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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-2472

U NI T E D S TAT E SOF A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

E RI C M I C HA E L C H E E K

, Defen dant-Appellant.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the

Central Distri ct o f Il l i noi s. No. 11 -CR-1 00 40 — Jame s E. S had id , Chief Judg e.

A RGU E D O C T OB E R 31, 2013

— D E C I D E D J ANU AR Y 22, 2014

Before B AU E R

, M AN I O N

, and R OVN E R

, Circ uit Judges. M AN I O N , Cir cui t Judge. Eric Cheek di strib uted i llegal drugs for most of hi s adult li fe. Pri or to thi s case, he w as convic ted of twe l v e of fe n s e s, in c l uding nine felony drug offenses

. Fol l ow in g
an ext ensiv e inv esti gation, law enforcement offi cers arr ested Cheek in 2011 for drug di strib uti on acti viti es. A jury convic ted Cheek of four feloni es, and the di stric t court sentenced Cheek to 576 months’ i mpri sonment. Cheek appeals both hi s convic

tions and sentence. For the reasons di scu ssed below , w e affi rm.2 No. 12-2472 I. Background
Fr om 2002–2003, EricCheek regularly sold mari juana and

cr a ck co caine to a drug dealer , Cor ey Eason, and Eason’s girlfri end, T

abi tha Harr i s. Whi le Cheek w as in pri son in 2004,
one of hi s associ ates, Antonio Sey mon, supp li e d E a son and Harris wit h d rugs. After he w as released, Cheek again suppli ed Eason and Harri s wi th m arijuana and crack cocaine. He also supp li ed tw o other drug dealers, Langston P ates and Andra P ace, wit h mari juana. He w as sub sequently incarcer ated again in 2008, and before his release in 2010, Cheek informed Eason, Brandon Wi lli ams (wh o had been in the same pris on as Cheek in 2008), and Sey mon that he w ould conti nue selling drugs upon hi s release. In August 2010, la w e nfo rcement persuaded Eason to cooper ate in the inv esti gation o f Cheek. Eason perfor med contro lled buys of i llegal drugs from Cheek and secretly recor ded hi s interactions wi th Cheek. Wi th court authorizati on, law enforcement also intercepte d more than 20,000 phone conv ersations and tex t conv ersations fro m telephones used by Cheek and hi s associ ates. The inv esti gation
unc ov ered conti nued drug oper ations unti l Sey mon w as
arr ested on Mar ch 23, 2011. Cheek sub sequently w as arr ested on April 5, 2011. A gr and jury indi cted Chee k a nd three co-defendan ts, T abi tha Harris, Bran d o n Wi lli ams, and Antonio Sey mon, for

v arious drug o ffens es. Cheek w as ch arg ed wi th conspi ring t o possess and di strib ute mo r e t han 280 gr ams of crack cocaine and more than 100 kilograms of mari juana from 2001 to 2011; intending to di strib ute more than 28 gr ams of crack cocaine on August 9, 2010; intending to di strib ute mari juana on Mar ch 23, 2011; and using a telephone on F e br ua r y 11 and 23, 2011, toNo. 12-2472 3
faci li tate the drug conspi racy
. All three co-defendan ts pleaded gui lty . Cheek did n ot. Pri or to Cheek’s tr i al, the government fi led an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 expr essing i ts intent to seek an enhanc ed sentence for Cheek based on sev en prior felony drug convic t io ns
. In a separate pret rial fi ling, the government i denti fi ed sev eral potent ial exper t wi tnesses. Most of these exper ts w ere forensi c chemi sts who w ere no t called at tr i al becau se their opin i ons w ere presented at tr i al by sti pulati on. How ev er

, one of the pro posed exper ts (wh o di d not testif y at tr i al) w as a Drug Enforceme nt A gency supervis or who w as prepar ed to testif

y gener ally about the use of code w or ds by drug dealer s. A few weeks before t rial, Cheek sent a hand-w ritten lette r to Harris’s teenage daught e r in r esponse to a lette r he had receiv ed from the daughter

. Cheek’s lette r stated in pertinent part: I remember when I met y our li ttle butt too

. Y es I am you r unc le and y ou w ould probably be o ut there if I w asn’t hard on y ou at tim es. I only di d i t out of lov e for y ou and fear of what y ou could turn into wi thout gui d a nc e
. Y

ou w ere the one Eric & Mikey [Cheek’s sons] asked about 1 back in the day

. ... It’ s s t been so long since the days I tr i ed to teach y ou about a dollar by let tin g y ou w atch the boys for $10–$15. Now y ou’v e got you r o wn li ttle one. And a pret ty
one at that. Y

ou know she w ould lov e me right? I

am gonna fi ght to the end to be able to rais e my kids and see y all again soon. Fr ee [mea ning T yr ell4 No. 12-2472
Bini on] got 54 months, so he wi ll be o ut soon. My si tuation ain’t or w asn’t bad shall I say
. I w on’t li e Isa, they di dn’t have shi t on none of us. T o prove it why w ould they need y our Mom to li e on me i f they had something? But the w or se part i s her own lawy er tr i cked her becau se she could’v e bea t the

case. She couldn’t get more th an 5 i f she w ould’v e just plead gui lty without lying on me. Now my li fe

a nd t he li v es of my kids lay in the balanc e of he r stor y she let t he m make her say
. The most she can get i s 5 and me LIFE i f she doesn’t tell the truth. Isa that means I wi ll NEVER see my k ids o r fami ly again

. Nor see y all or any of the people I know an d lov e. Who i s gonna teach Er[i ]c & Mikey to fi ght and be men? Who i s gonna keep boys aw ay from Emmy [Cheek’s daughter] and not let her be li ke her mom? LIFE means forev er! So as y ou can see why I am saying thi s but, y es I lov e y ou
... & y our mom. But no I wi ll nev er respect her deci si on. St i ll I am look ing at LIFE and not becau se of anybody but her , the person I thought

w ould nev er li e on me or hurt me. Ev en if sh e t old the tr uth she w ouldn’t be look ing at shi t but maybe 6 more months but at least I w o ul d n’t be in jail for the Rest of my li fe. So I am praying that she don’t let them keep scaring her

. They are gonna use plenty of

scare tactic s. But i t’s up to us to ma n up or w oman up.

...No. 12-2472 5
If God i s wi lling y ou know who w on’t tell that li e and I w i ll be there to see y all in the near f uture. My lawy er [i s] saying that i s the on l y thi ng they hav e again st me i s her

. At tr i al, the government cal l e d law enforcement offi cers and coo p e rat ing wi tnesses, inclu ding Eason, Harris, P ates, P ace, and Vi ctor i a Wi lli ams (wh o li v ed wi th Eason duri ng the conspi racy). The g ov ernment also offere d selecti ons fr om the intercepte d telephone commu ni cati ons and interactions
recor ded by Eason. The government prov i ded the jury wi th tr ansc ripts of t he se recor dings that contai ned (wi thi n square brackets) interpret a ti ons of certain w or ds and phrases from the

recor dings. The intercepte d commu ni cati ons, recor dings, and tr ansc ripts w ere admi tte d into evidenc e by sti pulati on. Cheek

s tip u l a te d th a t the c om muni cati ons, record in gs, a n d tr a n s c rip ts
w e r e accu rat e, but refused to sti pulate to the accu racy of th e interpr etat i ons wi thi n the brackets. Before the recor dings w ere play ed, the di stric t court instructed the jury that the recor dings
w ere the a ctual evidenc e and that the tr ansc ripts w ere not evidenc e
. The government eli ci ted testim ony from FBI Speci al

1 Agent Greg Catey, the lead case age nt , who offered hi s opin i ons reg ard ing the meaning of the w or ds and phrases i mmedi ately precedi ng the bracketed information contai ned wi thi n the tr ansc ripts. Ag e nt Catey testifi ed that he had

e xt e n s iv e e xp e ri e n c e in drug enforcement and had partici pated in numerous inv esti gations duri ng hi s law enforcement career
.

This i nstructio n i s di ffi cul t to reco ncil e with the fact tha t the i ntercepted 1 communic atio ns, reco rdi ngs, and trans cri pts were admitted i nto evidence b y stipul atio n.6 No. 12-2472
How ev er

, he also testifi ed that he knew t he me aning of the

w or ds in the tr ansc ripts based on hi s speci fi c inv olv ement in the inv esti gation o f Cheek and hi s co-cons pi rat or s. Polic e Detecti v e James Fer guson si mi larly of fe r ed testim ony about

some of the code w or ds and phrases used by Cheek and hi s coconspi rat or s, and stated t hat hi s knowledge w as bas ed on hi s partici pation in thi s inv esti gation. In hi s defense, Cheek arg ued that he o nl y sold mari juana and di d not conspi re wi th any one. The jury convic ted Cheek

on all counts. By speci al v erdic t, the jury found that the conspi racy inv olv ed at leas t 28 gr ams but less than 280 gr ams of crack cocaine and 100 ki logr ams or more of marijuana. Cheek’s pre-sentence repo rt (“PSR”) found that Cheek w as responsible for the drug-quanti ty-equiv alent of betw een 3,000 and 10,000 kilograms of mari juana, wh ich placed hi s base offense lev el at 34. How ev er , the PSR rec ommended a 2-lev el upw ard adjustment under U.S.S .G. § 3 B 1.4 becau se Cheek used a minor in commi ssi o n o f t he conspi racy; a 4-lev el upw ard adjustment under U.S.S .G. § 3 B 1 .1(a) becau se Cheek

w as the leader of a drug-tr affi cking or gani zation; and a 2-lev el upw a rd adjustment under U.S.S .G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justic e becau se of th e l e t ter he sent to Harris’s daughter

. The PSR recommended a cri minal hi stor y catego ry o f I V due to nine cri minal hi stor y poin ts. (The PSR found that C he e k had tw elv e prior convic tions, inc luding nine felony drug convic

tions .) Ultim ately

, the PSR calc ulated Ch e e k ’s tot al offense l ev el at 42. Gi v en Cheek’s cri minal his tor y catego ry of IV , t he PSR calcu lated Cheek’ s Gu i delines range to be 360 months to li fe. Cheek objecte d to the obstruction of justic e enhanc ement. But ev en wi thout that enhanc ement, Cheek’s Gui delines rangeNo. 12-2472 7

w ould hav e been 360 months to life. Cheek did n ot o therwis e object to the PSR’s Gui delines calc ulati ons or findings reg arding hi s pri or convic tions

. Counts I and II carried the gr eatest statuto ry maxi mum penalti es: 480 months. The statuto ry maxi mum p e na lty for count III w as 120 months. The statuto ry maxi mum penalti es fo r counts IV and V w ere 48 months. How ev er , 21 U

. S

. C

. § 841(b) (1)( B)’s career cri minal prov i si on autho r i zed the di stric t court to i mpose a sentence of up to li fe on ei ther count I or II. In o r d e r t o do so, the di stric t court mus t “before prono unc ement of sentence inqui re of the person wi th respect to whom the information w as fi led whether he affi r ms or deni es that he has been prev i ously convic ted as alleged in the information, and shall inform hi m that any challen ge to a prior convic tion whi ch i s not made before sentence i s i mposed may not there after be r a i sed to attack the sentence.” 21 U.S.C. § 851(b)

. At sen tencing, the di stric t court di d not comply wi th § 851(b)

. The government requested a pris on sent ence of “not less than 40 y ears,” and arg ued that Cheek w as “a bane to soci ety ” who se oper ations cov ered si gni fi cant port i ons of Illi noi s and inclu ded enormo us drug quan titi es. The government emphasi zed that i t w as unus ual that Cheek had managed to remain out of cus tody afte r r a ck ing up so many prior felony drug convic tions

. The government characterized Cheek as a di shonest and manipulativ e person who w as wi lling to use a minor to further hi s conspi racy and us e d p ro fane language in her presence when she “couldn’t get hi s money laundering down right.” In closing, the government reiterat ed i ts request “f or a sentence w i thi n the gui deline range.”8 No. 12-2472
In response, Cheek’s atto rney emphas i zed that v iolence

w as nev er par t of Cheek ’s admi tte dly ext ensi v e drug-deali ng
career
. Cheek’s atto rney also observ ed that, i f the di stric t court i mposed a 480-month sentence, Cheek w ould be “77 y ears old i f he w as ev er able to get out of the peni tentiary .” During hi s allocuti on, Cheek admi tte d that he w as not “the best person in the w or ld,” but repeat edly asserted that he w as “not the w or st person in the w or ld ei ther .” Cheek bri efly detailed a p ast inci dent in whi ch he had assi sted the poli ce by informi ng them that accu sati ons again st Detecti v e Fer guson (wh o happened to be a wi tness at Cheek’s tr i al), inv olving mi scondu ct allegedly occurrin g in Cheek’s presence, w ere false. Cheek also told the di stric t court that hi s mother had di ed when he w as 16 y ear s old, and that he had four chi ldren whom he lov ed and w anted to be t here for

. After reci tin g the factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3 553(a), the di stric t court told Cheek, “I’m not saying y ou’re a bad person.” The di strict co ur t commented that Cheek w as clearly an intelli ge nt person who spoke w ell and made a “ni ce appear ance .” But the di stric t court noted that, despi te Cheek’s potent i al, he had chosen from a y ou ng a g e to engage in cri minal dr ug acti vity

. The dis tr i ct court observ ed that Cheek had o pport uni ties to turn asi de, but ti me and again “chose to conti nue in the drug w o r l d , and the drug tr affi cking w or ld,” wh ich l e a ds “only to violence and death on ci ty street s of y oung peo p l e o r a sentence to pris on.” The di stric t court conclu ded that based on Cheek’s deci si on to play by hi s o wn rules and si gn ific a nt hi stor y of cri minal acti vity , a si gni fi cant pris on sentence w as appr opriate. Therefore , the di stric t court i mposed pris on sentences of 576 months on counts I and II. TheNo. 12-2472 9
di stric t c ourt also i mposed pris on sentences of 120 months on count III and 48 months on counts IV and V

. The court di rected that all sentences w ould run concu rr ently

. Cheek appeals both hi s convi cti ons and s entences. 2 II. Analysis On appea l , C he ek arg ues that hi s convic tions should be

v acated becau se Agent Catey ’s testimony inclu ded exper t testim ony that should not hav e b e en admi tte d, and becau se the jury sh o ul d not hav e been prov i ded (ei ther at tr i al or in deliberations) wi th copi es of the tr ansc ripts c ontaining Age nt Catey ’ s interpr etat i ons (in square brackets) of v arious w or ds and phrases from the recor dings play e d at tr i al. Cheek also arg ues that hi s sentence should be v acated becau se the di stric t court fai led to comply wi th the procedure prov i ded in § 851(b)

. Addi tionally

, Cheek contends that the di stric t court violated hi s rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constituti on as interpr eted by the Supreme Court in Apprendi

v
. New Jersey, 5 3 0 U

. S

. 466 (2000), when the di stric t court inv oke d § 84 1 (b)(1)(B ), whi ch enhanc ed Cheek’s potent i al sentence bey ond the 480-month statuto ry maxi mum penalti es for co un ts I and II, becau se the jury di d not find bey ond a reasonable doubt tha t C he e k had been convic ted of the prior feloni es supp or tin g appli cati on of § 841(b) (1)( B). Cheek also arg ues that hi s sentence i s procedurally unreasonable becau se the di stric t court err ed in i mposing the obstr uc tion of justic e enha nc ement and fai led to consi der meaningfully the arg uBecause Cheek’s sentences run concur rentl y, we refe r to them as his 57 6- 2 month sentence.10 No. 12-2472

ments Cheek o ffered in mi tigati on of hi s sentence under § 3553(a). Fin ally

, Cheek contends that hi s 576-month sentence i s a de facto li fe sentence that i s substanti v ely unreasonable. A. Agen t C a t e y’ s T

e s t i m ony and the Opini ons Contained in the T ranscri pts Provided to the Jury Cheek’s challen ges to hi s convic tions aris e from port i ons of Agent Catey ’s testim ony at tr i al and from the use of tr ansc ripts (both duri ng tr i al and deliberations) containing Agent Catey ’s interp ret ations (in square brackets) of v arious w or ds and phrases wi thi n t he t r ansc ripts. Becaus e he di d not object, Cheek concedes that our rev i ew i s for plain err or
. “Applyin g thi s standard, w e rev erse only when w e find: ‘(1) an err or or defect (2) that i s clear or obvious (3) affecti ng the defendant’s sub stanti al rights (4) and seri ously i mpugning the fai r ness, integr i ty , or publi c reputat i on of judi ci al proceedings.’” United States v
. Johnson , 680 F .3d 966, 973 (7th Ci r
. 2012) (quoti ng United S tat es v. Anderson , 604 F .3d 997, 1002 (7th Ci r . 2010)). Agent Catey’s T

esti mony Cheek contends that Agent Catey offered exper t testim ony wh e n testif

yin g as a lay wi tness. Speci fi cally , Cheek arg ues that Agent Cat e y testifi ed as an exper t about the meaning of drug code w or ds and phrases used by the conspi rat or s, the pric e for a kilo of cocaine, the main ingredient in crack cocaine, how a wir e t ap i s physi cally conduc ted, and the meaning of

such ter ms as “wi re ro om, minim i zation, sess i ons, magneto optical di sk, pen reg i st e r t r ap and tr ace, spin off wi ret ap, speci al federa l o ffic er

, case agent, contro lled buy , front and contro lled payment.” Cheek arg ues that allowing Agent Catey t o offer exper t testim ony under the gui se of lay tes t imo nyNo. 12-2472 11
cloaked that testim ony in an aura of exper tis e wi thout subjecting i t to the r eli abi li ty standards of Fed. R. Evid. 702 or the mandatory pret rial di scl osure requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P

. 16. The government may use a law enforcement offi cer as both

an exper t and lay wi tness in the same tr i p to the wi tness stand. United States v
. Y

ork , 572 F .3d 415, 425 (7th Ci r
. 2009). How ev er , there are some inherent dangers wi th this k ind of dual testimony . For example, the w i tness’s dual role mi ght confuse the jury

. Or , the j ury mi ght be smi tte n by an exper t’s “aura of speci al reliab ilit y” and there fore giv e hi s factual testim ony undu e w ei ght. O r

, “ t he jury may undu ly credi t the opin i on testim ony of an inv esti gating offi cer based on a perception that the exper t w as privy to facts about the defendant not presented at tr i al.” Id . (ci tations omi tte d). The government arg ues that these concerns do not apply in thi s case becau se Agent Catey w as only called as a lay wi tness. As far as Agent Catey ’s testim ony about the drug code w or ds and phrases used by Ch e ek and hi s co-cons pi rat or s are concerned, w e agr ee. When a law enforcement offi cer testifi es about the meaning of drug code w or ds used by defendants based on personal knowledge obtained from the inv esti gation of t ho se d efendants, the offi cer i s testif yin g as a lay wi tness. United States v
. Mor

eland, 703 F .3d 97 6 , 9 8 3 (7th Ci r
. 2012). How ev er

, i f the offi cer testifi es from “exper tis e havin g deriv ed from hi s inv olv ement in other drug inv est ig a t io ns,” then the offi cer i s testif

yin g as an e xper t wi tness. Id. As the lead case agent, Ag e nt C a tey w as inti mately inv olv ed in the inv esti gation of Cheek and hi s co-cons pi rat or s. For example, he reviewed more than 20,000 intercepte d commu ni cati on s and12 No. 12-2472
interv i ew ed more than 100 wi tnesses as par t of the inv esti gation into the conspi racy
. Mor eov er

, when the prosecutor questi oned A g e nt C atey about the meaning of the drug code

w or ds used by the conspi rat or s, the p r o se cutor phrased hi s questi ons in ter ms of Agent Catey ’s “understanding based on thi s inv esti gation” or “famil ia rity wi th thi s inv esti gation.” These facts convin ce us that Agent Catey ’s testim ony about the drug code w or ds and phrases used by Ch e e k and hi s coconspi rat or s “w as based on hi s own personal observ ations and perceptions deriv ed from thi s particu lar case.” United States v
. Rollin s , 544 F .3d 820, 8 3 3 (7th Ci r
. 2008) (finding law enforcement wi tness’s interpr etat i ons of code w or ds as admi ssi ble lay testim ony where wi tness based interpr etat i on onl y on l i s te nin g fi rst-hand to numerous recor ded telephone calls in that particu lar inv esti gation). And the fact that Agent Catey w as an exper i enced inv esti gato r does not alter thi s conclu si on. See Mor elan d, 7 0 3 F .3d at 983 (“Had the agent been testif yin g
e x cl usi v ely as a lay wi tness about the code w or ds he had learned the meaning of in the course of hi s inv esti gation of the defendants’ conspi racy , i t w ould no t ha v e been i mproper to intro duce hi m to the jury as an exper i enced inv esti gato r , rat her than a novice li stening to taped conv ersations of drug conspi r ator s for the fi rst t i me, any more t han i t i s imp ro per t o ask an ey ewi tness whether he has goo d vis i on.”). At the v ery least, i t
w ould not hav e been “clear or obvious” to the d istric t court that Agent Catey w as offerin g exper t testim ony about the drug code w or ds and p hrases us ed by the conspi rat or s. Mor eov er

, ev en i f Agent Catey ’s testim ony about the drug code w or ds and phrases used by the conspi rat or s could be labeled as i mproper ly admi tte d exper t testim ony , any err orNo. 12-2472 13

w ould be harmless. Fi rst, the ov erwhelming evi dence offered at tr i al demonstrate s that Agent Catey ’s interpr etat i ons of the drug code w or ds and phrases used by Cheek and hi s conspi rator s w ere accu rat e. For exam ple, Cheek focus es on Agent Catey ’s testim ony that the w or ds or phrases “girl,” “girly ,” or “bum ping into ol’ girl ” w e r e refer ences to “cocaine or crack cocaine.” Harris, Eason, and Wi lli ams testifi ed that these ter ms refer red to cocaine or crack cocaine. See T rial T r
. 161 (Harr is testif yin g that “ol’ girl” refer red to “cocaine”); 428–29 (Eason testif yin g that “ol’ g ir l ” means “cocaine” and “girl” means “cocaine”); 675–76 (Wi lli ams testif yin g that “Chris tin a, ol’ girl, [and] whi te girl” refer to “crack coca ine ” ). And Goodwin testifi ed that Cheek used these ter ms to re fe r t o co caine. See T rial T r
. 631–33; 637 (Goodwin testif yin g that Cheek used “ol’ girl” to refer to “c ocaine”). Second, at or al argument, Cheek’s

couns el conceded that Agent Catey w ould li kely hav e been quali fi ed as an exper t. See United S tat es v. Jones & Brown , Nos. 11-3864 & 12-169 5 , sli p op. at 10, 2014 WL 68143 (7th Ci r
. Jan. 9, 2014) (finding no harm from fai ling to comply wi th Rule 702 wi th respect to a detectiv e who offered exper t testi mony where t he defendant di d not challen ge the detectiv e’s quali fi cati on s
or the v ali di ty of hi s testim ony); United States v
. T ucker, 714 F .3d 1006, 1016 (7th Ci r . 2013) (“Further , [the defendant] does not questi on Offi cer Baranek’ s quali fi cati ons, and there i s li ttle doubt he w ould hav e been able to be quali fi ed as an exper t, thus fai lure to ‘formal ly anoint’ hi m as such i s harmless.”)

. Indeed, before tr i al the government di scl osed that i t w ould call

a DEA agent to testif

y reg ardin g the meaning of drug cod e
w or ds and phrases used by the drug dealers in gener al. Thus, Cheek had notic e that the government inte nd e d to offer the14 No. 12-2472
kin d of testim ony that Agent C a t e y offered concerning the meaning of drug code w or ds and phrases used by the conspi r ator s. See Jones & Brown , Nos. 11-3864 & 12-1695, sli p op. at 10. For both these reasons, no har m co uld hav e come to Cheek from fai ling to subject Agent Catey ’s testim ony about the drug code w or ds and phrases used by the conspi rat or s to the reliab i li ty standards of Rule 702 or the mandatory pret rial di scl osure re qui rements of Rule 16. Assu ming that Agent Catey ’s testim ony about the drug

co d e w or ds and phrases used by the conspi rat or s w as lay testim ony

, Cheek contends alter nati v ely that the testim ony
w as not “helpfu l,” and cons equently in admi ssi ble, see Fed. R. Evid. 701(b) , becau se Agent Catey testifi ed that the code w or ds could refer ei ther to cocaine or crack cocaine—but Cheek w as only charged wi th crack cocaine offenses

. W e di sagree. It

w ould hav e bee n imp r o per for Agent Catey to state that the code w or ds refer red only to crack cocaine giv en that they also could refer to powder cocaine. Agent Catey ’s testim ony may 3 hav e been insu ffi ci ent on i ts own to supp or t Cheek’s crack cocaine convic tions, but the testim ony w as certainly helpfu l to the jury inasmuch as i t excluded any other potent i al interpr etation of the code w or ds besi des ei ther “cocain e ” or “crack cocaine.” And Cheek does not rais e an insu ffi ci ency arg ument on appeal. 4

Eason conf i rmed tha t “o l ’ gir l ” and “gi rl ” can refe r ei ther to crack coc aine 3

or regul ar coc aine.”

Relatedl y, Cheek argues tha t this te st i mo ny b l urred the di stincti on 4 b etween powd er coc aine and crack coc aine, which coul d hav e confused the (co ntinued. ..)No. 12-2472 15
All of Agent Catey ’s remain ing testim ony about wh i ch Cheek complains could be proper ly admi tte d lay testim ony
. A wi tness could form tr ue opin i ons reg ardin g whether cocaine i s the main ingredient in crack cocaine, how a wir e t a p i s conducted, or the meanings of ter ms such as “wi re ro om, mini mi zation, sess i ons, magneto optical di sk, pen reg i ster tr ap and tr ace, sp in off wi ret ap, speci al federal offi cer , case agent, contro lled buy

, front and contro lled payment,” wi thout that knowledge being based on “sci entifi c, techni cal, or other speci ali zed knowledge.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. For example, the

( ...c onti nued) 4 jury i nto convicti ng Cheek fo r crack coc aine of fenses even though the jury onl y b el i e ve d t ha t Cheek had commi tted powd er coc aine of fenses. But evidence admitted at tri al dis tin gu ish ed b etw ee n p ow der and crack coc aine. See Tri al Tr. 67 2 (Wi l l i ams testifying tha t she rece i v e d bo t h “ powd er and hard crack”); 15 5 (Harri s testifying tha t she’d nev er seen Cheek “wi th crack,” b ut tha t twice b ought coc aine fro m him); 53 2 (sti p u l at i o n di stinguishi ng b etween “co caine b ase” and “ p owde r coc aine”)

. And Cheek’s def ense wa s not tha t he was sel l i ng powd er coc aine i nstead of crack

coc aine. Mo reo v er, as noted , whil e Agent Catey’s testimo ny ab out the drug cod e word s and phrases used by the conspi rators woul d not hav e b een suffi ci ent on i ts own to suppor t Cheek’s crack co caine co nv i cti ons, C heek do es not raise an i nsuffi ci ency argumen t o n appeal. A nyway, the go v ernment of fere d suffi ci ent evidence tha t Cheek c ommi tted the crack coc aine of fenses with which he was charged. See, e.g. , Tri al Tr. 11 3 (Age nt Cate y testifying tha t co ope rating witnesses reco rded purchases o f crack coc aine fro m Cheek); 12 5 (Harr i s testifying tha t Cheek’s conspi racy di stributed crack coc aine); 40 5– 06 (Eason testifying tha t he obtained crack coc aine fro m Cheek); 61 1 (Det e c t i ve Ferguson testifying ab out contro l l ed b uy of crack f r o m Cheek). Indeed, Eason testif i ed tha t Cheek suppl i ed him wi th 6 3 grams of crack coc aine every few weeks duri ng 20 02 –2 00 3, 20 06 –2 00 8, and 20 10 –2 01 1. See Tri al Tr. 40 5– 0 6 , 4 1 1– 13 , 41 7– 20

. Thus, Cheek sol d signi fi

cantly mor e than 280 grams of crack co caine to just o ne o f hi s customers.16 No. 12-2472
wi tness mi ght hav e observ ed another person maki ng crack cocaine or conduc tin g a wi ret ap; or the wi tness mi ght cons ult

a di cti onary

. When Agent Catey testifi ed about the ingredients of crack cocaine , he di d not i denti fy the source of hi s knowledge. And when he testifi ed that $23.50 refer red to $23,500 for

a kilo of cocaine, he testifi ed that hi s opin i on w as based on hi s
rev i ew of the calls

. Wi th respect to thi s tes t imo ny , preci sely because A g e nt Catey di d not speci fy whether hi s opin i ons
w ere based o n “ sci entifi c, techni cal, or other speci ali zed knowledge,” w e cannot say that i t w as “clear or obvious” that the testimony w as expertin nature. Mor eov er

, Cheek does not di spute the accu racy of any of th is testim ony

. Indeed, as noted, Cheek’s couns el conceded 5 that Agent Catey w ould li kely hav e been quali fi ed as an exper t. Therefore , the concern that Agent Catey ’s unc ontested testim ony may hav e been cloaked in an aura of exper tis e, whi le not concomi tantly being subjected to t he reliab i li ty standar ds of Rule 702 or the mandatory pret rial di scl osure requirements of Rule 16, could not hav e affec ted Cheek’s sub stanti al rights. See United States v
. Sykes , 614 F .3d 303, 312 (7th Ci r
. 2010) (“An

err or affec ts sub stanti al rights when i t ‘affected the outcome of the di stric t court proceedings.’” (quoti ng United States v
. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993))). Perhaps Cheek beli ev es that Agent Catey ’s t esti mony on these matter s cloaked the rest of hi s t e st imony—i nclu ding matter s that w ere contested—in an aura of exper tis e. But

Detecti v e Ferguson also testif i ed tha t “$ 23 .50 ” mean t “$ 2 3,5 00 .” But 5 Cheek do es not object to Detecti v e Ferguso n’s testimo ny.No. 12-2472 17
Cheek does not explain how Agent Catey ’s undi sputed testim ony about the ingredients of crack cocaine, the meanings of techni cal ter ms, or the p r ocess for conduc tin g a wi ret ap
w ould bolster the rest of hi s testim ony
. Mor eov er

, the government di d not ex pli ci tly present Agent Catey to the jury as an expert

. Consequently

, there w as li ttle ris k t ha t t he jury mi ght hav e been confu sed by Agent Catey ’s “dual ro les” as b oth an exper t and lay wi tness, that hi s status as an exper t mi ght

ov eraw e the jury

, or that t he j ur y mi ght hav e mi stakenly beli ev ed that hi s exper t opin i ons w ere based on facts about the defendant not presented at tr i al. See United States v
. Garcia-Avila, 737 F .3d 484, 489 (7th Ci r
. 2013) (observing that the

r isk o f unfai r prej udi ce i s reduced where a wi tness does no t t esti fy both as an exper t and as a lay wi tness); Mor e l an d, 7 0 3 F .3d at 983 (finding no “realis tic danger” that the jury mi ght be smi tte n by the agent’ s testim ony). And the evidenc e of Cheek’s gui lt w as ov erwhelming—Cheek admi tte d that he sold

ma rijuana, and Detecti v e Fer guson as w ell as a numb er of Cheek’s co-cons pi rat or s testifi ed that Cheek di strib uted crack cocaine. Therefore , any err or in admi tting Ag e nt Catey ’s testim ony o n these matter s w ould be harmless. See United States v
. Gayt an , 649 F .3d 573, 582–83 (7th Ci r
. 2011); Rollin s , 544 at 833 (“Besi des, the other evid e nce of gui lt of these tw o defendants i s so ov erwhelming that ev en i f the [o ff i cer’s] ‘i mpressi ons’ testim ony had crossed the line, i t w ould hav e, at
w or st, amounted to har mless err or .”). The T ranscri pts Cheek also contends that the di stric t court err ed in a l l ow ing the jury to hav e the tr ansc ripts (both duri ng tr i al and deliberati on s ) c onta inin g Agent Catey ’s interpr etat i ons
. Th e s e in te rp re -18 No. 12-2472
tatio n s we re inserted in square brackets following v arious code

w o r d s and phrases from the recor dings. Speci fi cally , Cheek arg ues that thi s unfai rly bo l st ered Agent Catey ’s testim ony and us urped the fact-finding func tion of the jury

. 6 “[D] i stric t courts hav e wi de di screti on in deter mining whether to allow j ur ies to use wri tte n tr ansc ripts as ai ds in li stening to audi otape recor dings.” United States v
. Breland, 356 F .3d 787, 794 (7th Ci r
. 2004) (ci tin g United States v
. Ke c k , 7 73 F .2d 759, 7 6 6 (7t h Ci r
. 1985)). And “[w] e hav e prev i ously per mit t ed tr ansc ripts to be admi tte d at tr i al and used by the jury duri ng their deliberations when the underlyin g tapes are actually play ed duri ng the tr i al (as w as the case here).” Breland, 356 F .3d at 794–95 (collec t ing cases ). In fact, Cheek’s couns el explic i tly informed the di stric t court th a t t he defense had no objection to prov i ding the tr ansc ripts to the jury

. See T r
. 67, 838. Ev en assu ming ar

guen do that prov i ding the tr ansc ripts wi th Agent Catey ’s interpr etat i ons t o the jury w as er ro r , any er ro r
w ould not hav e been “clear or obvious” to the di st ric t court giv en our precedent ci ted abov e and Cheek’s di scl ai mer of any objection. Mor eov er

, Cheek does not i denti fy whi ch (i f any) of AgentCatey ’s interpr etat i ons contained in the tr ansc ripts are in a ccu rat e. If Agent Catey ’s interpr etati on s a re c or re c t, Ch e e k’ s sub stanti al rights could not hav e bee n affec ted and the

Based on i nte r p retatio ns i n the trans cri pts tha t read “co caine/ crack 6

coc aine,” Cheek r ei terates his c oncer n tha t the jury mayhav e been misl ed i nto c o nvi cti ng him fo r the crack coc aine of fenses b ased on evidence tha t may hav e onl y pro v ed powd er coc aine of fenses. For the reasons di scussed ab ove, thi s argument

i s witho ut meri t.No. 12-2472 19
fai rness, integr i ty

, or publi c reputat i on of judi ci al proceedings could not hav e been seri ously i mpugned. 7
For supp or t, Cheek ci tes our deci si on United States v
. Berry, 9 2 F .3d 597, 601 (7th Ci r
. 1996), wherei n, unbeknownst t o t he judge, the ju r y ret ained tr ansc ripts prov i ded to them at tr i al duri ng t he ir deliberations. The di stric t court gr anted the defendant a new tr i al and the government appealed. On 8 appeal, w e observ ed that “the government’s case w as not stro ng,” and t hat our “deferential r eview” led us to conclu de that the di stric t court di d not abus e i ts di screti on in gr anti ng a
new tr i al. Id. at 601–02. W e stated that “[a] cri minal defendant has ‘a right to be tr i ed on the basi s of the evidenc e admi tte d at

We observ e tha t Detecti v e Ferguson testif i ed tha t a numb er of the word s 7

or phrases i n the trans cri pts mean t wha t the i nterpretati ons i n the adjacent squa re b rackets stat e d

. F o r exa mple , the trans cri pts contained the word “ki l ograms” i n squa re b rackets fo l l owi ng the word “boo ks, ” t he phrase “1 /8 th ounce or ‘8-ball ’ sam pl e” i n squa re b rackets fo l l owi ng the word “ba l l ,” and the phrase “$ 23 ,50 0 per kil ogram” i n squa re b rackets fo l l owi ng the numb er “$ 23 .50 ,” Detecti v e Ferguson testifie d tha t he b el i eved the word “boo k” as used i n t he reco rded conversatio ns b etween Cheek and others refe rred to a “ kil ogram of coc aine.” He al so t esti fi ed tha t the word “ba l l ”
mean t “a b all of coc aine” tha t was b ei ng given to a customer as a “sample. ” And he testif i ed tha t “$ 23 .50 ” mean t “$ 23 ,50 0.” Yet Cheek do es not contend

o n appe al tha t the i nclusi on of these i nterpretati ons i n squa re b rackets i n the trans cri pts unfairl y b ol stered Detec t i v e Ferguson’s tri al testimo ny or usurped the fact-fi nding r ol e o f the j ury.
Actuall y, the government appealed twice

. The fi rst time we remanded fo r 8 the di stric t cour t to expli ci tly deter min e wh e ther there was a reasonab l e possi b i l i ty tha t the jury’s use of the trans cri pt duri ng del i be r ati ons prej udi ced the def endant. See United States v. Berry, 64 F.3d 30 5, 30 8 (7 th Ci r. 19 95 ).20 No. 12-2472
hi s tr i al, and thi s right may be violated i f the jury get s acces s to ext ra-recor d e v idence ... ev en i f t he acces s is not the result of any prosecutor i al mis conduc t.’” Id. at 600 (quoti ng United S ta tes v
. Sabab u , 891 F .2d 1308, 1333 (7th Ci r
. 1989)). But her e , unli ke in Berry, the tr ansc ripts prov i ded to the jury we re admi tte d into evidenc e at tr i al by sti pulati on. See T r
. 67, 88. And our standard of rev i ew i s at th e o p p o site edge of the spectrum in thi s case—in Berry our hi ghly deferen t ia l rev i ew (abu se of d i screti on) fav or ed the defendant’s posi tion, whereas here our ev en more hi ghly defe r e nti al rev i ew (plain err or ) fav or s the government’s posi tion. Mor eov er , unli ke in Berry, the go v ernment’s case i s v ery stro ng—composed as i t isfrom the testim ony of fi v e of Cheek’s co-cons pi rat or s and Detecti v e Fer guson as we l l a s re c or d in gs of Cheek’s commu ni cati ons and interactions wi th one of hi s cus tomer s. Therefore , w e conclu de that the di stric t court di d not plainly err —or at lea st t ha t any
err or w ould be harmless—when the court perm itted Agent Catey ’s testim ony and allow ed the jury to hav e the tr ansc ripts contai ning Age nt Catey ’s interpr etat i ons in squ are bracke ts. B. Cheek’s Ch allenges t o his Sent ence Cheek arg ues that hi s 576-month p ris on sentence i s procedurally unreasonable becau se the di stric t courtfai led to comply wi th the pr ocedure provided in § 851(b) , err oneously inv o k e d § 841(b) (1)( B), err oneously i mposed the 2-lev el obstruction of justic e enhanc ement, and fai led to co ns i der meaningfu lly Cheek’s mi tigati on arg uments. Addi tionally , Cheek contends that a 576-month sentence is a de facto li fe sentence that i s substanti v ely unreasonable.No. 12-2472 21
Secti on 851(b)/Apprendi Arguments Cheek arg ues that hi s 576-month sentence mus t be v acated becau se the di stric t co urt fai led to comply wi th procedural requirements of 21 U.S.C. § 851(b) a nd becau se the sentence violates hi s rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendme nt s to the Constituti on a s interpr eted by the Supreme Court in Apprendi

. None of the c ounts for wh i ch Cheek was convic ted c arr i es
a statuto ry maxi mum penalty gr eater than 480 months’ i mpri sonment. How ev er , pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1)( B), the di stric t courtcould s entence Cheek to a pris on ter m of up to li fe on counts I and II prov i ded that Cheek ha d been prev i ously convic ted o f a t least one drug felony

. The di stric t court only could inv oke § 841(b) (1)( B) i f the requirements of § 851 were met. Cheek contends that the di stric t court fai led to
co mp l y wi th § 851(b) ’s requirement that the court “after convic tion but before pr o no unc ement of sentence inqui re of the person wi th respect to whom the information w as fi led whether he a ff irms or deni es that he has been prev i ously convic ted as alleged inthe in formation.” Generally

, “[w] hether the di stric t court follow ed proper sentencing procedure i s a legal questi on rev i ew ed de nov o.” United States v
. Pape, 601 F .3d 743, 746 (7th Ci r
. 2010). How ev er , the government urges us to rev i ew the di stric t court’s compli

ance wi th § 851(b) for plain err or becau se Cheek di d not object to the cri minal hi stor y secti on of hi s PSR and “di d not object to the alleged procedural defi ci ency at the tim e of sentencing
... .” United States v
. Corona-G onzalez, 628 F .3d 336, 340 (7th Ci r
. 2 0 1 0 ). But the standard of our rev i ew does not affec t th e22 No. 12-2472

outcome in t hi s case. “No person who stands convic ted o f a n offense under thi s part may challen ge the v ali di ty of any prior convic tion a l leged under thi s secti on whi ch occurred more than fi v e y ears before the date of the information allegin g such prior convic tion.” 21 U.S.C § 851(e). And fi v e of Cheek’s sev en felony drug convic tions li sted in the § 851(a) information fi led by the government prior to tr i al occurred more than fi v e y ears before the date the information w as fi led. Thus, Ch e e k w as barred fr om challenging the v ali di ty of any of these fi v e prior felony drug convic tions

. Only one such convic tion w as needed to tr i gge r § 841(b) (1)( B ). “ A di stric t court i s not required to ‘adhere to the rituals of § 851(b) where a defendant, as a matter of law , i s precluded from attacking the convic tion formin g the basi s of the enhanc ement information.’” United States v
. Flores , 5 F .3d 1070, 1082 (7th Ci r
. 1993) (quoti ng United States v
. Nanez , 694 F .2d 405, 413 (5th Ci r
. 1982)). So the di st r ict co urt di d not
err ; but ev en i f i t di d, any err or w as harmless. See United States

v
. W i l liams , 298 F .3d 688, 692–93 (7th Ci r
. 2002) (finding harmless any err or resulti ng from the di stric t court’s fai lure to comply wi th § 851(b) ); United States v
. Arango-Montoya, 61 F .3d 1331, 1339 (7th Ci r
. 1995) (per curi am) (“Si nce [the defendant] atte mpts to challen ge hi s prior convic tion and § 851(e) bars hi m from doing s o, any fai lure b y the dis tr i ct court t o ‘infor m hi m that any challen ge to a prior convic tion whi ch i s no t made before sen t e nc e i s i mposed may not there after be rais ed to attack t he sentence,’ 21 U.S.C. § 851(b), i s harmless .”). Cheek also contends that hi s 576-month sentence violates hi s rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments a s int e r pret ed by Appr

endi . In Apprendi, the Supr eme Courtheld that “any fact that increases the penalty fo r a cri me bey ond theNo. 12-2472 23 prescribed statuto ry maxi mum mus t be sub mi tte d to a jury , and pr ov ed beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. The questi on of wh e t her Cheek had been convic ted of any prior drug feloni es i s a factual pr e r equi si te to the di stric t court’s inv ocat io n of § 841(b) (1)( B) and i mposi tion of a pris on ter m gr eater than 480 mont hs

. I t i s undi sputed that thi s questi on
w as not subm i tte d to t he jury

. Cheek concedes that w e rev i ew for plain e rr or becau se he fai led to rais e any Apprendi arg ument before the di stric t court. But w e need not dally ov er the standard of our rev i ew becau se Apprendi expr essly excludes any questi on of “the fact of a prior convic tion” from the scope of i ts holding. Id. at 490. And ev en i f we thought the Supreme Court w as going to reconsi der thi s ruli ng, i t has “told the low er courts in no unc ert ain ter ms to leav e the ov err uling of i ts precedents to it

. ” U nited States v
. Ousl ey, 698 F .3d 972, 976 (7th Ci r . 2012) (qu oting United S tat es
v
. Cephus , 684 F .3d 703, 709 (7th Ci r
. 2012)). T o the ext ent Cheek wi shes to preserve hi s Apprendi arg ument for the Su p r eme Court, he has done s o. Obst ructi on of J usti ce Enhancement Next, Cheek contends t ha t the di stric t court i mproper ly calculated hi s Gui delines rang e when i t i mposed a 2-lev el upw ard adjustment under U.S

. S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justic e. Gui deline U.S.S .G. § 3C1.1 prov i des: If (1) the defendant wi llful ly obstructed or i mpeded,

or atte mpted to obstruct or i mpede, the admini stration of jus t ice wi th respect to the inv esti gation, prosecuti on, or sentencing of the instan t offense of convic tion, and (2) the ob s tru c tiv e conduc t relat ed to24 No. 12-2472 (A) the defendant's offense of conv ict i on and any
r e l e v ant conduc t; or (B) a closely relat ed offense, increase the offense lev el by 2 lev els. The dist r i ct court thought that Cheek’s lette r to Harris’s daughter w as an atte mpt to convin ce “the chi ld to get to he r mother .” Th us, ov er Cheek’s objection, the di stric t court conclu ded that the lette r constituted an obstructi on of j usti ce. How ev er

, the di stric t court remark ed, “I don’t find [the lette r]

v ery si gni fi cant.” “Whe n r eviewing an obstruction of justic e enhanc ement,
w e r eview the underlyin g factual findings, li ke all such findings, for clear err or

, ‘and w e rev i ew de nov o whether those findings adequately supp or t the enhanc ement.’” United States

v
. T aylor , 637 F .3d 812, 817 (7th Ci r
. 2011) (quoti ng United States

v
. V allar , 635 F .3d 271, 288 (7th Ci r
. 2011)). Cheek contends that the distr i ct court err ed in conclu ding that the lette r w as obstructiv e becau se the lette r urges Harris to tell the tr uth and urges Harris’s daughter to respect her mother ’s deci si on. But, in the lette r

, Cheek also states that Harris’ s testim ony for the government w ould be li es, that her testim ony i s all the government had to convict hi m, and that Harris h ad been tr i cked by her own lawy er
. Cheek remark s that he will “nev er respect [H a r r is’s] deci si on” and that he thought she w ould nev er li e about hi m. Cheek also notes that i f Cheek i s convic ted, then he wi ll go to pris on for the rest of hi s li fe and be unab l e to rais e hi s chi ldren or prot ect hi s daughter from boys. In conjuncti on wi th thi s expr essi on of parental concern, Cheek also mak e s a flatter ing refer ence to Harris’s daughter’ s chi ld. Fin ally , Cheek inv oke s “ Go d ” a nd remark s that “i t’s up to us to man up or
w oman up.” In short, Cheek’s lette r w as an intentio nal effortNo. 12-2472 25

to convin ce Harris’s daughter that her mother ’s testim ony
w ould be li es, whi ch w ere the only evidenc e the government had again st hi m, and that a convic tion w ould rui n hi s “li fe and the li v es of [hi s] kids .” The di stric t c ou rt re asonably interpr eted thi s effort as a wi llful atte mpt to persuade Harris’s daughter to tr y to sw ay her mother ’s testim ony
. Cert ainly thi s interpr etation w as not clearly err oneous. And an effort to influ ence a wi tness’s testim ony—albeit vic arious ly—is a prot oty pi cal example of obstruction of justic e. See U.S.S .G. § 3C1.1 Appli cation Note 4(A). Mor eov er

, ev en i f the di stric t c ourt err ed when i t i mposed the obstruction of justic e enhanc ement, that err or w ould be harmless. Enhanc ements are “used merely to deter mine the appli cable G ui delines range.” States v. Maggi, 44 F .3d 478, 482 (7th Ci r
. 1995). And the i mposi tion of the obstruction of justic e enhanc ement di d not change Cheek’s Gui delines range. In addi tion, the di stric t court explic i tly stated that he di d not thi nk the lette r si gni fi cant. Therefore , i t i s apparent that the enhanc ement di d not affec t Cheek’s sentence. See United States

v
. Eubanks , 593 F .3d 645, 655 (7th Ci r
. 2 0 1 0 ) (“T o prove harmless err or

, the government mus t be able to show that the gui delines err or di d not affec t the di stric t court’s sel e ct io n of the sentence i mposed.” (quoti ng United States v
. Abba s , 560 F .3d 660, 667 (7th Ci r . 2009)). Cheek’s Arguments in Miti gation and the Secti on 3553(a) Fact ors Cheek also co ntends that hi s sentence w as procedurally unreasonable becau se the di stric t court fai led to consi der that the sentence amounted to a de facto li fe sentence and di d not26 No. 12-2472

e xplai n why i t beli ev ed a sentence gr eater than that re co mmended by the government w as reasonable. Cheek relies upon
our deci si on United States v
. Patrick , 7 0 7 F .3d 815, 819–20 (7th Ci r
. 2013), wherei n the di stric t court expr essed an intent not to impo se a li fe sentence but then i mposed a sentence t ha t effecti v ely amounted t o a li fe sentence. Under those ci rcumstances, we w ere unabl e “to di scern whether the court appreci

ated the sev erity of the sentence i t im posed, and in part i cular i ts e q uiv alence to the li fe sentence that i t had purpor tedly rej ected.” Id. P at r i c k does not stand for the propo si tion that,

ev ery tim e a di stric t court i mposes a sentence that exceeds the defendant’s li fe expectancy , the court mus t explic i tly recog ni ze that fact. A nd Patrick i s di stingui shab le from Cheek’s case becau se here the di stric t court nev er stated that he wis he d to giv e Cheek something less than a li fe sentence. Instead, the di stric t court explain ed that, based on Chee k ’s ext ensi v e “hi stor y of cri minal acti vity ,” the court w as untroubled by the fact that Cheek w ould be i mpri soned “at least for a si gni fi cant amount of tim e.” Unli ke in Patrick , w e are able “to di scern [that] the court appreci ated the sev e r it y of the sentence i t i mposed ... .” Id.
In arg uing that the di stric t court procedurally err ed by fai ling to explain why it beli ev ed a sentence great er than that recommended by the g ov ernment w as reasonable, Cheek asserts t hat the g o vernment requested a 480-month sentence. That i s not qui te tr ue; the government asked for “a sentence of not l ess than 40 y ears [480 months] in pris on
... .” Mor eov er , Cheek’s sentence w as wi thi n hi s Gui delines rang e , a nd “a wi thi n-gui delines s entence recei v es a presumpti on of reasonableness

... .” United Stat es v
. Diekemper, 604 F .3d 345, 355 (7thNo. 12-2472 27
Ci r
. 2010). Where such a presumpti on appli es, w e doubt t hat

a sentencing court has a procedural obli gation to explain why i t has chosen not to adopt the government’s recommended sentence. And, as di scu ssed below , the di stric t court had goo d reasons for concluding that C heek deserv ed a long sentence. Cheek also arg ues that the di stric t court fail ed to consi der meaningfully the arg uments Cheek offered in mi tigati on of hi s
se ntence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Cheek i denti fi es th e following factors as ones upon whi ch he arg ued for leni ency at sentencing: hi s ag e (37 y ears old), the ext rao rdin ary length of

a Gui delines sentence of 360 mo nths to li fe, hi s hi stor y of non-vi olence, hi s adv anced age up on completing a lengthy sentence, that he had assi sted law enforcement in an unrelated matter , that hi s mother had di ed whe n he w a s only 16 y ears old, and that he had chi ldren. First of all, although Cheek’s couns el remark ed at sentencing that Cheek “i s 37 years old,” he di d not dev elop any arg ument for leni ency from that fact. And i t i s no t apparent why Cheek’s age w ould supp or t leni ency
. Cheek i s no t so y oung that one mi ght atte mpt to excuse hi s cri minal acti vity as the result of i mmaturi ty—no r i s he elderly

. Therefore , w e wi ll not fault the di stric t court for fai ling to menti on explic i tly Cheek’s age duri ng sentencing. See United States v
. Jones , 438 F

. App’x 515, 519 (7th C ir

. 2011) (notin g that the defendant “nev er explain ed why hi s age justifi ed a be low-gui delines sentence” and so the cour t w as not required to address i t). Sim i larly , ou r rev i ew of the sentencing tr ansc ript rev eals no arg ument by e ither Cheek or hi s couns el that the “ext rao rdinary length of a [Gu i delines] sentence o f 360 months to li fe” consti tutes a basi s for leni ency
.28 No. 12-2472
F u r t h e r m o r e , m o s t o f C h e e k ’ s r e m a i n i n g arg uments—n amely

, that he wi ll be elderly when he i s released from pris on, that his mo ther di ed when he w as o nly 16 yea r s o ld, and that he has chi ldren—are the kin ds o f sto ck arg ument s t ha t sentencing courts are not obli ged to address. See United States v
. Brock , 4 3 3 F

. 3d 931, 937 (7th Ci r
. 2006) (ruling that a di stric t court may r easonably find arg uments about a di ffi cult chi ldhood s o w eak as not t o m erit di scu ssi on whe r e t he defendant fai ls to explain why hi s di ffi cult chi ldhood should be a mi tigati ng factor); United States v
. T ahzib , 513 F .3d 692, 695 (7th Ci r
. 2008) (holding that “fami ly ties ” are “nothin g more than stock arg uments that s e nten c ing courts see
ro uti nely”); United States v
. Nurek , 5 7 8 F .3d 618, 626 (7th Ci r
. 2009) (holding that defendant’s “physi cal ai lments and [adv anced] age are not si gni fi cant mi tigati ng factors” that the di stric t court needed to separately address). Sim i larly , Cheek’s arg ument that none of hi s numerous p r i or convic tions inv olv ed violence i s essenti ally an arg ument that hi s cri minal hi stor y catego ry sub stanti ally ov er -represents the seri ousness of hi s past cri mes. See United States v
. Stephen , 160 F

. App’x 505, 507 (7th Ci r
. 2005). Thi s arg ument i s also a stock arg ument that the di stric t court w as no t r e q uired to address. United States v

. Mor eno-Padilla, 602 F

. 3 d 802, 811–12 (7th Ci r
. 2010) (“T o that end, there i s no requirement that a di stric t court ext ensi v ely address non-pri nci pal arg uments, or ‘stock arg uments that sentencing courts see ro utine l y , ’ inclu ding ‘how [a defend a nt’s] criminal his tor y catego ry ov er -represents the seri o us ness of hi s prior convic tion.’” (quoti ng T ahzib , 513 F .3d at 695)). Cheek’s final ar gument for leniency w as based on the fact that he had o nce assi sted law enfor cement by cle a r ing Detec-No. 12-2472 29
tiv e Fer guson of accu sati ons of mi scondu ct. Thi s w as Cheek’s most dev eloped arg ument at sentencing. But the fact that Cheek di d not li e to the poli ce o n an unrelated matt e r ha r dly consti tutes the kin d of meritorious co nduc t deserving of a sentencing reducti on. And, to the ext ent Cheek’s could be sai d to hav e render ed “sub stanti al assi stance” to the poli ce, sti ll “[a] d e fe n d ant’ s c lai m that sub stanti al assi stance to the go ve rnm e n t
w arr ants leni ency i s ‘ro uti ne,’

... and thus a sentenc ing court may rej ect that clai m wi th li ttle or no explanation.” See Jones , 438 F

. App’x a t 5 1 9 (ci tin g United States v
. Gonza lez , 462 F .3d 754, 756 (7th Ci r . 2006)). Mor eov er

, w e wil l no t find a sentence to be procedurally unreasonable as long as the tot ali ty of the recor d establi shes that the di stric t judge consi dered the arg uments in mi tigati on, “ev en i f i mpli ci tly and i mpreci sely .” Diekemper, 604 F .3d at 355; United States v
. Poetz, 5 8 2 F

. 3d 835, 839 (7th Ci r
. 2009). In thi s case, the di stric t court reci ted the § 3553(a) factors and focus ed

on Cheek’s ext ensi v e cri minal hi stor y—Cheek spent hi s entire adult li fe as a drug dealer and w as conv ict ed of nine prior fe lony drug convic tions

. The di stric t court recog ni zed t ha t Cheek had offered arg ume nt s that he w as not a bad person. Indeed, the di stric t court told Cheek, “I’m not saying y ou’re a bad pers on
. ” N e v e rth e l e s s, d e s p i te re c ogni zing the goo d thi ngs about Cheek, th e d ist ric t court conclu ded that the facts surroundi ng Cheek’s current offe n s e s an d hi s e xtensi v e hi stor y of cri minal acti vity called for a si g nif icant pris on sentence. Mor eov er

, the di stric t c ourt ’s deci si on to i mpose a sentenc ing
e nh a n c e m e n t on C h e e k for o b s t r uc t ing justic e demonstrate s th a t the court i mpli ci t l y rej ected any arg ument that Cheek’s sentence s hould be reduced becau se he assisted justic e. There-30 No. 12-2472 fore, ev en assu ming the di stric t court w as required to address Cheek’s mi tigati on arg ument based on hi s prior assi stance, w e conclu de that the court suffi ci ently consi dered i t. In any ev ent,
ev en i f the di stric t court di d not adequatel y consi der thi s mi tigati on arg ument, the err or w ould be harmless becau se the court’s focus on C he e k ’s ext ensi v e and egr egious hi stor y of cri minal acti vity

, and seri ous present offenses, convin ce us that Cheek’s sentence w ould not hav e been di fferent. United States

v
. Glos s e r, 623 F .3d 413, 419 (7th Ci r
. 2010) (“When w e are convin ced t he sentence w ould hav e been t he same absent the

err or , we deem the err or harmless.”)

. Subst antive Unreasonablenes s F ina lly , Cheek arg ues that hi s sentence—a de facto li fe sentence—i s sub st anti v ely unreasonably long. But Cheek’s sentence w as wi thi n his Gu ide lines range, and “a wi thi n-gui delines s entence recei v es a pr esum ption of reasonableness

... .” Diekemper, 604 F .3d at 355. Indeed, “ such a sentence ‘wi ll almost nev er be unreasonable.’” United States v
. V allar , 635 F .3d 2 7 1 , 279 (7th Ci r
. 2011) (quoting T ahzib , 513 F .3d at 695). In fact, the di stric t court could hav e i mposed a li fe sentence on Cheek and sti ll remain ed wit hin hi s Gui delines range. The di stric t court recounted the § 3553(a) factors and concl uded that, despi te the si gni fi cant cost of incarceration, a wi thi n - G u i d e l ines sentence w as appropr i ate in li ght of Cheek’s egr egious cri minal hi stor y , inc l uding nine prior felony drug convic tions, and seri ous present offen ses, inclu ding di strib uting at least 28 gr ams of crack cocaine and 100 kilograms of mari juana. W e prev i ously hav e found lengthy sentences to be sub stanti v ely reasonable under si mi lar ci rcums tances. See, e.g. , United States v
. T

aylor , 701 F .3d 1166 , 1 1 7 5 (7th Ci r
. 2012)No. 12-2472 31 (affi rmi ng 4 8 0 -m onth sentence in li ght of egr egious cri minal conduc t and ext ensi v e cri minal hi stor y); V allar , 635 F .3d at 280 (affi rmi ng 360-month sentence in li ght of “the seri o us ne ss of [the defendant’s] cri me, hi s past reci di vis m and the li kelih ood t hat he w ould conti nue to commi t cri mes i f released fr o m pris on, the fact t ha t he di rected the oper ation of a drug di strib uti on ring whi le in a federal p ris on, h i s lack of remor se for hi s offense, and i ts conclu si on that [he] i s a threat to soci ety due to hi s p e rsi stent di strib uti on of drugs.”). The recor d demonstrate s that Cheek has repeat edly refused to giv e up hi s li fe of cri minal drug di st r ibu tion—des pi te the efforts of the justic e system to deter hi m. Cheek’s sentence i s lengthy , but w e cannot say t ha t t he di stric t court abus ed i ts di screti on in conclu ding that C heek deserv ed i t. III. Conclusi on The di stric t cour t di d not plainly err when i t admi tte d A g e nt Catey ’s testim ony and permi tte d the government to prov i de the jury wi th tr ansc ripts contai ning Agent Catey ’s interpr etat i ons of v arious w or ds and phrases from the recor dings. At least, any err or w ould hav e been harmless. Addi tionally , the di stric t court di d not err when i t i mposed a 2-lev el obstruction of justic e enhanc ement, and t he co urt adequately consi dered Cheek’s mi tigati on arg uments in li ght of the § 3553 factors. The di stric t court’s fai lure to comply wi th the procedure prov i ded in § 851(b) w as, at most, harmless

err or —especi ally giv en that Cheek ’s couns el nev er rais ed the i s s u e
. Finally

, Cheek’s 576-month pris on sentence—authoriz e d by § 841(b) (1)( B)—i s not sub stanti v ely unreasonable. Ther e fore, w e AFF IRM Cheek’s convic tions and sentenc e.