II 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1044 

To preserve the ability of the United States to project power globally. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 14, 2009 

Mr. THUNE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To preserve the ability of the United States to project power 

globally. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Preserving Future 

5 United States Capability to Project Power Globally Act 

6 of 2009’’. 

7 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

8 Congress makes the following findings: 

9 (1) Long-range strike is a critical mission in 

10 which the United States needs to retain a credible 

11 and dominant capability. 


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1 (2) Long range, penetrating strike systems pro2 vide— 

3 (A) a hedge against being unable to obtain 

4 access to forward bases for political reasons; 

5 (B) a capacity to respond quickly to con6 tingencies such as the failure of a nuclear7 armed state; 

8 (C) the ability to base outside the reach of 

9 emerging adversary anti-access and area-denial 

10 capabilities; and 

11 (D) the ability to impose disproportionate 

12 defensive costs on prospective adversaries of the 

13 United States. 

14 (3) The 2006 Quadrennial Review directed the 

15 United States Air Force to ‘‘develop a new land16 based, penetrating long range strike capability to be 

17 fielded by 2018’’. 

18 (4) Secretary of Defense Robert P. Gates has 

19 publicly acknowledged the need for a next generation 

20 bomber on at least three separate occasions: 

21 (A) In a September 29, 2008, speech at 

22 National Defense University, where Secretary 

23 Gates said, ‘‘In the case of China, investments 

24 in cyber-and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and 

25 anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic 


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1 missiles could threaten America’s primary 

2 means to project power and help allies in the 

3 Pacific: our bases, air and sea assets, and the 

4 networks that support them. This will put a 

5 premium on America’s ability to strike from 

6 over the horizon, employ missile defenses, and 

7 will require shifts from short-range to longer8 range systems such as the next generation 

9 bomber.’’ 

10 (B) In the January/February 2009 edition 

11 of Foreign Affairs, in an article entitled, ‘‘A 

12 Balanced Strategy; Reprogramming the Pen13 tagon for a New Age,’’ where Secretary Gates 

14 wrote, ‘‘In the case of China, Beijing’s invest15 ments in cyberwarfare, antisatellite warfare, 

16 antiaircraft and antiship weaponry, submarines, 

17 and ballistic missiles could threaten the United 

18 States’ primary means to project its power and 

19 help its allies in the Pacific: bases, air and sea 

20 assets, and the networks that support them. 

21 This will put a premium on the United States’ 

22 ability to strike from over the horizon and em23 ploy missile defenses and will require shifts 

24 from short-range to longer-range systems, such 

25 as the next generation bomber.’’ 


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1 (C) In the First Quarter 2009 edition of 

2 Joint Force Quarterly, in an article entitled, 

3 ‘‘The National Defense Strategy; Striking the 

4 Right Balance,’’ where Secretary Gates wrote, 

5 ‘‘In the case of China, investments in cyber and 

6 antisatellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship 

7 weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles 

8 could threaten America’s primary means to 

9 project power and help allies in the Pacific: our 

10 bases, air and sea assets, and the networks that 

11 support them. This will put a premium on 

12 America’s ability to strike from over the horizon 

13 and employ missile defenses; and it will require 

14 shifts from short-range to longer range systems 

15 such as the next generation bomber.’’ 

16 (5) On April 6, 2009, Secretary Gates an17 nounced that the United States ‘‘will not pursue a 

18 development program for a follow-on Air Force 

19 bomber until we have a better understanding of the 

20 need, the requirement and the technology’’. 

21 (6) On May 7, 2009, President Barack Obama 

22 announced the termination of the next generation 

23 bomber program in the Office of Management and 

24 Budget’s ‘‘Terminations, Reductions, and Savings’’ 

25 document, stating that ‘‘there is no urgent need to 


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1 begin an expensive development program for a new 

2 bomber’’ and that ‘‘the future bomber fleet may not 

3 be affordable over the next six years.’’ 

4 (7) The need, requirement, and the technology 

5 for the next generation bomber are well understood, 

6 as set out by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. 

7 (8) The need for a new long-range strike capa8 bility is urgent because the conflicts of the future 

9 will likely feature heavily defended airspace, due in 

10 large part to the proliferation of relatively inexpen11 sive, but extremely sophisticated and deadly, air de12 fense systems. 

13 (9) General Michael Maples, Director of the 

14 Defense Intelligence Agency, noted during a March 

15 10, 2009, Committee on Armed Services of the Sen16 ate hearing on worldwide threats that ‘‘Russia, quite 

17 frankly, is the developer of most of those [advanced 

18 air defense] systems and is exporting those systems 

19 both to China and to other countries in the world’’. 

20 (10) The commanders of Pacific Command, 

21 Strategic Command, and Joint Forces Command 

22 have each testified in support of the capability that 

23 the next generation bomber will provide before the 

24 Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. 


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1 (11) Nearly half of the United States bomber 

2 inventory (47 percent) pre-dates the Cuban Missile 

3 Crisis. 

4 (12) The only air-breathing strike platforms the 

5 United States possesses today with reach and surviv6 ability to have a chance of successfully executing 

7 missions more than 1,000 nautical miles into enemy 

8 territory from the last air-to-air refueling are 16 

9 combat ready B–2 bombers. 

10 (13) The B–2 was designed in the 1980s and 

11 achieved initial operational capability over a decade 

12 ago. 

13 (14) The crash of an operational B–2 during 

14 takeoff at Guam in early 2008 indicates that attri15 tion can and does occur even in peacetime. 

16 (15) The primary mission requirement of the 

17 next generation bomber is the ability to strike tar18 gets anywhere on the globe with whatever weapons 

19 the contingency requires. 

20 (16) The requisite aerodynamic, structural, and 

21 low-observable technologies to develop the next gen22 eration bomber already exist in fifth-generation 

23 fighters. 

24 (17) A decision to terminate or delay the next 

25 generation bomber would severely diminish the abilVerDate Nov 24 2008 06:26 May 16, 2009 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S1044.IS S1044

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1 ity of the United States to project power on a global 

2 scale in the future. 

3 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON CONTINUED DEVELOP4 MENT OF THE NEXT GENERATION BOMBER 

5 IN FISCAL YEAR 2010. 

6 It is the policy of the United States— 

7 (1) to pursue a development program for the 

8 next generation bomber during fiscal year 2010, in 

9 accordance with the guidance established in the 

10 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, including the full 

11 authorization and appropriation of appropriate 

12 funds; and 

13 (2) not to delay the next generation bomber de14 velopment program by deliberations on the 2010 

15 Quadrennial Defense Review, deliberations on the 

16 Nuclear Posture Review, or negotiations over the fol17 low-on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). 

Æ 


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