UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-2091

JOSEPH MITCHELL MILLER; DOUGLAS A. DYE, JR.; KENNETH G. 

COLBY, JR., 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

 v. 

DOGWOOD VALLEY CITIZENS ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED; GARY E. 

LOWE; MATTHEW P. BROWN; DEAN MUSSER; KEITH WYNN; JUDITH 

FRANCES MCDAVID, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon, 

District Judge. (3:06-cv-00020-nkm-bwc) 

Submitted: August 18, 2009 Decided: October 8, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Joseph J. D’Erasmo, JOSEPH J. D’ERASMO & ASSOCIATES, LLC, 

Rockville, Maryland, for Appellants. John Loehr, 

Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Joseph Mitchell Miller, Douglas A. Dye, Jr., and 

Kenneth G. Colby, Jr., appeal from the district court’s order 

denying relief on their complaint against Dogwood Valley 

Citizens Association, Inc., Gary E. Lowe, Matthew P. Brown, Dean 

Musser, Keith Wynn, and Judith Frances McDavid. Finding no 

error, we affirm. 

 The Appellants filed a complaint against the Appellees 

seeking treble damages and costs and attorney’s fees for 

violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations Act (“RICO”). RICO makes it unlawful for, among 

other acts, any person to maintain an interest in an enterprise 

that affects interstate commerce through a pattern of 

racketeering, or for any person employed by or associated with 

an enterprise that affects interstate commerce to participate in 

the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of 

racketeering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b), (c) (2006); see also 18 

U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2006) (pattern of racketeering activity 

requires two acts of racketeering activity within ten years). 

Here, the Appellants alleged that the Appellees engaged in 

extortion, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 

(2006), mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006), and 

conspiracy to injure others in reputation, trade, business, or 

profession, in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-499 (2004). 

2 
See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2006) (defining “racketeering 

activity,” in part, as any act of extortion chargeable under 

state law and punishable by more than a year, and any act 

indictable under the Hobbs Act or § 1341). Under the Hobbs Act, 

extortion is defined as “the obtaining of property from another, 

with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or 

threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official 

right.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). 

 Extortion can be based on the fear of economic harm in 

which the “circumstances surrounding the alleged extortionate 

conduct rendered that fear reasonable.” United States v. 

Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 330 (4th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted); 

see also United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361, 365 (4th Cir. 

1995). However, where the threat of economic harm is based on 

legitimate economic threats to obtain property, a defendant 

violates the statute only if he has no claim of right to that 

property.* See, e.g., United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 773 

(1st Cir. 1989). In order to prove that a defendant did not 

have a legitimate claim of right to the property, a plaintiff 

must demonstrate that the defendant knew that he was not legally 

entitled to the property. See id. at 774. 

 *

 The Appellants have not challenged the existence of the 

claim of right defense in this court. 

3 
4 

After a bench trial, the district court found in favor 

of the Appellees, concluding that the Appellees at all times 

were acting under a bona fide claim of right, believing that 

they were entitled to the property obtained. Appellants contend 

that the district court erred in reaching this conclusion. We 

have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the 

district court did not err in finding that the Appellees 

believed they had a bona fide claim of right to the property 

obtained. 

Appellees next argue that the district court’s legal 

and factual findings are clearly erroneous because the district 

court omitted facts from its written opinion. We have 

thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the district 

court’s factual and legal conclusions are not clearly erroneous 

and were adequate to support its opinion. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment for the reasons 

stated by the district court. See J.A. 415-28. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED