1 

14-956-cr 

United States v. Stapleton

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after 

January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court’s 

Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite 

either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party 

citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 29th day 

of April, two thousand fifteen. 

PRESENT: 

 

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

GERARD E. LYNCH, 

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, 

Circuit Judges. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Appellee,

 

 -v.- No. 14-956 (L) 

 NO. 14-1710 (CON) 

CEASAR STAPLETON, JEFFERSON HERNANDEZ,

 Defendants-Appellants, 

RAFAEL ANTONIO ALVAREZ, LEONARDO 

CALDERON-CASTRO, JUAN FRANCISCO 

MONEG PERALTA, MAGDIEL ELIAS VALENCIA, 

RICHARD VIQUEZ VARGAS, KRISTOPHER WILKINS, 

Defendants. 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

STAPELTON: RANDOLPH Z. VOLKELL, Merrick, NY. 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

HERNANDEZ: Michael O. Hueston, New York, NY.
 

2 

FOR APPELLEE: DOUGLAS M. PRAVDA (Susan Corkery, Tiana A. 

Demas, on the brief), Assistant United States 

Attorneys, for Loretta E. Lynch, United States 

Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, 

Brooklyn, NY. 

Appeals from judgments of conviction in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 

of New York (Frederic L. Block, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgments of the District Court are AFFIRMED. 

Defendant Ceasar Stapleton appeals a judgment of the District Court convicting him, after his 

guilty plea, of conspiring to launder money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The District Court 

sentenced Stapleton principally to 27 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by 3 years of supervised 

release. On appeal, Stapleton contends that the District Court’s sentence is procedurally and substantively 

unreasonable. 

Defendant Jefferson Hernandez appeals a judgment of the District Court convicting him, after a 

guilty plea, of conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and sentencing 

him principally to 28 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by 3 years of supervised release. Counsel for 

defendant Hernandez moves to be relieved as counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

and the Government moves to dismiss Hernandez’s appeal. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Stapleton’s Procedural Unreasonableness Claim 

We review a sentence for procedural unreasonableness by focusing on whether the sentencing court 

followed all the necessary steps in deciding upon a sentence. United States v. Park, 758 F.3d 193, 197 (2d Cir. 

2014). A sentencing decision is procedurally unreasonable when a district court “makes a mistake in its 

Guidelines calculation, does not consider the § 3553(a) factors, or rests its sentence on a clearly erroneous 

finding of fact.” United States v. Hsu, 669 F.3d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis 

omitted). 
 

3 

Defendant Stapleton argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the District Court 

failed to give advance notice of its intention to impose an upward departure from the advisory sentencing 

range pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”). Contrary to Stapleton’s 

claim, however, the sentence imposed was not an upward departure but a variance.1

 Variances, unlike 

departures, do not require district courts to provide advance notice, even for those that increase a sentence 

above the Guidelines range. Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714-715 (2008). Accordingly, Stapleton’s 

sentence was procedurally reasonable. 

II. Stapleton’s Substantive Unreasonableness Claim 

We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard. United 

States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2009). An appellate court will “set aside a district court’s 

substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be located 

within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en 

banc) (internal citation, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). The length of a sentence is outside the 

range of permissible decisions when “affirming it would damage the administration of justice because the 

sentence imposed was shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” 

Park, 758 F.3d at 200 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Stapleton contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the District Court 

predicated its variance on the discovery of drug paraphernalia in his home at the time of his arrest and 

failed to place enough weight on the other sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). But district 

courts are given significant discretion in weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and nothing precludes a 

sentencing judge from resting a decision on the presence of one particular factor. Indeed, “we have never 

held that a district court’s particular reliance on one factor to justify departing from the Guidelines is 

suggestive of unreasonableness; we have only said that ‘unjustified reliance upon any one factor’ suggests 

unreasonableness.” United States v. Pope, 554 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and 

emphasis omitted). 

 1 The District Court never described the sentence imposed as an upward departure. To the contrary, the District Court, 

at the sentencing hearing, stated that “considering all of the 3553(a) factors . . . a sentence a little bit above the advisory

guideline range in this particular case is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to meet the end of sentencing as articulated in 

our statutory guidelines scheme.” App’x 106-07. Similarly, the written Statement of Reasons attached to the judgment makes 

clear that the sentence was “imposed . . . pursuant to the factors in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) and . . . is outside and above the 

advisory sentencing guideline range because the defendant was found in possession of drug paraphernalia in his apartment 

which was not taken into account when calculating the advisory guideline range.” 
 

4 

Here, the District Court was not unjustified in relying on one factor to increase Stapleton’s sentence. In 

light of Stapleton’s prior drug-related conviction and his money laundering activities while still on 

probation for that conviction, the District Court felt it appropriate that Stapleton’s sentence reflect the 

significant amount of drug paraphernalia found at the time of his arrest. App’x 106. It cannot be said that 

the District Court abused its discretion by taking this information into consideration while sentencing 

Stapleton. 

III. Anders Motion by Hernandez’s Counsel 

Michael O. Hueston, counsel for defendant Hernandez, moves for permission to withdraw as 

counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The Government moves to dismiss the 

appeal based on Hernandez’s waiver of his appellate rights. 

We agree with Hernandez’s counsel and the Government that there were no meritorious issues to 

be raised on appeal because (1) Hernandez’s guilty plea was valid; (2) he knowingly and voluntarily waived 

his right to appeal; and (3) his sentence was reasonable. However, because Hernandez’s term of supervised 

release and the special assessment are beyond the scope of the appeal waiver, he is not barred from 

challenging them on appeal. Nevertheless, Hernandez can make no meritorious objection to those aspects 

of his sentence. Hernandez’s term of supervised release is consistent with the relevant statute, see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(b)(2), and the $100 special assessment was mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(2)(A). 

 CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, we (1) AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court with regard to defendant 

Stapleton; (2) GRANT the Anders motion with regard to counsel for defendant Hernandez; (3) GRANT 

the Government’s motion to dismiss with respect to the appeal of defendant Hernandez’s conviction and 

term of imprisonment; and (4) construe the Government’s motion to dismiss as also requesting a summary 

affirmance, and GRANT the so-construed motion with respect to defendant Hernandez’s appeal of his 

term of supervised release and special assessment. 

FOR THE COURT, 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court