UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Plaintiff, Case No.: 08-20148 

Hon. Patrick J. Duggan 

v. 

D-1 ELSAYED KAZEM SAFIEDINE 

a/k/a “Tom”, 

D-2 MARY FAWAZ, 

 Defendants. 

 / 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR BOND 

PENDING APPEAL

After a jury trial held during September 2011, Defendants Elsayed Kazem 

Safiedine and Mary Fawaz were each convicted of one count of conspiracy to defraud the 

United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. After ruling on several post-trial motions, 

the Court sentenced the Defendants on October 17, 2012. Defendants have each moved 

to remain on bond pending resolution of their appeals of their conviction and sentence 

and it is on these motions which the Court is issuing a ruling today. The positions of the 

parties have been fully briefed. After careful consideration, the Court finds that both 

motions must be denied. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

The indictment in this case alleged that Defendants conspired to obstruct and 

impede the assessment and collection of income taxes by the Internal Revenue Service 
2 

(“IRS”). Defendant Safiedine exercised at least partial control over several business 

entities, including JSC Corporation (“JSC”), a Michigan partnership named MTK & 

KLC, and MTK Family Investments (“MTK”). These entities owned and operated gas 

stations in metropolitan Detroit. Defendant Fawaz worked for Defendant Safiedine. 

 At trial, the Government introduced testimony indicating that JSC’s taxable 

income was understated in tax returns filed with the IRS as a result of Defendants’ 

concealment of certain checks issued to JSC by Sunoco, Inc. (“Sunoco”). Witnesses also 

testified that Defendants’ actions in connection with the sale of a gas station led to the 

understatement of taxable income in MTK & KLC’s tax returns. By misrepresenting and 

concealing this taxable income Defendants caused false income tax returns to be filed by 

JSC and MTK & KLC. 

 At the conclusion of the Government’s case-in-chief, Defendants each reserved 

the right to move for a judgment of acquittal. Defendants did not call any witnesses and 

rested their case. The jury subsequently found Defendants Safiedine and Fawaz guilty of 

conspiracy to defraud the United States. (Verdict Form, ECF No. 51.) After the jury 

rendered its verdict, the Court took Defendants’ motions for a judgment of acquittal 

under advisement and permitted Defendants to remain free on bond. On June 7, 2012, 

the Court denied Defendants’ motions for a judgment of acquittal, or in the alternative, 

their motions for a new trial. (June 7, 2012 Op. & Order, ECF No. 71.) In rendering this 

decision, the Court determined (1) that the Government presented sufficient evidence to 
3 

sustain a conviction1 and (2) that the jury’s verdict was not against the manifest weight of 

the evidence.2

 (Id. at 12.) Defendants then filed a motion for reconsideration, which this 

Court denied on July 19, 2012. (July 19, 2012 Op. & Order, ECF No. 77.) 

 Upon denying aforementioned post-trial motions, the case proceeded to 

sentencing. The parties filed sentencing memoranda and the Court held a sentencing 

hearing on October 17, 2012. The Court determined that the tax loss attributable to 

Defendants’ conduct was $193,200 and that the corresponding advisory guideline range 

was 21-27 months. (Sent’g Hrg. Tr. 118:19-15, ECF No. 81.) The Court considered the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and thereafter sentenced Defendant Safiedine to twenty-one 

months of imprisonment (Def. Safiedine J. 2, ECF No. 79) and Defendant Fawaz to 

twelve months and one day of imprisonment (Def. Fawaz J. 2, ECF No. 80). In addition 

to the term of imprisonment, the Court sentenced Defendants to two years of supervised 

release and ordered restitution, although, the Court deferred ruling on the amount until 

the IRS determined the actual amount of tax loss incurred by the United States. (Def. 

Safiedine J. 3, 5; Def. Fawaz J. 3, 5.) 

II. GOVERNING STANDARD 

 Pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, a defendant found guilty and sentenced 

to a term of imprisonment may be released on bond pending appeal if the trial court finds 

 

1

 The Court made this determination in the context of Defendants’ motion for a judgment 

of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a). (Op. & Order 9.) 

2

 The Court determined that Defendants had not discharged their burden of demonstrating 

that “the interest of justice” required the Court to “vacate [] judgment and grant a new 

trial[.]” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a); (Op. & Order 12.). 
4 

that the defendant has satisfied the criteria delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1). The 

statute provides, in pertinent part: 

[T]he judicial officer shall order that a person who has been 

found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a term of 

imprisonment, and who has filed an appeal[,] . . . be detained, 

unless the judicial officer finds - - 

(A) by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not 

likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other 

person or the community if released . . . ; and 

(B) that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and 

raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result 

in - - 

(i) reversal, 

(ii) an order for a new trial, 

(iii) a sentence that does not include a term of 

imprisonment, or 

(iv) a reduced sentence to a term of imprisonment less 

than the total of the time already served plus the 

expected duration of the appeal process. 

18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1). The statute creates a presumption against release pending 

appeal. United States v. Vance, 851 F.2d 166, 169-70 (6th Cir. 1988). In overcoming 

this presumption, the burden of proof rests with the defendant. Id. (citing United States v. 

Pollard, 778 F.2d 1177, 1181-82 (6th Cir. 1985)). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Applying the standard above to Defendants’ motions for bond pending appeal 

reveals that neither Defendant is entitled to the relief they seek. 

A. Risk of Flight or Danger to Others 

 The Government does not seriously claim that Defendants are likely to flee or that 

they pose a danger to the safety of other persons or to the community. By all indications, 
5 

Defendants have complied with the conditions governing their pretrial release. In 

addition, the Court has twice permitted Defendant Fawaz to travel outside of the county, 

although both instances occurred before Defendants trial. (Mar. 5, 2009 Stip. & Order 

Allowing Travel, ECF No. 18; July 16, 2009 Stip. & Order Allowing Travel, ECF No. 

21.) Lastly, the fact that neither Defendant has yet to be incarcerated supports the 

inference that the Court previously determined that neither posed a risk of flight or a 

danger to others or the community. Consequently, the sole issue to be determined is 

whether Defendants’ motions raise a substantial issue for purposes of permitting them to 

remain on bond pending resolution in the Sixth Circuit. 

B. Substantial Question of Law or Fact 

To determine if an appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact, the Sixth 

Circuit applies the two-part test initially devised by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. 

Powell, 761 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Pollard, 778 F.2d at 1182. A court 

first determines whether the question is “substantial” in the sense that it constitutes a 

“close question or one that could go either way.” Id.; see also United States v. Mikell, 

No. 97-81493, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4233, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2007) (Cleland, 

J.) (“Courts have also held that a substantial question is ‘either a novel question, one that 

has not been decided by controlling precedent, or one which is fairly doubtful.’”). If the 

reviewing court finds that the question is “substantial,” it must then assess whether the 

question “is so integral to the merits of the conviction that it is more probable than not 

that reversal or a new trial will occur if the question is decided in the defendant’s favor.” 

Pollard, 778 F.2d at 1182. 
6 

Defendants argue that the Court ignored a more accurate assessment of the tax loss 

caused by their conduct which in turn caused the Court to incorrectly calculate the 

guidelines range. In addition, Defendants argue that the evidence presented at the 

sentencing hearing demonstrates that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

and that an order for a new trial is likely to result on appeal. The Court addresses these 

arguments in turn. 

A. Tax Loss and the Guidelines Range

 Defendants argue that the Court incorrectly calculated the guidelines range due to 

its purported failure to accurately determine the amount of tax loss. This, according to 

Defendants, constitutes procedural unreasonableness “requir[ing] reversal” or at least 

“resentencing.” (Def. Safiedine’s Br. in Supp. 13 (“Procedural reasonableness requires 

proper calculation of the guideline range.” (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 

128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007) and United States v. Conaster, 514 F.3d 508, 519-20 (6th Cir. 

2008)).) 

1. Determining Tax Loss 

 The pertinent guideline in the instant case is § 2T1.9, entitled “Conspiracy to 

Impede, Impair, Obstruct, or Defeat Tax.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2T1.9 

cmt. Background (2011) (noting that the guideline applies to 18 U.S.C. § 371). This 

guideline provides that the base offense level is the greater of the offense level from § 

2T1.1 or § 2T1.4 or 10. Id. § 2T1.9(a). Both § 2T1.1 and § 2T1.4 indicate that the base 

offense level is determined by the amount of “tax loss,” which is defined as “the total 

amount of loss that was the object of the offense (i.e., the loss that would have resulted 
7 

had the offense been successfully completed).” Id. § 2T1.1(c)(1). In recognition that tax 

loss is not always readily ascertainable, Note (A) provides: 

If the offense involved filing a tax return in which gross 

income was underreported, the tax loss shall be treated as 

equal to 28% of the unreported gross income . . . plus 100% 

of any false credits claimed against tax, unless a more 

accurate determination of the tax loss can be made. 

U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(c)(1) note (A) (emphasis added). After assigning the appropriate 

amount of tax loss, a sentencing court then refers to the Tax Table in § 2T4.1 to find the 

appropriate base offense level. 

2. The Positions of the Parties at the Sentencing Hearing 

At sentencing, the Government contended that Defendants caused $271,600 in tax 

loss.3

 (Sent’g Hrg. Tr. 99:21-23; Gov’t’s Sent’g Mem., ECF No. 76.) In reaching this 

figure, the Government added the values of the eight Sunoco checks and determined that 

$845,000 in taxable income went unreported. (Gov’t.’s Br. in Supp. of Sent’g. Mem. 4.) 

After applying the default 28% tax rate described in § 2T1.1(c)(1) note (A), the 

Government determined that the tax loss resulting from these unreported checks 

amounted to $236,000. (Id.) With respect to the $175,000 in unreported income from 

the 1999 gas station sale, the Government applied the 1999 capital gains tax rate of 20%. 

(Id.) The tax loss from this transaction amounted to $35,000. (Id.) The Government’s 

tax loss valuation of $271,600 would, according to the § 2T4.1 Tax Table, have resulted 

 

3

 The Presentence Reports (“PSR”) estimated the tax loss at $285,600. (PSR 5.) The 

PSR amount differed from the Government’s because the PSR taxed the $175,000 

unreported profit from the gas station sale at the default tax rate of 28% instead of 

applying the 1999 capital gains tax rate of 20%. 
8 

in a base offense level of 18. The advisory guidelines range for a defendant with a 

criminal history level of I sentenced to a crime with a base offense level of 18 is 27-33 

months. 

 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Defendants contested the Government’s calculation and 

presented the testimony of their expert, a former IRS Revenue Agent named Michael 

Washenko, at the sentencing hearing. Mr. Washenko concluded that due to the 

availability of various tax deductions, Defendants’ conduct resulted in a maximum tax 

loss of approximately $2,000. (Sent’g Hrg. Tr. 111:25.) A tax loss of this amount would 

result in a base offense level of 8. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2T4.1 (Tax 

Table). The relevant guideline, however, requires a minimum base offense level of 10.4

 

Id. § 2T1.9(a). Had the Court used the minimum base offense level of 10, the advisory 

guidelines range would have been between 6-12 months. 

3. The Sentence 

 The Court did not blindly adopt the figures presented in the Presentence Reports 

or the Government’s Sentencing Memorandum. Rather, the Court determined that 

$280,000 worth of Sunoco checks were reported, albeit by MTK instead of JSC. (Sent’g 

Hrg. Tr. 116:2-4.) This reduced the tax loss caused by Defendants’ conduct from 

$271,600 to $193,200, and reduced the base offense level from 18 (and the corresponding 

advisory sentencing range of 27-33 months) to 16 (with an advisory sentencing range of 

 

4

 In suggesting that the sentencing range for Defendant Fawaz should be 0-6 months, the 

Sentencing Memorandum appears to ignore the minimum offense level provided in U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2T1.9(a). (Def. Fawaz’s Sent’g Mem., ECF No. 78, at 

7.) 
9 

21-27 months). Based on this amended figure, the Court sentenced Defendant Safiedine 

to 21 months in prison and Defendant Fawaz, who benefitted from a downward 

departure, to one year and one day in prison. The Court also ordered two years of 

supervised release and ordered restitution in an amount to be initially determined by the 

IRS and subsequently approved by the Court. 

4. Defendants’ Arguments in Support of the Present Motion

 Because § 2T1.1 instructs district courts to treat the tax loss “as equal to 28% of 

the unreported gross income . . . unless a more accurate determination of the tax loss can 

be made[,]” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2T1.1(c)(1) note A, Defendants 

contest the Court’s tax loss calculation for sentencing purposes, arguing that Mr. 

Washenko presented a “more accurate” method. Mr. Washenko opined that the 

Government’s tax loss was minimal because various deductions, such as those for 

business expenses, depreciation, and leasehold improvement amortization, were available 

had the income been reported properly. Defendants’ argument, however, is premised on 

the erroneous notion that the tax loss for imposing a sentence is based on actual – as 

opposed to intended – tax loss.5

 (Sent’g Hrg. Tr. 95:21-22.) 

 

5

 The Court notes that for purposes of determining the restitution portion of a defendant's 

punishment, only actual loss may be taken into account. See United States v. Innarelli, 

524 F.3d 286, 291 n.1 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Swanson, 394 F.3d 520, 527 

(7th Cir. 2005)). Contrary to the suggestion in Defendant Safiedine’s Brief, the Court’s 

decision to defer entering the amount of restitution until the IRS is able calculate the 

amount owed does not underscore the existence of a substantial question of law or fact 

for purposes of remaining on bond pending appeal. (Def. Safiedine’s Br. in Supp. 9-10.) 

The Court believes that given the different penological purposes behind imprisonment 

(punishment) and restitution (restoring the victim), the use of intended loss for sentencing 

and the use of actual loss for restitution is plainly reasonable. Cf. Innarelli, 524 F.3d at 
10 

 Although the Sixth Circuit has not yet “wade[d] into [the] circuit split[6] over 

whether taxpayers may use ‘unclaimed’ deductions to reduce gross income under § 

2T1.1[,]” United States v. Harris, 433 F. App’x 383, 387 (6th Cir. 2011) it has explained 

in another context “that ‘tax loss’ for purposes of §§ 2T1.3 and 2T1.4 is based on the 

amount by which the income was understated on the false tax returns and not on whether 

the government ultimately lost money[,]” United States v. Tandon, 111 F.3d 482, 490-91 

(6th Cir. 1997) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the district court erred in failing to 

reduce the tax loss by the value of “unreported deductions that [defendant] could have 

claimed”). This suggests that the Sixth Circuit finds merit in using intended loss as the 

measure of culpability for purposes of imposing a sentence. See also United States v. 

Daulton, 266 F. App’x 381, 387 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The amount of loss is based on the loss 

the defendant intended to inflict and not the government’s actual loss.”) (citing United 

States v. Kraig, 99 F.3d 1361, 1370-71 (6th Cir. 1996)). 

 Although § 2T1.1 does permit “a more accurate determination” of tax loss than the 

28% approximation, this “might involve applying a different tax rate or incorporating 

exemptions and deductions legitimately claimed by the taxpayer on a tax return.” United 

 

293 (using this reasoning in a fraud case to find that “the appropriate loss amount for 

purposes of restitution may well be lower than the loss amount for purposes of 

sentencing”).

6

 Defendant Safiedine’s Brief in Reply, for example, cites authority from the Second 

Circuit holding that tax loss should be adjusted for “‘legitimate but unclaimed 

deductions.’” United States v. Gordon, 291 F.3d 181, 187 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting United 

States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 671 (2d Cir. 1998)). Several other circuits, 

however, disagree. See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 562 F.3d 1158, 1164 (11th Cir. 

2009); United States v. Blevins, 542 F.3d 1200, 1203 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. 

Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 472 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Phelps, 478 F.3d 680, 681-82 

(5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); United States v. Chavin, 316 F.3d 666, 677 (7th Cir. 2002). 
11 

States v. Yip, 592 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). However, it “does not require a court 

to speculate about tax deductions that the taxpayer chose not to claim.” Id.; United States 

v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 472-73 (explaining that district courts are not required to 

“consider the many ‘hypothetical ways’ that [defendants] could have completed their tax 

returns” and indicating that defendants are not entitled to the benefit of deductions that 

they might have claimed). 

To illustrate the speculative nature of such a post-hoc assessment, the Government 

points out that many of the deductions Mr. Washenko argues the Court should have 

applied “are for depreciation of assets owned by [D]efendant [S]afiedine’s other entities. 

[However, a]t no time in the past 30 years [has Defendant’s] accountant [] ever put the 

depreciation of a separate entity’s assets on the books and records of JSC Corporation.” 

(Gov’t.’s Br. in Resp. to Defs.’ Mots. for Bond 7-8.) While “[a] defendant may well be 

able to persuade a court that, given his tax-filing practice, he would have claimed 

deductions on the unreported income[,]” Defendants have not presented sufficient 

evidence that the deductions would have been claimed here. United States v. Hoskins, 

654 F.3d 1086, 1096 (10th Cir. 2011). 

The example above illustrates that the amount of tax loss in the instant case is 

uncertain at best, and the Court does not believe the guidelines require it to engage in the 

“nebulous and potentially complex exercise of speculating about [the merits of] 

unclaimed deductions.” Yip, 592 F.3d at 1041. When the amount of tax loss is uncertain 

“the guidelines contemplate that the court will simply make a reasonable estimate based 

on the available facts.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2T1.1 cmt. n.1 (emphasis 
12 

added). In making this “reasonable estimate,” the Sixth Circuit has explained, “the 

district court is to” assess “the amount of loss that [D]efendant[s] intended to inflict, not 

the actual amount of the [G]overnment’s loss.” Kraig, 99 F.3d at 1370-71. One way of 

determining such intended loss – that is, “the loss that was the object of the offense[,]” 

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2T1.1(c) – is to look at the “amount by which [a 

defendant] underreported and fraudulently stated his tax liability on his return.” United 

States v. Chavin, 316 F.3d 666, 677 (7th Cir. 2002). 

In the instant case, the Court determined that the available facts supported a tax 

loss calculation of $193,200. In reaching this amount, the Court found that Defendants 

intended to conceal the true amount of JSC’s taxable income by failing to report 

$565,000 in Sunoco checks and understating the sale price from the gas station on MTK 

& KLC’s tax returns by $175,000. (Sent’g Hrg. Tr. 116:5-19, 118:7-13.) These figures 

were supported by the testimony at trial. 

Allan Cohen, the accountant who prepared JSC’s tax returns, testified that he 

would obtain the business’s revenue figures based on reconciliations of JSC’s bank 

statements and meetings with Defendants. (Trial Tr. vol. 3, 85-88.) Mr. Cohen further 

testified that he was unaware of any checks that were negotiated to third parties when he 

prepared JSC’s tax returns. (Id., 96-102.) Thus, Mr. Cohen was never made aware of 

five checks from Sunoco to JSC totaling $565,000, as these checks were never deposited 

into JSC’s bank accounts nor were they otherwise reported to Mr. Cohen by Defendants. 

(Id., 97-102.) Without having knowledge of the income, Mr. Cohen could not include it 

in JSC’s tax return. The tax loss on the $565,000, calculated by applying the default 28% 
13 

tax rate, is $158,200. The Court further determined that Defendants negotiated these 

checks to third parties in order to escape detection by taxing authorities. 

With respect to the sale of the gas station, the Government elicited testimony from 

two witnesses supporting the contention that the gas station was sold for $875,000 and 

not the $700,000 reported to the IRS. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 51; id. vol. 3, 12.) Defendants’ 

expert Mr. Washenko opines that the sale price was approximately $725,000. (Washenko 

Report, Exhibits Expanding Record at Sent’g, ECF No. 90-3, 5.) While the amount of 

funds ultimately received from the gas station transaction appears disputed, the dispute 

does not affect the proper guidelines range. Assuming, for sake of argument, that 

Defendants are correct, the tax loss on the $25,000 that was not reported would be 

$5,000.7

 This would reduce the total tax loss to $163,200, which does not impact the 

advisory guidelines range. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2T4.1 (Tax Table). In 

fact, the tax loss from the negotiated Sunoco checks alone justifies imposition of the 

sentences both Defendants received. (Id.) 

Defendants do not argue that their appeals raise “substantial question[s] of law or 

fact likely to result in . . . a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment,” 18 

U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(B)(iii), nor could they given that they argue for a guidelines range of 

6-12 months. They do, however, argue that the appeals process will take longer than the 

maximum term of this 6-12 month advisory guideline range and that they are entitled to 

bond pending appeal on this ground pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(B)(iv). 

However, as discussed above, the Court does not believe that Defendants have raised a 

 

7

 Applying the 1999 capital gains tax rate of 20%. 
14 

substantial question with regard to the proper measure of tax loss for sentencing 

purposes. The majority of circuits addressing the question have determined that intended 

loss is the proper measure of tax loss and that district courts need not give defendants the 

benefit of unclaimed deductions. See n.6, supra. While the Government did not counter 

the testimony of Defendants’ expert at sentencing, it was not required to do so. 

In concluding that sentence was properly calculated, the Court notes its agreement 

with the observation made by the Tenth Circuit when it explained that it did not interpret 

the guidelines “as giving taxpayers a second opportunity to claim deductions after having 

been convicted of tax fraud.” United States v. Spencer, 178 F.3d 1365, 1368 (10th Cir. 

1999). Rather, like the Spencer Court, this Court is “merely assessing the tax loss 

resulting from the manner in which the defendant chose to complete his income tax 

returns.” Id. The Court reiterates that actual loss is not determinative for purposes of 

calculating the sentencing range. As such, the Court finds that Defendants have not 

satisfied the standard for remaining on bond pending appeal. 

B. Likelihood of an Order for a New Trial 

 Defendants also have not established the existence of “a substantial question of 

law or fact likely to result in . . . reversal[ or] an order for a new trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 

3143(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). Defendants argue that the unrebutted evidence at the sentencing 

hearing established a negligible tax loss. This evidence, they argue, undercuts a 

necessary element of the offense of conviction, namely, that Defendants intended to 

defraud the United States by concealing income from the IRS. (Def. Safiedine’s Br. in 

Supp. 14; Def. Fawaz’s Br. in Reply 7-8.) The Court rejects this argument. 
15 

Although Defendants argue that trial counsel’s decision not to put Mr. Washenko 

on the stand at trial “deprived the jury of the balanced analysis of the evidence that he 

provided and left the Government’s rough and crude calculation unrebutted[,]” (Def. 

Safiedine’s Br. in Supp. 14) the crime Defendants were convicted of does not require the 

Government to prove a tax loss. This Court has previously considered whether to grant 

Defendants’ motions for acquittal, or in the alternative, their motions for a new trial 

pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29 and 33 (June 7, 2012 Opinion & 

Order (denying Rule 29 and Rule 33 motions); July 19, 2012 Opinion & Order (denying 

motion for reconsideration of June 7, 2012 ruling).) In denying these motions, this Court 

determined that the record contained sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict and 

that the jury’s verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. (June 7, 2012 

Opinion & Order 12.) The evidence presented at sentencing does not persuade the Court 

differently. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the Court concludes that neither 

Defendant has overcome the presumption of incarceration embodied in the Bail Reform 

Act. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED THAT, Defendant Safiedine’s Motion for Bond Pending 

Appeal is DENIED; 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT, Defendant Fawaz’s Motion for Bond 

Pending Appeal is DENIED. 
16 

Dated: December 27, 2012 

 s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Copies to: 

James C. Thomas, Esq. 

Sabrina Shaheen Cronin, Esq. 

Tiwana L Wright, Esq.