1

 The Court originally scheduled this matter for hearing. Upon review of the

parties’ papers, however, the Court finds that oral argument is not necessary. See E.D.

Mich. LR 7.1(e)(2).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JO-BET, INC., GARTER BELT, INC., 

HAMILTON’S HENRY THE VIII LOUNGE,

HAMILTON’S BOGART, INC., JOHN 

HAMILTON, JOHN HAMILTON, JR., 

JEREMY HAMILTON, MICHAEL HAMILTON,

JOHN L. HAMILTON RETAINED ANNUITY Case No. 01-CV-74698

TRUST,

HONORABLE AVERN COHN

Plaintiffs, 

v.

CITY OF INKSTER, PAUL MARTIN, KENNETH 

BROWN, and ANTONY ABDULLAH,

Defendants. 

________________________________________/

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

(1) DISMISSING THE CITY OF INKSTER AS A DEFENDANT, (2) DISMISSING ALL

FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS, (3) DISMISSING JOHN HAMILTON, THE JOHN L.

HAMILTON RETAINED ANNUITY TRUST, JOHN HAMILTON, JR., JEREMY

HAMILTON, AND MICHAEL HAMILTON AS PLAINTIFFS, (4) DISMISSING

PLAINTIFFS’ TAKINGS CLAIM, (5) DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ CONVERSION

CLAIM, (6) DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ LARCENY CLAIM, and (7) GRANTING

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF ANTONY ABDULLAH, PAUL MARTIN and

KENNETH BROWN

I. Introduction1

This is civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(2) with pendent state law

claims. Broadly stated, Plaintiffs claim that defendants conspired to deprive them of their

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2

 SOB is defined as

an adult arcade, adult bookstore or adult video store, adult cabaret,

adult motel, adult motion picture theater, adult theater, escort

agency, nude model studio, sexual encounter center, or similar

establishment, or any place that permits patrons to be filmed or

photographed performing “sexually explicit activities” or displaying

“specified anatomical areas” for electronic transmission over the

World Wide Web.

See VBT Ex. 2 p. 7.

Strip club is defined by Wikipedia as “a nightclub or bar that offers striptease (the

erotic removal of a performer’s clothing) and possibly other related services such as lap

dances.”

2

right to operate sexually oriented businesses (“SOBs”); namely, four strip clubs.2 Plaintiffs

seek injunctive relief and damages.

Plaintiffs are as follows:

(1) Jo-Bet, Inc., d/b/a Henry the VII South – An adult entertainment establishment

located in the City of Southgate.

(2) The Garter Belt, Inc., d/b/a Legg’s Lounge (“Leggs”) – An adult entertainment

establishment located in Van Buren Township (“VBT”).

(3) Hamilton’s Henry VIII Lounge, Inc. - An adult entertainment establishment

located in the City of Inkster.

(4) Hamilton’s Bogart, Inc., d/b/a Bogart’s Joint - An adult entertainment

establishment located in the City of Inkster.

(5) John Hamilton - Sole stockholder of the above-listed corporations.

(6) John Hamilton Trustee of the John L. Hamilton Retained Annuity Trust.

(7) John Hamilton, Jr. – John Hamilton’s son.

(8) Jeremy Hamilton – John Hamilton’s son.

(9) Michael Hamilton – John Hamilton’s son.

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The defendants who remain party to this case are: (1) the City of Inkster, (2)

Detective Paul Martin (Martin), (3) Detective Kenneth Brown (Brown), and (4) Officer

Antony Abdullah (Abdullah). However, in their response brief, Plaintiffs admit that they

have no viable claim against the City of Inkster: “After extensive discovery[,] the Plaintiffs

acknowledge that the City [of Inkster] defendant does not have a municipal policy or

custom that has violated their constitutional rights.” In light of this concession, all claims

against the City of Inkster will be dismissed. From this point forward, the term “City of

Inkster Defendants,” as used herein, is a reference to Brown, Martin, and Abdullah only.

These three individuals are Inkster police officers who are being sued in their individual

capacities.

The complaint currently governing this action is the Corrected Fourth Amended

Complaint (“FAC”). See Dkt. 131. On August 17, 2009, the Court issued an order in which

it, among other things, granted summary judgment in favor of the Van Buren Township

Defendants and the City of Romulus Defendants. See Dkt. 333. For the purposes of this

memorandum and order, the Court will assume the parties’ familiarity with its previous

orders.

Now before the Court is the Inkster Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. For

the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in full as to Abdullah and granted in part

as to Martin and Brown.

II. Background

A.

This case involves four strip clubs: (1) Henry the VIII South, owned by J-Bet, Inc.,

(2) Leggs Lounge (“Leggs”), owned by the Garter Belt, Inc., (3) Henry the VIII Lounge,

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4

owned by Hamilton’s Henry the VIII Lounge, Inc. (“Henry’s”), and (4) Bogart’s Joint

(“Bogart’s”), owned by Hamilton’s Bogart, Inc. John Hamilton (Hamilton) is the sole

stockholder of the four corporations. Generally, Plaintiffs’ claims against the Inkster

Defendants stem from allegations that the Inkster Defendants conspired among

themselves, and with the Michigan Liquor Control Commission (MLCC), to put Hamilton’s

two Inkster strip clubs—Henry’s and Bogart’s—out of business. However, at his deposition,

Hamilton testified that there is no conspiracy involving the Inkster Defendants as to

Bogart’s:

Q: Okay. And as far as Inkster and Bogart’s, you don’t have

anything pending there, so there’s no conspiracy as far as

Bogart’s concerned?

A: No.

Q: Correct?

A: Correct.

* * * *

Q: Do you have any proof that anybody from Inkster at anytime

through any means whatsoever tried to close Bogart’s?

* * * *

A: Nobody involved in the City of Inkster, no.

Hamilton Dep. (Dec. 11, 2006) at pp. 399, 496. This testimony forecloses any conspiracy

claim involving the Inkster Defendants to harm Bogart’s. 

B.

The main thrust of Plaintiffs’ claims against the Inkster Defendants with regard to

Henry’s is that “Martin with Brown and Abdullah, set about to close Henry’s” when they

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allegedly planned and executed a bomb scare at Henry’s on May 11, 2000. FAC at ¶ 124.

The purported facts underlying the bomb scare incident are set forth in Plaintiffs’ FAC as

follows:

126. On May 11, 2000, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Abdullah came

into Henry’s, out of uniform, and took a seat at a side stage.

Abdullah drank “pop” and occasionally would leave his seat

and walk toward the men’s room.

127. At approximately 4:30- 5:00 p.m., Elvie Gensoli, acting

Manager and an employee of Henry’s, received a call from an

unidentified male stating that there was a bomb threat against

Henry’s and that the bomb was to explode at approximately

9:00 p.m. that night. Gensoli was instructed to close the doors

to Henry’s business and advised that new customers were not

to enter.

128. Ms. Gensoli inquired if this call was a “joke” and the caller said

“no” but did not identify himself. When the caller hung up, Ms.

Gensoli dialed “*69", redialed the number and when answered,

was advised that this was a phone at the Inkster police.

129. Approximately 20 minutes later, the Inkster Police Department

arrived with a “bomb” dog. Brown advised Ms. Gensoli to tell

customers that there was “carbon monoxide leaking” and that

patrons and dancers were to exit the bar. In addition, Brown

ordered Ms. Gensoli from the premises.

130. Approximately 15 minutes after ordered out of the bar, Brown

asked Ms. Gensoli to re-enter the bar and advised her that the

explosives dog utilized by the City of Inkster “had found

something” behind the bar and near the employees’ bags.

Officer Brown asked Ms. Gensoli to look around the bar to see

if anything was out of place. This action was totally against

acceptable police standards when faced with a bomb threat.

131. Brown advised Gensoli again to exit the bar and that the unit

would be bringing another dog to the scene to verify the

presence or absence of a bomb.

132. After a second delay of approximately 15 minutes, Brown again

asked Ms. Gensoli to enter and this time asked for her keys to

downstairs offices which were locked and had, at all times

relevant, been locked. Brown stated that it was necessary to

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6

check the downstairs office to insure that no bomb was

present. Brown was advised that the downstairs area was and

had been locked and not accessible to customers, but he

insisted on the keys.

133. At the insistence of Brown, Ms. Gensoli gave Brown keys to

the office and the downstairs area. Brown then went

downstairs.

134. Approximately 10 minutes later, Brown exited the downstairs

area, returned Ms. Gensoli’s keys and had a video tape in his

hand. Ms. Gensoli demanded that the tape be returned to her

and that he did not have permission to take the tape. At this

time Gensoli called E. Carol Paquette, manager of Henry’s on

her cell phone and Paquette told Brown not to take the tape.

Neither Gensoli nor Paquette has any idea what else Brown

may have taken.

135. Despite demands by the agents and employees of Henry’s,

Brown took the tape and placed it in his police vehicle, refusing

to return same.

136. Shortly after Brown placed the tape in his police vehicle, a

second dog arrived and, at a very few minutes, Brown advised

Gensoli that the second dog didn’t find anything.

137. At this point in time, the dancers and patrons were allowed to

return to the bar although most of the dancers and patrons had

now left the scene. At this time, Brown told Gensoli to close the

bar, although no indication of a bomb had been found and the

“bomb squad” never arrived.

138. One of the waitresses re-entered the bar with Paquette and

others. This waitress had noticed Abdullah, as set forth earlier

in this Complaint, when he had first entered at approximately

3:00 but did not know that he was a police officer. When she

returned inside of Henry’s, she noted that Abdullah was sitting

at the bar with Brown. At this point in time, the waitress heard

Brown say to Abdullah: “So you decided to do it today and I

was going to do it tomorrow.”

139. When Abdullah and Brown saw the waitress, they discontinued

their conversation. Subsequently, on August 3, 2000, Abdullah

again came to the bar and the waitress learned Abdullah’s

identity. The waitresses remember Abdullah in part because he

did not tip.

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140. The City of Inkster Police Department records incoming calls

such as bomb threats and Plaintiffs are informed and believe

that the call was made as a subterfuge and further believe that

it was made by Abdullah.

141. As police officers, Brown, Abdullah and Martin are also

enforcement agents for the MLCC.

142. At no time on May 11, 2000, did Brown, Abdullah or any other

member of the Inkster Police Department have a warrant to

search Plaintiffs’ property or seize any property therefrom and

the taking of property from Plaintiffs’ premises was over

objection of Henry’s agent and employee.

143. After taking the tape from Henry’s, Brown reviewed the tape,

found nothing regarding the bomb threat and placed it in his

desk drawer for return to Henry’s. However, Martin, in

furtherance of the conspiracy to put Hamilton out of business,

entered Brown’s desk drawer, took the tape and then filed a

formal complaint with the MLCC claiming that the tape

recording showed violations of Rule 436.1411(1).

144. Neither Henry’s agents or employees nor Hamilton saw the

tape before it was seized.

145. Hamilton contacted the Inkster Police Department, advised that

the tape had been unlawfully taken and further advised the

MLCC that the tape had been taken.

146. Assistant Attorney General Courtney Smith was advised that

the tape had been taken illegally, that the tape would reveal

that the statements of the officers were false and perjurious

and was advised that it made no difference whether the officers

were committing perjury or whether the tape had been illegally

seized.

* * * *

151. Hamilton was advised that the rules of evidence did not apply

in Administrative hearings in the State of Michigan and whether

the tape was illegally seized or not, the Commission could

make a determination of culpability.

152. In furtherance of the conspiracy to put Hamilton out of

business, Brown, Abdullah and Martin testified falsely, in direct

contradiction of the physical evidence: to wit, the tape

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8

recording showing their entry and actions at Henry’s on May

11, 2000.

* * * *

154. Martin subsequently recanted portions of his testimony,

claiming mistake.

FAC at ¶¶ 126-146, 151-152, 154. 

The person or persons responsible for executing the bomb scare have never been

identified. Moreover, the videotape, which was initially taken by Brown and subsequently

sent to the MLCC by Martin, was used as evidence in connection with liquor license

violation proceedings against Henry’s before the MLCC. The Michigan Court of Appeals

has adjudicated the issue of whether the videotape was admissible in those proceedings,

answering the question in the affirmative. See Hamilton’s Henry the VIII Lounge, Inc. v.

Dep’t of Consumer & Industry Servs., et al., No. 255893, 2006 WL 2035617 (Mich. Ct. App.

July 20, 2006) (per curiam). The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, thus

ending the litigation. See Hamilton’s Henry the VIII Lounge, Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer &

Industry Servs., et al., 728 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. 2007). 

III. Dismissal of Individual Plaintiffs and First Amendment Claims

Before addressing the Inkster Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court

first addresses the right of the individual plaintiffs to sue. As stated above, plaintiffs are

four corporations, four individuals, and one trust. As stated by the Fifth Circuit and quoted

with approval by the Sixth Circuit in Canderm Pharmacal, Ltd. v. Elder Pharms., Inc., 862

F.2d 597, 602-603 (6th Cir. 1988),

[t]he general rule is, of course, well established that an action to

redress injuries to a corporation, whether arising out of contract or tort,

cannot be maintained by a stockholder in his own name but must be

brought in the name of the corporation, since the cause of action

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3

 The Court notes that the individual plaintiffs baldy assert in the FAC that their

right to associate was violated by the Inkster Defendants. However, in their brief, they

9

being in the corporation, the stockholder's rights are merely derivative

and can be asserted only through the corporation. The general rule

is applicable in cases where the individual is the sole stockholder.

Schaffer v. Universal Rundle Corp., 397 F.2d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 1968) (footnote omitted).

Moreover,

it is universal that where the business or property allegedly interfered

with by forbidden practices is that being done and carried on by a

corporation, it is that corporation alone, and not its stockholders (few

or many), officers, directors, creditors or licensors, who has a right of

recovery, even though in an economic sense real harm may well be

sustained as the impact of such wrongful acts bring about reduced

earnings, lower salaries, bonuses, injury to general business

reputation, or diminution in the value of ownership. 

Martens v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1957) (footnotes omitted) (quoted with

approval by the Sixth Circuit in Canderm Pharmacal, Ltd., 862 F.2d at 603).

This case involves several claims; however, plaintiffs do not clarify which claims are

brought by which plaintiffs. Applying the law discussed in the preceding paragraph, it is

clear that the individual plaintiffs and the trust lack standing to assert a conspiracy claim,

or any other claim to redress injuries to the corporate entities, because their rights are, at

best, derivative of those of the corporate entities.

However, the individual plaintiffs may properly bring a claim that defendants violated

their freedom to associate under the First Amendment because that is a claim belonging

to them and not the corporate entities. However, the Court will summarily dismiss the First

Amendment claim because the individual plaintiffs claim that their right to associate was

violated—not by any of the defendants who remain party to this action— but rather by the

MLCC, a former defendant with which plaintiffs have settled. See Dkt. 330.3

 As the

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state that their “freedom to associate claim comes from the MLCC’s acts to only grant

liquor licenses to John Hamilton’s sons if they agreed to a stipulation that neither John

Hamilton or their mother could be present at or assist in the management of the son’s

businesses.” Pls.’ Br. at 5. The individual plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged or

proven that the Inkster Defendants had anything to do with the stipulation referenced in

the preceding sentence, much less that there was an agreement among the Inkster

Defendants, on the one hand, and the MLCC, on the other hand, to deprive the

individual plaintiffs of their rights. Hamilton even admitted during his deposition that he

has no evidence that anyone associated with Inkster interfered with his family

relationship or right of association. See Hamilton Dep. (Dec. 11, 2006) at pp. 497-498. 

To the extent the individual plaintiffs argue that the Inkster Defendants are liable under

the First Amendment because they are the MLCC’s co-conspirators, this argument fails

because the individual plaintiffs have offered only conclusory allegations and no

evidence in support of such an extraordinary claim.

4

 Plaintiffs do not specify whether they intend to bring a common law conversion

claim or a statutory conversion claim or both. In their brief, they discuss law relating to

both causes of action, intermingling the two. Moreover, Plaintiffs discuss their “takings”

claim and their conversion claim as if they are one claim.

10

individual plaintiffs and the trust assert claims against a former defendant who is no longer

party to this action, they are no longer appropriate plaintiffs herein. Therefore, John

Hamilton, the John L. Hamilton Retained Annuity Trust, John Hamilton, Jr., Jeremy

Hamilton, and Michael Hamilton will be dismissed as plaintiffs for lack of standing. From

this point forward, “Plaintiffs,” as used herein, refers only to the corporate plaintiffs.

IV. Analysis

Plaintiffs assert six claims against the Inkster Defendants: (1) conspiracy, (2) First

Amendment violations, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), (4) conversion,4

 (5)

taking, and (6) larceny. The Court has already adjudicated the First Amendment claim.

See supra at p. 9 n.3. The Court shall address the remaining claims, in turn, below.

A. Conspiracy

1. Law

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As stated by the Sixth Circuit, the standard for proving a conspiracy under § 1983

is as follows:

A civil conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to

injure another by unlawful action. Express agreement among all the

conspirators is not necessary to find the existence of a civil

conspiracy. Each conspirator need not have known all of the details

of the illegal plan or all of the participants involved. All that must be

shown is that there was a single plan, that the alleged coconspirator

shared in the general conspiratorial objective, and that an overt act

was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury to

the complainant.

Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943-944 (6th Cir. 1985). 

The standard is similar under Michigan law: “A conspiracy is a combination of two

or more persons, by some concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose,

or to accomplish a purpose not unlawful by criminal or unlawful means.” Fenestra Inc. v.

Gulf Am. Land Corp., 141 N.W.2d 36, 48 (Mich. 1966). Additionally, 

at the core of an actionable civil conspiracy is a question of damages.

This facet of the law of conspiracy is accurately summed up in the

case of Roche v. Blair: “The law is well established that in a civil action

for damages resulting from wrongful acts alleged to have been

committed in pursuance of a conspiracy, the gist or gravamen of the

action is not the conspiracy but is the wrongful acts causing the

damages. The conspiracy standing alone without the commission of

acts causing damage would not be actionable. The cause of action

does not result from the conspiracy but from the acts done.” In the

case of Auto Workers' Temple Ass'n v. Janson, the point is made

more succinctly: the foundation of the action is the damage and not

the conspiracy.

Id. at 48-49 (citations omitted). See also 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy § 53 ([t]he gist of a

civil conspiracy is not the unlawful agreement, but the damage resulting from that

agreement or its execution. The cause of action is not created by the conspiracy, but by

the wrongful acts done by the defendants to the injury of the plaintiff, and a conspiracy is

actionable only if the overt acts done pursuant to the common design proximately cause

2:01-cv-74698-AC Doc # 335 Filed 08/26/09 Pg 11 of 22 Pg ID 8926
12

damage to the party bringing the action” (footnotes omitted)). Additionally, “no cause of

action can exist in the absence of an overt, tortious, or unlawful act committed in

furtherance of the conspiracy.” 16 Am. Jur. 2d at § 52 (footnote omitted).

2. The Parties’ Arguments 

a. Plaintiffs’ Claims

Plaintiff assert conspiracy claims against the Inkster Defendants as follows:

221. The City of Inkster, Martin, Brown and Abdullah, and unknown

members of the Inkster Police Department, agreed among

themselves and the other named Defendants, in their individual

capacities, to act to put Plaintiffs out of business and to further

the overall objective of the conspiracy.

222. Martin, Brown and Abdullah, acting under color of law, with the

illegal search and seizure, under the alleged bomb threat, was

to injure Henry’s and to remove protected First Amendment

businesses from the City of Inkster, without appropriate

legislation, and to deprive Hamilton of his First Amendment

rights and to deprive him of his ownership of Henry’s and

Bogart’s, including his investment in each.

FAC at ¶¶ 221-222. In their response brief, Plaintiffs summarize the evidence of a

conspiracy involving the Inkster Defendants as follows:

(1) That the Inkster Defendants, among themselves, created a plan to

harass or shut down Henry’s. The overt acts include the false bomb

threat by Abdullah, which “justified” a search under false pretenses by

Brown, who stole a tape, which was obtained by Martin, who then

made a complaint to the MLCC, which was supported by perjured

testimony;

(2) That the Inkster Defendants conspired with the MLCC to shut

down Hamilton’s businesses. The overt acts include the above and

the MLCC’s eagerness to use evidence obtained unconstitutionally

and supported by perjured testimony.

b. The Position of the Inkster Defendants

The Inkster Defendants make a number of arguments in support of their position that

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13

Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim is not viable. One of their arguments is that Plaintiffs have not

suffered any monetary damages – a necessary element of a conspiracy claim. 

c. Plaintiffs’ Counter-Argument

Plaintiffs do not dispute the Inkster Defendants’ position regarding the non-existence

of monetary damages in this case. Rather, Plaintiffs contend that monetary damages are

not a necessary element of a conspiracy claim. In support of their position, Plaintiffs rely

upon Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 679 (6th Cir. 1998) (emphasizing that injuries in the

context of a § 1983 claim need not be monetary but rather may include impairment to

reputation, personal humiliation, and mental anguish).

3. Discussion

As stated above, “a conspiracy is actionable only if the overt acts done pursuant to

the common design proximately cause damage to the party bringing the action.” 16 Am.

Jur. 2d at § 53 (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiffs state that the overt act in furtherance of

the conspiracy was the false bomb threat. Pls.’ Br. at 4. Thus, in order to sustain a

conspiracy claim premised upon the bomb scare, Plaintiffs must show that the bomb scare

caused damages. As Plaintiffs correctly note, the damages need not be monetary. 

Plaintiffs have not shown that they suffered any damages, monetary or otherwise,

arising out of the bomb scare incident. First, Plaintiffs do not dispute the contention of the

Inkster Defendants that no monetary damages were suffered from the bomb scare incident.

Moreover, while Plaintiffs argue that the damages do not have to be monetary, they fail to

show that they suffered any non-monetary damages. Because Plaintiffs have failed to offer

any evidence of damages resulting from the purported overt act done in furtherance of the

alleged conspiracy, their conspiracy claim fails.

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B. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)

1. Law

Generally, “42 U.S.C. § 1985 provides a private cause of action for conspiracy to

interfere with civil rights.” Molnar v. Care House, 574 F. Supp. 2d 772, 787 (E.D. Mich.

2008). Specifically, § 1985(2) states as follows: 

If two or more persons . . . conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat,

any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such

court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and

truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on

account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict,

presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to

injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict,

presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or

having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose

of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due

course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen

the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully

enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of

persons, to the equal protection of the laws.

42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). 

The first clause of § 1985(2) “prohibits conspiracies to influence parties, witness, or

jurors in federal court proceedings.” Fox v. Mich. State Police Dep’t, 2006 WL 456008, *3

(6th Cir. Feb. 24, 2006). “The second clause of § 1985(2) creates a cause of action against

‘two or more persons’ who ‘conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing,

or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent

to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws. . . .’ Dallas v. Holmes, 2005 WL

1313801, *6 n.5 (6th Cir. May 12, 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)). “Under this clause

. . . a plaintiff must demonstrate that there was ‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise

class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action.’” Id. (citing

Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 726 (1983)). 

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2. Plaintiffs’ Claims

Plaintiffs assert claims under § 1985(2) against the Inkster Defendants as follows:

233. As set forth above, after the initial complaint was filed, Inkster

police officers continued to harass the dancers and patrons at

Henry’s and Bogart’s.

234. That with the filing of the complaint in December of 2001, law

enforcement officers of the City of Inkster have sought,

contrary to 42 U.S.C. 1985 (2), to obstruct justice and

intimidate witnesses and parties.

235. Police officers of the City of Inkster have and are approaching

dancers and patrons and are intimidating same so as to force

the dancers or patrons to testify in favor of the respective units

of government and the Defendants associated therewith,

and/or to refrain from testifying on behalf of Hamilton or the

Plaintiff corporations and to deprive Hamilton and the

corporations of equal protection of the law.

236. The conduct of the Inkster Defendants, in particular the law

enforcement arms of Defendants, to intimidate witnesses and

obstruct justice, will continue if they are not restrained and it

will become impossible for Plaintiffs to present their case to this

Court and Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed as will the cause

of justice and an injunction is necessary to prohibit Defendants

from further harassment, intimidation and obstruction.

FAC at ¶¶ 233-236. 

3. Discussion

While Plaintiffs discuss the law surrounding a § 1985(2) claim in their brief, they fail

to apply the law to the facts of this case. The Court interprets Plaintiffs’ failure in this

regard as a tacit acknowledgment that no viable § 1985(2) claim exists against the Inkster

Defendants. Although Plaintiffs have made very bald statements in their FAC, they have

failed to proffer even a shred of evidence in support of their claim. The Court will grant

summary judgment in favor of the Inkster Defendants on the § 1985(2) claim because it

lacks any arguable basis in law or fact, is entirely unsupported by any evidence, and is

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5

 In their brief, Plaintiffs discuss these two claims as if they are one claim. Insofar

as Plaintiffs intend to assert two distinct causes of action, the takings claim will be

dismissed because (1) it has not been separately briefed and (2) Plaintiffs have not

explained what cause of action is intended.

In addition, as noted above, Plaintiffs have not specified whether they intend to

bring a common law conversion claim or a statutory conversion claim or both. The

Court will assume that Plaintiffs intended to bring both claims. The common law

conversion claim is addressed in the body of this memorandum while the statutory claim

is addressed in footnote six.

16

frivolous.

C. Conversion and Taking5

1. Law

“Under Michigan law, conversion is defined generally as ‘any distinct act of domain

wrongfully exerted over another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with the

rights therein.’” Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. ABC Commc’ns, Inc., 264 F.3d 622, 637-38 (6th

Cir. 2001) (quoting Sarver v. Detroit Edison Co., 571 N.W.2d 759, 761 (Mich. App.1997)).

“The general rule for the measure of damages for conversion is the value of the converted

property at the time of the conversion.” Ehman v. Libralter Plastics, Inc., 523 N.W.2d 639,

639-640 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Baxter v. Woodward, 158 N.W. 137 (1916)). 

2. Plaintiffs’ Claims

The factual basis underlying Plaintiffs’ conversion claim, as described by Plaintiffs

in their FAC, is as follows:

238. The individual named Inkster police officers, at all times

mentioned herein, owed a duty to Plaintiffs not to steal, take,

convert, interfere with Plaintiffs’ business, commit malfeasance

or violate Plaintiffs’ civil rights. In each count listed hereinafter,

including the instant count, the individual police officers

breached their duty to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs were injured. The

conduct of the officers is not within the scope of their authority,

not permitted by the Constitutions of the State of Michigan or

of the United States and the individual police officers have no

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immunity of any nature.

239. The City of Inkster has no immunity. The City of Inkster had

knowledge of the misconduct of the individual police officers

and ratified and sanctioned their actions, violated, under color

of law, Plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory rights, and the City

of Inkster has no immunity in each count listed hereinafter,

including the instant count.

240. Defendants have converted Plaintiffs’ property for their own

use and have exercised wrongful dominion over Plaintiffs’

property without Plaintiffs’ authorization or consent and upon

demand has refused to return Plaintiffs’ property and all copies

that may have been made of the tape.

241. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs have been

damaged and injured in a sum in excess of $75,000 including

loss of business, injury to reputation, attorney fees as it relates

to the September 11, 2000 Administrative Hearing. Plaintiff

Hamilton’s investment in Henry’s has been impaired and he

has lost income as a result of Defendants’ actions and

conversion.

242. As a result of the actions and conversion of the officers of City

of Inkster, Hamilton has been injured by a sum in excess of 1

million dollars.

FAC at ¶¶ 238-242. The Court notes at the onset that the conversion claim is poorly pled

inasmuch as Plaintiffs have not even specified in the FAC what specific property was

allegedly converted.

 In their brief, however, Plaintiffs clear up the confusion. According to Plaintiffs,

the Inkster Defendants conspired together to take the tape or approve

and adopt the taking of the tape. Abdullah made the false bomb

threat, Brown took the tape without permission, and Martin used the

converted tape to make MLCC complaints. Martin clearly approved

and ratified the taking of the tapes (as did the MLCC) by viewing it and

sending the tape to the MLCC. Martin also converted the tape to his

own use by removing it from Brown’s drqwer [sic]. Presumably, Martin

also received some gain from the conversion, even if only kudos from

his employer or the MLCC. Therefore, all of the Inkster Defendants

are liable for the conversion.

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Moreover, Hamilton states in his deposition that the tape is the only property allegedly

converted. See Hamilton Dep. (Dec. 11, 2006) at p. 508. For relief on their conversion

claim, Plaintiffs seek “1 million dollars plus costs, interest and attorney fees plus punitive

damages.” See FAC at p. 43. 

3. The Position of the Inkster Defendants

The Inkster Defendants argue that the conversion claim fails against Abdullah

because there is no evidence that he was involved in the taking of the tape. As to the

conversion claims against Brown and Martin, the Inkster Defendants argue that Plaintiffs

cannot establish that they are entitled to the damages sought and that the claims should

therefore be dismissed. Importantly, however, the Inkster Defendants do not argue that

Martin and Brown are not liable for conversion; they only argue that Plaintiffs are not

entitled to the damages they seek.

D. Discussion

The common law conversion claim against Abdullah fails for the reason given by the

Inkster Defendants – the record does not contain evidence that Abdullah handled the tape

or otherwise had anything to do with taking it. Rather, Plaintiffs allege that Brown initially

took the tape from Henry’s, see FAC at ¶¶ 134-135, and that Martin subsequently took the

tape from Brown’s desk drawer and sent it to the MLCC. See id. at ¶ 143. Although

Plaintiffs claim a conspiracy between the three officers to take the tape, there is no

evidence in support of such a claim as it relates to Abdullah. That is, Plaintiffs have

offered no proof that there was an agreement between Abdullah, on the one hand, and

Martin and Brown, on the other hand, with regard to the taking of the tape.

Regarding the common law conversion claims against Martin and Brown, the Court

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agrees with the Inkster Defendants that Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek.

Hamilton testified as follows regarding the basis for the conversion claim:

Q: What personal property have [the Inkster Defendants] taken

from you?

A: Just the tape.

Q: Is the tape worth $1 million?

A: Cost me that much.

* * * *

Q: Okay. You don’t know the value of the tape; correct?

A: No.

Q: Would you rely on your accountant or attorneys for the

estimation of the value of that tape?

A: I’m sure they are basing it on the fact of the loss and

everything else, yes.

Q: So really not the value of the physical tape itself, you’re

referring to its, the effect that that tape had after the tape was

taken, is that your claim?

A: Right.

Hamilton Dep. (Dec. 11, 2006) at pp. 508-509. Thus, it is clear that the basis for the

damages sought is not the value of the tape, but rather the trouble caused by the tape

when it was admitted in the proceedings before the MLCC as evidence of liquor license

violations at Henry’s. However, this is not how damages are measured in the context of

a conversion claim. “The general rule for the measure of damages for conversion is the

value of the converted property at the time of the conversion.” Ehman, 523 N.W.2d at 639-

640 (citing Baxter, 158 N.W. at 137). Here, Plaintiffs have not established that anything

other than the general rule should apply. Therefore, if Plaintiffs can establish the elements

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 In their brief, Plaintiffs cite law relating a statutory conversion claim. “In addition

to the common-law [conversion] claim, Michigan provides a statutory cause of action

against those who aid in the conversion of property.” Entech Personnel Servs., Inc. v.

Feliciano Transport, Inc., 2004 WL 2889874, *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2004) (per

curiam) (emphasis added). As explained by the Michigan Court of Appeals,

Statutory conversion is provided for at MCL 600.2919a. Pursuant to

MCL 600.2919a, a person who is damaged as a result of another

person's buying, receiving, or aiding in the concealment of any stolen,

embezzled, or converted property when the person buying, receiving,

or aiding in the concealment of any stolen, embezzled, or converted

property knew that the property was stolen, embezzled, or converted,

may recover 3 times the amount of actual damages sustained, plus

costs and reasonable attorney's fees . . . . MCL 600.2919a is not

designed to provide a remedy against the individual who has actually

stolen, embezzled, or converted the property, as the actions

proscribed—buying, receiving, or aiding in the concealment—all occur

after the property has been stolen, embezzled, or converted by the

principal.

Palazzolo v. Nitzkin, 2005 WL 221431, *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2005) (emphasis in

original). Here, to the extent Plaintiffs assert a statutory conversion claim against Martin

and Brown, the claim is not cognizable because Plaintiffs allege that both were principals,

i.e., the people who actually did the stealing, and “MCL 600.2919a is not designed to

provide a remedy against the individual who has actually stolen.” Id. To the extent

Plaintiffs assert a statutory conversion claim against Abdullah, the claim fails because there

is no evidence that he bought, received, or aided in the alleged concealment of the tape.

20

of a common law conversion claim against Brown and Martin, they are entitled to nominal

damages in the amount of the fair market value of the tape at the time it was taken –

probably a dollar or two, at most. Because Plaintiffs do not seek nominal damages for the

fair market value of the videotape, but rather seek much more extensive damages to which

they are not entitled, the common law conversion claim will be dismissed.6

D. Larceny

Larceny is a crime and not a private cause of action. "[A] private citizen lacks a

judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another." Diamond

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v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986); see also Providence Baptist Church v. Hillandale

Comm., Ltd., 425 F.3d 309, 317 (6th Cir. 2005). "[T]he general rule is that a private cause

of action is not maintainable under a criminal statute.” Am. Postal Workers Union v. Indep.

Postal Sys. of Am., 481 F.2d 90, 93 (6th Cir. 1973); see also Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Nat’l

Abstract Agency, 2007 WL 2710113, **9-10 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2007) (granting summary

judgment because "the statutes for larceny and embezzlement are bare criminal statutes

containing no indication that a private right of action is available"). Plaintiffs’ larceny claim

is frivolous and must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above:

1. All claims against the City of Inkster are DISMISSED.

2. The First Amendment claims asserted by the individual plaintiffs are

DISMISSED.

3. John Hamilton, the John L. Hamilton Retained Annuity Trust, John

Hamilton, Jr., Jeremy Hamilton, and Michael Hamilton are

DISMISSED as plaintiffs.

4. The takings claim asserted against the Inkster Defendants is

DISMISSED.

5. The conversion claim asserted against the Inkster Defendants is

DISMISSED.

6. The larceny claim asserted against the Inkster Defendants is

DISMISSED.

7. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Abdullah, Martin, and Brown.

All claims against these defendants are DISMISSED.

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 This memorandum and order, together with the memorandum and order of

August 18, 2009 (Dkt. 333), disposes of the case.

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SO ORDERED.7

 s/ Avern Cohn 

AVERN COHN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: August 26, 2009

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to the attorneys of record

on this date, August 26, 2009, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

 s/ Julie Owens 

 Case Manager, (313) 234-5160

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