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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEE MANUEL,

Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER: 08-14046

HONORABLE VICTORIA A. ROBERTS

v.

BLAINE LAFLER, Warden, 

STEVEN HARRINGTON, Regular Unit Officer, 

FRANK CHAFFIN, Corrections Officer, and

BRADLEY PEET, Resident Unit Manager,

Defendant(s).

 /

 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Blaine Lafler, Steven Harrington,

and Bradley Peet’s (collectively “Defendants”) “Motion for Summary Judgment Based

on Plaintiff’s Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies, Failure to State a Claim and

Qualified Immunity.” (Doc. #13). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment is appropriate “if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In reviewing a motion for

summary judgment, “the evidence as well as all inferences drawn therefrom must be

read in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Kochins v.

Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 1986). 

The movant has the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue

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of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant

meets this burden, the nonmoving party must, by affidavit or otherwise as provided by

Rule 56, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The essential inquiry is “whether the evidence

presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so

one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52. If the

nonmoving party does not respond with specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial,

summary judgment is appropriate. Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 353 (6th Cir.

1989).

Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants’ motion. However, “a district court cannot

grant summary judgment in favor of a movant simply because the adverse party has not

responded.” Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 1991). The moving party

must always bear the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact, even if the opposing party fails to respond. Id. at 454-55. “The court is

required, at a minimum, to examine the [Defendants’] motion for summary judgment to

ensure that [they have] discharged that burden.” Id. at 455.

After reviewing the merits of Defendants’ motion, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s

claims against Lafler and Peet. The exhaustion provision of the Prison Litigation and

Reform Act (“PLRA”) says, “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under [42 U.S.C. §1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available

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are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). A prisoner must comply with a system’s critical

procedural rules to “properly exhaust” a claim. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 95

(2006). This requirement was clarified in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007):

Compliance with prison grievance procedures . . . is all that is required by

the PLRA to “properly exhaust.” The level of detail necessary in a

grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system

to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not

the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.

Jones, 549 U.S. at 218.

Paragraph T of the Michigan Department of Corrections’ Policy Directive

03.02.130 says, “Information provided [on grievance forms] shall be limited to the facts

involving the issue being grieved (i.e., who, what, when, where, why, how). Dates,

times, places and names of all those involved in the issue being grieved are to be

included.” (Emphasis in original).

Defendants present evidence that Plaintiff did not name Lafler or Peet on any

grievance forms. Defendants met their burden to demonstrate that no genuine issue of

material fact exists regarding whether Plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative

remedies as to Lafler and Peet. 

Defendants do not move for dismissal on behalf of Frank Chaffin because he has

not been served. However, sua sponte dismissal on Plaintiff’s claims against Chaffin is

appropriate because Plaintiff did not name Chaffin on any grievance forms. 

Plaintiff claims Harrington is responsible for closing the cell door on his head,

which resulted in the partial severing of his left ear. Defendants present evidence that

Harrington was not responsible for operating the cell doors when Plaintiff was injured. 

Plaintiffs claims against Harrington are DISMISSED. 

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IT IS ORDERED. 

s/Victoria A. Roberts 

Victoria A. Roberts

United States District Judge

Dated: January 6, 2009

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this

document was served on the attorneys of

record and Lee Manuel by electronic means

or U.S. Mail on January 6, 2009.

s/Linda Vertriest 

Deputy Clerk

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