1

John Gorajczyk is a fifty-four year old man who lives with his wife of twenty-four years

- Michelle Gorajczyk - and their two children, Kaitlin and Joseph.

2

These law enforcement officers were sued in their individual and official capacities.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOHN GORAJCZYK,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF ST. CLAIR SHORES, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 08-14764

Honorable Julian Abele Cook, Jr.

ORDER

This is a lawsuit which was initiated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the Plaintiff, John

Gorajczyk,1 who has accused the City of St. Clair Shores, Michigan ("St. Clair Shores") and five of

its police officers, Cathy McCabe, Paul Plaza, Michael Notorlano, Margaret Eidt, and Phil

Rzotkiewicz,2

 of violating his civil rights. In his second amended complaint, Gorajczyk generally

complains that (1) these officers used excessive force by handcuffing him too tightly during the

execution of an authorized search warrant at his home, (2) that Defendant Plaza used excessive force

by pushing him into his home and pulling him back to his feet from his shoulder, and (3) the

municipal government of St. Clair Shores failed to properly train its law enforcement officers.

Following a denial of these accusations by the Defendants, they filed a motion for the entry
3

Although there was some indication that Gorajczyk had also pursued claims of property

damage, he has since abandoned these claims.

4

Following his arrest, Gorajczyk’s son and daughter were also handcuffed and detained

by the arresting officers. A family friend, Marissa Waldorf, who was visiting Kaitlin Gorajczyk

at the time of the entry into the home by the Defendants, was handcuffed and detained as well.

Gorajczyk’s wife, who arrived at their home approximately forty five minutes after the raid had

begun, was also handcuffed and detained. 

5

All of the occupants of the house- with the exception of the arresting officers - support

Gorajczyk’s argument that he repeatedly sought relief from the pain caused by the handcuffs.

2

of a summary judgment, asserting that there are no remaining issues of a material fact to be resolved

in this controversy. On April 13th of this year, Gorajczyk filed a response in opposition to the

Defendants’ request for relief. On the same date, he voluntarily dismissed St. Clair Shores as a

Defendant with prejudice. The remaining Defendants replied in their individual capacities on April

29th, contending that they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Gorajczyk's remaining

excessive force claims.3

 The qualified immunity issue is now before this Court for its evaluation.

 I.

This case revolves around the events of November 16, 2005, when several St. Clair Shores

police officers, acting upon a facially valid warrant, traveled to Gorajczyk’s home ( 27100 Jefferson

Ave. in St. Clair Shores, Michigan) to search for suspected narcotics (marijuana). Shortly after their

arrival, Gorajczyk was immediately arrested, handcuffed, and detained while the other officers

entered and secured the home.4

 Gorajczyk maintains that, despite his vigorous complaints about the

injurious effect of the handcuffs on his wrists throughout this involuntary detention period, the

officers ignored his pleas.5

 Notwithstanding his contentions, the officers - some of whom allegedly

passed directly in front of Gorajczyk while he remained handcuffed - denied having heard any cries

by him for assistance. Incorporated within his complaints over the handcuff issue, Gorajczyk asserts
3

that he was also manhandled by the officers as they clumsily attempted to move him from the front

porch of his home into the living room. In the course of their efforts to effect the move, Gorajczyk

claims that he was pushed by the officers in an ostensible effort to make him move faster into the

house which, in turn, caused him to trip on the door threshold and fall on his hip. After falling,

Defendant Paul Plaza pulled him back up by an arm which, according to Gorajczyk, caused the

handcuffs to become even tighter. According to Gorajczyk, this encounter with the officers severely

aggravated his left shoulder which caused him to undergo a repair of his rotator cuff, and sustain

subsequent medical costs.

 I.

In 1986, the Supreme Court declared that "[o]ne of the principle purposes of the summary

judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupportable claims or defenses . . . " Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Nevertheless, the Court should only render such a

judgment if the pleadings and evidence "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A

material fact is one which "might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is genuine if it "may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250.

The moving party has the burden of showing an absence of evidence to support the

non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once this requirement has been met, the

responsibility shifts back to the non-moving party to act affirmatively in order to avoid the entry of

a summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). He must respond with evidence that generates more

than a "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
4

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Mere allegations or denials in the non-movant's pleadings

will not meet this burden, nor will a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Instead, there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find

for the non-movant. McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

In applying these standards, "the judge's function is not . . . to weigh the evidence and

determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. The evidence and all reasonable inferences must be construed in the

light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation

omitted). As such, the Court must examine the pleadings and the evidence in the light that is most

favorable to Gorajczyk. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc.,

504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Thus, his "version of any disputed

issue of fact . . . is presumed correct." Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 456.

II.

Initially, the Court concludes that the Defendants are entitled to the entry of a summary

judgment with respect to Gorajczyk's claims against them in their official capacities. The official

record in this cause indicates that Gorajczyk voluntarily dismissed his claims the City of St. Clair

Shores on April 3, 2010. As such, his accusations against these law enforcement officers in their

official capacities must also be dismissed because such allegations are equivalent to a claim that has

been leveled by him against the City of St. Clair Shores. See, e.g., Jackson v. Shelby County Gov't.,

Case No. 07-6356, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24045, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 2008) ("[T]he district

court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on the claims against the sheriff in his
5

official capacity because those claims mirror the claims against the County, and are therefore

redundant."); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (citation omitted) ("[A]n

official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.").

III.

In order to prevail on his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Gorajczyk is required to plead and

prove two essential elements: the Defendants (1) deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity that

has been secured to him by the United States Constitution, federal statute, or other federal law; and

(2) caused the alleged deprivation while acting under color of state law. Sigley v. City of Parma

Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006). There is no dispute in the instant case that the officers

were acting under color of state law at the time of the incident.

Gorajczyk claims that each of the Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using

excessive force during the raid on his home. When an excessive force claim arises in the context

of an arrest or an investigatory stop, it is most properly characterized as one that invokes the

protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees the constitutional right "to be secure . . .

against unreasonable . . . seizures." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Thus,

Gorajczyk's claim that law enforcement officers used excessive force must be analyzed under the

Fourth Amendment and its "objective reasonableness" standard. Id. at 395. 

Excessive force claims should be analyzed in segments to determine if the officers' alleged

conduct was objectively reasonable at each stage of the encounter. See Dickerson v. McCellen, 101

F.3d 1151, 1161-62 (6th Cir. 1996). Gorajczyk's claims in the present case will be analyzed in three

separate segments:

[1] Defendant Paul Plaza [used] excessive force when he pushed [Gorajczyk] from

behind while [Gorajczyk] was handcuffed behind his back causing [Gorajczyk] to
6

 The Sixth Circuit has periodically articulated a third step, in which the Court must

determine whether the plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence to indicate that what the official

allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established constitutional

rights. See, e.g., Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d, 689, 696 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Feathers v. Aey,

319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 2003)); Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 375 (quoting Williams v. Mehra, 186

F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir 1999)). Nevertheless, because in excessive force cases, the district court

must determine whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable, “the third step is

redundant.” Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302, 309 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying a two-step qualified

immunity analysis in an excessive force case) Therefore, the Court will adhere to the two-step 

framework in Binay.

6

trip and fall onto his right hip[;]

(Pl’s Br. in Supp. of Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 23.)

[2 Plaza] yanked [Gorajczyk] up and backwards by his left arm injuring [his] left

shoulder[;] 

(Id.) and,

[3] All Defendant police officers . . . fail[ed] to check and loosen [Gorajczyk's]

handcuffs when he complained numerous times . . . result[ing] in [Gorajczyk]

suffering permanent radial nerve damage and aggravation of carpal tunnel syndrome.

(Id. at 20.)

The Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity for all of Gorajczyk’s

excessive force claims. When qualified immunity applies, it is a defense - not just against liability,

but against the lawsuit itself. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (citations omitted).

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects those government officials who perform " discretionary

functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

To determine whether or not a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, the

Court must follow a two-step inquiry as follows:6
7

First, [the court must] consider whether [t]aken in the light most favorable to the

party asserting the injury . . . the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a

constitutional right. If the answer is yes, next [the court should] ask whether the

right was clearly established in light of the specific context of the case. 

Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 646-47 (6th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and internal citations

omitted). However, while the sequence of this two-step inquiry is often appropriate, it is no longer

mandatory. Id. (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 201 (2001))).

"Once the qualified immunity defense is raised, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate

that the officials are not entitled to qualified immunity." Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351,

375 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.2d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2006)). "If

a plaintiff fails to show either that a constitutional right was violated or that the right was clearly

established, [he] will have failed to carry [his] burden." Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d

901, 907 (6th Cir. 2009). The burden is high because qualified immunity is intended to protect "all

but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

335, 341 (1986). 

"Even at the late stage of summary judgment, the qualified immunity analysis remains a

question of law for a judge to decide." Fettes v. Hendershot, No. 08-4419, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS

8784, at *9 (6th Cir. Apr. 27, 2010). Thus, "[w]hether there is a genuine issue of material fact is

immaterial to a qualified immunity analysis because the court assumes the facts are as the plaintiff

alleges." Id.

A.

First, Gorajczyk asserts that Defendant Paul Plaza used excessive force when (1) he was
7

A “breezeway” is described in the Merriam-Webster dictionary as “a roofed open

passage connecting two buildings (as a house and garage) or halves of a building.”

8

pushed through the breezeway,7

 which, in turn, caused him to trip and fall on his hip, and (2) he was

pulled back up. However, assuming, arguendo, that Plaza used excessive force while escorting

Gorajczyk into the home, he is still entitled to qualified immunity because this Plaintiff cannot

satisfy the second prong of the qualified immunity inquiry. Inasmuch as Gorajczyk's claim fails

under the second prong, an analysis under the first is unnecessary. See Chappell, 585 F.3d at 907

("If a plaintiff fails to show either that a constitutional right was violated or that the right was clearly

established, [he] will have failed to carry [his] burden."). 

The second prong focuses on "whether the officer had fair notice that [his] conduct was

unlawful." Brosseau v.Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). Brosseau identifies two possible

approaches to this question; to wit, (1) “[I]n an obvious case, [generalized] standards can 'clearly

establish' the answer, even without a body of relevant case law.” Id. at 199 (citing Hope v. Pelzer,

536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002)). Otherwise, (2) the violation must be apparent based on the officer's

failure to adhere to a "particularized" body of precedent that "squarely governs" the case. Id. at 199-

201. Stated differently, "the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official

would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. 

To determine whether a constitutional right is clearly established, the Court must look to

binding precedent of (1) the Supreme Court, (2) the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, or (3) itself.

Barret v. Stubenville City, 388 F.3d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 

In the present action - even accepting that all of Gorajczyk's factual allegations establish a

violation of the Fourth Amendment by Plaza, it is not an "obvious" case that would provide notice
9

to an officer that his conduct was unconstitutional. Gorajczyk concedes that Plaza was pushing him

into the house to make him "go faster," and that he "tripped" or "stumbled" on the breezeway

threshold. (Gorajczyk Dep. 336: 4-9; 332: 8-15). "The Fourth Amendment addresses 'misuse of

power,' not the accidental effects of otherwise lawful government conduct." Brower v. Inyo County,

489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, "[n]ot every push or shove, even

if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a [suspect's]

constitutional rights." Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817 n. 4 (1985). Similarly, when

Plaza pulled Gorajczyk back up by grabbing his left arm, this action was not obviously unlawful.

Even if Plaza could have been gentler, "the reasonableness of any particular governmental activity

does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative 'less intrusive' means." Illinois

v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983).

Therefore, Gorajczyk must identify Plaza's failure to adhere to a more "particularized" body

of precedent that "squarely governs" the present case. See Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199-201. In his

response to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Gorajczyk identifies three cases

involving excessive force claims in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied qualified

immunity. First, he cites, Morrison v. Bd. of Trustees of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2009),

for the general proposition that "an officer may not use additional gratuitous force once a suspect

has been neutralized." Id. at 408. In Morrison, the defendant officer repeatedly pushed the

plaintiff's face into the ground after she was handcuffed, lying down, and compliant with the officer's

commands. Id. at 407. The officer's alleged behavior represented "gratuitous violence." Id. 

Similarly, the second case cited by Gorajczyk, Baker v. City of Hamilton, 471 F.3d 601 (6th

Cir. 2006), also recognized that a suspect who poses no threat to a police officer has a "clearly
10

established right to be free from gratuitous violence during an arrest." Id. at 608 (citation omitted).

In Baker, the defendant officer allegedly struck the plaintiff on his head and knee with a baton after

one of the plaintiffs had surrendered. Id. at 607. In the Sixth Circuit's view, the fact that the

defendant officer struck a blow to the head to the other plaintiff was also "significant," because the

head is "such a sensitive and vitally important" part of the body. Id. at 609. 

Finally, in Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 2002), the defendant officers "proceeded

to slam [plaintiff's] head into the floor at least three times" after plaintiff had been neutralized. Id.

at 298. The force used was gratuitous because "there was simply no governmental interest in

continuing to beat [plaintiff] after he had been neutralized." Id. at 301.

Gorajczyk - who bears the burden of refuting Plaza's claim of immunity - has failed to proffer

any authority which clearly establishes that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment when he

pushes a handcuffed suspect in order to facilitate a seizure. Taken together, Morrison, Baker, and

Phelps, support the principal that gratuitous violence against a neutralized suspect constitutes

excessive use of force, but none of the cases cited by Gorajczyk squarely govern Plaza's conduct in

the case at hand. Plaza’s use of force was not gratuitous - by Gorajczyk’s own admission- because

the push was designed to move him into the home. Moreover, there is no evidence that Plaza struck

or beat Gorajczyk after he was handcuffed. Rather, Gorajczyk was pushed into the house, and after

stumbling on the threshold, Plaza pulled him back to his feet. Finally, based on Gorajczyk's

testimony, Plaza did not target a "sensitive" or "vital" part of his body as did the defendant in Baker.

At most, Plaza's conduct falls in the "hazy border between excessive and acceptable force" that

qualified immunity is designed to protect against. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206.

Likewise, Plaza's conduct was not clearly unlawful when he grabbed Gorajczyk’s left arm
11

and pulled him up. There is no evidence that Plaza was aware of any preexisting injury to his

detainee’s shoulder, or that the force used by him to lift Gorajczyk to his feet was not gratuitous. 

In some cases, the Sixth Circuit has found an officer's conduct to be unconstitutional when the

officer pulls a suspect backward off the ground by the arm, but only when the officer was aware of

an injury beforehand. In Jones v. Garcia, 345 Fed. Appx. 987, 989 (6th Cir. 2009), the defendant

officer was denied qualified immunity because it would have been “objectively unreasonable” to

pull the plaintiff up by using only the injured arm of the detainee who had specifically advised the

officer of the pre-existing injury. Id. at 990. A similar result followed in Solovy v. Morabito, No.

09-1555, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 8785, * 1 (6th Cir. Apr. 27, 2010). In Solovy, the Court reasoned

that the method employed by the defendant to pull a suspect off the ground was "almost guaranteed

to cause substantial pain, especially to a person with a shoulder injury." Id. at *16. The Sixth

Circuit emphasized that prior to the officer’s action, "the suspect [had] warned the officer that [his

arm was injured]." Id. at *19-20. 

In contrast and based on Gorajczyk’s version of the facts in the present case, there was no

clearly established law to put Plaza on notice that pulling Gorajczyk up by the arm, when he had no

knowledge of Gorajczyk’s injuries prior to pulling him off of the ground, was an unconstitutional

use of force. Moreover, there is nothing on the record to suggest that Plaza’s pull was gratuitous or

violent, because it affected the same legitimate police purpose as the push, which was to move

Gorajczyk into the home. 

The entry of a summary judgment on the basis of a qualified immunity defense is appropriate

if and when the law does not put a governmental official on notice that the challenged conduct is

clearly unlawful. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Accordingly, inasmuch as Gorajczyk has failed to
12

proffer any authority which demonstrates that Plaza should have been on notice that his conduct was

unconstitutional, the Court grants the Defendants' motion on Gorajczyk's claims of excessive force

with respect to the injuries suffered by him as a result of (1) falling after being pushed by Plaza and

(2) being pulled up off of the ground by his shoulder.

B.

Gorajczyk’s next claim of excessive force stems from the placement of handcuffs on his

wrists by Plaza, and the other Defendants’ ignoring his requests to loosen them. The Sixth Circuit

has recognized that claims of excessive force "can be maintained for cuffing an individual's wrists

too tightly." Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 639 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

However, not all allegations of tight handcuffing amount to excessive force. Fettes, 2010 U.S. App.

LEXIS 8784 at *12. In order for an excessive force claim based on unduly tight handcuffing to

survive a motion for summary judgment, "a plaintiff must offer sufficient evidence to create a

genuine issue of material fact that: (1) he complained about the tightness of the handcuffs, (2) the

officer[s] ignored those complaints; and (3) the plaintiff experienced 'some physical injury' resulting

from the handcuffing." Morrison v. Bd. of Trs., 583 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Lyons, 417

F.3d at 575-76).

Paul Plaza

In light of Morrison, Gorajczyk's handcuffing claim against Plaza must survive the

Defendants’ summary judgment motion. First, Gorajczyk testified that he complained to Plaza that

the handcuffs were too tight as soon as they were placed on his wrists. Second, Gorajczyk asserts

that Plaza ignored his complaint. As to Morrison's third requirement, Gorajczyk claims that (1) the

handcuffs caused an actual physical injury ; i.e., radial nerve damage to his thumbs and index
13

fingers and (2) his carpal tunnel syndrome has been aggravated, according to the medical

assessments of two physicians. 

Moreover, Gorajczyk’s right to be free from excessively tight handcuffing was clearly

established at the time that Plaza is alleged to have handcuffed him too tightly. The Sixth Circuit

had declared as early as 2001 that such a right is clearly established for qualified immunity purposes.

Kostrzewa, 247 F.3d at 641. 

The Defendants take the position that Gorajczyk never complained about his handcuffs being

too tight, and also dispute his claim that the handcuffs caused his wrist injury. At best, they have

identified genuine issues of a material fact that a jury must resolve. A reasonable jury could credit

Gorajczyk’s testimony, and because the right Plaza is alleged to have violated was clearly

established at the time of the incident, the Court denies the entry of a summary judgment as it relates

to this excessive force claim against Plaza.

Phil Rzotkiewicz, Cathy McCabe, and Margaret Eidt 

Turning to Gorajczyk's claim against the Defendants Rzotkiewicz, McCabe, and Eidt, the

Court reaches the same result. Even though Gorajczyk does not allege that these Defendants had

any involvement in the actual handcuffing incident, they could be held liable if they (1) were aware

that the handcuffs were too tight and (2) failed to act. See Grooms v. Dockter, 1996 U.S. App.

LEXIS 3444 at *6 (Jan. 23, 1996) (no qualified immunity even though officer did not physically

place the handcuffs on the plaintiff because “a police officer, even if he is not a supervisor, has a

duty to try to stop another officer who summarily punishes a person in the first officer’s presence.”)

"[O]fficers present during a violation of a person's civil rights who fail to stop the violation can be

liable under § 1983." Sargent v. City of Toledo Police Dep't, 150 Fed. App'x. 470, 474 (6th Cir.
14

2005) (citing Smith v. Heath, 691 F.2d 220, 224-25 (6th Cir. 1988)). Liability will attach "when (1)

the officer observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used, and (2)

the officer had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring." Smoak v.

Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 784 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997)).

The Defendants have already conceded that they had the opportunity and the means to check

the tightness of Gorajczyk's handcuffs: "Each officer testified that had Plaintiff complained, they

would have checked the cuffs to determine that they were adequately secured without causing

unnecessary pain." (Defs.’ Mot. for Sum. J. at 18.) The Defendants’ sole argument for summary

judgment is that they were not aware of Gorajczyk's complaints that his handcuffs were too tight.

Gorajczyk alleges that he complained to Rzotkiewicz, McCabe, and Eidt and that they simply

ignored his complaints. At minimum, this allegation creates a genuine issue of a material fact as to

whether any of these Defendants were aware that excessive force was being used. A disputed issue

of fact remains with regard to whether any of them were aware that Gorajczyk's handcuffs were

excessively tight, and because the right to be free from excessively tight handcuffs was clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation, Kostrzewa, 247 F.3d at 641, the Court denies the

Defendants’ request for a summary judgment as it relates to this specific part of Gorajczyk's

handcuffing claim against Defendants Rzotkiewicz, McCabe, and Eidt.

Michael Notorlano

Finally, the Court grants a summary judgment as it relates to Gorajczyk's claim against

Notorlano. An examination of the official record indicates that Gorajczyk has failed to produce

more than a "scintilla" of evidence which shows that Notorlano heard him complain about the

handcuffs. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Gorajczyk's evidence fails to identify Notorlano as one
15

of the officers who ignored his complaints. In Gorajczyk's response to the Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, he advances no more of an accusation that Notorlano passed through the living

room "several times while the family was detained." Applying Smoak, Notorlano could only be

liable if he heard Gorajczyk complain. To the contrary, Gorajczyk has only established that

Notorlano was one of several officers who happened to pass through the living room during the

search. There is no claim that he complained about his handcuffs when Notorlano passed through

the living room. Thus, even drawing all inferences in Gorajczyk's favor, there is simply not enough

evidence for a reasonable fact finder to conclude that Notorlano heard Gorajczyk complain.

Therefore, Gorajczyk has not established that Notorlano violated his right to be free from the

excessive use of force. Hence, Notorlano is entitled to qualified immunity on this issue.

Accordingly, the Court grants a summary judgment as to Gorajczyk's claim against Notorlano.

V.

Therefore, the Court holds that Plaza's use of force to escort Gorajczyk into the home, by (1)

pushing him and causing him to trip and fall and (2) pulling him up off of the ground, did not violate

a clearly established constitutional right. Hence, Plaza is entitled to qualified immunity on that

issue. 

As to the tight handcuffing claim, the Court finds that four of the Defendants (Plaza,

McCabe, Rzotkiewicz, and Eidt) are not entitled to qualified immunity because Gorajczyk has

presented enough evidence for a reasonable finder of the facts to conclude that they violated the

Plaintiff's clearly established right to be free from excessively tight handcuffing.

Finally and with respect to the same handcuffing claim, the Court determines that Gorajczyk

has not offered sufficient evidence which would demonstrate that Notorlano was aware of this
16

potential constitutional violation. Hence, Notorlano is entitled to qualified immunity.

Accordingly, the Court grants in part, and denies in part, the Defendants’ motion for a

summary judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2010 s/Julian Abele Cook, Jr. 

Detroit, Michigan JULIAN ABELE COOK, JR.

United States District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Order was served upon counsel of record via the Court's ECF System to their respective

email addresses or First Class U.S. mail to the non-ECF participants on August 31, 2010.

s/ Kay Doaks 

Case Manager