Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. *

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 09-1089

SONORAN SCANNERS, INC.;

JOSEPH P. DONAHUE,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

PERKINELMER, INC.,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Boudin, and Dyk,*

Circuit Judges.

Edward T. Dangel, III, with whom Dangel & Mattchen, LLP,

was on the brief, for appellants.

Jonathan Isaac Handler, with whom Jillian B. Hirsch and

Day Pitney, LLP, was on the brief, for appellee.

October 29, 2009
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DYK, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Joseph P. Donahue

(“Donahue”) and Sonoran Scanners, Inc. (“Sonoran”) appeal from an

order of the United States District Court for the District of

Massachusetts granting summary judgment to defendant PerkinElmer,

Inc. (“PerkinElmer”) on claims for breach of contract and violation

of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A

§ 11. These claims arise from an Asset Purchase Agreement

(“Purchase Agreement”) in which PerkinElmer acquired Sonoran’s

computer-to-plate printing technology business (“CTP Business”) and

an employment agreement (“Employment Agreement”) under which

Donahue (the founder of Sonoran) agreed to serve as “Site Leader

and General Manager” of the CTP Business for PerkinElmer. Sonoran

Scanners, Inc. v. PerkinElmer, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass.

2008). 

We agree that the district court correctly granted

summary judgment to PerkinElmer with respect to most of the claims.

However, we conclude that under Massachusetts law the Purchase

Agreement contains an implied contractual term that required

PerkinElmer to use reasonable efforts to develop and promote

Sonoran’s technology. Accordingly, in this one respect, we reverse

the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for

further proceedings. In all other respects, we affirm.
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I.

Because this appeal is from a grant of summary judgment,

we view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving

parties (here Sonoran and Donahue). Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.3d

12, 15 (1st Cir. 2009).

Sonoran is an Arizona corporation founded in 1997 by

Donahue, an engineer and businessman, to develop and market highspeed computer-to-plate (“CTP”) technology to the newspaper and

graphic arts industries. The CTP technology developed by Sonoran

was intended to be a high-speed digital printing alternative,

superior to the costly and time-consuming analog process required

by conventional plate technology. Sonoran’s CTP technology

required a greater initial capital investment from customers than

conventional technology (approximately $500,000 per unit), but

potentially offered significant cost savings over the life of the

product. As of 2000, Sonoran had developed a prototype CTP

machine, but had not made any sales. Although there was interest

in Sonoran’s product, some customers expressed concern as to

whether the company was too small to assure long-term support for

the unproven technology. By mid-2000, Sonoran was running out of

cash despite Donahue’s investment of approximately $3.5 million of

his own money in the company. Facing these challenges, Sonoran

sought a purchaser to undertake the continued development and

marketing of its CTP technology.
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PerkinElmer is a publicly-traded Massachusetts

corporation headquartered in Wellesley, Massachusetts. In late

2000, Donahue approached PerkinElmer to determine if PerkinElmer

was interested in purchasing Sonoran’s CTP Business. PerkinElmer

was amenable to Donahue’s overtures, and after negotiations, agreed

to purchase substantially all of Sonoran’s assets and business.

PerkinElmer and Sonoran executed an “Asset Purchase

Agreement” (“Purchase Agreement”) on May 2, 2001. Under § 1.4 of

the Purchase Agreement, at closing PerkinElmer paid $3.5 million.

Some significant portion of that amount went directly to Sonoran’s

unsecured creditors. In addition, §§ 1.6 and 6.2 of the Purchase

Agreement (entitled “Additional Earnout Payments”) provided that

PerkinElmer would pay Sonoran additional amounts if certain CTP

product sales targets were met each year between 2001 and 2006.

Under the terms of the earn-out provisions, PerkinElmer would pay

Sonoran $750,000 if at least three CTP machines were sold in the

first year following closing, $1.5 million (less any previously

paid earn-out amounts) if at least ten machines were sold by the

end of the second year, and additional amounts if certain gross

margin targets on sales of CTP machines were met. The additional

earnout payment (over and above the $1.5 million) during the five

year payout period was a maximum of $2 million.

Also relevant to this dispute are § 6.1 and § 6.3 of the

Purchase Agreement. Section 6.3, entitled “Sharing of Data,”
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provided in part that “The Parties agree that from and after the

Closing Date they shall cooperate fully with each other to

facilitate the transfer of the Acquired Assets from the Seller to

the Buyer and the operation thereof by the Buyer.” Purchase

Agreement § 6.3(b) (emphasis added). Section 6.1 stated that “The

Buyer or a subsidiary of the Buyer shall offer employment to those

Employees identified on Schedule 6.1 attached hereto . . . .”

Schedule 6.1, in turn, listed eight Sonoran employees and stated

whether or not each had accepted an offer of employment from

PerkinElmer. The only employee on Schedule 6.1 who had not

accepted an employment offer before execution of the Purchase

Agreement was Norm Bogen, Sonoran’s chief of sales and marketing

and principal salesman.

PerkinElmer also entered into a separate employment

agreement (“Employment Agreement”) with Donahue, under which

Donahue was to serve as “Site Leader and General Manager” of the

CTP Business for PerkinElmer for a salary of $150,000 per year.

The Employment Agreement also specified that Donahue would be

eligible to receive, for five years, bonuses (limited in the

aggregate to $6.6 million) based on CTP sales and to be calculated

in a manner similar to the earn-out payments potentially payable to

Sonoran. The Annual Bonus Section of the Employment Agreement

stated that Donahue would “have the right to consult with

[PerkinElmer] regarding the pricing of [CTP] Product sales.”
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Upon closing, Sonoran’s CTP Business (which remained

located in Tucson, Arizona) became part of PerkinElmer’s Azusa,

California-based Lithography Systems division (“Lithography”). 

It is undisputed that the CTP Business, as operated by

PerkinElmer, was a failure. Between May 2001 and October 2004,

only one CTP unit was sold and no additional amounts were paid

under the provisions of the Purchase Agreement or Employment

Agreement to Sonoran or Donahue. According to Sonoran and Donahue,

the CTP Business’s failure to thrive was the avoidable result of a

series of unreasonable and bad faith decisions by PerkinElmer. 

By 2004 PerkinElmer was pursuing an exit strategy for the

CTP Business. In September 2004 PerkinElmer sold its CTP assets to

MacDermid, Inc. In October 2004 PerkinElmer shuttered the CTP

Business and laid off the associated staff, including Donahue.

On November 20, 2006, Sonoran and Donahue sued

PerkinElmer in the United States District Court for the District of

Massachusetts basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship.

Insofar as is pertinent to this appeal, Sonoran and Donahue sued to

recover on four separate theories. First, Sonoran alleged that

PerkinElmer breached the express terms of the Purchase Agreement by

failing to “cooperate fully” with Sonoran and by failing to hire

Bogen in accordance with §§ 6.3 and 6.1 respectively of the

Purchase Agreement. Second, Sonoran and Donahue claimed that

PerkinElmer breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
In the complaint, Donahue alleged additional theories 1

concerning breach of the Employment Agreement that are not

presented in this appeal. We note that Donahue signed the Purchase

Agreement as “Principal Stockholder.” That Agreement, however, was

silent as to any obligations running directly from PerkinElmer to

Donahue (though there are some obligations running from Donahue to

PerkinElmer). We assume that Donahue’s claims are limited to his

rights under the Employment Agreement.

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dealing in both the Purchase Agreement and the Employment Agreement

by engaging in bad faith conduct. Third, Sonoran claimed that

PerkinElmer breached the implied terms of the Purchase Agreement by

failing to make good faith and reasonably competent and diligent

efforts to develop, market, and sell Sonoran’s CTP products.

Finally, Sonoran contended that PerkinElmer violated Chapter 93A,

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A § 11, by engaging in unfair or deceptive

conduct.1

Following discovery, the district court granted summary

judgment to PerkinElmer on all four claims. The court held that no

express term of the Purchase Agreement had been violated. With

regard to breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing in both the Purchase and Employment Agreements, the court

held that “[t]he parallel economic interests of the parties compels

a conclusion that PerkinElmer did not intend to deny Plaintiffs the

fruits of the contract[s]” and thus that no breach could be shown.

Sonoran, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 211. The court added that “[e]ven were

this Court to find that PerkinElmer intended to deny the Plaintiffs

the benefit of the contractual earnouts, on the record before the
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Court, the Plaintiffs would have great difficulty establishing that

PerkinElmer’s conduct caused the injuries the Plaintiffs allege”

and that “they have not presented evidence sufficient to establish

their damages with the necessary certainty.” Id. The court

further found that the Purchase Agreement contained no implied

“obligation to continue operating the CTP Business” in the face of

millions of dollars of losses. Id. at 206. Finally, the court

held that Sonoran’s Chapter 93A claim must fail because the claim

relies exclusively on the same set of operative facts as the

Plaintiffs’ failed common law claims, and thus summary judgment was

appropriate on that claim as well. Id. at 212.

Sonoran and Donahue timely appealed from the judgment of

the district court dated December 23, 2008, and we have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party. Fenton v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 400

F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir. 2005).

A. Breach of the Express Terms of the Purchase Agreement

Sonoran first contends that PerkinElmer breached the

express terms of the Purchase Agreement, focusing on §§ 6.1 and

6.3 of the Agreement. The district court held that no reasonable
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jury could conclude that PerkinElmer breached any express

provision, and we agree.

We begin with Sonoran’s contention that PerkinElmer

breached § 6.3(b) of the Purchase Agreement. That provision,

entitled “Sharing of Data,” provided in part that “The Parties

agree that from and after the Closing Date they shall cooperate

fully with each other to facilitate the transfer of the Acquired

Assets from the Seller to the Buyer and the operation thereof by

the Buyer.” Purchase Agreement § 6.3(b) (emphasis added).

Although Sonoran apparently contends that the “shall cooperate

fully” language of § 6.3(b) created a freestanding obligation on

the part of PerkinElmer to “cooperate” with Sonoran and Donahue in

operating the business, the unambiguous language of the provision

was to the contrary. See, e.g., Eigerman v. Putnam Invs., Inc.,

877 N.E. 2d 1258, 1263 (Mass. 2007) (courts interpret contracts

according to plain terms where these are unambiguous).

Specifically, § 6.3(b) stated that the duty of cooperation was

intended to benefit PerkinElmer——that the parties shall cooperate

to facilitate transfer of Sonoran’s business “to the Buyer” and to

facilitate “the operation thereof by the Buyer.” Purchase

Agreement § 6.3(b) (emphasis added). The district court correctly

held that no basis exists to conclude that PerkinElmer breached

§ 6.3 of the Purchase Agreement. 
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 Equally unavailing is Sonoran’s argument that PerkinElmer

breached § 6.1 of the Purchase Agreement by failing to hire Bogen.

That provision stated that “The Buyer or a subsidiary of the Buyer

shall offer employment to those Employees identified on Schedule

6.1 attached hereto . . . .” Purchase Agreement § 6.1 (first

emphasis added). Sonoran maintains that the district court erred

by failing “to give any forward-looking meaning” to the phrase

“shall offer employment” such that PerkinElmer was required to make

a better offer to Bogen post-closing. 

 During negotiations with PerkinElmer before execution of

the Purchase Agreement, Donahue made clear to PerkinElmer that

Bogen would require a raise from his current salary of $100,000 a

year to $125,000 a year, as well as reimbursement for commuting

expenses and a fair commission, in order to remain with the

business. In April 2001 PerkinElmer made offers to the eight

Sonoran employees listed in Schedule 6.1 of the Purchase Agreement,

including Norm Bogen. PerkinElmer offered Bogen only his current

salary with no additional amount for expenses or commission. Bogen

rejected the offer. Upon learning of Bogen’s rejection, Donahue

asked Greg Baxter, the head of Lithography, to increase the offer.

Baxter represented that he would get a better offer for Bogen after

closing, though no such language was added to the Purchase

Agreement. PerkinElmer never made a better offer to Bogen, and

Bogen never accepted employment with PerkinElmer. 
Because the plain language of the provision is 2

unambiguous, Sonoran’s argument that certain parole evidence

(including pre-closing conversations in which Baxter represented

that Bogen would receive a better offer after closing) creates a

question of fact is without merit. The Purchase Agreement includes

an integration clause. See Bank v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 145

F.3d 420, 424 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that under Massachusetts law,

an integrated contract, “if unambiguous, cannot be modified by

evidence of earlier or contemporaneous discussions”).

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We agree with the district court that § 6.1 only required

PerkinElmer to make a bona fide offer of employment to Bogen; it

did not require PerkinElmer to make any particular offer to Bogen

or to make a second, better offer to Bogen after closing when the

first offer was rejected by Bogen. Schedule 6.1 of the Purchase 2

Agreement confirmed this interpretation of § 6.1. That schedule

listed eight Sonoran employees, including Bogen, and indicated that

each employee but Bogen had accepted PerkinElmer’s offer of

employment by the May 2, 2000, closing. This clearly indicated

that making an offer of employment before execution of the Purchase

Agreement complied with § 6.1. Under these circumstances, the

failure to make an offer of employment to Bogen after execution of

the Purchase Agreement could not be a violation of the Purchase

Agreement.

In sum, the district court correctly granted summary

judgment that PerkinElmer did not breach any express terms of the

Purchase Agreement.
Compare, e.g., Birbiglia v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 692 3

N.E.2d 9, 14 n.5 (Mass. 1998) (suggesting in a footnote that

specific intent would be required to establish a violation of any

duty of good faith and fair dealing), and Towner v. Bennington

Const. Co., No. 0033B, 2005 WL 3105653 at *11 n.6 (Mass. Super. Ct.

Oct. 12, 2005) (unreported) (reading Birbiglia as stating that a

“plaintiff must show ‘specific intent’ to violate duty of good

faith and fair dealing,” meaning intent “to deprive [plaintiff] of

the fruits of the contract”), with Philip Alan, Inc. v. Sarcia, No.

0500437, 2007 WL 738484 at *10 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2007)

(unreported) (rejecting specific intent standard and stating that

“[n]ot only does that lonely footnote [in Birbiglia] fail to

clearly state that specific intent must be alleged in order to

proceed with a claim of bad faith, this court has not been guided

to any other cases which so hold”).

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B. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair

Dealing

Sonoran and Donahue further contend that PerkinElmer

breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in

both the Purchase Agreement and the Employment Agreement by

engaging in bad faith conduct, including misrepresenting its

intention to give Bogen a better offer and failing to disclose the

Lithography Division’s true financial condition. The district

court rejected this claim on the ground that there was no evidence

that could support a finding that PerkinElmer intended to deprive

Sonoran or Donahue of the fruits of the contracts. 

The parties devoted much of their briefing for this claim

to the issue of whether specific intent is a necessary element of

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Indeed,

Massachusetts law is unclear whether specific intent is required

for this claim. But it is not necessary to resolve the specific 3
We agree that the other alleged instances of bad faith 4

were properly rejected by the district court.

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intent dispute. Establishing a violation of the covenant of good

faith and fair dealing requires at least bad faith conduct. See

Schultz v. R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat’l Bank, N.A., 94 F.3d 721, 730 (1st

Cir. 1996); Equip. & Sys. for Indus. v. Northmeadows Constr. Co.,

798 N.E.2d 571, 575 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003); Shawmut Bank, N.A. v.

Wayman, 606 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); see also FAMM

Steel, Inc. v. Sovereign Bank, 571 F.3d 93, 100 (1st Cir. 2009). 

The district court correctly determined that there were

only two potential instances of alleged bad faith on PerkinElmer’s

part. Both instances concerned only the Purchase Agreement and 4

not the Employment Agreement——namely, PerkinElmer’s representations

regarding its intention to offer Bogen a better employment contract

and its failure to inform Sonoran and Donahue that its Lithography

Division was struggling financially. However, statements that are

made before a contract is executed are “inadequate” for a claim of

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Accusoft Corp. v. Palo, 237 F.3d 31, 45 (1st Cir. 2001) (“It is

implicit in [the definition of the implied covenant of good faith

and fair dealing] that the prohibition contained in the covenant

applies only to conduct during performance of the contract, not to

conduct occurring prior to the contract’s existence, such as

conduct affecting contract negotiations.” (citing FDIC v. LeBlanc,
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85 F.3d 815, 822 (1st Cir. 1996), and Restatement (Second) of

Contracts § 205, cmt. c)); see also Eigerman v. Putnam Invs., Inc.,

877 N.E.2d 1258, 1265 (Mass. 2007) (stating that the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing only “concerns the manner

in which existing contractual duties are performed”); Human Res.

Dev. Press, Inc. v. IKON Office Solutions Co., No. 05-30068-KPN 3,

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1613 at *26 (D. Mass. Jan. 12, 2006).

While the failure to make a new and better offer to Bogen

occurred after the execution of the Purchase Agreement, the alleged

bad faith conduct here was the representation during negotiations

that a post-execution offer would be made to Bogen. In other

words, the bad faith act occurred before, not after, execution of

the Purchase Agreement. The same is true with respect to the

representations as to the financial condition of the Lithography

Division.

Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary

judgment that PerkinElmer did not breach the implied covenants of

good faith and fair dealing.

C. Breach of the Implied Reasonable Efforts Term of the

Agreement

Sonoran next asserts that, under the Purchase Agreement,

PerkinElmer had an implied obligation to exert reasonable efforts

to develop and promote Sonoran’s technology, and that it breached

its obligation. PerkinElmer in turn argues Massachusetts does not
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recognize such an implied obligation, at least not under the

circumstances involved here. We conclude that PerkinElmer did have

an implied obligation under the Purchase Agreement to use

reasonable efforts, and we reverse and remand for a determination

of whether PerkinElmer breached this obligation with respect to the

Purchase Agreement only.

Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Wood v. Lucy, Lady DuffGordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917), has influenced courts nationwide,

including Massachusetts courts, to follow the principle that: 

We are not to suppose that one party was to be

placed at the mercy of the other. . . . [The]

promise to pay the defendant one-half of the

profits and revenues resulting from the

exclusive agency and to render accounts

monthly was a promise to use reasonable

efforts to bring profits and revenues into

existence. 

Lady Duff, 118 N.E. at 215-16. Citing to Lady Duff, the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that it is implied

that one who obtains the exclusive right to manufacture a product

under a patent has “an implied obligation . . . to exert reasonable

efforts to promote sales of the process and to establish, if

reasonably possible, an extensive use of the invention.” Eno Sys.,

Inc. v. Eno, 41 N.E.2d 17, 19-20 (Mass. 1942). 

PerkinElmer contends that implying a reasonable efforts

obligation is only necessary and appropriate where there is no

other consideration supporting the existence of a contract. Thus,
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PerkinElmer seeks to limit the implied reasonable efforts

obligation to contracts in which there is no consideration other

than reasonable efforts. It points out that it paid $3.5 million

in consideration at closing, and concludes that the reasonable

efforts obligation does not apply here. While some jurisdictions

may have adopted this rule, see Emerson Radio Corp. v. Orion Sales,

Inc., 253 F.3d 159, 169 (3d Cir. 2001); WrestleReunion, LLC v. Live

Nation Television Holdings, Inc., No. 8:07-cv-2093-JDW-MAP, 2009

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70285, at *26-27 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2009),

Massachusetts has not. In Eno, for example, Mrs. Eno entered into

an arrangement with a company to market a particular type of tape

useful in the manufacture of shoes. Eno, 41 N.E.2d at 18. Under

the license, Eno Systems was to pay Mrs. Eno $100 per month where

the sales of tape were below 250,000 yards, and $200 per month

where yardage exceeded that amount. Thus, even if Eno Systems had

done nothing to exploit the patent, Mrs. Eno would have been

entitled to $100 per month for the life of the patent. Despite

this consideration, the court implied a reasonable efforts clause

to maximize revenue based on the intent of the parties. Id. at 19.

PerkinElmer also attempts to distinguish Eno as limited

to exclusive licensing arrangements. PerkinElmer asserts that the

implied reasonable efforts duty is inapplicable here because it

“did not obtain an exclusive license but rather purchased Sonoran’s

assets.” The district court found this argument compelling. We do
See also Bell v. Streetwise Records, Ltd., 761 F.2d 67, 5

73, 75 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding that the employment contracts

between the plaintiffs, the members of a rock group, and the

defendants, a record company and a manager, were “‘instinct’ with

that obligation” and required each party to maximize the sale of

records and royalties). 

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not because Massachusetts law is to the contrary. The fact that

Eno involved exclusive licensing arrangements does not lessen the

obligation to use reasonable efforts in other situations. See,

e.g., Brightwater Paper Co. v. Monadnock Paper Mills, 161 F.2d

869, 871 (1st Cir. 1947) (holding that the plaintiff had an implied

duty to use reasonable efforts to elicit particular business and to

hand it over to the defendant); Russo v. Enter. Realty Co., 199

N.E.2d 689, 692-93 (Mass. 1964) (imposing a duty on a seller of

land to use reasonable efforts to build a road of the width shown

on its subdivision plan as part of its closing obligations);

Graustein v. HP Hood & Sons, Inc., 200 N.E. 14, 20 (Mass. 1936)

(implying a duty on a purchaser of a retail milk delivery company

to make “reasonably diligent and persistent effort to collect [on

seller’s behalf] all the accounts recorded in the books which it

took over”). Rather, the key under Massachusetts law is that the 5

instrument as a whole must make certain that the reasonable efforts

term was implicit. Eno, 41 N.E.2d at 19; see also Spaulding v.

Morse, 76 N.E.2d 137, 139 (Mass. 1947) (“[I]f the instrument as a

whole produces a conviction that a particular result was fixedly

desired although not expressed by formal words, that defect may be
Indeed Sonoran alleged that all of the $3.5 million was 6

paid to Sonoran’s creditors. Pls.’ Counter-Statement of Material

Facts ¶ 13. 

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supplied by implication and the underlying intention . . . may be

effectuated, provided it is sufficiently declared by the entire

instrument.” (citing Dittemore v. Dickey, 144 N.E. 57 (Mass.

1924))).

Here various aspects of the Purchase Agreement in

addition to the contingent nature of Sonoran’s compensation support

its argument that the reasonable efforts term was implicit. The

earnout compensation was substantial (potentially $3.5 million) in

relation to the up-front payments made by PerkinElmer ($3.5

million). A significant portion of the $3.5 million was paid to

Sonoran’s creditors and did not benefit the shareholders directly.6

The Purchase Agreement contemplated a campaign to market the

Sonoran technology over the next five years (although this does not

suggest that it would not be reasonable to abandon those efforts

before the end of the five-year period). There was no language in

the agreement negating an obligation by PerkinElmer to use

reasonable efforts or conferring absolute discretion on PerkinElmer

as to the operation of the business. Under these circumstances, we

find that PerkinElmer had an implied obligation to use reasonable

efforts to develop and promote Sonoran’s technology.

Given that PerkinElmer had an implied obligation to exert
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reasonable efforts towards promoting sales of the CTP machines, the

factual question remains whether PerkinElmer breached this

obligation. On this question, as might be expected, the parties

have quite different views. Sonoran has alleged a number of ways

in which PerkinElmer potentially breached this obligation. In

addition to PerkinElmer’s failure to retain Bogen, Sonoran

criticizes PerkinElmer’s decision to assign Guy Antley, an in-house

salesperson with no publishing experience, to lead the CTP sales

efforts on a part-time basis. Sonoran contends that Antley was

incompetent and made little effort to learn or promote the CTP

Business. Sonoran further contends that PerkinElmer “backed out of

its commitment to allow Donahue to run the business . . . and

started to operate it on the cheap.” Pls.-Appellants’ Br. 12.

Sonoran offers the expert testimony of Paul Baier, who stated that

despite a viable market for the CTP product, there was “very little

or no commitment to this product” from PerkinElmer executives.

Finally, Sonoran points to PerkinElmer’s alleged mishandling of a

potential opportunity to sell a large number of CTP units to

MacDermid, Inc., a dominant supplier of equipment to newspaper

publishers, as typical of the operation of the business.

PerkinElmer, on the other hand, asserts that in 2003 and

2004 alone it invested (and lost) $2.5 million per year of its own

money in the venture and vigorously attempted to promote and sell

the Sonoran product. In PerkinElmer’s view, the lack of success
We note that in the complaint Donahue also argued that 7

the Employment Agreement should be construed to include a

reasonable efforts provision. That agreement presents a more

difficult issue with respect to an implied reasonable efforts

obligation. We need not, however, address this issue with respect

to the Employment Agreement since Donahue has not sufficiently

briefed the issue on appeal. See United States v. Zannino, 895

F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (“It is not enough merely to mention a

possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do

counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh

on its bones.”).

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was attributable not to any lack of effort by PerkinElmer, but to

a lack of enthusiasm by prospective purchasers in investing in an

unproven technology and the well-known financial problems of the

newspaper industry.

PerkinElmer did not argue in its motion for summary

judgment that, if the reasonable efforts obligation applied, it was

entitled to summary judgment on the question of whether PerkinElmer

had in fact satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. We

reverse and remand for the district court to determine whether

PerkinElmer breached this obligation with respect to the Purchase

Agreement——an issue to which we express no views. We recognize, 7

as did the district judge, that PerkinElmer made a substantial

investment in Sonoran and therefore had a substantial interest in

making the CTP Business succeed, and so it may not be easy for

Sonoran to show a lack of reasonable efforts. Whether on remand a

trial is required to determine whether PerkinElmer utilized

reasonable efforts is a matter for the district court to consider.
Def.-Appellee’s Br. 45 (“The District Court held that 8

Sonoran’s implied covenant claim independently failed because of

Sonoran’s failure to offer evidence of causation.”).

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Finally, we note that PerkinElmer may argue that the

grant of summary judgment can be upheld on the ground that the

district court found a lack of causation and insufficient proof of

damages. To the extent that PerkinElmer makes such an argument,

PerkinElmer is incorrect. The district court on summary judgment

only addressed causation and damages with respect to the claims

relating to the covenants of good faith and fair dealing and

PerkinElmer’s alleged bad faith, as PerkinElmer appears to

recognize at various places in its brief. Causation and damages 8

remain to be determined with respect to the reasonable efforts

claim if Sonoran is successful in establishing a breach of that

obligation. Again, whether on remand a trial is required to

determine causation and damages is a matter for the district court.

D. Violation of Chapter 93A

Finally, Sonoran asserts that PerkinElmer violated

Chapter 93A, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A § 11. Chapter 93A creates a

cause of action for unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The

specific allegation here is that PerkinElmer violated Chapter 93A

by: (1) making “almost no effort to develop, market, and sell

Sonoran’s CTP products”; (2) “promising to amend the earnout and

other incentive payment clauses in the contract”; and (3)
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misrepresenting its intention to “develop a strong marketing and

sales program” for the CTP Business through the end of 2003. In

considering PerkinElmer’s motion for summary judgment on this

claim, the district court noted: “[t]o the extent a party’s Chapter

93A claims are based only on failed common law or statutory

grounds, several courts have refused to find Chapter 93A

liability.” Sonoran, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 212 (citations omitted).

It then granted PerkinElmer judgment as a matter of law on the

claim because “the Plaintiffs [Chapter 93A] claims derive entirely

from the same set of operative facts as their failed common law

grounds.” Id. In addition, PerkinElmer sought summary judgment on

the alternative ground that the pertinent events did not occur

primarily and substantially in Massachusetts, as Chapter 93A

requires. We agree with PerkinElmer’s alternative argument and

need not reach the issue addressed by the district court. 

Chapter 93A states that: 

No action shall be brought or maintained under

this section unless the actions and

transactions constituting the alleged unfair

method of competition or the unfair or

deceptive act or practice occurred primarily

and substantially within the commonwealth.

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A § 11 (emphasis added). Courts apply this

standard by considering the facts “in the context of the entire §

11 claim,” and then determining “whether the center of gravity of
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the circumstances that give rise to the claim is primarily and

substantially within the Commonwealth.” Kuwaiti Danish Computer

Corp. v. Digital Equip. Co., 781 N.E.2d 787, 799 (Mass. 2003); see

also Kenda Corp. v. Pot O’Gold Money Leagues, Inc., 329 F.3d 216,

234-35 (1st Cir. 2003).

Sonoran contends that the alleged Chapter 93A violations

occurred primarily and substantially in Massachusetts because

“[i]n-house counsel and Perkin Corporate, based in Massachusetts,

were intertwined with California employees and had the final say.

Massachusetts was in control of the negotiations and made all of

the important decisions.” Pls.-Appellants’ Br. 46. Sonoran

further asserts that PerkinElmer’s failure to make Bogen a better

offer and disclose the Lithography Division’s financial

difficulties occurred through PerkinElmer Corporate, located in

Massachusetts. We do not think this is sufficient for

Massachusetts to be the “center of gravity.”

In Bushkin Assoc., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 473 N.E.2d 662

(Mass. 1985), a New York investment banker sued a Massachusetts

corporation under Chapter 93A, alleging that deceptive statements

were made to him in the course of telephone calls between

Massachusetts and New York. The Supreme Judicial Court of

Massachusetts determined that the alleged unfair or deceptive

conduct did not occur primarily in Massachusetts because, despite
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the fact that the allegedly deceptive phone calls were made from

Massachusetts, the telephone calls were received and acted upon in

New York and the plaintiffs’ losses were incurred in New York. Id.

at 672. As a result, the court rejected the Chapter 93A claim.

Id. 

This case is similar to Bushkin. Just as the losses in

Bushkin did not occur in Massachusetts, Sonoran’s losses were

incurred in Arizona where Donahue and the CTP Business were

located. Sonoran also received and acted upon PerkinElmer’s

allegedly deceptive conduct in Arizona. Indeed this case is less

favorable to the plaintiffs than Bushkin. Unlike Bushkin, where

the allegedly deceptive statements were uttered in Massachusetts,

the alleged misconduct here occurred primarily in Arizona and

California where the Lithography and Optoelectronics Divisions were

located. The fact that the Purchase Agreement provided that

Massachusetts law would govern does not require a finding that the

center of gravity for Chapter 93A liability is in Massachusetts.

In Bushkin, the court determined that Massachusetts law controlled

(even without a clause explicitly providing so) but still found

that the alleged unfair or deceptive conduct did not occur

primarily and substantially in Massachusetts and thus that there

could be no Chapter 93A liability. Bushkin, 473 N.E.2d at 636,

638.
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Thus, viewing the record in the light most favorable to

Sonoran, PerkinElmer was entitled to summary judgment on the

Chapter 93A claim as the alleged unfair or deceptive conduct of

PerkinElmer did not occur primarily and substantially in

Massachusetts.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment

of the district court with regard to whether the Purchase Agreement

contains an implied contractual term requiring PerkinElmer to use

reasonable efforts to develop and sell Sonoran’s CTP technology,

and remand for further proceedings on that issue. The judgment of

the district court is in all other respects affirmed. Each party

shall bear its own costs.

Affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part, and remanded.