plaintiff may have some residual claim under the new 

framework that was understandably not asserted previously, our practice is to vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings in which the parties may,

if necessary, amend their pleadings or develop the record more fully. See Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist 

Church of Miami, Inc., 404 U. S. 412, 415 (1972).” 

Petitioners also argue that, even though they have not previously asked for damages with respect to the City’s old

rule, they still could do so in this lawsuit. Petitioners did 

not seek damages in their complaint; indeed, the possibility 

of a damages claim was not raised until well into the litigation in this Court. The City argues that it is too late for

petitioners to now add a claim for damages. On remand, 

the Court of Appeals and the District Court may consider

whether petitioners may still add a claim for damages in

this lawsuit with respect to New York City’s old rule. The 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is 

remanded for such proceedings as are appropriate. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 1 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 18–280 

NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION, 

INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CITY OF 

NEW YORK, NEW YORK, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[April 27, 2020]

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring. 

I agree with the per curiam opinion’s resolution of the 

procedural issues before us—namely, that petitioners’ 

claim for injunctive relief against New York City’s old rule

is moot and that petitioners’ new claims should be addressed as appropriate in the first instance by the Court of 

Appeals and the District Court on remand. 

I also agree with JUSTICE ALITO’s general analysis of Heller and McDonald. Post, at 25; see District of Columbia v. 

Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 

U. S. 742 (2010); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F. 3d 

1244 (CADC 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). And I 

share JUSTICE ALITO’s concern that some federal and state 

courts may not be properly applying Heller and McDonald. 

The Court should address that issue soon, perhaps in one of

the several Second Amendment cases with petitions for certiorari now pending before the Court. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 1 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 18–280 

NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION, 

INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CITY OF 

NEW YORK, NEW YORK, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[April 27, 2020] 

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, and

with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins except for Part IV–B, dissenting. 

By incorrectly dismissing this case as moot, the Court 

permits our docket to be manipulated in a way that should

not be countenanced. Twelve years ago in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008), we held that the Second Amendment protects the right of ordinary Americans 

to keep and bear arms. Two years later, our decision in 

McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742 (2010), established

that this right is fully applicable to the States. Since then, 

the lower courts have decided numerous cases involving

Second Amendment challenges to a variety of federal, state, 

and local laws. Most have failed. We have been asked to 

review many of these decisions, but until this case, we denied all such requests. 

On January 22, 2019, we granted review to consider the 

constitutionality of a New York City ordinance that burdened the right recognized in Heller. Among other things,

the ordinance prohibited law-abiding New Yorkers with a 

license to keep a handgun in the home (a “premises license”)

from taking that weapon to a firing range outside the City.

Instead, premises licensees wishing to gain or maintain the 

ability to use their weapons safely were limited to the seven 
 

 

 

2 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. 

CITY OF NEW YORK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

firing ranges in the City, all but one of which were largely 

restricted to members and their guests. 

In the District Court and the Court of Appeals, the City

vigorously and successfully defended the constitutionality 

of its ordinance, and the law was upheld based on what we 

are told is the framework for reviewing Second Amendment 

claims that has been uniformly adopted by the Courts of 

Appeals.1 One might have thought that the City, having

convinced the lower courts that its law was consistent with 

Heller, would have been willing to defend its victory in this 

Court. But once we granted certiorari, both the City and 

the State of New York sprang into action to prevent us from

deciding this case. Although the City had previously insisted that its ordinance served important public safety 

purposes, our grant of review apparently led to an epiphany 

of sorts, and the City quickly changed its ordinance. And 

for good measure the State enacted a law making the old 

New York City ordinance illegal.

Thereafter, the City and amici supporting its position

strove to have this case thrown out without briefing or argument. The City moved for dismissal “as soon as is reasonably practicable” on the ground that it had “no legal reason to file a brief.” Suggestion of Mootness 1. When we 

refused to jettison the case at that early stage, the City submitted a brief but “stress[ed] that [its] true position [was]

that it ha[d] no view at all regarding the constitutional 

questions presented” and that it was “offer[ing] a defense of 

the . . . former rul[e] in the spirit of something a Courtappointed amicus curiae might do.” Brief for Respondents 2.

A prominent brief supporting the City went further. Five 

United States Senators, four of whom are members of the 

bar of this Court, filed a brief insisting that the case be dis-

—————— 1See Brief for Second Amendment Law Professors et al. as Amici 

Curiae 8–9. 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

missed. If the Court did not do so, they intimated, the public would realize that the Court is “motivated mainly by politics, rather than by adherence to the law,” and the Court 

would face the possibility of legislative reprisal. Brief for 

Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse et al. as Amici Curiae 2–3, 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Regrettably, the Court now dismisses the case as moot. 

If the Court were right on the law, I would of course approve 

that disposition. Under the Constitution, our authority is

limited to deciding actual cases or controversies, and if this

were no longer a live controversy—that is, if it were now

moot—we would be compelled to dismiss. But if a case is 

on our docket and we have jurisdiction, we have an obligation to decide it. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the 

Court in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821), “[w]e

have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction

which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.” 

Thus, in this case, we must apply the well-established

standards for determining whether a case is moot, and under those standards, we still have a live case before us. It 

is certainly true that the new City ordinance and the new 

State law give petitioners most of what they sought, but 

that is not the test for mootness. Instead, “a case ‘becomes 

moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.’” Chafin v. 

Chafin, 568 U. S. 165, 172 (2013) (emphasis added). “‘As 

long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, 

in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.’” Ibid. 

(emphasis added).

Respondents have failed to meet this “heavy burden.” 

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U. S. 216, 222 

(2000) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

This is so for two reasons. First, the changes in City and 

State law do not provide petitioners with all the injunctive 

relief they sought. Second, if we reversed on the merits, the 

District Court on remand could award damages to remedy 
4 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. 

CITY OF NEW YORK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

the constitutional violation that petitioners suffered. 

I 

A 

1 

New York State has strict laws governing the possession 

of firearms. With only a few exceptions, possession without 

a license is punishable by imprisonment and a fine. N. Y. 

Penal Law Ann. §§60.01(3), 70.15, 265.01–265.04, 

265.20(a)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 2020). Local authorities administer the licensing program, §400.00(3)(a), and in New 

York City, this is done by the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD’s) License Division. See 38 N. Y. C. R. R. §5–

01 et seq. (2020); N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §265.00(10); N. Y. C.

Admin. Code §10–131 (2020). 

New York State law contemplates two primary forms of

handgun license—a premises license, which allows the licensee to keep the registered handgun at a home or business, and a carry license, which permits the licensee to 

carry a concealed handgun outside the home. N. Y. Penal 

Law Ann. §§400.00(2)(a), (b), (f). In this case, only premises 

licenses are at issue. 

State law imposes an exacting standard for obtaining a 

premises license, and the NYPD License Division subjects 

applicants to rigorous vetting. Licenses may be issued only 

if, among other things, an applicant is “of good moral character” and “no good cause exists for the denial of the license.” §§400.00(1)(b), (n); see also App. 95–109 (“Instructions to Handgun License Applicants”) (capitalization 

omitted).

New York City residents must submit their applications 

in-person at One Police Plaza in Manhattan. An applicant

must pay a fee of $431.50; must provide proof of age, citizenship, and residence; and must produce an original Social 

Security card. Id., at 95–96, 98. A completed application

must specify the particular handgun that the applicant 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 5 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

wishes to possess and the address for which the license is

sought. It must list all the applicant’s residences and places 

of employment for the past five years. Id., at 99–100, 104– 

105. An applicant must answer questions about past arrests, summonses, indictments, convictions, and civil orders, and must respond to probing questions about past 

drug use, subpoenas and testimony, unsuccessful applications for civil service positions, military service, mental illness, and physical conditions (such as “Epilepsy,” “Diabetes,” or “any Nervous Disorder”) that could, in the judgment

of the License Division, interfere with the use of a handgun. 

Id., at 96–97, 101–102. The applicant must explain where

and how he or she will safeguard the handgun when not in

use, and furnish the name and address of a New York State 

resident who will take custody of the handgun in the event 

of the applicant’s death or disability. Id., at 104. 

And these application requirements are only the beginning. The submission of an application triggers a “‘rigorous’” police investigation “into the applicant’s mental

health history, criminal history, [and] moral character.” 

Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F. 3d 81, 87 (CA2 

2012). A licensing officer is required by law to review mental health records, investigate the truthfulness of the statements in the application, and forward the applicant’s fingerprints to the New York State Division of Criminal 

Justice Services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to 

determine if the applicant has a criminal record. N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §§400.00(1), (4). Under City law, grounds for 

denial include, among other things, any arrest, indictment,

or conviction for a crime or violation (with the exception of 

minor traffic violations) in any federal, state, or local jurisdiction; a dishonorable discharge from the military; alcoholism, drug use, or mental illness; “a poor driving history”;

failure to pay debts, including child support and taxes; and

untruthfulness in the application. 38 N. Y. C. R. R. §5–10. 

The process also includes an in-person interview, during 
6 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. 

CITY OF NEW YORK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

which the License Division may request additional paperwork. App. 100. 

It takes the License Division approximately six months 

to process applications, §5–07(a), and during this time, the

applicant cannot lawfully possess a handgun in the home, 

§5–09. When the license issues and the applicant wishes to 

obtain it, he or she must appear in person at police headquarters for at least the third time. §5–07(b). At present,

we are told, approximately 40,000 City residents (representing about 1.29% of the households in the City)2 have 

been issued handgun licenses.

The NYPD may revoke a premises license at any time,

§5–07(d), including for such things as laminating the license, §5–22(a)(4). And a license expires after three years, 

so a licensee who wants to continue to possess a gun in the

home after that time must file a renewal application. §5–

28(a). 

2 

The ordinance that petitioners challenged in this case 

was adopted in 2001. Before then, the NYPD issued both 

premises licenses and so-called “target licenses,” which allowed licensees to transport their handguns to specified, 

preapproved ranges outside of the City. See App. to Pet. for 

Cert. 90–92. Target licenses were eliminated in 2001, and 

from that time until the City’s post-certiorari change of 

heart, premises licensees could practice with their guns

only if: they traveled “directly to and from an authorized 

small arms range/shooting club”; their guns were unloaded

and secured in a locked container; and any ammunition was

“carried separately.” §5–23(a)(3) (in effect prior to July 21,

2019) (emphasis added); id., at 88. And—what is most important for present purposes—the only “authorized” ranges 

—————— 2The last census found that there were 3,109,784 households in the 

City. D. Gaquin & M. Ryan, County and City Extra: Special Decennial 

Census Edition 607 (2012). 
 

 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 7 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

or clubs were ones “located in New York City.” App. 50, 63. 

At the relevant time, there were only seven such ranges in 

the entire City: two in Staten Island, two in Queens, one in

Brooklyn, one in Manhattan, and one in the Bronx. See id., 

at 92–93. All but one generally admitted only members and 

their guests, and the only range open to the public was

closed for a time during the pendency of the case below. 

B 

1 

In 2013, three individuals and one organization representing New York gun owners brought suit under Rev. Stat.

§1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, against the City and the NYPD 

License Division, contending that the restrictive premises 

license scheme, 38 N. Y. C. R. R. §5–23, violated their rights

under the Second Amendment and other provisions of the

Constitution. 

One of the individual petitioners, Romolo Colantone, has 

held a New York City firearms license since 1979. App. 28–

29, 51. Colantone currently has a premises license for his

residence and wishes to take his handgun to ranges and 

competitions outside the City and to his second home in 

Hancock, New York. He refrained from doing so because of 

the ordinance prohibiting such travel. Id., at 32, 53–54. 

For example, Colantone registered to participate in the 

2012 World Class Steel Northeast Regional Championship 

in Old Bridge, New Jersey—about 20 miles from his home 

in the City. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of CrossMotion for Summary Judgt. in No. 13–cv–2115 (SDNY), 

Doc. No. 44 (Plaintiffs’ Memo). But after the hosts of that 

competition alerted him that his premises license did not 

allow him to transport his handgun to New Jersey—and after Inspector Andrew Lunetta, the commanding officer of

the NYPD License Division, confirmed this—Colantone 

pulled out of the competition. App. 32, 49–50, 55. 
 

 

 

 

 

8 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. 

CITY OF NEW YORK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

Plaintiff Efrain Alvarez has had a firearms license for approximately 30 years, and plaintiff Jose Anthony Irizarry

has been licensed for 15 years. Both men would like to take 

their handguns to ranges and competitions outside the City,

but they have not done so because of the same ordinance. 

See id., at 29, 32–33. After the hosts of the previously noted 

competition in New Jersey advised them that their New 

York City premises licenses barred them from taking their

handguns outside the City, they both decided not to attend. 

Id., at 32–33. For the same reason, Alvarez also did not 

participate in the International Defensive Pistol Association Postal Matches in Simsbury, Connecticut. Ibid. All 

three individual petitioners aver that they regularly traveled outside the City to ranges and championships before 

learning of the restriction imposed by §5–23. Id., at 32–33. 

Petitioners’ amended complaint maintained that the Second Amendment requires “unrestricted access to gun ranges

and shooting events in order to practice and perfect safe

gun handling skills.” Id., at 36 (emphasis added). The complaint asserts that practice is necessary for “the safe and

responsible use of firearms for . . . self-defense, and the defense of one’s home.” Id., at 33. And a New York City ordinance backs this up, providing that a licensee “should endeavor to engage in periodic handgun practice at an

authorized small arms range/shooting club.” §5–22(a)(14).

According to the complaint, the City, by limiting licensees

like petitioners to the seven ranges in the City, imposed a 

serious burden on the exercise of their Second Amendment 

right. App. 36. 

The amended complaint’s prayer for relief sought

an injunction against enforcement of the travel restriction, 

as well as attorney’s fees, costs of suit, declaratory relief . . . 

and “[a]ny such further relief as the [c]ourt deems just and 

proper.” Id., at 47–48 (emphasis added). 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 9 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

2 

The City vigorously defended its law. The ordinance did 

not impinge on petitioners’ Second Amendment right, the 

City told the lower courts, and even if it did, the law survived heightened scrutiny. That was so, the City maintained, because the travel restrictions were “necessary to 

protect the public safety insofar as the transport of firearms

outside the home potentially endangers the public.” City of

New York’s Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for 

Summary Judgt. & Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction in No. 13–cv–2115, Doc. No. 36, p. 10. 

To support this assertion, the City relied on the declaration of Inspector Lunetta, which attempted to explain why

the restrictions were “necessary to address . . . public safety

concerns.” App. 76. Lunetta justified the law in three ways. 

First, he maintained that the restriction on out-of-city

transport promoted public safety by causing “premises license holders [to] bring their firearms into the public domain less frequently.” Id., at 78; see also id., at 77. 

Second, he claimed that the transport restriction helped 

to prevent the gun violence that might occur if a licensee

became involved in an altercation while on the way to an

out-of-city range or competition. Lunetta asserted that 

licensees are “as susceptible as anyone else” to “stressinducing circumstances” that can lead to violence. Ibid. 

Finally, he claimed that the travel restriction made it

simpler for a patrol officer to check whether the holder of a

premises license who is found in possession of a gun outside 

the home is really headed for a range or is simply using that 

as a pretext for carrying a gun. Id., at 78–79. He declared 

that “there were several reported cases where [holders of

premises or target licenses] were charged with criminal 

possession of a weapon when found with their firearms 

while not en route to a range.” Id., at 89. He cited five 

cases, id., at 88–89, but not one of the opinions indicates 
 

 

 

 

 

10 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. 

CITY OF NEW YORK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

that the licensee claimed to be headed to a range or competition outside the City.3 

The District Court denied petitioners’ motions for preliminary injunction and summary judgment and granted the 

City’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 86 F. Supp. 3d 

249, 261–263 (2015). The District Court deemed any burden on petitioners’ Second Amendment right “minimal or, 

at most, modest.” Id., at 260. And the court credited the 

City’s public safety rationale, citing the Lunetta declaration

approvingly and discussing the importance of the travel restrictions in limiting the movement of licensees with their 

handguns. See id., at 262. 

The Second Circuit affirmed. The panel derided the ordinance’s burdens on petitioners’ Second Amendment right as 

“trivial” and expressly credited Lunetta’s explanation of the

public safety purposes served by the travel restriction. 883 

F. 3d 45, 63–64 (2018).

When petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, the City

opposed review, contending, among other things, that the 

travel restriction promoted public safety, as demonstrated 

by Lunetta’s declaration (which the City cited six times).

Brief in Opposition 9, 21–23. We nevertheless granted review on January 22, 2019, and this, as noted, apparently

led the City to reconsider whether the travel restriction was

actually needed for public safety purposes. 

C 

On April 12, the NYPD published a proposed amendment 

to the travel restriction that was admittedly spurred at 

—————— 3 In one case, the violation charged was transporting a loaded gun. 

People v. Schumann, 133 Misc. 2d 499, 507 N. Y. S. 2d 349 (Crim. Ct. 

1986). In another case, the gun was not in a locked container. People v. 

Thompson, 92 N. Y. 2d 957, 705 N. E. 2d 1200 (1998); see also People v. 

Lap, 150 Misc. 2d 724, 570 N. Y. S. 2d 258 (Crim. Ct. 1991) (loaded and 

unlocked). In the other two, there is no mention of an out-of-city range. 

Lugo v. Safir, 272 App. Div. 2d 216, 708 N. Y. S. 2d 618 (2000); People v. 

Ocasio, 108 Misc. 2d 211, 441 N. Y. S. 2d 148 (1981). 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 11 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

least in part by our grant of review. See Motion to Hold 

Briefing Schedule in Abeyance in No. 18–280, p. 3. Under 

this amendment, holders of premises licenses would be allowed to take their guns to ranges, competitions, and second homes outside the City provided that the licensees traveled “directly” between their residences and the permitted

destinations. After a period of notice and comment, the proposed amendment was adopted on June 21 and took effect 

on July 21. Suggestion of Mootness 5–6. 

Our grant of certiorari also prompted action by New York

State. With the support of the City, Tr. of Oral Arg. 46, the

Legislature enacted a new law abrogating any local law,

rule, or regulation that prevented the holder of a premises 

license from transporting a licensed handgun “directly to or 

from” an authorized range, competition, or second home. 

N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §400.00(6) (as in effect July 16, 2019). 

Shortly after the new State law took effect, the City filed 

a Suggestion of Mootness, asking us to vacate the decision 

below and to remand with instructions to dismiss. The City

urged us to rule on this matter expeditiously so that it

would not be required to file a brief defending its prior law. 

Suggestion of Mootness 1. When we refused to vacate at 

that stage, the City protested that briefing the merits “require[d] the City to do what Article III’s case-or-controversy 

requirement is designed to avoid: engage in litigation regarding the constitutionality of a law that no longer exists” 

and that the City would not reenact. Brief for Respondents

1. When the case was argued, counsel for the City was 

asked whether the repeal of the travel restriction had made

the City any less safe, and his unequivocal answer was no. 

Tr. of Oral Arg. 52. 

II 

The Court vacates the judgment of the Court of Appeals, 

apparently on the ground that this case is now moot. (Other

than mootness, no other basis for vacating comes to mind, 
12 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. 

CITY OF NEW YORK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

and therefore I proceed on that assumption.) And if that is 

the reason for what the Court has done, the Court is wrong.

This case is not moot. 

Article III, §2 of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction

of the federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies,” and as 

a result, we may not “‘decide questions that cannot affect 

the rights of litigants in the case before [us].’” Chafin, 568 

U. S., at 172. Nor may we advise “‘what the law would be 

upon a hypothetical state of facts.’” Ibid. This means that 

the dispute between the parties in a case must remain alive

until its ultimate disposition. If a live controversy ceases to 

exist—i.e., if a case becomes moot—then we have no jurisdiction to proceed. But in order for this to happen, a case

must really be dead, and as noted, that occurs only “‘when 

it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.’” Ibid. (quoting Knox v. Service 

Employees, 567 U. S. 298, 307 (2012)). “‘[A]s long as the 

parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.’” Chafin, 568 

U. S., at 172 (quoting Knox, 567 U. S., at 307–308). Thus, 

to establish mootness, a “demanding standard” must be 

met. Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 

587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 6). 

We have been particularly wary of attempts by parties to

manufacture mootness in order to evade review. See Knox, 

567 U. S., at 307; accord, Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 

U. S. 656, 661 (1993). And it is black-letter law that we 

have a “virtually unflagging” obligation to exercise our jurisdiction. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. 

United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976). 

In this case, the amended City ordinance and the new

State law gave petitioners most of what they sought in their 

complaint, but the new laws did not give them complete relief. It is entirely possible for them to obtain more relief, 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 13 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

and therefore this case is not moot. This is so for the following reasons. 

A 

First, this case is not moot because the amended City ordinance and new State law do not give petitioners all the 

prospective relief they seek. Petitioners asserted in their 

complaint that the Second Amendment guarantees them,

as holders of premises licenses, “unrestricted access” to 

ranges, competitions, and second homes outside of New

York City, App. 36, and the new laws do not give them that.4 

The new City ordinance has limitations that petitioners

claim are unconstitutional, namely, that a trip outside the 

City must be “direc[t]” and travel within the City must be

“continuous and uninterrupted.” 38 N. Y. C. R. R. §§5– 

23(a)(3), (a)(7). Exactly what these restrictions mean is not 

clear from the face of the rule, and the City has done little 

to clarify their reach. At argument, counsel told us that the 

new rule allows “bathroom breaks,” “coffee stops,” and any 

other “reasonably necessary stops in the course of travel.” 

Tr. of Oral Arg. 36, 64. But the meaning of a “reasonably 

necessary” stop is hardly clear. What about a stop to buy 

groceries just before coming home? Or a stop to pick up a 

friend who also wants to practice at a range outside the

City? Or a quick visit to a sick relative or friend who lives

near a range? The City does not know the answer to such 

questions. See, e.g., id., at 65–66. 

—————— 4Contrary to the City’s suggestion, see Reply to Suggestion of Mootness 5, petitioners have not softened their stance over the course of this

litigation. At summary judgment, petitioners asked that the District

Court declare 38 N. Y. C. R. R. §5–23 unconstitutional and enjoin its enforcement “in any manner that prohibits or precludes [petitioners] from 

traveling” with their handguns to a range, competition, or second home

outside the borders of New York City. Notice of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgt. in 13–cv–2115, Doc. No. 43, p. 1; Plaintiffs’ Memo, at 32; and 

Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum, Doc. No. 53, p. 9 (emphasis added); see

also Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Doc. No. 9, p. 1. 
 

14 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. 

CITY OF NEW YORK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

Based on all this, we are left with no clear idea where the 

City draws the line, and the situation is further complicated 

by the overlay of State law. The new State law appears to

prevent the City from penalizing any “direc[t]” trip to a

range or competition outside the City, but the State law 

does not define that limitation. The petitioners wanted to

enter competitions in upstate New York more than a five 

hour drive from the City. Could they stop along the way? 

And if so, for how long? The State has not explained its

understanding of this limitation, and in any event, prosecutorial decisions in New York are generally made by the 

State’s 67 elected district attorneys. See Haggerty v. Himelein, 221 App. Div. 2d 138, 144–145, 644 N. Y. S. 2d 934, 

940 (1996). The bottom line is that petitioners, who sought 

“unrestricted access” to out-of-city ranges and competitions,

are still subject to restrictions of undetermined meaning. 

These restrictions may not seem very important, but that

is beside the point for purposes of mootness. Nor does it 

matter whether, in the end, those restrictions would be 

found to violate the Second Amendment. All that matters 

for present purposes is that the City still withholds from

petitioners something that they have claimed from the beginning is their constitutional right. It follows that the case 

is not moot. It is as simple as that.

The situation here resembles that in Knox, 567 U. S. 298. 

The issue in that case was whether a public sector union 

had provided nonmembers the sort of notice that our case

law required before they could be forced to pay a fee to 

subsidize certain union activities. We granted certiorari to

review the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the notice that the 

union had provided was sufficient, but before we could decide the case, the union sent out a new notice and moved to 

dismiss the case as moot. The employees objected that the

new notice was inadequate, and we refused to dismiss. In 

so doing, we did not opine on the adequacy of the new notice

but simply held that the case was not moot because “there 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 15 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

[was] still a live controversy as to the adequacy” of the notice. Id., at 307. Although the new notice might have given

the nonmembers most of what they sought, they still possessed “‘a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome 

of the litigation.’” Id., at 307–308. And that was enough. 

The situation here is essentially the same. Petitioners 

got most, but not all, of the prospective relief they wanted,

and that means that the case is not dead. 

B 

The case is not moot for a separate and independent reason: If this Court were to hold, as petitioners request and 

as I believe we should, that 38 N. Y. C. R. R. §5–23 violated 

petitioners’ Second Amendment right, the District Court on 

remand could (and probably should) award damages. See 

Mission Product Holdings, 587 U. S., at ___. Petitioners 

brought their claims under 42 U. S. C. §1983, which permits the recovery of damages. See Monell v. New York City 

Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 695–701 (1978). And 

while the amended complaint does not expressly seek damages, it is enough that it requests “[a]ny other such further

relief as the [c]ourt deems just and proper.” App. 48. Under 

modern pleading standards, that suffices. 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a “final 

judgment should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its 

pleadings.” Rule 54(c) (emphasis added); see also 10 C.

Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure 

§§2662, 2664 (4th ed. 2014) (Wright & Miller).5 Courts have 

—————— 5Lower courts have affirmed that Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(c) means 

what it says: “[R]elief in damages is not foreclosed by plaintiff ’s failure 

to ask for damages in prayer.” Jet Inv., Inc. v. Department of Army, 84 

F. 3d 1137, 1143 (CA9 1996); Illinois Physicians Union v. Miller, 675 

F. 2d 151, 158 (CA7 1982) (“It is well-settled that the district court may 

grant monetary relief . . . , even without a specific request”); United 

States v. Marin, 651 F. 2d 24, 30 (CA1 1981) (affirming award of damages 

although not expressly requested in complaint); Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 
16 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. 

CITY OF NEW YORK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

refused to award relief outside the pleadings only when that 

would somehow prejudice the defendant, such as when the 

defendant did not have an opportunity to contest the basis 

for that relief. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 

405, 424 (1975); United States v. Marin, 651 F. 2d 24, 30 

(CA1 1981); 10 Wright & Miller §2664. Otherwise, “a party

should experience little difficulty in securing a remedy

other than that demanded in the pleadings as long as the 

party shows a right to it.” Id., §2662, p. 168. Here, that 

could include damages. 

1 

At a minimum, if petitioners succeeded on their challenge

to the travel restrictions, they would be eligible for nominal 

damages. When a plaintiff ’s constitutional rights have 

been violated, nominal damages may be awarded without 

proof of any additional injury. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 

U. S. 247 (1978); Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U. S. 299 (1986). Nominal damages are “the appropriate means of vindicating rights whose deprivation

has not caused actual, provable injury.” Id., at 308, n. 11 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Carey, 435 

U. S., at 266. And they are particularly important in vindicating constitutional interests. See Riverside v. Rivera, 477 

U. S. 561, 574 (1986) (plurality opinion). Consequently,

courts routinely award nominal damages for constitutional 

violations. See, e.g., Stoedter v. Gates, 704 Fed. Appx. 748,

762 (CA10 2017) (Fourth Amendment); Klein v. Laguna 

Beach, 810 F. 3d 693, 697 (CA9 2016) (free speech); Project 

Vote/Voting for America, Inc. v. Dickerson, 444 Fed. Appx. 

660, 661 (CA4 2011) (per curiam) (free speech); Price v. 

Charlotte, 93 F. 3d 1241, 1257 (CA4 1996) (equal protection). And it is widely recognized that a claim for nominal 

—————— 

F. 2d 172, 176, n. 3 (CA5 1975) (allowing claim for damages raised for 

first time on appeal in light of Rule 54(c) and the catchall prayer for relief 

in plaintiff ’s complaint); accord, 10 Wright & Miller §2664. 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 17 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

damages precludes mootness. See 13C C. Wright, A. Miller,

& E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3533.3, n. 47 

(3d ed. Supp. 2019) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Central 

Radio Co. v. Norfolk, 811 F. 3d 625, 631–632 (CA4 2016); 

Morgan v. Plano Independent School Dist., 589 F. 3d 740, 

748, n. 32 (CA5 2009); Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 

279 F. 3d 862, 872 (CA9 2002); Amato v. Saratoga Springs, 

170 F. 3d 311, 317 (CA2 1999) (Sand, J., joined by Sotomayor, J.); Committee for First Amendment v. Campbell, 

962 F. 2d 1517, 1526–1527 (CA10 1992); Henson v. Honor 

Committee of U. Va., 719 F. 2d 69, 72, n. 5 (CA4 1983).6 

2 

It is even possible that one or more of the petitioners may 

be eligible for compensatory damages. To get such relief,

they would of course be required to show that they suffered

an “actual injury.” See Carey, 435 U. S., at 266; D. Dobbs 

& C. Roberts, Law of Remedies §7.4(1), p. 660 (3d ed. 2018). 

But petitioners may be able to make such a showing. As 

discussed above, the failure to include in their complaint

specific factual allegations of actual injury would not preclude such recovery.7 See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(c). Nor 

were petitioners obligated to provide information supporting actual injury in opposing the City’s motion for summary

judgment.

If we were to reverse the judgment below and hold the 

City’s old rule unconstitutional, it would be appropriate to 

—————— 6A single Circuit has held that a claim for nominal damages alone does 

not maintain a live dispute. See Flanigan’s Enterprises, Inc. of Ga. v. 

Sandy Springs, 868 F. 3d 1248 (CA11 2017). But that holding is difficult 

to reconcile with Carey and Stachura’s endorsement of nominal damages 

as an appropriate constitutional remedy. 7Even if specific allegations in the complaint were necessary, the District Court could allow amendment. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 

Research, Inc., 401 U. S. 321, 331 (1971); 6 Wright & Miller §1474 (3d ed. 

2010). 
18 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. 

CITY OF NEW YORK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

remand the case for proceedings on the question of remedies. We have frequently done this when we reverse a judgment that was entered against the plaintiff on liability 

grounds. See, e.g., Mission Product Holdings, 587 U. S., at 

___, ___ (deeming case live due to claim for damages, reversing judgment against petitioner, and remanding for 

further proceedings); Parents Involved in Community 

Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 720, 748 

(2007) (holding case live due in part to damages claim in 

complaint, reversing judgment against petitioners, and remanding for further proceedings); Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 

U. S. 561, 583 (1984) (holding case live due to damages

caused by lower court injunction and reversing); Powell v. 

McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 493, 550 (1969) (remanding for 

award of unpaid congressional salary); cf., e.g., Richmond 

v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 478, n. 1 (1989) (holding 

that expiration of challenged ordinance did not moot dispute over whether defendant’s action was “unlawful and

thus entitle[d] appellee to damages”).

With this is mind, the possibility of actual damages cannot be ruled out. One or more of the petitioners could seek

compensation for out-of-pocket expenses, such as membership fees at in-city ranges. The current record shows that 

at least one of the petitioners is a member of a range in the 

City. App. 93–94. In addition, a petitioner may be entitled 

to compensation for expenses incurred in registering for

out-of-city competitions from which he was compelled to 

withdraw. The record shows that one petitioner signed up

for such a competition but had to pull out as a result of the

City ordinance. Id., at 32, 55. Petitioners could also seek 

compensation for any intangible but nevertheless real and 

personal injuries that they suffered due to their inability to

attend shooting competitions, to practice at out-of-city

ranges, or to take their licensed handguns to second homes. 

Noneconomic damages such as loss of enjoyment are available in §1983 litigation. See Stachura, 477 U. S., at 306– 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 19 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

307; Carey, 435 U. S., at 260–264; Dobbs, Law of Remedies 

§7.4(1), at 660, §8.1(4), at 676; cf. 4 F. Harper, F. James, & 

O. Gray, Torts §25.10A (3d ed. 2007) (surveying loss of enjoyment awards). Among other things, depriving a licensee

of the opportunity to obtain the benefits of competing and 

perhaps obtaining recognition at a well-known competition 

may cause a real loss. Lower courts have affirmed awards 

of compensatory damages for similar kinds of injuries resulting from constitutional violations. See Dobbs, Law of 

Remedies, at 660.8 Petitioners could introduce evidence on 

remand to show such loss. 

For purposes of determining whether this case is moot, 

the question is not whether petitioners would actually succeed in obtaining such damages or whether their loss was 

substantial. If there is a possibility of obtaining damages 

in any amount, the case is not moot. 

—————— 8For example, in Brooks v. Andolina, 826 F. 2d 1266 (1987), the Third 

Circuit held that a prisoner could seek damages for various deprivations 

suffered during punitive segregation imposed in retaliation for the exercise of his free speech rights. Id., at 1270. These injuries included loss

of visiting and phone privileges, recreation rights, and access to the law 

library. 

In Young v. Little Rock, 249 F. 3d 730 (2001), the Eighth Circuit affirmed a jury award of compensatory damages for wrongful detention

that caused psychological harm. Id., at 736. 

In Drake v. Lawrence, 524 N. E. 2d 337 (1988), the Indiana Court of

Appeals affirmed a compensatory damages award for, among other 

things, the embarrassment of a false arrest in front of an employee and 

customer and the anxiety associated with pending charges. Id., at 342.

 In Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 F. 2d 1547 (1986), 

aff ’d, 479 U. S. 1048 (1987), the Seventh Circuit affirmed an award of 

damages for “specific compensable, non-abstract harm” resulting from an 

unconstitutional ordinance restricting door-to-door solicitation. That 

harm included the organization’s inability to recruit new members, disseminate its views, and encourage others to support its positions. 796 

F. 2d, at 1558–1559; see also, e.g., King v. Zamiara, 788 F. 3d 207, 213– 

214 (CA6 2015) (affirming compensatory damages award for injury

caused by transfer of inmate in retaliation for filing lawsuit, when transfer impeded his ability to participate in litigation). 
20 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. 

CITY OF NEW YORK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

3 

One final point about damages must be addressed. We 

have warned in dicta that a claim of damages, “asserted 

solely to avoid otherwise certain mootness, [bears] close inspection.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 

U. S. 43, 71 (1997). But if, after close inspection, we conclude that the stringent test for mootness is not met, we

have no authority to dismiss on that ground.

 Nothing in Arizonans for Official English suggests otherwise. In that case, the plaintiff, who was an employee of 

the State of Arizona when she filed her complaint, sued the 

State under §1983, claiming that a state constitutional 

amendment declaring English the official language of the

State unconstitutionally prevented her from using Spanish

to perform her job. Her requests for declaratory and injunctive relief became moot when she left state employment for

the private sector, and we held that her request for nominal 

damages from the State did not save her case from mootness since a State may not be sued under §1983. 520 U. S., 

at 67–69, 71. The situation here is different because nothing blocks an award of nominal damages from a city.9 

C 

Relief would be particularly appropriate here because the 

—————— 9The per curiam refuses to decide whether petitioners have a live claim 

for damages, claiming that the lower courts should determine in the first

instance whether any effort to recover damages has come “too late.” 

Ante, at 2. But as previously discussed, see supra, at 15–16, prejudice is 

the critical factor in determining whether to permit a late request for a 

form of relief not expressly demanded in a complaint, and the per curiam 

does not identify any reason why allowing petitioners’ request for damages at this juncture would prejudice the City. Under the Court’s decision, allowing damages will not prolong this litigation, because the case 

is being remanded anyway, and there is no suggestion that the City

would have litigated the case any differently if it had been on express 

notice that petitioners were seeking the sort of modest damages discussed in this opinion. 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 21 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

City’s litigation strategy caused petitioners to incur what

are surely very substantial attorney’s fees in challenging 

the constitutionality of a City ordinance that the City went 

to great lengths to defend.10 Of course, a claim for attorney’s fees is not alone sufficient to preserve a live controversy. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 480 

(1990). But where a live controversy remains, a defendant 

who would otherwise be liable for attorney’s fees should not 

be able to wiggle out on the basis of a spurious claim of 

mootness. 

If a §1983 plaintiff achieves any success on the merits, 

even an award of nominal damages, the plaintiff is a prevailing party and is eligible for attorney’s fees under 42 

U. S. C. §1988. See Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. 

v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 

U. S. 598, 603 (2001). For this reason, were the Court to 

exercise jurisdiction in this case and rule for petitioners, 

they would be eligible for attorney’s fees. See Farrar v. 

Hobby, 506 U. S. 103, 109 (1992).

On the other hand, dismissing the case as moot means 

that petitioners are stuck with the attorney’s fees they incurred in challenging a rule that the City ultimately abandoned—and which it now admits was not needed for public 

safety. That is so because “[a] defendant’s voluntary change

in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary

judicial imprimatur on the change.” Buckhannon, 532 

U. S., at 605. 

Section 1988 attorney’s fees are an important component 

of civil rights enforcement. See id., at 635–638 (GINSBURG, 

J., dissenting). The prospect of an award of attorney’s fees 

ensures that “private attorneys general” can enforce the 

—————— 10Attorney’s fees are specifically requested in the amended complaint. 

App. 48. 
 

 

22 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. 

CITY OF NEW YORK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

civil rights laws through civil litigation, even if they “‘cannot afford legal counsel.’” Id., at 635–636. 

Here, the City fought petitioners tooth and nail in the 

District Court and the Court of Appeals, insisting that its 

old ordinance served important public safety purposes.

When petitioners sought review in this Court, the City opposed certiorari on the same ground. But once we granted

review, the City essentially attempted to impose a unilateral settlement that deprived petitioners of attorney’s fees. 

And those fees would likely be substantial. They would reflect five years of intensive litigation—everything from the 

drafting of the complaint, through multiple rounds of District Court motion practice, to appellate review, and proceedings in this Court. 

III

 The per curiam provides no sound reason for holding that 

this case is moot. The per curiam states that the City’s current rule gave petitioners “the precise relief [they] requested” in their prayer for relief, ante, at 1, but that is not 

so. Petitioners’ prayer for relief asks the court to enjoin 38 

N. Y. C. R. R. §5–23 insofar as it “prohibit[s]” travel outside

the City to ranges, competitions, and second homes. App.

48. The new rule’s conditions unmistakably continue to 

prohibit some travel outside the City to those destinations.

For this reason, petitioners have not obtained the “unrestricted access” that, they have always maintained, the Second Amendment guarantees. Id., at 36. The per curiam

implies that the current rule, as interpreted at oral argument by counsel for the City, gives petitioners everything

that they now seek, ante, at 1, but that also is not true. Petitioners still claim the right to “unrestricted access” and 

counsel’s off-the-cuff concessions do not give them that.11 

—————— 11The City’s enforcement position as to “coffee, gas, food, or restroom 

breaks” by no means resolves the meaning of §5–23. The City’s counsel 

informed the Court that those stops are permissible because they are 
 

 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 23 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

The per curiam’s main argument appears to go as follows: 

Petitioners’ original claim was a challenge to New York’s

old rule; this claim is now moot due to the repeal of that 

rule; and what the petitioners are now asserting is a new

claim, namely, that New York’s current rule is also unconstitutional. 

This argument also misrepresents the nature of the claim

asserted in petitioners’ complaint. What petitioners

claimed in their complaint and still claim is that they are 

entitled to “unrestricted access” to out-of-city ranges and

competitions. App. 36. The City’s replacement of one law 

denying unrestricted access with another that also denies 

that access did not change the nature of petitioners’ claim

or render it moot. 

Consider where acceptance of the argument adopted by

the per curiam leads. Suppose that a city council, seeking 

to suppress a local paper’s opposition to some of its programs, adopts an ordinance prohibiting the publication of

any editorial without the approval of a city official. Suppose

that a newspaper challenges the constitutionality of this

rule, arguing that the First Amendment confers the unrestricted right to editorialize without prior approval. If the 

council then repeals its ordinance and replaces it with a 

new one requiring approval only if the editorial concerns 

one particular city program, would that render the pending 

lawsuit moot and require the paper to commence a new one?

Or take this example. A State enacts a law providing that

any woman wishing to obtain an abortion must submit certification from five doctors that the procedure is medically 

necessary. After a woman sues, claiming that any requirement of physician certification is unconstitutional, the 

—————— 

“reasonably necessary” under the new rule. Tr. of Oral Arg. 64–65. But 

what that means is far from clear, and, at any rate, coffee breaks and the

like are just illustrative examples of potential ways in which the new 

rule affords something less than unfettered access to gun ranges, competitions, and second homes outside the City. See supra, at 13. 
 

24 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. 

CITY OF NEW YORK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

State replaces its old law with a new one requiring certification by three physicians. Would the court be required to 

dismiss the woman’s suit? Suppose the court, following the

precedent set by today’s decision, holds that the case is 

moot, and suppose that the woman brings a second case 

challenging the new law on the same ground. If the State 

repeals that law and replaces it with one requiring certification by two doctors, would the second suit be moot? And 

what if the State responds to a third suit by enacting

replacement legislation demanding certification by one 

doctor? 

Mootness doctrine does not require such results. A challenge to an allegedly unconstitutional law does not become

moot with the enactment of new legislation that reduces but 

does not eliminate the injury originally alleged. And that 

is the situation here. 

The Court cites one case in support of its holding, Lewis 

v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 482–483 (1990), 

but that decision is wholly inapposite. The situation in 

Lewis was complicated, but the critical point for present

purposes is that, by the time the case reached this Court,

the enactment of new legislation meant that the plaintiff no

longer had Article III standing to assert its original claim. 

Id., at 478–479. But instead of simply ordering that the

case be dismissed, the Court remanded to give the plaintiff 

the opportunity to assert a different claim and, if necessary,

to amend the complaint or “develop the record” to show it

had standing to pursue this new claim. Id., at 482. 

The situation here is entirely different. It is not disputed

that petitioners have standing to contest the City’s restrictions on trips to out-of-city ranges and competitions, 

and as a result of those restrictions, petitioners have suffered and will continue to suffer injury that is concrete, 

traceable to actions taken by the City, and remediable by a 

court. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. ___ (2016).

They are not asserting a new claim. Their original claim— 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 25 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

that they have the right under the Second Amendment to

unrestricted access to out-of-city ranges and competitions—

is unchanged, and this claim does not require an amendment of the complaint or any supplementation of the record 

to support their allegations of injury. 

For these reasons, there is no justification for holding 

that this case is moot. 

IV 

A 

Having shown that this case is not moot, I proceed to the

merits of plaintiffs’ claim that the City ordinance violated 

the Second Amendment. This is not a close question. The 

answer follows directly from Heller. 

In Heller, we held that a District of Columbia rule that 

effectively prevented a law-abiding citizen from keeping a 

handgun in the home for purposes of self-defense constituted a core violation of the Second Amendment. 554 U. S., 

at 635. We based this decision on the scope of the right to 

keep and bear arms as it was understood at the time of the 

adoption of the Second Amendment. Id., at 577–605, 628– 

629. We recognized that history supported the constitutionality of some laws limiting the right to possess a firearm, 

such as laws banning firearms from certain sensitive locations and prohibiting possession by felons and other dangerous individuals. See id., at 626–627; see also McDonald, 

561 U. S., at 787, 904. But history provided no support for 

laws like the District’s. See 554 U. S., at 629–634. 

For a similar reason, 38 N. Y. C. R. R. §5–23 also violated 

the Second Amendment. We deal here with the same core 

Second Amendment right, the right to keep a handgun in 

the home for self-defense. As the Second Circuit “assume[d],” a necessary concomitant of this right is the right

to take a gun outside the home for certain purposes. 883 

F. 3d, at 58–59. One of these is to take a gun for maintenance or repair, which City law allows. See §5–22(a)(16). 
 

26 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. 

CITY OF NEW YORK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

Another is to take a gun outside the home in order to transfer ownership lawfully, which the City also allows. §5–26(j).

And still another is to take a gun to a range in order to gain 

and maintain the skill necessary to use it responsibly. As 

we said in Heller, “‘to bear arms implies something more 

than the mere keeping [of arms]; it implies the learning to

handle and use them in a way that makes those who keep 

them ready for their efficient use.’” 554 U. S., at 617–618 

(quoting T. Cooley, Constitutional Law 271 (1880)); see also 

Luis v. United States, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (THOMAS, J., 

concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 3) (“The right to keep 

and bear arms . . . ‘implies a corresponding right . . . to acquire and maintain proficiency in their use’”); Ezell v. Chicago, 651 F. 3d 684, 704 (CA7 2011) (“[T]he core right 

wouldn’t mean much without the training and practice that

make it effective”).

It is true that a lawful gun owner can sometimes practice

at a range using a gun that is owned by and rented at the 

range. But the same model gun that the person owns may

not be available at a range, and in any event each individual gun may have its own characteristics. See Brief for Professors of Second Amendment Law et al. as Amici Curiae 

10–12; see also App. 51, 56, 59 (referencing differences

across ranges and shooting competitions). Once it is recognized that the right at issue is a concomitant of the same

right recognized in Heller, it became incumbent on the City

to justify the restrictions its rule imposes, but the City has 

not done so. It points to no evidence of laws in force around

the time of the adoption of the Second Amendment that prevented gun owners from practicing outside city limits. The 

City argues that municipalities restricted the places within 

their jurisdiction where a gun could be fired, Brief for Respondents 18, and it observes that the Second Amendment

surely does not mean that a New York City resident with a 

premises license can practice in Central Park or Times 

Square, id., at 21. That is certainly true, but that is not the 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 27 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

question. Petitioners do not claim the right to fire weapons 

in public places within the City. Instead, they claim they

have a right to practice at ranges and competitions outside 

the City, and neither the City, the courts below, nor any of 

the many amici supporting the City have shown that municipalities during the founding era prevented gun owners

from taking their guns outside city limits for practice. 

B 

If history is not sufficient to show that the New York City

ordinance is unconstitutional, any doubt is dispelled by the 

weakness of the City’s showing that its travel restriction

significantly promoted public safety. Although the courts 

below claimed to apply heightened scrutiny, there was 

nothing heightened about what they did. 

As noted, the City relied entirely on the declaration of Inspector Lunetta, but this declaration provides little support. See supra, at 9–10. Some of what Inspector Lunetta

asserted was simply not relevant to the justification for

drawing a distinction between trips to a range in the City

and trips to a range in a neighboring jurisdiction. For example, he stated that persons holding premises licenses “do

not always transport their firearms in a locked box carrying

ammunition separately, as required by NYPD rules,” but

the issue in this case does not concern the storage of a gun 

on the way to a range. App. 77–78. Similarly, he declared 

that “[p]remises license holders have not demonstrated 

proper cause to carry a concealed firearm in public,” id., at 

78, but the question before us is not whether petitioners 

have the right to do what they could if they had carry licenses. 

Other statements actually undermine the City’s public 

safety rationale. Thus, the fact that prosecutors typically

do not bring even misdemeanor charges against licensees

who carry a weapon in violation of the limitations of their 
28 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. 

CITY OF NEW YORK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

licenses, ibid., does not suggest that the City regards violations as presenting a particularly significant threat to public safety.

When all that is irrelevant is brushed aside, what remains are the three arguments noted earlier. First, Inspector 

Lunetta asserted that the travel restrictions discouraged licensees from taking their guns outside the home, but this

is a strange argument for several reasons. It would make 

sense only if it is less convenient or more expensive to practice at a range in the City, but that contradicts the City’s 

argument that the seven ranges in the City provide ample 

opportunity for practice. And discouraging trips to a range 

contradicts the City’s own rule recommending that licensees practice. Once it is recognized that a reasonable opportunity to practice is part of the very right recognized in 

Heller, what this justification amounts to is a repudiation

of part of what we held in that decision.

Second, Inspector Lunetta claimed that prohibiting trips

to out-of-city ranges helps prevent a person who is taking a 

gun to a range from using it in a fit of rage after an auto 

accident or some other altercation that occurs along the 

way. And to bolster this argument, Inspector Lunetta asserted that persons who have met the City’s demanding requirements for obtaining a premises license are just as

likely as anyone else to use their guns in a fit of rage. App. 

77. If that is so, it does not reflect well on the City’s intensive vetting scheme, see supra, at 4–6, and in any event, the 

assertion is dubious on its face. 

More to the point, this argument does not explain why a

person headed for a range outside the City is any more

likely to engage in such conduct than a person whose destination is a range in the City. There might be something to 

the argument if ranges in the City were closer than those

just outside its borders, but the City never attempted to

show that. The courts below were incurious about the va-
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 29 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

lidity of Inspector Lunetta’s assertion, and given the location of the City’s seven ranges, the assertion is more than

dubious.12 

Inspector Lunetta’s final justification for the travel restrictions was only marginally stronger. It goes like this.

Suppose that a patrol officer stops a premises licensee and 

finds that this individual is carrying a gun, and suppose

that that the licensee says he is taking the gun to a range 

to practice or is returning from a range. If the range in

question is one in the City, the officer will be better able to

check the story than if the range is outside the officer’s jurisdiction. App. 79–80.

How strong is this argument? The City presumably has 

access to records of cases in which licensees were cited for 

unauthorized possession of guns outside the home, and it 

failed to provide any evidence that holders of target licenses 

had used their right to practice at out-of-city ranges as a 

pretext. And it is dubious that it would be much harder for 

an officer to check whether a licensee was really headed for 

an out-of-city range as opposed to one in the City. If a licensee claims to be headed for a range in the City, the officer can check whether the range is open and whether the

individual appears to be on a route that plausibly leads to

that range. But how much more difficult would it be to do 

the same thing if the range is in one of the counties that 

border New York City or across the Hudson River in New

Jersey? A phone call would be enough to determine the 

range’s operating hours, and the route would still be easy 

—————— 12Two of the seven City ranges (28%) were located in Staten Island 

(home to under 6% of the City’s residents), and the trip there from the 

other boroughs is not quick. Another range (the only one open to the 

public) was located in the north Bronx. See Brief for Appellants in No.

15–638, p. 32 (CA2) (explaining that, for plaintiff Colantone, “traveling

from his home in Staten Island to the authorized range Olinville Arms 

in the Bronx[ involves] a far longer drive” than to a shooting club in New

Jersey). 
 

 

30 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. 

CITY OF NEW YORK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

to determine: There are only a few bridges and tunnels to 

New Jersey and just a few main thoroughfares to the neighboring New York counties. A court conducting any form of 

serious scrutiny would have demanded that the City provide some substantiation for this claim, but nothing like

that was provided or demanded.

Would the situation be much different if the individual 

claimed to be headed home from a range? Once again, it

would not be difficult for the officer to check whether the 

range was or recently had been open. And it is not at all 

apparent that determining whether a licensee was on a 

route to his or her residence would be any harder if the

range at which the licensee claimed to have practiced was 

outside the City. 

Inspector Lunetta’s declaration stated that ranges in the

City are required to keep a record of everyone who practices 

there, and therefore if a person claims to be coming from a 

city range, the officer could easily check that story. But the 

declaration does not state that ranges in nearby jurisdictions do not keep similar records.13 It should have been 

easy enough for the City to check, and a court engaged in 

—————— 13 Inspector Lunetta also expressed concern that officers in other jurisdictions might detect and report fewer license violations. App. 80. But 

Inspector Lunetta did not support this prediction, and his declaration 

gives reason to doubt whether a decrease in referrals will actually occur.

Lunetta explains that the NYPD License Division already receives “reports from [the New York State Division of Criminal Justice System] regarding all arrests made within the State of New York for which an arrestee is fingerprinted.” Id., at 86. But “[n]o formal report is forwarded 

to the License Division for summonses and other arrests and incidents 

for which a detainee is not fingerprinted.” Ibid. “[T]he License Division 

may be, but is not always, notified of an arrest” made by the Federal 

Government or authorities in another State. Ibid. By Lunetta’s own 

account, the NYPD already appears reliant on the State fingerprinting

database to detect violations in other jurisdictions. There is no reason to 

expect that database to be any less effective today in alerting the License

Division to potential violations than it was under the old ordinance. 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 31 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

any serious form of scrutiny would have questioned the absence of evidence, but no substantiation was provided or demanded below. 

In sum, the City’s travel restriction burdened the very

right recognized in Heller. History provides no support for 

a restriction of this type. The City’s public safety arguments were weak on their face, were not substantiated in 

any way, and were accepted below with no serious probing.

And once we granted review in this case, the City’s public

safety concerns evaporated.

We are told that the mode of review in this case is representative of the way Heller has been treated in the lower 

courts. If that is true, there is cause for concern. 

* * * 

This case is not moot. The City violated petitioners’ Second Amendment right, and we should so hold. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the

case to the District Court to provide appropriate relief. I 

therefore respectfully dissent.