UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 TENTH CIRCUIT 

WILLIAM R. STEVENSON, 

Petitioner–Appellant, 

v. 

WARDEN RAE TIMME; JOHN 

SUTHERS, The Attorney General of the 

State of Colorado, 

Respondents–Appellees. 

No. 13-1147 

(D.C. No. 1:12-CV-02175-WJM) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

Before LUCERO, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

 William Stevenson, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of 

appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas 

petition. We deny a COA and dismiss the appeal. 

I

 In 2008, Stevenson was convicted in Colorado state court of aggravated robbery. 

 *

 This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, 

res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value 

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

August 27, 2013

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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He was sentenced to twenty-four years’ imprisonment. The Colorado Court of Appeals 

affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct review. Stevenson did not seek state postconviction relief. In a federal habeas petition, Stevenson asserted three claims: (1) his 

arrest was not supported by probable cause, rendering any evidence gathered subsequent 

to his arrest inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment; (2) his Miranda warning was 

inadequate; and (3) his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated. Stevenson 

later amended his application to include a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The 

district court concluded that Stevenson’s speedy trial and ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims had not been exhausted, and gave Stevenson an opportunity to withdraw 

those claims. After Stevenson elected to proceed only with claims one and two, the 

district court denied relief and declined to grant a COA. Stevenson now seeks a COA 

from this court.1

II 

A petitioner may not appeal the denial of habeas relief under § 2254 without a 

COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). We will grant a COA only if Stevenson shows “that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should 

 1

 The district court entered final judgment on March 12, 2013. Stevenson then had 

thirty days to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). He filed his notice of 

appeal on April 12, 2013—thirty-one days after judgment had been entered. However, 

under the prison mailbox rule, “a pro se prisoner’s notice of appeal will be considered 

timely if given to prison officials for mailing prior to the filing deadline.” Price v. 

Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 2005). The certificate of mailing attached to 

Stevenson’s notice of appeal was dated April 10, 2013, and thus his appeal is timely. 
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have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to 

deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000) (quotations omitted). To prevail on the merits, Stevenson must demonstrate that 

the state courts’ adjudication of his claims either “resulted in a decision that was based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented” or was 

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” 

§ 2254(d)(1), (2). Because Stevenson proceeds pro se, we construe his filings liberally; 

however, “we do not assume the role of advocate.” Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 

927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). 

On appeal, Stevenson claims that the district court erred in determining that he 

was provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in state 

court. “[A] state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground 

that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial” 

if “the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth 

Amendment claim.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (footnote omitted). 

“Opportunity for full and fair consideration includes, but is not limited to, the procedural 

opportunity to raise or otherwise present a Fourth Amendment claim,” a “full and fair 

evidentiary hearing,” and “at least colorable application of the correct Fourth Amendment 

constitutional standards.” Gamble v. Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1978) 

(quotation and footnote omitted). 

The state trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Stevenson’s motion to 
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suppress, during which the investigating detective and Stevenson were carefully 

questioned, before concluding that the arrest was lawful. And the Colorado Court of 

Appeals upheld that determination, colorably applying the correct standard for probable 

cause. Stevenson’s disagreement with the precedent applied and the conclusions reached 

by the state courts does not demonstrate an “unconscionable” breakdown in the state 

court proceedings. Id. at 1165 n.3. We agree with the district court that Stevenson had a 

full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in state court. See

Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1265 (10th Cir. 1999) (habeas relief barred 

because Fourth Amendment claims were adequately presented at trial and considered on 

direct appeal under appropriate Supreme Court precedent). 

Stevenson also argues that the district court failed to make its own factual 

determinations in evaluating the sufficiency of his Miranda warnings and improperly 

concluded those warnings were adequate. But under Supreme Court precedent, the 

“inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably convey to a suspect his rights as 

required by Miranda.” Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 60 (2010) (quotation and 

alterations omitted). The state courts reasonably concluded that that threshold was 

satisfied. The Colorado Court of Appeals rejected Stevenson’s Miranda claim based on 

credible testimony that Stevenson demonstrated willingness to speak with the 

investigating detective after his Miranda rights were recited to him at the time of his 

arrest and again at the police station. Both times, Stevenson knowingly and voluntarily 

waived his rights. See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1987) (setting forth 
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standard for knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights). 

Stevenson complains that the district court analyzed the state court decision rather 

than considering the facts and law independently. But the district court properly 

evaluated the state court’s adjudication of his claim against the applicable standard for 

habeas relief. See § 2254(d)(2). Stevenson failed to provide clear and convincing 

evidence to rebut the state courts’ factual determinations, and thus those determinations 

are presumed correct. See § 2254(e). For this reason, Stevenson’s final contention that 

he should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing also lacks merit. See Anderson v. 

Attorney Gen. of Kan., 425 F.3d 853, 859 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n evidentiary hearing is 

unnecessary if the claim can be resolved on the record.”). We are in substantial 

agreement with the reasoning of the district court and conclude that reasonable jurists 

could not debate its rulings. 

III

 For the foregoing reasons, we DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal. We 

GRANT Stevenson’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 

Entered for the Court 

 Carlos F. Lucero 

 Circuit Judge