1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

GARY M. RESTAINO

United States Attorney

District of Arizona

KEVIN M. RAPP (Ariz. Bar No. 014249, kevin.rapp@usdoj.gov) MARGARET PERLMETER (Ariz. Bar No. 024805, margaret.perlmeter@usdoj.gov) PETER S. KOZINETS (Ariz. Bar No. 019856, peter.kozinets@usdoj.gov) 

ANDREW C. STONE (Ariz. Bar No. 026543, andrew.stone@usdoj.gov)

Assistant U.S. Attorneys

40 N. Central Avenue, Suite 1800

Phoenix, Arizona 85004-4408

Telephone (602) 514-7500

DAN G. BOYLE (N.Y. Bar No. 5216825, daniel.boyle2@usdoj.gov) Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

312 N. Spring Street, Suite 1400

Los Angeles, CA 90012

Telephone (213) 894-2426

NICOLE M. ARGENTIERI

Acting Assistant Attorney General 

Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice

AUSTIN M. BERRY (Texas Bar No. 24062615, austin.berry2@usdoj.gov) U.S. Department of Justice

Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section

1301 New York Avenue, NW, 11th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20005

Telephone (202) 412-4136

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

v.

Michael Lacey, et al,

 Defendants.

CR-18-422-PHX-DJH

UNITED STATES’ MOTION FOR 

PROTECTIVE ORDER 

CONTAINING SENSITIVE VICTIM 

INFORMATION

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1948 Filed 11/08/23 Page 1 of 15
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d) (the Child Victims’ and Child Witnesses’ Rights 

Act) and § 3771(a) (the Crime Victims’ Rights Act), the United States respectfully requests 

that this Court enter the proposed Protective Order submitted with this Motion.

1

BACKGROUND

Defendants have been indicted on one count of conspiracy to violate the Travel Act, 

and 50 substantive counts of violating the Travel Act, as well as multiple money laundering 

counts. (Doc. 230.) During trial, the United States has introduced into evidence more than 

50 advertisements, related to the 50 substantive Travel Act counts, which contain

sexualized photos of victims, some of whom were minors at the time of their exploitation.

Additionally, the United States introduced Backpage ads of other victims who were part of 

the conspiracy count, but not Counts 2-51. All of these exhibits were displayed in open 

court where the public and press had unfettered access to attend the trial and observe and 

report on the exhibits. 

Now, after these sensitive materials have already been on public display, David M.

Morgan, who has been present almost every day of the trial, has requested access to 

“admitted (and non-admitted?) exhibits during and/or after trial.” See Exhibit 1 (Oct. 24, 

2023 E-mail from Mr. Morgan to Clerk of the Court); see also Exhibit 2 (Oct. 25, 2023 Email exchange between Mr. Morgan and Clerk of the Court). Mr. Morgan operates a 

website, dedicated to the trial in this matter, which offers access to “100s of case-related 

1 The United States inquired of defense counsel regarding opposition to this motion. Defendants Padilla and Vaught 

have expressly stated their opposition to such a motion. The remaining defendants have not notified the United 

States of their respective positions.

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1948 Filed 11/08/23 Page 2 of 15
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

court documents” for members who pay a $29 fee. See Exhibit 3. After the United States 

orally moved to seal the exhibits, undersigned counsel learned that Mr. Morgan had already 

obtained at least one exhibit that was admitted in this trial.2

Consequently, the United States specifically requests that the Court issue the 

Proposed Protective Order, which prohibits public dissemination by the parties and their 

counsel of any document that contains identifying information3 and potentially identifying 

information4 of any victim in this matter. The Court should grant the United States’ 

requests for two reasons. First, the Court has discretionary and supervisory power over its 

own records and files and should deny access to the requested Exhibits. Second, federal 

law provides good cause to issue a protective order regarding these sensitive materials to

protect the victims’ right to privacy and dignity and prevent further trauma and repeated

harm to the victims. 

2 See Exhibit 4 (Oct. 27, 2023 E-mail from Mr. Morgan to subscribers disclosing Govt

Exh. 171, which was discussed in closing by Mr. Cambria, and was the subject of an 

objection by the United States).

3 The United States proposes that “identifying information” include victims' names, social 

security numbers, addresses, and telephone numbers. See generally, 18 U.S.C. § 

3509(d)(3)(A); Fed. R. Crim. P. 49.1(a) (social security numbers, taxpayer identification 

numbers, birth dates, names of minors, financial account numbers, and home addresses); 

Rule Fed. R. Crim. P. 49.1(e) (for good cause, the court may by order in a case require 

redaction of additional information).

4 “Potentially identifying information” includes information found in the advertisements 

which would tend to publicly identify the victim, including photographs of the victim found 

on Backpage advertisements. See generally, 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d)(3)(A); Fed. R. Crim. P. 

49.1(e).

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1948 Filed 11/08/23 Page 3 of 15
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

DISCUSSION

A. THE COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO GRANT THE UNITED STATES’ 

MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER

1. The Court has supervisory power over its own records and files and 

should seal the Exhibits at issue.

Courts have supervisory power over their own custodial records and files, and it is 

well within a Court’s power to issue a protective order. See Nixon v. Warner Commc’n 

Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 590 (1978). With facts similar to those before the court, the Supreme 

Court in Nixon held that (1) the common law right of access to judicial records did not 

require the release of the exhibits sought, and (2) denying the media a physical copy of an 

exhibit entered into evidence and displayed in Court did not implicate either the First 

Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press or the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a 

public trial. Id. at 608. 

In Nixon, the press sought audio tapes admitted into evidence at trial to copy the 

tapes for “broadcasting and sale to the public.” Id. at 591. During the trial, hours of the 

taped audio recordings were played for the jury and the public in the courtroom and entered 

into evidence. Id. at 594. In addition, transcripts of the recordings were widely printed in 

the press. Id. Several weeks after the trial, certain broadcasters sought permission to 

“copy, broadcast, and sell to the public the portions of the tapes played at trial.” Id. The 

Supreme Court stated that while courts recognize a general right to inspect and copy public 

records and documents including judicial records, these rights are not absolute. Id. at 597-

98, 599 (“It is uncontested, however, that the right to inspect and copy judicial records is 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1948 Filed 11/08/23 Page 4 of 15
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

not absolute. Every court has supervisory power over its own records and access has been 

denied where court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes”).

5

Ultimately, because “the decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the 

trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of 

the particular case,” the Court concluded that the common law right of access did not 

warrant release of the tapes.6

 Id. at 599. 

Next, rejecting the applicability of the respondents’ constitutional arguments, the 

Court stated that, with respect to the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press,

“there were no restrictions upon press access to, or publication of any information in the 

public domain. Indeed the press . . . was permitted to listen to tapes and report on what 

was heard.” Id. at 609. Moreover, as it concerned the press in particular, the Court added 

that “[t]he First Amendment generally grants the press no right to information about a trial 

superior to that of the general public” – who in this case “never had physical access to the 

materials at issue.” Id. (emphasis in the original). Finally, rebuffing the respondents’ Sixth 

Amendment guarantee of a public trial, among other points, the Court concluded that not 

only does the Sixth Amendment “confer[] no special benefit on the press,” but that it does 

not “require that the trial – or any part of it – be broadcast live or on tape to the public. The 

5 In providing examples of “improper purposes,” the Court noted the use of records to 

“‘gratify private spite or promote public scandal.’” Id. at 603. 

6 As part of its balancing, the Court considered an aspect unique to Nixon – that the 

Presidential Recordings Act provided that portions of the recordings that had “historical 

value [would be] preserved and made available for use in judicial proceedings and, 

eventually, made accessible to the public.” Id. at 603. 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1948 Filed 11/08/23 Page 5 of 15
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

requirement of a public trial is satisfied by the opportunity of members of the public and 

the press to attend trial and report what they have observed.” Id. at 610. 

Here, like in Nixon, the Constitution is not implicated – simply put, there have been 

no restrictions to the press or public’s access to the trial; the exhibits at issue were displayed 

in open court, and the public and press had unfettered access to observe the trial and the 

exhibits and had every opportunity to report those observations. And like in Nixon, because 

the public never had physical access to the relevant exhibits, the press is not entitled to any 

rights “superior to that of the general public.” Id. at 609.

Even if the Court were to apply a constitutional analysis to Mr. Morgan’s request –

which according to Nixon is inapt – his request should still be denied. For example, in 

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596 at 604-606 (1982), 

the Court balanced the constitutional right to informational privacy against the First 

Amendment right of the public’s access to criminal trials. In striking this balance, the 

Court found that the denial of an open courtroom to protect the disclosure of sensitive 

information must be necessitated by a compelling governmental interest that is narrowly 

tailored to serve that interest. Id. at 606-07. In addition to a victim’s right to informational 

privacy, the Court determined that “safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of a minor” is a compelling interest. Id. This Circuit has also recognized that 

safeguarding a minor sexual abuse victim’s psychological well-being is indeed a 

compelling interest. See United States v. Yazzie, 743 F.3d 1278, 1287 (9th Cir. 2014), 

citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607-08. Moreover, there are no reasonable 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1948 Filed 11/08/23 Page 6 of 15
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

alternatives to a protective order that would adequately protect these interests and the harm 

that would result from continued public dissemination of these Exhibits. See United States 

v. Doe, 870 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2017). Here, protecting only those court Exhibits 

containing private and sensitive victim information, which were previously published in a 

public trial following open testimony from the victims, is narrowly tailored and serves 

compelling and recognized interests – the victims’ right to informational privacy and their 

right to be free from the unnecessary psychological harm caused by the further and 

indefinite public disclosure of these exhibits. See Yazzie 743 F.3d at 1283, 1287, 1291. In 

addition, issuing the protective order furthers the United States’ compelling interest in 

protecting minor and other victims from repeated re-traumatization that would be caused 

by further dissemination of the victim ads on the Internet.

Simply put, and as affirmed by Nixon, the Court possesses the power in its discretion 

to deny access to trial exhibits. And, as discussed below, there is good cause for this Court 

to issue the Proposed Protective order regarding the sensitive Exhibits to protect the 

victims’ rights and deny Mr. Morgan’s (and anyone else’s similar) request. 7

2. Courts may enter a protective order for good cause shown 

The Court may enter a protective order at any time, for good cause, pursuant to Rule 

7 To the extent Mr. Morgan (or any other member of the media) would like to report on 

what he or she observed about those exhibits, they are free to do so. There is no need for 

Mr. Morgan (or anyone else for that matter) to possess a copy of those exhibits for 

publication, which, based on the sexualized nature of the content and personally identifying 

information contained therein, could reasonably be expected to be used for “improper 

purposes” and unquestionably run afoul of the victims’ right to privacy and dignity. 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1948 Filed 11/08/23 Page 7 of 15
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d) and its general supervisory authority. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d) 

(“At any time, the court may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or 

inspection, or grant other appropriate relief.”); see also Alderman v. United States, 394 

U.S. 165, 185 (1969) (“[T]he trial court can and should, where appropriate, place a 

defendant and his counsel under enforceable orders against unwarranted disclosure of the 

materials which they may be entitled to inspect.”); Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 

726 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The power of courts... to delimit how parties may use information 

obtained through the court’s power of compulsion is of long standing and well accepted.”).

Rule 16(d)’s provision for protective orders was specifically designed to protect against 

dissemination of a witness’, victim’s, or third party’s personal information. As stated in 

the Advisory Committee notes to the 1974 amendments to Rule 16, “[a]lthough the rule 

does not attempt to indicate when a protective order should be entered, it is obvious that 

one would be appropriate where there is reason to believe that a witness would be subject 

to physical or economic harm if his identity is revealed.” Indeed, courts should seek to 

ensure that disclosure of discovery materials to a defendant “involve[s] a minimum hazard 

to others.” Alderman, 394 U.S. at 185. 

As discussed below, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”), which established 

the right of victims “to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity 

and privacy,” is more than sufficient to provide good cause for issuing the Proposed 

Protective Order. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8). In addition to the CVRA, because a subset 

of the Exhibits contains images of minors, they are further subject to the Child Victim’s 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1948 Filed 11/08/23 Page 8 of 15
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and Child Witnesses’ Rights Act—which provides additional good cause to grant the 

United States’ motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509. Restricting the unnecessary additional 

publication of traumatic and triggering sensitive photographs that document the sex 

trafficking of victims significantly outweighs any public interest in publication. 

B. THE CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS ACT PROTECTS VICTIMS’ RIGHTS TO 

PRIVACY AND DIGNITY AND IS GOOD CAUSE TO GRANT THE 

UNITED STATES’ MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER

The victims in this case have a statutory right to privacy and dignity that militate in 

support of granting the United States’ Motion. The CVRA guarantees a victim of a crime 

certain rights and protections. See 18 U.S.C. §3771(a) (listing the eight protections and 

rights afforded to victims). The CVRA provides, in relevant part, that: “In any court 

proceeding involving an offense against a crime victim, the court shall ensure that the crime 

victim is afforded the rights described in [the CVRA].” One of the most stalwart rights 

afforded to each and every victim of a crime, and the right at issue here, is the “right to be 

treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy.” 18 U.S.C. § 

3771(a)(8) (emphasis added). Recognizing the importance of these rights and the need to 

enforce them, the CVRA, unlike prior victims’ rights statutes, allows both the government 

and the victims to enforce the CVRA. See 18 U.S.C. §3771(a)(d)(1), Kenna v. U.S. Dist. 

Ct. for C.D. Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 2006). Indeed, Congress was clear in their 

intention in the enactment of the CVRA: “it is not the intent of this bill that its significance 

be whittled down or marginalized by the courts or the executive branch. The legislation is 

meant to correct, not continue, the legacy of poor treatment of crime victims in the criminal 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1948 Filed 11/08/23 Page 9 of 15
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

proceedings.” See Senate Debate at S4269 (statement of Sen. Feinstein); see also United 

States v. Dearing, 2021 WL 672987, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2021) (quoting Senate 

Debate at S4269); United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)

(same). Moreover, courts are tasked with ensuring that victims are afforded this right, and 

the government is obligated to make its best efforts to do the same. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 

3771(b)(1) (“the court shall ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described in 

subsection (a)”) and 3771(c)(1) (the government “shall make their best efforts to see that 

crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a)”).

Courts routinely recognize the trauma, stigma, and emotional harm that victims of 

sexual exploitation suffer through the judicial process and the concomitant need to limit 

that harm where possible.8

 See, e.g., Dillard v. City of Springdale, Arkansas, 930 F.3d 935 

(8th Cir. 2019) (victims of sexual abuse had right to privacy from public disclosure of this 

abuse); Quinn v. Haynes, 234 F.3d 837, 850 (4th Cir. 2000), relying on Michigan v. Lucas, 

500 U.S. 145, 149-51 (1991) (state has a valid interest in protecting victims of sexual abuse 

from needless harassment, humiliation and unnecessary invasions of privacy); United 

8 Such harm is well documented. See Suzanne M. Leone, Protecting Rape Victims’ 

Identities: Balance Between the Right to Privacy and the First Amendment, 27 New Eng. 

L. Rev. 883, 909-10 (1993) quoting Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-

14, at 650 (1st ed. 1978)) (a victim’s right to control personal information “is breached 

most seriously when intimate facts about one’s personal identity are made public against 

one’s will ”); Joel M. Schumm, No Names Please: The Virtual Victimization of Children, 

Crime Victims, the Mentally Ill, and Others in Appellate Court Opinions, 42 Ga. L. Rev. 

471, 475-76 (2008) (discussing increased harm to victims for disclosure of personal 

information in public court records because of easy and pervasive internet access to such 

information). 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1948 Filed 11/08/23 Page 10 of 15
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1989) citing Charles 

Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.J., 475, 483 (1968) (information about one’s body, state of health, 

and medical records disclosing personal details is constitutionally protected from 

inappropriate disclosure).

Here, several victims took the stand, were subject to extensive cross examination, 

and had to relive some of their most traumatic moments in the public eye. See SEALED 

Attachment B (three affidavits of victims who testified at trial). Not only did the victims

testify about being advertised on Backpage.com, but they also faced the very images of 

themselves that were used in the advertisement of their bodies for commercial sex – the 

ones sought here by Mr. Morgan as part of his general request for all admitted and nonadmitted exhibits. These images were displayed to the public in a courtroom while the 

victims answered questions. This alone is traumatizing. Id. It is without question that the

victims will suffer compounded and repeated harm by the continued dissemination of these 

traumatic images. Id. What is more, as the Court is well aware, these images often depict 

the victims in various states of undress and posed in sexually suggestive positions. The 

repeated publication of these images via Mr. Morgan’s website, or elsewhere, for public

purchase and consumption undeniably violates the victims’ right to privacy and dignity.

Id. As such, this Court should determine that there is good cause to protect the victims’

right to dignity and privacy as provided for in the CVRA and issue a protective order 

regarding the Exhibits identified in Attachment A.

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1948 Filed 11/08/23 Page 11 of 15
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. THE CHILD VICTIM’S AND CHILD WITNESSES’ RIGHTS ACT 

PROVIDES GOOD CAUSE TO GRANT THE UNITED STATES’ MOTION 

TO ISSUE A PROTECTIVE ORDER

The Child Victims’ and Child Witnesses’ Rights Act (the “Act”) is another 

independent basis upon which good cause can be shown for issuing the Proposed Protective 

Order and is applicable to a subset of the Exhibits. Regarding the safeguarding of children 

involved in criminal proceedings, the Act provides for confidentiality of information 

concerning children. The Act defines a “child” as “a person who is under the age of 18, 

who is or is alleged to be ... a victim of a crime of physical abuse, sexual abuse, or 

exploitation ... or a witness to a crime committed against another person." 18 U.S.C. § 

3509(a)(2). The Act defines “sexual abuse” to include the “sexual exploitation of 

children.” 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8). The Act defines the term “exploitation” to mean “child 

pornography or child prostitution[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(3).

Under the Act, information “that concerns a child” may only be disclosed to 

“persons who, by reason of their participation in the proceeding, have reason to know such 

information.” 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d)(1)(A)(ii). Employees of the Government, employees 

of the Court, the defendants, defense counsel, and the jury must “keep all documents that 

disclose the name or any other information concerning a child in a secure place to which 

no person who does not have reason to know their contents has access[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 

3509(d)(1)(A)(i). “This protection applies even when victims are no longer underage.”

United States v. Lewis, 2017 WL 750456, at *5 (S.D. Ga. 2017) (citing Lebowitz v. United 

States, 2015 WL 630394, at *14 n.13 (N.D. Ga. 2015); Luttrell v. McDonald’s Corp., 2004 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1948 Filed 11/08/23 Page 12 of 15
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WL 2750244, at *6 (S.D. Ind. 2004) (“[T]he protection of [a minor’s] privacy will mean 

little if the cloak protecting that privacy disappears simply upon reaching the age of 

majority.”)); see also United States v. Gardner, 2016 WL 5404207, at *5 (E.D. Mich. 2016) 

(collecting cases and allowing then-18-year-old trafficking victim to testify without full 

name, relying on spirit of § 3509(d) as well as § 3771).

Protecting the confidentiality of the child is so paramount that any information that 

“disclose[s] the name of or any other information concerning a child shall be filed under 

seal without necessity of obtaining a court order.” 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d)(2). The Act also 

contemplates that “the court may issue an order protecting a child from public disclosure 

of the name of or any other information concerning the child in the course of the 

proceedings, if the court determines that there is a significant possibility that such 

disclosure would be detrimental to the child.” 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d)(3). The Court may also 

issue a protective order that provides for any other measure that may be necessary to protect 

the privacy of the child. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d)(3)(B). As the Supreme Court has recognized, 

the continued possession of private materials “is of sufficient importance to merit 

constitutional protection.” Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 506 U.S. 

9, 13 (1992). And the victims will suffer continuous harm if this information remains 

widely and publicly available. Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 13; see also, Gavin, 595 

F.2d at 788 (favoring redaction of minor sex abuse victim’s name in already publicly 

published court opinion). Here again, the Act’s vital purpose – protecting any identifying 

information regarding minor victims’ identity from general, public consumption provides 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1948 Filed 11/08/23 Page 13 of 15
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

overwhelming good cause to issue the Protective Order.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the United States respectfully requests that the Court 

grant the United States’ Motion and issue the Proposed Protective Order. 

Respectfully submitted this 8th day of November, 2023.

GARY M. RESTAINO

United States Attorney District of Arizona

NICOLE M. ARGENTIERI

Acting Assistant Attorney General Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice

s/Austin M. Berry

AUSTIN M. BERRY

Trial Attorney

KEVIN M. RAPP

MARGARET PERLMETER

PETER KOZINETS

ANDREW STONE

DANIEL BOYLE

Assistant U.S. Attorneys

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1948 Filed 11/08/23 Page 14 of 15
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November 8, 2023, I electronically transmitted the attached 

document to the Clerk’s Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and transmittal of a 

Notice of Electronic Filing to the CM/ECF registrants who have entered their appearance 

as counsel of record.

s/Austin M. Berry

AUSTIN M. BERRY

Trial Attorney

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1948 Filed 11/08/23 Page 15 of 15