### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 07 -0 00 79 -C V

______________________________

IN T H E IN T E R E S T O F P

. D

. D

. , A C H ILD

On Appea l from the 5th J udicial District Court

Bow ie County , Texas Trial Court No. 93C1350-005

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Opinion by

J ustice Moseley2 O P I N I O N Th is i s an a

pp e a l by Vi c ke y Pa c e Mc Al lis te r of an or de r d e nyinghe r r e c ov e ry of a c la im ag ainst J oel Steven Pace for unpa id health insuranc e p re m i u m s and unpaid medic al expenses incu rr ed b y M cA l lister for c overa g e of the ir child, P.D.D. The tria l court ruled that the claims of McAllister we re ba

rre d under the doctrine of res judicata. BA CK G RO UN D O F CO NT RO VE RSY McAllister and Pac e we re onc e husband a nd wife. A divorce was instituted by McAllister in 1993 and g rante d J anuar y 31, 1994; the divorce decr ee re ci t ed t hat no childre n wer e born to or adopted by t h e mar

riag e and that none wer e expected. H oweve r, shortly afte r the divorc e wa s g ra nte d, Mc Al lis te r d isc ov e re d h e rs e lf to be pregna nt and

sh e fi le d a

n a c tio n to mod if

y in a su it aff ectingthe par ent-c hild relationship. P.D.D., the child resulting from that preg nancy , was born on October 3, 1994, and an ag ree d order of pater nity was e ntere d on J une 30, 1995, which f ound Pace to be the fathe r and order ed him to pay child support and hea lth insurance pr emiums for the c hild, with uninsured medica l expenses to be share d by M cA l l i s t er a

nd Pace. T his same orde r name d McAllister mana g ing c onservator of the c hild with P ace as possessory conser vator having sta

ndard specifie d rig hts of possession of the child. At some point dur ing 1995, McAllister and Pac e re -established a joint household and lived toge ther without mar

riag e until the ear ly part of 1999, when they once ag ain separ ated. I n 2 003, McAllister moved to Arizona and r emarri ed

. I n the Summer of 2004, McA llist er a nd PaceThe Mar ch 28, 2005, order and the attac hment wer e not made a part of the rec ord, but the 1 nature of their conte nt is drawn fr om rec itations in t he orde r fr om which appe al has be en per fec ted and fr om t he br ie fs of

the pa rt ie s. 3 experience d some kind of disag ree ment conce rning Pace' s visitation with or possession of P.D.D. and amica

ble re lations betwee n Pace a nd McAllister evapor ated. McAllister moved he r re sidence without telling Pace of her wher eabouts or the wher eabouts of P.D.D. O n November 16, 2004, Pace fi le d a n a c tio n fo r c on te mpt to c omp e l e nf or c e me nt o f h is c us tod ia l r ig hts wi th P .D .D . A s a re su lt of the he aringon t h at m o t i o n, on Marc h 28, 2005, McAllister wa s held in contempt of cour t and

o r d e r e d t o p ay P a c e ' s a t t o r

n e y' s f e e s ; i n a d d i t i o n , P a c e w a s g r an t e d c o mp e n s a t o r

y p o s s e s s i o nd a ys in addition to thos e re g ular da y s set out in the 1995 order. Writs of attac hment and commitment for McAllister we re issued on A pril 18, 2005, but these writs wer e neve r ser ved on McA llist er. 1 On J uly 19, 2005, Pace f

iled a motion to modify

the custody

of P.D.D. McAllister r esponded with a re quest for modification of the child support obligation, r etroa ctive to the date of filing of the reque st. A hear ing on these iss ues was beg un on Aug ust 30, 2005, but rece ssed bef ore c ompletion of all of the e vidence , the trial cour t indicating that it would be resumed at a later time. I nstead of

a re sumption of the hear ing, a n ag ree d order

was e ntere d on November 15, 2005; in the ag ree d order , the pre vious fin d i n g of McAllister' s contempt of cour t and the portions of the pr eviously -ente red order g ranting Pace a

n awa rd of attorney 's fe es we re va cate d; the order s reg ardingthe

conser vatorship and possession of a nd access to P .D.D. we re modified to a standard posse ssory

or de r. Th e or de r c on c lud e d w iththe state me nt t hat " I T I S ORDE RED that a ll re lie f r e qu e ste d in thi sI n 2003, the child beca me elig ible for health insurance cover ag e at no cost t h ro u gh 2 McAllister' s curr ent husband' s insurance provider. Th e Tex as Fam il y

Co de t reat s h eal th in su ranc e as " a d d i t i on al c hi ldsupp ort ." T EX . F AM . 3 C ODE ANN . § 15 4. 18 2 ( b– 1) (V e rn on Sup p. 20 07 ). Som e tim e s in thi s o pin ion , n o di st in ctio n is ma de be tw e e n unp a id h e a lthins ur anc e pr e miums a nd un pa id c hil d s up po rt
. 4 case and not ex pressly g rante d is denied. All other terms of the pr ior order s not specifica lly modified in this order shall re main in full force and ef fec t." On Marc h 13, 2006, McAllister filed an application for enfor ceme nt of the support orde r and for the r eturn of items of personalty belong ing to the c hild; specifically , McAllister soug ht to recove r $400.00 in unpaid child support for the month of O ctober 2005, $37,645.28 in reimburseme nt of health insuranc e pre miums for a per iod beg inning at the bi rth of t he child and ending in 2003, and 2 Pace' s half of uninsure d medical e x penditures, t h e re turn of a pink blanke t and diamond nec klace belong ing to the c hild, and a judg ment for attorney ' s fee s incurre d in br inging the action. A hea ring 3 on this claim was conduc ted on October 12, 2006, afte r which the trial court r ece ived trial brief s by both McAllister an d P ac e. I n its memorandum order dated F ebrua

ry 19, 2007, the trial cour t included a f

inding that the a g ree d order enter ed November 15, 2005, barr ed McAllist er' s claims by res judicata. As a ba sis for this , the t rial court found t hat t he is sues had been tried by consent in the hear ing le ading to the entry of that o rd er and that the prior order was a monumentation of a

se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s whi c h disp os e d o f a ll c la ims be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s p ri or to the entry of the a g ree d order . There wer e no findings of fac t and conclusions of law re quested a nd

no ne we re fi le d, bu t in

re c itatio ns c on ta ine d in

the or de r, the tr ia l c ourt

ba se d i ts f

ind ing s th a t a5

settlement had oc curr ed on the pleadi n gs an d t es timony of the pa

rties at the August 30, 2005, h ea ri n g. I n her appea l, Mc Allister maintains that: (1) Pace had never filed plea dings c laiming e ither res judicata or settlement pr ior to the hea ring . Be caus e t h er e were no ple ading s filed upon which those aff irmative def

enses c ould have be en ra ised, Pace was prohibited from doing so. (2) The re w as no trial by

consent of the issue of t he health insurance premiums or settl ement in t he prior he aring and re sulting ag ree d order . (3) The trial co u rt erred in ruling that there was a previous trial by

c on se nt o f t

he iss ue of

he a lthins ur anc e pr e mium r e imb ur se me nt. WERE A F F IR M AT IV E D EF EN SES R AI SED BY P AC E'S P LEA DI NG S? Rule 94 of the Tex as R u l es o f Civil P roce dure pr ovides, in part, that " I n pleading to a prec eding pleading , a par

ty shall set forth af

firmatively

acc ord and satisfac tion .

. ., pay ment, rele ase, res judicata . . ., waive r, and a ny o t h er m at t er constituti ng an avoida nce or aff irmative def

ense." T EX . R. C IV . P. 9 4. I t ha s lo ngbe e n h e ld t hat th e purp os e of

Rul e 94 is t o g ive the op po sin g pa rt y notice of the def

ensive issues to be trie d. Land Titl e C o. of Dallas, Inc. v. F. M. Stigler, Inc ., 609 S.W. 2d 75 4, 75 6 ( Te x. 19 80 ); Hunter v. Carter , 476 S.W. 2d 41 , 4 5 ( Te x. Civ . App .—Ho us ton [14t h Di st. ] 1 97 2, wr it re f' d n .r .e .) ; Musso v. Cronley , 422 S.W .2d 840, 841 (Tex. Civ. App.—W aco 1967, no writ). An af firmative de fense does not tend t o rebut factual propositions asser ted by a plaintiff, but

rathe r it se e ks to e sta

bli sh an ind e pe nd e nt re a so n wh y the pla int if f sh ou ld n ot recov er. Gorman v.6

Life Ins. Co. of N

. Am. , 8 1 1 S

. W

. 2 d 5 4 2 , 546 (Tex. 1991); Hamm v . Millennium Incom e Fund, L.L. C. , 178 S.W .3d 256, 268 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2005, pet. denied)

. McAllister has a

rg ued that Pace failed to c omply with t h e re quirement of Rule 94 that the aff irmative def

enses of res judicata and se ttlement be spec ially pled. Al tho ug h Pa c e ' s b ri ef ma ke s n o me nti on of thi s f a c t, t he fi rs t f ull pa ra g ra phin h is " F ir st Amended Re sponse to Motion for Enfoc ement [sic] and Motion to Enfor c e a n d M otion for Sanctions Un de r T e x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. C od e § 1 0. 00 2" re c ite s in pa rt : RESP ONDEN T would show that ea ch of the se alleg ed violat io n s w a s f u ll y addre ssed in a he ari ngon Au g us t 30, 200 5, by thi s Cour t and dis po se d of by the or de r of thi s Court , s ig ne d by the Ho no ra ble Ra lph B ur g e ss o n N ov e mbe r 1 5, 20 05 , s pe c if ic a lly the fi na l pa

ra g ra ph of sa id or de r o n p a g e 15 wh ic h s ta te s, " I T I S ORDE RED that a ll relief reque sted in this case a

nd not expressly

g rante d is denied." I n presc ribing the deg ree of definiteness which pleadings contain, Rule 47 of t he Te x as Rules of Civ il Pr oc e dure re qu ir es th at th ey be p art ic ula r e no ug h a s to " g ive fa ir no tic e of

the c la im in vo lv ed. " T EX . R. C IV . P. 4 7. A p art y ne e d n ot p le a d a

c a us e of a c tion and

its e le me nts wi th specific ity

if it can be r easona

bly inferr ed fr om the pleading s. McNeil v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc ., 36 S.W .3d 248, 250 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Although there is no mention of t he wor ds "ba

rre d," " claim pre clusion," " issue prec lusion," or " res judicata" within them, the ple a din g s f

ile d b y Pa c e we re su ff

ic ie nt t o p lac e McA lliste r o n n oti c e of the int e nti on

of Pa c e to interpose the de fense that t h e i s s u es ra ised by McAllister for

rec overy of unpaid he alth insurance7

premiums and medical expenses had bee n previously litigated in the pr evious hea ring and we re thus not capa ble of be ing he ard onc e ag ain. As to whether

there wer e plea dings w hich ra ised the issue of whe ther a settlement betwe en the par ties prec luded re cove r

y , it a p p e a r s there w ere no such alleg ations contained in Pac e' s response. There fore , irrespe ctive of w hether this iss ue woul d fa l l wi thin the terminology of ac cord a

nd sat i s fa cti on, waiver , or estoppel, ther e is simply no pleading confor

ming to the r equire ments of Ru le 9 4

. A c c o r d in g ly , th e is s u e o f s e tt le me n t ( h o w e v e r

c h ar a c te r iz e d ) w a s n o t r a is e d in the ple a din g s. TR IA L BY CO NSE NT ? Howeve r, althoug h an af

firmative de fense has not bee n pleade d, it can still be considere d if, at trial, it is tried by

the conse nt of the par

ties. SeeT EX . R. C IV . P. 6 7; se e als o Bell v. Me eks , 725 S.W .2d 179, 179–80 (Tex. 1987). To deter mine whether

an issue wa s tried b y

consent, the c ourt must e x amine the rec ord not f or evidenc e of the issue, but rather for e vidence of trial of the issue. Picke lner v. Adler , 229 S.W .3d 516, 523 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) ; Bec k v. W alker , 154 S .W .3 d 895, 90 1 n .3 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 5, no pe t.) ; Ste ph an z v . La ird , 846 S.W. 2d 89 5, 90 1 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 93 , w ri t de nie d) ; W atts v. St. Mary's Hall, Inc ., 662 S.W .2d 55, 58 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983, writ ref ' d n.r.e.)

. L ooking at the circ umstances leading up to the hear ing held on Aug ust 30, 2005, we f ind that McAllister had be en pre viously found to be in conte mpt; a writ of attac hment had been issued; andA c op y of the re po rt e r' s r e c or d o f th e Au g us t 30 , 2 00 5, pr oc e e din g wa s in tr od uc e d in to 4 ev idence at the hea

ring held on Octobe r 21, 2006, and w as a pa rt of the r eporte r' s rec ord of the s ec o n d p ro ce ed i n g. 8 Pace ha d been a

war ded attorne y ' s fee s ag ainst McAllister. Pace had broug ht a n action to modify

the

conser vatorship of the child and McAllister had responde d by filing a motion to modify Pace' s future child support obligation. There w as no mention in any party ' s pleading s of unpaid child support due from Pace to McAllister nor any ref ere nces to unpa id health insuranc e pre miums t o cover P.D.D., or hea lth ex penses whic h had bee n incurre d by McAllister which ha d not been r eimbursed to her by Pace. During the hea

ring which ensue d on that date, there wer e mentions of the dispute c oncer ning 4 the he a lthins ur anc e pr e miums a nd the on e mon th' s unp a id c hil d s up po rt : (1) I n response to dir ect examination by his ow n attorney , Pace testified that afte r he and McAllister had se para t ed i n 1 999, he had be g un pay ing he r $100.00 more tha n the cour

t-order ed child support. He indicated that this additional sum was what he ( who was f amiliar with insuranc e

rate s, havin g be e n a

n in sura nc e a g e nt) e sti ma te d to be the a dd iti on a l c os t in c ur re d b y Mc Al lis te r i n adding P.D.D. to McAllister' s employ er- provided medic al insuranc e cove rag e. (2 ) Ag a in i n

re sp on se to d ir e c t e xami natio n b y his a tto rn e y , Pa c e , w ho by a g re e me nt w ith McAllister, had be en pay ing his child support direc tly to McAllister instead of in the f ashion direc ted by the order of the court, testified that he had se nt the chec k for the one month's c hild support which McAllister claimed that she had not re ceive d. He pr offe red the unopened e nvelope c ontaining the9

chec k which had be en sent to Mc Allister' s then last-known addre ss in Arizona but returned by the postal service

. (3 ) Du ri n g cr o s s -e x am i n at i o no f P ac e b y M cA l l i s t er 's at t o rn ey , t h e fo l l o wi n g ex ch an ge

occur red: Q. Do y ou

have any ide a wh a t the he a lthins ur anc e c os ts f or [P.D .D .] is rig ht now? A. Idid chec k the price of a ma jor medica l policy

for a child her a g e, and it was somewher e in the $60.00, $70.00 ra ng e per month. Q. I f y ou' d like to give me that information -- A. Well, come see me

. Q. Would i t surprise y ou if it was more c losely around $ 200.00 per month? A. Ig uess it would. (4) Dur ing dir ect e x amination by her attorney , McAllister testified tha t althoug h she had he a r d Pa c e te s ti f

y th a t h e a lt h in s u r an c e f

o r P. D

. D

. c o u ld

b e o b ta in e d

f o r a b o u t $ 6 0

. 0 0 p e r

month, sh e ha d b e e n una

ble to o bta in i t for th at pric e . Rathe r, sh e state d th a t th e c os t to a dd P.D .D . to Mc Al lis te r' s h e a lth

ins ur anc e po lic y

wa s a bo ut $ 45 1. 00 pe r m on th, a pp lyingno sp e c if

ic fi g ur e s.The memorandum order from which a

ppeal ha s been taken re cites that McAllister testified 5 that " the c hil d' s c ov e ra g e wa s $ 45 1. 00 per mo nth thr ou g h T ri -C are He a lthI ns ur anc e , w hic h is fe de ra l he a lthins ur anc e that her hu sb and pr ov ide s thr ou g h his m ili tary re tir e me nt. MO VA

NT a lso testified that the cove rag e costs her nothing and that there is no out-of-poc ket cost for c overa g e under that po lic y ." Th is i s an in c or re c t r e a din g of

the record. Th e re c or d s ho ws that th e mon thl y e xpe nd iture fo r h e a lth ins ur anc e so ug ht by Mc Al lis te r wa s in c ur re d b e fo re P.D .D . b e c a me e lig ibl e fo r c ov e ra g e un de r the Tr i- Care He a lthI ns ur anc e pr og ra m in 20 03 and that th e re ha s b e e n n o c la im made by McAllister for

P.D.D.' s health insuranc e cove rag e since she bec ame e ligible.

10 (5) Dur ing c ross-examinat i o n o f McAllister by Pace' s attorney , McAllister testified that P.D.D.' s health insuranc e was cover ed at that time f or no additional cost throug h McAllister' s curr ent husband' s mili tary

retire ment health insuranc e cove rag e. 5 There was no testimony at that hear ing conce rning the time f rame during which McA llist er incurre d the monthly

char g es for

health insuranc e for P.D.D. nor the g ross amount of money

e xpe nd e d b y

Mc Allis te r f

or that pu rp os e . T he re wa s a lso no te sti mony re g ard ingany

un pa id uninsured medica l expenses incurre d by McAllister for P.D.D.' s car e. The ag ree d order enter ed by the trial cour

t makes no spec ific re fer ence to any then-outstanding monetary obligation. The doc trin e o f t ri al by

consent is not intended to establish a g ener al rule of prac tice and should be applied with ca

re; it should never be applied in a doubtful situation. Stephanz , 846 S.W .2d at 901. Trial by

implied consent "a

pplies only wher e it appea rs from the r ecor d that the issue was actual ly tr ied , al th ou gh n o t p lea ded ." Johnston v. Mc Kinney Am., I

nc. , 9 S. W. 3 d

2 7 1 , 2 8 1 ( T e x. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 1999, pet. denied). "Rule 67 conce rning trial by consent a pplies where it clear ly appea rs from the rec ord as a whole that the parties tried out a c ontroverte d issue and that th e is s u e w a s f

u ll y d e v e lo p e d. See T EX . R. C IV . P. 6 7; Praeger v . W ilson , 721 S.W .2d 597, 60311

(Tex . Ap p. —Fo rt W o r t h 1 9 86 , wr it ref'd n .r. e.). " Fiduciary Mortgage Co. v . City Nat' l Bank of Irving , 762 S.W .2d 196, 202 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, wr it denied). Plainly , althoug h there was evidenc e about the issue of the nonpay ment of hea lth insurance premiums which ar ose duringthe hea ring on Aug ust 30, 2005, it was raised pr imarily by Pace ( who had not paid them) a

nd not by McAllister (the pe rson who later soug ht to recover them). The evidenc e conc erningthese insura nce pr emiums was sketchy and incomplete a

t the 2005 hear ing. Th e re wa s n o tr ia l of tho se iss ue s a t that tim e and it wa s e rr or to d e te rm ine that th e re wa s a tr ia l by c on se nt o f t

he m. WA S M c AL LIST ER

RE QU IR ED TO R

AI SE THO SE ISS UE S? I n the orde r ente red by

the trial court, it is noted that under the transac tional a pproac h to the

a p p li c a ti o no f

r e s ju d ic a ta , " A s u

b s e qu e n t s u it

w il l b e b ar

r e d if it ar is e s o u t o f

th e s a me s u

b je ct

ma tte r of a pr e vio us su it and wh ic h thr ou g h the e xer c ise of dil ig e nc e , c ou ld h a ve be e n li tig a te d in a pri or s ui t. " Ba rr v . R eso lut ion Tru st C or p ., 837 S.W .2d 627, 631 (Tex. 1992). We observe that the bar of a claim by res judicata g ener ally require s proof of the following elements: (1) a prior f inal jud g me nt o n the me ri ts by a c ourt of c omp e te nt jur isd ic tio n; (2 ) ide nti ty of pa rt ie s o r t ho se in p ri vit

y with them; and (3) a s ec o nd action base d on the same c laims that were raised or could have been raised in the f

irst action. Amstadt v. United Stat es Brass Corp. , 919 S.W .2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996). Ex pa rteMy e rs , 68 S.W .3d 229, 232 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.).12

The que stion whether r es judicata applies in a g iven instance is a mix ed question of law a nd fac t. My e rs , 68 S.W.3 d at 2 31 ; Po ny Ex pr ess Cou rie r Co rp . v . M orris , 9 2 1 S. W. 2 d

8 1 7 , 8 2 0 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ). When a matter involving both fa ctual dete rminations and leg al conclusions is decide d by the trial cour

t, Texas appellate c ourts g ener ally use an a buse of discr etion

s t an d ard of revie w. My e rs , 6 8 S. W. 3 d a t 2 3 1

– 3 2

. I na

p p ly in g th is s ta

n d ar d , w e d e f

e r to th e tr ial court' s fac tual deter

minations as long a s they are proper ly supported by the rec ord, and we r eview its lega l determinations de novo. Mo rri s , 921 S.W .2d at 820. At first blush, it may appea r t hat under a rigid adherenc e to the tra nsactional a

pproac h set out

a bo ve , it wa s the re sp on sib ili ty of Mc Al lis te r to ra ise the iss ue of the de lin qu e nc y

a t th e he ari ngin 2 0 0 5

. He r cl ai m s aga i n s t P ac e fo r un p ai d h ea l t h i n s u ra n ce p re m i u m s an d m ed i ca l ex p en s es , t h ro u gh the e xer c i s e o f

d i l i g e n c e , c o u l d

h a v e b e e nl i t i g a t e d

a tt h a tt i m e . A l l o f

t h e i s s u e s b e t w e e nt h e se pa rt ie s ( bo th p ote nti a l is su e s and tho se a c tua lly tr ie d be fo re the c ourt ) s pr ingfr om t he ir re la tio ns hip as the pa rents of the child. The parties are the same and would require no third parties to be joined. Howeve r, the c ritical inquiry here as it pertains to the i ssue of res judicata ce nters upon what is the

" same su bje c t mat ter ." I n o the r w or ds , is the iss ue of de lin qu e nt c hil d s up po rt wi thi n th e same

su bje c t matte r a s r e qu e sts fo r m od if ic a tio n o f c on se rv a tor sh ip o r f utu re c hil d su

pp or t ob lig a tio ns ? Chapter 155 of

t h e T ex as F amily

Code provides for

continuing jur isdiction of family law matters. Ne verthe less, in re cognition that custody matters and suppor

t matters ar e intended to be independe nt of one a

nother, the L eg islature provide d that "Acourt may not rende r an or der that13

c on dit ion s th e ri g ht o f a

c on se rv a tor

to p os se ssi on

of or a c c e ss t o a

c hil d o n th e pa

y me nt o f c hil d

supp ort ." T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 153.001(b) ( Ver non 2002). On the o t h er h and, S ection 15 7. 00 3( a ) of the Te xas F a mil y Cod e pr ov ide s that " A pa rt y re qu e sti nge nf

or c e me nt may

join in the same proc eedingany

claim and r emedy

provided for in this chapte r, other pr ovisions of this t itle, or ot her rul es o f l aw. " T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 1 5 7

. 0 0 3 (a ) (V ern o n 2 0 0 2 ) (e mp h as i s ad d ed ). Al t h o u gh the law p e rm its tho se kin ds of a c tio ns to b e pr os e c ute d s imu lta ne ou sl y , it do es no t r e qu ir e the ir joi nd e r. From th ese, one c an d e te rm ine that it is the int e nti on

of the dr a ft e rs of

the Te xas F a mil y Code to treat the is s u es of cur rent a nd future suppor

t, custody and visitation, and enfor ceme nt of order s as sepa

rate and def

inable questions. I n th e c a se a t ba

r, the a c tiv e ple a din g s at th e tim e of the 20 05 he ari ngwe re (1 ) a mot ion to modify the conse rvatorsh i p fi l ed by Pace a nd (2) a motion to m odify

the future child support obligation filed by

McAllister. "Adeter mi n at i o n o f what constit utes the subject matter of a suit nec essar ily

require s an

e xami na tio n o f t he fa c tua l ba sis of the c la im or c la ims in the pr ior lit ig a tio n. I t re qu ir e s an a na ly sis of the fa ctual matter s that make up the gist of t he complaint, without reg ard to the form of ac tion." Ba rr , 8 37 S.W. 2d

a t 63 0. L oo kin g a t th e e vid e nc e wh ic h w ou ld b e pe rt ine nt t o Pac e ' s mo tio n to mod if y the c on se rv a tor sh ip a

nd po sse ssi on

of P.D .D ., it i s c le ar t

hat " Th e be st i nte re st o f t he c hil d sh a ll a lw ay s b e the pr ima

ry c on sid e ratio n o f t

he c ourt in d e te rm ini ng the iss ue s o f c on se rv a tor sh ip andpo ss ess io n o f and acces s to th e chi ld ." T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 153.002 (Ve rnon 2002). The14

party seekingmodification of a c onservatorship or cu s t o d y order bear s the burden of

proving that there has been a materia l a nd substantial c hang e in c ircumstance s within the releva nt time frame a

nd that the m odification i s in the child' s best interest. Gardner v. G ardner , 229 S.W .3d 747, 755–56 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.). Mc Al lis te r' s r e sp on din g mot ion to m od if y the de c a de -o ld o rd e r e sta bli sh ingPa c e ' s c hil d

su pp or t ob lig a tio n invo lve d o the r f a c ts a nd oth e r d e te rm inatio ns . Ch a pte r 1 54 of

the Te xas F a mil y Code provides ex tensive di rec tion for a court to deter mine the amount of child support which eac h support-pay

ing pa rent is to pay ; the primary thrust of the evide ntiary h ea ri n g on a motion for modification of a c hild support obligation deals with the curr ent income of the support-pa

y ing pa re nt. Both of the issues raised by the pleading s involve questions of the cur rent circ umstance of the pa rt ie s and se e k o rd e rs to d ic ta te futur e c on du c t. I n c on tr a st, the iss ue of d eli nq uent c hil d

su pp or t is no t a qu e stion of the p re se nt c ir c ums tanc e s o f t he pa rt ie s o r t he ir futur e c on du c t but, rathe r, the c ontent of prior or ders f or support and the deg ree o f compliance with those order s the

su pp or t- pa y ingpa re nt h a s o bs e rv e d in the pa st. Th e iss ue of su pp or t del inq ue nc ie s is no t th e same

s u b j e c tm a t t e r

a s p r e s e n tan d

f u tu r e i s s u e s c o n c e r

n i n g c h i l d

s u p p o rtan d c u s t o dy. This case is easily

distinguishable f

rom t h e ci rcumstanc e in In re M .K.R. , 216 S.W .3d 58 (Tex. App.—For

t Wor t h 2 0 0 7 , n o pet.). In that case , a judg ment for de linquent child support pay ments was ente red in 1993. In 2001, another judgme nt for child support wa s entere d that15

included delinquent pa

y ments which, althoug h due bef ore the 1993 order , wer e not mentioned in that

or de r. I n tha t cir c ums tanc e , the c ourt he ld t hat th e c la ima

nt f or c hil d s up po rt

wa s o bli g a te d to ra ise the question of al l claims for de linquent child support which bec ame due befor e the f iling for

e nf or c e me nt o f

t h e c h i l d s u p p o rto b l i g a t i o nb e c a

u s e i ti n v o l v e d

t h e s a m e i s s u e : u np a i d c h i ld support. I n the M.K.R . case , the 1993 orde r wa s d et er minative of the amount of child support delinquency

exis ting at the date of

the entry of the orde r finding t he amount of delinquenc y . Her e, there wer e diffe rent matter s or issues which we re involved. The 2005 hear ing involved the issues of c u s to dy an d f

u tu r e s u p p o rt; th e thr

u s t o f M c A ll is te r ' s 2 0 0 6 mo ti o n f o r e n f o r c e me n t in v o lved a

s e p a r a t e i s s u e : u np a i d

c h i l d s u p p o rt
. T h i s C o u rth a s p r e v i o u s l y d e t e r m i n e d t h a te v e ni nc l o s e l yrelated suits between the same individuals reg ardingsimil ar i ssues, if unlitigate d claims are "not essentially connec ted" to the l itigate d claims, then they are not barre d by

res judicata. I

n r e J

. G

. W. , 54 S.W .3d 826, 833 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (tort claims stemming f rom the ac tions of the mother and he r boy friend in wr ong fully taking the childre n and fle eing the state we re not the same subjec t matter of the c ustody dispute). Res judi c a ta d o e s n o t b ar a li ti g an t w h o d id n o t a s s e rt an a f f ir mati v e c la im f

o r r e lief in an

ear lier ac tion from stating a claim i n a l at er a ction that could have been f iled as a c ross-cla im or counter claim in the ea

rlier a ction, unless the claim wa s compulsory in the ear lier ac tion. I n g e r s o l l

- R a n d C

o . v . V a l e r o E n e rg y Cor p ., 99 7 S. W.2 d 2 03 , 2 07 (T e x. 19 99 ). A c la im i s a compulsory

counter claim only

if16

(1) it is within the jurisdiction of the court; (2) it is not at the time of filing the answe r the subject of a pending action; (3) the claim is mature and owned by the def endant at the time of filing the answe r; (4) it ar ose out of the same transa ction or occ urre nce that is the subject matter of the opposing party ' s claim; (5) it is ag ainst an opposing party in the same c apac ity ; and ( 6 ) i t d o es n ot require the pre sence of third par ties ov e r w ho m th e cou rt c ann ot a c qu ir e jur isd ic tio n. A c la im h a vin g a ll o f t he se e le me nts mus t be as se rt e d in th e ini tia l a c tio n a nd c ann ot b e a sse rt e d in

la te r a c tio ns . Id. (f oo tno te s o mit te d) ; se e als o T EX . R. C IV . P. 97( a). Mc Allister' s action for rec overy of past-due child support was not a c ompulsory counter claim to Pace' s motion to modify the conse rvatorship of the child. I t was not requir ed for McAllister to ha ve litigated her claim for de linquent pay ments when respondingto a motion to modi fy custody or when she soug ht to modify future c hild support lest she be bar red by res judicata. I n her circ umstance, she responde d to a motion to m odify child custody wi th a mot ion to m od if y the c hil d s up po rt

ob lig a tio n. Ha d she c ho se n to do so, she c ou ld h a ve a lso made a claim for the unpaid h ea l t h i n suranc e pre miums at the same time; never theless, since the subject matter w as different a nd did not arise fr om the same tra nsaction, not having chosen that option, her re cover

y on these issues wa s not therea fter ba rre d. There for e, i t was e rror

to have de termined that he r cla im for past-due child support was barr ed by res judicata. DID THE PR IOR AG REED ORDER REP RESENT A SETT LEMENT AGREEMENT WHICH BARRED RECOVERY? I nextricably

bound to the issue of re s judicata in this case is the issue of whe ther the pr evious ag ree d order

(which pe rtained to the conservatorship and custodial matter s reg ardingthe child and17

which e xc u lp a te d

M c A ll is te r

o f h e r p e n a lt ie s f

o r c o n te mp tu o u s a c ti o n s ) r e p r e s e n te d a s e tt lement ag ree ment which bar

red Mc Allister from pur s u i ng her c laims for delinquent support oblig ations. I t is settled law that the construction of an ag ree d judgme nt and a de termination of the ob lig a tio ns imp os e d u po n th e pa

rt ie s are g ov e rn e d b y

the ru les app lica

ble to contra cts g ener ally

. Ex parte J ones , 163 Tex. 513, 358 S .W .2d 370, 375 (1962); Conner v. Be an , 6 30 S.W. 2d 69 7, 70 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 81 , w ri t re f' d n .r .e .) . In co ns tr

uin g a wr itt e n co ntr a c t, the pr ima ry c on c e rn of

the c ourt is t o asce rtain the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument. Coker v. Coker , 650 S.W .2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983); R & P En te rp ris es v . La Gu ar ta, Ga v re l & Kirk, Inc ., 596 S.W .2d 517, 518 (Tex. 1980). Gracia v. RC Cola-7-Up B ottling Co. , 667 S.W .2d 517, 519–20 (Tex. 1984). An ag ree d judgme nt must be interpre ted as if it we re a contra ct betwee n the par ties and the interpre tation is, acc ording ly , g overne d by the laws relating to contrac ts. See McCray v . McCray , 5 8 4 S.W .2d 279, 281 (Tex. 1979) (holding a child support ag ree ment is larg ely g overne d by

the

ru le s r e la tin g to c on tr a c ts) ; W agner v. W

arnasch , 156 T ex . 3 3 4 , 295 S.W .2d 890, 893 (1956) (h old inga jud g me nt b y

c on se nt i s c on tr a c tua l in

natur e ); Biaza v. Simon , 8 7 9 S. W. 2 d 3 4 9 , 3 5 5 ( T e x. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 1994, writ denied) (holding an ag ree d or consent judgme nt is g overne d by the law of

contra cts); se e als o P atev . P ate , 8 74 S.W. 2d 18 6, 18 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (" Ag ree d judgme nts, once rende red, are contrac ts betwee n the parties that

excuse err or and ope rate to end all controve rsy betwee n the par

ties.")

. I n revie wing the ag ree d judgme nt which was enter ed, it f irst alters the c onservatorship of the child from a posse ssory

/manag ing c onservatorship relationship to a joint manag ing c onservatorship; it then confor

ms the custodial and possessory rig hts of the child to the standard posses s i o n o rd er18

presc ribed by

statute; it vacate s the previous order s finding McAllister in contempt and the awa rd

o f a t t o r n e y' s f e e s a g a i n s th e r

i n f a v o r o f P a c e ; i t d e n i e s a l l r e l i e f r e qu e s t e d an d n o t g r an t e d ; f i n a l l y, it o rd e rs that al l pre vio us or de rs of the c ourt no t mo dif

ie d r e ma in i n f

or c e and e ff e c t. T he re is

no thi nga mbi g uo us a

bo ut t his or de r w hic h ma

nd a te s it s ju dic ia l c on str

uc tio n; i t s t e r

m s a r e manif e stl y clea r and de terminable f

rom the four

corne rs of the instrument. Nothing in this order modifies the child support obligation; contrarily , by specific ally

not modify ing the se orde rs (a nd stating that prior order s not modified by

it rema in in forc e and eff ect) , it ratifies the continued validity of those prior

or de rs . I t is c omp le te ly

sil e nt a s to any

thi ngre la tin g to p a st- du e su pp or t. Whe re the re is n o ambi g uit y in a c on se nt de c re e or

jud g me nt, a

tr ia l c ourt is w ith ou t a

uth or ity to modify it. See Pearcy v. Pe arcy , 884 S.W .2d 512, 514 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 1994, no writ). I n the 2006 hea

ring , McAllister made it plain that when she c onsented to the e ntry of the ag ree d order , it was not her intention to waive any rig ht to reimbursement for past hea lth insurance premiums. The closest which Pace came to expressing his belief that the ag ree d order

exculpated him f r o m t h e o b l i g a t i o n s w h i c h M c A l l i s t e r h a s p u r s u e d i s i n s ay i n g , " M y u n d e r s t an d i n g wa s in hamme ri ngtha

t a g re e me nt an d g ivi ngup e ve ry thi ngthat I

did , a nd dr op pin g the c on te mpt

qu e sti on s,

wa s that thi s wa s ov e r wi th, that we we re g oin g to g o a bo ut no t bic ke ri ng , be ing dr ug ba c k in to c ourt , and doing what was best for [t he child]." I t appea rs that Pace ' s impression of things did not match the int e nti on s o f M c Al lis te r. A unil a te ra l un de rs tan di ngis n ot a n a g re e me nt. Emeritus Corp. v. Hi gh sm ith , 211 S.W .3d 321, 329 (Tex. App.—San An t onio 2006, pet. denied) . Even if one wer e19

to l oo k at th e e ntr

y of the a g re e d ju dg me nt u

nd e r a n im pli e d- in- fa c t c on tr a c t th e or y , th a t w ou ld require a mee ting of

the minds which the evide nce a t the hear ing doe s not revea l. Ex c e ss Un der w r i t er

s at Ll oyds v. Frank 's C

asing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. , 2 4 6 S. W. 3 d 4 2 , 4 9 ( T e x. 200 8 ). Pace' s unilateral unde rstanding of the intention of the pa rties in enter ing the ag ree d order does not constitute g rounds t o alter it to incorporate t hings it excludes. The ag ree d order does not ba r M c Al lis te r' s c la im. T h e o rd er o f the trial court is r ever sed and the matter is r emande d to the trial court for a de te rm inatio n o f t

he iss ue s r a ise d in

Mc Al lis te r' s mo tio n f

or e nf or c e me nt.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: May 14, 2008 Date D ecide d: J une 5, 2008