1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3912041.4

BRUNST’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RULE 29 MOTION

Gary S. Lincenberg (admitted pro hac vice)

 glincenberg@birdmarella.com

Ariel A. Neuman (admitted pro hac vice)

 aneuman@birdmarella.com

Gopi K. Panchapakesan (admitted pro hac vice)

 gpanchapakesan@birdmarella.com

BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT, NESSIM,

DROOKS, LINCENBERG & RHOW, P.C.

1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor

Los Angeles, California 90067-2561

Telephone: (310) 201-2100

Facsimile: (310) 201-2110

Attorneys for Defendant John Brunst

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Michael Lacey, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:18-cr-00422-004-PHX-DJH

BRUNST’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 

RULE 29 MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2029 Filed 01/16/24 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3912041.4 i

BRUNST’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RULE 29 MOTION 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................... 1

II. ARGUMENT.............................................................................................................. 2

A. The Travel Act Conspiracy Conviction Rests on a Series of Inferences 

That Do Not Establish the Requisite Intent..................................................... 2

1. Purported Marketing Strategies............................................................ 2

2. Outside Scrutiny ................................................................................... 3

3. Banking and Credit Cards .................................................................... 3

4. Website Technologies .......................................................................... 4

B. The Government’s Key Concessions Require Dismissal of the Money 

Laundering Charges Against Brunst. .............................................................. 4

1. The Government Tacitly Concedes a Failure to Prove a 

Specified Unlawful Activity................................................................. 4

2. The Government Ignores the Purpose of the Transactions at 

Issue in the Concealment Money Laundering Counts (Counts 

53 to 62)................................................................................................ 6

3. The Government Failed to Prove that Loan Payments 

Promoted Travel Act Violations (Counts 64 to 68). ............................ 7

4. There Can be No Transactional Money Laundering Without an 

Underlying SUA (Counts 69-70, 78-84, and 86-93)............................ 9

5. No Rational Juror Could Find That Brunst Participated in 

a Money Laundering Conspiracy (Count 52)..................................... 10

III. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 11

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2029 Filed 01/16/24 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3912041.4 ii

BRUNST’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RULE 29 MOTION 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Brinegar v. United States

338 U.S. 160 (1949)....................................................................................................... 6

Ingram v. United States

360 U.S. 672 (1959)............................................................................................. 1, 2, 10

United States v. Jolivet

224 F.3d 902 (8th Cir. 2000).......................................................................................... 8

United States v. Montoya

945 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1991)........................................................................................ 8

United States v. Rutgard

116 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 1997).................................................................................... 5, 9

United States v. Sun

673 F. App'x 729 (9th Cir. 2016)................................................................................... 7

United States v. Wilkes

662 F.3d 524 (9th Cir. 2011).......................................................................................... 8

Statutes

18 U.S.C.

§ 1952....................................................................................................................passim

§§ 1961, et seq................................................................................................................ 5

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2029 Filed 01/16/24 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3912041.4 1

BRUNST’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RULE 29 MOTION 

I. INTRODUCTION

The Government impermissibly tries to draw inferences from general business 

meetings to support the Count One conviction. See Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 

680, (1959) (granting motions for acquittal as to conspiracy charge regarding evasion of 

taxes on lottery operations where Government’s approach involved “piling inference upon 

inference, thus fashioning a dragnet to draw in all substantive crimes”).1 Even when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, evidence that Brunst understood the

revenue implications of adult advertising, was aware of staffing increases, and conveyed to 

investors the pressures facing a challenged company does not establish that Brunst

conspired with Ferrer with the specific intent to foster the business enterprises of particular 

pimps or prostitutes. 

The existence of specified unlawful activity (“SUA”) is an essential element of each 

money laundering charge. The Government concedes that a Travel Act conspiracy is not 

an SUA under the applicable statutes. Further, the jury acquitted Brunst of the SUA 

charged in Counts 2-51 (substantive Travel Act violations), and the Government never 

introduced evidence of some other specified Travel Act violations that were tied to the 

charged wires. The Government simply avoids addressing the fact that, without SUA, 

there is no money laundering. Instead, the Government asks the Court to presume that 

because the charged transactions involved funds from Backpage, they must also have 

involved funds obtained from Travel Act violations. But there was no proof of that at trial. 

The Government had Ferrer make some broad assertions, but made no attempt at trial to 

show that all Backpage revenue was derived from Travel Act violations. Indeed, the

Government introduced evidence of the contrary. Accordingly, the money laundering 

counts all must be dismissed.

1 Unless otherwise noted, internal citations and quotation marks have been omitted.

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2029 Filed 01/16/24 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3912041.4 2

BRUNST’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RULE 29 MOTION 

II. ARGUMENT

A. The Travel Act Conspiracy Conviction Rests on a Series of Inferences 

That Do Not Establish the Requisite Intent. 

The Government’s best evidence falls woefully short of establishing an intent on 

Brunst’s part to enter into an agreement to violate the Travel Act. As the Supreme Court 

has repeatedly held: as to a criminal conspiracy charge, “[w]ithout the knowledge, the 

intent cannot exist. Furthermore, to establish the intent, the evidence of knowledge must 

be clear, not equivocal.” Ingram, 360 U.S. at 680 (emphasis added). As demonstrated by 

the Government’s own response, the evidence of Brunst’s knowledge in the context of the 

Travel Act conspiracy charge is, at best, equivocal.

1. Purported Marketing Strategies

The Government argues that Brunst “focused on growing escort advertising” and 

“knew the revenue implications,” e.g., through PowerPoint presentations. Dkt. 2019 at 2. 

But knowing the revenue implications of adult advertising generally is not the same as 

willfully entering into a criminal agreement to violate the Travel Act through the 

promotion of particular business enterprises involving prostitution. In terms of budget 

approval, Ferrer clarified that the only instance in which he recalled Brunst dealing with 

a specific line item was in the context of salaries. 09/27/23 PM Trial Tr. at 14:14-25. 

There was insufficient evidence that Brunst himself approved any kind of strategy that the 

Government claims was used by Ferrer to drive unlawful ads to the site. Indeed, the 

Government presented no evidence that Brunst—at any point during the alleged 14-year 

conspiracy—even viewed an adult ad (let alone a “prostitution” ad) on the Backpage site.

As to TER, there was no evidence that Brunst ever reviewed the TER site, had any 

knowledge about the content on the site, or interacted with any TER representatives. 

There also was no evidence that Brunst ever dealt with TER or signed any checks made 

out to TER. Jess Adams, who managed the accounting process with regard to TER, 

testified that it was Spear—not Brunst—who approved and signed the TER checks. 

10/10/23 PM Trial Tr. at 142:5-143:5. Further, the only substantive reference to TER 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2029 Filed 01/16/24 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3912041.4 3

BRUNST’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RULE 29 MOTION 

pertaining to Brunst is found in Exhibit 23 (p. 3), a lengthy budget plan presented by Ferrer 

that merely states “we struck a deal” with TER. In other words, there was no evidence that 

Brunst was involved in consummating, or approving of, any deal with TER.

With regard to moderation, the Government infers conduct on the part of Brunst as 

to which there was no supporting evidence. Ferrer testified generally that Brunst was part 

of an executive team that approved an “increase” in terms of “marketing staff and efforts”

(09/13/23 PM Tr. at 106-107), but did not testify about any corresponding discussions with 

Brunst about prostitution, moderation practices, coded language, or the like. And, of 

course, no other witness gave any incriminating testimony whatsoever about Brunst.

2. Outside Scrutiny

The Government argues guilt by innuendo. That Brunst was aware Backpage 

received subpoenas or conveyed to investors that various government officials were 

applying pressure on Backpage (Dkt. 2019 at 4-5) proves nothing. On the contrary, most 

major companies, including internet and social media companies like Google, Meta, X,

and TikTok, are regularly faced with these same types of challenges.2 

3. Banking and Credit Cards

At best, the evidence in this respect establishes that various financial institutions 

and credit card companies ceased doing business with Backpage for reputational reasons. 

Mickey Hansen of AmEx (the only credit card, bank, or processing company witness to 

testify) said as much. He was not concerned that AmEx was facilitating a prostitution 

business; he made clear that the concern was reputational. 10/12/23 AM Trial Tr. at 

20:16-21:2. No witness suggested that Brunst should have concluded otherwise. There 

was no testimony that any such institution made a determination Backpage was engaged in 

illegal conduct. Nor was there evidence that seeking credit card processing in Europe is 

illegal or indicative of criminal conduct. 

2 And as to the CNN piece, there is not a shred of evidence that Brunst discussed it with 

others or was involved in the response. The cited testimony only references Larkin and 

Spear. 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2029 Filed 01/16/24 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3912041.4 4

BRUNST’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RULE 29 MOTION 

Evidence regarding the use of Backpage affiliates for processing purposes, or the 

use of different billing descriptors, completely missed the mark. This is not a bank fraud 

case. And the Government made no attempt to show that any particular advertisement 

leading to an act of prostitution or to an alleged money laundering transaction involved the

use of a misleading billing descriptor to disguise the transaction. In other words, even if 

a rational juror could find the existence of an agreement to avoid the reputational concerns 

raised by financial institutions, there was no proof that any such agreement extended to the 

facilitation of particular business enterprises engaged in prostitution.

4. Website Technologies

The Government claims that using Website Technologies to bank with BMO, or to 

handle payroll or 401(k) payments, was not above board. But again, this is not a bank or 

tax fraud case—instead, the Government was required to show that Brunst was part of a 

criminal agreement to use Website Technologies to commit Travel Act violations. That 

critical connection between Website Technologies and a particular advertisement or 

prostitution business enterprise was never established.

B. The Government’s Key Concessions Require Dismissal of the Money 

Laundering Charges Against Brunst.

1. The Government Tacitly Concedes a Failure to Prove a Specified 

Unlawful Activity.

The central reason Brunst must be acquitted as to the money laundering counts is 

because the Government failed to prove the existence of any SUA, i.e., Travel Act 

violations, that the jury rationally could have found forms the basis for those counts. 

When the Government finally gets around to acknowledging this key gap in proof (Dkt. 

2019 at 12:22-26), it erroneously responds that the prior Court resolved the issue. But the 

prior Court in ruling on a motion to dismiss merely pointed to the mens rea requirement of 

concealment money laundering, as reflected in the second element of the Court’s jury 

instruction. Dkt. 946 at 17; Dkt. 1998 at 41 (“Second, the defendant knew that the 

property represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.”). The Government 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2029 Filed 01/16/24 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3912041.4 5

BRUNST’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RULE 29 MOTION 

ignores the first element of that crime, which requires that the defendant “conducted a 

financial transaction involving property that represented the proceeds of a violation or 

violations of the Travel Act.” Dkt. 1998 at 41 (emphasis added). The other charges have 

similar requirements. Dkt. 1998 at 44 (transactional money laundering requires that “the 

property was, in fact, derived from violations of the Travel Act.”); Mtn. at 21 (SUA 

required for money laundering conspiracy); Dkt. 1998 at 42 (requiring the “intent to 

promote a violation of the Travel Act” under a charge of promotional money laundering). 

The Government then claims that (1) Backpage “primarily derived its revenue from 

promotion of business enterprises that posted prostitution advertisements” and (2) the 

transactions at issue “included Backpage revenue.” Dkt. 2019 at 13:19-23. But there was 

no proof at trial that all Backpage revenue was presumptively derived from Travel Act 

violations. United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 1997) is instructive in this 

regard. There, in a case involving alleged fraudulent surgeries performed by a physician,

the Ninth Circuit reversed convictions as to transactional money laundering. In Rutgard, 

the Government premised its money laundering case on the notion that Rutgard’s “entire 

medical practice was an insurance fraud.” Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the Government 

failed to prove this theory of money laundering because: (1) it did not charge or prove that 

the subject medical practice “was a criminal enterprise of the kind condemned by RICO;” 

(2) “there are portions of Rutgard’s practice where no fraud was suggested;” and (3) “no 

fraud was shown on the counts” where the Court reversed. Id. at 1288-1289. 

Likewise, here, the Government (1) premised its money laundering case not on the 

source of funds tied to individual transactions, but on the generalized notion that all 

Backpage revenue was tainted and (2) did not charge or prove that Backpage itself was a 

criminal enterprise, such that all revenues it generated were illegally obtained. 

Specifically, as to the millions of ads posted on the site, it was established at trial that (a) 

Backpage hosted non-adult ads, (b) even experienced law enforcement officers could not 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2029 Filed 01/16/24 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3912041.4 6

BRUNST’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RULE 29 MOTION 

determine just from looking at an ad whether the ad related to prostitution,

3

and (c) not all 

adult ads posted on the site resulted in prostitution. See, e.g., 10/12/23 PM Trial Tr. at 

117:11-118-9 (Detective Murry testifying that he has never made an arrest based on an ad 

like Exhibit 218, which was tied to a substantive Travel Act count); 10/13/23 AM Tr. at 

89:6-11 (Detective Griffen testifying to the same); 09/26/23 PM Tr. at 94:18-96:1 (Ferrer 

testifying that certain terms in ads were suggestive of prostitution and that he was making 

an “educated guess”); 10/12/23 AM Trial Tr. at 97:6-98:22 (one of the subjects of the 

substantive counts testifying that in two instances, advertisements did not result in sex). 

There was simply no competent testimony at trial that would permit a rational juror to infer 

that every transfer of funds involving Backpage revenues necessarily resulted from a 

Travel Act violation. Such an inference not only would have been contrary to the 

evidence, but it also would have violated the Court’s instruction that the jury was to 

presume that Backpage’s publication of every ad was protected by the First Amendment 

unless and until the government proved that “each ad” “propose[d] an illegal transaction”

(Dkt. 1998 at 48:1-7), which necessarily turned on the content of each individual ad. The 

Government presented evidence about the content of only an infinitesimal percentage of 

the adult ads that ran on Backpage.com. 

2. The Government Ignores the Purpose of the Transactions at Issue 

in the Concealment Money Laundering Counts (Counts 53 to 62).

The Government tacitly concedes that, as Ferrer testified, payments from Website 

Technologies to Cereus Properties were loan payments in connection with the sale of 

Backpage. Nor does the Government dispute that the purpose of a given transaction must 

be to conceal in order to support the charge. But there was no evidence that the loan 

3 The law enforcement witnesses all testified that adult advertisements on Backpage did 

not provide probable cause to make arrests for prostitution. Probable cause requires “more 

than bare suspicion,” but is a low bar requiring only “facts and circumstances . . . sufficient 

in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been 

or is being committed.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2029 Filed 01/16/24 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3912041.4 7

BRUNST’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RULE 29 MOTION 

payments themselves were intended to conceal that the source of the payments was 

Backpage. Indeed, the sale and loan documents themselves reference the sale of Backpage

and were prepared with the involvement of lawyers and accountants who understood it was 

Backpage—not some “shell” company—being sold. See, e.g., Exh. 5427 (Loan 

Agreement referencing “Backpage US Operations” in the heading); 09/28/23 AM Trial. 

Tr. at 52:2-8 (Ferrer testifying that the accounting firm BDO set up the corporate structure 

of the sale of Backpage); Exh. 5364 (April 16, 2015, BDO document entitled “Backpage –

Restructuring and Sale of Business”). 

That the subject transactions involved Backpage proceeds is plainly insufficient to 

prove concealment. The Government’s own cases support this proposition, and that more 

is required. See, e.g., United States v. Sun, 673 F. App'x 729, 733 (9th Cir. 2016) (“From 

Sun’s statement to investigators that he deposited the proceeds into his personal account to 

avoid reporting them to the IRS, among other evidence, a rational jury could infer that 

Sun had the purpose to conceal their illegal nature or source.”) (emphasis added).

And even if a rational juror could believe that Website Technologies was 

established to get access to banking or credit card processing, that finding reflects dealings 

that are wholly separate from the specific loan payments from Ferrer to the sellers of 

Backpage charged in these counts. See 09/21/23 AM Trial Tr. at 61-62 (describing loan 

payments made from Ferrer to Cereus Properties, owned by certain of the Defendants); 

09/28/23 AM Tr. at 97:16-21 (Ferrer testifying that his CFO, Michael Gage, accounted for 

the wire transfers to Cereus Properties as Backpage sale loan payments); 09/21/23 PM 

Trial Tr. at 91:1-25 (Ferrer testifying that post-sale wire transfers to Cereus Properties 

were loan payments made by Website Technologies and Ad Tech B.V.).

3. The Government Failed to Prove that Loan Payments Promoted 

Travel Act Violations (Counts 64 to 68).

As to the promotional money laundering counts, the Government again ignores 

Ferrer’s uncontroverted testimony that the purpose of these transactions was for Ferrer to

make loan payments on the sale of Backpage. Loan payments out of Backpage to the 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2029 Filed 01/16/24 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3912041.4 8

BRUNST’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RULE 29 MOTION 

sellers of the company do not establish promotion. See United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 

524, 548 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Promotional money laundering is ‘different from traditional 

money laundering because the criminalized act is the reinvestment of illegal proceeds 

rather than the concealment of those proceeds.’”) (quoting United States v. Jolivet, 224 

F.3d 902, 909 (8th Cir. 2000)). There simply was no evidence that Brunst—who, as the 

CFO of Cereus Properties, collected on these loan payments—acted with the intent to 

promote Travel Act violations by doing so.

The Government takes issue with the notion that promotion requires the “plowing” 

of money back into an illegal enterprise—phrasing that the Government itself used during 

its closing argument. 10/27/23 AM Tr. at 26:5-13. But even under the cases cited by the 

Government, for there to be promotion, the transaction at issue must be required to carry 

out the alleged illegal scheme. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068, 1076 

(9th Cir. 1991) (“[D]epositing the check provided an opportunity for Montoya to carry out 

the illegal bribery by characterizing the funds as a legitimate honorarium.”) (emphasis 

added). Here, there was no evidence that loan payments tied to the sale of Backpage (1) 

resulted from Travel Act violations, (2) completed any Travel Act violations, or (3) were 

characterized as loan payments to promote Travel Act violations. Indeed, even if any such 

Travel Act violation occurred, it would have been completed prior to the later transfer of 

funds in connection with a loan payment. By the Government’s logic, if Ferrer had taken 

out a loan from a bank to pay for the purchase of Backpage, the bank’s mere receipt of 

loan payments would make it guilty of promotional money laundering.4 

4 The Government hangs its hat on the testimony of Quoc Thai that Cereus Properties 

was a “payroll company” for Backpage employees. But there was no evidence of that. 

The Government concedes that no fact witness—including Ferrer—testified to this effect. 

And the Government ignores that, as discussed in the Motion, a late-produced Backpage 

Investigation Report reviewed by Thai—and that Defendants never had an opportunity to 

use on cross-examination—contradicts Thai in this respect. Nor does the Government cite 

any cases supporting the notion that the payment of employee salaries establishes 

“promotion” under the statute.

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2029 Filed 01/16/24 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3912041.4 9

BRUNST’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RULE 29 MOTION 

4. There Can be No Transactional Money Laundering Without an 

Underlying SUA (Counts 69-70, 78-84, and 86-93).

The Government’s argument amounts to ipse dixit, stating without explanation that 

the funds wired in these transactions were “all derived from Travel Act violations” 

(Dkt. 2019 at 17:21-22), violations that the Government never even sought to prove. For 

this theory to work, every dime made by Backpage must not only have been tied to an ad

proposing an illegal transaction, but every dime also must have been tied to an ad intended 

by Ferrer or one of the Defendants to promote a business enterprise involved in 

prostitution. But there was no proof to that effect at trial; indeed, the Government never 

even made an effort to show the source of revenue tied to these transactions. The Ninth 

Circuit has rejected the general presumption the Government asks the Court to apply here

as to Backpage’s revenues (in Rutgard, a case with no First Amendment implications). 

See 116 F.3d at 1293 (“To create such a presumption in order to sustain a conviction under 

§ 1957 would be to multiply many times the power of that draconian law. It would be an 

essay in judicial lawmaking, not an application of the statute. As the government did not 

prove that any fraudulently-derived proceeds left the account on May 5 or May 6, 1992, 

the monetary transfer counts, Counts 216 and 217, were not proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt.”). Here, the Government also, in effect, asks the Court to reverse the presumption 

required by the First Amendment and to presume that all ads published by Backpage.com 

were unprotected, which the First Amendment does not allow. Mtn. at 14.

As to Counts 68-70 and 83-84, which reflect Lacey’s personal transactions, the 

Government obfuscates. None of these counts, as alleged in Indictment, concerns transfers 

from Cereus Properties. The charged transactions undisputedly concern only transfers 

from Lacey’s personal bank accounts to residential title companies for real property he 

purchased. That Brunst was a signatory on the Cereus Properties account is irrelevant; he 

was not a signatory on the subject Lacey accounts. The Government asserts that Lacey 

could not have transferred money between his personal accounts “without Brunst sending 

him the money.” Dkt. 2019 at 18. By the Government’s logic, every person or entity in 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2029 Filed 01/16/24 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3912041.4 10

BRUNST’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RULE 29 MOTION 

the chain of fund transfers preceding the charged transfer—from the ad poster, to the credit 

card company, to the processor, to the bank—would be guilty of transactional money 

laundering because Lacey could not have received the underlying funds but for their 

actions. The Government provides no support for this argument because there is none. 

Section 1957 instead focuses on the conducting of individual transactions above $10,000—

not the transfer or series of transfers preceding the subject transaction. 

5. No Rational Juror Could Find That Brunst Participated in 

a Money Laundering Conspiracy (Count 52).

As discussed in the Motion, the lack of an identifiable SUA is fatal to the 

conspiracy charge. As to the creation of Website Technologies, the Government failed to 

prove that any revenues that flowed through Website Technologies were tied to Travel Act 

violations, or that Brunst hid Website Technologies’ affiliation with Backpage for the 

purpose of concealing or promoting Travel Act violations. See, e.g., Exh. 885 (Brunst 

extensively disclosing to Bank of Montreal the ties between Backpage and Website 

Technologies). At a minimum, the evidence of Brunst’s knowledge in this respect was 

“equivocal”—i.e., that ties to Backpage were disclosed in payment processing and banking 

applications, but more could have been disclosed—which is insufficient to support 

a conspiracy charge. Ingram, 360 U.S. at 680; 09/27/23 PM Trial Tr. at 53:14 (Ferrer 

testifying, “We knew we couldn’t lie” on payment processing applications), 76:4-6 

(“Q. Were you concealing that Backpage was connected with this application? A. No, 

‘cuz my e-mail address has backpage.com in it.”). And, in any event, the only money 

laundering charges that involve Website Technologies reflect innocuous loan payments on 

the sale of Backpage (discussed above).

Nor does the Government point to even circumstantial evidence concerning 

a criminal agreement in this regard. The Government merely argues that “[w]ithout 

Brunst, Defendants could not have continued to reap the benefits of their criminal 

scheme.” Dkt. 2019 at 18. The Government speaks in generalities, when specifics are

necessary to sustain a conspiracy conviction.

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2029 Filed 01/16/24 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3912041.4 11

BRUNST’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RULE 29 MOTION 

III. CONCLUSION

Brunst respectfully requests that the Court grant his motion for acquittal, and 

reiterates his request to serve targeted interrogatories to jurors to support his objection to 

the Allen instruction.

DATED: January 16, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

Gary S. Lincenberg

Ariel A. Neuman

Gopi K. Panchapakesan

Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim,

Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C.

By: /s/ Gary S. Lincenberg

Gary S. Lincenberg

Attorneys for Defendant John Brunst

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2029 Filed 01/16/24 Page 14 of 14