### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE June 15, 200 4 S es sio n
RA YM OND RO GERJONES v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Washington Cou nty

No. 21822 Robert

E. Cup p, Jud ge

No. E2003-00580-CC A-R3- P C F iled Septem ber 29, 2004

Pe tit ion e r, Ra y mon d Rog e r Jone s, app e a ls the Was hin g ton Cou nty Cr imi na l Co urt’ s d ism iss a l of his pro s e c omb ine d mo tio n to re op e n his po st- c on vic tio n pe tit ion , pe tit ion fo r writ of e rr or c or a m no bis , and petition for DN A ana ly sis. Petit ioner wa s convicted by a jury in the Knox C o u n t yCriminal Court o f tw o c o u n ts o f f

ir s t d e g r e e mu r d e r

. H e r e c e iv e d c o n s e c u ti v e li f e s e n te n c e s

. T h is Court aff irmed De fenda nt’s convictions and sente nces on dire ct appe al. See State v . Jones , 735 S.W .2d 803 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Washing ton Co u n ty Crim in a l Co u r t. T h e tria l c o u r t d is mi s s e d th e p e ti ti o n , a n d th is Co u r t a f f irmed. S ee Ra y mo nd Ro ge r J on e s v . S tat e , No. 03C01-9102-CR-00068, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S 584, (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knox ville, J uly 26, 1991), perm
. to app. denied (Tenn. 1992) . On J une 22, 2001, Petitioner filed a pro s e motion to reopen his post-conviction petition, alleg ing that the United States Supreme Court’s dec ision in Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 5 3 0 U

. S

. 4 6 6 , 1 2 0 S

. C t

. 2 3 4 8 , 1 4 7 L. Ed . 2 d 4 35 (2 00 0) , e sta

bli sh e d a ne w ru le of c on sti tut ion a l law re qu ir ing re tr oa c tiv e app lic a tio n to his c as e. P et i t i o ner subse quently filed a suppleme ntal reque st for DNA analy sis. The trial court dismiss ed the motion and denie d Petitioner’s reque st for DNA Analy sis. Petitioner appea ls. After revie wing the re cord, w e af firm the judg ments of the trial c ourt. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Trial Court Affi rm ed

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

J anie L . L indamood, J ohnson City , Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Ray mond Roge r Jones.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; J ohn H. Bledsoe, Assis tant Attorney Gene ral; Joe C. Cruml e y , Jr., Di stric t At torne y Ge ne ra l; a ndSte ve F inn e y , A ssi sta nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, the State of Tenne ssee.-2- OP IN ION F ac tu al B ac kgr ound The following fac tual backg rou n d i s t aken from this Court’s opinion i n Petitioner’s direc t appea l. State v. Jone s , 7 35 S.W. 2d80 3 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 87 ). Sta nle y a nd J ean Jone s, P e t i t i o n e r ’ s b r o t h e r

a n d s i s t e r

- i n

- l a w , d i s ap p e ar e d f r o mt h e i r h o m e i n W a s h i n g t o n C o u n t y o n F r i d a y, Aug ust 13, 1982. Stanley owned 35 acr es of pr operty , adjac ent to wher e Petitioner lived, which he
rec eived when the farm on which Petitioner and his br others wer e raised was d i v i d ed am ong Petitioner, Stanley , and their br other Cly de. An e mpt y gra v e wa s found bene ath the floor of an abandone d schoolhouse located on that prope rty . Petitioner’s fing erprints we re d i s co vere d on a flashlig ht, which was f

ound on the s choolhouse floor. On t he Sunday following the Friday

on which the victims were last seen, Petitioner’s neig hbor hear d voices and a g unshot coming f rom betwe en Petitioner’s house and the schoolhouse on Stanley ’s prope rty

. The neig hbor hear d a woman’s voice
scre aming , “He lp! Help! Plea se, help me! ” Then she heard the voices of two pe ople talking . She
re co gn i z ed o n e o f t h e v o i ce s as P et i t i o n er ’s

. L at ert h at d ay , t h e n ei gh b o r s aw S t an l ey ’s o ra n ge Datsu n s ta tio n w a g on pa

rk e d be tw e e n the ba c k doo r of Pe tit ion e r’ s h ou se a ndhis g ara g e . A c ou ple also saw the sta tion wag on parke d in front of Petitioner’s house wit h the rear hatch open. The station wag on was se en at P et itioner’s house a g ain on Tuesday , but it was not there on Wednesday . The station wag on was late r found a bandoned at the Empire Motor L odg e in Abing don, Virg inia.

A crime lab ana ly sis revea led blood stains on the car pet, the kitchen floor, a wicker table, and a chair in the victims’ home. Blood stains on the kitche n floor matched S tanley ’s bl ood type, which was ty pe “A,” and a lthough no e vidence of Jean’s blood type wa s prese nted, a sa nitary napkin found in the tr a sh ha d ty

pe “ O” blo od , w hic h w a s the ty pe fo un d in the c arp e t. A bul le t hole wa s f ou ndin
a ta ble le g . T wo le a d b ull e t fr a g me nts we re fo un d in the c arp e t. Asp e nt b ull e t w a s in sid e a bo ot, and anothe r wa s embedde d in the kitchen wa ll.

Che ste r A lle n, a

frie ndof Pe tit ion e r, te sti fi e d a t tria l a s to se ve ra l in c ri min a tin g state me nts that Pe tit ion e r m a de to h im. He te sti fi e d th a t on the Mo nd a y fo llo wi ng the la st da y that th e vic tim s wer e see n alive, Petitioner aske d him to keep a Walther P-38 p i s t o l fo r h im. Petit ioner told Mr. Allen, “The re’ s a g ood chanc e that Stanley won’t show up ag ain,” a nd ref erring to a

conver sation he had w ith a third party , “You know, he reme mbere d that bastard, Stanley .” Petitioner told Mr. Allen that he ha d taken the p i s tol to a gunsmith in J ohnson Cityfor r epair s and that he ha d used another man’s name . The g unsmith had g iven Petitioner ammunition for the pistol. Mr. Allen saw Petitioner clea n the pistol, which was loade d with solid cop per ja cket bullets. Mr. Allen r eporte d the seria l number of the pistol to the sheriff ’s depa rtment. Petitioner hid the pistol i n Mr. Allen’s barn, but Mr

. Allen reque sted that Petitioner retrie ve it the next day , and Petitioner did so. Petitioner told Mr. All en, “L et m e tell y ou, there is nothing to be worried about,” and “Everything’ s been ta ken
car e of.” Refer

ring to the victims, P etitioner said, “T hey are not c oming back now or neve r,” a nd

“ the re ’s no th in g t o b e a fr a id o f. ” Mr . A lle n a sk e d Pe tit ion e r i f the g un wa s in vo lve d in the ir disappea ranc es, and Petitioner r esponded, “ I f it didn’t, why would I want to be g ettin’ rid of it? ”-3-

M r

. A l l e n c o o p e r a t e d w i t h i n v e s t i g a t o r s a n d w i r e

- t ap p e d a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h P e t i t i o n e r

. In that conver sation, Petiti oner told Mr. Allen that he had wiped any fing erprints from the g un and the box it was in and buried the box with the g un i n s i d e i n a b ar n s table. He also told Mr. Allen that Stanley was g oing to ta

ke his pla ce from him. He said, “I cannot say that I don’t h at e t h i s t h ing happene d – that Stanley ’s g one.” Petitioner sa id that St anley and Jean had g one on a pe rmane nt
vacation. Petit ioner said, “ When it really comes down to y our fa mily

. . . every body has a bre aking point.” I nvestig ators found the pistol that Petitioner had buried. The g unsmith i dentified it, and a ballistic ex pert testi fi ed t h at t h e bullets found in the boot and the wa ll of the victims’ home wer e fired f rom it.

The e vidence showed that Petitioner had defaulted on a loan on which his brother s Stanley and Cly de had co-sig ned. Stanley had obtained a judgme nt ag ainst Petiti oner a nd was c ontemplating a for eclosure on Petitioner’s home. A c ritical stag e in the lawsu i t b y S t an l ey ag ainst Petiti oner occur red in May , 1982, which is when Petitioner took the pistol to be repaired.

There w as al so evidenc e that the victims had money in active ba nk acc ounts. They had bo ug ht andsto re d r oo fi ng ma te ri a ls, int e nd ing to re -r oo f the ir 10 0- y e ar- oldlog ho us e . T he vic tim s had a w hite pickup truck tha t was being repa ired at the time of their disappea ranc e. Jean had boug ht an air line ticket for a

trip to Denver , which ar

rived in the mail after her di sappea ranc e. J ean’ s sister, who had visited Stanley

and Jean in J uly , 198 2 , t es t i fi ed that Stanley and Jean had a

“re al g ood” relationship. S tanley

had bee n neg otiating the sale of some cattle, which was sc heduled to occ ur on Saturday , Aug ust 14, 1982, but he did not arrive for the s ale. Tom Allen, the buy er of the cattle, had g iven Stanley

a che ck, which Stanley

never cashe d.

After Petitioner’s arr est in September, 1 9 8 2 , t he bodies of Stanley and Jean J ones we re discovere d. Howeve r, evide nce c oncerning the discovery of t h ei r b o d ies was suppre ssed upon motion of Petit ioner.

On Ju l y 2 8 , 1 9 8 4 , P e t i t i o n e r w a s c o n v i c t e d b y a K n o x C o u n t y j u r y o f t w o c o un ts o f f ir st deg ree murder. H e wa s sentence d to life imprisonment for ea ch off ense, a nd the sentenc es we re or de re d to be se rv e d c on se c uti ve ly

. Hi s c on vic tio ns a ndse nte nc e s w e re a ff ir me d o n d ir e c t app e a l. Jones , 735 S.W .2d at 805. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on Aug ust 3, 1987. Petitioner later f

iled an ame nded petition. On appe al, this Court aff irmed t he trial court’s de nial of post-conviction re lief. J

on e s v . S tat e , su

pr a
. On J une 22, 2001, Petitioner filed a pro s e motion to reope n his petition for post-conviction relief , pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. s ection 40-30-117(a) (1), asserting that Tenne ssee’ s consec utive sentenc ing sta tute violates a new constitutional right e stablished in Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 5 30 U. S. 466, 120 S. Ct . 2348, 147 L . Ed. 2d 435 (2000). The trial court summarily dismiss ed Petitioner’s motion. P etitioner subseque ntly filed a suppleme ntal reque st for DNA analy sis; petiti on for writ of
err or c or am no bis ; a n d p e t i t i o n f o r d e c l ar a t o r y

j u d g m e n t

. T h e t r i a l c o u r td i s m i s s e d t h e p o s tconviction alleg ations as time-bar red. The trial court a lso concluded tha t Petiti oner’ s reque st for DNA a naly sis did not m eet the sta tutory require ments of Tenn. Code A nn. section 40-30- 304(1).-4-

I n an orde r, a pa nel of this Court dismi ssed Petitioner’s appe al from the trial court’s de nial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petit i o n u n d er Rule 3 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Appellate Procedur e. An appe al as of right is not ava ilable for r eview of a lower court’s de nial of
a mo ti on to reo pe n a

pe tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 (b ); Gary W allace v. Sta te , No. W2002-01832-CCA-R3-PC, 2003 Tenn. Crim

. App. L EXI S 566, (Tenn. Crim. App. at J ackson, June 26, 2003), no perm. to app. filed . Howeve r, this Court concluded that Petitioner’s reque st for DNA analy sis wa s proper ly prese rved for appeal. T here fore , the only issue for our

revie w is w he ther t he tria l c ou rt pr op e rl y de nie d Pe tit ion e r’ s r e qu e st f or DN A a na ly sis un de r the Pos tConviction DNA Analy sis Act.
The Post-Conviction DNA Analy sis Act of 2001 provides, “ [A] person co n v i ct ed of and sentenc ed for

the commission of first deg ree murder .

. . may at any time, file a pe tition requesting the fore nsic DNA a naly sis of any evidenc e that is in the possession or control of the pr osecution.” Te nn . Co de An n. § 40-3 0- 30 3. Af te r the Sta te ha s an o pp ortun ity to r e sp on d, the tr ia l c ou rt mus t
or de r D NA a na ly sis if : (1) A r easona

ble pr o b ab i l ity

exis ts that the petitioner would not have be en prosec uted or co nvicted if e x culpatory results had be en obtained thr oug h DNA
a na ly sis ; (2 ) T he e vid e nce i s st il l in e xiste nc e a ndin s uc h a c on dit ion that D NA a na ly sis may be conduc ted;
(3) T h e ev idence was ne ver pr eviously subjected to DN A ana ly sis or was not subjected to the analy sis that is now requested w hich could re solve an issue not
re so lve d b y

pr e vio us a na ly sis ; (4) The application for

analy sis is m ade f

or the purpose of demonstra ting innocenc e and not to unrea sonably delay the execution of sentenc e or administration of justice.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-304. “The failure to me et any of the qualifying c riteria is, of c ourse, f atal to the action.” W

ill iam D. Bu

for d v . S tat e , No. M2002-02180-CCA-R3-PC, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 370 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Na shville, April 24, 2003), perm. to app. denie d (Tenn. 2003)

.
I n his pe tition for DNA analy sis, Petitioner alleg es that the re sults of DNA testing on 22 trial
e xhibi ts w ou ld “ sh ow the ide nti ty of the re a l mu rd e re r andpr ov e Pe tit io ner’ s in no c e nc e .” Th os e items, which Petitioner alleg es ar e in the possession of the State, inc lude, am o n g o t h er thing s, a flashlig ht, pretzels, a pistol, t he victim’s blood, a chair, bullet fra g ments, boots, a paper bag , a piec e of linoleum, car

pet fiber s, a sanitary

napkin, and a

wicker end table.

The trial c ou rt fo u n d that even if the 22 trial exhibit s on which Petitioner re quested DN A analy sis were amena

ble to testing, the results would not ne g ate the over whelming evidenc e at tria l-5-

of Pet it io n e r ’ s g u il t. I n it s w r it te n o r d e r s u mm ar il y d is mi s s in g th e p e ti ti o n f o r D N A a n a ly s is, the tr ia l c ou rt state d a s f

oll ow s: Assuming, a

rg uendo that DNAanaly sis could be conduc ted on eac h of the items, would this show the real identity of t he murderer , or m urder ers in thi s case ? This Court does not believe so. The listed items could contain DNA f rom numerous individuals, simplybeca use of the nature of the item. As an example, the bag containing piece s of ca rpet c ou l d have the DNA of the installer or installers, the people who manufa cture the carpet, the sa lesman of the c arpe t and the pe op le wi thi n th e ho us e ho ld, inc lud ing the famil y , a lon g wi th v isi tor s. Th is arg ument would be true as to any item list ed by

the Petitioner.
Ag a in, a ssu min g that DN A c ou ld be ob ta ine d f ro m a ny or a ll o f the se ite ms, how would the Petitioner propose to match the DNAto all these unknown persons. To g rant DN A ana ly sis of thes e i t em s wo uld be nothing mor e than a n e xer c ise in f

uti lit y that th is c ou rt

do e s n ot b e lie ve that th e statut e c on te mpl a te s.

Moreove r, and more im portantly , this court finds there is a threshold provision for T.C.A. 40- 30-404(1) which re quires “a rea sonable proba

bility exis ts that the Petitioner would not have be en prose cuted or convicted if

exculpatory

results had been obta ined throug h DNA a naly sis.”
Reading the opi nion from the Petitioner’s orig inal appea l reve als overw helming evid e nc e fr om w hic h a

jury c ou ld h a ve c on c lud e d th e Pe tit ion e r g uil ty of the se crimes. Incredibly, the m ost dam nin g evidence of his gu ilt w as evidence that
was r ule d ina dm iss ible . T he Pe tit ion e r, wh ile inc arc e rate d ma de a state me nt t o another inmate that lead [sic] the W ashing ton County Sheriff’ s Depa rtment to the discovery of the buried bodies of t he P etitioner’s brother and sister- in-law. In one of the g rave s t h ey als o found a tube of bathtub ca ulk. This lead [sic] the investigators to return to the victims’ home whe re the y found a spent bullet that
app e are d to ha ve be e n f

ir e d f ro m th e mur de r w e apo n. Th is bu lle t, andthe ho le it produce d, had been overlooked during prior ins pections of the hous e as it was embedde d in a wall, and c aulk was use d to mask the hole.
Although all this evid ence was inad m issib le at tr ial, in cludin g discovery of th e bodi e s, th is C our t c an c ons ide rth e e vid e nc e to r e ac h c e r ta in c onc lusi ons r e ga r ding DN A a nal ys is . I n this reg ard, it would be proper to conclude, unde r the fa cts of this case , that the only person who w ould know wher e the bodies w ere buried wou ld b e th e k il le r

. T h e r e f o r e , it w o u ld b e im mate r ia l h o w mu c h DNA
on e c ou ld g arn e r f

ro m th e e vid e nc e in thi s c a se , a s it wo uldbe lit e ra lly imp os sib le for the Petitioner to show “ a re asonable probability exis ts tha t t h e P etitioner would not have be en prose cuted or convicted if

excu l p atory

results had be en obtained throug h DNA analy sis.” I n other words, beca use the bodies were-6-

discovere d wher e the Petitioner direc ted, there simply can be n o ex culpatory evidenc e obtained by

D.N.A. [sic]. Therefor e, this arg ument is without m erit.
(B old emphasis added)

. First, Petitioner re lies upon Rule 28 of the Rules of t he S upreme Court to arg ue that the tria l court err ed by

summarily

dismiss ing the petition without allowing Petitioner to amend the pe tition afte r appointm ent of counsel. The rule states, “No pro se petition shall be dismissed for fai lure to follow the prescribe d form until the court has g iven petitioner a re asonable opportunity to amend the petition with the assistance of co u nsel.” Te nn. Sup. Ct . R. 28 §6(B) (4)( b) (e mphasis added)

. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-30-106(d), de aling with the preliminary consideration of a po st- c on vic tio n p e tit ion , s ta te s: The pe tition m ust contain a c lear and spec ific statement of

all g rounds upon which relief is sought, including full disclosure of the fa ctual basis of those g rounds. A bare alleg ation that a constitutional rig ht has bee n violated and mer e conc lusions of la w s ha ll n ot b e su ff

ic ie nt t o w arr a nt any

fu rthe r p ro c e e din g s. F a ilu re to s ta te a fa ctual basis for

the g rounds alleg ed shall result in immediate di smissal of the petition. I f, howe ver, the petition was filed pro se, the j udg e may enter an orde r statin g that

the pe tit ion e r m us t f

ile a n a me nd e d p e tit ion that c omp lie s w ith thi s section within fiftee n (15) day s or the petition will be dismiss ed.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-106(d)

.
I n th is c a se , th e tr ia l c ou rt

didno t di smi ss P e tit ion e r’ s pro s e petition for fa ilure to follow the presc ribed form. T he trial court dismiss ed the petition be cause , the trial court c oncluded, Petitioner did not meet the threshold showing require d under se ction 40-30-304( 1) of the Post-Co n v i ction DNA Ana ly sis Act.
Petitioner also arg ues that the trial c ourt should no t h av e co n sidered e vidence that was deeme d inadmissible at trial in de termining that a re asonable probability did not ex ist that P etitioner would not have be en prose cuted or convicted if

exculpatory

results had been obtained throug h DNA
an al y sis. See T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 3 0

- 3 0 4 ( 1 )

. T h e S t a t e ar g u e s t h a tt h e tr i a l c o u r tp r op e rl y considere d all of the fac ts and circ umstances of Petitioner’s ca se. The State a lso arg ues that eve n without consideration of the excluded eviden ce t h at Petitioner, after his arre st, directed la w e nf or c e me nt t o th e loc a tio n o f the vic tim s’ bo die s, a ny e xcu lpatory

re su lts fr om D NA te sti ng wo uld not have a ffe cted the pr osecution or c onviction in this case

.
I n determining whe ther to g rant or deny a post -convic tion petition for DN A ana ly sis, the trial court must consider a ll the available e vidence , including the evidenc e pre sented at trial and any stipulations of fact made by either pa rty

. W ill ie Tom En sle

y v . S tat e , No. M2002-01609-CCA-R3- PC, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 335 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Na shville, April 11, 2003), no perm. to app. filed . The trial c ourt may also consider

t h e o p i n ions of this Court on di rec t appea l of the-7-

petitioner’s c onviction or the appe als from prio r p ost-conviction or ha beas c orpus ac tions. Id

. Mo re ov e r, “ [a] d e te rm inatio no f th e e v i d e n c ean d

s u rr ou nd ing c ir c ums ta nc e s is ne c e ssa ry to e va luate whether exculpatory results would have preve nted prosecution or conviction or would ha ve re sulted in a more fa vorable verdic t or sentenc e.” State v. David I. Tucke r , No. M2002-02602-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 Tenn. Crim

. App. L EXI S 46 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, J anuary 23, 2004), no pe rm . to app. filed

. There are no Tenne ssee a ppellate c ourt dec isions holdi ng that a post-convic tion court may
c on sid e r e vid e nc e that w a s e xclu de d a t tria l in makin g thi s det e rm inatio n, a nd we de c lin e to d o s o here

. We c onclude that consideration of such evidenc e is not appropriate. Ne verthe less, we a g ree with the trial court’ s conclusion that any exculpatory

results of DNAtesting w ould n ot have prec luded Petitioner’s prose cution or convic tion.

I n J ac k J ay Sh utt le v . S tat e , N o

. E 2 0 0 3

- 0 0 1 3 1

- C C A

- R 3

- P C , 2 0 0 4 T e n n

. C r i m

. A p p

. LE X IS 80 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, Fe bruary 3, 2004), perm. to app. pending , a pane l of this Court
reve rsed the trial court’s de nial of the pe titioner’s reque st for DNA analy sis of blood underneath the victim’s fing erna ils and on the petitioner’s jeans despite trial testimony by the pe t i tioner that he kil le d th e vic tim . I n T e nn e sse e , th e pe tit ion e r is no t r e qu ir e d to sh ow that id e nti ty wa s a n is su e in order for a court to orde r DNA testing. W ill iam D. Bu

fo rd v . S tat e , su

pr a . I n Sh utt le , this Court stated, “f or purpose s of the Ac t, we must assume that DNA testing w ill revea l exculpatory evidenc e.” I n another

rec ent case, Car l E. Sain e v . S tat e , N o. W20 02 -0 30 06 -C CA -R 3- PC, 2 00 3 T e nn . Crim. App. LEXI S 1135 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Dec ember 15, 2003), perm. to app. denie d (Tenn. 2004), this C ourt aff

irmed the trial c ourt’s denia l of DNA te sting. The petitioner, convic ted of assault and r ape, r equeste d DNA a naly sis of spermatozoa found on the vic tim’s torn panties. The petitioner admitted that he assaulted the victim, but arg ued that he le ft the victim unconscious, and
someone e lse could have then enter ed the r oom and ra ped the victim. A pane l of this Court not ed that the victim had identified the pe titioner as her rapist and other

evidenc e at tria l corrobor ated he r testimonyreg arding the ra pe.

I n the direc t appea l of Petitioner’s c o n v i ctions, a pane l of this Court concluded that the circ umstantial e vidence ag ainst Petitioner was sufficie nt to support his c onvictions. State v. Jone s , 735 S.W .2d at 809. The Court noted, “ Perhaps the most da mning evidenc e ag ainst the appe llant was the testimony

of his friend Che ster Allen.” Id . at 807. As noted su pr a , M r. Al l en testified that Petitioner made sever al incriminating statements to him. Mr. Allen also g ave te stimonyreg arding a pistol that Petit ioner hid in Mr. Allen’s ba rn, which inve stigators later loc ated.
Petitioner states in his brief, “A s a matter of la w, there is alway s evidenc e of g uilt, bey ond
a re asonable doubt, in every criminal convic tion. . . .” The de termination to be made is whether “ [a]
re a so na ble pr ob abilit y ex ist s th a t th e pe tit ion e r w ou ld n ot h a ve be e n p ro se c ute d o r c on vic te d if exculpatory

results had be en obtained throug h DNA analy sis.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-304(1)

. I n this case, DN A ana ly sis might reve al the pre sence or abse nce of Petitioner’s DNA on any , all or none of the items that Petit ioner re quests be submitted for testing. Howeve r, we cannot se e how a ny results of DNA testing w ould have ha d a fa vorable aff ect on the pr osecution or c onviction of-8-

Pe tit ion e r. We a g re e wi th the tr ia l c ou rt that th e pr e se nc e of oth e r p e rs on s’ DN A o n th e ite ms Petitioner reque sts be analy zed would not have a f avora ble ef fec t on Petiti oner’ s prosec ution or conviction.

Petitioner raises two a dditional issues on appeal, a ttorney misrepr esenta tion and unconstitutional indictment and jury instructions. The trial court concluded that those a lleg ations
are statutorily

time-barr ed. I n its orde r deny ing the petition, the trial court quoted Te nn. Code Ann. section 40-30- 102(b)( 1) and state d that “Petitioner has failed to show that these two alleg ations are ‘base d upon a fina l ru l ing of an Appe llate Court [si c] establishing a Constit utional [ sic] right that
wa s n ot r e cogni z ed as ex ist ing a t th e tim e of tr ia l, i f r e tr oa c tiv e [sic ] ap pli c a tio n o f that r ig ht i s require d.’”
By statute, a pe titioner may

file only one petition for post-c onviction r elief. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102( c). F ollowing Petitioner’s c onvictions, he soug ht post-conviction relief. T h i s Court aff irmed t he trial court’s denial of relief. Se e Ra y mo nd Ro ge r J on e s v . S tat e , N o. 03 C01 -9 10 2- CR00068, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 584, (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxvill e, Jul y 26, 1991), perm. to app. denied

(Tenn. 1992) . The trial c ourt d i s m i s s ed a second post-conviction petition as timebarr ed, and this Court af

firmed on a

ppeal. Se e Ra

y mo nd Ro ge r J on e s v . S tat e , No. E1999-00572- CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi l l e, November 10, 1999), perm. to app. denie d (Tenn. 2000). While Petit ioner’s se cond petition was pe nding, he moved to reope n his first post-conviction proce eding , alleg ing c onstitut ional claims based upon Sandstrom v. Montana , 4 42 U. S. 5 10 , 9 9 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L . Ed. 2d 39 (1979), a nd Sta te v . B ro wn , 836 S.W .2d 530 (Tenn. 1992). The trial court denied the motion, and this C ourt denied a n appea l from the trial c ourt’s ac tion. See R aymond Roge r J on e s v . S tat e , No. 03C01-9801-CR-00007 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knox ville, March 17, 1998) , perm. to app. denied

(Tenn. 1999)

. Finally , Petitioner arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed by not considering his petition for writ of
e rro r c or am no bis under W

or k ma n v . S tat e , 41 S.W .3d 100 (Tenn. 200 1 ). Un d er very particula r circ umstances, a

defe ndant may

file for a wri t of e rro r c or

am no bis

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26- 105. This remedy

is available only

wh en n ew l y d iscovere d evidenc e “ma y have r esulted in a differ ent judgme nt, ha d it been pre sented at the trial.” Id .; se e als o S tat e v . H ar t , 911 S.W .2d 371, 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) . The pe tition m ust contain:
(a) the g rounds and the nature of the newly discovere d evidenc e, (b ) wh y the a dmi ssi bil ity

of the ne wl y

dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e ma y ha ve re su lte d in
a dif fe re nt j ud g me nt i f the e vid e nc e be e n a dmi tte d at th e pr e vio us tr ia l,
(c) the petitioner “wa s without f ault in f ailing to pr esent” the n ew l yd i scover ed evidenc e at the a

ppropriate time, and
(d) the r elief soug ht by

the petitioner.-9-

Ha rt , 911 S.W .2d at 374-75 (c itations omi tted).

The State responds that the petition is untimely

. A defe ndant has one y ear from the date of the fi na l ju dg me nt i n w hic h to file a petition for wri t of e rro r c or am no bis . Tenn. Code Ann. § 27- 7- 10 3. Pe tit ion e r’ s re qu e st fo r re lie f c ome s a lmo st 18 y e ars a ft e r his c on vic tio ns . Pe tit ion e r a sse rt s that due proc ess re quires a tolling of the statute of limit ations under W

or k ma n v . S tat e , 41 S.W .3d 101 (Tenn. 2001). As we state d above, on January 8, 2002, Petitioner filed a pro s e pleading sty led “Amend m en t an d Supplement to Petit ion for Post-Conviction Relief; Petit ion for Writ of Error Coram Nobis; Petiti on for Declar atory J udg ment; and P etition for DNA Analy sis.” Howeve r, the pleading does not contain eve n a bar e alleg ation of wha t “subsequently or new ly

discovere d evidenc e” e ntitles him to relief

. There fore , petitioner has not shown in his petition any g rounds for relief that would justify

the tolling of the statute of limitations.

CO NC LU SION The judg ments of the trial c ourt are aff irmed.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE