PUBLISH UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________ _______________ R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, 1 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. PARAGON CONTRACTORS CORPORATION; BRIAN JESSOP, individually,
De fendants-Appellants, and JAMES JESSOP, individually, Defendant. No. 17-4025

__________________ _______________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Utah (D.C. No. 2:06-CV-00700-TC)

__________________ _______________ Rick J. Sutherland (M. Christopher Moon, with him on the briefs), of Jackson Lewis PLLC, Salt Lake City , Utah, for Defenda nts-Appellants. Maria Van Buren, Counse l for Child Labor and Special FLSA Projects (Nicholas C. Geale, Acting Solicitor of Labor; Jennifer S. Brand, Associate Solicitor, and Paul L. Frieden, Counse l for Appellate Litigation, with her

1 In light of Fed. R. App. P. 43(c )(2), we substitute Mr. R. Alexander Acosta, the current Secr etary of Labor, for Mr. Thomas E. Perez. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 13, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 on the brief), United States Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellee.

__________________ _______________ Before LUCERO , BACHARACH , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

__________________ _______________ BACHARACH , Circuit Judge.

__________________ _______________ This case arises out of a 2007 injunction, which prohibited Paragon Contractors Corporation and its pr esident (Mr. Brian Jessop) from engaging in oppressive ch ild labor. The Department of Labor procured a contempt citation, with the district court finding that Paragon and Mr. Jessop had violated the injunction by employing children to harvest pecans. For this violatio n, the district court sanctioned Pa ragon and Mr. Jessop by

 appointing a special master to monitor Paragon’s ongoing compliance with the injunction and

 ordering Paragon and Mr. Jessop to pay $200, 000 into a fund to compensate the children. Paragon and Mr. Jessop appeal th e contempt finding and the sanctions. We conclude that the district court did not err in

 finding that Paragon and Mr. Je ssop had violated the injunction by oppressively employ ing children and

 ordering Paragon and Mr. Jessop to pay $200,000.
But we reverse the district court’ s appointment of a special master.3 I. The Use of Children to Gath er Pecans and the Subsequent Contempt Citation The Southern Utah Pecan Ranch owned over 100 acres of pecan trees in Utah. Through 2007, the Ranch had an inform al arrangement with the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latte r-Day Saints. After the Ranch harvested pecans from the tree s, the Church coul d send community members to gather the p ecans that had fallen to the ground. The gatherers consisted largely of children, who ga ve half of the fa llen pecans to the Church and half to the Ranch. In 2008, the Ranch bega n a series of year-long contracts with Paragon. Under these contracts, Pa ragon obtained re sponsibility for operating the pecan grove and harvesting the p ecans. Paragon received 70% of the proceeds from the sale of the pecans, and the Ranch received 30%. Though Paragon was to manage the pecan grove, the Church continued to send children to gather the fa llen pecans. Paragon hired Mr. Dale Barlow to fulfill th e contract with the Ranc h. The Church identified Mr. Barlow as the contact person fo r the gathering op eration, and he participated in organizing and managing the Church’s efforts to gather the fallen pecans. In 2012, the Department of Labo r investigated Paragon and Mr. Jessop, concluding that they had violated the child-labor provisions of the4 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S. C. § 212. This conclusion led the Department of Labor to allege a violation of the 2007 injunction. This allegation ultimately led to the finding of contempt. II. Did Paragon and Mr. Jessop violate the 2007 injunction? Paragon and Mr. Jessop deny violating the 2007 in junction. On this issue, we review the district court’ s ruling for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ford , 514 F.3d 1047, 1051 (10th Cir. 2008). The court abuses its discretion by relying on an error of law or reaching a clearly erroneous finding of fact. Id. To prevail, the Depart ment of Labor needed to prove by clear and convincing evidence “[1] that a vali d court order existe d, [2] that the defendant[s] had knowledge of the order, and [3] that the defendant[s] disobeyed the order.” F.T.C. v. Kuykendall , 371 F.3d 745, 756-57 (10th Cir. 2004) (en ba nc) (quoting Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mast Constr. Co. , 159 F.3d 1311, 1315 (10th Cir. 1998)) (alterations in or iginal). Paragon and Mr. Jessop do not disput e the first two elements, focusing instead on the third element. The 2007 injunction prohibited Paragon and Mr. Jessop from employing minors “under conditions constituting oppressive child labor.” Appellant’s App’x at 17. Paragon and Mr. Jessop do not question the oppressiveness of the labor. Instead, they make two arguments:5 1. The children were not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act because they were voluntee rs rather th an employees. 2. Even if the children were employees, they we re not Paragon’s employees; therefore, Para gon and Mr. Jessop are not responsible for the employ ment of the children. We reject both contentions. A. Were the children volunteers? The first question is wh ether the children were volunteers rather than employees. We review de novo the district court’ s determination that the children were “employee s,” which presents an issue of statutory interpretation. Johns v. Stewart , 57 F.3d 1544, 1557 (10th Cir. 1995). The statutory definiti on of “employee” is “a ny individua l employed by an employer.” 29 U. S.C. § 203(e)(1). And “emp loy” is defi ned as “to suffer or permit to work.” Id. § 203(g). These defin itions are “e xceedingly broad.” Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor , 471 U.S. 290, 295 (1985). Paragon and Mr. Jessop cont end that the children are not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act based on (1) the Supreme Court’s opinion in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundati on v. Secretary of Labor , 471 U.S. 290 (1985), and (2) the statutory food-bank exception, 29 U. S.C. § 203(e)(5). We reject both contentions.6 1. Are the children covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act based on Alamo Foundation ?
In Alamo Foundation , the Supreme Court discussed the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s coverage of employees. The Court noted that the scope of “employee” is “exceedingly broad” but does contain limits. 471 U.S. at 295. For exam ple, the definition of an “employee” does not include “[a]n individual who, ‘w ithout promise or expectation of compensation, but solely for his personal purpose or pleasure, worked in activities carried on by other persons[.]’” Id. (quoting Walling v. Portland Terminal Co. , 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947)). Paragon and Mr. Jessop use this defi nition, arguing th at the children were not “employees” because

 they had no reas on to expect co mpensation and

 they worked “solely for [their] personal purpose or pleasure.” Id. According to Paragon and Mr. Jess op, the children freely chose to gather pecans in order to help the Church and the commu nity. Paragon and Mr. Jessop point to tes timony from some of the children that they viewed themselves as volunteers and chose wh ether to participat e in the harvest. The district court disagreed, relying instead on testimony characterizing the children ’s participation as mandatory. Some children and parents testified that

 the children had been ordered to attend the harvest and7  the Church had closed the schools when it was time to harvest the pecans. In addition, one ch ild stated that if she had not worked, she would have lost her family and been kicked out of the community. Likewise, parents testified that they had sent their children to the ha rvest because of pressure from the Church, and one father expre ssed fear that his family would be separated if he had disobeyed. In light of the testimony, th e district court’s finding of coercion was not clearly erroneous. Gi ven this finding, we conclude that the children did not c hoose to work for their own “personal purpose or pleasure”; they worked because of coercion. Paragon and Mr. Jessop respond that even if the ch ildren had been coerced, the coercion ha d come from the Church rather than Paragon. But the Alamo Foundation standard does not a ddress the source of the coercion. 2 Alamo Foundation states only that indivi duals working for their own “personal purpose or pleasure” ar e not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. (quoting Walling v. Portl and Terminal Co. , 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947)). Under this standard, the children were not gathering pecans solely for their own personal purpose or pleasure. Therefore, Alamo Foundation does not suppor t reversal. 3

2 The source of the coercion bears instead on which entity was the employer: the Church or Paragon. We address that inquiry below.

3 We need not decide t oday whether a thir d party’s coerci on may affect volunteer status when the employer is unaware of the coercion. That8 2. Does the food-bank exception apply? Paragon and Mr. Jessop also invoke 29 U.S.C. § 203 (e)(5), known as the “food-bank exception,” which preclu des consideration as “employees” when workers “volunteer their services solely for humanita rian purposes to private non-profit food banks and . . . receive from the food banks groceries.” Based on this statute, Pa ragon and Mr. Jessop argue that the children gathered pecans for the benef it of the Bishop’s Storehouse of the Church. For this argument, we may assume (without deciding) that the Bishop’s Storehouse constitut es a non-prof it food bank. See Susan Harthill, Shining the Spotlight on U npaid Law-Student Workers , 38 Vt. L. Rev. 555, 582 (2014) (“[I]n amen ding [the Fair Labor Standards Act] . . . , Congress chose to only exempt volunteers at food banks and not any other type of nonprofit volunteer.”) . Even with this assumption, the ar gument would fail because the children did not “volunteer” th eir services. The Fair Labor Standa rds Act does not define the term “volunteer.” We therefore consider the term’s ordinary meaning. See Conrad v. Phone
Directories Co. , 585 F.3d 1376, 1381 (10th Cir. 2009). Dictionaries provide a helpful basis for determining this meaning. Jones v. C.I.R. , 560

situation is not present here. The district court found that Paragon and Mr. Jessop had known that the Church was sending children to the harvest, and the evidence suppor ts this finding. For exam ple, Mr. Jessop and Mr. Barlow attended Church meetings wh ere the harvest was discussed, the Church designated Mr. Barlow as th e contact person for the harvesting operation, and Mr. Jessop sent his own children to the harvest.9 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2009). Th e term “volunteer” is commonly defined as an offer to work without solicitation, compulsi on, constraint, or influence of another. We bster’s Third New Intern ational Dictionary 2564 (1993); see also The American Heritage Di ctionary of the English Language 1941-42 (5th ed. 2011) (defining “volun teer” as “[t]o give or offer to give voluntarily” and “volunt ary” as “[d]one or undertaken of one’s own free will”). As discussed above, the district court reasonably found that the children had not voluntee red to gather pecans. Therefore, the food-bank exception does not apply. 4 Paragon and Mr. Jessop criticize the us e of dictionary definitions to interpret the word “volun teer,” asserting that the Supreme Court already interpreted th e word in Alamo Foundation . This criticism is misguided. Alamo Foundation ’s definition encompassed the same concept but did not address the term “volunteer” or refer to that term as it is used in the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Tony and Susan Alamo Found . v. Sec’y of Labor , 471 U.S. 290, 295 (1985). In any event, we have concluded that Alamo

4 The Department of Labor cites 29 C.F.R. § 553.101 , which defines the term “volunteer” as it is used in another statutory exception, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)(A). That defi nition applies only to individuals wh o volunteer “for a public agency which is a State, a political subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)(A). The parties agree that this defin ition does not apply here.10 Foundation does not preclude characteri zation of the children as employees.
* * * We conclude that the children were “employees,” subjecting their employer to the requir ements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. B. Who employed the children? Classifying the children as empl oyees does not en d the inquiry. Paragon and Mr. Jessop argue in two ways that even if the children had been employees, the empl oyer would have been the Church or Mr. Barlow rather than Paragon: 1. Paragon’s contract with th e Ranch did not extend to the gathering of pecans from th e ground; therefore, Paragon and Mr. Jessop did not employ the children. 2. Mr. Barlow was an independent contractor; therefore, he alone was responsible for the children’s employment. 1. Did the contract cover gath ering pecans from the ground? First, Paragon and Mr. Jessop argue that the contract se rved only to obligate Paragon to harves t the pecans from the tr ees. Under this argument, the contract did not govern what happened after the pecans had been harvested from the trees. This argument, if credite d, would relieve Paragon of responsibility for what the children did afte r the tree harvest. The district court rejected this argument, finding that

 the contract had obli gated Paragon to harves t all of the pecans rather than just the pecans in the trees and11  the informal arrangement between the Ranch and the Church had ended when Paragon assumed contractua l responsibility for the pecan harvest. We agree with the district court base d on the text of the contract, the testimony of a Ranch representative, and Paragon’s receipt of profits from the sale of the fallen pecans. 5
a. The Text of the Contract The contract obligated Paragon to manage the pecan groves and to bear the “[c]osts related to the nu t gathering/harves ting operation.” Appellant’s App’x at 296-97. And the compensation provis ion stated only that “[t]he 2011 pecan crop [would] be sold ,” with Paragon receiving 70% of the gross proceeds. Id. at 298. These provisions did not differentiate between pecans collect ed from the ground and from the trees. Paragon and Mr. Jessop re ly on the “cos ts” provision, arguing that the contract would not ha ve singled out the “costs ” related to the “nut gathering/harvesting operation” if gathering the pecans from the ground had constituted part of Paragon’s contractual obligations.

5 We need not decide the standard of review for this issue. The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is review ed de novo, but the interpretation of an ambiguous contract is review ed for clear error. See Edwards & Daniels Architects, In c. v. Farmers’ Props., Inc. , 865 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Kimball v. Campbell , 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985)). The dist rict court did not speci fy the approach that it was using.12 This argument distinguishes between “harvesting” and “gathering.” The contract required Pa ragon to “harve st” the nuts, wh ich Paragon and Mr. Jessop characterize as a referenc e to the collection of nuts from the trees. This characterization leads Pa ragon and Mr. Jess op to deny any contractual obligation to “g ather” nuts, which they re gard as a reference to the collection of nuts fr om the ground. For the nu ts on the ground, Paragon and Mr. Jessop insist that their res ponsibilities had been limited to the payment of some of the gathering costs. Even if the costs provision had differentiated between “harvesting” and “gathering,” the prov ision had allocated the costs to Paragon for both harvesting and gathering. By assigning the contr act’s costs to Paragon for both harvesting and gathering, the co ntract suggested th at Paragon bore responsibility for both activities. And Paragon and Mr. Jessop identify nothing in the contract that would

 restrict Paragon’s obligations to harvesting pecans from trees or

 disclaim responsibility to ga ther pecans fro m the ground. Accordingly, the contract language suggests coverage of pecans collected from the ground as well as from the trees.13 b. Testimony by Mr. Freeman The district court could rely not only on the cont ract language but also on testimony by Mr . Norman Freeman, the Ranch representative who had dealt with Paragon. Mr. Freeman testified that

 the contract had obli gated Paragon to gather the pecans from the ground and ended the Ranch’s informal arrangement with the Church and

 Mr. Jessop had known th at Paragon was cont ractually obligated to harvest all of the pecans, including those that had fallen to the ground. Paragon and Mr. Jessop challenge Mr. Fr eeman’s testimony as internally inconsistent and in conflict with Mr. Barlow’s testimony. According to Paragon and Mr. Je ssop, Mr. Freeman contradicted himself when he acknowle dged that he had not ob jected after seeing children collect pecans. But Mr. Freeman clarifie d that he had assumed that the children were helping Paragon fulfill its contractual obligations. Paragon and Mr. Jessop al so point to Mr. Freem an’s admission that he could not recall a speci fic discussion with Mr. Jessop about collecting the fallen pecans. But Mr. Freeman explained that he had regarded the contract as so clear that there would have been little reas on to remind Mr. Jessop of Paragon’s obliga tion to collect the nuts from the ground. Paragon and Mr. Jessop also rely on testimony by Mr. Barlow, who stated that the Ranch’ s informal arrangement with the Church had continued after Paragon took over th e management of the grove. But the14 district court did not be lieve Mr. Barlow, and we have little reason to question the court’s asse ssment of credibility. See United States v. Quaintance , 608 F.3d 717, 723 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[W ]e generally grant ‘great deference’ to a district court’s credibilit y assessments.” (quoting Wessel v. City of Albuquerque , 463 F.3d 1138, 1145 (10th Cir. 2006))). In our view, the district cour t did not clearly err in finding that the parties had understood the contract to include th e harvesting of fallen pecans. c. Paragon’s Receipt of Profits The district court could also reason ably rely on the fact that Paragon had profited from the ground pecans. Those pe cans were comi ngled with the other pecans and sold together, with Paragon recei ving 70% of the total proceeds. Paragon and Mr. Jessop do not explai n why they would receive proceeds from the sale of the fallen peca ns if they had been excluded from the contract.
* * * The district court reasonably de termined that the contract had required Paragon to collect the fallen pecans. Thus, th e district court could reasonably find that the children had been helpin g Mr. Barlow, through his status with Paragon, to fulfill Paragon’s contractual obligations. 2. Was Mr. Barlow an independent contractor? Paragon and Mr. Jessop also ch aracterize Mr. Barlow as an independent contractor, making his employment of the children his15 responsibility rather than Paragon’s or Mr. Jessop’s. 6 We conclude that Mr. Barlow was an employee of Paragon, not an in dependent contractor; 7 therefore, the children were also employees of Paragon.

a. The Pertinent Factors In determining whether an individual was an independent contractor or employee, we focu s on the economic realities and the worker’s economic dependence on the business. Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co ., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1998). The economi c realities ordinarily turn on six factors: 1. The degree of control exercised by the alleged employer over the worker, 2. the worker’s opportun ity for prof it or loss, 3. the worker’s investment in the business, 4. the permanence of the working relationship, 5. the degree of skill require d to perform the work, and 6. the extent to which the work is an integral part of the alleged employer’s business.

6 Mr. Barlow’s status as an independent contractor would not automatically preclude the children from being considered employees of Paragon and Mr. Jessop. See Boire v. Greyhound Corp. , 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964); Hodgson v. Griffin & Br and of McAllen, Inc. , 471 F.2d 235, 237 (5th Cir. 1973).

7 The district court did not decide whether Mr. Barlow had been an independent contractor, c oncluding instead that Mr . Barlow had been an agent of Paragon and Mr. Jessop under Utah agen cy law. But we may affirm the district court’s ruling on any ground support ed by the record. Stillman v. Teache rs Ins. & Annuity Ass’n Coll. Ret. Equities Fund , 343 F.3d 1311, 1321 (10th Cir. 2003).16 Id. The overarching inquiry is based on the totalit y of the circumstances, and no single factor is dispositive. Johnson v. Unified Gov’t of Wynadotte Cty. , 371 F.3d 723, 729 (10th Cir. 2004). In considering these circumstances, we review the district court’s underlying factual findings for clear error. Baker , 137 F.3d at 1441. But we regard the ultimate classification (employee or independent contractor) as a matter of law. Id. ; Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co. , 41 F.3d 567, 571 (1 0th Cir. 1994).
b. Degree of Control The first factor involves the de gree of Paragon’s control over Mr. Barlow. In evaluating this factor, we consider vari ous considerations such as Mr. Barlow’s independence in se tting his own work hours and other conditions and details of his work, the extent of Paragon’s supervision of Mr. Barlow, and the degree of Mr. Ba rlow’s ability to work for other employers. See Baker , 137 F.3d at 1441; Johnson , 371 F.3d at 729-30; Henderson , 41 F.3d at 570. This factor indicates status as an independent contr actor. Mr. Barlow was hired to manage the pecan grove, and he coul d set his own hours and determine how best to pe rform his job within br oad parameters. Although Mr. Barlow periodically reported to Paragon and would occasionally request assistance, Paragon did not substantially supervise Mr. Barlow’s work. In addition, Mr. Barlow could work for other employers. For17 example, he testified that he had engaged in flooring and plumbing work for other companies and had fac ilitated a similar nut-gathering arrangement between the Church and another nearby nut grove. In our view, the evid ence indicates that Pa ragon did not exercise substantial control over Mr. Barlow’s work. As a resu lt, this factor supports classification of Mr. Barlow as an independent co ntractor rather than an employee. See Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms , 20 F.3d 434, 441 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Control arises, we believe, wh en the farmer goes beyond general instructions, such as how many acres to pick in a given day, and begins to assign specific tasks, to assi gn specific workers, or to take an overly active role in the oversight of the work.”).

c. Opportunity for Profit or Loss In evaluating the second factor, we consider whethe r Mr. Barl ow had the ability to profit ba sed on his performance. Such an ability is “consistent with the characteris tics of being [an] independent businessm[a]n.” Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co ., 137 F.3d 1436, 1441 (10th Cir. 1998). This f actor indicates that Mr. Barlow was an employee rather than an independent contractor. Mr. Barlow was paid on ly a flat fee for mana ging the pecan grove. Thus, he could not increase or decrease his profit based on how well he did his job. See id. (holding that this factor supported empl oyee status because the workers had been paid at a fixed rate and had not incurred any risk of18 loss); Dole v. Snell , 875 F.2d 802, 810 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that this factor supported employee status because earnings had not depended on the workers’ “judgment or initiative”).
d. Investment in the Business The third factor is the extent of Mr. Barlow’s investment in the business. The mere fact that workers supply thei r own tools or equipment does not establish status as independ ent contractors; ra ther, the relevant “investment” is “the am ount of large capital expe nditures, such as risk capital and capital investments, not negligible items, or labor itself.” Dole , 875 F.2d at 810. To analyze this factor, we compare the investments of the worker and the alleged employer. Baker , 137 F.3d at 1442 . This factor points heavily to status as an employee. The supplie s and equipment were provided by the Ranch, not Mr. Barlow. 8 His only work-rel ated expenses were for travel to and from the pecan farm . By contrast, Paragon bore the contractual obligation to pay for equipment mainte nance, fertilizer, pe st control, and utilities. Paragon and Mr. Jessop point out th at Mr. Barlow s upplied buckets for the families that ha d not brought buckets. But this expense was negligible. We consider Mr. Barlow’s negligible expense as a factor that

8 Mr. Barlow stated that he had provided his truck to manage the harvest. But he conceded that he ha d later obtained re imbursement from Paragon.19 strongly supports Mr. Barl ow’s status as an em ployee rather than an independent contractor.

e. Permanence of the Wo rking Relationship The fourth factor addresses th e permanence of Mr. Barlow’s relationship with Paragon . For purposes of this factor, “‘[i]ndependent contractors’ often have fixed employment periods and transfer from place to place as particular work is offered to them, wh ereas ‘employees’ usually work for only one employer and such relati onship is continuous and of indefinite duration.” Dole v. Snell , 875 F.2d 802, 811 (10th Cir. 1989). This factor weighs heavily in favor of employee status. Paragon and Mr. Jessop contend that Mr. Ba rlow was employed temporarily because he was hired for on ly one harvesting season at a time. But “‘[m]any seasonal businesses necessarily hire only seasonal employees, [and] that f act alone does not convert seasonal empl oyees into seasonal independent contractors.’” Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co ., 137 F.3d 1436, 1442 (10t h Cir. 1998) (quoting Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen , 835 F.2d 1529, 1537 (7th Cir. 1987)) (alterations in original). Thus, even when the relationship is short, the worker may be considered an employee when the relationship is shortened because of the job’s “intrinsic nature” rather than the worker’s “choice or decision.” Id. Mr. Barlow was hired for a relative ly short time peri od (the harvest season). But his employment was pe rmanent for the du ration of each20 harvest season. This factor supports Mr. Barlow’s status as an employee rather than an independent contractor. See Lauritzen , 835 F.2d at 1537 (“[H]owever temporary the relation ship may be it is permanent and exclusive for the du ration of that harvest season.”). 9
f. Degree of Skill Required to Perform the Work The fifth factor addres ses the degree of skill th at Mr. Barlow needed for the job. For this factor, we co nsider whether the job contains a “requirement of specialized skills”; if such a requirement exists, the worker is more likely to be considered an independent contractor. Dole v. Snell , 875 F.2d 802, 811 (10th Cir. 1989 ). These specialized skills are distinct from general “‘ occupational skills’” that “‘any good employee in any line of work must [have].’” Id. (quoting Lauritzen , 835 F.2d at 1537). This factor supports cons ideration of Mr. Barlow as an employee rather than an independe nt contractor. Mr. Barlow testified that his job had included atte nding to the dayto-day operations of th e pecan grove, providing security, performing general maintenance (such as watering, pruning, and trimming the trees), and cleaning debris out of the nuts. Paragon and Mr . Jessop do not identify any specialized skills needed for these tasks. As a result, this factor also supports classification of Mr. Barlow as an employee rather than an

9 The temporary nature of the re lationship was ca used not by Mr. Barlow’s choice to seek work elsewhere, but by the seasonal nature of the harvest.21 independent contractor. See id. (“The lack of th e requirement of specialized skills is indicat ive of employee status.”)
g. Integral Part of th e Employer’s Business The last factor turns “on whether workers’ services are a necessary component of th e business.” Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co ., 137 F.3d 1436, 1443 (10th Cir. 1998 ). If Mr. Barlow’s wo rk was essential to Paragon’s business, this f actor would support consid eration of Mr. Barlow as an employee of Paragon. The district court found that “Paragon’s usual business is construction,” which the Departme nt of Labor does not dispute. Perez v. Paragon Contra ctors Corp. , 233 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1237 (D. Utah 2017). Because Mr. Barlow’s management of the pecan grove was not integral to the bulk of Paragon’s busi ness, this factor support s consideration of Mr. Barlow as an inde pendent contractor. But this factor carries little weight here because of th e unique nature of Mr. Barlow’s work . That work wa s not essential to Paragon’s overall business, but his management of the pecan grove was essential to Paragon’s pecan-harv esting business. See Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen , 835 F.2d 1529, 1537-38 (7th Ci r. 1987) (concluding that for a pickle farm, picking the pickles is an integral part of the business, supporting classification of the pickers as empl oyees). Accordingly, this factor provides only marg inal support for status as an independent contractor.22 * * * Considering the totality of the ci rcumstances, we conclude that Mr. Barlow depended economica lly on Paragon’s busines s “for the opportunity to render service” and was not “in business for [himself].” Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co ., 137 F.3d 1436, 1443 (10th Cir. 1998). Therefore, Mr. Barlow was an employee , not an indepe ndent contractor, of Paragon. 3. Were the children employees of Par agon and Mr. Jessop? Because Mr. Barlow was employed by Paragon, the children would also be considered employees of Paragon. See Beliz v. W.H. McLeod & Sons Packing Co. , 765 F.2d 1317, 1327 (5th Cir. 1985) (not ing that if the alleged contractor were considered an employee of the defendant, “it would necessarily follow” that the contr actor’s employees would also be considered employees of the defendant).
* * * We therefore conclude that

 Paragon had employed the children and

 the district court co rrectly concluded th at Paragon and Mr. Jessop had violated the 2007 in junction by employing the children.
III. Were the district court’s sanctions permissible? Paragon and Mr. Jessop also challe nge the contempt sanctions. We agree with Paragon and Mr . Jessop regarding the a ppointment of a special23 master. But we reject th e challenge regarding the order to pay into the fund. A. What is the standard of review? The district court has “inherent pow er to enforce compliance with [its] lawful orders through civil contempt.” Shillitani v. United States , 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). In exercising this power , the court enjoys broad discretion. Rodriguez v. IBP, Inc. , 243 F.3d 1221, 1231 (1 0th Cir. 2001). We accordingly review the court’s imposition of sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Id. The court abuses its discreti on by committin g an error of law; as a result, we engage in de novo review on matters of law. Consumers Gas & Oil, Inc. v. Farmland Indus., Inc. , 84 F.3d 367, 370 (10th Cir. 1996).
B. What are the purposes of civil-contempt sanctions? Civil-contempt sanctio ns may be imposed only

 “‘to compel or co erce obedience to a court order’” or

 “‘to compensate the contemno r’s adversary for injuries resulting from the contem nor’s noncompliance.’” O’Connor v. Midwest Pi pe Fabrications, Inc. , 972 F.2d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Shuffler v. Heritage Bank , 720 F.2d 1141 , 1147 (9th Cir. 1983)). Here, the district court imposed both types of sanctions. First, the court imposed a coercive sanction, appointing a speci al master to monitor24 compliance with the injunc tion. Second, the court imposed a compensatory sanction, ordering Paragon and Mr. Jessop to pa y $200,000 into a fund to compensate the children for their la bor. Paragon and Mr. Jessop challenge both sanctions. C. Was appointment of a spec ial master permissible? First, Paragon and Mr. Jessop argu e that the distri ct court exceeded its authority by appo inting a special master to monitor compliance with the injunction. We agree. The district court can impose coercive sanctions designed to compel obedience to a court orde r. But because coercive sanctions seek to avoid the “‘harm threatened by continued contumacy,’” the sanctions can remain only until the contemnor complies with the order. O’Connor v. Midwest Pipe Fabrications, Inc. , 972 F.2d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Unite d Mine Workers of Am ., 330 U.S. 258, 304 (1947)). Thus, the sanctioned party must be able to immediately e nd the sanction by complying with the court order. See id. at 1211-12; see also Shillitani v. United States , 384 U.S. 364, 370-71 (1966) (noting that a coercive sanction must give the contemnor an “opportunity to purge himself of contempt”). The district court based its sanctio n on the risk that Paragon and Mr. Jessop might again employ children. The court stressed three facts:
1. Paragon and Mr. Jessop ha d begun profiting fr om child labor on the Ranch shortly afte r getting caught using child labor in the construction industry.25 2. Paragon and Mr. Jessop ha d tried to conceal their violation of the injunction by telli ng employees to lie, hiding children during inspections, and failing to maintain proper records.
3. Paragon and Mr. Jessop had flou ted subpoenas and testified untruthfully. The district court was understanda bly frustrated with what it saw as repeated and willful violations by Pa ragon and Mr. Jessop. But no evidence existed regarding Paragon’s employment of children at the time of the district court’s sanction, for Paragon had ended its relationship with the Ranch years earlier. 10 The sanction therefore di d not comply with the requirement of “conti nued contumacy.” Because there was no evidence of child labor at the time of the sanction, there was nothi ng that Paragon or Mr. Jessop could do to bring themselves into compliance. As a re sult, Paragon and Mr. Jessop had no way to purge themselves of contempt. See O’Connor v. Midwest Pipe Fabrications, Inc. , 972 F.2d 1204, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 1992).
* * *

10 The district court stated that “[d] efendants [had] left the court with no assurance that they [were] in co mpliance with its or der or that they [would] . . . comply in the future.” Perez v. Paragon Contractors Corp. , 233 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1240 (D . Utah 2017). This stat ement suggests that the district court might have believe d that Paragon and Mr. Jessop were currently noncompliant. But the court pointed to no evidence of current noncompliance, and a factfi nder cannot speculate a bout a current violation without evidence. See Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. , 811 F.2d 511, 521 (10th Cir. 1987).26 A coercive sanction ca nnot be imposed on a party that is currently in compliance just to ensure future compliance. Accordingly, the district court abused its discreti on in appointing a special master to monitor compliance. 11
D. Was the compensatory sanction permissible? Paragon and Mr. Jessop also ch allenge the district court’s compensatory sanction. The court or dered Paragon and Mr. Jessop to compensate the children by paying $2 00,000 into a fund managed by the Department of Labor. The Department would then allow the children and their representatives to present evidence of their labor and obtain compensation from the fund. The district court can impose a sanction “‘to compensate the contemnor’s adversary for injuries resulting from the contemnor’s noncompliance[.]’” O’Connor v. Midwest Pi pe Fabrications, Inc. , 972 F.2d 1204, 1211 (10th Ci r. 1992) (quoting Shuffler v. Heritage Bank , 720 F.2d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 1983)) (alteration in original); see McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co. , 336 U.S. 187, 193 (1949) (n oting that the district court may order contemnors “to pay the damages caused by their violations of the decree”). The amount of the comp ensatory sanction must be based upon the “‘actual losses sustained as a result of the contumacy.’”

11 We do not address wh ether the district court could have modified the injunction to requir e a special master.27 O’Connor , 972 F.2d at 1211 (quoting Perfect Fit Indus. v. Acme Quilting
Co. , 646 F.2d 800, 810 (2d Cir. 1981)). Therefore, a direct causal relationship must exist between the amount of dama ges and the violation of an injunction. See id. This question of causatio n underlies the parties’ dispute over the sanction. We have not articulated a precise te st for causation in this context. But we are guided by the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger , 137 S. Ct. 1178 (2017). Goodyear involved a district court’s order requiring an of fending party to pay the other party’s legal fees. 137 S. Ct. at 1183-84. The Supreme Court held that the sanction must be limited to the “f ees the innocent party incu rred solely because of the misconduct—or put another way, to the fees that party would not have incurred but for the bad faith.” Id. at 1184. The Court characterized this causal connection as a “but-for test.” Id. at 1187. Paragon and Mr. Jesso p deny a causal conn ection between the sanction and the violation of the injunction. 12 This distinction, according to Paragon and Mr. Jessop, is reflected in two different stat utory viol ations: (1) employment of ch ild labor under oppressiv e conditions and (2) violation of minimum-wage requirements. See Gemsco, In c. v. Walling , 324

12 In their reply brief, Paragon and Mr. Jessop argue th at they lacked notice that violation of the 2007 injunction could re sult in a f und to pay child laborers. But this ar gument did not appear in the opening brief. As a result, we decline to co nsider this argument. Bronson v. Swenson , 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007).28 U.S. 244, 261-62 (1945) (no ting that the child-labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act are independent of the minimum-wage provisions). Paragon and Mr. Jessop argue that the compensa tory sanction effectively served as a sanction for the failure to pay minimum wages to the children. Bu t the injunction did not pr ohibit Paragon and Mr. Jessop from violating the minimum-wage provis ions; the injunction served only to prohibit violations of the child-labor provisions. Because the sanction must be causally related to violation of the injunction, Para gon and Mr. Jessop argue that an order to pay unpaid wages serves as an impermissible sanction for a child-labor violation. We disagree. Paragon and Mr. Jessop point ou t that unpaid wages are not necessarily the direct result of a child-labor violation. After all, if Paragon and Mr. Jessop had paid the children minimum wage for their work, the injunction against oppress ive child labor would still have been violated. But we are not faci ng such a case. He re, the unpaid wages were the direct result of the child- labor violation. If Paragon and Mr. Jessop had not employed the children, the children would not have performed unpaid labor. In other words, the violation of the injunction (emp loyment of child labor under oppressive conditions) wa s the “but-for” cause of the children’s unp aid labor. Paragon and Mr. Jessop es sentially assume that the damages from a child-labor violation and the damages from a minimum-wage violation are29 mutually exclusive. This approach posits that because unpaid wages constitute the damages from a minimu m-wage violation, the unpaid wages cannot also constitute damages from a child-labor violation. But these damages are no t mutually exclusive. In this case, the children’s unpaid labor re sulted directly from empl oyment of th e children; accordingly, the “‘actual lo sses sustained as a resu lt of the [child-labor violation]’” include the value of the children’s uncompensated work. 13
O’Connor v. Midwest Pi pe Fabrications, Inc. , 972 F.2d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 1992). For these reasons, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in ordering Paragon and Mr. Jessop to pay into a fund to compensate the children for their work. IV. Conclusion We affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm the district court’s co nclusion that Paragon and Mr. Jessop violated the 2007 injunction prohibiting the use of oppressive child labor.

13 Paragon and Mr. Jessop argue that unpaid wages se rved as an impermissible sanctio n because such wages could be sought in a separate proceeding ag ainst Paragon and Mr. Jessop fo r minimum-wage violations. But the mere fact that certain damages could also be recovered in a separate proceeding does not prevent the district court from ordering the same payment as a sa nction for contempt. See McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co. , 336 U.S. 187, 194 (1949) (approving th e district court’s contempt sanction, which had ordered payment of damages, noting that “[t]he fact that another suit might be brough t to collect the payments is, of course, immaterial”).30 The children were not volunteers, and Paragon and Mr. Jessop employed the children. We further affirm the district court’s order for Paragon and Mr. Jessop to pay into a fund to compensate the childr en. In our view, this order constituted a pe rmissible compensa tory sanction. But we reverse the district court’s appointment of a special master to monitor compliance with the injuncti on. This appointm ent exceeded the court’s authority to impose coercive sanctions.