ORDER

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25 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AMOS SHARPE, et al.,
Plaintiffs

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants. No. 1:11

- cv

- 01812 BJR

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CLING ER MAN’S MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on Defendant John Clingerman’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 2.). Upon
consideration of the motion, the opposition and reply thereto, the entire record, and the
applicable law, the court will grant t he motion. The court’s reasoning is set forth below.

II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, Amos and Monica Sharpe, reside at 97 Glavenston Street SW apartment #302,
an apartment building located in Washington , D.C. ( See Superior Court of the District of
Columbia Search Warrant, attached as Ex. 1 to Dkt. No. 2.)

. On August 10, 2010, atORDER

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25 approximately 7:00 in the morning, members of the Metropolitan Police Department, including

Defendant Detective Clingerman, “burst” through the door of the Sharp e’s home in order to
execute a search warrant that Detective Clingerman had obtained from the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia several days earlier. 1

Plaintiffs describe the events of the morning of Augus t 10, 2010 as follows: ( See Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 10

- 11.). The
warrant was issued pursuant a sworn affidav it prepared by Detective Clingerman in the course of
his investigation of the June 27, 2010 murder of Victor Mba

- Jones. (Dkt. No. 2, Ex. 1 at pp. 1

- 9.). In the affidavit, Detective Clingerman stated that there were two murder suspects in the Mba

Jones homi cide. Id . One suspect was Nathaniel Headspeth. ( Id . at ¶ 11.). As part of the
investigation, Detective Clingerman sought the warrant to locate evidence to connect Headspeth

to the Mba

- Jones murder, e.g . “red tennis shoes, white shirt, firearm(s), ammunitio n, gun
holster,” etc . ( Id . at ¶¶ 6, 8.). In identifying an address for Headspeth, Detective Clingerman
relied on the statement of Headspeth’s relative. ( Id . at ¶ 19.). Detective Clingerman asserted that
on July 20, 2010, Headspeth’s relative told the detec tive that the suspect res ided at his sister’s
apartment located at 97 Galveston Street, SW #302, Washington, D.C

. Id . As it turns out, this is
plaintiffs’ address. (Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 1 at ¶ 10.). Detective Clingerman claims that he later learned
that Headspe th was staying in apartment # 304. (Dkt. No. 2 at 6 n. 2.). Based on Detective
Clingerman’s affidavit, D.C. Superior Court Judge Hamilton issued a search warrant on August
2, 2010. (Dkt. No. 2, Ex. 1.).

[D] ef endant officers invaded the plaintiff’s [sic] home and terrorized them for an extended period. Even though plaintiff Amos Sharpe was over

1 The court may take judicial notice of the search warrant and affidavit without converting the present motion into a motion for summary judgment. See Vance v. C hao, 496 F. Supp . 2d 182, 184 n.1 (D.D.C. 2007) (noting that a c ourt may take judicial notice of public documents, such as court records, without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment ).ORDER

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25 seventy (70) years old at the time, the defendant officers manhandled [him], pointed guns in his face and handcuffed him as they forced him [to] stay seated in his own home. Similarly, Monica Sharpe, who is a pharmacist, and who repeatedly told the officers that she had to go to work, was also manhandled, had guns pointed in her face, [and was] handcuffed and forced to stay seated in her own home. After terrorizing the plaintiff’s [sic] for over an hour, the bungling officer defendants finally realized that they had the wrong home, at which point they released the plaintiff’s [sic] from custody, and left the plaintiffs and their home in shambles.
(Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 1 at ¶ 12.). Plaintiffs claim that Detective Clingerman either knew or should
have known that he was relying on false information when he submitted the affidavit in support

of the search warrant. Plaintiffs assert that “[Detective] Clingerman had no legitimate facts of
any kind that would support a search of the plaintiff’s [sic] home. He had never been in the
plaintiff’s [sic] home; he had no previous contact with either of the pla intiff’s [sic]; and he had
no information associating the plaintiff’s [sic] with any kind of criminal conduct whatsoever.”
( Id . at ¶ 11.).
Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in D.C. Superior Court on August 4, 2011 against the District of
Columbia, Detective Clin g er man and “ several unknown police officers ” . ( Id . at ¶¶ 5

- 7.).
Plaintiffs allege claims for Assault and Battery (Count I), False Arrest

— Imprisonment (Count
II), violation of their due process rights under the Fourth Amendment (Count III) , and negligent

tr aining and supervision against the District (Count IV) . They seek $1,500,000 in compensatory
damages, in addition to unspecified sums as punitive damages, attorney fees and costs. ( Id . at ¶¶
17, 20, 23, and 27.).

Defendants removed the case to this court on October 13, 2011 ( Dkt. No. 1) and
Detective Clinger man filed the present motion to dismiss . (Dkt. No. 2.). Plaintiffs filed their
opposition to the motion on November 22, 2011 (Dkt. No. 7) and Detective Clinger man filed hisORDER

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25 reply on December 6, 2011. (D kt. No. 8.). The case was reassigned to this court on April 3, 2012.
(Dkt. No. 9.).

II I

. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is to test
“the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint after taking those
allegations as true. ” In re Interbank Fund Corp. Sec. Litig ., 668 F. Supp. 44, 47

- 48 (D.D.C.
2009) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes , 416 U.S . 232, 236 (1974)). A mbiguities must be resolved in

favor of the plaintiffs, giving them the benefit of every reasonable inference drawn from the

well

- plea ded facts and allegations in the complaint. See id

. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must plead sufficient facts, taken as
true, to provide “pl ausible grounds” that discovery will reveal evidence to support the plaintiff’s
allegations. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw th e reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.” Aschroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) ( citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570)) . Moreover, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels

and conclusions’ or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor
does the complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement.’” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. (citation omitted).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id . (citation omitted). For
example, “the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in
support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believeORDER

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25 that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims.”
Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider , 493 F.3d 1174 , 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in

ori ginal) . However, the court’s function is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might
present at a later stage, but to assess whether the pleading alone is legally sufficient to state a
claim for which relief may be granted. Caribbean Broad. Sy s., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC , 148 F.3d 1080, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1998). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely
consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of “entitlement to relief.” ’” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678

. (citation omitted).

B

. Analysis
Plaintiffs contend that Detective Cling er man violated their right against unreasonable

search and seizure guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and seek
compensation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Detective Cling er man argues that this claim must be
dismissed because: (1) the facts alleged in the complaint do not rise to the level of a

constitut ional violation, and (2) he is entitled to qualified immunity. In addition, he argues that
the court should not assert supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining state claims.

1

. The Fourth Amendment Claim
Plaintiffs claim that Detective Cling er man and the other defendant officers acted with
deliberate indifference to and in reckless disregard of plaintiffs’ due process rights under the
Fourth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 1 at ¶ 22.). Specifically, plaintiffs allege that they were
subjected to “an unlawful seizure when they were accosted at gunpoint, manhandled and
handcuffed like common criminals.” ( Id . at ¶ 23.). Plaintiffs concede that the defendant officers
acted pursuant to a search warrant, but argue that the search was unlawful because it was not
based on “legitimate facts of any kind that would support a search of plaintiff’s [sic] home.” ( Id

.ORDER

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25 at ¶ 11.). In support of this argument, plaintiffs claim that Detective Cling er man had never been
in the plaintiffs’ home, had not had any previous contact with plaintiffs, and did not have
information associating plaintiffs with criminal activity

. Id . Therefore, plaintiffs conclude,
Detective Cling er man knew or should have known that the information in the affidavit he
prepared and the wa rrant that Judge Hamilton signed were false. Id

. Detective Cling er man urges the court to dismiss this claim. He asserts that plaintiffs’
conclusory allegation that he had “no legitimate facts” to justify a search of plaintiffs’ residence

is an inadequate response t o overcome his Rule 12(b)(6) motion given the pleading requirements
establish by Twombly and Iqbal . (Dkt. No. 2 at 5.). He argues that the only facts that plaintiffs
offer in support of this allegation

— that Detective Cling er man had never been to their hous e, did
not know them, and did not have information associating them with criminal activity

— are irrelevant to whether the search was justified, because the detective did not obtain a warrant to

search plaintiffs ’ residence. Rather, the warrant was obtained to conduct a search of an apartment

in which he believed the suspect was residing. Because the warrant and affidavit clearly indicate
that there was probable cause to believe that the suspect resided in apartment #302, Detective
Clingerman argues, the sear ch did not violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
Detective Clingerman also argues that plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that he knew or
should have known that the information contained in the affidavit was false, also fails to satisfy
the pleadings requirements under Twombly and Iqbal . He claims that the search warrant and

affidavit show that he relied on statements from the suspect’s relative who reported that the

suspect resided in apartment #302. Importantly, he asserts that the complaint contains no facts
that call his reliance on this information into question.ORDER

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25 Plaintiffs respond that it is their contention that Detective Clinge rman “lied in his
affidavit,” that “no one told [the detective] that Mr. Headspeth lived” in apartment #302 and, if
someone did tell the detective that Headspeth lived there, that person “was not a family member
of Mr. Headspeth.” (Dkt. No. 7 at 4

. )

. In addition, plaintiffs assert that it would not have “taken

much for the defendant off icers to learn that neither of the plaintiffs were related to Mr.
Headspeth, nor would it have taken much for these inept officers to learn that plaintiff Amos
Sharpe had lived in that same apartment for decade s .” Id

. The court finds that plaintiffs have failed to allege factual allegations that, when accepted
as true, are sufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Iqbal , 556 U.S. at

678 . Detective Cling erman’s affidavit sets forth the factual basis for his belief th at the s uspect

resided in the apartment and a superior court judge reviewed the affidavit and found probable
cause to issue the warrant. Plaintiffs’ blanket assertions that Detective Clingerman lied in order
to obtain the warrant, are not only un supported by any f actual allegations in the complaint, but
they make little sense. As plaintiffs concede, Detective Clingerman had no prior contact with

them or any reason to believe that they had been involved in any criminal activity. Plaintiffs’
allegation is nothing sho rt of claiming that the detective lied in order to obtain the warrant so t hat
he could search plaintiffs’ apartment for sport

— an allegation that this court finds implausible.
See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. Gates , 602 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting
that plaintiff failed to recite facts sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level )

. That the officers may have pointed guns at plaintiffs and handcuffed them, while unfortunate, is

not unexpected behavior in light of the fact that the officers believed a murder suspect was
residing in the apartment. By making this finding, the court does not mean to discount the
understandable fear and indignation that plaintiffs must have felt at having their home invad edORDER

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25 by police officers. It is this court’s sincere wish that plaintiffs had never experienced the events
of that morning. Nevertheless, plaintiffs’ allegations do not support a viable constitutional claim.

2. Qualified Immunity

Detective Clingerman pleads in the alternative that he is protected by qualified immunity
for his actions in connection with the search of plaintiffs’ apartment. (Dkt. No. 2 at 9.). He
argues that a reasonable police officer, facing the same circumstances, wo uld ha ve believed that

the conduct was lawful. Plaintiff counters that qualified immunity is not available to a police
officer who knowingly falsifies a search warrant affidavit. (Dkt. No. 7 at 4.). Plaintiff asserts that
it was unreasonable for Detective Clinge rman to “accept the word of a presumed family member
of a suspected murderer as to where he lived without any indicia of reliability at all; even though
he had never receive reliable information from the alleged family member in the past; even
though he di d not undertake surveillance of the location, or check the rental office to see whose
name was not the lease....” ( Id . at 5.).
Public officials are protected from suit if their official acts were “objectively reasonable”
under the legal rules that were “cl early established” at the time of the alleged illegal action. See
Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635 , 639

- 640 (1987); Siegert v. Gilley , 500 U.S. 226, 232
(1991). Qualif ied immunity is immunity from suit rather tha n a mere defense to liability. Hunter

v. Bryant , 502 U.S. 22, 227 (1991). Therefore, the question of immunity should be resolved at
the earliest po ssible stage of the litigation. Id

. The court finds that Detective Clingerman is entitled to qualified immunity. His reliance
on the information prov ided by the suspect’s relative was reasonable and, indeed, the type of
information customarily relied on by law enforcement officers. 2

2 Indeed, other than being off by one apartment number, the information was accurate

. “Only where the warrantORDER

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25 application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existe nce unreasonable...will the shield of [qualified] immunity be lost.” Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335,

344

- 45 (1986) (internal citation omitted). Such is not the case here. Detective Clingerman’s
actions in obtaining a warrant and his sworn statement that he w as informed that apartment #302
was the correct address for Headspeth establish that he acted in good faith. The detective

concedes that the informant’s inf ormation ultimately ended up being partially incorrect, but such
a mistake does not negate his entitlement to immunity. As the United State Supreme Court has
noted, “it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will, in some cases, reasonably but
mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have indicated that in such cases

those of ficials

— like other officials who act in ways they reasonably believe to be lawful

— should not be held personally liable. ” Anderson , 483 U.S. at 641 (citing Malley , 475 U.S. at 344

- 345).

3. Supplemental Jurisdiction
It is a fundamental principle of comity that federal courts should avoid “needless

decisions of state law.” Gaubert v. Gray , 747 F. Supp. 2d 40, 50 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing United
Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). “Pendent jurisdiction is a
doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.” Gaubert , 747 F. Supp. 2d at 50 (dismissing
plaintiff’s four common law claims after dismissing plaintiff’s constitutional claims on the
ground of qualified immunity); see als o S hekoyan v. Sibley Int'l, 409 F.3d 414, 423
(D.C.Cir.2005) (citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726) (the decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
is discretionary)

. Furthermore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court “may decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim [that forms part of the same case or controversy] if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has originalORDER

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25 Barbara Jacobs Rothstein U.S. District Court Judge jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In this case, plaintiffs have failed to plead a viable
constitutional claim. All remaining claims are based on s tate law. Detective Clingerman urges
this court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and plaintiffs make no argument in

favor of retaining jurisdiction except to argue that the detective’s request “is just plain batty”
given that he removed the matter to this court in the first place. (Dkt. No. 7 at 5.). Given that this
case is at the earliest stages of litigation, the court finds that comity, convenience and judicial
economy weigh against supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court will d ismiss without
prejudice the remainder of plaintiffs’ claims.

IV

. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Detective Clingerman’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Count III is dismissed with prejudice. The remaining claims are dismis sed
without prejudice. This matter is hereby closed.

DATED this 18 th day of May, 2012. 

# AORDER

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