J-S53015-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ROBERT L. MADISON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 220 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 13, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0100662-1977

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 05, 2019

Appellant, Robert L. Madison, appeals pro se from an order entered 

December 13, 2018, which dismissed his petition for collateral relief filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

We previously summarized the facts of this case as follows: 

On December 8, 1976, Appellant was in a luncheonette in 

Philadelphia[, Pennsylvania] when he and the owner had an 

altercation. Appellant left the establishment and returned with 

Tyrone Smith and a shotgun and killed the owner. On October 

25, 1977, he was found guilty of first[-]degree murder at a 

non[-]jury trial and subsequently was sentenced to life 

imprisonment. We affirmed [Appellant’s judgment of sentence] 

on October 26, 1979. Our Supreme Court denied further review 

on November 11, 1979. Appellant filed his first [collateral relief]

petition on February 19, 1986; relief was denied, and [thereafter,] 

we dismissed the appeal [] due to counsel’s failure to file a brief. 

In 1996, Appellant filed a second [collateral relief] petition and 

again[,] was denied relief. On September 12, 2002, Appellant 

filed [his third collateral relief] petition claiming the existence of 
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[a newly-discovered fact]. [On September 20, 2004, this Court 

affirmed the PCRA court’s dismissal order, holding that Appellant’s 

petition was untimely and failed to meet the newly-discovered fact 

exception to the PCRA’s time-bar]. 

Commonwealth v. Madison, __A.2d__, 2267 PHL 2003 (Pa. Super. 2004)

(unpublished memorandum), at 1-4 (citation omitted). 

Appellant filed his fourth PCRA petition on August 23, 2012. Appellant’s 

Fourth PCRA Petition, 8/23/12, at 1-20. He subsequently amended his 

petition on March 25, 2016. Appellant’s Amended PCRA Petition, 3/25/16, at 

1-10. On September 17, 2018, the PCRA court provided Appellant with notice 

that it intended to dismiss his PCRA petition in 20 days without holding a 

hearing, as the petition was untimely. PCRA Court Order, 9/17/18, at 1; see 

also Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition on 

December 13, 2018, and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.1 

Appellant presents one issue for our review:

[Whether Appellant satisfied the new rule of constitutional law 

exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement?] 

See generally Appellant’s Brief. 

The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions “is mandatory and 

jurisdictional in nature.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245, 1248 

(Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). “The question of whether a petition is timely 

raises a question of law. Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our 

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1 The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
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standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.” 

Commonwealth v. Hudson, 156 A.3d 1194, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal 

denied, 170 A.3d 1007 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). 

A PCRA petition is timely if it is “filed within one year of the date the 

judgment [of sentence] becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1). “[A] 

judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the 

review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(3). Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence 

became final on February 9, 1980, 90 days after the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court denied allocatur and the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the 

United States Supreme Court elapsed. See U.S.Sup.Ct. Rule 13. Hence, 

Appellant’s petition is manifestly untimely. Therefore, unless one of the 

statutory exceptions to the time-bar applies, no court may exercise 

jurisdiction to consider this petition.

Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b), there are three statutory exceptions 

to the timeliness provision that allow for very limited circumstances under 

which the late filing of a PCRA petition will be excused. To invoke an 

exception, a petition must allege and prove one of the following: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
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(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). If an exception applies, a PCRA petition 

may be considered if it is filed “within 60 days of the date the claim could have 

been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).2 “The petitioner bears the 

burden to plead and prove an applicable statutory exception.” Hudson, 156 

A.3d at 1197. 

Herein, Appellant attempts to invoke the new constitutional right

exception by arguing that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), which made the holding 

in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) retroactive, warrants relief. 

Specifically, he argues that, even though he was 20-years-old at the time he 

committed the murder, per Miller, his “brain was not fully formed” and 

therefore, his sentence of life-without-parole violates the Eighth and 

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2 Effective December 24, 2018, the legislature amended Section 9545(b)(2) 

to read: “Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1) shall 

be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.” See

42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b)(2) (effective December 24, 2018). However, the 

amendment to Section 9545(b)(2) only applies to “claims arising on 

[December] 24, 2017 or thereafter.” See id. at Comment. Appellant filed his 

current petition on March 25, 2016; thus, the amended Section 9545(b)(2) 

does not apply to Appellant’s claim.
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Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as Article 

1, § 13 of Pennsylvania’s Constitution. Appellant’s Brief at 6-17. We disagree. 

Previously, this Court explained that “Montgomery merely made Miller

retroactive for juvenile offenders whose judgments of sentence had already 

became final. It did not extend Miller's holding to those individuals who 

committed homicides after they reached the age of 18.” Commonwealth v. 

Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 366 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (citation 

omitted). Thus, pursuant to this rationale, we have consistently held that 

“age is the sole factor in determining whether Miller applies to overcome the 

PCRA time-bar” and have “decline[d] to extend its categorical holding.” 

Commonwealth v. Lee, 206 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc); see 

Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 91-94 (Pa. Super. 2016); 

Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa. Super. 2013) abrogation 

on other grounds recognized in Furgess, supra at 94. In this case, Appellant 

admits that he was 20 years old at the time of the murder. Appellant’s Brief 

at 10. Hence, Appellant failed to plead and prove the applicability of a new 

rule of constitutional law in this case. Because no exception to the PCRA's 

one-year time-bar applies, the PCRA court properly held that it lacked 

jurisdiction over the petition.

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/5/19