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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anant Kumar Tripati,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Corizon Incorporated, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-18-00066-TUC-RM

ORDER 

Pending before the Court are numerous miscellaneous motions. The Court 

addresses below all motions filed in August and September 2019, as well as a Motion to 

Disqualify the Arizona Attorney General (Doc. 61) that the Court previously took under 

advisement (see Doc. 100 at 15). Any pending motions filed in or after October 2019 

will be resolved separately. 

I. Motion to Disqualify the Arizona Attorney General (Doc. 61)

Plaintiff moves for an order disqualifying the Arizona Attorney General. He avers 

that Jonathan Henry Schwartz (“Schwartz”) was his trial and sentencing judge and is 

currently a member of the Arizona Attorney General’s Office. Defendants Daniel 

Moreno (“Moreno”) and Jose Ramos (“Ramos”) filed a Response, confirming that 

Assistant Attorney General Schwartz presided over Plaintiff’s criminal case when he was 

a Maricopa County Superior Court Judge. (Doc. 72.) Defendants avow that Schwartz 

has been screened from this case. (Id.) Defendants later filed a Supplemental Response, 

asking the Court to deny Plaintiff’s Motion and providing a more detailed overview of 
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the applicable law and Defendants’ screening of Schwartz. (Doc. 76.)

Defendants attach to their Supplemental Response a declaration by Assistant 

Attorney General Paul Carter (“Carter”), who represents Defendants Moreno, Ramos, 

George Osler (“Osler”) and Glenn Schletter (“Schletter”) in this matter, as well as a 

declaration by Schwartz. (Doc. 76-1 at 2-4, 6-7.) In his declaration, Carter states that he 

has been assigned to defend Tripati v. Corizon, CV 13-615-TUC-DCB (“Corizon”) and 

Tripati v. Osler, CV 18-66-TUC-RM (“Osler”). Immediately upon his receipt of 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify the Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Carter confirmed 

that Schwartz sentenced Plaintiff to a term of imprisonment in State v. Tripati, CR1992-

008576 and CR1992-009620. (Id. at 2.) Upon confirming the conflict, Carter 

immediately contacted the Attorney General Office’s Ethics Counsel, who prepared a 

screening memorandum to all persons who have or potentially will have information 

concerning Corizon and Osler. (Id.) The screening memorandum, which was issued on 

April 18, 2019, instructed recipients not to discuss or convey information regarding 

Corizon or Osler to Schwartz or his immediate staff; required all files maintained in and 

related to Corizon or Osler to be prominently marked as screened from Schwartz; 

required that Schwartz’s access to electronic records concerning Corizon or Osler be 

restricted; and directed staff working with Schwartz not to communicate in any manner 

with him regarding Corizon or Osler. (Id. at 2-3.) Carter avers that physical and 

electronic Corizon and Osler files have been marked and restricted from Schwartz, in 

compliance with the screening memorandum. (Id. at 3.) He further avers that he has not 

disclosed material confidential information relating to Corizon or Osler to Schwartz and 

is unaware of anyone who has done so. (Id.) Finally, Carter promises that his office will 

respond promptly to any future written inquiries or objections by the parties or the Court 

regarding its screening procedure. (Id.)

Schwartz’s declaration confirms his conflict and avers that he knows nothing 

about Plaintiff’s two pending lawsuits other than what Plaintiff wrote in a July 2018 letter 

concerning Schwartz’s conflict. (Id. at 6.) Schwartz states that he is aware of his ethical 
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obligations to be screened from Plaintiff’s two pending lawsuits and that he intends to 

abide by the requirements of the Ethics Counsel’s screening memorandum. (Id. at 7.)

Plaintiff filed Replies (Docs. 77, 80) in which, among other things, he complains 

that privileged documents regarding Schwartz’s rulings and this case were seized from 

him; that his computer time has been restricted and he has been denied calls to counsel;

that Corizon canceled medical treatment and Plaintiff’s special-needs diet; that 

representation by the Arizona Attorney General creates an appearance of impropriety 

mandating disqualification; and that Ethics Rule 1.12 and Ethics Opinion 88-04 mandate 

disqualification. Plaintiff attaches his computer-use calendar, a restricted diet order, a 

letter he wrote to Carter, an inmate property/contraband receipt, newspaper articles, and 

an inmate request for paralegal assistance. (Docs. 77-1, 80-1.) In an Order dated July 

24, 2019, the Court took this Motion under advisement. (Doc. 100 at 15.)

The Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct provide that “a lawyer shall not 

represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally 

and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer . . . unless all parties to the 

proceeding give informed consent confirmed in writing.” E.R. 1.12(a). The merits of 

Plaintiff’s underlying criminal case before former Judge Schwartz are not at issue in the 

above-captioned matter, but there is no dispute that Schwartz is disqualified from 

representation in this matter. Schwartz’s disqualification is not directly in issue because 

he does not represent any party in this matter. Carter represents Defendants Osler, 

Moreno, Ramos, and Schletter, and thus the issue is whether Carter is disqualified from 

representation due to the disqualification of Schwartz, given that both attorneys now 

work for the Arizona Attorney General’s Office. Arizona Rule of Professional Conduct 

1.12(c) governs that issue:

If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which 

that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue 

representation in the matter unless:

(1) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any 

participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the 

fee therefrom; and

(2) written notice is promptly given to the parties and any 

appropriate tribunal to enable them to ascertain compliance 
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with the provisions of this Rule, including a description of the 

particular screening procedures adopted; when they were 

adopted; a statement by the personally disqualified lawyer 

and the new firm that the parties’ and tribunal’s material 

confidential information has not been disclosed or used in 

violation of the Rules; and an agreement by the new firm to 

respond promptly to any written inquiries or objections by the 

parties or the tribunal about the screening procedure; and

(3) the personally disqualified lawyer and the new firm 

reasonably believe that the steps taken to accomplish the 

screening of material confidential information will be 

effective in preventing such information from being disclosed 

to the new firm and its client.

E.R. 1.12(c).

Upon review of Defendants’ Response and Supplemental Response, and of the 

declarations of Carter and Schwartz, the Court is satisfied that the screening procedures 

put into place by the Arizona Attorney General’s Office comply with Arizona Rule of 

Professional Conduct 1.12(c). Therefore, although Schwartz is disqualified from 

undertaking representation in this matter, Carter is not disqualified from continuing his 

representation. Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied.

II. Motion to Hold ADOC in Contempt (Doc. 103), Motion Under General Order 

18-19 (Doc. 104), and Motion to Serve Schletter/Osler by Publication (Doc. 109)

On January 29, 2019, the Court directed the Arizona Department of Corrections

(“ADOC”) to provide the last-known addresses of Defendants Schletter and Osler. (Doc. 

41 at 15.) ADOC did not comply with the Court’s Order. In his Motion to Hold ADOC 

in Contempt, Plaintiff asks that the Court hold ADOC in contempt and, as a sanction, 

require ADOC to accept service and forward it to Defendants Schletter and Osler. (Doc. 

103.) In his Motion Under General Order 18-19, Plaintiff asks the Court to order the U.S. 

Marshal to serve a subpoena duces tecum on ADOC requesting the addresses of Schletter 

and Osler. (Doc. 104.) In his Motion to Serve Schletter/Osler by Publication, Plaintiff 

asks that the Court allow service by publication in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(e)(1) and Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(f), with the costs of such service to be taxed on ADOC. 

(Doc. 109.)

On August 13, 2019, non-party ADOC appeared specially to respond to Plaintiff’s 
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Motion to hold ADOC in contempt, indicating it did not receive the Court’s January 29, 

2019 Order. (Doc. 110.) On the same date, Defendants Osler and Schletter waived 

service. (Doc. 111.) On September 12, 2019, Defendants Osler and Schletter joined 

(Doc. 135) Defendants Moreno and Ramos’s Answer (Doc. 75) to Plaintiff’s Second 

Amended Complaint (Doc. 42). On August 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 117), 

which—albeit while continuing to assert allegations of impropriety against defense 

counsel—appears to concede that the issues raised in Plaintiff’s Motions are moot.

As Defendants Schletter and Osler have waived service and answered Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint, the Court will deny as moot Plaintiff’s Motion to Hold ADOC in 

Contempt (Doc. 103), his Motion Under General Order 18-19 (Doc. 104), and his Motion 

to Serve Schletter/Osler by Publication (Doc. 109).

III. Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 107), Motion for Leave to Take Telephonic 

Depositions (Doc. 126), and Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 139)

In an Order dated July 24, 2019, the Court addressed various motions, 

applications, and notices filed by Plaintiff. (Doc. 100.) In his Motion to Reconsider, 

Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider a portion of its July 24, 2019 Order contained on 

page 8, beginning at line 12. (Doc. 107.) In that portion of the Order, the Court denied 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Modify Rule 31 Procedures (Doc. 74) as moot because the Motion

did not appear to request any action on the part of the Court but, instead, appeared to be a 

discovery request that should have been served upon the opposing party rather than filed 

with the Court. (Doc. 100 at 8.)

In both his prior Motion to Modify Rule 31 Procedures (Doc. 74) and his currently 

pending Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 107), Plaintiff asks that particular witnesses—rather 

than opposing counsel—respond to written questions in lieu of oral depositions.1 In his 

 

1 Plaintiff argues that the court in Myers v. Andzel provided for the use in prisoner 

cases of written interrogatories in lieu of oral depositions. No. 06 Civ. 14420(RWS), 

2007 WL 3256879 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2007). Plaintiff is incorrect. In Myers, the court 

denied a prisoner-plaintiff’s motion for leave to take oral depositions of non-parties on 

the grounds that allowing the depositions “would negatively impact the discipline, 

morale, and effective functioning of the prison” and because the plaintiff was unable to 

obtain a proper transcription of the depositions and no authority requires the Government 

to pay for such costs. Id. at *1. The court further noted that interrogatories may not be 
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Motion for Leave to Take Telephonic Depositions, Plaintiff requests leave to conduct 

telephonic oral depositions due to defense counsel’s refusal “to respond to discovery—in 

accordance with judicially created exceptions in prisoner cases.” (Doc. 126 at 1 (citing 

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).

2

) Plaintiff indicates that the oral depositions can be 

recorded using a Voice Over IP account, which can be opened for about $100. (Id. at 11-

12.) Plaintiff does not indicate he would be able to pay for the Voice Over IP account.

On September 13, 2019, non-parties Borhuszewicz,3 Dossett, Erwin, and ADOC 

Custodian of Records filed a Motion for Protective Order, requesting an order pursuant to 

Rule 26(c) protecting them from having to appear for and respond to Plaintiff’s 

telephonic depositions. (Doc. 139.) Movants argue (1) that the Court’s Scheduling Order 

limits the parties to seeking discovery from other parties; (2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave 

to Take Telephonic Depositions fails to describe the information he seeks from the 

deponents, and the questions proposed in his prior Motion to Modify Rule 31 Procedures 

are irrelevant; and (3) Plaintiff has not identified an officer to prepare the record or 

transcripts of the requested depositions and has not shown that he has the financial ability 

to retain and compensate such an officer. (Id. at 5-6.)

Plaintiff filed a combined Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to Take 

Telephonic Depositions and Response to Motion for Protective Order. (Doc. 146.) 

Plaintiff argues that his proposed questions are relevant because Boschuweicz, Erwin,

and Dossett were all personally involved in instructing that Plaintiff’s legal mail be 

opened in his absence and that he be denied access to legal documents. (Id. at 3, 5, 7-8, 

11-13.)

Movants filed a Reply in support of their Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 153), 

arguing that Plaintiff has not shown that Movants possess any relevant information about 

 

used to obtain information from non-parties but that the plaintiff could serve subpoenas 

upon the non-parties pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. The 

court did not discuss or analyze Rule 31.

2 The Court is unable to locate any material in Turner that appears to support

Plaintiff’s Motion.

3 The filings by the non-party Movants and Plaintiff conflict in their spelling of this 

name.
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his claims, that this Court does not have authority to intervene until Plaintiff demonstrates 

that he attempted unsuccessfully to resolve his recent mail issues administratively before 

bringing them to the Court’s attention,4and that Plaintiff has acted frivolously and 

maliciously by propounding discovery requests on non-parties without first obtaining 

leave of Court to do so.

On September 16, 2019, Defendants Corizon, Glen Babich (“Babich”), and 

Charles Ryan (“Ryan”) filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Take 

Telephonic Depositions. (Doc. 140.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave 

to Take Telephonic Depositions is deficient because Plaintiff does not provide the names 

of the proposed deponents or information concerning what relevant information the 

proposed deponents may have concerning Plaintiff’s claims, that Plaintiff does not 

specify how he intends to secure the presence of the deponents, and that Plaintiff does not 

state how he plans to pay for a transcription of the telephonic depositions or arrange for 

an officer appointed or designated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28. (Id. at 1-2.) 

Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 147), arguing that he named the proposed deponents in his 

original Motion to Modify Rule 31 Procedures (Doc. 74). Plaintiff also complains in the 

Reply about the medical care provided to inmates by Corizon and about Corizon’s 

alleged concealment of evidence and alteration of records. (Doc. 147 at 3-14.)

Pursuant to Rules 33, 34, and 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party 

may serve interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission on any 

other party. The Court’s Scheduling Order contains numerical limits on the number of 

interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission that a party may 

serve. (Doc. 64 at 3.) However, contrary to the non-party Movants’ argument, the 

Scheduling Order does not limit discovery to parties. Under Rules 30 and 31 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may “depose any person”—whether or not a 

party—by oral or written questions; furthermore, under Rule 45, a subpoena may 

 

4 The Court notes that Defendants did not file a motion to dismiss asserting failure 

to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and the 

deadline for doing so has expired. (Doc. 64 at 3.)
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command a non-party to testify or produce documents, electronically stored information, 

or tangible things in that person’s possession. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

31(a)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(iii). Nothing in the Court’s Scheduling Order alters 

these provisions of Rules 30, 31, and 45. Accordingly, the Court rejects the non-party 

Movants’ argument that they need not appear for depositions merely because they are 

non-parties.

Absent certain exceptions not applicable here, a party may depose any person5 by 

written questions under Rule 31 without leave of Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 31(a)(1)-(2).

The Court previously denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Modify Rule 31 Procedures (Doc. 74) 

as moot because—despite its title—the Motion did not appear to request any action on 

the part of the Court. (Doc. 100 at 8.) Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration does not 

present any grounds for reconsidering the Court’s prior denial of that Motion. See LRCiv 

7.2(g)(1) (motions for reconsideration will ordinarily be denied “absent a showing of 

manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have been 

brought” to the Court’s “attention earlier with reasonable diligence”). However, to the 

extent that Plaintiff intended to request action on the part of the Court in his prior Motion 

to Modify Rule 31 Procedures, the Court alternatively finds that the prior Motion should 

be denied on the merits.

“At first glance, a deposition upon written questions may look like an inexpensive 

way for a prisoner to do discovery compared with a traditional deposition but it usually is 

not.” Picozzi v. Clark Cnty. Detention Ctr., No. 2:15-cv-00816-JCM-PAL, 2017 WL 

4678472, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 16, 2017). Although Rule 31 allows for parties to exchange 

written direct, cross, redirect, and recross questions for a witness, absent the parties’ 

stipulation to another procedure, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 29(a), an officer authorized under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28 must take the witness’s deposition at a scheduled date 

and time and then prepare and certify a record of the deposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 31(a)(5), 

(b). Accordingly, “[t]o obtain a deposition upon written questions, the prisoner is 

 

5

“A public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, or a governmental 

agency” may also be deposed by written questions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 31(a)(4).
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responsible to pay the witness fee, deposition officer fee, court reporter fee, and the cost 

of the deposition transcript.” Picozzi, 2017 WL 4678472, at *4. A plaintiff’s “indigent 

status does not entitle him to a waiver of [these] fees.” Id. (denying indigent plaintiff’s 

motion for deposition upon written questions where the plaintiff did not designate a 

deposition officer and had not shown he could pay any of the costs associated with 

written depositions); see also Masterson v. Campbell, No. CIV S-05-0192 JAM DAD P., 

2009 WL 2824754, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2009) (denying motion to take written 

depositions where plaintiff had “not shown that he is able and willing to procure the 

services of an officer that could administer the written deposition, certify [the witnesses’] 

responses, and prepare a record”).

Plaintiff has not identified a duly authorized deposition officer, nor has he 

designated a time and place for such an officer to take any witness’s deposition by 

written questions. Plaintiff has also failed to show that he can pay the costs associated 

with taking depositions under Rule 31. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff’s prior 

Motion to Modify Rule 31 Procedures (Doc. 74) and Plaintiff’s currently pending Motion 

for Reconsideration (Doc. 107) request leave of Court to take written depositions without 

complying with the procedures of Rule 31 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 

Court denies that request on the merits.

For similar reasons, the Court will also deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Take 

Telephonic Depositions (Doc. 126) and grant non-party Movants’ Motion for Protective 

Order (Doc. 139). Oral depositions under Rule 30 must be conducted before an officer 

authorized under Rule 28. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(5). Although the parties may stipulate to 

a deposition being taken before any person, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 29(a), the parties have not 

so stipulated in this case. Plaintiff has not identified a duly authorized officer to oversee 

the oral depositions that Plaintiff seeks to take, nor has he shown that he can pay the costs 

associated with such depositions.

IV. Motion for Leave to File Motion to Compel (Doc. 108)

In his Motion for Leave to File Motion to Compel (Doc. 108), Plaintiff requests 
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leave of Court to file a motion to compel against Defendants Corizon, Babich, and Ryan. 

Plaintiff indicates that these Defendants have refused to provide him with his medical 

records; emails concerning informal complaints concerning medical care submitted by 

Plaintiff to ADOC CO IIIs; emails from Corizon staff concerning Plaintiff’s medical 

care; directives to Corizon employees concerning prisoner healthcare; performance 

measures; records of training of Corizon employees who made decisions concerning 

Plaintiff’s medical care and any allegations and investigations against them for not 

following policies; false records and documents concerning alteration of medical records;

escalation lists kept by Corizon; other complaints similar to Plaintiff’s; charging orders;

privileged information given to Corizon by ADOC employees; and investigations of 

Plaintiff’s medical grievances by Corizon and ADOC. (Id.)

In Response, Defendants Corizon, Babich, and Ryan state that Plaintiff has 

arguably failed to attempt to resolve the parties’ discovery dispute without Court 

intervention because he has refused to narrow his discovery requests to render them 

proportional to the allegations at hand. (Doc. 118.) However, Defendants agree that a 

discovery motion or hearing “will likely be the only way to resolve the ongoing dispute” 

and accordingly have no opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Motion to 

Compel. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 120) and a notice of additional authority 

(Doc. 119).6

There being no objection by Defendants, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion 

for Leave to File Motion to Compel. (Doc. 108.) Any motion to compel filed by 

Plaintiff shall include as attachments copies of the specific discovery requests and 

responses that are in dispute.

. . . .

 

6 Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 120) argues that Defendants have waived all objections and 

the Court should summarily direct the production of the information listed in Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Leave to File Motion to Compel (Doc. 108). The Court reminds Plaintiff that 

his Motion for Leave to File Motion to Compel (Doc. 108) does not itself constitute a 

motion to compel, and thus Defendants had no obligation at this time to respond to the 

merits of Plaintiff’s discovery dispute arguments. Once Plaintiff files a motion to 

compel, and the motion becomes fully briefed, the Court will determine whether it is 

appropriate to direct production of any information at issue in the motion to compel. 
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V. Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 112) and Motion to 

Exceed Page Limit (Doc. 113)

In his Motion to Exceed Page Limit (Doc. 113), Plaintiff requests leave to exceed 

by three pages the presumptive page limit in his Motion for Leave to File Third Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 112). The Motion to Exceed Page Limit will be granted, and Plaintiff’s 

17-page Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 112) will be 

considered properly filed.7

Plaintiff avers in his Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint that he 

has deleted claims dismissed with prejudice, as directed by the Court. (Doc. 112 at 1.) 

Plaintiff lists the claims and defendants deleted and added in his proposed Third 

Amended Complaint (“TAC”) (lodged at Doc. 114), and he summarizes the allegations of 

the TAC. (Id. at 1-17.) Defendants Moreno and Ramos filed a Response (Doc. 123)

opposing Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to show 

that justice requires granting leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a Reply. (Doc. 131.)

The district court has discretion in determining whether to grant or deny leave to 

amend, Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), but leave should freely be given 

“when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In determining whether to grant 

leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2), the Court considers whether there has been “‘undue 

delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure 

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party 

by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.’” Eminence 

Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (quoting 

Foman, 371 U.S. at 182).

This is the fourth time that Plaintiff has sought to amend his Complaint. The 

Court denied Plaintiff’s first request to amend for failure to comply with LRCiv 3.4. 

 

7 Plaintiff previously filed a motion seeking leave to file a Third Amended 

Complaint (Docs. 47, 48), which this Court denied (Doc. 100 at 14). Nevertheless, the 

Court will adopt Plaintiff’s nomenclature and refer to the current proposed amended 

complaint as a proposed Third Amended Complaint.
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(Doc. 28 at 2-3, 7.) Although the Court later granted Plaintiff leave to file a Second 

Amended Complaint (“SAC”), it dismissed on screening the majority of claims raised in 

the SAC. (Doc. 41.) The only claims asserted in the SAC that remain pending are a 

portion of Count I and a portion of Count III. (Doc. 41 at 5-10.) Specifically, the Court 

ordered Babich to respond to the portion of Count I alleging deliberately indifferent 

medical care; ordered Corizon to respond to the portion of Count I alleging a policy and 

practice of delaying and denying treatment for inmates’ serious medical needs; and 

ordered Ryan to respond to the portion of Count I seeking declaratory and injunctive 

relief based on ADOC’s alleged policy of rewarding Corizon for providing 

constitutionally inadequate medical care. (Id. at 5-8.) The Court ordered Osler, 

Schletter, Ramos, and Moreno to respond to a portion of Count III alleging that they 

opened two pieces of legal mail from attorney Fred Romero. (Id. at 9.) The Court later 

denied Plaintiff leave to file a proposed Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. 100 at 14; see 

also Docs. 47, 48.)

Plaintiff’s currently pending Motion to Amend was filed within the deadline for 

moving to amend pleadings (see Doc. 100 at 16), and the Court accordingly does not find 

undue delay. However, the docket reflects potential bad-faith or dilatory motive on 

Plaintiff’s part. Plaintiff’s prolific filings evidence a tendency to re-hash previously 

litigated issues, to raise a plethora of far-ranging and oftentimes vague and disjointed

allegations against a multitude of individuals, and to ignore the limits that this Court’s 

screening orders have imposed on the scope of this litigation. Plaintiff’s proposed 28-

page TAC lists 55 defendants and raises claims that would greatly expand the scope of 

this litigation, thereby causing further delays and prejudicing the current defendants. 

Furthermore, it appears that granting leave to file the TAC would be futile, as most of the 

claims raised in the TAC would likely be dismissed on screening. The proposed TAC 

does not cure the deficiencies that led the Court to previously dismiss portions of Counts 

I and III, and the allegations supporting the remaining Counts raised in the proposed TAC 

are vague, conclusory, disjointed and, in some instances, duplicative of previously 
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litigated claims and/or indecipherable. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend will be denied.

VI. Motion for Leave to File Motion to Compel Against Ramos and Moreno (Doc. 

115)

Plaintiff seeks leave to file a Motion to Compel against Ramos and Moreno. (Doc. 

115.) In support of this request, Plaintiff summarizes numerous discovery requests and 

asserts in conclusory fashion that the requests seek relevant information. (Id. at 1-7.) 

Plaintiff also attaches a letter to him from defense counsel Carter, dated August 7, 2019. 

(Id. at 13-14.) In the letter, Carter states that Ramos and Moreno stand by their discovery 

responses and decline to amend or supplement them because the documents that Plaintiff 

seeks are irrelevant and a search for them would be disproportional to the needs of this 

case. (Id.)

Defendants Ramos and Moreno filed a Response (Doc. 124), arguing that 

Plaintiff’s Motion fails to comply with the discovery-dispute procedure outlined in this 

Court’s Scheduling Order because (1) Plaintiff fails to show that he made a sincere effort 

to resolve his conflict through personal consultation; (2) Plaintiff fails to specify the 

result of the parties’ personal consultation and the matters remaining in dispute; and (3) 

Plaintiff has sought discovery regarding matters irrelevant to his claims, demonstrating 

that he is pursuing this case frivolously, maliciously, and in bad faith. Plaintiff filed a 

Reply (Doc. 132), arguing that Carter advised him in no uncertain terms that he would 

not provide Plaintiff’s requested discovery.

The Court’s Scheduling Order provides:

The parties shall not file written discovery motions without leave of Court. 

In the event of a dispute over discovery matters, the parties must engage in 

personal consultation regarding the dispute and must make a sincere effort 

to resolve the conflict expeditiously. See LRCiv 7.2(j). If a discovery 

dispute cannot be resolved despite the party’s sincere efforts, either party 

may file a request for a telephonic conference or for permission to file a 

written discovery motion; such a request must specify the results of the 

parties’ personal consultation and the matter(s) remaining in dispute.

(Doc. 64 at 2-3.)

The Court finds that the August 7, 2019 letter attached in support of Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Compel sufficiently indicates that Plaintiff attempted to resolve the parties’ 
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discovery dispute through personal consultation prior to filing his Motion for Leave to 

File Motion to Compel. Given Defendants’ unequivocal refusal to amend or supplement 

their discovery responses, it does not appear that further attempts at resolving the parties’ 

dispute through personal consultation would be fruitful. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s 

summary of the discovery requests that he asserts Defendants refused to respond to is 

sufficient to satisfy the Scheduling Order’s requirement of specifying the results of the 

parties’ personal consultation and the matters remaining in dispute. Accordingly, the 

Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file a Motion to Compel against Ramos and Moreno. 

Plaintiff shall attach to the Motion to Compel copies of the specific discovery requests 

and responses at issue.

VII. Motion to Declare Indemnification of Ryan and ADOC Employees (Doc. 116)

In this Motion, Plaintiff argues that the Court should declare invalid

indemnification by Corizon, and indemnification of ADOC employees by ADOC,

because Plaintiff’s move to the East Unit was made in bad faith, maliciously, and as 

retaliation. (Doc. 116 at 4-8.) Defendants Corizon, Babich, and Ryan filed a Response 

(Doc. 122), which Defendants Moreno and Ramos joined (Doc. 125). Defendants argue

that Plaintiff’s request is unsupported and premature. (Doc. 122 at 1-2.) Plaintiff filed a 

Reply. (Doc. 133.)

The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s request is premature, as there 

has been no finding of liability or wrongdoing in this case and no award of damages. The 

Court also agrees with Defendants that the cases relied upon by Plaintiff, Trevino v. 

Gates, 99 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 1996), and Cornwell v. City of Riverside, 896 F.2d 398 (9th 

Cir. 1990), do not support Plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied.

VIII. Motion to Allow Search of Corizon and ADOC’s Computers (Doc. 127)

In this Motion, Plaintiff requests leave to search Corizon’s computers because 

“counsel for Corizon . . . cannot be trusted with providing the relevant evidence.” (Doc. 

127 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Corizon has a history of falsifying records, and that 

Corizon and Ryan have attempted to artificially limit discovery. (Id. at 2-3, 5.) Plaintiff 
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attaches excerpts of a brief filed in the Ninth Circuit case Parsons v. Ryan, No. 18-16368

and alleges that the excerpts should be judicially noticed. (Doc. 127 at 2; Doc. 127-1.)8

Defendants Corizon, Babich, and Ryan filed a Response opposing Plaintiff’s 

Motion. (Doc. 143.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations of falsification of 

medical records are unsupported and irrelevant to the claims remaining in this case. (Id.

at 1-2.) Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s requested relief is not proportional to the 

needs of this case and is “nothing more than an attempt to skirt the Court’s rules 

regarding discovery disputes.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff filed a Reply in support of his Motion, 

arguing that he asked Corizon’s attorney for the documents at issue in his Motion, that 

she refused to provide them, and that he should either be allowed to search Corizon’s 

computers or Corizon should be required to provide the requested information. (Doc. 

150.)

The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has not complied with the 

discovery-dispute procedures outlined in the Court’s Scheduling Order. (Doc. 64 at 2-3.) 

If Plaintiff believes that Corizon has not adequately responded to discovery requests, 

Plaintiff shall comply with the Court’s discovery-dispute procedures. Plaintiff’s Motion 

to Allow Search of Corizon and ADOC’s Computers will be denied.

IX. Motion to Modify Scheduling Order (Doc. 129)

In his Motion to Modify Scheduling Order filed on September 5, 2019, Plaintiff 

requests that discovery deadlines set forth in the Court’s Scheduling Order be extended 

by 180 days. (Doc. 129 at 10.)9 As support for this request, Plaintiff states that he 

received 8,000 pages of medical records on August 30, 2019 but was prevented from 

reviewing them; that he has filed two Motions for Leave to File Motions to Compel, a 

Motion to Take Oral Depositions, and a Motion to Allow Search of Corizon and ADOC’s 

computers; that two subpoenas served on the Arizona Medical Board and Arizona 

Nursing Board have not been responded to; that Plaintiff is awaiting an expert report 

 

8 The Court declines to judicially notice the excerpts, as Plaintiff has not shown that 

they are a proper subject of judicial notice. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

9 Plaintiff also requests an order shortening time, without specifying what deadline 

he seeks to shorten. (Id. at 10.)
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regarding falsification of medical records; and that Plaintiff has moved to file a TAC. 

(Id. at 1, 4-5.) Plaintiff also complains that he is being prevented from reviewing 

documents until after Betty Ullibarri reviews them and determines it is appropriate for 

him to review them; he requests that the Court order that Betty Ullibarri cannot determine 

what evidence he can review. (Id. at 6-10.) 

Defendants Moreno, Osler, Ramos, and Schletter filed a Response (Doc. 144), 

arguing that Plaintiff has not shown good cause for his requested 180-day extension. 

Defendants also complain that the Court’s Screening Order did not enforce the three 

strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) with respect to Plaintiff’s mail claim, as nothing 

in Plaintiff’s pleadings suggests he was placed in imminent danger of serious physical 

injury by the factual allegations underlying the mail claim. (Doc. 144 at 2-3.) 

Defendants ask the Court to deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Modify Scheduling Order and to 

order Plaintiff to show cause why his claims should not be dismissed based on his 

frivolous and malicious prosecution of this matter. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff filed a Reply. 

(Doc. 152.)

The Court previously granted a request by Plaintiff to extend deadlines set forth in 

the Court’s Scheduling Order. (Doc. 100 at 16.) The Court’s revised schedule set a 

September 16, 2019 deadline for disclosure of initial expert testimony; an October 7, 

2019 deadline for disclosure of witness lists; and a November 4, 2019 discovery deadline. 

(Id.) On October 15, 2019, the Court extended to November 13, 2019 the deadline for 

the Arizona Medical Board and Arizona State Board of Nursing to respond to Plaintiff’s 

subpoenas. (Doc. 164.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion fails to set forth good cause for extending 

the expert disclosure deadline; however, given the Arizona Medical Board and Arizona 

State Board of Nursing’s extended deadline for responding to Plaintiff’s subpoenas, and 

given that the Court in this Order is granting Plaintiff leave to file two Motions to 

Compel and granting issuance of one additional subpoena, the Court finds good cause to 

extend the discovery deadline and the deadline for disclosing witness lists. The Court 
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declines to extend these deadlines by the full 180 days requested by Plaintiff but will 

grant a 60-day extension. The Court will also grant a corresponding extension of the 

deadlines for filing dispositive motions and for filing the Joint Proposed Pretrial Order.

The Court declines to address Plaintiff’s allegations concerning Betty Ullibarri 

because those allegations are not properly raised in a Motion to Modify Scheduling 

Order. Likewise, the Court declines to address Defendants’ arguments concerning the 

Court’s Screening Order. If Defendants believed that the Court’s Screening Order was 

erroneous or that in forma pauperis status was improvidently granted, they could have 

filed a motion to dismiss seeking reconsideration of the Screening Order, or a motion to 

revoke in forma pauperis status. They did not do so. The Court also declines to address 

Defendants’ request that Plaintiff be ordered to show cause why his claims should not be 

dismissed for frivolous and malicious prosecution, as it is not proper to embed such a 

request in a response to a motion for extension of deadlines. If Defendants feel that 

Plaintiff’s conduct in this litigation is vexatious and warrants sanctions. they are free to

file an appropriate motion.

X. Emergency Application to Enjoin Ramos and Erwin (Doc. 130)

In his Emergency Application to Enjoin Ramos and Erwin, Plaintiff indicates that 

on September 3, 2019, Defendant Ramos—by Order of non-parties Erwin and others—

directed that Plaintiff’s medical records be seized, thereby frustrating this litigation. 

(Doc. 130.) Plaintiff attaches an inmate property/contraband receipt which appears to be 

dated September 3, 2019 and which indicates that medical records from a lawyer were 

seized from Plaintiff. (Doc. 130-1.) Defendants Moreno, Osler, Ramos, and Schletter 

filed a Response in opposition. (Doc. 145.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff provides no 

facts to support his Motion and that “the unverified hearsay statements he has provided 

fail to establish that he is entitled to the extraordinary remedy of an injunction.” (Id. at 1; 

see also id. at 4.) Defendants note that it is not clear from Plaintiff’s Motion which 

documents were allegedly seized, for what purpose they were seized, or how the alleged 

seizure is frustrating this litigation. (Id. at 1-2, 4.) Defendants also argue that Plaintiff 
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has not shown that he attempted to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking the 

Court’s intervention. (Id. at 2-4.) Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 151), arguing that he 

grieved this issue in A03033019 and he has no available administrative remedy; that 

Ramos directed CO II Negron to seize his medical records; and that Julia Erwin and 

Boschuweicz sent emails indicating a paralegal must review all legal documents for 

relevancy before Plaintiff is allowed to view them.

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” 

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). A plaintiff seeking a 

preliminary injunction must show (1) that it is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that it is 

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction, (3) that the 

balance of equities tips in its favor, and (4) that a preliminary injunction is in the public 

interest. Id. at 20.10 Although a nexus between the preliminary relief and ultimate relief 

sought is normally required, such a nexus is not necessary “where the preliminary relief 

is directed to the prisoner’s access to the Courts.” Prince v. Schriro, CV08-1299-PHXSRB, 2009 WL 1456648, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 22, 2009) (citing Diamontiney v. Borg, 918 

F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1990)).

The inmate property/contraband receipt attached to Plaintiff’s Motion indicates 

that medical records were seized from Plaintiff and thus provides some evidentiary 

support for Plaintiff’s Motion. Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion does not 

include any attached declarations or other documentary evidence addressing the seizure 

of medical records and whether it was directed by Ramos and Erwin. Defendants also do 

not address Plaintiff’s allegations that legal documents and discovery materials are being 

screened for relevancy before he is allowed to view them.

The Court will take Plaintiff’s Motion under advisement pending supplemental 

briefing. Within fourteen days of the date this Order is issued, Defendants shall file a 

 

10 The Court may grant injunctive relief only against the parties or their officers, 

agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, or persons in active concert with the parties or 

their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2). 

Erwin is not a party to this litigation, but it is unclear whether he acted in active concert 

with Ramos to seize Plaintiff’s medical records. 
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supplemental response—including attached declarations and other documentary evidence 

as appropriate—that addresses Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the seizure of medical 

records from Plaintiff on September 3, 2019 and the alleged screening of Plaintiff’s 

documents and discovery materials for relevancy. Plaintiff may file a supplemental reply 

within seven days of service of Defendants’ supplemental response.

XI. Motion to Modify Prior Order (Doc. 142)

In its Order dated July 24, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request for the 

issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to the Arizona Medical Board. (Doc. 100 at 9-11, 

15.) In his Motion to Modify, Plaintiff avers that counsel for the Arizona Medical Board 

advised him that Dr. David Robertson, Dr. Bonnie Goodman, and Dr. Aydjeji Cadele are 

licensed as osteopathic physicians, and that Plaintiff has learned that Dr. Christopher 

Johnson is also a D.O. (Doc. 142 at 1-2.) Accordingly, Plaintiff asks the Court to modify 

its prior Order to allow the issuance of a subpoena to the Arizona Board of Osteopathic 

Examiners. (Id. at 2; Doc. 142-2.)

Non-party Dr. David Robertson, D.O., filed a Response in opposition. (Doc. 154.) 

Dr. Robertson avers that he is employed on ADOC’s Health Services Monitoring Board 

as a Medical Program Monitor and that he has not provided medical care to any ADOC 

inmates for over seven years. (Id. at 1.) Dr. Robertson argues that Plaintiff’s Motion 

does not indicate what relevant information he believes Dr. Robertson’s Arizona Board 

of Osteopathic Examiners file contains, as Dr. Robertson’s professional record, 

credentials, and treatment of Plaintiff are not at issue in this case. (Id. at 2.) Dr. 

Robertson further opines that Plaintiff is on a fishing expedition and there is a high 

probability that Plaintiff wants the information contained in Dr. Robertson’s file in order 

to misuse it in the future. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 159), in which he states that he has never misused 

information and that his medical records show that in 2015, 2016, and 2017, Dr. 

Robertson by email directed Corizon to cancel orders as to Plaintiff.

The Court construes Plaintiff’s Motion to Modify Prior Order as an Application 
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for Issuance of Subpoena pursuant to General Order 18-19, which provides:

[A]ny self-represented litigant who wishes to serve a subpoena must file a 

motion with the Court for issuance of the subpoena. The motion must (1) be 

in writing, (2) attach a copy of the proposed subpoena, (3) set forth the 

name and address of the witness to be subpoenaed and the custodian and 

general nature of any documents requested, and (4) state with particularity 

the reasons for seeking the testimony and documents. The assigned judge 

shall determine whether the requested subpoena shall issue. Issuance of the 

subpoena shall not preclude any witness or person subpoenaed, or other 

interested party, from contesting the subpoena.

Gen. Order 18-19. Plaintiff’s Motion, when read in conjunction with his prior Motion 

(Doc. 84), sufficiently complies with General Order 18-19. Accordingly, the Court will 

grant the Motion. However, the Court notes that its granting of Plaintiff’s Motion does 

not preclude Dr. Robertson, any other witness or person subpoenaed, or any other 

interested party, from contesting the subpoena. Gen. Order 18-19.

XII. Motion to Declare DI 380/902 Unconstitutional (Doc. 148)

In this Motion, Plaintiff argues that ADOC’s Director’s Instruction 380, which 

outlines procedures for inmates’ use of tablets, and ADOC’s Department Order 902, 

which governs inmates’ court access, are unconstitutional on their face and as applied. 

(Doc. 148 at 4-5.) Plaintiff then complains that his CDs/DVDs are missing and that he is 

not permitted to view his medical records and discovery unless an ADOC paralegal 

determines the documents are relevant. (Id. at 5-6.) He requests an order declaring DI 

380 and DO 902 unconstitutional. (Id. at 12.) He also requests that he be allowed to 

download and access legal cases using a tablet; allowed access to other education sites on 

a tablet; and allowed to prepare, store, view, and print legal papers, research, and 

discovery on a tablet. (Id. at 12-13.)

Defendants filed a Response (Doc. 156), in which they argue that Plaintiff 

provides no evidence showing that Defendants have done anything according to an 

unconstitutional policy that has implicated Plaintiff’s right to court access in this case. 

Plaintiff filed a Reply. (Doc. 163.)

The constitutionality of DR 380 and DO 902 is not at issue in the claims pending 

in this case. To the extent that Plaintiff is alleging that documents are being screened for 
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relevancy before he is permitted to view them, this allegation is more appropriately 

addressed by way of the supplemental briefing that the Court has ordered on Plaintiff’s 

Emergency Application to Enjoin Ramos and Erwin (Doc. 130). The Court will deny 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Declare DI 380 and DO 902 unconstitutional. 

XIII. Motion to Enjoin Systematic Destruction of Records by ADOC (Doc. 149)

In this Motion, Plaintiff alleges that ADOC has a systematic policy of destroying 

records that it should know are customarily requested during the normal and ordinary 

course of litigation, and that this policy has prevented Plaintiff from obtaining documents 

sought during discovery in this case. (Doc. 149 at 1, 2-7.) Plaintiff seeks an order 

enjoining ADOC from destroying records that are customarily requested in litigation. 

(Id. at 7.) In support of his request, Plaintiff attaches a copy of the Arizona State Library, 

Archives, and Public Records Division’s general records retention schedule. (149-1.) 

Defendants Moreno, Osler, Ramos, and Schletter filed a Response (Doc. 157), 

arguing that this case has nothing to do with ADOC’s records retention policies, that 

ADOC is not a party in this litigation, that Plaintiff has failed to show that he complained 

to ADOC about the destruction of relevant records, and that Plaintiff has further failed to 

show that ADOC has destroyed any relevant records. Plaintiff filed a Reply. (Doc. 163.) 

Plaintiff attaches to his Reply an inmate grievance response dated July 26, 2016 

explaining that, due to limited storage space, the ADOC email system does not store 

emails for more than 104 calendar days. (Doc. 163-1.) Plaintiff also attaches a letter 

from Frederick Romero to Paul Carter; a witness list from Defendants Moreno, Osler, 

Ramos, and Schletter; and various responses to requests for production. (Doc. 163-1 at 

2-19.)

ADOC is not a party to this litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2). Furthermore, 

to the extent that Plaintiff is arguing that ADOC’s alleged destruction of records has 

prevented Plaintiff from receiving requested discovery in this case, Plaintiff has not 

followed the Court’s discovery-dispute procedures and does not clearly explain which 

discovery requests are at issue. The Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Enjoin
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Systematic Destruction of Records by ADOC.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify the Arizona Attorney General (Doc. 61) is 

denied.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Hold ADOC in Contempt (Doc. 103) is denied as 

moot.

3. Plaintiff’s Motion Under General Order 18-19 (Doc. 104) is denied as 

moot.

4. Plaintiff’s Motion to Serve Schletter/Osler by Publication (Doc. 109) is 

denied as moot.

5. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 107) is denied.

6. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Take Telephonic Depositions (Doc. 126) is 

denied.

7. Non-party Movants’ Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 139) is granted.

8. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Motion to Compel against Defendants 

Corizon Health, Inc., Glen Babich, and Charles Ryan (Doc. 108) is 

granted. Within fifteen (15) days of the date this Order is filed, Plaintiff 

may file a Motion to Compel against Defendants Corizon, Babich, and 

Ryan. Plaintiff shall attach to the Motion copies of the specific discovery 

requests and responses at issue.

9. Plaintiff’s Motion to Exceed Page Limit (Doc. 113) is granted. Plaintiff’s 

17-page Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 112) is 

considered properly filed.

10.Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 112) 

is denied. The Clerk of Court shall NOT file Plaintiff’s proposed Third 

Amended Complaint (lodged at Doc. 114).

11.Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Motion to Compel Against Defendants 

Ramos and Moreno (Doc. 115) is granted. Within fifteen (15) days of the 
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date this Order is filed, Plaintiff may file a Motion to Compel against 

Defendants Ramos and Moreno. Plaintiff shall attach to the Motion copies 

of the specific discovery requests and responses at issue.

12.Plaintiff’s Motion to Declare Indemnification of Ryan and ADOC 

Employees (Doc. 116) is denied.

13.Plaintiff’s Motion to Allow Search of Corizon and ADOC’s Computers 

(Doc. 127) is denied.

14.Plaintiff’s Motion to Modify Scheduling Order (Doc. 129) is partially 

granted and partially denied as follows:

A. Plaintiff’s Motion to extend the expert disclosure deadline is denied.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion to extend the witness-list disclosure and discovery 

deadlines is partially granted, as follows:

i. The deadline for disclosure of witness lists is extended to 

December 6, 2019.

ii. The discovery deadline is extended to January 3, 2020.

iii. The dispositive motion deadline is extended to February 3, 

2020.

iv. A Joint Proposed Pretrial Order shall be filed within thirty 

(30) days after resolution of the dispositive motions filed 

after the end of discovery or, if no such motions are filed, on 

or before February 15, 2020.

15.Plaintiff’s Emergency Application to Enjoin Ramos and Erwin (Doc. 130) 

is taken under advisement. Within fourteen (14) days of the date this 

Order is issued, Defendants shall file a supplemental response—including 

attached declarations and other documentary evidence as appropriate—that 

addresses Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the seizure of medical records 

from Plaintiff on September 3, 2019 and the screening of documents for 

relevancy. Plaintiff may file a supplemental reply within seven (7) days of 
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service of Defendants’ supplemental response.

16.Plaintiff’s Motion to Modify Prior Order (Doc. 142), which the Court

construes as an Application for Issuance of Subpoena pursuant to General 

Order 18-19, is granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to issue the 

subpoena appearing at Doc. 142-2, and the U.S. Marshal is directed to serve 

the subpoena.

17.Plaintiff’s Motion to Declare DI 380/902 Unconstitutional (Doc. 148) is

denied.

18.Plaintiff’s Motion to Enjoin Systematic Destruction of Records by ADOC 

(Doc. 149) is denied.

Dated this 15th day of November, 2019.