NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Victor A Castillo Sanchez,

Petitioner,

v.

Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 22-104

Agency No. A200-281-513

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 17, 2023

Phoenix, Arizona**

Before: OWENS and BADE, Circuit Judges, and BAKER,*** International 

Trade Judge.

Victor Castillo Sanchez, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of a 

decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal of 

an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for cancellation 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not 

precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable M. Miller Baker, Judge for the United States Court 

of International Trade, sitting by designation.

FILED

APR 20 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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of removal and adjustment of status. We deny the petition.

We generally lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary 

determinations. See Torres-Valdivias v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 

2015) (adjustment of status); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). But we retain 

jurisdiction to consider “constitutional claims or questions of law” raised in a 

petition for review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 

1614, 1618 (2022) (holding that, except for “legal and constitutional questions,” 

the bar on judicial review of discretionary decisions “precludes judicial review 

of factual findings that underlie a denial of relief”). “[T]he phrase ‘questions of 

law’ in the [Limited Review] Provision includes the application of a legal 

standard to undisputed or established facts.” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 

S. Ct. 1062, 1067 (2020) (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)). We review 

questions of our own jurisdiction de novo. See Rosales-Rosales v. Ashcroft, 347 

F.3d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 2003).

1. The agency determined that police reports related to Castillo 

Sanchez’s 2014 and 2016 arrests provided “reason to believe” that he had been 

involved “in the illicit trafficking of a controlled substance,” and therefore, he 

was inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) and statutorily ineligible for 

adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).1 Castillo Sanchez argues that the 

1 The BIA also affirmed the denial of cancellation of removal. Castillo 

Sanchez does not raise, and thus has waived, any arguments challenging the 

denial of cancellation of removal. See Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1125 n.1 
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“reason to believe” and “probable cause” standards are “equivalent.” See 

Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980). He therefore reasons 

that because the prosecutor did not “bring formal charges relating to drug 

trafficking” based on the same evidence that the agency considered, the agency 

legally erred in finding “reason to believe” Castillo Sanchez was involved in 

drug trafficking. We have jurisdiction to consider whether the agency applied 

the correct legal standard—a question of law in the context of the denial of 

discretionary relief. See Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 980 (9th 

Cir. 2009). 

Castillo Sanchez’s argument lacks merit because the prosecutor’s 

discretionary decision not to bring charges against him does not bear on whether 

there was probable cause or “reason to believe” he was involved in illicit 

trafficking. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). The 

absence of formal charges does not imply the lack of probable cause or mean 

the agency applied an incorrect legal standard in determining that Castillo 

Sanchez was inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) and thus statutorily 

ineligible for adjustment of status.2

2. Castillo Sanchez also contends that the IJ erred in denying his 

(9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that issues not specifically raised and argued in a 

party’s briefs are waived).

2 A conviction is not a prerequisite for § 1182(a)(2)(C)(i) to render a 

noncitizen inadmissible as an illicit trafficker. See Alarcon-Serrano v. INS, 220 

F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000).
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motion to suppress evidence discovered during the 2014 and 2016 arrests 

because that evidence was allegedly obtained in an egregious violation of his 

Fourth Amendment rights. See Martinez-Medina v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1029, 

1033–34 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the court may bar evidence in the 

immigration context only when a Fourth Amendment violation occurred “and 

that violation was egregious”). We review de novo the denial of a motion to 

suppress. Id. at 1033. Castillo Sanchez, who has the burden of making a prima 

facie showing of an egregious constitutional violation, see B.R. v. Garland, 26 

F. 4th 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2022), does not present any arguments explaining why 

any alleged Fourth Amendment violation during his arrests constitutes an 

egregious violation. See Martinez-Medina, 673 F.3d at 1034 (“A constitutional 

violation is not egregious unless evidence is obtained by deliberate violations of 

the Fourth Amendment or by conduct a reasonable officer should have known is 

in violation of the Constitution.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). Accordingly, he has not met his burden to show a prima facie 

egregious Fourth Amendment violation.

PETITION DENIED.