## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS

N O . P D - 1072 - 09

Ex par t e M A N U EL A M A D O R , A ppe l l ant

ON APP ELLANT ’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW

FROM THE EI GH TH CO URT O F AP PEALS

EL P ASO CO UNTY K ELL ER , P. J. , f

i l e d a di s s e nt i ng o pi ni on i n w hi c h K EASLE R , and H ERVEY , J J ., j oi ne d. Ap pe lla nt a lle g e dly

e xpos e d h ims e lf

in a pu bli c pa rk wh ile tw o c hil dr e n a

nd a t le a st o ne a du lt

we re pr e se nt. He ha s b e e n c on vic te d of ind e c e nt e xpos ur e . Th e iss ue in t his c a se is w he the r d ou

ble jeopar dy principles bar

a subseque nt prosecution for two co unts of indece ncy with a child by exposure. Iwould hold tha t two counts of indec ency with a child by

exposure can be based upon

a s i n gl e e x p o s u re i f t h er e ar e t wo ch i l d v i ct i m s . I wo u l d al s o h o l d t h at an i n d ec en t -e x p o s u re ch ar ge can be based upon the same ex posure that g ave r ise to indece ncy -with-a- child counts so long a s the de fe nd ant w a s r e c kle ss w ithre sp e c t to the pr e se nc e of a t le a st o ne pe rs on

oth e r t ha n th e c hil d victims. That is what happene d in this case . I would, there fore , aff irm the judgme nt of the cour t ofAMAD OR DISSE NT — 2

Ex parte Hawk

ins , 6 S. W. 3 d 5 5 4 , 5 5 7 n . 8 ( T e x. Cr im

. A p p . 1 9 9 9 ) ( d is c u s s in g leg al 1 elements ve rsus units of prosec ution). Id. (quoting Akhil Reed Amar , Do ub le J e op ar dy Law M ad e Sim ple , 106 Yale L .J . 1807, 2 1817-18 (1997) (“a

n offe nse must not only be the same in la w—it must also be the same in fa ct”) ). Bi go n v. Sta te , 25 2 S.W. 3d 36 0, 37 0 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 08 ); Ha ll v . S tate , 225 S.W .3d 3 524, 532-33 (Te x . Crim. App. 2007). Blockburge r v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 4 State v. Pe rez , 947 S.W .2d 268, 270 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (c iting fina lity conce rn 5 prese nt in successive- prosec ution context ). I f the offe nses are the subject of a single prosec ution, then the Blockburge r te st m e re ly c re a te s a pr e sumpt ion

tha t th e le g isl a tur e did

no t in te nd

mul tip le punishments that can be rebutted by a clea r leg islative expression of intent to the contrar y . Id. (citing Missouri v . Hunter , 459 U. S. 3 59 (1 98 3) ); Litt re ll v . S tate , 271 S.W .3d 273, 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 08 ); Hunter , 459 U.S. at 366 (“With respe ct t o cumulative sentences imposed in a sing le trial, the Double Je o p ar dy

Cl a u s e d o e s n o mo r e th anp r e v e n t t h e s e n te n c in g c o u rt f

r o m p r e s c r ib in g g r e ater a pp e a ls. A. G eneral Double Jeopardy P rinciples Addre ss i n g ap p ell ant’s complaint re quires an unde rstanding of the two wa y s in which offe nses ca

n be the same or d i ffe rent unde r Double Jeopardy law whe n two statutes are involved: (1) by elements, and (2) by units. For a Double Jeopardy

violation to occur, the of fense s at issue 1

mus t be the “ same ” in b oth re sp e c ts. 2 An “e lements” inquiry

is lim ited to the law and the char g ing instrument. I n determ i ning 3 whether offe nses ar e t h e same under suc h an inquiry , we be g in with the Bl oc k bu rg e r test: “wher e the same a ct or tra

nsaction constitutes a viol ation of t wo di stinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to deter

mine whether

there are two offe nses or only one, is whether e ach pr ovision requires proof of a fa ct which the othe r does not.” I f t h e o ff en s es have the same e lements under 4 Blockburge r , t h en t h ey cannot be the subject of suc cessive pr osecutions. I f the off enses have 5AMAD OR DISSE NT — 3

punishment than t he legislature intended.”)

. But see State v. Flenoy , 968 S.W .2d 141, 143-45 (Mo. 1998) (a ppl y i n g Hu n t er

in a succ essive-pr osecution ca se, in part r elying upon Justice Scalia’s statement in United States v. Dix on , 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993) that, “It is embarra ssing to asse rt that the single term ‘same offe nce’ (the words of the Fifth Ame ndment at issue her e) ha s two differ ent meaning s—that what is the same of fense is y et not the same of fense .”). Go nz ale s v . S tate , 304 S.W .3d 83 8, 845-46 (Te x . Crim. App. 2010) (“T he tra ditional 6 i n d icium of . . . leg islative intent is the so-called ‘ same e lements’ test of Blockburge r , ” b u t “ even if a straig htforwa

rd application of the Bl oc k bu rg e r test would sugg est that two offe nses ar e not the ‘same’ for double jeopardy purposes,” the offenses are neverthele ss considere d the s ame, “if other indicia manife st a leg islative intent that an ac cused not be punished for both off enses” ) (c iting Ex pa rteErv in , 99 1 S. W.2 d 8 04 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 )) ; Se e als o Erv in , 991 S.W .2d at 804 (“ [T] he Blockburge r

te st c ann ot a

uth or ize tw o p un ish me nts wh e re the le g isl a tur e c le arl y int e nd e d o nly one.”) ; See B igon , 252 S.W .3d at 372 (underan Erv in analy sis, looking at cha rg ing instrument 7 a lle g a tio ns to d e te rm ine the un der lyingfe lony in f e lony mur de r p ro se c uti on ); se e als o H all , 225 S.W. 3d a t 53 3 n .3 9 ( re c og nizi ngthat Hunter inv olv e d a

c og nate ple a din g s a

na ly sis ); Erv in , 991 S.W. 2d a t 80 7 ( re c og nizi ng“ the inv e rs e c on c lus ion ” fr om Hunter). Bigon , 252 S.W .3d at 371-72. 8 See Sanabria v . United States , 4 37 U. S. 5 4, 69 -7 0, 69 n. 24 (1 97 8) ; Sa e nz v . S tate , 166 9 S.W .3d 270, 272-74 (Te x . Crim. App. 2005). di ff er en t elements under Blockburge r , the offe nses ar e pre sumed to be diffe rent, but that presumption can be rebutted if othe r fa ctors re veal that the L eg isl at u re never theless intended the offe nses to be tre ated a s the same. The Erv in ana ly sis is p art of the “ e le me nts ” a sp e c t of Do ub le 6 J eopar dy law. The allowable unit of prosec ution pr escr ibed for the offe nses in question is a rele vant

7 consideration in the abstrac t under a n Erv in analy sis, to deter mine whether , under the law and the 8

c h ar g i n g i n s t r

u m e n t , t h e o f

f e n s e s ar e c o n s i d e r e d

t o b e t h e s a m e e l e m e n t a l l y. But a “units” (or “allowa

ble unit of prosec ution”) inquiry is itself a separ ate inquiry , desig ned to determine w hether

a sing le leg ally -prosc ribed off ense ha s been c ommited more than once

. A 9AMAD OR DISSE NT — 4

Se e e .g . V

ic k v . S tate , 991 S.W .2d 830, 832-34 (Te x . Crim. App. 1999) (pene tr at i o n of 10 anu s a nd sex ual or g an d if

fe re nt u nit s in a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult ); Hawkins , 6 S.W .3d at 556 (d if fe re nt vic tim s are dif

fe re nt u nit s in a ro bb e ry ); Ex parte Cavazos , 2 0 3 S. W. 3 d 3 3 3 , 3 3 5

- 3 7 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2006) (entr

y is the allowable unit in a burg lary ). Blockburge r , 284 U.S. at 303 (sec ond drugsale wa s a sepa rate offe nse bec ause it “w as not 11 the re su lt o f the or ig ina l im pu lse , b ut o f a

fr e shon e ” ); Ex parte Goodbre ad , 967 S.W .2d 859, 860-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (ca n have multiple prosec utions for diffe rent incide nts of the same ty pe of sexual assault).

Blockburge r , 2 84 U. S. at 30 3; Goodbread , 967 S.W .2d at 860 (“F or Dou b l e J eo p ar dy 12 purposes, the sa

me offe nse mea

ns the identical c riminal act, not the s ame offense by name . . . . whe n one ca nnot deter

mine from the State’s pl eading s whether the offenses prosecuted are the same, the c ourt mus t loo k to the pr oo f of fe re d a t tr ia l.” ) ( Citi ngand qu oti ngfa

vo ra bly fr om Lun a v . S

tate , 493 S.W. 2d 85 4 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 73 )) ; id. at 861 (We look to evidenc e at tria l to determine what instances of

conduct c onforming to the indictment are jeopar dy -bar red.) ; see also Q u i n tano v. Pe op le , 105 P.3d 585, 592, 595 (Colo. 2005) (“[W ]hi le we do not adopt any specific list of factors to determine w hether

the def endant’s acts constitute fa ctually distinct offenses, w e look to all the evidenc e introduce d at trial to deter mine wh ether

the evidenc e on which the jury relied f or convic tion was suff icient to support distinct and separ ate of fense s.”). See B igon , 252 S.W .3d at 371-72 (“ Usually , analy sis of an allowa ble unit of prosec ution 13 involves a situation in which two offe nses from the sa me statutory

section ar e cha

rg ed.”)

. See V ick, 9 91 S.W. 2d

a t 83 3 ( e xami nin g the langua g e of the sex ual a ssa

ult statut e to 14 deter mine whether

the leg islature intended to “se parately and distinctly

criminalize any

act whic h c on sti tut e s th e pr os c ri be d c on du c t” ); see also id. at 833 n.1 (noting that application of Blockburge r would yield the same r esult). un its inq uir y c an a lso be div ide d in to t wo pa rt s: ( 1) wh a t th e un it i s, and (2 ) whe the r t

he re qu isi te 10 number of units has be en shown. A units inquiry can involve deter mining such things a s whether 11 the re we re tw o mu

rd e r v ic tim s, wh e the r a

vic timwh o w a s a ssa

ult e d o n M on da

y wa s a ssa ult e d a g a in on Tuesday , or whe ther multipl e kinds of sex ac ts w ere committed a g ainst a victim. Evidence at trial

c an b e c on sid e re d in

de te rm ini ngwh e the r t

he re qu isi te numbe r of un its ha s bee n s ho wn . A unit s 12 inq uir y mig ht m or e c omm on ly

ari se wh e n a

sin g le statut e is in volve d and a c ourt is try ingto 13 dis c e rn ho w t o d ivi de c on du c t (e .g ., a se xua l a ssa ult wi th mul tip le mann e rs and me ans ) i nto un its

. 14AMAD OR DISSE NT — 5

Id. at 832. 15 Se e Vi ne

y ar d v . S tate , 9 58 S.W. 2d

83 4, 83 6 n. 5 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ) (“ We a lso no te 16 this Court has stated the B l o ck b urger test is not ‘precise ly

applicable ’ to ca ses like this where a defe ndant’s conduc t violates one statutory provision more than onc e.”)

. See H awkins , 6 S.W .3d at 557 n.8. 17 J on es v . S tate , 2010 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 1208, at 5 (Septembe r 29). This is true e ven 18 in the succe ssive prosec ution context

. Sa na br ia , 437 U.S. at 69-70 (“ But onc e Cong ress ha s defined a st atutory offe nse by its prescription of the ‘ allowable unit of pr osecution,’ [citations omitt ed], that presc ription deter

mines the s cope of protec tion aff orded by a prior conviction or acquittal. Whether Pars inga sin g le statut e “ is unli ke a sit uatio n invo lvi ngdif

fe re nt s tatut e s, wh ic h, by

its e lf , is so me indication of leg islative intent to authorize mu l t i p l e prose cutions simply beca use the off

enses a re separ ately define d in differ ent statutes.” So, while a deter mination that the eleme nts are dif fer ent 15 under the Blockburge r

test sets up a pre sumption i n a multiple-statute eleme nts inquiry , no such presumption is crea

ted in a sing le-statute units inquiry

. Neve rtheless, if of fense s under diff

ere nt 16 statutes are the “same” e lementally , a units analy sis would be appropr iate if, for example, the pleading s or the evide nce indica tes that there are differ ent victims. Of c ourse, if it is unc lear how 17 an ele ments question should be resolved, a nd i f i t is clear that differ ent units of prosec ution were involved, then a c ourt could choose simply to addre ss the units iss ue. B. Units of

P rosec ution I n this case, I

think it i s helpful to de termine fir st the allowable units of prose cution for the offe nses of indec ent exposure and indec ency with a child by

exposure. 1. Unit of Prosecution Principles An inquiry into a

particula r statute’s a llowable unit of prose cution is purely one of statutory construction. I n construing a statute, we look f irst to its litera l te x t. When e x amining the literal 18 19AMAD OR DISSE NT — 6

a par ticular c ourse of

conduct involves one or more distinct ‘of fense s’ under the statute depe nds on thi s c on g re ssi on a l c ho ic e ” ); Hawkins , 6 S

. W

. 3 d at5 5 6 -5 7 (q u o t i n g an d

d i s cu s s i n g Sa na br ia ), 561 (over ruling the “holding of Crosby , that th e Do ub le Jeop ard y Cla us e is v iol a te d b y

mul tip le prosec utions for robber

y when multiple assaults are committed in the course of only one thef t”). Jones , 2010 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 1208, at 7; Bo y k in v . S tate , 818 S.W .2d 782, 785 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Jones , 2010 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 1208, at 7. 20 Id. 21 Id. 22 Id. at 8. 23 T EX . P EN A L C ODE §21.08(a)

. 24 text , “we rea d words and phr ases in conte x t and construe them acc ording to the ru l es of g rammar and usag e.” I f the statutory lang uag e is ambig uous, or leads to a bsurd re sults that the L eg islature 20

c ou ld n ot p os sib ly

ha ve int e nd e d, the n we may c on su lt e xtra -t e xtua l so ur c e s of inf or matio n. I n th is

21 proce ss, w e consider any prior judicial construction of the statute. Absent an e x plicit statement that 22 “the a llowable unit of prose cution sh al l be such-a nd-such,” the best indicator of leg islative intent with respec t to the unit of prosecution see ms to be the focus or “g rava men” of the offe nse. 23 2. Ind e c e nt Ex po sure Th e of fe ns e of ind e c e nt e xpos ur e pr ov ide s: A p e rs on c omm its an off

e ns e if he e xpos e s his a

nu s o r a ny pa rt of his g e nit a ls w ith inte n t t o arouse or g ratify the sexual desire of a

ny person, a nd he is rec kless about wh e the r a no the r i s p re se nt w ho wi ll b e of fe nd e d o r a larm e d b y

his a c t. 24 I n W all ac e v . S tate , we he ld that “to whom the expo s u re i s d irec ted is not an essentialAMAD OR DISSE NT — 7

W all ac e v . S tate , 550 S.W .2d 89, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). 25 Id. 26 Se e Ex pa rteLe wis , 544 S.W. 2d 43 0, 43 1 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 76 ); se e als o Fi sh e r v . S tate , 27 8 8 7 S

. W

. 2 d 4 9 , 5 5 n . 8 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 4 ) ( ci t i n g Le wis for the pr oposition t hat the abse nce of the victim’s name r ender ed a c h ar gi n g instrument fundamenta lly defe ctive prior to the 1985 constitutional amendment). T EX . P EN A L C ODE §6.03(c) (def inition of “rec klessly ”). 28 element of

the offe nse of indec ent exposure.” We found it to be the “be tter pra ctice” to plead 25 “whe re a pplicable,” that the ac cused e x posed himself “to a specifie d person or

persons,” but the fa i l u re t o s o al l ege d i d n o t re n d er a ch ar gi n g i n s t ru m en t“f u n d am en t al l y

d ef ec t i v e. ” T h i s h o l d i n g,

26 made at a time when the f ailure to name a c omplaining witness wa s considere d a funda mental defe ct, leads to the inesc apable conclusion that the off ense of indece nt expos ure ha s no 27 “complainingwitness” or vic tim that would define a unit of pr osecution for the offe nse. The holding in W

allace is consistent with the lang uag e of the st at u t e. T he pre sence of

a no t h e r i s a c i r c u m s t an c e s u r

r o u n d i n g t h e c o n d

u c to f e xp o s u r e . T h e i n d e c e n te xp o s u r e s t a tut e require s a finding that the def endant wa s “re ckless” w i t h re spect to this circumstanc e. Unde r the Penal Code, a pe rson is “re ckless” with respec t to circumstance s surrounding his conduct “w hen he is awar e of but c onsciously disreg ards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the cir cumstance s exis t.” The de finition of “re ckless” doe s not itself say that the circ umstances a ctually exis t. The 28

wo rd ingof

the ind e c e nt e xpos ur e statut e —th at a de fe nd ant b e “reck less a bo ut whether

ano the r i s prese nt”—in d i ca t es t h at the circ umstance of another ’s pre sence does not have to exi st. Had the statut e sa id that the de fe nd ant wa s “ re c kle ss a bo ut the pr e se nc e of ano the r, ” on e c ou ld m or e re a dil y maintain that the statute re quired both the pre sence of anothe r and the defe ndant’s re cklessness a sAMAD OR DISSE NT — 8

Id. , § 1.07(5). 29 to that presenc e. I n a dd iti on , th e us e of

“ ano the r” in c onne c tio n w iththe ph ra se “ a bo ut wh e the r” su g g e sts a po ssi ble rathe r t

ha n a c tua l in div idu a l. “ An oth e r” me ans “ a pe rs on oth e r t ha n th e a c tor .” L ite ra lly

29 incorpora ting this definition results in the stat u t e re ad ing that the defe ndant “is re ckless about whether a per son other than the a ctor is pre sent.” So, if a defenda

nt walked onto a publi c st ree t and ex posed hi mself, consciously disreg arding a substantial and unjustifiable r isk t h at an o ther wa s prese nt, but fortuitously , no other pe rson happene d to be pre sent, the def endant would ne verthe less be guilty of t h e cr i m e of inde cent

e xpos ur e . Co nv e rs e ly , if

the de fe nd ant e xpos e d h ims e lf in a sta dium ful l of p e op le , h e wo uld sti ll be gui l ty of only one off ense of indece nt expos ure be cause the offe nse does not depe nd on the exis tence of a vic tim of the crime. W allace sug g ested it would be the “ better pr actice ” to include the na me of someone who was prese nt and offe nded, as w as done in the case befor e us. Including the name of such an individual would help g ive the defe ndant notice of the particula r cr ime in question, and as will be see n below, mig ht a lso dis tin g uis h th e of fe ns e of ind e c e nt e xpos ur e fr om i nd e c e nc y wi th a c hil d. He re , th e State alleg ed a pa

rticular a dul t as t he off

ended individual in the indec ent exposure prosec ution—an ind ivi du a l d i f

fe re nt f ro m th e vic tim s in

the ind e c e nc y -w ith -a -c hil d a lle g a tio ns . B ut i n a n a pp ro pr iate

case a cha

rg ing instrument c ould alleg e that a de fenda nt was re ckl es s as to the pre sence of an “unknown” person ( or per haps an “ unknown adult.”)

.AMAD OR DISSE NT — 9

T EX . P EN A L C ODE §21.11(a) (2)( A) (e mphasis added)

. 30 3. Ind e c e nc y with a Chi

ld b y Exp os ure Th e wo r d i n g o f

t h e p r o v i s i o np r o s c r i b i n g i n d e c e n c y w i t h a c h i l d b y e xp o s u r e i s quit e dif fe re nt. Th e re le va

nt p or tio n o f t hat st a tut e pr ov ide s: A per son commits an offense if, with a child y oung er tha n 17 y ear s of ag e, whe ther the child is of the same or opposite sex, the person . . . with intent to a rouse or g ratify the sexual de sire of any person . . . exposes the person’ s anus or an y p ar t o f t he p er s o n ’s gen i t al s , kn o wi n g the child is p re se nt. 30 The phra ses “wit h a ch ild” and “know ing the child is present” clea rly spell out the statute’s require ment that a child act u al ly be pre sent. Moreove r, the statute spe cifies that the de fenda nt be

awa re of t he pre sence of “ the c hil d, ” no t “ a c hil d” or “ any c hil d. ” Th is f

oc us ind ic a te s th a t a particula r child victim is contemplated, in turn indicatingthat t h e ch i l d victim defines the unit of prosec ution. This conclusion i s consistent with the wording of the ot her provisions in t he indec ency -witha-c hild statute

. T h e s tatute s e ts o u t t h e f o ll o w in g me th o d s o f

c o mm itti n g in d e c e n c y

w it h a c h ild, including the exposure offe nse alre ady quoted above : A per son commits an of

fense if, with a child y oung er tha n 17 y ear s of ag e, whe ther the child is of the same or opposite sex, the person: (1) e ng ag es in sexual contact with the child or cause s the child to eng ag e in sexual contac t; or (2) with intent to arouse or g ratify the sexual desire of a

ny person: (A ) e xpos e s th e pe rs on ’s anu s or any pa rt of the pe rs on ’s g e nit a ls, kn ow ingthe c hil d is present; orAMAD OR DISSE NT — 10

T EX . P EN A L C ODE §21.11(a)

. 31 Ic ha ra c te ri ze t

he un it o f p ro se c uti on

a s “ e a c h c hil d, e a c h e xpos ur e ” be caus e se pa rate 32 exposures would also b e separate offe nses. I f a de fenda nt expos ed himself to two childre n on Monday , and then e x posed hims el f t o t h o s e two childre n ag ain on Tuesda y , he would have c omm itt e d f

our o ff e ns e s. J udg e Cochra

n contends that the unit of pr osecution for indece ncy

with a child by 33 e xpos ur e is simp ly

e a c h e xpos ur e . In s up po rt of thi s c on te nti on , s he c ite s W allace and thre e cour

t of a pp e a ls o pin ion s: Y

or k v . S tate , 3 1 S. W.3 d 7 98 (T e x. App .– Dal las 20 00 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; Metts v. Sta te , 22 S.W .3d 54 4 (T ex . Ap p.–For t Worth 2000, pet. ref’d) ; and Ur ibev . S tate , 7 S.W .3d 294 (Tex. App.–Austin 1999, pet. ref ’d). W allace is ab ou t inde c e nt expo sure , n ot i nd e c e nc y wi th a c hil d by exposure , an d

th e r e f o r e d o e s n o t s u

p p o rt h e r c la im

. A s e xp la in e d

a b o v e , th e r e ar e v e r

y r e al differ ence s betwee n the two offenses that dictate measuring the uni t of prose cution differ ently

. Y or k (B ) c a us e s th e c hil d to e xpos e the c hil d’ s a nu s o r a ny pa rt of the c hil d’ s g e nit a ls. 31 Th e “ se xua l c on ta c t” of

fe ns e fo un d in

§ 2 1. 11 (a )(1 ) cle arl y

c on te mpl a te s th a t a

pa rt ic ula r c hil d is the victim of sexual contact, and the other method of committing indece ncy with a child by

exposure, found in §21.11(a) (2)( B) , contemplates that the defe ndant ca uses a particular child to be exposed. Sandwiched be tween the se two provisions, and shar ing some o f t he languag e of e ach, is the ind e c e nc y -w ith -a -c hil d- by -e xpos ur e of fe ns e a t is su e in t

he pr e se nt c a se . I t wou ld be ano ma lou s to find that the statute pre scribes diff ere nt units of prosecution for the differ ent methods of committing indece ncy with a child, when the diffe rent methods ar e so tig htly woven tog ether

in the lang uag e of the statute. F urther, if

the L eg islature had w anted t o p re s cr ibe the same unit of prosec ution for indece ncy with a child by

exposure as it had for

indece nt expos ure, it cou ld have simply added a subsection to the indece nt expos ure statute to incre ase the penalty if the ac tor knew that a child was prese nt. Cons eq u en t l y , I wo uld hold that the unit of prosecution for indece ncy

with a child by

e xpos ur e is e a c h c hil d, e a c h e xpos ur e —me anin g the State c an seek two c on vic tio ns fo r a sin g le 32

e xpos ur e wh e n th e re are tw o c hil d v ic tim s. 33AMAD OR DISSE NT — 11

and Me tts are a lso ind e c e nt- e xpos ur e c a se s, and thu s do n ot s up po rt he r c la im (

Me tts does re ly

upon i n d ec en cy -w i t h -a -c h i l d

d ec i s i o n s (i n cl u d i n g Uribe ), Se e Me tts , 2 2 S. W.3 d a t 54 7, and to t hat e xten t, my comments below a

pply). Uribe hel d th at a de fe nd ant c an b e g uil ty of ind e c e nc y

wi th a c hil d, if he e xpos e s h ims e lf while the child is prese nt, even if the child does not ac tually see the defe ndant’s g enitals. Uribe , 7 S.W .3d at 297. Even if that holding is corr ect, it does not m ea n t h at t h e u n it of prosec ution for indece ncy with a child by

exposure is simpl y

eac h exposure. Whether or not the child has to see the defe ndant’s g enitals, the child must stil l be pre sent, and it is the focus on the c hild’s actual pr esenc e that define s the unit of prosec ution for the offe nse of indece ncy with a child. I ndece nt expos ure, by contra st, does not require the ac tual prese nce of any individual. Uribe ha d n o o c c a sio n to a dd re ss wh e the r a sin g le e xpos ur e c ou ld r e su lt i n mul tip le c on vic tio ns ba se d u po n th e pr e se nc e of

mul tip le children beca

use t he conviction at i ssue i n that case was based upon only one child victim. Uribe , 7 S.W .3d at 295-96. Moreove r, Uribe is simp ly a c ourt of a pp e a ls decis ion

—it is not bin din g on us and sh ou ld not trump an ana ly sis of the lang uag e of the indece ncy -with-a- child statute. As explained above, a n ana ly sis of

the statut e c le arl y

sh ow s th a t th e ind e c e nc y -w ith -a -c hil d- by -e xpos ur e of fe ns e is v ic tim

cente red. Judge Cochran makes no attempt whatsoever to a naly ze the lang uag e of the statute. At least two cour

ts of appea ls have c oncluded that the unit of pr osec u t ion for indec ent 34 e xp o s u r e an d

in d e c e n c y

w it h a c h il d b y e xp o s u r e is th e s a me , b u t w it h o p p o s it e r e s u lt s . I n Y

anes v . S tat e , the Th ird Court of Appea ls held that the unit of prosec ution for both offe nses was e ach exposure. 149 S.W .3d 708, 710-12 (Te x . App.–Austin 2004). In Ba gge tt v . S tate , the Fir st Court of Appe als conc luded that the unit of prose cution for both off enses wa s the vi ctim. 860 S.W .2d 207, 209 (Tex. App.–Houston [1 Dist.] 1993). st 4. Diffe rent Measurin g Sticks We are fac ed, then, with the f act that the two statutory

offe nses at issue—indec ent exposure and indec ency

with a child—measur e the a llowable unit of prose cution differen tly . For indece nt exposure, the allowable unit of prosec ution is each ex posure. F or indec ency with a child, the allowable unit is ea ch child, ea ch exposure. A d o u b l e j eo pardy analy sis would be simpler if the

a llo wa ble un it o f p ro se c uti on

fo r t he tw o s tatut or

y of fe ns e s we re the same . I f t he a llo wa ble un it 34 of pr os e c uti on

un de r b oth

statut e s w e re e a c h e xpos ur e , th e n a sin g le e xpos ur e wo uld

be a sin g le un it

and the on ly re ma ini ngqu e sti on

wou ld be whe the r t

he of fe ns e s a re the same un de r a

n e le me ntsAMAD OR DISSE NT — 12

analy sis. Conversely , if the allowa ble unit of prosec ution under both statutes wer e ea ch victim, then three victims (one adult, two childre n) would mea n three units of pr osecution, and the re w ould be

no ne e d to c on du c t an e le me nts ana ly sis

. I nstead, the statutes pr escr ibe allowable units of prosecution that sometimes co i n cide pe rf e c tly , s ome tim e s c oin c ide imp e rf e c tly , o r so me tim e s me re ly ov e rl a p. An e xamp le of

the fi rs t sit ua tio n w ou ld b e a

de fe nd ant w ho e xpos e s h ims e lf to on e chi ld in the pr iva c y of his ow n h ome without being r eckle ss about any other pe rs o n b eing pre sent. The one unit of prosec ution for indece ncy with a child in that case would coinci d e p er fe ctly with the one unit of prose cution for indece nt expos ure. On the ot her hand, if a defenda nt exposed himself to two children in the privac y of his own home, with no re cklessness as t o t h e presence of any other pe rson, the units of prosec ution would coincide, but they would do so i n an i m p er fec t manner. The one unit of prosec ution for the indecent ex posure would e ncompass two childre n (eve n though only one of the children w ould be nec essar y to establish the indece nt expos u re ) wh o co u l d g ener ate two units of prosec ution f

or indece ncy with a child. The prese nt c ase prese nts the third ty pe of situation, in which the units merely

overla p: expos ure to two children and rec klessness as to the presence of at least one oth e r p e rs on

(e .g . a n a du lt) . In th a t situa

tio n, the ind e c e nt- e xpos ur e of fe ns e e nc omp a sse s ( a t le a st) thr e e p e r s o n s , o n l y

t w o o f w h o m c ans e r

v e a s t h e b a s i s f

o r i n d e c e n c y - w i t h

- a - c h i l d

o f f e n s e s , wi th neither of those two ac tually

being neede d for the inde cent- exposure offe nse.

C. Elem ents 1. Com parison of th e Of

fenses A c omp ari so n o f t

he statut e s r e ve a ls the fo llo wi nge le me nts :AMAD OR DISSE NT — 13

Se e Erv in , 991 S.W .2d at 806 (intox ication manslaug hter a nd manslaug hter not the “ sam e” 35 under a “strict applica

tion” of Blockburge r ). Ind ece ncy wi th a Child by Exp osure Ind ece nt Expos ure e xpos e s anu s o r g e nit a ls e xpos e s a nu s o r g e nit a ls with intent to arouse or g ratify sexual desire with intent to arouse or g ratify sexual desire with a child (unde r 17 and not spouse) kn ow ing : re c kle ss: a. the c hild is present a. about whe ther a nother is pre sent b. who will be offe nded or a larmed I ndece ncy

with a child by

exposure require s proof of at least three elements not re quired for indece nt exposure: (1) that a person other than the def endant a ctually

be pre sent, (2) that this ot her pe rson be a child, and ( 3) that the defe ndant have the culpable me ntal state of knowle dg e with re spect to the prese nce of

this other p er s on. I ndece nt expos ure r equire s proof of one element not re quired for ind e c e nc y wi th a c hil d by e xpos ur e : that the de fe nd ant h a ve a c ulp a ble me nta l st a te wi th r e sp e c t to the pre sence of a pe rson “who w ill be offende d or ala rmed” by the defendant’s ex posure. The e x tra

e le me nt f or in decent

e xpos ur e is p ur e ly

on e of me nta l c ulp a

bil ity : th e re is n o r e qu ir e me nt t hat a person who is off

ended or alar med ac tually

be pre sent. Neve rtheless, it is a differ ence , simil ar to the differ enc e b et wee n the eleme nts of rec klessness and intoxi cation, which w e found in Erv in to be differ ent under

a strict applica

tion of the Blockburge r

te st. 35 2. Bric e no I n Br ic e no v . S

tate , this Court held that indecent exposure wa s a lesser -included of fense of indece ncy with a child by exposure for the purpose of deter mining whether a defe ndant was e ntitledAMAD OR DISSE NT — 14

580 S.W .2d 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). 36 Id. at 844 (e mphasis in origina l). 37 Id. ; see also T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 37.09(1) (“ An of fe ns e is a le sse r i nc lud e d o ff

e ns e 38 if . . . it is established by proof of the same or

less than all the fa cts requir ed to establish the commission of the offe nse cha rg ed.”)

. 299 S.W .3d 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 39 982 S.W .2d 904, 909-11 (Te x . Crim. App. 1998) (Ke ller, J., concurring ). 40 to a lesser -included- offe nse jury instruction. The Court held t hat t he elements of the two off enses 36

wer e “identica l, e x cept that indece ncy with a child require s the def en d an t t o knowthat a c hil d is pr e se nt, wh e re ind e c e nt expo sure re qu ir e s th a t th e de fe nd ant i s re c k le ss as to the pre sence of anothe r person .” Consequently , the Court found t hat i ndece nt exposure was a lesser- included off

ense of 37 indece ncy with a ch i l d under A rticle 37.09(1) on the basis of its few er e lements. Howeve r, the 38 Court fa ile d to a dd

re ss t he ind e c e nt e xpos ur e statut e ’s re qu ir e me nt t hat th e de fe nd ant’ s r e c kle ssn e ss

e xten d n ot m e re ly

to t he pr e se nc e of ano the r pe rs on , but to the pr e se nc e of ano the r p e rs on “ wh o w ill be off ended or alar med.” I n Ev an s v . S

tate , we he ld that indecenc y with a child by sexual contact wa s a lesser -included offe nse of a g g ravated sexual assault of a c hild even thoug h the indece ncy o ff en se conta ined what mig ht a pp e ar t o b e an e xtra e le me nt— int e nt to aro us e or g ratif y se xua l de sir e . Re lyingup on my 39

concur renc e in Oc ho a v . S

tate , the Court found that “intent to ar ouse or g ratify sexual desire” w as 40 not an extra eleme n t b ec ause it was alrea dy part of the definition of “se x ual contac t,” and se x ual contac t was a f

orm o f t o u ch ing subsumed w ithin the “penetr ation” re quired to prove ag g ravatedAMAD OR DISSE NT — 15

Evans , 299 S.W .3d at 141-43. 41 T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 37.09(3)

. 42 The indec ency -wit h -a -c hild-by -exposure def endant doe s not have to be a war e that the 43 person is a c hild. Ro of v . S tate , 665 S.W .2d 490, 491-92 (Tex

. Crim. App. 1984) (c oncluding that sexual assault. But, unli ke the statutory lang uag e in Evans , the phrase “who will be of fende d or 41 alar med” is par

t of the main text of the indecent e x posure of fense , not part of a

definition. 3. Le ss S e rio us Cul

pa ble Me nta l Sta te That does not mea

n that the Briceno court wa s nece ssarily wrongin its conclusion that the de fe nd ant i n that c a se wa s e nti tle d to a jur y ins tr uc tio n on the of

fe ns e of ind e c e nt e xpos ur e . A rt ic le 37 .0 9( 1) e sse nti a lly

pr e sc ri be s Blockburge r ’s “same elements” test, but a rticle 37.09 include s other

me tho ds f o r d e t e r m i n i n g wh e the r a n o ff e ns e is c on sid e re d le sse r- inc lud e d, on e of wh ic h is a pp lic a ble he re . A rt ic le 37 .0 9( 3) pr ov ide s th a t an o ff e ns e is l e sse r- inc lud e d if “ it d iffers fro m th e of

fe ns e

c ha rg e d o nly in t he re sp e c t th a t a

le ss s e ri ou s c ulp a

ble me nta l state su ff

ic e s to e sta

bli shits commission.” As explained above, the “extra” e lement of indec ent exposure—“wh o wi ll be

42 offe nded or a larmed” —is part of the culpable mental state; a pe rson who is offe nded or a larmed ne ed

no t a c tua lly

be pr e se nt. Th e ne xt que sti on

is w he the r r e c kle ssn e ss a s to “ wh o w ill be of fe nd e d o r a larm e d” is a

“ le ss serious” cu lpable mental state than the indec ency -with-a- child offe nse’s c ulpable mental state of

“ kn ow ingthe c hil d is pre se nt. ” B oth statut e s r e qu ir e mor e tha

n h a vin g a

c ulp a ble me nta l st a te wi th

re sp e c t to the pr e se nc e of “ a pe rs on .” Th e “ pe rs on ” in the ind e c e nt expo sure statut e c an b e po ssi ble rathe r than a ctual, and this possible person must be so m eo n e “who will be of fende d or ala

rmed.” For indece ncy

with a child, the “pe rson” must be a n actua l person who is a c hild. 43AMAD OR DISSE NT — 16

the re fer ence “in Briceno that the def endant must know a c hild is present is dictum.”). Alam e da v . S

tate , 235 S.W .3d 218, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 44 See E vans , 2 99 S.W. 3d

a t 14 2 ( “ [W]e c ann ot i ma g ine ho w it wo uld be e ve n th e or e tic a lly 45 possible to commit t his particular form of penetr ation [causing the victim’s sex ual org an to contac t and pene trate the defe ndant’s mouth] wit hout an intent to arouse or g ratify one’s se x ual desire .”). Se e Blac k v . S tate , 26 S.W .3d 895, 897-98 (Te x . Crim. App. 2000). 46 The maxim t hat childre n “do not have the leg al ability to consent in most sit uations,” 44 sug g ests in this contex t that a child ca nnot consent to an ex posure, which in turn sugg ests that the char acte ristic of “w ill be offende d or alar med” is imputed to the child. Moreove r, a de fenda nt who knows a ch i l d i s p re s ent m ight not be r eckle ss about whether that child would be off

ended or

a larm e d b e c a

us e the de fe nd ant k

no ws the c hil d is no t in

fa c t of fe nd e d o r al arm e d. B ut i t is ha rd to imag ine a situation in which a de fenda nt would have the intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire, a nd be reckless about a child’s presenc e, but not be re ckless about whe ther the c hild would be offe nded or ala rmed. Fur

ther, the g overnme nt has a co m p el l i n g i ntere st in protecting the well-be ing of 45 children, w ho are among the more innoc ent and vulner able membe rs of society

. I t can at least be 46 rationally argued that, all other things being equal, a culpable menta l state with respe ct to an ac tual person who is a child is “ more serious” than a c ulpable mental state with respec t to the presenc e of a possi ble person who will be offe nded or a larmed. G iven these c onsiderations, and g iven a pr ior holding in Briceno that should not be overr uled lightly , Iwould rea ffirm that the of fense of indec ent exposure is included within the offe nse of indec ency with a ch i l d by

exposure for the pur

pose of ob ta ini nga

le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e jur y ins tr uc tio n—tho ug h I

wo uld do so on the ba sis of

Ar tic le 37.09(3) r ather

than Article 37.09(1).AMAD OR DISSE NT — 17

J udg e Cochra

n ignor es the “ unit of prosecution” aspe ct of the c ase w hen she se ts up her 47 “Q.E.D .” statement. She claims first that we have held that “indec ent exposure is a lesser- included offe nse of indece ncy with a child by exposure.” B ut our holding ( in Briceno ) wa s based solely on the e le me nts of the tw o statut or y of fe ns e s, wi tho ut a c c ounti ngfo r p ote nti a l unit of prosecution issues that might be p o s ed b y multipl e victims. J udg e Cochra n next contends that “double jeopa rdy principles prohibit multiple punishments for both a g reater a nd a lesser -included of

fense stemming from the same cr iminal act.” That is a false s t at em en t i f o n e looks only to the e le me nts of the offe nses, without consideringthe leg islatively presc ribed unit of prose cution. Fo r ex am p le, if a defe ndant rams his car into another car that contains an adult and a child under ag e si x , and by doing so intentionally

kills t he two occ upants of that other car , the defen d an t h as co mmitt ed a c apital murder of the child and a

murder (at least) of the adult. Murder is, by its e lements, a lesse r-include d offe nse of c apital murder , and the de fenda nt in that situation ha s eng ag ed in only one ac t, but that defe ndant has never

theless committed two offe nses. J udg e Cochra n’s citation of Lan gs v . S

tate , 183 S.W. 3d 68 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ) i s unava ili ngif on e loo ks a t the fu ll c on te xt of the state me nts sh e qu ote s f

ro m Langs

. T h e t w o d o u b l e - j e o p ar dy s i tu a t i o n s a d dr e s s e d b y Langs are a s f

oll ow s: (1) the lesser- included offe nse context, in which the same c onduct is punished twice; once for the basic conduct, and a second time f or that same conduct plus more (for example, atte m

p te d a s s a u lt o f Y a n d a s s a u lt o f Y; a s s a u lt

o f X a n d ag gr a v a te d as sa ult of X ); and (2) punishing the same c riminal act twice und er t wo distinct statutes when the l egi s l at u re i n t e n d edt h e c o n d u ct t o b e p u n i s h edo n l y

o n ce (f o r e x am p l e, cau s i n g a s i n g l e d e ath by committing both intox ication manslaug hter a nd involuntary manslaug hter). Langs , 183 S.W .3d at 685 (e mphasis added) . I n both situations, Langs provided a n example that e xplic itl y a ssume d th a t th e c ri me in q ue sti on ha d o nly on e vic tim . B ut t

he c a se be fo re us de a ls w ith the situation in which there a re multiple victims. B ut t his ho ldi ngwi th respe c t to le sse r- inc lud e d- of fe ns e jur y ins tr uc tio ns , w hil e hig hly

re le va nt t o a Do ub le Jeop ard

y e le me nts ana ly sis , is no t di sp os iti ve of the Do ub le Jeop ard

y c la im be fo re us . H e re , w e are c on c e rn e d no t on ly wi th the e le me nts of the statut or

y of fe ns e s, bu t a lso wi th

un its of pr os e c uti on . Ev e n in the jur y ins tr uc tio n c on te xt, an o ff

e ns e that is le sse r- inc lud e d b y its 47

e le ment s ma

y no t be su

bmi tte d if

it c omp ri se s a

dif fe re nt u nit of pr os e c uti on

tha n th e of fe ns eAMAD OR DISSE NT — 18

Cam pb e ll v . S tate , 149 S.W .3d 149, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (smaller , but differ ent 48 dr ugsta sh ) ( I n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a n o ff ens e mu st be subm itt e d a s le sse r- inc lud e d, “ on e mus t c on sid e r s tatut or

y e le me nts and

surrounding fac ts a

nd circ umstances to se e if there are two distinct criminal ac ts.”) (e mphasis in origina l). char g ed. Or, a s expl ained in Ar ticle 37.09(3), the less serious culpa ble mental state must b e the 48 only way in w hich the lesser offe nse diffe rs from the g reater off ense. I f the lesse r off

ense a lso differs beca use the c ulpable mental state encompa sses more people, then it does not satisfy Article 37.09( 3). 4. Elasti c Nature of the Unit of Prosecution Th e c omp lic a tin g fa c tor

he re is that the un it of pr os e c uti on in an ind e c e nt e xpos ur e of fe ns e is essentially

elastic: A person could be reckless as to multi ple per sons but need only be re ckless as to o ne pe rs on

to b e g uil ty

of ind e c e nt expo sure . Th e e la sti c natur e of the ind e c e nt e xpos ur e of fe ns e makes the pr ocedur al posture of the ca se important. To rec eive a lesser- included-of

fense jury instruction on indecent e x posure, a defe ndant cha

rg ed with indece ncy

with a child could re ly

upon the fa ct that indece nt expos ure can be ba se d s ole ly up on the c hil d v ic tim

a lle g e d in

c onne c tio n w ith the cha rg ed off ense. B ut in a double j eopar dy context, the S tate ar g uably could re ly

upon the fa ct that indece nt expos ure ne e d n ot be ba se d u po n th e c hil d v ic timin t

he ind e c e nc y -w ith -a -c hil d c ount. 5. Erv in a nal

y sis I n Erv in , we se t forth a none x clusive list of fac tors to consider in dete rmining w hether offe nses that are differ ent under the Blockburge r test should neverthe less be conside red the same: (1) whe ther the pr ovisions are c ontained in the same statutory section, (2) whether the offe nses ar e phrase d in the alt er n ative, name d simil arly , or have common punishment rang es, (3) whether the of fe ns e s h a ve a

c omm on fo c us or g ra vame n, (4 ) whe the r t

he c omm on

fo c us , if any , in dic a te s a

sin g leAMAD OR DISSE NT — 19

Erv in , 991 S.W .2d at 814. 49 252 S.W .3d at 368-72. 50 Id. at 371. 51 Id. ; se e als o E

rv in , 991 S.W .2d. at 816. 52 Bigon , 252 S.W .3d at 371. 53 Driving Whil e Intox icated. 54 Id. at 371-72. 55 instance of

conduct, ( 5) whe ther the e lements could be considere d the s ame under an imputed theor y of liability

(libera liz ed Blockburge r standard) , and (6) whether the leg islative history

sheds any light

o nth e matt e r . E mp lo y in g an Er v in analy sis in Bigon , we he ld that felony murder, intoxication 49

man s l a u g h t e r , an d

m an s l a u g h t e r ( a l l i n v o l v i n g t h e s a m e v i c t i m ) w e r e t h e “ s a m e ” f o r D o u ble J eopar dy purposes. We noted in Bigon that in toxic a tio n ma ns la ug hte r u se d to a

pp e ar in the same 50

c ha pte r a s a ll o f t

he ho mic ide of

fenses and wa s f

ra me d a s an a lte rn a tiv e wa y to c omm it manslaug hter. We expl ained that we had previously sug g ested in Erv in that the move to Chapter 51 49 was lar g ely

for house keepingp u rp o s es . We also observe d that intox ication manslaug hter 52 reta ined “mansla

ug hter” in its t itle and was still considere d a hom i ci d e offense. We further 53 explained that intox ication manslaug hter a nd murder both h ad t h e s am e focus on the death of an ind ivi du a l, t

he of fe ns e s w e re bo th r e su lt- or ie nte d, the a llo wa ble un it o f p ro se c uti on

—o ne of fe ns e pe r vic tim

—w a s the same , and

that w he re the un de rl yingfe lony fo r f e lony mur de r w a s a

DWI , “ it

54 is h ard to f a tho m th a t the le g isl a tur e int e nd e d f or on e dr un k- dr ivi nga c c ide nt t o r e su lt i n mu lti ple homicide convictions for

eac h victim.” 55AMAD OR DISSE NT — 20

See T EX . P EN A L C ODE §§ 21.08(b) (Class B misdemeanor), 21.11( d) (third de g ree felony ). 56 I ndece nt expos ure a

nd indece ncy

with a child by

exposure are n o t i n the same statutory section, althoug h they

do appe ar i n the same c hapter . I ndece nt expos ure ha s a lower punishment

ra n ge t h an i n d ec en cy

wi t ha c h i l d

b y ex p o s u re t h at wo u l d

b e c o n s i s t en twi t h t h e f

o rm er b ei n g a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e of the latte r. Th e tit les of th e stat ute s c on ta in f

or ms o f t he same 56 word—“ indece nt” and “ indece ncy”—thoug h the word is a noun in one title and an adje ctive in the other. The se titles are not quite as closely worde d as “m an s l au gh ter” and “intoxication

m an s l a u g h t e r . ” T h e r e i s s o m e c o m m o n a l i t y i n t h e f o c u s o f t h e i n d e c e n te x p o s u r e an d i n d e c e n c ywi th- a -c hil d of

fe ns e s b ut t

he re is a str iki ngdif

fe re nc e a s w e ll. B oth

of fe ns e s are “ natur e of

c on du c t” offe nses that involve the same actus reus : expos ure. B ut while both of fense s focus on “ exposure,” the i ndece ncy -with-a- child provision also focuse s on a victim . The a llowable units of prosec ution for the of fense s are differ ent, with the allowable unit for indece nt expos ure be ing e ach e x posure, a nd the allowable u n i t for indec ency with a child by

exposure being eac h child, eac h exposure. The offe nses ca

n b e co n s i d er ed the same under a libera liz ed Blockburge r analy sis if the “who will be offe nded or alar

med” element of indece nt expos ure is imputed to the “c hild” element of indece ncy with a ch ild by

exposure. And indece nt expos ure is a le sser-inc luded offe nse of indec ency with a child by exposure under A rticle 37.09, b u t only to the extent that the defenda nt’s culpable me ntal state embra ces the same pe rson as the r ecipient of the exposure. An ana ly sis under the Erv in fac tors sug g ests that t h e o ff enses of indece nt expos ure a

nd indece ncy with a child by

exposure should be treated a s t he same only to the extent that the defe ndant’s culpa

ble mental state r elates to the same person as the rec ipient of the exposure. To theAMAD OR DISSE NT — 21

extent that a defe ndant’s culpa ble mental state r elates to diff ere nt persons a s t h e re ci p i ents of the

e xpos ur e , th e of

fe ns e s sh ou ld b e tr e a te d a s d if fe re nt. D. Conclusion I n th e c a se be fo re us , a

pp e lla nt a lleg e dly

e xpos e d h ims e lf

in a pu bli c pa rk , w he re an a du lt

and tw o c hil dr e n w e re pr e se nt. B e c a us e a pp e lla nt e xpos e d h ims e lf

in p ub lic , th e re we re c on c e iva bly any number of persons to w hom he could have been rec kless in e x posing himself, but t h er e w ere (a pp are ntl y ) on ly tw o c hil dr e n that a

pp e lla nt c ou ld have kn ow ing ly e xpos e d h ims e lf to. Un de r t

he se

c ir c ums tanc e s, a

pp e lla nt’ s ma ximum c ri min a l e xpos ur e wa s fo r thr e e of fe ns e s: t wo ind e c e nc y

wi th a child of fe n s es for the two childre n, and one inde cent e x posure of fense beca

use appe llant was

rec kless with respec t to the presenc e of at least one other person be sides the childre n. The c ourt of appe als held that the successive prosecutions for indecenc y with a child we re not barre d by

the Double Jeopardy

Clause. I ag ree , and I

would aff

irm the judgme nt of the cour t of

a pp e a ls. Ire sp e c tf

ull y dis se nt. Filed: Oc tober 13, 2010 Pub lis h