C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS

YAGHO UB “JACOB” KO HANNI M, Ap pe lla nt,
v.
PARVANEH KAT OL I , Appellee
. § § § § § § No . 0 8- 11 -0 01 55 -C V

Appea l from the 236th J udicial District Court of Ta rr ant C ounty , T e xas (TC# 236-217944-06)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION ON M OTI ON Pending be fore the Court is Appellant’s motion to review a trial court’ s ruling r eg arding
su sp e ns ion

of a jud g me nt p e nd inga

pp e a l. Appellee sued Appe llant and 360 Center, L .L .C. (the company ). On F ebrua

ry 16, 2011, the cour t signe d the final judg ment in the suit. The judgme nt states that Appellant def raude d Appellee and that but for A ppellant’s wr ong ful ac ts and omissions, t he value of Appe llee’s portion of the compa

ny ’s assets would have bee n $418,761.06 more. The court ther efor e
awa rd e d App e lle e $4 18 ,7 61 .0 6 in c omp e ns ator

y dama g e s f

ro m App e lla

nt. Th e c ourt

a lso order ed Appe llant to pay

Appellee $150,000 in punitive damag es and $165,533.93 in attorney ’s fee s for ser

vices re ndere d throug h the end of trial. The c ourt g ave A

ppellant a c redit re g arding the damag e aw ards f

or $2,400, a sum which he had pre viously deposited into the trust acc ount of Appellee ’s attorne y s. The judg ment bear s interest at the r ate of 5% per y ear . The c ourt deter

mined that the company

had $1,445,969.26 in assets, c onsisting of $1,393,469.26 in cash he ld by a re ceive r and a

“re nt judgment” in the amount of $52,500.The pa rties agree that the re ceive r wa s authorized to deduct a por tion of his fee f

rom 1 Ap pe lla nt’ s a llo c atio n. As a

re su lt, le ss t

ha n $ 72 2, 98 4. 63 wa s d e po sit e d f or Ap pe lla nt’ s b e ne fi t. -2- Appellant and A

ppellee e ach ha

ve a 50% benef

icial intere st in the company ’s assets, amounting to $722,984.63 eac h. In acc ordanc e with their be nefic ial interests, the c ourt “a llocated a nd partitioned” the assets equa lly , g iving e ach pa rty $722,984.63. Appellant is to rec eive his entire interest in ca sh, where as Appe llee is to rec eive $670,484.63 in ca sh and the $52,500 re nt judgme nt. The cour

t ordere d the re ceive r to transfe r the re nt judgment to Appe llee “immediately” and to de posit $670,484.63 int o the re g istry of the c ourt “to the be nefit of [Ap pe lle e ] re fe re nc ingthi s F ina l Judg me nt.
. . .” Th e c ourt fu rt he r o rd e re d th e re c e ive r t o de po sit the re c e ive rs hip ’s re ma ini ngfu nd s into t he re g istry

“ to t he be ne fi t of

[Ap pe lla nt] ref ere ncingthis Final J udg ment.” Immediately following these provisions, the judg ment states that the funds in the cour

t reg istry “shall be he ld in the Court Registry pendingsubsequent distribution as contemplated her ein.” In acc ordanc e with these pr ovisions, the rece iver de posited a total of $1,390,544.51 into the cour t reg istry —$670,484.63 for Appe llee’s be nefit and $7 20 ,0 59 .8 8 f

or Ap pe lla nt’ s b e ne fi t. 1 Appellant appe aled a

nd, on Marc h 15, 2011, filed a notice of deposit in lieu of superse deas bond, statinghis intent to supersede the judg ment with the $720,059.88 that the
rec eiver had deposited f

or his benef

it into t he cour

t reg istry . On April 19, 2011, Appe llee filed a motion for rele ase of

funds, see king to obtain the e ntire $1,390,544.51 that the re ceive r had deposited into the court’ s reg istry . She asser ted that the fina l judgment e ffe ctively awa rded the
e nti re sum to he r. In r e sp on se , App e lla nt a rgue d th at th e jud g me nt h a d b e e n s up e rs e de d b y his notice of de posit in l ieu of super sedea s bond. Howeve r, Appe llant stated that he would have noThe trial c ourt made its ora l ruling on a Fr iday afte rnoon and state d that a wr itten order 2 wo uld be signe d b y

the e nd of the da y on the fo llo wi ngMo nd ay . App e lla nt f ile d h is m oti on s in thi s Co ur t th at Mo nd ay . A lth ou g h w e g ra nte d th e sta

y that da y wi tho ut f ir st o bta ini nga

re sp on se fr om A pp e lle e , o ur

or de r a llo we d App e lle e to f ile a su bs e qu e nt r e sp on se sh ow ingg ro un ds to dis so lve the sta

y . A lth ou g h App e lle e fi le d a c omb ine d r e sp on se to b oth mot ion s, the re sp on se did not show gr ounds for dissolving the stay . We have c onsidered a ll of the brief ing submitted by the pa rt ie s r e g ard ingbo th m oti on s. -3- ob je c tio n to the re le a se of

the $6 70 ,4 84 .6 3 d e po sit e d f or Ap pe lle e ’s be ne fi t. The c ourt held two hea

ring s on Appellee ’s motion, but took no evidence. At the se cond he ari ng , th e c ourt

ma de an o ra l r

uli ngthat th e e nti re $1 ,3 90 ,5 44 .5 1 w ou ld b e imm e diate ly
re le a se d to Ap pe lle e , b ut t he c ourt de lay e d s ig nin gan o rd e r t o th at e ff e c t so that App e lla

nt c ou ld seek r elief f

rom this Court. Appellant then filed a motion for a n emer g ency

stay of the trial
c ourt ’s ru lin gand

a mot ion to r e vie w t

he ru lin g . We g ra

nte d th e sta

y , a llo wi ngthe tr ia l c ourt to sign a written orde r re flec ting its oral r uling, but providingthat the orde r would be stayed imm e diate ly

up on signin g . T he tr ia l c ourt

su bs e qu e ntl y

signe d a n o rd e r f or re le a se of

fu nd s, direc ting the district c lerk to conve y all of the funds to Appe llee. The motion to review the ruling is now ripe for

considera

tion. 2 A j ud g me nt d e bto r i s g e ne ra lly e nti tle d to su

pe rs e de the jud g me nt p e nd inga pp e a l, there by defe rringpay

ment until the appeal is dec ided. See M iga v. Je nsen , 299 S.W .3d 98, 100 (T e x. 20 09 ); se e als o T EX .R.A PP .P. 24.1(a). To supe rsede the judg ment, the judg ment debtor may file a bond or , in lieu of bond, may deposit money

with the trial court c lerk. See T EX .R.A PP .P. 24.1(a)( 2), (3) . The amount of the bond or deposit depe nds on the ty pe of judgme nt. For a

money judgme nt, the bond or deposit “must equa l the sum of compensatory dama g e s awa

rd e d in the jud g me nt, int e re st f

or the e sti mate d d

ur atio n o f t

he a pp e a l, a nd c os ts
awa rded in the judg ment.” T EX .R.A PP .P. 24.2(a)( 1). When the judg ment is for the re cover y of-4-

an inte re st i n p e rs on a l pr op e rt y , th e tr ia l c ourt

wi ll d e te rm ine the amou

nt o f t he bo nd or de po sit , but at a minimum the amount mustequal the va lue of the pr operty interest as of

the date of

the judgme nt. T EX .R.A PP .P. 24.2(a)( 2)(B ). We revie w a tria l court’s rulingreg ardingthe sufficie ncy

of super sedea s for a

buse of discr etion. FaulknerUSA , LP v. Alaron Supply Co., Inc. , 301 S.W .3d 345, 347 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2009, no pet.)
. Ap pe lla nt a rgue s th at hi s n oti c e of

de po sit in l ie u o f s up e rs e de a s b on d e ff e c tiv e ly adopted, a s a ca sh deposit, the $720,059.88 that the re ceive r deposited into the cour t reg istry for his benefit. Appe llee does not dispute that it is possibl e for a judg ment debtor to super sede a judgme nt by

adoptingfunds alre ady

held in the cour

t reg istry for the de btor’s bene fit. Se e In re Levitas , No. 13-10-00345- CV, 2010 WL2968189, at *3 (Te x .App.--Corpus Christi J uly 27, 2010, orig . proce eding )(mem. op.) . She argues, howe ver, that Appellant could not superse de the judgme nt in this fashion bec ause the $720,059.88 has neve r belong ed to him. See I n re Rome ro, Gonzalez &Benav ides, L.L.P. , 2 9 3 S
. W
. 3 d 6 6 2 , 6 6 3 -6 4 (T ex . Ap p . -- S an An t o n i o 2 0 0 9 , o ri g. proce eding )(indicating that a n appellant c ould not supersede the judg ment with funds in the court reg istry that had not bee n awa

rded to him). In Appellee ’s view, the f

inal judgme nt, when re ad in its entirety , eff ectively awa rded nothing to Appe llant. Although Appe llee ac knowledg es that the fina l judgment a llocated $722,984.63 to Appellant when it par titioned the company ’s assets, she c ontends that the judgme nt “ef

fec tively eliminated the funds pr eviously allocate d to” Appellant whe n it awar ded her da mag es (both compe nsatory and punitive) a

nd attorney ’s fe es ag ainst Appellant. Appe llee emphasizes that the final judg ment states that the funds we re to be deposited into the court
re g istry , “ pe nd ingsu

bs e qu e nt d istri butio n a s c on te mpl ate d h e re in. ” She se e ms t o inte rp re t th is-5-

languag e as me aningthat the funds alloca ted to Appellant we re to be used to pay the damag es
and atto rn e y ’s fe e s. Whether a judg ment is ambiguous is a que stion of law. Shanks v. Treadway , 110 S.W .3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2003). A judg ment should be construe d as a whole to harmonize and g ive ef fec t to the entire instrument. Id . I f the judg ment is unambiguous, the c ourt must give e ffe ct to the literal languag e used. Id . I f the judg ment is ambiguous, the c ourt should reviewthe re cord a long with the judgme nt to determine its meaning
. Id
. Nothing in the f

inal judgme nt supports Appellee’ s interpre tation. The judg ment

“ a llo c ate d a

nd pa rt iti on e d” the c omp any ’s a sse ts b e tw e e n App e lla nt a nd Ap pe lle e and

e xpre ssl y order s that cer

tain rec eiver ship funds be deposited into the cour t reg istry “to Appellant’ s benef

it.” The judg ment does not state that this sum is t o be used to off set Appellant’s liability

for damag es and attorne y ’s fe es. At no point does the judg ment even r equire Appellant to pay Appellee for he r s ha re of the a sse ts. Ins te a d, the jud g me nt e xpre ssl y or de rs there c e iv e r to transfe r the re nt j u d g m e n tt o Ap p e l l e e a

n d t o d e p o s i tth e c a s hi n t o th e c o urt r e g i s tr y f o r th e b e n e f i to f e a c hp arty. We conclude that Appellant could desig nate the f unds repr esentinghis share of the company ’s assets a s a deposit in lieu of super sedea s bond. Appellee sug g ests that even if the Appellant could a dopt his share of the company ’s asset a s a ca sh deposit, enforc ement of the judgme nt stil l was not suspended be cause $720,059.88 is insufficient to superse de the judg ment. We disag ree with this sugg estion. First, a bond or

deposit is not rendere d invalid beca use it is too sm all. See D elhi Gas Pi pe lin e Cor

p. v . H as se ll , 730 S.W .2d 159, 161 (Tex.App.--Ty ler 1987, no wr it). I f Appe llee believed the amount was insuffic ient, she could have aske d the trial cour t to increa se the amount-6-

of sec urity
. SeeT EX .R.A PP .P. 24.3(a). Enf orce ment of the judg ment should have be en suspended upon the f

iling of the notice of de posit in l ieu of super sedea s. See T EX .R.A PP .P. 24.1(f)
. Se c on d, un de r t

he un iqu e fa c ts o f t

his c a se , w e c on c lud e that th e amou nt o f t he de po sit

is sufficie nt. I t is undisput ed that the c ourt’s aw ard of $418,761.06 in damag es is a money judgme nt within the meaningof Rule 24.2(a )(1) . Appellant does not dispute that the $165,533.93 attorney ’s fe e aw ard should be inc luded within the amount that must be supersede d. See Clearv iew Props., L.P. v. Prop. Tex. SC One Corp. , 228 S.W .3d 262, 264 (Tex.App.-- Houston [14t h Dist.] 2007, no pet.)(pe r cur iam order)(upholdingorder requiringattorney ’s fe e
awa rd to b e su pe rs e de d p art ly

be c a us e the pa rt ie s’ c on tr a c t pr ov ide d th at atto rn e y ’s fe e s w ou ld constitute compensation). Bu t se e Po pCa p G am es, In c . v . M

um boJ um bo , LLC , 317 S.W .3d 913, 914 (Tex.App.--Da llas 2010, no pet.)(holding , in a contra ct ac tion, that attorney ’s fe es nee d not be super seded be cause the par ties’ contra ct did not specify that such fe es would be a n element of
c omp e ns atio n f

or a br e a c h) ; Shook v. W

alden , 304 S.W .3d 910, 913 (Tex.App.--Austin 2010, no pet.)(sa me). Althoug h the par

ties also ag ree that interest should be c alculate d at 5% pe r y ear for one y ear , they

disag ree as to whethe r intere st should be calculated on the attorne y ’s fe e aw ard. For purposes of a

rgument, we will adopt Appe llee’s c alculations and inc lude intere st on the
atto rn e y ’s fe e awa

rd . T hu s, the amou

nt r e qu ir e d to su

pe rs e de the mon e y

jud g me nt i s $610,989.74, which is less than the $720,059.88 that Appe llant effe ctively deposited into the
c o urtr e g i s tr

y. Howeve r, Appe llee asse rts that Appellant wa s also require d to supersede the portion of the judg ment that allocate d half of the company ’s assets to her . She char acte rizes this portion of-7-

the judg ment as a judg ment for pe rsonal prope rty . Since its value wa s $722,984.63, Appellant’s deposit would be insufficie nt if he we re r equire d to supersede this portion of the judgme nt. But Ap pe lla nt h a s d isc la ime d a

ny int e nt t o a

pp e a l th is p or

tio n o f t he jud g me nt a

nd he ha s a g re e d to let Appellee rec over this portion of the judg ment immediately . We theref ore c onclude that Appellant is not require d to post security reg ardingthis portion of the judgme nt. See M udd v. Mudd , 665 S.W .2d 128, 129-30 (Te x .App.--San Antonio 1983, no writ)(allowingjudgme nt debtor to super sede two distinct portions of a judg ment). Bu t se e Ha ne yEle c . Co . v . H

ur st , 608 S.W .2d 355, 356 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1980, no wr it)(holding that a money judgme nt cannot be partially superse ded). Al tho ug h th is m e tho d o f s up e rs e din gthe jud g me nt m ay be unus ua l, i t is imp or

tant t o n ote that Appellee is not being de prived of a ny secur ity to which she is entitled. Fr om the judgme nt
cre ditor’s perspe ctive, the pur pose of supe rsede as is to ensure that the judgme nt can be collecte d if it is affirmed on a

ppeal. Fa ulk

ne rU SA , LP , 3 01 S.W. 3d

at 34 7. He re , App e lle e wi ll immediately

rec eive what she cha

rac terizes as the pe rsonal prope rty judgme nt, consisting of the $5 2, 50 0 r e nt j ud g me nt a

nd $6 70 ,4 84 .6 3 f

ro m th e c ourt

re g ist ry . A s f or the mon e y

jud g me nt, construingthe fa cts and lawmost favora bly to Appellee, A

ppellant was r equire d to deposit funds
e qu a lin gthe c omp e ns ator y dama g e s p lus atto rn e y ’s fe e s thro ug h th e e nd of tr ia l and 5% int e re st on both the compensatory damag es and attorney ’s fe es for one y ear . Under

Appellee ’s own calc ulations, this t otals only $610,989.74. Thus, the money judgme nt is more than fully secur ed b y th e $ 7 2 0 , 0 5 9
. 8 8 , w h i c hi s s a f e l y e n s c o n c e d

i nth e c o urtr e g i s tr

y. Appellant’s motion for r eview of the trial cour

t’s ruling reg ardingsuperse deas is g rante d. Th e tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r f

or re le a se of

fu nd s is re fo rm e d to a llo w the re le a se of on ly the fu nd s h e ld-8-

in the court re g istry

for Appe llee’s be nefit. Enfor ceme nt of the monetar y portion of the judg ment is s us pe nd e d p e nd ing

a pp e a l.

J une 29, 2011 DAVI D WEL L I NGTONCHEW, C hief Just ice B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l ur e , a n d R i v e r a , JJ.