[Cite as State v. Williams, 2011-Ohio-3290.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MIAMI COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO : 

Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 10CA28 

vs. : T.C. CASE NO. 10CR68 

BOBBY A. WILLIAMS : (Criminal Appeal from 

 Common Pleas Court) 

Defendant-Appellant : 

 . . . . . . . . . 

 O P I N I O N

 Rendered on the 30th day of June, 2011. 

 . . . . . . . . . 

James Bennett, Prosecutor, 201 West Main Street, Troy, OH 45373 

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

Stephanie A. Gunter. Atty. Reg. No.0070436, 429 N. Main Street, 

Piqua, OH 45356 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . 

GRADY, P.J.: 

{¶ 1} On March 10, 2010, M.S. was standing on the back patio 

of her home in Piqua, Ohio, smoking a cigarette, when Defendant 

Bobby Williams walked up and asked M.S. to come over to him. When 

M.S. approached Defendant, he extended his hand and introduced 

himself as her neighbor. When M.S. shook Defendant’s hand, he 
2

grabbed her and forcibly restrained her while touching her breast 

underneath her shirt. 

{¶ 2} Defendant was indicted on one count of gross sexual 

imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), a felony of the 

fourth degree. Defendant was found guilty following a jury trial. 

 The trial court sentenced Defendant to eighteen months in prison 

and classified him as a Tier I sexual offender. 

{¶ 3} Defendant appealed to this court from his conviction 

and sentence. Defendant’s appellate counsel filed an Anders

brief, Anders v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 

19 L.Ed.2d 493, stating that she could find no meritorious issues 

for appellate review. We notified Defendant of his appellate 

counsel’s representations and afforded him ample time to file a 

pro se brief. None has been received. This case is now before 

us for our independent review of the record. Penson v. Ohio (1988), 

488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300. 

{¶ 4} Defendant’s appellate counsel has identified two 

possible issues for appeal, the first of which raises an issue 

concerning the validity of Defendant’s sentence. 

{¶ 5} In State v. Jeffrey Barker, Montgomery App. No. 22779, 

2009-Ohio-3511, at ¶36-37, we wrote: 

{¶ 6} “The trial court has full discretion to impose any 

sentence within the authorized statutory range, and the court is 
3

not required to make any findings or give its reasons for imposing 

maximum, consecutive, or more than minimum sentences. State v. 

Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, at paragraph 7 of the 

syllabus. Nevertheless, in exercising its discretion the trial 

court must consider the statutory policies that apply to every 

felony offense, including those set out in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. 

State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 

1, at ¶37. 

{¶ 7} “When reviewing felony sentences, an appellate court 

must first determine whether the sentencing court complied with 

all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence, 

including R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, in order to find whether the 

sentence is contrary to law. State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 

2008-Ohio-4912. If the sentence is not clearly and convincingly 

contrary to law, the trial court’s decision in imposing the term 

of imprisonment must be reviewed under an abuse of discretion 

standard. Id.” 

{¶ 8} The transcript of the sentencing hearing demonstrates 

that the trial court considered the purposes and principles of 

felony sentencing, R.C. 2929.11, and the seriousness and recidivism 

factors, R.C. 2929.12, in imposing its sentence. The court also 

considered oral statements of counsel and Defendant. The eighteen 

month sentence the court imposed on the gross sexual imposition 
4

charge, while the maximum sentence, is nevertheless within the 

authorized range of available punishments for a felony of the fourth 

degree, which is six to eighteen months. R.C. 2929.14(A)(4). 

The court also informed Defendant about post release control 

requirements and the consequences for violating post release 

control. Defendant’s sentence is not clearly and convincingly 

contrary to law. Kalish. 

{¶ 9} Furthermore, the court’s eighteen month sentence is not 

an abuse of discretion because the record supports that sentence. 

 Defendant touched the victim’s breast underneath her clothing 

while forcibly restraining her. As a result, the victim suffered 

psychological harm. When he committed this offense, Defendant 

had been released from prison on parole for only three months after 

serving thirty one years for murder. That circumstance 

demonstrates a high likelihood for recidivism. Finally, Defendant 

denied any culpability and expressed no remorse. We see no abuse 

of discretion in imposing the maximum eighteen month sentence. 

This assignment of error lacks arguable merit. 

{¶ 10} Appellate counsel additionally raises as a possible 

issue for appeal trial counsel’s performance. 

{¶ 11} Counsel's performance will not be deemed ineffective 

unless and until counsel's performance is proved to have fallen 

below an objective standard of reasonable representation and, in 
5

addition, prejudice arose from counsel's performance. 

Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 

80 L.Ed.2d 674. To show that a defendant has been prejudiced by 

counsel’s deficient performance, the defendant must affirmatively 

demonstrate to a reasonable probability that were it not for 

counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different. 

Id., State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136. 

{¶ 12} Appellate counsel does not identify any instances of 

deficient performance by trial counsel. To the contrary, 

appellate counsel states that in reviewing this record she can 

find no evidence of trial counsel rendering ineffective assistance. 

 Our independent review of the record has likewise not turned up 

any instances of deficient performance by trial counsel, much less 

resulting prejudice as defined by Strickland. This assignment 

of error lacks arguable merit. 

{¶ 13} In addition to reviewing the possible issues for appeal 

raised by Defendant’s appellate counsel, we have conducted an 

independent review of the trial court’s proceedings and have found 

no error having arguable merit. Accordingly, Defendant’s appeal 

is without merit and the judgment of the trial court will be 

affirmed. 

FROELICH, J. And HALL, J., concur. 
6

Copies mailed to: 

James Bennett, Esq. 

Stephanie A. Gunter, Esq. 

Bobby Williams 

Hon. Robert J. Lindeman