UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-2249

ASMAA JAMAL ASHQAR, 

 Petitioner, 

 v. 

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals.

Argued: September 22, 2009 Decided: December 8, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and James P. JONES, 

Chief United States District Judge for the Western District of 

Virginia, sitting by designation. 

Petition for review denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

ARGUED: Eleanor Roy Barrett, DUANE MORRIS, LLP, Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, for Petitioner. Shahrzad Baghai, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON 

BRIEF: Denyse Sabagh, Thomas K. Ragland, DUANE MORRIS, LLP, 

Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Tony West, Assistant Attorney 

General, Civil Division, Terri J. Scadron, Assistant Director, 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Asmaa Jamal Ashqar (“Mrs. Ashqar”) petitions for review of 

an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”), 

entered October 3, 2008, denying her application for asylum and 

withholding of removal. According to Mrs. Ashqar, the BIA 

erroneously concluded that she had failed to demonstrate she had 

a well-founded fear of future persecution. As explained below, 

we reject this contention and deny the petition for review. 

I. 

 Mrs. Ashqar is a Kuwaiti-born Palestinian who was first 

admitted to the United States in March 1990 on a J-2 visa. She 

moved to Oxford, Mississippi, in order to join her Palestinian 

husband, Dr. Abdelhaleem Ashqar (“Dr. Ashqar”), who entered the 

United States on a J-1 visa in November 1989 after receiving a 

fellowship to study at the University of Mississippi. Once Dr. 

Ashqar’s studies were completed, the Ashqars moved to Virginia. 

 In 1998, Dr. Ashqar filed an application for asylum in the 

United States, in which Mrs. Ashqar was a derivative applicant. 

Shortly thereafter, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 

2 
(the “INS”)1 charged Mrs. Ashqar with removability because she 

was in the United States longer than her authorized stay. 

Dr. Ashqar eventually decided to withdraw his application 

for asylum in 2003, prompting Mrs. Ashqar to move to sever her 

asylum claim from her husband’s. On June 16, 2003, the 

Immigration Court in Arlington, Virginia, granted Mrs. Ashqar’s 

motion. 

In her independent application, Mrs. Ashqar conceded she 

had overstayed her visa but sought relief from removal. Mrs. 

Ashqar requested asylum pursuant to 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158 (West 

2005) due to her fear of persecution in Israel and the Occupied 

Territories. She also sought withholding of removal under both 

the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”) and the 

Convention Against Torture (the “CAT”). 

A. 

On March 15, 2004, the Immigration Court held a hearing on 

Mrs. Ashqar’s application. The following is a summary of the 

facts taken from the record of that hearing. 

Mrs. Ashqar grew up as a refugee in Gaza in the Israeli 

Occupied Territories. It was there, beginning in 1982, she 

 1

 On March 1, 2003, the INS integrated into the newly formed 

Department of Homeland Security (the “DHS”). Homeland Security 

Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2195-205 

(2002). Thus, the DHS is now the agency overseeing Mrs. 

Ashqar’s immigration case. 

3 
attended the Islamic University of Gaza. Sometime between 

September 1986 and January 1987, Mrs. Ashqar married Dr. Ashqar, 

a lecturer at the university.2 A few months after the Ashqars 

married, Dr. Ashqar was promoted to the position of university 

director of public relations and became editor of the 

university’s magazine. 

Dr. Ashqar was an outspoken opponent of the Israeli 

occupation. According to Mrs. Ashqar, Dr. Ashqar’s political 

activities were not ignored by the Israeli government. In 1981, 

as a student at Birzeit University, Dr. Ashqar was arrested, 

beaten, tortured, and held in jail for sixteen days by the 

Israeli military for having participated in a demonstration 

protesting the creation of the state of Israel. 

In contrast, Mrs. Ashqar admits that she was never 

mistreated by Israeli authorities. She was, however, questioned 

by Israeli intelligence twice between 1984 and 1986 as a member 

of the Islamic University of Gaza’s student council. After she 

 2

 There is some discrepancy in the record as to when the 

Ashqars were married. The Immigration Court’s decision first 

states that the Ashqars were married on September 19, 1986, then 

later notes that Mrs. Ashqar testified she was married in 

January 1987. According to the transcript of the hearing, Mrs. 

Ashqar testified that the Ashqars were engaged in September 

1986, signed a marriage contract in December 1986, and held the 

wedding in January 1987. Fortunately, to consider the merits of 

this petition, we do not need to determine the correct date. 

4 
was married, she was never again summoned for questioning by 

Israeli officials. 

It was a different story for her husband. The Israeli 

authorities interrogated Dr. Ashqar on several occasions. 

Between 1986 and 1989, he was often detained and questioned as 

well as threatened with jail and/or deportation. When Dr. 

Ashqar attempted to leave the Occupied Territories for the 

United States in 1989 to pursue his studies at the University of 

Mississippi, the Israeli officials tried to stop him. 

Eventually, the authorities permitted Dr. Ashqar to leave, but 

only after a former Israeli Interior Minister intervened on his 

behalf. Mrs. Ashqar, on the other hand, testified that she had 

been able to follow her husband a few months later, in 1990, 

without any complications. 

After settling in the United States, Dr. Ashqar continued 

to attract attention from Israeli authorities and began also 

garnering the U.S. government’s attention. As early as December 

1991, the FBI interviewed Dr. Ashqar about his activities for 

the Islamic University of Gaza and his purported fundraising for 

the Islamic Resistance Movement, an organization commonly 

5 
referred to as HAMAS.3 Much of its information on Dr. Ashqar’s 

ties to HAMAS at that time came from Israeli officials. 

In 1993, Mrs. Ashqar returned to Gaza for the first and 

only time to visit with family for two months. She did not 

experience any difficulties with the Israeli authorities while 

she was there. 

Following Mrs. Ashqar’s return, in 1994, a book was 

published in Israel mentioning Dr. Ashqar’s connection to HAMAS. 

Mrs. Ashqar testified that an FBI agent had approached her 

husband and requested a meeting with him to question him about 

the book. According to the Ashqars, the FBI questioned Dr. 

Ashqar at the request of the Israeli government. 

In 1997, Dr. Ashqar completed his Ph.D. program at the 

University of Mississippi, and the Ashqars moved to Virginia 

where Dr. Ashqar planned to work. In February 1998, Dr. Ashqar 

was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury in the Southern 

District of New York about persons accused of fundraising for 

HAMAS. Dr. Ashqar gained international media attention when he 

refused to testify, telling reporters he feared his answers 

 3

 HAMAS is an acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement in 

Arabic, Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya. United States v. 

Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 493 F.3d 469, 471 n.1 (5th 

Cir. 2007). On October 8, 1997, the U.S. Secretary of State 

designated HAMAS as a Foreign Terrorist Organization pursuant to 

8 U.S.C.A. § 1189 (West 2005). (J.A. 1013.) 

6 
would be used against others close to him in the Palestinian 

liberation movement. The district court found him in civil 

contempt, and he was detained for six months, during which he 

went on a hunger strike and was eventually force fed by court 

order. 

Dr. Ashqar was subpoenaed a second time in 2003 to appear 

before a grand jury in the Northern District of Illinois, but 

again he refused to testify, was held in contempt and jailed, 

and began a hunger strike. Dr. Ashqar was subsequently indicted 

by a federal grand jury for criminal contempt, obstruction of 

justice, and conspiring to violate the RICO act to finance the 

affairs of HAMAS.4 

Mrs. Ashqar bases her claim for asylum on these more recent 

events. She believes that the publicity surrounding the book in 

1994 and the subsequent media coverage of her husband’s refusal 

to testify before the grand juries made her husband a much 

bigger target of Israeli officials. Consequently, she fears 

that if she were to return to her homeland, the Israeli 

authorities would detain and torture her in order to force Dr. 

 4

 Dr. Ashqar was eventually convicted of criminal contempt 

and obstruction of justice, but not the RICO charge, and was 

sentenced to 135 months in prison. See United States v. Ashqar, 

582 F.3d 819, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). The Seventh Circuit recently 

affirmed his convictions and sentence. Id.

7 
Ashqar to eventually return to the Occupied Territories where 

they would be able to arrest him. 

B. 

 On April 25, 2006, the Immigration Judge (the “IJ”) granted 

Mrs. Ashqar’s application for asylum without considering either 

of her requests for withholding removal. The IJ found that Mrs. 

Ashqar had established that she had a reasonable fear of future 

persecution if she returned to Israel or the Occupied 

Territories based on the political opinions imputed to her from 

her association with her husband. 

 The DHS filed a timely appeal of the IJ’s decision to the 

BIA. On October 3, 2008, the BIA sustained the appeal and 

reversed the IJ’s decision. The BIA concluded “that there is no 

specific evidence in the record which, taken alone or 

cumulatively, would support a finding that [Mrs. Ashqar] has a 

well-founded fear of persecution in Israel.” (J.A. 18.) The 

BIA also denied Mrs. Ashqar’s requests for withholding of 

removal under the INA and CAT. 

On October 29, 2008, Mrs. Ashqar filed a petition for 

review with this court pursuant to 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (West 

2005). In her petition, Mrs. Ashqar only challenges the BIA’s 

ruling on her asylum eligibility. 

 

8 
II. 

The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General 

may grant asylum to an alien who is unable or unwilling to 

return to her home county because she has “a well-founded fear 

of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . 

. . .” 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101 (a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A) (West 

2005). The burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that she 

has a well-founded fear of persecution based on one or more of 

the listed grounds. See Abdel-Rahman v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 444, 

449 (4th Cir. 2007). Such a fear is proven by showing there is 

a reasonable possibility that the applicant will be persecuted. 

8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(B) (2009). 

Mrs. Ashqar claims that if she returns to the Occupied 

Territories she has a well-founded fear that she will be 

targeted for persecution because of: (1) the political opinions 

of her husband imputed to her; and (2) her membership in the 

social group of wives of political dissidents. She believes 

that, because of his political activism, the Israeli authorities 

want to capture Dr. Ashqar. Thus, it is Mrs. Ashqar’s 

contention that if she returns to her homeland, the Israeli 

government will persecute her in order to lure Dr. Ashqar back 

to the Occupied Territories. The BIA found, however, that Mrs. 

9 
Ashqar presented no persuasive evidence to demonstrate that she 

had a well-founded fear of such an occurrence. 

Mrs. Ashqar argues that the BIA erred in denying her asylum 

application because: (1) the BIA applied the incorrect legal 

standard; and (2) the BIA’s decision is not supported by 

substantial evidence. We disagree. 

A. 

It is Mrs. Ashqar’s contention that the BIA mistakenly 

required her to show more than a reasonable possibility of 

future persecution to establish a well-founded fear. We review 

this question of law de novo. See Abdel-Rahman, 493 F.3d at 

449. Although the BIA did not cite to 8 C.F.R. § 

1208.13(b)(2)(i)(B) -- the regulation outlining the reasonable 

possibility standard -- a plain reading of the BIA’s analysis 

convinces us that it was nonetheless applying the correct 

criterion.5

 5

 The BIA did incorrectly cite to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1) 

to support the statement that “the burden of proof to establish 

a well-founded fear of future persecution remains with [Mrs. 

Ashqar].” (J.A. 16.) That section actually sets out the burden 

of proof necessary to establish a past threat to life or freedom 

claim for withholding of removal under the INA and CAT and does 

not relate to asylum claims. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1) 

(2009). Regardless of the citation, the BIA was nonetheless 

correctly stating the law -- the burden of proof to demonstrate 

a well-founded fear of future persecution lies with the 

applicant. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2009). 

10 
The first indication that the BIA applied the proper 

standard is that the BIA stated in its opinion that “[a]lthough 

there is anecdotal evidence in the record that the wives and 

family members of suspected terrorists have sometimes been 

subjected to mistreatment of various kinds by the Israeli 

government, there is no persuasive evidence that such an 

occurrence is a reasonable possibility in [Mrs. Ashqar’s] case.” 

(J.A. 17 (emphasis added).) We do not believe, as Mrs. Ashqar 

argues, that the BIA’s use of the phrase “reasonable 

possibility” was a mere coincidence. 

The BIA stated several times in its opinion such phrases 

as: there is “no persuasive evidence” that shows persecution 

“would” occur; and it was mere “speculation” that Mrs. Ashqar 

“might,” “would,” or “will” face persecution. (See J.A. 17-18.) 

While Mrs. Ashqar argues that the use of “would,” “might,” and 

“will” proves that the BIA applied a “more likely than not” 

standard, we find that argument unconvincing. Mrs. Ashqar’s 

reading ignores the fact that the BIA found no convincing 

evidence of her claim. To rule that there is a chance of 

persecution at least some scintilla of persuasive evidence, 

something more than speculation, is necessary. Thus, despite 

its failure to identify the appropriate regulation, the BIA did 

apply the requisite standard. 

11 
B. 

Given that the BIA applied the correct legal standard, Mrs. 

Ashqar next contends that the BIA erred by ruling she did not 

demonstrate a reasonable possibility of persecution. 

Judicial review of the BIA’s factual determinations is 

narrow. We review factual findings under the substantial 

evidence standard. See Abdel-Rahman, 493 F.3d at 448. Such 

findings are only to be overruled if “any reasonable adjudicator 

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 

1252(b)(4)(B) (West 2005). In other words, “[i]n order to 

secure judicial relief from the denial of an application for 

asylum or withholding of removal, an alien ‘must show that the 

evidence [s]he presented was so compelling that no reasonable 

factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of 

persecution.’” Abdel-Rahman, 493 F.3d at 448-49 (quoting INS v.

Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84). We find that Mrs. Ashqar 

has failed to overcome this burden. 

Mrs. Ashqar first asserts that the BIA completely ignored 

her claim that she would be persecuted because her husband’s 

political opinions would be imputed to her,6 but this is easily 

refuted. 

 

(Continued) 

6

 “An imputed political opinion, whether correctly or 

incorrectly attributed, may constitute a ground for a wellfounded fear of political persecution within the meaning of the 

12 
It is apparent that the BIA did consider the risk of 

persecution based on imputed political opinions because the BIA 

spent much of its opinion detailing its disagreement with the 

IJ’s decision. (See J.A. 16-17 (“We disagree with the 

Immigration Judge’s conclusion . . . .”; “the Immigration 

Judge’s decision is incorrect . . . .”).) And the IJ ruled 

solely on Mrs. Ashqar’s claim that her husband’s political 

opinions would be imputed to her. Indeed, he did not even 

consider her other grounds for relief. (See J.A. 117.) 

The BIA is not required to specifically delineate between 

its consideration of Mrs. Ashqar’s imputed political opinions 

and social group grounds for persecution because “[i]ndividual 

targeting and systematic persecution do not necessarily 

constitute distinct theories. Rather, an applicant will 

typically demonstrate some combination of the two to establish a 

well-founded fear of persecution.” Chen v. INS, 195 F.3d 198, 

203-04 (4th Cir. 1999). 

The BIA’s ruling, in fact, was largley based on its finding 

that Mrs. Ashqar had not sufficiently demonstrated that her risk 

 

INA.” Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1289 (11th Cir. 2001) 

(citations, alterations, and internal quotes omitted); see also

In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 489 (BIA 1996). 

13 
of persecution had increased from when she previously lived in 

the Occupied Territories -- a period when Mrs. Ashqar admits she 

was not persecuted. Mrs. Ashqar’s own testimony confirms that 

Dr. Ashqar was a highly visible political opponent of the 

Israeli occupation from 1986 to 1990. According to Mrs. Ashqar, 

during that period the Israeli authorities were frequently 

detaining and interrogating her husband, but they never once 

came after her. 

Furthermore, FBI reports show that Israel had connected her 

husband to HAMAS as early as January 1991. Yet, Mrs. Ashqar 

concedes when she visited Gaza in 1993, she was not disturbed by 

Israeli officials. 

Mrs. Ashqar tried to show that events after 1994 -- the 

publication of the book connecting Dr. Ashqar to HAMAS and the 

infamous grand jury incidents -- altered the landscape. As 

proof of her increased risk of persecution, Mrs. Ashqar offered 

evidence that she claimed showed the Israeli government went 

after her innocent family members. Viewing the administrative 

record as a whole however, we conclude substantial evidence 

supports the BIA’s conclusion that Dr. Ashqar’s “additional 

alleged activities in support of Hamas in the United States, and 

other intervening events, do not show that the Israeli 

government, which did not persecute [Mrs. Ashqar] in the past, 

is now inclined to do so.” (J.A. 18.); cf. Chen, 195 F.3d at 

14 
200-01, 203-05 (ruling that a couple who showed no proof of past 

persecution when they previously violated China’s “one child” 

policy did not sufficiently demonstrate they faced a reasonable 

possibility of persecution if they returned with another child, 

their second violation of the policy.) 

Mrs. Ashqar testified that her nephew was detained and 

tortured by Israeli authorities in 1999 and “the only thing they 

asked him about was his uncle, [Dr. Ashqar], and his connections 

to Hamas.” (J.A. 103 (emphasis added); see also J.A. 184.) The 

BIA found that this testimony was contradicted by the nephew’s 

affidavit however. The nephew’s affidavit shows that the 

Israeli authorities believed the nephew himself was a member of 

HAMAS: 

[The Israeli interrogators] accused me of being a 

member of Hamas. I was told by the interrogators that 

people confessed against me during their 

interrogation. My response was let them face me. I 

told them that I am not a member of Hamas and never 

have been a member of Hamas. Also, the interrogator 

accused me of being detained by the Jordanians, 

Americans and the Palestinians. I told them that was 

not true and I was never detained by any one [of] the 

above governments or anyone. Finally, they accused me 

of talking to my uncle, Abdelhaleem, on a regular 

basis and therefore, I must be involved with him for 

Hamas. I denied all charges. 

(J.A. 547.) It is thus not compelling evidence that Mrs. 

Ashqar, who is not herself tied to HAMAS, would be targeted. 

 Mrs. Ashqar also offered evidence that the Israeli Army 

searched the Ashqars’ home in the Occupied Territories twice in 

15 
1995 because they believed Dr. Ashqar had returned from the 

United States and had a warrant for his arrest. But the BIA 

ruled that “it is mere speculation to infer from this that the 

military would have persecuted [Mrs. Ashqar] had she been 

present or that they will do so now or in the future.” (J.A. 

17.) We have to agree. The fact that the Israeli Army entered 

the home pursuant to a warrant for Dr. Ashqar’s arrest is not 

evidence of persecution of Dr. Ashqar, much less his wife. See

Abdel-Rahmen, 493 F.3d at 452 (“the potential for a criminal 

prosecution in an applicant’s native country does not alone 

constitute persecution”). 

Additionally, the BIA held that Mrs. Ashqar “failed to show 

a documented pattern of the Israeli government persecuting the 

innocent wives of alleged or actual Hamas members who have not 

been directly implicated in terrorist attacks . . . .” (J.A. 

17.) Mrs. Ashqar asserts that the BIA erred by considering her 

the wife of a suspected member of HAMAS, rather than a political 

dissident. It is unclear why Mrs. Ashqar believes she would be 

more likely to be persecuted as a wife of a political dissident 

than as a wife of a suspected HAMAS member, particularly when 

much of her own argument for asylum rests on the assumption that 

she faces more danger now that Dr. Ashqar has been publicly tied 

to HAMAS through the publication of the 1994 book and the 

incidents with the grand juries. Nonetheless, assuming arguendo 

16 
that it would be in her favor to be considered a family member 

of a political dissident rather than suspected member of a 

terrorist group, we find that substantial evidence supports the 

BIA’s determination. 

The record is replete with evidence that Dr. Ashqar was a 

suspected member of HAMAS, including a 2001 FBI report in which 

Dr. Ashqar was deemed “a member of the HAMAS U.S. leadership.” 

(J.A. 1015.) Although Mrs. Ashqar argues that the allegations 

against her husband were false, the record shows that she was 

not in the best position to make that assessment. Besides her 

obvious bias by the nature of their relationship, Mrs. Ashqar 

remained ignorant of their finances and her husband’s business 

pursuits. As the BIA noted, Mrs. Ashqar testified that “she did 

not involve herself in his ‘business’ activities, was unaware of 

what he did while traveling, and did not learn until years 

later” about a $100,000 check her husband wrote “to a man later 

designated as a terrorist.” (J.A. 18.) Therefore, it is 

reasonable to conclude that Mrs. Ashqar’s testimony was 

insufficient to overcome other evidence that Dr. Ashqar was 

involved with HAMAS. 

There is substantial evidence as well, to support the BIA’s 

determination that Mrs. Ashqar failed to demonstrate a pattern 

of Israeli authorities targeting the families of security 

suspects. Mrs. Ashqar argues that this ignores articles she 

17 
submitted from human rights organizations about female relatives 

of security suspects who have been detained without charge in 

order to indirectly punish the accused. 

However, also in the record are the 2003, 2004, and 2005 

State Department country reports on Israel and the Occupied 

Territories. Significantly, the State Department reports do not 

recognize any retribution directed toward the family members of 

political dissidents or HAMAS members not accused of terrorist 

attacks. The State Department mentioned only that the HAMAS 

members or political opponents themselves have been subject to 

persecution. While the State Department made the finding that 

Israeli forces demolish “the homes of the families and relatives 

of those convicted of or suspected of committing terror attacks, 

effectively punishing innocent Palestinians not implicated in 

the attacks,” as the BIA noted, there was no evidence in the 

record that Dr. Ashqar was ever suspected of such an attack. 

(J.A. 948; see also J.A. 844, 881.) 

The BIA relied on the State Department’s reports because it 

apparently found the private organizations’ information to be 

merely “anecdotal” and thus unpersuasive. We cannot fault the 

BIA for preferring the State Department’s assessment. 

A State Department report on country conditions is 

highly probative evidence in a well-founded fear case. 

Reliance upon these reports makes sense because this 

inquiry is directly within the expertise of the 

Department of State. 

18 
19 

 . . . . 

. . . Absent powerful contradictory evidence, the 

existence of a State Department report supporting the 

BIA’s judgment will generally suffice to uphold the 

Board’s decision. Any other rule would invite courts 

to overturn the foreign affairs assessments of the 

executive branch. 

Gonahasa v. INS, 181 F.3d 538, 542-43 (4th Cir. 1999) (citations 

and internal quotes omitted). 

 Although we have considerable sympathy for Mrs. Ashqar, 

“our task is not to reweigh the evidence and determine which of 

the competing views is more compelling. It is instead to ensure 

that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s judgment.” Id. at 

542. Accordingly, because we do not find that the evidence 

compels only one reasonable conclusion in this case, we must 

defer to the BIA’s decision. 

III. 

 Pursuant to the foregoing, we deny Mrs. Ashqar’s petition 

for review of the BIA’s denial of her request for asylum. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED