### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE Jul y 22 , 200 8 S es sio n
FRANCES RODRIGUE Z v . CHARLES G. PRI CE

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Blou nt County No. 2006-130 Telfor d E. Forgety, Jr ., Chancellor

No. E2007-02178-COA- R3-CV - FILED OCTOB ER 6, 2008

This is an appea l from a Final Judgment issued b y the Chance llor in respec t to a Petition for Registration an d M o d ification of Fore ign Decr ee in the Cha ncery Court of Blount C ounty, Te nn e sse e

. Th e Tria l Cou rt or de re d the re gis tr a tio n of the fo re ign Ju dg me nt, bu t de nie d th e re qu e st fo r m od if ic a tio n. On app e a l, w e a ff ir m.

Te nn. R . A pp. P .3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Cha nc e r y C our t A ff ir me d.

H ER S CHEL P ICK EN S F R ANKS , P.J., delivered the opinion of t he Court, in which D. M I CHAEL S W I NEY , J., and S HAR ON G. L EE , J., joined.

W . A nd re w Fo x, Kn ox vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or app e lla nt. Craig L. Ga

rre tt, Maryville, Tenne ssee, f or appe llee.

OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound Appellant F ranc es Rodrig uez and appe llee C harle s G. Price we re divorc ed on May 26, 1998. The F inal J udg ment of Dissolution of Marr iag e was enter ed by the Family Division of the Circuit Court of the E i gh t ee n th J udicial District for B reva rd County , Florida . I n this action, appellant pe titioned the Chancer y Court to reg ister t he Florida court’s Final J udg ment and modify the child support order on the g rounds that there was a signific ant var iance pursuant to the Unifor m Family Support Act, Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-5-2001 et seq . Appellant alleg ed that al t h o u gh the orig inal jurisdiction in Florida wa s appropr iate at the time of the divorce , neither the child, Aar on-2-

T. Pr ic e , n or

the pa rt ie s to the div or c e pr e se ntl y liv e in F lor ida . App e lla

nt a nd Aa ro n r e sid e in S ou th Carolina and Pric e re sides in Blount County , Tenne ssee.

App e ll e e f

il e d anA n s w e r

an d Co u n te r
- Pe ti ti o n , an d

c o n c e d e d

th e Ju d g me n t of Divorce could be made a judg ment of the Tenne ssee court pursuant to T ennesse e law, but de nied the Tr ia l Co ur

t c ou ld m od if

y the pr ior or de r o f sup po rt be c a

us e Aa ro n Pric e wa s n ot h is b iol og ic a l c hil d and he ow ed no leg al duty of support for

Aar on Price. He furthe r av er re d t h at any obligation for support o f Aaron was c ontrac tual in nature a s set forth in the Mar ital Settlement Agr eeme nt, and stated t h at he ha d ag ree d to provide limited support in a set amount for Aa ron Price, a

ppellant’s natura l ch i ld, in ex chang e for appellant’ s waiver

of any rig hts she might have to his mi litary retire ment benef

its. Appellee averr ed that he ha d faithfully provided $400. 0 0 a m o n t h for Aa ron P ri ce as s et forth in the Ma rital Settlement Ag ree ment, and the F inal J udg ment of Dissolution of Marr iag e both stated that Aa ron wa s not the biologica l child of Price.

The Trial

The matter

came on for t ri al August 7, 2007, and the Tria l Court, after he aring argument from counse l and the testimony of the pa

rties, orde re d t h e Florida J udg ment to be reg istered but denie d appellant’ s Petiti on to modify the child support for A aron.
The Court made the following finding s of fa ct and c onclu s i o n s o f l aw at the
co n cl u s i o no f t h e h ea ri n g:

1. There is no question that Aar on Price is not the biologic al child of Mr. Price

. 2. The c hild support ag ree ment contained in the ag ree ment betwee n the par ties
and in t he Fin a l Judg me nt o f D ivo rc e wa s n ot c hil d s up po rt in t he c la ssi c sense be cause Mr. Price is not the father of A aron.
3. Th e ob lig a tio n o f s up po rt fo r A aro n M r. Pr ic e un de rt oo k o f $ 40 0. 00 a mon th was by contra ct and not law. N either the contra ct or the Final Judgment
c o nta in a ny provision that the support obligation was modifiable. The support obligation wa s in c onsideration for Ms. Rodriguez’s ag ree ment not to make any claim ag ainst Mr. Price’ s mili tary retire ment benef

its.

4. The support oblig ation which Mr. Price contr actually undertook is not modifiable by

the Court.

Th e F ina l Judg me nt e nte re d r e fl e c ts t he Tr ia l Co ur

t’ s h old ing s:
1. Petitioner is hereby allowed to r eg ister the fore ign F lorida dec ree in the event the same e ver needs to be enforc ed” a nd was subjec t to be reg istered but wa s not subject to be modified as it re lates to child sup p o rt fo r t h e mi nor child,-3- Aar on T. Price, an d t h at the same was a non-modifiable c ontrac tual obligation.

2. Sa id f

or e ig n d e c re e is n ot s ub

ject to mod if

ic a tio n a s it

re late s to the c hil d support obligations relative to Aar on T. Price inasmuc h it is undi sputed that the Respondent, Charle s G. Price, is not the fa ther of Aaron T. Price a

nd the child support obligation set forth in said decr ee is a contra ctual oblig ation not subject to modification. Appellant admitted to appe llee that Aar on is not his son. She claims she did not know the full name of

Aar on’s biologic al father a nd she had never tried to find him. Appellant testified that Aar on called a

ppellee “ Dad” during the marr iag e. B etwee n the time of Aar on’s birth, J anuar y 5, 1993, and the parties separation, appellant lived with appe llee for approximately

one to one a

nd a half y ear s. Appellee serve d twenty -one y ear s in the Air For ce, f rom 1980 to 2001, and re tired as a master serg eant a

nd curr ently

rec eives military retire ment benef its. Aa ron is listed as a depe ndent on his mil itary

health insuranc e.
Th e Mari ta l Se ttl e me nt Ag re e me nt sp e c if ic a lly state s that “ [b]oth p art ie s in te nd thi s A g r e e m e n tt o r e f

l e c ta c o mp l e t e an d f

i n a l A g r e e m e n tb e t w e e nt h e m a s t o a l i m o n y, c h i l d c u s t o dy, child support, visitation, proper ty and financial rights, in order that such rig hts and relations mi g ht be fi na lly fi xed and de te rm ined for all ti me . T he pe rt ine nt p art s o f t he Ag re e me nt r e g ard ingc hil d
c us tod y and su pp or t are a s f oll ow s:
10. SHARED PARENTAL RESP ONSI BI L I TY. The parties shall have sha red pare ntal responsibility

for the c hil d

r e n. Howeve r, Mother sha ll be the primary resi d e n ti a l p ar e n t f

o r A A RO N PR I CE an d

F a th e r s h a ll b e th e p r ima ry residentia l p ar en t for AL EX PRI CE. The par ties shall retain full par ental
re sp on sib ili ty

wi th r e sp e c t to the c hil dr e n, and sh a ll c on fe r in g oo d fa ithwi th a view towa

rds adopting a harmonious attitude in matters such as medical a nd dental ca re, e ducation, re ligious trainingand the other major aspe cts of the children’ s g rowth and de velopment.
Parag raph 11 of the Ag ree ment provides in de tail the terms reg arding visitation betwe en Rodrig uez and Alex, but does not addre ss specifics r eg ardingvisitation between a ppellee a nd Aar on. Para g ra ph s 1 2 a nd 14 pr ov ide for chi ld s up po rt and the wa ive r b y

a pp e lla nt o f a ny ri g hts to
a pp e lle e ’s mil ita

ry re tir e me nt b e ne fi ts a s f

oll ow s:
12. CHI L D SUPPOR T. The Husba nd shall pay

direc tly to the Wife by

allotment from the Ar

med For ces, a s and for

the support of AA RON, t h e amount of $400.00 per month commenc ing on the 1 day of the month following entry st of a f inal judgme nt, and continuing on the 1 day of eac h month therea fter. st Chi ld s up po rt

sh a ll c on tin

ue a s to A aro n unti l he a tta ins the a g e of 18 y e ars , marr ie s, dies , ent e rs the arm e d f or c e s, be c ome s se lf

-s up po rt ing , o r i s-4- otherwise e mancipate d. . . .

* * * *

14. WAI VER OF HUSBAN D’S MI L I TARY RETI RED PAY. The Wife wa ives any rig ht s h e m ay

have to a

portion of the Husba

nd’s military

retire d pay
s h o u l d h e b e e n t i t l e d

t o s a i d p ay w h e nh e l e a v e s t h e ar

m e d f o r c e s

. In
c on sid e ratio n, sh ou ld t

he Hu sb and e ve r dis a vo w his su pp or t f or Aa ro n o r f a il to make child support pay ments, the Wife shall have the rig ht to reopen he r c l a i m f o r a p o rt i o no f

H u s b an d ’ s m i l i t ar

y r e t i r e d p ay.

Para g ra ph20 of the Ag re e me nt s tate s:
20. TOTAL

AGREEMENT. Ea ch of the parties unde rstands that this Ag ree ment constitutes the entire c ontr ac t b etwee n them, superse ding a ny prior understandingor Ag ree ment betwee n them. No m o d i fi ca tion or waiver by the par ties of any of t he terms here in shall be valid unless executed in wr iting signe d by both of them. Appellee testified that at the time he sig ned the a g ree ment he believe d that appellant ha d a c la im t o a

po rt ion of his mil ita

ry re tir e me nt b e ne fi ts, and

he a g re e d to pa

y $4 00 .0 0 a

mon th fo r A aro n a

nd in r e tur n a pp e ll ant agreed to w a ive a ll c la ims sh e ha d to the re tir e me nt b e ne fi ts. Ap pe lle e sa id h e pla

nn e d to ma int a in a re latio ns hip wi th Aa ro n, bu t a pp e lla nt wo uld no t a llo w h im to have a ny relationship wit h Aar on afte r the divorc e. Appe llee said he had se en Aa ron on only

one occa sion since the divorc e at the w edding of Aaron’s half-brother Alex in 2006, and Aaron has ne ver visited appellee ’s home. He has had no involvement in dec isions reg ardingAar on’s upbring ing or education.

Th e iss ue s o n a pp e a l are summa

ri zed a s f oll ow s:
A. Whether the Tr ial C o u rt erred whe n it refuse d to modify the child support obligation im p osed by

both the marital settlement ag ree ment and the f inal judgme nt of dissoluti on of marr iag e base d on a findi n g t h at the obligation
wa s c on tr a c tua l?

B. Whether the Tr ial Court had jurisdiction to modify th e ch i ld support obligation under t he uniform inter state family support act, Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-5-2001 et seq .?

C. Whether the c hild support obligation is elig ibl e fo r modification under the Te nn e sse e c hil d s up po rt

g uid e lin e s?

A trial cour

t’s fin dings of

fac t in a non-jury

trial are revie wed de novo upon the-5-

re c or d, wi th a

pr e sumpt ion

of c or re c tne ss u nle ss th e evi de nc e pr e po nd e ra te s o the rw ise . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3 ( d) ; Ke

y t v . Ke y t, 24 4 S. W.3 d 3 21 , 3 27 (T e nn .2 00 7) ; Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) . The trial c ourt’s conclusions of law, howeve r, ar e re viewed unde r a p u r e l y de novo standard w ith no presumption of corr ectne ss. Tay lor v . F e ze ll , 158 S.W .3d 352, 357 (Tenn. 2005)

.

T h e f

i l i n g o f t h e a p p e l l an t ’ s P e t i t i o ni nt h e T e n n e s s e e C o u rto f B l o u n tC o u n t y, Tenne ssee to re g ister the F lorida cour t’s Fin al Dec ree was a

ppropriate and the Tr ial Court had subject matter jur isdiction to consider the matter pur suant to the Uniform Interstate F amily Support Act (U I FSA), Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 2001 et seq

.

The UI FSA controls the establishment, enfor ceme nt, or modification o f s u pport order s a c r o s s s tate li n e s b y p r o v id in g a

me c h an is m b y

w h ic h s u p p o rt o r d e r s f

r o m o th e r s tate s c an be re g istered a

nd enfor ced in Te nnessee when the obli go r p are nt lives in Tennessee

. Torrico v. Smithson, No. M2004-01924-COA- R3-J V, 2006 WL 334032 at * 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2006)

. Under UI FSA, a state that issues a support order has continuing exclusive jurisdiction over that order and no other

state may

modify that order

as long as the issui n g s t at e has c ontinuing exclusive jurisdiction. He re , th e iss uin g state wa s Flo ri da , but it lost c on tin uin g e xclu siv e jur isd ic tio n, be c a us e neither a ppellee, a ppellant, nor the ch i l d are residents of that state. Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-5- 2205(a) (1).

Acc ord i n g ly , the Trial Court had subje ct matter jurisdiction to modify the support order issued by

Florida when a ll the elements of Te nn. Code An n

. § 3 6 -5-2611(a) a re me t. See, LeTellier v. LeTellier, 40 S.W .3d 490, 497 (Tenn. 2001)

.

The substantive lawof Tenne ssee r eg ardingth e oblig ation of child support and modification of child support is applicable to this case

. Se e Pi c k e rn v . P ic k

e rn , No. E2004-02038- COA-R3-CV, 2 0 0 5 W L7 1 1 9 6 4 a t* 1 ( T e n n

. C t

. A p p

. M ar

. 2 9 , 20 05 ); S t a t e ex rel. Schle igh v. Schleigh , No. E-2002- 1237-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31421665 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2002) . The Ag ree ment betwee n the par ties contains a c hoice of l aw cl au se that provides that “all matters aff ectingthe interpre tation and enf orce ment of this Ag re em ent shall be c onstrued and inter prete d pursuant to the laws of

t h e s t at e o f Florida. Thus, Florida la w g overns our

interpre tation of the Ag ree ment. See Credit General Ins. Co. v. I nsurance Se rviceGroup, Inc, No. E2007-00033- COAR 3 -C V, 2 0 0 7 W L2 1 9 8 4 7 5 at * 2 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. J u l

. 3 1 , 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Goodwin Bros. Leasing, Inc. v. H &B, Inc., 597 S.W .2d 303, 306 (Tenn.1980))(A s a rule, T ennesse e cour ts will honor a contra ctual choic e of law provision). The Trial Court held t he child support ag ree ment in the divorce jud g me nt w a s p ur su ant t o th e Ag re e me nt e nte re d i nt o by the pa rt ie s and wa s n ot t ra dit ion a l c hil d support “w i t h i n the meaningof the lawsuch as to continue to be modified there afte r.” The Trial Court also found that as t h e Agr ee ment contained no pr ovisions for modification of the support ag ree ment, the set amount of $400.00 a month coul d n o t b e modified by the Court. Fur

ther, the Court found the support oblig ation was in consideration for a ppellant’s ag ree ment not to make any claim ag ainst the appe llee’s mil itary retire ment benef

its, and the Court also reje cted a ppellant’sA p p e l l e e t e s t i f i e d o n t h i s i s s u e , a n d ap p e l l a n t d i d n o t c o n t e s t h i s s t a t e m e n t

. Itis 1 uncontrove rted that a

ppellee did not have a re lationship with t he child af ter the divorc e.
Where a party makes no leg al ar g ument and cites no authority in support of a position, such 2 is s u e is d e e me d

w a iv e d an d w il l n o t b e c o n s id e r e d

o na p p e a l. Volunteer ConcreteW alls, L LC v. Community Trust & Banking Co., No. E2006-006020COA- R3-CV, 2006 WL 3497894 at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2006) , se e als o Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a) (7)( b).

-6- argume nt t

hat a pp e lle e wa s r e qu ir e d to su pp or t th e c hil d und e r a

the or y of in l oc o p are nti s.

Ap pe lla nt a rgue s th a t th e Ag re e me nt es ta bli sh e d an in l oc o p are nti s r e latio ns hip wi th the child. What appellant does not a cknow l ed ge i s that the appe llee neve r exercise d any of the “rig hts” the agr eeme nt g rante d him as t o the child beca use appellee would not allow him to have any relationship wit h the child af ter the divorc e. 1

Appellant re lies on the Florida case of Taylor v. Taylor , 279 So. 2d 364, 366 (Fla. DC A, 19 73 ) t o s up po rt he r c on te nti on that F lor ida c omm on law re c og nize s the c on c e pt t hat an in loco par entis relationship ca n b e ex t ended or cre ated by

contra ct. The holdingin Tay lor that “a pe rs on ha s n o le g a l duty

to p ro vid e su

pp or t f or a mi no r chi ld who i s n e ith e r h is n a tur a l no r h is adopted c hild and for whose car e and support he ha s not contrac ted” is a w ell settled rule of Florida law. See Daniel v. Danie l, 69 5 So. 2d 12 53 , 1 25 4 ( F la .1 99 7) ; Albe rt v . A lbe rt, 415 So.2d 818, 820 (F la . 2 d DCA19 82 ); Portuondo v. Portuondo, 57 0 So .2 d 1 33 8, 13 42 (F la . 3 d D CA 19 90 ); Swa in v. Swain, 5 6 7 S o

. 2 d

1 0 5 8 ( F l a

. 5 t h D C A 1 9 9 0 ); Fer ra da z v . O rti z , 754 So. 2d 867, 869 (Fla. 3d DC A 2 00 0) ; Bostwick v. Bostwick, 346 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 197 7 ). None of these c ases following the Tay lor holding conce rned a situation where a non-pa rent ha d contra ctually

assumed the obligation of support of a c hild and none involved a contr act that be stowed the status of in loco pare ntis on an individual. All of these ca ses that f o u n d i n l o co pare ntis also found that the relationship t erminate d at the dissolution of the marria g e.

I n relying on Taylor , appellant misconstrue s the meaningof the languag e in Tay lor

. Taylor states that a pe rson who stands in loco par entis to a child has a le g al dut y t o ca re for and support the child but any leg al dut y of support based on in loco parentis status, under the fac ts of the Tay lor case , would have be en ter minated upon the divorce of the parties. Moreove r, Tay lor does not hold that a non-par ent who contracts to take on the car e and suppor t of a c hild, as appellee did, acquir es in loco par entis status which then extends t h e s u p p ort obligations by operation of law bey ond the support terms of the contract. Appellant cites no case that so holds. Appellant’s brief argues t hat bot h Florida

and Te nnessee law support her contention that common law holds in loco pa re nti s c an be e xten de d be c on tr a c t. S he do e s n ot c ite any a uth or ity fr om t he se state s to su

pp or t th is
s t a t e m e n t , an d

w e c an n o tl o c a t e an y. 2This is not the law in T ennesse e. Penland v. Pe nland, 521 S.W .2d 222 (Tenn. 1975) The 3 provisions of a mar ital dissolut ion ag ree ment that g o bey ond the scope of leg al or statutory duty for support rema in contrac tual even if incorporated into the final judg ment. Penland at 224.
These a re te rms various courts have used to de scribe a perso n in the appellant’ s position 4 as to the child.

-7-

Appellant re lies on Du

ffy v . D uff y , 4 38 S.E .2 d 4 45 (N .C. Ap p. 19 94 ). Th e No rt h Caro l i n a C o u rt held that base d on a Nor th Carolina statute, husband, by signingthe Separ ation Ag ree ment in which he a g ree d to pay child support for the child, voluntarily and in writing extended his status of in loco pare ntis post-divorce. Id. at 385. The Duffy Court found t hat s ince the Separation Agr ee ment was incor

porate d into the judgment of divorce , the Trial Court wa s not bound by the amount of support the pa

rties had a g ree d upon, but was fr ee to modify the amount of child support in the event of chang ed cir cumstance s. Id. at 448. The Du ffy Court concluded that in the event the 3 needs of the child exceede d the abili ty of t he natural pare nts to meet thos e needs, then and only then would the husband be seconda rily responsible for

the def iciency

. Id. at 449.

Her e, the Chance llor corr ectly deter mined that the re asoning of Duffy is i na pp lic a ble to this case as Te nnessee does not have a s tatute t hat requires a person or entity that stands in loco pare ntis to bear seconda

ry or, for that matter , any liability for the suppor

t of a c hild. Moreover , as appellee pointed out in his argument, the re sult in Du ffy is the exact opposite of what a ppellant see ks in this case. In Du

ffy the c a se wa s r e mand e d f or a de te rm inatio n o f c hil d s up po rt to b e a sse sse d to both the natura l pare n t s o f t h e child who bor e primar y responsibility

for support. A suppor

t ob lig a tio n wo uld on ly be a ssi g ne d se c on da ri ly to Mr . D uf

fy in t he e ve nt b oth natur a l pa

re nts c ou ld
no t me e t th e c hil d’ s n e e ds . T he ult imate qu e sti on be fo re us is w he the r t

he Ag re e me nt c re a te d a

n in loco par entis relationship betwe en Aa ron and the appellee , post -d i v o rce . A marital settlement ag ree ment enter ed and modified by the Court is subject to inter pretation a s a matter of law like any other c on tr a c t, t

hu s th e Court ’s re vie w i s de novo

. Ho bu s v . Cran da ll , 972 So.2d 867, 869 (Fla. 2nd DC A. 2 0 0 7 )( ci t i n g Kenyon v . Kenyon, 49 6 So.2 d 839 (F la . 2 d D CA 19 86 ); Ballantyne v. Ballantyne
, 666 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996))

. Court s ma y no t in te rp re t a

mari ta l set tl eme nt a g re e me nt t o include terms that wer e not pla inly stated in the ag ree ment. Robinson v. Robinson, 788 So.2d 1092. 1094 (F la. 4th DCA 2001).

The Ag ree ment sets forth cle arly in the first para g raph that appellee is not the c hild’s natura l father , nor does it state any thing to the effe ct that althoug h appellee is not the child’s natural fathe r his intent is to remain in loc o pare ntis or “as a fathe r”, or

a “le g al father” or a “ psy cholog ical fathe r” to the c hild. Since cour ts are not to interpr et a mar ital settlement ag reem en t to include 4 terms that w er e n o t p l ainly stated in the ag ree ment, we c onclude the A g ree ment did not create or extend an in loco pare ntis relationship. The Ag ree ment does provide that appellee will pay support in t he a mou nt o f $ 40 0. 00 a

mon th, and

a lso state s th a t a

pp e lla nt w a ive s a

ny ri g ht s he may

have to a portion of Mr. Pric e’s military retire ment benef

its. This i s ti ed t o appellee ’s ag ree ment to pay $400.00 a month. The Ag ree ment statement that appe llant can r eopen a claim for a

portion of the-8-

re tir e me nt b e ne fi ts as a c on se qu e nc e of a pp e lle e ’s dis a vo wa l of

his su pp or t ob lig a tio n f

or the c hil d is significa

nt for two rea sons. I t demonstrates that the $400.00 a month support obligation was g iven in c on sid e ra

tio n o f t he wa ive r of a

pp e lla nt’ s ri g hts to the re tir e me nt be ne fi ts. Mo re imp or tantl y , th is clause demonstrates that the parties ag ree d that appellee had the r ight to disclaim the support ob lig a tio n a

nd tha t sh ou ld h e e xer c ise that r ig ht, a pp e lla nt’ s r e me dy

wo uld be to b ri ngan a c tio n to
rec over pa

rt of the military

retire ment benef

its. I f the Ag ree ment was int ended to c reate or e x tend the in loco pare ntis re lationship, this clause would not make sense . I f the c hild support obligation
aro se a s a mat ter of lawbe c a us e of the in l oc o p are nti s st a tus , a pp e lle e wo uld

have no ri g ht t o disavow the oblig ation and if he failed to make the pay ments that he wa s oblige d to make the r emedy would be for appellant to bring him into court in a contempt proce eding . The for eg oing indicates that the child support obligation is purely contra ctual, anothe r provision of the Ag ree ment de mon str a te s the c hil d su pp or t ob lig a tio n is a

matte r o f c on tr a c t. I

n s um, un de r F lor ida

law, c hil d support o b li g a ti o n s ar is e b y

s tatute , b y

c o n tr a c t o r

b e c a u s e o f anin lo c o p ar e n ti s r e lati o nship. Appellant’s position that the Ag ree ment g ave appellee in loco par entis status post-divorce c ausing
a c hil d sup po rt ob lig a tio n to ar ise a s a matte r o f l aw, is n ot c on sis te nt w iththe un a mbi g uo us te rm s of the Ag re e me nt and the a c tio ns of the pa rt ie s. Th e c hil d s up po rt

ob lig a tio n o f $ 40 0. 00 a

mon th is contrac tual and not modifiable by the Court under the Tenne ssee Child Support guidelines.

Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff

ir m th e Judg me nt o f t

he Tr ia l Co ur

t and re man d, wi th the c os t of the a ppeal a ssessed to Fr ance s Rodrigue z.

______________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.