UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DARNELL BRANTLEY,

Petitioner,

v.

CATHERINE BAUMAN,

Respondent. 

/

Case Number: 2:09-CV-10129

HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner Darnell Brantley has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is incarcerated at the Baraga

Maximum Correctional Facility in Baraga, Michigan. In the petition, Petitioner

challenges his convictions for two counts of assault with intent to murder,

felonious assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. 

He claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that he was

denied his right to a jury trial. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies

the petition and denies a certificate of appealability.

I.

Petitioner’s convictions arise from two shooting incidents that occurred in

the City of Detroit on December 5, 2005. Nikka Adams testified that, on that date,

at about 6:00 p.m., she was at her home with her friend LaKeisha Laughlin and

2:09-cv-10129-GCS-VMM Doc # 9 Filed 04/07/11 Pg 1 of 13 Pg ID 464
2

Laughlin’s seven-year-old step-son Edward Robinson. An acquiantance she

knew as Deon stopped by her home to purchase a DVD player. While Deon was

in her home, Petitioner, Damon and Donta Marshal (who were brothers) came to

her home. They were on the front porch with Adams when Deon exited the

home. Petitioner and Damon began to beat Deon. A man from the neighborhood

came to the house and shot a rifle near the men. After firing six shots, the man

ran away, and Petitioner and the Marshal brothers also fled. 

At about 12:30 a.m., Adams saw Petitioner and the Marshal brothers

approach her house. Adams testified that the three men all pulled out handguns

and began shooting at her house. One of the bullets went into a dryer on her

porch, another broke her front window, and the third ended up in her kitchen. 

Adams ran inside. Damon Marshal asked her about the “crack head they had

just beat up.” Damon believed Deon was still in Adams’ home. Eventually, the

men left and Laughlin called the police.

Adams then walked to Petitioner’s grandmother’s house, where Petitioner

also lived. Petitioner was not home, but his grandmother and some others were

there. Adams testified that she told everyone about the shooting, including

Petitioner’s grandmother. When Adams left to return home, Petitioner ran up to

her and the two began arguing with Petitioner accusing Adams of lying about

whether the “crack head” was at her home. When Adams turned to walk away, 

Petitioner shot at her twice, missing both times. He then ran up behind her and

2:09-cv-10129-GCS-VMM Doc # 9 Filed 04/07/11 Pg 2 of 13 Pg ID 465
3

shot her in the back. Adams was hospitalized for six days. 

Laughlin testified that she witnessed Petitioner and the Marshal brothers

shoot at Adams’ home. Some time later, Laughlin heard gun shots and heard

Adams say that she had been shot. Laughlin saw Petitioner standing over

Adams. He then fled toward his grandmother’s house. 

II.

Following a bench trial in Wayne County Circuit Court, Petitioner was

convicted of two counts of assault with intent to murder, felonious assault, and

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On June 14, 2006, he

was sentenced to 125 to 180 months in prison for each of the assault convictions,

two to four years in prison for the felonious assault conviction, and a consecutive

two-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction.

Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals. He

raised these claims:

I. Was appellant denied the effective assistance of counsel where his

trial attorney failed to call a defense witness?

II. Was the appellant denied his constitutional right to a jury trial where

the record fails to demonstrate a voluntary and understanding waiver

of the right to jury trial?

Petitioner also filed a motion to remand for an evidentiary hearing on his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim pursuant to People v. Ginther, 390 Mich.

426 (1973).

2:09-cv-10129-GCS-VMM Doc # 9 Filed 04/07/11 Pg 3 of 13 Pg ID 466
4

The Michigan Court of Appeals denied the motion for remand and affirmed

Petitioner’s convictions. People v. Brantley, No. 271677 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 20,

2007).

Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme

Court, raising the same claims raised in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The

Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Brantley, 480 Mich.

1033 (Mich. Jan. 22, 2008).

Petitioner then filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The

petition raises the same claims presented in state court. 

III.

Petitioner’s claims are reviewed against the standards established by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110

Stat. 1214 (AEDPA). The AEDPA provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceedings. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

2:09-cv-10129-GCS-VMM Doc # 9 Filed 04/07/11 Pg 4 of 13 Pg ID 467
5

“A state court's decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it

‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court

cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from

[this] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam)

(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). “[T]he ‘unreasonable

application’ prong of the statute permits a federal habeas court to ‘grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme]

Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts’ of petitioner's case.” 

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). 

However, “[i]n order for a federal court find a state court's application of [Supreme

Court] precedent ‘unreasonable,’ the state court's decision must have been more

than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application must have been

‘objectively unreasonable.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see

also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. “A state court's determination that a claim lacks

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’

on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S.

__, 131 S. Ct. 770, 789 (2011), quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652,

664 (2004). “Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard

against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a

substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal. . . . As a condition for

2:09-cv-10129-GCS-VMM Doc # 9 Filed 04/07/11 Pg 5 of 13 Pg ID 468
6

obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the

state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-87

(internal quotation omitted). 

Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court's review to a determination

of whether the state court's decision comports with clearly established federal law

as determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its

decision. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Section 2254(d) “does not require

citation of [Supreme Court] cases – indeed, it does not even require awareness of

[Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

“[W]hile the principles of "clearly established law" are to be determined solely by

resort to Supreme Court rulings, the decisions of lower federal courts may be

instructive in assessing the reasonableness of a state court's resolution of an

issue.” Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2007), citing Williams v.

Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2003); Dickens v. Jones, 203 F. Supp. 2d

354, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2002).

Lastly, a federal habeas court must presume the correctness of state court

factual determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this

presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d

2:09-cv-10129-GCS-VMM Doc # 9 Filed 04/07/11 Pg 6 of 13 Pg ID 469
7

358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998).

IV.

A.

In his first claim for habeas relief, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel

was ineffective in failing to call his grandmother, Ceola Brantley, as a witness. 

He argues that Brantley would have impeached Adams’ testimony that, on the

night of the shooting, she spoke to Brantley about the shooting. 

The two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984), governs claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Towns v. Smith, 395

F.3d 251, 258 (6th Cir. 2005). To show a violation of the Sixth Amendment right

to effective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must establish that his attorney’s

performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. An attorney’s performance is deficient if

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id.

at 688. The defendant must show “that counsel made errors so serious that

counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the

Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must

be highly deferential.” Id. at 689. The Supreme Court has “declined to articulate

specific guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct and instead [has] emphasized

that the proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness

under prevailing professional norms.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521

2:09-cv-10129-GCS-VMM Doc # 9 Filed 04/07/11 Pg 7 of 13 Pg ID 470
8

(2003). 

An attorney’s deficient performance is prejudicial if “counsel’s errors were

so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show “a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. Unless the

petitioner demonstrates both deficient performance and prejudice, “it cannot be

said that the conviction [or sentence] resulted from a breakdown in the adversary

process that renders the result unreliable.” Id. at 687.

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.

Kentucky, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). 

[T]he Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest

‘intrusive post-trial inquiry’ threaten the integrity of the very adversary

process the right to counsel is meant to serve. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 689-90. Even under de novo review, the standard for judging

counsel’s representation is a most deferential one. Unlike a later

reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings,

knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the client,

with opposing counsel, and with the judge. . . . The question is

whether an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence

under ‘prevailing professional norms,’ not whether it deviated from

best practices or most common custom. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 

Establishing that a state court's application of Strickland was

unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The standards

created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both “highly deferential,” id.,

at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7,

2:09-cv-10129-GCS-VMM Doc # 9 Filed 04/07/11 Pg 8 of 13 Pg ID 471
9

117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), and when the two apply in

tandem, review is “doubly” so, Knowles, 556 U.S., at , 129 S.Ct.

at 1420. The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of

reasonable applications is substantial. 556 U.S., at , 129 S.Ct. at

1420. Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of

equating unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness

under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not

whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether

there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s

deferential standard.

Richter, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. at 788. 

The Michigan Court of Appeals, specifically citing the Strickland standard,

held that Petitioner failed to satisfy either prong of Strickland. The court

reasoned:

“Decisions regarding what evidence to present and whether to cal or

question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy.” 

People v. Rockey, 237 Mich. App. 74, 76; 601 N.W.2d 887 (1999). 

Likewise, decisions regarding how to cross-examine and impeach

witnesses are matters of trial strategy. In re Ayres, 239 Mich. App. 8,

23; 608 N.W. 2d 132 (1999). A defendant may establish ineffective

assistance of counsel based on defense counsel’s failure to call

witnesses only if the failure deprives the defendant of a substantial

defense, i.e., one that might have made a different in the outcome of

the trial. Id. at 22. But this Court will not find ineffective assistance

merely because a strategy backfires, or assess counsel’s

competence with the benefit of hindsight. . . . 

One of the victims, Nikki Adams, testified that after defendant and

two accomplices opened fire on her house, she went to defendant’s

house to speak to Brantley. Defendant contends that counsel should

have called Brantley to testify that although Adams came to her

house, she never spoke to Adams. However, defendant has not

shown that Brantley’s testimony was admissible. Whether Adams

spoke to Brantley at her home was not material to the issues to be

determined in this case, and the general rule is that extrinsic

evidence may not be used to impeach a witness on a collateral

2:09-cv-10129-GCS-VMM Doc # 9 Filed 04/07/11 Pg 9 of 13 Pg ID 472
10

matter. . . . Furthermore, Brantley’s proposed testimony would have

confirmed Adams’s testimony that she went to Brantley’s house. 

Thus, it was reasonable to decline to call Brantley to impeach Adams

on one point to avoid having her confirm Adams’s testimony on

another point. Additionally, it is not reasonably probable that

impeaching Adams’ testimony on this one minor point would have

affected the outcome of the trial in light of the other evidence

establishing defendant’s guilt. Accordingly, defendant has not shown

that counsel’s failure to call Brantley constituted error or deprived

him of a substantial defense. 

Brantley, slip op. at 2. 

Petitioner has failed to show that his attorney’s conduct was not reasonable

trial strategy. Brantley’s testimony would not have refuted any of the

incriminating testimony offered at trial. As noted by the court of appeals, the

Brantley’s testimony, instead, would have substantiated at least part of Adams’

testimony. Defense counsel’s decision not to call Petitioner’s grandmother to

testify was reasonable trial strategy. Moreover, Petitioner has failed to show any

prejudice resulted from counsel’s decision not to call Brantley. Accordingly, the

state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court precedent. 

B.

In his second claim, Petitioner argues that he did not validly waive his right

to a jury trial because the trial court failed to explain to him what a jury trial is. 

The right to a trial by jury is a fundamental right, a cornerstone of the

American system of criminal justice, which is enshrined in the Constitution. See

2:09-cv-10129-GCS-VMM Doc # 9 Filed 04/07/11 Pg 10 of 13 Pg ID 473
11

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). It is a right that may be waived, if

such waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276,

312-13 (1930). In Lott v. Coyle, 261 F.3d 594, 615 (6th Cir.2001), the Sixth

Circuit set forth the level of knowledge a defendant must have to validly waive a

right to a jury trial:

A waiver may be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent if the defendant

has a minimum amount of knowledge concerning his jury trial right

and the mental capacity to understand the implications of the waiver

of that right. See [United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 273 (6th

Cir.1983)]. Although a defendant need not have a detailed, technical

knowledge of this right, “[a] defendant is [deemed] sufficiently

informed to make an intelligent waiver if he was aware that a jury is

composed of 12 members of the community, [that] he may

participate in the selection of the jurors, [that] the verdict of the jury

must be unanimous, and that a judge alone will decide guilt or

innocence should he waive his jury trial right.” Id. at 273. We did

not, however, adopt a mandatory rule requiring trial courts to

interrogate defendants prior to accepting a jury trial waiver, but

instead, offered a “suggestion” that district courts personally inform

defendants of the “benefits and burdens of jury trials on the record

prior to accepting a proffered waiver.” Id. at 274.

Id. at 615. 

The Michigan Court of Appeals held that Petitioner’s waiver was knowing

and voluntary and that the trial court was not required to explain and ascertain

that Petitioner understood the meaning of a jury trial. Brantley, slip op. at 2. On

habeas review, the Court is “required to give a high measure of deference to the

state court’s findings concerning the jury waiver, which are supported by the

contemporaneous record in the case.” Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 371 (6th

2:09-cv-10129-GCS-VMM Doc # 9 Filed 04/07/11 Pg 11 of 13 Pg ID 474
12

Cir. 2002). “[T]here is no federal constitutional requirement that a court conduct

an on-the-record colloquy with the defendant prior to accepting the jury waiver.” 

Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 370 (6th Cir. 2002). 

Petitioner does not dispute that he executed a waiver form. The trial court

advised him of his constitutional right to a jury trial on the record and ascertained

that Petitioner was not waiving that right pursuant to any threats or promises. 

Although the colloquy was not complex, it is sufficient to establish a voluntary and

intelligent waiver. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is without merit and habeas relief

is denied. 

V.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not

proceed unless a certificate of appealability (COA) is issued under 28 U.S.C. §

2253. Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings now requires

that the Court “must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a

final order adverse to the applicant.” 

A COA may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). A

petitioner must show “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that

matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner

or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to

proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (citation omitted). 

2:09-cv-10129-GCS-VMM Doc # 9 Filed 04/07/11 Pg 12 of 13 Pg ID 475
13

In this case, the Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not debate the

conclusion that the petition fails to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief

should be granted. Therefore, the Court will deny a certificate of appealability.

VI.

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED and the matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED. 

Dated: April 7, 2011

S/George Caram Steeh 

GEORGE CARAM STEEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on

April 7, 2011, by electronic and/or ordinary mail and also to

Darnell Brantley at Baraga Maximum Facility, 13924 Wadaga

Road Baraga, MI 49908-9204.

S/Josephine Chaffee

Deputy Clerk

2:09-cv-10129-GCS-VMM Doc # 9 Filed 04/07/11 Pg 13 of 13 Pg ID 476