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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Teresa Marie Fields,

Defendant.

No. CR-18-00136-003-PHX-SMB

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Defendant Teresa Marie Fields’ Motion for 

Compassionate Release. (Doc. 194.) The Government has filed a response (Doc. 195) and 

Notice of Supplemental Authority. (Doc. 199.) Defendant has filed a reply. (Doc. 204.) 

The Court denies the motion for the reasons discussed below. 

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Teresa Marie Fields (“Defendant”) is a fifty-year-old inmate at Federal Medical

Center (“FMC”) Carswell who was convicted of Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with 

Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and 

(b)(1)(A)(viii). (Doc. 132.) The conduct underlying her conviction involves trafficking 

442.3 grams of methamphetamine, 146.2 grams of fentanyl, and 2.125 kilograms of “ice” 

from Arizona to Arkansas. (Doc. 117. ¶¶ 27, 29.) On June 20, 2019, she was sentenced to 

ninety-seven months of incarceration to be followed by sixty months of supervised release. 

(Doc. 132.) She has since completed 24 months of the sentence.

During Defendant’s incarceration, the COVID-19 pandemic spread to this nation’s 
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prisons. To combat the pandemic and ensure inmate health, the Federal Bureau of Prisons

(BOP) has modified its operations.

1 While FMC Carswell experienced 695 COVID-19 

cases in total, only three active cases remain for the facility’s inmate population. See BOP, 

COVID-19 Coronavirus (updated daily), available at https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ 

(last visited June 29, 2021.) 

Defendant maintains that despite BOP protocols and receiving both doses of the 

Pfizer vaccine, she is still in danger of contracting COVID-19 a second time. (Doc. 194 at 

5.) Defendant suffers from heart problems, arthritis, restless leg syndrome, asthma, and 

obesity. (Id. at 1.) Defendant states she is in a “higher risk category” because these 

comorbidities could exacerbate the effects of COVID-19. (Id. at 5.) In addition, Defendant 

argues that she is not a danger to the community because she has “no violent convictions” 

and was in an “abusive relationship with her husband” who used her “to do his bidding”

during the time she committed the offenses. (Id. at 5.) Moreover, Defendant states her 

involvement in the convicted offense stemmed from “her own use and abuse of illegal 

substances” and that this “got the best of her.” (Id. at 1, 5.) Defendant now asks this Court 

to grant her compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(C)(1)(A). (Id. at 6.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Section 3582(c), as a general matter, prohibits a court from modifying an inmate’s 

terms of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 

824-825 (2010). However, a court is authorized, but not required, to reduce an 

imprisonment term 

upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully 

exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the 

Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf 

or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the 

warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier.

1 Such modifications include temperature checks, social distancing, and COVID-19 

screening for inmates, staff, contractors, and other visitors. In addition, visitors and inmates 

must wear face coverings and perform hand hygiene during visits. Tables and chairs must 

be disinfected between visitation groups. See BOP, BOP Modified Operations, (updated 

Nov. 25, 2020), available at https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/covid19_status.jsp.
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18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also United States v. Tomlinson, No. CR-18-08374-002-

PCT-DWL, 2020 WL 193552, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2020). A motion for compassionate 

release is not an opportunity for “plenary sentencing.” United States v. Kelley, 962 F.3d 

470, 475 (9th Cir. 2020). Compassionate release is reserved for “compelling circumstances 

which could not reasonably have been foreseen by the court at the time of sentencing.” See

28 C.F.R. § 571.60. A compassionate release “due to a medical condition” is generally 

treated “as an extraordinary and rare event.” United States v. Hearron, No. CR 91-392-2-

TUC-CKJ, 2020 WL 4569556, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 7, 2020). To prevail on a motion for 

compassionate release, the Defendant must show that “extraordinary and compelling 

reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). In addition to showing 

extraordinary and compelling reasons, a district court may also consider whether a 

defendant has shown she is not a danger to any other person’s safety or the community. 18 

U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; see United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799

(9th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added).

If an inmate successfully presents a compelling and extraordinary case for early 

release, the Court must also weigh the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether release is 

warranted. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The § 3553(a) factors include: 

the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant; the purposes of sentencing; the 

kinds of sentences available; the sentences and ranges 

established by the Sentencing Guidelines; relevant policy 

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; the need to 

avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly 

situated defendants; and the need to provide restitution to 

victims.

United States v. Trujillo, 713 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2013). “The Sentencing 

Commission’s statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 may inform a district court’s discretion for 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by a defendant, but they are not binding.” Aruda, 993 F.3d 

at 802 (9th Cir. 2021).
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III. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The government concedes that Defendant has exhausted her administrative

remedies. (Doc. 195 at 6.) Accordingly, the Court finds this requirement to be met. 

B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

Defendant contends that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant her release

because she is in a higher-risk category for COVID-19 and may contract COVID-19 a 

second time despite BOP’s modified COVID-19 policies and receiving the Pfizer vaccine.

(Doc. 194 at 5-6.) The Government responds that Defendant has not shown extraordinary 

and compelling reasons because her risk for reinfection is low since she received both doses 

of the Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine and BOP’s efforts have been effective at combatting 

COVID-19. (Doc. 195 at 9-11.) 

While not binding, the Court will look to the Sentencing Commission’s policy 

statement addressing the reduction of sentences to inform its decision. According to U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines’ Application Note 1(A) of § 1B1.13, “extraordinary and 

compelling” reasons may exist due to “a medical condition of the defendant” where:

(i) the defendant is suffering from a terminal illness . . . (ii) the 

defendant is suffering from a serious physical or medical 

condition, suffering from a serious functional or cognitive 

impairment, or experiencing deteriorating physical or mental 

health because of the aging process that substantially 

diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care 

within the environment of a correctional facility and from 

which he or she is not expected to recover.

Defendant contracted COVID-19 in January 2021 and received doses of the 

COVID-19 Pfizer vaccine on February 23, 2021 and March 16, 2021. (Doc. 195 at 2.) 

Defendant takes a low level of oxygen, 2L, below the normal flow rate of 6-10L per min. 

(Doc. 195 at 2); see Gary Porter-Jones, Short-term oxygen therapy, Nursing Times, 

https://www.nursingtimes.net/clinical-archive/respiratory-clinical-archive/short-term-
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oxygen-therapy-01-10-2002/ (“The normal flow rate of oxygen is usually six to 10 litres

per minute ...”). Additionally, Defendant’s comorbidities include “congestive heart failure 

requiring a pacemaker, leaky mitral valve, arthritis, restless leg syndrome, asthma, and 

obesity.” (Doc. 194 at 1.) However, Defendant is “stable.” (Doc. 195 at 2.) Defendant 

argues that despite BOP’s COVID-19 mitigation efforts and being “housed at a [m]edical 

[f]acility,” she would virtually be “guaranteed that medical care is superior in a non-prison 

sentence.” (Doc. 194 at 6.) Defendant cites no authority to support her contention about 

the superiority of non-prison medical care.

The Government argues that because of the low infection rate and most of FMC 

Carswell’s inmate population being fully vaccinated, BOP’s mitigation efforts have been 

successful. (Doc. 195 at 11.) The Government further responds that because the Pfizer 

COVID-19 vaccine has been proven to be 95% effective in preventing infection and 

“virtually entirely effective in preventing severe disease” for individuals with 

comorbidities, Defendant no longer presents a sufficient argument for compassionate 

release. (Doc. 195 at 9.) 

At least one judge in this district has previously determined that an inmate receiving

a COVID-19 vaccine weighs against granting compassionate release. See United States v. 

Cortez, No. CR180085801PHXSPL, 2021 WL 689923 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2021). With this 

in mind and because the Defendant has not presented evidence sufficient to show that she 

is at a greater risk of contracting COVID-19 during her incarceration, the Court agrees that 

the Defendant’s circumstances are not extraordinary and compelling.

While the Court’s analysis could end here, out of an abundance of caution, the Court 

will next examine the danger Defendant poses to the community and the 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(a) factors.

C. Danger to the Community

Defendant contends that nothing in her criminal history suggests she is a danger to

the community because her convictions did not involve violent behavior. (Doc. 194 at 6.) 

Furthermore, Defendant argues that she committed the conduct underlying the conviction 
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because her abusive husband forced her to do his bidding and that she succumbed to her 

drug use. (Doc. 194 at 5.) 

The Government cites to Reynolds and Gentry to argue that danger to the 

community is not limited to physical violence and can take different forms. (Doc. 195 at 

13); see United States, v. Reynolds, 959 F.2d 192, 192 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[D]anger may, at 

least in some cases, encompass pecuniary or economic harm.”); see also United States v. 

Gentry, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1032 (D. Ariz. 2006). The Court agrees that “danger” is not 

confined to violent acts.

While not required to do so, the Court will consult the factors listed in 18 § U.S.C. 

Sec. 3142(g) to inform its decision. These factors include:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, 

including whether the offense is a crime of violence, ..., or 

involves a minor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, 

explosive, or destructive device; (2) the weight of the evidence 

against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the 

person, ...; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to 

any person or the community that would be posed by the 

person’s release.

The Defendant was convicted of trafficking a controlled substance, 

methamphetamine. (Doc. 132.) Defendant presents this conviction as an aberration, 

attributing her actions as a fault of manipulation by her husband and her drug use. (Doc. 

194 at 5.) In support, Defendant argues that she has had “no involvement in the criminal 

justice system between 2003 and the time frame of this case.” (Doc. 194 at 2.) This 

contention is incorrect. Defendant has a long history of drug trafficking and substance 

abuse. (Doc. 117.) In 2004, Defendant was convicted for Attempt to Manufacture 

Controlled Substance Methamphetamine and received five years’ probation. (Doc. 117 ¶ 

43.) In 2017, she was arrested on drug trafficking charges, and the disposition for this 

offense is pending. (Doc. 117 ¶ 48.) Defendant’s pretrial release was also revoked because 

she tested positive for methamphetamine. (Doc. 117 ¶ 6.) The Government contends that 
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because the Defendant has not provided a release plan or any evidence to show why she 

would comply with conditions of release after she was “unable to comply with conditions 

of her pretrial release” that she has not met her burden. The Court agrees that Defendant 

has failed to show that she no longer is a danger to the community. 

D. Consistency with Section 3553(a) Factors

As discussed above, Defendant has a history of drug trafficking and substance 

abuse, and her conviction involved trafficking a controlled substance. The Defendant 

argues that while incarceration offers some deterrence, it offers “no guarantee that crimes 

are prevented” because “criminal conspiracies” and “fraudulent scams” can still occur 

within prisons. (Doc. 194 at 6.) Defendant further contends that she should receive 

compassionate release because it would “most likely” be easier to participate in “vocational 

training” and “medical care.” (Doc. 194 at 6.) 

The Government responds that the Court considered Defendant’s medical condition 

during sentencing because the Presentence Investigation Report mentioned many of 

Defendant’s medical issues, such as congestive heart failure. (Doc. 195 at 14.) 

Because incarceration offers “adequate deterrence to the criminal conduct” and the 

Court considered the Defendant’s medical condition during sentencing, the Court does not 

find Defendant’s arguments convincing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B). The Government

correctly highlighted that this Court already varied downward by 38 months when 

imposing Defendant’s 97-month term of incarceration. (Doc. 195 at 15.) A further 

downward variance would not “reflect the seriousness of the offense,” “promote a respect 

for the law,” “provide just punishment for the offense,” or “afford adequate deterrence to 

the criminal conduct.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(B). Accordingly, the Court finds 

that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors also weigh against compassionate release.

///

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///

///
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IV. CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Compassionate Release, (Doc. 194), 

is denied.

Dated this 2nd day of July, 2021.