No. 09-3299

Har tman’s other c laim supporting his motion is that Har tman’s execution by

lethal injection 1 violates the Eig hth A mendment, in light of the Supreme Court’s re cent de cision in Baze v. Rees , — U.S. —, 128 S. C t. 1520 (2008). This Court ca nnot authorize a succ essive petition or g rant a stay on this ground, be cause the S u p re m e C o u rt’s dec ision in Ba ze did not create a ne w constitutional ri g ht t hat a pp lie s r e tr oa c tiv e ly

to H artman’ s c la im. UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F ile Nam e: 09a0245n.06 F iled: Marc h 31, 2009 F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT BRETT HARTMAN, ) ) Pe tit ion e r, ) ) v. ) ) DAVID BOBBY, WARDEN, ) ) Re sp on de nt. ) ) O R D E R

BEFORE: CLAY, G ILMAN and ROGERS , Circuit Judges

. Petitioner Br ett Har

tman (“H artman” ) moves this Court to authorize him t o file a second or

succe ssive habea s petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)( 3)(A) , and to stay his ex ecution set for April 7, 2009. Har

tman was c onvicted of the murder and kidnapping of Winda Snipes and sentenc ed to death. Ha

rtman’s pe titions for state post-conviction re li ef we re denied, a s was his subsequent fe de ra l pet iti on

fo r wri t of

ha be a s c or pu s. Ha rtman n owargue s th a t pr e vio us ly un dis c ov e ra

ble evidenc e, when viewed in the contex t of all of t he evidence in the ca se, ca n demonstrate his a ctual innocenc e. Although w e cann o t gr ant Har tman’s motion to file a second or succe ssive habea s 1 pe tit ion a t th is t ime , w e fi nd th at a brief sta y of Ha rtman’ s e xec uti on

is a pp ro pr iate to p e rm it a deter mination r eg arding whether further evidentiar y development will support his c l ai m o f a ctualNo. 09-3299

-2- innocenc e. “[A] s tay of execution is an equitable r emedy .” Hi l l v. McDonough , 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006). “ We consider the f ollowing f

actor s i n d ec i ding whether to gr ant [a petitioner] a stay of execution: 1) whether

there is a likelihood he will succee d on the m erits of the appe al; 2) whe ther the re is a lik e lih oo d h e wi ll s uf

fe r i rr e pa ra ble ha rm a bs e nt a sta y ; 3) wh e the r the st ay will c a us e substantial harm to others; and 4) whether the injunction would s erve the public intere st.” W orkman

v . B e ll , 4 84 F .3 d 8 37 , 8 39 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7)

. A sta y “ is no t a va ila

ble a s a matte r o f r ig ht, and

e qu ity must be sensitive to the Stat e’s stronginterest in enf orcingits criminal judgments without undue interfe rence fr om the fede ral c ourts.” Hi ll , 547 U.S. at 584. Har tman “must show a ‘sig nificant possibili ty of succe ss on the merits’ in orde r to obtain a stay .” W orkman , 484 F.3d at 839 (quoting Hi ll , 547 U.S. at 584). The sec ond and third fa ctors unquestionably favor g rantinga s tay : the harm in executing Har tman, if he is indeed innoc ent, would be irr ever sible, and tempora ri ly staying the execution would not cause substantial harm t o others. As for the fourth fa ctor, while the state has a n important interest in enfor cing its c riminal judgme nts, e x ecuting an innocent man would not be in the state’s interest, and c ould undermine the public’ s confidenc e in Ohio’s cr iminal just ice sy stem. Whether Ha

rtman has shown a

signific ant possibilit y

of succ ess i s a more difficult question, which we find imprudent to attempt to r esolve at this time. This Court may authorize a petitioner to br ing a c la im n ot p re se nte d in

the pr ior ha be a s p e tit ion

if (1 ) “ the a pp lic ant s ho ws that th e c la im relies on a

new r ule of c onstitut ional law, made retroa ctive to ca ses on collater al review by the Sup re me Court , th a t wa s pre vio us ly un a va ila ble ;” or (2 ) “ the fa c tua l pr e dic a te fo r t he c la im c ou ldNo. 09-3299

-3- not ha ve been discovere d previously throug h the exercise of due diligenc e; and the f acts unde rlying the c la im, if

pr ov e n a nd vie we d in

lig ht o f t he e vid e nc e a s a

wh ole , w ou ld b e su ff

ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh by c le ar a nd c on vin c inge vid e nc e that, b ut f or c on sti tut ion a l e rr or , n o r e a so na ble fa c tf ind e r w ou ld have f ound the applica

nt guilty of the unde rlying of

fense .” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (interna l numberingomitted). This Court may authorize the petition only “if it deter

mines that the application makes a prima fa cie showingthat the application satisfies the require ment s ” of § 2244( b)(2) . 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)( C). “‘Prima f acie ’ in this context means simply sufficie nt alleg ations of fa ct toge ther with some documentation that would war rant a fuller e x ploration in the district court.” In

re Lot t , 366 F.3d 431, 433 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and c itation omit ted). Ha rtman a rgue s th a t pr e vio us ly

un dis c ov e ra

ble e vid e nc e , if p ro ve n a

nd vie we d a lon g sid e a ll of the e vi den ce availab le , w ou ld p re c lud e any re a so na ble jur or fr om f ind inghim

g uil ty . T his evidenc e would purportedly show that Har tman’s prison jailmate, who testified at trial that Hartman confe ssed the cr ime to him, may have pe rjured himself. T here was no witness to the c rime, and the jailmate’s testimony

was a critica l pa

rt of the state’s case ag ainst Har tman, as the only

evidenc e that Har tman ever admitted his guilt to any one. Har tman also seeks acc ess to crime- scene evidenc e that has ne ver be en tested, suc h as hairs found on the victim’s body , a cloc k cord which appar ently was used to strang le the victim, and a use d

con do m fou nd

in t he vic tim ’s a

pa rtme nt. Th e Sup re me Cou rt re c e ntl y he ard argume nts in a

c a se

conce rning whether the s tate is obligated t o produce evidenc e of D NA testing that could be mate rial to a showing of actua l innoc ence when a n inmate see ks such evidenc e post-convic tion. See D istrict Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist rict v. Osborne , 129 S. Ct. 488 (2008) ( g rantingwrit ofNo. 09-3299

-4- cer tiorari). D ependingon the scope o f t h e S u p reme Court’s holding, its dec ision could create a constitutional right entitli n g Ha rt m an acc ess to the cr ime scene evidenc e he c urre ntly seeks. Such evidenc e may

be par ticularly valuable in this ca se bec ause the defe nse pre sented e vid ence at trial pointing to the victim’s ex-boy friend a s a possible suspect; a de tective at Har tman’s re cent c lemency he ari nga c kn ow le dg e d th a t th e e x-bo y fr ie nd wa s in iti a lly

the pr ime su sp e c t, but

wa s r ule d o ut b e c a

us e he had a n alibi–an alibi which appare ntly has been found to no long er c oincide with the time of the victim’s death. I n light of t h e u n certainty surroundingHar

tman’s ca se, we will gr ant a tempor ary stay of execution to a ll o w s u f

f ic ie n t ti me f

o r u s to r e a s s e s s a ll o f th e e v id e n c e . We b e li e v e th a t, a f te r the Supreme Court’s for

thcoming r

uling in Osborne , we will be in a be tter position to dete rmine whe ther there is a “sig nificant possi bility ” that Har tman may be able to make the pr ima fac ie showing require d for us to authoriz e him to file a sec ond or succ essive habe as petition. See W orkman , 484 F.3d at 839. I n car efully

weig hing the equities involved, the i n t er es t s o f justice and the finality of Ha rtman’s capital punishment compe l us to stay his ex ecution long enoug h to asce rtain what evidence Har tman may actua lly have to support his motion. Ac c or din g ly , H artman’ s mo tio n for a st ay of e xec uti on

is g ra nte d. Th is p ane l w ill re ta in jurisdiction, and will r

ule on Har

tman’s motion to file a second or succe ssive habea s petition after the Supreme Court issues its decision in Osborne

. The stay of ex ecution shall remain in effe ct until our ruling on the motion to permit a second or succe ssive habea s petition. EN TE RED B Y O RD ER O F TH E CO UR TNo. 09-3299

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