UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WELLS FARGO ADVANTAGE

NATIONAL TAX FEE FUND, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

HELICON ASSOCIATES, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

Case No. 08-15162

Stephen J. Murphy, III

United States District Judge

Michael Hluchaniuk

United States Magistrate Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS (Dkt. 250, 251)

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The complaint in this matter was filed on December 15, 2008, alleging

several federal and state causes of action. (Dkt. 1). Jurisdiction over the state

claims was based on the court’s supplemental jurisdiction regarding such matters. 

The subsequent litigation resulted in a narrowing of the permissible claims on

behalf of the plaintiffs until there was a dismissal of all of the federal claims and

the court issued a show cause order as to why the remaining state claims should

 These matters were referred to the undersigned for hearing and determination. (Dkt. 1

252). However, it is clear that a post-judgment motion for attorney fees is a dispositive matter

and a magistrate judge only has the authority to issue a report and recommendation. See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2)(D) (“the court...may refer a motion for attorneys’ fees to a magistrate

judge under Rule 72(b) as if it were a dispositive pretrial matter.”). While a magistrate judge’s

authority as to post-judgment costs are less clear, in an abundance of caution, the undersigned’s

consideration of this matter is also done by report and recommendation.

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not be dismissed. (Dkt. 218). The parties prevailed on the court to exercise its

discretion and to retain jurisdiction of the remaining state claims given the

significant investment in time the parties had put into the litigation. On February

9, 2012, the court entered an order allowing the case to go forward under its

supplemental jurisdiction as to claims under Michigan, Massachusetts and

Connecticut law. (Dkt. 225). On April 25, 2012, the parties entered into a consent

judgment awarding substantial damages to plaintiffs under the Connecticut

Securities Act. The present motions for attorney fees and costs were filed on May

11, 2012. (Dkt. 250, 251). These matters were referred to the undersigned on

May 20, 2012. (Dkt. 252). Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on August 9,

2012. (Dkt. 255). After the hearing, the parties entered into a proposed stipulated

order that provides as follows:

1. Plaintiffs shall be awarded an attorney fee in the amount

of $873,810.70;

2. Plaintiffs shall be awarded taxable costs in an amount no

less than $31,603.57; and

3. The parties have not been able to come to an agreement

on the remaining issues regarding Plaintiffs’ motion for an award of

costs, which has been fully briefed and argued before the Court. The

Court will take these remaining issues under advisement.

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(See Exhibit A attached to this Report and Recommendation). For the reasons set

forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court enter the parties’

stipulation as to attorney fees and costs and adopt the recommendations set forth

below regarding the unresolved costs issues.

II. SPECIFIC COSTS CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff claims costs under the provisions of federal as well as state law. 

Those claims that are made exclusively under federal law include: (1) taxable fees

of the clerk - $1,728.12; (2) court reporter fees for transcripts - $28,942.41; (3)

fees for witnesses - $178.04; (4) fees for service of process - $755.00; and (5) fees

for copies - $31,351.93. Claims made exclusively under state law include: (1)

expert witness fees - $195, 622.48; (2) attorney travel expenses - $33,210.66; (3)

mailing - $3,835.80; and (4) conference calls - $404.15. Plaintiff claims costs for

online research fees under federal or state law in the amount of $24,634.50. 

As set forth above, a number of these costs have not been objected to by

defendant. Defendant has not objected to the taxable costs to the clerk of

$1,728.12, the court reporter fees for transcripts of $28,942.41, the witness fees of

$178.04, and the service of process fees of $755.00.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

Plaintiff seeks costs under federal law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and

Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d). Rule 54(d) provides that unless a statute, rule or order

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provides otherwise, costs, not including attorney fees, “should” be allowed to the

prevailing party. Section 1920 includes a list of items which may be taxed as costs

by the clerk or a judge. The Supreme Court has determined “that § 1920 defines

the term ‘costs’ as used in Rule 54(d). Section 1920 enumerates expenses that a

federal court may tax as a cost under the discretionary authority found in Rule

54(d). It is phrased permissively because Rule 54(d) generally grants a federal

court discretion to refuse to tax costs in favor of the prevailing party.” Crawford

Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1987). 

Plaintiff also seeks costs under state law. Specifically, the consent

judgment in plaintiff’s favor was based on an acknowledged violation of the

Connecticut Uniform Securities Act (CUSA), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 36b-29(a)(2). 

That section of Connecticut law provides, in part, that a “person who ... sells ... a

security by means of any untrue statement of a material fact ... is liable to the

person buying the security [for] the consideration paid for the security, together

with interest at eight per cent per year from the date of the payment, costs and

reasonable attorney fees ...”

IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Costs under Federal Law

1. Fees for Exemplification and Copies

Plaintiff seeks an award of costs in the amount of $31,351.93. Section

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1920(4) clearly allows for the award of costs relating to “[f]ees for exemplification

and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily

obtained for use in the case.” Defendant does not dispute plaintiff’s entitlement to

an award of costs for copying charges under § 1920(4) but disputes the amount of

the award plaintiff seeks based on the contention that the amount sought is

“undefined and unreasonable.” (Dkt. 256, Pg ID 8634). Plaintiff has attached to

its motion a schedule of the duplication costs incurred during the course of this

litigation. Undeniably this litigation was extensive and complicated and lasted

more than three years. Defendant contends these costs are “not documented” in

such a way that it can be determined that they were “necessarily obtained” for the

litigation. The undersigned finds that the documentation provided by plaintiffs is

adequate under the circumstances. It would be impractical to provide

documentation for each specific item that was copied so that in each of the

instances a copy of something was created a finding of necessity could be made. 

In this context, a certain amount of deference is allowed to the party requesting an

award of costs and where adequate documentation is made as to those costs, as is

the case here, reasonable necessity will be found. Also, comparing one side of 2

 It makes no practical sense to require the type of evidentiary showing defendant seems

2

to suggest in these circumstances. To do so would require the compounding of the litigation well

beyond what seems reasonable. Rule 54(d)(2)(D) indicates an allowance for procedures where

related issues can be resolved “without extensive evidentiary hearings.” Additionally, the

Supreme Court, in slightly different circumstances, has determined that a “request for attorney’s

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the lawsuit to the other for purposes of determining reasonableness in the amount

of copying expense is not particularly helpful. There are too many variables in

that comparison to make it a fair way to reach a decision. Plaintiff’s claim for

copying costs in the amount of $31,351.93 is deemed reasonable and that amount

will be awarded as a taxable cost.

2. Fees for Online Legal Research

Plaintiff seeks $24,634.50 in costs for online research conducted in this

litigation which consists of $20,779.70 in charges for the research by primary and

local counsel and $3,854.80 in related printing of the research. Defendant objects

to the taxation of these costs as not being allowed under § 1920 and based on the

claim the charges are not reasonable. (Dkt. 256, Pg ID 8635-36). 

Online research expenses are not included in the list of recoverable costs

included in §1920. “[A]bsent explicit statutory or contractual authorization for the

taxation of [costs] federal courts are bound by the limitations set out in 28 U.S.C.

... § 1920.” Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 445. Online research expenses are not a

taxable cost under § 1920. 

fees should not result in a second major litigation.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437

(1983). While the question of an award of costs is not the same as a request for attorney fees,

there are many similarities in principle and the words of the Supreme Court are viewed as an

admonition to not turn these post-judgment issues into a second trial. Such an admonition

warrants a more summary analysis of the facts here than might be given to the underlying merits

of the case.

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Plaintiffs rely on Farley v. Country Coach, Inc., 2008 WL 905215 (E.D.

Mich. 2008) in support of their request. Indeed, Farley was a case in which online research costs were awarded to a prevailing party. The successful plaintiff in

Farley had pursued a cause of action pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty

Act which included a provision that allowed “the aggregate amount of cost and

expenses (including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended) determined by

the court” to be recovered by plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2). The Farley

opinion relied on decisions from three other circuits (the 9th, 2d and 1st) which

awarded on-line research expenses as part of an attorney fee petition, not under

§ 1920. “The costs that courts may tax under Rule 54(d)(1) are confined to the

costs itemized in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.” In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 481

F.3d 355, 359 (6th Cir. 2007). The cost of on-line research may be taxed under

the “cost” provision of 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2), as determined by Farley, but they

may not be taxed under Rule 54(d) and § 1920. Plaintiffs cite no other federal law

that allows for an award of costs for on-line research in the present circumstances.

B. Costs under State Law

1. Expert Witnesses

Plaintiffs request an award of costs for three expert witnesses totaling

$195,622.48. Plaintiffs contend that expert witness fees can be awarded under the

“costs” language of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 36b-29(a)(2). Plaintiffs appear to cite

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Duerr v. Dicesare, 2004 WL 2361833 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004) in support of their

position. (Dkt. 251, Pg ID 7747). Defendant opposes an award of costs relating to

expert witness fees under Connecticut law arguing any “cost” award must be

clearly provided for in the statute. Defendant cites Arnone v. Town of Enfield, 79

Conn.App. 501 (2003), among other cases, in support of its position. (Dkt. 256,

Pg ID 8638). 

As to whether Connecticut state law allows for the award of costs beyond

that allowed in § 1920, the Supreme Court of Connecticut addressed a related

issue in M. DeMatteo Const. Co. v. City of New London, 236 Conn. 710 (1996). 

In DeMatteo the court considered a situation in which plaintiff had successfully

appealed a valuation of real estate for tax purposes by the City of New London. 

The statute under which the appeal was taken, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-117a,

provided that if “the assessment made by the board of tax review is reduced by

said court, the applicant shall be reimbursed by the town or city for any

overpayment of taxes, together with interest and costs.” Plaintiff sought an award

of costs for the expense of a real estate appraiser who provided a report and

subsequently testified at the trial under the provisions of § 12-117a and § 52-

260(f), a more general provision that allowed for the award of certain taxable costs

to a prevailing party in litigation. The court considered the “settled principle of

[Connecticut] common law that parties are required to bear their own litigation

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expenses, except as otherwise provided by statute ...[and] courts cannot tax

[costs]” unless the statute “clearly provides for them.” While not identifying what

was included in the “costs” provided for in § 12-117a, the court concluded that a

real estate appraisal report was not “clearly” provided for in that statutory section

and therefore denied the request for an award of costs for the appraisal report. The

court also considered whether the cost of the expert’s report could be awarded

under § 52-260(f) and, although the cost of the appraiser’s trial testimony was a

cost that could be awarded under this section, the cost of the report prepared

earlier was not a cost that could be treated as being associated with the witness’

trial testimony. The significance of DeMatteo in this context is that the

Connecticut Supreme Court considered a substantive state statute that included an

unspecified “costs” provision and declined to allow an award of costs for an expert

witness that was not otherwise allowed by the more general state statute relating to

certain expert witnesses or any other provision of law. 

In 2003, the Connecticut appellate court issued two opinions that relied on

DeMatteo in reaching similar decisions based on other state statutes. Miller v.

Guimaraes, 78 Conn. App. 760 (2003), involved a successful plaintiff in a case

under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The plaintiff sought

an award of costs for an attorney expert witness based on language in the CUTPA

that provided for an unspecified award of costs to the plaintiff. Concluding the

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CUTPA did not “clearly” provide for an award of costs for an expert witness, and

finding that an attorney expert witness was not included in more general expert

witness statute, § 52-260, the request for an award of costs for this witness was

denied. 

In Arnone, supra, the court considered whether a plaintiff who had

successfully sued based on a retaliatory discharge theory was entitled to an award

of costs for an economist expert witness who had testified in the case. The

plaintiff’s cause of action was based on a substantive provision of state law that

allowed for an unspecified award of costs to a successful plaintiff. Citing

DeMatteo, the Arnone court said that the unspecified “costs” language of the

substantive statute giving rise to the cause of action did not clearly provide for an

award of costs for plaintiff’s expert witness, and the general expert witness statute,

§ 52-260, did not list this type of expert as one for which an award of costs could

be given. As a result, an award of costs for this purpose was not allowed. The

court specifically rejected the argument that giving the “costs” language in the

substantive statute no broader meaning than the general limitations of § 52-260

“would give no meaning to the legislature’s words” in the substantive statute.3

 In their reply, plaintiffs cite to the case of Gerner v. Applied Indus., 2005 WL 1805670 3

(Conn. Super. Ct. 2005) which finds that the “costs” language of CUTPA must mean something

more than the general authority to award costs to prevailing parties. However, that opinion is at

odds with the appellate courts in Connecticut in that conclusion and has not been cited by any

other courts that would agree with the proposition.

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Duerr, the case cited by plaintiff, was another CUTPA case where the

plaintiff sought an award of costs for an engineer who had testified on plaintiff’s

behalf. While the trial judge recognized that the provisions of the CUTPA

allowed for an unspecified award of “costs,” and it would be “logical” to award

costs for an expert who was necessary to plaintiff’s case, the court ruled that it was

bound by Miller to disallow such a cost because that type of expert was not

included in § 52-260. 

The common principle identified in these Connecticut cases is that unless a

statute clearly provides for a specific award of costs none will be allowed. These

substantive state statutes differ to some degree in the way they refer to an award of

costs but the differences are not significant. The common feature of all of these

state statutes is that they all have a substantive provision allowing for an award of

costs but do not specify what costs are allowed. Plaintiff contends that because

this case was litigated in federal court, rather than Connecticut state court, the

state decisional law holding that costs of this nature are controlled by § 52-260,

when the substantive law giving rise to the cause of action does not clearly

provide for costs of this nature, should not be followed. (Dkt. 251, Pg ID 7747, n.

4). To the contrary, when a case in federal court is based on diversity jurisdiction

or supplemental jurisdiction, the law of the state relating to the substantive rights

of the parties should be applied as if the case was litigated in state court. “[T]he

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intent of [Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)] was to insure that, in all

cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the

diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal

court should be substantially the same ... as it would be if tried in a State court.” 

Whenever the “source of substantive rights enforced by a federal court under

diversity jurisdiction ... is the law of the States [as] authoritatively declared by a

State, whether its voice be the legislature or its highest court, such law ought to

govern in litigation founded on that law, whether the forum of application is a

State or a federal court.” Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99,

109, 112 (1945). 

Plaintiff also relies on a few federal cases such as Bristol Tech., Inc. v.

Microsoft Corp., 127 F.Supp.2d 64 (D. Conn. 2000) in support of their position. 

Bristol Tech did award “costs” to the plaintiff under CUTPA noting the provisions

in CUPTA, § 42-110g(d), allowed for the award of costs exceeding those costs

otherwise allowed in state court and pointing out the desire to apply state law to

the case in order to avoid any differences between state and federal law on that

subject. However, the court did not address those Connecticut state cases, some of

which are cited above, which appear to limit the award of costs to those that are

clearly provided for. As a result, Bristol Tech is not persuasive authority for the

proposition that Connecticut state law allows for costs beyond those for which

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there is a clear provision. A second case cited by plaintiff, Emerald Investments,

LLC v. Porter Bridge Loan Co., 2007 WL 1834507 (D. Conn. 2007), awarded

costs under CUTPA but also without mentioning any Connecticut state cases and

therefore suffers from the same malady as Bristol Tech. A third case, Charts v.

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 357 (D. Conn. 2005), reversed on other

grounds, Chartschlaa v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 538 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2008),

awarded some costs under CUTPA and the Franchise Act (costs such as

“messenger services, copies, travel and court reporter services”) but declined to

award expert witness fees as costs citing Miller v. Guimaraes, supra. 

The expert witnesses plaintiffs seek an award of costs for include a real

estate appraiser (David Burgoyne), an economist (Gordon Yale) and a securities

expert (Robert Doty). (Dkt. 256, Pg ID 8639). Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-260 allows 4

for certain expert witnesses to be paid a reasonable fee where the expert witness

“gives expert testimony in any action or proceeding, including by means of a

deposition” and that fee may be taxed as costs. § 52-260(f). The only expert

witness plaintiffs seek an award of costs for that is included in the list of permitted

 Plaintiffs’ pleadings do not clearly define the expertise of these individuals but 4

defendant has characterized them in this fashion and plaintiffs have not objected to that

characterization so it will be accepted by the undersigned for the purpose of this analysis.

Report and Recommendation

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experts in § 52-260 is the real estate appraiser. Additionally, the amount of costs 5

that may be allowed for an expert witness is the charge for their testimony plus

any preparation time for their testimony, at deposition or trial, but not for their

services prior to that such as preparing a report. Levesque v. Bristol Hospital, Inc.,

286 Conn. 234, 261-63 (2008). Records provided by plaintiffs indicate that Mr.

Burgoyne charged $4,950.00 for “preparation and deposition” out of a total fee of

$16,215.00. (Dkt. 251, Ex. 12). That amount is deemed a reasonable fee and will

be awarded to plaintiffs as costs. The balance of plaintiffs’ request for an award of

costs relating to expert witness fees is denied.

2. On-line Legal Research

To the extent it was not a cost that could be awarded under federal law,

plaintiff seeks an award for on-line legal research expenses under state law,

specifically the provisions of CUSA. Plaintiff cites Rand-Whitney

Containerboard v. Town of Montville, 2006 WL 2839236 (D. Conn. 2006) in

support of this argument. While there was an award of costs to the successful

plaintiff in Containerboard, the award was made under the provisions of a

contract which had been breached by defendant, not CUTPA. The only CUTPA

 Gordon Yale is an accountant by profession but his expertise in this case is that of an 5

economist. Licensed public accountants are included in the list of permitted experts in § 52-

260(g) but only where they testify in their “capacity as a public accountant” which would not

appear to be the case here. 

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claim was made by defendant in an unsuccessful counterclaim against plaintiff and

the cost shifting provisions of CUTPA were not the basis of the award of costs

relating to on-line research. A second case cited by plaintiff in this portion of its

argument was Pappas v. Watson Wyatt & Co., 2008 WL 45385 (D. Conn.). 

Pappas involved a Title VII action and an award of attorney fees and costs under

that provision of federal law, not Connecticut state law. The opinion did not

appear to address on-line research costs. There may be strong arguments in favor

of awarding costs associated with on-line research, or at least including them as an

expense in an award of attorney fees. However, plaintiff has not cited any

persuasive authority that on-line research should be included in an award of costs

in a CUSA claim. DeMatteo, and Connecticut cases that have addressed the

question of the scope of statutory provisions that include an unspecified allowance

of “costs,” have not been generous in expanding the scope and have declined to

award costs unless “clearly” provided for. On-line research expenses have not

been clearly provided for under Connecticut law and therefore plaintiffs’ request

for $24,634.50 in costs for on-line research is denied.

3. Attorney Travel Expenses

Defendant does not argue that the requested costs associated with attorney

travel are unreasonable - just that the costs sought are not authorized under Conn.

Gen. Stat. § 52-257, which is the state statute authorizing an award of costs to a

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prevailing party regardless of the cause of action. Without question such costs are

not authorized by § 52-257. As indicated above, the state law relating to an award

of costs, as interpreted by the highest courts in the state, would appear to say that

unless costs are “clearly” provided for they are not allowed. Plaintiff does cite to a

few cases in which an award of costs, under a statute similar to the CUSA, was

made for travel expenses. Two of those cases, Emerald Investments, supra, and

Bristol Tech, supra awarded travel expenses as a cost item under the CUTPA,

which has a statutory provision allowing for attorney fees and costs to be awarded

to the prevailing plaintiff, similar to the terms of the CUSA. Those cases were

decided in federal court rather than state court and included very little in the way

of analysis of state law. As a result, they are not particularly persuasive on that

point. The third case, Pappas, supra, awarded attorney fees and costs under Title

VII, which has little relevance to the present case. 

DeMatteo and the other Connecticut appellate court cases that conclude

that “costs” cannot be awarded unless they are “clearly” provided for prohibit the

award of costs associated with travel expenses. Plaintiffs’ request for an award of

costs in the amount of $33,210.66 for attorney travel is denied. 

4. Mailing and Shipping

Plaintiffs seek an award of costs in the amount of $ 3,835.80. The amount

sought seems like a reasonable amount but plaintiffs face the same problem here

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as with other requests. Connecticut law does not clearly provide for an award of

costs for mailing and shipping expenses and therefore this request is also denied.

5. Conference Calls

Plaintiffs request an award of costs in the amount of $ 404.15 relating to

conference calls that were made during the course of the litigation. While it may

have been reasonable and necessary for conference calls to be made in this case

those costs are not clearly provided for under Connecticut law. This request by

plaintiffs is also denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that:

1. plaintiffs should be awarded an attorney fee in the amount of

$873,810.70 (as stipulated by the parties);

2. as stipulated by the parties, plaintiffs should be awarded costs in the

amounts of (1) $1,728.12 for taxable costs to the clerk; (2) $28,942.41 for court

reporter fees; (3) $178.04 for witness fees; and (4) $755.00 for service of process

fees. Additionally, as discussed above, plaintiff should also be awarded costs in

the amounts of (1) $31,351.93 for copying charges; and (2) $4,950.00 for expert

witnesses, for a total amount of $67,905.50 in costs.

The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and

Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service,

Report and Recommendation

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as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule

72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right

of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health and

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some

issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a

party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health

and Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of

Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule

72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge.

Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” “Objection No. 2,”

etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an

objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the

objections in length and complexity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), Local Rule 72.1(d). 

The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, in the

same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to Objection

No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it may

rule without awaiting the response.

Date: October 31, 2012 s/Michael Hluchaniuk

Michael Hluchaniuk

United States Magistrate Judge

Report and Recommendation

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on October 31, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing paper

with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which will send electronic

notification to the following: Michael P. Cillo, Raymond W. Henney, Heidi D.

Hudson, Andrea M. Johnson, Robert T. Kent, Richard J. Landau, Daniel J.

McCarthy, Clinton Meyering, Valeri S. Pappas, Joseph E. Potchen, Michael J.

Watza, and Scott W. Wilkinson.

s/Tammy Hallwood

Case Manager

(810) 341-7887

tammy_hallwood@mied.uscourts.gov

Report and Recommendation

Motions for Attorney Fees and Costs 19 Wells Fargo v. Helicon; Case Nos. 08-15162

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

WELLS FARGO ADVANTAGE 

NATIONAL TAX FREE FUND, et al, 

 Plaintiffs, Case No. 08-cv-15162 

v 

 

HELICON ASSOCIATES, INC., et al., 

 Defendants. 

_______________________________________________________/ 

[PROPOSED] ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY 

FEES AND COSTS

 WHEREBY, upon motion by Plaintiffs, the filing of responsive pleadings by the parties, 

and the prior Order of the Court during oral argument on August 9, 2012, the parties have 

conferred and it is hereby ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiffs shall be awarded an attorney fee in the amount of $873,810.70; 

2. Plaintiffs shall be awarded taxable costs in an amount no less than $31,603.57; 

and 

3. The parties have not been able to come to an agreement on the remaining issues 

regarding Plaintiffs’ motion for an award of costs, which has been fully briefed and argued 

before the Court. The Court will take these remaining issues under advisement. 

 

 __________________________________ 

 U. S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 

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WE HEREBY STIPULATE TO FORM OF THE ORDER, this 6th day of September, 2012. 

s/Valeri S. Pappas _____________________ 

MICHAEL P. CILLO, ESQ. 

VALERI S. PAPPAS, ESQ. 

DAVIS & CERIANI, P.C.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs 

1350 17th Street, Suite 400 

Denver, Colorado 80202 

(303) 534-9000 

mcillo@davisandceriani.com

vpappas@davisandceriani.com 

s/Andrea M. Johnson __________________ 

HEIDI D. HUDSON (P32495) 

ANDREA M. JOHNSON (P67522) 

ZAUSMER KAUFMAN AUGUST 

CALDWELL & TAYLER P.C. 

Attorneys for Defendants Helicon and 

Witucki 

31700 Middlebelt Road, Suite 150 

Farmington Hills, Michigan 48334 

(248) 851-4111 

ajohnson@zkact.com 

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