1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

October 28, 2014 Session

IN RE CONSERVATORSHIP OF DESSA L. MCQUINN

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hamilton County

No. 13-G-127 W. Frank Brown III, Chancellor

No. E2013-02790-COA-R3-CV-FILED-MARCH 30, 2015

Jacqueline D. Cameron filed a petition seeking to be named as conservator of her mother, 

Dessa L. McQuinn. After a hearing, the trial court declined to appoint Cameron 

conservator, finding that such an appointment was against McQuinn‟s wishes and best 

interest. Exercising the discretion provided it by Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-114 (Supp. 

2013), the trial court ordered Cameron to pay the fees and expenses of McQuinn‟s 

appointed guardian ad litem. The court also ordered Cameron to return all of McQuinn‟s 

personal property to her house, which property Cameron had earlier removed from 

McQuinn‟s house without authorization. Cameron appeals. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W.

MCCLARTY and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JJ., joined.

Jacqueline D. Cameron, Cartersville, Georgia, appellant, pro se. 

No appearance by or on behalf of appellee.

OPINION

 

I.

McQuinn was admitted to Erlanger Hospital in Chattanooga on July 15, 2013 for 

confusion and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). She was transferred on 

July 22, 2013, from Erlanger to The Bridge, a nursing home in Monteagle (the nursing 
2

home). Cameron filed a petition for appointment of a conservator for McQuinn on 

September 13, 2013. Her petition alleges as follows in pertinent part:

Upon information and belief, [McQuinn] is in need of the 

appointment of a Conservator because there has been some 

suspicious activity by Sara Ann Ford, . . . who currently has 

Power of Attorney for the Respondent . . . and because of 

Respondent‟s declining health and impaired cognitive skills, 

she needs more assistance with all activities of daily living, 

and she has senile dementia; and the need to have someone 

help manage her financial and medical affairs.

Further, your Petitioner is the Respondent‟s daughter, and she 

believes that her mother‟s best interests are not being met by 

the current Power of Attorney, that Sara Ann Ford is making 

statements to Respondent that are upsetting, and that your 

Petitioner believes that it would be in the Respondent‟s best 

interest that Sara Ann Ford be restrained from any contact 

with Respondent. Your Petitioner is willing and able to move 

back to Chattanooga, Tennessee to help her mother.

As a result of the Respondent‟s disability, it is believed that 

there are circumstances such as dementia and paranoia that 

. . . will likely result in substantial harm to the Respondent‟s 

health, safety or welfare and therefore, an Emergency 

Conservator should be appointed to make any immediate 

decisions necessary to insure Respondent‟s health and safety 

and to preserve her assets.

Attached to the petition was the sworn examination report of Dr. Jon Cohen, who 

examined McQuinn on July 19, 2013. Dr. Cohen‟s report states that McQuinn showed 

impaired cognitive function and poor memory, insight and understanding. It further notes 

that “her paranoid delusions pose a risk to others, potentially” and “she cannot reliably 

follow medical recommendations.” Dr. Cohen suggested that McQuinn should have a 

conservator appointed because of the “risk of severe health decline or death if not 

properly supervised.” His diagnosis was senile dementia, complicated by paranoid 

delusions, and he stated that McQuinn was “unlikely to show any significant 

improvement in the foreseeable future.” 

In her petition, Cameron asked the trial court to appoint a guardian ad litem for 

McQuinn; to void the general power of attorney executed by McQuinn to Sara Ann Ford 
3

on February 7, 2013; to issue a restraining order prohibiting Ford from having contact 

with McQuinn; and to appoint Cameron as conservator. On September 18, 2013, 

Cameron filed her affidavit alleging in pertinent part as follows:

That [McQuinn‟s] health has deteriorated considerably while 

residing [at the nursing home], and [she] has lost much 

weight;

That I have noticed a loss of weight from one week to 

another, and when I was at The Bridge Nursing Home this 

weekend to visit my mother, she had not been bathed, and 

was not eating.

* * *

That I have observed urine on the floors in the hall of the 

facility and have never seen any person cleaning the halls or 

the rooms at The Bridge when I have been there to visit.

That my mother is in a very weakened state and I am afraid 

that she will not survive if she has to continue to stay at The 

Bridge Nursing Home.

That my mother has told me that she is in a “prison” and 

wants to go back to the hospital where she was previously 

hospitalized.

That it is my intention to move my mother by ambulance at 

the very first opportunity in an effort to get her the medical 

help that she so desperately needs but cannot do so for 

herself.

The trial court entered an order on September 18, 2013, appointing Cameron as 

emergency conservator, attorney Rebecca Woods as McQuinn‟s guardian ad litem, and 

attorney Steve Tepley as McQuinn‟s attorney ad litem. 

On September 23, 2013, a status conference took place before the trial court. The 

trial court later entered an order providing in pertinent part as follows:

[P]resent before the court for a status conference were 

Stephen O. Tepley, Attorney ad litem for Dessa L. McQuinn, 
4

Mitchell Meeks, Attorney for [Cameron], Rebecca Siera 

Woods, Guardian ad litem, and Ronald Berke, long term 

attorney for [McQuinn] (present at the request of [McQuinn]).

Based upon the reports of the Attorney ad litem and the 

Guardian ad litem and statements of counsel, the court found 

that [McQuinn‟s] circumstances did not rise to the level 

necessitating the appointment of an emergency conservator at 

that time. [McQuinn‟s] health was stable; a valid Power of 

Attorney naming Sara Ford as agent was in place; and further 

[McQuinn] was able to communicate clearly to her attorneys 

that she did not want [Cameron] to serve as any form of 

conservator. At that time, [Cameron] was removed as 

Emergency [Conservator] for [McQuinn] and the Guardian ad 

litem was given medical decision-making authority.

Since September 30, 2013, there have been several incidences 

regarding [Cameron], including but not limited to [Cameron] 

failing to adhere to the request of the Guardian ad litem not to 

visit [McQuinn] until further notice resulting in [Cameron] 

and her guest disrupting [McQuinn‟s] placement at The 

Bridge at Monteagle Nursing Home and thus upsetting 

[McQuinn] causing her unnecessary stress. Further, although 

no wrongdoing has been found on her part, Sara Ford, the 

agent under the Power of Attorney, is hesitant to continue in 

her role due [to] the continued friction with [Cameron.] . . . 

Therefore, the court finds that the circumstances have 

escalated to the point where an Emergency Conservator is 

appropriate [and] it is hereby ORDERED that

1. Petitioner Jacqueline Cameron is hereby removed as 

Emergency Conservator for the Respondent;

2. Petitioner Jacqueline Cameron shall relinquish the 

Emergency Letters of Conservatorship previously issued to 

her by the Court . . . Further, Petitioner will relinquish to the 

Clerk & Master any documents or records in her possession 

regarding [McQuinn‟s] estate or healthcare as well as the key 

to [McQuinn‟s] home, said items will then be provided [to]

the successor Emergency Conservator;
5

3. Attorney Rebecca Siera Woods is appointed as successor 

Emergency Conservator for [McQuinn], subject to removal 

by the Court at any time[.]

On November 5, 2013, guardian ad litem/emergency conservator Woods filed her 

report with the trial court, stating as follows:

The Guardian ad litem interviewed McQuinn at The Bridge at 

Monteagle on Thursday, September 26, 2013. McQuinn was 

dressed for the day and headed out of her room to socialize 

with other residents upon the Guardian ad litem’s arrival. 

McQuinn was able to move herself from her wheelchair back 

onto her bed to sit comfortably for the meeting. She was 

vibrant and alert, in very good spirits and able to 

communicate clearly and effectively.

McQuinn is very spirited, but pleasantly so, which is contrary 

to some of the information previously provided to the 

Guardian ad litem and stated in her medical chart regarding 

negative behaviors. From the investigation, the only negative 

behavior exhibited by McQuinn occurs after McQuinn is 

upset by Petitioner, McQuinn‟s alleged daughter, Jacqueline 

Cameron; and then the behavior is similar to a teenager 

“acting out.” McQuinn does repeat her statements, and tends 

to drift in conversation from the specific topic at hand, but all 

around is able to express her opinion and let her feelings be 

known. Her short-term memory is not phenomenal; however, 

she is able to pull from her long term memory quite well.

McQuinn was able to clearly discuss the negative relationship 

between herself and Cameron, as well as her dislike of 

Cameron‟s acquaintance, Calvin Grey. She was able to 

explain why she asked Sara Ford to serve as her power of 

attorney, and why she did not want Cameron to serve in any 

capacity. McQuinn had only nice things to say about her 

placement at The Bridge at Monteagle. The Guardian ad litem 

did not observe any of the negative issues described by 

Cameron in her pleadings or communications with the 

Guardian ad litem.
6

(Underlining and italics in original; word “respondent” in original replaced with 

“McQuinn”; “petitioner” in original replaced with “Cameron.”)

On November 7, 2013, a full hearing took place before the trial court at the 

conference room of the nursing home. On November 15, 2013, the trial court entered an 

order appointing Jan Cloud, an agent for the Southeast Tennessee Development District, 

Public Guardian for the Elderly Program, conservator for McQuinn. The trial court 

approved the attorney ad litem‟s requested fees and expenses in the amount of $5,835.60 

and assessed them to McQuinn. The court approved the guardian ad litem‟s request for 

fees and expenses in the amount of $8,027.43, and assessed them to Cameron. The trial 

court also ordered Cameron to return all of McQuinn‟s personal property, which 

Cameron had removed from McQuinn‟s home and placed in a storage unit in Georgia. 

Cameron, acting pro se, timely filed a notice of appeal. 

II.

The issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred in ordering Cameron to pay 

the guardian ad litem‟s fees and expenses pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-114, and 

whether the trial court erred in ordering Cameron to return McQuinn‟s property to her 

residence.1

III.

Our review of this non-jury case is de novo upon the record of the proceedings 

below with a presumption of correctness as to the trial court‟s factual findings, a 

presumption we must honor unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). “When the resolution of an issue depends upon the credibility of 

witnesses, „[t]he weight, faith, and credit to be given to any witness‟s testimony lies in 

the first instance with the trier of fact, and the credibility accorded will be given great 

weight by the appellate court.‟ ” In re Conservatorship of Tate, No. M2010-01904-

COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 6935342 at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S., filed Dec. 29, 2011). We 

review the trial court‟s conclusions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. 

Oakes v. Oakes, 235 S.W.3d 152, 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). Issues involving statutory 

construction and application are questions of law reviewed de novo. In re 

Conservatorship of Thomas, No. W2012-00349-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 4550961 at *2 

(Tenn. Ct. App. W.S., filed Oct. 3, 2012). “„The allowance of attorney‟s fees is largely in 

the discretion of the trial court, and the appellate court will not interfere except upon a 

clear showing of abuse of that discretion.‟” In re Conservatorship of Lindsey, No. 

 

1 According to Cameron‟s brief, McQuinn died two days after the trial court entered its final 

judgment. Therefore, any other potential issues pertaining to McQuinn‟s conservatorship are moot.
7

W2011-00196-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 4120664 at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S., filed Sept. 

16, 2011) (quoting Taylor v. Fezell, 158 S.W.3d 352, 359 (Tenn. 2005)).

IV.

Five witnesses testified at the November 7, 2013 hearing at the nursing home: 

Cameron, McQuinn, McQuinn‟s nephew, Alphonso Pollard, and two employees of the 

nursing home, Eller Hall and Cheryl Green. The trial court entered a comprehensive 30-

page memorandum opinion and order one week later, containing extensive findings of 

fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found, in pertinent part, as follows regarding 

McQuinn‟s mental and physical condition:

The Sworn Medical certificate of Jon Cohen, M.D., a 

psychiatrist practicing in Chattanooga, provided the initial 

medical information in his Report. Dr. Cohen‟s certificate is 

considered as prima facie evidence as to Ms. McQuinn‟s 

disability and need for a conservator because the Report was 

not (a) contested or (b) found to be erroneous. Tennessee 

Code Annotated § 34-3-105(d)(Supp. 2013).

Trial Exhibit 2 was a copy of medical records in Ms. 

McQuinn‟s file at The Bridge. The records were generated as 

a result of a request by The Bridge for an evaluation of Ms. 

McQuinn‟s “decisional capacity.” Trial Exhibit 2 is a copy of 

a four page initial psychiatric review by Wayne Tasker and 

Associates. The evaluation occurred on October 8, 2013 at 

The Bridge. Ms. McQuinn‟s many diagnoses and 

medications were listed in the Report.

On October 8, 2013, Ms. McQuinn was evidently not having 

a good day. She was quite confused and disoriented. 

However, she exhibited no paranoia. The psychiatric 

diagnosis was vascular dementia with delusion. Dr. Andrew 

L. Spitznas made several recommendations in his Report.

The following is the first recommendation of four listed:

1. Recommend to Primary Care Physician the 

following: P[atient] clearly lacks decisional 

capacity to manage meds or finances, to make 

medical decisions, and to independently manage 
8

ADLs. I base this clinical judgment upon her 

inability to voice coherently her medical 

problems or a comprehension of necessary 

treatment. Her gross disorientation, lack of 

insight into her present medical problems, and 

grossly impaired executive function also render 

her unable to make informed decisions about 

her medical treatment, finances, or abilities to 

live independently. Her impaired concentration 

would also make it impossible for her to 

independently manage finances. . . . 

The final witness was Ms. [Cheryl] Green, a licensed 

practical nurse. . . . She has worked at The Bridge for over 

two years and has been the nurse manager of the west wing 

since February 19, 2013. 

Ms. Green read a long list of diagnoses that had been 

assigned to Ms. McQuinn, including but not limited to 

COPD, Asthma, Hypertension, coronary artery disease, 

diabetes II, hyperlipedemia, GERD, neuropathy and a history 

of thyroid cancer. She has also been diagnosed as having 

dementia with some associated paranoia. Ms. Green also read 

a long list of medicines to treat Ms. McQuinn‟s various 

illnesses, diseases and conditions. Most had previously been 

prescribed before Ms. McQuinn‟s admission to The Bridge. 

The only medicine for any mental issue was Seroquel. 

Supplements were added by The Bridge.

The majority of issues for Ms. McQuinn are physical and not 

mental. Her COPD taxes her strength. She uses oxygen as 

needed and receives breathing treatments. However, Ms. 

McQuinn does have intermittent confusion, sometimes lasting 

for a few minutes to hours. At times, Ms. McQuinn is very 

confused. Ms. McQuinn exercises choices, which are usually 

reasonable or rational. She can usually answer questions. She 

remembers staff names, rooms, and faces. Ms. Green did 

recite her first meeting with Ms. McQuinn. When Ms. Green 

entered the room, Ms. McQuinn was placing tooth paste on a 

round hairbrush so she could brush her teeth. One time Ms. 

McQuinn was walking down the hall without clothes.
9

. . . Ms. Cameron came on September 20, 2013 to remove Ms. 

McQuinn. Ms. McQuinn did not want to leave The Bridge. 

Ms. McQuinn made some negative comments about Ms. 

Cameron. Ms. McQuinn was upset. It was a wild day.

* * *

Ms. Green testified on cross-examination that, in her opinion, 

Ms. McQuinn needed medical assistance 24 hours a day, 365 

days a year. Ms. Green did not think one person could take 

care of Ms. McQuinn. She needed someone nearby at all 

times. Ms. McQuinn took many medications. It is necessary 

to give the correct medicines at the right time or Ms. 

McQuinn could be harmed. Persons at Erlanger Hospital also 

told Ms. Cameron that Ms. McQuinn needed 24x7 assistance 

when she was there in July of 2013.

Ms. Green agreed with the doctors that Ms. McQuinn‟s 

dementia (and paranoia or paranoid ideation) did affect her 

ability to make major decision[s] even though, emotionally, 

Ms. McQuinn knows what she feels and what she wants. Ms. 

Green explained that Ms. McQuinn was very emotional when 

she was placed at The Bridge. She initially did not have a 

good rapport with the staff or anyone. However, over time, 

Ms. McQuinn has developed trust and made friends. Ms. 

McQuinn is strong-willed and still thinks she can do many of 

the things she used to do. She does not understand her 

physical limitations.

The court finds that Ms. McQuinn is partially disabled due to 

her dementia with paranoia. She also has significant physical 

limitations and medical conditions.

* * *

The guardian ad litem recommended an independent 

conservator, not Ms. Ford or Ms. Cameron. Therefore, the 

court finds that Ms. McQuinn does need a conservator 

appointed to assist and protect her.
10

As already stated, the trial court appointed an agent of the Southeast Tennessee 

Development District, Public Guardian for the Elderly Program as conservator. The trial 

court agreed with Cameron‟s position that “this case is not financially suitable for the 

appointment of an attorney as conservator.” The court explained its decision not to 

appoint Cameron as conservator as follows in pertinent part:

First, Ms. McQuinn does not want Ms. Cameron to be her 

conservator. Ms. McQuinn made that fact abundantly clear 

during the hearing on November 7, 2013. She had also earlier 

made the same statements to Ms. Green, Ms. Hall, Ms. 

Woods, the guardian ad litem, and Mr. Tepley, the attorney 

ad litem. Ms. McQuinn still has much of her mental faculties

and her wishes should be given weight and consideration.

Second, both Ms. Green and Ms. Hall testified that Ms. 

McQuinn was visibly upset when Ms. Cameron visited her at 

The Bridge. She even “acted out” the next day or so after

such visits. It was also mentioned that Ms. McQuinn was 

having nausea and upset stomach during the time Ms. 

Cameron was trying to remove Ms. McQuinn from The 

Bridge and at other visits. Ms. McQuinn lost weight. The 

same thing occurred prior to the hearing on November 7, 

2013. The evidence is that the strained relationship between 

Ms. Cameron and Ms. McQuinn results in changes in Ms. 

McQuinn‟s physical and mental conditions. Thus, Ms.

Cameron‟s appointment could worsen Ms. McQuinn‟s 

condition.

Third, Ms. McQuinn had stated to others that Ms. Cameron 

just wanted her stuff. At the hearing, Ms. McQuinn testified 

that some of Ms. Cameron‟s friends wanted her art collection. 

Ms. Cameron did get her stuff, or at least most of it. Ms. 

Cameron admitted she took most of the household goods, 

furniture, appliances and art collection on October 13, 2013. 

Ms. McQuinn was said to have had some really nice furniture 

and furnishings. Ms. Cameron had been removed as 

Emergency Conservator and knew of such before she

removed the household goods and furnishings. She did not 

ask anyone‟s permission. She just did it. Ms. Cameron 

testified that she had planned to return to her mother‟s home 
11

to get the rest of the stuff but was not able to do so because 

Ms. Woods changed the locks.

* * *

Further, it . . . strikes the court as odd or raises “red flags”

when a person, here Ms. Cameron, pleads the Fifth when she 

is asked the name and address of the storage facility where 

the items are stored. She said in Cartersville, Georgia. She 

gave very little other information about such. One can also 

wonder why the personal property was moved to Cartersville, 

where Ms. Cameron and [her fiancée] live, instead of being 

stored in Chattanooga.

* * *

Initially, Ms. McQuinn was not happy at The Bridge. That 

feeling changed in time. She had made friends. She has 

activities. She and the staff appear to have bonded. She did

not want to leave the nursing home. She did not talk about 

her home or possessions. She seemed quite content where 

she was living. The court did not find true Ms. Cameron‟s

allegations that her mother was chemically restrained, over 

medicated, and subject to undue influence by staff as a way of 

damaging the mother-daughter relationship or keeping Ms.

McQuinn at The Bridge against her will.

Ms. Cameron and Mr. Gray live in Cartersville, Georgia, 

which is approximately halfway between his job in Dekalb 

County, Georgia and her job in Chattanooga. Ms. Cameron is

also a part-time student at Georgia Northwestern Technical 

College in Rock Spring, Georgia. Ms. Cameron said she 

would move in with her mother at her mother‟s home. Due to 

her job, she would have to have other people assist in caring 

for her mother. Ms. Green did not think such an arrangement 

was feasible due to Ms. McQuinn‟s medical and mental 

condition.

* * *
12

Ms. McQuinn said on several occasions that “I love Jackie

[Cameron].” However, she did not want Ms. Cameron to be 

her conservator. In the court‟s opinion, based upon the 

emotion with which Ms. McQuinn spoke, the appointment of 

Ms. Cameron as conservator would not be in Ms. McQuinn‟s 

best interest. The court is to make the decision at conservator 

in Ms. McQuinn‟s best interest. The court has concluded that 

it is not in Ms. McQuinn‟s best interest to appoint Ms. 

Cameron as conservator for the reasons stated herein.

The court‟s opinion is based not only upon Ms. McQuinn‟s 

own feelings and desires but the court‟s concerns about Ms. 

Cameron‟s judgment and how far she went to get her own

way. She accused the staff of using chemical restraints and 

overmedicating Ms. McQuinn to keep her at The Bridge 

because the more people who reside there, the more money 

the facility receives from the State of Tennessee. She also 

accused the staff of using undue influence to turn Ms. 

McQuinn against Ms. Cameron.

Based upon our review of the transcript of the hearing, the evidence in the record fully 

supports these findings made by the trial court. 

Finally, the trial court stated as follows regarding its decision to assess attorney‟s 

fees and costs of the attorney ad litem and the guardian ad litem:

When Ms. Cameron became emergency conservator, the 

court was required to appoint an attorney ad litem to represent 

Ms. McQuinn in this case. Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-

1-132(a) (Supp. 2013). Further, Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-125 

provides as follows:

Attorney ad litem. - (a) The court shall appoint 

an attorney ad litem to represent the respondent 

on the respondent‟s request, upon the 

recommendation of the guardian ad litem or if it 

appears to the court to be necessary to protect

the rights or interests of the respondent. The 

attorney ad litem shall be an advocate for the 

respondent in resisting the requested relief.
13

(b) The cost of the attorney ad litem shall be 

charged against the assets of the respondent.

According to subsection (b), the costs of the attorney ad litem 

must be charged against and paid from the assets of Ms. 

McQuinn.

* * *

The only reason [attorney ad litem] Tepley was appointed 

was due to Ms. Cameron‟s appointment as emergency 

conservator. His fees, by statute, have to be charged against 

Ms. McQuinn‟s assets. Here, the court finds that the costs of 

the guardian ad litem should be charged to Ms. Cameron.

The Bridge was relying on Ms. Ford, as attorney in fact for 

Ms. McQuinn, for advice and direction. It can be inferred 

that the principal purpose of the proceeding was to benefit 

Ms. Cameron. She, while the case was proceeding, removed 

almost all of Ms. McQuinn‟s property from the home. One 

can argue that the conservatorship petition was not necessary 

due to the existence of the power of attorney document and 

Ms. Ford‟s service.

Therefore, the court sets Ms. Woods‟ fee and expense at 

$8,027.43 and assess[es them] against Ms. Cameron.

(Bold print in original.)

As the trial court correctly noted, an award of the guardian ad litem‟s fees and 

costs in a conservatorship action is governed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-114 (Supp. 

2014), which provides,

(a) The costs of the proceedings, which are the court costs, 

the guardian ad litem fee and expenses incurred by the 

guardian ad litem in conducting the required investigations, 

the required medical examination costs, and the attorney‟s fee 

for the petitioner, may, in the court’s discretion, be charged 

against the property of the respondent to the extent the 

respondent‟s property exceeds the supplemental security 

income eligibility limit, or to the petitioner or any other party, 

or partially to any one or more of them as determined in the 
14

court’s discretion. In exercising its discretion to charge some 

or all of the costs against the respondent‟s property, the fact a 

conservator is appointed or would have been appointed but 

for an event beyond the petitioner‟s control is to be given 

special consideration. The guardian ad litem fee and the 

attorney‟s fee for the petitioner shall be established by the 

court. If a fiduciary is cited for failure to file an inventory or 

accounting, the costs incurred in citing the fiduciary, in the 

discretion of the court, may be charged to and collected from 

the cited fiduciary.

(b) If the principal purpose for bringing the petition is to 

benefit the petitioner and there would otherwise be little, if 

any, need for the appointment of a fiduciary, the costs of the 

proceedings may be assessed against the petitioner, in the 

discretion of the court.

(Emphasis added.) In 2013, the General Assembly amended this statute, deleting the 

former version in its entirety and rewriting the statute to, among other things, provide the 

trial court a greater measure of discretion in assessing guardian ad litem fees.2 As can be 

seen from the plain language of the statute, it clearly accords the trial court discretion to 

award the fees and expenses of the guardian ad litem against the petitioner. We hold that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its award of guardian ad litem fees and 

expenses. 

Regarding the trial court‟s order that Cameron return the items of personal 

property taken by her and her fiancée from McQuinn‟s house, Cameron admitted that she 

knowingly took the items after her appointment as emergency conservator had been 

revoked. She maintained that all of the personal property belonged to her mother and she 

 

2

The former version of Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-114 (2007) provided:

(a) If a fiduciary is appointed, the costs of the proceedings, which are the 

court costs, the guardian ad litem fee, the required medical examination 

costs and the attorney's fee for the petitioner, shall be charged against the 

property of the respondent to the extent the respondent's property 

exceeds the supplemental security income eligibility limit. If no fiduciary 

is appointed, the costs of the proceedings shall be charged against the 

petitioner. The guardian ad litem fee and the attorney's fee for the 

petitioner shall be established by the court. If a fiduciary is cited for 

failure to file an inventory or accounting, the costs incurred in citing the 

fiduciary, in the discretion of the court, may be charged to and collected 

from the cited fiduciary.
15

took it for safekeeping. Obviously, it is now part of McQuinn‟s estate. We find no error 

in the trial court‟s judgment ordering Cameron to return the personal property to 

McQuinn‟s home.

The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court‟s findings of fact. 

Furthermore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it made its 

various discretionary rulings in this case.

V.

The trial court‟s judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are assessed to the 

appellant, Jacqueline D. Cameron. This case is remanded to the trial court for such 

further action as may be required consistent with this opinion. 

______________________________________

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., CHIEF JUDGE