*

We granted the parties’ joint motion to waive oral argument.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(f); CIR. R. 34(f).  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted March 11, 2009*

Decided March 11, 2009

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No.  07‐3994

JERLENE HARRIS,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CITY COLLEGES OF CHICAGO, OLIVE

HARVEY COLLEGE,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 04 C 00695

Joan B. Gottschall,

Judge.

O R D E R

Jerlene Harris appeals the denial of her motion to reconsider a judgment enforcing a

settlement agreement with her former employer, the City Colleges of Chicago.  We affirm.

Harris worked as an adult educator for City Colleges for more than sixteen years.

She fell while on the job and injured her back, necessitating accommodations at work.  After

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07‐3994 Page 2

returning from medical leave in 2004, Harris received a letter from her supervisor telling her

not to return to work.  Later that month, she filed suit, claiming that City Colleges failed to

accommodate her disability and ultimately fired her on account of her disability in violation

of the Americans with Disabilities Act.  She also claimed that City Colleges retaliated

against her for filing with the EEOC a complaint against them while she was on medical

leave.  Finally, she claimed that City Colleges subjected her to a hostile work environment

and “converted” her personal property when they refused to return her belongings

following her termination.  

The district judge referred the case to a magistrate judge for discovery supervision

and possible settlement.  A settlement conference was eventually held, and the parties

apparently reached an oral agreement.  At the conference’s conclusion, the parties on the

record stated the terms of their agreement.  Under the agreement, Harris would receive a

cash amount and favorable letter of recommendation in exchange for her promise not to

reapply to work at City Colleges and her release of any and all claims against City Colleges.

Harris confirmed on the record that the terms the parties had recited were the ones to which

she agreed.  The magistrate judge reported that the case had settled, but the parties would

need time to memorialize their agreement in writing.  At some point later, however, Harris

began to have second thoughts about signing an agreement.  Over the next few weeks, she

expressed misgivings about certain provisions.  She asserted that, at the settlement

conference, she did not understand all the terms of the settlement and argued that the

settlement would negatively affect her retirement benefits.  After a hearing, the magistrate

judge concluded that the oral settlement should be enforced because the parties had reached

a valid agreement and Harris understood the relevant terms at the time.  

Harris filed objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation.  She asserted,

among other things, that her mental state on the day of the settlement conference was too

impaired to enter into an agreement; that the parties had not had a meeting of the minds as

to the written terms of the agreement; that some terms of the agreement made off the record

were not included among those recited on the record (such as an understanding that she

would receive a position with City Colleges if she were no longer disabled in the future);

and that the settlement would negatively affect her retirement benefits.  The district judge

overruled the objections, ordered that the oral settlement be enforced, and terminated the

case.   

Harris did not appeal and nearly a year later moved pro se to reconsider the

judgment.  She argued that the settlement should not be enforced because it included terms

that she did not understand, such as the bar against future employment, and because it did

not address her retirement benefits.  She also asserted that her attorney committed “fraud”

on the court by affixing her name at the end of court documents.  The district judge denied
No. 07‐3994 Page 3

Harris’s motion, finding that it was essentially an attempt to re‐litigate her case and thus

presented no valid basis for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

Harris appeals the denial of her motion for reconsideration.  She raises two new

theories of relief: she contends that the underlying judgment unconstitutionally infringes on

her right to contract and is therefore void under Rule 60(b)(4), and she argues that changed

circumstances (she claims now to be healthy enough to work) render the continued

enforcement of the settlement inequitable pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5).  Even construed

broadly, Harris’s motion to reconsider makes no mention of either theory, and arguments

raised for the first time on appeal are waived.  See Freeland v. Enodis Corp., 540 F.3d 721, 731

(7th Cir. 2008); Newkirk v. Vill. of Steger, 536 F.3d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 2008).  In any event, to the

extent these arguments target the settlement agreement itself, they should have been

brought in a direct appeal and not in a motion under Rule 60(b).  See Stoller v. Pure Fishing

Inc., 528 F.3d 478, 480 (7th Cir. 2008); Bell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 214 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir.

2000).

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.