15-1704 

Singh v. Lynch 

BIA 

Morace, IJ 

A200 938 552 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

11th day of January, two thousand seventeen. 

PRESENT: 

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

PETER W. HALL, 

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

SANDEEP SINGH, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 15-1704 

 NAC 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Dalbir Singh, New York, N.Y. 

 

FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General; Anthony 

P. Nicastro, Acting Assistant 

Director; Sheri R. Glaser, Trial 

Attorney, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C. 
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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

 Petitioner Sandeep Singh, a native and citizen of India, 

seeks review of an April 27, 2015, decision of the BIA, affirming 

a March 25, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 

denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, 

and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In 

re Sandeep Singh, No. A200 938 552 (B.I.A. Apr. 27, 2015), aff’g

No. A200 938 552 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Mar. 25, 2013). We assume 

the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 

procedural history in this case. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the 

IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 

391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review 

are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin 

v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). 

 For asylum applications like Singh’s, governed by the REAL 

ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the 

circumstances,” base a credibility finding on an asylum 

applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” and 
3 

inconsistencies in his or his witness’s statements “without 

regard to whether” those inconsistencies go “to the heart of 

the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu 

Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. “We defer . . . to an IJ’s 

credibility determination unless, from the totality of the 

circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could 

make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d 

at 167. As discussed below, substantial evidence supports the 

adverse credibility determination. 

 Singh does not challenge the agency’s reliance on his vague 

testimony about his party activities. That finding therefore 

stands as a proper basis for the credibility determination. 

See Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) 

(“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered 

waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.”); see also 

Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) 

(“Where an applicant gives very spare testimony . . . the 

IJ . . . may fairly wonder whether the testimony is 

fabricated.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Shi Liang 

Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 305-10 (2d Cir. 

2007). 
4 

 The agency also reasonably based the credibility 

determination on inconsistencies among Singh’s testimony, 

border patrol interview, and credible fear interview about 

whether he was born Sikh. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. 

Singh testified that he was born Sikh. At his border patrol 

interview, however, he said that he feared persecution because 

he was born Hindu and converted to Sikhism. Singh initially 

denied making this statement, both during his credible fear 

interview and testimony, but later explained that he misspoke 

at his border patrol interview because he was hungry and tired. 

The agency was not required to credit this explanation; as the 

IJ observed, Singh did not have problems answering any other 

question asked during his border interview. See Majidi v. 

Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must 

do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent 

statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a 

reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his 

testimony.” (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis 

omitted)). 

 The agency also reasonably rested its adverse credibility 

determination on inconsistencies concerning Singh’s political 

party membership. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. Singh 
5 

testified (consistent with his application) that he became an 

official member, but during his credible fear interview, he 

denied being an official member and stated that he only attended 

rallies. The agency was not required to credit Singh’s 

explanation that he was a junior member and was unsure why his 

credible fear interview records indicated he was not an official 

member. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. 

 We decline to consider Singh’s unexhausted challenge to the 

reliability of his credible fear interview records. Singh did 

not challenge the reliability of these records before the BIA, 

the BIA did not address the issue, and the Government asserts 

Singh’s failure to exhaust. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 123-25 (2d Cir. 2006) (providing that 

judicially imposed issue exhaustion is mandatory). 

 Given the foregoing inconsistencies, the totality of the 

circumstances supports the credibility ruling. Xiu Xia Lin, 

534 F.3d at 167. The inconsistencies related to Singh’s 

religion, party membership, and political activities: the sole 

basis on which he claims to have suffered past harm. Because 

Singh’s claims for relief are all based on the same factual 

predicate, the adverse credibility determination is 
6 

dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. 

Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk