### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 116 -CR

Jo hn Wi lli am Us se r y , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WI LLIAM SO N COUNTY , 277TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 05- 264- K2 77 , HO NORAB LE KEN ANDERSO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
J ohn Wil liam Ussery was char g ed with a three -count indictment a lleg ing inde cenc y with a child by

contac t. See Te x. Pe na l Cod e Ann. § 2 1. 11 (We st 2 00 3) . Ajur y fo un d h im guil ty
on eac h of the c ounts and assesse d pu n i s h m ent at twenty y ear s’ conf

inement. The tria l court sentenc ed appe llant to twenty y ear s on eac h count and or dere d his sentence in coun t two to run
c o n s e c u t i v e l y

t o h i s s e n t e n c e i nc o u n to n e an d h i s s e n t e n c e i nc o u n t t h r e e t o r u nc o n c u r r e n t l y . In five points of er

ror on a ppeal, a ppellant cha lleng es (i) the trial court’s dismiss al of a juror, (ii) the admission of illega lly

seized evidenc e and the court’s f ailure to prope rly

instruct the j ury

with reg ard to the evidenc e, and (iii) the trial court’s failure to a llow a hear ing on appellant’ s motion for a new tr ia l. F or the re a so ns that f

oll ow , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt. The e vidence at trial showed that in the s pring of 2004, four teen- y ear -old T.G. wa s l i v i n g wi t h h er gra n d

p ar en t s wh o we re h er l ega l gu ar d i an s . I n p u rs u i n g h er h o b b y o f ho rs e r i d i n g,2

sh e me t a pp e lla nt, a 60 -y e ar- old ho rs e tr a ine r, a t a hor se sh ow a t the Ge or g e tow n sho w barn . Shor tly afte r mee ting, a

ppellant and T.G. beg an to e x chang e e-ma ils whic h beca me sexually sug g estive and the n s e xua lly

e xplic it. Th e y

a lso e ng a g e d in

te le ph on e c on ve rs a tio ns . On one oc casion, whe n her g randpa rents we re not at h o m e, appellant c ame to the ho us e and

e ng a g e d in

se xua l c on du c t wi th T .G . O n a no the r o c c a sio n, T. G. vis ite d a pp e lla nt at hi s horse tra iler par

ked outside the s h o w barn w here they eng ag ed in sexual conduct. L ester G arne r, T.G.’s g randf

ather and leg al g uardia

n, beg an to suspe ct appellant was eng ag ing in imprope r conduc t wi th h is g ra

nd da ug hte r. He be g an to re c or d T .G .’ s te le phon e ca lls and arr ang e d f

or his wi fe to ins ta ll s py

wa re so ft ware on th e fa

mil y c omp ute r t o mo nit or

T. G. ’s e -m a il c omm

un ic a tio ns wi th appellant. At tria l, appellant objec ted to the admission of the re corde d telephone conver sations and
e-ma ils on the basis that they wer e illeg ally

interce pted by

Mr. Gar ner. Be cause there is no challeng e to the l eg al and factua l sufficienc y of the e vidence , we will discuss the releva

nt fac ts more fully

when a ddressing the par

ticular leg al issue ra ised.
AN AL YSI S Juror Dism issal

I n his first two points of error , appellant c halleng es t h e trial court’ s dismis sal of a juror as disable d. He ur g es that the trial court err ed in dismissing the juror and that the trial court
c o mm itte d s tr

u c tu r a l e r r o r b e c a u s e th e ju

r o r ’ s r e mo v a l r e d

u c e d th e St a te ’ s b u r d e n o f proof by
a llo wi nga

c on vic tio n b y

e le ve n ju ro rs . At the beg inning of

the sec ond day

of the trial, J uror Florenc e informed the trial cour t in c hambe rs on

the re c or d th a t sh e kn e w o ne of a pp e lla nt’ s famil y me mbe rs and that “ Ife e l si c k to3

my stomach that’s a ll.” She advised the c ourt that she wa s close fr iends with appellant ’s wife’ s brother and sister-in-law
. Be cause she knew of appellant only by the nickname of his initials, J .W., she had not made a conne ction during jury selec tion that he was related to her friend, the sister-inlaw, wi th w h o m s h e c o mm u n ic a te d o n a d a il y b a s is
. T h e f r ie n d in f o r me d Ju r o r F lo r e nce tha t she had se en new s of the trial on the te levision news and that the jur or wa s probably s er v i n g on her r elative’ s jury . The juror and her friend did not discuss the case . I n response to the trial court’ s questioning, J u ro r Florence told the judge that, despite her fee lings of une ase c aused by he r f ri e nd sh ip w itha

pp e lla nt’ s si ste r- in- law, sh e c ou ld r e ma in f a ir and un bia se d a s a

jur or in appellant’ s case .

Th e tr ia l c ourt

inf or me d th e pa

rt ie s o f h is c on ve r s a

t i o n w ithJuro r F lor e nc e . T he State first sug g ested that, unless the j uror was “emotionally unable” to serve, the y continue with the jury
a s c on sti tut e d. Ap pe lla

nt r e qu e ste d a mistr ia l, statin g “ Ido no t w ant t o ta ke the c ha nc e that th is w ill adver sely aff ect he r and by

adver sely aff ectingher, it will adver sely aff ect the f airne ss of this trial.” Th e tr ia l c ourt the n e xpla ine d that the “ fi rs t re me dy” wa s a c on sid e ra tio n o f w he the r t

he jur or sh ou ld be dismissed and the c ase pr ocee d with the eleve n rema ining jurors or whether the juror be lef t on the jury and the c ase proce ed: “[T] he sequenc e we do these in is do we r emove the jur or, and the n we de al with the mistrial.” Def ense c ounsel then re quested that the juror be dismissed. The trial
co u rt gra n t edt h e r eq u es tan d d i s m i s s edt h e j u ro r, s t at i n g:
Ba sed upon the e ntirety

of my conver sation with her, including t he flushed fac e that she had w hen she c ame in, the fa ct that she said she was sick to the stomac h—to her stomach, and de spite the fac t that Ifee l like I was a ble to calm her

down and g et her to relax, she clea

rly was upset about this. She clea rly had had a difficult nig ht. And all that seeme d to me to be unre lated to t he fa cts of the c ase a nd to be re lated to the4

fa c t th a t th is h a d b e e n b oth e ri nghe r a nd at th is t ime , I ’m

g oin g to f

ind that sh e is a disabled juror. We c ould develop the r ecor d more if y ’all wa nt to, but si nce you’ve alre ady ag ree d—the def

ense ha s asked that she be r emoved a nd the State has a g ree d, Idon’t know if that’s wha t we should do at this point or it would be appropriate. The followingcolloquy

then occ urre d: [P rosec utor]: Yea h, J udg e. I f they

reque st it and we agr ee, Idon’t think y ou need to de velop the re cord a ny further
. [Defense Counsel] : Ithink that’s rig ht, Your Honor. Court: All rig ht. I will r emove her on a finding that she’s a

disabled juror and on the ag ree ment of the—or the reque st of the defe nse and the ag ree ment of the State.
Def ense counsel renewe d his reque st for mis trial and objected t o “being forc ed to continue with 11 jur or s. ” Th e c ourt

ov e rr ule d th e mot ion

fo r m ist ri a l. T h e United St ates Constituti on does not requir e a pa rticular numbe r of juror s
n e c e s s ar y t o c o n s t i tu t e a

j u r y p an e l , o n l y t h a t t h e j u r

y m u s tb e i mp art i a l
. U
. S
. C o n s t
. a m e n d
. V I. The Tex as C onstitut ion, howeve r, does require a jury of t welve members for case s tried in district courts, but provision is made fo r t h e l egislature to modify the rule to a

uthorize verdicts by less than twelve. Sn e e d v . S tate , 209 S.W .3d 782, 785 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. re f’d) , cert. de nied , 128 S. Ct . 5 37 , 2 00 7 U .S. L EX I S 11 98 6 ( 20 07 ); He ga r v . S tat e , 11 S.W .3d 290, 295 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (c iting Te x . Const. art. V, § 13). Ar tic l e 3 6 .29 of the code of cr iminal procedur e spea ks to a juror be coming disabled:We n ote that th e statut e ha s b e e n ame nd e d, bu t th e ame nd men ts ar e no t r e le va nt t o th is 1 appea l. There fore , we c ite to the curr ent ver sion of the statute. 5 ( a ) N o tl e s s t h an

t w e l v e j u r o r s c anr e n d e r

an d r e tu r na v e r d i c ti n

a f e l o n y c a s e . It must be concur

red in by eac h juror and signe d by the fore man. Except as provided in Subsec tion (b), howeve r, af ter the tria l of any

felony case beg ins and a juror

dies or, as de termined by

the j udg e, becomes di sabled from sitti ng at any time before the char g e of the court is re ad to the jury , the rema inder of the jury shall have the power to r e nd e r the ve rd ic t; bu t wh e n the ve rd ic t sh a ll be re nd e re d b y le ss t ha n th e wh ole numbe r, it s ha ll b e sig ne d b y e ve ry me mbe r o f t

he jur y c on c ur ri ngin i t.
Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 36.29 (West Supp. 2007). 1

Appellant conte nds that a j uror’ s bias or prejudice for or aga inst a defenda nt does not
re nd e r a jur or “ dis a ble d” and that th e jur or ’s “ c omm e nts and ind ir e c t kn ow le dg e of

a pp e lla nt w ou ld not have been sufficie nt to sustain a challeng e for cause to he r fitness to sit as a juror” in the case and she wa s, theref

ore, not disabled. B ut appellant did not asser t in the court below that the juror wa s not disabled. I n the trial cour t, appellant ar g ued that a mi strial was the appropr iate re medy and that he sh ou ld n ot b e c omp e lle d to c on tin ue the tr ia l w ithon ly

e le ve n ju ro rs . A c omp la int

mus t be pr op e rl y pr e se rv e d be fo re it c an b e pr e se nte d o n a pp e a l. T e x. R. App. P. 33.1. The rec ord must show that the complaint was timely prese nted to the trial cour t, that the def endant state d the g rounds for the objection wit h sufficie nt specific ity to make the tria l court
awa re of the complaint or that the spe cific g rounds wer e appa rent fr om the context, and that the trial court ruled on the objection. Id
. A g ener al or insufficiently specific objection does not prese rve a n
err or for appea l. Lon g v . S

tat e , 800 S.W .2d 545, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). This case is simi lar to J

on es v . S tat e , 1 19 S.W. 3d

76 6 ( Te x. Cr im. App
. 20 03 ), in which the de fenda

nt first requ es t ed a m i strial but, after the trial cour

t denied the r equest, then6

proposed the dismissal of the juror in questi o n . T h e t ri al court ex cused the juror. On a ppeal, the defe ndant ar g ued that the tria l court er red in dismissing the juror u n d er article 36.29. J ones contende d that th e re m ed y o f dischar g e wa s inappropriate bec ause bia s is not a disabilit y under article 36.29. Id . at 784.

The c ourt of criminal appea ls concluded in J on es that, beca

use appe llant reque sted the dis c ha

rg e a s an a lte rn a tiv e to m istri a l, h e wa s e sto pp e d f ro m c omp la ini nga

bo ut i t: Appellant had the option of contending at t rial that mistrial was the sole le g al and appropr iate remedy , and he c ould have de clined to sug g est or support any alternatives. By

proposing alternatives he is estopped from c omplaining on a ppeal a bo ut t he jud g e havin g a c c e pte d o ne of the m. P art ie s a re of te n f a c e d w ithdif

fi c ult choice s, but fac ing a t oug h dilemma does not cre ate a claim or e x cuse a

party for the option chosen.
Id
. I n th is ca se , ap pe lla nt ini tia lly re qu e ste d a mistr ia l but, a ft e r t he tr ia l c ourt

fa ile d to g rant his re quest, reque sted the dismiss al of the juror. Appellant asked that the juror be dismissed as an alternative to mistrial, and then a ppellant ag ree d that the par ties need not de velop the re cord further to make any additional showing as to disability . The trial c ourt proce eded to make a finding that the juror wa s disabled under article 36.29. We conc l u de that appe llant is estopped from
c omp la ini nga

bo ut c on tin

uin g the tr ia l w ithe le ve n ju ro rs and that th e tr ia l c ourt

wa s w ith in i ts discretion in finding the j uror disabled within the m eaning of article 36.29. W e over rule a ppellant’s first and sec ond points of error
.We n ote that th e statut e ha s b e e n ame nd e d, bu t th e ame nd men ts ar e no t r e le va nt t o th is 2 appea l. There fore , we c ite to the curr ent ver sion of the statute. 7 Admiss ibi

lit y of Wireand

Ele c tro nicCommunica tio ns 1. V ic ariou s Co nse nt I n his third point of

err or, appe llant contends that the c ommunications intercepte d by the Gar ners we re obta ined in violation of the statute barring the interc eption of nonconse nsual
c o mm u n ic a ti o n s , see T ex . Penal Code Ann. § 16.02 (West Supp. 2007), and should have been 2 excluded pursuant to article 38.23 of t he Tex as C ode of Criminal Proce dure. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a

rt . 3 8. 23 (We st 2 00 5) . We re vie w a tri a l cou rt ’s de c isi on to a dmi t e vid e nc e su bje c t to an abuse of discre tion standard of r eview. Mo ntg om e ry v . S tat e , 8 10 S.W. 2d

37 2, 39 1 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1990) (op. on r eh’g ). We do not disturb its ruling on appea l unle ss it falls outside the “zone of re asonable disag ree ment.” Id
.

Article 38.23( a) of

the code of cr iminal procedur e spec ifies that “No e vidence obtained by

an off icer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitut ion or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constit ution or laws of the United States of Americ a, shall be admitted in e vid e nc e a g a ins t th e a c c us e d on the tr ia l of any c ri min a l c a se .” Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt
. 38. 2 3 ( a )
. T h e p e n a l c o d e a d dr e s s e s th e u n la w f u l i n te r c e p ti o no f

c o mm u n ic a ti o n s , s tati n g tha t a per son commits an offense if he intentionally interce pts a wire or

elec tronic communication. Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 16.02(b)( 1). The statute lists various affirmative defe nses to prosec ution
u n d er s ec t i o n1 6
. 0 2 (b ), i n cl u d i n g t h e f o l l o wi n g:
I t is a n a ff

ir ma tiv e de fe ns e to p ro se c uti on un de r S ub se c tio n ( b) that:8

. . . . (4) a person not ac ting unde r color of law interc epts a wire , oral, or elec tronic communication, if: (A) the person is a pa

rty to the communication; or (B ) one of

the par ties to the comm unication has g iven prior c on se nt t o th e int e rc e pti on , unle ss t he com mun ic a tio n is int e rc e pte d f

or the purp os e of

c omm itt ingan unla

wf ul a c t.
Id. § 16.02(c) (4). T h e st atute does not spec ify that consent c an be g iven vicar iously by a par ent or g uardia

n. I n Alam e da v . S

tat e , 235 S.W .3d 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), the c ourt of cr iminal appeal s u p h eld t he convic tion of a def endant c onvicted of a g g ravated sexual assault. At trial, the State offe red, a

nd the trial cour

t admitted, a re corde d telephone conver sation betwee n the def endant and the twe lve-y ear -old victim. The teleph o ne conve rsation had be en re corde d by the victim’s mother without her da

ug hter’s know ledg e or c o nsent. The de fenda nt argued that the r ecor ding shoul d be suppre ssed pursuant to ar ticle 38.23 of the c ode of c riminal proce dure be cause the mother’s una

uthorized r ecor ding of the conver sation constituted illega l w iretappingunder se ction 16.02. Id . at 220.

Re c og nizi ngtha

t no Tex as ca se ha d a dd

re sse d a pa re nt’ s a uth or ity to v ic ari ou sly consent to the re cordingof a c hild’s telephone c onversation, the court looked to the Six th Circuit’s decision in Pollock v . Pollock , 154 F.3d 601 ( 6th Cir. 1998), the leadingcase reg ardingtheThe c ourt rec og nized that the fede ral wire tap statute is “substanti v ely ” the same as the 3 T e xa s s ta tute. Al ame da v . S tat e , 235 S.W .3d 218, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

. The fe dera l c ounte rp art

to t he c on se nt e xce pti on is fo un d in 18 U. S.C. § 25 11 (2 )( d) (2 00 7) and state s th a t it

is not unlawful for

a per son not acting under c olor of law to inter cept a wire c ommunication where such per son is a party to the communication or whe re one of the pa rties to the communication has g ive n pr ior c on se nt t o s uc h in te rc e pti on un le ss s uc h c omm

un ic a tio n is int e rc e pte d f

or the purp os e of c omm itt ingany

c ri min a l a c t. 9 vicar ious-consent doctrine i n the contex t of the fe dera l wiretap statute. I n upholding the tr ial court’s 3 decision t hat t he parent had not violated the fede ral prohibition of wire tapping when she rec orded
conver sations betwee n her da ug hter a nd the plaintiff, the Pollock court he ld: [A] s long a s the guar dian has a good faith, objectively rea sonable ba sis for believing that it is necessar

y and in the best interest of the child to c onsent on behalf of his or her mi n o r c h il d to th e ta p in g o f te le p h o n e c o n v e r s a ti o n s , th e g u ar d ia n may v i ca ri o u s l y

co n s en to nb eh al f o f t h e c h i l d t o t h e r ec o rd i n g.
Id. at 610
. R ef

er encingvarious state a

nd fede ral c ases a ddressing the vicar ious-consent doc trine, the c ourt of c ri min a l a

pp e a ls r e c og nize d tha t the do c tr ine wa s n e c e ssa ry be c a us e c hil dr e n la c k b oth th e c a p a c it y to c o n s e n t a

n d th e a b il it y to g iv e a c tu a l c onsent. A lameda , 235 S.W .3d at 223. The
co u rt t h en adopted the Pollock court’s standa rd, re cog nizi ng the leg ality of a pa rent’s vic arious
c on se nt i f t

he pa re nt ha d an “ ob

je c tiv e ly re a so na

ble , g oo d- fa ith be lie f that c on se nti ngfo r t he c hil d was in the c hild’s best interest.” Id . The c ourt then upheld the l ower court’s de termination based on the evidenc e at the suppr ession hear ing. Id
.

Appellant ac knowledg es that this case is “similar to the fac ts of Alameda .” B ut he argues that the tr i al co u rt err ed in admitting the e vidence beca use “a deter mination must be made as to whethe r an objectively rea sonable, g ood-fa ith be lief allows a pare nt or g uardia n to violate the10

privac y interests of the child.” He urg es there is nothing in the rec ord to de monstrat e t h at the Gar ners ha d a re asonable and objec tive belief that j u s t i fi ed their inter ception of the telephone
rec ording s and e- mail messag es. Unlike Alameda in w hic h th e de fe nd ant f ile d a mot ion

to s up pr e ss
and the c ourt of a pp e a ls v ie we d th e e vid e nc e in t he lig ht mos t fa

vo ra ble to t he tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g s, in this case ther e wa s no motion on t he issue. Dur ing Mr . Gar n er ’s testimony , appellant objec ted to t he a dmi ssi on

of the int e rc e pte d c omm

un ic a tio ns . The trial c ourt conduc ted a h ea ri n goutside the prese nce of the jury . Mr. Gar

ner testified. The trial court found that Mr. Gar ner had an objective, g ood faith basis for r ecor ding the
c a lls and state d on the re c or d the ba sis fo r his ru lin g : that a pp e lla nt i nd ic a te d th a t no pa

re nt c ou ld be pr e se nt a

t th e le sso ns , th a t a

pp e lla nt p ark e d h is t

ra ile r a wa y fr om e ve ryon e els e at the ho rs e sh ow s, and

tha t th e min or

T. G. wa s e ng a g ingin e xten de d te le ph on e c on ve rs a tio ns and e -m a il exchang es with appe llant, a 60-y ear -old man.

Although the chronolog y

of events is unclea

r, at or about the t ime T.G.’s guardia ns decide d to interce pt T.G.’s communications with a ppellant, there was testimony that they knew that app e lla

nt an d T.G . we re sp e nd ing tim e a lon e tog e the r at ho rs e sh ow s; a pp e lla nt p ark e d h is h or se tr a il e r in an is o late d lo c a ti o n b e h in d th e s h o w b ar n ; a p p e ll an t w an te d to g iv e T
. G
. riding lessons
a t hi s r e sid e nc e bu t on ly if Mr. Garn e r w a s n ot p re se nt; T. G. wa s sp e nd inga lot of tim e communicating with someone by telephone and e-mail; and appellant had bee n suspected of “being inv olv e d with ” ano the r min or fe ma le he me t a t a ho rs e sh ow . V ie wi ngthe e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t favor able to the trial court’ s rulings, w e hold that as a matter of la

w, the Ga rner s had a g ood faith,Th e jur y ins tr uc tio n d e nie d b y

the tr ia l c ourt

re a d a s f oll ow s: 4 No evidenc e obtained by

an off icer or other pe rson i n violation of any provisions of the Constitut ion or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constit ution or laws of the United States of Americ a, shall be admitted in evidence ag ainst the ac cused on the tr ial of any cri min a l c a se . I t is a vio la tio n o f T e xas l aw t o in te rc e pt, re c or d o r u se elec tronic communications of any kind, unless one of the pa rt i es t o the communication conse nts to the intercept or rec ording . There fore , if y ou believe, or have a rea sonable doubt, that the e vi d ence in this cause—consisting of interc epted telephone or

email communications, or the testimony perta ining to such interce pted or re corde d elec tronic communications—was obtained in violat ion of the law g overninginterce pt or rec ording of ele ctronic c ommunications, t h en and in such event, you shall disreg ard a ny such evide nce so obta ined.

11 ob je c tiv e ly re a so na

ble be lie f that int e rc e pti ng T. G. ’s te le ph on e c on ve rs a tio ns and e -m ail s w as in he r b e st i nte re st.

Be cause we hold that the tria l c ourt corr ectly deter mined that T.G.’s guardia ns had a g oo d f a ith , o b j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e be lie f t

hat in te rc e pti ngT. G. ’s te le ph on e c on ve rs a tio ns and e -m a ils was in her

best interest, we hold tha t t h e t ri al co u rt did not err in allowingthis evidence to be admitted over a

ppellant’s objec tion. W e over rule a ppellant’s third point of er ror. 2. Jury Inst

ruction Ap pe lla nt argue s in his fo ur

th po int of e rr or that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y de nyinghis reque st for an article 38.23(a) instruction r eg ardingthe leg ality of the interc eption of the a udio-taped
conver sat io n s . A p p e ll an t r e qu e s te d th a t b e c a u s e th e a u d io ta p e s w e r e p la

y e d to th e ju r y , th e jury should be able to deter

mine whether Mr. Gar

ner’ s decision to tape the conver sations was base d upon
a g oo d f a ith , o bje c tiv e ly

re a so na ble be lie f t

hat r e c or ding the c on ve rs a tio ns wa s in the c hil d’ s b e st int e re st. Ap pe lla

nt p ro ff e re d a jur y ins tr uc tio n th a t w a s d e nie d b y the tr ia l c ourt
. 412 Ar tic le 38 .2 3( a ) p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s: (a) No evidence obtaine d by an off icer or other pe rson in violation of any provisions of the Constitut ion or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constit ution or laws of the U nited States of Amer ica, sha ll be admitted in evidence ag ainst the acc used on the trial of

any criminal ca se. I n any case where the legal evide nce raises an issue hereunde r , the jury shall be instructed that if it believe s, or has a re asonable doubt, that the evidenc e wa s obtained in vi ol a tio n o f t

he pr ov isi on s o f t

his Ar tic le , th e n a

nd in s uc h e ve nt, the jur

y sh a ll disreg ard a

ny such evide nce so obta ined.
Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 38.23(a ) (empha sis a dded). The question, there fore , is whether the leg al evidenc e ra ises an issue as to wh ether the interc epted tele phone or e -mail communications wer e obtained in violation of law. Appe llant argues that, bec ause the re w ere disp u t ed fa cts reg arding wh e the r T .G .’ s g ua

rd ians ha d a re a so na

ble be lie f that the int e rc e pts we re in t he c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st,
an ar ticle 38.23(a ) instruction was r equire d to inform the jury of their rig ht to disre g ard the evidenc e of the fr uits of the interce ption if they found the belief unrea sonable. Be cause the disputed evidenc e does not raise a fact issue as to whether the g uardia

ns had a r easona

ble belief so as to war

rant the interce ptions, we conc lude that an a rticle 38.23(a ) instruction is not required. Se e Ma dd e n v . S tat e , No. PD-1243-05, 2007 Te x . Crim. App. L EXI S 1802, at *14-15 (Tex. Crim. App. De c. 19, 2007); Ga rza v . S

tat e , 126 S.W .3d 79, 84-85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“[A]n Art i cl e 3 8
. 2 3 instruction must be included in the jury char g e only

if there is a fac tual d i s p u te about how the e vidence was obtaine d.”).

The c ourt o f cr i m i n al appe als’ dec ision in Ma dd e n v . S tat e wa s a nn ounc e d s ho rt ly afte r brief ing in the instant c ase w as complet ed. I t is dispos itive of the issue her e. A de fenda nt’s13

rig ht to the submiss ion ofjury instructions under ar

ticle 38.23(a ) is limit ed to disputed issues of fa ct that are materia l to his c laim of a constitutional or statutory violation that wou l d re n d er ev idence inadmissible. See M

adden , 2007 Tex. C ri m . App. L EXI S 1802, at *14-15 (citing Pi e rc e v . S tat e , 32 S.W .3d 247, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (jury instruction can ope rate “only if there is a contested issue of fa ct about the obtaining of t h e ev idence . . . . There is no issue for the jury when the question is one of law only .”)) . There are three require ments that a def endant must meet be fore he is entitled to the submis sion of a jury instruction under a

rticle 38.23(a ): (1 ) Th e e vid e nc e he ard by the jur y mus t r a ise an is su e of

fa c t; (2) The e vidence on that fac t must be affirmatively contested; a

nd (3) That conte sted fac tual issue must be material to the law fulness of the challeng ed conduc t in obtaining the e vidence
. Id. at *15 (c iting 40 Ge org e E. Dix & Robert O. D awson, Texas Practice : Criminal Practice and Procedure § 4.194 (2d ed. 2001) ). In Madden , the cour t stated:
There must be a g enuine dispute a bout a mater ial fac t. I f t here is no disputed factua l issue, the leg ality

of the c onduct is deter

mined by the trial judg e alone , as a que stion of law. A nd if other f

acts, not in dispute, are sufficie nt to support the lawfulness of the cha lleng ed conduc t, then the disputed fac t issue is n o t s u b m itted to the jury beca use it is not material to the ultimate a dmissibi lity of the evidenc e. The disputed fa c t mu st b e an e sse nti a l on e in d e c idi ngthe lawf uln e ss o f t

he c ha lle ng e d c on du c t.
Id. (footnotes omitted). As in Madden , here there was no dispute as to how the ev i d en ce was ob ta ine d. Th e re we re a lso su ff ic ie nt fa c ts— a

pa rt fr om any dis pu te d on e s— to su pp or t th e lawf uln e ss of the c halleng ed conduc t. I n any event, the only deter mination to be made in this case was of a leg al14

nature . Appellant’s pr oposed i nstruction did not ask the jury to decide a

disputed issue of historical fac t. I t asked the jury

to decid e a que stion of law—whethe r the guardia ns had a r easona

ble, g ood faith belief

that the i nterc eptions wer e in the child’s best interest. The c ourt in Madden observe d that the term “ rea sonable suspicion” w as not t h e t y pe of suspicion, hunc h, or notion that an ordinar y person mig ht have. “ Rather, it is a leg al term of a rt.” Id. a t *2 0. Th e c ourt the n c on c lud e d th a t it is the job of

the tr ia l ju dg e to dec id e th e qu a lity and qu anti ty of fa c ts n e c e ssa

ry to e sta bli sh

“ re a so na ble su sp ic ion .” On ly

if the un de rl y ing fact s are di sp ute d d oe s th e jud g e a sk the jur y to decide whether

the ac tor’s belief

in those fac ts was re asonable
. Id. Thus, appellant’ s proposed instruction wa s defe ctive: it failed to identify a disputed fac t issue upon which the leg ality of the a cquisition of the interce ptions tu rn ed
. M oreove r, the
rea sonablene ss of the g uardia ns’ g ood faith belief was not a fac tual issue, but a leg al issue. The tria l
c ourt did no t e rr in re fu sin g a

pp e lla nt’ s re qu e ste d jur

y ins tr uc tio n. We o ve rr

ule a pp e lla nt’ s f ourt h point of err or.
3. Aut hentication Appellant complains in hi s fifth point of err or that the e -mail communications wer e imp ro pe rl y

a dmi tte d o ve r h is o bje c tio n b e c a us e the State fa ile d to a uth e nti c a te the e le c tr on ic
rec ording evidenc e. See Tex. R. Evi d. 901(a ) (“ re q u irement of a uthentication or identification as a condition pre cede nt to admissibili ty is satisfied by evidenc e suff

icient to support a finding that the
ma tte r i n q

ue sti on is wh a t its pro po ne nt cl a ims ” ). Ap pe lla nt obj e c te d to the a dmi ssi on of the e -m a ils on the g rounds that they wer e unlawfully obtained and that the State failed to c all as a w itness the pe rs on who act ually

ins ta lle d th e “ sp y

wa re ” on the c omp ute r a

nd pr int e d o ut t

he e -m a ils be c a

us e15

Mr. Gar ner a cknowledg ed that he knew little about computers. B ut appellant did not object to the
e-ma ils on the authentication g round, and he has there fore failed to pr eser ve this issue. See Te x. R. Ap p. P. 3 3. 1. Ev e n h a d a pp e lla nt p reserved this iss ue , T .G . te sti fi e d, ide nti fy ingthe e -m a il communications as fa ir and a ccur ate copies of actual e-ma ils she exchang ed with appe llant. She thus provided testimony

authenticating the e -mails. We overrule appellant’ s fifth point of err or.
Motion for New Trial

I n h is s ixth p oin t of

e rr or , a pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in fa ili ngto hold a hearing on his motion for ne w trial. Asser ting that ther e ar e fa cts outside the re cord r elating to h is c la im that th e tr ia l c ourt wa s re qu ir e d to add re ss in an e vid e nti ary

he ari ng , a

pp e lla nt s e e ks a
re m an d fo r s u ch a h ea ri n g. We revie w a trial court’ s ref usal to hold an evidentiar

y hear ing on a

motion for new trial for a n abuse of discretion. Se e W

all ac e v . S tat e , 106 S.W .3d 103, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Ma rti ne z v . S tat e , 74 S.W.3 d 19, 22 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ). A tri a l court a bu se s its d isc re tio n in denying a hear ing on a t i m ely

filed motion for newtrial if the motion raises a matter outside the
rec ord upon which r elief c ould be g rante d. W allace , 1 06 S.W. 3d

a t 10 8; Martinez , 74 S.W .3d at 22; Fl or es v . S

tat e , 18 S.W .3d 796, 798 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.). The rig ht to a hear ing o n a m o tion for new tr ial is not absolute. Ro ze ll v . S tat e , 17 6 S.W.3 d 228 , 2 30 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); Re y es v . S tat e , 84 9 S.W. 2d 81 2, 81 5- 16 (T e x. Cr im. App. 1993). As a p rer equisite to obtaining a hear ing on a

motion for new tria l, a def endant must support his m otion with an af fidavit showing the truth of the g rounds for attack. Martinez , 74 S.W. 3d a t 21. Ge ne ra lly , a tria l court sh ou ld hol d a hea ri ng if the mot ion

and a tta c he d a ff

ida vit16

raise matters not deter

minable from the r ecor d that could entitle the ac cu s ed t o re l ief. W allace , 106 S.W .3d at 108. To be suf ficient to entitle the defe ndant to a hea ring , the motion for new tr ial and supporting a ffidavit need not establish a prima fac ie case for a new trial; howeve r, the motion and aff idavit must reflec t that rea sonable g rounds exist for holding that such relief could be g rante d. Id
. Affida vits that are c onclusory

in nature and unsupported by fac ts are insuff

icient to put the trial court
on notice that rea sonable grounds for relief exist. J or da n v . S tat e , 8 83 S.W. 2d

66 4, 66 5 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1994). The purpose of the hea ring is to give the defe ndant an oppor tuni t y t o fu lly

develop the matters r aised in his motion that, if proved at a he aring , could entitle him to relief. W allace , 10 6 S. W.3 d at 10 8; Martinez , 74 S.W .3d at 21.

Ap pe ll ant rai sed t

he fo llo wi ngg ro un ds in h is m oti on fo r n e w tri a l and

a ff ida vit s supplied by appellant and his counsel: (1) that appellant did not consent to the dismissal of the juror; (2) that not all rec orded conversations wer e turned over to the de fense prior to trial; and (3) that trial counsel fai l ed t o interview two c hara cter witnesses prior to trial who w ould have attacked T .G.’s
cre dibilit y

and re putation for truthfulness. In the motion, appellant does not asse rt that these g rounds involve fac ts outside the record nor did he allege any fac ts which, if proven, would entitle him t o the relief reque sted. As to the first g round, t he trial court made finding s that the juror wa s disabled that
rema in unchalleng ed by

appellant. With reg ard to the sec ond g round, numerous c ommunications
wer e introduce d showing the nature of t he relationship betwee n appellant and T.G.; appe llant does not assert what information could be pr ovided to co n t ra d i ct t he evide nce introduc ed at tria l. The
c on ve rs a tio n b e tw e e n a

pp e lla nt a nd ano the r m an ref

e re nc e d in

the a ff ida vit wa s p ro vid e d to17

appellant dur ing disc overy ; its admission was discussed at t rial and the evidenc e wa s excluded by the trial cour

t. As to the third g round, appellant sug g ests that his counsel was ineffe ctive for failing to interview two possible impeac hment wi t n es s es. Ther e is discussion on the rec ord of the two witnesses who a

ppear on the State’s witness list but wer e not serve d with subpoenas. The parties discuss the possibili ty

of conta cting them for potential testimony but rea ch no conc lusion. Appellant’s motion for ne w trial and his af fidavit an d t h at o f his counsel we re not
su ff ic ie nt t o p ut t

he tr ia l ju dg e on

no tic e tha

t r e a so na ble g ro un ds e xiste d f

or ho ldi ng that re lie f c ou ld be g ra nte d. B e c a

us e the mot ion and

a ff ida vit s a re c on c lus or

y , a lle g e ins uf

fi c ie nt f a c ts, and fa il t o alleg e matter s outside the rec ord upon which re lief ca n be g rante d, the trial cour t did not err in fa iling to hold a hear ing on the motion. W e over rule a ppellant’s six th point of error
. CO NC LU SION Having overr

uled appellant’ s points of err or, we a ffirm the judg ment of convic tion.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: January

30, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh