09
- 16 78
- cv

K i r k v . Sc h i n dl er El ev at or Cor por at i on U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT

_______________ August Term, 2009 (Argued: Dec ember

10, 2009 Dec ided: April 6, 2010) Docke t No. 09-1678-c v

_______________ U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ex rel. D A N I EL K I RK , Plaintif f-Appellant , —v.— S CHI N D LER E LEVA T O R C OR PO R ATI ON , Defendant- Appellee
.

_______________ B e f o r e : M C L A U G H LIN , K ATZ MANN , and LY N CH , Circuit Judges
.

_______________ Appea l from a judg ment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New Y ork (Sidney

Stein, Judge ), ente red Ma rch 30, 2009, dismissing the Plaintiff- Appellant’s complaint for f

ailure to state a

claim upon which r elief c an be grante d and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We hold that a document obtaine d in response to a reque st made under

the Fr eedom of

Information Ac t (“F OIA”) , 5 U.S.C. § 552, qualifies as an e numerated source trig g eringthe jurisdictional bar of the Fa lse Claims Act (“F CA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (4)( A),2

only when the doc ument itself is a “c ong ressional, a dminist rative, or Gover nment Acc ounting Offic e re port, hea

ring , audit, or investig ation,” and that the documents obtained by the plaintiff throug h FOIA do not fall within any of these c ateg ories. We furthe r hold that the plaintiff’s complaint stated valid cla ims under the F CA when it alleg ed that De fenda nt-Appellee had enter ed into contra cts with the fede ral g overnme nt while not in compliance with the Vie tnam Era Ve te ra ns Re a dju stm e nt A ssi sta

nc e Ac t ( “ VE VR

AA ” ), 38 U. S.C. § 4 21 2, ins of ar a s it (1 ) h a d in some y ear s, failed to file c erta in reports re quired by VEVRAA, a

nd (2) ha d in other y ear s, filed false r eports. We there fore vaca te the judg ment of the district cour t and re mand for f

urther proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

_______________ J ONATHAN A. W I L L EN S , J onathan A. Willens L L C, New Yor k, NY, for Plain tif f- Ap pe lla nt. S TEVE N A L AN R EIS S (Gre g ory Silbert, David Yolkut, on the brief ), Wei l, Gotshal & Mang es L L P, New Yor k, NY, for Defendant-Appe llee
. C H A RLES W. S C AR B OR OUGH , App e llate Sta ff (M ic ha e l S. Ra a

b, Ap pe llate Staff, on the brief

), for To ny Wes t, A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, U .S. De pa rtme nt o f Jus tic e , Ci vil Di vis ion , Wa sh ing ton , D C; Jea nn e tte Va rg a s, Assistant United States Attorney , for Preet B hara

ra, United States Attorney , Southern District of Ne w York, N ew Yor k, New Y ork, for Amicus Curiae the United States of Americ a . K AT HERI NE Y.K. C HE UNG (Rae T . Vann, on the brief ), Norr is, Ty sse, L ampley & L akis, L L P, W ashing ton, DC, for Amicus Curiae the Equal Employme nt Ad v iso ry Cou nc il
.

_______________ K ATZ MANN , Circuit Judge : The Vie tnam Era V eter ans Readjustment Assistance Act (“ VEVRAA” ), 38 U.S.C. § 4212, require s contrac tors doing busine ss with feder al g overnme nt entities to submi t annual3

repor ts to the Secreta

ry of L abor pr oviding infor mation about the number of veter ans employ ed by the c on tr a c tor

(t he “ VE TS- 10 0 r e po rt s” ). Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt D anie l K ir

k b ro ug ht t

his qui tam
a c tio n o n b e ha lf

of the Un ite d St ate s g ov e rnme nt u nd e r t he F a lse Cla ims Ac t ( “ F CA ” ), 31 U. S.C. § 3729 et seq. , alleg ing that his former e mploy er, D efe ndant-Appe llee Schindler Ele vator Corp. (“Schindler ”), obta ined g overnme nt contrac ts while repr esentingthat it had filed the re quired VETS-100 re ports, when in fa ct it either ha d failed to file a repor t or had filed a

false r eport for the re levant y ear s. Kirk base d his alleg ations in larg e par t on information he obtained a fter submitt ing r equests under the Fr eedom of

Information Ac t (“F OIA”) , 5 U.S.C. § 552. This case calls on us to decide a question of f irst impression in thi s Circuit: whether the FCA’s jurisdictional ba

r, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)( 4)(A) , which provide s that “[n] o court shall have jurisdiction over an a ction under this sec tion based upon the public disclosure of alleg ations or tr ans a c tio ns in .
. . a

c on g re ssi on a l, a dmi nis tr ativ e , o r G ov e rnme nt A c c ounti ngOf fi c e re po rt , he ari ng , a ud it, or inv e sti g atio n, ” a

pp lie s w he n th e pla int if

f’ s a lle g atio ns are ba se d o n mate ri a ls produce d in response to a FOIA re quest. Our sister Circ uits are divided on this issue. I f the jurisdictional bar doe s not apply , this case a lso presents the que stion whether Schindler may be held liable under

the FCA f

or (1) failingto file VETS-100 re ports, and (2) filing f alse VET S-100 repor ts. We hold that the answer

to the question whether

a docume nt obtained in response to a FOIA re quest qualifies a s an enume rate d source under 31 U .S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (A) de pends on the
natur e of the do c ume nt i tse lf

; th e F CA ’s jur isd ic tio na l ba r a pp lie s o nly

wh e n th e do c ume nt i s a “congressional, a dminist rative, or Gover nment Acc ounting Of

fice repor t, hear ing, a

udit, or investigation.” We further hold that Kirk stated valid cla ims under the F CA when he alleg ed that4

(1) Schindler

had fa iled to file VETS-100 re ports for c erta in y ear s, and (2) Schindler had f iled false V ETS-100 repor

ts for ce rtain y ear s. We vacate the judg ment of the district cour t and
rema nd for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion. BACK GR OUND The F CA is designe d to help combat fr aud ag ainst the fede ral g overnme nt by persons who provide g oods and ser vices to it. See U

nited States ex re l. Doe v. J ohn Doe Corp. , 960 F.2d 318, 319 (2d Cir. 1992). It establishes liability for pe rsons who submit false cla ims for pay ment to t he g ov e rnme nt, 31 U. S.C. § 3 72 9( a )( 1) , a nd it c on ta ins a

va ri e ty of me a sure s d e signe d to enhanc e dete rre nce a

nd enfor ceme nt. These include , for e x ample, a tr eble damag es provision, id. , and — ce ntral to this case — qui tam provisions that allow private c itiz ens who lea rn of fra ud to bring suit in t he name of the g overnme nt and to share in any rec overy , id. § 3730(b)- (d). Plaintiff-relator Danie l Kirk broug ht such an a ction based on his belief that his employ er, Sc hin dle r, ha d o bta ine d c ontr a c ts a nd pa y me nts fr om t

he fe de ra l g ov e rnme nt whil e fa ili ngto comply with the require ments of VEVRAA. Kirk ser ved in the United States Ar my from 1969 to 1971, per formingpart of his ser vice in Vietnam. In 1978, he took a job at Millar Ele vator Industries, Inc. (“ Millar”). Millar w as boug ht by Schindler in 1989, but the two companie s operated sepa rate ly until 2002. I n the y ear s prec eding2002, Kirk wa s promoted seve ral times, eve ntually (in 2001) bec oming Vic e President responsible for

the Modernization, Repair, a nd Maintenanc e Support Depa rtments of Millar. After Schindler integ rate d Millar’s oper ations into it s own in 2002, Kirk was initially named Schindler’s Reg ional Modernization Manag er f or Ne w York City

and L ongI sland, in which
c a pa c ity he mana g e d o ve r 1 00 e mpl oye e s. In July 20 03 , h ow e ve r, Ki rk

dis c ov e re d, a

pp are ntl yThe moneta ry threshold at which V EVRAA bec omes applica ble to a contr act ha s 1 chang ed seve ral times duringthe time period re levant to this lawsuit. For c ontrac ts signed be fore November

13, 2001, the minimum amount of a contrac t subject to VEVRAA wa s $10,000; for contra cts signe d on or af

ter Nove mber 13, 2001 a

nd befor e September

28, 2006, the minimum amount was $25,000; and f or contra cts signe d on or af ter Septembe r 28, 2006, the minimum 5 without being inf

ormed dire ctly , that he wa s beingdemoted to the non-ma nag eria l positi on of Field Super intendent. He r esig ned fr om Schindler in August 2003. In April 2004, Kirk filed a complaint with the Offic e of F eder al Contract Compliance Prog rams (“ OFCCP”) at the Depa rtment of L abor ( “DOL ”), c laiming that he had bee n imp ro pe rl y

de mot e d a

nd c on str uc tiv e ly te rm inate d b y

Sc hin dle r d e sp ite the fa c t th at he wa s a Vietnam vete ran in violation of VEV RAA. The OF CCP provided Schindler w ith a copy of K i r k ’ s c o mp l a i n t

an d b e g anani n v e s t i g at i o no f S c h i n d l e r ’ s c o mp l i an c e w i thV E V RA A
. In Fe bruar y 2005, OFCCP found that there was insuffic ient evidenc e to support Kirk’s c laim. Kirk appea led this finding, a

nd in November

2009, the DOL

aff irmed the OF CCP ’s findingthat Sc hin dle r h a d n ot v iol ate d V EV RA A whe n it too k a n a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio n a g a ins t hi m. In Marc h 2005, meanwhile, K irk filed the instant ca se under the FCA in the na

me of the U.S. gove rnment. As provide d for by the FCA, see31 U. S.C. § 3 73 0( b) , th e c a se wa s in iti a lly filed under

seal; in J une 2007, af

ter the g overnme nt had dec ided not to intervene , the ac tion was unseale d and Kirk w as per mitted to pursue it as relator . He then f iled the Amende d Complaint. Be fore turning to the fac tual alleg ations in the Amended Complaint, it is useful to review the re le va nt r e qu ir e me nts of

VE VR AA . V EV RA A a

nd its a c c omp anyingre g ulatio ns imp os e
sever al spec ific re quirements on contr acts “ enter ed into by any depar tment or ag ency

of the United States for the procur ement of pe rsonal prope rty and nonper sonal servic es (including
c on str uc tio n) ,” wh e n th e va lue of the c on tr a c t e xce e ds a

c e rt a in m on e tary

thr e sh old
. 38 U. S.C.

1amount is $100,000. 66 Fed. Reg . 51,998, 51,998 (Oc t. 11, 2001); 71 Fe d. Reg . 57,363, 57,369

(Sept. 28, 2006) (a

mending48 C.F.R. § 52.222-37). Th e te rm “ c ov e re d v e te ra

n” de signate s 2 (i) Disable d veter ans. (ii) Vete rans who se rved on a ctive duty in the Armed F orce s duringa wa r or in a campa ign or

expedition for which a c ampaig n badg e has be en author ized. (iii) Veter ans who, while se rvingon active duty in the Armed F orce s, participate d in a United States milit ary

operation for which a

n Armed F orce s service medal wa s awa rded pursuant to Executive Orde r No. 12985 (61 F ed. Reg . 1209). (iv) Rec ently

separ ated ve tera

ns. 38 U.S.C. § 4212(a)(3) (A). “ The ter m ‘qualified,’ with respec t to an employ ment position, means having the ability

to perfor m the essential func tions of the position wit h or without rea sonable a ccommodation for an individual with a disability .” Id. § 4212(a) (3)( B)
.

6 § 4212(a) (1). Contrac ts subject to VEVRAA must contain provisions obligating the c ontrac tor (1) to “ta ke af firmative a ction to employ and adva nce in e mploy

ment qualified c overe d veter ans,” 38 U.S.C. § 4212(a)(1) ; (2) to invite elig ible veter ans to identify themselves 2 voluntarily

to their employ er, 48 C.F .R. §§ 22.1310(b), 52.222-37( e); a nd (3) to submit annual repor ts to the Secreta

ry of L abor ( the “VE TS-100 repor ts”) providingdata a

bout the qualified
cover ed vete rans in the c ontrac tor’s workf orce , including the number of qua lified cove red veter ans in ea ch job categ ory and hiringlocation and the numbe r of ne w employ ees who are qualified c overe d veter ans, 38 U.S.C. § 4212(d); 48 C.F.R. §§ 22.1310(b), 52.222- 37(c)
. In 1998, Congr ess passed the Veter ans Employ ment Opportunities Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1354, which provide s that “no ag ency may obligate or e x pend funds . . . to ente r into a contra ct [co ve re d b y

VE VR AA ] wit h a c on tr a c tor

fr om whic h a

[VE TS- 10 0] r e po rt

wa s r e qu ir e d .
. . if such contra ctor did not submit such report,” id. § 1354(a) (1). In turn, 48 C.F.R. § 52.222-38 provides that “[b]y

submissi on of its offer , the offe ror r epre sents that, if it is subj ect to the7

repor ting r equire ments [of VEVRAA] . . . it has submitted the most rece nt VETS-100 Report require d by

[t he Ac t] .” This re g ulation issued in October 2001 a nd beca me ef fec tive Dec ember 21, 2001. See66 Fe d. Reg . 53,487-01, 53,487 (Oc t. 22, 2001). Kirk’s Ame nded Complaint alleg es that Schindler, while e nteringinto numerous contra cts with the fede ral g overnme nt that were subject to the re quirements of V EVRAA, fa iled to comply with it in s ever al salient wa y s. Be cause the district court dismissed the complaint under F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 12( b)(1) , we a cce pt as true the material fa cts alleg ed in the complaint and dra

w all re asonable infere nces in Kirk’ s favor
. Sh ar k e yv . Q ua ra nti llo , 541 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 2008); Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer , 363 F.3d 149, 151 ( 2d Cir. 2004). Ki rk a lle g e s th at f

ro m 19 98 to t

he pr e se nt, he wa s n e ve r a sk e d to ide nti fy him se lf a s a veter an and that when Schindler integrate d its operations with Millar’s, the appr ox imately 400 former Millar employ ees w ere not give n an opportunity to self-identify

as vete rans. He further
a lle g e s th at a s a

mana g e r o f 1 00 e mpl oye e s at Sc hin dle r w ithre sp on sib ili ty fo r h ir ing s, fi ri ng s, and promotions, he wa s never informed of

any aff irmative ac tion prog ram a iding ve tera ns. A copy of Schindler’ s employ ee ma nual makes no r efe renc e to an a ffirmative action program for veter ans. In addition, Kirk alleg es that Schindler f ailed to submit VETS-100 reports fr om 1998 until late 2004 and that the re ports it did file in 2004, 2005, and 2006 are false. T hese latter alleg ations are based in sig nificant pa rt on the re sults of severa l FOIA re quests submitt ed to the DOL by his wife, L inda Kirk. In November 2004, Mrs. Kirk submitted a F OIA re quest seeking copies of a

ny VETS-100 re ports filed by Schindler for

the y ear s 2002, 2003, or 2004. In a letter dated F ebrua

ry 11, 2005, the Off

ice of the Assistant Secre tary

for Ve tera

ns Employ

ment andThe a pplicable r egulations require that VETS-100 re ports be filed no later than 3 September 30 of

eac h y ear , 48 C.F.R. § 52.222-37(c ), and that they repor t on the number of veter ans in the employ er’ s workfor ce in va rious cate g ories duringthe 12-month period pr ece ding a date chosen by

the employer but fa lling betwe en Jul y 1 and August 31, id. § 52.222-37(d) . The parties, a nd the FO I A re sponses from the D OL , g ener ally ref er to a VETS-100 re port “for ” a g iven y ear , but we note that unde r the re g ulations the repor t filed in a

g ive n ye ar n e c e ssa

ri ly cover s a 12-month per iod ext endinginto two calenda r y ear s and is not, strictly speaking , the re po rt for the y ear in which it was filed. This ambiguity

makes it unclea

r whe ther the Septe mber 29, 2005 re sponse to Mrs. Kirk’s second F OIA re quest is complete, in that no mention is made of VE TS-100 repor ts filed in 2001. Th e re po rt s f

ile d in 20 02 do c ov e r s ome po rt ion of 20 01 and in t his wa y are re sp on siv e to M rs . Ki rk ’s re qu e st f

or VE TS- 10 0 r e po rt s “

for ” 2001. Howe ver, the September 29, 2005 le tter does not expl icitly

state that the DO Llocated no r eports filed in 20 01 , a nd it i s c on c e iva

ble that w hil e such re ports did exi st, it understood the production of the 2002 r eports to satisfy Mrs. Kirk’s reque st. Drawingall rea sonable infe renc es in light of the plaintiff, howeve r, we conclude that the DOL located no r eports filed in 2001. 8 Traininginformed Mrs. K irk that the DOL had located no VETS-100 re ports from 2002 or 2003 and enc losing c opies of thre e VETS-100 r eports filed by Schindler in 2004. In J anuar y 2005, Mrs. Kirk submitted a sec ond FOIA re quest seekingcopies of a ny VETS-100 re ports filed by Schindler for

the y ear s 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. B y letter dated September

29, 2005, the Offic e of the Assistant Secreta ry for Ve tera

ns Employ

ment and Tra ining infor

med her that the DOL had located no VETS-100 re ports for 1998, 1999, or 2000, but enclosed c opies of 28 VETS-100 re ports filed by Schindler for

the 12-month period e nding Septe mber 30, 2002. 3 Finally , in April 2007, Mrs. Kirk submitted a third FO I A re quest to the DOL , this ti me see king copies of a

ny VETS-100 re ports filed by Schindler for

the y ear s 2005 and 2006. Unde r cove r of a letter dated Ma y 14, 2007, the Off

ice of the Assistant Secre tary

for Ve tera

ns Employ

ment and Trainingprovided c opies of 19 VETS-100 r eports filed in 2005 a nd 49 filed in 2006. On the ba sis of

the se fa c ts, Ki rk

a lle g e d th at Sc hin dle r w a s n ot i n c omp lia nc e wi th VEVRAA in that it (1) did not offe r its employ ees the opportunity to identify

themselves as9

Vietnam-e ra ve tera

ns, (2) fa iled to implement an aff irmative ac tion prog ram a iding c overe d
ve te ra ns , a nd (3 ) f a ile d to fi le VE TS- 10 0 r e po rt s f or the y e ars 19 98 thr ou g h 2 00 3, and fi le d f a lse VE TS- 10 0 r e po rt s f

or 20 02 , 2 00 4, 20 05 , a

nd 20 06 . K ir

k b a se d h is a lle g atio n th at Sc hin dle r d id
n o tf i l e V E T S
- 1 0 0 r e p o rt s i n1 9 9 8
- 2 0 0 3 o nth e r e s p o n s e s M r s . K i r k r e c e i v e d t o h e r F O IA reque sts; with reg ard to the 2002 r eports, Kirk a lleg ed that the f act that these repor

ts were not pr od uc e d in re sp on se to M rs . K ir

k’ s N ov e mbe r 2 00 4 r e qu e st b ut w e re e ve ntu a lly pr od uc e d in response to her January

2005 reque st indicates that the 2002 re ports wer e belatedly filed. Kirk also alleg ed that the 2002 r eports we re, in a ny event, f alse. Kirk’ s alleg ation that Schindler’s 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006 VETS-100 r eports we re f alse wa s based on his compa rison of the inf or matio n c on ta ine d in

the re po rt s p ro du c e d p ur su ant t o M rs . K ir k’ s F OIA r e qu e st w ithhis persona l knowledg e of Schindler ’s oper ations. For e x ample, he a lleg ed that while the 2004
re po rt s c ov e r o nly

e ig hte e n uns pe c if

ie d lo c atio ns , Sc hin dle r h a s mo re tha n e ig hte e n lo c atio ns in the United States. He also alleg ed that while the 2004, 2005, a nd 2006 repor

ts list ed no cove red
ve te ra ns wh o a re te c hn ic ians or

c ra ft wo rk e rs in N e w Y or

k, he pe rs on a lly

kn ow s ( and

name d in the complaint) a

number of c overe d veter ans workingfor Schindler in those job categ ories. Moreove r, he a lleg ed, the f iled repor ts must be false bec ause, a s his personal experienc e demonstrated, Schindler

never asked V ietnam-e ra ve tera ns to self-identify
. Duringthe y ear s in which Schindler wa s not in compliance with VEVRAA , Kirk alleg ed, it e nte re d into h

un dr e ds of

c on tr a c ts w iththe fe de ra l g ov e rnme nt t hat w e re su

bje c t to VE VR AA ’s re qu ir e me nts . App e nd e d to the Am e nd e d Co mpl a int a re lis ts o f s pe c if

ic c on tr a c ts betwee n Schindler and va rious ag encie s of the U.S. g overnme nt dating f rom 1999 to the time the Amended Complaint was f iled in 2007, all of which e x cee d VEVRAA’ s minim um value. Kirk10

c ha rg e d th at e a c h c la im f

or pa y me nt s ub mitte d b y

Sc hin dle r u

nd e r o ne of

the se c on tr a c ts w a s a false c laim within the terms of the F CA. In September 2007, Schindler filed a motion to dismis s the Amende d Complaint. The three stated g rounds for Schindler ’s motion were (1) that unde r the jurisdictional provision of the FCA, 31 U.S.C. 3730(e) (4), the district c ourt lacke d jurisdiction over Kirk’ s suit because the information on which his alleg ations were based — spe cifica lly , the information g arne red thr ou g h M rs . K ir

k’ s F OIA r e qu e sts — h a d b e e n p ub lic ly dis c los e d, (2 ) t

hat K ir k h a d f a ile d to plead his fr aud cla ims with adequate spe cificity under F ed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), and (3) that in light of Kirk’s pe nding c omplaint before the OF CCP , the district court should def er to the a g ency

and dismiss the ac tion under the doc trine of “ primary jurisdiction.” The district cour t gr anted Schindler’s motion to dismi ss. First, the district cour t found that there could be no liability for those of Kirk’ s alleg ations that were based on Schindler ’s filing of fa lse or inac curate VETS-100 repor ts beca use Schindler ne ver c ertified the acc urac y of the re ports. Second, the district cour t assessed the applicability of the F CA’s jurisdictional bar to Kirk’ s remainingclaims. Recog nizi ngthat it face d a question that had not be en dec ided in this Ci rcuit, the district cour t found that the F OIA re ports constituted a “public disclosure ” via one of the sourc es enume rate d in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (A). It concluded, a ccor dingly , that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Kirk’s c laims based on Schindler’ s failure to file VETS-100 re ports beca use all of the material inf or matio n o n whic h th e se c la ims we re ba se d w a s c on ta ine d in the DO L ’s re sp on se s to Mr s. Kirk’s F OIA re quests. This appea l followed. DI SCU SSIO NThis provision has rec ently been a mended to spec ify

that in order f

or the jurisdictional 4 bar to a pply , “substantially

the same a lleg ations or transa ctions” must be publicly disclosed in a federal c ri min a l, c ivi l, o r a dmi nis tr ativ e he ari ng , a c on g re ssi on a l, G ov e rn

me nt A c c ounta

bil ity 11 Whil e the district cour

t addre ssed the question of subjec t matter jurisdiction only afte r
c on c lud ingthat K ir

k’ s c la ims wi th r e sp e c t to the a lle g e dly fa lse or ina c c ur ate VE TS- 10 0 r e po rt s
we re no t vi a

ble un de r t

he F CA , “ the fi rs t qu e sti on fo r a n a pp e llate c ourt

or din ari ly

is t hat of its jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the lower court in the c ause unde r re view.” Monegasquede Reassurance

s S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine , 3 11 F .3 d 4 88 , 4 97 (2 d Ci r. 20 02 ); se e als o United States ex

rel. Kreindler &Kreindler v. United Tec hs. Corp. , 985 F.2d 1148, 1155- 56 (2d C i r. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Rhulen Agenc y, Inc . v. Ala. Ins. Guar. Ass’n , 896 F.2d 674, 678 ( 2d Cir. 1990)) (stating , in the context of a suit under the F CA, that “[w] here . . . the def endant moves f

or dismiss al under

Rule 12(b)(1) , . . . as we ll as on other g rounds, the cour t should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) challeng e first since if it must di smiss t he complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the acc ompanying de fense s and objec tions become moot and do not nee d to be deter mined” (inter

nal quotation marks omitted)). Ac cording ly , we f irst analy ze whether

the FCA’s jurisdictional ba

r is applicable here
. I. Sub jec t Mat terJurisdi ction We reviewa district cour t’s deter mination of subject matter jurisdiction de novo
. Di Tol la
v . D o r a l D e n ta l I P A o f N

. Y. , 469 F.3d 271, 275 ( 2d Cir. 2006). Ti tle 31 , Se c tio n 3 73 0( e )( 4) (A ) o f t he Un ite d St ate s Co de pr ov ide s th at No c ourt sh a ll h ave jur isd ic tio n o ve r a n a c tio n und e r [the F CA ] ba se d u po n th e pu

bli c disclosure of a lleg ations or transa ctions in a criminal, civil, or a dminist rative he aring , in a cong ressional, a dminist rative, or Gover nment Acc ounting Of

fice repor t, hear ing, a

udit, or investigation, or from the ne ws media, unless the a ction is broug ht by the Attorney Gene ral or the person br ingingthe ac tion is an origina l source of the information. 4Offic e, or othe r federal repor t, hear ing, a

udit, or investigation, or by the news me dia. Patient Protection and Af

forda ble Care Act, Pub. L . 111-148, § 10104(j)( 2), 124 Stat. 119 (2010). Be cause this amendment was not made retroa ctive, see G raham County Soil & W ater Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. W ilson , 559 U.S. ---, slip op. at 1 n.1 (2010) , we do not addre ss the new statutory languag e her e. Throughout this opi nion, we will use the pre sent tense to re fer

to the version of the statute that applies in this case. 12 As we ha ve pre viously

explained, in order f

or the F CA’s jurisdictional bar to apply there must be

“ pu bli c dis c los ur e ” of

the inf or matio n o n whic h th e a lle g atio n o f f ra ud re sts , a nd thi s “ pu bli c disclosure” must occur through one of the source s enumerated in the statute. Doe , 960 F.2d at 322-23. In addition, the statute indicates that the public disc losure (via an enume rate d source ) must be of the mater ial elements of the “alleg ations or transa ctions” on which the claim is based. 31 U. S.C. § 3 73 0( e )( 4) (A ); se e Un ite d S tates e xre l. F owle r v . Ca re ma rk

RX , L. L.C. , 496 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 2007) (statingthat “[a] ‘public disclosure’ e x ists under § 3730(e) (4)( A) whe n the cr itical elements e x posing the transac tion as fra udulent are place d in the public domain” (interna l quotation marks omitted)), ov e rru le d o n o the r g ro un ds by Glas e r v . W

ou nd Car e Con su lta nts , 5 70 F .3 d 9 07 (7 th C ir . 2 00 9) ; United States ex rel. Grynbe rg v. Praxair, Inc

. , 389 F.3d 1038, 1049- 51 (10th Cir. 2004) (findingthat “alleg ations or transa ctions” have been disclosed when “ [a] ll of the materia l elements of the f raudule nt transac tion were alre ady in the pu bli c do ma in” ); United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn , 14 F.3d 645, 654 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 4) (“ Th e langua g e e mpl oye d in § 3 73 0( e )( 4) (A ) s ug g e sts that Co ng re ss s ou g ht t o pr oh ibi t qui tam a c tio ns on ly when e ither the a lleg ation of fr aud or the critica l elements of the fra udulent transac tion themselves wer e in the public domain.”) . I f it is established that the alleg ations or transa ctions at issue wer e publicly disclosed throug h an enume rate d source , a qui tam plaintiff may

avoid dismissal under the jurisdictional bar by establishing that she was a n13

“orig inal source ” of the rele vant information. Kreindler , 9 85 F .2 d at 11 58 -5 9. Th e statut e define s an “or igina l source” as one who “has dire ct and indepe ndent knowledg e of the inf or matio n o n whic h th e a lle g atio ns are ba se d a nd ha s v olu nta ri ly pr ov ide d th e inf

or matio n to the Gover nment befor e filingan ac tion under this section which is base d on the information.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (B ). Kirk does not conc ede that the information containe d in the response s Mrs. Kirk re ceive d to h e r F OIA r e qu e sts wa s “ pu bli c ly dis c los e d. ” Ho we ve r, e ve ry c ir c uit to h ave c on sid e re d th is iss ue ha s d e te rm ine d th at in fo rm atio n p ro du c e d in re sp on se to a

F OIA r e qu e st b e c ome s p ub lic once it is rec eived by

the re quester. United States ex rel. Ondis v. City of W

oonsocke t , 587 F.3d 49 , 5 5 ( 1s t Cir . 2 00 9) ; Un ite d S tates e xre l. R e ag

an v . E. Te

x . M e d. Ctr . R e

g’ l H e alt hc ar e Sy s. , 38 4 F .3 d 1 68 , 1 75 -7 6 ( 5th Cir . 2 00 4) ; United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. H

ous. Auth. of Pittsburgh , 186 F.3d 376, 383 ( 3d Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Burns v. A.D. RoeCo., Inc. , 18 6 F .3 d 7 17 , 7 23 -2 4 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 9) ; United States ex rel. Schume r v. Hughe

s Aircraft Co. , 63 F.3d 1512, 1519- 20 (9th Cir. 1995), vacate d on other grounds , 520 U.S. 939 (1997). More over, in the context of construing the term “ public disclosure” in the Consumer Product Safe ty Act, 15 U. S.C. § 2 05 5( b) (1 ), the Sup re me Cou rt ha s h e ld t

hat th e te rm

e nc omp a sse s mate ri a ls r e le a se d in response to a FO I A re quest. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylv ania, Inc. , 4 47 U. S. 102, 109 (1980). F inally , this conclusion is consistent with our own prior discussions of what constitutes a “public disclosure ” under the FCA. I

n Doe , we f

ound that once innoc ent employ ees of a c ompany

beinginvestigated for f

raud w ere informed of

the alleg ations, public disclosure of those alleg ations had occ urre d. 960 F.2d at 323. We rejec ted the conte ntion that, in order for public disclosure to have taken plac e, the infor mation must be more broa dly disseminated. Id.14

Doethe re fo re un de rm ine s K ir k’ s argume nt t

hat th e inf

or matio n c on ta ine d in

the F OIA m ate ri a ls was not public bec ause it had be en disclosed only to the Kirks. Acc ording ly , we f ind that the inf or matio n p ro du c e d to Mr s. Ki rk in r e sp on se to h e r F OIA r e qu e sts , o nc e sh e ha d r e c e ive d it , was “ publicly

disclosed” within the mea ning of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (B ). Howeve r, the que stion remains whethe r any or all of the F OIA mater ials qualify as an
enumer ated sourc e under

the statute. “Sec tion 3730(e)( 4)(A) furnishes a n exclusive list of the way s in which a public disclosure must occur f or the jurisdictional bar

to apply .” Id. Her e, the potentially

applicable cate g ories ar e “a dminist rative . . . r eport . . . or inve stigation.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (4)( A). Our

sister Circuits have c ome to differ ing c onclusions reg ardingwhether materia ls produced by

a g overnme nt ag ency

pursuant to a F OIA re quest are administrative repor ts or investigations withi n the meaningof the F CA’s jurisdictional bar. The Third Circ uit, in Mistick, conclude d that they are . Relying la

rg ely on dictionary definitions of the terms of the statute, the Third Circuit held that whe n a re lator’s c laim was ba se d o n f

ile s r e le a se d b y

the De pa rtme nt o f H ou sin gand

Ur ba n D e ve lop me nt ( “ HU D” ) i n
re sp on se to a

F OIA r e qu e st, inc lud ingle tte rs su bmi tte d to HU D c on ta ini nga lle g e dly fa lse claims, the F CA’s jurisdictional bar a pplied. Mistick, 186 F.3d at 383-84. After finding that the word “ administrative” r efe rs “only to those administrative repor ts that originate with the fe dera l g overnme nt,” id. at 383, the cour t rea soned, [a] “re port” is def

ined as, among othe r thing s, “somethingthat g ives information” or a “notification,” W

e bs te r’ s Th ird Ne w I nte rn ati on al D ic tio na ry

1925 (1971), a

nd an “off icial or for

mal statement of f

acts or pr ocee ding.” Blac k ’s Law D ic tio na ry 13 00 (6 th e d. 19 90 ). A r e sp on se to a F OIA r e qu e st f

a lls wi thi n th e se de fi nit ion s. Suc h a re sp on se provides information and notification reg ardingthe re sults of the ag ency ’s sea rch f or the re qu e ste d d oc ume nts and c on sti tut e s a

n o ff ic ia l and fo rm a l st ate me nt c on c e rn ingtho se results.The Te nth Circuit has also found that a le tter fr om the Depa rtment of the Interior 5 Minerals Mana g ement Servic e disclosed pur suant to a F OIA re quest constituted an administrative re port under § 3730( e)( 4)(A) , althoug h the cour t’s rea soning is not set for th at leng th beca

use the issue doe s not appea r to have been disputed by the par ties. United States ex re l. Grynbe rg v. Praxair, Inc

. , 389 F.3d 1038, 1049 ( 10th Cir. 2004). Gr y nb e rg do e s n ot c ite Mistick
. See id. 15 Id. at 383-84. The court c ontinued, [w] e also be lieve that this response oc curr ed “in a [n] . . . administrative . . . investigation.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (A). F or the re asons alre ady explained, HUD’s se arc h f or the do c ume nts so ug ht u

nd e r t he F OIA a

nd its de c isi on

to d isc los e the m c le arl y satis fi e d o ur

c ourt ’s int e rp re tatio n o f t he te rm “ a dmi nis tr ativ e ,” and

we be lie ve that th e se proce sses should be viewe d as constituting a n “investig ation” within the meaningof 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (A). A cce pted def initions of the ter

m “investig ation” include “ a detailed e x amination,” W e bs te r’ s Th ird Ne w I nte rn ati on al D ic tio na ry

1189 (1971), a

nd the “makingof a se arc h.” 1 TheCom pa c t E dit ion of t heOx for d E ng lis h D ic tio na ry

457 (1971). When an a g ency

rec eives a

FOIA re quest, it is obli g ated to conduc t a sea rch that is r e a so na bly c a lc ulate d to un c ov e r a ll r e le va nt d oc ume nts . Id. at 384. Acc ording ly , the Mistick court found that jurisdiction was barr ed by the statute. Id. at 382-84. Mistick ’s ana ly sis ha s si nc e be e n f oll ow e d b y

the F ir st a

nd F if th C ir c uit s. On dis , 587

5 F .3 d at 56 -5 7; Reagan , 384 F.3d at 175-76. The Ninth Circuit, in Un ite d S tates e xre l. H aig ht v . Ca tho licHe alt

hc ar e W est , 445 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2006), took a diffe rent a pproac h. Rather than r elying on the dictionary definition of the wor ds “re port” a

nd “investig ation,” the Haight court looked at the words in the conte x t of § 3 73 0( e )( 4) (A ) a s a

wh ole . T he c ourt

re a so ne d th at a F OIA re quest is a mecha nism for duplicatingrec ords that ar e in the possession of the f e d e r a l g o v e r

n m e n tan d

th atar e n o to th e r

w i s e e x c l u d a

b l e f r o mm e mb e r s o f

th e p u b l i c . In contra st, reports and inve stigations ge nera lly involve independe nt work produc t. “Report” denotes a

document that includes a n analy sis of findings; “ investigation” implies independent g overnme ntal leg -work. Mor eover , the FCA’ s jurisdictional bar g roups “r eport” and “inve stigation” with a serie s of other e numerated source s that eac h involve extensive gove rnmental wor k product a

nd involvement. Be cause respondingto a F O IAr e qu e s tr e qu i r e s l i t t l e m o r e th and u p l i c at i o n , l a

b e l i n gan y

r e s p o n s e t o a

F O IA reque st a “re port” or “ investigation” would ignor e the wa y in which ea ch of the16

enumer ated sourc es [in the statute] involves g overnme ntal work produc t. Id. at 1153 (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit also re viewed the leg islative history of the F CA’s jurisdictional provisions: The orig inal version of the Act, ena cted in 1863, allowe d qui tam suits with no limit ations based on how the relator came to know of the f alse c laim, even if the g overnme nt was alre ady in possession of the rele vant information. Id. at 1154. In 1943, in Un ite d S tates e xre l. Ma rc us v . H

ess , 317 U.S. 537 (1943), the Supre me Court found that a qui tam suit was permitted
even when the a lleg ations in the complaint were copied dire ctly from a publicly

filed cr iminal indictment. See H

aight , 445 F.3d at 1154. I n response to Marcus , Congr ess ena cted a strict j uri s d i ct i o n al p ro v i s i o np ro h i b i t i n g qui tam suits “based upon e vidence or information in the po sse ssi on

of the Un ite d St ate s, or

any a g e nc y , o ff

ic e r o r e mpl oye e the re of

, at th e tim e ” the c a se
wa s b ro ug ht. Pub . L . N o. 78 -2 13 , 5 7 St at. 6 08 , 6 09 (1 94 3) (s up e rs e de d 1 98 6) ; see also Haight , 4 4 5 F. 3 d at1 1 5 4
. Un d er

th i s p ro v i s i o n , ev en i f t h e r el at o r h ad o b t ai n edth e i n fo rm at i o nth ro u gh independe nt effor

t and then submitted it to t he g overnme nt, the fac t that the g overnme nt then possessed the infor

mation would bar a qui tam action. The high w ater mark of this re strictive
a pp ro a c h w a s United States ex rel. W isconsin v. Dean , 729 F.2d 1100 ( 7th Cir. 1984), in which the Seventh Circuit found that the state of Wisconsin was barr ed fr om pursuing a qui tam action to rec over the proce eds of a Medica id fraud that the state had discove red through its own investigation when Wisconsin had previously , as re quired by fede ral law , submitt ed information
conce rningthe fra

ud to the U.S. gove rnment. See Haight , 4 45 F .3 d at 11 54 . In 1 98 6, Con g re ss ag ain took action, this time to relax the jurisdictional bar, and the c urre nt lang uag e wa s instit uted. Pub . L . N o. 99 -5 62 , 1 00 Stat. 3 15 3, 31 57 (1 98 6) . Summi ngup the le sso n to be take n f ro m th is17

history , the Haight

c o urt s tate d , “ th e ju

r is d ic ti o n a l b ar

p r o v is io n s mu s t b e an a ly ze d in th e c o n te xt of the se tw in g oa ls o f r e

je c tin gsu its wh ic h th e g ov e rnme nt i s c a pa ble of purs uin gits e lf

, whil e promoting those which the g overnme nt is not equipped to bring on its own.” 445 F.3d at 1154 (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) ; se e als o Doe , 9 60 F .2 d at 32 1- 22 (r e vie wi ngthe same leg islative history

and conc luding that “ [t ]he 1986 amendments attempt to strike a ba lance betwee n encour ag ing pr ivate citizens to ex pose fr aud and a voiding pa

rasitic ac tions by op po rt un ist s w ho atte mpt

to c a pit a lize on

pu bli c inf or matio n w ith out se ri ou sly

c on tr ibutin gto the disclosure of

the fra ud”). Th e Ni nth

Cir c uit c on c lud e d th at c on str

uin gthe te rm s “ re po rt ” and “ inv e sti g atio n” to ref er to wor k product that re prese nts gove rnmental a naly sis or leg -work r ather than the mecha nistic production of docume nts that follows upon a FO I A re quest is in keepingwith the g oa ls o f t he F CA ’s jur isd ic tio na l pr ov isi on , a s d e mon str ate d b y thi s h ist or

y : Congr ess soug ht to bar suits in which the g overnme nt could alre ady be expected to be on notice of the fra

ud. . . . [W ]hen respondingto a FO I A re quest, the g overnme nt need not assimilate the information containe d in the reque sted documents. The duplication of F OIA-re quested documents does not re quire the de g ree of familiarity and cognizance that the dr aftingof a re p o rto r t h e c o n d

u ct i n g o f a ni n v es t i gat i o n wo u l d
. Ac co rd i n gl y , p ro h i b i t i n g qui tam re lator s f ro m ba sin gthe ir

a lle g atio ns on

any inf or matio n o bta ine d in

a F OIA r e sp on se would damag e the f

raud- detec tion purpose of the F CA while failingto serve its twin g oal of pr e ve nti ngop po rt

un ism
. Haight , 445 F.3d at 1154-55. The Haight court ther efor e held that the que stion whether a document obtained thr oug h a F OIA re quest qualifies a s one of the e numera ted source s under the FCA’s jurisdictional ba

r should be answ ere d by

assessingthe nature of the doc ument itself. Id. at 1156. I f the doc ument obtained via F OIA re quest is a public disclosure of a “c riminal, civil, or18

administrative hea

ring , . . . a congressional, a dminist rative, or [Genera l] Acc ounting Offic e re port, hea

ring , audit, or investig ation, or [is] from the ne ws media,” then the j ur i s d i c t i o n a l b ar

i s a p p l i c a b l e . If , a s w a s th e c a s e h e r e , th e d o c u m e n to b t a i n e d v i a F O IA do e s n ot its e lf

qu a l i f y a s ane nu m e r at e d

s o ur c e , i t s d i s c l o s ur e i nr e s p o n s e t o th e F O IA reque st does not make it so. Id. After

undertaking our

own re view of the statute and its leg islative history , as we ll as consideringthe ana ly ses under taken by our sister Circuits, we a g ree with the Ninth Circuit that whether a docume nt obtained throug h a F OIA re quest is an enumer ated sourc e within the
me anin gof

§ 3 73 0( e )( 4) (A ) d e pe nd s o n th e natur e of the do c ume nt i tse lf

. O ur c on c lus ion

is compelled, f

irst, by the languag e of the provision. The spec ific question we f ace is whether a document produc ed in re sponse to a F OIA re quest is alway s an “a dminist rative . . . r eport . . . or investigation.” In order

to asce rtain the import of these potentially broad te rms, howeve r, we do not focus on them in isolation; rather, the ir “mea ning[] [ is] narr owed by

the commonsense c anon of no sc itu r a so c iis — which counse ls that a word is g iven more pr ecise content by the neig hboringwords with which it is associate d.” United States v. W illiams , 553 U.S. 285, ---, 128 S. Ct . 1830, 1839 (2008). All of the other ter ms in the list of enume rate d source s connote the sy nthesis of information in an investig atory context. “[ C] riminal, civil, [ and] administrative hear ings,” for instanc e, all enta il a g overnme nt inquiry into a g iven subject, he re into an a lleg ed
case of fr aud. Similarly , g overnme nt “hea ring [s and] audit[s] ” ar e proc esses by which i n fo rm at i o ni s co mp i l edwi thth e c o n ce rt edai mo f d ee p en i n g a go v ern m en ten t i ty ’s kn o wl ed ge of a g iven subject or, of

ten, deter mining whe ther a

party is in compliance with applica ble law. Given this company

of “ne ighbor ing w ords,” we find that it strains the natura l meaningof the statute to construe the terms “r eport” and “inve stigation” as broa dly as some of our

sisterIn applying the no sc itu r a so c iis c ano n, we have take n guid anc e fr om t he Sup re me 6 Court’s decision in Grah am Cou nty So il a nd W ate r Co ns e rv ati on Di

str ic t v . U nite d S tates e xre l. W ilson , 5 59 U. S. -
-- (2 01 0) , in wh ic h th e Court

dir e c tly a dd re sse d th e a

pp lic atio n o f t

his c ano n to the F CA ’s jur isd ic tio na l ba r. Our i nte rp re tatio n f

oll ow s th e Court ’s c ouns e l th at “ all of the source s listed in §3730(e)(4) (A) pr ovide interpre tive g uidance ,” id. , slip op. at 8, not merely the immediate neig hbors of the te rm. We also have not use d the ca non to inject into a word a meaningthat would otherwise be wholly absent. See ge nerally id. , slip op. at 4-9. Rather, we us e it a s a g uid e in s if

tin gthr ou g h th e c omm on un de rs tand ing s o f “ re po rt ” and “ inv e sti g atio n” to discover the ir intended mea ning w ithin the FCA. See W illiams , 128 S. Ct . at 1839 (holdingthat wher e ter ms “are susceptible of multiple and wide -ra ng ing me aning s . . . those meaning s are narr owed by

the commonsense c anon of no sc itu r a so c iis ”); Jarec ki v. G. D . Searle &Co. , 367 U. S. 3 03 , 3 07 (1 96 1) (“ Th e maximno sc itu r a so c iis
. . . is of te n w ise ly

a pp lie d whe re a

wo rd is capa ble of many

meaning s in order to avoid the g iving of unintended bre adth to the Acts of Congr ess.”) . We likewise have not used the ca non to impose commonality on terms that “do not share any . . . core of mea

ning,” Grah am Cou nty , s lip op . at 7 n .7 . T o th e c on tr ary , th e te rm s

19 C i r c u i t s h av e d o n e , s o th atth e y i n c l u d e an y

an d a l l m at e r i a l s p r o d

u c e d i nr e s p o n s e t o a

F O IA
re qu e st. In th is c on te xt, th e te rm “ re po rt ” mos t r e a dil y

be ars a na rr ow e r m e anin gtha

n s imp ly “somethingthat g ives information.” On dis , 587 F.3d at 56 (citing W ebster’s Third New Int’l Dict. 19 25 (2 00 2) ); see also Mistick, 1 86 F .3 d at 38 3 ( fi nd ingthat a re sp on se to a

F OIA r e qu e st is a “re port” be cause it “provides information and notification reg ardingthe re sults of the ag ency ’s sea

rch” ). Rather , it connotes the compilation or ana ly sis of information with the aim of sy nthesizi ngthat information in order to serve some end of the g overnme nt, as in a “he aring ” or

“ a ud it. ” I t do e s n ot n atur a lly e xten d to c ov e r t

he me c ha nis tic pr od

uc tio n o f d oc ume nts in response to a FO I A re quest made by a member

of the public. Similarly , the term “ investigation,” in the context of the statute, must be construed more narr owly than simply

a “de tailed examination” or “sea

rch.” Mistick, 186 F.3d at 38 4. Ins te a d, an “ inv e sti g atio n” he re imp lie s a more foc used and sustaine d inquiry direc ted towar d a g overnme nt end — for e x ample,
uncover ing possible nonc ompliance or assemblinginformation re levant to a pr oblem of pa rt ic ula r c on c e rn to t he g ov e rnme nt. 6“hea

ring ,” “r eport,” “audit,” a nd “investig ation” all re fer to proce sses of uncove ringand ana ly zinginf or matio n o r t o th e pr od

uc ts o f t ho se pr oc e sse s. Our i nte rp re tatio n f oc us e s o n th e ir share d “cor e of me aning .” In this connection, we note that FO I A itself nowher e uses the te rm “re port” to desc ribe 7 the end pr oduct g ener ated by an ag ency

in response to a

reque st, nor does it use the ter m “ inv e sti g atio n” to d e sc ri be the pr oc e ss o f s e arc hin gfo r r e c or ds . Ins te a d, it d e sc ri be s th e pr oc e ss a s o ne of “ mak[in g ] . . . re c or ds pr omp tly ava ila ble ” to a pa rt y wh o h a s r e qu e ste d th e m, 5 U. S.C. § 552(a) (3)( A), or “ production of . . . a g ency rec ords,” id. § 552(a) (4)( B)
. 20 Those of our

sister Circuits who have c ome to the opposite conc lusion have empha siz ed that an a g e nc y

re sp on din gto a

F OIA r e qu e st c on du c ts a re vie w o f i ts r e c or ds and c omp ile s a ll responsive doc uments befor e providingthem to the reque ster. See On dis , 587 F.3d at 56; Mistick, 1 86 F .3 d at 38 3- 84 . B ut what th e a g e nc y do e s not do in such a c ase is sy

nthesize the do c ume nts or

the ir c on te nts wi th t

he a im o f i tse lf

g le anin gany

ins ig ht o r i nf

or matio n, a s, in
c on tr a st, it n e c e ssa

ri ly wo uld in c on du c tin ga

“ he ari ng ” or

“ a ud it. ” F OIA i s si mpl y

a me c ha nis m f o r g r an t i n gth e p u

b l i c a c c e s s t o i n f

o r m at i o ni nth e p o s s e s s i o no f ana g e n c y. See F

BI v. 7 Abramson , 456 U.S. 615, 641-42 (1982) ( “[T] he princ ipal purpose of the FO I A was to e stablish a g ener al philosophy

of full ag ency

disclosure, in orde r to permit ac cess to off icial information long shie lded unnec essar ily from public view . . . .” (interna l quotation marks and citation omi tte d) ); Mistick, 186 F.3d at 393 (Be cker , C.J. , dissenting) (“[FOIA] does not compel an
a g e nc y to ‘ inv e sti g ate ’ a

re qu e st, in t

he se ns e that an a g e nc y

of the fe de ra l g ov e rnme nt n or ma lly investigates such thing s as alleg ations of fra ud, crimes, or

other wr ong doing. Rather, the A ct
s i mp l y fo rc es age n ci es t o ‘m ak e [ th ei r] re co rd s p ro mp t l y av ai l ab l e, ’ up o nre qu es t . ” ( ci t i n g 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (A)) ). Our re adingof the statute is buttressed by the leg islative history

of § 3730(e )(4) (A). Although, a s the Supreme Court re cently noted, the leg islative history does not indicate the21

dr a ft e rs ’ r e a so ns fo r a do pti ngthe sp e c if ic langua g e c on ta ine d in

the fi na l ve rs ion

of the bil l, Graham County Soil and W ater Conservation District v. United States ex rel. W ilson , 5 59 U. S. ___, slip op. at 14-18 (2010), the history does make clea

r that the 1986 amendments to the FCA’ s jurisdictional provision were a re action ag ainst the previous ve rsion of the statute, whic h had b ar r e d an y qui tam action that wa s based on infor mation in the possession of the g overnme nt, id.
at 13 ; se e als o Haight , 4 45 F .3 d at 11 54 -5 5; United States ex rel. Findley v . FPC-Boron Employe es’ Club , 1 05 F .3 d 6 75 , 6 84 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 7) (“ Whe n Co ng re ss a me nd e d th e Ac t in 1986, . . . the foc us of the jurisdictional bar [chang ed] from evidenc e of f raud inside the g overnme nt’s overc rowde d file ca binets to fraud a lrea dy

exposed in the public domain.”). Con g re ss’ s avo we d g oa l w a s, g e ne ra lly , to “ e nc oura g e mor e pr ivate e nf or c e me nt” of

the F CA thr ou g h e xpans ion

of its qui tam provisions, S. R ep. No. 99- 345 , at 23-24 (1986) , as re pr inte d in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5288-89, and, more spe cifica lly , to “cor rec t[ ] restrictive interpre tations of the a ct’s . . . qui tam jurisdiction,” id. at 4, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269. As the D.C. Circuit noted in Findley , the leg islators sought “ to prod the g overnme nt into action” by al l o wi n g qui tam suits when “evide nce or information of fr aud wa s buried somewhe re in a g overnme nt file.” Findley , 105 F.3d at 684 n.4. What we find most problematic a bout an interpre tation that construes F OIA mater ials as “administrative r eports” or the produc t of an “ administrative investig ation” within the meaning of § 3730(e )(4) (A) is that it would essentially resur rec t, in a signific ant subset of c ases, the g ov e rnme nt p os se ssi on

sta nd a rd that Co ng re ss r e pu diate d in 19 86 . A s a

pr a c tic a l matte r, it i s likely that in a substantial number of c ases involvingfra ud ag ainst the g overnme nt, some key piece of information — such as a c ontrac t, a re cord of order s place d, etc. — will be in theAt oral a rgument, counsel for

Schindler noted, in addr essingwhether a findingthat 8 FOIA mater ials are an enume rate d source under the statute would reinstate the g overnme nt po sse ssi on

sta nd ard , th at no t a ll i nf

or matio n in the g ov e rnme nt’ s p os se ssi on is s ub je c t to disclosure unde r F OIA. We see no r eason of logic or policy , howeve r, why the pre sence or absenc e of jurisdiction in a suit under the FCA should turn on the que stion of whether one of the exceptions to FOIA applies. See5 U .S. C. § 55 2( b) (p ro vid ingthat F OIA d oe s n ot a pp ly to classified infor

mation, information relating to the inter nal per sonnel rules a

nd prac tices of a

n ag ency , information spec ifically exempted from disclosure by statute, trade secr ets, inter- or int ra -a g e nc y me mor and a , p e rs onne l and me dic a l f

ile s, c e rt a in l aw e nf

or c e me nt r e c or ds , c e rt a in repor ts of financ ial reg

ulatory ag encie s, or g eolog ical and g eophy sical information concer ning wells). More over, it make s litt le sense to f ind that a par

ty is able to bringa suit beca use the information he attempted to obtain from the g overnme nt was not subject to disclosure unde r FOIA when that party

will, in such a ca se, nec essar ily not have in her

possession all of the inf or matio n s he re qu ir e s to br inghe r l aws uit
. 22 g overnme nt’s possession. Under the approa ch adopte d in Mistick, the moment a motivated ind ivi du a l se e kin gto u

nc ov e r f ra ud re c e ive s su c h a

do c ume nt t

hr ou g h F OIA, it b e c ome s a publicly disclosed “a dminist rative r eport” or the produc t of an “ administrative investig ation,” trig g eringthe FCA’ s jurisdictional bar. Such an individual would then be barr ed fr om bring ing an F CA claim when a

ny of the pe rtinent information is possessed solely in the g overnme nt’s files, a r esult that is counterproduc tive to Congre ss’s g oal of “ strik[ ing] a ba lance betwee n
encour ag ing pr ivate citizens to ex pose fr aud and a voiding pa

rasitic ac tions by

opportunists who attempt to capitalize on public information without seriously contributing to the disclosure of the fra ud,” Doe , 960 F.2d at 321. 8 Certainly , in some case s a qui tam plaintiff will herself possess all of the re levant inf or matio n, and

in s uc h c a se s th e me re fa c t th at so me or a ll o f t he inf or matio n w a s a lso possessed by

the g overnme nt would not be a bar to a suit. Si milarly , in some case s a qui tam plaintiff will qualify

as an “ orig inal source ” under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (B ), in which c ase the jurisdictional bar’s e x ception applies a nd the status of F OIA documents unde r the provision23

become s irrele vant, id. § 3730(e) (4)( A). Se e Grah am Cou nty , slip op. at 20 (noting that e ven under the Court’s broade r re adingof the F CA’s jurisdictional bar the r ights of “ orig inal source ” qui tam pla int if

fs are pr e se rv e d) . B ut t

he fa c ts o f t

his c a se be lie the a sse rt ion that in div idu a ls wh o a re no t or ig ina l so ur c e s and wh o o bta in i nf

or matio n thro ug h F OIA r e qu e sts wi ll g e ne ra lly not be per sons with firsthand knowledg e of f raud but rather will be opportunistic litigators. See On dis , 587 F.3d at 56. The fa cts also illustrate how an ove rbroa d rea ding of the jurisdictional bar would preve nt an individual with independent but par tial knowledg e of a

possible fraud w ould be ba rr e d f ro m br ing inga

laws uit that is ne ith e r p ara sit ic no r f ri vo lou s. He re , K ir

k b e c ame suspicious, based on his own experienc e as a Vietnam vete ran e mploy ed by Schindler, that Schindler wa s not in compliance with VEVRAA . To confir m this sus picion, howeve r, he ne eded
c op ie s o f S c hin dle r’ s V ET S- 10 0 r e po rt s, and the re a die st l awf

ul m e ans thr ou g h whic h h e c ou ld obtain them was a

FOIA re quest. Once he had r ece ived copies of the exist ing r eports, and le arn e d th at no re po rt s h a d b e e n f ile d f or c e rt a in ye ars , h e wa s a

ble to p ut t

he pie c e s o f h is lawsuit toge ther. The assumption that such a ca se will be a r are exception is questionable. Finally , we note that our interpre tation of § 3730(e) (4)( A) a ccor ds with that urg ed by the g overnme nt as amicus cur iae. The g overnme nt states that the “more limit ed” jur isdictional bar
enac ted in 1986 is “predic ated upon the public disc losure of a lleg ations in specific c ateg ories demonstratingthat the g overnme nt is either ac tively investigating the a lleg ed fr aud or that there is sufficient public aw are ness of the a lleg ations to pressure the g overnme nt to start an investigation.” Br ief for Amicus Curiae the United States of Ame rica in Support of Appellant at 24-25. In other wor ds, the g overnme nt advocates an interpr etation of the statute unde r which citizen relators will be a

ble to bringsuit in t hose instance s in which the g overnme nt itself is notWe n ote that th e F CA ’s pr ov isi on s sp e c if yingthat qui tam suits be filed under se al and 9 that th e g ov e rnme nt b e a llo we d th e op po rt un ity to i nte rv e ne and

purs ue the a c tio n it se lf

, a s w e ll a s to mov e fo r a

n e xten sio n o f t ime duri ngwh ic h th e c omp la int re ma ins un de r s e a l, t o mo ve to dismiss the ac tion, or to settle the action, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)-( c), pr otect the g overnme nt’s a bil ity to m a int a in c on tr ol o f c a se s in wh ic h it is p ur su ingan inve sti g atio n o r o the rw ise wi sh e s to asser t its own int ere sts ag ainst those of the qui tam relator. In one sense the jurisdictional bar, a s we int e rp re t it , s e rv e s a

sim ila r p ur po se , in that it pr e ve nts qui tam actions whe re the g overnme nt has initiated an investig ation of its own. Howeve r, the provisions also addr ess diffe rent situations, as the intervention provisions allow the g overnme nt a measur e of c ontrol over a qui tam suit based on alleg ations that have not be en made public in any way , while the jurisdictional ba r s ave s th e g ov e rnme nt t

he tr ou ble of int e rv e nin gin a

pa ra sit ic c a se ba se d o n p ub lic a lle g atio ns . 24 pursuing , or consider ing the pursuit of, an investig ation. See Findley , 105 F.3d at 688 (finding 9 that a qui tam action wa s barr ed whe re the complaint was ba sed on publicly disclosed inf or matio n th at “ a lr e a dy

e na ble [d] th e g ov e rnme nt t o a de qu ate ly inv e sti g ate the c a se and

to
make a de c isi on wh e the r t o p ro se c ute ” ); Springfield T erminal Ry. , 14 F.3d at 655 (findingthat the FCA’ s jurisdictional bar is best under stood as applying when the g overnme nt is already , or
c an r e a so na

bly be e xpe c te d to be , “ on

the tr a il” of

fr a ud ); se e als o United States ex rel. Fine v. Sandia Corp. , 7 0 F. 3 d

5 6 8 , 5 7 1 (1 0 thC i r. 1 9 9 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Springfield T erminal Railway ). Whil e the “public disclosure ” standa rd that Cong ress e nacte d is disti nct from a n actua l notice standar d,
se e Grah am Cou nty , slip op. at 19 (noting that “ [t ]he statutory touchstone . . . is whether the alleg ations of fra

ud have be en ‘publicly

disclosed,’ not whe ther they have la nded on the de sk of a DOJ l awyer” (bra ckets a

nd citation omitted)), we note that the forms of public disc losure that tr ig g e r t he jur isd ic tio na l ba

r a re a ll f or ms that c an r e a so na

bly be e xpe c te d to ind ic ate that so me b ra n ch o f go v ern m en th as turn edi t s at t en t i o nt o th e p o t en t i al fr au d i nqu es t i o n , s u ch as a h ea ri n g, audit, repor

t, or investigation. Under this rea ding, qui tam re lator s w ou ld n ot d up lic ate g overnme nt effor

ts to crac k down on fra

ud but would bring their own re source s to bear where theB e c a us e we fi nd

that th e F OIA m ate ri a ls a re no t e nume rate d s ourc e s, the pa rt ie s’ 10 dispute over whe ther the “ alleg ations or transa ctions” re quirement of § 3730( e)( 4)(A) is satisfied is moot. S imilarly , we ne ed not addr ess the question of whe ther Kirk qua lifies as an “ orig inal source ” of the information within the meaningof § 3730(e )(4) (A). For the first time on appe al, Schindler ra ises the additional ar g ument that the information on wh ic h K ir

k’ s c la ims are ba se d w a s p ub lic ly dis c los e d b e c a

us e the DO Lis r e qu ir e d b y law t o “make available in a databa se a list of the c ontrac tors that have c omplied with [ VEVRAA’ s 25 g overnme nt was not in a position to act. This divisi on of labor w ill max imiz e ef ficient enfor ceme nt of the F CA in the manner e nvisioned by the authors of

the 1986 amendme nts. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 2, as re pr inte d in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5267 (“In the fa ce of sophisticated and wide sprea d fra ud, the Commit tee be lieves only a coor dinated ef

fort of both the Gover nment and the c itiz enry

will decre ase this wave of def raudingpublic funds.”)
. F o r a l l o f th e f o r e g o i n gr e a s o n s , w e h o l d th ata d o c u m e n to b t a i n e d

i nr e s p o n s e t o a

F O IA reque st qualifies as an e numerated source under 31 U .S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (A) only when the do c ume nt i tse lf

is a “ c on g re ssi on a l, a dmi nis tr ativ e , o r G ov e rnme nt A c c ounti ngOf fi c e re po rt , h e ar in g , a u d it , o r inv e s ti g ati o n , ” r e f

le c ti n gth e g o v e r

n me n t’ s e f

f o rts to c o mp il e o r

s y n th e s iz e information to serve its own investigative or analy tic ends. The me re f

act that a g overnme nt ag ency has asse mbled and duplicate d rec ords, or noted the absenc e of r ecor ds, in respondingto a FOIA re quest does not itself re nder the materia l produce d an “a dminist rative . . . r eport . . . or investigation” within the meaningof § 3730(e )(4) (A). In this case, the materials produc ed to the Kirks by the DOL in response to Mrs. Kir

k’s FOIA re quests consisted only of Schindler’ s VETS-100 filing s as well as le tters indicatingthat for c erta in y ear s no responsive r ecor ds had bee n found, neither of which c onstitut es an “administrative . . . r eport . . . or inve stigation” under the statute. Acc ording ly , the mater ials are
n o te nu m e r at e d

s o ur c e s , an d

th e F C A ’ s j ur i s d i c t i o n a l b ar d o e s n o ta

p p l y. 10re qu ir e me nt t hat V ET S- 10 0 r e po rt s b e fi le d],” 31 U. S.C. § 1 35 4( b) . H ow e ve r, “ [i]t is a we ll- e sta bli sh e d g e ne ra l r

ule that an a

pp e llate c ourt

wi ll n ot c on sid e r a

n is su e ra ise d f

or the fi rs t time on appea l.” Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner , 4 1 6 F. 3 d 1 0 9 , 1 1 4 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Gree ne v. United States , 13 F.3d 577, 586 ( 2d Cir. 1994). Whil e we have disc retion to consider waived argume nts in o rd e r t o avo id a manif e st i nju sti c e or

wh e re a qu e sti on of law i s at is su e and

the re is no need f or additional fa ctfinding , id. , th is i s n ot a n in sta nc e in whic h it

wo uld be a pp ro pr iate to exercise that discr etion. Kirk conte nds that the databa se is not available to the public but r ather is password-pr otected a

nd available only

to cer tain ag ency

officia ls. Given that there is nothing in the rec ord indicatingwhat the nature of this data base is or to whom it is available, w e ar e not in a position to evaluate Schindler’ s argument. As noted above , Kirk’s c omplaint alleg es that Schindler f ailed to file a

VETS-100 11 repor t for 2002 by

the applica

ble dea dline, and it also alleg es that Schindler’ s VETS-100 re port was fa lse. We assume for the purposes of

this analy sis that both allegations are potentially true, an d s i mp l y a d dr e s s th e l e g a l v a l i d i ty o f e a c hth e o r

y o f l i a b i l i ty. On a pp e a l, K ir

k d oe s n ot p ur su e his c la ims ba se d o n Sc hin dle r’ s a lle g e d f a ilure to 12 implement an af

firmative a ction plan for ve tera ns and to offe r vete rans a n opportunity

to selfidentify
. 26 II. The Valid ity of Kirk’s Claim s Under the F CA We next addre ss whether Kirk stated va lid claims under the F CA when he alleg ed that (1) S ch i n d l er d i d n o tfi l e, o r d i d

n o tt i m el y

fi l e, an y VE T S -1 0 0 re p o rt s fo r t h e y ea rs 1 9 9 8 th ro u gh 2 0 0 3 , an d ( 2 ) Sc h in d le r

f il e d f a ls e V E T S- 1 0 0 r e p o rts f

o r 2 0 0 2 , 2 0 0 4 , 2 0 0 5 , an d

2 0 0 6
. We 11 12 revie w de novo a district cour t’s decision to dismiss a plaintiff’s claims for f ailure to state a claim. Gr e

go ry v . D aly , 2 43 F .3 d 6 87 , 6 91 (2 d Ci r. 20 01 ). In d oin gso , w e a c c e pt a s tr ue a ll fac tual alleg ations contained in the c omplaint and drawall infere nces in fa vor of the pla intiff. Id. As an initial matter, the pa rties ea ch make arguments that we e ither should not or nee d not rea ch this issue. Schindler ar g ues, for the first time on appe al, that the provisions of VE VR AAon wh ic h K ir

k r e lie s are no t a

pp lic a ble to i ts c on tr a c ts w iththe g ov e rnme nt b e c a us e the applica

ble re gulations ex empt “contr acts for commerc ial items” from the r equire ment of filing V ETS-100 repor

ts. See48 C.F.R. § 22.1302(b) ( exempting “c ontrac ts for commer cial27

i t em s ” f ro mfi l i n g VE T S -1 0 0 re p o rt s an d o th er VE VR AA fi l i n g re qu i re m en t s ); 6 6 Fe d
. R eg. 53,487, 53,487 (Oc t. 22, 2001) (notingthat 31 U.S.C. § 1354, which prohibits the gove rnment from ente ringinto contrac ts with contractor s who have not filed their VETS-100 r eports, does not apply to “ac quisiti ons of commer cial items”). B eca use this argument was not ra ised befor e the district court, howe ver, it is waived. Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner , 416 F.3d 109, 114 ( 2d Cir. 2005). We furthe r obser

ve that the que stion of whether Schindler’s c ontrac ts to inst all and maintain elevators and esc alators a re pr operly

considere d “contr acts for commerc ial items” rathe r tha n c on tr a c ts f

or c on str uc tio n, wh ic h a

re no t e xemp te d f

ro m th e VE TS- 10 0 f

ili ngre qu ir e me nts , is fact- specific and ther efor e does not pre sent an a ppropriate occa sion for us to exercise our discretion to consider

an ar g ument that has bee n waived. See id. Kirk, for his part, ar g ues that it was improper for the district c ourt to consider the
su bs tanti ve va lid ity

of his F CAc la ims be c a

us e Sc hin dle r d id n ot m ov e to d ism iss the se c la ims under F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and a sserted instea d that the ac tion should be dismi ssed on jur isd ic tio na l and

Rul e 9( b) g ro un ds . K ir

k c ha ra c te ri zes the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of c e rt a in of his claims as a su a s

po ntedismiss al for f

ailure to state a

claim on which r elief c an be grante d,
and a sk s th at, i f w e do no t r e ins tate his dis mis se d c la ims on su bs tanti ve g ro un ds , w e va c ate thi s aspec t of the district court’ s decision in order to affor d him an opportunity to be hea rd. It is true that “ [p]r ov idi nga

pla int if f w ithno tic e and

an o pp or tun ity to b e he ard

is o ft e n n e c e ssa

ry to establish the fa irness and r eliability of a dismissal,” Abbas v. Dixon , 480 F.3d 636, 639 ( 2d Cir. 2007), and f

ailure to a ffor d plaintiff an oppor tunity to be hea rd ca n be g rounds for r ever sal, see Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tarif f Bureau, Inc

. , 760 F.2d 1347, 1365 ( 2d Cir. 1985). Be cause , for the r easons e x plained below, w e re verse the district court’s de termination thatTh is p ro vis ion imp os e d li a

bil ity on any pe rs on wh o “ kn ow ing ly

pr e se nts , o r c a

us e s to 13 be pre sented, to an of

fice r or e mploy ee of

the United States Gove rnment . . . a f alse or f raudule nt claim for pa

y ment or appr oval.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1) ( 2006), amende d byFr aud Enfor ceme nt and Rec overy

Act of 2009, Pub. L . No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009). This provision impos ed liability on any person who “ knowing ly

makes, uses, or

cause s 14 to be made or

used, a f alse re cord or

statement to g et a f

alse or f raudule nt claim paid or a

pproved by the Gover

nment.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2) ( 2006), amende d byFr aud Enfor ceme nt and Recove ry Act of 2009, Pub. L . No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009). 28 cer tain of Kirk’ s claims wer e substantively invalid and re instate those claims, howe ver, w e nee d not addre ss this alternative ar g ument. We theref ore dr aw no c onclusions as to whether the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dis mis sa l is pr op e rl y c ha ra c te ri zed a s su a s po nteor wh e the r i t is in f

a c t th e c a se that Kirk did not rec eive a meaning ful opportunity

to be hea rd below. Turn ing , th e n, to t

he va lid ity

of Ki rk ’s c la ims , w e fi rs t r e vie w the e le me nts of lia bil ity
un de r t he F CA . A t th e tim e Ki rk fi le d h is c la im, the po te nti a lly a pp lic a ble pr ov isi on s o f t

he F CA
wer e 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1) and (a )(2)
. In 2009, Congr ess passed the Fr aud Enfor ceme nt and 13 14 Recove ry Act (“ FERA” ), Pub. L . No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009), which amende d and renumbe red the se provisions as §§ 3729(a )(1) (A) a nd (a) (1)( B) , respe ctively , seeFERA § 4( a), 123 Stat. at 1621. The ame ndment to § 3729(a)( 2), but not the amendme nt to § 3729(a)( 1), wa s made r etroa ctive to J une 7, 2008, applica ble to “all cla ims under the F alse Claims Act . . . that [were] pendingon or af

ter that date,” F ERA § 4(f) , 123 Stat. at 1625. Be cause Kirk’s c laim was fi le d in Ma rc h 2 00 5, and

wa s p e nd inga s o f Jun e 7, 20 08 , th e po te nti a lly a pp lic a ble pr ov isi on s in th i s ca s e a re fo rm er

§ 3 7 2 9 (a )( 1 ), es t ab l i s h i n g l i ab i l i ty fo r “ kn o wi n gl y

p re s en t [ i n g] , o r c au s [ i n g] to be pre sented, to an of

fice r or e mploy ee of

the United States Gove rnment . . . a f alse or fra udulent claim for pa

y ment or appr oval,” a

nd curr ent § 3729(a )(1) (B ), establishingliability for “knowing ly

mak[ing], us[ ing], or ca

us[i ng ] t o be made or used, a false r ecor d or statementSc hin dle r m ake s mu c h o f t he mate ri a lity

re qu ir e me nt c on ta ine d in c ur re nt § 15 37 29 (a )( 1) (B ). As we have e xpla ine d, ho we ve r, fo rm e r § 37 29 (a )( 1) is e qu a lly a pp lic a ble to Kirk’s c laims. W hile, prior to the adoption of the new pr ovision, the First, Four th, Fifth, Six th, Eig hth, and Ninth Circuits had all held that the F CA includes a mate riality require ment, see United States v. Bourseau , 531 F.3d 1159, 1170- 71 (9th Cir. 2008) (listing Circuits that have adopted a materia lity

require ment and similarly adoptingone), this Court has neve r so held, see Mike s , 274 F.3d at 697 (noting that some Circuits have adopte d a mater iality require ment but ref rainingfrom dec iding whe ther “ a fa lse statement or c laim must be material to the g overnme nt’s fundingdecision”) . Rather, Mike s focuse d on the question of whe n a cla im for pay ment may be construe d as “f

alse” under f

ormer § 3729( a)( 1). See id. at 69 6. I ts a na ly sis rema ins applicable to c laims under that provision. 29 materia l to a false or

fra udulent claim,” seeFERA § 4( a), 123 Stat. at 1621. We first addre ss Kirk’s cla ims based on Schindler’s a lleg ed fa ilure to file VETS-100 repor ts for the year s 1998 throug h 2003. We will begin our analy sis, as the district court did, wi th a n a sse ssm e nt o f whe the r l ia bil ity ari se s und e r f

or me r § 37 29 (a )( 1) , e mpl oyingthe ana ly sis set forth in Mike

s v. Straus , 274 F.3d 687 ( 2d Cir. 2001). As we c onstrued for mer § 3729(a )(1) in Mike s , in or de r t o e sta

bli shlia bil ity a pla int if f m us t sh ow“ that de fe nd ants (1 ) m a de a c la im, (2) to the United States g overnme nt, (3) that is false or fr audulent, (4) knowingof its falsity , and (5) se ekingpay

ment from the f

eder al trea sury .” Id. at 69 5. Th e c e ntr a l di sp ute wi th r e g ard to Kirk’s c laims based on Schindler’ s failure to file VETS-100 re ports is whether its subseque nt
c l a i m s f o r p aym e n tw e r e “ f

a l s e ” w i th i nth e m e an i n go f th e s t atu t e , a s c o n s tr

u e d b y Mike s . In 15
some ca ses, a c laim made to the g overnme nt is “fac tually false,” meaningthat a contr actor supplies “an incor

rec t description of g oods or servic es provided or a re quest for r eimbursement for g oods or servic es neve r provided,” id. at 697 — in other wor ds, the contra ctor bills for something it did not provide. In such a c ase, a pplication of the F CA is fairly straig htforwa

rd. Mo re dif fi c ult to a sse ss, ho we ve r, are c a se s in wh ic h a c on tr a c tor

fa lse ly re pr e se nts that it

is i n compliance with a par

ticular fe dera l statute or re g ulation or an a pplicable c ontrac tual term. See30

id. at 696. B eca

use “[t] he languag e of [the FCA] plainly links the wrong ful ac tivity to the g overnme nt’s decision to pay ,” id. , the statute “doe s not encompass those instanc es of r egulatory noncompliance that are irrele vant to the g overnme nt’s disbursement dec isions,” id. at6 9 7
. In other wor ds, not every

instance in whic h a fa lse repr esentation of compliance with a re g ulatory reg ime is made will lead to liability
. Mike s extensively

addre ssed the “le g ally

false c ertification theory” of liability under the FCA, a s distinct from a “f actua lly false” claim. Id. at 696-97. L eg ally false c ertification occurs “whe re a party cer tifies compliance with a statute or r egulation as a c ondition to gover nmental pay ment.” Id. at 697. In some ca ses, there will be an “e x press fa lse ce rtification,” where “a
c la im .
. . fa lse ly

c e rt if ie s c omp lia

nc e wi th a

pa rt ic ula r s tatut e , r e g ulatio n o r c on tr a c tua l te rm , wher e complianc e is a pre requisite to pay ment.” Id. at 698. In other c ases, howe ver, where no express cer

tification is require d, there may still be liability

under a n “implied cer

tification the or y ” : implied false ce rtification is appropr iately applied . . . whe n the under lying statute or re g ulatio n u

po n whic h th e pla int if

f r e lie s e x pr essl ystate s th e pr ov ide r m

us t c omp ly

in order to be paid. . . . L iability

under the Act may

proper ly be found the ref

ore when a de fe nd ant s ub mit s a

c la im f or [pay me nt] whil e kn ow ing
. . . th at pa y me nt e xpre ssl y

is prec luded bec ause of

some noncompliance by

the def endant. Id. at 70 0. In o the r w or ds , th e c on tr a c tor its e lf ne e d n ot c e rt if

y c omp lia nc e fo r a le g a lly fa lse
cer tification to have oc curr ed, althoug h when it does so ther e will be an e x pr ess fa lse
cer tification. An implied

false c ertification takes place wher e a statute expressly conditions pa y me nt o n c omp lia

nc e wi th a

g ive n s tatut e or

re g ulatio n, and

the c on tr a c tor , whil e fa ili ngto
c omp ly wi th t he statut e or

re g ulatio n ( and

wh ile kn ow ingthat c omp lia nc e is r e qu ir e d) , s ub mit s a
c la im f or pa y me nt.31

Title 31, Section 1354(a) (1) of the United States Code provide s that “no ag ency may obligate or e x pend funds a ppropriate d for the a g ency for a fiscal year

to enter into a c ontrac t [co ve re d b y

VE VR AA ] wit h a c on tr a c tor

fr om whic h a

[VE TS- 10 0] r e po rt

wa s r e qu ir e d .
. . wi th respe ct to the pre cedingfiscal year if such contr actor

did not submi t such repor t.” In addition, 48 C.F .R. § 5 2. 22 2- 38 pr ov ide s th at “ [b]y su bmi ssi on of its of fe r, the of fe ro r r e pr e se nts that, i f i t is subject to the re porting require ments of [VEVRAA], it has submitted the most rece nt VETS-100 Re po rt re qu ir e d b y

that [Ac t].” Th is r e g ulatio n w a s a do pte d in Oc tob e r 2 00 1 a

nd be c ame eff ective D ece mber 21, 2001. See66 Fe d. Reg . 53,487 (Oc t. 22, 2001). The district cour t found that Kirk stated a

valid claim under

the FCA when he a lleg ed that Schindler submitted bids
cover ed by

48 C.F.R. § 52.222-38 without havingsubmitt ed a V ETS-100 repor t for the prec edingfiscal year

and then won a

contra ct. We ag ree . The e ffe ct of the r egulation is that any contra ctor c overe d by

VEVRAA c ertifies that it has submit ted its most recent VET S-100 repor t when it makes a

bid for g overnme nt business. I f it has not submitt ed the r eport, such a
cer tification would be fa lse. In the terms of the Mike s ana ly sis , th e n, su c h a

c on tr a c tor

wo uld have ma de an e x press fa lse ce rtification (a lbeit by operation of the regulation rather than by makingthe ce rtification dire ctly ). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a lso , h ow e ve r, dis mis se d th os e of Ki rk ’s c la ims ba se d o n c on tr a c ts
awa rded be fore the re gulation’s eff ective date, implicitly

holding that liability

cannot be predic ated on 31 U.S.C. § 1354(a) alone. We re spectfully disag ree with this aspect of the district
c ourt ’s ho ldi ng . A s Mike s explained, impli ed fa lse ce rtification take s place “whe n the under lying statut e or re g ulatio n u

po n whic h th e pla int if

f r e lie s e x pr essl ystate s th e pr ov ide r m

us t c omp ly

in order to be paid” a

nd the def

endant, while not in complianc e, submits a claim for pa y ment. 27432

F.3d at 700. Our discussion, in Mike s , of a pr ovision of the Medica re statute of

fer s a usef

ul illust ration: Section 1395y (a) (1)( A) of the Medica re statute states that “no pa y ment may be made under the Medica

re statute f

or any expenses incurre d for items or se rvice s which . . . ar e no t reasonable and nec essary fo r t he dia g no sis or

tr e atme nt o f i lln e ss o r i nju ry or to improve the func tioning of a malformed body

member.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y (a) (1)( A) (empha sis added). B eca

use this section contains an e x press c ondition of pay ment — that is, “no pay

ment may be made ” — it expli citly links each Me dicar e payme nt to the require ment that the par

ticular item or se rvice be “r easona ble and ne cessa

ry .” . . . Since § 1395y (a) (1)( A) e

x pr essl ypr oh ibi ts p ay

me nt i f a pr ov ide r f

a ils to c omp ly

wi th i ts t e rm s, de fe nd ants ’ s ub mis sio n o f t he c la im f

or ms i mpl ic itl y

c e rt if ie s c omp lia

nc e wi th i ts provision. Id. at 700-01 (br acke ts omit ted). Similarly , 31 U.S.C. § 1354(a)(1) provides that “no a g ency may obligate or e x pend funds” to enter a contra ct cove red by

VEVRAA whe n the contra ctor ha s not submitt ed the r equisite VETS-100 re port. Be cause the statute expressly states that the contr actor must have submitted the repor t in order to be pa id, a contra ctor that re quests pay ment under suc h a contr act “ implicitl y

cer tifies compliance ” with the VETS-100 r eportingrequire ment. Kirk there fore states a va lid claim under the F CA when he alleg es that Schindler submitted bids and won contra cts without having filed the re quisite report, e ven bef ore 48 C.F .R. § 52.222-38 beca me ef fec tive. Ne xt, w e a dd

re ss t he va lid ity

of Ki rk ’s c la ims ba se d o n Sc hin dle r’ s f ili ngof a lle g e dly false V ETS-100 repor

ts. Here , the district court, re lying on f ormer §§ 3729( a)( 1) and ( 2) as
c o n s tr u e d b y Mike s , found that there could be no liability for f iling alleg edly

false V ETS-100 repor ts beca use none of

the applica

ble statutes or re g ulations makes filing an ac c uratere po rt a prec ondition to pay

ment or provides that a contra ctor, by submitt ing a

bid or a re quest for pay ment, cer tifies the accurac

y , as opposed to the submission, of its reports. We need not de te rm ine wh e the r t

his ana ly sis is c or

re c t, h ow e ve r, be c a

us e we fi nd

that K ir k s tate s a va lidW e n o t e t h atam i cu s cu ri ae th e U n i t edS t at es t ak es th e p o s i t i o n th at“th e p l ai nl an gu age 16 of the F CA establishes that, wher e a c ontrac tor knowing ly submits a false re port to the g overnme nt in order to obtain contr acts (a nd pay ments on those contra cts), no statute or regulation has to separ ately require that the re port be a ccur ate” for liability to attach. B rief f

or Amicus Curiae the United States of Ame rica in Support of Appellant at 29. 33 claim under

the new § 3729( a)( 1)(B ). 16 Th e ne w p ro vis ion

e sta bli sh e s li a

bil ity wh e n a pa rt y “ kn ow ing ly

make s, us e s, or

c a us e s to be made or used, a

false r ecor d or statement mate rial to a fa lse or fr audulent cla im.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1)( B) . Acc eptingas true a ll of the fac tual alleg ations set forth in the complaint and draw ing a ll inferenc es in the lig ht most favorable to plaintiff, see Gregory 24 3 F .3 d at 69 1, in 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006 Schindler f iled false V ETS-100 repor ts, nece ssarily

knowingthat they wer e fa lse bec ause Schindler in fac t had no mecha

nism in pl ace to identify

cover ed vete rans. I t did so in order to procur e contr acts or obta in pay ment under e x isting contra cts, as it could do neither w ithout fili ngthe re ports. See31 U.S.C. § 1354(a)(1) ; 48 C.F.R. § 52.222-38. Acc ording ly , it knowingly used a f alse re cord in orde r to obtain pay ment from the g overnme nt. SeeS. Rep. No. 99-345 at 9, as re pr inte d in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5274 (“[A] false claim may take many

forms, [including] a claim for g oods or servic es . . . provided in violation of c ontrac t terms, spec ification, statute, or r egulation. . . . [ C] laims may be fa lse eve n though the service s
are provided a s claimed if, f or example, the cla imant is ineligible to participate in the prog ram.” ) S c h i n d l e r ar g u e s th atth e m at e r i a l i ty r e qu i r e m e n to f

§ 3 7 2 9 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( B ) i s n o tm e th e r e . It notes that the g overnme nt does not require , befor e ente ringinto a contra ct or makingpay ment under a n exis ting c ontrac t, that some threshold number of Vietnam vete rans be employ ed by any g iven contra ctor. B eca

use the g overnme nt’s fundingdecisions ar e not pre dicated on the content of the re po rt s, Sc hin dle r r e a so ns , th e a lle g e dly fa lse state me nts in t

he re po rt s w e re no t “ mate ri a l”Presumably Schindler has in mind such mea sures a s oversig ht by the OF CCP
. See41 17 C.F.R. § 60-250.60 (pr oviding that the O FCCP conduct compliance evaluations to determine wh e the r c on tr a c tor s are c omp lyingwi th t he ir ob lig atio ns un de r V EV RA A, inc lud ingthe ir obligation to file VETS-100 repor ts). Indeed, r eports pre pare d in the manner alleg ed by

Kirk ar e ar g uably

not VETS-100 18 repor ts at all within the definition set forth in VEVRAA. VEV RAA requir es that contra ctors s u b m i t re p o rt s d et ai l i n g (A) the number of e mploy ees in the w orkfor ce of such contra ctor, by

job categ ory

and hiring location, and the numbe r of suc h employ ees, by job categ ory

and hiringlocation, wh o a re qu a lif ie d c ov e re d v e te ra

ns ; (B ) the total number of

new e mploy ees hire d by

the contra ctor duringthe per iod cover ed by the re port and the numbe r of suc h employ ees who are qualified c overe d veter ans; and (C) the maximum number a nd the minimum num ber of employ ees of

such contra ctor duri ngthe pe ri od

c ov e re d b y

the re po rt . 34 as def ined by § 3729(b)( 4) — i.e. , “havinga natur al tendenc y to influence , or be c apable of influencing , the pay

ment or re ceipt of mone y or prope rty .” Schindler ma intains that it does not take the po sit ion

that th e g ov e rnme nt i s e nti re ly ind if fe re nt t o th e a c c ur a c y

of VE TS- 10 0 r e po rt s; rathe r, Cong ress simply

did not contemplate usingthe FCA to e nsure the a ccur acy of the re ports. Instead, a ccor ding to Schindler , their ac cura cy is best monitored throug h exis ting a dminist rative
me c ha nis ms. 17 We are not persuade d by

Schindler’s a

rguments. Whi le it is clear that the statute imposes
a mate ri a lity

re qu ir e me nt, we fi nd

that th at r e qu ir e me nt i s me t un de r t he c ir c ums tanc e s a lle g e d in the complaint. Kirk doe s not merely alleg e that Schindler f

iled inacc urate repor

ts, he alleg es that Sc hin dle r f

a ile d to take any

ste ps wh atso e ve r t o mo nit or the numbe r o f c ov e re d v e te ra ns in i ts
wo rk fo rc e and

ins te a d f a br ic ate d th e numbe rs it s up pli e d in its VE TS- 10 0 r e po rt s, e sse nti a lly plu c kin gthe m out of

thi n a ir
. We n e e d n ot n owde fi ne the pr e c ise c ontou rs of the mate ri a lity 1838 U.S.C. § 4212(d)(1). I n turn, 31 U.S.C. § 1354(a) pr ovides that no pay ment can be made to a c on tr a c tor

“ fr om whic h a

re po rt wa s r e qu ir e d und e r s e c tio n 4 21 2( d) of [titl e 38 ] wit

h r e sp e c t to the pre cedingfiscal year

if such contr actor

did not submi t such repor t.” A contr actor

that has submitt ed a r eport c ontaining e ntirely fabr icated numbe rs has a rguably not submit ted “suc h repor t” within the meaningof 31 U.S.C. § 1354(a). A m e re mis re po rt ingof

the re le va

nt f igur e s f ro m a c omp any that ha d ta

ke n s ome 19 imperfe ct measur es to asce rtain the number of vete rans in its workfor ce, on the other ha nd, might not fulfill the materiality

require ment of § 3729(a )(1) (B ). Kirk fur ther a sks us to decide in his favor the two issues that wer e not re ache d by the 20 dis tr ic t c ourt

but th at Sc hin dle r r a ise d in its mot ion

to d ism iss : w he the r h e ple a de d h is c la ims wi th s uf fi c ie nt p art ic ula

ri ty un de r F e d. R. C iv. P. 9 (b ), and wh e the r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

sh ou ld dis mis s th e c a se un de r t

he do c tr ine of

“ pr ima ry jur isd ic tio n. ” Ho we ve r, “ [i]n g e ne ra l, w e re fr a in from ana ly

zing issues not decide d below.” Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino , 380 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2004). Althoug h we ha ve discre tion to reac h such issues wher e the c ircumstance s favor so doing, id. , we do not find that such c ircumstance s exi st here. 35 require ment in order to hold that in such a case , the VETS-100 re ports constitute “fa lse . . . statement[s] materia l to a false . . . c laim.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)( 1)(B ). The r eporting require ments of VEVRAA a re suf ficiently important to Congre ss that it made fulfillment of them a pre condition to pay

ment. See id. § 1354(a) (1). Schindler alleg edly submitt ed VETS-100
re po rt s th at g ave the imp re ssi on that it wa s c omp lyingwi th t

he se re qu ir e me nts wh ile in f a c t it
wa s e nti re ly

dis re g ard ingthe m. S uc h a fa lse state me nt w ou ld c e rt a inl y have a te nd e nc y to “influenc e, or be capa

ble of influenc ing, the pay ment or re ceipt of mone y or prope rty .” Id. §

19 3729(b)( 4). Cf. United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lit hium Power Technologies, Inc

. , 575 F.3d 20 458, 470 (5th Cir. 2009) (c onstruing the materia lity require ment, as def

ined in § 3739(b)( 4), as

“ re qu ir [ing ] onl y

that th e fa lse or

fr a ud ule nt s tate me nts e ith e r ( 1) make the g ov e rnme nt p ro ne to a par ticular impression, ther eby producingsome sort of ef fec t, or (2) ha

ve the a bility to [ a]ffec t the g overnme nt’s actions, eve n if this is a result of indirec t or intang ible actions on the pa rt of the Def endants” ). Kirk’ s FCA cla ims based on Schindler’s f iling of a lleg edly

false r eports ar e thus36

valid. CO NC LU SION We have c onsidered the other a rguments made by

Schindler and f

ind them to be without merit. We hold that whether doc uments produce d in response to a FOIA re quest are enumer ated
source s under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (4)( A) is to be dete rmined by assessingthe nature of the do c ume nts the mse lve s; the y are no t “ a dmi nis tr ativ e . . . r e po rt [s] . . . o r i nv e sti g atio n[s]” sim ply by vir tue of havin gbe e n g athe re d b y

an a g e nc y

re sp on din gto a

F OIA r e qu e st. We f

ur the r h old that K ir k s tate d v a lid

c la ims un de r t

he F CAwh e n h e a sse rt e d ( 1) that Sc hin dle r h a d f a ile d to fi le VE TS- 10 0 r e po rt s in

c e rt a in ye ars , a

nd (2 ) t hat Sc hin dle r h a d f

ile d f a lse VE TS- 10 0 r e po rt s in
cer tain y ear s beca

use it had filed r eports that purpor ted to detail the number

of cove red ve tera

ns in its workforce while in fac t the company no measure s to identify

such vete rans. We ther efor e VA CA TE the judg ment of the district cour t and REMAND th e c as e f o r f urt h er p ro ce ed i n gs consistent with this opi nion.