NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

ANTHONY TERRANOVA, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0404 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR 1996-095002

The Honorable Daniel J. Kiley, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix

By Diane Meloche

Counsel for Respondent

Anthony Terranova, Tucson

Petitioner

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

FILED 10-3-2017
STATE v. TERRANOVA

Decision of the Court

2

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Anthony Terranova petitions this court for review from the 

dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). We have 

considered the petition for review and, for the reasons stated below, grant 

review but deny relief.

¶2 A jury rejected Terranova's claim of self-defense and 

convicted him of first-degree murder and third-degree burglary. The 

superior court sentenced him to natural life in prison for the murder

conviction and to a consecutive term of eight years for the burglary

conviction. This court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct 

appeal. State v. Terranova, 1 CA-CR 98-0805 (Ariz. App. Sep. 2, 1999) (mem. 

decision).

¶3 Terranova timely sought post-conviction relief, asserting 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC"), newly discovered 

evidence, excessive sentence, unlawful suppression of evidence, and use of 

perjured testimony by the State. The superior court summarily dismissed 

Terranova's filing because it found no colorable claims. Terranova did not 

seek review by this court.

¶4 Over 14 years later, Terranova filed a successive PCR. 

Asserting several claims based on "new evidence," he first argued that the 

State disposed of his vehicle to prevent defense experts from examining it 

for blood splatter evidence, which would prove the victim was shot further 

outside the restaurant than the State alleged at trial. He also claimed that

other blood found at the scene should have been tested for the same reason. 

Terranova argued that a "second man," a restaurant employee named M. 

Papa, witnessed the shooting, but that M. Papa "was neither on the [S]tate's 

list of witnesses" nor mentioned during discovery.

¶5 As additional claims of "new evidence," Terranova asserted

he discovered an audiotape of witness interviews that had not been 

disclosed. He argued the tape contained a statement by witness Mary 

Yazzie that could have been used to impeach her testimony at trial and to 

prove that the prosecutor had coerced her to change her testimony. He also 

claimed that news footage airing shortly after the murder included an 

interview with police in which statements were made that were 

inconsistent with the State's theory that the victim was inside the restaurant 

when the shooting occurred. He further argued that an independent 

emergency medical technician's report supported his claim that the victim 

had been shot while outside the restaurant.
STATE v. TERRANOVA

Decision of the Court

3

¶6 Asserting prosecutorial misconduct, Terranova alleged the 

State committed a Brady violation when the prosecutor "made a deal" with 

his cell mate, Darren Fox, but had not disclosed the deal. He further 

claimed that the State had searched a witness's truck at the crime scene and 

might have found incriminating evidence, but may not have prosecuted the 

witness in exchange for the witness's testimony in Terranova's case. Next, 

he claimed that the character and honesty of the medical examiner, Dr. 

Phillip Keen, and the prosecutor, Noel Levy, had been called into question 

by other cases and media reports. 

¶7 Terranova's PCR also included several IAC claims, some of 

which had already been presented in his earlier PCR. The last claim he 

asserted was actual innocence. Essentially, Terranova argued that but for

the claimed errors outlined above, no reasonable jury would have convicted 

him.

¶8 The superior court addressed each of Terranova's claims and 

concluded they were precluded or not colorable, and summarily dismissed

them. This petition for review followed.

¶9 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, this court will 

not disturb a superior court's ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief. 

State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012). Terranova has not shown 

any abuse of discretion or error of law.

¶10 On review, Terranova first complains that the superior court

incorrectly referred to his PCR as his "fourth" PCR. Whether identified as 

his second or fourth PCR, the rules and consequences of filing an untimely 

and successive PCR are the same. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); see also State 

v. Petty, 225 Ariz. 369, 372-73, ¶ 10 (App. 2010).

¶11 Terranova argues the superior court improperly deemed his 

"Rule 32 Post Conviction Relief" a "Notice of Post-Conviction Relief," and 

complains that the order dismissing the PCR does not have a signature or 

seal "signifying the mandate was an official order by a duly sworn judge of 

the Superior Court of Arizona."

1 Terranova does not explain how or why 

this is error, nor does he cite any authority requiring or even suggesting

that an order dismissing a PCR must be signed or bear an official seal, or 

 

1 Rule 32.9 allows for a petition for review from the superior court's 

final decision and does not require that the order be signed, or that the order 

bear an official seal.
STATE v. TERRANOVA

Decision of the Court

4

that the court erred when it referred to his PCR as "Notice of PostConviction Relief."

¶12 Terranova next argues the superior court erred when it 

dismissed his claims of prosecutorial misconduct and insufficiency of 

evidence as precluded because "[t]hat is what the Rule 32 process is for, to 

raise issues that were not raised on direct appeal." Contrary to Terranova's 

understanding, any claim that could have been (or was) raised on direct 

appeal or in an earlier PCR proceeding is precluded, except for claims 

raised under 32.1(d), (e)-(h). See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a), (b). And for these

claims, a petitioner must state in the notice of PCR why the claim was not 

raised before, and must set forth the specific exception. Id. 32.2(b). Given 

that requirement, only the "new evidence" claims are properly before us.

¶13 Terranova, however, has failed to show that any of the "new 

evidence" is material or that it would have probably changed the jury's 

verdict. State v. Saenz, 197 Ariz. 487, 489, ¶ 7 (App. 2000). Stated differently, 

Terranova's claims, even if true, would not entitle him to relief. Terranova 

admitted at trial he shot the victim twice in the back, but claimed he acted 

in self-defense because the victim had been carrying a knife. No knife was 

ever found, and the only eyewitness to the shooting testified that the victim 

was unarmed. The superior court ruled on these issues in a thorough, wellreasoned manner that will allow any future court to understand the court's 

ruling. Under these circumstances, no further analysis is needed. See State 

v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274 (App. 1993). Therefore, we adopt the trial 

court's ruling and deny relief.