### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Ma y 19 , 200 9 S es sio n GRACO CHI LDREN' S PRODUCTS I NC., ET AL 

### . v. SHEL TER

INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., ET AL 

### . Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forHardin Cou nty No. 3791 Charles Cr eed Mc Ginl ey, Judge

No. W2008-01915-C OA-R3-C V - Filed June 23, 2009

Th is i s a ne gli ge nc e c a se . A pp e lla nt b ro ug ht s uit a ga ins t A pp e lle e a lle gin g th a t A pp e lle e ne gli ge ntl y de str oy e d a

pie c e of e vid e nc e . Thi s evi de nc e wa s re le va nt to a sep arate la ws uit inv olv ing Ap pe lla nt. The trial c ourt grante d summary judgment in favor of Appellee finding that Appellee did not owe a du ty o f c are to A pp e lla nt. Fin din g n o e rr or , w e a ff ir m.
Tenn. R. App . P.3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Cir cuit Court Af firme d
J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J

. , and H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., joined.
Da le Con de r, Jr ., a nd To dd D. Sir oky, Ja c ks on , Te nn e sse e , Jose ph J. Kr a so ve c , I II , Ch ic a go , I lli no is, fo r the Ap pe lla nt, Gr a c o Ch ild re n' s Pr od uc ts.
Jo h n S. L ittl e a n d A n d r e w V

. Se ll e r s , J a c k s o n , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e A p p e ll e e , Sh e lt e r

Mutual Insura nce Company.
OP IN ION This appea l involves a neg lige nce a ction broug ht by a third party plaintiff. The unde rlying a c tio n h a s b e e n s e ttl e d b y the pa rt ie s and is no t a t iss ue on a pp e a l. F or

c lari fi c a tio n, we wi ll b ri e fl y re c ite the fa c ts a

nd pr oc e e din g s in

the tr ia l c ourt

. On Nov emb er 27 , 200 2, Jillia n D avis wa s d

ri vin g a 19 90 Che vr ole t Cava lie r i n H ard in County , Tenne ssee. He r son, Waylon Davis, was a lso in the vehicle sitting in an i n fa n t car seat manufa cture d by

Gra co Children’s Produc t’s Inc. (“ Gra co”) . As Ms. Davis drove throug h an int e rs e c tio n, he r v e hic le wa s st ru c k b y a Che vr ole t S-10 B la zer dr ive n by Jame s B ake r. B oth Ms. Davis and he r son suffe red se vere injuries as a r esult of the collision.G r aco i ni t i al l y as s er t ed a c l ai m f or negl i gent s po i l at i on of evi dence agai nst Shel t er
. Th i s cl ai m w as di s m i s s ed 1 b y th e trial c o u rt, a n d G ra c o h a s n o t p u rs u e d it o n a p p e a l. -2- At the time of the accide nt, Mr. B aker had automobile insuranc e provide d by Shelter Mutual I nsuranc e Company , I nc. (“Shelter”)

. On December 2, 2002, Melvin Davis, J illian’s husband and Way lon’s fathe r, conta cted Vic toria Roy al, a c laim repre sentative for Shelter. Ms. Roy al explained that Mr. B aker ’s insuranc e policy would provide a maxi mum of $50,000 for Jil lian and Waylon’s me dic a l e xpe ns e s. Al tho ug h th e pr e c ise de ta ils of the c on ve rs a tio n a

re un cle ar, Ms . Ro y a l di d inf or m Mr . D avis that $5 0, 00 0 w ou ld n ot f ull y c ov e r t ho se e xpe ns e s. She the n a dv ise d M r. Da vis t o c o n t a c tana t t o r

n e y.
On De c e mbe r 1 6, 20 02 , Mr

. Da vis me t w ithEr

ne st R us se ll, a c la ims a dju ste r f

or She lte r, to settle the prope rty

damag e cla i m for the Davises’ ve hicle. Shelter ha d previously deter mined the vehicle w as a total loss. In settling the property claim, Mr. Davis signed a form provide d by

Shelter with the heading“Permission to Move Vehicle s Su r r e n d e r o f Salvag e.” T his form authorized Shelter “to move [the Chevrolet C avalier ] to a place sele cted by Shelter for

storag e.” Mr . Davis also sig ned the provision assig ning a

nd surre nderingall rig hts of possession and title of the vehic le to Shelter.
On Dec ember

19, 2002, Mr. Russell sent an orde r to Southern Aut o S al v age Pool (“Southern” ) requesting that they pick up and store the vehicle . Southern retr ieved the ve hicle fr om Mr. Davis a

fewday s later. On Dec ember 27, 2002, Paul F ava, another Shelter employ ee, r eviewe d the claim information a

nd approve d a salva g e orde r authorizing Souther n to dispose of the vehic le. Southern sold the vehicle a t auction to Complete Auto Parts on J anuar y 8, 2003. At some point in J anuar

y 2003, Mr. Davis hire d an attorne y to pursue a ny claims arisingfrom the ac cident. The attorney , Keith For stman, sent two identical letters to Shelter –the first on J anuar

y 23 , 2 00 3, the se c on d o n Jan ua ry 24 , 2 00 3–

re qu e sti ng that Shel te r pr e se rv e the ve hic le in or de r t o fac ilitate his i n v e s ti g a ti o no f th e a c c id e n t. O nF e b r

u ar y 2 0 , 2 0 0 3 , a

Sh e lt e r e mp lo y e e , w h o w as a pp are ntl y un awa re tha t the ve hic le ha d be e n so ld, inf or me d Mr

. F or stm an that the ve hic le wa s in storag e. Throughout 2003, Shelter repe atedly assure d Mr. Forstman that the vehicle was in storag e. On Oc tob e r 31 , 20 03 , She lte r fi na lly inf or me d Mr

. F or stm an that the ve hic le ha d, in f a c t, b e e n s old and destroyed in J anuar

y 2003.
The Da vises filed a c omplaint in Har din County Circuit Court on November 25, 2003. The complaint named Gr aco, among others, as defenda nt for its role as ma

nufac turer of

the ca r seat. The c la ims a sse rt e d a g a ins t G ra c o a nd the oth e r d e fe nd ants we re ult imate ly sett led ou t of

c ourt . T his appea l only

involves a cla im asserted by Gra co as a

third party

plaintiff.
Gra co’s c omplaint, filed on Fe bruar y 27, 2006, asser

ted a c laim of common law ne g lige nce 1 ag ainst Shelter. Specific ally , Gra co alleg ed that Shelter had a leg al duty

to preser ve the ve hicle for use in litigation. This duty was bre ache d, Gra co alleg ed, whe n the vehicle was destroy ed. Shelter answe red the complaint and filed a motion for summary judgme nt. T he trial c ourt hea rd the motion-3-

on J uly 8, 2008 and subsequently enter ed an or der grantingsummary judgme nt in favor of

Shelter. I n it s o rd e r, the tr ia l c ourt fo un d th a t “ the re is n o d

uty be tw e e n Sh e lte r a

nd Gr a c o. ” Gr a c o a

pp e a ls.
I n its brief, Grac o raises two challeng es t o the t rial court’s ruling . First, Gr aco a rgues that the t ri al co u rt misapplied the “for esee ability ” test in its analy sis of leg al duty . Second, Gr aco contends that the tria l court should have f ound that Shelter voluntarily undertook a duty to preser ve the ve hic le in t

he c ours e of

its int e ra c tio ns wi th M r. Da vis

. Standard of Re view Summary judgme nt is appropriate when the moving pa rty demonstrates that there a re no g enuine issues of material fa ct and that judg ment is appropriate as a matter of la

w. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 5 6. 04 ; By rd

v . Ha ll , 847 S.W .2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993) . Be cause summary judgme nt involves qu e sti on s o f l aw o nly , o ur re vie w i s de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss affor ded to the trial cou rt ' s determination. Teter v . Republic Parkin g Sys., Inc. , 181 S.W .3d 330, 337 (Tenn. 2005) ; Bai n v . W e lls , 936 S.W .2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997)

. L aw a nd An a ly sis
The issue prese nted in this case involves the first eleme nt of a ne g lige nce c laim: the duty of car e. Whether a defe ndant owes a plaintiff a duty of car e is a question of law to be decide d by the court. West v. E. Tenn. Pioneer Oil Co. , 172 S.W .3d 545, 550 (Tenn. 2005)

. Al l pe rs on s h ave a duty to u se re a so na ble c are to r e fr a in f

ro m c on du c t th a t w ill fo re se e a bly cause injury

to others. Bu rr o ughs v. Magee , 1 18 S.W. 3d 32 3, 32 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 5) . T his duty is define d as “the leg al obligation that a def endant owe s a plaintiff to conf orm to a re asonable person standard of

car e in orde r to protec t ag ains t u n re as o n able r isks of harm.” Id .; Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc. , 15 S

. W

. 3 d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000) . To deter mine if a pa

rticular r isk is unreasonable , courts conside r whe ther “ the fore seea ble proba bility and g ravity of t he har

m posed by

defe ndant’s conduct outwe igh the burden upon de fenda nt to eng ag e in alter

native conduc t t h at would have preve nted the har

m.” McCall v. Wilder , 913 S.W .2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995) . In Mc Cal l , the Court listed severa l fac tors to be consider ed in deter mining whe ther a

particula r risk wa s unrea sonable: [T] he for esee able pr obability of the ha rm or injury occur

ring ; the pos sible mag nitude of t he potential harm or injury ; the importance or social va lue of the a ctivity eng ag ed in by defe ndant; the usefulne ss of th e conduct to defenda nt; the fea sibili ty

of alternative, safe r con d u ct and the relative c osts and burdens a ssociated with that conduct; the r elative use fulness of the sa fer con duct; and the r elative sa fety of a lte rn a tiv e c on du c t.
Id . (citing Restatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts, §§ 292, 293 (1964)). With these fac tors in mind, we turn to the fac ts in the present c ase.-4-

Gr a c o c on te nd s th a t it

wa s f or e se e a ble to She lte r that dis po sin g of the ve hic le wo uld c a us e harm to others. The harm in t his case w as depr iving potential litiga nts of a piec e of e vidence in an action ar ising fr om the acc ident. Gra co relies on the deposition testimony of Ms. Roy al, who had advised Mr. D avis to consult with an at t orney to determine if a

ny claims from the a ccide nt were available . Neither

Ms. Roy al nor a

ny other Shelter e mploy ee, however , wer e aw are of any litigation or in vestig a tio n w he n th e ve hic le wa s d e str oy e d. In f a c t, M r. F or stm an’ s le tte rs a sk ingShe lte r t o pr e se rv e the ve hic le arr ive d se ve ra l we e ks a ft e r the ve hic le wa s de str oy e d. Ms. Roya l’ s c omm e nts simpl y d o n ot show it was fore seea ble to Shelter that destroy ing the vehicle w ould cre ate a n unrea sonable risk of ha

rm. Fina lly , acc epting Gra co’s argument would require Shelter t o store (at its own ex pense) damag ed vehicles indefinitely in order to pr event a

ny harm to a va st and unknown arr ay of potential litiga

nts. Next, Graco c ontends that Shelter under took an af firmative duty to store and the pr eser ve the vehicle throug h its ag ree ment with Mr. Davis. Gra co relies on the foll owing provision of the for m sig ne d b y Mr . D avis :
P ER M ISSI ON TO M OV E V EHI CL E
I/We do hereby

authorize and pe rmit Shelter I nsuranc e Companies to move th e above descr ibed vehicle to a place selec ted by Shelter for

storag e.
Gra co conte nds that this created an oblig ation for Shelter to place the vehicle in storag e. I n response , She lte r p oints t o th e se c on d p ro vis ion on the fo rm sig ne d b y

Mr . D avis :
SURRE ND ER

OF SAL VA G E A ND TITL E
I/We he re by

a ssi g n a nd su rren der all o f my

/ou r r ig hts of

po sse ssi on

and tit le to my /o ur a bo ve de sc ri be d mo tor

ve hic le tog e the r w itha ll i ts p art s and e qu ipm e nt t o Shelter Insuranc e Companies.
Shelter also notes that Mr. D avis testified in his deposition that he was a war e whe n signingthe form that Shelter would destroy the vehicle . Considering this t estimony , we c annot find that Shelter ag ree d to store the vehic le indefinitely when the only

other pa rty to the ag ree ment denies it.
F o r t h e s e r e a s o n s , w e f

i n d t h a tS h e l t e r

d i d n o to w e a d

u ty, o r a f f i r m a t i v e l y u n d e rt ak e a

d u ty, to preser ve the ve hicle as e vidence . Acc ording ly , t h e o rd er of the trial cour

t gr anting summary judgme nt in favor of

Shelter is aff

irmed. Costs of this appeal ar e asse s s ed t o Ap pellant, Gra co C h i l dr e n ’ s P r o d

u c t s , In c
. an d

i t s s u r e t y.

___________________________________

J. STE VE N ST AFF OR D, J.