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ELIZABETH A. STRANGE

First Assistant United States Attorney District of Arizona

KEVIN M. RAPP (Ariz. Bar No. 14249, kevin.rapp@usdoj.gov)

DOMINIC LANZA (Cal. Bar No. 225989, dominic.lanza@usdoj.gov)

MARGARET PERLMETER (Ariz. Bar No. 024805, margaret.perlmeter@usdoj.gov)

Assistant U.S. Attorneys 40 N. Central Avenue, Suite 1800

Phoenix, Arizona 85004-4408

Telephone (602) 514-7500

JOHN P. CRONAN

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice

REGINALD E. JONES (Miss. Bar No. 102806, reginald.jones4@usdoj.gov)

Senior Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice

Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section 

950 Pennsylvania Ave N.W., Room 2116

Washington, D.C. 20530

Telephone (202) 616-2807 

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

2. James Larkin

Defendant.

CR-18-00422-PHX-SPL (BSB) 

UNITED STATES’ MOTION FOR 

DETENTION PENDING THE 

IMPOSITION OF RELEASE 

CONDITIONS 

The United States respectfully seeks the detention of defendant James 

Larkin(“Larkin”) unless and until stringent release conditions are imposed. 

As explained below, Larkin poses a significant risk of flight based on the nature 

of the charges, his massive financial resources, his frequent international travels (he 

was arrested returning from a European trip), his possession of significant international 

assets (including a multi-million dollar property in France), and his current possession 

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of a passport. These factors suggest that Larkin could easily flee the country and use 

the wealth he has stashed overseas to live out the remainder of his life, in lavish style, 

as a fugitive. 

The United States also harbors concerns that Larkin could, if released without 

conditions, pose a danger to the community. As alleged in the 93-count indictment,

Larkin is one of the masterminds behind Backpage.com, the internet’s most notorious 

destination for prostitution advertisements, including advertisements depicting the 

prostitution of children. In its 14-plus years of existence, the website has helped 

facilitate the victimization of untold thousands of victims of sex trafficking. 

Paragraphs 122-138 of the indictment provide a powerful snapshot of such 

victimization, including instances in which women trafficked via Backpage were 

murdered and had their corpses desecrated. Furthermore, although Larkin purported 

to sell his interest in Backpage in 2015, he has continued receiving large Backpagerelated distributions since then and also appears to have retained a degree of 

operational control over the company. 

On the other hand, the United States also recognizes that Larkin is a United 

States citizen with no prior criminal convictions who has abided by the release 

conditions that were previously imposed in a related proceeding in California state 

court. Accordingly, the United States believes there are conditions that would likely 

be sufficient to justify his release from pretrial custody. Specifically, to ameliorate the 

risk of flight, Larkin should be required to relinquish his passport, submit to electronic 

monitoring, post a sizeable bond from sources that are not subject to forfeiture, provide 

a complete accounting of his financial holdings, and be precluded from engaging in 

any financial transactions without prior Court and government approval. Additionally, 

to ameliorate any danger to the community, Larkin should be precluded from taking 

any steps to exercise control over Backpage. However, unless and until such 

conditions are imposed, Larkin should remain in custody. 

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ARGUMENT

A. Legal Standard

As the Court is no doubt aware, “[t]he Bail Reform Act . . . requires a district court

to order a defendant detained pending trial if ‘no condition or combination of conditions 

will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required.’” United States v. Gentry, 

455 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1019-20 (D. Ariz. 2006) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)). This 

analysis involves a “two-step inquiry.” Id. First, the Court must make a finding as to 

whether the defendant presents a “serious risk that such person will flee” if not detained. 

Id. at 1020 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A)). The government bears the burden of 

proving such risk of flight by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Second, if the defendant 

is likely to flee, the Court next must determine whether some set of conditions would 

sufficiently vitiate that risk. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)). “In making the determination 

whether conditions exist that would reasonably assure a defendant’s appearance, Section 

3142(g) requires the district court to take into account four statutory factors: (1) the nature 

and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; 

(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including his character, physical and 

mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the 

community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, 

criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and (4) the nature 

and seriousness of the danger to any person or community that would be posed by the 

person’s release.” Id.

In addition to seeking detention based on the risk of flight, the United States also

may seek detention on the ground that the defendant poses a risk of danger to the 

community. The government bears the burden of proving such danger by clear and 

convincing evidence. United States v. Hir, 517 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A finding 

that a defendant is a danger to any other person or the community must be supported by 

‘clear and convincing evidence.’”) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B)).

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B. Flight Risk

The Court should find, for several reasons, that releasing Larkin without stringent 

conditions would create a significant risk of flight. 

Nature And Circumstances Of Charged Offense. Larkin is charged with a total of 

70 felony crimes—specifically, one count of conspiracy, fifty counts of facilitating 

prostitution in violation of the Travel Act, one count of conspiracy to commit money 

laundering, ten counts of concealment of money laundering, six counts of international 

money laundering, and two counts of transactional money laundering. Many of these 

counts, standing alone, carry a statutory maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. The 

indictment also describes the extreme toll that Larkin’s conduct took on the many 

victims who were sex-trafficked via the Backpage website and, separately, details the 

extensive efforts that Larkin and others took to launder hundreds of millions of dollars 

of Backpage-related revenues. If convicted of all (or even a portion of) these charges, 

Larkin—who is nearly 70 years old—faces the very real possibility of spending the 

rest of his life in federal prison. Such exposure creates a powerful incentive to flee. 

See, e.g., United States v. Townsend, 897 F.2d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Facing the 

much graver penalties possible under the present indictment, the defendants have an 

even greater incentive to consider flight.”); United States v. Anderson, 384 F. Supp. 2d 

32, 35 (D.D.C. 2005) (ordering pretrial detention in white collar case, even though the 

defendant had no prior felony convictions and “no history of violent criminal activity,” 

in part because “[t]he combined statutory maximum penalties for the federal crimes 

with which Mr. Anderson is charged is 23 years. . . . At 51 years old, Mr. Anderson 

potentially could spend most of the remainder of his life in prison if convicted.”).

Strength Of The Evidence. The strength of the evidence also supports a flightrisk finding. As an initial matter, the fact the grand jury has returned an indictment is 

enough to meet the government’s initial burden as to the strength-of-the-evidence 

factor. See, e.g., United States v. Hamlin, 2007 WL 2225868, *1 (E.D. Mich. 2007) 

(“Under subsection (g)(2), from the a grand jury having passed an Indictment, there is 

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a definite weight of evidence against the Defendant.”); United States v. Bradshaw,

2000 WL 1371517, *4 (D. Kan. 2000) (“[T]he grand jury’s indictment, standing alone,

establishes probable cause for purposes of the Bail Reform Act.”).

In addition, the indictment in this case is a speaking indictment that sets forth,

in extensive detail, some of the evidence supporting the charges against Larkin, including 

damning emails and internal company documents that Larkin wrote or received. Finally, 

the strength of the evidence is further bolstered by the fact that, in January 2017, the Senate 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (“PSI”) issued a 50-page report entitled 

“Backpage.com’s Knowing Facilitation of Online Sex Trafficking.” This report included, 

among other things, a finding that “Backpage’s public defense is a fiction. Backpage has 

maintained a practice of altering ads before publication by deleting words, phrases, and 

images indicative of criminality, including child sex trafficking . . . . Those practices served 

to sanitize the content of innumerable advertisements for illegal transactions—even as 

Backpage represented to the public and the courts that it merely hosted content others had 

created.” 

Notwithstanding all of this, the United States anticipates Larkin may argue that the 

trajectory of the criminal case against him in California state court (in which pimpingrelated charges were previously dismissed) somehow undermines the strength of the 

evidence in this case. Any such argument should be rejected. In the California case, Larkin

was able to secure dismissal of the pimping-related charges by invoking section 230 of 

the Communication Decency Act (“CDA”), which preempts state law in certain 

circumstances. Because this is a federal case involving violations of federal criminal 

law, the CDA has no application. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (“Nothing in this section 

shall be construed to impair the enforcement of . . . [any] Federal criminal statute.”). 

Larkin may further argue that he has complied with the relatively lax release 

conditions set by the California court (e.g., access to his passport for international 

travel, a waiver of appearance at court dates, a relatively low bond, no electronic 

monitoring, etc.) and, therefore, he has inspired confidence that he is not a flight risk. 

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However, the California case is distinguishable from this case for several reasons that 

give Larkin a greater motive to flee. First, in the California prosecution there has yet 

to be a probable cause determination. Here, Larkin is faced with a 70 counts charged 

in a 61-page federal indictment. Second, as noted above, the California prosecution 

had legal hurdles as a result of section 230 of the CDA. The CDA provides no such 

defense here. Third, the federal indictment is far more expansive that the California 

indictment insofar that it includes international, concealment, and transactional money 

laundering. Fourth, the California indictment did not seek to forfeit any of Larkin’s 

assets. Here, the federal indictment seeks to forfeit every asset (e.g., multiple homes, 

international and domestic bank accounts, etc.) that was purchased in whole or in part 

with Backpage-generated revenue. In sum, Larkin now has a greater motive to flee 

the United States.

Defendant’s History And Characteristics. Larkin’s history and characteristics 

also support a flight-risk finding. On the one hand, the United States acknowledges

that aspects of Larkin’s background are favorable to him. He is a United States citizen 

with community and family ties who has never been convicted of a crime. 

Additionally, he has appeared for every required court appearance in the California 

case, has been permitted to travel internationally by the court in that case, and has 

surrendered his passport to the California court following each such trip.

On the other hand, Larkin has access to significant amounts of money, including 

money in foreign bank accounts. For example:

• Paragraphs 26 and 139 of the indictment explain that Larkin once owned 45% of 

Backpage and that Backpage has earned approximately $500 million in illicit revenue since 

2004. 

• Paragraph 154 of the indictment explains that, “between January 2016 and January 

2017, LARKIN received [Backpage-related] distributions totaling over $21 million.” 

• Counts 80 and 87 of the indictment summarize instances in which massive 

quantities of Backpage-related funds were transferred to or from financial accounts held 

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by Larkin. 

• Finally, the declaration of Special Agent Richard Robinson of IRS-CI, which is 

enclosed as an attachment to this pleading, provides additional details concerning Larkin’s 

international financial transfers and activities.

For all of the reasons, Larkin has both the financial ability and access to foreign 

bank accounts to allow him to successfully escape prosecution. See, e.g., Anderson, 384 

F. Supp. 2d at 36 (“Anderson appears to have the ability not only to flee the District of 

Columbia and the United States without detection, but also to live comfortably and evade 

capture in foreign jurisdictions. Mr. Anderson has traveled extensively, . . . has numerous 

international personal and business contacts, . . . [and] appears to have access to substantial 

assets overseas.”).

Larkin also engages in frequent foreign travel. Again, he was arrested returning 

from a European trip on April 6, 2018, and he owns a property in France. Foreign 

connections, coupled with access to foreign funds, suggest an ability “to live comfortably” 

abroad, a consideration that supports a flight-risk finding. See, e.g., United States v. Hong 

Vo, 978 F.Supp.2d 41, 45 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Vo’s access to substantial assets overseas, 

combined with her experience living in Vietnam for the past two years, . . . demonstrate 

her ability not only to flee . . . the United States . . . but also to live comfortably and evade 

capture in foreign jurisdictions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. 

Saani, 557 F. Supp. 2d 97, 98-99 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Defendant’s alleged access to funds in 

foreign bank accounts, and Defendant’s alleged purposeful and illegal concealment of that 

access, is directly relevant to Defendant’s flight risk.”).

Danger To Community If Released. The United States also harbors concerns 

that Larkin could, if released without conditions, pose a danger to the community. The 

indictment expresses the grand jury’s conclusion that Larkin was one of the 

masterminds behind a website that has contributed to the victimization of untold 

thousands of victims (including minors) of sex trafficking. Any future effort by Larkin

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to exert control over Backpage would result in further victimization—and, thus, pose 

a danger to the community.

Conclusion. In sum, Larkin poses as serious risk of flight due to the severity the 

charges (and penalties) he faces, his extensive foreign connections and financial resources, 

and his expressed desire to conceal assets from the government. Although Larkin will 

presumably argue that this risk is minimal given that he did not flee despite being exposed 

to charges in California and knowing he was under investigation in this case, “a preindictment investigation and a post-indictment trial are two very different things.” 

Anderson, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (“The defense has emphasized . . . that Mr. Anderson has 

left the country and returned many times during the pendency of the government's 

investigation into his business and investment activities. His willingness to remain in and 

repeatedly return to the United States despite the risk of indictment, the defense argues, 

indicates that Mr. Anderson wishes to remain here to defend his good name and reputation 

against attack in the criminal proceeding, even if it means, ultimately, risking his freedom. 

The Court does not find this argument convincing. . . . [A] pre-indictment investigation 

and a post-indictment trial are two very different things.”).

C. Danger To The Community

In addition to seeking detention (at least temporarily) based on the risk of flight, 

the United States also seeks detention on the ground that the Larkin could, if released 

without conditions, pose a danger to the community. On this point, the United States 

simply re-incorporates the argument set forth above. Any post-indictment effort by 

Larkin to exert control over Backpage should be forbidden—the website poses a 

danger to the community. 

D. Potential Release Conditions And Request For Nebbia Hearing

Because Larkin poses a serious risk of flight, the remaining question is “whether 

any condition or combination of conditions” authorized under the Act “will reasonably 

assure the appearance of [Larkin] as required.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The United States

believes that a package of suitable conditions could be crafted here. Those conditions 

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should include (1) relinquishing his passport, (2) travel restrictions, (3) electronic 

monitoring, (4) a sizeable bond based on assets that are not subject to forfeiture, (5) 

providing a complete accounting of all financial holdings, and (6) being precluded 

from engaging in any financial transactions (except routine, day-to-day expenditures 

and mortgage payments on a primary residence) without prior Court and government 

approval. 

Courts have recognized that “there is much subjectivity in determining what amount 

of bail will assure a defendant's appearance, and much of necessity must be left to the 

discretion of the judicial officer who makes the initial determination.” See Wright, Leipold, 

et al., Fed. Practice & Proc. Crim. § 776 (4th ed. 2017 update). Congress has also provided 

significant guidance. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B), some of the statutorily-authorized 

conditions are third-party custody, restrictions on a defendant’s associations and travel

(including association with potential witnesses), periodic reporting, curfews, a bond with

solvent sureties, and “any other condition that is reasonably necessary to assure the 

appearance of the person as required and to assure the safety of any other person and the 

community.” The Act also contemplates a focus on the defendant’s finances as a relevant 

consideration. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A) (person’s history and characteristics include 

“financial resources”); id. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xi) and (xii) (authorizing release subject to 

financial conditions). For those reasons, courts have routinely determined that release 

conditions in white collar cases should require the posting of substantial cash or other 

assets, to be accompanied by a range of other restrictions (such as the surrender of passports 

and travel limitations). See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 872 F.3d 78, 83-84 (2d Cir. 2017) 

(“The district court held a hearing and determined that Brooks was a flight risk on the basis 

of his considerable wealth and the potential for access to foreign accounts if he fled the 

country. . . . The district court issued a Bail Release Order . . . granting Brooks’s motion 

for pre-trial release. The Order included such restrictions as home detention monitored by 

a private security firm, monitored conversations, independent auditing of bank accounts 

and assets, and a prohibition on liquid assets being held overseas without the approval of 

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the U.S. Attorney's office. Brooks and his family sureties also provided $48 million in 

cash as security for the $400 million bond the court ordered.”); United States v. Dreier, 

596 F. Supp. 2d 831, 833 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (release conditions included “(1) a $10 million 

personal recognizance bond that, while not secured by cash, will be co-signed by 

defendant's son, Spencer Dreier, and his mother, Mildred Dreier; (2) home detention, 24/7, 

in his East Side apartment, secured not only by electronic monitoring but by on-premises 

armed security guards, supplied by a company acceptable to the Government but paid for 

by the defendant's relatives; (3) elimination of computer access, surrender of all travel 

documents, and screening and searching of pre-approved visitors; (4) strict supervision by 

Pre–Trial Services; and (5) ongoing cooperation with the court-appointed Receiver in 

identifying and preserving all assets held directly or indirectly by defendant”).

The United States also requests, should Larkin identify funds or assets that could be 

used to secure a suitably-large bond, that the Court conduct an inquiry into the source of 

those funds or assets. The Bail Reform Act codified a district court’s authority to conduct 

such an inquiry, which is often called a Nebbia hearing. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4) (“[T]he 

judicial officer . . . shall upon the motion of the Government . . . conduct an inquiry into 

the source of the property to be designated for potential forfeiture or offered as collateral 

to secure a bond, and shall decline to accept the designation, or the use as collateral, of 

property that, because of its source, will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person 

as required.”). Here, Larkin should not be permitted to use the proceeds of the charged 

crime to secure his release pending trial. Cf. United States v. Sharma, 2012 WL 1902919, 

*4 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (holding that although “there is no iron-clad rule that a defendant 

must show that collateral to support pre-trial release was lawfully acquired,” “the 

legislative history of the [Bail Reform] Act makes clear that Congress believed, in most 

cases, the potential loss of the fruits of an alleged crime will not reasonably assure the 

appearance of the defendant at trial” and that “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, bail 

funded in part from alleged criminal activity does not adequately assure the appearance of 

the defendant; instead, as the Senate Committee found, forfeiture of the proceeds of a crime 

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is simply a business cost of avoiding prosecution, leaving the defendant no worse off than 

before he engaged in criminal activity, but far better off than if in prison”).

Finally, to reduce the risk that Larkin may be endangering the community, the Court 

should impose the following conditions: (1) Larkin shall not engage directly or indirectly 

in the control or operation of Backpage or a similar website, and (2) Larkin shall not 

participate in, consult with, or otherwise support any business venture that offers or 

publishes adult content similar to that available on Backpage.

Respectfully submitted this 9th day of April 2018.

ELIZABETH A. STRANGE

First Assistant United States Attorney

District of Arizona

JOHN P. CRONAN

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice

/s Kevin Rapp__________________________ KEVIN M. RAPP

DOMINIC LANZA

MARGARET PERLMETER

Assistant U.S. Attorneys

REGINALD E. JONES

Senior Trial Attorney

U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division

Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section

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