Gen. 269] 269

1 The tract is now owned by the Maryland-National Capital Park

and Planning Commission.

2 The agreements of the variousparties are reflected in a Letter of Intent dated De cember

3, 1995. The Letter

of Inten t is not it self leg ally binding. The par

ties will be

bound only

after the deal i s emb odied in a memorandum of understanding. T RANSPORTATION

) S TATUTORY C ONSTRUCTION

) B UDGETARY A DMINISTRATI ON

) U SE OF T RANSPORTATION T RUST F UND F OR G RANT TO P AY O N -S ITE I NFRASTRU C TURE C OSTS AT R EDSKINS S TADIUM

February 15, 1996

The Ho norable Chris Van H ollen, Jr. Maryla nd S enate

You have request ed our opini on whether funds from the Transport ationTrust Fundmay be u sed as a grant to reimburse the Washington Re dskins or any other party f

or the cons truction of parking lot s or othe r on-si te improvements for the proposed Red sk i ns St ad i um.
Jack Kent Cooke, Inc., the ownerof the Washington R edskins, p lans to buil d a new footbal l st adium on a trac t of l and in Pri nce Geo rg e’ s Co unt

y kn own as the Wils on Farm property. 1 As part of the indu cem ent for Co oke to build t he stadium, the State ha s agreed in principl e to pay for certa in on-site inf

rastructur e, i ncluding parking lot cons truction. 2 You r q uestio n is whether the Transport ation Trus t Fun d m ay be used to fun d a gr ant for this purpose. Our opinion is as follows:

1. Subject

to any r estriction that m ight ap pear in the budget bill, the Se c retary of Transportati on has authority to use Transport ationTrust Fund money for a gr ant to t he Red sk ins or anot her pa rty f

or the cons truction of on- sit e roadways and rel ated infrastructure changes, l ike the rerout ing of a sewer li ne requir ed by the road c onstruc tion.270 [81 O p. Att’y

3 Because of the broad wording “[a]ny othe r person,” theSecretary unquestionably may provide a grant to a private entity. 2. Whatever the bu dget b ill migh t prov ide, th e S ecretary does not have authority to use T rust Fund money for a grant to the Redskins or an other p arty fo r the co nstruc tion of o n-site infr astr ucture, like wa ter or se we r lines, tha t is needed because of the stad ium itself, n ot b eca use of ro ad c ons truc tion

. 3. The Secr etary w ould have autho rity to provide a gr ant for the co nstruc t ion of on- sit e parking l ots i f the budget billfor fi scal yea r 19 97 e xpr essly auth oriz es th at us e of Tru st Fu nd m one y.

I

Secreta ry of T ransp ortation’s G rant-M aking A uthority

The Transportation TrustFund may be used by the Department of Transport ation, after

payment of debt s ervice , “for any lawful purpose related to t

he exercise of its r ights , po wers, dut ies, and obl igati ons .” §3-216(d)( 1) of the Transport ation ( “TR”) Articl e, Maryland Cod e. Und er TR §2-103 (i )(2 ), t he Secret ary of Transport ationhas the aut horit y t o make grants “f or any trans portation rel ated purpos e”:

To the ex tent pe rmitte d by the S tate bud get, the Secre tary may ma ke gr ants-in -aid to: (i) Any gover n mental tr ansport ation agency in th is State, in cludin g any coun ty agency, bi-count

y agency, mult i-j urisdi ction agency, or

municipal a gency; or (ii) Any other person for an y trans portation rel ated purpos e. 3

The phra se “tran sporta tion rela ted pu rpose ” is no t d ef ined; ne ither is the te rm “transpor

tati on.” The langua ge has not bee n constr ued in any report ed Maryland case. Nor has it been int erpret ed by regulation or adj udicat ory decis ion.Gen. 269] 271

The text i s not i lluminat ed by the legis lative hist ory. When the Dep art m ent of Transp ortation wa s created in 19 70, the Sec retary
was gr anted authorit

y to “appl y for and r eceive . .. gr ants i n aid or gifts to be used for

trans portation rel ated purpos es.” Form er A rticle 41, §20 8(m ). See Chap ter 5 26 of the L aws of Maryl an d 19 70. At the time , the Se cretary ’s auth ority to m ake g rants w as li m ited to “any governmental t

ransport ation a gency withi n the Stat e of M ary land .”

In 1972, the Secretary’s gr ant-making authori ty was expanded beyond gov ernm ental tran sporta tion ag encie s. As a resul t of Chapter17 of the L aws o f Ma ry lan d 1972, the Secretary was additio nally autho rized to ma ke gr ants “to any per son, cor porati on, associ ation, or other

entit y fo r an y tra nsp orta tion relat ed p urp ose .” Form er A rticle 41, § 208 (g). The 197 7 ena ctm ent of T R § 2-10 3(i) carri ed for ward this language wit hout subst antive change or elab ora tion

. See Ch apte r 13 of th e L aw s of M ary land 197 7.

If the term “tran sportation” w ere construed with prim ary re gard for its bro ad statu tory co ntext, th e term wo uld b e take n to refer to the g oals an d activ ities of the vario us com ponents of the Department of Transportati on. The Depa rtment i s the spine of an organizationthat, through its m odal adm inistrations, renders parti cular

transportation service s: mass transit, highw ays, airport services, the Port of

Ba ltim ore , and the li ke. See TR §2-107. “T ran spo rtatio n,” in other wo rds, is what the parts of t he Department do, and wha t t hey do is pr ovide the means by which people and goods move from place to pl ace. This concept of “t r ansport ation” dov eta ils wit h th e ev ery day def initio n of

the te rm

. See Random House Dictionar

y of theEnglish Language 2012 (2 d ed. 198 7); Black’s Law D ictionary149 9 (6 th ed . 199 0).

Und er the ever

yday defini tion, and under any o the r conc eivab le reading of the te r m “trans portation,” at le ast one component of the on- sit e infr astr ucture c onstruc tion

) the constr uctionof roadways

)is unquestionably an object for which t

he Secretary’s gran ts ma y be p rovid ed. A gran t w ould also be “trans portation related” if it covered the costof infrastructure w ork causedby road const

ructi on

)if, for example, storm drai ns or sewer lines had to be re locat ed. Conversely, the S ecreta ry may not provide a gr ant for infrastructure work thatis needed, not because of roadconstr uction, but because a stadium will be built on the site in place of farm272 [81 O p. Att’y
buildings. Presu ma bly 78,000 peopl e will impose quite a demand on waterand sew er lines; if the existing lines are inadequat e, they will need to be upgraded. That is not a “transportation r elat ed purpose” and may not be the obj ect of a grant f rom the Secret ary.

Between these c lear ca tegorie s of w hat is allo we d and wh at is not fallparki ng lot s. On the one hand, no component of the Department is re spons ible f or pa rking lots (ex cept, o f cou rse, in connecti on with a direct trans portation ser

vice, like a

park-and- ride lotfor m ass tran sit ). If “transportation related p urpose” w ere constr ued t o me anon l y p ur po se s r el at edt o the mi ssion of the Dep artmen t’s adm inistr ation s, a gr ant for park ing lots to accommodate fans at

a footbal l st adium would not be permis sibl e.
On the other hand, we cannot say that the term “tr ansport ation relat ed purpose” bear s no meaning other than th is relative ly narrow one. To the contrary: Out-of-stat e authority su gges ts that t he provisi on of parki ng can it self fairly be regarded a s a “tr ansport ation relat ed purpose, ” beca use a ccess to park ing red uces poten tially hazardous r oad congesti on.

In Miller

v. Co mm onw ealth , 498 A.2d 1370 (Pa. Cmw lth. 1985), the Pennsyl vania Department of Transport ation ha d condemned some property f or a highway ease ment. When the highway was delayed, the pro perty w as leas ed to a private party for
use as a parki ng lot. Later, when the original highway desi gn was scaled down and the prop erty was no longer t o be part of a highway interchange, the pro perty wa s plan ned to be used as a par king garage adjacent to the highway. The landowner obj ectedto the t aking for this purpose, co ntendi ng th at the p arking garag e w as no t a perm issible objec tive of c ond em nation und er a statu te auth oriz in g condemnation for “t

ransport ationpurposes. ” The court r eject ed this argu me nt, holding t

hat the te rm “transpor

tati on purpose” was broad enough to inc lude tr ansport ation- relat ed acti viti es, l ike the parking garage, “which was designed a s a int egral part of the highway project and was intende d to miti gate th e loss of exist ing surf

ace parking and m inim iz e t raffic con ges tion .” 49 8 A .2d a t 13 74. See also Commonwealth v. E-Z Parks, Inc. , 620 A.2d 712, 719-20 (Pa. Cm wlth. 1993) (Pennsylvania Department of Transportati on h a d discr etionto concl ude that leased l and for a par

king garage w as a “relatedtra ns portatio n pu rpose ”); E-Z Parks, I nc. v. Larson , 498 A.2d 136 4, 13 68 ( Pa. C m wlt h. 19 85) , aff’d , 503 A.2d 931 (Pa. 1986) (pu blic p ark ing wa s a “ hig hw ay r elate d us e”).Gen. 269] 273

These Pennsy lvania cases, with their broad vi ew of “tran spo rtatio n,” are no t uniqu e. Oth er cou rts, in othe r con te xts , ha ve t ak ena s i mi l ar

vi ew o f t

he t erm. For example, in Kennedy v. Aerr Co. , 833 P.2d 807 (Colo. App. 1991), t he issue wa s whe ther a “trans portation” exclu sion in an insur ance poli cy excused an i nsurer f rom liabi lit

y for an acc ident c aused by a parke d piec e o f constr uctionequipment. The equip me nt spilled som e oil w hile being loaded ont o a trai ler, and the plaintiff was injur ed when her car skiddedon a patc h of the o il. T he co urt held that the “trans portation” exclusion applied: “Transportat ion includes a process that i s not l imited t o a moving vehicle , butalso i ncludes t he acti viti es (proces ses ) ori ginating from or flowing fro m trans por tat ion .” 833 P.2d at 809. Parking a vehi cle i s surely an acti vity “originating fr om or flowing fr om transport ation. ”

To su mm arize, the phra se “tran sporta tion rela ted pu rpose ” is ambiguous. A c onse rvative interpre tation w ould li mit p arking facility grants to thos e parking f acil ities that are directly related to
a programmatic miss ion o f a component within t he Department of Tran sporta ti o n. A mor e e xpans iv e i nt er pr et at io n wo ul d a ll ow a grantfora parking f

acil ity t hat the Secretary might det ermine to be needed to reduce the ri sk of gri dlock on roads near the stadium as fans par k where they can.

In our view , t he b etter ap proa ch to re solvin g the m atter is to constr ue this ambiguous stat ute in l ight of

anot her le gisl ative
ena ctm ent: t he a nnu al bu dge t bill.

II

Effect of Budget Bill Language

The annual budget

billis a l aw like an y ot

he r l aw. To be sure, it has cert ain unique featur es, deprived fr om the requi rem ents of Article III, §52 of the Const itution, t he Executive Budget Am endm ent. Ne verthe less, the b udg et bill is sub ject to th e cus tom ary prin ciple s of s tatut ory con struc tion

. One such pri nciple is that laws on the same subjec t are to be readtogeth er, to the exten t reaso nably poss ib le , so as to create an integr atedbody of law

. See, e.g. , Haskell v. Carey , 294 Md. 550, 55 6, 45 1 A. 2d65 8. “[ L] eg i sl at i ve i nt en t maybe gl eane d f ro m a statute’s ‘rel ations hip to earli er and subsequent legislation.’” In re274 [81 O p. Att’y

4 Th e Consolida

ted Transportation Program is an annu

al li st o f current and future projects. SeeTR §2-103.1(c).

5 The Counsel to the Department of Transportation earlier gave the

(continued...) Douglas P. , 333 Md. 38 7, 393, 635 A. 2d 427 (1994) (quoting Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore , 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628 (1987)) (em phas is added). Thi s princ iple would s eem especia lly apt here, given that TR §2-103(i) (2) expr essly r ecognizes the role of the annual bud get bill in s hapin g gra nt-m aking practic e: The statute conditi ons the S ec retar y’s grant -making authority “[ t]o t he extent permitt ed by the State budge t .. ..” As the Co urt of A ppea ls recen tly observed, “In examining t he langu ag e,

.. . w e cannot vi ew individua l provisi ons in isolat ion, but must look at the en tire statu tory sch em e.” Ward v. Department

of Publi c Safet

y & Correctional

Services , 339 M d. 34 3, 35 1-5 2, 66 3 A .2d 6 6 (1 995 ).

For the curr ent fi scal year, and f or the pas t seve ral y ears, the budget of the Depart

ment of Transportati on has contained the follow ing co ndition :

It is th e i nt en t o f t

he Gen er al As sembl y that funds de dicated to the T ransport at ion Trust Fund shallbe appli ed to purpos es bea ring dir ect re lati on to the St at e Transport ationprogram, unl ess dir ected othe rwi se by leg islation. T o im plem ent this intent for the De partm ent of T ransp ortation in FY 1996, no commitment of f unds in ex ce ss of $250,000 may be made nor may such an amount be trans ferr ed, by budget amendment
or otherwis e, for

any projec t or pur

pos e not
n orm ally arising in con nectio n w ith th e ordinary ongoing operation of t he Department and not cont emplated i n the budget approved
or the last publi shed Conso lidate d Transport ationProg ram with out re view and
comm ent by the budget comm ittees. 4

This language, applie d to TR §2-103(i) (2), would prevent a grant f or a park in g lot f

or the pr oposed Redskins St adium “without r eview and comment by the budgetcom m ittees .” 5 The stat ement of int entGen. 269] 275

5 (...continued) Secretary of Transportation

precisely this advice in a

memorandum dated Novembe r 9, 1995. H e conclu ded that,given the

language containe d in the budget bill, the Department should construe the term “transportation related”in a conservative manner, so as not to permit grants to be utilized for the const

ruction o f a park

ing lo t. Memo randum from Assistant AttorneyGeneral Edward R. K. Hargadon to Secr etary David L. Winstead (November 9, 1995). in the fi rst s entence of

the budget

conditi on, if

applie d rigor ously by the budget committee s, would r ule out s uch a grant, for i t cannot be said th at t he pa rking lot bea rs “dire ct relation to the S tate Transport ationprogram.” Yet, the very e x is tence of this budget restriction imp lies that th e statuto ry au thority o f the S ecreta ry is broader. If

the st atutor

y authori ty were narr ow, the budget condi tion
m igh t no t be n eed ed.

We under stand that t he Administration i s conside ring l anguage in a supplementalbud get bi ll t hat would ret ain the prior conditi on but add language expr essly a uthori zing Transpor

tati on Trust Fund money to be used f

or the con struc t ion of a par king faci lit

y at the prop osed Red skins S tadium . In all likel ihood, t he language wo uld recogniz e the speci al probl em of traf fic co nges ti on that would be posed by a crowd at a f

ootballgame if parki ng were not adeq uate at the s tadiu m itself.

In our view, s uch budget bil l langua ge would resol ve the i ssue squa rely in favo r of rec ogn izing th at a gra nt for th e park ing lot is perm itte d by the st atute . Of course , budget billlanguage cannot author ize a pro gram to be “ imp lem ented in a m anne r con trary to statute

... .” Bayne v. Sec retary of State , 283 Md. 560, 574, 392 A.2d 67 (1978). A budget billis not a means by which t he General Ass em bly may enlarge the scope of a stat ute. So, for

example, t

he budget billcould not a

uthori ze Trust Fund money to be us ed for onsit e wa te r and sewer l ine const ructi on not caused by road constr uction.

But it is not impermissi ble “l egisl ating in the budget ” for t he budget bil l to specif

y a use of f

unds that

can reasona

bly be encompassed by the ambiguous t erm “trans portation rel ated pur pos e.” Because the statu te itself rec ogn izes tha t grants are to be made “to the extent

permitt ed by t he State budge t,” there i s allthe276 [81 O p. Att’y

6 Indeed,if

the budget bill were enacted with language authorizing the use of Trust Fund money for stadium pa

rking lots,a court would likely favor a broad in

terpretation of the statute, to avoid declaring the budget billlanguage unconstitutional. A constructi on of a sta tute that a voids a constitu tional problem is to be preferred. See, e.g., Yangming Marine Transport Corp. v. Revon Prod

ucts U.S.A. Inc, 311 Md. 496, 536 A.2d 633 (1988). mo re reason t o harmonize the stat ute with an inter

pret atio n of it in the bu dget b ill. 6

III

Conclusion

In su mmary, i t i s our

opini on that Transportat ion Tr ustFu n d money may be used fo r a gr ant for on-sit e road const

ructi on and relate d infr astru ctur e w ork at the pro pos ed R eds kin Sta diu m . A grantmay also be m ade for p arking lot con struction if that use is authori zed in the budge t bil l. Tr ust Fundmoney may not be used f or a grant f or on-si te inf

rastructur e work needed for re asons other t han
roa d co nstru ction

. J. Joseph C urran, Jr. AttorneyGeneral

Jack Sch wa rtz Chief Counsel Opinions and Advic e