MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 7 ME 66 Docket: Cum

- 16

- 286 Submitted

On	Briefs: January	19,	2017 Decided: April 6 ,	2017 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J., and	ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN,	JABAR , HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

IN	RE	CALEB	M.	et	al.

SAUFLEY,	C. J. [¶1] More	than	two and	a	half years	after Caleb	M.	and	Ayden	R.	were first	 removed	 from their mother’s	 care because	 of her substance	 abuse	 and consequent neglect, the	 mother’s	 parental	 rights	 to	 the	 children were terminated	 by	 a	 judgment	 of	 the	 District	 Court	 (Portland, Eggert ,	 J. )

. The mother	 appeals, arguing	 that the	 court did	 not	 independently	 exercise its judicial	function , that	the	court im properly	relied on the reports of a	guardian ad	 litem	 (GAL),	 and that the	 evidence was	 insufficient	 to support the termination	of	her	parental	rights.		We	affirm	the	judgment.
I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ]	 	 On November	 7,	 2013,	 the	 Department	 sought	 child	 protection orders	on	behalf	of	Caleb	M.	and	Ayden	R.	due	to	allegations	of	neglect c ause d2 by the	mother’s substance	abuse. 1 By	agreement, on	March	3,	2014, t he court ( Goranites,	J. )	made	a finding	of jeopardy against	the	mother	as	to	each	child , based	on	the	mother’s exposure	of the	children	to	drug	use,	criminal	activity, and	 unsafe	 individuals;	 and her	 lack	 of appropriate	 housing. While	 these proceedings	 were pendin g ,	 the	 mother	 gave	 birth	 to	 a daughter who is	 the subject	of	a	separate	chil d	protection	proceeding. [¶ 3 ] J udicial	 reviews were	 held on	 March 3 and September	 3, 2014 ; March	3 and September	9,	2015; and	March	8,	2016 , and orders	were	entered by	agreement after	each	of	these	reviews

. Reports	of	a GAL were	admitted	in evidence	at each	of the	judicial	reviews. The	September	9,	2015,	and	March	8, 2016,	judicial	reviews	were	presided	over	by	the	same	judge ( Eggert,	J. ) who ultimately presided	over	the	termination	hearing. [ ¶4 ] On	Decem ber	14,	2015,	the	Department	filed	a	petition	to	terminate the	 mother’s	 parental	 rights	 to	 Caleb,	 and	 on	 February	 18,	 2016,	 the Department	filed	a	petition	to	terminate	her	parental	rights	to	Ayden. In	both petitions,	 the	 Department	 alleged	 that	 the	 mothe r	 had	 inconsistently participated	in	mental	health	and	substance	abuse	services,	and	had	continued

1 At	the	time	the	Department	filed	its petition , the	children	had	been	placed	with	their	maternal aunt	since	September	2013 , pursuant	to	a	safety	plan.3 to	permit	unsafe	individuals,	including	the	three	fathers	of	her	children,	to	be present	around	the	children. [¶ 5 ] The	court	conducted	a	hearing	on	the	peti tions on	May 12	and	16,
2016 ,	during	which	the	court	heard	testimony	from	the	mother ,	the	mother’s and	 the	 children’s	 providers, Department caseworkers,	 and	 the	 GAL. At	 the conclusion	 of	 the	 hearing,	 the	 court	 sought	 proposed	 orders	 from	 both	 the mother	and	the	Department. In	a	judgment	entered	on	June	2,	2016,	in	which the	 court	 largely	 adopted	 the	 Department’s	 proposed	 order,	 the	 court terminated	 the	mother’s	parental	rights	 to	both	children

. 2 In	a	 footnote,	 the

court	 no ted that	it	 had	 used	 the Department’s	 proposed	 order	 “extensively” because	 “the	 Department’s	 proposed	 findings	 align	 quite	 closely	 with	 the court’s	view	of	the	evidence

. ” [¶ 6 ] In	its	judgment,	the	court	made the	following	supported	findings	by clear	and	convincing	evidence. See In	re	Hannah	S. ,	2016	ME	32 ,	¶ 3,	133	A.3d 590. The	mother has had a	substance abuse	problem for	several	years

. She participated	 in	 various	 treatment	 programs	 including	 outpatient,	 intensive outpatient,	 and	 residential	 programs.	 	Her	 compliance	 with	 these	 treatment

2 The	fathers’	parental	rights	were	terminated	by	judgments	entered	on May	26,	2016. Neither father	appealed	the	termination of	his	parental	rights.4 programs was inconsistent,	and	she	was	discharged	from	one	program	for her failure to	 make	 progress. Need les	 were	 found	 in	 her	 room	 at	 one	 of	 the treatment	programs. [¶ 7 ] The	mother relapsed	 on	 several	 occasions,	and	 recent	 drug	 tests performed	by	her	doctor showed elevated	levels	of	her	prescribed	medica tions and	 indications	 that	 she	 wa s	 also	 using	 nonprescribed	 medications. In December	 2015,	 the	 mother	 admitted that	 she overused	 her	 prescribed Suboxone. Only	 two	 months	 before	 her parental rights	 were	 terminated, a Department	caseworker	found needles	in	her	bedside	table. [¶ 8 ] The	m other	permitted	several	“unsafe	men”	to	be	present	with	the children

. In	 early	 2016,	 a	Department	 caseworker	making	 an	 unannounced visit	to	the	mother’s	home	discovered	Ayden’s	father	hiding	in	a	closet	despite the	mother’s	 denial	 that	 he	was	 there. Ayde n’s	 father	was	 then	arrested	 on outstanding	warrants. In	April	2016,	a	caseworker	visiting	the	mother’s	home noticed her	infant daughter’s	father	leaving. When	the	caseworker	asked	the mother	 about	 needles	 that	 were	 found	 in	 a	 nightstand,	 she	 blamed	 the daughter’s	father	and his friend. [¶ 9 ] Caleb	wa s	afraid	 of	 returning	 to	live	wi th his mother	because	he worried that	he	would be	the	one	who	would have had to	care	for	Ayden	and5 their sister. He	 worried about	 having	 enough	 food to	 eat,	 and	 he	 regularly checked the	cupboards	in	his foster	home	to	see	that	there	wa s	enough	food. Caleb	has	been	diagnosed with autism	spectrum disorder ,	and is	on	the	waiting list	 for	more	intensive	in

- home	support,	as	well	as	 trauma

- focused	cognitive behavioral	 therapy. Caleb’s	 therapist believes that	 returning	 Caleb	 to	 his mother’s care	would	“re

- traumatize”	him

. [¶1 0 ] The	mother did	not consistent ly	attend visits	with	her	children.
T he	 visit	 supervisor	 testified	 that	 Caleb	 seemed	 to	 “r[u]n	 the show” during visits	with	the	mother. When	the	mother	misses	visits	with	Caleb,	he	becomes very	upset. The	Department	intends	to	seek	an	adoptive	placement	for	Caleb. [¶1 1 ] Ayden	has	been	diagnosed	with	ADHD. In	his f oster	placement, Ayden thri ved on	structure	and	routine. In	late	2015, the	mother	was	given	the opportunity	 to	have	Ayden	with	her	again. H e was returned	 to	his	mother’s
care	in a	trial	placement	but	had	to	be	removed	again	in	early	2016. [¶1 2 ]		Supporting	the	decision	to	remove	Ay den,	t he	GAL	testified	that during	the	trial	placement,	Ayden ’s “level	of	care	suffered	enormously	when	he was	with	his	mother.” According	 to	 the	GAL,	h e was	“ falling	asleep	in	class, ”

“ behind	academically, ” and	“hungry.” “ H is	mother	was	no t	picking	.

. . him	up6 reliably,” and	“ he	was	having	hygiene	issues .” The	Department	plans	to	seek	an adoptive	placement	for	Ayden. [¶1 3 ] The	 court	 ultimately	 found	 that , despite	 the mother’s	 access	 to services	for more	than two	years, t he	mother could	not rebut	the	presumption of	unfitness	that	arose	because	of her chronic	substance	abuse. S ee 22	M.R.S. § 4055 (1

- A)(C)	(2016). At	the	time	of	the	hearing,	the	mother	was	unable	to care	 for	 the	children , and	 she	may	never	be	able	 to	do	 so. Caleb	and	Ayden “need permanency ”	 after	 having	 lived	 in	 a	 state	 of	 “limbo”	 for	 nearly	 three
years. Both	children	“deserve	the	permanency	of	adoption.” The	court	found that	 a doption i s	 in	 the	 best	 interest	 of each	 child

. S ee 22	 M.R.S. § 4055 (1)(B )( 2 ) (a)	(2016)

. The	mother	timely	appealed. See 22	M.R.S.	§ 4006 (2016) ; M.R.	App.	P.	2 (b)(3).
II.		DISCUSSION [¶1 4 ] The	mother contends on	appeal	that	the	court failed	to	exercise	its independent	 judgment	 in	 terminating	 her	 parental	 rights and erred	 in considering	GA L	reports , and that the	evidence	was	insufficient to	support	the court’s	decision	to	terminate	her	parental	rights

.7 A. Trial Court’s	Independent	Judgment [¶1 5 ] The	 mother	 first	 argues	 that	 the	 court	 did	 not	 exercise	 its
in dependent	 judgment	 in terminating	 her	 parental	 rights	 because	 the	 court adopted	the	Department’s	proposed	order	with	minimal	changes. We	note	that the	mother	 failed	 to	 file	a	motion	 for	 further	 findings	 or	 for	 reconsideration before	 raising	 this	issue	in	 her	appeal. As	we	 hav e	 recently	 noted,	 “ appeals challenging	orders	based	upon	an	alleged	lack	of	independent	judgment	by	a judge	should	be	preceded	by	an	appropriate	motion	that	identifies	the	issue	and allows	 the	 trial	 judge	 an	 opportunity	 to	 address	 those	 concerns	 prior	 to

a ppellate	review.” Yap	v.	Vinton ,	2016	ME	58 ,	¶	9	n.1,	137	A.3d	194. We	now clarify	 the	 importance	 of	 such	 a	 motion in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 child	 protection proceeding

. In	 order	 to	 avoid	 the	 delay	inherent	in	 a	later	 challenge	 to	 the court’s	order	that	could have	been	expeditiously	addressed	by	the	trial	court, we	 will	 no longer entertain a	 challenge	 t o	 the	 trial	 court’s	 independent judgment based	on	the	court’s adoption	of	a	party’s	proposed	order , absent	a8 parent’s	motion	for	further	or	clarified	findings	pursuant	to Maine Rule of	Civil Procedure 52 (b). 3 [¶1 6 ] Because	we	have	not	previously	announced this requirement ,	we proceed	 to consider	 the	 merits	 of	 the	 mother’s	 argument. “In	 reviewing whether	 the	 tri al	 court	 performed its	 judicial	 function ,	 we	 must	 determine whether	 the	 findings	 adequately	indicate	 the	 factual	 basis [ fo r ] the	 ultimate conclusion.” In	re	Sabrina	M. ,	460	A.2d	1009 ,	1013	(Me.	1983)

. “If	the	proposed findings	are	argumentative	or	insufficiently	objective	because	they	are	drafted by	a	party,	a	judgment	adopting	 those	 findings	may	be	defective.” In	re	C.P. , 2016	ME	18 ,	¶ 19,	132	A.3d	174. [¶1 7 ] Although	“a	verbatim	adoption	of	findi ngs proposed	by	one	party

. . . is	disfavored ,	as	such	an	approach	suggests	that	the	court	has	not applied its independent	judgment	in	making	its	 findings	and	conclusions,”	draft	 findings proposed	by	either	side can	aid the	court’s fact

- finding. In	re	Marphe en	C. ,	2002
ME	170 ,	¶	7,	812	A.2d	972. “[W] hen	draft	orders	are	adopted	without	change or	with	little	material	change, ” and	th e	court’s findings	have	not	changed	as	a

3 S uch	a	motion	t erminates	the	running	of the	time	for	filing	an	appeal ,	with	the	time	for	appeal then	commencing	to	run	from	the	entry	of	the	ruling	on	that	motion

. M.R.	App. P.	2 (b)(3) .		Therefore, the	 Rule	 52(b)	motion should not be	 accompanied	 by	 a	 notice	 of	 appeal	 and	 should	 be	 acted	 on expeditiously.9 result	 of a	properly	 filed	motion	 for	 further	 or	clarified	 findings	pursuant	 to Rule	52(b), the	key	question	for	our	review “ will	be	whether	the	findings	and order	reflect	the	application	of	judgment	by	the	court	and	not	simply	one	of	the parties.” See Yap ,	2016	M E	58 ,	¶	10,	137	A.3d	194. [¶1 8 ]		It	is evident	that	the	court’s judgment in	this matter resulted	from the court’s careful	application	of its own	independent	judgment. The	judgment is	 not	 a	 verbatim	 adoption	 of	 the	 Department’s	 proposed	 order. The	 court specifically acknowledged	 that	 it made	 extensive	 use	 of	 the	 proposed	 order because	it articulated the	 court’s	 view	 of	 the	 case. Further,	 the	 court	made substantive	additions	to five paragraphs	and made other	changes to	reflect that the	court	did	not	belie ve	parts	of	the	mother’s	testimony

. T he	court’s	judgment

was the product	of	 the	proper	exercise	of	its	judicial	 function	and	it	was	not defective

. See	id. ; In	re	Marpheen	C. ,	2002	ME	170,	¶ ¶ 7

- 8 ,	812	A.2d	972.
B

. GAL	Reports [¶1 9 ]		The	mother next argues	that	her due	process	rights	were	violated when	the	court	took	judicial	notice	of	all	of	the	GAL	reports	in	the	court’s	file

an d	then	relied	on	those	reports	in	its	judgment. Specifically,	she	contends	that the reports	 were	 largely	 hearsay	 and	 that she	 had no	 opportunity fo r

cross - examination	or	rebuttal	of	 the	information	in	 the	reports. The	mother10 further	 asserts	 that the	 court	 made six	 factual	 findings that were clearly erroneous	because	they	we re	supported	only	by	GAL	reports	 that	she	insists th e	court was	not	permitted	to	consider

. 1. Admission in	Evidence [¶ 20 ] T he	admission	of	GAL	reports	in	evidence	is	specifically	authorized by	statute. 22	M.R.S.	§	4005(1)(D) (2016) ; see	also M.R.	Evid.	802 (providing that hearsay	is	not	inadmissible	if	a	statute	provides for	its	admissibility ); In	re Chelsea	C. ,	2005	ME	105 ,	¶	10 ,	884	A.2d	97	(“[T]here	is	no	question	 that	 the Legislature	may	authorize	court	consideration	of	the	contents	of	guardian	ad litem	reports	as	an	e xception	to	the	hearsay	rule.”)

. Thus,	the admission	of	GAL reports at	 earlier	 stages	 in	 the	 proceedings comported	 with	 the	 law and allowed	the court , at each stage , to	rely	on	the	report to	the	extent	it	deemed appropriate	in	light	 of all	 of	 the	evidence	presented	 or the agreement	 of	 the parties

. See In	re	Chelsea C. ,	2005	ME	105 ,	¶	16,	884	A.2d	97. [¶ 2 1 ] Nor did	 the admission of	 those	 reports at	 the	 judicial	 reviews violate	the	mother’s	due	process	rights. “[D]ue	process	requires: notice	of	the issues,	an	opportunity	to	be	heard,	the	right	to	introduce	evidence	and	present witnesses,	 the	 right	 to	 respond	 to	 claims	 and	 evidence,	 and	 an	 impartial fact

- finder.” I d

. Judicial	 reviews provide	 an	 opportunity	 for	 an	 evidentiary11 hearing. 22	M.R.S.	§	4038(5) (2016)

. At those	reviews,	the	mother	had	notice of	the	hearing,	court

- appointed	counsel,	and	an	opportunity	to	challenge	any evidence	offered	through	the	GAL	report	or	otherwise. [¶ 2 2 ] T he	mother	agreed	to	the	orders	entered at	the	judicial	reviews , all	of which	stated	that	the	GAL	reports	were	admitted	in	evidence,	and	t here	is no	indication	that she was	denied	the	opportunity	for	a	hearing that	provided each	of	the	essentials	of	due	process

. See	In	re	Chelsea	C. , 2005	ME	1 05,	¶	16, 884	A.2d	97.
2. Termination	Court’s Consideration	of	GAL	Reports [¶ 2 3 ] The	 remaining	 question	 is	 whether	 the	 court	 that	 held	 the termination	 hearing	 could	 consider evidence	 contained	 only	 in previously admitted	GAL reports. When a GAL report was admitted in	evidence in	a	prior stage	of	the	proceeding , the court conducting	a	hearing	on	a	later	judicial	review or	 termination	 petition can c onsider	 and	 rely	 on that	 report only if	 it	 was admitted	by the	same	judge in	the	earlier	proceeding

. See In re	Scott	S. ,	2001
ME	114 ,	¶	12,	775	A.2d	1144. “ The	authority	of	the	trial	judge	to	take	judicial notice	of	matters	of	record	is	distinct	 from	 the	authority	of	a	single	judge	 to consider evidence	presented in	a	previous	stage	of	a	child	protective	proceeding when	that	evidence	was	presented	to	the	same	trial	judge. ” Id. “ When	the	trial12 judge	 has	 actually	 heard	 the	 evidence	 presented	 in	 prior	 stages	 of	 a	 child protection	proceeding,	that	judge	may	consider the	evidence	in	the	 following stages	because	 the	process	is,	in	 fact,	a	unified	proceeding. ” Id. ; cf.	 Cabral	v. L’Heureux ,	2017	ME	50,	¶ ¶ 10

- 11 &	n.3 , --- A.3d

--- (in	non

- unified pro ceedings, different	rules	apply). “ When	a	different	trial	judge	presid es	at	a	later	stage	of the	process,	that	trial	judge	may	not	rely	on	the evidence presented	to	the	pri or judge	.	.	.	.” In	re	Scott	S. ,	2001	ME	114,	¶	12,	775	A.2d	1144. The	trial	judge	at the	termination	proceeding	may,	however, take	judicial	notice	of the	existence of prior	orders and	judgments	and	the	action s	taken	by the	court. S ee M.R.	Evid.
201 ; Cabral ,	2017	ME	50,	¶	11,

--- A.3d

--- ; see also United	States	v.	Jones ,	29	F.3d 1549 ,	1553	(11th	Cir. 1994). [¶ 2 4 ]		In	this matter, the	court	did	not explicitly admit	any of	the	GAL’s prior reports in	evidence during the	termination	hearing. Thus,	t he	only prior reports available	for the	court’s potential consider ation	were those	that	were admitted	in prior proceedings held by	the	same	judge who presid ed	over	the termination	 hearing

. See In	 re	 Scott	 S. ,	 2001	 ME	 114, ¶	 12 ,	 775	 A.2d	 1144

. Specifically, the termination court	could	consider only	those GAL	reports that had	been admitted	during	the September	9,	2015,	and	March	8,	2016 ,	judicial
reviews that	the	same	judge	had	held , along	with	the	GAL’s	report	prepared	for13 the	termination	proceeding

. 4 Consequently, of	the	six	factual	findings	that	the mother challenges , four were not	supported	by	the	record because	they	were supported	 only within GAL	 re ports	 that this	 particular	 judge could	 not consider

. 5 See Guardianship	of	Hailey	M. , 2016	ME	80 ,	¶	15,	140	A.3d	478	( “A finding	 of	 fact	 is	 clearly	 erroneous	 if	 there	 is	 no	 competent	 evide nce	 in	 the record	to	support	it

.	.	. . ”). [¶ 2 5 ] We are	not,	however,	required	to	vacate	the	trial	court’s	judgment if	the	court’s factual errors	are	harmless

. See M.R.	Civ.	P. 61. “In	the	context	of a	termination	of	parental	rights	proceeding,	a	preserved	error	is	harmless	if	it is	highly	probable	that	the	error	did	not	prejudice	the	parents	or	contribute	to the	result	in	 the	case.” In	re	M.S. ,	2014	ME	54 ,	¶	12,	90	A.3d	443	(quotat ion marks	omitted). [¶ 2 6 ]	 	 Here,	 none	 of	 the unsupported findings were	 important	 in	 the court’s	findings	regarding the	mother’s	substance	abuse	or	the	best	interest of each	 child

— the	 grounds	 for	 the	 court’s	 determination	 to	 terminate	 her

4 The	 court	 did	 admit	 the	 GAL’s	 most	 recent	 report	 for	 each	 child,	 both	 dated	 May	 2,	 2016. Evidence	supporting	the	challe nged	findings	was	not	contained	in	either	of	those	reports.

5 Specifically, the	 evidence	 that	 could	 be	 considered	 by	 the	 court	 cannot	 support	 the	 court’s findings	that the	mother never had	a	case	ma nager	for	housing	support, the	Department	“lost	touch” with	the	mother for	a	period	of	time, the	mother explained	the	presence	of a	bottle	of	urine	in	her room	at	one	of	the	treatment	programs by	asserting	that she	had	been	“too	lazy”	to	get	up	and	use the	bathroom, and the	mother never participated	in	mental health	treatment

.14 parental	rights. As	we	discuss	below,	t here	was	ample	competent	evidence	for the	court	to	have	found,	by	clear	and	convincing	evidence,	that	the	presumption of	unfitness	applied	and	that	termination	was	in	the	best	interest	of each	child

. Thus,	it	was	highly	probable	that the	erroneous	findings	did	not	prejudice	the mother	 or	 contribute	 to	 the	 court’s	 ultimate	 determination,	 and	 the	 court’s mistaken	 reliance	 on	 certain	 GAL	 reports	 was	 harmless	 error. See id. Accordingly ,	we	turn	to	the	sufficiency	of	the	evidence	support ing	the	court’s judgment. In	 reviewing	 the	 mother’s	 challenge	 to	 the	 sufficiency	 of	 the evidence,	we	disregard	the	court’s unsupported findings.
C. Sufficiency	of	the	Evidence [¶ 2 7 ] Before a	court	may	terminate	a	parent’s	parental	rights,	the	court must	 find,	“by	clear	and	convincing	evidence,	at	least	one	ground	of	parental unfitness	.	.	.	and	that	termination	is	in	the	child’s	best	interest.” In	re	C.P. ,	2016
ME	18 ,	¶ 30,	132	A.3d	174; s ee	also 22	M.R.S.	§ 4055(1)(B) (2) (2016) .		“Evidence is	clear	and	convincing	when	the	court	could	reasonably	have	been	persuaded that	the	required	factual	findings	were	proved	to	be	highly	probable.” I n	re	C.P. , 2016	ME	18,	¶	30,	132	A.3d	174 (quotation	m arks	omitted).		“The	weight	and credibility	of	the	testimony	and	other	evidence,	including	GAL	reports,	is	for	the fact

- finder’s	determination.” In	re	Cameron	B. ,	2017	ME	18 ,	¶ 10,

--- A.3d

--- .15 1. Unfitness [¶ 2 8 ] The trial	court	may	presume	that	a	parent	is	unfit	when [t] he	 child	 has	 been	 placed	 in	 the	 legal	 custody	 or	 care	 of	 the department,	 the	 parent	 has	 a	 chronic	 substanc e	 abuse	 problem, and	the	parent’ s	prognosis	indicates	that	the	child	will	not	be	able to	retur n	to	the	custody	of	the	parent	within	a	reasonable	period	of time,	 consideri ng	 the	 child’ s	 age	 and	 the	 need	 for	 a	 permanent home. The	fact	that	a	parent	has	been	unable	to	provide	safe	care of	 a	 child	 for	 a	 period	 of	 9	 months	 due	 to	 substance	 abuse consti tutes	a	chronic	substance	abuse	problem. 22	M.R.S.	§	4055(1

- A)(C); see	also 22	M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(B)(2)(b) (i)

. T he	mother contends	that the	statute defines “chronic	substance	abuse	problem” to mean that “ a	parent	has	been unable	 to	provide	safe	ca re	of	a child	 for	a	period	of
9 months	due	 to	substance	abuse.” Accordingly,	 the	mother	argues, because she	cared	for	her	daughter	after	the	daughter	was	born,	and	bec ause	Ayden was placed	with	her	on	a	trial	basis until January	2016, she does	not	have	a	chronic substance	abuse	problem	within	the meaning	of	the	statute ,	and	therefore	the court	 erred	 in	 applying	 the	 presumption	 of	 unfitness	 provided	 by	 22	 M.R.S. § 4055(1

- A)(C)

. We	 rev iew	 the	 interpretation	 of	 a	 statute	 de	 novo. In	 re Jacob C. ,	2009	ME	10 ,	¶	9, 965	A.2d	47.		“When	a	statute	is	not	ambiguous ,	its plain	meaning	will	govern.” I d. [¶ 2 9 ] Contrary to	 the	 mother’s	 contention ,	 the	 plain	 meaning	 of	 the statutory	language	 that	a	parent’s	inability	 to	pr ovide	safe	care	of	a	child	 for16 nine	months	“constit utes”	a	ch ronic	substance	abuse	problem	does	not mean that	 a “chronic	 substance	 abuse	 problem” is limited	 to	 only those
circumstances. [¶ 30 ]	 	 It	 is	 imperative,	 however,	 that	 we	 not	 use	 the	 broad	 brush	 of “chronic	substance	abuse”	to enable	the continue d separation	of children	from their	parents	when	the	children’s	health	and	safety	do	not	require	it.		In	a	time when	 far	 too	many	young	parents	struggle	with	drug	and	alcohol	addictions, every	effort	must	 be	made	 to	 help	 those	parents	 find	 sobriety	and	 retur n	 to their	parental	roles.		To	do	otherwise	risks	the	separation	of	children	from	their birth	 families when	 it	 could	 have	 been	 avoided. Thus, a trial	 court must carefully	consider	whether	the	substance	abuse	of	the	parent	is	truly	“chronic.” [¶ 3 1 ] Sadly for	 the	children in	 the	matter	 before	 us,	 t here	was ample competent	 evidence f or	 the	 court	 to	 have	 found,	 by clear and	 convincing evidence,	that	the	mother has engaged	in chronic substance	abuse ; that	she	has been	provided many services, including multipl e	opportunities	to	wo rk	toward recovery	and	sobriety; that	she	was	even	provided	a	trial	placement	of	Ay den and	could	not	keep	him	safe; and	that	Caleb	and	Ayden	will	not	be	able	to	be returned	to	her	cus tody	within	a	reasonable	time.17 [¶ 3 2 ] The mother’s	substance	abuse made	her	unable	to	care	for	Caleb and	Ayden	for	a	period that	far	exceeds nine	months. At	the	time	of	the final hearing	in	 this	matter, Caleb	 and	 Ayden	 had	 been	in	 the	Department’s	legal custody	for	more	than	two	years , during	wh ich time she made	little	progress	in recovering	from	her	addiction

. Despite	opportunities,	she	remained	unable	to provide	 safe	 care	 for	 her	 children,	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 removal	 of	 her daughter	 f rom her care, and	 the	 removal	 of Ayden from	 her	 care

— for the second	 time

— following the trial	placement

. The	court	did	not	err	in	 finding that	the	presumption	of	unfitness	applied	and	that	the	mother	failed	to	rebut	it.
2. Best	Interest	of Each	Child [¶ 3 3 ] The	 mother	 further	 asserts	 that	 the	 court	 erred	 or	 abus ed	 its discretion	in	determining	that the termination	of	her	parental	rights	was	in	the best	interest of each	 child

. 6 We	 review	 the	 court’s factual	 finding s for	 clear error	and	its ultimate	conclusion	regarding	the	best	interest determination	“ for an	 abus e	 of	 discretion,	 viewing	 the	 facts,	 and	 the	 weight	 to	 be	 given	 them,

6 The	mother	argue s ,	citing our	opinion	in In	re	Thomas	H. ,	2005	ME	123 ,	¶	32,	889	A.2d	297, that the	court	was	required	to	find	a	“compelling	reason”	to	terminate	her	parental	rights	because	Caleb and	Ayden	were	doing	well	in	foster	car e	and	there	were	no	identified	adoptive	placements.		Contrary to	the	mother’s	argument,	in In	re	Thomas	H. ,	we	held	that	the	court	was	required	to	find	a	compelling reason not to	terminate	parental	rights	when	the	children	would	be	“consigned	to	the	instab ility	and impermanence	of	long

- term	foster	care.” Id. ¶	35.		The	court	was	not	required	to	find	a	compelling reason	to	terminate	the	mother’s	parental	rights	in	this	matter. See	id.18 through	 the	 trial	 court’ s	 lens.” In	 re	 M.B. ,	 2013	 ME	 46 ,	 ¶ 37,	 65	 A.3d	 1260 (quotation	marks	omitted). “ The	District	Court’ s	judgment	on	the	issue	of	best interest	is	entitled	to substantial	deference	because	that	court	is	able	to	directly evaluate	the	testimony	of	the	witnesses. ” In	re	Michaela	C. ,	2002	ME	159 ,	¶ 27, 809	A.2d	1245. [¶ 3 4 ] Here, Caleb	 and	 Ayden were	 first	 removed	 from	 their	mother’s care	nearly three	years	before the	hearing and had	been	in	the	Department’s custody	for more	than	two	years. During	that	time,	the	mother	had	made	no substantial	 progress	in recovering	 from	 her	 addiction,	 and	 she	 continued	 to allow	unsafe	individuals	to	be	around	her	children. T he	cou rt	found that Caleb and	Ayden	need the	permanency	of	adoption	and , because	of	their	young	age s and the length of	time	they	ha ve already	spent	in	foster	care,	they cannot wait any	longer	 for	 their	mother	 to be	 able	 to	 care	 for	 them. Th ese	 findings	 are supported	by	the	evidence	in	the	record.		Th e	court	did	not commit	clear	error or	abuse	its	discretion	in	determining	that	termination	was	in each	child’s	best
interest. See	In	re	M.B. ,	2013	ME	46,	¶	37,	65	A.3d	1260. The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.19
Virginia	Lee	Holt,	Esq.,	Holt	Family	Law,	Saco,	for	appellant	mother Janet	T.	Mills,	Attorney	General,	and	Meghan	Szylvian,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	of the	Attorney	General,	Aug usta,	for	appellee	D epartment	of	Health	and	Human Services

Portland	District	Court	docket	numb er s PC

- 2013

- 99	and

- 100 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY