Page 4

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110347, *

be productive[,]" "[bJut there is also.the danger
of duplication, a-waste of resources which is
difficult to measure." Coulter v. Tennessee, 805
F.2d 146, 152 (6th Cir. 1986). [*8] This Court
engaged in a painstaking review of every hour
claimed by every staff member in this case and
has, where possible, cut specific hours that it
finds to have been duplicative or otherwise un-
reasonable. See Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 611
F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 1980), overruled on
other grounds (noting that "[h]ours may be cut"
"for duplication" and "padding"); Roland vy.
Johnson, No. 91-1460, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
22047, 1992 WL 214441, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept.
4, 1992) (affirming district court's exclusion of
duplicative time spent by second attorney on
case).

3 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ fee
petition should be denied due to the ex-
cessive hours claimed. (Defs.' Resp. at
6-11). Defendants rely for this proposi-
tion on a case in which a plaintiffs fee
petition exaggerated hours expended by
eight times. (/d. at 7 (citing Brown v.
Stackler, 460 F. Supp. 446 (N.D. Il.
1978))). This Court does not find Brown
applicable and concludes that it would be
inappropriate to deny Plaintiffs a fee
award.

To this end, this Court excludes all time
billed by Kathleen Kalahar as it finds it unrea-
sonable for Plaintiffs' counsel to have consulted
with an additional attorney given the amount of
time already being expended [*9] by lead
counsel and their associates on this case. ‘ The
Court also excludes all time spent by Matthew
Vasconsellos as it finds it unreasonable for
Plaintiffs’ counsel to have hired an additional
attorney to work on tasks such as Plaintiffs’
motion for sanctions and Plaintiffs’ response to
Defendants' summary judgment motion when
Julie Hurwitz and Kathryn James also spent a
tremendous amount of time on these pleadings.
> This Court also excludes all time billed by law
student Caryn Smith, the bulk of which was

spent drafting Plaintiffs' fee petition. This is
because the Court finds the approximately 50
hours spent by Ms. Hurwitz drafting the fee
petition to be more than adequate. (Pls.' Pet.,
Ex. 9). * The Court also finds the time spent by
paralegal Kara Sullivan typing handwritten
time records and corresponding with attorneys
about the fee petition to be unreasonable. The
Court excludes these hours but will award fees
for half of the time Ms. Sullivan spent compil-
ing the costs incurred by Plaintiffs' counsel in
this case. This Court also finds the hours billed
by law student Melanie Elturk to be excessive
for the tasks performed and has excluded
two-thirds of her claimed time.’ [*10] Finally,
this Court finds the time spent by Mr. Benchich
creating a Powerpoint presentation and provid-
ing technical assistance at trial to be excessive
and awards Plaintiffs for half of his total time. *

4 It is also the case that Ms. Kalahar's
tasks were all ones for which other at-
torneys at Ms. Hurwitz's firm also billed
substantial time.

5 This Court understands that Ms.
James was out of the office during Mr.
Vasconsellos' tenure, but notes that Ms.
James spent more than sufficient time on
these tasks upon her return.

6 Plaintiffs are correct that "time spent
in preparing . . . attorney fees applica-
tions is compensable." Coulter, 805 F.2d
at 151. That time, however, must be rea-
sonable.

7 For example, Ms. Elturk billed ap-
proximately 38 hours for drafting a
memo on prejudgment interest. (Pls.'
Pet., Ex. 9).

8 Plaintiffs request fees for Greg An-
gello and Jacob Lehman but do not in-
clude corresponding itemized time
records. (Pls.' Pet., Ex. 9 at 101-02). For
this reason, this Court does not award
fees for these individuals’ time.

In addition to general overstaffing of this
litigation, Plaintiffs’ counsel also spent exces-



Page 9

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110347, *

ent claim[] for relief" than Plaintiffs’ claims
against individual officers, "based on different
facts and legal theories." Hensley, 461 U.S. at
434. A finding of municipal liability in this
case required the existence of a policy or cus-
tom with respect to supervising, training, and
overseeing officers and was wholly distinct
from the proof that led to jury verdicts against
individual officers for their treatment of Plain-
tiffs. “ For this reason, the Court excludes the
time spent by Plaintiffs on their munici-
pal-liability claim. *

14 This is to be distinguished from
cases in which plaintiffs have sued under
related theories of employment discrimi-
nation (see e.g. Thurman v. Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1169-70
(6th Cir. 1996); [*19] Lilley v. BTM
Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 756 (6th Cir.
1992)), or cases in which plaintiffs have
brought the same exact claims against
municipal and individual defendants (see,
e.g., Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d
517, 532 (6th Cir. 1994)).

15 Plaintiffs identified the hours spent
exclusively on their claims against the
City of Detroit. (Pls.’ Reply, Docket Text
# 216-6). Based on these figures, this
Court excludes 95.35 hours from Ms.
Hurwitz's time, 228.75 hours from Ms.
James' time, 18.75 hours from Mr. Gant's
time, and 4 hours from Ms. Elturk's time.
The Court makes this reduction from Ms.
James' law-associate hours rather than
her law-student hours since the bulk of
time spent on this claim seems to have
been after August 2007.

2. Unsuccessful Related Claims

Defendants seem to suggest that Plaintiffs’
fee award should be further reduced because
Plaintiffs did not prevail on every claim against
every individual officer (Defs.' Resp. at 16).
Three officers were dismissed prior to trial and
a fourth was found not to be liable by the jury.

The Court also dismissed as a matter of law
several claims against the remaining three of-
ficers.

Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual of-
ficers [*20] were related claims, based on a
common core of facts or legal theories. As
such, a different legal standard applies to these
unsuccessful claims than applies to Plaintiff's
unsuccessful, unrelated claim against the City
of Detroit. It is true that the Supreme Court has
instructed that "even where the plaintiff's [suc-
cessful and unsuccessful] claims were interre-
lated," if "a plaintiff has achieved only partial
or limited success," "the product of hours rea-
sonably expended on the litigation as a whole
times a reasonable hourly rate may be an ex-
cessive amount." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. But
where, as in this case, "commonality is present"
between the unsuccessful and successful claims
against individual officers and "a plaintiff has
obtained excellent results" on these claims
overall, a "fee award should not be reduced
because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every
contention raised." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435;
Phelan v. Bell, 8 F.3d 369, 374 (6th Cir. 1993).

The Court finds the lodestar, as adjusted for
the unsuccessful, unrelated municipal-liability
claim, to be reasonable given Plaintiffs’ overall
success against the individual officers. That
some of the Plaintiffs' related claims [*21]
against some of the officers were ultimately
unsuccessful does not necessitate a further re-
duction of the lodestar. See City of Riverside v.
Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 570-71, 106 S. Ct. 2686,
91 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1986) (refusing to adjust fee
award downward because Plaintiff did not ul-
timately prevail against all individual defen-
dant-officers since "all claims were based on a
common core of facts"); Thurman, 90 F.3d at
1169-70 (denying defendant's request for fur-
ther reduction of lodestar to reflect plaintiff's
limited success on related  employ-
ment-discrimination claims).

3. Proposed Fee Enhancement



Page 6
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110347, *

attendance at depositions 3
Percent Reduction for Overbilling 25%
Total Reasonable Hours as Student 101.70
Total Reasonable Hours as Assoc. 719.44
Gary Gant I [
Claimed Hours 547.95
Hours Subtracted attendance at depositions 23
excessive hours on 8/2/06 3
excessive hours on 8/3/06 15
excessive hours on 8/7/06 3.5
excessive hours on 8/8/06 1.75
excessive hours on 8/10/06 7
excessive hours on 8/11/06 3
excessive hours on 8/14/06 7
excessive hours on 8/15/06 7
excessive hours on 8/16/06 7
excessive hours on 4/16/07 2
excessive hours on 4/18/07 15
excessive hours on 4/19/07 2
excessive hours on 4/20/07 2.5
excessive hours on 4/23/07 45
excessive hours on 4/27/07 3
excessive hours on 4/29/07 3.5
excessive hours on 6/25/07 4
Total Reasonable Hours 461.2
Kara Sullivan l I
Claimed Hours 43.45
Hours Subtracted e-mailing attorneys re: fees 6.45
typing handwritten fee records 315
half time spent compiling costs 2.25
Total Reasonable Hours 3.25
Alan Benchich
Claimed Hours 101.3
Hours Subtracted half total time 50.65
Total Reasonable Hours 50.65
Maureen Kalahar
Claimed Hours 5
Total Reasonable Hours 5
Bob Ingalls
Claimed Hours: 2.5
Total Reasonable Hours 25
Melanie Elturk
Claimed Hours 198.8
Hours Subtracted two-thirds of total time 132.53
Total Reasonable Hours 66.27
Plaintiff Urquhart
Thomas Loeb



Page 5

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110347, *

sive time on specific tasks. In the case of Mr.
Gant, this Court was able [*11] to identify
each excessive billing record and reduce it to a
reasonable amount of time. (See Table 1). This
Court found, however, that the billing of exces-
sive time for particular tasks was a pervasive
problem for Ms. Hurwitz and Ms. James. For
example, they billed approximately: (1) 175.6
and 145.6 hours, respectively, for the drafting
of a response to a motion for summary judg-
ment; (2) 157.55 and 85.2 hours, respectively,
for trial preparation; and (3) 76.15 and 100.5
hours respectively for the drafting of a response
to a motion for a new trial. (Pls.' Pet., Ex. 9).
Due to the difficulty of adjusting more than a
hundred pages of individual billing entries to
determine their reasonable hours, this Court
reduces Ms. Hurwitz's and Ms. James' claimed
hours by 25 percent. See Northcross, 611 F.2d
at 636-637 (noting that "in complicated cases,
involving many lawyers" "simply deducting a
small percentage of the total hours to eliminate
duplication of services" "seems preferable to an
attempt to pick out, here and there, the hours
which were duplicative"); Coulter, 805 F.2d at
152 ("Where duplication of effort is a serious
problem, . . . the District Court may have to
make across the board [*12] reductions . . .");
' Louisville Black Police Officers Org. v. Louis-

ville, 700. F.2d 268, 272 (6th Cir. 1983) (same).

9 Before taking the twenty-five percent
reduction, this Court does exclude as un-
reasonable the ten hours that Ms. Hur-
witz bills on July 23, 2007 for "e-mail
correspondence." (Pls.' Pet., Ex. 9 at 28).
The Court also subtracts the 14 hours that
Plaintiffs' counsel identified at oral ar-
gument as having been erroneously
billed.

This Court is also disallowing time spent by
all staff that it finds to have been unreasonable.
This includes time billed by staff for attending
depositions, with the exception of the deposing
counsel and lead counsel for each Plaintiff. See
E.E.O.C. v. E.J. Sacco, 102 F. Supp. 2d 413,
420-21 (E.D. Mich 2000) (noting that "an op-
posing party should only be charged for the
cost of the essential participating attorney" at a
deposition). This also includes time spent call-
ing Judges’ chambers because it was this
Court's experience that these calls were unne-
cessary and needlessly time-consuming. This
Court is also only awarding counsel for half of
the time spent working with a jury consultant.
A breakdown of the reasonable hours expended
by each staff member [*13] in this litigation is
as follows:

Table 1

Plaintiff Sykes

Julie Hurwitz

Claimed Hours 1615.1

Hours Subtracted calls to court clerk 0.75
e-mailing on 7/23/07 10
erroneous hours 14

Percent Reduction for Overbilling 25%

Total Reasonable Hours 1192.76

Kathryn James |

Claimed Hours, 1099.85

Hours as Law Student 135.6

Hours as Law Associate 964.25

Hours Subtracted from Assoc. calls to court clerk 1.25

half of jury consultant time 0.75



Page 8

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110347, *

Thomas Loeb 663.1 250 165775
Kim Cochrane 61.55 100 6155
Total Lodestar: 171930

10 The Sixth Circuit has approved the
use of the State Bar of Michigan surveys
in calculating prevailing rates. See, e.g.
Lamar Adver. Co. v. Charter Twp., 178
Fed. Appx. 498, 2006 WL 1133309, at
*2-3 (2006); Auto Alliance Int'l, Inc. v.
U.S. Customs Serv., 155 Fed. Appx. 226,
2005 WL 2149673, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov.
23, 2005).

11 The [*16] 2003 Economics of Law
Practice Survey lists a median hourly
billing rate of $ 210 for attorneys in
downtown Detroit and $ 175 for those in
the remainder of Southeast Michigan.
2003 Economics of Law Practice Survey
at 26. The 2007 online version of the
survey, which reports data differently,
states that the median hourly billing rate
for litigation firms in Michigan is $ 195.
2007 Economics of Law Practice Survey.
12 According to the 2003 Survey, for
example, the median hourly rate for pa-
ralegals in downtown Detroit with at
least 10 years of experience is $ 80.
Economics of Law Practice Survey at 26.
The 2007 version states that the median
hourly billing rate for paralegals
throughout Michigan is $ 75. 2007 Eco-
nomics of Law Practice Survey.

13 Plaintiffs have requested an hourly
rate of $ 150 for Ms. James. This rate is
only appropriate for hours billed after she
became an associate in August of 2007.
(Pls.' Pet. at 12). The reasonable rate for
her work when she was a law student is $
75 an hour.

C. Adjusting the Lodestar

Calculation of the lodestar "does not end
the inquiry." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. This

Court must next determine whether it is appro-
priate "to [*17] adjust the fee upward or
downward" to reflect factors such as "the re-
sults obtained" in the case. Id. (citing Johnson
v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714
(Sth Cir. 1974)); see also id. at 438 (noting that
district courts must "consider the relationship
between the extent of [a plaintiff's] success and
the amount of the fee award"). Plaintiffs argue
that not only are they entitled to compensation
for hours spent pursuing ultimately unsuccess-
ful claims but that their fees should be adjusted
upward to reflect their "exceptional success" in
the case. (Pls.' Pet. at 19-24). Defendants object
to both claims. (Defs.' Resp. at 16-18).

1. Unrelated Unsuccessful Claims

If a plaintiff "fail[s] to prevail on claims
that were unrelated to the claims on which he
succeeded," "the hours spent on the unsuccess-
ful claim should be excluded in considering the
amount of a reasonable fee." Hensley, 461 U.S.
at 434, 440. "[S]uccessful and unsuccessful
claims are deemed related when they 'involve a
common core of facts,’ 'are based on related
legal theories,’ or when counsel's time is
‘devoted generally to the litigation as a whole,
making it difficult to divide the hours ex-
pended." Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401
F.3d 729, 745 (6th Cir. 2005) [*18] (quoting
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433).

Plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the City of Detroit was unsuccessful. At
its earliest convenience upon inheriting this
case, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ munici-
pal-liability claim because Plaintiffs could not
prove that Detroit had a policy or custom of
failing to "track, monitor, and respond to police
misconduct" and of failing to train or supervise
its officers. (Opinion and Order, Docket Text #
132. at 8, 12-17). This was "a distinctly differ-



EXHIBIT 6



Page 11

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110347, *

Reasonable Subtracted Reasonable New
Hours Municipal-Liability Rate Lodestar
Hours
Thomas Loeb 663.1 250 165775
Kim Cochrane 61.55 100 6155
Total Fee 171930
Award:
deem to be reasonable out-of-pocket expenses
D. Costs normally charged to a fee-paying client. These

Plaintiffs have also asked for an award of
costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (Pls.' Pet. at
27-28). "Some expenses are included in the
concept of attorney's fees, as ‘incidental and
necessary expenses incurred in furnishing ef-
fective [*24] and competent representation,’
and thus are authorized by section 1988."
Northcross, 611 F.2d at 639 (internal citation
omitted). These expenses are limited to "rea-
sonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the
attorney which are normally charged to a
fee-paying client, in the course of providing
legal services." Id. *

18 The Clerk of Court has taxed costs
in the amount of $ 7740.21 under 28
US.C. § 1920. Plaintiffs filed objections
to the Clerk's failure to tax certain costs,
which this Court has sustained. (Opinion
and Order, Docket Text # 226).

This Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ claimed
costs and has excluded those costs it does not

include the costs of: (1) transcripts of hearings
and status conferences; (2) parking; (3) attor-
ney and client meals; (4) lost wages of a ‘wit-
ness ” ; and (5) jury-consultant services. This
Court finds Plaintiffs’ claimed per-page rate of
fifty cents for photocopying to be excessive and
will award costs for photocopying at a reasona-
ble rate of twenty-five cents per page. See, e.g.,
King v. Gowdy, No. 02-75136, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32755, 2008 WL 1820837, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Apr. 22, 2008). [*25] This Court ex-
cludes half of Plaintiffs' investigative expenses,
finding the amount claimed excessive for a case
of this type. This Court also excludes $ 333.90
in expenses sought by Plaintiff Urquhart for
trial exhibits since this will be taxed by the
Clerk of Court per this Court's Opinion and
Order granting Plaintiffs' motion to adjust the
taxed bill of costs. (Docket Text # 226). A
breakdown of the costs that this Court will
award Plaintiffs is as follows:

Table 4

Plaintiff Sykes

Total Claimed Costs 20191.66

Subtracted Costs. discovery hearing transcript 46.1
lunch case meeting 24.91
motion hearing transcript 72.6
half investigative costs 3203.75
parking 226.43
lost wages of Vendricks Smith 175.26
status conference transcripts 101.85
mid-trial meals 136.07
meals during trial with clients 212.45



2008 U.S. Dist. LE

Plaintiffs have requested a 15% upward
adjustment of the lodestar and base this request
on several of the factors enumerated in Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d
714 (Sth Cir. 1974). * (PL.'s Pet. at 19-20). The
presumption is that the lodestar provides a rea-
sonable attorney's fee. Blum, 465 U.S. at 897;
see also Murphy v. Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 774 F.2d 114, 128 (6th Cir. 1985). An
enhancement award is only justified in "rare
cases[s]" "of exceptional success." Blum, 465
US. at 897, 899.

16 The twelve factors are: (1) the time
and labor required; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions; (3) the [*22]
skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly; (4) the preclusion of other em-
ployment by the attorney due to the ac-
ceptance of the case; (5) the customary
fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or con-
tingent; (7) time limitations imposed by
the client or the circumstances; (8) the
amount involved and the results ob-
tained; (9) the experience, reputation, and
ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesi-
rability" of the case; (11) the nature and
length of the professional relationship
with the client; and (12) awards in simi-
lar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-719.

Page 10
XIS 110347, *

This Court. has considered the twelve
Johnson factors and finds that they are ade-
quately reflected in Plaintiffs’ reasonable hours
and rate. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n.9;
Blum, 465 U.S. at 899. The lodestar, as ad-
justed to account for the unsuccessful unrelated
municipal-liability claim, already represents
Plaintiffs' reasonable attorney's fee award. As
such, no enhancement is required. A break-
down of the reasonable fees to which Plaintiffs
are entitled after adjustment of the lodestar is as
follows ”:

17 To calculate an adjusted lodestar
for Ms. Hurwitz and Ms. James, this
Court subtracted the time that each spent
on the [*23] municipal-liability claim
from their total claimed hours before
taking the 25% reduction for overbilling.
Similarly, this Court calculated Ms. El-
turk's adjusted lodestar by subtracting her
time spent on the municipal-liability
claim before taking the two-thirds reduc-
tion of her time for overbilling. These
necessary additional calculations are not
laid out in Table 3 but are reflected in the
three individuals’ respective adjusted lo-
destars in Table 3.

Table 3
Plaintiff Sykes
Reasonable Subtracted Reasonable New
Hours Municipal-Liability Rate Lodestar
Hours
Julie Hurwitz 1192.76 95.35 250 280312.5
Kathryn James 101.7/ 723.19 228.75 751150 89808.75
Gary Gant 461.2 18.75 100 44245
Kara Sullivan 3.25 100 325
Alan Benchich 50.65 75 3798.75
Maureen Kalahar 5 75 375
Bob Ingalls 2.5 75 187.5
Melanie Elturk 66.27 4 75 4870
Total Fee 423922.5
Award:

Plaintiff Urquhart



Page 7

2008 US. Dist. LEXIS 110347, *

Claimed Hours 664.7
Hours Subtracted calls to court clerk 0.7
half of jury consultant time 0.9
Total Reasonable Hours 663.1
Kim Cochrane
Claimed Hours 61.65
Hours Subtracted calls to court clerk 0.1
Total Reasonable Hours 61.55

B. [*14] Reasonable Rate

"[H]ourly rates for fee awards should not
exceed the market rates necessary to encourage
competent lawyers to undertake the representa-
tion in question." Coulter, 805 F.2d at 149. In
order to determine whether Plaintiffs' requested
hourly rates are reasonable, the Court looks to
[rates] prevailing in the community for similar
services by lawyers of reasonably comparable
skill, experience, and reputation." Hadix, 65
F.3d at 536 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 896
n.11). This Court has "discretion to accept, re-
ject, or modify [Plaintiffs'] requested rates
based on its experience and knowledge of the
relevant marketplace." Roland, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22047, 1992 WL 214441, at *3.

Plaintiffs have asked for hourly rates of $
350 for Ms. Hurwitz and Mr. Loeb. (Pls.' Pet. at
10). Defendants respond that appropriate hour-

ly rates would be $ 170 and $ 150, respectively.
(Defs.' Resp. at 16). After considering "the at-
torneys' level of experience" and "the services
they provided" (Roland, 1992 U.S. App. LEX-
IS 22047, 1992 WL 214441, at *3), and after
reviewing Plaintiffs’ affidavits, the 2003 State
Bar of Michigan Economics of Law Practice
Survey submitted by the parties, and the 2007
State Bar of Michigan Economics of Law Prac-
tice Survey [*15] ®, this Court has determined
that a reasonable hourly rate for Ms. Hurwitz
and Mr. Loeb is $ 250. " Based on a review of
the 2003 and 2007 editions of the State Bar of
Michigan Economics of Law Practice Survey
and the Court's knowledge of the local market,
the Court concludes that a reasonable hourly
fee for associates, paralegals, and law students
is $ 150, $ 100, and $ 75, respectively. » A
breakdown of the lodestar calculation, based on
these reasonable rates, is as follows:

Table 2
Plaintiff Sykes

Reasonable Hours Reasonable Hourly Rate Lodestar
Julie Hurwitz 1192.76 250 298190
Kathryn James 101.7/ 719.44 75/150 115543.5
Gary Gant 461.2 100 46120
Kara Sullivan 3.25 100 325
Alan Benchich 50.65 75 3798.75
Maureen Kalahar 5 75 375
Bob Ingalls 2.5 75 187.5
Melanie Elturk 66.27 75 4970.25

Total Lodestar: 469510

Plaintiff Urquhart | l

Reasonable Hours

Reasonable Hourly Rate Lodestar



Page 3

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110347, *

matter of law as to Plaintiffs due process
claims. (Jd. at 5).

On February 25, the jury rendered a verdict
for Plaintiffs on their remaining claims against
Defendants Anderson and Nichols. (Jury Ver-
dict Forms, Docket Text # 170, # 171). The
jury returned a verdict of "no cause of action"
against Defendant McClure. (/d.). The jury
awarded compensatory damages in the amount
of'$ 1,020,000 to Ms. Urquhart and $ 1,063,000
to Ms. Sykes. (/d.). The jury also awarded each
plaintiff $ 150,000 in punitive damages against
Defendant Anderson and $ 100,000 in punitive
damages against Defendant Nichols. (/d.).

This matter is now before the Court on
Plaintiffs’ joint petition for attorney's fees and
costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

TI. Analysis

In an action brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, "the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party" "a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
Plaintiffs are prevailing parties "'if they succeed
on any significant -[*6] issue in litigation
which achieves some of the benefit the parties
sought in bringing suit." Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed.
2d 40 (1983) (internal citation omitted). De-
fendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs are pre-
vailing parties. *

2 Defendants claim that, although
Plaintiffs are prevailing parties, this
Court should deny them attorney's fees
under the criteria articulated in Zarcone
v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978).
(Defs.’ Resp. at 11-12). Zarcone is not
binding on this Court and to the extent
that it supports Defendants’ argument,
“this Court disagrees with respect to its
application to the facts of this case. See
Kindig v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 709
F.Supp. 787, 790-92 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(refusing to apply Zarcone).

The "primary concern" then becomes en-
suring that the "fee awarded be reasonable.”
Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 535 (6th Cir.
1995). "A reasonable fee is ‘one that is
‘adequate enough to attract competent counsel,
but . . . [does] not produce windfalls to attor-
neys."" Id. (quoting Blum y. Stenson, 465 U.S.
886, 897, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891
(1984) (internal citation omitted)). The first
step in assessing reasonable attorney's fees is to
calculate the ‘lodestar.' Blanchard v. Bergeron,
489 U.S. 87, 94, 109 S. Ct. 939, 103 L. Ed. 2d
67 (1989). [*7] The lodestar is determined by
multiplying the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation by the attorney's
reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at
433.

A. Reasonable Hours

This Court must "exclude from this initial
fee calculation hours that were not ‘reasonably
expended." Jd. at 434 (internal citation omit-
ted). The Supreme Court has explained:

Cases may be overstaffed, and
the skill and experience of lawyers
vary widely. Counsel for the pre-
vailing party should make a good
faith effort to exclude from a fee
request hours that are excessive,
redundant, or otherwise unneces-
sary . . . In the private sector,
‘billing judgment’ is an important
component in fee setting. It is no
less important here.

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).

Plaintiffs staffed this case with five attor-
neys, three paralegals, two law students, and
three technical assistants, and their time records
reveal that they have not always exercised the
required "billing judgment." * The Sixth Circuit
has cautioned that "multiple representation can



Page 2

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110347, *

several motions and a jury trial in this matter.
The facts relevant to Plaintiffs’ fee petition are
as follows.

In 2002, Plaintiffs Kimberly Sykes and
Tevya Urquhart were arrested, convicted, and
imprisoned in connection with the robbery of a
Sprint store where they both worked. (Pls.' Pet.
at 1). In May of 2004, the Michigan Court of
Appeals vacated their convictions because there
was no evidence to support the charges. (/d.;
Opinion and Order, Docket Text # 132 at 3). !
On March 8, 2005, Ms. Sykes filed an action
under state tort law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against seven defendants in state court. Ms.
Sykes asserted state-law claims of false arrest
and imprisonment and violation of her Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights against six
police officers, Derrick Anderson, Carol Ni-
chols, Terrence Sims, Patrick Jones, Aaron
Copeland, and Maurice McClure. (Sykes
Compl., Ex. A, Docket Text # 1); Opinion and
Order, Docket Text # 48 at 2). She also asserted
a claim against the City of Detroit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to train, discipline, or
supervise its officers. (/d.). On September 29,
2005, Ms. Urquhart filed [*3] an action in this
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the same
six officers, alleging violation of her rights un-
der the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
(Urquhart Compl. at 2, 5-6).

1 For purposes of this opinion, all
Docket references will be for case num-
ber 05-71199.

Plaintiffs' cases were consolidated on June
19, 2006. (Docket Text # 18). On August 15,
2006, Ms. Sykes amended her complaint to add
a state-law claim of malicious prosecution
against the six officers. (Sykes Am. Compl.,
Docket Text # 37-3 at 14-15; Opinion and Or-
der, Docket Text # 48 at 3). On the same day,
Ms. Urquhart amended her complaint to add a
claim against the City of Detroit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to train, discipline, or

supervise its officers. (Urquhart Am. Compl.,
Docket # 37-2 at 10-11).

On June 22, 2006, Defendants filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment, which was denied
without prejudice on August 28, 2006. (Docket
Text # 19; Opinion and Order, Docket Text #
48). On July 23, 2007, this Court issued a sti-
pulated order, dismissing Defendants Terrence
Sims, Patrick Jones, and Arthur Copeland from
the lawsuit. (Docket Text # 77). On June 29,
2007, Defendants filed a second motion for
summary judgment. [*4] (Docket Text # 73).
On August 29, 2007, this Court denied the mo-
tion as untimely but granted summary judg-
ment as to Plaintiff Urquhart’s false-arrest and
false-imprisonment claims. (Opinion and Or-
der, Docket Text # 99 at 3). Ms. Urquhart had
conceded that these claims were time-barred.
(id.). On November 6, 2007, this case was
reassigned from the Honorable Bernard A.
Friedman to the Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds.
(Docket Text # 117). At a hearing on Novem-
ber 16, 2007, the Court instructed the parties
that it would re-hear arguments on the City's
motion for summary judgment and invited the
parties to submit supplemental briefing. (Opi-
nion and Order, Docket Text # 132 at 4). On
December 20, 2007, this Court granted Defen-
dant City of Detroit's motion for summary
judgment, leaving only individual Defendants
Anderson, Nichols, and McClure in the case at
the time of trial. (/d. at 17).

A trial was held from February 5 to Febru-
ary 25, 2008. At the close of Plaintiffs’ proofs,
Defendants orally moved for judgment as a
matter of law with respect to all claims. (Opi-
nion and Order, Docket Text # 179 at 2). The
Court granted (1) Defendant Nichols' and De-
fendant McClure's motion for judgment as a
matter [*5] of law with respect to Sykes' un-
lawful seizure claim; (2) Defendant McClure's
motion for judgment as a matter of law as to
Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims; and (3)
Defendant Nichols' motion for judgment as a



Na * *
@ LexisNexis’

Page 1

LEXSEE 2008 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 110347

Kimberly Sykes and Tevya Grace Urquhart, Plaintiffs, v. Derrick
Anderson and Carol Nichols, Defendants.

Case No. 05-71199,Case No. 05-73725

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DIS-
TRICT OF MICHIGAN, SOUTHERN DIVISION

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110347

October 31, 2008, Decided
October 31, 2008, Filed

PRIOR HISTORY: Sykes v. Anderson, 2008
US. Dist. LEXIS 22372 ( E.D. Mich., Mar. 21,
2008)

COUNSEL: [*1] For Kimberly Sykes, Plain-
tiff! Julie H. Hurwitz, LEAD ATTORNEY,
Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C., Detroit, MI;
Thomas M. Loeb, Farmington Hills, MI.

For Tevya Grace Urquhart, Consol Plaintiff:
Thomas M. Loeb, LEAD ATTORNEY, Far-
mington Hills, MI; Julie H. Hurwitz, Goodman
and Hurwitz, P.C., Detroit, MI; Mark Granzot-
to, Royal Oak, MI.

For Terrence Sims, Patrick Jones, City of De-
troit, Defendants: Krystal A. Crittendon, LEAD
ATTORNEY, Detroit City Law Department,
Detroit, MI.

For Arthur Copeland, Maurice McClure, De-
fendants: Krystal A. Crittendon, Detroit City
Law Department, Detroit, MI.

JUDGES: Hon. Nancy G. Edmunds, United
States District Judge.

OPINION BY: Nancy G. Edmunds
OPINION

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS [201]

This matter comes before the Court on
Plaintiffs’ joint petition for attorney's fees and
costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Plaintiff Kim-
berly Sykes has asked for an award of $
995,530.85 in attorney's fees and $ 20,191.66
in costs. Plaintiff Tevya Urquhart has asked for
an award of $ 267,541.75 in attorney's fees and
$ 2,320.23 in costs. For the reasons set forth
below, this Court GRANTS IN PART Plain-
tiffs' petition.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The Court [*2] is familiar with the facts
presented in this action, having presided over



Page 12

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110347, *

meals during trial 146.79
jury consultant fee 2000
photocopying [.25/page instead of .50] 3929
jury consultant fee 542.25
Total Awarded Costs 9374.2
Plaintiff Urquhart | |
Total Claimed Costs 2320.23
Subtracted Costs parking 282.5
trial exhibits taxed under s.1920 333.9
motion for directed verdict transcript 179.45
Total Awarded Costs 1524.38

19 This witness’ fee, parking, and mi-
leage were already taxed under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920.

I. Conclusion

For [*26] the reasons stated above, the
Court reduces Plaintiff Sykes' requested attor-
ney's fee award of $ 995,530.85 to $
423,922.50 and Plaintiff Urquhart's requested
attorney's fee award of $ 267,541.75 to $

171,930. For the reasons stated above, the
Court also reduces Plaintiff Sykes' requested
costs of $ 20,191.66 to $ 9,372.20 and Plaintiff
Urquhart's requested costs of $ 2,320.23 to $
1,524.38.

/s/ Nancy G. Edmunds
Nancy G. Edmunds

United States District Judge
Dated: October 31, 2008