COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bumgardner, Humphreys and Agee 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

CLAUDE GENE SLOAN 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1313-00-3 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS 

 APRIL 10, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SCOTT COUNTY 

Ford C. Quillen, Judge 

 Max Jenkins (Jenkins & Jenkins, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Stephen R. McCullough, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Claude Gene Sloan appeals his conviction, after a jury trial, 

of two counts of arson, three counts of conspiracy to commit 

arson, and one count of obstruction of justice. Sloan contends 

the trial court erred in: 1) denying his motion to sever the 

arson and conspiracy charges from the obstruction of justice 

charge; 2) permitting the Commonwealth to submit evidence 

pertaining to his activities involving marijuana; 3) permitting a 

witness to testify that he encouraged the witness to grow 

marijuana; and 4) permitting the Commonwealth to amend the 

conspiracy indictments after the jury had returned a guilty 

verdict. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions. 
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I. Background

 "On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth, 

4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). So viewed, the 

evidence presented at trial established that Sloan hired Harold 

Michael Bledsoe to burn three houses in early 1993. Several 

years later, in January, 1998, while he was serving time in jail 

on unrelated convictions, Bledsoe gave a statement to police 

investigators confessing to setting the fires in 1993, and 

naming Sloan as being involved. In his signed statement, 

Bledsoe claimed the reason Sloan wanted the houses burned was 

"because he [did not] want anyone living close to him finding 

his pot" or stealing from his "pot patch." 

 Shortly thereafter, Bledsoe was released from prison, and 

arson and conspiracy charges were brought against Sloan.1 

Bledsoe was subpoenaed to testify. After Sloan learned about 

the statement Bledsoe had given to police, Sloan offered Bledsoe 

approximately $500 not to appear and testify.2 Bledsoe agreed. 

Sloan gave him $100 and also had Bledsoe record a statement 

 1

 Sloan was charged with the arson of unoccupied dwelling 

houses, in violation of Code § 18.2-77. 

2

 Apparently, there were unrelated charges also pending 

against Sloan and his son, Keith Sloan, in a neighboring 

jurisdiction. Sloan was offering to pay Bledsoe not to testify 

during those proceedings as well. 
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denying Sloan's involvement in the fires. Later, on two 

separate occasions, Sloan and his son, Keith, threatened to kill 

Bledsoe if he testified. In response, Bledsoe told Sloan they 

would work something out. 

 Eventually, Bledsoe and Sloan met at Sloan's home and 

talked about the events that were happening. Sloan told Bledsoe 

that he would have to stay at a trailer on Sloan's property, and 

if Bledsoe left, Sloan would kill him or "burn [his] mom and 

them out." Bledsoe agreed and stayed on Sloan's property until 

he was apprehended by police on June 22, 1999. During that 

time, due to Bledsoe's disappearance, the arson and conspiracy 

charges against Sloan were withdrawn. However, once Bledsoe was 

apprehended, the charges were re-filed along with a new 

obstruction of justice charge. 

 Prior to trial, Sloan moved to sever the obstruction of 

justice charge from the arson and conspiracy charges. Sloan 

argued that "the intimidation of witnesses is a separate event, 

and has nothing to do with the arson charges." The trial court 

overruled the motion, finding a sufficient relationship between 

the charges to warrant a single trial. 

During the trial, a substantial amount of evidence was 

admitted concerning Sloan's involvement with marijuana. Sloan 

objected to the admission of testimony concerning "stealing 

pot," as well as testimony that he provided marijuana to Rickey 
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Benton. Sloan also objected to the testimony of Jeff McNew, who 

testified that Sloan encouraged him to grow marijuana. Finally, 

Sloan objected to the admission of Commonwealth's Exhibits 

23-39, including photos of drug paraphernalia found in Sloan's 

home, books pertaining to growing marijuana, and notes 

containing police radio frequencies. The trial court overruled 

each objection, finding that the evidence was relevant to the 

issues in the case.3

 After the jury returned a verdict convicting Sloan of two 

counts of arson, three counts of conspiracy and one count of 

obstruction of justice, the Commonwealth moved to amend the 

indictments for conspiracy. The conspiracy indictments each 

read, in pertinent part, as follows: 

did unlawfully and feloniously conspire, 

confederate, or combine with another to 

commit arson, in violation of Section 

18.2-22 of the Code of Virginia Class 6

Felony 

The Commonwealth argued that the indictments contained a 

typographical error classifying the conspiracy charges as Class 

6 felonies, rather than Class 5 felonies. The trial court 

granted the motion, finding that Sloan was not taken by surprise 

by the amendment and that because the jury had not seen the 

indictments and/or considered punishment, the indictments could 

 3

 Sloan also moved for a mistrial in conjunction with 

several of these objections. These motions were likewise 

overruled. 
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be properly amended. After sentencing, Sloan made a motion to 

set aside the verdict that was also overruled. 

II. Motion to Sever

 On appeal, Sloan argues that the trial court erred in 

failing to grant his motion to sever the obstruction of justice 

charge from the arson and conspiracy charges, because joinder 

"allowed [the Commonwealth] to introduce multiple [m]arijuana 

offenses which would not normally be admissable [sic] in an 

[a]rson case." However, Sloan's only argument to the trial 

court concerned his theory that the intimidation and the arsons 

were separate offenses. Accordingly, we do not address his 

argument on appeal. See Buck v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 449, 

452-53, 443 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1994); see also Rule 5A:18. 

III. Drug Related Evidence

 Sloan next argues that the trial court erred in allowing 

the admission of evidence concerning his alleged marijuana 

operation, as well as allowing the admission of testimony from 

witness Jeff McNew that Sloan had encouraged McNew to grow 

marijuana. Sloan argues that, because the arson charges and the 

obstruction charge were tried together, the evidence pertaining 

to marijuana "became admiss[i]ble" and the prejudicial effect of 

this evidence outweighed the probative value because "[t]here 

was no showing of any motive connecting the [m]arijuana and 
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drugs to the [a]rson and [c]onspiracy to commit [a]rson." We 

disagree.4

The general rule is well established that in 

a criminal prosecution, proof which shows or 

tends to show that the accused is guilty of 

the commission of other crimes and offenses 

at other times, even though they are of the 

same nature as the one charged in the 

indictment, is incompetent and inadmissible 

for the purpose of showing the commission of 

the particular crime charged . . . . 

However, the exceptions to the general rule 

are equally as well established. Evidence 

of other offenses is admitted if . . . it 

tends to prove any relevant element of the 

offense charged. Such evidence is 

permissible in cases where the motive, 

intent or knowledge of the accused is 

involved, or where the evidence is connected 

with or leads up to the offense for which 

the accused is on trial. Also, testimony of 

other crimes is admissible where the other 

crimes constitute a part of the general 

scheme of which the crime charged is a part. 

Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 

805 (1970) (citations omitted). 

 The evidence presented at trial established that at least 

part of Sloan's motive for hiring Bledsoe to burn the houses, 

and in aiding Bledsoe in burning them, was to prevent others 

from moving into properties close to his own and "finding his 

pot." Thus, we conclude it was necessary and proper for the 

Commonwealth to show the extent of Sloan's activities involving 

 4

 During the trial, Sloan failed to object to admission of 

most of the evidence he now disputes until after it had already 

been admitted and heard by the jury. 
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his marijuana operation in order to prove his motive and 

connection to the arsons. This evidence was "so intimately 

connected and blended with the main facts adduced in evidence, 

that [it could not] be departed from with propriety; and there 

is no reason why the criminality of such intimate and connected 

circumstances, should exclude [such evidence], more than other 

facts apparently innocent." Id. at 273, 176 S.E.2d at 806. 

IV. Correction of the Indictments

 Sloan finally argues that the trial court erred in allowing 

the Commonwealth to amend the conspiracy indictments after the 

jury had returned its verdict. We have not previously addressed 

this issue. 

 "The function of an indictment . . . is to give an accused 

notice of the nature and character of the accusations against 

him in order that he can adequately prepare to defend against 

his accuser." Morris v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 664, 668, 536 

S.E.2d 458, 460 (2000) (citations omitted). Thus, Code 

§ 19.2-220 requires the following: 

The indictment or information shall be a 

plain, concise and definite written 

statement, (1) naming the accused, (2) 

describing the offense charged, (3) 

identifying the county, city or town in 

which the accused committed the offense, and 

(4) reciting that the accused committed the 

offense on or about a certain date. In 

describing the offense, the indictment or 

information may use the name given to the 

offense by the common law, or the indictment 

or information may state so much of the 
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common law or statutory definition of the 

offense as is sufficient to advise what 

offense is charged. 

Although it is fundamental that when a statute contains 

more than one grade of offense carrying different punishments, 

"the indictment must contain an assertion of the facts essential 

to the punishment sought to be imposed," Code § 19.2-220 does 

not require an indictment to affirmatively set forth the 

punishment for the offense. Moore v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 

192, 198, 497 S.E.2d 908, 910 (1998). 

 Here, the indictments clearly placed Sloan on notice of the 

nature and character of the accusations against him, as well as 

the facts essential to punishment. They also listed the code 

section under which punishment was sought. That code section, 

Code § 18.2-22, specifically provides that the offense is 

punished as a Class 5 felony, under the circumstances for which 

Sloan was charged. Thus, any reference in the indictment to the 

punishment for the offense was mere surplusage and did not 

render the indictment invalid. See Code § 19.2-226(9); see also

Black v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 277, 281-82, 288 S.E.2d 449, 451 

(1982) (additional unnecessary language included in the 

indictment which is surplusage does not invalidate the 

indictment). 

 We reject Sloan's argument that Code § 19.2-231 bars the 

modification of the indictments. It is true that Code 
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§ 19.2-231 provides for amendment of an indictment "[i]f there 

be any defect in form . . ., or if there shall appear any 

variance between the allegations therein and the evidence 

offered in proof . . . at any time before the jury returns a 

verdict . . . ." There was no defect in form in the conspiracy 

indictments here, nor was there any variance between the 

allegations listed and the evidence offered at trial. The 

indictments contained the necessary language to put Sloan on 

notice of the nature and character of the accusations against 

him, as well as the facts essential to punishment. The fact 

that the indictments contained surplus language, and were 

subject to a technical correction, did not render them defective 

and in need of a substantive amendment to sustain their 

validity. We therefore find the court's action to be in the 

nature of a correction to remove incorrect or misleading 

surplusage rather than a substantive amendment subject to Code 

§ 19.2-231. 

 Furthermore, Sloan has failed to establish that he was 

prejudiced either by the alleged error or by the court's action 

in correcting it. Accordingly, even if we were to assume that 

the trial court erred in permitting the post-verdict 

corrections, any such error would have been harmless. 

Affirmed.