[Cite as State v. Shabazz, 2020-Ohio-799.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 108353 

 v. : 

 

DAWUD SHABAZZ, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 5, 2020 

 

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case Nos. CR-18-626570-A and CR-18-633959-A 

 

Appearances: 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Gregory Paul, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Ruth R. Fischbein-Cohen, for appellant. 

 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J.: 

Defendant-appellant Dawud D. Shabazz (“Shabazz”) appeals his 

guilty plea and asks this court to vacate his convictions. We affirm. 

Shabazz pleaded guilty in two separate cases. In the first case, 

Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-18-626570-A, Shabazz pleaded guilty to one count of child 
endangering, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A); and one count 

of obstructing justice, a fifth-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2921.32(A)(5). In the 

second case, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-18-633959-A, Shabazz pleaded guilty to three 

counts of attempted child endangering, third- and fourth-degree felonies, in 

violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1) and (3); and one count of child endangering, a thirddegree felony, in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(3). Shabazz was sentenced to a total 

prison term of six years. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

At Shabazz’s plea hearing, he pleaded guilty to punching his 19-month 

old nephew, Z.F., in the head because the nephew asked for milk during an argument 

between Shabazz and the nephew’s mother. Z.F. became unresponsive, and was 

taken to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with a retinal hemorrhage and a 

subdural hematoma. The other child living in the Shabazz home also complained of 

physical abuse at the hand of Shabazz. 

Shabazz pleaded guilty and stated, at his sentencing hearing, 

[y]es, your Honor. I can’t change the past of what happened, and 

reflect. I understand the circumstances of discipline and how we can 

over exceed. However, the only fact that I have suffered it’s significant 

time — 

* * * 

No. What I’m saying is — I meant to say this, ma’am. My children 

have suffered as well as I have suffered from being absent while in 

CBCF. It have given me enough time to reflect as well as being here 

ten months has given me enough time to reflect on the actions that I 

have made. 
Also, I’ve learned since then how to handle myself, and how to be 

productive in society, as well as how to be productive as a man and a 

father to my children. 

I have one son with Ms. Howard, so, you know, I definitely miss him, 

and I understand the circumstances that’s held against me. 

Prior to this situation, I wasn’t given no skills on how to handle certain 

things so I did go overboard, and I’m holding myself responsible for 

such matters. 

However, since then, I have changed. I have become smarter and 

more educated on how to handle myself as well as children in the 

future. 

And I hope that you can understand and consider the circumstances 

of this case, and understand where I stand right now. 

(Tr. 20-21.) 

At the plea hearing, after Shabazz pleaded guilty, the trial court 

stated, “[l]et the record reflect that I find you knowingly, voluntarily, and with a full 

understanding of your rights entered your change of plea. I accept them, make [a] 

finding of guilt. On the recommendation of the prosecutor’s office, nolle the 

remaining counts.” (Tr. 12-13.) 

Shabazz’s guilty plea was a result of a plea agreement between 

Shabazz and the state. In exchange for Shabazz’s guilty plea, the state agreed to nolle 

13 counts from the original 19-count indictment. At the plea hearing, the trial court 

fully advised Shabazz of his constitutional rights regarding his guilty pleas. (Tr. 6-

12.) Shabazz was sentenced to six years imprisonment, and filed this appeal 

assigning two errors for our review: 
I. The finding of guilt herein was against the manifest weight of 

the evidence absent sufficiency as required by law; and, 

II. The trial court erred in not considering the R.C. 2929.12 factors 

at sentencing. 

II. Manifest Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

Shabazz contests his guilty plea as not being intelligently made 

because it was against the manifest weight of the evidence and absent sufficient 

proof as required by law. Crim.R. 11 governs how trial courts should accept a 

defendant’s guilty plea. Under Crim.R. 11(C)(2), 

[i]n felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a 

plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest 

without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the 

following: 

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea 

voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and 

of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the 

defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of 

community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing. 

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the 

defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no 

contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may 

proceed with judgment and sentence. 

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the 

defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is 

waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against 

him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 

in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the 

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which 

the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or 

herself. 

The trial court fully complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2). (Tr. 6-13.) 
Shabazz argues that his plea is comparable to an Alford plea, where 

he maintained his innocence. An Alford plea is made to a reduced charge, only as a 

risk assessment to taking the matter to trial. However, “[u]nder Alford, a trial court 

may accept a guilty plea despite claims of innocence ‘when a factual basis for the 

guilty plea is evidenced by the record.’” State v. Alvelo, 2017-Ohio-742, 85 N.E.3d 

1032 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103408, 2016-

Ohio-2840, ¶ 27. Additionally, “[a]n Alford plea exists where a defendant enters a 

guilty plea contemporaneously with a ‘protestation of innocence.’” Alvelo at ¶ 23, 

quoting Alford v. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 

(1970). Shabazz did not protest his innocence at the plea hearing or at sentencing, 

and took responsibility for his actions. Therefore, Shabazz’s plea is not akin to an 

Alford plea. 

Additionally, Shabazz has provided no evidence that the trial court 

failed to follow the requirements of Crim.R. 11 at the time he entered his plea of 

guilty in exchange for concessions by the state of Ohio. The record reveals that the 

trial court fully advised Shabazz that he was waiving certain rights, and Shabazz 

agreed to waive those rights. “By entering a guilty plea, a defendant waives his right 

to present manifest-weight-of-the-evidence or sufficiency-of-the-evidence attacks 

against his convictions.” State v. Barrett, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24150, 2011-

Ohio-2303, citing State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 

51; State v. Rice, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106953, 2018-Ohio-5356, ¶ 7; State v. 

Jamison, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21165, 2006-Ohio-4933, ¶ 38. (““‘A guilty plea 
waives a defendant’s right to challenge sufficiency or manifest weight of the 

evidence.’””). 

Crim.R. 11(B)(1) provides that “a plea of guilty is a complete 

admission of the defendant’s guilt.” By entering a plea of guilty, Shabazz 

surrendered his right to have the state prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

State v. Patton, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2016-CA-37, 2017-Ohio-1197, ¶ 16. 

Shabazz’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

III. Sentencing Factors 

 A. Standard of review 

When we review felony sentencing, our review follows the standard 

set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), which provides, 

[t]he court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this 

section shall review the record, including the findings underlying the 

sentence or modification given by the sentencing court. 

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a 

sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the 

sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for 

resentencing. The appellate court’s standard for review is not whether 

the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate court may 

take any action authorized by this division if it clearly and 

convincingly finds * * * the following: 

 * * * 

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

Id.

A sentence is contrary to law if the sentence is more or less than the 

statutory range or if the trial court does not consider purposes and principles of 
felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12. 

State v. Franklin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107482, 2019-Ohio-3760, ¶ 41, citing 

State v. Pawlak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103444, 2016-Ohio-5926, ¶ 58. However, 

in its consideration, the trial court is not mandated to make findings or give their 

reasoning for imposing more than the minimum sentence. Id. Therefore, a 

sentence is not contrary to law when it is within the statutory range and where the 

trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. State v. Price, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 104341, 2017-Ohio-533, ¶ 14. 

B. Whether the Trial Court Considered the R.C. 2929.12 

Factors at Sentencing 

Shabazz is not arguing that the trial court did not consider the 

statutory factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 relating to the purposes and principles of 

felony sentencing. Rather, Shabazz contends that the trial court did not consider 

the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(E) before sentencing 

him. “Although there is a mandatory duty to ‘consider’ the relevant statutory factors 

under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, the sentencing court is not required to engage in 

any factual findings under R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12.” State v. Gonzalez, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 102579, 2015-Ohio-4765, ¶ 6, citing State v. Bement, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 99914, 2013-Ohio-5437, ¶ 17, and State v. Combs, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 99852, 2014-Ohio-497, ¶ 52. 

Specifically, Shabazz argues that the trial court did not consider 

R.C. 2929.12(E), which states, 
The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply 

regarding the offender, and any other relevant factors, as factors 

indicating that the offender is not likely to commit future crimes: 

(1) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had not been 

adjudicated a delinquent child. 

(2) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had not been 

convicted of or pleaded guilty to a criminal offense. 

(3) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had led a lawabiding life for a significant number of years. 

(4) The offense was committed under circumstances not likely 

to recur. 

(5) The offender shows genuine remorse for the offense. 

Id. 

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated, 

[a]ll right. I have considered the purposes and principles of the Ohio 

Revised Code sections regarding sentencing. I’ve read the 

Presentence report. I’ve listened to what everybody had to say. 

I reviewed your record, Mr. Shabazz, and I have had an opportunity 

to read the letters. 

I think the only inference is that you did try and get Ms. Howard to lie 

to change her story, and there’s so many things in this letter, but here’s 

the one that I will quote and this is a quote, and so pardon any 

grammatical errors. 

* * * 

You know you have a record. You were permitted in 2017 to plead to 

attempted domestic violence. You violated that. You also a have in 

2013, domestic violence with a prior conviction. 

In ‘11, you pled guilty to attempted domestic violence with prior 

convictions, a felony of the fifth degree. 
And so I suppose it’s really no surprise that you continued that kind 

of activity throughout the rest of your life, and God help these poor 

children. 

(Tr. 32-33.) 

The trial court discussed Shabazz’s prior violent history, reoccurrence 

of the same type of behavior resulting in the Shabazz not living a law-abiding life. 

The record reveals that the trial court considered the factors under R.C. 2929.11 and 

2929.12 when sentencing Shabazz. “While trial courts must carefully consider the 

statutes that apply to every felony case, it is not necessary for the trial court to 

articulate its consideration of each individual factor as long as it is evident from the 

record that the principles of sentencing were considered.” State v. Roberts, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 89236, 2008-Ohio-1942, ¶ 10. We add that the trial court stated in 

its journal entry that it considered the required factors under R.C. 2929.11 and 

2929.12. Therefore, we find that the trial court fulfilled its statutory requirements. 

State v. Clayton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99700, 2014-Ohio-112, ¶ 9. 

Shabazz’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

Judgment is affirmed. 

 It is ordered that the appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

 The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. 
 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

_________________________________ 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, PRESIDING JUDGE 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and 

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR