NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

GARY LANE EISENMANN, Appellant.

Nos. 1 CA-CR 17-0144; 1 CA-CR 17-0155 (Consolidated)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

Nos. CR2012-009381-001; CR14-001133-001 (Consolidated)

The Honorable Teresa A. Sanders, Judge

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Michelle L. Hogan, Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

The Law Office of Kyle T. Green, PLLC, Tempe

By Kyle T. Green

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 10-18-2018
STATE v. EISENMANN

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James P. Beene delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge 

James B. Morse Jr. and Chief Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

B E E N E, Judge:

¶1 The State obtained a 71-count indictment against Gary Lane 

Eisenmann (“Eisenmann”), alleging various felony offenses, including nine 

counts of misconduct involving weapons (“MIW”). The State later indicted 

Eisenmann on ten additional MIW counts. The superior court consolidated 

these cases, but severed the MIW counts from the other charges. After a 

jury convicted Eisenmann of all non-MIW counts, the 19 MIW charges 

proceeded to a bench trial, where Eisenmann was found guilty on all 

counts.

¶2 Eisenmann appeals his jury trial convictions for theft and 

theft of means of transportation, as well as taking the identity of another

and aggravated taking the identity of another, arguing that his convictions

violate his double jeopardy rights. Eisenman also timely filed an appeal in 

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Leon, 

104 Ariz. 297 (1969) following his bench trial convictions for 19 counts of 

MIW. In this consolidated appeal, for the following reasons, for 

Eisenmann’s appeal challenging the jury verdicts, we (1) merge together the 

counts for theft with the counts of theft of means of transportation, (2) 

vacate Eisenmann’s convictions and sentences for theft of means of 

transportation, (3) we merge together the counts for taking the identity of 

another with the count for aggravated taking the identity of another, (4) 

vacate Eisenmann’s convictions and sentences for the taking the identity of 

another counts, and (5) affirm his remaining convictions and sentences. For 

Eisenmann’s Anders appeal challenging the bench trial convictions, we 

affirm his convictions and sentences for the MIW charges.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 From May 2012 through August 2012, Eisenmann and his 

codefendant committed multiple burglaries at different residences. 

Eisenmann broke into these residences and stole property including guns,

credit cards, and vehicles. In one burglary, Eisenmann stole a Toyota 

Forerunner, and in a later burglary, he stole a 2008 Infiniti. Eisenmann gave 
STATE v. EISENMANN

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3

the stolen credit cards to his codefendant who then used them to purchase 

items in the respective victims’ names. During one of the burglaries,

Eisenmann stole a cellphone and used it to call a phone belonging to him. 

The police tracked this phone call, suspected Eisenmann of the burglaries, 

and surveilled him. On August 21, 2012, the police pulled over a vehicle in 

which Eisenmann was a passenger and arrested him.

¶4 After proceeding to a jury trial, and subsequent bench trial, 

Eisenmann was found guilty as charged on all counts. At sentencing, 

Eisenmann received multiple concurrent sentences, the longest of which 

was 25 years’ imprisonment. Eisenmann timely appealed. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 

-4033(A).

DISCUSSION

I. Eisenmann’s Challenges To The Jury Verdicts.

¶5 Eisenmann argues that his convictions for theft and theft of 

means of transportation, as well as his convictions for taking the identity of 

another and aggravated taking the identity of another, violated his double 

jeopardy rights. We analyze each argument in turn.

A. Standard of review.

¶6 “We review claims of double jeopardy de novo.” State v. 

Braidick, 231 Ariz. 357, 359, ¶ 6 (App. 2013). Because Eisenmann did not 

raise an objection on double jeopardy grounds below, we limit our review 

to fundamental error. State v. Price, 218 Ariz. 311, 313, ¶ 4 (App. 2008); State 

v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 19 (2005). “[D]ouble jeopardy principles 

prohibit convictions for both a greater offense and a lesser included offense, 

and a violation of double jeopardy is fundamental error.” Price, 218 Ariz.

at 313, ¶ 4. We review de novo whether an offense is considered a 

lesser-included offense. State v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, 448, ¶¶ 6-8 (2008).

B. Theft and theft of means of transportation.

¶7 Eisenmann argues that his charges for both theft and theft of 

means of transportation violated his double jeopardy rights. He argues that 

theft is a lesser-included offense of theft of means of transportation. 

Without deciding that issue, we conclude that Eisenmann’s double 

jeopardy rights were violated when he was convicted of theft involving the 

Forerunner and Infiniti under A.R.S. § 13-1802 as well as theft of means of 
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transportation of these same vehicles under A.R.S. § 13-1814, all based on 

the same acts by Eisenmann. “Although we do not search the record for 

fundamental error, we will not ignore it when we find it.” State v. Fernandez, 

216 Ariz. 545, 554, ¶ 32 (App. 2007).

¶8 “The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and 

Arizona Constitutions protect criminal defendants from multiple 

convictions and punishments for the same offense.” State v. Ortega, 220 

Ariz. 320, 323, ¶ 9 (App. 2008). “[W]here the same act or transaction 

constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be 

applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether 

each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Id. at 

323-24, ¶ 9 (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). 

“In other words, in order to avoid double jeopardy, it must be possible to 

violate one statute without violating the other.” State v. Cope, 241 Ariz. 323, 

325, ¶ 8 (App. 2016). “Distinct statutory provisions constitute the same 

offense if they are comprised of the same elements.” State v. Siddle, 202 Ariz. 

512, 516, ¶ 10 (App. 2002).

¶9 “The Blockburger same-elements test focuses on the statutory 

elements of the two crimes charged, not on the factual proof that is offered 

or relied upon to secure a conviction.” State v. Cook, 185 Ariz. 358, 361 (App. 

1995). In applying this test, “we need look only to the statutory elements of 

the offenses to see if each statute contains an element not contained in the 

other; we may not consider the particular facts of the case in making that 

determination.” Id. “But Blockburger does not preclude consideration of the 

offense as it has been charged in determining the elements of an offense and 

whether two offenses are the same.” Ortega, 220 Ariz. at 325, ¶ 14.

¶10 The relevant charges are found in Counts 11, 12, 34, and 35.1 

For Count 11, the State alleged that “[o]n or between July 11 and July 12, 

2012, [Eisenmann], without lawful authority, knowingly controlled 

[respective victim’s] television and/or Toyota Forerunner, of a value of 

$4000 or more but less than $25,000, knowing or having reason to know that 

the property was stolen[.]” For Count 12, the State alleged that “[o]n or 

between July 11 and July 12, 2012, [Eisenmann], without lawful authority, 

knowingly controlled [respective victim’s] TOYOTA FORERUNNER, a 

means of transportation, knowing or having reason to know that the 

property was stolen[.]”

 

1 We reference the numbered counts used in the amended indictment.
STATE v. EISENMANN

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¶11 For Count 34, the State alleged that “[o]n or between July 23, 

2012, and July 28, 2012, [Eisenmann], without lawful authority, knowingly 

controlled [respective victim’s] 2008 INFINITI, jewelry, cash, purse, clock, 

televisions and/or painting with a value of $25,000 or more but less than 

$100,000, knowing or having reason to know that the property was 

stolen[.]” For Count 35, the State alleged that “[o]n or between July 23, 2012, 

and July 28, 2012, [Eisenmann], without lawful authority, knowingly 

controlled [respective victim’s] 2008 Infiniti, a means of transportation, 

knowing or having reason to know that the property was stolen[.]” 

Eisenmann was convicted of each of these counts.

¶12 Using the Blockburger same-elements test to compare the 

elements of the charges for both theft and theft of means of transportation, 

each statute requires the State to prove that the defendant (1) without 

lawful authority, (2) knowingly controlled (3) either the property of another 

or another person’s means of transportation and (4) knew or had reason to 

know the property was stolen. A.R.S. §§ 13-1802(A)(5), -1814(A)(5). 

Property as defined in this statute may include a means of transportation. 

See State v. Garcia, 235 Ariz. 627, 631, ¶ 10 (App. 2014) (“There is no 

suggestion in this broad definition [under A.R.S. § 13-1801(A)(12)] that 

’property’ does not include a means of transportation.”). The only 

difference between the two crimes charged is that A.R.S. § 13-1802(G) 

requires proof of value of the property stolen to determine the felony 

classification while A.R.S. § 13-1814 does not. Therefore, because it would 

be impossible to violate A.R.S. § 13-1814 without also violating A.R.S. 

§ 13-1802, Eisenmann’s double jeopardy rights were violated when he was 

convicted and sentenced under Counts 11 and 12 and Counts 34 and 35. 

Cope, 241 Ariz. at 325, ¶ 8 (“[I]n order to avoid double jeopardy, it must be 

possible to violate one statute without violating the other.”).

¶13 We therefore merge Eisenmann’s convictions under Count 11 

and Count 12, vacate his sentence under Count 12, and affirm his sentence 

under Count 11. For these same reasons, we also merge his convictions 

under Count 34 and Count 35, vacate his sentence under Count 35, and 

affirm his sentence under Count 34.

C. Taking the identity of another and aggravated taking the 

identity of another.

¶14 Eisenmann next argues that the State violated his double 

jeopardy rights by charging him with taking the identity of another as well 

as aggravated taking the identity of another. Eisenmann notes that in 

Counts 21, 28, 44, and 55 of the indictment (alleging taking the identity of 
STATE v. EISENMANN

Decision of the Court

6

another), the State alleged that he “knowingly took, purchased, 

manufactured, recorded, possessed or used any personal identifying 

information . . . of [the respective victims], without consent, with the intent 

to obtain or use, the identity for any unlawful purpose or to cause loss to a 

person[.]”

¶15 Eisenmann also notes that the State alleged in Count 61 for 

aggravated taking the identity of another that he

knowingly took, purchased, manufactured, recorded, 

possessed or used any personal identifying information . . . of 

[the respective victims], three or more other persons . . .

including real or fictitious persons . . . without the consent of 

the other persons . . . with the intent to obtain or use the other 

persons’ . . . identities for any unlawful purpose or to cause 

loss to the persons . . . whether or not the persons . . . actually 

suffer any economic loss[.]

He argues that taking the identity of another is a lesser-included offense of 

aggravated taking the identity of another with the only additional 

requirement for the aggravated count being the need for “three or more 

persons[.]”

¶16 Here, Eisenmann’s convictions for both taking the identity of 

another and aggravated taking the identity of another constitute

fundamental error because taking the identity of another is a 

lesser-included offense of aggravated taking the identity of another. 

Counts 21, 28, 44, and 55 are based on A.R.S. § 13-2008, which is the lesserincluded offense of A.R.S. § 13-2009 and the basis for Count 61. Each

element of A.R.S. § 13-2008(A) is a constituent part of A.R.S. § 13-2009(A). 

The only additional factor under § 13-2009 is that the defendant committed 

taking the identity of another person with “three or more persons” as 

victims. See State v. Chabolla-Hinojosa, 192 Ariz. 360, 363, ¶¶ 11-12 (App. 

1998) (lesser-included offense is composed solely of some but not all the 

elements of the greater crime and is “always a constituent part of the greater 

offense”). Thus, Eisenmann’s double jeopardy rights were violated when 

he was convicted of the charges under Counts 21, 28, 44, and 55 (the 

lesser-included offenses), as well as Count 61 (the greater offense). See State 

v. Becerra, 231 Ariz. 200, 205, ¶ 20 (App. 2013) (“A defendant’s right not to 

be subjected to double jeopardy is violated if he is convicted of both a 

greater and lesser-included offense.”).
STATE v. EISENMANN

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¶17 Because Eisenmann’s convictions for both the greater and 

lesser-included offenses for taking the identity of another person violated 

his double jeopardy rights and resulted in fundamental error, we merge 

Counts 21, 28, 44, and 55 with his conviction under Count 61 and vacate the 

sentences for Counts 21, 28, 44, and 55. See Merlina v. Jejna, 208 Ariz. 1, 4 

n.4, ¶ 14 (App. 2004) (“The principal danger in multiplicity [—] that the 

defendant will be given multiple sentences for the same offense [—] can be 

remedied at any time by merging the convictions and permitting only a 

single sentence.”); see also A.R.S. § 13-4037(A).

D. Jury instructions.

2

¶18 Eisenmann also argues that the instruction for the definition 

of a dangerous offense was not properly submitted to the jury during the 

trial’s aggravation phase. “We review a trial court’s refusal to give a jury 

instruction for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 467, 

¶ 197 (2004). “We will reverse only if the instructions, taken together, 

would have misled the jurors. Where the law is adequately covered by 

instructions as a whole, no reversible error has occurred.” State v. Doerr, 

193 Ariz. 56, 65, ¶ 35 (1998) (citation omitted).

¶19 Eisenmann requested the jury instruction for the definition of 

a “dangerous offense” be given as defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(13), which 

states: “‘Dangerous offense’ means an offense involving the discharge, use 

or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, or 

the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury on another 

person.” Instead, the instruction given read as follows: “‘Dangerous 

offense’ means an offense that involved the discharge, use or threatening 

exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.”

¶20 Here, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

Eisenmann’s requested instruction of the full definition of dangerous 

offense under A.R.S. § 13-105(13). The State did not allege that Eisenmann 

had used any weapon to cause serious physical injury on another person. 

The court properly recognized this issue:

Dangerous offense means an offense involving the discharge, 

use, or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or 

 

2 In his Anders appeal, Eisenmann included a claim unrelated to the 

MIW counts. Because this issue deals with a non-MIW claim, we will 

address the jury instruction argument in this section of the decision.
STATE v. EISENMANN

Decision of the Court

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dangerous instrument, or the intentional or knowing

infliction of serious physical injury on another person.

I mean, that’s not applicable. There’s no allegation that you 

did that. There’s no allegation that you intentionally or 

knowingly inflicted serious physical injury on a person.

¶21 Including the phrase “or the intentional or knowing infliction 

of serious physical injury on another person” in the jury instructions would 

have been irrelevant and potentially confusing to the jury. State v. 

Musgrove, 223 Ariz. 164, 167, ¶ 6 (App. 2009) (“[A] court . . . should reject a 

‘proffered jury instruction that misstates the law or has the potential to 

mislead or confuse the jury.’”) (quoting State v. Rivera, 177 Ariz. 476, 479 

(App. 1994)). Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Eisenmann’s requested instruction.

II. Eisenmann’s Anders Claims.

¶22 For his convictions following the bench trial, counsel for 

Eisenmann has advised the court that, after searching the entire record, 

counsel has found no arguable question of law and asks this court to 

conduct an Anders review of the record. Eisenman was given the

opportunity to file a supplemental brief pro se and has done so. Eisenmann

raises several arguments in his supplemental pro se brief. We address each 

in turn.

A. Unlawful search.

¶23 Eisenmann first argues that the superior court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress evidence found through law enforcement’s 

request to search the phone records of one of the victims. He argues that 

he was an aggrieved person under A.R.S. § 13-3015(c) and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2518(10)(a)(iii). “We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress 

for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Peterson, 228 Ariz. 405, 407-08, ¶ 6 (App. 

2011).

¶24 Here, the superior court did not err in denying Eisenmann’s 

motion. In the minute entry regarding the motion, the court noted that 

Eisenmann

concedes in his motion that the request made by law 

enforcement, which ultimately led police to [his] phone 

number, was based on the victim’s stolen cell phone. Since 

law enforcement was using the victim’s phone number to 
STATE v. EISENMANN

Decision of the Court

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obtain information and [Eisenmann] did not own that phone 

or have any legal right to that phone, he has no standing to 

object to any information not properly or legally obtained.

¶25 We agree. Eisenmann does not have standing to raise a legal 

objection regarding the privacy rights of someone else’s phone. See State v. 

Gortarez, 141 Ariz. 254, 259 (1984) (“[W]e note that appellant has no 

standing to challenge the validity of tapes of telephone calls to which he 

was not a party.”).

¶26 Eisenmann also makes several arguments that an affidavit for 

a court-ordered wiretap, as well as an application for a wiretap, on the 

victim’s phone did not meet certain statutory requirements. The same legal 

reasoning applies to Eisenmann’s first argument: he has no standing to 

make legal arguments regarding the victim’s phone because he did not own 

that phone. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying his 

motion.

B. Search warrants.

¶27 Eisenmann next raises issues regarding the legal sufficiency 

of several of the search warrants issued in this case. He argues that search 

warrant 2012-008515 failed to particularly describe the place to be searched 

or to establish probable cause. He argues that search warrant 2012-007841 

also failed to establish probable cause. He further argues that the police 

unlawfully searched vehicles not described in a warrant. While Eisenmann 

asks us to review these issues de novo, Eisenmann already argued these 

issues in separate motions to suppress, and the superior court ruled on both 

motions. The correct standard of review for the court’s rulings on these 

motions to suppress is for an abuse of discretion. Peterson, 228 Ariz. at 

407-08, ¶ 6.

¶28 Here, we cannot consider Eisenmann’s arguments because he 

has failed to provide correct citations to the record sufficient to locate the 

specified search warrants. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.10(a)(7)(B) (requiring 

each argument to contain, “[f]or each issue, references to the record on 

appeal where the issue was raised and ruled on”). Eisenmann does not 

reference the record on appeal but instead references either the superior 

court docket or exhibits attached to his motions, both of which are 

insufficient records for our review. Therefore, we presume that the court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying these motions. See Phx. Airport 

Travelodge v. Dolgin, 12 Ariz. App. 358, 360 (1970) (“If . . . the partial record 
STATE v. EISENMANN

Decision of the Court

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i[s] insufficient to decide the issue, we will presume the trial court 

correct.”).

C. Sufficiency of the evidence.

¶29 Eisenmann next argues that there was not substantial 

evidence presented to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for his MIW 

convictions, Counts 1 through 19. Eisenmann notes that the allegations for 

these charges required that he “knowingly possessed” each firearm. He 

further notes that in Counts 1 through 10, as well as 19, others occupied the 

premises where the firearms were found, and in Counts 11-17, an 

accomplice was involved. Eisenmann argues that because no one 

witnessed him possessing these firearms, and others were either present or 

involved as an accomplice, the evidence was insufficient to prove that every 

element was met and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶30 The question of sufficiency of the evidence is one of law that 

we review de novo. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). “We review 

the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial only to determine whether 

substantial evidence supports the . . . verdict, viewing the facts in the light 

most favorable to sustaining the . . . verdict.” State v. Cox, 217 Ariz. 353, 357, 

¶ 22 (2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “[T]he relevant 

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Mathers, 165 

Ariz. 64, 66 (1990) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

¶31 To prove the MIW charges, the State had to prove that 

Eisenmann knowingly possessed a “deadly weapon” or “prohibited 

weapon” and was a prohibited possessor. A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4). “‘Deadly 

weapon’ means anything that is designed for lethal use. The term includes 

a firearm.” A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(1). “Prohibited possessor” means any 

person who has been convicted of a felony within or without the state. 

A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(7)(b). “‘Possess’ means knowingly to have physical 

possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over property.” 

A.R.S. § 13-105(34).

¶32 Here, the evidence was sufficient to support each of the MIW 

convictions. At the bench trial, Eisenmann was proven to be a convicted 

felon and had not filed to have his civil rights restored to possess a 

handgun. The State correctly noted that evidence established at the jury 

trial on the other counts indicated that the guns were found both in 

Eisenmann’s warehouse and the vehicle in which he was arrested, all 
STATE v. EISENMANN

Decision of the Court

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within Eisenmann’s dominion or control. The State then called two 

witnesses who testified that the firearms listed in the MIW charges were 

functional. Given the evidence produced at trial, we conclude that 

substantial evidence supports the superior court’s verdicts on these counts.

D. Multiplicity.

¶33 Eisenmann argues that Counts 2 through 10 of his MIW 

charges were multiplicitous. He contends that regardless of the number of 

firearms found in the warehouse, there is only one offense of felony 

possession, not multiple offenses unless it can be shown that the firearms 

were acquired at various times.

¶34 A charge is multiplicitous if it charges a single offense in 

multiple counts and thereby raises the potential for multiple punishments 

for a single act. State v. Brown, 217 Ariz. 617, 620, ¶ 7 (App. 2008) (citation 

omitted). Here, Counts 2 through 10 were not multiplicitous because the 

charges were not for a single act. Eisenmann was not charged and 

convicted under Counts 2 through 10 for a single offense of misconduct 

involving the same firearm. Each of the counts required proof that 

Eisenmann possessed distinct firearms at different times. Therefore, 

Counts 2 through 10 were not multiplicitous.

E. Sufficiency of indictment.

¶35 Eisenmann next argues that Counts 11 through 19 in the 

amended indictment failed to fairly inform him of the charges against him. 

Specifically, Eisenmann argues that these counts failed to describe or 

inform him as to which firearm he allegedly possessed on any given date. 

Eisenmann raised the same argument when he filed a motion to dismiss 

these charges, but the superior court denied the motion and found that it 

had no merit.

¶36 We review a superior court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for 

an abuse of discretion. State v. Martinez, 220 Ariz. 56, 58, ¶ 5 (App. 2008). 

Here, each of Counts 11 through 19 list specific dates in which the State 

alleged Eisenmann possessed a firearm. The indictment did not require the 

State to allege that Eisenmann possessed distinct firearms because the 

charges only required proof that Eisenmann possessed a firearm, a deadly 

weapon, on the respective dates alleged. Therefore, we find that the court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Eisenmann’s motion.
STATE v. EISENMANN

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CONCLUSION

¶37 For his convictions after the bench trial, this Court has read 

and considered the record and Eisenmann’s pro se supplemental brief, and

has searched the record provided for reversible error and has found none. 

See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300; State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999).

¶38 For the foregoing reasons, we (1) merge Eisenmann’s 

convictions under Count 11 and Count 12, vacate his sentence under Count 

12, and affirm his sentence under Count 11; (2) merge his convictions under 

Count 34 and Count 35, vacate his sentence under Count 35, and affirm his 

sentence under Count 34; (3) merge his convictions under Counts 21, 28, 44, 

and 55 for taking the identify of another with his conviction for aggravated 

taking the identity of another under Count 61, and affirm his sentence 

under Count 61; and (4) vacate his convictions and sentences under Counts 

21, 28, 44, and 55.

¶39 Upon the filing of this decision, defense counsel is directed to 

inform Eisenmann of the status of the appeal and of his future options. For 

his convictions after the bench trial, defense counsel has no further 

obligations unless, upon review, counsel identifies an issue appropriate for 

submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. See State 

v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85 (1984). Eisenman shall have 30 days from 

the date of this decision to proceed, if he desires, with a pro se motion for 

reconsideration or petition for review.