(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES ET AL. v. PIMENTEL, 

TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR OF ESTATE OF
 

PIMENTEL, DECEASED, ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 06–1204. Argued March 17, 2008—Decided June 12, 2008 

A class action by and for human rights victims (Pimentel class) of Ferdinand Marcos, while he was President of the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), led to a nearly $2 billion judgment in a United 

States District Court. The Pimentel class then sought to attach the 

assets of Arelma, S. A. (Arelma), a company incorporated by Marcos,

held by a New York broker (Merrill Lynch). The Republic and a Philippine commission (Commission) established to recover property

wrongfully taken by Marcos are also attempting to recover this and

other Marcos property. The Philippine National Banc (PNB) holds 

some of the disputed assets in escrow, awaiting the outcome of pending litigation in the Sandiganbayan, a Philippine court determining

whether Marcos’ property should be forfeited to the Republic. Facing

claims from various Marcos creditors, including the Pimentel class, 

Merrill Lynch filed this interpleader action under 28 U. S. C. §1335,

naming, among the defendants, the Republic, the Commission,

Arelma, PNB (all petitioners here), and the Pimentel class (respondents here). The Republic and the Commission asserted sovereign

immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, and

moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), 

arguing that the action could not proceed without them. Arelma and 

PNB also sought a Rule 19(b) dismissal. The District Court refused,

but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the Republic and the

Commission are entitled to sovereign immunity and are required parties under Rule 19(a), and it entered a stay pending the Sandiganbayan litigation’s outcome. Finding that that litigation could not determine entitlement to Arelma’s assets, the District Court vacated 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2 REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. PIMENTEL 

Syllabus 

the stay and ultimately awarded the assets to the Pimentel class.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that dismissal was not warranted under Rule 19(b) because, though the Republic and the Commission were required parties, their claim had so little likelihood of

success on the merits that the action could proceed without them.

The court found it unnecessary to consider whether prejudice to those 

entities might be lessened by a judgment or interim decree in the interpleader action, found the entities’ failure to obtain a judgment in 

the Sandiganbayan an equitable consideration counseling against

dismissing the interpleader suit, and found that allowing the interpleader case to proceed would serve the Pimentel class’ interests. 

Held: 

1. Because Arelma and PNB also seek review of the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision, this Court need not rule on the question whether the Republic and the Commission, having been dismissed from the suit, had the

right to seek review of the decision that the suit could proceed in 

their absence. As a general matter any party may move to dismiss

an action under Rule 19(b). Arelma and PNB have not lost standing

to have the judgment vacated in its entirety on procedural grounds 

simply because they did not appeal, or petition for certiorari on, the 

underlying merits ruling denying them the interpleaded assets.

Pp. 7–9.

2. Rule 19 requires dismissal of the interpleader action. Pp. 9–20.

(a) Under Rule 19(a), nonjoinder even of a required person does

not always result in dismissal. When joinder is not feasible, the

question whether an action should proceed turns on nonexclusive 

considerations in Rule 19(b), which asks whether “in equity and good 

conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or 

should be dismissed.” The joinder issue can be complex, and the

case-specific determinations involve multiple factors, some “substantive, some procedural, some compelling by themselves, and some subject to balancing against opposing interests,” Provident Tradesmens 

Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U. S. 102, 119. Pp. 9–10.

(b) Here, Rule 19(a)’s application is not contested: The Republic

and the Commission are required entities. And this Court need not 

decide the proper standard of review for Rule 19(b) decisions, because 

the Ninth Circuit’s errors of law require reversal. Pp. 10–19.

(1) The first factor directs the court to consider, in determining

whether the action may proceed, the prejudice to absent entities and

present parties in the event judgment is rendered without joinder.

Rule 19(b)(1). The Ninth Circuit gave insufficient weight to the sovereign status of the Republic and the Commission in considering 

whether they would be prejudiced if the case proceeded. Giving full 

effect to sovereign immunity promotes the comity and dignity inter-
 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

Syllabus 

ests that contributed to the development of the immunity doctrine. 

See, e.g., Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 

486. These interests are concrete here. The entities’ claims arise 

from historically and politically significant events for the Republic

and its people, and the entities have a unique interest in resolving 

matters related to Arelma’s assets. A foreign state has a comity interest in using its courts for a dispute if it has a right to do so. Its 

dignity is not enhanced if other nations bypass its courts without 

right or good cause. A more specific affront could result if property 

the Republic and the Commission claim is seized by a foreign court 

decree. This Court has not considered the precise question presented, but authorities involving the intersection of joinder and the

United States’ governmental immunity, see, e.g., Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U. S. 371, 373–375, instruct that where 

sovereign immunity is asserted, and the sovereign’s claims are not 

frivolous, dismissal must be ordered where there is a potential for injury to the absent sovereign’s interests. The claims of the Republic 

and the Commission were not frivolous, and the Ninth Circuit thus 

erred in ruling on their merits. The privilege of sovereign immunity 

from suit is much diminished if an important and consequential ruling affecting the sovereign’s substantial interest is determined, or at

least assumed, by a federal court in its absence and over its objection.

The Pimentel class’ interest in recovering its damages is not discounted, but important comity concerns are implicated by assertion of 

foreign sovereign immunity. The error is not that the courts below 

gave too much weight to the Pimentel class’ interests, but that they

did not accord proper weight to the compelling sovereign immunity 

claim. Pp. 11–16. 

(2) The second factor is the extent to which any prejudice could

be lessened or avoided by relief or measures alternative to dismissal,

Rule 19(b)(2), but no alternative remedies or forms of relief have been 

proposed or appear to be available. As to the third factor—whether a 

judgment rendered without the absent party would be adequate, Rule

19(b)(3)—“adequacy” refers not to satisfaction of the Pimentel class’

claims, but to the “public stake in settling disputes by wholes, whenever possible,” Provident Bank, supra, at 111. Going forward with 

the action in the absence of the Republic and the Commission would 

not further this public interest because they could not be bound by a

judgment to which they were not parties. As to the fourth factor— 

whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action

were dismissed for nonjoinder, Rule 19(b)(4)—the Ninth Circuit made

much of the tort victims’ lack of an alternative forum. But Merrill 

Lynch, not the Pimentel class, is the plaintiff as the stakeholder in 

the interpleader action. See 28 U. S. C. §1335(a). The Pimentel 
 

 

4 REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. PIMENTEL 

Syllabus 

class’ interests are not irrelevant to Rule 19(b)’s equitable balance, 

but the Rule’s other provisions are the relevant ones to consult. A 

dismissal on the ground of nonjoinder will not provide Merrill Lynch 

with a judgment determining entitlement to the assets so it could be

done with the matter, but it likely would give Merrill Lynch an effective defense against piecemeal litigation by various claimants and inconsistent, conflicting judgments. Any prejudice to Merrill Lynch is 

outweighed by prejudice to the absent entities invoking sovereign 

immunity. In the usual course, the Ninth Circuit’s failure to give sufficient weight to the likely prejudice to the Republic and the Commission would warrant reversal and remand for further determinations, 

but here, that error plus this Court’s analysis under Rule 19(b)’s additional provisions require the action’s dismissal. Pp. 17–20. 

464 F. 3d 885, reversed and remanded. 

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and SCALIA, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined, in 

which SOUTER, J., joined as to all but Parts IV–B and V, and in which 

STEVENS, J., joined as to Part II. STEVENS, J., and SOUTER, J., filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 06–1204 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JERRY S. PIMENTEL, TEMPORARY 

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF MARIANO J. 

PIMENTEL, DECEASED, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 12, 2008] 

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 

This case turns on the interpretation and proper application of Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

and requires us to address the Rule’s operation in the 

context of foreign sovereign immunity.

This interpleader action was commenced to determine

the ownership of property allegedly stolen by Ferdinand 

Marcos when he was the President of the Republic of the 

Philippines. Two entities named in the suit invoked sovereign immunity. They are the Republic of the Philippines

and the Philippine Presidential Commission on Good

Governance, referred to in turn as the Republic and the 

Commission. They were dismissed, but the interpleader 

action proceeded to judgment over their objection. Together with two parties who remained in the suit, the 

Republic and the Commission now insist it was error to 

allow the litigation to proceed. Under Rule 19, they contend, the action should have been dismissed once it became clear they could not be joined as parties without 
 

2 REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. PIMENTEL 

Opinion of the Court 

their consent. 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, agreeing with the District Court, held the action

could proceed without the Republic and the Commission

as parties. Among the reasons the Court of Appeals gave

was that the absent, sovereign entities would not prevail 

on their claims. We conclude the Court of Appeals gave

insufficient weight to the foreign sovereign status of the 

Republic and the Commission, and that the court further

erred in reaching and discounting the merits of their 

claims. 

I 

A 

When the opinion of the Court of Appeals is consulted, 

the reader will find its quotations from Rule 19 do not 

accord with its text as set out here; for after the case was 

in the Court of Appeals and before it came here, the text of 

the Rule changed. The Rules Committee advised the 

changes were stylistic only, see Advisory Committee’s 

Notes on 2007 Amendment to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19, 28 

U. S. C. A., p. 168 (2008); and we agree. These are the 

three relevant stylistic changes. First, the word “required”

replaced the word “necessary” in subparagraph (a). Second, the 1966 Rule set out factors in longer clauses and 

the 2007 Rule sets out the factors affecting joinder in

separate lettered headings. Third, the word “indispensable,” which had remained as a remnant of the pre-1966

Rule, is altogether deleted from the current text. Though

the word “indispensable” had a lesser place in the 1966

Rule, it still had the latent potential to mislead. 

As the substance and operation of the Rule both preand post-2007 are unchanged, we will refer to the present, 

revised version. The pre-2007 version is printed in the 

Appendix of this opinion. The current Rule states, in 

relevant part, as follows: 
 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

“Rule 19. Required Joinder of Parties. 

“(a) Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible. 

“(1) Required Party. A person who is subject to

service of process and whose joinder will not deprive

the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined 

as a party if:

“(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord 

complete relief among existing parties; or 

“(B) that person claims an interest relating to the

subject of the action and is so situated that disposing

of the action in the person’s absence may: 

“(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest; or 

“(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial

risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. 

“(2) Joinder by Court Order. If a person has not 

been joined as required, the court must order that the

person be made a party. A person who refuses to join 

as a plaintiff may be made either a defendant or, in a

proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. 

“(3) Venue. If a joined party objects to venue and the 

joinder would make venue improper, the court must

dismiss that party.

“(b) When Joinder Is Not Feasible. If a person 

who is required to be joined if feasible cannot be

joined, the court must determine whether, in equity 

and good conscience, the action should proceed among 

the existing parties or should be dismissed. The factors for the court to consider include: 

“(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the

person’s absence might prejudice that person or the 

existing parties;

“(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by: 
 

4 REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. PIMENTEL 

Opinion of the Court 

“(A) protective provisions in the judgment; 

“(B) shaping the relief; or 

“(C) other measures; 

“(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence would be adequate; and

“(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate 

remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.” 

Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 19(a)–(b). 

See also Rule 19(c) (imposing pleading requirements);

Rule 19(d) (creating exception for class actions). 

B 

In 1972, Ferdinand Marcos, then President of the Republic, incorporated Arelma, S. A. (Arelma), under Panamanian law. Around the same time, Arelma opened a 

brokerage account with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 

Smith Inc. (Merrill Lynch) in New York, in which it deposited $2 million. As of the year 2000, the account had 

grown to approximately $35 million. 

Alleged crimes and misfeasance by Marcos during his

presidency became the subject of worldwide attention and 

protest. A class action by and on behalf of some 9,539 of

his human rights victims was filed against Marcos and his

estate, among others. The class action was tried in the 

United States District Court for the District of Hawaii and 

resulted in a nearly $2 billion judgment for the class. See 

Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F. 3d 767 (CA9 1996). We 

refer to that litigation as the Pimentel case and to its class 

members as the Pimentel class. In a related action, the 

Estate of Roger Roxas and Golden Budha [sic] Corporation

(the Roxas claimants) claim a right to execute against the 

assets to satisfy their own judgment against Marcos’ 

widow, Imelda Marcos. See Roxas v. Marcos, 89 Haw. 91, 

113–115, 969 P. 2d 1209, 1231–1233 (1998). 

The Pimentel class claims a right to enforce its judgment by attaching the Arelma assets held by Merrill 
 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

Lynch. The Republic and the Commission claim a right to

the assets under a 1955 Philippine law providing that

property derived from the misuse of public office is forfeited to the Republic from the moment of misappropriation. See An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the 

State Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully 

Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing 

for the Proceedings Therefor, Rep. Act No. 1379, 51:9 O. G. 

4457 (June 18, 1955). 

After Marcos fled the Philippines in 1986, the Commission was created to recover any property he wrongfully 

took. Almost immediately the Commission asked the 

Swiss Government for assistance in recovering assets—

including shares in Arelma—that Marcos had moved to

Switzerland. In compliance the Swiss Government froze 

certain assets and, in 1990, that freeze was upheld by the 

Swiss Federal Supreme Court. In 1991, the Commission 

asked the Sandiganbayan, a Philippine court of special 

jurisdiction over corruption cases, to declare forfeited to 

the Republic any property Marcos had obtained through

misuse of his office. That litigation is still pending in the 

Sandiganbayan. 

The Swiss assets were transferred to an escrow account 

set up by the Commission at the Philippine National Banc 

(PNB), pending the Sandiganbayan’s decision as to their 

rightful owner. The Republic and the Commission requested that Merrill Lynch follow the same course and

transfer the Arelma assets to an escrow account at PNB. 

Merrill Lynch did not do so. Facing claims from various

Marcos creditors, including the Pimentel class, Merrill

Lynch instead filed an interpleader action under 28 

U. S. C. §1335. The named defendants in the interpleader 

action were, among others, the Republic and the Commission, Arelma, PNB, and the Pimentel class (the respondents here).

The Pimentel case had been tried as a class action be-
 

 

6 REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. PIMENTEL 

Opinion of the Court 

fore Judge Manuel Real of the United States District 

Court for the Central District of California, who was sitting by designation in the District of Hawaii after the 

Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the

various human rights complaints against Marcos in that 

court. See Hilao, supra, at 771. Judge Real directed 

Merrill Lynch to file the interpleader action in the District 

of Hawaii, and he presided over the matter. 

After being named as defendants in the interpleader 

action, the Republic and the Commission asserted sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities

Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U. S. C. §1604. They moved to 

dismiss pursuant to Rule 19(b), based on the premise that 

the action could not proceed without them. Arelma and 

PNB also moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 19(b). Without addressing whether they were entitled to sovereign 

immunity, Judge Real initially rejected the request by the 

Republic and the Commission to dismiss the interpleader

action. They appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed.

It held the Republic and the Commission are entitled to

sovereign immunity and that under Rule 19(a) they are

required parties (or “necessary” parties under the old 

terminology). See In re Republic of the Philippines, 309 

F. 3d 1143, 1149–1152 (CA9 2002). The Court of Appeals

entered a stay pending the outcome of the litigation in the 

Sandiganbayan over the Marcos assets. See id., at 1152– 

1153. 

After concluding that the pending litigation in the

Sandiganbayan could not determine entitlement to the 

Arelma assets, Judge Real vacated the stay, allowed the 

action to proceed, and awarded the assets to the Pimentel 

class. A week later, in the case initiated before the Sandiganbayan in 1991, the Republic asked that court to declare the Arelma assets forfeited, arguing the matter was

ripe for decision. The Sandiganbayan has not yet ruled. 

In the interpleader case the Republic, the Commission, 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

Arelma, and PNB appealed the District Court’s judgment

in favor of the Pimentel claimants. This time the Court of 

Appeals affirmed. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 

Smith v. ENC Corp., 464 F. 3d 885 (CA9 2006). Dismissal 

of the interpleader suit, it held, was not warranted under

Rule 19(b) because, though the Republic and the Commission were required (“necessary”) parties under Rule 19(a), 

their claim had so little likelihood of success on the merits 

that the interpleader action could proceed without them.

One of the reasons the court gave was that any action

commenced by the Republic and the Commission to recover the assets would be barred by New York’s 6-year

statute of limitations for claims involving the misappropriation of public property. See N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. 

§213 (West Supp. 2008). The court thus found it unnecessary to consider whether any prejudice to the Republic and

the Commission might be lessened by some form of judgment or interim decree in the interpleader action. The 

court also considered the failure of the Republic and the 

Commission to obtain a judgment in the Sandiganbayan—

despite the Arelma share certificates having been located 

and held in escrow at the PNB since 1997–1998—to be an 

equitable consideration counseling against dismissal of the 

interpleader suit. The court further found it relevant that 

allowing the interpleader case to proceed would serve the

interests of the Pimentel class, which, at this point, likely 

has no other available forum in which to enforce its judgment against property belonging to Marcos.

This Court granted certiorari. See 552 U. S. ___ (2007). 

II 

We begin with the question we asked the parties to

address when we granted certiorari: Whether the Republic 

and the Commission, having been dismissed from the

interpleader action based on their successful assertion of 

sovereign immunity, had the right to appeal the District 
 

 

8 REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. PIMENTEL 

Opinion of the Court 

Court’s determination under Rule 19 that the action could 

proceed in their absence; and whether they have the right

to seek this Court’s review of the Court of Appeals’ judgment affirming the District Court. See ibid. 

Respondents contend that the Republic and the Commission were not proper parties in the Court of Appeals 

when it reviewed the District Court’s judgment allowing

the action to proceed without them; and, respondents 

continue, the Republic and the Commission are not proper 

parties in the instant proceeding before us. See Brief for 

Respondent Pimentel 21. 

Without implying that respondents are correct in saying

the Republic and the Commission could neither appeal nor 

become parties here, we conclude we need not rule on this 

point. Other parties before us, Arelma and PNB, also seek 

review of the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the

District Court. They, too, moved to dismiss the action

under Rule 19(b), appealed from the denial of their motion, and are petitioners before this Court. As a general

matter any party may move to dismiss an action under

Rule 19(b). A court with proper jurisdiction may also 

consider sua sponte the absence of a required person and

dismiss for failure to join. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Northern 

Securities Co., 184 U. S. 199, 235 (1902); see also Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U. S. 

102, 111 (1968).

Respondents argue, however, that Arelma and PNB 

have no standing to raise before this Court the question

whether the action may proceed in the absence of the

Republic and the Commission. Arelma and PNB lost on 

the merits of their underlying claims to the interpleaded 

assets in both the District Court and the Court of Appeals. 

By failing to petition for certiorari on that merits ruling, 

respondents contend, Arelma and PNB abandoned any 

entitlement to the interpleaded assets and therefore lack a 

concrete stake in the outcome of further proceedings. We 
 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

disagree. Dismissal of the action under Rule 19(b) would 

benefit Arelma and PNB by vacating the judgment denying them the interpleaded assets. A party that seeks to

have a judgment vacated in its entirety on procedural 

grounds does not lose standing simply because the party 

does not petition for certiorari on the substance of the 

order. 

III 

We turn to the question whether the interpleader action

could proceed in the District Court without the Republic

and the Commission as parties. 

Subdivision (a) of Rule 19 states the principles that 

determine when persons or entities must be joined in a 

suit. The Rule instructs that nonjoinder even of a required person does not always result in dismissal. Subdivision (a) opens by noting that it addresses joinder “if 

Feasible.” Where joinder is not feasible, the question 

whether the action should proceed turns on the factors

outlined in subdivision (b). The considerations set forth in 

subdivision (b) are nonexclusive, as made clear by the

introductory statement that “[t]he factors for the court to

consider include.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(b). The general

direction is whether “in equity and good conscience, the 

action should proceed among the existing parties or should

be dismissed.” Ibid. The design of the Rule, then, indicates that the determination whether to proceed will turn 

upon factors that are case specific, which is consistent 

with a Rule based on equitable considerations. This is 

also consistent with the fact that the determination of who 

may, or must, be parties to a suit has consequences for the

persons and entities affected by the judgment; for the 

judicial system and its interest in the integrity of its processes and the respect accorded to its decrees; and for

society and its concern for the fair and prompt resolution 

of disputes. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 
 

10 REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. PIMENTEL 

Opinion of the Court 

U. S. 720, 737–739 (1977). For these reasons, the issue of 

joinder can be complex, and determinations are case specific. See, e.g., Provident Bank, supra, at 118–119. 

Under the earlier Rules the term “indispensable party”

might have implied a certain rigidity that would be in

tension with this case-specific approach. The word “indispensable” had an unforgiving connotation that did not fit 

easily with a system that permits actions to proceed even 

when some persons who otherwise should be parties to the

action cannot be joined. As the Court noted in Provident 

Bank, the use of “indispensable” in Rule 19 created the 

“verbal anomaly” of an “indispensable person who turns

out to be dispensable after all.” 390 U. S., at 117, n. 12. 

Though the text has changed, the new Rule 19 has the 

same design and, to some extent, the same tension. Required persons may turn out not to be required for the

action to proceed after all. 

In all events it is clear that multiple factors must bear 

on the decision whether to proceed without a required 

person. This decision “must be based on factors varying

with the different cases, some such factors being substantive, some procedural, some compelling by themselves, and 

some subject to balancing against opposing interests.” Id., 

at 119. 

IV 

We turn to Rule 19 as it relates to this case. The application of subdivision (a) of Rule 19 is not contested. The 

Republic and the Commission are required entities because “[w]ithout [them] as parties in this interpleader 

action, their interests in the subject matter are not protected.” In re Republic of Philippines, 309 F. 3d, at 1152; 

see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(a)(1)(B)(i). All parties appear 

to concede this. The disagreement instead centers around 

the application of subdivision (b), which addresses 

whether the action may proceed without the Republic and 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

the Commission, given that the Rule requires them to be 

parties.

We have not addressed the standard of review for Rule 

19(b) decisions. The case-specific inquiry that must be 

followed in applying the standards set forth in subdivision 

(b), including the direction to consider whether “in equity 

and good conscience” the case should proceed, implies 

some degree of deference to the district court. In this case, 

however, we find implicit in the District Court’s rulings, 

and explicit in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, errors 

of law that require reversal. Whatever the appropriate 

standard of review, a point we need not decide, the judgment could not stand. Cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 

81, 99–100 (1996) (a court “by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law”). 

The Court of Appeals erred in not giving the necessary

weight to the absent entities’ assertion of sovereign immunity. The court in effect decided the merits of the 

Republic and the Commission’s claims to the Arelma 

assets. Once it was recognized that those claims were not

frivolous, it was error for the Court of Appeals to address

them on their merits when the required entities had been

granted sovereign immunity. The court’s consideration of 

the merits was itself an infringement on foreign sovereign 

immunity; and, in any event, its analysis was flawed. We 

discuss these errors first in the context of how they affected the Court of Appeals’ analysis under the first factor 

of Rule 19(b). We then explain that the outcome suggested

by the first factor is confirmed by our analysis under the 

other provisions of Rule 19(b). The action may not

proceed. 

A 

As to the first Rule 19(b) factor—the extent to which a

judgment rendered in the person’s absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties, Fed. Rule Civ. 
 

 

12 REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. PIMENTEL 

Opinion of the Court 

Proc. 19(b)(1)—the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 

incorrect. 

In considering whether the Republic and the Commission would be prejudiced if the action were to proceed in

their absence, the Court of Appeals gave insufficient

weight to their sovereign status. The doctrine of foreign

sovereign immunity has been recognized since early in the 

history of our Nation. It is premised upon the “perfect

equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and 

th[e] common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse.” Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 

137 (1812). The Court has observed that the doctrine is 

designed to “give foreign states and their instrumentalities some protection from the inconvenience of suit,” Dole 

Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U. S. 468, 479 (2003). 

The privilege is codified by federal statute. FSIA, 28 

U. S. C. §§1330, 1602–1611, provides that “a foreign state

shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the

United States and of the States except as provided in 

sections 1605 to 1607,” absent existing international

agreements to the contrary. §1604; see Verlinden B. V. v. 

Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 486–489 (1983) 

(explaining the history of the doctrine’s codification). 

Exceptions to the general principle of foreign sovereign 

immunity are contained in §§1605–1607 of the statute.

They are inapplicable here, or at least the parties do not 

invoke them. Immunity in this case, then, is uncontested; 

and pursuant to the Court of Appeals’ earlier ruling on the 

issue, the District Court dismissed the Republic and the 

Commission from the action on this ground. 

The District Court and the Court of Appeals failed to 

give full effect to sovereign immunity when they held the 

action could proceed without the Republic and the Commission. Giving full effect to sovereign immunity promotes the comity interests that have contributed to the

development of the immunity doctrine. See, e.g., id., at 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

486 (“[F]oreign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace

and comity”); National City Bank of N. Y. v. Republic of 

China, 348 U. S. 356, 362, and n. 7 (1955) (foreign sovereign immunity derives from “standards of public morality,

fair dealing, reciprocal self-interest, and respect for the 

‘power and dignity’ of the foreign sovereign” (quoting 

Schooner Exchange, supra, at 136–137, 143–144)). 

Comity and dignity interests take concrete form in this 

case. The claims of the Republic and the Commission 

arise from events of historical and political significance for 

the Republic and its people. The Republic and the Commission have a unique interest in resolving the ownership 

of or claims to the Arelma assets and in determining if,

and how, the assets should be used to compensate those 

persons who suffered grievous injury under Marcos. 

There is a comity interest in allowing a foreign state to use

its own courts for a dispute if it has a right to do so. The 

dignity of a foreign state is not enhanced if other nations

bypass its courts without right or good cause. Then, too, 

there is the more specific affront that could result to the

Republic and the Commission if property they claim is 

seized by the decree of a foreign court. Cf. Republic of 

Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U. S. 30, 35–36 (1945) (pre-FSIA, 

common-law doctrine dictated that courts defer to executive determination of immunity because “[t]he judicial

seizure” of the property of a friendly state may be regarded as “an affront to its dignity and may . . . affect our 

relations with it”).

Though this Court has not considered a case posing the

precise question presented here, there are some authorities involving the intersection of joinder and the governmental immunity of the United States. See, e.g., Mine 

Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U. S. 371, 373–375 

(1945) (dismissing an action where the Under Secretary of 

the Navy was sued in his official capacity, because the 

Government was a required entity that could not be joined 
 

 

14 REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. PIMENTEL 

Opinion of the Court 

when it withheld consent to be sued); Minnesota v. United 

States, 305 U. S. 382, 386–388 (1939) (dismissing the 

action for nonjoinder of a required entity where the United 

States was the owner of the land in question but had not 

consented to suit). The analysis of the joinder issue in

those cases was somewhat perfunctory, but the holdings

were clear: A case may not proceed when a required-entity 

sovereign is not amenable to suit. These cases instruct us 

that where sovereign immunity is asserted, and the claims

of the sovereign are not frivolous, dismissal of the action 

must be ordered where there is a potential for injury to

the interests of the absent sovereign.

The Court of Appeals accordingly erred in undertaking

to rule on the merits of the Republic and the Commission’s

claims. There may be cases where the person who is not 

joined asserts a claim that is frivolous. In that instance a 

court may have leeway under both Rule 19(a)(1), defining 

required parties, and Rule 19(b), addressing when a suit 

may go forward nonetheless, to disregard the frivolous 

claim. Here, the claims of the absent entities are not 

frivolous; and the Court of Appeals should not have

proceeded on the premise that those claims would be 

determined against the sovereign entities that asserted

immunity.

The Court of Appeals determined that the claims of the 

Republic and the Commission as to the assets would not 

succeed because a suit would be time barred in New York. 

This is not necessarily so. If the Sandiganbayan rules that

the Republic owns the assets or stock of Arelma because

Marcos did not own them and the property was forfeited to

the Republic under Philippine law, then New York misappropriation rules might not be the applicable law. For 

instance, the Republic and the Commission, standing in

for Arelma based upon the Sandiganbayan’s judgment, 

might not pursue a misappropriation of public property

suit, as the Court of Appeals assumed they would. They 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

might instead, or in the alternative, file suit for breach of

contract against Merrill Lynch. They would argue the

statute of limitations would start to run if and when 

Merrill Lynch refused to hand over the assets. See 

N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. §213 (West Supp. 2008); ElyCruikshank Co. v. Bank of Montreal, 81 N. Y. 2d 399, 402, 

615 N. E. 2d 985, 986 (1993) (“In New York, a breach of 

contract cause of action accrues at the time of the breach”). 

Or the Republic and the Commission might bring an 

action either in state or federal court to enforce the Sandiganbayan’s judgment. See 1 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §482, Comment a 

(1986) (jurisdiction of foreign court rendering judgment is 

presumed); id., at Comment d (providing exceptions not

relevant here); see also 28 U. S. C. §2467(c) (providing for

enforcement of foreign forfeiture judgments in certain

circumstances). Merrill Lynch makes arguments why 

these actions would not succeed, see Brief for Merrill 

Lynch as Amicus Curiae 26–27, to which the Republic, the 

Commission, and the United States respond, see Reply 

Brief for Petitioners 14–18; Brief for United States as 

Amicus Curiae 24–28. We need not seek to predict 

the outcomes. It suffices that the claims would not be 

frivolous. 

As these comments indicate, Rule 19 cannot be applied 

in a vacuum, and it may require some preliminary assessment of the merits of certain claims. For example, the

Rule directs a court, in determining who is a required

person, to consider whether complete relief can be afforded

in their absence. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(a)(1)(A). 

Likewise, in the Rule 19(b) inquiry, a court must examine, 

to some extent, the claims presented and the interests

likely to be asserted both by the joined parties and the 

absent entities or persons. Here, however, it was improper to issue a definitive holding regarding a nonfrivolous, substantive claim made by an absent, required entity 
 

 

16 REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. PIMENTEL 

Opinion of the Court 

that was entitled by its sovereign status to immunity from

suit. That privilege is much diminished if an important 

and consequential ruling affecting the sovereign’s

substantial interest is determined, or at least assumed, by 

a federal court in the sovereign’s absence and over its 

objection.

As explained above, the decision to proceed in the absence of the Republic and the Commission ignored the 

substantial prejudice those entities likely would incur. 

This most directly implicates Rule 19(b)’s first factor, 

which directs consideration of prejudice both to absent 

persons and those who are parties. We have discussed the 

absent entities. As to existing parties, we do not discount

the Pimentel class’ interest in recovering damages it was

awarded pursuant to a judgment. Furthermore, combating public corruption is a significant international policy.

The policy is manifested in treaties providing for international cooperation in recovering forfeited assets. See, e.g.,

United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G. A.

Res. 5814, chs. IV and V, U. N. Doc. A/RES/58/4, pp. 22, 

32 (Dec. 11, 2003) (reprinted in 43 I. L. M. 37 (2004));

Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 

Art. 16, Nov. 13, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104–18 (1995).

This policy does support the interest of the Pimentel class 

in recovering damages awarded to it. But it also underscores the important comity concerns implicated by the

Republic and the Commission in asserting foreign sovereign immunity. The error is not that the District Court 

and the Court of Appeals gave too much weight to the 

interest of the Pimentel class, but that it did not accord proper weight to the compelling claim of sovereign 

immunity.

Based on these considerations we conclude the District 

Court and the Court of Appeals gave insufficient weight to

the likely prejudice to the Republic and the Commission 

should the interpleader proceed in their absence. 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

B 

As to the second Rule 19(b) factor—the extent to which

any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by relief or

measures alternative to dismissal, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 

19(b)(2)—there is no substantial argument to allow the 

action to proceed. No alternative remedies or forms of 

relief have been proposed to us or appear to be available. 

See 7 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice

and Procedure §1608, pp. 106–110 (3d ed. 2001) (collecting

cases using alternative forms of relief, including the granting of money damages rather than specific performance,

the use of declaratory judgment, and the direction that 

payment be withheld pending suits against the absent 

party). If the Marcos estate did not own the assets, or if 

the Republic owns them now, the claim of the Pimentel 

class likely fails; and in all events, if there are equally 

valid but competing claims, that too would require adjudication in a case where the Republic and the Commission 

are parties. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. 

Tashire, 386 U. S. 523, 534, and n. 16 (1967); Russell v. 

Clark’s Executors, 7 Cranch 69, 98–99 (1812) (Marshall,

C. J.); Wichita & Affiliated Tribes of Okla. v. Hodel, 788 

F. 2d 765, 774 (CADC 1986) (“Conflicting claims by beneficiaries to a common trust present a textbook example of a 

case where one party may be severely prejudiced by a 

decision in his absence” (citing Williams v. Bankhead, 19 

Wall. 563, 570–571 (1874))). 

C 

As to the third Rule 19(b) factor—whether a judgment

rendered without the absent party would be adequate,

Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(b)(3)—the Court of Appeals understood “adequacy” to refer to satisfaction of the Pimentel 

class’ claims. But adequacy refers to the “public stake in

settling disputes by wholes, whenever possible.” Provident 

Bank, 390 U. S., at 111. This “social interest in the effi-
 

18 REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. PIMENTEL 

Opinion of the Court 

cient administration of justice and the avoidance of multiple litigation” is an interest that has “traditionally been 

thought to support compulsory joinder of absent and potentially adverse claimants.” Illinois Brick Co., 431 U. S., 

at 737–738. Going forward with the action without the 

Republic and the Commission would not further the public

interest in settling the dispute as a whole because the

Republic and the Commission would not be bound by the

judgment in an action where they were not parties. 

D 

As to the fourth Rule 19(b) factor—whether the plaintiff 

would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(b)(4)—the

Court of Appeals made much of what it considered the tort 

victims’ lack of an alternative forum should this action be 

dismissed. This seems to assume the plaintiff in this

interpleader action was the Pimentel class. It is Merrill 

Lynch, however, that has the statutory status of plaintiff 

as the stakeholder in the interpleader action.

It is true that, in an interpleader action, the stakeholder 

is often neutral as to the outcome, while other parties 

press claims in the manner of a plaintiff. That is insufficient, though, to overcome the statement in the interpleader statute that the stakeholder is the plaintiff. See 

28 U. S. C. §1335(a) (conditioning jurisdiction in part upon 

whether “the plaintiff has deposited such money or property” at issue with the district court or has “given bond

payable to the clerk of the court in such amount and with

such surety as the court or judge may deem proper”). We 

do not ignore that, in context, the Pimentel class (and 

indeed all interpleader claimants) are to some extent 

comparable to the plaintiffs in noninterpleader cases.

Their interests are not irrelevant to the Rule 19(b) equitable balance; but the other provisions of the Rule are the 

relevant ones to consult. 
 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 19 

Opinion of the Court 

Merrill Lynch, as the stakeholder, makes the point that 

if the action is dismissed it loses the benefit of a judgment 

allowing it to disburse the assets and be done with the 

matter. Dismissal of the action, it urges, leaves it without

an adequate remedy, for it “could potentially be forced . . . 

to defend lawsuits by the various claimants in different 

jurisdictions, possibly leading to inconsistent judgments.”

Brief for Merrill Lynch as Amicus Curiae 14. A dismissal 

of the action on the ground of nonjoinder, however, will 

protect Merrill Lynch in some respects. That disposition

will not provide Merrill Lynch with a judgment determining the party entitled to the assets, but it likely would

provide Merrill Lynch with an effective defense against 

piecemeal litigation and inconsistent, conflicting judgments. As matters presently stand, in any later suit

against it Merrill Lynch may seek to join the Republic and 

the Commission and have the action dismissed under Rule 

19(b) should they again assert sovereign immunity. Dismissal for nonjoinder to some extent will serve the purpose of interpleader, which is to prevent a stakeholder 

from having to pay two or more parties for one claim. 

Any prejudice to Merrill Lynch in this regard is outweighed by prejudice to the absent entities invoking sovereign immunity. Dismissal under Rule 19(b) will mean, 

in some instances, that plaintiffs will be left without a 

forum for definitive resolution of their claims. But that 

result is contemplated under the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 497 (“[I]f 

a court determines that none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity applies, the plaintiff will be barred from 

raising his claim in any court in the United States”). 

V 

The Court of Appeals’ failure to give sufficient weight to

the likely prejudice to the Republic and the Commission 

should the interpleader proceed in their absence would, in 
 

 

 

 

20 REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. PIMENTEL 

Opinion of the Court 

the usual course, warrant reversal and remand for further 

proceedings. In this case, however, that error and our 

further analysis under the additional provisions of Rule 

19(b) lead us to conclude the action must be dismissed.

This leaves the Pimentel class, which has waited for years 

now to be compensated for grievous wrongs, with no immediate way to recover on its judgment against Marcos.

And it leaves Merrill Lynch, the stakeholder, without a 

judgment.

The balance of equities may change in due course. One 

relevant change may occur if it appears that the Sandiganbayan cannot or will not issue its ruling within a

reasonable period of time. Other changes could result

when and if there is a ruling. If the Sandiganbayan rules 

that the Republic and the Commission have no right to the 

assets, their claims in some later interpleader suit would 

be less substantial than they are now. If the ruling is that

the Republic and the Commission own the assets, then 

they may seek to enforce a judgment in our courts; or

consent to become parties in an interpleader suit, where

their claims could be considered; or file in some other 

forum if they can obtain jurisdiction over the relevant 

persons. We do note that if Merrill Lynch, or other parties, elect to commence further litigation in light of

changed circumstances, it would not be necessary to file

the new action in the District Court where this action 

arose, provided venue and jurisdictional requirements are

satisfied elsewhere. The present action, however, may not 

proceed. 

* * * 

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 

Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to order the District Court to dismiss the interpleader action. 

It is so ordered. 
Opinion of the Court 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 21 

Appendix to opinion of the Court 

APPENDIX
 

The Court of Appeals issued its decision before the 2007 

Amendments to Rule 19(b) became effective. See Merrill 

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. ENC Corp., 464 F. 3d 

885, 891 (CA9 2006). The text of the Rule before those 

changes were adopted is as follows: 

“Rule 19. Joinder of Persons Needed for Just 

Adjudication

“(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person

who is subject to service of process and whose joinder

will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in 

the action if (1) in the person’s absence complete relief 

cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2)

the person claims an interest relating to the subject of 

the action and is so situated that the disposition of the 

action in the person’s absence may (i) as a practical

matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect 

that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already 

parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by 

reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not 

been so joined, the court shall order that the person be 

made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff

but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If

the joined party objects to venue and joinder of that

party would render the venue of the action improper, 

that party shall be dismissed from the action. 

“(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)–(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the 

court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties 
 

Opinion of the Court 

22 REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. PIMENTEL 

Appendix to opinion of the Court 

before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person 

being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to

be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person’s absence 

might be prejudicial to the person or those already

parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or

other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or 

avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the 

person’s absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the

plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is

dismissed for nonjoinder. 

“(c) Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall state the names,

if known to the pleader, of any persons as prescribed 

in subdivision (a)(1)–(2) hereof who are not joined, and

the reasons why they are not joined. 

“(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is 

subject to the provisions of Rule 23.” 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 

Opinion of STEVENS, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 06–1204 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JERRY S. PIMENTEL, TEMPORARY 

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF MARIANO J. 

PIMENTEL, DECEASED, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 12, 2008] 

JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in 

part. 

While I join Part II of the Court’s opinion holding that 

we have jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeals’ decision and agree that we should not affirm the Court of 

Appeals’ judgment on the merits of its analysis under Rule 

19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I believe the 

appropriate disposition of this case is to reverse and remand for further proceedings. The District Court and the 

Ninth Circuit erred by concluding that the New York

statute of limitations provides a virtually insuperable 

obstacle to petitioners’ recovery of the Arelma, S. A., assets, and I therefore agree that this Court should reverse.

I would not, however, give near-dispositive effect to the 

Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and the Philippine 

Presidential Commission on Good Governance’s (Commission) status as sovereign entities, as the Court does in 

ordering outright dismissal of the case. 

In my judgment, the Court of Appeals should either

order the District Judge to stay further proceedings pending a reasonably prompt decision of the Sandiganbayan or 

order the case reassigned to a different District Judge to

conduct further proceedings. There is, of course, a risk of 
 

2 REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. PIMENTEL 

Opinion of STEVENS, J. 

unfairness in conducting such proceedings without the 

participation of petitioners. But it is a risk that they can 

avoid by waiving their sovereign immunity, and the record

provides a basis for believing that they would do so if the

case proceeded before a different judge. 

The Republic did not invoke its sovereign immunity 

until after the District Court denied its motion seeking

dismissal or transfer for improper venue, dismissal on act 

of state grounds, or recusal of the District Judge. App. 9; 

id., at 2–3 (docket entries). In support of that motion they 

advanced a factual basis for suspecting that the District

Judge’s impartiality could be questioned. Memorandum of 

Law in Support of the Motions to Dismiss, Transfer or 

Stay, and For Recusal 23–28 in Civ. No. CV00–595MLR 

(D. Haw.). These facts demonstrate that the District 

Judge would likely “have substantial difficulty in putting 

out of his or her mind previously-expressed views.” California v. Montrose Chemical Corp. of California, 104 F. 3d 

1507, 1521 (CA9 1997) (providing the standard for when

the Ninth Circuit will reassign a case; internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

It appears, for example, that the District Judge summoned an attorney representing Merrill Lynch to a meeting in chambers in Los Angeles on September 11, 2000,

after learning that the Republic and the Commission

sought to obtain the Arelma funds from Merrill Lynch.

During these proceedings, the District Judge directed 

Merrill Lynch to file an interpleader action before him in 

the District of Hawaii and to deposit the Arelma funds 

with the court, despite the attorney’s argument that New 

York would likely be the more appropriate forum. See 

ante, at 6; Tr. 6 (Sept. 11, 2000). Merrill Lynch filed the

interpleader on September 14, 2000, and the District 

Judge sealed the file, making it difficult for other parties 

to determine the status of the proceedings. See Affidavit 

of Richard A. Martin in Support of the Motions to Dismiss, 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

Opinion of STEVENS, J. 

Transfer, or Stay Submitted by the Republic of the Philippines and the Presidential Commission on Good Government in Civ. No. CV00–595MLR (D. Haw.), ¶6–7, 11. 

These actions bespeak a level of personal involvement and 

desire to control the Marcos proceedings that create at

least a colorable basis for the Republic and the Commission’s concern about the District Judge’s impartiality. 

Furthermore, following the Republic and the Commission’s motion to dismiss the action on sovereign immunity

grounds, the District Judge decided that they were not

“real parties in interest.” See In re Republic of Philippines, 309 F. 3d 1143, 1148 (CA9 2002). The Ninth Circuit 

reversed and directed the District Judge to enter a stay, 

id., at 1153; the District Court did so, but vacated the stay

within months. While the District Court’s decision to do 

so was not without some basis, it presumably increased

concern about the possibility that the District Judge would 

not fairly consider the Republic’s position on the merits. 

Upon reassignment, the question whether to dismiss the 

case, to stay the proceedings, or to require the Republic to

choose between asserting its sovereign immunity and 

defending on the merits would be open. The District 

Judge might wish to hold a hearing to determine whether 

the Republic and the Commission have a substantial 

argument that the Republic owned the disputed assets

when they were conveyed to Arelma in 1972. While the 

Court assumes that the Republic’s interest in the Arelma

assets is “not frivolous,” ante, at 14, on this record, it is not 

clear whether the Republic has a sufficient claim to those

assets to preclude their recovery by judgment creditors of

Marcos. The Republic’s claim to disputed assets may be

meritless for reasons unrelated to the potential statute of

limitations. 

Further, in conducting the balancing inquiry mandated

by Rule 19, as interpreted by Justice Harlan’s opinion for 

the Court in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. 
 

4 REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES v. PIMENTEL 

Opinion of STEVENS, J. 

Patterson, 390 U. S. 102 (1968), I would conclude that 

several facts specific to this case suggest that the Republic

and the Commission’s sovereign interests should be given 

less weight than in the ordinary case. First, in all events, 

the Republic and the Commission must take affirmative

steps in United States courts (or possibly invoke the assistance of the Attorney General to do so, see Brief for United

States as Amicus Curiae 27) at some point in order to 

recover the assets held in the United States. Thus, the 

sovereign interest implicated here is not of the same magnitude as when a sovereign faces liability; the Republic’s

interest is in choosing the most convenient venue and time 

for the suit to proceed.

Second, in the past two decades, the Republic has participated in other proceedings involving Marcos’ assets in

our courts without interposing any objection. Indeed, in 

1987 it filed an amicus brief with the Ninth Circuit in the 

underlying consolidated class action that led to the entry

of respondents’ judgment against Marcos; in that brief the 

Republic urged the Ninth Circuit to reverse the District

Judge’s dismissal of two of the cases (later consolidated) 

under the act of state doctrine and “to allow the Plaintiffs 

in those two cases to present their evidence of gross human rights violations against Ferdinand Marcos and to

pursue justice in U. S. District Court.” App. A to Brief for 

Respondent Pimentel RA–1.

This was the Republic’s position notwithstanding the

fact that any recovery would come from a judgment

against Marcos’ assets—assets that the Republic and the

Commission now claim to have owned in full from the 

moment Marcos acquired them. See, e.g., Brief for Republic in Nos. 04–16401, 04–16503, and 04–16538 (CA9), p. 9

(“Under Philippine law, assets resulting from the misuse 

of public office, bribery, corruption, and other such crimes

by public officials are forfeit to the Republic from the 

moment such assets are generated”); Pet. for Republic in 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 5 

Opinion of STEVENS, J. 

No. 0141 (Sandiganbayon) (filed 1991) (seeking forfeiture 

of a large number of Marcos assets). Even if the Republic 

believed that Marcos might have some personal assets

that were not ill gotten, under the Republic’s theory that

amount could not possibly have approached the judgment 

respondents received. Either the Republic was encouraging futile and purely symbolic litigation, or the Republic

believed that other creditors would have access to at least 

a portion of Marcos’ vast assets. 

In sum, I am persuaded that the Court’s judgment today

represents a more “inflexible approach” than the Rule 

contemplates. Provident, 390 U. S., at 107. All parties

have an interest in the prompt resolution of the disposition of the Arelma assets. A remand would allow a new 

judge to handle the matter in an expeditious fashion 

rather than requiring a brand new proceeding. The Court 

suggests that Merrill Lynch may file in another District 

Court—presumably in New York—if it seeks to commence

further litigation. See ante, at 20. While this solution 

would put the matter before another District Judge, it

requires the initiation of a new proceeding that may unnecessarily delay the final resolution.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 

Opinion of SOUTER, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 06–1204 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JERRY S. PIMENTEL, TEMPORARY 

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF MARIANO J. 

PIMENTEL, DECEASED, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 12, 2008] 

JUSTICE SOUTER, concurring in part and dissenting in 

part. 

I join all but Parts IV–B and V of the Court’s opinion. I 

differ as to relief because a conclusion of the matter pending before the Sandiganbayan may simplify the issues

raised in this case and render one disposition or another

more clearly correct. I would therefore vacate the judgment and remand for a stay of proceedings for a reasonable time to await a decree of the Philippine court. If it 

should appear later that no such decree can be expected,

the Court of Appeals could decide on the next step in light

of the Court’s opinion. For reasons given by JUSTICE 

STEVENS, I would order that any further proceedings in 

the District Court be held before a judge fresh to the case.