UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 08-20585

v. Hon. Gerald E. Rosen

PETER HENDRICKSON,

Defendant.

______________________________/

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR RELEASE PENDING APPEAL

At a session of said Court, held in

the U.S. Courthouse, Detroit, Michigan

on June 14, 2010 

PRESENT: Honorable Gerald E. Rosen

Chief Judge, United States District Court

By motion filed on June 9, 2010, Defendant Peter Hendrickson requests that he be

permitted to remain free on bond pending the resolution of his appeal of his conviction

and sentence. This request is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1), which provides in

pertinent part:

[T]he judicial officer shall order that a person who has been found

guilty of an offense and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and who has

filed an appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari, be detained, unless the

judicial officer finds —

(A) by clear and convincing evidence that the person

is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other

person or the community if released . . . ; and

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(B) that the appeal is not for the purpose of delay and

raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in

—

(i) reversal,

(ii) an order for a new trial,

(iii) a sentence that does not include a term of

imprisonment, or

(iv) a reduced sentence to a term of imprisonment

less than the total of the time already served plus the

expected duration of the appeal process.

18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1). “This statute creates a presumption against release pending

appeal.” United States v. Sabino, No. 04-3499, 97 F. App’x 626, 627 (6th Cir. May 14,

2004) (citing United States v. Vance, 851 F.2d 166, 169-70 (6th Cir. 1988)).

The Court finds that Defendant has not overcome this presumption against release,

because he has not identified a substantial question of law or fact that he intends to pursue

on appeal. The Sixth Circuit has explained that the “substantial question” prong of §

3143(b)(1) is satisfied if “the appeal presents a close question or one that could go either

way and . . . the question is so integral to the merits of the conviction that it is more

probable than not that reversal or a new trial will occur if the question is decided in the

defendant’s favor.” United States v. Pollard, 778 F.2d 1177, 1182 (6th Cir. 1985)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The “substantial questions” identified in

Defendant’s present motion are precisely the same issues he raised at trial and in his postverdict motion for a judgment of acquittal or new trial. This Court has thoroughly

addressed and rejected these challenges — most of them on more than one occasion. 

Upon once again considering the issues raised in Defendant’s present motion, the Court

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cannot say that any of them “present[] a close question or one that could go either way,”

such that Defendant’s release pending appeal would be warranted under § 3143(b)(1). To

the contrary, Defendant merely rehashes legal challenges that have very little prospect of

success on appeal, for the reasons previously explained in the Court’s various pre-trial,

trial, and post-verdict opinions and rulings.

 Accordingly,

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s June 9, 2010

motion for release pending appeal (docket #108) is DENIED.

s/Gerald E. Rosen 

Chief Judge, United States District Court

Dated: June 14, 2010

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record

on June 14, 2010, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Ruth A. Gunther 

Case Manager

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