NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of: 

CHRISTIAN ERIC DOWNUM, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

DENISE ELAINE SHAY DOWNUM, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0457 FC

FILED 6-7-2016

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County

No. S0300DO201300006

The Honorable Ted Stuart Reed, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART

APPEARANCES

Christian Eric Downum, Flagstaff

Petitioner/Appellant

Denise Elaine Shay Downum, Flagstaff

Respondent/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.
DOWNUM v. DOWNUM

Decision of the Court

2

GOULD, Judge:

¶1 Christian Eric Downum (“Father”) appeals from the trial 

court’s orders regarding legal decision-making authority, parenting time,

spousal maintenance, and property allocation. For the reasons stated 

below, we affirm the court’s legal decision-making and parenting time 

orders. We affirm the court’s ruling Denise Elaine Downum (“Mother”) is 

entitled to an award of spousal maintenance but reverse the order 

modifying the duration of the award. We remand for the court to address 

the dissipation of Mother’s retirement account. In all other respects, we 

affirm the property allocation. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 Father filed a petition for dissolution in 2013. While the 

dissolution case was pending, Father also filed for bankruptcy. As a result, 

the court deferred ruling on the parties’ property allocation while the 

bankruptcy case was pending, but proceeded to resolve legal decisionmaking, parenting time, child support, and spousal maintenance. 

¶3 In February 2014, after a two-day trial, the court awarded 

Father sole legal decision-making authority and equal parenting time over 

the parties’ minor child (“Child”).

1 The court also awarded Mother lifetime 

spousal maintenance of $2,500 per month (“February 2014 Order”). 

¶4 Following entry of the February 2014 Order, the issue of 

spousal maintenance was heavily re-litigated. Mother successfully moved 

to amend the February 2014 Order, increasing her lifetime award to $2,750 

per month. A few months later, the court denied the parties’ cross-petitions 

to modify spousal maintenance. The next day, Father filed another petition 

to modify spousal maintenance. After an evidentiary hearing, the court 

modified the award to $1,200 a month for six years (“February 2015 

Order”). 

¶5 After the bankruptcy case was resolved, the court held a 

consolidated trial on the allocation of property, the parties’ cross-petitions 

to modify legal decision-making and parenting time, and Mother’s motion 

to "correct" the February 2015 Order regarding spousal maintenance. 

 

1 The parties also have an older child who turned eighteen shortly 

after the petition was filed. 
DOWNUM v. DOWNUM

Decision of the Court

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¶6 After trial, the court entered a final Decree in May 2015. In its 

Decree, the court determined it was in the Child’s best interests to award 

sole legal decision-making authority to Mother, with Father having 

parenting time “no less than two evenings per week, from 5:00 PM to 6:30 

PM[.]” See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 25-403 (Supp. 2015).2 Mother was 

awarded the marital residence and was assigned responsibility for the 

mortgage. Each party was awarded specific personal property as well as 

the remaining unallocated personal property currently in his or her 

possession. The court modified the February 2015 Order regarding spousal 

maintenance to Mother, maintaining the $1,200 a month amount but 

extending the duration of the award through her lifetime. Father timely 

appealed. 

DISCUSSION

I. Modification of Legal Decision-Making and Parenting Time

¶7 Father appeals the order awarding Mother sole legal decisionmaking authority and reducing his parenting time to “no less than two 

evenings per week, from 5:00 PM to 6:30 PM[.]” We review an order 

modifying legal decision-making and parenting time for an abuse of 

discretion. Baker v. Meyer, 237 Ariz. 112, 116, ¶ 10 (App. 2015) (citations 

omitted). 

A. Premature and Insufficient Petition

¶8 Father contends Mother’s December 2014 petition to modify 

legal decision-making and parenting time was premature because (1) it was 

filed less than one year after the February 2014 Order was entered, and 

(2) Mother’s petition did not contain the requisite allegations allowing the 

filing of a premature petition. See A.R.S. § 25-411(A) (Supp. 2015) (A motion 

to modify legal decision-making or parenting time shall not be filed earlier 

than one year after the order to be modified, “unless the court permits it to 

be made on the basis of affidavits that there is reason to believe the child’s 

present environment may seriously endanger the child’s physical, mental, 

moral or emotional health.”). 

¶9 Father’s argument is moot. The requirements of A.R.S. § 25–

411 are procedural rather than jurisdictional and are intended to “prevent 

repeated or insubstantial motions for modification.” In re Marriage of 

Dorman, 198 Ariz. 298, 302, ¶ 11 (App. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). 

 

2 Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite the current 

version of the statutes. 
DOWNUM v. DOWNUM

Decision of the Court

4

Failure to comply with these procedural requirements may be challenged 

by special action “prior to a resolution on the merits.” Id. at 302–03, ¶¶ 11–

12 (declining to review noncompliance with A.R.S. § 25–411 on direct 

appeal). Where, as here, an appeal is taken from a final judgment after the 

trial court has conducted an evidentiary hearing, evaluated the case on the 

merits, and found sufficient cause for modification, “the time for achieving 

the statute’s intended protections . . . has passed.” Id. at 302, ¶ 11. We find 

no error.

B. Evidentiary Rulings

¶10 Father also contends the trial court improperly considered 

evidence regarding the parties’ relationship and custody of the Child prior 

to the February 2014 Order. The court sustained some objections to 

testimony relating to 2012 and 2013 events but noted some of the other older 

evidence provided background information relevant to its custody 

determination. The court acted within its discretion in allowing Mother to 

testify about this background information. See Pridgeon v. Superior Court 

(LaMarca), 134 Ariz. 177, 180 (1982) (holding court may consider prior 

circumstances in determining whether change has occurred); Hendricks v. 

Mortensen, 153 Ariz. 241, 243-44 (App. 1987) (same). 

¶11 Father argues the court abused its discretion by allowing 

hearsay evidence of the Child’s statements. However, the court considered 

only statements relating to the Child’s wishes as to custody and parenting 

time; the court specifically declined to consider other statements by the 

Child that it concluded “should have been subject to crossexamination[,]”and also excluded testimony that called for double hearsay, 

i.e., what the Child said others had said. The court concluded the Child, 16

years old, was old enough for his wishes to be considered, and, given the 

custody evaluator’s expertise in child psychology, ordered the evaluator to 

perform the interview. See A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(4) (stating one factor in 

determining the best interests of the child is the wishes of a child that is of 

suitable age and maturity); Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”)

12 (authorizing interview to ascertain child’s wishes). We find no abuse of 

discretion. 

¶12 Next, Father asserts the court abused its discretion by 

admitting and considering the transcript of the Child’s interview with the 

custody evaluator despite Mother’s failure to disclose the transcript. 

¶13 The parties did not stipulate or request to seal the transcript; 

thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the transcript of the 
DOWNUM v. DOWNUM

Decision of the Court

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interview into evidence or considering it as evidence of the Child’s wishes. 

See A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(4). The court ordered the evaluator to interview the 

child with a court reporter present. The court also acted in accordance with 

Rule 12(A), which provides that a child’s interview be recorded by a court 

reporter and the record may be sealed for good cause or by stipulation of 

the parties. See Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. 12(A). However, Rule 12(A) also provides 

the record of an interview must be available to the parties unless they have 

agreed otherwise, and may be considered by the court. 

¶14 Father contends the Child’s statements were unreliable 

because it was likely he knew Mother would purchase the transcript. 

However, beyond his own conjecture, Father provides no evidence the 

Child possessed such knowledge, and, in any event, pursuant to Rule 12(B), 

any child undergoing an interview must be told his interview is going to be 

made part of the court record. We will not reweigh the evidence the trial 

court considered on this issue, and conclude the court did not abuse its 

discretion by considering the Child’s statements. In re Estate of Pouser, 193 

Ariz. 574, 579, ¶ 13 (1999). 

C. Evidence Supporting Legal Decision-Making and Parenting 

Time Orders

¶15 In making its custody orders, Father argues the court erred in 

failing to properly weigh the custody evaluator’s testimony. The weight 

given the custody evaluator’s testimony and report was for the trial court 

as fact finder; we do not reweigh evidence on appeal. See Sholty v. Sherrill 

(Sholty), 129 Ariz. 458, 461 (App. 1981).

¶16 In the custody evaluator’s 2013 report, he expressed concern 

Mother was engaging in alienating behavior. Consistent with this report, 

during the May 2015 trial, the evaluator testified that the Child’s 

relationship with Father significantly deteriorated since 2013, from which 

he inferred that Mother continued to engage in such improper behavior.

He also testified the court should restrict Mother’s alienating behavior. 

¶17 However, the custody evaluator also provided testimony that 

supported the court’s eventual orders concerning legal decision-making 

and parenting time. The evaluator testified that when Father moved the 

Child in with his girlfriend and her three children in June 2014, this caused 

a situation that was already stressful to become “increasingly intolerable,” 

thereby causing more anger and distance between Father and the Child. 

The evaluator also stated that limiting Mother’s parenting time, as Father 

proposed, would be difficult on the Child. 
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¶18 Here, in addition to the evaluator’s testimony, the court heard

conflicting evidence about the cause of the deterioration of the Child’s 

relationship with Father. Clearly, the Child was experiencing distress as a 

result of the February 2014 Order granting Father sole legal decisionmaking and equal parenting time. Additionally, Father’s new living 

arrangements caused significant and continuing changed circumstances 

that negatively affected the Child. Although Father blames Mother for the 

Child’s distress, the trial court saw and heard the witnesses. We defer to 

the court’s determination as to the weight to give this conflicting evidence. 

See Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347, ¶ 13 (App. 1998). 

¶19 We also conclude the evidence supports the court’s finding 

that joint legal decision-making was not possible because the parties were 

unable to make joint decisions in the Child’s best interests. See A.R.S. § 25-

403.01(B)(3). We therefore affirm the court’s conclusion it was in the Child’s 

best interests that Mother have sole legal decision-making authority. 

¶20 Father argues the reduction of his parenting time was not in 

the Child’s best interests, was punitive, and therefore was an abuse of 

discretion. Father also argues the court abused its discretion by failing to 

order reunification therapy. 

¶21 The court reduced Father’s parenting time based on its 

finding that “[m]andated extensive and overnight [p]arenting time with 

[Father] would currently endanger [the child’s] emotional health.” See

A.R.S. § 25-411(J) (A court may modify parenting time when modification 

would serve the best interests of the child, and shall not restrict parenting 

time unless it finds parenting time “will endanger seriously the child’s 

physical, mental, moral or emotional health.”). 

¶22 Based on an interview with the Child, the custody evaluator 

reported that forcing the Child and Father into extensive and overnight 

parenting would cause more anger and distance between them. Previous 

attempts at therapy had failed to improve the Child’s relationship with 

Father and caused the Child to feel angry and alone. The Child also 

reported feeling he would respond violently if he were physically forced to 

attend counseling with Father. Given this evidence, we find no abuse of 

discretion in the court's decision concerning parenting time.

II. Modification of Spousal Maintenance

¶23 Father appeals the court’s modification of spousal 

maintenance from the six-year award in the February 2015 Order to the

lifetime award in the Decree three months later. Father argues Mother was 
DOWNUM v. DOWNUM

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not entitled to any spousal maintenance, and, alternatively, the amount and 

duration of the award was an abuse of discretion. 

¶24 “The question of spousal maintenance is left to the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and an appellate court will not substitute its 

judgment for that of the trial court unless there has been a clear abuse of 

discretion.” Deatherage v. Deatherage, 140 Ariz. 317, 319 (App. 1984). To 

modify spousal maintenance, there must be evidence of “changed 

circumstances that are substantial and continuing[.]” A.R.S. § 25-327(A)

(Supp. 2015).

¶25 The February 2015 Order regarding Mother’s eligibility for 

spousal maintenance was based on the court’s findings Mother (1) lacked 

sufficient property, including property apportioned to her, to provide for 

her reasonable needs; (2) was currently unable to be self-sufficient through 

appropriate employment; and (3) had a marriage of long duration and was 

of an age that may preclude the possibility of finding adequate 

employment. See A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(1), (2), (4) (2015). Father argues, 

however, that Mother is voluntarily unemployed, is able to support herself 

through adequate employment, and was awarded sufficient property to 

provide for her reasonable needs. 

¶26 The record supports Mother’s eligibility for spousal 

maintenance. Father does not contest the fact the parties had a marriage of 

long duration: they were married for over twenty-six years. A.R.S. § 25-

319(A)(4). As to Mother’s employment situation, there is no evidence 

showing that her ability to find adequate employment changed in the three

months between the February 2015 Order and the May 2015 Decree. Thus, 

as to this factor, the evidence showed that at the time the Decree was 

entered Mother was still eligible for spousal maintenance because she was

unable to be self-sufficient through appropriate employment. See A.R.S. §

25-319(A)(2).

¶27 Father also challenges the amount of spousal maintenance

ordered in the Decree, arguing that because Mother was awarded the 

marital residence, which she can sell or rent for additional income, she now 

has adequate property to provide for her needs.

3 See A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(9). 

We disagree.

 

3 Father also argues the amount of spousal maintenance should have 

been reduced because Mother was capable of supporting herself through 
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¶28 Although Father suggests the equity in the residence was

$51,200 to $163,650, other evidence showed the equity was only $20,000 to 

$25,000. Indeed, even if Mother sold this asset, she would have to pay for 

housing. Mother was awarded a house with significant mortgage debt, a 

car, personal property of an unspecified value, and an interest in Father’s 

retirement account. None of these assets are significantly liquid to provide 

for Mother’s reasonable needs. 

¶29 Father also claims he cannot afford to pay spousal 

maintenance because he was also ordered in the Decree to pay the majority 

of community debt. See A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(4). However, Father received a 

larger portion of community personal property (the parties' collection of 

military memorabilia) than Mother to pay off this debt. Father also argues 

he will be unable to afford the spousal maintenance payment when he 

retires. The spousal maintenance award is modifiable as to amount and 

duration upon a proven change in circumstances that is substantial and 

continuing. See A.R.S. § 25-327(A). Father’s speculation about his future 

income is not an appropriate consideration in determining the current 

spousal maintenance award. 

¶30 Finally, Father argues the court had no basis for modifying 

the six-year spousal maintenance award in the February 2015 Order to the

lifetime award in the Decree. 

¶31 The Decree modified the February 2015 Order regarding 

spousal maintenance “in light of the allocation of community property and 

community debts[.]” Although the court properly reconsidered spousal 

maintenance in light of the final property allocation, see A.R.S. § 25-

319(B)(9), in modifying the spousal maintenance award, the court failed to 

explain how the final property and debt allocation was a sufficient change 

in circumstances to support the modification. 

¶32 We agree with Father that the record does not support the 

order modifying the duration of Mother’s spousal maintenance. Clearly, 

the final property and debt allocations did not justify an increase in spousal 

maintenance, because these allocations did not place Mother in a worse 

position financially than she was at the time of the February 2015 Order. 

Mother received the community residence with an “uncertain equity” 

value. See supra ¶ 28. To the extent Mother received more equity in the 

 

appropriate employment as an attorney. However, as noted in ¶ 26, above, 

no evidence showed any change in Mother’s employment situation 

between the February 2015 Order and entry of the Decree.
DOWNUM v. DOWNUM

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home than Father, this was awarded as an offset against $3,200 Father owed 

in past child support. No value was placed on the personal property 

awarded to the parties, and, in the absence of an equalization payment, we 

presume the personal property was allocated equally. The community 

interest in Father’s retirement account was also divided equally. Although 

Father was ordered to pay $56,000 in community debts pursuant to the 

bankruptcy action, in exchange, Father was awarded $81,000 in community 

property (the military memorabilia) to pay those debts. The parties’ 

employment situations also had not changed in the short time between the 

February 2015 Order and the Decree. 

¶33 Accordingly, we reverse the court’s modification of the 

duration of Mother’s spousal maintenance award, and remand for 

reconsideration, if warranted, based on the property allocation adjustment 

discussed below. 

III. Property Allocation

¶34 The court awarded specific items of personal property to each 

party based on their detailed inventory lists. Each party was awarded all 

other unallocated property in his or her possession. Father argues, 

however, that some of his separate property remained in the marital 

residence; as a result, it was in Mother’s possession and erroneously 

awarded to her in the Decree. 

¶35 Prior to trial, Father was allowed access to the marital 

residence to inventory the community property and his separate property. 

The parties disputed whether Mother blocked Father’s access to closets and 

the attic. Although Father claimed Mother’s actions prevented him from

making a complete inventory, he also admitted that a complete inventory 

would have been difficult because the house contained thousands of items 

of personal property. 

¶36 The court awarded Father certain property from the 

inventory lists and sanctioned Mother for her failure to comply with its

order granting Father’s access to the residence. Given the quantity of the 

property involved, we cannot say the court abused its discretion by 

awarding each party the property in his or her possession and imposing a 

monetary sanction against Mother. 

¶37 Father argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

order Mother to reimburse him for $18,000 in Father’s separate property she 

withdrew to pay community debts. The parties disputed whether Father 

agreed to use the funds to pay off community debt. We will defer to the 
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Decision of the Court

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trial court’s determination of witnesses’ credibility. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at

347, ¶ 13. The trial court did not abuse its discretion on this issue. 

¶38 Finally, Father argues he was entitled to an offset for the 

$11,766 Mother withdrew from her retirement account in violation of the 

court’s preliminary injunction enjoining the parties from disposing of 

community assets. See A.R.S. § 25-315(A). 

¶39 Mother agreed the retirement account was a community 

asset. She testified that she used $2,700 from the account to pay her 2014 

taxes, and that she was subject to an unspecified penalty for the early 

withdrawal. Mother testified that she withdrew the remaining $9,000 for 

“necessities,” but otherwise failed to account for these funds. 

¶40 The Decree is silent regarding Mother’s expenditure of these 

community funds. Therefore, we remand for the court to address the 

dissipation of this community asset. If the resolution of this issue on 

remand affects any of the factors relating to spousal maintenance, the court 

may, in its discretion, take it into account as it reconsiders the spousal 

maintenance award. 

CONCLUSION

¶41 We affirm the court’s legal decision-making and parenting 

time orders. We also affirm the court’s ruling Mother is entitled to spousal 

maintenance, as well as the amount of spousal maintenance, but reverse the

order modifying the duration of spousal maintenance from six years to 

lifetime. We remand for the court to address the dissipation of Mother’s 

retirement account and, if warranted, modify the spousal maintenance 

award in view of the dissipation of Mother’s retirement. In all other 

respects, we affirm the property allocation. Each party shall pay his or her 

own costs on appeal.