* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines o f law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** The Honorable John L. Kane, Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by desi gnation. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### AUG 6 2004 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

DENNIS CARRILLO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. QWEST, Defendant-Appellee. No. 03-2208 (D.C. No. CIV-03-233-WJ/RLP)

(D. N.M.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before SEYMOUR and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges, and KANE , ** Senior District Judge.
Dennis Carrillo appeals from the district court’s j udgment granting Qwest Corporation’s motion to dismiss his complaint alleg ing wrongful termination. He also appeals from the district court’s denial of tw o post-judgment motions, (1) his-2-

“Motion to Modify or Amend Judgment Granting Defend ant’s Motion to Dismiss and for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (“Fed . R. Civ. P. 59(e) / Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) motion”), and (2) his motion for leav e to interview and depose a witness. On appeal, Mr. Carrillo asserts that the district c ourt erred by (1) granting Qwest’s motion to dismiss; (2) finding Qwest’s moti on to dismiss need not be converted into a motion for summary judgment, (3) f inding Mr. Carrillo’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) affidavit could not be consid ered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); (4) denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) / F ed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) motion; and (5) denying his motion for leave to interview and depose a witness. Mr. Carrillo also asserts for the first time on appeal that he w as denied due process of law, but he fails “to articulate a reason for us to depart f rom the general rule that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not pass ed upon below.” Walker v. Mather (In re Walker) , 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). We therefore decline to consider his due process ar gument. See id. We likewise decline to consider the arguments he sought to rais e in his proposed first amended complaint, that he here reasserts. Mr. Carrillo fa iled to meet the standard for granting a Rule 59(e) motion, a prerequisite to con sidering his proposed first amended complaint, and the district court therefore properly rejected it.-3-

Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Be cause “the sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law, we review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), applying th e same standards as the district court.” Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind , 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation and quotation omitted). We re view for abuse of discretion a Rule 59(e) motion. Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L .P. , 312 F.3d 1292, 1296 n.3 (10th Cir. 2002). Having examined the briefs, the record, and the app licable law pursuant to the above-mentioned standards, we conclude that Mr. Carrillo has not raised a reversible error in this case. We therefore AFFIRMthe district court’s judgment granting Qwest’s motion to dismiss for the reasons stated in its May 27, 2003, memorandum opinion and order, and AFFIRM its August12, 2003, memorandum opinion and order denying Mr. Carrillo’s post-judgment motions. See Aplt. App. at 106-12 & 164-66. Entered for the Court

Stephen H. Anderson Circuit Judge