[Cite as State v. Williams, 2011-Ohio-3267.]

 Court of Appeals of Ohio

 EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 No. 96323 

STATE OF OHIO

 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs.

DENNIS WILLIAMS

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-432748 

BEFORE: Kilbane, A.J., Sweeney, J., and Jones, J. 
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 30, 2011 

APPELLANT

Dennis Williams, Pro Se 

Inmate No. 453-475 

Grafton Correctional Institution 

2500 S. Avon-Belden Road 

Grafton, Ohio 44044 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

Mary McGrath 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center - 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J.: 

{¶ 1} This appeal is before the court on the accelerated docket pursuant 

to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 11.1. 

{¶ 2} Defendant-appellant, Dennis Williams (Williams), pro se, appeals 

the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct a void sentence. For the 

reasons that follow, we remand the case for the limited purpose to correct the 

sentencing entry regarding postrelease control. 
{¶ 3} The facts of this case were previously set forth by this court in 

State v. Williams, Cuyahoga App. No. 85858, 2005-Ohio-4422, as follows: 

“On January 22, 2003, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury 

jointly indicted Williams and his co-defendant, Lawrence 

Royster, on eight counts: two counts for aggravated 

murder with felony-murder specifications, one count for 

aggravated arson, two counts for aggravated robbery, and 

three counts for intimidation. All of the counts had oneand three-year firearm specifications attached. The 

counts arose from Williams setting fire to Lawrence 

Royster’s home to cover up the murder of Kenyard Drake. 

On June 6, 2003, Williams entered a guilty plea to an 

amended count of involuntary manslaughter, one count of 

aggravated arson, and one count of aggravated robbery. 

He also pled to the attached three-year firearm 

specifications. The remaining counts were nolled. 

Williams filed a motion to vacate his plea prior to being 

sentenced, which was denied. On October 6, 2003, the 

trial court sentenced Williams to ten years on the 

involuntary manslaughter count, six years on the 

aggravated arson count, two years on the aggravated 

robbery count, and a mandatory three years on each of the 

firearm specifications, which were merged. The 

sentences were imposed consecutively for a total of 

twenty-one years. 

Williams filed a notice of appeal from his plea and 

sentence. However, he thereafter voluntarily dismissed 

the appeal. [State v. Williams (December 22, 2003), 

Cuyahoga App. No. 83706.] This court denied his motion 

to reinstate the appeal and motion to file a delayed appeal. 

 Id. at ¶3-6.” 

{¶ 4} In September 2004, Williams filed another motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. In December 2004, he filed a 
motion to correct his sentence, which the trial court also denied. This court 

affirmed the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct his sentence, finding 

that Williams’s claim cannot be considered because it is barred by res 

judicata. Id. at ¶10. 

{¶ 5} Then, in December 2010, Williams filed another motion to correct 

a void sentence in light of the Ohio Supreme Court’s rulings in State v. Bezak, 

114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, and State v. Singleton,

124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, arguing that he is 

entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing because the trial court failed to 

properly notify him of postrelease control. The State opposed the motion, 

arguing that Williams’s sentence is not void and may be corrected by a nunc 

pro tunc journal entry. The trial court denied Williams’s motion in January 

2011. 

{¶ 6} It is from this order that Williams now appeals, raising the 

following two assignments of error for review. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE 

“The trial court committed reversible error when it failed 

to properly notify [Williams] that five years of postrelease 

control was mandatory in his case during his sentencing 

hearing on September 30, 2003 and failed to properly 

include postrelease control into the judgment entry of that 

sentence; violating [R.C. 2967.28] and [Williams’s] right to 

Due Process protected by both the Ohio and United States 

Constitutions.” 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO 

“The trial court abused its discretion when it overruled 

[Williams’s] Motion to Correct a Void Sentence for lack of 

properly imposed postrelease control.”

{¶ 7} As an initial matter, we note that both of Williams’s assigned 

errors challenge the trial court’s imposition of postrelease control at the 

September 2003 sentencing hearing. In State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 

2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, the Ohio Supreme Court recently held that 

principles of res judicata, including the doctrine of the law of the case, do not 

preclude appellate review of the imposition of postrelease control and that the 

sentence may be reviewed at any time, on direct appeal or by collateral 

attack. Thus, the issue of Williams’s postrelease control is properly before 

this court. 

{¶ 8} Williams argues his sentence is void because the trial court failed 

to advise him at the sentencing hearing and include in the sentencing journal 

entry that he would be subject to five years mandatory postrelease control 

upon his release from prison. He claims that the trial court’s failure to use 

“mandatory language” rendered his sentence void and entitled him to a de 

novo hearing. However, we are unable to determine whether the trial court 

properly sentenced Williams to a mandatory five years of postrelease control 

at the sentencing hearing because he did not file a transcript of that hearing. 
{¶ 9} In Ohio, the appellant has the duty to file the transcript or such 

parts of the transcript that are necessary for evaluating the lower court’s 

decision. See App.R. 9(B); Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories (1980), 61 Ohio 

St.2d 197, 199, 400 N.E.2d 384. The failure to file the transcript prevents an 

appellate court from reviewing the appellant’s assignments of error. State v. 

Turner, Cuyahoga App. No. 91695, 2008-Ohio-6648, ¶13, appeal not allowed, 

121 Ohio St.3d 1476, 2009-Ohio-2045, 905 N.E.2d 655. Thus, absent a 

transcript or alternative record, we must presume regularity in the 

proceedings below. Knapp at 199. 

{¶ 10} Since Williams did not file a transcript of the proceedings below, 

which is necessary for our determination of the issue before us, his argument 

that the trial court failed to provide proper notice of postrelease control 

during the sentencing hearing is without merit. 

{¶ 11} Our analysis does not end here, however, because Williams also 

claims that the trial court failed to properly incorporate his postrelease 

control obligations into its sentencing journal entry. This portion of his 

argument has merit. In the sentencing journal entry, the trial court stated 

“[p]ost release control is part of this prison sentence for the maximum period 

allowed for the above felony(s) under R.C. 2967.28.” Williams argues the 

trial court was required to state that he was obligated to serve a mandatory 

period of five years of postrelease control. 
{¶ 12} This court has held that it is insufficient for the court to inform 

the defendant at sentencing and in its journal entry that he “may be” subject 

to postrelease control when postrelease control is mandatory. See State v. 

Nicholson, Cuyahoga App. No. 95327, 2001-Ohio-14, ¶12. Here, Williams 

plead guilty to a first degree felony, so he was subject to a mandatory 

five-year period of postrelease control. See R.C. 2967.28(B)(1). Therefore, 

the court did not properly impose a mandatory five-year period of postrelease 

control in its sentencing entry. 

{¶ 13} Furthermore, this court has also held that if a court imposes a 

prison sentence that includes a term of postrelease control, the court must 

notify the offender, both at the sentencing hearing and in its journal entry, 

that the parole board could impose an additional prison term if the offender 

violates the terms and conditions of postrelease control. State v. James, 

Cuyahoga App. No. 94400, 2010-Ohio-5361, ¶25. In the instant case, the 

trial court erred by failing to state in its journal entry that the parole board 

could impose an additional term of incarceration if Williams violates the 

terms and conditions of postrelease control. See State v. Rice, Cuyahoga 

App. No. 95100, 2011-Ohio-1929, ¶10 (where this court, relying on Fischer, 

remanded appellant’s case for the trial court to correct the sentencing journal 

entry to reflect that appellant could be subject to further incarceration for 

violation of terms and conditions of postrelease control.) 
{¶ 14} The State argues that under Fischer, this court can correct 

Williams’s sentence without remanding for a resentencing hearing. We find 

the State’s argument more persuasive. 

{¶ 15} In Fischer, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that appellate 

courts do not have to remand a sentence that includes an improper period of 

postrelease control, calling remand “just one arrow in the quiver.” Id. at ¶29. 

 Instead, the Fischer court acknowledged that an appellate court’s discretion 

to correct “a defect in a sentence without a remand is an option that has been 

used in Ohio and elsewhere for years in cases in which the original 

sentencing court, as here, had no sentencing discretion.” Id. The court 

explained, “[c]orrecting the defect without remanding for resentencing can 

provide an equitable, economical, and efficient remedy for a void sentence [,]” 

in cases where “a trial judge does not impose postrelease control in 

accordance with statutorily mandated terms.” Id. at ¶30. 

{¶ 16} Accordingly, we remand the matter with instructions to the trial 

court to correct its journal entry dated October 6, 2003, to reflect that 

Williams is subject to five years mandatory postrelease control and that an 

additional term of up to one-half of his prison sentence could be imposed if 

Williams violates the terms and conditions of his postrelease control. See 

State v. Norris, Cuyahoga App. No. 95485, 2011-Ohio-1795, ¶22; State v. 

Williams, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 94321–94323, 2011-Ohio-316, ¶29. 
{¶ 17} Judgment is affirmed and the sentence is modified. The matter 

is remanded with instructions to the trial court to correct its sentencing entry 

dated October 6, 2003 to reflect that Williams is subject to five years 

mandatory postrelease control and that Williams could be subject to an 

additional term of up to one-half of his prison sentence if he violates the 

terms and conditions of his postrelease control. 

It is ordered that the parties share equally the costs herein taxed. 

 The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 

JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., and 

LARRY A. JONES, J., CONCUR