UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROBERT SILER,

Plaintiff, Case No. 08-CV-15077-DT

v. Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

W. BALDWIN, REBECCA J. ROBINSON,

WHIPPLE, PATRICIA L. CARUSO,

KAREN R. HALLIDAY, C. WASHINGTON,

K. MORGAL, DAVID L. BERGH, J. 

ARMSTRONG, and JOHN DOE, 

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER

At a session of said Court, held in the U.S.

District Courthouse, Eastern District 

of Michigan, on March 16, 2010.

PRESENT: THE HONORABLE PATRICK J. DUGGAN

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Robert Siler (“Plaintiff”), a former state prisoner, filed this civil action against

defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 9, 2008. In his complaint,

Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights when he was

denied medical treatment after he fell out of his bed, hit his head on the concrete floor,

and aggravated a pre-existing spinal injury on July 28, 2008. This Court referred all

pre-trial proceedings in this case to Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub on March 9,

2009. As part of the pre-trial proceedings, Magistrate Judge Majzoub considered a
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Defendant’s Whipple, Caruso, Halliday, Washington, Morgal, Bergh, and Armstrong

were dismissed without prejudice by order of this Court on October 8, 2009. 

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Plaintiff also filed a motion to amend his first motion to compel. Magistrate Judge

Majzoub’s January 26, 2010, order also granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend.

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motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Baldwin on October 30, 2009.1

Magistrate Judge Majzoub also considered applications for the appointment of counsel

and motions to compel discovery filed by Plaintiff.

On January 25, 2010, Magistrate Judge Majzoub issued a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that this Court grant Baldwin’s motion for

summary judgment and a separate order denying Plaintiff’s applications for appointment

of counsel. The next day, Magistrate Judge Majzoub issued an order denying Plaintiff’s

motions to compel.2

 

On February 5, 2010, Plaintiff filed objections to the R&R. On February 9, 2010,

Plaintiff filed an appeal of Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s orders denying appointment of

counsel and Plaintiff’s motions to compel discovery.

I. Standard of Review

The parts of the R&R to which objections are made will be reviewed by the Court

de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Thomas v. Halter, 131 F. Supp. 2d 942, 944 (E.D.

Mich. 2001). The Court, however, “is not required to articulate all of the reasons it

rejects a party’s objections.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Tuggle v. Seabold, 806 F.2d

87, 92 (6th Cir. 1986). As to non-dispositive issues, Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s orders

will only be set aside if “found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ.
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P. 72(a). 

II. Objections to the R&R

Plaintiff presents five objections to Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s R&R. First,

Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s statement that he failed to specifically

identify the material facts he believes he will uncover if he is allowed more time to

conduct discovery. (R&R at 4.) Second, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s

conclusion that he had adequate opportunity for discovery and that sufficient evidence

was presented to allow the Court to decide the pending motion for summary judgment. 

(Id.) Third, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s holding that his claim against

Baldwin in her official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Id. at 5.) Fourth,

Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s finding that Baldwin did not violate his

Eighth Amendment rights and is entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 5-8.) And fifth,

Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Morgan’s recommendation that any retaliation claim

against Baldwin be dismissed. (Id. at 8-9.) The Court addresses these objections below.

A. Discovery and the Pending Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff’s first objection to the R&R is that it incorrectly concludes that he failed

to specifically identify facts he believes he will uncover if additional discovery is granted. 

Plaintiff asserts that he specifically indicated in a sworn affidavit that additional discovery

would allow him to prove that Baldwin, the Resident Unit Officer to whom Plaintiff

reported his fall from bed, lied about his condition and whereabouts in order to deny and

delay medical treatment. Raising a related issue, Plaintiff argues in his second objection
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Although the text of the Eleventh Amendment refers explicitly to suits “commenced or

prosecuted . . . by Citizens of another State,” U.S. Const. amend XI, “the doctrine of sovereign

immunity categorically prohibits such suits against a state by one of its own citizens.” Dixon v.

Clem, 492 F.3d 665, 673 (6th Cir. 2007).

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that it is unlawful to decide the motion for summary judgment before he has been

afforded an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.

As discussed in more detail below, the Court believes that Plaintiff has presented

sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Baldwin’s

statements concerning Plaintiff’s condition and whereabouts resulted in the delay of

medical treatment for a serious medical need. This requires that Baldwin’s motion be

denied, at least in part. So while Plaintiff may be entitled to additional discovery as this

case proceeds, there is no reason to delay a decision on the motion at this time.

B. Official Capacity and Eleventh Amendment

In his third objection, Plaintiff argues that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows him to sue

Baldwin in her official capacity regardless of the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiff’s

objection lacks merit.

“The Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits by citizens of a state against a

state in federal court.”3

 League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 474

(6th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity

is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. . . . As

such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (1989). As noted by Magistrate Judge
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Majzoub, the State of Michigan has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from

§ 1983 civil rights lawsuits filed in federal court. (R&R at 5 (citing Johnson v. Unknown

Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 545 (6th Cir. 2004)).) Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against

Baldwin in her official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

C. Eighth Amendment and Qualified Immunity

In his fourth objection, Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Judge Majzoub erroneously

concluded that he failed to support his claim for an Eighth Amendment violation and that

Baldwin is protected by qualified immunity. To sustain an Eighth Amendment claim of

cruel and unusual punishment based on inadequate medical treatment, Plaintiff must

demonstrate that Baldwin acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. 

See Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004). Based on

conflicting evidence submitted by the parties, Magistrate Judge Majzoub concluded that

there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff suffered an obvious

and objectively serious medical need after falling out of his bunk bed. (R&R at 6.) The

Court agrees with this analysis.

Nonetheless, Magistrate Judge Majzoub recommended that the Court grant

Baldwin’s motion for summary judgment on grounds that Baldwin failed to demonstrate

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical need. Specifically, the R&R notes that it is

the responsibility of the health services staff to decide how to respond to reported medical

emergencies and that Baldwin, a resident unit officer, fulfilled her duties by reporting

Plaintiff’s complaint to the health services staff. According to an affidavit submitted by
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Baldwin, she called a member of the health services staff to report Plaintiff’s complaint

but health services staff indicated that Plaintiff had just been to the med window and was

not experiencing a medical emergency. Baldwin also attests that she observed Plaintiff

walking in and out of the yard and interacting with other inmates with no signs of distress

or discomfort. Baldwin’s affidavit is generally supported by an entry in the prison log

book on the date of Plaintiff’s injury.

Although these pieces of evidence support Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s

recommended dismissal, the Court must view the record evidence in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff in deciding this motion. According to Plaintiff’s affidavit and a

progress note made by Rebecca Robinson, the nurse who answered Baldwin’s call,

Baldwin spoke with Robinson on two separate occasions. During the first call, Robinson

indicated that she needed to consult with management regarding the proper response to

Plaintiff’s complaint. Robinson then placed a return call to Baldwin to inform her that

health services would be coming with a wheelchair to retrieve Plaintiff. Baldwin,

however, informed Robinson that Plaintiff went “to rec court with basketball . . . .” As a

consequence, health services did not assess Plaintiff’s condition until August 7,

2008—ten days after he fell from the bunk bed. Plaintiff alleges that Baldwin knew that

he was waiting for the response from health services in the chair nearest to her office and

that she lied when she informed health services that he had gone to the rec court with a

basketball. Plaintiff also submitted an affidavit from another prisoner who witnessed

some of Plaintiff’s interactions with Baldwin and attested to his whereabouts at the
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relevant times.

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there remains a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Baldwin acted with deliberate indifference to

Plaintiff’s serious medical need. If Baldwin knew that Plaintiff was suffering from a

serious medical need and that he was waiting near her office for a response from health

services but nonetheless informed health services that he was off on the basketball courts

to interfere with what would otherwise have been an immediate response by health

services, those facts would indicate deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Dominguez v.

Correctional Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining the required

proof to establish deliberate indifference). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s right to be free from

cruel and unusual punishment in the form of deliberate indifference to a serious medical

need is a clearly established constitutional right. See, e.g., Scicluna v. Wells, 345 F.3d

441, 446 (6th Cir. 2003). It would be objectively unreasonable then for Baldwin to have

intentionally interfered with Plaintiff’s receipt of treatment while suffering from a serious

medical need. Therefore, if Plaintiff succeeds in proving the facts described above,

Baldwin will not be protected from Plaintiff’s claim by qualified immunity. See id. at 445

(explaining qualified immunity). Under these facts, Baldwin’s motion for summary

judgment as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim must be denied.

D. Retaliation

Finally, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s recommendation that the

Court dismiss any retaliation claim asserted by Plaintiff. Having carefully reviewed
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Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s reasoning, Plaintiff’s objection, and Plaintiff’s amended

complaint, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s conclusion that Plaintiff

failed to adequately allege a retaliation claim in this case. Therefore, any such claim is

dismissed.

III. Appeals of Non-Dispositive Orders

As previously indicated, Plaintiff also appeals Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s orders

denying his motions to compel discovery and applications for appointment of counsel. In

the order denying the motions to compel, Magistrate Judge Majzoub noted that Baldwin’s

counsel denies being served with discovery requests. Magistrate Judge Majzoub also

advised that, in the future, Plaintiff should serve his discovery requests directly on

defense counsel as provided for by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (January 26,

2010, Order at 2.) In light of this Court’s partial denial of Baldwin’s motion for summary

judgment, it may be appropriate for Plaintiff to seek additional discovery. The Court

therefore directs Plaintiff to serve his reasonable discovery requests on defense counsel as

suggested by Magistrate Judge Morgan. 

As to Plaintiff’s applications for appointment of counsel, the Court agrees with

Magistrate Judge Majzoub that Plaintiff has no constitutional right to the appointment of

counsel and has, to date, adequately represented his own interests in this case. (January

25, 2010, Order at 1-2.) Given this Court’s partial denial of Baldwin’s motion for

summary judgment, however, the Court believes that appointment of counsel for Plaintiff

could assist all involved in obtaining an efficient, expedient, and just resolution. 
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Therefore, the Court will take the matter under advisement and, in the meantime, refer the

case to the Court’s pro bono program administrator to determine whether counsel can be

located that will agree to represent Plaintiff. Upon response from the pro bono program

administrator, the Court will enter an order either granting or denying Plaintiff’s

applications.

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff failed to properly allege a claim of retaliation against Baldwin and his

claim against Baldwin in her official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 

Nonetheless, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Baldwin acted

with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need suffered by Plaintiff. Therefore,

Baldwin’s motion for summary judgment must be denied as to Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. §

1983 claim alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by Baldwin in her

individual capacity. In regard to the future progress of this case, the Court agrees with

Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s analysis of Plaintiff’s motions to compel and takes his

applications for appointment of counsel under advisement.

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Baldwin’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED

IN PART as to Plaintiff’s claim against Baldwin in her official capacity and his claim for

retaliation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Baldwin’s motion for summary judgment is

DENIED IN PART as to Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging an Eighth
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Amendment violation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s applications for appointment of

counsel are TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motions to compel discovery are

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff shall serve his reasonable discovery

requests directly on defense counsel.

s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies To:

Robert Siler 

P.O. Box 581

Grand Haven, MI 49417

Allen J. Soros, Esq.