*Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 96-30515

SUMMARY CALENDAR

CHARLES W. CLARKE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

RICHARD L. STALDER, Secretary at Dep’t of Corrections; ED DAY,

Warden at Washington Correctional Institute; JIMMY MILLER, Asst.

Warden, Washington Correctional Institute; CRAIG THOMAS, Washington

Correctional Institute; MAJOR DUNAWAY, Washington Correctional

Institute; JUDITH RABORN, formerly known as Judith Phelps,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of Louisiana

(95-CV-2644)

November 26, 1996

Before WISDOM, KING, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:*

The plaintiff, Charles W. Clarke, challenges the district

court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants and dismissal
1 Weyant v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 917 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir.

1990).

2

of his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This court reviews a

district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.

1

The plaintiff asserts two claims in the present case. First,

he maintains that he was denied procedural due process because,

during a discliplinary hearing, prison officials relied on

unreliable drug test evidence and did not allow the plaintiff to be

retested. This denial, he asserts, caused him to be transferred to

a working cell block, deprived him of his trusty status, and

deprived him of his job placement. Second, the plaintiff asserts

that, contrary to his experience, two similarly situated inmates

were allowed to take retests. The plaintiff asserts that this

action denied him equal protection under the law, in contravention

of the fourteenth amendment.

A. Due Process

In order to state a claim under § 1983 for violation of the
2 Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1435 (5th. Cir.

1990)(internal citations omitted).

3 515 U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995).

4 Id. at 115 S.Ct. at 2300.

3

due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, a litigant must

show that he has “asserted a recognized ‘liberty or property’

interest within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that

he was intentionally or recklessly deprived of that interest, even

temporarily, under color of state law”.2 In analyzing an alleged

due process violation in a prison context, this court is guided by

the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sandin v. Conner.3 There,

the Court held that a prisoner’s liberty interest is “generally

limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the

sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection

by the due process clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life”.4 Sandin determined that

administrative confinement standing alone did not present an
5 Id. at 2301.

6 See Bulger v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 49 (5th Cir.

1995) (“prison classification and eligibility for rehabilitation

programs are not directly subject to ‘due process’ protections”)

7 See Sandin, 515 U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 2301.

4

"atypical, significant deprivation" which gives rise to a protected

liberty interest.5

In the light of Sandin, the fact that Clarke was placed in

administrative segregation does not entitle him to procedural due

process safeguards. Similarly, his assignment to a working cell

block and loss of a job assignment fall within the expected

parameters of his sentence and do not present the type of atypical,

significant deprivation addressed in Sandin.6 To the extent that

the plaintiff alleges that his disciplinary record will affect his

parole consideration, this allegation is too attenuated to

establish a liberty interest.7 

B. Equal Protection

The plaintiff asserts that other inmates similarly situated
8 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (1982)

(applying ‘strict scrutiny’).

9 Id. at 218, 102 S.Ct 2382.

10 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S.

540, 547, 103 S.Ct. 1997 (1983).

11 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382.

12 See Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 580 (5th Cir. 1995).

5

were retested, while the plaintiff was denied such a retest.

Aside from classifications that disadvantage a “suspect

class”,8 or a quasi-suspect class,9 equal protection claims are

analyzed under the rationality test.10 Under the rationality test,

the state action need bear only a rational relationship to a

legitimate state interest to be sustained.11

The defendants do not dispute that the other inmates were

retested. They assert, however, that only inmates whose initial

results were inconclusive receive a retest. Although the plaintiff

asserts that no inconclusive reading is possible, he has failed to

substantiate this claim. Similarly, the plaintiff has offered no

proof of discriminatory intent on the part of prison officials.12
6

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s equal protection argument fails.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is AFFIRMED.