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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, ex rel. Gregory 

Kuzma,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Northern Arizona Healthcare Corporation, 

et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV18-8041-PCT-DGC

ORDER

Relator Gregory Kuzma alleges that Defendants Northern Arizona Healthcare 

Corporation (“NAHC”), Northern Arizona Orthopedic Surgery Center, LLC (“NAOSC”), 

and Flagstaff Medical Center, Inc. (“FMC”) violated the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 

U.S.C. § 3729, et seq. Doc. 40. Defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint 

pursuant to Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. 44. The 

Court heard oral argument on September 25, 2020, and will grant the motion to dismiss 

and allow Relator to file a second amended complaint.

1

I. Background.

The Court takes the factual allegations of Relator’s amended complaint as true for 

purposes of this motion. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Relator worked for

1 Relator has filed a separate complaint against NAHC, FMC, and Northern Arizona 

Health Foundation, alleging unrelated FCA violations. Doc. 35 (No. 18-cv-8040). The 

Court will also issue an order granting the motion to dismiss that case with leave to amend.

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NAHC from January 1992 to March 2014. Doc. 40 ¶ 2. He held various financial planning 

roles from 1992 to October 2004, and served as NAHC’s Vice President and Chief 

Financial Officer for the remainder of his tenure. Id.

In 2013, Defendants began investigating the possibility of acquiring the assets of 

Summit Surgery and Recovery Care Center, Inc. (“Summit Center”), which was owned 

by 16 orthopedic surgeons. Id. at ¶¶ 25, 31-32, 35. Summit Center’s assets included a 

15,932 square foot surgery center, consisting of three operating rooms, five pre-operation

bays, and an eight-room recovery center. Id. ¶ 30. The surgeons were interested in selling, 

in part, because of anticipated capital expenditures of up to $2 million over the following

two years. Id. ¶¶ 36-38. Relator gathered information and documentation for a fair market 

valuation of Summit Center. Id. ¶ 39. Relator was experienced in business valuation and 

had performed this function for NAHC during his more than 20 years with the company.

Id. ¶ 40. He determined that the fair market value of Summit Center was between $8 and 

$10 million, and shared his report with NAHC’s CEO in December 2013. Id. ¶¶ 43, 44. 

In 2015, after he had left Defendants’ employment, Relator learned that, on April 1, 

2015, Defendants acquired Summit Center’s assets for $25.1 million – a price two to three 

times higher than Relator’s valuation and higher than the 90th percentile of any peer 

comparison. Id. ¶¶ 42-44, 46, 54. Relator also learned that Somerset CPAs and Advisors, 

an independent accounting firm, had performed a fair market value analysis of Summit 

Center and arrived at a value of $23.9 million (plus or minus 5%), and that Defendants had 

paid the high end of that value. Id. ¶¶ 48-50.

Relator filed this FCA action alleging that Defendants’ purpose in paying an inflated 

price for Summit Center was to reward its surgeon-owners for their past business with 

Defendants and to induce them to provide future business, in violation of the federal AntiKickback Statute (“AKS”), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b. Id. ¶¶ 56-58, 63-65. Relator alleges 

that all claims submitted to government healthcare programs for services performed by 

physicians at Defendants’ facilities after the April 1, 2015 acquisition date violate the FCA. 

Id. ¶ 65.

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Relator filed this action on February 28, 2018. Doc. 1. On November 21, 2019, the 

United States announced its decision not to intervene. Doc. 15. Relator filed his amended 

complaint on April 27, 2020, after considering Defendants’ first motion to dismiss based 

on Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6). See Docs. 35, 40.

II. Relevant Standards.

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim to relief under Rule 12(b)(6), 

the well-pled factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). A 

successful motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) must show either that the complaint lacks 

a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege facts sufficient to support its theory. Balistreri 

v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A complaint that sets forth a 

cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss as long as it contains “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

Because FCA claims involve allegations of fraud, they must comply with the 

heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). Cafasso ex rel. United States v. Gen. 

Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2011). That rule requires a party 

alleging fraud to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud[.]” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 9(b). A “pleading must identify the who, what, when, where, and how of the 

misconduct charged, as well as what is false or misleading about the purportedly fraudulent 

statement, and why it is false.” Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1055 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Rule 9(b) serves dual purposes: (1) to give defendants fair notice of the 

allegations of fraud, so that they have an opportunity to rebut specific accusations; and 

(2) to deter the harm caused by unsubstantiated fraud complaints. United States v. United 

Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1180 (9th Cir. 2016).

III. Discussion.

Relator alleges that Defendants violated the AKS and the FCA by knowingly paying 

an inflated price for Summit Center in order to reward the surgeon-owners for their past 

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business and induce continued loyalty, and by billing the United States for services 

subsequently performed by the surgeons at Defendants’ facilities. Doc. 40. Defendants 

argue that the amended complaint does not adequately plead a violation of the AKS and 

elements of the FCA. Doc. 45 at 6-13.

2

A. The Anti-Kickback Statute.

The AKS imposes criminal penalties on a person or entity who “knowingly and 

willfully offers to pay remuneration to another to induce them to . . . order, or arrange for 

[any] service, or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal 

health care program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2)(B). While the AKS itself provides no 

private right of action, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act made any “claim 

that includes items or services resulting from a violation of [the AKS] . . . a false or 

fraudulent claim for the purposes of [the FCA].” 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(g). “The elements 

of the [AKS] violation must . . . be pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b) because they 

are brought as a [claim under the FCA].” United States v. Abundant Life Therapeutic Servs. 

Tex., LLC, 2019 WL 1930274 at *6 (S.D. Tex., Apr. 30, 2019) (citation omitted). 

1. Fair Market Value.

Defendants contend that they paid fair market value for Summit Center and 

therefore could not have violated the AKS. Doc. 45 at 6 (citing United States ex rel. ObertHong v. Advocate Health Care, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1049 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“To comply 

with the AKS, the hospital must simply pay fair market value for the practice’s assets.”)). 

In order to allege a kickback under the AKS, “the complaint must particularly allege facts 

showing that” the acquisition was “not commercially reasonable.” Obert-Hong, 211 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1049.

While it is true that the price Defendants paid for Summit Center was within the fair 

market value range identified by Somerset, Relator argues that “Somerset’s valuation was 

plainly and materially wrong in ways that Defendants knew or, at a minimum, that 

2 Citations are to page numbers placed at the top of each page by the Court’s 

electronic filing system.

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Defendants acted in reckless disregard of the truth.” Doc. 46 at 12. Relator is a CPA with 

significant experience in business valuation, including valuations he performed while 

employed by Defendants. Doc. 40 ¶¶ 1, 2, 40. In 2013, Relator conducted a fair market 

value analysis of Summit Center, consistent with applicable federal and industry standards. 

Id. ¶ 41. He concluded the Center was worth between $8 and $10 million and shared this 

valuation with NAHC’s CEO. Id. ¶¶ 43-44. The combined equity value of the 16 surgeons 

who owned Summit Center was about $7.2 million, and the surgeons were interested in 

selling, in part, because they knew Summit Center would require capital expenditures in 

the next two years. Id. ¶¶ 31-36. The surgeon-owners were an important profit center for 

Defendants NAHC and FMC. Id. ¶ 34. Orthopedic surgery (their specialty) was among 

the top two or three profit centers each year for FMC, and accounted for 17.5% of NAHC’s 

inpatient cases in 2011 and 2012. Id. ¶¶ 34, 63.

Relator’s amended complaint includes specific reasons why Somerset’s valuation 

was not commercially reasonable. He alleges that it included overstated historical

operating income and net revenue, a future operating income projection that was 

inconsistent with historical performance, future case volume projections that were 

inconsistent with historical performance, understated future capital expenditures, and 

overstated present value. Doc. 40 ¶ 53(a)-(e). Correcting these errors brings the Somerset 

valuation in line with Relator’s fair market value of $8 to $10 million. Id. ¶ 55.

Relator provides factual detail to support his assertions. For example, the Somerset

valuation projected only $100,000 in capital expenditures in the two years after acquisition

(id. ¶ 53(d)), while the surgeon-owners themselves anticipated capital expenditures of $2 

million (id. ¶ 38, 53(d)). The amended complaint explains: “The [Summit Center] was 

nearly 15 years old and had a variety of equipment that was at the end of its economic 

useful life and in need of replacement, including: four anesthesia machines at $250,000 or 

$300,000 apiece; laparoscopic equipment and cameras with an estimated replacement cost 

of $400,000; operating room lights; and computer systems that needed upgrades.” Id. ¶ 37. 

In fact, Defendants spent more than $1 million on capital expenditures at Summit Center 

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during the first quarter after they purchased it. Id. ¶ 53(d). Additionally, the difference 

between the historical operating income data used by Relator and the figures used by 

Somerset was $14 million. Id. ¶ 55(a). 

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Relator, the Court cannot 

conclude that the amended complaint fails to plead a violation of the AKS simply because 

Defendants paid a price that fell within Somerset’s fair market value. Cousins, 568 F.3d 

at 1067. Relator alleges facts that, if true, show Somerset’s valuation was far from

accurate, Defendants knew or had reason to know it was not accurate, and Defendants 

nonetheless overpaid for the facility. The Court finds the allegations of an AKS violation

to be plausible. 

2. Rule 9(b)’s Particularity Requirement.

Relying on Rule 9(b), Defendants argue that “Relator must plead not just the 

specific Somerset CPAs numbers with which he disagrees, but also particularized facts 

supporting his allegation that Somerset CPAs’ valuation was fraudulent.” Doc. 45 at 7. 

To the extent Defendants suggest that Relator must show Somerset committed fraud in 

valuing Summit Center, the Court does not agree. Relator must show that Defendants 

committed fraud – that they knew the valuation by Somerset was overstated and yet paid 

the inflated price anyway. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).

Defendants contend that Relator’s disagreement with Somerset’s valuation is 

insufficient to establish fraud. Docs. 45 at 7, 47 at 2. But as already noted, the amended 

complaint contains more than Relator’s disagreement. In addition to the anticipated capital 

costs discussed above, Relator alleges that the surgeon-owners’ total equity contribution to 

Summit Center was $7.2 million in 2011 and that there was a 10% increase in surgeries the 

following year, suggesting only a modest increase in the Center’s value. Doc. 40 ¶¶ 31-

33. Relator notes that the prevailing industry multiple of 6.0 to 7.9 times earnings before 

interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization would value Summit Center at between $8 

and $9 million. Id. ¶ 42. He also alleges that Somerset’s valuation was higher than 90% 

of relevant peer comparisons. Id. ¶ 54. These facts do not “simply label a few of Somerset 

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CPAs’ assumptions and projects as flawed.” Doc. 45 at 8. They provide a particularized 

factual basis for Relator’s claims.

Defendants also argue that Relator does not present “any contemporaneous facts 

whatsoever concerning Somerset CPAs’ analysis.” Id. The Court disagrees. In order to 

value the business for NAHC in 2013, Relator was given access to relevant Summit Center 

data through the end of 2013. Doc. 40 ¶ 39. When he compared that data with the Somerset 

valuation done less than two years later, he found that Somerset overstated Summit 

Center’s operating income by two to three times. “The Somerset valuation lists operating 

income in 2012 and 2013 as $4.3 million and $3.6 million respectively, but, based on 

Relator’s review of the relevant data, [Summit Center] only produced historic operating 

income in the $1.2 million to $1.5 million range.” Id. ¶ 53(a). 

Defendants argue that impairment charges NAHC took on Summit Center’s assets 

in the years following the acquisition are not evidence that Defendants knowingly overpaid 

for the Center at the time. Docs. 45 at 9-10, 47 at 5-6. Impairment charges are taken on a 

company’s financial statements when the fair market value of an asset is deemed to be 

unrecoverable under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Doc. 40 ¶ 60. The 

impairment charge allegations alone are not enough to establish that the Summit Center 

price was inflated, considering that “real estate values can be variable, and that fluctuations 

in prices over a period of years are not necessarily unusual, nor are they conclusive proof 

of wrongdoing.” Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996 

(9th Cir. 2014). But the impairment charges are relevant, and Relator does not rely on 

them alone, as shown above. 

In summary, Relator cites industry metrics that Defendants do not challenge, lists 

errors that form the basis of Somerset’s analysis, and alleges that Defendants’ agreed to 

pay the inflated price to reward the surgeons. Id. ¶¶ 52-56. These facts are sufficient for 

the Court to draw a reasonable inference that there was a kickback in the form of a 

commercially unreasonable acquisition price in violation of the AKS. See Obert-Hong, 

211 F. Supp. 2d at 1049.

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3. Collective Liability.

Defendants contend that the amended complaint “fails to plead with particularity 

each Defendant’s role in the purported fraud, or to identify an individual employee who 

took (or failed to take) any particular action” as required by Rule 9(b). Docs. 45 at 10, 47 

at 6. The amended complaint identifies three defendants: NAHC, NAOSC, and FMC, and 

alleges that NAOSC and FMC are wholly owned subsidiaries of NAHC. Doc. 40 ¶¶ 3-5. 

Relator asserts that at “all relevant times, all actual and/or apparent agents of NAHC, 

NAOSC and FMC are employees solely of NAHC” and that “FMC provided the funds 

used by NAOSC to acquire [Summit Center’s] assets and the individuals responsible for 

negotiating and consummating the transaction were NAHC officers and/or employees.” 

Id. ¶¶ 6, 47. Relator asserts that because the three Defendants “engaged in a common 

fraudulent scheme to further their collective financial interest,” he is not required to state 

specific allegations against each Defendant. Doc. 46 at 17-18. The Court agrees, in part.

“Rule 9(b) does not allow a complaint to merely lump multiple defendants together 

but requires plaintiffs to differentiate their allegations when suing more than one defendant 

and inform each defendant separately of the allegations surrounding his alleged 

participation in the fraud.” United Healthcare, 848 F.3d at 1184 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “There is no flaw in a pleading, however, where collective allegations 

are used to describe the actions of multiple defendants who are alleged to have engaged in 

precisely the same conduct.” Id. 

Relator’s allegations are sufficient with respect to the AKS violation. He alleges 

that all three Defendants engaged in a single kickback – paying the surgeon-owners a 

significantly inflated price for Summit Center to induce them to continue doing business 

with Defendants. See, e.g., Doc. 40 ¶ 56. He identifies the relationships between the parties 

and the role each played in the kickback (NAHC employees negotiated and consummated

the transaction, FMC provided the money, and NAOSC acquired Summit Center). Id. ¶ 3-

5, 46-47. This was not a series of events over a prolonged period, but one transaction 

completed on a specific date. Relator appropriately used “collective allegations . . . to 

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describe the actions of multiple defendants who are alleged to have engaged in precisely 

the same conduct.” Id.

3

The collective allegations fall short, however, in their assertion of false claims. 

They say nothing about the roles of NAHC, FMC, and NAOSC in making allegedly false 

claims or false statements in support of claims, the persons by whom the false claims and 

statements were made, when they occurred, or how they were false. More will be said of

this shortcoming below.

B. The False Claims Act.

Defendants contend that the amended complaint fails to plead elements of the FCA. 

Doc. 45 at 11. Relator alleges violations of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) and (B), which 

create liability for any person who “(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a 

false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” or “(B) knowingly makes, uses, or 

causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent 

claim.” The elements of § 3729(a)(1)(A) and (B) are “virtually identical, with the only 

difference being whether Defendants submitted a false claim or made a statement material 

to such a claim[.]” McGrath v. Microsemi Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 885, 894 (D. Ariz. 2015), 

aff’d, 690 F. App’x 551 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 

Defendants argue that “Relator fails to identify a single claim for services performed 

by Defendants, much less one linked to these particular physicians and the alleged 

kickback, nor does he offer any reason to believe such claims were submitted.” Doc. 45 

at 12-13. Relator responds that he has “linked Defendants’ violation of the AKS to false 

claims submitted for reimbursement” because the taint of a kickback renders every 

reimbursement claim fraudulent. Doc. 46 at 20. 

The parties do not address in any detail the requirements for an FCA claim based 

on a violation of the AKS. Courts have wrestled with the question of whether a relator 

3 Defendants argue that the claims against NAHC should be dismissed because 

Relator fails to identify specific employees involved in the alleged fraud. Docs. 45 at 10, 

47 at 7-8. But Relator identifies NAHC’s CEO as the person with specific knowledge of 

Relator’s 2013 report and involvement with the transaction. See Doc. 40 ¶¶ 44, 47.

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must plead and prove that the AKS violation – the kickback – caused the claims at issue

under the FCA. Applied to this case, the question is whether Relator must prove that the 

physician services billed to the federal government as allegedly false claims resulted from 

the kickback in the purchase of Summit Center. Although the Court has not conducted 

exhaustive research, it appears that most courts reject the suggestion that a relator must 

prove “but for” causation – that a false claim would not have been made without the 

kickback. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 880 F.3d 

89, 100 (3d. Cir. 2018); United States ex rel. Bawduniak v. Bioden Idec, Inc., 2018 WL 

1996829 at *5-6 (D. Mass., Apr. 27, 2018); United States ex rel. Kester v. Novartis Pharm. 

Corp., 41 F. Supp. 3d 323, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 

But the cases do not appear to have settled on a single standard for what a relator 

must plead and prove with respect to the AKS and FCA, and the parties cite no Ninth 

Circuit case on point. One leading case, the Third Circuit’s Greenfield decision, rejects 

“but for” causation, but also states that “[a] kickback does not morph into a false claim 

unless a particular patient is exposed to an illegal recommendation or referral and a 

provider submits a claim for reimbursement pertaining to that patient.” 880 F.3d at 100. 

Greenfield states that there must be “a link between the alleged kickback and the medical 

care,” but does not describe the nature of the link. Id.; see also United States ex rel. Dan 

Abrams Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 2018 WL 5266863, at *8 (C.D. Cal., June 7, 2018)

(complaint must “allege a clear link between any alleged inducements and the false 

claims”). Other courts hold that a mere temporal sequence is enough: “[i]t is sufficient to 

show that Defendant paid kickbacks to a physician for the purpose of inducing the 

physician to prescribe specific drugs, and that the physician then prescribed those drugs, 

even if the physician would have prescribed those drugs absent the kickback.” Bawduniak, 

2018 WL 1996829 at *3. 

Nor have courts identified the nature of the false statement that must be made to 

constitute a false claim based on violation of the AKS. Some cases have noted that the 

defendant, in submitting claims to the government, specifically certified that the claims 

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complied with the AKS. Greenfield, 880 F.3d at 92. Other courts, including the Ninth 

Circuit, have recognized an “implied certification” approach to the FCA, which “occurs 

when an entity has previously undertaken to expressly comply with a law, rule, or 

regulation, and that obligation is implicated by submitting a claim for payment even though 

a certification of compliance is not required in the process of submitting the claim.” Ebeid 

ex rel. U.S. v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).4 The Supreme Court has stated 

that an implied certification theory can be a basis for liability where at least two conditions 

are satisfied: “first, the claim does not merely request payment, but also makes specific 

representations about the goods or services provided; and second, the defendant’s failure 

to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements 

makes those representations misleading half-truths.” Universal Health Services, Inc. v. 

United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2001 (2016). 

The parties do not address these requirements, and the Court will not attempt to 

settle them for all purposes in this case without further briefing. But the Court does 

conclude that Relator has failed sufficiently to plead the existence of false claims. The 

amended complaint alleges “[u]pon information and belief” that “Defendants have 

continued to submitted [sic] thousands of claims annually for payments for surgeries and 

other services performed or referred by physicians at Defendant’s facilities since April 1, 

2015.” Doc. 40 ¶ 62. He alleges that Defendants violated the AKS “and, therefore, claims 

submitted to government healthcare programs for payment for surgeries and other services 

performed by these physicians at Defendants’ facilities after April 1, 2015, violate the 

FCA.” Id. ¶ 65. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “‘Rule 9(b) does not require a relator to allege the 

details of every false claim submitted to the federal government for reimbursement, so long 

as he alleges particular details of a scheme to submit false claims paired with reliable 

4 Some cases note that Medicare claims must include an acknowledgement on CMS 

Form 855s that the claims are subject to the AKS. Greenfield, 880 F.3d at 92 n.3. Others 

note that “[c]ompliance with the AKS by a party is a prerequisite to its receiving payment 

from federally funded healthcare programs, including Medicaid and Medicare.”Dan 

Abrams Co., 2018 WL 5266863, at *8 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2018). 

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indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually submitted.’” United States 

ex rel. Solis v. Millennium Pharm., Inc., 885 F.3d 623, 628–29 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 

United Healthcare, 848 F.3d at 1180) (quotation marks omitted). Relator describes the 

alleged AKS violation in some detail, as discussed above, but he does not “allege particular 

details” of the scheme to submit false claims, nor provide “reliable indicia” that false claims 

were in fact submitted. Indeed, he says almost nothing about the false claims, asserting 

only on information and belief that billings for physician services occurred after 

Defendants’ purchase of Summit Center. Doc. 40 ¶ 62. This is not sufficient to satisfy 

Rule 9(b), even under the somewhat relaxed interpretation adopted by the Ninth Circuit in 

United Healthcare and other cases. 

The Court will dismiss Relator’s amended complaint for failure to satisfy Rule 9(b), 

but will permit him to file a second amended complaint. See Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 

USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003). Relator is cautioned, however, that the Court 

likely will not allow a third amended complaint. Plaintiff laid out his claims in an original 

complaint, and then amended the complaint after he saw Defendants’ first motion to 

dismiss. He will now be given a third opportunity to plead his claims. If he cannot plead 

a viable claim in three attempts, further attempts likely will be futile.5

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 44) is granted. The 

amended complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Relator may file a second amended 

complaint within 21 days of this order. If Defendants choose to file a motion to dismiss 

the second amended complaint, they shall file a single joint motion, within 14 days of the 

amended complaint, and shall limit the motion to 12 pages. Relator shall file a response 

5

In light of the defects identified above, the Court need not address Defendants’

argument that the amended complaint fails adequately to allege scienter. Docs. 45 at 13, 

47 at 9. Relator should nonetheless consider Defendants’ argument seriously in framing 

his second amended complaint.

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28

within 14 days, also limited to 12 pages. Defendants shall file a reply within 7 days, limited 

to 8 pages. The parties shall call the Court to advise it when briefing on the motion has 

been completed.

Dated this 30th day of September, 2020.

Case 3:18-cv-08041-DGC Document 54 Filed 09/30/20 Page 13 of 13