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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 43833

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DORAN CARL ESLINGER,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 741

Filed: October 20, 2016

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Clearwater County. Hon. Gregory Fitzmaurice, District Judge. 

Order denying motion to suppress, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. 

Reynolds, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Theodore S. Tollefson, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GUTIERREZ, Judge

Doran Carl Eslinger appeals from the district court’s order denying Eslinger’s motion to 

suppress any items taken from his vehicle. He argues the automobile exception to the warrant 

requirement did not apply because his vehicle was parked at the courthouse, making it simple for 

the officers to obtain a warrant prior to searching his vehicle. For the reasons explained below, 

we affirm the district court’s order.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Informants told an officer that Eslinger was a methamphetamine distributor and carried 

methamphetamine in his vehicle. The officer learned that Eslinger would be at the courthouse 

because his wife was subpoenaed for a hearing. The officer, along with another officer, waited 

in the courthouse parking lot for Eslinger to arrive. Once Eslinger arrived, parked, and entered 
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the courthouse, one of the officers had his drug dog circle the vehicle. The drug dog alerted on 

the driver’s side of the vehicle. Eslinger returned to his vehicle and the officers informed 

Eslinger that they intended to impound the vehicle and obtain a search warrant to look for drugs, 

unless Eslinger granted consent to search. Eslinger stated, “Well, you can look, I don’t know.” 

The officers interpreted this statement as sufficient consent to search, and they subsequently 

searched the vehicle. They arrested Eslinger after discovering methamphetamine and 

methamphetamine paraphernalia.

The State charged Eslinger with possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, 

Idaho Code § 37-2732(a)(1)(A), and possession of drug paraphernalia, Idaho Code § 37-2734A. 

Eslinger filed a motion to suppress any items taken from his vehicle, arguing that he did not 

freely and voluntarily consent to the search. Following a hearing, the district court issued an 

order denying Eslinger’s motion to suppress. The district court determined that, while the State 

did not establish Eslinger’s consent was voluntary, the drug dog’s alert on the vehicle gave the 

officers probable cause to search the vehicle without a warrant, and thus the warrantless search 

was justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

Eslinger pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, reserving his right to appeal 

from the denial of his motion to suppress. In exchange, the State dismissed the remaining charge 

and recommended a suspended sentence. Eslinger appeals from the district court’s order 

denying the motion to suppress.

II.

ANALYSIS

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a 

motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by 

substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 

as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a 

suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 

weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 

127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 

659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 

Eslinger maintains the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress because the 

officers should have obtained a search warrant prior to searching Eslinger’s vehicle, since the 
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vehicle was parked in a courthouse parking lot when the drug dog alerted. Eslinger concedes 

that the drug dog’s alert provided probable cause to search the vehicle. He maintains, however, 

that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement does not apply because the officers 

could have easily obtained a warrant by walking to the courthouse.

The United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures of 

persons or property.1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 17. Warrantless searches 

are presumed to be unreasonable and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment. Coolidge v. 

New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.3d 

196, 198 (1995). The State may overcome this presumption by demonstrating that a warrantless 

search fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 

465; Weaver, 127 Idaho at 290, 900 P.2d at 198. One of these exceptions is the automobile 

exception.

Under the automobile exception, police may search an automobile and the containers 

within it when they have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband or 

evidence of a crime. State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898, 821 P.2d 949, 953 (1991). Probable 

cause is a flexible, commonsense standard. A practical, nontechnical probability that 

incriminating evidence is present is all that is required. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 

(1983). When a reliable drug-detection dog indicates that a lawfully stopped automobile 

contains the odor of controlled substances, the officer has probable cause to believe that there are 

drugs in the automobile and may search it without a warrant. State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 

843, 979 P.2d 1199, 1201 (1999); Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 898, 821 P.2d at 953.

The automobile exception is based both upon the automobile’s ready mobility, which is 

deemed an exigency sufficient to excuse the warrant requirement once probable cause for the 

search is clear, and upon the lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile as compared to the 

privacy interest in a home. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-92 (1985); State v. 

Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93, 625 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1981).

Here, the fact that Eslinger’s vehicle was parked at the courthouse does not increase 

Eslinger’s expectation of privacy in the vehicle, and Eslinger does not argue otherwise. 

Moreover, the automobile exception applies to parked vehicles because absent some objective 

 

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Eslinger does not argue the Idaho Constitution affords greater protection, so this Court 

follows the analysis pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
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indicia of immobility, a vehicle is presumed mobile. State v. Gosch, 157 Idaho 803, 808, 339 

P.3d 1207, 1212 (Ct. App. 2014). Eslinger’s vehicle was clearly readily mobile because the 

officers observed Eslinger park the vehicle in the parking lot. The proximity of the courthouse to 

the parked vehicle is immaterial for purposes of the automobile exception. Because the drug dog 

alerted on Eslinger’s vehicle, the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle, and the 

automobile exception to the warrant requirement therefore permitted the warrantless search. The 

district court did not err in denying Eslinger’s motion to suppress any items taken from his 

vehicle.

III.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not err in denying Eslinger’s motion to suppress any items taken 

from his vehicle because the drug dog alert provided the probable cause required for the 

automobile exception to the warrant requirement. We therefore affirm the district court’s order 

denying Eslinger’s motion to suppress.

Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.