1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 05 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### HO LMES v . SOU T H C AROLINA CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREM E COUR T OF SOUTH CAROLINA

No. 04–1 32 7. Ar g u ed Feb r u a r y22, 2006—D ec ided M ay1, 2006 Atpet i t i oner’s S o ut h Ca rolinat r ia l for murder a n d rela t e d crimes , the

pros ecut ion r e lied heav ily on forens i c e v idence t h a ts t rongly s u p por t ed petitio n er ’s g u ilt. Petition ersou gh tto u n d er min eth e State’s for en sicev iden c e byin tr oduc in gex per ttes t imon ysu g g e stin gth at th e ev iden c eh a d beenc o n tamin ated an d th a t th e polic e h a d en g a g e d ina plot to fr ame h i m. Petition eralso sou gh tto in tr odu c e ev iden c e th at a n ot her ma n, J i mmy McCa w Whit e, ha d b e en in t h e vict im’ s n e ighb or h ood onth e morn ingof th e assau l t an d th at Wh ite h a d ei

th erac kn ow ledg ed petition e r ’s in n o c e nc e oradmit t ed t oc o mmit t in g t h e crimes hi ms elf. In Whi t e’s pret ria lt e s t imony, he d e nied ma king the incriminating state ment s and providedan alibi for th e time of the ass a u l t.

The t r ia l cour texcluded pet i t i oner’s t h ird-pa rt y guiltevidence cit

ing the State Supreme Court’s Gregoryde cis i on, which held s uch evi

den c e admissi ble if it r a i s es a r e ason able in fer en c eas to th e defen

da nt ’s own innocen c e, b u tina d miss ib le if it merely ca s t s a b a r e s u s p icion or ra is es a conj ect ura l inferenc e a s t o a n ot her’s guilt

. Af

firming t h e t r ia l court , t h e S t at e S u preme Courtcit e d b o t h Gregory an d it s l aterd e c i sionin Gay , a n d held t h atwhere t h ere is st rong fo

rens ic eviden c e of a na ppella nt ’s guilt , proffered evide nce ab o uta third party’s a lleged guilt do es not rais e a rea s onab l e inference a s to t h e a ppella nt ’ s own inno ce nce. Applying t h is s t a n dard, t h e court held t h a t pet i tioner could no tovercome t h e forens ic evidence a g a i ns t him. Held: A criminal defendant’s federal co nstitutional righ ts are violate d

b ya nevidenc e rule u n der whicht h e def e nda n tma y notint r oduce evidence of t h ird-pa rt y guiltif t h e pros ecut ion ha s int r oduced foren

sicev iden c e th at, if belie v e d, st ronglys u pport s a guilt y verdict

. “[S]t ate an d f e der a l r u l emaker s h av e br oad lat i tu de u n d erth e Con

-2 HO LM ES v. S O UTH CAROLINA Sy llabu s stitu t ionto es tabl ishr u l es ex c l u d in gev iden c efr om c r i min a l tr ial s .” United Statesv. Sche ffer , 523U. S

. 303 , 308

. Th islatitude, howev e r , h a s li m it s . “Whet h er root ed direct ly in t h eDue Pro c es s Cla u s eof t h e Fourteenth A m endment or in the Co mpuls o ry Pro c es s or Confro nt a tionc l au ses o f th e Six t hA m en dmen t, th e Con s ti tu tiong u ar an tee s criminal defendants ‘a mean ingful o pportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” Cra n ev. Kentu ck y, 4 7 6 U

. S

. 6 8 3 , 69 0. Th is r i gh t is abridged by evidence rules that “inf ring[e] upon a weighty interest of t h e a ccus ed” a n d a r e “ ‘a rb it ra ry’or ‘dis proport i ona t e t o t h e purpos es they are designed to serve.’ ” Scheffer, supra , at 3 08. While the Con s titution thus proh ibits the exclusion of defense evi

den c e u n d erru les th at serv e n olegi tima t epu r p ose orth at ar e dis

pr opor tion ate to th e en ds t h at th eyare asserted to promote, welles t ab l is hed ru les of evidencepermitt r ia l judges t o excl u d e evidence if it s prob at ive va lue is out w eighed b y cert a i n ot her fa ct orss uch a s un fa ir prej udice, confus ion of t h e i ssu es, orpoten t ial to misle a d th e j ury . An appli c ation of thi s principle is found in rules regula t i ng t h e admission of e v idence proffe red by cri minal defendants to show that s o meone els e commit t e d the crime wit hwhic ht h eya r e cha rged. S uch r u les a r ewidely a ccept ed a n d a r e notcha llenged he re. I n Gre gory, th e Sou t hCar o lin a Su pr em e Cou r tadopt e d an d ap

plied a r u l e in ten d ed to be o f th is ty pe. I n Gaya n d t h is ca s e , how

ever, t h a tcourtra dica lly cha nged a n d extended t h e Gre gory rule b y holding t h a t , where t h e r e is s t rong evidence of adefen da nt ’s guilt , especially strong fore n sic evidence , proffered evidence about a third pa rt y’s a lleged guiltma y (orperha ps mus t) b e excluded. Under t h is r u l e, th e tr ial ju dg e does n o t foc u s onth e pr obativ ev a lu e orth e po tential adverse effects of admitting the defense evidence of thirdpa rt y guilt

. I n s t ea d, t h e crit i ca l inq u iry c o ncer n s t h e s t rengt ho f t h e pros ecut ion’s c a s e : If t h e pro s ecut ion’s ca s eis s t rong eno u gh , t h e e v i

dence of t h ird- pa rt y guiltis excludedeven if that evidence, if viewed independent l y, would have gr ea tprob a t ive va lue a n d even if itwould notpos e a nundue ris kof ha ra s s ment , prej udice, or con f us ion of t h e is s u es . Furt hermore, a s a pplied b e low, the rule s e ems t oca ll for lit

tle, if any, examinat ion of the cre dibility of the prosecution’s wit

nesses or the reliab ility of its evidence.

By eva l ua t i ng t h e s t rengt h of only onepa rt y’s eviden ce, no logica l conclus ion ca n b e rea ched rega rding t h e s t rengt hof cont ra ry evi

dence offered by the other s i de to re but or cast doubt. Because the rule a pplied below did not heed t h is poin t , t h e rule is “a rb it ra ry” in th e sen s e th atit does n o t r ation al lyserv e th e en d th at th e Grego r y rule a n d ot her s i mila r t h ir d-pa rt y guilt rules were des i gned t ofur

th er . Norh a s th e St ate iden tified an yoth e rlegi tima te e n d serv ed by3 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Sy llabu s the rule. T h us, the rule viol ates a criminal defendant’s right to have “ ‘a mean in gf u loppor t u n i ty to pr esen t a c o mplete defen se.’ ” Crane, supra , at 690. Pp. 4–11. 361 S. C. 33 3, 605 S. E. 2d 1 9 , v a c ated an d r e man d ed.

ALITO , J., delivered t h e opini o n forauna ni mous Court

._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 04–1 32 7 

### BOB BY LE E HOLME S , PETITIONER v. SO UTH CAR OLINA ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREM E COUR T OF SOUTH CAROLINA [M ay1, 2006] 

### J USTICE 

### ALI T O 

### delivere dthe opinio n of the Court. This case presents the question whether a criminal defendant’s federal constitutio nal rights are violated by a n evidence rule under which the defendant may not intro

duce proof of third-party guilt if the prosecution has intro

duced forensic evidence that, if beli eved, strongly supports a guilty ver d ict. I On the morning of December 31, 1989, 86-year-old Mary Stewart wa s beaten, raped, and ro bbed in her home. She later died of complica t ions st em ming from her injuri es. Petitioner was convict e d by a South Carolina jury of mur

der, first-d e gree crim i nal sexual conduct, first-deg r ee burglary, a n d robbery, and he was sentenced to death. Sta t ev. Ho lmes , 320 S. C. 259, 262, 464 S. E. 2d 334, 336 (1995). Th e South Ca rolina Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence, and this Court denied certiorari. Ibid., ce rt. denie d , 51 7U. S. 1 248 (199 6). Upon sta t e po s t

convi c tio nr e vie w , ho w e ver , pe ti tio n er was gr ante d a n e w trial. 361 S. C. 333, 335, n. 1, 605 S. E. 2 d19, 20, n

. 1 (2004).2 HO LM ES v. S O UTH CAROLINA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### At the second trial, th e prosecution relied heavily on the following forensic evidence: “(1) [Petitioner’s] palm print was found just above the door k n ob o nthe interi or side of t h e front door of the victim’s ho use; (2) fibers consis tent with a black sweatshirt owned by [ p etitioner] were found on the victim’s bed sheets; ( 3 ) ma tching blue fibers were found on the victim’s pink nigh tgown and on [peti

tioner’s] blue jeans; ( 4 ) microscopically consistent fi

bers were found on th e pink nightgown and on [peti

tioner’s] underwear; (5) [peti t ioner’s] underwear contained a mixture of DNA from two individuals, and 99.99% of the population other than [petitioner] and the victim were exclud ed as contributors to t hat mix

ture; and ( 6 ) [petitioner’s] tan kt o p was fou n d to con

tain a mixture of [peti t ioner’s] blood and the victim’s blood.” Id., at 343, 605 S. E. 2d, at 24. In addition, the prosecution introduced evidence that petitioner had been s een near Stewart’s home within an hour of the time when, accordi n g to the prosecution’s evidence, the attacktookplace. Id ., at 337– 338, 343, 6 0 5 S. E. 2d, at 21, 24. As a major part of his defens e, petitioner attempted to undermine the State’s forensic evidence by suggesting that it had been contaminated and that certainlaw enforce

ment officers had engaged in a plot to frame him. Id., at 339, 605 S. E. 2d, at 22. Petitioner’s expert witnesses criticized the procedures used by the police in h andling the fiber and DNA evidenc e and in collecting the fingerprint evidence. App. 299–311, 313–323. Another de fense expert provided te stimony that petitioner cited as s u pporting h i s claim that the palm print had been planted by the police. Id. , at 326–327. Petitioner also soughtto introduce proof that another man, Jimmy McCaw White, had attacked Stewart. 3 6 13 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### S. C., at 340, 605 S. E. 2d, at 22. At a pretrial hearing, petitioner p r offered sev e ral witnesses who pla c ed White i n the victim’s neighborhood on th e morning of the assaul t, as well as four other witne sses who testified that White had either ack n owledged that petitioner was “ ‘innocent’ ” or had actu ally admitt ed to committing the cr imes. Id., at 340–342, 6 05 S. E. 2d, at 22–23. One witness recounted that when he asked White abou tthe “word .

. . on t h e street” thatWhite was responsible for Stewart’s murder , White “put his head down and he raised his h e ad back up and he sa id, well, youknow I l i ke older women

. ” App. 119. Accordin g t o this witn ess, White added that “he did wh at they say he did” and that he had “no regrets about it at all.” Id., at 120. Another witness , who had b een incarcer

ated with White, testified that White had admitted to assaulting Stewart, th at a police officer had asked th e witness to testify falsely ag ains t petitioner, and that employees of the pros ecutor’ s office, while s o liciting the witness’ cooperation, had sp oken of manufa cturing evi

dence against petitioner. Id., at 3 8–50. Whit e testified a t the pretrialhearing and denied making the i n criminating statements. 361 S. C., at 341–342, 605 S. E. 2d, at 23. He also provided an alibi for the time of the crime, but an

other witness refuted his alibi. Id., at 342, 605 S. E. 2d, at 23. The tri a l c o ur t e xcl ud ed pe ti tion er’s t h ir d- p a r ty gu il t evide n cecit i ng Stat ev. Gregor y , 1 98 S. C. 98 , 16S. E. 2 d 532 (194 1), whi c h hel dtha tsu ch e vide n ce is a d missible i f it
“ ‘raise [s] a reason able infere nceo rpresu m ptio n as to[the defen d an t’s] own in nocence ’ ” bu t is not a d m i ssible if i t merely “ ‘ca s t[s ] a ba re suspi c ion u p on another’ ” or “ ‘r aise [ s ] a con j e c t u r a l infe ren c e as to the co mmissio nof the cri me b y another.’ ” App. 1 33–1 34 (quo tin g G regor y , supra , a t 104, 16 S. E. 2 d , at 534). On a ppe al, the Sou th Ca rolina Su

pre m e Cou r t foun d no erro r in theexcl usion o f petitio n er’s thi r d

- p a r t yguil t evi d ence. Citi ng bo th Gre go r y an dit s4 HO LM ES v. S O UTH CAROLINA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### late r deci si on in St atev. Gay , 34 3 S. C. 5 43, 541 S. E. 2d 541 (2 001 ), the State Supreme Cou rt held tha t“whe re the r e is st ron g e viden ce of a nap pella n t ’ s guil t, e s p e ciall y whe r e the r e is strong fo rensic evid ence, the proffe red e vidence abou ta thi r d pa rty’s a llege d guil t does no t rai s e a re ason able infe re nce as to the appe llant’s own innocence.” 361 S. C., at 34 2–343 , 605 S. E. 2 d , a t24. Appl yi ng this s t a n da rd, the co ur t hel dt h a tpe ti tione r coul d no t “o ver c o m e the forensic evidence against him to raise a reasonable infe r ence of hi s own in noce nce.” Id., a t343 , 605 S. E. 2d, at 2 4
. We gra n te d certio ra ri. 545 U. S.

__ _ (20 05). II “[S]ta te and federal r u lemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding ev i

dence from criminal trials.” U n ited Statesv. Sc hef f

er

, 52 3 U. S. 3 0 3 , 3 08 (199 8); s e e a l s o Cra n ev. Kent uck y, 47 6 U. S. 683 , 68 9– 69 0 (19 8 6) ; Mars ha ll v. Lonberger , 45 9U. S

. 422 , 438 , n . 6(198 3); Chambersv. Mississ ippi, 4 10 U. S. 28 4 , 302 –3 03 (19 73); Spe n cer v. Texas, 38 5 U. S. 55 4, 56 4 (1 96 7). This la titu de, ho weve r, has limi t s. “Wheth er roo t ed di

r e ctly in the Due Pr oc ess Cla u se of theFou rtee n t h Am e n d m entori nth e C o mp u l s o ry Process o r Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Co nstitution guaran tees crimin al de fen d a n ts ‘a me a n ingfulopportu n ity to prese n t a c o mple te def e nse. ’ ” Cra n e , sup ra, at 690 (quo t

ing Ca li fo rni a v. Tro m betta, 46 7 U. S. 4 7 9 , 4 85 (1 9 84); c i t a ti o n s o m it t e d)

. This right is abridged by evidence rules that “infrin g [e] upon a weight y i n terest of t h e accused” and are “ ‘ a rbitrary’or ‘ d isproportionate to t h e purposes they are de signed to se rve.’ ” Schef f

er , supra, at 308 (quot

ing Ro ckv. Ark a n s as, 48 3U. S. 44 , 5 8 , 56( 1 9 87) ). This Court’s cases contain several illustration s of “arbi

trar y” rules, i.e. , rules that excluded important defense evidence but that didnot serve any legitimate interests. In Was h i n g to nv. Texas, 3 88 U. S. 14 (1 96 7), s t a t e s t a t u t e s5 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### barred a person who had been charged as a participant in a crime from testifying in defens e of an other alleged p a r ticipant un less the wi tness had been acqui tted. As a result, whe nthe defe ndant in Was h ingt on was t r ied f o r murder, he was precluded from calling as a witness a person who had been charged and previously convicted of committingthe same murder. Holding th at the defen

dant’s righ t to put ona defense had been violated, we noted that the rule embodied inthe statutes could n o t “even be defended onthe groun dthat it rationally sets apart a gr oup of persons who ar e particularly likely to commit per j ury” since the rule allowed an alleged partici

pant to testify if he o rshe had been acquitted or wa s called by the prosecution. Id., at 2 2–23. A similar c o nstitutionalviolation occurredin Chambers v. Mississ ippi, s u pra . A murder defendant called as a witness a man named McDonal d, who had previously confessed to the murder. When McDonald r e pudiated the confessionon the stand, the defend ant was denied permis

sion to examine McDonald as an adverse witness bas ed on the State’ s “ ‘voucher’ rule,” whi c h barred parties fro m impeaching their own witnesses. Id. , at 294. In addition , because the state hearsay rule did not include an excep

tion for statements against penal interest, the defendant was not permitted to introdu ce evidence that McDonal d had made self-incrimi nating statements to three othe r persons. Noting that the State ha d not even attempted to “defend” or “explain [t he] underlying rationale” of the “voucher ru le,” id., at297, this Court held that “the exclu

sion of [the evidenceof McDonald’ s out-of-court state

ments], coupled with t h e State’s refusal to permit [the defendant] to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a tri a l in accord with traditio nal and fundamental standards o f due process,” id., at 302. Another arbitrary rul e was hel dunconstitutional in Cra n ev. Kent ucky, supra . There, the defendant was pre

-6 HO LM ES v. S O UTH CAROLINA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### vented from attempting to show a t trial that his confession was unreliable because of the circumstances under which it was obtained, and neither the State Supreme Court nor the prosecution “advanced any rational justification for the wholesale exclusionof this body of potentially exculpa

tory eviden ce.” Id., at 691. In Rockv. Ark a n s as, supra , this Court held that a rule prohibiting hypnotical ly refreshed testimony was un con stitutional because “[w]holesal e in admissibilit y of a defen

dant’s testi m ony is an arbitrar yre striction on the right t o testify in the absence of clear evidence by the State repu

diating the validity of all po st-hypnotic recollections.” Id ., at 61. By contrast, inU n ite d Statesv. Sc he ffer , su p ra , we held that a rule excluding all polygra p h evidence did not abridge the right to present a defense because the rule “serve[d] se veral legitimate in terests in the c r iminal trial process,” w a s “neither arbitrar y nor disprop o rtionate in promoting these ends, ” and did not “implicate a suffi

ciently weighty interestof the defendant.” Id., at 309. While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimat e purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that the y are asserted to promote, well-established rule s of evidenc e permit tria ljudges to exclud e evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain othe r factors su ch as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to misle a d the jury. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Evid. 403; Uni f orm Rule of Evid. 45 (1 953); ALI, Model Code of Evidence Rule 303 (1942); 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§1863, 1904 (1904). Plainly referring to rul e s of this type, we have stated that the Constitution permits judges “t o exclude evidence tha t is ‘repetitive .

. . , onl ymarginally relevant’ or poses a n undue risk of ‘harassment, prejudi c e, [or] confusion of the issues.’ ” Cra n e , sup ra , at 689–69 0 (quoting Delawarev. Van Arsdall, 4 7 5U

. S

. 6 7 3 , 6 7 9( 1 9 8 6) ; ellipsis and bra c k

ets in original). See al so Montana v. Egelh o f f , 518U. S. 3 7 ,7 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### 4 2 ( 1 9 9 6) (plurality opinion) (terming such ru les “familiar and unquestionably constitutional”). A specific a pplication of this principle is foun d in rule s regulating the admissio nof evidence proffered by criminal defendants to show that someone else committed the crime with which the y are char ged. See, e. g., 41 C. J. S., Homicide §216, pp. 56–58 (1991 ) (“Evidence tending to show the commission by another person of the crime charged ma y be introduced by accused when it is inconsi s tent with, and raises a reasonable doubt of, hi s own guilt; but frequently matters offered in evidence for this purpose are so remote and lack suchcon n ection with the crime that they a r e excluded”); 40A Am. Jur. 2d, Ho micide §286 , pp. 136–138 (1999) (“ [T]he accused may introduce any legal evidence tending to prove that another person may have committed the crime with which the defendant is charged . . .

. [Such evidence ] may be excluded where it does not sufficiently connect th e other person to the crime, as, for example, where the evid ence is speculative or re

mote, or does not tend to prov e or disprove a material fact in issue a tthe defendant’s tri al” (footnotes omitted)). Such rules are widelyaccepted,* and neither petitioner

——————

* See, e.g., Sm ithartv. State , 988 P. 2d58 3, 58 6–5 87 (Alaska1 999) ; Shields v. Sta t e , 357 Ar k. 2 83, 2 87– 28 8, 166 S. W. 3d 28, 3 2 (2 004); Peoplev. Hall , 41 Cal. 3d 826, 833, 71 8 P. 2d 99, 103– 104 (1 986) (e n b a nc); People v. Mulliga n , 1 93 Colo. 5 09, 517 –5 18 , 56 8 P. 2d 449, 45 6– 457 (19 77) (enban c ) ; State v. West , 274 Co n n . 605, 62 4– 627, 87 7 A. 2d 787, 802 –8 03 (200 5); Winfieldv. United States , 676 A. 2d 1 (D C Ap p . 199 6) (enb a n c ) ; Klinectv. State , 269 G a . 57 0, 57 3, 50 1 S. E. 2d81 0, 813 –8 14 (19 9 8); State v. Ra bellizsa , 79 Haw

. 347, 35 0–3 51, 90 3 P. 2d 43, 4 6–4 7 (1 9 95); Peoplev. Fort , 248 Ill. App. 3d 30 1, 3 14, 6 18 N. E. 2d 445, 45 5 (19 9 3 ); State v. Adams , 280 K a n . 494, 504–5 07 , 124 P. 3d 19, 27– 29 (20 05); Beatyv. Commonwealth , 125 S. W. 3d 1 96, 2 0 7

– 2 08 ( Ky . 200 3); State v. Dechai n e , 572 A. 2d 13 0, 13 4 (M e. 1990); Commonwealth v. Scot t , 408 M a ss. 81 1, 81 5–8 16, 5 64 N. E. 2d 370, 3 74– 37 5 (19 90) ; State v. Jon e s , 678 N. W. 2d 1, 16– 17 (M in n . 2004); Moorev. St a t e , 179 M i ss. 26 8, 2 7 4–27 5, 17 5 So. 183, 184 (1 937 ); State v. Cha ney , 967 S. W. 2d 47, 55 (M o. 1998) (enba n c ) ; State v. Cotto , 182 N. J. 316, 33 2–3 33 ,8 HO LM ES v. S O UTH CAROLINA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### nor his amicichallenge them here. In Gregory , the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted and applied a rule apparently intended to be of this type, given the court’s refer e nces to the “applicable rule” from Corpus Juri s and American Jurisprudence:

“ ‘[E] videnc e offered by accused a s to the commission of the crime by another person must be limited to such facts as are inconsist e nt with his own guilt, and to such facts as raise areasonable in ference or p r esump tion as to his own innocence; evidence which can have (no) other effect than to cast a bare suspicion upon another, or to raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another, is not admissi

ble.

. . . [B]efore such testimony can be received, there must be such proof of connection with it, su c ha train of facts orc i rcumstanc es, as tends clearly to p o int out such other person as the guilty p a rty.’ ” 198 S. C., at 104–105, 16 S. E. 2d, at 534–53 5 (quoting 16 C. J., Criminal Law §1085, p. 560 (1918) and 20 Am. Jur., Evidence §265, p. 254 (1939); footn o tes omitted). In Gayand this case, however, the South Carolina Supreme Court radical l y changed and extended the rule. In Gay , aft e r recognizi n g the stan dard a pplied in Gregory , the court s t ated that “[i]n view o f the stron gevidence of appellant’s guilt—especially the fo rensic evidence— . . . the proffered evidence .

. . did not ra ise ‘a reasonable infer

ence’ as to appellant’s own innocence.” Gay , 343 S. C., at

—————— 865 A. 2d 6 60, 669– 67 0 (20 0 5 ); Gorev. Sta t e , 2005 O K CR 14, ¶¶13– 24 , 119 P. 3d 126 8, 127 2– 127 6; Statev. Grego r y , 198 S. C. 9 8 , 104–1 05, 1 6 S. E. 2d 53 2, 534–5 35 (1 94 1 ) ; Wileyv. State , 74 S. W. 3d 39 9, 40 5–4 0 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Sta t e v. G rega , 16 8 Vt. 36 3, 37 5, 72 1 A. 2d 44 5 , 454 (1 998); State v. Thomas , 150 Wa sh . 2 d82 1, 8 5 6

– 8 5 8 , 83 P. 3d 97 0, 988 (2 004) (enban c ) ; Stat e v. Parr , 207 W. Va. 469, 475, 534 S. E. 2d 23, 29 (20 00) (per cu riam); State v. D e nny , 120 Wi s. 2d614, 6 2 2

– 6 2 5 , 357 N. W. 2d 1 2 , 16–1 7 (Wis. App. 198 4).9 Cite as: 54 7 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### 550, 541 S. E. 2d, at 545 (quoting Gre gory , supra, at 10 4, 16 S. E. 2d, at 534, in turn quoting 16 C. J., §1 085, at 560). Similarly, in the present case, as noted, the State Supre m e Court appli e d the rule that “ w here there is strong evi

dence of [adefendant’s] guilt , especially where there is strong fore nsic evidence, the pro ffered evid ence about a third party’s alleged guilt” may (or perhaps must) be excluded. 361 S. C., at 342, 605 S. E. 2d, at 24. Under this rule, the t r ial judge does not focus on th e probative value or thepotential adverse effects of admit

ting the defense eviden ce of third-party guilt. Instead, the critical inq u iry concer ns the stre ngth of the prosecution’s case: If theprosecution’ s case is strong enough, the evi

dence of third-party gu ilt is ex cluded even if that evidence, if viewed independently, woul d ha ve great pr obative value and even if it would not pose an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issue s . Fur t hermo r e, as applie d in this ca se, the Sou t h Ca rolina Supreme Court’ s rule seems to call for li ttle, if any, exami

nation of the credibility of the prosecution’ s witnesses or the reliabili ty of its e vi d ence. Her e , for exam ple, the de

fense stren u ously clai med tha tthe prosecution’ s forensic evidence was so unreliable (due to mishandling and a deliberate plot to frame petitio n er) that the evidence should not have even been admitted. The South Carolina Supreme Court responded that these challenges did not entirely“e vi scerate ” th e forensic evidence a n d t h atth e defense cha llenges wen t to the we ight and not to the a d

missibility of that evi d ence. Id. , at 343, n. 8, 605 S. E. 2 d , at 24, n. 8. Yet, in evaluatin g the prosecu t ion’s forens ic evidence an d deeming i tto be “s tro ng”

— and th ereby jus t i

fyin g exclus ion of pe titioner’ s third-party guilt evidence

— the South Carolina Supreme Court made no mention of the defense challenges to the prosecution’ s evidence. Interpretedin this way, the rule applied by the State Supreme C o urt does n o t rationally serve the end thatth e10 HO LM ES v. S O UTH CAROLINA Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Gre goryrule and its analogues in other jurisdictions were designed to promote, i. e. , to focus the trial onthe cent ral issues by excluding evidence that has only a very wea k logical connection to the cen tral is sues. The rule applied in this cas e appears t o be based on the following logic: Where (1) i tis clear that only oneperson was involved i n the commission of a particular crime and (2) there is strong evid ence that t h e defendant was the perpetrator , it follows that evidence of third-pa rty guilt mu st be wea k

. But this logic depends on an accurate evaluation of the prosecution’ s proof, and the true strength of the prosecu

tion’s proof cannot be assessed wi thout considering chal

lenges to the reliab ility of the pros ecution’s evidence. Jus t because the prosecution’ s evidence, if cred ited , would provide str o ng suppor tfor a gui l ty ver d ict, it does not follow that evidence of third-party guilt has only a wea k logical connection to the cen tral issues in the case. And where the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses or the reliability of its eviden ce is n o t conceded, the strength of the prosecution’s case cannot be a ssessed wit h out making the sort of factual findings that have traditionally been reserved for the trier of fact and that the So uth Carolin a courts did n o t purport t o make in this case. The rule applied in this case is no more logical than its converse would be, i.e. , a rule barring the pros ecution from introducing evidence of a defendant’s guilt if the defendant is able to proffer, at apretrial he aring, evidence that, if believed, st rongly supports a ve rdict of not guilty. In the present case, for exa m ple, the petitioner proffered evi

dence that, if believed , squar ely proved that White, not petitioner, was the perpetrator. It would make no sens e, however, to hold that this proffer precluded the prosecu

tion from introducing its evidence, including the forensic evidence that, if credited, provided strong proof of the petitioner’s guilt. The point is that, b yevaluat ing the strength of only one11 Cite as: 54 7 U

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### party’s evi d ence, no logical conclusion can be reache d regarding t h e strengthof con traryevidence offered by th e other side to rebut or cast doubt. Because th e rule applied by the Stat e Supreme Court in this case did not heed this point, the rule is “arbitrar y” in the sense that it does not rationally serve the end that the Gre goryrule and other similar third-part y gui l t rules were designed to further. Nor has the State identif i e d any o th e r l e gi ti m a t e en d t h a t the rule serves. It follo ws th at the rule applie d in this ca se by the State Supreme Court vi olates a criminal defendant’s ri gh t tohav e“ ‘a mea n i n gful o ppo rtuni ty to present a com

plete defense.’ ” Cra n e , 476 U. S., at 690 (q uotin g Tro m betta, 46 7 U. S., a t 485 ). III For these reasons, we vacate the j u dgment of the Sout h Carolina Supreme Court and re mand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with t h is opinion. It is so orde red.