UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DAWNA KUHNE,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 08-14088

v.

LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY Hon. John Corbett O’Meara

E. BAXTER AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.,

a professional corporation,

Defendant.

_________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Before the court is Plaintiff’s motion for entry of judgment, filed May 27, 2009. 

Defendant filed a response on June 11, 2009. Pursuant to L.R. 7.1(e)(2) (E.D. Mich. 1998), the

court did not hear oral argument.

On March 27, 2009, the court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint because Defendant had

served an offer of judgment offering Plaintiff the maximum amount recoverable ($1,000) in this

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act suit. The court stated that it would enter a judgment and

retain jurisdiction to determine the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff has submitted a motion for entry of judgment, seeking $4,226.75 in attorney’s fees. 

Plaintiff’s attorney asserts that he has expended 15.95 hours on this case at a rate of $265 per

hour. Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s request for fees.

The FDCPA mandates the award of “a reasonable attorney’s fee” and costs to a

prevailing party. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). A reasonable fee is one that is “adequately

compensatory to attract competent counsel yet which avoids producing a windfall for lawyers.”

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 Plaintiff asserted that she did not receive the offer of judgment. She did receive it,

however, at the latest, when she was served with Defendant’s motion.

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Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Determining a

reasonable fee begins with calculating the product of a “reasonable hourly rate” and the “number

of hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

“A district court has broad discretion to determine what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate for

an attorney.” Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 533 (6th Cir. 1994). A useful guideline

in determining a reasonable hourly rate is the “prevailing market rate . . . in the relevant

community,” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984), defined as “that rate which lawyers of

comparable skill and experience can reasonably expect to command within the venue of the

court of record.” Adcock-Ladd v. Sec’y of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 350 (6th Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiff’s counsel, Gary Nitzkin, has been licensed to practice law in Michigan for

nearly twenty years. He avers that his usual and customary hourly rate is $265. The court finds

that, given Mr. Nitzkin’s experience, this rate is reasonable. See 2003 Michigan State Bar

Economics of Law Survey. Mr. Nitzkin also states that he expended 15.95 hours on this suit. 

The majority of this time, or 10.1 hours, was expended after Plaintiff received Defendant’s

motion to dismiss, detailing the offer of judgment. The offer of judgment offered Plaintiff the

maximum statutory recovery and should have been accepted, thereby ending this litigation.1

 The

court finds that the time Plaintiff’s counsel spent on this case after receiving Defendant’s motion

was not reasonable. See Lee v. Thomas & Thomas, 109 F.3d 302 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming

exclusion of attorney’s fees expended after offer of statutory maximum judgment under

FDCPA). Therefore, the court will reduce the recoverable hours to 5.85, producing an attorney

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fee of $1,550.25. The court does not discern reasons to increase or decrease this award and finds

it appropriate given the relative simplicity of this case and the work required. See Hensley, 461

U.S. at 430 n.3, 434 n.9 (listing additional factors to consider beyond the lodestar amount). The

court will also award costs in the amount of $350, representing the filing fee.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART, consistent with this opinion and order. 

s/John Corbett O’Meara

United States District Judge

Date: June 23, 2009

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties of

record on this date, June 23, 2009, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/William Barkholz

Case Manager

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