EXHIBIT A

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SUPREME COURT 

OF THE UNITED STATES 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

UNITED STATES, ) 

Petitioner, ) 

v. ) No. 22-179 

HELAMAN HANSEN, ) 

Respondent. ) 

Pages: 1 through 97 

Place: Washington, D.C. 

Date: March 27, 2023 

HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION 

Official Reporters 

1220 L Street, N.W., Suite 206 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

(202) 628-4888 

www.hrccourtreporters.com 

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Official - Subject to Final Review 

1 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

UNITED STATES, )

 Petitioner, )

 v. ) No. 22-179

 HELAMAN HANSEN, )

 Respondent. ) 

Washington, D.C.

 Monday, March 27, 2023 

The above-entitled matter came on for 

oral argument before the Supreme Court of the 

United States at 11:46 a.m. 

APPEARANCES: 

BRIAN H. FLETCHER, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf 

of the Petitioner. 

ESHA BHANDARI, ESQUIRE, New York, New York; on behalf 

of the Respondent. 

Heritage Reporting Corporation 

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C O N T E N T S 

ORAL ARGUMENT OF: PAGE:

 BRIAN H. FLETCHER, ESQ.

 On behalf of the Petitioner 3

 ORAL ARGUMENT OF:

 ESHA BHANDARI, ESQ.

 On behalf of the Respondent 56

 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF:

 BRIAN H. FLETCHER, ESQ. 

On behalf of the Petitioner 92 

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P R O C E E D I N G S

 (11:46 a.m.)

 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear

 argument next in Case 22-179, United States

 versus Hansen.

 Mr. Fletcher.

 ORAL ARGUMENT OF BRIAN H. FLETCHER

 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

 MR. FLETCHER: Thank you, Mr. Chief 

Justice, and may it please the Court: 

For more than a century, Congress has 

made it a crime to encourage or induce certain 

immigration offenses. Mr. Hansen violated that 

statute by inducing noncitizens to reside in the 

United States illegally so that he could take 

their money in a fraudulent citizenship scheme. 

No one suggests that that conduct was 

protected by the First Amendment. But the Ninth 

Circuit invoked the overbreadth doctrine to 

facially invalidate this longstanding statute by 

giving the words "encourage" and "induce" their 

broadest possible meaning and sweeping in wide 

swaths of protected speech. 

Now we haven't argued that the statute 

would be constitutional if it swept that 

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broadly. Our position here is that the statute 

need not and should not be read that way.

 Everyone agrees that in criminal law,

 the terms "encourage" and "induce" are terms of 

art that can refer narrowly to soliciting or 

aiding and abetting unlawful activity. And as

 nine dissenting judges explained below, text, 

context, and history confirm that the words 

carry that traditional meaning in the context of 

Section 1324. 

At the very least, that's a plausible 

reading of the statute that ought to be adopted 

under the canon of constitutional avoidance 

because it would eliminate any overbreadth 

concern. 

Prohibitions on soliciting or 

facilitating both criminal and civil violations 

have long been common and have never been 

thought to raise a First Amendment problem 

because, as the Court held in Williams, the 

First Amendment does not protect speech that is 

intended to induce or commence specific illegal 

activities. 

Now I acknowledge that it will 

sometimes be hard to draw the line between 

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 protected advocacy and unprotected solicitation, 

but that problem is not unique to Section 1324. 

Exactly the same issue can arise under any

 solicitation or aiding-and-abetting statute.

 And, more importantly here, that is 

not an overbreadth problem. As with other

 solicitation and aiding-and-abetting statutes,

 the possibility that some applications of 

Section 1324 might raise First Amendment 

questions may provide a basis for future 

as-applied challenges, but it does not justify 

facially invalidating the statute and preventing 

its application to plainly unprotected schemes 

like Mr. Hansen's. 

I welcome the Court's questions. 

JUSTICE THOMAS: Are you aware of any 

instance in which the -- this section has been 

applied in the way that the Ninth Circuit 

hypothesized? 

MR. FLETCHER: I'm not. And I really 

do think that's significant, Justice Thomas. We 

are, after all, here on an overbreadth case, and 

this Court has emphasized, most recently, the 

last time it heard this issue in Sineneng-Smith, 

that overbreadth is strong medicine that ought 

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to be applied only as a last resort, and it said 

you have to vigorously enforce the limits on 

that doctrine. One of the limits --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Sorry. There's a 

district court case involving the woman who 

encouraged her housekeeper that -- or told her, 

if you leave, you can't come back, which is --

was an accurate statement of the law, and she 

was prosecuted in that case. 

MR. FLETCHER: Justice Sotomayor, 

you're referring to the Henderson case --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Yes. 

MR. FLETCHER: -- out of the District 

of Massachusetts, which is the case that the 

amicus briefs focus almost entirely on. I 

think, even if you were troubled by that case, 

that would be one district court prosecution --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, I -- I --

MR. FLETCHER: -- we -- we don't think 

found for --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What I find 

interesting is that the government there also 

hypothesized that a lawyer who told his client 

that if he -- that -- what the consequences were 

of leaving, that you would prosecute the lawyer 

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too. And the lawyer there is earning money for 

that statement. He's giving advice.

 MR. FLETCHER: I'm not sure whether

 that's what the government said there. It's 

certainly not what we're saying now, as we

 explain --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, I know you

 aren't. But could you tell me exactly how you 

want us to rewrite the statute? I think, if 

you're going to call it aiding and abetting or 

soliciting, that you have to write in a specific 

intent, don't you? 

MR. FLETCHER: I wouldn't -- I'd just 

dispute the premise. I don't think we're asking 

you to rewrite it. I think we're saying these 

are words that connote aiding --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. 

MR. FLETCHER: -- and abetting. 

They're terms of art. They bring the old 

soil with them. 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: With it, and 

that's an intent requirement? 

MR. FLETCHER: Correct, which is --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And, here, the 

defendant asked for an intent statute to come 

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in.

 MR. FLETCHER: Not quite. The intent 

requirement that's required for aiding and 

abetting and the one that we accept here is the

 one the Court referred to in Rosemond. That's

 the intent of facilitating, making the offense

 succeed. What the defendant asked for here --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, with aiding

 and abetting, you have to intend to make it 

succeed. And I'm wondering what you're making 

succeed, meaning nothing -- you haven't proven 

that these aliens were going to leave anyway. 

MR. FLETCHER: I actually think we 

have here. There was testimony that -- there 

are two noncitizens at issue. 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I -- well --

MR. FLETCHER: Both of them said their 

visas were expiring, they would have left, but 

Mr. Hansen said --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Yeah. That's --

MR. FLETCHER: -- you can stay because 

I'm going to make you a citizen. 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Right. But -- so 

we have to write in an intent. We have to take 

the words and define the words "encourage" or 

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 "inducing" to mean aiding and abetting or

 soliciting. 

What do we do with our Elonis point,

 where we said, if we're going to define a 

statute, we shouldn't define it to put in words

 that Congress took out? And Congress, previous

 to this statute, had the words "aiding and

 abetting" and "soliciting" and took them out. 

So now we're putting back in what Congress took 

out? 

MR. FLETCHER: I disagree, Justice 

Sotomayor. I think this is an area of the law 

where commentators and the Court have long 

recognized there are lots of different words 

that have overlapping meanings that legislatures 

and courts use to capture these -- these 

concepts of "solicitation" and "aiding and 

abetting." 

The LaFave treatise cites about a 

dozen of each species. "Induce" and "encourage" 

are among them both. And I don't think that the 

fact that Congress took out "assist" and 

"solicit" in 1952 suggests that it intended to 

change the meaning of this words. It was, in 

fact, adopting the shorthand that this Court had 

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just five years earlier in the Hoy case given to

 the predecessor statute. When the other words 

were in there, this Court shorthanded it as

 "encouraging or inducing."

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: You agree --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And --

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Go -- go ahead.

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Go ahead. No, go

 ahead. 

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice --

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: You agree, though, 

that the intent requirement that's traditionally 

associated with aiding and abetting and 

solicitation should be part of the statute, 

correct? 

MR. FLETCHER: We do. And we just 

don't think that's rewriting. You know, if you 

look at 18 U.S.C. 2, the statute at issue in 

Rosemond, the traditional aiding-and-abetting 

statute, it doesn't have any explicit intent 

requirement. Judge Hand and then this Court 

found it implicit in words like "induce." And 

we're saying the same old soil comes with those 

same words where they appear here. 

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And then I think 

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you probably do have a problem on the jury

 instructions. Do you want us to remand and let 

the Ninth Circuit sort that out, or what's --

what's your suggestion for how to deal with

 that?

 MR. FLETCHER: We do. We think that's

 appropriate. You know, we don't think the jury 

instructions are before you. What's before you 

is an overbreadth challenge, and part of that, 

of course, is figuring out what the statute 

means. Once you do that, we don't have any 

objection at all to sending it back to the Ninth 

Circuit. 

JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Fletcher, suppose 

we take your view of what "encourage" and 

"induce" means here and we take your view of the 

correct mens rea requirement, and suppose we say 

that's the statute. And is there a world of 

cases where -- I mean, what happens to all the 

cases where it could be a lawyer, it could be a 

doctor, it could be a neighbor, it could be a 

friend, it could be a teacher, it could be 

anybody says to a noncitizen, I really think you 

should stay? What happens to that world of 

cases? 

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MR. FLETCHER: So I think our view is

 those cases get analyzed the same way that you'd 

analyze any other aiding-and-abetting question 

or solicitation question under any other

 statute. And I'll talk about how we think those 

principles cash out as applied to all of the

 different hypotheticals that have been bandied

 about. 

But I think, at the end of the day, 

the most important thing for this Court's 

purposes is, once you go -- you take the two 

steps that you just described of saying that the 

words mean what we say they mean and that the 

intent requirement applies, I think you've taken 

care of any arguable overbreadth problem. 

JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, maybe or maybe 

not. I mean, I would think that there are a 

world of communications that take place every 

day which are something along those lines, with 

somebody saying to a noncitizen, I know you're 

thinking of what you should do now, I really 

think you should stay. 

MR. FLETCHER: So, just to fight the 

premise and then I'll talk about how we think 

the principles would apply in those 

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circumstances, you know, the traditional

 aiding-and-abetting and solicitation statutes 

apply to tax avoidance, to the use of marijuana, 

to avoiding the draft back when that was an

 issue. In all of those circumstances, you

 likewise have to draw the line. There's a lot

 of abstract advocacy on those things. People

 talk with their friends and acquaintances and 

family about those things. 

JUSTICE KAGAN: So where -- where --

where do we draw the line? You're -- you're not 

giving me much. 

MR. FLETCHER: I -- I -- sorry. I 

promised I would get there, and I will. 

I think you -- you apply the 

traditional principles of aiding and abetting. 

So one of them is specific intent that the --

the -- the violation occur. We think that's 

going to weed out a lot of cases. 

JUSTICE KAGAN: Yeah. I really think 

you should stay, somebody says to a friend. 

MR. FLETCHER: Right. 

JUSTICE KAGAN: I mean, that's a 

specific intent, I guess. 

MR. FLETCHER: Right. Another one is 

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sort of full knowledge of the circumstances, and

 that in this statute includes additionally some

 knowledge of the law, knowledge or reckless 

disregard of whether or not staying is going to 

violate the law. We think that's going to take 

care of another category of cases.

 There's also a requirement that's 

always been understood to be implicit in 

solicitation and aiding and abetting that they 

don't cover general advocacy, you know, a 

newspaper editorial, general advocacy public 

speeches. We're talking about specific conduct 

with specific people. I think that takes care 

of another slice of cases. 

And then you're left with the cases 

that the law candidly acknowledge are the 

hardest hypotheticals where somebody says to a 

family member, I know it would be unlawful for 

you to stay, but I think you should stay. 

Those are a hard problem under 

aiding-and-abetting statutes. There's not a lot 

of law on how you end up cashing out 

aiding-and-abetting principles there. The 

closest we find is in Footnote 55 of Section 

13.2 of the LaFave treatise which we cite in our 

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 opening brief.

 And, there, the Court has said, look,

 when you're talking about aid and the form takes

 material -- of aiding and abetting takes

 material aid, as you said for the Court in

 Rosemond, any amount of aid is enough, you've 

associated with a venture, you've sought to 

facilitate it, and that's good enough.

 When what you're talking about is just 

sort of moral suasion or a request, that can 

sometimes be aiding and abetting. Recruiting 

someone to commit a murder is a classic case of 

aiding and abetting, but we want to demand a 

little bit more to make sure that you really did 

associate yourself with the venture, you really 

did seek to facilitate it with your request. 

JUSTICE KAGAN: So do -- do I 

understand you to be drawing a line between a 

friend who says, I know exactly what the law is 

on this and I really think you should stay, 

which would be in violation of the law, that's 

on one side of the line, and saying that exact 

same thing and saying also, I'm going to provide 

you support when you stay? Is that -- is that 

the line you're drawing? And --

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MR. FLETCHER: Not -- not precisely.

 I think saying, you know, I'm going to provide 

you support, I'm going to tell you how to do it,

 you know, here's how to -- to work without being 

on the books, I think those things start to move

 you much more into assistance.

 JUSTICE KAGAN: But -- but -- but, on 

the first one, where there's not that, do I take 

you to be saying, well, this is very hard, but, 

in the end, we don't think that that's covered 

by the statute --

MR. FLETCHER: So I think --

JUSTICE KAGAN: -- or we do think that 

that's covered by the statute? 

MR. FLETCHER: -- I think it's hard to 

say that that's covered. I've read a lot of 

aiding-and-abetting cases to get ready for this 

argument. I haven't seen one that looks like 

that, you know, the mother who says to the son, 

gee, I don't want you to go to war. 

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Mr. Fletcher, that's 

because I think that in aiding and abetting, you 

not only need a mens rea purpose, you know, we 

talked about that, you conceded that, but you 

also have to have an actus reus of some step to 

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 associate yourself with a venture. But 

"encourage" and "induce" or "incite," whatever 

it is, "encourage" and "induce," does that --

does that import that actus reus requirement

 too?

 MR. FLETCHER: I think it does. And

 I -- I -- I think the actus reus for aiding and 

abetting can be speech, it can be a request, you

 know, would you rob this bank and I'll give 

you -- we'll split the proceeds or, you know, I 

really would like you to kill this business 

associate of mine and I'll pay you if you do it. 

All of those things are speech in some sense. 

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, but it's 

commitment to do something in the world, and --

and, you know, it's obviously an inchoate 

offense, but it's still I'm going to take some 

step to associate myself with the completion of 

this venture. 

MR. FLETCHER: Right. 

JUSTICE GORSUCH: And are you saying 

that comes along -- that soil comes along too? 

MR. FLETCHER: We're saying the soil 

of aiding and abetting comes along, Your Honor. 

JUSTICE GORSUCH: The full soil, all 

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of it?

 MR. FLETCHER: Yes.

 JUSTICE JACKSON: And I'm sorry,

 why -- why does the full soil come along? I --

I'd like to go back to Justice Sotomayor's 

point. If we have evidence, or we think we do, 

in the amendment history of the statute that 

Congress actually took out of the statute 

similar concepts, the idea of, you know, aiding, 

the idea -- I -- I don't have the exact language 

in front of me -- but soliciting. 

MR. FLETCHER: Right. 

JUSTICE JACKSON: Soliciting was 

there. 

MR. FLETCHER: Right. 

JUSTICE JACKSON: And Congress took it 

out. So I think you have -- are struggling at 

least in my mind a little bit to have us read 

what remains to include the kinds of things that 

Congress actually excluded. 

MR. FLETCHER: So let me give you two 

answers, one that's about this area of law in 

general and one that's specific to the 1952 

amendment that you're talking about. 

As to this area of the law in general, 

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this is a space where courts and legislatures 

have often used different words as synonyms for 

the same basic concept. In 18 U.S.C. 2, it's

 not just aids and abets. It's aids, abets,

 induces, commands. There's about seven

 different words. No one parses them out and

 asks which exactly is it. We all understand 

them to bring along the concept, the general

 category. 

JUSTICE JACKSON: Right, but what 

about -- what about the fact that someone in 

Congress thought that they needed to take out 

those other words? So you might be right that 

there are all kinds of synonyms floating out 

there, and if this statute had all of them, I 

might be persuaded, I think, to agree with you. 

But I guess I'm worried about an 

active, conscious effort on Congress's part to 

exclude certain words that I now hear you 

wanting us to read back into this statute. 

MR. FLETCHER: So I think maybe if 

there was any reason to think in the legislative 

history in the context that Congress intended to 

do that, that the reason why they wanted to do 

that was that they wanted to not make it a 

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 solicitation or aiding-and-abetting statute, 

which I think we all basically agree it was 

before, and they wanted to turn it into

 something else --

JUSTICE JACKSON: So do you have a

 theory of why they took out "solicits"?

 MR. FLETCHER: Yeah, I do. I think 

one of them is just economy. As I said earlier, 

this Court just five years earlier in Hoy had 

described the prior statute as "induces" or 

"encourages." So Congress was just using a more 

concise formulation that mirrored what this 

Court had used for the prior statute. 

And I guess the other thing I'd say 

is, you know, I think the -- the context I think 

matters here too. This is the -- the -- what 

Respondents and the Ninth Circuit are positing 

Congress did in 1952 was really something 

extraordinary. They took the statute that had 

always been focused on soliciting and -- and 

aiding and abetting and transformed it into a 

really very broad ban on speech that would be 

obviously unconstitutional in many of its 

applications. 

And I don't think the Court should 

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 lightly attribute that intent to Congress. And

 I think also it's significant that after 1952 we

 have decades more of history. Congress

 revisited the statute again in 1986 and kept the

 "induces" or "encourages" language but otherwise 

tweaked the statute and then revisited it again 

in 1996 and changed the penalty provisions.

 JUSTICE JACKSON: What about the --

JUSTICE BARRETT: Mr. Fletcher --

JUSTICE JACKSON: Go ahead. 

JUSTICE BARRETT: -- I have two 

questions. One is kind of focusing on a 

different part of the statutory language. Is 

there a difference between "resides" and 

"remains?" Because they appear in different 

sections, and it seems to me like "resides" 

could mean take up residence in, which might be 

different than "remains." 

MR. FLETCHER: So I think -- I puzzled 

over this too. You know, I think I'm not sure 

if there's any difference in them. I think, if 

by "take up residence in" you're referring to 

the interpretation that Judge Collins floated in 

his dissent, where it suggested encouraging 

someone to reside in might mean take up 

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 residence for the first time and not continue 

unlawful residence, the reason why I don't think

 that works is because of the description the 

statute has of the mens rea. It says knowing 

that the person's coming to or residing in the 

United States is or will be unlawful, and I 

think that suggests that Congress understood 

that you could violate the statute by 

encouraging someone to continue residence that 

is already unlawful. 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And that's the --

JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. Go 

ahead. No, no, no. I'm sorry. 

JUSTICE BARRETT: And my second 

question is about the effect of the enhancement. 

So a jury has to find the elements of the 

enhancement. 

MR. FLETCHER: Correct. 

JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. So, in 

thinking about this as an overbreadth challenge, 

I mean, obviously, the substance of offense 

itself could, standing alone, in a situation 

where the penalty or the enhancement wasn't 

applicable, let's just posit that maybe that 

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violates the First Amendment and fails in an

 overbreadth challenge.

 You say there's no evidence for 

someone bringing an overbreadth challenge in a

 situation like this where you can combine it 

with the the enhancement that requires the 

financial gain, so I just want to be sure that's

 right.

 MR. FLETCHER: That's right. 

JUSTICE BARRETT: That's right? 

MR. FLETCHER: Right. We don't 

have -- we haven't seen any precedent for an 

overbreadth challenge like that, and we don't 

think allowing the extension of overbreadth to 

that sort of challenge is consistent with the 

principles of overbreadth, which include that if 

there's a way to sever invalid parts of the 

statute and leave the rest, courts ought to do 

that. 

And we think that's exactly what's 

true here. Even if you thought, as your 

question posits, that the general offense is 

potentially overbroad, I don't think that would 

mean that the enhanced offense is overbroad. 

It's a severable class of offenses. 

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JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Wait a minute.

 Here, the enhanced offense includes the first

 part.

 MR. FLETCHER: That's right.

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How can you say

 the first part is invalid and still keep a

 second part? The second part says you did

 the -- the second part says you did the first

 part for money. 

MR. FLETCHER: Correct. 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So you have to 

define what the first part permits or doesn't 

permit, correct? You always have to go to the 

first part and define it. 

MR. FLETCHER: Correct. And what I'm 

positing is that even if you thought -- and we 

obviously disagree, but even if you thought that 

the general offense is unconstitutionally 

overbroad and therefore potentially invalid, the 

subset of that offense that is defined by the 

enhanced offense, you could invalidate other 

applications of the general provision, but there 

would be no reason to invalidate the subset of 

applications of the general provision that also 

carry this enhancement, which has to be found by 

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the jury.

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, you still 

have to prove that what the lawyer did was 

aiding and abetting or solicitation, correct?

 MR. FLETCHER: That's our view of what 

we would have to prove under any of the

 provisions we have.

 JUSTICE ALITO: Mr. Fletcher, an 

unusual feature of this statute is that the 

underlying conduct, remaining in the 

United States, is not itself a crime. 

And I can certainly understand that 

there are situations in which urging someone to 

engage in certain conduct is more blameworthy 

than engaging in the conduct itself because the 

person who engages in the conduct may be in a 

particularly vulnerable position or may be less 

blameworthy for some other purpose. 

But is there some limitation on --

that provide -- does the First Amendment in any 

way limit the ability of Congress to criminalize 

the solicitation of conduct that is not itself 

criminal? We could think of conduct that --

regulatory violations, for example, of speech 

requirements, speech requirements -- regulatory 

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 provisions that limit speech in some way. Would

 the First Amendment allow Congress to make all

 of -- urging somebody to engage in that conduct

 a crime under all circumstances?

 MR. FLETCHER: I think there'd be a 

couple of principles that would come into play.

 I'll tell you first candidly I don't think the

 Court has ever spoken to that. To the extent 

the Court has spoken to this issue, it's done it 

in cases like Williams and Pittsburgh Press, 

where it said that offers to engage in or 

attempts to solicit or induce illegal 

transactions, even if they're only civilly 

prohibited, are just outside the protection of 

the First Amendment. And I think -- so to say 

anything beyond that would be new. 

I think the things that -- principles 

that might come into play, you know, I can 

conceive of, if you had a law that targeted just 

speech that didn't target assistive or 

soliciting conduct, there might be different 

issues that would come into play. That's not a 

concern here because everyone agrees that the 

statute gets at encouraging and inducing, 

whether that happens through speech or conduct. 

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And I can imagine, although I'm not so 

sure so much that this is in the First Amendment 

that this limitation inheres, but you can posit 

really absurd hypotheticals about very, very 

draconian penalties for soliciting things that

 aren't criminal or are perfectly lawful. I 

think, if that happened, you'd have some sort of

 rationality limit. 

But I just want to underscore I don't 

think that's what's going on here because this 

is, as you said, a circumstance where 

legislatures might decide that the people being 

solicited to do the underlying conduct are less 

blameworthy and more vulnerable, as I think this 

case well illustrates. 

And, also, this is a very special 

circumstance. It's true that remaining in the 

country unlawfully is only a civil violation, 

absent sort of special circumstances. But it's 

a civil violation that's subject to a very, very 

serious civil penalty, deportation and removal. 

And I think that indicates that this really is 

conduct that Congress has taken seriously and 

has made an appropriate determination --

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: What do you --

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MR. FLETCHER: -- that soliciting or

 facilitating it is deserving of punishment.

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: What -- what --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: It's -- I'm sorry.

 Go ahead.

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: What do you say to 

the charitable organizations that say, even

 under your narrowing construction, there's still 

going to be a chill or a threat of prosecution 

for them for providing food and shelter and aid 

and recommending people for scholarships and --

and all the rest? You're familiar with all the 

hypotheticals. But they seem to have a sincere 

concern about that and that it will deter their 

kind of everyday activities. That's what a lot 

of charities do as part of their day-to-day 

activities with noncitizens who are not in the 

in the country lawfully. 

MR. FLETCHER: I think a couple 

observations. One is a lot of what they talk 

about and you just recited isn't speech at all. 

It's definitely conduct. So it doesn't raise 

First Amendment questions at all. 

You know, I understand the concern, 

though, that goes to both about are these 

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 activities being chilled, and I'd say that on 

our view of the statute, you know, the vast --

that activity is not going to be covered because 

we think it has to meet the sort of very high 

bar of aiding and abetting liability as

 traditionally understood with all of the old

 soil. And it's --

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And explain that.

 Why wouldn't it be covered? 

MR. FLETCHER: Yeah, because I think 

there are -- there are a bunch of different 

examples, and I think there are sort of 

different requirements that would weed out 

different versions of them. I think the one 

that's most relevant to --

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Well, I gave you 

the food and shelter one. You know, I want to 

MR. FLETCHER: Yeah. 

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- I want you to 

stay here and I'm going to help you, and 

here's -- which I think is a pretty common part 

of the conversations and -- and happens all the 

time. So is that enough? 

MR. FLETCHER: I don't think so. You 

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know, I think there's a difference between 

assuming, taking for granted that people are 

going to be in the country unlawfully and 

providing some assistance to them while they are

 here and taking steps that -- where you 

associate yourself with the venture and seek by 

your action to make it succeed. That's the

 canonical formulation of aiding and abetting

 liability. 

And I just think it's hard to say that 

a charity that provides assistance to people, 

including people who are in the country 

unlawfully, is meeting the requisites of aiding 

and abetting liability. 

JUSTICE JACKSON: But I don't know why 

you say that. I mean, if the venture is -- if 

the civil violation or the criminal violation is 

to have the person stay here and remaining here 

is unlawful, why wouldn't giving them food and 

shelter that facilitates their ability to stay 

here violate the statute? 

MR. FLETCHER: Because, Justice 

Jackson, I don't think -- a couple of different 

reasons. You know, one is I don't think it's 

going to have the requisite intent at least in 

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the vast majority of the cases. I think all of 

these organizations are describing themselves as 

wanting to provide food and shelter for people

 who need -- who are in need, who need food and

 shelter.

 JUSTICE JACKSON: What if they -- what

 if they limited their mission? If they limit --

MR. FLETCHER: To just people who are

 here unlawfully? 

JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. Yes. 

MR. FLETCHER: Yes. 

JUSTICE JACKSON: We are limiting our 

mission. We see a bunch of people in our 

community who are here -- we know they're here 

unlawfully, but they're also starving, and what 

we've decided to do is make sure that they're 

not on the streets, they're not exposed to the 

elements. We're giving them food and shelter. 

MR. FLETCHER: Yeah. I think I'd give 

the same -- a version of the same answer but 

just to say that even then, I don't think that's 

acting with the purpose of keeping those people 

in the country when they would otherwise leave. 

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Are there any 

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MR. FLETCHER: I think it would be

 accepting --

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- any 

examples of prosecutions in those cases?

 MR. FLETCHER: No, absolutely not, Mr.

 Chief Justice. And, you know, likewise, you 

could imagine, I think, as I -- one of the

 things I said earlier is that we would take 

cases under this statute the same way you take 

cases under other aiding-and-abetting statutes. 

You know, you can imagine there are a lot of 

social services organizations that provide 

services and counseling to people who are 

engaged in unlawful activity, and I'm not aware 

of cases that suggest that the provision of 

those services to someone who happens to be 

engaged in unlawful activity aids and abets 

those activities. 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, we do know 

that the Customs Department made a list of all 

of the people, religious entities, the lawyers, 

and others who were providing services to 

immigrants at the border and was saying that 

they intended to rely on this statute to 

prosecute them. You're saying to me it didn't 

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 happen. Congress issued a subpoena to many of 

these organizations, did a lot of investigation

 as to what was said.

 So how do we tell all those people not 

to chill speech because the only thing being 

punished under this statute, unless you want me 

to add that it has to say that the statute 

requires something more than just words, we're

 criminalizing words related to immigration. 

And I thought there were only certain 

statutes that were immune to First Amendment 

challenges, obscenity, fighting words. 

Otherwise, everything else is subject to the 

First Amendment and strict scrutiny. So why 

should we uphold a statute that criminalizes 

words, makes the punishment five years, which is 

rather significant? I know of no other statute 

where aiding-and-abetting punishment or 

solicitation punishment is greater than the 

punishment we're giving the person who's going 

to commit the crime. But that's what we're 

doing with this statute. It's a first of a 

kind. 

MR. FLETCHER: A couple thoughts, 

Justice Sotomayor. I think one of the 

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 traditional categories of speech that is outside

 the First Amendment is speech that -- this is

 straight from Williams -- is speech that seeks

 to induce or commence illegal activities.

 Our view is that that's --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: If something -- if 

something is going to be illegal, but people 

enter the United States illegally all of the 

time and they're here, they're remaining, but 

you would have to prove that they're remaining 

because of those words? Are you -- are you 

willing to take that part of the element? 

Because that would make sense to me. 

MR. FLETCHER: We're willing to take 

all of the soil that comes with the idea of --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So do you believe 

MR. FLETCHER: -- aiding and abetting 

and solicitation. 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- that the soil 

includes that the government has to prove that 

the words actually is what caused that person to 

remain? 

MR. FLETCHER: No, I don't think 

that's a requirement of traditional aiding and 

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 abetting.

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So why not? 

Because that's what I think words that have to 

do with inducing a crime is, that you want the

 crime to succeed and that you have to make 

yourself a part of the principle of succeeding

 in that crime.

 MR. FLETCHER: So, if that's what you

 think aiding and abetting connotes, then 

we're -- that's actually a further reason not to 

hold this statute invalid as overbroad. It 

means the statute has an even narrower reach. 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, no, no, you 

tell me because I think we're going to talk to 

the grandmother who lives with her family who's 

illegal or who are noncitizens. The grandmother 

tells her son she's worried about the burden 

she's putting on the family, and the son says, 

Abuelita, you are never a burden to us. If you 

want to live here -- continue living here with 

us, your grandchildren love having you. 

Are you -- can you prosecute this? 

And, if not, why not? So what do you tell the 

grandmother? 

MR. FLETCHER: I think not, Justice 

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 Sotomayor. I think it's very hard to make out

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Don't -- stop

 qualifying with "think," because the minute you

 start qualifying with "think," then you're

 rendering asunder the First Amendment.

 MR. FLETCHER: Justice Sotomayor --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: People have to 

know what they can talk about. 

MR. FLETCHER: Justice Sotomayor --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Once you create a 

lack of clarity in the law, then we're not 

writing to clarify it. 

MR. FLETCHER: Justice Sotomayor, I 

don't think it's possible for me or for this 

Court to define how these principles will apply 

in all of the different factual circumstances 

that we can imagine, and I think the fact that 

we're trying to engage in that exercise is one 

of the problems with overbreadth analysis. 

What we would do is have this Court 

say, not the government say but this Court say, 

and write into law --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No --

MR. FLETCHER: -- the idea --

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JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- you could

 ask -- you could ask to criminalize actions, not

 words. You've chosen to read a statute that

 criminalizes words. Shouldn't we be careful

 before we uphold that kind of statute?

 MR. FLETCHER: We're asking you to go

 only so far as every aiding-and-abetting and

 solicitation statute goes. And to criminalize

 words --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, generally 

with aiding and abetting, the person has to do 

something to make that act come about? 

MR. FLETCHER: I think generally yes. 

I think there are some circumstances where 

soliciting someone to commit a crime with words 

would count, and I'm not willing to give that up 

here because our position is the same aiding and 

abetting principles ought to apply in both 

contexts. 

But if you have a narrower conception 

of aiding and abetting that is all the more 

reason to conclude that this is a narrow statute 

that doesn't trench on the First Amendment. 

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Can I ask -- I'm 

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sorry. Go ahead.

 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Go ahead.

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: There was an 

intent requirement asked for here. You say it

 was broader than you think it should have been

 given, but we've had a number of cases this

 term, Ciminelli, Percoco, Dubin, now this case,

 where the government is conceding that the 

statute read by its plain terms is too broad. 

And you come back to us and say read it more 

narrowly, but you won at a jury trial on a 

broader charge. 

If we keep doing, as you ask us to, 

which is to rewriting statutes, are we 

encouraging the government to continue this 

practice? 

MR. FLETCHER: I don't think so, 

Justice Sotomayor. And, again, we're not asking 

you to rewrite the statute. We're asking you to 

give these words the same meaning they have --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, you said the 

jury instruction wasn't consistent with this. 

MR. FLETCHER: So that -- that's 

right, Justice Sotomayor. This, in fairness --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And in those other 

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four cases it wasn't consistent with this. We

 keep -- you keep coming here and admitting that 

statutes have to be read in a different way when

 you argue the opposite below.

 MR. FLETCHER: So let me put this case

 in context, Justice Sotomayor. This case was

 tried before Sineneng-Smith came up, before the

 Ninth Circuit called for supplemental briefing

 on overbreadth, and it really injected this 

whole constellation of issues and concerns about 

a broad reading of the statute that didn't 

really exist before. 

And at the time I think it was 

reasonable for the government to support the 

model jury instruction, especially because no 

one seriously argues that the speech at issue, 

the conduct really at issue here was protected 

by the First Amendment. 

So I acknowledge we didn't write the 

instructions at the time of the trial the way 

that we would write them now with the benefit of 

five or six years of experience and a lot more 

airing out of the arguments --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well --

MR. FLETCHER: -- and I acknowledge 

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you should send the case back to the Ninth 

Circuit and let the Ninth Circuit decide what's 

appropriate in light of that.

 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice 

Thomas, anything further?

 Justice Alito? Anything further?

 Justice Kagan?

 JUSTICE KAGAN: So, Mr. Fletcher, so, 

again, I want to assume your version of the 

statute as to encourage and as to the mens rea. 

Now I want to make two further assumptions, 

okay. We can come back to those assumptions, 

but I just want you to assume them. 

The first is that the statute, even as 

interpreted by you would, in fact, encompass the 

wealth of examples of people of various kinds, 

friends, neighbors, doctors, whatever, saying to 

people, I really think you should stay, and 

saying that knowing that they are in the country 

unlawfully, having all the intent that --

So my first assumption is that all of 

those communications are within the statute. My 

second assumption is that for one or another 

reason, maybe it's what Justice Alito said about 

the fact that this is civil conduct, maybe it's 

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for another reason, my second assumption is that 

this statute as applied to those people would be

 unconstitutional.

 And now I want you to tell me how to 

do the overbreadth analysis on this, because I

 think I might say to you, I can imagine that 

there's like a whole -- a huge number of such

 communications taking place every day, because

 for every person who's in this country 

unlawfully, there are probably some number of 

people who want that person to stay, family 

members, you know, whatever. 

So how do we think about the 

overbreadth on those two assumptions? 

MR. FLETCHER: So taking those 

assumptions, you know, the Court has never said 

explicitly you can't reduce overbreadth to math, 

it has to substantial and it has to be 

substantial both absolutely and in relation to 

the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. 

I take it based on those assumptions 

that you would say that's substantial. That's a 

substantial number of --

JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, I'm asking you 

sort of. 

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MR. FLETHCER: No, no --

JUSTICE KAGAN: How do we even go

 about thinking about that question?

 MR. FLETCHER: So I guess I'd say 

maybe that's substantial in the absolute sense. 

I guess I would say, though, that the Court has 

also emphasized the real costs of overbreadth in

 terms of invalidating permissible applications 

of the statute, and that that's something that 

has to be borne in line in the relative 

analysis. 

And at least -- I can't purport to 

have read every one of the Court's overbreadth 

cases, but in the vast majority of them the 

Court says over -- you know, the vast majority 

of the applications of the statute are 

unconstitutional or there's just no core of 

constitutional applications. 

I don't think either of those things 

-- even granting you're assumptions, I don't 

think either of those would be true here. And 

the other thing that the Court has said is it 

can't just be theoretical. We want some 

realistic demonstration of chill. 

Because this is ultimately --

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overbreadth is sort of a prudential, judicial

 decision that we're concerned about chilling in

 the real world, understandably, and so we're

 going to depart from traditional principles by 

letting people whose conduct isn't protected 

assert the rights of others, in essence, and

 there may be reason to do that, but we should do

 it very carefully.

 And I guess, I think, you have almost 

a textbook case here for whether we know there 

is not a chill because this statute was on the 

books in basically the same form for 70 years 

and it was only used --

JUSTICE KAGAN: And how is that 

argument -- because it's a strong argument --

how is it different -- sometimes the government 

comes in and says, essentially, don't worry, 

we're never going to apply the statute in these 

circumstances. 

And we always say back, it's like, 

well, that's very nice, you can stand up there 

and say it, but we're not taking your word from 

it. 

How is this different from that? 

MR. FLETCHER: So in a couple of ways. 

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I mean, one is that to the extent that we're 

saying that here, mostly what we're saying, and 

I guess this is maybe fighting your premise a

 little bit, but we're not just saying take our

 word for it. We're asking you to write into the 

-- your decision that the statute has the limits 

that we say it has in ways that we won't be able 

to get around in the future.

 I understand you might think we're 

pushing it here, that that doesn't fully solve 

the problem and what to do --

JUSTICE KAGAN: Right. 

MR. FLETCHER: -- about it then. And 

then I guess I would say then we're in this 

special world of overbreadth, right, which is a 

departure from usual standards. You're not just 

interpreting the statute. You're not just 

asking is it constitutional as applied in a 

particular case where you sometimes say we're 

not willing to take the government's word for 

it. 

You're saying are we going to do this 

extraordinary thing and depart from ordinary 

principles of adjudication. And there I 

actually do think it's fair to say, yeah, we're 

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going to demand a real showing of chill, and I

 think here this is not some newly-passed statute

 where we're all just sort of guessing about what

 might happen. We have a lot of history.

 And the thing that raised concerns, 

the thing that got the amici to write the briefs 

and to raise all the hypotheticals that we have

 spent all this time debating, was the Ninth

 Circuit's invitation to imagine broad 

interpretations of the statute in order to 

strike it down. There really wasn't a concern 

about it during all of the many decades it was 

on the books before that. 

JUSTICE KAGAN: Thank you. 

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice 

Gorsuch? 

Justice Kavanaugh? 

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: You've reassured 

us with your narrowing construction, just take 

aiding and abetting law, solicitation law and 

bring that old soil here. And that is a good 

answer, but I think it still raises questions, 

because the underlying offense is so different 

from bank robbery or carjacking or securities 

fraud. 

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It's just existing here as the

 underlying offense. And I don't know if that

 should affect how we think about it. I just 

wanted to get your response to that, because 

that makes it seem a lot broader. You wouldn't

 say providing food to the bank robber

 necessarily is, you know, a meal, is -- is 

aiding and assisting the -- aiding and abetting 

the bank robbery, but if the underlying offense 

is just being here, that -- that seems a little 

different. 

Should that affect how we think about 

it or how do you just answer that concern? 

MR. FLETCHER: Yeah, so it's a fair 

concern. I'd say a couple things. You know, 

one is there are other offenses that may not get 

the just being here concept, but there are 

aiding and abetting concerns about other 

relatively minor offenses, you know, the tax 

things, the sort of draft evasion, drug use, 

things like that. 

The law is capable of dealing with 

this, you know, aiding and abetting minor 

offenses that happen a fair amount. So I think 

that helps with one set of concerns. 

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The -- the being here concern, I guess 

I do think you could take into account the

 nature of the offense in deciding sort of are 

the requisites of aiding and abetting liability

 met? One part of that answer might be what I

 said to Justice Jackson, that having the intent 

to help someone, assuming they are going to be 

here, isn't necessarily the intent that they

 remain here. 

Another thing might be, you know, the 

-- the aiding and abetting doctrine demands that 

you associate yourself with a venture and seek 

by your action to make it succeed. And I 

suppose you could take account of what the 

venture here is in deciding sort of what level 

of words or action are necessary to constitute 

facilitation in that context. 

So I guess I do think that traditional 

aiding and abetting principles would allow those 

sorts of things to be taken into account. 

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you. 

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice 

Barrett? 

JUSTICE BARRETT: Mr. Fletcher, so 

you've pointed out, and I agree with you that 

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it's interesting, kind of odd, it strikes me as 

unusual, but I haven't done a study to see, to

 have an overbreadth challenge to a statute

 that's older, because all of these overbreadth 

challenges invite a string of hypotheticals, 

but, as you say, we have a track record.

 Can you think, have you looked at it?

 Are there overbreadth challenges that have 

succeeded in the past where we have this much 

data? 

MR. FLETCHER: So I don't know, 

candidly. I can't -- I'm not aware of one of 

the Court's recent cases where this has come up, 

Stevens, Alvarez, those sorts of cases are 

relatively newer laws. 

But the reason I don't want to say 

definitively that there isn't one is that I 

think some of the earlier laws involved state 

statutes. And I just haven't traced back 

exactly how old they are. But I'm -- I'm 

certainly not aware of anything where you have 

sort of the track record going the other way. 

Not only is it old but also we have 

such a strong empirical track record against the 

very broad interpretation. And, you know, I 

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 think that's relevant not just to overbreadth, 

but also to what the statute means because 

Congress has been coming back and amending the 

statute and revisiting it against the backdrop 

of that narrow application of the statute.

 JUSTICE BARRETT: Well, and speaking 

of state statutes, so we have some amicus briefs 

saying that lots of states have language like

 this. It's possible that lots of statutes would 

then succumb to First Amendment challenges of 

this sort. 

Have there been similar 

overbreadth-type concerns litigated, especially 

since Sineneng-Smith, about other solicitation 

statutes or other induce-and-encourage statutes? 

MR. FLETCHER: It comes up 

occasionally. They don't get a lot of traction. 

You know, one example that we cite in our brief 

is the Ford versus State case out of Nevada, 

which is about solicitation of prostitution. 

JUSTICE BARRETT: Prostitution. 

MR. FLETCHER: A Very similar statute. 

You know, it's induce, encourage, or persuade, 

coerce to -- to --

JUSTICE BARRETT: Yeah. 

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MR. FLETCHER: -- enter into 

prosecution, and the defendant tried an

 overbreadth challenge there. I think we also

 cite a Minnesota case. So there are examples 

out there, but, frankly, courts have not had

 much difficulty dismissing them, either because 

you can't imagine circumstances where the aiding 

and abetting or solicitation would actually be 

protected, or because, even if you could, that's 

such a sort of edge case that it doesn't call 

for the application of overbreadth. 

JUSTICE BARRETT: Thank you. 

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice 

Jackson? 

JUSTICE JACKSON: So I guess I'm 

trying to figure out, looking at all the other 

provisions in this statute, what -- what is the 

core constitutional application of this? I 

mean, you sort of responded to Justice Kagan's 

question in saying that if we can identify that 

and we understand that it's there, that would be 

a reason not to strike it down. 

But I am struggling, especially, for 

example, with the part of 1324 here that is, you 

know, small division (v)(II) that itself has an 

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 aiding-or-abetting piece to it. So it sounds 

like Congress was covering aiding and abetting 

to some extent in another part of this same 

statute. So, if we read this one to be aiding 

and abetting too, what are we really -- what is

 it really covering?

 MR. FLETCHER: It's a different kind

 of aiding and abetting. So the Romanette (v) --

JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. 

MR. FLETCHER: -- aiding and abetting 

is aiding and abetting violations of the 

preceding clauses of 1324(a)(1)(A). So aiding 

and abetting, bringing someone to the border in 

violation of clause (i) or harboring or 

transporting someone within the country in 

violation of clauses (ii) or (iii), that sort of 

aiding and abetting is covered by (v). 

JUSTICE JACKSON: All right. And what 

-- what is the aiding and abetting in (iv) that 

could be aided and abetted per (v)? 

MR. FLETCHER: So the aiding and 

abetting that is covered in (iv) is assisting 

someone to enter or remain in the country 

unlawfully. That's the core constitutional 

application of (iv). That's what it does. And 

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if you -- the way you would violate (v) is if

 you aided and abetted someone who was soliciting

 or facilitating people to enter into the country

 unlawfully --

JUSTICE JACKSON: I see. So you're --

you're helping the person who's doing it --

MR. FLETCHER: Mr. Hansen's helpers --

JUSTICE JACKSON: -- in (v). Okay.

 MR. FLETCHER: -- for instance. Yeah. 

JUSTICE JACKSON: All right. So, in 

the (iv), you say it's aiding and abetting or 

soliciting is the -- is the constitutional 

application of (iv), and we're to look at aiding 

and abetting and the old soil that comes with 

it. And Justice Kavanaugh raises an interesting 

point, which is, wouldn't providing provisions 

to a bank robber who you knew to have committed 

this crime and is here, wouldn't that be 

considered aiding and abetting? And, if so, why 

isn't the nonprofits who are providing these 

kinds of provisions to people who are remaining 

in this case -- in the United States in 

violation of the law also a violation of this? 

MR. FLETCHER: So, yes, providing 

tools, you know, a gun, a mask to a bank robber 

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knowing that he's going to use them to rob the 

bank and intending that he use them to rob the

 bank, that's aiding and abetting the bank

 robbery. 

I think the reason why I don't think 

the provision of food or something like that to 

a noncitizen who happens to be here unlawfully

 qualifies as aiding and abetting --

JUSTICE JACKSON: What about aiding 

and abetting after the fact? He bank -- he's 

robbed the bank already and he comes and he 

knocks on the door and you know he's a bank 

robber and you let him in, you let him stay. 

And maybe that's harboring, I don't know, but --

MR. FLETCHER: That -- that's not 

aiding and abetting at all. 

JUSTICE JACKSON: I see. 

MR. FLETCHER: That's accessory after 

the fact at best. 

JUSTICE JACKSON: Okay. 

MR. FLETCHER: And 18 U.S.C. 2 covers 

only accessory before the fact and aid during 

the crime but not aid after the crime. 

JUSTICE JACKSON: Not aid after. All 

right. One more. 

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The point that Justice Alito brought 

up with the civil violation, are you asking us 

to decide that here, or could the Ninth Circuit 

be tasked with looking into that when we return

 the case, if we return the case?

 MR. FLETCHER: I guess I have 

understood Respondent, Mr. Hansen, to be

 making -- relying on the civil/criminal

 distinction in service of his overbreadth 

argument and to suggest that to the extent that 

section -- clause (iv) would reach aiding and 

abetting or soliciting conduct that is only a 

civil violation, that's a First Amendment 

problem and that that is part of his overbreadth 

argument. 

JUSTICE JACKSON: But the Ninth 

Circuit didn't rule on that, right? The Ninth 

Circuit didn't reach the question of how civil 

liability interacts with any of this. 

MR. FLETCHER: That's correct because 

the Ninth Circuit held it overbroad, you know, 

on a much broader theory. So I suppose you 

could -- if you didn't want to reach that 

question, you know, you could decline to do it, 

say that the Ninth Circuit's reasoning was 

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wrong, that there may be alternative arguments 

for overbreadth, and send it back for that 

purpose. I guess I view this more as a subissue of the overbreadth argument on which the

 Court granted cert and not as the sort of really 

distinct issue that the Court usually remands

 for consideration of.

 JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we would have 

to sort of sort it out. Isn't it complicated to 

sort of determine the extent to which the speech 

incident to criminal conduct scenario, which is 

what I understand you to be relying on, reaches 

civil conduct as well? 

MR. FLETCHER: I don't think so. I 

think the Court crossed that bridge in Gazzam 

the year after Giboney, which we cite in our 

reply brief. It did it again in Pittsburgh 

Paper. And then, in Williams, it described, 

relying on Pittsburgh Paper, a civil case, the 

unprotected category of speech that seeks to 

induce or commence illegal transactions. So we 

think you've crossed that bridge already. 

Now I'm sensitive to the idea that 

these are hard questions of aiding-and-abetting 

law and First Amendment law, and this is an 

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awkward posture to try to nail all of them down 

in. And so I do want to emphasize that all we

 think you have to decide today is that the 

statute is not overbroad. And if you want to 

reserve questions that might arise in an

 as-applied posture, I think it's perfectly fine

 to do that.

 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,

 counsel. 

Ms. Bhandari. 

ORAL ARGUMENT OF ESHA BHANDARI

 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 

MS. BHANDARI: Mr. Chief Justice, and 

may it please the Court: 

Mr. Hansen should prevail here for 

three reasons. The government concedes that the 

statute is unconstitutional under its plain 

meaning. Instead, it asks this Court to rewrite 

the statute to prohibit only solicitation and 

aiding and abetting. 

But that is Congress's job, and 

Congress in 1952 took out the very words the 

government now asks this Court to write in: 

"solicit" and "assist." And in 1986, Congress 

took out the required intent. The government 

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has cited no case in which Congress has used the

 terms "encourage" and "induce" alone to stand 

for solicitation or aiding and abetting.

 Second, even if you construe the 

statute as limited to solicitation or aiding and 

abetting, this Court should not create a new 

category of unprotected speech, namely, criminal

 solicitation of civil law violations. The 

historical roots of that exception are limited 

to solicitation of crimes and for good reason. 

If the justification for treating speech as 

categorically unprotected is that it is integral 

to conduct that the government can punish, then 

the speech cannot be punished more harshly than 

that conduct. 

This Court has consistently resisted 

prior invitations to expand categories of 

unprotected speech and should do the same here. 

Otherwise, Congress and the states will be free, 

without any First Amendment scrutiny, to 

criminalize speech soliciting violations of the 

vast range of administrative and regulatory laws 

that govern us today, from mask and vaccine 

mandates to parking ordinances. 

To deny the government's requested 

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 expansion would only mean that it would have to

 satisfy ordinary First Amendment scrutiny when 

it regulates such speech.

 And, finally, even if the Court were

 to adopt the government's narrowing

 construction, Mr. Hansen's convictions must be 

vacated because the jury was not instructed to

 apply the government's narrowing construction, 

and the government argued that the plain meaning 

of the statute should control. 

I welcome the Court's questions. 

JUSTICE THOMAS: Is speech the only 

component of the First Amendment subject to 

overbreadth? 

MS. BHANDARI: Justice Thomas, I -- I 

think that speech is the realm in which this 

Court has applied overbreadth analysis. 

JUSTICE THOMAS: Has it ever applied 

it in any other aspect of the First Amendment? 

MS. BHANDARI: I'm not aware of any 

context in which it has applied overbreadth to 

other aspects of the First Amendment, no, 

Justice Thomas. 

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, you 

focused on the amendment, what was it, '52 or 

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'56?

 MS. BHANDARI: 1952.

 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: '52. 

Suggesting there was a purpose to take out the 

two provisions that were -- the two words that 

were taken out and the two left in.

 What -- what was that purpose? What

 is -- in other words, what is the distinction 

you see between the words that were left in and 

the words that were taken out? 

MS. BHANDARI: I think we can go by 

what Congress actually did. Congress removed 

the narrower verbs, "solicit" and "assist," and 

left in the broader verbs, "encourage" and 

"induce." That was a deliberate choice. If 

Congress wanted to write a solicitation law, it 

could have left in the verb "solicit." 

And I note that in 1984, which was two 

years prior to the 1986 amendment to the 

statute, Congress drafted 18 U.S.C. 373, which 

is the general prohibition on soliciting a crime 

of violence, and Congress took a very different 

approach in writing that solicitation statute. 

It required specific intent to solicit a 

particular felony, and it required circumstances 

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 strongly corroborative of that intent.

 And the Senate committee report noted 

that mere encouragement is not enough and that 

the specific intent requirement was especially

 important not to trench on First Amendment

 concerns.

 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So we would

 have to see a distinction along the lines you

 suggest between "solicit" and "assist" and 

"encourage" and "induce" to the extent that the 

-- the former are broader or narrower? 

MS. BHANDARI: Encourage and induce 

are narrower -- are broader terms. Solicit and 

assist are the narrower terms. 

And I also think that you can look at 

the pattern of amendment to see that Congress 

over time has broadened the statute from its 

initial roots. 

Initially it was tied to prohibiting 

the entry of -- of -- assisting the entry of 

contract laborers. Then Congress took away the 

limitation on contract labor. It was assisting 

anyone's entry. But still in 1952 it used the 

verb solicit and assist and it required the 

willful or knowingly standard. 

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Then Congress removed the mens rea

 requirement and required only knowledge or

 reckless disregard, again, an expansion. And 

Congress removed the verb solicit and assist to

 leave only the broader terms encourage and 

induce, and expanded to remaining in the country

 unlawfully in 1986. That was its final

 expansion.

 So over time, Congress has 

consistently shown its intent as evidenced by 

the plain text to cover much more than 

solicitation or aiding and abetting. 

JUSTICE BARRETT: Counsel let's assume 

JUSTICE ALITO: May I -- go ahead. 

JUSTICE BARRETT: I just want to 

follow up on mine quickly, and let's just assume 

that you're wrong about Congress's intent. 

Would you concede that if we accept the 

government's narrowing construction, let's 

assume the underlying offense is criminal, not 

civil, would you concede that you would lose --

your overbreadth challenge if the government is 

right about the narrower solicitation? 

MS. BHANDARI: If you are limiting it 

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just to crimes and only to solicitation and 

aiding and abetting with the requisite intent, 

then, yes, but I don't understand the government

 to be limiting its argument only to crimes. And

 JUSTICE ALITO: Well what -- go ahead.

 JUSTICE BARRETT: No, my hypothetical

 changed that.

 MS. BHANDARI: Yes, yes. 

JUSTICE ALITO: Well, that's what I 

wanted to ask you about. I understood your 

second point to be that the First Amendment 

prohibits the criminalization of the 

solicitation of conduct that is unlawful but not 

criminal. 

Is that your second point? 

MS. BHANDARI: That is correct. 

JUSTICE ALITO: And -- and that you 

think that's true across the board in all 

circumstances? 

MS. BHANDARI: Yes, Justice Alito, 

because we're talking about whether speech is 

categorically beyond the protection of the First 

Amendment. 

So anytime you have a law-targeting 

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 speech, which would cover a solicitation law,

 the first step is, of course, it's a law

 targeting speech, you, you know, trigger First

 Amendment scrutiny.

 Now, if the law fits within a narrow 

category of historical exception, like obscenity 

and so forth, then it doesn't have to

 satisfy scrutiny.

 JUSTICE ALITO: Yeah, okay. So 

solicitation -- soliciting someone to engage in 

prostitution, that's unconstitutional, 

criminalizing the solicitation of someone to 

engage in prostitution, that's -- that's 

unconstitutional. 

MS. BHANDARI: No, Justice Alito. 

That can be regulated as a transaction. And 

this Court in Williams made clear that you 

can -- you can render certain transactions 

illegal. So speech that effectuates those 

transactions, for example, if I say to you I 

want to buy drugs, that is proposing an illegal 

transaction. That speech can be regulated. And 

that was the case with Williams where it was 

speech about a transaction involving child 

pornography. 

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JUSTICE ALITO: All right. Not

 soliciting a prostitute but encouraging someone

 to engage in prostitution, that cannot be

 criminalized?

 MS. BHANDARI: If prostitution is not

 a crime --

JUSTICE ALITO: Yes.

 MS. BHANDARI: -- then such speech is 

not categorically unprotected. It would just be 

subject to First Amendment scrutiny, which means 

that if the government had a compelling interest 

and narrowly tailored that law, they could do 

so. But -- but that is the key difference, 

Justice Alito, between solicitation as used in 

the sense of transactions versus solicitation of 

a third person to do something. 

JUSTICE ALITO: So encouraging someone 

to engage in prostitution is not necessarily 

criminalizing, that is not necessarily 

unconstitutional, it just has to satisfy strict 

scrutiny, and you would apply the same thing 

here? 

MS. BHANDARI: That is correct, 

Justice Alito. Any law burdening speech where 

it makes the speech a crime and it's soliciting 

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 underlying civil violations would be subject

 to -- if it's content based, it would be 

subject to strict scrutiny.

 JUSTICE ALITO: Encouraging someone to

 commit suicide?

 MS. BHANDARI: I think --

JUSTICE ALITO: Same thing?

 MS. BHANDARI: Same thing. If it's

 not a crime, you just subject it to ordinary 

First Amendment scrutiny, which the Minnesota 

Supreme Court did in Melchert-Dinkel it applied 

strict scrutiny to a law encouraging suicide. 

In that case, the law did not satisfy 

strict scrutiny but a narrowly tailored law very 

well might. 

JUSTICE ALITO: What if the person who 

is encouraged to commit suicide is 

intellectually disabled, particularly vulnerable 

to that encouragement? 

MS. BHANDARI: Again, I think if a 

state or Congress passed a law that was directed 

specifically at encouraging someone in that 

vulnerable state and narrowly tailored it, it 

very well might pass strict scrutiny, but --

JUSTICE ALITO: And why would that be, 

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because that's an important interest, protecting

 those people is an important interest?

 MS. BHANDARI: That's correct. I

 think the strict scrutiny analysis builds into 

it the interest that the government has in

 criminalizing speech.

 JUSTICE ALITO: And then why wouldn't 

that be satisfied here?

 MS. BHANDARI: In this case, there --

JUSTICE ALITO: The government has 

a -- now, people disagree about this, but the 

law expresses a strong interest in regulating 

who is allowed to remain in the United States. 

MS. BHANDARI: I think that that 

standard would not be satisfied here even if you 

read this as a narrow solicitation law, because 

it would reach solicitation of civil law 

violations that Congress itself has incentivized 

people to engage in. 

So, for example, when Congress has 

provided under the Violence Against Women Act, a 

pathway to lawful status for women who have been 

battered or a pathway to lawful status for 

victims of trafficking or a pathway to lawful 

status to people who overstayed their visas but 

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 married a U.S. citizen.

 In all of those cases, lawyers,

 community members who provide know your rights 

training and materials are entitled to tell 

people about those paths to lawful status if 

they remain even unlawfully.

 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Counsel, I'm --

MS. BHANDARI: And I don't think the 

government could claim a compelling interest. 

JUSTICE GORSUCH: I'm -- I'm sorry to 

interrupt. Are you finished? 

MS. BHANDARI: Yes. 

JUSTICE GORSUCH: So I -- I just want 

to follow up on Justice Alito's line of 

questioning with you because I think I heard you 

say there could be some examples where you could 

criminalize the act of soliciting or aiding and 

abetting an underlying civil offense, whether 

it's prostitution or assisting a suicide of a 

vulnerable person. 

And once -- once -- you said there 

could be circumstances at least possibly where 

such a law would be narrowly tailored and would 

survive. How does that affect our overbreadth 

analysis? 

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Because now we're saying that

 civil/criminal distinction isn't what matters,

 there are some categories of cases, even -- even

 with respect to underlying civil offenses where 

the government can regulate aiding and abetting

 or soliciting more -- more specifically and

 dramatically than the underlying offense.

 So now we've -- we've narrowed the

 category dispute. How does that affect the 

overbreadth analysis? 

MS. BHANDARI: I think if you are 

talking about a world in which you've narrowed 

the statute to solicitation only, so leaving 

aside the -- just pure encouragement and 

inducement --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Yeah. 

MS. BHANDARI: -- and you've narrowed 

it in that way, I think the statute would still 

be substantially overbroad because it reaches 

solicitation of civil violations that I don't 

think even the government would claim an 

interest in criminalizing. 

And, again, I point to the example of 

lawyers advising people about a pathway to 

lawful status that Congress itself has 

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 incentivized. And I think it would raise major

 First Amendment concerns for the government to 

be able to criminalize lawyers and others

 providing truthful information about legal

 options.

 JUSTICE GORSUCH: I would certainly 

imagine that there would be a -- a very strong

 as-applied challenge in those kinds of cases, 

but an overbreadth analysis, we're supposed to 

ask -- I -- I don't know what we're supposed to 

ask, but something like, is it impossible to 

apply the statute constitutionally or is it 

really, really almost unlikely it will ever be 

applied constitutionally. 

And you're -- you're positing a narrow 

set of cases in which it would be a good First 

Amendment challenge, might exist, but, again, 

how does -- how do we -- how do we struggle with 

this overbreadth? What -- when is enough 

enough? 

MS. BHANDARI: I would point you to 

the -- the approach the Court took in Free 

Speech Coalition and in Stevens where the 

inquiry is simply does the statute -- even if 

you narrowly construe it, does the statute reach 

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 protective speech that people engage in. Is it

 realistic speech that they engage in every day

 frequently?

 In Stevens, the Court didn't do an

 empirical analysis. It looked at the fact that

 many people engaged in hunting videos actually

 as a strength of the overbreadth challenge, 

because it said, you don't need to look at who's

 not speaking. The fact that people do violate 

the statute, as the government construes it, is 

a reason for us to apply the overbreadth remedy. 

Similarly, in Free Speech Coalition, 

the Court looked at the fact that mainstream 

movies such as Romeo and Juliet or American 

Beauty might fall within the terms of the 

statute. And it didn't attempt to quantify 

examples of mainstream movies vis-à-vis actual 

child pornography. 

JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Fletcher points 

out that this statute has been with us a long 

time and we've just never seen such prosecutions 

or at most just a handful of cases. 

So in that circumstance, isn't our 

task made easier with respect to overbreadth, if 

you can just say look at the history? 

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MS. BHANDARI: Two responses, Justice

 Kagan. First, prosecutions are not necessary, 

and Stevens and in Free Speech Coalition this 

Court didn't require actual prosecutions of

 protected speech.

 And in Stevens, this Court invalidated 

that law eleven years after it had been passed.

 So that law had been on the books for a while

 and Free Speech Coalition, it had been at least 

five years. In Virginia v. Black, the plurality 

opinion holding that statute overbroad, that law 

had been on the books for 35 years. 

So the length of time and the lack of 

prosecutions isn't the inquiry, because on a 

facial challenge, the facial validity of a law 

does not depend on the government's 

prosecutorial choices. 

JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, doesn't the 

prosecutorial choice have something to do with 

what kinds of activity the law chose? 

MS. BHANDARI: Even if you look at the 

prosecutorial activities relevant to that, I 

think there's realistic danger of chill here, 

just from the fact that the government in recent 

years has invoked Section 1324 in investigative 

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activities, as the amicus brief from the

 Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press

 noted. The government doesn't treat Section

 1324 as a dead letter. It's still available to

 open investigations even if they never charge 

someone. The City and States' amicus brief

 notes that they have to certify compliance with 

1324 to receive funding in certain instances.

 But, finally, I would just point to 

the government's ever-changing positions on what 

the statute means as presenting a chilling 

effect to the public. 

JUSTICE BARRETT: But -- but, in 

addition, just to follow up on Justice Kagan's 

point, in addition to prosecutions we also have 

a record of activity not being chilled. I mean, 

no one's pointed out there are charitable 

organizations, to use Justice Kavanaugh's 

hypothetical, that are not giving food and 

shelter and resources or that lawyers are afraid 

to give advice. I mean, the statute's been on 

the books for a long time. And there might --

there's an absence of prosecutions. There is 

also an absence of demonstrated chilling effect. 

MS. BHANDARI: This Court has never 

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 required a demonstrated chilling effect. Again, 

in Stevens and Free Speech Coalition, this Court 

didn't say the fact that mainstream movies were 

out there, the fact that hunting videos were out

 there was proof that nobody was chilled, because

 the -- the overbreadth doctrine is concerned 

with two main things. One, the chill on people 

who would conform their behavior to the letter 

of the law, and that behavior isn't visible to 

this Court, the people who are not speaking. 

And, second, it gives an incentive to 

Congress to craft narrow laws. So, for example, 

if Congress made it a felony to criticize the 

president and only ever prosecuted people who 

engaged in constitutionally unprotected true 

threats, that law could then be immunized from 

challenge if -- if the government could come in 

and say, no, no, no, this person engaged in true 

threats, even though all the jury had to find 

was did you criticize the president --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well --

MS. BHANDARI: -- yes or no. 

JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- it is a little 

awkward, tough, that this case comes up in a 

posture with Mr. Hansen, who I don't think 

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anybody could say he's been chilled from

 speaking. I mean, he's had no problem

 soliciting people here in this country and --

and defrauding them to the tune of lots and lots

 of money. I mean -- I mean, he is -- he has 

victimized these people, and it may be a poster

 child for a situation in which the underlying

 offense might be modest, but you might want to 

criminalize it because he's taking advantage of 

very vulnerable people. And -- and it just 

seems awkward that we're in -- in a posture 

where we're asserting third-party rights of 

really hypothetical situations without an 

example. 

MS. BHANDARI: In this case, 

Mr. Hansen is asserting his own legal rights. I 

want to be very clear. 

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Is he -- how is he 

being affected? How are his speech rights being 

affected? 

MS. BHANDARI: Mr. Hansen, as a 

defendant, he is entitled to have the government 

prove facts or elements that would make out 

speech that is constitutionally unprotected, and 

that did not happen here. 

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So we -- we don't disagree that he 

victimized many people and, for that, he was

 convicted under fraud counts and -- and received 

20 years. And none of those will be disturbed

 here.

 But under the encouragement provision, 

the government did not have to prove that he 

lied to anyone, that he deceived anyone, that he

 engaged in any false speech. All they had to 

show was that he encouraged or induced people. 

No mens rea requirement. No intent. 

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, that's going 

to be -- the government concedes that that has 

to be resolved on remand, and it seems highly 

unlikely that he's going to prevail under that 

standard on remand. I think we'd agree on that. 

I mean, he -- he had every intent in the world 

to keep these people here to -- to -- to take 

their money with no prospect they'd ever 

actually see -- obtain any kind of relief. And 

that's what -- those are the facts. 

And I guess, again, it's just a little 

awkward that we're worried about chilling other 

people's speech and it has nothing to do with 

the case before us. 

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MS. BHANDARI: I would argue that if 

you were reconsidering overbreadth doctrine, 

this wouldn't be the case in which to do this 

because the government secures convictions under

 the broad terms of the statute. That goes to

 the chilling effect.

 The broad terms of the statute that 

are on the books, which the government uses to 

secure convictions, that, in and of itself, is 

enough to tell the public that, if I engage in 

any conduct that the government doesn't like, 

even if it doesn't amount to solicitation or 

aiding and abetting with all of the many 

requirements that the government says should be 

read in, it won't matter, because I could be 

convicted by this jury. 

JUSTICE JACKSON: And in fact, that 

happened in this very case, right? I mean, 

didn't the government object to narrow 

instructions that would have tailored this to 

the kinds of things the government is saying 

right now? 

MS. BHANDARI: That is correct. The 

government --

JUSTICE JACKSON: So, in open court, 

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with respect to this particular defendant, the 

government said no, no, the statute is really 

broad and it covers all this kind of conduct,

 did they not?

 MS. BHANDARI: That is correct. The 

government objected to those very elements in

 this case, in Sineneng-Smith in the district 

court, and the Tenth Circuit case of --

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Do you 

disagree -- do you disagree with Mr. Fletcher 

that they have never brought such a prosecution? 

MS. BHANDARI: I don't disagree that 

they haven't brought such a prosecution. What I 

submit is that that's not relevant to the 

overbreadth analysis because the government, you 

know, has many other tools to threaten 

invocation of Section 1324 as it has done, as 

the amici have pointed out. And mainly because 

in a facial challenge, the government's choice 

not to prosecute to the full extent is not 

relevant. Just as in Stevens, it was not 

relevant that the government essentially had 

promised never use -- to use the statute that 

way. 

I do want to go back to Justice 

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 Gorsuch, your question about this particular

 defendant and his conduct.

 In R.A.V. v. St. Paul, the -- the

 opinion for the Court noted that, just because 

someone engages in conduct that could be 

regulated in one way doesn't mean that the 

government can regulate it in another way that 

violates the First Amendment. 

So there you had a defendant who 

burned a cross in a family's yard, and Justice 

Scalia's opinion for the Court noted that arson 

laws, property damage laws could have gotten 

that defendant's behavior, but that didn't mean 

the application of a viewpoint discriminatory 

law was permissible with respect to him. 

JUSTICE GORSUCH: I -- I -- I totally 

accept that, and I totally accept as well your 

-- your point, your good point, that if -- even 

under the government's view remand is going to 

be required, and you'll have an opportunity to 

make arguments. How successful they will be is 

an interesting question. But in an overbreadth 

challenge, isn't it surely relevant that your 

client is not likely to benefit from whatever we 

do? And, as the Chief Justice just pointed out, 

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 there has never been a prosecution of some of

 these hypotheticals we've been discussing, and

 the book -- the -- the law has been on the books

 for 70 years.

 I mean, it is an extraordinary thing 

for this Court to grant third-party standing, 

which is effectively what we're being asked to 

do here. Why would we do it in this -- under --

under those circumstances, when an as-applied 

challenge would always be available should the 

government -- because I don't take them at their 

word either, okay? But should they ever go 

after somebody who actually meets one of these 

hypotheticals that have been very interesting 

this morning, they would have a good First 

Amendment defense. 

MS. BHANDARI: Justice Gorsuch, I -- I 

would note the law in its current form has only 

been on the books since 1986, absent the mens 

rea requirement. And the government secures 

convictions, as it did in this case, without 

showing any of the elements that would make 

someone's speech unprotected. 

So I understand that, you know, 

Mr. Hansen's behavior was not commendable here, 

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but the government didn't have to prove any of

 the narrowing elements that would make the

 statute permissible.

 And so I think that is one reason that 

this Court should make sure that this law 

doesn't in the future chill those, you know, who 

have engaged in the type of speech that Justice

 Kagan --

JUSTICE JACKSON: Isn't it possible to 

really figure out how many people have been 

chilled? I mean, I guess I'm trying to 

understand how it would work if we didn't have 

some sort of an overbreadth argument, because on 

the one hand, you can look at the situation and 

you can say the government has never charged any 

of these people who are actually doing this, but 

we don't know -- by "this," I mean, for example, 

Justice Kavanaugh's example of, you know, 

helping -- helping noncitizens by giving them 

food and water. Fine. The government has never 

charged any, but we don't know how many other 

people would have engaged in that kind of, you 

know, speech and -- and action if it weren't for 

this law. 

So it's really hard to know, I think, 

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by looking only at what the government has done,

 who is being prevented from engaging in First

 Amendment activity.

 MS. BHANDARI: That is correct. And 

that is one of the overriding concerns of

 overbreadth doctrine. Again, is the concern 

with people who are silent and whose silence is 

not visible to the Court. But I --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: And we --

MS. BHANDARI: -- don't --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: And we have no 

record of that here either. We're just -- we 

just coming up with hypotheticals, right? 

MS. BHANDARI: Well, what we have 

is --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: There's no record of 

people coming into court and a factual finding 

in district court on -- on who has been chilled 

and how. I mean, that could have happened, but 

we don't have that here. 

MS. BHANDARI: Justice Gorsuch, I 

don't think that would be likely to happen in a 

criminal case like this. Perhaps in a 

pre-enforcement challenge. But I also note the 

amici -- the AL amicus brief noting lawyers have 

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said that lawyers, immigration lawyers, are 

watching this case very closely and already 

starting to advise each other on how they may 

have to curtail the advice that they give to

 their clients.

 I also want to emphasize that the 

government hasn't made very clear the 

distinction between solicitation and aiding and

 abetting. It seemed to conflate those points. 

Aiding and abetting requires that the 

principal complete the underlying act. I'm not 

sure if the government is saying that that is 

required here, because solicitation does not 

require that. 

The government's also has not 

explained whether "encourage" means solicitation 

and "induce" means aiding and abetting, or 

vice versa, which of these words apply to which 

concept. 

Solicitation and aiding and abetting 

aren't the same. They have different elements. 

And the government hasn't explained how this 

Court could clearly write in those elements in a 

way that would tell the lawyer or the community 

activists advising people what their rights are 

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 under the law whether they can remain in the

 country. 

And when the stakes of getting it

 wrong are felony prosecution and five years 

imprisonment, people are not going to go

 anywhere close to the line --

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: I thought the --

MS. BHANDARI: -- if they can help it.

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- I thought the 

government was saying that both solicitation and 

aiding and abetting were coming in and that the 

elements of the two offenses would be the 

traditional elements, both of which require 

intent. 

MS. BHANDARI: I agree that both of 

them require intent, but the government has at 

various times suggested that you need an act, 

which I agree is true for aiding and abetting 

but for solicitation isn't necessarily true. 

So you're reaching pure speech on the 

hypothetical of someone simply saying come to my 

food pantry. Not engaging in the conduct of 

actually giving food, just saying come to my 

food pantry, it's open to anyone who's 

undocumented, would that constitute solicitation 

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to remain in the country, or someone who runs a 

domestic violence shelter, for example, telling 

people who come, knowing that they're

 undocumented, stay here, it's a safe place, 

you're welcome here, and we don't want you to

 leave here where you're safe.

 It -- it's critical that a statute 

that hits on speech draw clear lines when felony

 prosecution is at stake. Congress did not do 

that here. And Congress could do so if this 

Court were to hold that this law simply doesn't 

say what the government says, and Congress then 

remains free to draft the narrow 

aiding-and-abetting or solicitation law if it 

wishes to. 

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 

counsel. 

Justice Thomas? 

Justice Alito, anything further? 

Justice Sotomayor? 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Yes. I -- I think 

you maybe gave up a little bit too much when you 

were talking about answering Justice Alito's 

questions and Justice Gorsuch, that there might 

be cases where Congress could criminalize a 

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 civil violation.

 Did I understand you to say, once you 

give that up, then this is okay because they can

 criminalize all civil violations?

 MS. BHANDARI: Not at all. In the 

circumstances in which there is a --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I -- I would like 

to know where to draw that line.

 MS. BHANDARI: It --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I -- I find it 

hard to borrow concepts of aiding and abetting 

or solicitation because, by definition, both of 

those concepts, as we have traditionally had 

them in the criminal law, require a criminal act 

by the perpetrator. There has to be an act done 

by the perpetrator. You have to solicit a 

crime. 

We've never had a crime defining 

solicitation of a civil violation, correct? 

MS. BHANDARI: That's correct. This 

Court has never upheld a criminal solicitation 

law directed at a civil crime. 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Now too much, 

never done it, and, in fact, all of the 

solicitation and aiding-and-abetting crimes, 

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 generally, the punishment is less than the

 completed act, correct?

 MS. BHANDARI: That's correct.

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Perpetrators are

 treated more -- the perpetrators of the crime

 are treated more harshly, and solicitation, it's

 still not -- the punishment has never been as

 great as the completed crime. You don't get

 punished for solicitating -- soliciting arson 

and get treated as harshly as the arsonist. 

MS. BHANDARI: I -- I think -- yes. I 

want to be very clear about our position, which 

is that solicitation, criminal solicitation 

laws, when they are directed at civil conduct, 

are not categorically unprotected under the 

First Amendment. 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. So 

let's go, because -- let's go there, because 

when are they not categorically protected? When 

are they categorically protected? I want to 

know what the difference is, why this one is not 

protected and others might be. 

MS. BHANDARI: I think that if you had 

a law criminalizing solicitation of certain 

civil violations, you would subject it to strict 

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 scrutiny and it would then be a case-by-case

 analysis.

 I don't think the government has even 

attempted to argue in this case that this law

 would satisfy strict scrutiny with respect to

 civil violations. That -- that argument has not 

been on the table.

 But I -- I say that only to show that

 when it comes --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But what would 

qualify? What -- you -- you admitted that a --

inducing a person of lesser mental ability to 

prostitution would probably fall into it. 

MS. BHANDARI: Yes. I think you could 

see a spectrum of laws. Again, it's the normal 

First Amendment scrutiny. So where the 

government has a compelling interest and, of 

course, narrowly tailors its law and has no 

alternative to get at that conduct other than 

criminalizing speech, it might satisfy it. 

But, on the other end of the spectrum, 

if a municipality decided to make it a crime to 

solicit parking violations because everyone in 

town is just violating the parking violations 

and paying the fee and so it's decided to make 

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it a crime to solicit that, I don't think that 

that speech is categorically unprotected under

 the First Amendment and probably wouldn't 

satisfy heightened First Amendment scrutiny.

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So now let's go to 

why not having an example of a generalized --

more examples of prosecutions, the Henderson

 everybody keeps forgetting, but there's at least

 one prosecution in -- under the 1986 statute. 

Why do you think the history from '86 

to currently shouldn't be viewed as important? 

MS. BHANDARI: It's not relevant that 

the government has chosen not to file actual 

prosecutions of protected speech. That's never 

been required by this Court for First Amendment 

overbreadth analysis, again, for good reason, 

because a law, if it's facially reaching 

protected speech, does not become more or less 

constitutional depending on the government's 

prosecutorial choices. 

It's also relevant, however, that the 

government has ways of chilling speech simply by 

having the law on the books without filing 

actual prosecutions. 

So, for example, when it opens 

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investigations into people and invokes Section

 1324, as has happened with journalists, perhaps

 it might be --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What happened with

 Customs patrol.

 MS. BHANDARI: With -- with the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection, yes.

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And Congress did

 subpoenas too. 

MS. BHANDARI: That is correct. And 

also when it asks cities and states to certify 

compliance with Section 1324 to receive federal 

funding, which, of course, could chill those 

city and state officials from even coming close 

to the line of violating the encouragement 

provision for fear of losing that funding. 

So there are many aspects beyond 

simple prosecutions that can chill speech, and 

-- and the government has certainly used some of 

those tools in the last five years even. 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Thank you. 

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan? 

Justice Gorsuch? 

Justice Barrett? 

Justice Jackson? 

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JUSTICE JACKSON: If I can just ask 

you, one thing you said was curious to me, that 

aid and abet and solicitation have different

 elements, and so what is then the implication of 

the government saying, we look at the statute, 

it says encourage or induce, you should read 

that to mean aid or abet -- aid and abet or

 solicitation, I guess that carries with it the

 elements, but is your point that the person who 

is being convicted or prosecuted under this 

statute is not going to really know what it is 

that the government needs to prove in order to 

establish their liability? 

MS. BHANDARI: That is correct, 

Justice Jackson. The government hasn't 

specifically delineated which one would apply in 

any particular case. It simply says both. But 

there are different elements to them. 

That's why Congress has two separate 

provisions, 18 U.S.C. 373, which is a 

solicitation provision, and 18 U.S.C., 

subsection 2, which is an aiding-and-abetting 

provision. 

In this --

JUSTICE JACKSON: This is not a First 

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 Amendment argument, but it still could -- it's 

something problematic, I think, perhaps about 

the government's intention of importing both of

 those concepts wordlessly, silently, into this

 statute.

 MS. BHANDARI: It goes to

 congressional intent and what the text says.

 So Congress has at various times used

 induce along with solicit, as it did in 373. At 

other times, it used induce along with aid and 

abet, as it did in subsection 2. 

Now the government doesn't explain 

here why Congress would not have used aiding and 

abetting and solicitation along with induce when 

it previously has used induce with those other 

verbs, and it also doesn't explain why Congress 

would have mashed up both concepts of 

solicitation and aiding and abetting in one 

statute when they have different elements. 

JUSTICE JACKSON: Thank you. 

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 

counsel. 

Rebuttal, Mr. Fletcher? 

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REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF BRIAN H. FLETCHER

 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

 MR. FLETCHER: Thank you, Mr. Chief

 Justice.

 I'd just like to say a word about what 

the statute means, a word about the 

criminal/civil distinction, and then close with

 a word or two about overbreadth. 

So, first of all, about what the 

statute means. I understand their position to 

be that until 1952, this was a permissible 

statute because it had other words in it, but in 

1952, Congress turned it into a prohibition on 

speech. And I think that's a pretty 

extraordinary thing for Congress to have done, 

and the Court should demand a pretty 

extraordinary showing before assuming that 

Congress did it, and I just haven't heard such a 

showing made. 

What I've heard is Congress took out 

some words. And that's true, but the words it 

left in had the same meaning and the words it 

left in were the words this Court had just used 

to summarize the previous statute. 

I heard that it took out the mens rea 

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 requirement in 1986. But that's not quite

 right. It tailored the mens rea that the

 offender has to know about the noncitizen's 

status, knowing or in reckless disregard, but it 

left in the words induce or encourage. And

 those are words that we think inherently carry a

 mens rea requirement.

 That's what Judge Hand said in Peoni 

when he was interpreting the words of 18 U.S.C. 

2, words like induce, aid, and abet carry an 

implication of purpose. We think they still 

carry that implication here. 

And, finally, I heard that there's no 

other statute that looks like this. And that's 

just not quite right. You know, the provision 

of the National Labor Relations Act that was at 

issue in the electrical workers case that we 

cite at page 32 of our brief prohibited inducing 

and encouraging a secondary boycott. And this 

Court upheld that against a constitutional 

challenge. 

The Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. 2422(a) 

prohibits persuading, inducing, enticing or 

coercing an individual to travel in interstate 

commerce to engage in prostitution. These 

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are -- this is not an unusual way to convey

 these ideas.

 Now, I'd like to turn to the civil or

 criminal distinction, which I understand to be

 their fallback argument, essentially to say that 

even if you construe the statute the way we 

construe it, they still think it's overbroad 

because it covers soliciting or facilitating

 civil violations. 

As Justice Gorsuch said, I think 

there's a real question whether even if they're 

right that there's constitutional questions 

about soliciting or facilitating civil conduct, 

whether that meets the high threshold for 

overbreadth. 

But I think more fundamentally they're 

not right about that. This Court has said in 

cases like Pittsburgh Press, and Gazzam, and 

Williams that soliciting or inducing illegal 

activities, even if they are only civilly 

illegal, are not protected by the First 

Amendment. 

And I don't really hear them to be 

contesting that. Instead, they don't want a 

special rule. They want to say it's okay to 

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 civilly regulate that kind of solicitation but 

facilitation but you can't criminally punish it.

 And that sort of mish-mash is just not

 something that I know of any analog in this

 Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, but what 

this Court has always said before is that there

 are certain categories of speech that are 

unprotected. And we think this is one of them.

 Now, I take the point that it's 

unusual to punish the speech or the conduct that 

solicitates or facilitates underlying actively 

more stiffly than the activity, but that's not a 

First Amendment rule. That's a legislative 

judgment about culpability. 

Usually we think people that who 

solicit or facilitate unlawful activity share 

the same culpability as the person who commits 

that activity. But not always, as Justice Alito 

and I discussed, and not here. 

And the judgment that Congress made 

here is that, when someone solicits or 

facilitates immigration violations, they are 

deserving of more punishment than the 

noncitizens who are already subject to removal. 

We think that's a reasonable judgment. 

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And within the contours of that judgment, I

 think it's important to emphasize that Congress 

treated speech and conduct exactly the same. 

Whether solicitation or facilitation takes the 

form of speech or takes the form of conduct, 

this statute treats it identically, and so I

 don't think it has the effect of treating speech 

worse than conduct that my colleague describes.

 Finally, just to say a word about 

overbreadth. You know, we've talked about the 

difficulties of overbreadth analysis, what an 

extraordinary thing it is, how cautious the 

Court has been about it. And I think it's just 

worth underscoring all of the different ways in 

which Respondent and the Ninth Circuit are 

trying to stretch overbreadth doctrine. 

This Court has said that limiting 

constructions are especially important in 

overbreadth cases, but they ask you to bypass a 

limiting construction. 

The Court has said that we are in 

realistic danger of prosecution, but they are 

asking you to find the statute overbroad, even 

though we don't have any history of either 

prosecution or of chilling. 

Heritage Reporting Corporation 

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And the Court said in Hicks, that

 rarely if ever will a statute be overbroad, when 

it aims at conduct and not primarily at speech

 or at inherently expressive conduct. But this 

is a statute that we know from 70 years aims

 primarily at conduct, even if you thought it 

also may sweep in some speech.

 It would really be extraordinary, I 

think, to say that the statute can't be used to 

prosecute schemes, like Mr. Hansen's and all of 

the other schemes that it has been used to 

prosecute over the last 70 years. 

We'd ask the Court to reverse. 

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 

counsel. The case is submitted. 

(Whereupon, at 1:08 p.m., the case was 

submitted.) 

Heritage Reporting Corporation 

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1 ability [3] 25:21 30:20 87: 

12 

agree [8] 10:5,11 19:16 20: 

2 47:25 75:16 83:15,18 

among [1] 9:21 

amount [3] 15:6 46:24 76: 

asserting [2] 74:12,16 

assist [7] 9:22 56:24 59:13 

1:08 [1] 97:16 able [2] 44:7 69:3 agrees [2] 4:3 26:23 12 60:9,14,24 61:4 

11:46 [2] 1:15 3:2 above-entitled [1] 1:13 ahead [10] 10:7,8,9 21:10 analog [1] 95:4 assistance [3] 16:6 30:4, 13.2 [1] 14:25 absence [2] 72:23,24 22:14 28:5 38:1,2 61:15 analysis [13] 36:20 41:5 42: 11 

1324 [10] 4:10 5:2,9 50:24 absent [2] 27:19 79:19 62:6 11 58:17 66:4 67:25 68:10 assisting [5] 46:8 51:22 

71:25 72:4,8 77:17 89:2, absolute [1] 42:5 aid [12] 15:3,5,6 28:10 53: 69:9 70:5 77:15 87:2 88: 60:20,22 67:19 

12 absolutely [2] 32:5 41:19 22,23,24 90:3,7,7 91:10 93: 16 96:11 assistive [1] 26:20 

1324(a)(1)(A [1] 51:12 abstract [1] 13:7 10 analyze [1] 12:3 associate [6] 15:15 17:1, 18 [8] 10:18 19:3 53:21 59: absurd [1] 27:4 aided [2] 51:20 52:2 analyzed [1] 12:2 12,18 30:6 47:12 

20 90:20,21 93:9,22 Abuelita [1] 35:19 aiding [72] 4:6 7:10,16 8:3, Another [8] 13:25 14:6,14 associated [2] 10:13 15:7 

1952 [9] 9:23 18:23 20:18 accept [4] 8:4 61:19 78:17, 8 9:1,7,17 10:13 13:16 14: 40:23 41:1 47:10 51:3 78: assume [5] 40:9,13 61:13, 

21:2 56:22 59:2 60:23 92: 17 9 15:4,11,13 16:22 17:7,24 7 17,21 

11,13 accepting [1] 32:2 18:9 20:21 25:4 29:5 30:8, answer [4] 31:20 45:22 46: assuming [3] 30:2 47:7 92: 

1984 [1] 59:18 accessory [2] 53:18,22 13 34:18,25 35:9 37:11,17, 13 47:5 17 

1986 [7] 21:4 56:24 59:19 account [3] 47:2,14,20 21 45:20 46:8,8,18,23 47:4, answering [1] 84:23 assumption [3] 40:21,23 

61:7 79:19 88:9 93:1 accurate [1] 6:8 11,19 50:7 51:2,4,8,10,11, answers [1] 18:22 41:1 

1996 [1] 21:7 acknowledge [4] 4:24 14: 12,17,19,21 52:11,13,19 anybody [2] 11:23 74:1 assumptions [6] 40:11,12 

2 16 39:19,25 53:3,8,9,16 54:11 56:20 anyone's [1] 60:23 41:14,16,21 42:20 

2 [6] 10:18 19:3 53:21 90: acquaintances [1] 13:8 57:3,5 61:12 62:2 67:17 anytime [1] 62:25 asunder [1] 36:6 

22 91:11 93:10 across [1] 62:19 68:5 76:13 82:8,10,17,20 anyway [1] 8:12 attempt [1] 70:16 

20 [1] 75:4 act [10] 37:12 66:21 67:17 83:11,18 85:11 91:13,18 appear [2] 10:24 21:15 attempted [1] 87:4 

2023 [1] 1:11 82:11 83:17 85:14,15 86:2 aiding-and-abetting [16] APPEARANCES [1] 1:17 attempts [1] 26:12 

22-179 [1] 3:4 93:16,22 5:4,7 10:19 12:3 13:2 14: applicable [1] 22:25 attribute [1] 21:1 

2422(a [1] 93:22 acting [1] 31:22 21,23 16:17 20:1 32:10 33: application [7] 5:13 49:5 available [2] 72:4 79:10 

27 [1] 1:11 action [4] 30:7 47:13,16 80: 

23 

18 37:7 55:24 84:14 85:25 

90:22 

50:11,18 51:25 52:13 78: 

14 

avoidance [2] 4:13 13:3 

avoiding [1] 13:4 

3 actions [1] 37:2 aiding-or-abetting [1] 51: applications [7] 5:8 20:24 aware [5] 5:16 32:14 48:12, 

3 [1] 2:4 active [1] 19:18 1 24:22,24 42:8,16,18 21 58:20 

32 [1] 93:18 actively [1] 95:11 aids [3] 19:4,4 32:17 applied [10] 5:18 6:1 12:6 away [1] 60:21 

35 [1] 71:12 activists [1] 82:25 aims [2] 97:3,5 41:2 44:18 58:17,18,21 65: awkward [4] 56:1 73:24 74: 

373 [3] 59:20 90:20 91:9 activities [9] 4:23 28:15,17 airing [1] 39:23 11 69:14 11 75:23 

5 29:1 32:18 34:4 71:22 72: 

1 94:20 

AL [1] 81:25 

aliens [1] 8:12 

applies [1] 12:14 

apply [12] 12:25 13:3,15 36: B 

52 [2] 58:25 59:3 activity [10] 4:6 29:3 32:14, ALITO [24] 25:8 40:6,24 54: 16 37:18 43:18 58:8 64:21 back [14] 6:7 9:9 11:12 13: 

55 [1] 14:24 17 71:20 72:16 81:3 95:12, 1 61:15 62:6,10,18,21 63:9, 69:12 70:11 82:18 90:16 4 18:5 19:20 38:10 40:1, 

56 [2] 2:7 59:1 16,18 15 64:1,7,14,17,24 65:4,7, approach [2] 59:23 69:22 12 43:20 48:19 49:3 55:2 

7 

70 [4] 43:12 79:4 97:5,12 

actual [4] 70:17 71:4 88:13, 

24 

actually [13] 8:13 18:8,20 

16,25 66:7,10 84:19 95:18 

Alito's [2] 67:14 84:23 

allow [2] 26:2 47:19 

appropriate [3] 11:7 27:24 

40:3 

area [3] 9:12 18:22,25 

77:25 

backdrop [1] 49:4 

ban [1] 20:22 

8 34:22 35:10 44:25 50:8 59: allowed [1] 66:13 aren't [3] 7:8 27:6 82:21 bandied [1] 12:7 

86 [1] 88:10 12 70:6 75:20 79:13 80:16 allowing [1] 23:14 arguable [1] 12:15 bank [12] 17:9 45:24 46:6,9 

9 83:23 

actus [3] 16:25 17:4,7 

almost [3] 6:15 43:9 69:13 

alone [2] 22:23 57:2 

argue [3] 39:4 76:1 87:4 

argued [2] 3:24 58:9 

52:17,25 53:2,3,3,10,11,12 

bar [1] 29:5 

92 [1] 2:10 add [1] 33:7 already [5] 22:10 53:11 55: argues [1] 39:16 BARRETT [17] 21:9,11 22: 

A addition [2] 72:14,15 

additionally [1] 14:2 

22 82:2 95:24 

alternative [2] 55:1 87:19 

argument [19] 1:14 2:2,5,8 

3:4,7 16:18 43:15,15 54: 

12,15,20 23:10 47:23,24 

49:6,21,25 50:12 61:13,16 

a.m [2] 1:15 3:2 adjudication [1] 44:24 although [1] 27:1 10,15 55:4 56:11 62:4 80: 62:7 72:13 89:24 

abet [5] 90:3,7,7 91:11 93: administrative [1] 57:22 Alvarez [1] 48:14 13 87:6 91:1 92:1 94:5 based [2] 41:21 65:2 

10 admitted [1] 87:11 amending [1] 49:3 arguments [3] 39:23 55:1 basic [1] 19:3 

abets [3] 19:4,4 32:17 admitting [1] 39:2 Amendment [49] 3:18 4: 78:21 basically [2] 20:2 43:12 

abetted [2] 51:20 52:2 adopt [1] 58:5 19,21 5:9 18:7,24 23:1 25: arise [2] 5:3 56:5 basis [1] 5:10 

abetting [70] 4:6 7:10,18 8: adopted [1] 4:12 20 26:2,15 27:2 28:23 33: around [1] 44:8 battered [1] 66:23 

4,9 9:1,8,18 10:13 13:16 adopting [1] 9:25 11,14 34:2 36:6 37:23 39: arson [2] 78:11 86:9 Beauty [1] 70:15 

14:9 15:4,11,13 16:22 17: advantage [1] 74:9 18 49:10 54:13 55:25 57: arsonist [1] 86:10 become [1] 88:18 

8,24 20:21 25:4 29:5 30:8, advice [3] 7:2 72:21 82:4 20 58:2,13,19,22,25 59:19 art [2] 4:5 7:19 behalf [8] 1:19,21 2:4,7,10 

14 34:18 35:1,9 37:11,18, advise [1] 82:3 60:5,16 62:12,24 63:4 64: as-applied [4] 5:11 56:6 3:8 56:12 92:2 

21 45:20 46:8,18,23 47:4, advising [2] 68:24 82:25 10 65:10 69:2,17 78:8 79: 69:8 79:9 behavior [4] 73:8,9 78:13 

11,19 50:8 51:2,5,8,10,11, advocacy [4] 5:1 13:7 14: 16 81:3 86:16 87:16 88:3, aside [1] 68:14 79:25 

13,17,19,22 52:11,14,19 10,11 4,15 91:1 94:22 95:5,13 asks [4] 19:7 56:18,23 89: believe [1] 34:16 

53:3,8,10,16 54:12 56:20 affect [4] 46:3,12 67:24 68: American [1] 70:14 11 below [2] 4:7 39:4 

57:3,6 61:12 62:2 67:18 9 amici [3] 45:6 77:18 81:25 aspect [1] 58:19 benefit [2] 39:21 78:24 

68:5 76:13 82:9,10,17,20 affected [2] 74:19,20 amicus [5] 6:15 49:7 72:1, aspects [2] 58:22 89:17 best [1] 53:19 

83:11,18 85:11 91:14,18 afraid [1] 72:20 6 81:25 assert [1] 43:6 between [8] 4:25 15:18 21: 

Heritage Reporting Corporation 

Sheet 1 1:08 - between 

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14 30:1 59:9 60:9 64:14 

82:8 

beyond [3] 26:16 62:23 89: 

17 

BHANDARI [58] 1:21 2:6 

56:10,11,13 58:15,20 59:2, 

11 60:12 61:25 62:9,17,21 

63:15 64:5,8,23 65:6,8,20 

66:3,9,14 67:8,12 68:11,17 

69:21 71:1,21 72:25 73:22 

74:15,21 76:1,23 77:5,12 

79:17 81:4,10,14,21 83:8, 

15 85:5,9,20 86:3,11,23 87: 

14 88:12 89:6,10 90:14 91: 

6 

bit [4] 15:14 18:18 44:4 84: 

22 

Black [1] 71:10 

blameworthy [3] 25:14,18 

27:14 

board [1] 62:19 

book [1] 79:3 

books [10] 16:5 43:12 45: 

13 71:8,12 72:22 76:8 79: 

3,19 88:23 

border [3] 32:23 51:13 89: 

7 

borne [1] 42:10 

borrow [1] 85:11 

both [13] 4:17 8:17 9:21 28: 

25 37:18 41:19 83:10,13, 

15 85:12 90:17 91:3,17 

boycott [1] 93:19 

BRIAN [5] 1:18 2:3,9 3:7 

92:1 

bridge [2] 55:15,22 

brief [7] 15:1 49:18 55:17 

72:1,6 81:25 93:18 

briefing [1] 39:8 

briefs [3] 6:15 45:6 49:7 

bring [3] 7:19 19:8 45:21 

bringing [2] 23:4 51:13 

broad [8] 20:22 38:9 39:11 

45:9 48:25 76:5,7 77:3 

broadened [1] 60:17 

broader [8] 38:5,12 46:5 

54:22 59:14 60:11,13 61:5 

broadest [1] 3:22 

broadly [1] 4:1 

brought [3] 54:1 77:11,13 

builds [1] 66:4 

bunch [2] 29:11 31:13 

burden [2] 35:17,19 

burdening [1] 64:24 

burned [1] 78:10 

business [1] 17:11 

buy [1] 63:21 

bypass [1] 96:19 

C 

call [2] 7:10 50:10 

called [1] 39:8 

came [2] 1:13 39:7 

candidly [3] 14:16 26:7 48: 

12 

cannot [2] 57:14 64:3 

canon [1] 4:13 

canonical [1] 30:8 

capable [1] 46:22 

capture [1] 9:16 

care [3] 12:15 14:6,13 

careful [1] 37:4 

carefully [1] 43:8 

carjacking [1] 45:24 

carries [1] 90:8 

carry [5] 4:9 24:25 93:6,10, 

12 

Case [42] 3:4 5:22 6:5,9,11, 

14,16 10:1 15:12 27:15 38: 

7 39:5,6 40:1 43:10 44:19 

49:19 50:4,10 52:22 54:5, 

5 55:19 57:1 63:23 65:13 

66:9 73:24 74:15 75:25 76: 

3,18 77:7,8 79:21 81:23 

82:2 87:4 90:17 93:17 97: 

15,16 

case-by-case [1] 87:1 

cases [28] 11:19,20,25 12: 

2 13:19 14:6,14,15 16:17 

26:10 31:1 32:4,9,10,15 

38:6 39:1 42:14 48:13,14 

67:2 68:3 69:8,16 70:22 

84:25 94:18 96:19 

cash [1] 12:6 

cashing [1] 14:22 

categorically [7] 57:12 62: 

23 64:9 86:15,19,20 88:2 

categories [4] 34:1 57:17 

68:3 95:7 

category [6] 14:6 19:9 55: 

20 57:7 63:6 68:9 

caused [1] 34:22 

cautious [1] 96:12 

century [1] 3:11 

cert [1] 55:5 

certain [8] 3:12 19:19 25: 

14 33:10 63:18 72:8 86:24 

95:7 

certainly [5] 7:5 25:12 48: 

21 69:6 89:19 

certify [2] 72:7 89:11 

challenge [19] 11:9 22:21 

23:2,4,13,15 48:3 50:3 61: 

23 69:8,17 70:7 71:15 73: 

17 77:19 78:23 79:10 81: 

24 93:21 

challenges [5] 5:11 33:12 

48:5,8 49:10 

change [1] 9:24 

changed [2] 21:7 62:8 

charge [2] 38:12 72:5 

charged [2] 80:15,21 

charitable [2] 28:7 72:17 

charities [1] 28:16 

charity [1] 30:11 

CHIEF [24] 3:3,9 10:10 31: 

24 32:3,6 37:24 38:2 40:4 

45:15 47:22 50:13 56:8,13 

58:24 59:3 60:7 77:9 78: 

25 84:16 89:22 91:21 92:3 

97:14 

child [3] 63:24 70:18 74:7 

chill [10] 28:9 33:5 42:24 

43:11 45:1 71:23 73:7 80: 

6 89:13,18 

chilled [6] 29:1 72:16 73:5 

74:1 80:11 81:18 

chilling [8] 43:2 72:11,24 

73:1 75:23 76:6 88:22 96: 

25 

choice [3] 59:15 71:19 77: 

19 

choices [2] 71:17 88:20 

chose [1] 71:20 

chosen [2] 37:3 88:13 

Ciminelli [1] 38:7 

Circuit [14] 3:19 5:18 11:3, 

13 20:17 39:8 40:2,2 54:3, 

17,18,21 77:8 96:15 

Circuit's [2] 45:9 54:25 

circumstance [3] 27:11, 

17 70:23 

circumstances [14] 13:1, 

5 14:1 26:4 27:19 36:17 

37:14 43:19 50:7 59:25 62: 

20 67:22 79:9 85:6 

cite [5] 14:25 49:18 50:4 55: 

16 93:18 

cited [1] 57:1 

cites [1] 9:19 

cities [1] 89:11 

citizen [2] 8:22 67:1 

citizenship [1] 3:16 

City [2] 72:6 89:14 

civil [28] 4:17 27:18,20,21 

30:17 40:25 54:2,13,18 55: 

13,19 57:8 61:22 65:1 66: 

17 67:18 68:4,20 85:1,4,19, 

22 86:14,25 87:6 94:3,9,13 

civil/criminal [2] 54:8 68:2 

civilly [3] 26:13 94:20 95:1 

claim [2] 67:9 68:21 

clarify [1] 36:13 

clarity [1] 36:12 

class [1] 23:25 

classic [1] 15:12 

clause [2] 51:14 54:11 

clauses [2] 51:12,16 

clear [5] 63:17 74:17 82:7 

84:8 86:12 

clearly [1] 82:23 

client [2] 6:23 78:24 

clients [1] 82:5 

close [3] 83:6 89:14 92:7 

closely [1] 82:2 

closest [1] 14:24 

Coalition [5] 69:23 70:12 

71:3,9 73:2 

coerce [1] 49:24 

coercing [1] 93:24 

colleague [1] 96:8 

Collins [1] 21:23 

combine [1] 23:5 

come [14] 6:7 7:25 18:4 26: 

6,18,22 37:12 38:10 40:12 

48:13 73:17 83:21,23 84:3 

comes [11] 10:23 17:22,22, 

24 34:15 43:17 49:16 52: 

14 53:11 73:24 87:9 

coming [7] 22:5 39:2 49:3 

81:13,17 83:11 89:14 

commands [1] 19:5 

commence [3] 4:22 34:4 

55:21 

commendable [1] 79:25 

commentators [1] 9:13 

commerce [1] 93:25 

commit [5] 15:12 33:21 37: 

15 65:5,17 

commitment [1] 17:15 

commits [1] 95:17 

committed [1] 52:17 

committee [2] 60:2 72:2 

common [2] 4:18 29:22 

communications [3] 12: 

18 40:22 41:8 

community [3] 31:14 67:3 

82:24 

compelling [3] 64:11 67:9 

87:17 

complete [1] 82:11 

completed [2] 86:2,8 

completion [1] 17:18 

compliance [2] 72:7 89:12 

complicated [1] 55:9 

component [1] 58:13 

concede [2] 61:19,22 

conceded [1] 16:24 

concedes [2] 56:16 75:13 

conceding [1] 38:8 

conceive [1] 26:19 

concept [4] 19:3,8 46:17 

82:19 

conception [1] 37:20 

concepts [6] 9:17 18:9 85: 

11,13 91:4,17 

concern [9] 4:15 26:23 28: 

14,24 45:11 46:13,15 47:1 

81:6 

concerned [2] 43:2 73:6 

concerns [8] 39:10 45:5 

46:18,25 49:13 60:6 69:2 

81:5 

concise [1] 20:12 

conclude [1] 37:22 

conduct [38] 3:17 14:12 25: 

10,14,15,16,22,23 26:3,21, 

25 27:13,23 28:22 39:17 

40:25 43:5 54:12 55:11,13 

57:13,15 62:14 76:11 77:3 

78:2,5 83:22 86:14 87:19 

94:13 95:10 96:3,5,8 97:3, 

4,6 

confirm [1] 4:8 

conflate [1] 82:9 

conform [1] 73:8 

Congress [56] 3:11 9:6,6,9, 

22 18:8,16,20 19:12,23 20: 

11,18 21:1,3 22:7 25:21 

26:2 27:23 33:1 49:3 51:2 

56:22,24 57:1,19 59:12,12, 

16,20,22 60:16,21 61:1,4,9 

65:21 66:18,20 68:25 73: 

12,13 84:9,10,12,25 89:8 

90:19 91:8,13,16 92:13,15, 

18,20 95:20 96:2 

Congress's [3] 19:18 56: 

21 61:18 

congressional [1] 91:7 

connote [1] 7:16 

connotes [1] 35:9 

conscious [1] 19:18 

consequences [1] 6:24 

consideration [1] 55:7 

considered [1] 52:19 

consistent [3] 23:15 38:22 

39:1 

consistently [2] 57:16 61: 

10 

constellation [1] 39:10 

constitute [2] 47:16 83:25 

constitutional [10] 3:25 4: 

13 42:18 44:18 50:18 51: 

24 52:12 88:19 93:20 94: 

12 

constitutionally [4] 69:12, 

14 73:15 74:24 

construction [6] 28:8 45: 

19 58:6,8 61:20 96:20 

constructions [1] 96:18 

construe [4] 57:4 69:25 94: 

6,7 

construes [1] 70:10 

content [1] 65:2 

contesting [1] 94:24 

context [7] 4:8,9 19:23 20: 

15 39:6 47:17 58:21 

contexts [1] 37:19 

continue [4] 22:1,9 35:20 

38:15 

contours [1] 96:1 

contract [2] 60:21,22 

control [1] 58:10 

conversations [1] 29:23 

convey [1] 94:1 

convicted [3] 75:3 76:16 

90:10 

convictions [4] 58:6 76:4, 

9 79:21 

core [3] 42:17 50:18 51:24 

Correct [21] 7:23 10:15 11: 

17 22:19 24:10,13,15 25:4 

54:20 62:17 64:23 66:3 76: 

23 77:5 81:4 85:19,20 86: 

2,3 89:10 90:14 

corroborative [1] 60:1 

costs [1] 42:7 

counsel [7] 56:9 58:24 61: 

13 67:7 84:17 91:22 97:15 

counseling [1] 32:13 

Heritage Reporting Corporation 

Sheet 2 between - counseling 

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100

count [1] 37:16 currently [1] 88:11 11,13,14 30:23 36:17 39:3 effort [1] 19:18 evasion [1] 46:20 

country [14] 27:18 28:18 curtail [1] 82:4 43:16,24 45:23 46:11 51:7 either [6] 42:19,21 50:6 79: even [33] 6:16 23:21 24:16, 

30:3,12 31:23 40:19 41:9 Customs [3] 32:20 89:5,7 59:22 82:21 90:3,18 91:19 12 81:12 96:24 17 26:13 28:7 31:21 35:12 

51:15,23 52:3 61:6 74:3 D 96:14 electrical [1] 93:17 40:14 42:2,20 50:9 57:4 

83:2 84:1 difficulties [1] 96:11 element [1] 34:12 58:4 66:15 67:6 68:3,3,21 

counts [1] 75:3 D.C [2] 1:10,19 difficulty [1] 50:6 elements [14] 22:17 31:18 69:24 71:21 72:5 73:19 76: 

couple [6] 26:6 28:19 30: damage [1] 78:12 directed [3] 65:21 85:22 74:23 77:6 79:22 80:2 82: 12 78:18 87:3 89:14,20 94: 

23 33:24 43:25 46:15 danger [2] 71:23 96:22 86:14 21,23 83:12,13 90:4,9,18 6,11,20 96:23 97:6 

course [4] 11:10 63:2 87: data [1] 48:10 disabled [1] 65:18 91:19 ever-changing [1] 72:10 

18 89:13 day [4] 12:9,19 41:8 70:2 disagree [7] 9:11 24:17 66: eleven [1] 71:7 everybody [1] 88:8 

COURT [69] 1:1,14 3:10 4: day-to-day [1] 28:16 11 75:1 77:10,10,12 eliminate [1] 4:14 everyday [1] 28:15 

20 5:23 6:5,17 8:5 9:13,25 dead [1] 72:4 discriminatory [1] 78:14 Elonis [1] 9:3 Everyone [3] 4:3 26:23 87: 

10:3,21 15:2,5 20:9,13,25 deal [1] 11:4 discussed [1] 95:19 emphasize [3] 56:2 82:6 23 

26:8,9 36:16,21,22 41:16 dealing [1] 46:22 discussing [1] 79:2 96:2 everything [1] 33:13 

42:6,15,22 55:5,6,15 56:14, debating [1] 45:8 dismissing [1] 50:6 emphasized [2] 5:23 42:7 evidence [2] 18:6 23:3 

18,23 57:6,16 58:4,17 63: decades [2] 21:3 45:12 dispute [2] 7:14 68:9 empirical [2] 48:24 70:5 evidenced [1] 61:10 

17 65:11 69:22 70:4,13 71: deceived [1] 75:8 disregard [3] 14:4 61:3 93: encompass [1] 40:15 exact [2] 15:22 18:10 

4,6 72:25 73:2,10 76:25 decide [4] 27:12 40:2 54:3 4 encourage [18] 3:12,21 4: Exactly [7] 5:3 7:8 15:19 

77:8 78:4,11 79:6 80:5 81: 56:3 dissent [1] 21:24 4 8:25 9:20 11:15 17:2,3 19:7 23:20 48:20 96:3 

8,17,18 82:23 84:11 85:21 decided [3] 31:16 87:22,25 dissenting [1] 4:7 40:10 49:23 57:2 59:14 60: example [13] 25:24 49:18 

88:15 92:16,23 93:20 94: deciding [2] 47:3,15 distinct [1] 55:6 10,12 61:5 82:16 90:6 93: 50:24 63:20 66:20 68:23 

17 95:6 96:13,17,21 97:1, decision [2] 43:2 44:6 distinction [7] 54:9 59:8 5 73:12 74:14 80:17,18 84:2 

13 decline [1] 54:24 60:8 68:2 82:8 92:7 94:4 encouraged [3] 6:6 65:17 88:6,25 

Court's [6] 5:15 12:10 42: defendant [7] 7:25 8:7 50: district [5] 6:5,13,17 77:7 75:10 examples [7] 29:12 32:4 

13 48:13 58:11 95:5 2 74:22 77:1 78:2,9 81:18 encouragement [5] 60:3 40:16 50:4 67:16 70:17 88: 

courts [4] 9:16 19:1 23:18 defendant's [1] 78:13 disturbed [1] 75:4 65:19 68:14 75:6 89:15 7 

50:5 defense [1] 79:16 division [1] 50:25 encourages [2] 20:11 21: exception [2] 57:9 63:6 

cover [3] 14:10 61:11 63:1 define [6] 8:25 9:4,5 24:12, doctor [1] 11:21 5 exclude [1] 19:19 

covered [7] 16:10,14,16 29: 14 36:16 doctors [1] 40:17 encouraging [11] 10:4 21: excluded [1] 18:20 

3,9 51:17,22 defined [1] 24:20 doctrine [7] 3:19 6:3 47:11 24 22:9 26:24 38:15 64:2, exercise [1] 36:19 

covering [2] 51:2,6 defining [1] 85:18 73:6 76:2 81:6 96:16 17 65:4,12,22 93:19 exist [2] 39:12 69:17 

covers [3] 53:21 77:3 94:8 definitely [1] 28:22 doing [4] 33:22 38:13 52:6 end [4] 12:9 14:22 16:10 87: existing [1] 46:1 

craft [1] 73:12 definition [1] 85:12 80:16 21 expand [1] 57:17 

create [2] 36:11 57:6 definitively [1] 48:17 domestic [1] 84:2 enforce [1] 6:2 expanded [1] 61:6 

crime [22] 3:12 25:11 26:4 defrauding [1] 74:4 done [7] 26:9 48:2 77:17 engage [13] 25:14 26:3,11 expansion [3] 58:1 61:3,8 

33:21 35:4,5,7 37:15 52: deliberate [1] 59:15 81:1 85:15,24 92:15 36:19 63:10,13 64:3,18 66: experience [1] 39:22 

18 53:23,23 59:21 64:6,25 delineated [1] 90:16 door [1] 53:12 19 70:1,2 76:10 93:25 expiring [1] 8:18 

65:9 85:17,18,22 86:5,8 demand [3] 15:13 45:1 92: down [3] 45:11 50:22 56:1 engaged [8] 32:14,17 70:6 explain [4] 7:6 29:8 91:12, 

87:22 88:1 16 dozen [1] 9:20 73:15,18 75:9 80:7,22 16 

crimes [4] 57:10 62:1,4 85: demands [1] 47:11 draconian [1] 27:5 engages [2] 25:16 78:5 explained [3] 4:7 82:16,22 

25 demonstrated [2] 72:24 draft [3] 13:4 46:20 84:13 engaging [3] 25:15 81:2 explicit [1] 10:20 

criminal [15] 4:3,17 25:23 73:1 drafted [1] 59:20 83:22 explicitly [1] 41:17 

27:6 30:17 55:11 57:7 61: demonstration [1] 42:24 dramatically [1] 68:7 enhanced [3] 23:24 24:2, exposed [1] 31:17 

21 62:15 81:23 85:14,14, deny [1] 57:25 draw [5] 4:25 13:6,11 84:8 21 expresses [1] 66:12 

21 86:13 94:4 depart [2] 43:4 44:23 85:8 enhancement [5] 22:16, expressive [1] 97:4 

criminal/civil [1] 92:7 Department [2] 1:19 32:20 drawing [2] 15:18,25 18,24 23:6 24:25 extension [1] 23:14 

criminalization [1] 62:13 departure [1] 44:16 drug [1] 46:20 enough [7] 15:6,8 29:24 extent [7] 26:8 44:1 51:3 

criminalize [9] 25:21 37:2, depend [1] 71:16 drugs [1] 63:21 60:3 69:19,20 76:10 54:10 55:10 60:10 77:20 

8 57:21 67:17 69:3 74:9 depending [1] 88:19 Dubin [1] 38:7 enter [4] 34:8 50:1 51:23 extraordinary [7] 20:19 44: 

84:25 85:4 deportation [1] 27:21 during [2] 45:12 53:22 52:3 23 79:5 92:15,17 96:12 97: 

criminalized [1] 64:4 

criminalizes [2] 33:15 37: 

4 

Deputy [1] 1:18 

described [3] 12:12 20:10 

55:18 

E 

each [2] 9:20 82:3 

enticing [1] 93:23 

entirely [1] 6:15 

entities [1] 32:21 

8 

F 

criminalizing [7] 33:9 63: describes [1] 96:8 earlier [5] 10:1 20:8,9 32:8 entitled [2] 67:4 74:22 facial [3] 71:15,15 77:19 

12 64:19 66:6 68:22 86:24 describing [1] 31:2 48:18 entry [3] 60:20,20,23 facially [3] 3:20 5:12 88:17 

87:20 description [1] 22:3 earning [1] 7:1 ESHA [3] 1:21 2:6 56:11 facilitate [3] 15:8,16 95:16 

criminally [1] 95:2 deserving [2] 28:2 95:23 easier [1] 70:24 especially [5] 39:15 49:13 facilitates [3] 30:20 95:11, 

critical [1] 84:7 deter [1] 28:14 economy [1] 20:8 50:23 60:4 96:18 22 

criticize [2] 73:13,20 determination [1] 27:24 edge [1] 50:10 ESQ [3] 2:3,6,9 facilitating [6] 4:17 8:6 28: 

cross [1] 78:10 determine [1] 55:10 editorial [1] 14:11 ESQUIRE [1] 1:21 2 52:3 94:8,13 

crossed [2] 55:15,22 difference [5] 21:14,21 30: effect [6] 22:16 72:12,24 essence [1] 43:6 facilitation [3] 47:17 95:2 

culpability [2] 95:14,17 1 64:13 86:21 73:1 76:6 96:7 essentially [3] 43:17 77:22 96:4 

curious [1] 90:2 different [25] 9:14 12:7 19: effectively [1] 79:7 94:5 fact [17] 9:22,25 19:11 36: 

current [1] 79:18 2,6 21:13,15,18 26:21 29: effectuates [1] 63:19 establish [1] 90:13 18 40:15,25 53:10,19,22 

Heritage Reporting Corporation 

Sheet 3 count - fact 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1585-1 Filed 05/12/23 Page 102 of 108
Official - Subject to Final Review 

101

70:5,9,13 71:24 73:3,4 76: 24 48:11 49:16,22 50:1 51: 30:19 31:18 33:20 72:19 20,25 93:13 incentivized [2] 66:18 69: 

17 85:24 7,10,21 52:7,9,24 53:15,18, 80:19 83:23 heightened [1] 88:4 1 

facts [2] 74:23 75:21 21 54:6,20 55:14 70:19 77: GORSUCH [24] 16:21 17: HELAMAN [1] 1:6 inchoate [1] 17:16 

factual [2] 36:17 81:17 10 91:23 92:1,3 14,21,25 45:16 67:7,10,13 held [2] 4:20 54:21 incident [1] 55:11 

fails [1] 23:1 FLETHCER [1] 42:1 68:16 69:6 73:21,23 74:18 help [3] 29:21 47:7 83:8 incite [1] 17:2 

fair [3] 44:25 46:14,24 floated [1] 21:23 75:12 78:1,16 79:17 81:9, helpers [1] 52:7 include [2] 18:19 23:16 

fairness [1] 38:24 floating [1] 19:14 11,16,21 84:24 89:23 94: helping [3] 52:6 80:19,19 includes [3] 14:2 24:2 34: 

fall [2] 70:15 87:13 focus [1] 6:15 10 helps [1] 46:25 21 

fallback [1] 94:5 focused [2] 20:20 58:25 got [1] 45:6 Henderson [2] 6:11 88:7 including [1] 30:12 

false [1] 75:9 focusing [1] 21:12 gotten [1] 78:12 Hicks [1] 97:1 indicates [1] 27:22 

familiar [1] 28:12 follow [3] 61:17 67:14 72: govern [1] 57:23 high [2] 29:4 94:14 individual [1] 93:24 

family [5] 13:9 14:18 35:15, 14 government [62] 6:22 7:4 highly [1] 75:14 induce [26] 3:12,21 4:4,22 

18 41:11 food [13] 28:10 29:17 30:19 34:21 36:22 38:8,15 39:14 historical [2] 57:9 63:6 9:20 10:22 11:16 17:2,3 

family's [1] 78:10 31:3,4,18 46:6 53:6 72:19 43:16 56:16,23,25 57:13 history [8] 4:8 18:7 19:23 26:12 34:4 49:23 55:21 57: 

far [1] 37:7 80:20 83:22,23,24 58:9 61:23 62:3 64:11 66: 21:3 45:4 70:25 88:10 96: 2 59:15 60:10,12 61:6 82: 

fear [1] 89:16 Footnote [1] 14:24 5,10 67:9 68:5,21 69:2 70: 24 17 90:6 91:9,10,14,15 93:5, 

feature [1] 25:9 Ford [1] 49:19 10 71:24 72:3 73:17 74:22 hits [1] 84:8 10 

federal [1] 89:12 forgetting [1] 88:8 75:7,13 76:4,8,11,14,19,21, hold [2] 35:11 84:11 induce-and-encourage 

fee [1] 87:25 form [5] 15:3 43:12 79:18 24 77:2,6,15,22 78:7 79:11, holding [1] 71:11 [1] 49:15 

felony [4] 59:25 73:13 83:4 96:5,5 20 80:1,15,20 81:1 82:7,12, Honor [1] 17:24 induced [1] 75:10 

84:8 former [1] 60:11 22 83:10,16 84:12 87:3,17 housekeeper [1] 6:6 inducement [1] 68:15 

fight [1] 12:23 formulation [2] 20:12 30:8 88:13,22 89:19 90:5,12,15 however [1] 88:21 induces [3] 19:5 20:10 21: 

fighting [2] 33:12 44:3 forth [1] 63:7 91:12 Hoy [2] 10:1 20:9 5 

figure [2] 50:16 80:10 found [3] 6:20 10:22 24:25 government's [12] 44:20 huge [1] 41:7 inducing [9] 3:14 9:1 10:4 

figuring [1] 11:10 four [1] 39:1 57:25 58:5,8 61:20 71:16 hunting [2] 70:6 73:4 26:24 35:4 87:12 93:18,23 

file [1] 88:13 frankly [1] 50:5 72:10 77:19 78:19 82:15 hypothesized [2] 5:19 6: 94:19 

filing [1] 88:23 fraud [2] 45:25 75:3 88:19 91:3 23 information [1] 69:4 

final [1] 61:7 fraudulent [1] 3:16 grandchildren [1] 35:21 hypothetical [4] 62:7 72: inherently [2] 93:6 97:4 

finally [4] 58:4 72:9 93:13 free [7] 57:19 69:22 70:12 grandmother [3] 35:15,16, 19 74:13 83:21 inheres [1] 27:3 

96:9 71:3,9 73:2 84:13 24 hypotheticals [9] 12:7 14: initial [1] 60:18 

financial [1] 23:7 Freedom [1] 72:2 grant [1] 79:6 17 27:4 28:13 45:7 48:5 Initially [1] 60:19 

find [6] 6:21 14:24 22:17 frequently [1] 70:3 granted [2] 30:2 55:5 79:2,14 81:13 injected [1] 39:9 

73:19 85:10 96:23 friend [3] 11:22 13:21 15: granting [1] 42:20 I inquiry [2] 69:24 71:14 

finding [1] 81:17 19 great [1] 86:8 instance [2] 5:17 52:9 

fine [2] 56:6 80:20 friends [2] 13:8 40:17 greater [1] 33:19 idea [5] 18:9,10 34:15 36: instances [1] 72:8 

finished [1] 67:11 front [1] 18:11 guess [16] 13:24 19:17 20: 25 55:23 Instead [2] 56:18 94:24 

First [58] 3:18 4:19,21 5:9 full [4] 14:1 17:25 18:4 77: 14 42:4,6 43:9 44:3,14 47: ideas [1] 94:2 instructed [1] 58:7 

16:8 22:1 23:1 24:2,6,8,12, 20 1,18 50:15 54:6 55:3 75: identically [1] 96:6 instruction [2] 38:22 39: 

14 25:20 26:2,7,15 27:2 fully [1] 44:10 22 80:11 90:8 identify [1] 50:20 15 

28:23 33:11,14,22 34:2 36: fundamentally [1] 94:16 guessing [1] 45:3 ii [1] 51:16 instructions [4] 11:2,8 39: 

6 37:23 39:18 40:14,21 49: funding [3] 72:8 89:13,16 gun [1] 52:25 iii [1] 51:16 20 76:20 

10 54:13 55:25 57:20 58:2, 

13,19,22 60:5 62:12,23 63: 

further [5] 35:10 40:5,6,11 

84:19 H illegal [10] 4:22 26:12 34:4, 

7 35:16 55:21 63:19,21 94: integral [1] 57:12 

intellectually [1] 65:18 

2,3 64:10 65:10 69:2,16 future [3] 5:10 44:8 80:6 Hand [3] 10:21 80:14 93:8 19,21 intend [1] 8:9 

71:2 78:8 79:15 81:2 86: 

16 87:16 88:3,4,15 90:25 G handful [1] 70:22 

HANSEN [9] 1:6 3:5,13 8: 

illegally [2] 3:15 34:8 

illustrates [1] 27:15 

intended [4] 4:22 9:23 19: 

23 32:24 

92:9 94:21 95:5,13 gain [1] 23:7 19 54:7 56:15 73:25 74:16, imagine [8] 27:1 32:7,11 intending [1] 53:2 

fits [1] 63:5 gave [2] 29:16 84:22 21 36:18 41:6 45:9 50:7 69:7 intent [29] 7:12,22,25 8:2,6, 

five [7] 10:1 20:9 33:16 39: Gazzam [2] 55:15 94:18 Hansen's [5] 5:14 52:7 58: immigrants [1] 32:23 24 10:12,20 12:14 13:17, 

22 71:10 83:4 89:20 gee [1] 16:20 6 79:25 97:10 immigration [4] 3:13 33:9 24 21:1 30:25 38:4 40:20 

FLETCHER [106] 1:18 2:3, General [11] 1:18 14:10,11 happen [5] 33:1 45:4 46:24 82:1 95:22 47:6,8 56:25 59:24 60:1,4 

9 3:6,7,9 5:20 6:10,13,19 18:23,25 19:8 23:22 24:18, 74:25 81:22 immune [1] 33:11 61:10,18 62:2 75:11,17 83: 

7:3,13,18,23 8:2,13,17,21 22,24 59:21 happened [5] 27:7 76:18 immunized [1] 73:16 14,16 91:7 

9:11 10:16 11:6,14 12:1, generalized [1] 88:6 81:19 89:2,4 implication [3] 90:4 93:11, intention [1] 91:3 

23 13:13,22,25 16:1,12,15, generally [3] 37:10,13 86:1 happens [6] 11:19,24 26: 12 interacts [1] 54:19 

21 17:6,20,23 18:2,12,15, gets [1] 26:24 25 29:23 32:16 53:7 implicit [2] 10:22 14:8 interest [8] 64:11 66:1,2,5, 

21 19:21 20:7 21:9,19 22: getting [1] 83:3 harboring [2] 51:14 53:14 import [1] 17:4 12 67:9 68:22 87:17 

19 23:9,11 24:4,10,15 25:5, Giboney [1] 55:16 hard [9] 4:25 14:20 16:9,15 important [7] 12:10 60:5 interesting [5] 6:22 48:1 

8 26:5 28:1,19 29:10,19,25 give [8] 17:9 18:21 31:19 30:10 36:1 55:24 80:25 85: 66:1,2 88:11 96:2,18 52:15 78:22 79:14 

30:22 31:8,11,19 32:1,5 37:16 38:20 72:21 82:4 85: 11 importantly [1] 5:5 interpretation [2] 21:23 

33:24 34:14,18,24 35:8,25 3 hardest [1] 14:17 importing [1] 91:3 48:25 

36:7,10,14,25 37:6,13 38: given [2] 10:1 38:6 harshly [3] 57:14 86:6,10 impossible [1] 69:11 interpretations [1] 45:10 

17,23 39:5,25 40:8 41:15 gives [1] 73:11 hear [3] 3:3 19:19 94:23 imprisonment [1] 83:5 interpreted [1] 40:15 

42:4 43:25 44:13 46:14 47: giving [9] 3:21 7:2 13:12 heard [6] 5:24 67:15 92:18, incentive [1] 73:11 interpreting [2] 44:17 93:9 

Heritage Reporting Corporation 

Sheet 4 fact - interpreting 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1585-1 Filed 05/12/23 Page 103 of 108
Official - Subject to Final Review 

102

interrupt [1] 67:11 

interstate [1] 93:24 

invalid [4] 23:17 24:6,19 

35:11 

invalidate [3] 3:20 24:21, 

23 

invalidated [1] 71:6 

invalidating [2] 5:12 42:8 

investigation [1] 33:2 

investigations [2] 72:5 89: 

1 

investigative [1] 71:25 

invitation [1] 45:9 

invitations [1] 57:17 

invite [1] 48:5 

invocation [1] 77:17 

invoked [2] 3:19 71:25 

invokes [1] 89:1 

involved [1] 48:18 

involving [2] 6:5 63:24 

isn't [13] 28:21 43:5 47:8 

48:17 52:20 55:9 68:2 70: 

23 71:14 73:9 78:23 80:9 

83:19 

issue [11] 5:3,24 8:15 10: 

18 13:5 26:9 39:16,17 55: 

4,6 93:17 

issued [1] 33:1 

issues [2] 26:22 39:10 

itself [8] 22:23 25:11,15,22 

50:25 66:18 68:25 76:9 

iv [6] 51:19,22,25 52:11,13 

54:11 

J 

JACKSON [34] 18:3,13,16 

19:10 20:5 21:8,10 30:15, 

23 31:6,10,12 47:6 50:14, 

15 51:9,18 52:5,8,10 53:9, 

17,20,24 54:16 55:8 76:17, 

25 80:9 89:25 90:1,15,25 

91:20 

job [1] 56:21 

journalists [1] 89:2 

Judge [3] 10:21 21:23 93:8 

judges [1] 4:7 

judgment [4] 95:14,20,25 

96:1 

judicial [1] 43:1 

Juliet [1] 70:14 

jurisprudence [1] 95:5 

jury [10] 11:1,7 22:17 25:1 

38:11,22 39:15 58:7 73:19 

76:16 

Justice [238] 1:19 3:3,10 5: 

16,21 6:4,10,12,18,21 7:7, 

17,21,24 8:8,16,20,23 9:11 

10:5,6,7,8,10,10,11,25 11: 

14 12:16 13:10,20,23 15: 

17 16:7,13,21 17:14,21,25 

18:3,5,13,16 19:10 20:5 

21:8,9,10,11 22:11,12,13, 

15,20 23:10 24:1,5,11 25:2, 

8 27:25 28:3,4,6 29:8,16, 

20 30:15,22 31:6,10,12,24 

32:3,6,19 33:25 34:6,16,20 

35:2,13,25 36:3,7,8,10,11, 

14,24 37:1,10,24,24,25 38: 

2,3,18,21,24,25 39:6,24 40: 

4,4,6,7,8,24 41:24 42:2 43: 

14 44:12 45:14,15,15,17, 

18 47:6,21,22,22,24 49:6, 

21,25 50:12,13,13,15,19 

51:9,18 52:5,8,10,15 53:9, 

17,20,24 54:1,16 55:8 56:8, 

13 58:12,15,18,23,24 59:3 

60:7 61:13,15,16 62:6,7,10, 

18,21 63:9,15 64:1,7,14,17, 

24 65:4,7,16,25 66:7,10 67: 

7,10,13,14 68:16 69:6 70: 

19 71:1,18 72:13,14,18 73: 

21,23 74:18 75:12 76:17, 

25 77:9,25 78:10,16,25 79: 

17 80:7,9,18 81:9,11,16,21 

83:7,9 84:16,18,19,20,21, 

23,24 85:7,10,23 86:4,17 

87:10 88:5 89:4,8,21,22,22, 

23,24,25 90:1,15,25 91:20, 

21 92:4 94:10 95:18 97:14 

justification [1] 57:11 

justify [1] 5:11 

K 

KAGAN [20] 11:14 12:16 

13:10,20,23 15:17 16:7,13 

40:7,8 41:24 42:2 43:14 

44:12 45:14 70:19 71:2,18 

80:8 89:22 

Kagan's [2] 50:19 72:14 

KAVANAUGH [16] 10:5,7, 

11,25 27:25 28:3,6 29:8,16, 

20 45:17,18 47:21 52:15 

83:7,9 

Kavanaugh's [2] 72:18 80: 

18 

keep [5] 24:6 38:13 39:2,2 

75:18 

keeping [1] 31:22 

keeps [1] 88:8 

kept [1] 21:4 

key [1] 64:13 

kill [1] 17:11 

kind [10] 21:12 28:15 33:23 

37:5 48:1 51:7 75:20 77:3 

80:22 95:1 

kinds [7] 18:19 19:14 40: 

16 52:21 69:8 71:20 76:21 

knocks [1] 53:12 

knowing [5] 22:4 40:19 53: 

1 84:3 93:4 

knowingly [1] 60:25 

knowledge [4] 14:1,3,3 61: 

2 

L 

labor [2] 60:22 93:16 

laborers [1] 60:21 

lack [2] 36:12 71:13 

LaFave [2] 9:19 14:25 

language [4] 18:10 21:5, 

13 49:8 

last [4] 5:24 6:1 89:20 97: 

12 

law [57] 4:3 6:8 9:12 14:3,5, 

16,22 15:19,21 18:22,25 

26:19 36:12,23 45:20,20 

46:22 52:23 55:25,25 57:8 

59:16 63:1,2,5 64:12,24 

65:12,13,14,21 66:12,16, 

17 67:23 71:7,8,11,15,20 

73:9,16 78:15 79:3,18 80: 

5,24 83:1 84:11,14 85:14, 

22 86:24 87:4,18 88:17,23 

law-targeting [1] 62:25 

lawful [6] 27:6 66:22,23,24 

67:5 68:25 

lawfully [1] 28:18 

laws [8] 48:15,18 57:22 73: 

12 78:12,12 86:14 87:15 

lawyer [6] 6:23,25 7:1 11: 

20 25:3 82:24 

lawyers [8] 32:21 67:2 68: 

24 69:3 72:20 81:25 82:1, 

1 

least [7] 4:11 18:18 30:25 

42:12 67:22 71:9 88:8 

leave [6] 6:7 8:12 23:18 31: 

23 61:5 84:6 

leaving [2] 6:25 68:13 

left [9] 8:18 14:15 59:6,9,14, 

17 92:22,23 93:5 

legal [2] 69:4 74:16 

legislative [2] 19:22 95:13 

legislatures [3] 9:15 19:1 

27:12 

legitimate [1] 41:20 

length [1] 71:13 

less [4] 25:17 27:13 86:1 

88:18 

lesser [1] 87:12 

letter [2] 72:4 73:8 

letting [1] 43:5 

level [1] 47:15 

liability [6] 29:5 30:9,14 47: 

4 54:19 90:13 

lied [1] 75:8 

light [1] 40:3 

lightly [1] 21:1 

likely [2] 78:24 81:22 

likewise [2] 13:6 32:6 

limit [4] 25:21 26:1 27:8 31: 

7 

limitation [3] 25:19 27:3 

60:22 

limited [3] 31:7 57:5,9 

limiting [5] 31:12 61:25 62: 

4 96:17,20 

limits [3] 6:2,3 44:6 

line [11] 4:25 13:6,11 15:18, 

22,25 42:10 67:14 83:6 85: 

8 89:15 

lines [3] 12:19 60:8 84:8 

list [1] 32:20 

litigated [1] 49:13 

little [7] 15:14 18:18 44:4 

46:10 73:23 75:22 84:22 

live [1] 35:20 

lives [1] 35:15 

living [1] 35:20 

long [4] 4:18 9:13 70:20 72: 

22 

longstanding [1] 3:20 

look [9] 10:18 15:2 52:13 

60:15 70:8,25 71:21 80:14 

90:5 

looked [3] 48:7 70:5,13 

looking [3] 50:16 54:4 81:1 

looks [2] 16:18 93:14 

lose [1] 61:22 

losing [1] 89:16 

lot [12] 13:6,19 14:21 16:16 

28:15,20 32:11 33:2 39:22 

45:4 46:5 49:17 

lots [5] 9:14 49:8,9 74:4,4 

love [1] 35:21 

M 

made [9] 3:12 27:24 32:20 

63:17 70:24 73:13 82:7 92: 

19 95:20 

main [1] 73:7 

mainly [1] 77:18 

mainstream [3] 70:13,17 

73:3 

major [1] 69:1 

majority [3] 31:1 42:14,15 

mandates [1] 57:24 

Mann [1] 93:22 

many [10] 20:23 33:1 45:12 

70:6 75:2 76:13 77:16 80: 

10,21 89:17 

March [1] 1:11 

marijuana [1] 13:3 

married [1] 67:1 

mashed [1] 91:17 

mask [2] 52:25 57:23 

Massachusetts [1] 6:14 

material [2] 15:4,5 

materials [1] 67:4 

math [1] 41:17 

matter [2] 1:13 76:15 

matters [2] 20:16 68:2 

meal [1] 46:7 

mean [28] 9:1 11:19 12:13, 

13,17 13:23 21:17,25 22: 

22 23:24 30:16 44:1 50:19 

58:1 72:16,21 74:2,5,5 75: 

17 76:18 78:6,13 79:5 80: 

11,17 81:19 90:7 

meaning [8] 3:22 4:9 8:11 

9:24 38:20 56:18 58:9 92: 

22 

meanings [1] 9:15 

means [10] 11:11,16 35:12 

49:2 64:10 72:11 82:16,17 

92:6,10 

medicine [1] 5:25 

meet [1] 29:4 

meeting [1] 30:13 

meets [2] 79:13 94:14 

Melchert-Dinkel [1] 65:11 

member [1] 14:18 

members [2] 41:12 67:3 

mens [10] 11:17 16:23 22:4 

40:10 61:1 75:11 79:19 92: 

25 93:2,7 

mental [1] 87:12 

mere [1] 60:3 

met [1] 47:5 

might [25] 5:9 19:13,16 21: 

17,25 26:18,21 27:12 41:6 

44:9 45:4 47:5,10 56:5 65: 

15,24 69:17 70:15 72:22 

74:8,8 84:24 86:22 87:20 

89:3 

mind [1] 18:18 

mine [2] 17:12 61:17 

Minnesota [2] 50:4 65:10 

minor [2] 46:19,23 

minute [2] 24:1 36:4 

mirrored [1] 20:12 

mish-mash [1] 95:3 

mission [2] 31:7,13 

model [1] 39:15 

modest [1] 74:8 

Monday [1] 1:11 

money [5] 3:16 7:1 24:9 74: 

5 75:19 

moral [1] 15:10 

morning [1] 79:15 

most [4] 5:23 12:10 29:15 

70:22 

mostly [1] 44:2 

mother [1] 16:19 

move [1] 16:5 

movies [3] 70:14,17 73:3 

Ms [55] 56:10,13 58:15,20 

59:2,11 60:12 61:25 62:9, 

17,21 63:15 64:5,8,23 65:6, 

8,20 66:3,9,14 67:8,12 68: 

11,17 69:21 71:1,21 72:25 

73:22 74:15,21 76:1,23 77: 

5,12 79:17 81:4,10,14,21 

83:8,15 85:5,9,20 86:3,11, 

23 87:14 88:12 89:6,10 90: 

14 91:6 

much [9] 13:12 16:6 27:2 

48:9 50:6 54:22 61:11 84: 

22 85:23 

municipality [1] 87:22 

murder [1] 15:12 

must [1] 58:6 

myself [1] 17:18 

N 

nail [1] 56:1 

namely [1] 57:7 

narrow [8] 37:22 49:5 63:5 

66:16 69:15 73:12 76:19 

84:13 

Heritage Reporting Corporation 

Sheet 5 interrupt - narrow 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1585-1 Filed 05/12/23 Page 104 of 108
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103

narrowed [3] 68:8,12,17 offense [17] 8:6 17:17 22: 3,10 12:6 13:19 14:22 18: 13,22 32:13,21 33:4 34:7 practice [1] 38:16 

narrower [7] 35:12 37:20 22 23:22,24 24:2,18,20,21 8,17 19:6,12,14 20:6 29:13 36:8 40:16,18 41:2,11 43: pre-enforcement [1] 81: 

59:13 60:11,13,14 61:24 45:23 46:2,9 47:3 61:21 36:1 39:23 47:25 49:19 50: 5 52:3,21 66:2,11,19,25 67: 24 

narrowing [6] 28:8 45:19 67:18 68:7 74:8 5,16 55:9 56:22,25 59:4,6, 5 68:24 70:1,6,9 73:7,10, precedent [1] 23:12 

58:5,8 61:20 80:2 offenses [7] 3:13 23:25 46: 10 70:20 72:17 73:4,4 74: 14 74:3,6,10 75:2,10,18 80: preceding [1] 51:12 

narrowly [8] 4:5 38:11 64: 16,19,24 68:4 83:12 23 77:18 78:25 80:10 92: 10,16,22 81:7,17 82:25 83: precisely [1] 16:1 

12 65:14,23 67:23 69:25 offers [1] 26:11 20,25 5 84:3 89:1 95:15 predecessor [1] 10:2 

87:18 officials [1] 89:14 outside [2] 26:14 34:1 people's [1] 75:24 premise [3] 7:14 12:24 44: 

National [1] 93:16 often [1] 19:2 over [5] 21:20 42:15 60:17 per [1] 51:20 3 

nature [1] 47:3 Okay [9] 22:12,20 40:12 52: 61:9 97:12 Percoco [1] 38:7 presenting [1] 72:11 

necessarily [5] 46:7 47:8 8 53:20 63:9 79:12 85:3 overbreadth [56] 3:19 4: perfectly [2] 27:6 56:6 president [2] 73:14,20 

64:18,19 83:19 94:25 14 5:6,22,25 11:9 12:15 Perhaps [3] 81:23 89:2 91: Press [3] 26:10 72:2 94:18 

necessary [2] 47:16 71:2 old [7] 7:19 10:23 29:6 45: 22:21 23:2,4,13,14,16 36: 2 pretty [3] 29:22 92:14,16 

need [7] 4:2 16:23 31:4,4,4 21 48:20,23 52:14 20 39:9 41:5,14,17 42:7,13 permissible [4] 42:8 78:15 prevail [2] 56:15 75:15 

70:8 83:17 older [1] 48:4 43:1 44:15 48:3,4,8 49:1 80:3 92:11 prevented [1] 81:2 

needed [1] 19:12 Once [6] 11:11 12:11 36:11 50:3,11 54:9,14 55:2,4 58: permit [1] 24:13 preventing [1] 5:12 

needs [1] 90:12 67:21,21 85:2 14,17,21 61:23 67:24 68: permits [1] 24:12 previous [2] 9:6 92:24 

neighbor [1] 11:21 one [46] 3:17 6:3,17 8:4,5 10 69:9,19 70:7,11,24 73:6 perpetrator [2] 85:15,16 previously [1] 91:15 

neighbors [1] 40:17 13:17,25 15:22 16:8,18 18: 76:2 77:15 78:22 80:13 81: Perpetrators [2] 86:4,5 primarily [2] 97:3,6 

Nevada [1] 49:19 22,23 19:6 20:8 21:12 28: 6 88:16 92:8 94:15 96:10, person [15] 25:16 30:18 33: Principal [2] 1:18 82:11 

never [17] 4:18 35:19 41:16 20 29:14,17 30:24 32:7 33: 11,16,19 20 34:22 37:11 41:9,11 52: principle [1] 35:6 

43:18 70:21 72:5,25 77:11, 25 36:19 39:16 40:23 42: overbreadth-type [1] 49: 6 64:16 65:16 67:20 73:18 principles [12] 12:6,25 13: 

23 79:1 80:15,20 85:18,21, 13 44:1 46:16,25 47:5 48: 13 87:12 90:9 95:17 16 14:23 23:16 26:6,17 36: 

24 86:7 88:14 12,17 49:18 51:4 53:25 73: overbroad [11] 23:23,24 person's [1] 22:5 16 37:18 43:4 44:24 47:19 

New [4] 1:21,21 26:16 57:6 7 78:6 79:13 80:4,14 81:5 24:19 35:11 54:21 56:4 68: persuade [1] 49:23 prior [4] 20:10,13 57:17 59: 

newer [1] 48:15 86:21 88:9 90:2,16 91:18 19 71:11 94:7 96:23 97:2 persuaded [1] 19:16 19 

newly-passed [1] 45:2 95:8 overlapping [1] 9:15 persuading [1] 93:23 probably [4] 11:1 41:10 87: 

newspaper [1] 14:11 one's [1] 72:17 overriding [1] 81:5 Petitioner [6] 1:4,20 2:4, 13 88:3 

next [1] 3:4 only [24] 6:1 16:23 26:13 overstayed [1] 66:25 10 3:8 92:2 problem [9] 4:19 5:2,6 11: 

nice [1] 43:21 27:18 33:5,10 37:7 43:13 own [1] 74:16 piece [1] 51:1 1 12:15 14:20 44:11 54:14 

nine [1] 4:7 48:23 53:22 54:12 56:19 P Pittsburgh [4] 26:10 55:17, 74:2 

Ninth [15] 3:18 5:18 11:3, 58:1,12 61:2,5 62:1,4 68: 19 94:18 problematic [1] 91:2 

12 20:17 39:8 40:1,2 45:8 13 73:14 79:18 81:1 87:8 p.m [1] 97:16 place [3] 12:18 41:8 84:4 problems [1] 36:20 

54:3,16,17,21,25 96:15 94:20 PAGE [2] 2:2 93:18 plain [4] 38:9 56:17 58:9 proceeds [1] 17:10 

nobody [1] 73:5 open [3] 72:5 76:25 83:24 pantry [2] 83:22,24 61:11 prohibit [1] 56:19 

noncitizen [3] 11:23 12:20 opening [1] 15:1 Paper [2] 55:18,19 plainly [2] 5:13 41:20 prohibited [2] 26:14 93:18 

53:7 opens [1] 88:25 parking [3] 57:24 87:23,24 plausible [1] 4:11 prohibiting [1] 60:19 

noncitizen's [1] 93:3 opinion [3] 71:11 78:4,11 parses [1] 19:6 play [3] 26:6,18,22 prohibition [2] 59:21 92: 

noncitizens [6] 3:14 8:15 opportunity [1] 78:20 part [20] 10:14 11:9 19:18 please [2] 3:10 56:14 13 

28:17 35:16 80:19 95:24 opposite [1] 39:4 21:13 24:3,6,7,7,8,9,12,14 plurality [1] 71:10 Prohibitions [1] 4:16 

none [1] 75:4 options [1] 69:5 28:16 29:22 34:12 35:6 47: point [14] 9:3 18:6 52:16 prohibits [2] 62:13 93:23 

nonprofits [1] 52:20 oral [5] 1:14 2:2,5 3:7 56: 5 50:24 51:3 54:14 54:1 62:12,16 68:23 69:21 promised [2] 13:14 77:23 

normal [1] 87:15 11 particular [5] 44:19 59:25 72:9,15 78:18,18 90:9 95: proof [1] 73:5 

note [3] 59:18 79:18 81:24 order [2] 45:10 90:12 77:1 78:1 90:17 9 property [1] 78:12 

noted [4] 60:2 72:3 78:4,11 ordinances [1] 57:24 particularly [2] 25:17 65: pointed [4] 47:25 72:17 77: proposing [1] 63:21 

notes [1] 72:7 ordinary [3] 44:23 58:2 65: 18 18 78:25 prosecute [6] 6:25 32:25 

nothing [2] 8:11 75:24 9 parts [1] 23:17 points [2] 70:19 82:9 35:22 77:20 97:10,12 

noting [1] 81:25 organizations [5] 28:7 31: pass [1] 65:24 pornography [2] 63:25 70: prosecuted [3] 6:9 73:14 

number [4] 38:6 41:7,10, 2 32:12 33:2 72:18 passed [2] 65:21 71:7 18 90:10 

23 other [32] 5:6 10:2 12:3,4 past [1] 48:9 posit [2] 22:25 27:3 prosecution [11] 6:17 28: 

O 19:13 20:14 24:21 25:18 

32:10 33:17 38:25 42:22 

paths [1] 67:5 

pathway [4] 66:22,23,24 positing [3] 20:17 24:16 

69:15 

9 50:2 77:11,13 79:1 83:4 

84:9 88:9 96:22,25 object [1] 76:19 46:16,18 48:22 49:14,15 68:24 position [5] 4:1 25:17 37: prosecutions [11] 32:4 70: 

objected [1] 77:6 50:16 58:19,22 59:8 75:23 patrol [1] 89:5 17 86:12 92:10 21 71:2,4,14 72:15,23 88:7, objection [1] 11:12 77:16 80:21 82:3 87:19,21 pattern [1] 60:16 positions [1] 72:10 14,24 89:18 

obscenity [2] 33:12 63:6 91:10,15 92:12 93:14 97: Paul [1] 78:3 posits [1] 23:22 prosecutorial [4] 71:17,19, observations [1] 28:20 11 pay [1] 17:12 possibility [1] 5:8 22 88:20 

obtain [1] 75:20 others [4] 32:22 43:6 69:3 paying [1] 87:25 possible [4] 3:22 36:15 49: prospect [1] 75:19 

obviously [4] 17:16 20:23 86:22 penalties [1] 27:5 9 80:9 prostitute [1] 64:2 

22:22 24:17 otherwise [4] 21:5 31:23 penalty [3] 21:7 22:24 27: possibly [1] 67:22 prostitution [10] 49:20,21 occasionally [1] 49:17 33:13 57:19 21 poster [1] 74:6 63:11,13 64:3,5,18 67:19 

occur [1] 13:18 ought [4] 4:12 5:25 23:18 Peoni [1] 93:8 posture [4] 56:1,6 73:25 87:13 93:25 

odd [1] 48:1 37:18 People [51] 13:7 14:13 27: 74:11 protect [1] 4:21 

offender [1] 93:3 out [39] 6:13 9:6,8,10,22 11: 12 28:11 30:2,11,12 31:3,8, potentially [2] 23:23 24:19 protected [13] 3:18,23 5:1 

Heritage Reporting Corporation 

Sheet 6 narrowed - protected 

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104

39:17 43:5 50:9 71:5 86: 

19,20,22 88:14,18 94:21 

protecting [1] 66:1 

protection [3] 26:14 62:23 

89:7 

protective [1] 70:1 

prove [8] 25:3,6 34:10,21 

74:23 75:7 80:1 90:12 

proven [1] 8:11 

provide [7] 5:10 15:23 16: 

2 25:20 31:3 32:12 67:3 

provided [1] 66:21 

provides [1] 30:11 

providing [8] 28:10 30:4 

32:22 46:6 52:16,20,24 69: 

4 

provision [9] 24:22,24 32: 

15 53:6 75:6 89:16 90:21, 

23 93:15 

provisions [8] 21:7 25:7 

26:1 50:17 52:16,21 59:5 

90:20 

prudential [1] 43:1 

public [3] 14:11 72:12 76: 

10 

punish [3] 57:13 95:2,10 

punished [3] 33:6 57:14 

86:9 

punishment [8] 28:2 33: 

16,18,19,20 86:1,7 95:23 

pure [2] 68:14 83:20 

purport [1] 42:12 

purpose [7] 16:23 25:18 

31:22 55:3 59:4,7 93:11 

purposes [1] 12:11 

pushing [1] 44:10 

put [2] 9:5 39:5 

putting [2] 9:9 35:18 

puzzled [1] 21:19 

Q 

qualifies [1] 53:8 

qualify [1] 87:11 

qualifying [2] 36:4,5 

quantify [1] 70:16 

question [11] 12:3,4 22:16 

23:22 42:3 50:20 54:18,24 

78:1,22 94:11 

questioning [1] 67:15 

questions [10] 5:10,15 21: 

12 28:23 45:22 55:24 56:5 

58:11 84:24 94:12 

quickly [1] 61:17 

quite [3] 8:2 93:1,15 

R 

R.A.V [1] 78:3 

raise [5] 4:19 5:9 28:22 45: 

7 69:1 

raised [1] 45:5 

raises [2] 45:22 52:15 

range [1] 57:22 

rarely [1] 97:2 

rather [1] 33:17 

rationality [1] 27:8 

rea [10] 11:17 16:23 22:4 

40:10 61:1 75:11 79:20 92: 

25 93:2,7 

reach [6] 35:12 54:11,18, 

23 66:17 69:25 

reaches [2] 55:12 68:19 

reaching [2] 83:20 88:17 

read [13] 4:2 16:16 18:18 

19:20 37:3 38:9,10 39:3 

42:13 51:4 66:16 76:15 90: 

6 

reading [2] 4:12 39:11 

ready [1] 16:17 

real [4] 42:7 43:3 45:1 94: 

11 

realistic [4] 42:24 70:2 71: 

23 96:22 

really [29] 5:20 11:23 12:21 

13:20 15:14,15,20 17:11 

20:18,22 27:4,22 39:9,12, 

17 40:18 45:11 51:5,6 55: 

5 69:13,13 74:13 77:2 80: 

10,25 90:11 94:23 97:8 

realm [1] 58:16 

reason [16] 19:22,24 22:2 

24:23 35:10 37:22 40:24 

41:1 43:7 48:16 50:22 53: 

5 57:10 70:11 80:4 88:16 

reasonable [2] 39:14 95: 

25 

reasoning [1] 54:25 

reasons [2] 30:24 56:16 

reassured [1] 45:18 

REBUTTAL [3] 2:8 91:23 

92:1 

receive [2] 72:8 89:12 

received [1] 75:3 

recent [2] 48:13 71:24 

recently [1] 5:23 

recited [1] 28:21 

reckless [3] 14:3 61:3 93:4 

recognized [1] 9:14 

recommending [1] 28:11 

reconsidering [1] 76:2 

record [6] 48:6,22,24 72:16 

81:12,16 

Recruiting [1] 15:11 

reduce [1] 41:17 

refer [1] 4:5 

referred [1] 8:5 

referring [2] 6:11 21:22 

regulate [3] 68:5 78:7 95:1 

regulated [3] 63:16,22 78: 

6 

regulates [1] 58:3 

regulating [1] 66:12 

regulatory [3] 25:24,25 57: 

22 

related [1] 33:9 

relation [1] 41:19 

Relations [1] 93:16 

relative [1] 42:10 

relatively [2] 46:19 48:15 

relevant [9] 29:15 49:1 71: 

22 77:14,21,22 78:23 88: 

12,21 

relief [1] 75:20 

religious [1] 32:21 

rely [1] 32:24 

relying [3] 54:8 55:12,19 

remain [7] 34:23 47:9 51: 

23 66:13 67:6 83:1 84:1 

remaining [7] 25:10 27:17 

30:18 34:9,10 52:21 61:6 

remains [4] 18:19 21:15,18 

84:13 

remand [4] 11:2 75:14,16 

78:19 

remands [1] 55:6 

remedy [1] 70:11 

removal [2] 27:21 95:24 

removed [3] 59:12 61:1,4 

render [1] 63:18 

rendering [1] 36:6 

reply [1] 55:17 

report [1] 60:2 

Reporters [1] 72:2 

request [3] 15:10,16 17:8 

requested [1] 57:25 

require [5] 71:4 82:14 83: 

13,16 85:14 

required [10] 8:3 56:25 59: 

24,25 60:24 61:2 73:1 78: 

20 82:13 88:15 

requirement [16] 7:22 8:3 

10:12,21 11:17 12:14 14:7 

17:4 34:25 38:4 60:4 61:2 

75:11 79:20 93:1,7 

requirements [4] 25:25,25 

29:13 76:14 

requires [3] 23:6 33:8 82: 

10 

requisite [2] 30:25 62:2 

requisites [2] 30:13 47:4 

reserve [1] 56:5 

reside [2] 3:14 21:25 

residence [5] 21:17,22 22: 

1,2,9 

resides [2] 21:14,16 

residing [1] 22:5 

resisted [1] 57:16 

resolved [1] 75:14 

resort [1] 6:1 

resources [1] 72:20 

respect [5] 68:4 70:24 77:1 

78:15 87:5 

responded [1] 50:19 

Respondent [6] 1:7,22 2:7 

54:7 56:12 96:15 

Respondents [1] 20:17 

response [1] 46:4 

responses [1] 71:1 

rest [2] 23:18 28:12 

return [2] 54:4,5 

reus [3] 16:25 17:4,7 

reverse [1] 97:13 

revisited [2] 21:4,6 

revisiting [1] 49:4 

rewrite [4] 7:9,15 38:19 56: 

18 

rewriting [2] 10:17 38:14 

rights [6] 43:6 67:3 74:12, 

16,19 82:25 

rob [3] 17:9 53:1,2 

robbed [1] 53:11 

robber [4] 46:6 52:17,25 

53:13 

robbery [3] 45:24 46:9 53: 

4 

ROBERTS [19] 3:3 10:10 

31:24 32:3 37:24 38:2 40: 

4 45:15 47:22 50:13 56:8 

58:24 59:3 60:7 77:9 84: 

16 89:22 91:21 97:14 

Romanette [1] 51:8 

Romeo [1] 70:14 

roots [2] 57:9 60:18 

Rosemond [3] 8:5 10:19 

15:6 

rule [3] 54:17 94:25 95:13 

runs [1] 84:1 

S 

safe [2] 84:4,6 

same [21] 5:3 10:23,24 12: 

2 15:23 19:3 31:20,20 32: 

9 37:17 38:20 43:12 51:3 

57:18 64:21 65:7,8 82:21 

92:22 95:17 96:3 

satisfied [2] 66:8,15 

satisfy [7] 58:2 63:8 64:20 

65:13 87:5,20 88:4 

saying [28] 7:5,15 10:23 12: 

12,20 15:22,23 16:2,9 17: 

21,23 32:23,25 40:17,19 

44:2,2,4,22 49:8 50:20 68: 

1 76:21 82:12 83:10,21,23 

90:5 

says [16] 11:23 13:21 14:17 

15:19 16:19 22:4 24:7,8 

35:18 42:15 43:17 76:14 

84:12 90:6,17 91:7 

Scalia's [1] 78:11 

scenario [1] 55:11 

scheme [1] 3:16 

schemes [3] 5:13 97:10,11 

scholarships [1] 28:11 

scrutiny [17] 33:14 57:20 

58:2 63:4,8 64:10,21 65:3, 

10,12,14,24 66:4 87:1,5,16 

88:4 

second [10] 22:15 24:7,7,8 

40:23 41:1 57:4 62:12,16 

73:11 

secondary [1] 93:19 

Section [11] 4:10 5:2,9,17 

14:24 54:11 71:25 72:3 77: 

17 89:1,12 

sections [1] 21:16 

secure [1] 76:9 

secures [2] 76:4 79:20 

securities [1] 45:24 

see [9] 31:13 48:2 52:5 53: 

17 59:9 60:8,16 75:20 87: 

15 

seek [3] 15:16 30:6 47:12 

seeks [2] 34:3 55:20 

seem [2] 28:13 46:5 

seemed [1] 82:9 

seems [4] 21:16 46:10 74: 

11 75:14 

seen [3] 16:18 23:12 70:21 

Senate [1] 60:2 

send [2] 40:1 55:2 

sending [1] 11:12 

sense [4] 17:13 34:13 42:5 

64:15 

sensitive [1] 55:23 

separate [1] 90:19 

serious [1] 27:21 

seriously [2] 27:23 39:16 

service [1] 54:9 

services [4] 32:12,13,16, 

22 

set [2] 46:25 69:16 

seven [1] 19:5 

sever [1] 23:17 

severable [1] 23:25 

share [1] 95:16 

she's [2] 35:17,18 

shelter [8] 28:10 29:17 30: 

20 31:3,5,18 72:20 84:2 

shorthand [1] 9:25 

shorthanded [1] 10:3 

shouldn't [3] 9:5 37:4 88: 

11 

show [2] 75:10 87:8 

showing [4] 45:1 79:22 92: 

17,19 

shown [1] 61:10 

side [1] 15:22 

significant [3] 5:21 21:2 

33:17 

silence [1] 81:7 

silent [1] 81:7 

silently [1] 91:4 

similar [3] 18:9 49:12,22 

Similarly [1] 70:12 

simple [1] 89:18 

simply [5] 69:24 83:21 84: 

11 88:22 90:17 

since [2] 49:14 79:19 

sincere [1] 28:13 

Sineneng-Smith [4] 5:24 

39:7 49:14 77:7 

situation [4] 22:23 23:5 74: 

7 80:14 

situations [2] 25:13 74:13 

six [1] 39:22 

slice [1] 14:14 

small [1] 50:25 

social [1] 32:12 

soil [11] 7:20 10:23 17:22, 

23,25 18:4 29:7 34:15,20 

45:21 52:14 

Heritage Reporting Corporation 

Sheet 7 protected - soil 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1585-1 Filed 05/12/23 Page 106 of 108
Official - Subject to Final Review 

105

solicit [15] 9:23 26:12 56: 94:25 21 32:10 33:11 38:14 39:3 supplemental [1] 39:8 took [15] 9:6,8,9,22 18:8,16 

24 59:13,17,24 60:9,13,24 species [1] 9:20 48:19 49:7,9,15,15 support [3] 15:24 16:3 39: 20:6,19 56:22,25 59:22 60: 

61:4 85:16 87:23 88:1 91: specific [9] 4:22 7:11 13: statutory [1] 21:13 14 21 69:22 92:20,25 

9 95:16 17,24 14:12,13 18:23 59: stay [15] 8:21 11:24 12:22 suppose [4] 11:14,17 47: tools [3] 52:25 77:16 89:20 

solicitates [1] 95:11 24 60:4 13:21 14:19,19 15:20,24 14 54:22 totally [2] 78:16,17 

solicitating [1] 86:9 specifically [3] 65:22 68:6 29:21 30:18,20 40:18 41: supposed [2] 69:9,10 tough [1] 73:24 

solicitation [62] 5:1,4,7 9: 90:16 11 53:13 84:4 SUPREME [3] 1:1,14 65: town [1] 87:24 

17 10:14 12:4 13:2 14:9 spectrum [2] 87:15,21 staying [1] 14:4 11 traced [1] 48:19 

20:1 25:4,22 33:19 34:19 speech [67] 3:23 4:21 17:8, step [3] 16:25 17:18 63:2 surely [1] 78:23 track [3] 48:6,22,24 

37:8 45:20 49:14,20 50:8 13 20:22 25:24,25 26:1,20, steps [2] 12:12 30:5 survive [1] 67:24 traction [1] 49:17 

56:19 57:3,5,8,10 59:16,23 25 28:21 33:5 34:1,2,3 39: Stevens [7] 48:14 69:23 swaths [1] 3:23 traditional [9] 4:9 10:19 

61:12,24 62:1,14 63:1,10, 16 55:10,20 57:7,11,14,18, 70:4 71:3,6 73:2 77:21 sweep [2] 41:20 97:7 13:1,16 34:1,25 43:4 47: 

12 64:14,15 66:16,17 68: 21 58:3,12,16 62:22 63:1,3, stiffly [1] 95:12 sweeping [1] 3:22 18 83:13 

13,20 76:12 82:8,13,16,20 19,22,24 64:8,24,25 66:6 still [12] 17:17 24:6 25:2 28: swept [1] 3:25 traditionally [3] 10:12 29: 

83:10,19,25 84:14 85:12, 69:23 70:1,2,12 71:3,5,9 8 45:22 60:23 68:18 72:4 synonyms [2] 19:2,14 6 85:13 

19,21,25 86:6,13,13,24 90: 73:2 74:19,24 75:9,24 79: 86:7 91:1 93:11 94:7 T trafficking [1] 66:24 

3,8,21 91:14,18 95:1 96:4 23 80:7,23 83:20 84:8 87: stop [1] 36:3 training [1] 67:4 

solicited [1] 27:13 20 88:2,14,18,22 89:18 92: straight [1] 34:3 table [1] 87:7 transaction [3] 63:16,22, 

soliciting [27] 4:5,16 7:11 14 95:7,10 96:3,5,7 97:3,7 streets [1] 31:17 tailored [6] 64:12 65:14,23 24 

9:2,8 18:11,13 20:20 26: speeches [1] 14:12 strength [1] 70:7 67:23 76:20 93:2 transactions [5] 26:13 55: 

21 27:5 28:1 37:15 52:2, spent [1] 45:8 stretch [1] 96:16 tailors [1] 87:18 21 63:18,20 64:15 

12 54:12 57:21 59:21 63: split [1] 17:10 strict [9] 33:14 64:20 65:3, talked [2] 16:24 96:10 transformed [1] 20:21 

10 64:2,25 67:17 68:6 74: spoken [2] 26:8,9 12,14,24 66:4 86:25 87:5 target [1] 26:20 transporting [1] 51:15 

3 86:9 94:8,13,19 St [1] 78:3 strike [2] 45:11 50:22 targeted [1] 26:19 travel [1] 93:24 

Solicitor [1] 1:18 stake [1] 84:9 strikes [1] 48:1 targeting [1] 63:3 treat [1] 72:3 

solicits [2] 20:6 95:21 stakes [1] 83:3 string [1] 48:5 task [1] 70:24 treated [4] 86:5,6,10 96:3 

solve [1] 44:10 stand [2] 43:21 57:2 strong [5] 5:25 43:15 48: tasked [1] 54:4 treating [2] 57:11 96:7 

somebody [5] 12:20 13:21 standard [3] 60:25 66:15 24 66:12 69:7 tax [2] 13:3 46:19 treatise [2] 9:19 14:25 

14:17 26:3 79:13 75:16 strongly [1] 60:1 teacher [1] 11:22 treats [1] 96:6 

someone [24] 15:12 19:11 standards [1] 44:16 struggle [1] 69:18 tells [1] 35:17 trench [2] 37:23 60:5 

21:25 22:9 23:4 25:13 32: standing [2] 22:23 79:6 struggling [2] 18:17 50:23 Tenth [1] 77:8 trial [2] 38:11 39:20 

16 37:15 47:7 51:13,15,23 start [2] 16:5 36:5 study [1] 48:2 term [1] 38:7 tried [2] 39:7 50:2 

52:2 63:10,12 64:2,17 65: starting [1] 82:3 suasion [1] 15:10 terms [12] 4:4,4 7:19 38:9 trigger [1] 63:3 

4,22 72:6 78:5 83:21 84:1 starving [1] 31:15 sub [1] 55:3 42:8 57:2 60:13,14 61:5 troubled [1] 6:16 

95:21 state [6] 48:18 49:7,19 65: subject [9] 27:20 33:13 58: 70:15 76:5,7 true [9] 23:21 27:17 42:21 

someone's [1] 79:23 21,23 89:14 13 64:10 65:1,3,9 86:25 testimony [1] 8:14 62:19 73:15,18 83:18,19 

sometimes [4] 4:25 15:11 statement [2] 6:8 7:2 95:24 text [3] 4:7 61:11 91:7 92:21 

43:16 44:19 STATES [13] 1:1,3,15 3:4, submit [1] 77:14 textbook [1] 43:10 truthful [1] 69:4 

son [3] 16:19 35:17,18 15 22:6 25:11 34:8 49:8 submitted [2] 97:15,17 themselves [1] 31:2 try [1] 56:1 

Sorry [8] 6:4 13:13 18:3 22: 52:22 57:19 66:13 89:11 subpoena [1] 33:1 theoretical [1] 42:23 trying [4] 36:19 50:16 80: 

13,14 28:4 38:1 67:10 States' [1] 72:6 subpoenas [1] 89:9 theory [2] 20:6 54:22 11 96:16 

sort [25] 11:3 14:1 15:10 23: status [6] 66:22,23,25 67:5 subsection [2] 90:22 91: there'd [1] 26:5 tune [1] 74:4 

15 27:7,19 29:4,12 41:25 68:25 93:4 11 There's [20] 6:4 13:6 14:7, turn [2] 20:3 94:3 

43:1 45:3 46:20 47:3,15 statute [113] 3:14,20,24 4:1, subset [2] 24:20,23 21 16:8 19:5 21:21 23:3, turned [1] 92:13 

48:22 49:11 50:10,19 51: 12 5:4,12 7:9,25 9:5,7 10: substance [1] 22:22 17 28:8 30:1 41:7 42:17 tweaked [1] 21:6 

16 55:5,9,9,10 80:13 95:3 2,14,18,20 11:10,18 12:5 substantial [5] 41:18,19, 71:23 72:23 81:16 88:8 93: two [15] 8:15 12:11 18:21 

sorts [2] 47:20 48:14 14:2 16:11,14 18:7,8 19: 22,23 42:5 13 94:11,12 21:11 40:11 41:14 59:5,5, 

SOTOMAYOR [60] 6:4,10, 15,20 20:1,10,13,19 21:4,6 substantially [1] 68:19 therefore [1] 24:19 6,18 71:1 73:7 83:12 90: 

12,18,21 7:7,17,21,24 8:8, 22:4,8 23:18 25:9 26:24 succeed [6] 8:7,10,11 30:7 thinking [3] 12:21 22:21 19 92:8 

16,20,23 9:12 10:6,8 22:11, 29:2 30:21 32:9,24 33:6,7, 35:5 47:13 42:3 type [1] 80:7 

13 24:1,5,11 25:2 28:4 32: 

19 33:25 34:6,16,20 35:2, 

15,17,22 35:11,12 37:3,5,8, 

22 38:9,19 39:11 40:10,14, 

succeeded [1] 48:9 

succeeding [1] 35:6 

third [1] 64:16 

third-party [2] 74:12 79:6 U 

13 36:1,3,7,8,10,11,14,24 22 41:2 42:9,16 43:11,18 successful [1] 78:21 THOMAS [8] 5:16,21 40:5 U.S [2] 67:1 89:6 

37:1,10,25 38:3,18,21,24, 44:6,17 45:2,10 48:3 49:2, succumb [1] 49:10 58:12,15,18,23 84:18 U.S.C [8] 10:18 19:3 53:21 

25 39:6,24 84:20,21 85:7, 4,5,22 50:17 51:4 56:4,17, suggest [3] 32:15 54:10 though [5] 10:11 28:25 42: 59:20 90:20,21 93:9,22 

10,23 86:4,17 87:10 88:5 19 57:5 58:10 59:20,23 60: 60:9 6 73:19 96:24 ultimately [1] 42:25 

89:4,8,21 17 68:13,18 69:12,24,25 suggested [2] 21:24 83:17 thoughts [1] 33:24 unconstitutional [7] 20: 

Sotomayor's [1] 18:5 70:10,16,20 71:11 72:11 Suggesting [1] 59:4 threat [1] 28:9 23 41:3 42:17 56:17 63:11, 

sought [1] 15:7 76:5,7 77:2,23 80:3 84:7 suggestion [1] 11:4 threaten [1] 77:16 14 64:20 

sounds [1] 51:1 88:9 90:5,11 91:5,19 92:6, suggests [3] 3:17 9:23 22: threats [2] 73:16,19 unconstitutionally [1] 24: 

space [1] 19:1 10,12,24 93:14 94:6 96:6, 7 three [1] 56:16 18 

speaking [4] 49:6 70:9 73: 23 97:2,5,9 suicide [4] 65:5,12,17 67: threshold [1] 94:14 under [24] 4:13 5:3 12:4 14: 

10 74:2 statute's [2] 41:20 72:21 19 tied [1] 60:19 20 25:6 26:4 28:8 32:9,10 

special [4] 27:16,19 44:15 statutes [12] 5:7 13:2 14: summarize [1] 92:24 today [2] 56:3 57:23 33:6 56:17 66:21 75:3,6, 

Heritage Reporting Corporation 

Sheet 8 solicit - under 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1585-1 Filed 05/12/23 Page 107 of 108
Official - Subject to Final Review 

106

[3] 3:5 49:19 64:15 15 76:4 78:19 79:8,9 83:1 versus willful [1] 60:25

[1] 82:18 86:15 88:2,9 90:10 vice Williams [7] 4:20 26:10 34:

[13] 25:10 27: underlying victimized [2] 74:6 75:2 3 55:18 63:17,23 94:19 

13 45:23 46:2,9 61:21 65: victims [1] 66:24 willing [4] 34:12,14 37:16 

1 67:18 68:4,7 74:7 82:11 videos [2] 70:6 73:4 44:20 

95:11 view [8] 11:15,16 12:1 25:5 wishes [1] 84:15 

[1] 27:9 underscore 29:2 34:5 55:3 78:19 within [5] 40:22 51:15 63:5

[1] 96:14 underscoring viewed [1] 88:11 70:15 96:1 

[13] 15:18 19: [1] 78:14 understand viewpoint without [5] 16:4 57:20 74:

7 25:12 28:24 44:9 50:21 vigorously [1] 6:2 13 79:21 88:23 

[5] 14:5 22:8 30:21 55:12 62:3 79:24 80:12 85: violate woman [1] 6:5

2 92:10 94:4 52:1 70:9 Women [2] 66:21,22 

[1] 43:3 [1] 3:13 understandably violated won [1] 38:11

[5] 14:8 22:7 understood violates [2] 23:1 78:8 wondering [1] 8:10 

29:6 54:7 62:11 violating [2] 87:24 89:15 word [8] 43:22 44:5,20 79: 

[2] 83:25 undocumented violation [14] 13:18 15:21 12 92:5,6,8 96:9 

84:4 27:18,20 30:17,17 51:14, wordlessly [1] 91:4

[1] 5:2 unique 16 52:23,23 54:2,13 85:1, words [45] 3:21 4:8 7:16 8:

UNITED [10] 1:1,3,15 3:4, 19 25,25 9:5,7,14,24 10:2,22, 

15 22:6 25:11 34:8 52:22 violations [15] 4:17 25:24 24 12:13 19:2,6,13,19 33:8, 

66:13 51:11 57:8,21 65:1 66:18 9,12,16 34:11,22 35:3 37:3, 

unlawful [10] 4:6 14:18 22: 68:20 85:4 86:25 87:6,23, 4,9,15 38:20 47:16 56:22 

2,6,10 30:19 32:14,17 62: 24 94:9 95:22 59:5,8,9,10 82:18 92:12,21, 

14 95:16 violence [3] 59:22 66:21 21,22,23 93:5,6,9,10 

[12] 27:18 30:3, unlawfully 84:2 work [2] 16:4 80:12

[1] 71:10 13 31:9,15 40:20 41:10 51: Virginia workers [1] 93:17

[1] 70:17 24 52:4 53:7 61:7 67:6 vis-à-vis works [1] 22:3

[1] 33:6 unless visas [2] 8:18 66:25 world [8] 11:18,24 12:18 

[2] 69:13 75:15 unlikely visible [2] 73:9 81:8 17:15 43:3 44:15 68:12 75: 

unprotected [13] 5:1,13 vulnerable [6] 25:17 27:14 17 

55:20 57:7,12,18 64:9 73: 65:18,23 67:20 74:10 worried [3] 19:17 35:17 75:

15 74:24 79:23 86:15 88:2 W 23

95:8 worry [1] 43:17

[1] Wait [1] 24:1 92:11 until worse [1] 96:8

wanted [4] [6] 19:24,25 20:3 25:9 48:2 94:1 unusual worth [1] 96:14

46:4 59:16 62:11 95:10 write [10] 7:11 8:24 36:23

wanting [2] 19:20 31:3 up [18] 14:22 21:17,22,25 39:19,21 44:5 45:6 56:23 

war [1] 16:20 37:16 39:7 43:21 48:13 49: 59:16 82:23 

Washington [2] 1:10,19 16 54:2 61:17 67:14 72:14 writing [2] 36:13 59:23

watching [1] 82:2 73:24 81:13 84:22 85:3 91: 

water [1] 80:20 Y 17 

[2] way [18] 4:2 5:18 12:2 23: yard [1] 78:10 upheld 85:21 93:20

[2] 17 25:21 26:1 32:9 39:3, year [1] 55:16 uphold 33:15 37:5

[2] 20 48:22 52:1 68:18 77:24 years [16] 10:1 20:9 33:16 urging 25:13 26:3

78:6,7 82:24 94:1,6 39:22 43:12 59:19 71:7,10, uses [1] 76:8

ways [4] 43:25 44:7 88:22 12,25 75:4 79:4 83:4 89: using [1] 20:11

[1] 96:14 20 97:5,12 usual 44:16

wealth [1] 40:16 York [2] 1:21,21 V weed [2] 13:19 29:13 yourself [5] 15:15 17:1 30: 

v)(II [1] 50:25 welcome [3] 5:15 58:11 84: 6 35:6 47:12 

vacated [1] 58:7 5 

[1] 57:23 vaccine whatever [4] 17:2 40:17

validity [1] 71:15 41:12 78:24 

[3] 40:16 83:17 91: various Whereupon [1] 97:16

8 whether [11] 7:3 14:4 26:

vast [5] 29:2 31:1 42:14,15 25 43:10 62:22 67:18 82: 

57:22 16 83:1 94:11,14 96:4 

venture [8] 15:7,15 17:1,19 who's [6] 33:20 35:15 41:9

30:6,16 47:12,15 52:6 70:8 83:24 

[3] 59:17 60:24 61:4 verb whole [2] 39:10 41:7

verbs [3] 59:13,14 91:16 wide [1] 3:22

[1] 82:18 versa will [10] 4:24 13:14 22:6 28:

version [2] 31:20 40:9 14 36:16 57:19 69:13 75:4 

versions [1] 29:14 78:21 97:2 

Heritage Reporting Corporation 

Sheet 9 under - yourself 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1585-1 Filed 05/12/23 Page 108 of 108