### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN
NO. 03-01-00121-CR

Mark Dietz, Appellant
v. The State of Texas , Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 390T H JUDICIAL DIST RICT NO. 0994422, HONORABLE CHARLES F. CAMPBELL, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

Mark Die t z a pp ea ls his con

v i cti on f or i m pers on ati n g a pu b l i c s er v an t, see Te x. P en. Code An n. § 37.11 (West Supp. 2001), for which he w as sen

tenced t o t wo years’ probation. He compl ai ns on appeal

that t here i s a f

atal variance b etween

t he indict ment a nd t he pr oo f at t rial, a nd that t he State i

ntroduc ed f

al se e vi den ce. We will over ru le bot h issues and a ffi rm t he judg ment o f the trial cou rt. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The Impersonation Inciden t

In the early morni ng of J une 19, 1999, bai

l e nf orcemen t agent Mark Dietz attempted to apprehen

d Nabor Rangel, who had f ai le d to appear

on a schedul

ed court dat e after

posting b ond. Acco rd ingto Die

tz, a confidentia

l so ur ce ha d infor med him that Nabo r Ra ngel co uld be fou nd at t he1 Off

ic er Schroeder testifi

ed on di rect t hat Aust in Po lice Dep ar t ment o ffi cer s will not assist in a forced entry

apprehensi on of a suspect where only a m is dem eanor warrant is

in volv ed. 2 apartment of h

is ex-wife, Ida Ran

gel . Dietz testif

ie d that h e ty pi ca l l y perf orm s a pp re h ensi on s wi th
a pa r t ne r , bu t o n t ha t da y his p ar t ne rwa s ill a nd Die t z’ s s ev en t ee n- yea r - o ld son was with h

im . They dr ove t o t he Bo o ke rT . Wa shin gt o n a pa r t men t co mple x bu t we r e u na ble to locate t he address. Wh en Dietz’s son spott ed a poli ce car nearby , they dec ided t o a sk t he o ffi

cer for assist ance in locat ing t he ap ar tmen t. Acco rd ingto Ang el i que H ooper, an off

ic er with the A

ustin Police De pa rtm en t, D i etz ide ntif ie d hi ms el f as a T ra v i s C oun ty Sheri f f ’s de pu ty an d sh owe d h

er h i s b ad ge . D i etz to ld h er that he had a felony war ra nt for Nabo r Ra ngel t hat he needed h el p servi ng. Hooper t estif

ie d that it was
cus tomar y for Aust in po lice officer s t o he lp o t her law enfo rc ement officer s ser ve felonywar ra nt s and
so she di rected hi m to the apartment. Backup off ic er Julie Schroeder testifi

ed that she and H ooper began doubting that Dietz was a l awenfo rc ement officer beca use of his beha vior . Ac co rd ingt o t he
o ffic er s, Die t z h ad a “ co ck y” and “ authoritative” a tt itude, was “ furti

ve” an d “j umpy ,” and ha d o nly
a very poor quality

photo graph of the al

le ged “sus

pect.” Dietz’s b ehav

ior soon ma

de it clear t o t he officers t hat he was no t a sher if f’sdeputy b

ut rat her a ba

il bondsm an or bounty hun

ter. After they le arned from the dis patcher that Die

tz had onl y a mi sdem eanor warrant, the offi

cers refus ed

to assis t hi m f urthe r. 1 Both off ic ers testif ie d that t hey

stayed b ack

wh i l e D i etz kicked at the doorand f

orced his way past Ida Rangel

in to her apartmen

t. Ida Rangel testi fi

ed that Dietz told her at the door t hat he wasa pol

i ce of f i cer. A s h e w en t i n th e a pa rtm en t, he wa s br an dis hing a g un an d ye lling o n his ce ll3

phone. Ida testifi

ed that a m

an h ad calle d the apartmen

t at six that m

ornin g say in g he h ad a Federal Express del iv

ery f or Nabor Ran gel . S he infor med him that Nabo r Ra ngel did no t live at t he apartment, but the cal

ls had conti nued. IdaRangel’s relati

ves Sara F igue

roa and her hus

ban d Ruben Hernan dez wer e st aying wi th h er i n th e a pa rtm en t; Hern andez tes tif i ed th at Di etz ca

me upstai rs i nto the r oom wh ere they were sleep ingwith thei

r three children . He kicke d their door open and poin ted a gun at Hernandez demand ingto know if

he was Na

bor Rangel . Hernandez was f righ ten ed fo r hi mse lf an d fo rhis chi ldren and wi fe. Ida Rangel ’s ten-y

ear-old son was al

so in the apartmen

t. He t estif

ie d that he was in the living ro om wit h his mot her when D ietz kicke d his wa y into t he house and that h e s aw Di etz po intthe gun at Her nandez. Ida Rangel testif ied that when he cam

e downst ai rs, Dietz w as “real
an gr y” an d he a ppe are d “ cra

zy .” W he n h e c oul d n ot loca t e Na bor Rang el, he left t he ap artm en t; on his wa y out, he i ns ul ted Ida R angel , a Puerto Ri can

U.S. ci tiz en , cal l i ng h er a “ f ***i ng M exi can .” Di etz pre sente d a

ve ry dif f ere nt v ers i on of t he incident . Ac co rd ingt o his t es t imo ny, he never represented hi

ms el f as a sheri ff ’s depu ty or police off

ic er to Hooper, Schroeder or Ida Ra ng el; r at he r , he t es t ified t ha t he cle ar ly indicat ed t hat he wa s a ba il enforc ement age nt . Ac co rd ing t o D ietz , no one would ha ve ass um ed th at he wasan off i cer b ase d on h

i s ap peara nc e. He went out of his way t o d esc ribe w hat he wa s we ar ing, w hich, i f true , wou

l d have b orne n

o res em bl an ceto a typ i cal pol i ce or sh

eri f f uni f orm. Di etz testifi ed that when h

e got t he cal

l that Nab or Rangel

was al le gedl

y a t his form er wif e’s ap ar t men t , he an d h is s o n ha d b ee n w o r ki ng o n t he irr an ch in J o hns o n C it y. He h ad not wa nt ed t o t ak e t he ch an ce o f miss ing Ra ng el, so he ca me st ra ight fro m the ra nch wit hou t chang ing4

his cl othes. He t est ifi

ed t hat he had been c ast ra t ing farm animals and c learing bru sh, so t he shirt he
was we ari n g w as cov er ed wi th ani ma l blood. Dietz stated that he had not shaved i

n day s, that he was
wea ring b oots up to his knee s wit h his jeans t uck ed int o t he bo ot s, a nd th at h e h ad on a b l ac k h at wi th a tu rk ey f ea th er i n i t. Nei ther police off

ic er remem

bered seei ng bl ood o n Dietz’s clot hes. Hooper testifi ed t hat Diet z wa s dr esse d in jeans a nd a d enim shirt , a nd lo ok ed “d ece nt .” She did not see any bl ood on hi s clot hes an

d did n ot get the im

pression that he ha d b ee n w o r kin g w it h a nimals or hauling bru sh. Di

etz at t emp t ed t o dis cr ed it t he o ffi cer s’ t est imony by i

mplyi ng t hat t hey sho uld have known tha t he wa s n ot a s he ri f f ’s deputy or oth er l

aw en f orce men t of ficer. He i

n trod uc ed i n to evi dence the b adge he was

wearin g that day an

d cross-exam

in ed Hooper r egardin

g its appearan

ce. When Ho op er was able t o c lose ly exami ne t he bad ge d ur ing t he t rial, s he r ead t he wo rd s “Fug itive Rec overy .” She testif

ie d that on

th e m orn i n g of th e i n ci den t, howev er , D i etz

f l ashe d the b adgef

rom in si de hi s v eh i cl e, w hi ch wa s s i x or seve n feet awa y from her . Mo re ove r, she did no t scr ut inize the badgeb ec au se

sh e i n i ti al l y took D i etz

at his wo r d w he n he t o ld he rt ha t he wa s a sh er iff’ s d ep ut y. Had she i nspected the badge, sh

e w oul d have n oti ce d that i

t did n ot res em bl e a pol i ceof f i cer’ s or sheriff ’s badg e. Diet z also t est ifi ed t hat he ga ve the officers his busi ness card, which cl

early in dic ated his employment wit h a bail enfor cement agency calle d “Steal

th Hunters.” Off

ic er Hooper testifi

ed, however, that Di

etz nev er sh

owed h er h i s ca rd. Di etz also co nt ra dict ed t he ac co unt of his ent ry into Id a Ra ngel’s ho me and hi s f ai le d attempt to apprehen

d Nabor Rangel . He admit t ed t hat he was car rying a g un, but explained t hat he hasa concealed han

dgun l ic ense, that hi s gun

is al way s conceal

ed, and t hat it w as c onc ealed dur ing2 Bu

rg l ar y of a h ab i tati on wi th int en t t o co mmit a fe lo ny is a fi rst-degree felony, Tex . Pen. Code Ann. § 30 .0 2( d) (Wes t Su pp. 200 1) ; and ag gr av at ed as sa ul t is a se co nd
- de gr ee fe lo ny, id. § 22 .0 2( b) (West 1994)
. I mp er so na t ing a p ub lic o ffic er is a t hir d- de gr ee fe lo ny. Id. § 37. 11(b ) (West Supp. 2001)
. 5 t his i nc i den t. He al so disputed thath e p oi n ted th e g un at a n y of th e r es i den

ts o f th e a pa rtm en t. D i etz cl ai me d that he di d not force hi s way in to the apartmen

t, but rat her

that Ida Rangel

consented to let hi m c ome i nsi de. Di etz was char ged in a thr ee- co unt indict ment fo r a lleged o ffenses a rising out of t he June in ci dent. They

i n cl ud ed b urgl ar y of a h ab i tati on wi th i n ten t to co m m i t ag gr av ate d a ss aul

t wi th
a dead l y weap on, see

Tex . Pen . Code A

nn . § 30.02 (West Supp. 2001) ; agg ra vat ed a ssau lt w ith a de ad ly weap on, see

id. § 22.02( a)(2) (West 1994) ; a nd i m pers onati ng a pub l i c se rva nt, s ee id. § 37.11 (West Supp . 20 01 ). A

f ter a b en ch trial , D i etz

wa s f oun d g ui l ty of on l y the l es s s eri ousof f en se of imperso nat inga pub l i c s er v an t. 2 The j udge sentenc ed hi m to two ye ars’ i

mprisonm ent but suspen

ded his se nt en ce an d p lac ed him o n p r o ba t io n. Die t z a pp ea ls th e j ud gm en t a nd rai ses two issue s. He argues fi rst t hat a m

aterial variance ex

is ts between the i

ndictmen t and the proo f at trial

and, theref

ore, t he ev i den ce i s l eg al l y i n suf f i ci en t to s us tai n th e c on v i cti on . Se con

dl y , h e c on ten dsth at th e S tate int r o du ce d fa lse ev ide nc e a t t r ial. DISCUSSI ON Variance Sec

ti on 37.11( a)(1) of the Penal Code pro vides that “[a] perso n comm its an off ense i f h e i m pers on ate s a

pu b l i c s er v an t wi th i n ten t to i n du ce an oth er to s ub m i t to hi s pretended

off ic ia l
au th ori ty or to re l y on hi s pretended off

ic ia l a cts.” Id. § 37 .11 (a) (1) . The p orti on of t he indict ment3 Th e i nd i ctm en t al so accus ed

Dietz of a v i ol ati on of se cti on 37.11( a)(2). See id. § 37.11( a)(2). Wh en t he judg e anno unce d his ru ling from t he benc h, he made c lear t hat he was basing his jud gment as to Di etz ’s gui l t base d o n a vi ola

tion of s ection 37.1 1(a)(1 ) and not of section 37.11( a)(2). Moreov er, the parties do not address section 37.11(a)(2). Therefore, we con f i n e ou r op i n i on to an anal y si s un der s ection 37.1 1(a)(1 ). 6 per t aining to the i m pers onati on of f en se w as descri

pti ve of the i nc i den t. It s tate s th

at D i etz “i mpe rsonate[d] a pub l i c s er

v an t wi th i n ten t to i n duce an oth er , to w i

t: Ida Ra ng el an d Sa ra F i gue roa and Ruben

Hernan dezan d A ng eliq ue Ho o pe rt o su bmit t o his p r et en de d a ut ho r it y o rt o r ely o n his preten ded of f i ci al acts.”

3 At trial , Off

ic er Hooper an d I da Ra ng el t es t ified t ha t Die t z e xp licit ly t o ld them tha t he was a sheriff’ s deput y or a po li ce o ff icer. Her nandez and Figuero a’s testim ony di d not allege that Di etz im personated an off

ic er, only that he brandi

shed h is weapon i n a thr ea ten i n g m an n er . D i etz argues that sin

ce the evi den ce s how s t ha t he t old only t wo of t he fo ur individuals named in the indict ment that he wa s a law enfo rc ement off ic er, he cann

ot be gui lty of vi olatin g section 37.11(a)(1)
as t o t he ot her t wo . I n esse nce, it is Diet z’s c ont ent ion t hat a fat al varianc e exist s bet wee n t he allegat ions in t he in dic tment an d t he pr oo f at t rial. T he su ffi ciency o f the evidenc e t o s ust ain a crim in al convi ction i s m easured by

the el em ents of the off

ense as defined in a hy

pot hetic al ly

correct j ury ch arge f or the ca se. Malik v. State , 953 S.W.2d234, 240 (Tex. Crim . App. 1997) . The court of cr iminal a pp ea ls r ec en t ly

exp laine d t he a pp licat io n o f Malik in cases of al le ged variances b etween t he p lea ding and t he p ro o f: [W]e h ol d th at w hen face d wit h a su ffi ciency o f the evidenc e claim based upo n a variance be t we en t he ind ict men t an d t he pr o o f, o nly a “m aterial ” variance wi

ll render t he evidenc e insufficient. Thu s, t he hyp oth eti ca l l y cor re ct ch arge

wi l l tak e i n to con si de rati on t he fat al varianc e do ct rine fo rmer ly expres sed by thi s Court

and today7

reaff irm ed. Al le gations gi

vi ng ri se to im

ma terial variances m

ay be disr ega rd ed in t he hyp o t he t ica lly

corr ect charge, but allegations givi ng rise to material v

ariances m

ust be i ncl uded. Gollihar v. State , 46 S.W .3d 243 , 257 (Tex. Cri m . App. 2001 ) (f

ootnote omi

tted). The in dictment i nf ormed appel

la nt t ha t he wa s a cc us ed o f impe r so na t ing a p ub lic
ser vant un

de r s ec ti on 3 7.1 1(a

)(1 ). To v

i ol atese cti

on 37. 11( a) (1 ), t her e must be a f al se as su m ption o rpr et en sio n by a person that he i s a publ ic servan t and overt action in

that ca paci ty cou pl ed wi th t he re qui si

te i nten t. See Tova r v. State , 777 S.W.2d 481, 48 9 ( Te x . A pp .—C orp usCh

ri sti 19 89 , pe t. ref ’d); see also Boyett v. St ate , 368 S.W .2d 769 , 771 (Tex. Cri m . App. 1963 ) ( int er pr et in g pre de ce ss orstatut ory provi si on). The prosecution proved both of these el em ents of the off

en se . Und er Dietz’s i

n ter pr eta ti on of th e statu

te, h owev er , the S tate

also h ad to prov e th

at D i etz i m pers on ate d h

i m se l f as a pub l i c s er

v an t to each pe r so n t ha t he int en de d t o ind uc e t o su bmit t o his pretended au t ho r it y o rt o r ely o n his pretended off ic ia l ac ts. The S tate

as se rtsth at i t di d n ot n ee d to pr ove that Dietz i

mpe rsonated hi

ms el f to every

person i nvol ved in t he incident but t hat unde r t he express t er ms of t he sta

tute, proof

th at D i etz

i m pers on ate d h

i m se l f to one p er son

wi th th e r eq ui si te i n ten t to i n du ce “ an oth er” to s

ub m i t to hi s pre ten

de d a uth ori ty wa s s uf f i ci en t. Th e p l ai n l an gua geof th e statu te doe s n ot l en d i tse l f to the i nte rpreta ti on of se cti on 37.11( a)( 1) t hat Diet z ur ges us t o a do pt . B y its t er ms, t he st at ut e is violat ed w hen an indivi dua l im personates a publi

c servant with the in

tent t hat someone rely

on his pr ete nd

ed of f i ci al ac ts or
au t ho r it y. See id. § 37 .11 (a) (1) ; Tovar , 777 S. W. 2d at 48 9. T he ac t o rne ed no t su cc ee d in ac t ua lly inducing any

one to submi

t t o or rely on hi s assum

ed authority; al l that i s requi redis the i m pe rs ona ti on and the i nten t. See id. § 37. 11( a)( 1); Tovar , 777 S.W.2d at 489. T hat such i s s uf f i ci en t to vi ol ate8

se cti on 37. 11( a) (1 ) r eflect s t he und er lyi ng purpose of the statut e, whi ch i s to mai ntain publ ic trust in l aw en f or c em en t and governm en t. See gen erally

Rus sel l G. Donaldson , An

notati on, “Acts as Such” Eleme

nt of 18 USCS § 9 12, Making it a Crime to Pre tend to be an Off icer or Employee of the United States , 55 A .L. R. F ed . 49 4 (1 981 ) (d i sc us si ng pur pos esof federal im personation statute, whi ch ar e t o maint ain public r esp ect and g oo dwill for t he go ver nment a nd go ver nment o ffi cials, a nd to mai ntai n the di gni ty of governm en t serv i ce). Every

tim e someone f

al sel y assum es governm

ental autho rity, he i

mpl icates the purpo se of such statut es. The pur po se o f sect ion 3 7. 11( a) (1 ) w ou ld be underm in ed i f the State were required to prove that a d efe n da

n t h el d h i m se l f out a s a pu b l i c s er v an t to ea ch pers on th at h e i n ten de d to in duce t o r ely

on or submi

t t o his authority. For exam

ple , a person mi

ght im personate apolice off

ic er to an of f i ce b ui l di n g s ecuri ty gu ard a n d order the ev acua

ti on of th e b ui l di n g, i n ten di n g th er eb y to in duce every

one i n the b uil din g to subm it to his pretende d authority. Nei ther logic nor the lan

guage of sec t ion 3 7. 11( a) (1 ) r equ ires t hat t he imper so nat ion be addressed to each in div idua l i n the b uil din g.
Dietz’s pri

mary obj ec ti ve wa s to g et i

ns i dethe ap artm en t an d s ea rch f or Na bor Ra ng el, wh

o Di etz th oug h t wa s h i di n g i n si de . H e acc om

pl i sh ed th i s ob j ec ti ve by im per so nat ing himse lf as a sher iff

’s de put y to Officer H oo per and t hen as a po lice officer t o I da R ang el
. Once in si de, he br andishe d his gu n and t hre at ened Her nande z and Figue ro a, t her eby evidenc inghis intent that t he y su bmit t o his pr et en de d a ut ho r it y. The f act fi nder could reas onabl

y c oncl ude that hi s i

ni tial i m pe rs ona ti on to Hooper and Ida Rangel was i ntended to in duce ev er yo ne in t he ap ar t men t t o su bmit9

to hi s pretende d aut hor ity. I ndee d, t he t rial co ur t explained t hat Diet z’s initial de cep t ion wa s t he b as i s f or h i s r ul i n g th at D i etz h ad v i ol ate d s ec ti on

37 .11 (a)(1 ) a s s et f

orth i n th e i n di ctm en t: [I] bel ie ve that there is co mpet ent cr edible evide nce fr om bo t h po lice witne ss[ es] and a ci vi li an wit ness t hat t his defend ant did indee d r epr ese nt himself as a member o f the T r av is Cou

nty sh eri f f ’s of f i cean d that tru thf ul l y non e of t his wo uld have unfo lded t he wa y it di d i f

that hadn ’t ha

ppen ed. The reason that it went aw ry is because of that initial deception. Had

that initial d

eceptio n not occu rred

, I don’t think an

y of this w ould have unfolded the way it did. (Em phasi s ad ded.) Dietz’s init ial d ec ep t io n se t in mo t io n a n e ve nt t ha t ult imat ely a ffec t ed all o f t he pe o ple in the apartmen

t t hat day . The i

ndictmen t describ ed the people that Di etz in teracted wit h dur ingt he i n ci den t. It is of n

o consequence that

Die tz did not expl

ic itl y tel l He rnandez or Figueroa that he was a g ove rn men t of f i ci al . Ba se d on

the pl ai n l an gua geof th e statu te, we con cl ud e th at D i etz violated
sec t ion 3 7. 11( a) (1 ) a s set ou t in the ind ictment when he im personated hi

ms el f as a sh eri f f ’s de pu ty to Off ic er Hooper and as a pol

ic e off ic er to Ida Rangel

to gai n acces s to t he apartme

nt where he

then threatened

the nam ed others so t hat they

wou l d s ub m i t to hi s pretended authority . We hol d, t he r efo r e, t ha t t he r e is no va r ian ce be t we en t he alle ga t io ns in t he ind ict men t an d t he pr o o f at t r ial.

Even i f a vari anc e does ex

i st, it i s not a m

ateri al one: A va ri an cebe twe en the word i ng of an indict ment a nd

the evi dence prese

nted at tr ia

l is fat al o nly

if “i t is material and prej udices

[the d ef endan t’s] s ubs tantial ri ghts .” Wh en revi ewi ng s uch a v ariance, we m

us t determi

ne wh ether the in

dictment, as wr itt en, informed t he de fendant of t he ch arge ag ai n st h i m suf f i ci en tl y to al l ow h i m to prepa re an adequate def

ense at trial, and w

het he rpr o se cu t io n u nd er t he de ficie nt ly dr aft ed indict ment w ou ld subjec t t he de fendant t o t he risk of bei ng prosecuted later for the sam

e crim e.10

Gollihar , 46 S.W.3d

at 257 (quo ting United States v. Sprick , 233 F .3d 845 , 853 (5 th Ci r. 2000 )). The re i s n othi ng i n the rec ordto in

dic at e th at th e p re cise n um b er of pe opl e to w h om Di etz imp ersonatedhi

ms el f as a publ ic servan t was crucial

to hi s abi

li ty to conduct his de f

en se to th e charged off ense. A ppel la nt argues tha

t he f ac esthe ri sk of being pr os ecu t ed a gain und er a differe nt indict ment beca use t he evide nc e was i n suf f i ci en t to pr ov e th e a l l eg ati on s i n th e i n di ctm en t as to Hernan dezand Fi gueroa. Even i f Di

etz were correct that t he State’s evi dence f ai le d as to Hernandez and F ig ueroa, Dietz face s no f urther prosecut ion b ecause the i ndictmen t o n i ts face constitutes evi dence that he was ch ar ge d w it h imp er so na t ing a p ub lic servant with respect t o all f our in div idual s. Moreov er, the reco rd indi cates t hat Dietz was tried

on the o ff enseas to all

four peopl e. See Gollihar , 46 S.W.3d at 25 8 ( st at ing t ha t t he “e nt ire r ec o r d, no t jus t [ t he ] ind ict men t , may be r efe rr ed t o in pr o t ec t in g aga inst d ou ble jeop ar dy in event of su bseq uent pr os ecu t ion”) (c itat ion o mitt ed) . We concl ude that any all

eged variance is im

material and should be disr ega rd ed in d et er mini ng t he suf fi ci ency o f t he ev ide nc e u nd er a h ypo t he t ica lly corr ect jury charge. Because appella nt’s ch al le nge to the le gal

su ffi ci ency

of the evi

dence rests solel

y on a n i mm aterial variance, if an

y, i t is wi thout
meri t. False Evidence

Di etz argues under h

is second i ssue that

the Stat e used

fals e e vid en ce t o impe ac h his
cr ed i b i l i ty at t r ial. At t r ial, Die t z t es t ified o n his o wn be ha lf and off ered a differe nt ver sion o f the June incident than that descri

bed b y the Stat e’s wi

tnesses. He

al so test if

ie d regardin

g hi s credenti al s as a professi onal ba il r ec o ve ry ag en t an d e mph as ize d t he impo r t an ce o f his w o r k. “We ll, w he n p eo ple are arrested, they

ulti ma tely ma ke bond through

surety, and a

great percentage of

th em don ’t g o to c our

t.4 Die

tz’s obj ection on the ground of rel evan ce was overruled by

the court , which ex

pla in ed that Diet z’s t est imony

o n d ire ct as t o his experience m ade the State’s questioni

ng relevan

t. Dietz does not argu e on appe al th at t he quest ionin

g or exhi bits in tr odu ced by the St ate to cont radict Dietz’s t est imony we r e im pr o pe r ly allo we d o n t he gr o un d o f r ele va nc e. His ch alle ng e o n a pp ea l is o nly directed at the alle ged “f

al si ty” of the State’s ev

ide nce. 11 It ’s my job to locate them , fi

nd them an d p ut th em b ac k i n j ai l so t h ey ’l l go a n sw er to the judge .” He asserted tha t l aw en f orce men t of f i ci als w ere aw are of and res pected the w ork done

by ba i l recovery agents: “[The] polic e . . . were very recepti ve i n that we were out t her e t rying t o d o t he ri ght th i ng.” Di etz asse rt ed t hat he had been a n age nt since 1 986 and t hat no o ne had eve r qu es t io ne d h is
cr ed en t ials befo re t his inc ide nt . H e p ut evid enc e o f t he se cr eden ti als b ef oreth e tr

i al cou rt, sp ec ific ally, his badg e and a c ard tha t i nd i ca teshe i s a mem be r of t he “U nit ed St at es Pr o fes sio na l Ba il Bond Inv esti gators A ssoc i ati on.” Af ter Die tz tes tified as t o his experience, t he St ate was per mi tt ed, o ver Dietz’s objec t ion, 4 t o q ues t ion him reg ar ding his cr ede nt ials. Du ring t he co ur se o f the que st ioning, t he pros ecutor

brought out t he fact t hat Diet z had t est ifi ed be for e t he gr and jur y that he had been a police off ic er with the R

ound Rock Poli ce Departmen t and that he had a

priv ate in vestigator ’s l

ic ense. The State then of

f ered Exh i bi ts 23, 24 , and 25 to sh

ow that Di

etz’s gran d j ury testi mony wasf al se. E xhib it 25 wa s a n a ffid av it by t he custodi an of records f or t he Round Rock Poli

ce Dep ar t ment stati

ng th at no em ploym en t records werefou nd

for Diet z. In his clo sing ar gument , t he pr os ecu t or st at ed: “Mr. Diet z lied abo ut having been a police off ic er, and that’s why

the Court has
an af f i da v i t [c er ti f y i n g th at] no busi

ness records from the Round R ock Police

Departmen

t [had been f oun d] .” Di etz di d n ot ob j ec t to Ex h i b i t 25 or to th

e c l osi n g a rgum en t.5 Ap pe llan t cit es pr imar ily Giglio v. United States , 4 05 U .S . 1 50 ( 197 2) , a nd Mooney v. Holohan , 294 U .S. 103 (1 935). 12

On appe al , Di etz f

ocuse s on a

l etter to the prose cutor f rom RRP D’s records supervi sor. The letter confi rms tha t no empl oym ent records had b een f

ound for Di etz; it then a

dds t hat Diet z had been a reserve off ic er wi th th e dep ar tmen t b ut th at h e w as n ot th er e l

on g en oug

h to “be al l owe d to w

ri te repo rts, supplem

ents, or citations,” so he was not li sted in

their com

puter dat abas e. The lett er was in the Stat e’s possess ion b ut the prosecuto r did n

ot fi le it wi th Exhi bi t 25
ori ntroduc e i t at tria l
. Ana lo gi zin g t his t o a p r o se cu t o r ’s kn o win g u se o f p er ju r ed t es t imo ny, 5 Di

etz
as se rtstha t the State depri ve d h i m of due pr oc ess by int ro duc ing t he aff ida vi t stat in g that Dietz had
no em pl oy men t re cordswi

th RRPD when

the prosecuto r knew that Die tz had been

a reserve of

fi cer there. The St at e r esp ond s t hat by affi rmat ively stat ing“n

o obj ection,”Dietz

wai ve d a ny err or f rom the use of Exh

ibit 25. It also chal

le ngesDie tz’s characteri

zation of Ex

hi bi t 25 as fal se evi dence; it suggests that more appropriately Die t z’s argumen

t i s th at th e S tate f ai l ed to pres en t a c om pl ete pi cture of Dietz’s record with RRPD. The State further notes that the explanatory letter wa s contain ed i n th e p ros ecutor ’s

trial n oteb ook to which Di etz’s at to rney h ad access b ef

oretrial . D i etz does not di spute th

at he had notice of

the l etter. Finally

, t he St at e co nt ends t hat t he evi dence was not m aterial
. See Ex Parte Caste llano , 86 3 S
. W. 2d 47 6, 48 5 ( T ex . Cr im. App. 199 3) (st at ingthat t he use of p er

jure d t est imony is pres umed mat er ial “unless a r eviewing c ou rt is co nvinced be yond a r ea so na ble dou

b t th at th e p er j ur y di d n ot co n tri b ute to the con

vi cti on or pun

i sh men t”); Duggan v. State , 778 S.W.2d 465, 469 (Tex. Crim . App. 1989) (explai ni ng that “[b]eca

use f al se evidenc e13

cor ru pts the truth se ek i ng f un cti on of trial , a new

trial wil l b e neces sary

unless the f

al se evi dence does not vi ola te the a ccus ed’ s ri

ght to due process ”). Set t ingaside any

is sue of preserv

ation of error, we do n

ot f i n d th at th e S tate used fal se evi dence. Die

tz does not contend, an

d w e do not f

i nd , th at Ex

hi bi t 25 wasf al se on its f ace; n or do es t he expl anatory

l etter makethe aff

ida vi t fal se. At most, the le

tt er reveal s that the aff

ida v it wa s in compl ete. The omi tted l etter m

ust b e exam

i ne d i n the con text of thi s ca se. W

h eth er Di etz had b een a po lice o ffice rwit h RRPD was no t at iss ue in t he ca se . Die t z c r ea t ed an iss ue r eg ar din g h is employment wi

th RRPDby

testi f y i ng b ef ore the g rand j ury ab out hi s ex

peri ence a s a p oli

ce of f i cer; t he St at e o ffer ed E xhib it 25 in r es po nse t o t his t es t imo ny as a w ay t o impe ac h D iet z’ s c r ed ibilit y in
a ca se that cam

e down to Die tz’sword aga

i nst the word of

al l of the State’ s wi

tnes ses . Di etz was in the be st po sit io n t o pr es en t an ac cu r at e p ict ur e o f his own experience as an officer , w hich he did on redi rect exam in ation by expl ai ni ng that no reco rds were found because he was a r ese rve officer wit h RRP D, but t hat he had been w ith t he depart men t for several months. Thus, Die t z w as ab le t o pr es en t t he sa me info r mat io n a s t ha t co nt ain ed in th e l ette r. M ore ov er , D i etz ap pa r en t ly

cr eat ed a ny inaccur acy re gar ding h i s p oli ce ex perien ce b y f ai l i n g to specif

y that he was a
re ser ve off

ic er with R

RPD. Furtherm

ore, t he l etter was consistent with the af fi davi t becaus e it confi rmed tha t no e m pl oy men t rec ords ex i ste d re ga rdi ng Dietz . There f

ore, the af f i da vi t doe s n ot constitute false evi

dence. In t he ca se o f a co nst itu t ional er ro r su ch as t he us e of perjured test im

ony, we must
reverse a judgm

ent of conviction unl

ess we a re co nvinced be yond a re as ona bl e doubt tha

t the err or did no t co nt ribut e t o t he co nvictio n. Tex. R. App . P . 44 .2( a); Ex Part e Castellano , 863 S.W.2d at6 The C om m i ss i on i s th e state age ncy tha t re gulat es a nd l i censes pri va te sec uri ty of f i cers . See Tex . Occ. C ode A

nn . § 1702 .001-1 702.38 9 (West 200 0). 14 485
. In t his case , be cau se t he evi den ce was n ot fal se, w e need n

ot appl y the h arm l ess error stan

dard contai ne d i n ru l e 44.2 (a). Di etz al so asserts that Exhibits 23 a nd 24 constituted false evi

dence. The State used these ex h i b i ts to con tra di ct D i etz ’s testi mon y to th e g ra n d j ur y th at h e b ec am e a l i cen se d p ri

v ate i nv es ti ga torafter the i

nci dent and that he h

ad recei ved a certif i ca te i nd i ca ti ng tha t he wa s l i cens ed on August 24, 1999. At t rial, the Stat e off ered two af

f i da v i ts f rom th e T ex as Com m i ss i on on Pri v ate S ec ur it y. 6 On e a ffida vit stated t hat as of S ept ember 2 1, 199 9, t he Co mmi ssio n had no t loca t ed a ny records indic at ing t hat Die t z w as licen se d. Th e s ec o nd a ffi davi t stat ed t hat a se ar ch o f the Commi ssion’s records reveal ed that Die tz wa s no t lice nse d a s a pr iva t e in ve st iga t o rbu t t ha t his appl i ca ti on for a lic ense h

ad been fi le d on or about Se pt emb er 23 , 19 99 , jus t da ys a ft er his Septembe r 17 gr and jur y tes t imony; the app licatio n was incomplet e as of Ja nuar y 21, 200 0, t he da t e o f the af f i da v i t. At t rial, t he Stat e used

t he t wo affidavits t o s how first , t hat Diet z’s a sser t ions t o t he gr and j ury that he was l

ic ensed we

re fal se statemen

ts, and second, that Dietz’s applic ation f or a license was stil l i ncom ple te. Dietz’s at t or ney affirmatively st at ed t hat he had no obj ec ti on t o t he exhibits when t he pros ecutor

o ffer ed t he m. Di etz arg

ueson ap peal , however, that h

i s testi mony be f ore the g rand j ury was t hat he h ad

a “ certif i ca te of compl

etion” wh ic h he equated

wit h being licensed . D ietz ’s ar gument is simila rt o his argumen

t regarding Exh

ibit 25: He does not ar gue t hat t he exhibits offer ed by t he pr ose cuto rwere on thei r face f al se or in accurate, but rat her that the exh ibits created a f

als e7 Diet z also asse rt s t hat t he Co mmi ssio n on L aw E nfor cement Of f i cer Sta nd ard s a nd Educa ti on had r ec o r ds o n file pe r t ain ing t o Die t z, sp ec ifica lly do cu me nta ti onthat Dietz had recei ved a profi ci ency

certificate as a peac e of

f i cer. Diet z fur t her ar gue s t hat t his informat ion, maintained by a sta te agency, should be imputed t o t he pro secut or as the S tat e’s repr esentat ive at tr ial . The S tat e’s ef f orts to i m pe ach Di etz con cerned Di etz ’s testi mon y to th e g ra n d j ur y th at h e h ad re ce i v ed a p ri v ate inv estigat or ’s license. We t her efo re do not add re ss Diet z’s a rg ument s co ncer ningdoc um en tation of Di etz’s prof i ci ency as a peac e of f i cer. 15 i m pre ss i on in li ght of the certif

ic ate of compl

etion. The certi fi

cate, however, was i ssued b y a p ri v ate
co mp an y, not t he Comm

iss ion. Nor do es it i

ndi cate t hat it is a l

icense; i t merely stat es that it is a
certif i ca te of compl

etion of a “

le vel one traini ng course.” Mor

eov er , the f ac t th at D i etz

ap pl i ed f or a l i cens e w i

th th e C om m i ss i on da ys a ft er his g r an d ju ry t es t imo ny u nd er cu t his p o sit io n a t t r ial, whi ch
was tha t he be l i eved tha t the certi f i ca te w aseq ui va l en t to ali cense. Di etz’s unreasona

ble bel ie f had
no eff ect o n the accuracy of the exhi bi ts. 7 We do not fi

nd that the Stat e i

ntroduced fal

se evi dence by way of Exh ibits 23 an

d 24. Therefore, we overrule D ie tz’s second i ssue. CONCLU SION Ha v i n g ov er ru l ed b oth of Di etz ’s i ss ue s, we af f i rm th e j udgm

en t of th e tr i al cou rt.

Bea An n Sm ith, Justice Bef ore Chi ef J

ustice A boussie, Justices

B. A. Sm ith an d Puryear Af fi rmed File d: Decem

ber 6, 200116

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