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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DAWN MARIE BALL

Appellant No. 1909 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 11, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0000979-2010

BEFORE: BOWES, OTT, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 12, 2016

Appellant, Dawn Ball, appeals from the judgment of sentence1entered 

in the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas following her convictions for 

aggravated harassment by a prisoner,2simple assault,3and harassment.4 

Appellant contends the sentence violates her state and federal constitutional 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellant purported to appeal from the October 15, 2014 order denying 

her post-sentence motion. “However, when timely post-sentence motions 

are filed, an appeal properly lies from the judgment of sentence made final 

by the denial of post-sentence motions.” Commonwealth v. Kuykendall, 

2 A.3d 559, 560 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2010). Accordingly, we have amended the 

caption.

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2703.1.

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1).

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(1).
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rights and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction for 

simple assault. We affirm. We deny counsel’s application to withdraw 

without prejudice.

We adopt the recitation of facts and procedural history as set forth by 

the trial court. Trial Ct. Op., 7/7/15, at 1-3.5 On June 11, 2014, the court 

sentenced Appellant to nine to eighteen months’ imprisonment in a state 

correctional institution, consecutive to the one to eight year prison sentence 

she was already serving. On June 26, 2014, Appellant filed a post sentence 

motion requesting the court to “grant leave for Defense to file a Post 

Sentence Motion Nunc Pro Tunc.” Appellant’s Post Sentence Mot. Nunc Pro 

Tunc, 6/26/14 at 1 ¶6. On July 10, 2014, the court granted the motion to 

file post trial motion nunc pro tunc. The court denied the motion on October 

15, 2014. On October 16, 2014, the court denied additional issues Appellant 

raised pro se. This timely appeal followed. Appellant filed a court-ordered 

 

5

In its opinion and order denying Appellant’s post sentence motion the trial 

court noted

[b]y way of background, the charges were filed against 

[Appellant] on April 1, 2010. Reaching trial was a long and 

tortured process. The case has and continues to be 

complicated by [Appellant’s] institutional behaviors, [her] 

demands on counsel, [her] relationship with counsel, 

[Appellant’s] mistrust of counsel, [her] barrage of written 

correspondence to the [c]ourt, a plethora of motions 

relating in large part to representation of [A]ppellant, and 

the [c]ourt seeking information from appropriate 

professionals with respect to [Appellant’s] mental health.

Trial Ct. Op., 10/15/14, at 1.
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Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial 

court filed a responsive opinion.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Were the Appellant’s State and Federal Constitutional 

rights violated when she was sentenced to an aggregate 

term of state incarceration for less than a two (2) year 

sentence?

2. Was there significant evidence to support a conviction 

concerning “substantial pain” required for Simple Assault 

and was there a nexus between liquid at the prison and 

irritation in the eye?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

First, “Appellant argues that the sentencing Court has violated her 

constitutional rights in that the aggregation of her sentences is not 

applicable as the sentencing courts were separate sovereigns.” Id. at 11. 

In support of this contention, she avers that the first sentence of one to 

eight years was entered in Northampton County,6 while the instant 

contested sentence was imposed in Lycoming County. Id. at 13. Appellant 

concludes that she “should have been sentenced under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9761[7]and not 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9757.”8 Id.

 

6 CP-48-0000621-2007.

7 Section 9761 provides:

(b) Sentences imposed by other sovereigns.─If the 

defendant is at the time of sentencing subject to 

imprisonment under the authority of any other 

sovereign, the court may indicate that imprisonment 

under such other authority shall satisfy or be credited 
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against both the minimum and maximum time imposed 

under the court’s sentence. If the defendant is released by 

such other authority before the expiration of the minimum 

time imposed by the court, he shall be returned to a 

correctional institution of the Commonwealth to 

serve the time which remains of the sentence. If the 

defendant is released after the minimum time has elapsed, 

he shall be considered for parole on the same basis as a 

prisoner who has served his minimum time in a 

correctional institution of the Commonwealth. If the 

defendant is released after the maximum time imposed 

under the sentence of imprisonment he shall be deemed to 

have served his sentence.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9761(b) (emphasis added). 

8 We note that Appellant raised the following issue in her Rule 1925(b) 

statement:

[Appellant’s] constitutional rights under equal protection 

incorporated through the 14th Amendment of the U[.]S[.] 

Constitution were violated when the [c]ourt relied on 

Commonwealth vs. Tilghman, 543 Pa. 578 (1996) and 

Commonwealth v. Harris, 620 A.2d 1175 (Pa. Super 

1993) and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9761 in its order dated August 

1, 2014 . . . .

Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 1925(b) (emphasis added).

 

 Instantly, the trial court noted that Appellant did not raise this issue in 

her written or oral post sentence motions and “question(ed) whether this 

issue has been properly preserved for appellate review.” Trial Ct. Op., 

7/7/15, at 4. We note that Appellant is challenging the legality of her 

sentence. See Commonwealth v. Foster, 17 A.3d 332, 342 (Pa. 2011) 

(citing In re M.W., 725 A.2d 729, 731 (Pa. 1999) (holding when sentencing 

issue “centers upon a court’s statutory authority” to impose a sentence, 

rather than the “court’s exercise of discretion in fashioning” the sentence, 

the issue raised implicates the legality of the sentence imposed)); 

Commonwealth. v. Hall, 652 A.2d 858, 860 n.2 (Pa. 1995) (citation 

omitted) (“aggregating consecutive sentences is mandatory; since this is not 

discretionary with the trial court, this interpretation of 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 

9757 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine”)). Therefore, it is 
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Our review is governed by the following principles: “Issues relating to 

the legality of a sentence are questions of law[.] . . . Our standard of review 

over such questions is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” 

Commonwealth v. Fennell, 105 A.3d 13, 15 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 121 A.3d 494 (Pa. 2015).

Pennsylvania statutory law provides:

Whenever the court determines that a sentence 

should be served consecutively to one being then 

imposed by the court, or to one previously imposed, 

the court shall indicate the minimum sentence to be 

served for the total of all offenses with respect to 

which sentence is imposed. Such minimum shall not 

exceed one-half of the maximum sentence imposed.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9757. Our Commonwealth Court has 

interpreted this statute to mandate automatic aggregation 

of sentences once the trial court imposes a consecutive 

 

non-waivable. See Commonwealth v. Dickson, 918 A.2d 95, 99 (Pa. 

2007) (holding “if the sentence clearly implicates the legality of sentence, 

whether it was properly preserved below is of no moment, as a challenge to 

the legality of sentence cannot be waived.”).

Furthermore, we note that the trial court’s August 1st amended order 

provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

This sentence shall run consecutively to any and all 

sentences that [Appellant] is presently serving, including 

but not limited to the 1-8 year sentence imposed by 

Northampton County . . . . These sentences shall 

aggregate, making [Appellant’s] sentence in this case a 

state sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9757 . . . . Therefore,

[Appellant] shall remain incarcerated in a state correctional 

facility.

Amended Order, 8/1/14, at 2 (emphasis added).

 
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sentence. Gillespie v. Commonwealth Department of 

Corrections, [ ] 527 A.2d 1061, 1065 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 

1987) . . . . 

Commonwealth v. Harris, 620 A.2d 1175, 1179 (Pa. Super. 1993); see 

also Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 673 A.2d 898, 901-02 (Pa. 1996) 

(holding consecutive sentence should be aggregated pursuant to Section 

9757). “Section 9757, however, clearly by its terms, referring specifically to 

previously imposed sentences, applies to sentences imposed at different 

times by different courts.” Gillespie, 527 A.2d at 1066.9

Instantly, the trial court opined: “The court also notes that it did not 

rely on 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9761 in its order dated August 1, 2014; it relied on 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9757. . . . Where, as here, consecutive sentences were imposed 

by two courts of common pleas, the sentences aggregate as a matter of 

law.” Trial Ct. Op., 7/7/15, at 4.

Section 9757 is applicable in the instant case because Appellant was 

sentenced by two courts of common pleas, viz., Northampton County and 

Lycoming County. See Gillespie, 527 A.2d at 1066. Therefore, the 

sentences are aggregated. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9757; Tilghman, 673 A.2d at 

901-02, Harris, 620 A.2d at 1179; Gillespie, 527 A.2d at 1066.

Lastly, Appellant contends “the evidence at trial was insufficient to 

support [her] conviction for simple assault because no evidence was 

 

9 We note that “[a]lthough decisions of the Commonwealth Court are not 

binding on this Court, we may rely on them if we are persuaded by their 

reasoning.” NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc. v. PennMont Sec., 52 A.3d 296, 

320 (Pa. Super. 2012).
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presented the C.O. George’s eye pain constituted substantial pain.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant states: “Correctional Officer George 

testified that on December 7, 2009 she was working in the Restrictive 

Housing Unit. While passing [Appellant’s] cell, she was hit in the face with a 

liquid, which got in her eyes, nose and mouth.” Id. at 15 (citation to the 

record omitted and emphasis added). 

In support of her argument that the trial court erred in indicating that 

C.O. George testified she immediately felt irritation, Appellant notes that 

“the testimony at trial indicates that C.O. George sought medical treatment 

on December 7, 2009, 5 days later.”10 Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added). 

Appellant avers “[t]here was no indication or expert testimony at trial that 

the liquid caused the irritation.” Id. at 16. 

The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence is de novo, as it is a question of law. Commonwealth v. 

Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1235 (Pa. 2007).

[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a criminal conviction . . . does not 

require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the 

evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Instead, it must determine simply whether the 

evidence believed by the fact-finder was sufficient to 

support the verdict.

 * * *

 

10 We note that Appellant ostensibly refers to the incident which occurred on 

December 2, 2009, for which no medical treatment was required. 
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When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an 

appellate court must determine whether the evidence, and 

all reasonable inferences deducible from that, viewed in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict 

winner, are sufficient to establish all of the elements of the 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Id. at 1235-36, 1237 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The Pennsylvania Crimes code defines simple assault as follows:

(a) Offense defined.─ Except as provided under section 

2702 (relating to aggravated assault), a person is guilty of 

assault if he:

(1) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or 

recklessly causes bodily injury to another[.]

18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1). Bodily injury is defined as “impairment of physical 

condition or substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301 (emphasis added). “The 

Commonwealth need not establish that the victim actually suffered bodily 

injury; rather, it is sufficient to support a conviction if the Commonwealth 

establishes an attempt to inflict bodily injury. This intent may be shown by 

circumstances which reasonably suggest that a defendant intended to cause 

injury.” Commonwealth v. Richardson, 636 A.2d 1195, 1196 (Pa. Super. 

1994) (citation omitted). In Richardson, this Court found the evidence 

sufficient to support a conviction for simple assault where the defendant 

punched the police officer in the face which caused the officer “to suffer a 

sore jaw for a couple of days but did not require him to go to a hospital or to 

miss work.” Id.
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At trial, Corrections Officer Maurica George testified that on 

December 2, 2009 she was assigned to the RHU. N.T., 9/20/12, at 33. 

She handed out and collected meal trays from the inmates. Id. at 32. She 

testified, inter alia, as follows:

[The Commonwealth]: How are the meal trays given to the 

inmates in the RHU?

A: They’re wheeled in and you take a tray and you open 

the wicket and you hand a tray to the inmate.

Q: And then how do you collect the trays?

A: Do the reverse. You open the wicket and the inmate 

hands you the tray.

THE COURT: Can you tell the jury what a wicket is?

[The Commonwealth]: Your Honor, I will show a picture 

shortly.

THE COURT: All right.

 * * *

[The Commonwealth]: I’m going to show you a second 

photograph . . . . Does this appear to be an accurate 

portrayal of the wicket that would have been in 

[Appellant’s] cell door?

A: That is the food. It’s actually known as a food aperture 

but we just shorten it to wicket.

Q: And you would have handed her a tray through that 

opening?

A: Yes.

Q: And when you went to retrieve the tray what 

happened?
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A: [Appellant], appeared to me, handing me the tray. As I 

took the tray then she spit on me.

Q: Where did the spit hit you?

A: In the right portion of my shirt.

* * *

Q: . . . [W]ere you also working on December 7th?

A: Yes, I was.

Q: And during the afternoon did you hand out meal trays 

in the RHU?

A: Yes, I did.

Q: Did you attempt to hand [Appellant] a meal tray?

A: Attempted to.

Q: Would she accept it from your hand?

A: No. She stated, I’m not taking a tray from a nigger.

Q: Later that day did you collect meal trays from the 

neighboring [c]ells?

A: Yes, I did. I was at cell four[11]collecting that tray.

Q: What happened while you were near cell four?

A: Well, as I lift cell four, since December 2nd she spit on 

me I wasn’t taking a chance so I was walking around like 

this to go to cell six.

Q: You’re tracing an arc in front of the cell?

 

11 Appellant was in cell five. See N.T., 9/20/12, at 50, 165. The trial court 

noted that at times cell five is referred to as cell 1005. They are references 

to the same cell. Id. at 195-96.
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A: Yeah. It wasn’t a straight shot. I arced around to go to 

cell six to collect that tray, and about right here is where 

you I [sic] something hit me and it was liquid. And then it 

got into my eyes right here and got into my nose, my 

mouth. It drenched─it drenched the whole of my right 

side.

Q: Did you see where the liquid came from?

A: Yes.

Q: Where did [sic] come from?

A: It came from right there.

Q: Is there a crack in the door there?

A: Yes, there is.

Q: . . . What does this picture depict, if you can tell?

A: That’s the wicket, part of the wicket.

Q: And on the right side of the wicket does there appear to 

be a gap?

A: Yeah, there’s a gap like right [sic].

 * * *

Q: After the liquid struck you did you hear anything from 

[Appellant]?

A: Yes. She called me a nigger. She said . . . that she 

was going to kill me. She was banging on her door. She 

just continued to tirade. Most of it was that I was a 

nigger.

 * * *

Q: Did you experience any pain after the substance 

went in your eye?
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A: Yes. I was─it was burning. My eyes were irritated 

for quite a while and then I had some pain in the 

right eye.

Q: Did you seek any medical treatment?

A: Yes. I went to the infirmary first and then I went 

out to Muncy Valley where they took blood. They 

washed it out again and they evaluated my [sic] and 

gave me a shot.

Q: Did you miss any work?

A: Yes.

Q: How long did the pain last?

A: After I went back to work I still had pain.

Q: Did it last more than a day?

A: It lasted for more than a day. It lasted more than 

a week.

 * * *

[Appellant’s Counsel]: So what did you do immediately 

after you were struck?

A: Shock.

Q: . . . What did you physically do?

 * * *

A: I think my partner─I went over to my partner or my 

partner came over to me and he─I don’t remember what 

he said. And then I went up to the bubble because we 

couldn’t find the eye station.

 * * *

Q: What’s the bubble?
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 * * *

A: Our control center in the RHU has like a control center 

where the doors are all controlled there. You can’t get into 

a door without them letting you in or out, so I went up 

there because they had an eye station up there.

Q: By eye─what are you talking about when you say eye 

station?

A: When you get something in your eyes, when your eyes 

are burning you have to flush it out because you don’t 

want that irritant to damage your eye. So I had to go to 

where I knew there was a station.

Q: And did you flush your eye with the eye─

A: I flushed my eye upstairs, as well as the infirmary 

because it was still burning. And then at the hospital.

 * * *

Q: . . . Was your vision affected at all?

A: Yes.

N.T., 9/20/12, at 33, 35-36, 39-41, 43-45, 55-56, 60 (emphases added).

Corrections Officer Greg Pickering testified, inter alia, as follows:

[The Commonwealth]: Do you recall if you were working 

on December 7th 2009?

A: Yes. I was.

 * * *

Q: Do you recall being near Corrections Officer George that 

day?

A: Yes, I do.

Q: And where were you standing when you were close to 

her?
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A: I was in back of her.

Q: Where was she standing?

A: She was─we were─if I remember right, I think we were 

either collecting or giving out trays at that point. I was 

right behind her as we were helping out.

Q: Did you observe an incident involving Ms. George?

A: Yes.

Q: What did you see?

A: I witnessed an unknown substance, a liquid, come out 

of a cell door which was housing a certain person that’s 

here in the courtroom, and also witnessed some verbal 

exchange between [Appellant] toward Ms. George.

 * * *

Q: And did you see who was inside the cell the liquid came 

out of?

A: Yes. [Appellant] was inside.

Id. at 110-112.

Instantly, the record viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth reveals that Appellant attempted to cause, or intentionally, 

knowingly or recklessly caused, bodily injury to C.O. George. See 18 

Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1). After being stuck with the liquid in her eye, C.O. 

George experienced burning in her eyes, went to the hospital, missed work 

and had pain in her right eye for more than one week. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 

2301; Richardson, 636 A.2d at 1196. After careful consideration of the 

entire record, we hold the evidence believed by the jury was sufficient to 
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sustain a simple assault conviction. See Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 1235-36. 

Accordingly, having discerned no error of law, we affirm. See id. at 1235.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Application to Withdraw as Counsel 

denied without prejudice. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/12/2016