### J-A01039- 18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 BARBARA ROSMARIN, EXECUTRIX FOR THE ESTATE OF GENE BARCLAY ROSMARIN Appellant

v.
LAKPA YANJI SHERPA : : : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1132 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree March 3, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Orphans' Court at No(s): 2014
-E0441 BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OTT, J., and PLATT

### , J. MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED AUGUST 20, 2018 Barbara Rosmarin 1

### , Executrix of the Estate of Gene Barclay Rosmarin (Executrix), appeals from the decree entered March 3, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, that denied her petition and “order to show cause” filed against Lakpa Yanji Sherpa, wife of Gene Barclay Rosmarin (Decedent) . Specifically, the orphans’ court’s decree denied Executrix’s

“Petition to (1) Strike Lakpa Sherpa’s Claim to be Recognized as Decedent’s Surviving Spouse because the Alleged Marriage between Lakpa Sherpa and the Decedent is Fraudulent and therefore Void under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(3) [,] and (2) Strike Lakpa Sherpa’s Claim Against Decedent’s Estate

_________________ ____________________ _______

 

### Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 

### In the orphans’ court, Rosmarin’s surname is Nolan .

### J-A01039- 18

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Pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2507(3) because Decedent’s Last Will and Testament was Drafted in Contemplation of his Future Marriage to Lakpa Sherpa,” as well as Executrix’s “Order to Show Cause,” requesting the orphans’ court to strike Lakpa Sherpa’s spousal share claim pursuant to the doctrine of unclean hands. 2 

### In this appeal, Executrix presents multiple issues, discussed below, in support of her contention that the orphans’ court erred in its determination that Sherpa is entitled to pursue her spousal share of Decedent’s estate. We affirm on the basis of the orphans’ court’s sound opinions, filed March 7, 2017, and May 26, 2017. The orphans’ court has fully set forth the facts and procedural history of this case in both opinions, and we need not reiterate the background herein . We simply state that Executrix is the ex
-wife of Decedent. Decedent died testate on June 10, 2014, having executed a Will, dated April 9, 1998. Following his 1996 divorce from Rosmarin, Decedent married Sherpa in Nepal in 2008, and he then returned to the United States. On January 22, 2014, Sherpa entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident. Decedent did not execute another will after his marriage to Sherpa .

_________________ ____________________ _______ 2 

### In the orphans’ court, Executrix withdrew her attempt to strike Sherpa’s spousal share claim pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S. § 2507(3). See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/7/2017, at 2.

### J-A01039- 18

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On August 8, 2014, Executrix was granted Letters Testamentary. Sherpa filed a spousal election against Decedent’s Will on January 18, 2014. Subsequently, Executrix filed the above
-mentioned petition and order to show cause. Following entry of the orphans’ court’s March 3, 2017 decree, Executrix filed this appeal . Executrix presents nine claims in her brief, as follows: 1. Is it an abuse of discretion to go against the weight of the evidence to disregard authenticated, admitted and highly probative documentary evidence and to accept as true self
serving testimony from an interested party with an established history of making material misrepresentations? 2. Is it an abuse of discretion/reversible error for a court to erroneously hold that there was no testimony establishing the prima facie case when admissible testimony from an uninterested, non-party witness establishing the prima facie case was relied upon by the court and cited to in its decision? 3. Is it an abuse of discretion to refuse to admit affidavits submitted to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services by a party witness and her cousin, who is also a witness, under the doctrine of completeness and Pa. R. E. 106 when the affidavits that were highly probative and exposed material misrepresentations made under oath during the pendency of this litigation? 4. Is it an abuse of discretion for a court of equity to disregard the doctrine of unclean hands to grant relief to a deceitful party that advanced its position by lying about material facts to influence the outcome of the matter in controversy that affects the relationship of the parties? 5. Is it an abuse of discretion for a court of equity to refuse to invoke the doctrine of unclean hands when it is shown by

### J-A01039- 18

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documentary evidence, sworn statements and judicial admissions that a party to the litigation lied to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, committed perjury and suborned perjury regarding elements central to the matter in controversy? 6. Does 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(3) authorize the orphans’ court to annul a void marriage fraudulently undertaken solely to defraud United States Citizenship and Immigration Services based upon the parties’ lack of capacity to consent to a marriage that is void for illegality. 7. Is a marriage void where both of the parties lacked capacity to consent to the marriage because it was entered into solely for an illegal purpose in express violation of federal statute? 8. Does a court’s use of dicta from In Interest Of Miller, 301 Pa. Super. 511, 448 A.2d 25 (1982) to constrain the clear and unequivocal language of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(3) violate principles of statutory interpretation? 9. Can a state court decide whether to annul a marriage that is void for illegality if it violates a federal statute? Executrix’s Brief at 5
-7. 3 

### Our standard of review is well settled: When an appellant challenges a decree entered by the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt, our standard of review “requires that we be deferential to the findings of the [o]rphans' [c]ourt. ” [We] must determine whether the record is free from legal error and the court's factual findings are supported by the evidence. Because the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt sits as the fact
-finder, it determines the credibility of the witnesses and, on review, we will not reverse its credibility determinations absent an abuse of that discretion. However, we are not constrained to give the same

_________________ ____________________ _______ 3 

### Executrix timely complied with the order of the orphans’ court to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.

### J-A01039- 18

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deference to any resulting lega l conclusions. Where the rules of law on which the court relied are palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable, we will reverse the court’s decree. In re Staico, 143 A.3d 983, 987 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). The orphans’ court has thoroughly addressed the claims raised in this appeal in its March 7, 2017 opinion filed in conjunction with the March 3, 2017 decree, and its May 26, 2017 Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/7/2017 (rejecting Executrix’s theories (1) that the Decedent and Sherpa’s marriage was void pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(3); (2) that the marriage should be deemed void ab initio due to the fact it was an allegedly illegal contract that violates the federal immigration law codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) ; and (3) that Sherpa should be denied her spousal share due to unclean hands). See also Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/26/2017 (finding (1) certain issues raised in Executrix’s concise statement were too vague to warrant review; (2) the orphans’ court properly denied Executrix’s request to submit affidavits of Sherpa’s mother, daughter, cousin and the Decedent because the affidavits could not be properly authenticated and the affidavits themselves constituted inadmissible hearsay; and (3) the orphans’ court properly sustained Sherpa’s objection to the testimony of Lynne Jones, Decedent’s cousin, where no hearsay exception applied .

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Based on our review of the orphans’ court’s opinion, we find the orphans’ court properly rejected Executrix’s claims, and further discussion is unnecessary, in all but one respect. Specifically, we address the following contention : [T] he Orphans’ Court passed on ruling whether a marriage should be deemed void because it was an illegal agreement to circumvent federal immigration law. The Court reasoned that ruling on this basis would infringe on the federal judiciary’s exclusive jurisdiction over immigration matters. This too was reversible error.

**** It was an error of law for the [o] rphans’ [c]ourt, which had the exclusive power to annul marriages in Pennsylvania, to pass on whether the agreement to marry in order to circumvent immigration laws violated a statute and is therefore an illegal agreement that is void ab initio. Executrix’s Brief, at 58-59 . In the orphans’ court, Executrix claimed Decedent and Sherpa had committed marriage fraud under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c), which provides: Any individual who knowingly enters into a marriage for the purpose of evading any provision of the immigration laws shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or fined not more than $250,000, or both. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c). The orphans’ court rejected this argument, explaining : In assessing [Executrix’s] argument that Decedent and [Sherpa’s] marriage should be deemed void because it was an illegal agreement to circumvent federal immigration law, initially we find

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that [Executrix’s] invocation of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1325(c) as a basis for invalidating the marriage between Decedent and [Sherpa] raises jurisdictional concerns. Federal immigration law vests the federal district courts with exclusive jurisdiction of all determinations under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1325(c),4 

### which is in line with the general principle that “[i]mmigration is a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction.” See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1329 (West); Ruiz v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 911 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).

____________________________________________________ 4 

### It should be noted that if we were to accept [ Executrix’s] theory that the marriage between Decedent and [Sherpa] was nothing more than a contract between them to violate U.S.C.A. § 1325(c), then we would thereby in practicality be making the determination that Decedent and [Sherpa] did in fact violate U.S.C.A. § 1325(c). Further, we also note that as a criminal statute, such a finding of culpability under U.S.C.A. § 1325(c) would require a higher burden of proof of being proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Islam, 418 F.3d 1125, 1127 (10th 

### Cir. 2005) (On appeal the issue was “whether a reasonable jury could have found Defendant guilty of marriage fraud beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

____________________________________________________ 

### We believe, therefore, that ruling on this basis in the present case would infringe on the federal judiciary’s exclusive jurisdiction over immigration matters. 5

____________________________________________________ 5 

### In this context [ Executrix] almost exclusively cites to federal cases, the majority of which involve prosecution by the United States government. See [Executrix’s] Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to Lakpa Sherpa’s Unclean Hands and Void Marriage, pp. 42
-44.

____________________________________________________

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Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/7/2017, at 12 . We agree with the orphans’ court’s analysis. Contrary to the argument of Executrix, the orphans’ court did not “pass” on the issue of whether Decedent and Sherpa committed marriage fraud under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) . Rather, the orphans’ court recognized it had no authority to question the federal immigration decision to allow Sherpa to enter this country as Decedent’s wife. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/7/2017, at 3 (stating that that Sherpa was admitted as a lawful permanent resident “after going through the federal immigration process, which included a review of all of the relevant marriage documents”). The record discloses the following facts. 4 

### In September, 2008, Decedent and Sherpa married in Katmandu, Nepal. On November 30, 2008, Decedent filed a United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) form, “I
130, Petition for Alien Relative,” for a visa for Sherpa, as his wife. On April 27, 2009, USCIS notified Decedent the petition was approved, and had been forwarded to the Department of State’s National Visa Center (NVC) for completion of the visa processing steps. Thereafter, Sherpa was determined

_________________ ____________________ _______ 4 

### See Exhibits E-32, “Immigration Papers,” and E
-33, “Approval Notice.”

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to be inadmissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 5 

### but not on the grounds that she was not a spouse. Sherpa filed for a waiver of grounds of inadmissibility, which was ultimately approved in May, 2013, and in January, 2014, she arrived and was admitted to the United States as Decedent’s wife for lawful permanent residence. Executrix asked the orphans’ court to conclude the marriage of Decedent and Sherpa was void as illegal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c), regarding marriage fraud for the purpose of evading United States immigration laws. The orphans’ court properly declined to do so. Immigration is the subject of federal, not state, law. The INA allows citizens to file Form I- 130 to petition for immediate relative status on behalf of their alien spouses so that the alien spouses may immigrate to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i). The term “immediate relatives” includes the “children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States. ” § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). Here, USCIS approved the I
- 130 petition filed by Decedent for Sherpa, as his wife
. Section 1325(c), upon which Executrix relies, is a federal criminal provision, and Section 1329 expressly grants to United States district courts

_________________ ____________________ _______ 5 

### See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.

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jurisdiction of “all causes brought by the United States that arise under the provisions of this title” and provides that “[i]t shall be the duty of the United States attorney of the proper district to prosecute every such suit when brought by the United States. ” 8 U.S.C. § 1329. To the extent that Executrix seeks to invalidate the Decedent and Sherpa’s marriage on the basis of Section 1325(c), she is requesting the orphans’ court to interfere with a “binding” decision of USCIS, and indirectly intrude into the jurisdiction of the federal court regarding a Section 1325(c) issue. See Ruiz v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. Of Review, supra, 911 A.2d at 603 (holding “where the USCIS denies or revokes an alien’s work authorization, the determination is binding
on the states and can be assailed only before a federal agency or in a federal court.”). 6, 7

_________________ ____________________ _______ 6 

### We note that “[t]his Court is not bound by decisions of the Commonwealth Court[,]” however, we may consider their decisions as persuasive authority when appropriate. Petow v. Warehime, 996 A.2d 1083, 1089 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotation omitted). 7 

### In Ruiz, the claimant sought unemployment benefits and contended the expiration of his green card did not render him legally unavailable for work during the period February 18 to March 18, 2006. The claimant argued that because he had applied twice to USCIS for renewal of his green card before it expired, he should not have been denied benefits available under Pennsylvania’s Unemployment Compensation Law. Id., 911 A.2d at 603. The Ruiz Court found the USCIS determinations electing not to process two green card renewal requests filed by the claimant were “binding.” Id. at 605

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While we acknowledge the difficult facts of this case and that equity principles apply in orphans’ court proceedings, we agree with the orphans’ court that “ruling on this basis in the present case would infringe on the federal judiciary’s exclusive jurisdiction over immigration matters. ” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/7/2017, at 12. A determination that the marriage of Decedent and Sherpa was an illegal contract to circu mvent immigration law would impermissibly make a finding that is strictly within federal jurisdiction. Decree affirmed. 8 

### Judge Lazarus joins this memorandum. Judge Platt files a dissenting memorandum. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 8/20/18

_________________ ____________________ _______ 

### (emphasis supplied). In addition, the claimant’s green card automatically expired on February 2, 2006. Id. The Ruiz Court concluded the claimant was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits because he “could not accept employment, and employers could not hire, recruit, or continue to employ him during the period he sought benefits.” Id. 8 

### In the event of further proceedings, the parties are directed to attach copies of the orphans’ court’s March 7, 2017, a nd May 26, 2017 opinions to this memorandum.

### J-A01039- 18

- 12 -Received 4/22/2017 10:46:44 AMY:4044 0/Eriktfeff2f3ZIFIM

Filed 4/22/2017 10:46:00 AM Superior Court Eastern District 1132 EDA 2017 IN THE COURT OF 

### COMMON PLEAS OF BUCKS COUNTY, 

### PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION In re: 

### ESTATE OF GENE B. 

### ROSMARIN, : 

### Deceased : No. 2014-0441


### DECREE AND NOW, this 

# 3 c'6 day 

### ofMarch, 2017, 

### upon consideration 

### ofPetitioner Barbara 

### Nolan's Petition to (1) Strike 

### Lakpa Sherpa's Claim to be 

### Recognized as 

### Decedent's Surviving Spouse because the Alleged Marriage between Lakpa Sherpa and Decedent is 

### Fraudulent and therefore Void under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(3)[] and (2) Strike 

### Lakpa Sherpa's Claim 

### Against 

### Decedent's Estate Pursuant to 20 

### Pa.C.S.A. § 2507(3) 

### because 

### Decedent's Last Will and 

### Testament was Drafted in 

### Contemplation 

### ofhis Future Marriage to 

### Lakpa Sherpa, and 

### Petitioner's "Order to 

### Show Cause" requesting that the Court strike 

### Respondent Lakpa 

### Sherpa's spousal share 

### claim pursuant to the doctrine 

### ofunclean hands, and the responses thereto, and after an 

### extensive hearing in this matter, it is 

### hereby ORDERED and 

### DECREED that said Petition and the 

### relief sought in 

### Petitioner's "Order to Show Cause" are 

### DENIED and DISMISSED. Respondent Lakpa Sherpa shall be 

### entitled to 

### pursue her spousal share 

### of Decedent's estate.

N.B. It is 

### your responsibility to notify all interested parties 

### of the 

### above action. BY THE COURT:


### ,L21, C. 

### THEODORE FRITSCH, JR., ADMN. J.IN THE 

### COURT OF 

### COMMON PLEAS OF BUCKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

### ORPHANS' COURT 

### DIVISION In re: 

### ESTATE OF 

### GENE B. ROSMARIN, : 

### Deceased : No. 2014-0441


### MEMORANDUM 

### OPINION Currently before the Court are two separate 

### requests for 

### reliefseeking to strike the spousal share 

### claim filed by 

### Respondent Lapka Sherpa 

### (hereinafter sometimes referred to as 

### "Respondent") against the 

### estate 

### ofthe Decedent Gene B. 

### Rosmarin (hereinafter sometimes referred to as 

### "Decedent"), which were filed by the 

### Petitioner Barbara Nolan (hereinafter sometimes referred to as 

### "Petitioner") on 

### January 30, 2015, and 

### June 22, 2015. 

### Petitioner is the ex-wife 

### ofthe 

### Decedent and the executrix 

### ofhis estate. 

### Petitioner now seeks to have the Court either: (1) annul 

### the marriage between Decedent and 

### his second-wife, Respondent Lakpa Sherpa,

on the basis 

### ofPetitioner's allegations that the marriage between 

### Decedent and 

### Respondent was
a 

### "sham" in 

### order to 

### perpetrate immigration fraud or (2) 

### strike 

### Respondent's claim for her elective share 

### ofthe 

### Decedent's estate under the doctrine 

### ofunclean hands. 

### BACKGROUND On 

### January 30, 

### 2015, 

### Petitioner filed a document entitled: 

### Petition to (1) Strike Lakpa 

### Sherpa's Claim to be 

### Recognized as 

### Decedent's Surviving Spouse because the Alleged Marriage between Lakpa Sherpa and 

### Decedent is 

### Fraudulent and therefore Void 

### under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(3); and (2) 

### Strike Lakpa 

### Sherpa's Claim Against 

### Decedent's Estate Pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 

### 2507(3) because 

### Decedent's Last Will and 

### Testament was Drafted in 

### Contemplation 

### ofhis Future Marriage to 

### Lakpa Sherpa. On 

### June 22, 2015, Petitioner filed a 

### document titled 

### "Order to Show Cause" in which she 

### requested that the 

### Court strike 

### Respondent's spousal share

### claim with prejudice 

### pursuant to 

### her allegation that Respondent is 

### in violation 

### ofthe 

### doctrine 

### of unclean hands. We 

### held an 

### eight-day hearing in this matter, with substantive hearing dates spanning from September 29, 2015, through October 26, 2016. 

### On January 30, 2017, the 

### parties submitted proposed findings 

### of fact and 

### conclusions 

### oflaw. In 

### "Petitioner's Proposed Findings 

### ofFact and 

### Conclusions 

### of Law as to Lakpa 

### Sherpa's Unclean Hands and Void Marriage," Petitioner indicated that she was withdrawing 

### her attemptto 

### strike 

### Respondent's spousal share claim pursuant to 20 

### Pa.C.S.A. § 2507(3). 

### Decedent Gene B. 

### Rosmarin died on 

### June 10, 2014. 

### Decedent died with a Last Will and 

### Testament dated April 9, 1998, 

### which appointed his ex-wife, 

### Petitioner Barbara Nolan, executrix 

### ofhis estate and 

### left her the entirety 

### ofthe rest, residue, and 

### remainder 

### ofhis estate. See 

### Decedent's Last Will and 

### Testament dated April 9, 1998. 

### Decedent's Last Will and 

### Testament was drafted after his 

### divorce from Petitioner, the 

### Petitioner and 

### Decedent having been divorced in 1996. 

### After 

### Decedent's divorce from Petitioner, Decedent 

### engaged in a 

### long-term relationship with a 

### Nepalese woman, Chopka Sherpa. N.T. 10/26/16, pp. 118-119; N.T. 9/28/16, p. 144. 

### Decedent and Chopka 

### Sherpa remained in a 

### relationship for several 

### years, until eventually Chopka no 

### longer wished to 

### pursue a 

### romantic relationship with Decedent. N.T. 9/28/16, pp. 148-154. In 2002, 

### Decedent met Respondent Lakpa Sherpa while he was on a trip to Nepal with Chopka. N.T. 7/15/16, p. 4. 

### From the time they met, 

### Respondent and 

### Decedent stayed in touch, with Chopka primarily 

### helping to 

### facilitate their communications. N.T. 7/15/16, pp. 9-10. 

### Testimony was elicited 

### that Decedent often expressed feelings 

### ofbeing lonely and depressed, and he was in 

### search 

### ofcompanionship. N.T. 9/28/16, pp. 53-54, 86, 168-169; N.T. 9/29/15, p. 126, 161-162. 

### Decedent wanted the 

### comfort and security 

### that he 

### associated with marriage. N.T.

29/29/15, p. 126. 

### Eventually, Decedent expressed to his 

### mother and his 

### sisterhis 

### desire to 'marry Respondent. N.T. 9/29/15, pp. 126, 161-162. However, 

### Decedent's children were not made
aware 

### ofRespondent, nor 

### Decedent's intention to remarry. N.T. 9/28/16, pp. 126-127, 

### N.T. 9/29/15, pp. 

### 211, 219-220. In describing the progression 

### ofher 

### relationship with Decedent, Respondent stated: 

### "he loved me and I 

### had small kids[,] he was very good to the kids and he loves me and 

### cared for me[,] [s]o I 

### decided to get married to 

### him." N.T. 7/15/16, pp. 10-11. On 

### September 29, 2008, 

### while Decedent was in Nepal, 

### Respondent and 

### Decedent entered into a marriage. N.T. 

### 7/15/16, p. 11. 

### Respondent and Decedent 

### "[f]irst [] got 

### married traditionally in [Nepalese] 

### culture and then after that [] went to the government office and got [their] 

### marriage registered." N.T. 

### 7/15/16, p. 11. A copy 

### ofDecedent and 

### Respondent's marriage certificate was entered as an 

### exhibit at trial. N.T. 5/6/16, pp. 27-28. On 

### January 22, 2014, after going through the federal 

### immigration process, which included a 

### review 

### ofall 

### ofthe relevant marriage documents, Respondent entered the United States as a lawful 

### permanent resident. N.T. 7/15/16, pp. 44-46. Respondent currently maintains her status as a 

### lawful 

### permanent resident. N.T. 7/15/16, pp. 44-46. While living in the United States during the time 

### Decedent was alive, Respondent did not reside with Decedent on a continual basis, and 

### would spend a majority 

### ofthe week in 

### New York, 

### where she 

### was able to find work. N.T. 5/6/16, pp. 31-47; N.T. 7/15/16, p. 47. 

### However, Decedent did hold Respondent out to be 

### his wife, naming her as a 

### beneficiary for his 

### work benefits, and 

### expressing his desire to be 

### with her to his doctor. N.T. 7/15/16, pp. 66-69; 

### see ExhibitsE-33 and 

### E-35. Although 

### Decedent's tax 

### preparer stated 

### Decedent had once 

### mentioned the prospect 

### ofdivorce to him, from 

### the time 

### ofRespondent's arrival, neither Decedent nor 

### Respondent took any affirmative steps 

### towards obtaining a divorce. N.T. 9/29/15, pp. 19, 25.

3On May 10, 

### 2014, Decedent suffered a serious accident that resulted in his 

### hospitalization and his 

### placement on life 

### support. N.T. 7/14/16, p. 22, N.T. 9/29/15, pp. 219-220. 

### Petitioner and 

### Decedent and 

### Petitioner's children claim they were not aware 

### ofRespondent's marriage to 

### Decedent until her involvement at the hospital following

### Decedent's accident. N.T. 9/28/16, pp. 126-127, N.T. 9/29/15, pp. 

### 211, 219-220. However, Decedent had a 

### somewhat estranged and 

### distant relationship in 

### recent years with his children and Petitioner. 

### N.T. 9/28/16, pp. 147-159; N.T. 

### 7/13/16, pp. 97-98; 

### N.T. 10/26/16, p. 119. Ultimately, the 

### hospital recognized Respondent

as 

### the legal wife 

### ofDecedent, and as such granted her decision-making authority. N.T. 7/15/16, p. 87, see 

### Exhibit E-35. On 

### June 10, 2014, Decedent passed away. On 

### August 8, 2014, 

### Petitioner was granted Letters 

### Testamentary in 

### regard to 

### Decedent's estate. See 

### August 8, 

### 2014, Decision and Decree issued by the 

### Register 

### ofWills, Docket No. 

### 2014-01469. Respondent filed her spousal election against 

### Decedent's Will on 

### November 18, 2014. 

### Thereafter, Petitioner initiated the present attemptsto 

### disallow 

### Respondent's spousal share claim. 

### DISCUSSION We will discuss 

### below both 

### ofPetitioner's theories 

### ofrelieffor 

### striking 

### Respondent's spousal share claim; to wit, 

### the marriage being voidpursuant to 23 

### Pa.C.S.A. § 

### 3304(a)(3) and 

### Respondent's conduct being in 

### violation 

### ofthe doctrine 

### ofunclean hands. At the outset, it is 

### necessary to 

### address the meaning 

### ofa 

### marriage under Pennsylvania law, and 

### whether what transpired between Decedent and 

### Respondent can be recognized as a 

### prima facie marriage. 

### "Marriage in 

### Pennsylvania is a civil 

### contract by 

### which a man and a


### woman take 

### each other for 

### husband and 

### wife." In re 

### Manfredi's Estate, 399 Pa. 285, 291, 159 

### A.2d 697, 700 (1960). 

### "The validity 

### ofa 

### marriage is to be 

### determined by the law 

### ofthe place

4where it was celebrated; 

### ifvalid there, it is valid everywhere."1 

### Phillips v. 

### Gregg, 1840 WL 3833, at *I (Pa. 

### 1840). In the 

### present case, 

### the record reflects 

### that Decedent and Respondent entered into a 

### marriage in 

### Nepal, and 

### their marriage was recognized as 

### valid by the 

### Nepalese government, as 

### evidenced by their marriage certificate. N.T. 5/6/16, pp. 26-28; see 

### Exhibit E-16. The record 

### establishes that Decedent and 

### Respondent received a 

### marriage certificate from the Nepalese government and had a 

### ceremonial wedding pursuant to 

### Nepalese and 

### Buddhist customs.2 N.T. 5/6/16, pp. 

### 26-28; N.T. 

### 7/15/16, p. 11; see 

### Exhibit E-16. Accordingly, based 

### upon the previously stated principles and the evidence 

### ofrecord, we find that a prima facie marriage 

### between Decedent and Respondent has been established. We now must look at the 

### ramifications 

### ofthis determination. Pursuant to 20 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2507(3): Wills shall be 

### modified upon the occurrence 

### of any 

### ofthe 

### following circumstances, among others: (3) 

### Marriage.--Ifthe 

### testator marries after making a will, 

### the surviving spouse shall 

### receive the share 

### ofthe estate to 

### which he 

### would have been entitled had the 

### testator died intestate, unless the will shall give 

### him a 

### greater share or 

### unless it 

### appears from the will 

### that the will was 

### made in 

### contemplation 

### ofmarriage to the 

### surviving spouse.

We do recognize that there is an exception to this general principle when a foreign marriage is repugnant to the public policy ofthe Commonwealth ofPennsylvania. See Corn, v. Custer, 145 Pa. Super. 535, 540, 21 A.2d 524, 526 (1941) ("An exception to the general rule, however, is ordinarily made in the case ofmarriages repugnant to the public policy ofthe domicile ofthe parties, in respect ofpolygamy, incest, or miscegenation, or otherwise contrary to its positive laws."). Pennsylvania now only recognizes ceremonial marriages for any marriage entered into in the Commonwealth after January 1, 2005, and "[a] ceremonial marriage is a wedding or marriage performed by a religious or civil authority with the usual or customary ceremony or formalities." In re Manfredi's Estate, 399 Pa. 285, 291, 159 A.2d 697, 700 (1960); see Elk Mountain Ski Resort, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 114 A.3d 27, 32-33 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) ("The legislature [] amended Section 1103 ofthe Marriage Law, 23 Pa.C.S. § 1103, effective January 24, 2005, statutorily abolishing common law marriages in Pennsylvania. Section 1103 provides: 'No common-law marriage contracted after January 1, 2005, shall be valid. Nothing in this part shall be deemed or taken to render any common-law marriage otherwise lawful and contracted on or before January 1, 2005, invalid." (quoting 23 Pa.C.S. § 1103)); see also In re Manfredi's Estate, 399 Pa. 285, 291, 159 A.2d 697, 700 (1960) ("There [used to be] two kinds ofmarriage: (1) ceremonial; and (2) common law.").

520 Pa.-Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 

### 2507(3) (West). Under the laws 

### of intestate succession, as set forth 

### under 20 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2102(4): 

### The intestate share 

### ofa 

### decedent's surviving spouse is: (4) 

### Ifthere are 

### surviving issue 

### of the 

### decedent one or more 

### ofwhom are not issue 

### ofthe surviving spouse, 

### one-half 

### ofthe intestate estate. 20 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 

### 2102(4) (West). Further, 

### under 20 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 

### 2203: (a) 

### Property subject to 

### election.--Except as 

### provided in 

### subsection (c), 

### when a 

### married person domiciled in 

### this Commonwealth dies, his 

### surviving spouse has a 

### right to an 

### elective share 

### ofone-third 

### ofthe following property: 

### (I) Property passing from the decedent by will or 

### intestacy. (2) 

### Income or use for 

### the remaining life 

### ofthe spouse 

### ofproperty conveyed by 

### the decedent during the marriage to the 

### extent that the 

### decedent at the time 

### ofhis death 

### had the 

### use 

### ofthe property or an 

### interest in or 

### power to 

### withdraw the income thereof. (3) 

### Property conveyed by the decedent during his 

### lifetime to the extent that the 

### decedent at the time 

### ofhis death had a 

### power to 

### revoke the conveyance or to 

### consume, invade or dispose 

### ofthe principal for his own benefit. (4) Property 

### conveyed by 

### the decedent during the marriage to 

### himselfand another or 

### others with right 

### ofsurvivorship to the 

### extent 

### of any 

### interest in 

### the property that the decedent had the power at the time 

### ofhis 

### death unilaterally to convey absolutely or in fee. (5) 

### Survivorship rights 

### conveyed to a 

### beneficiary 

### ofan 

### annuity contract to the extent it was 

### purchased by 

### the decedent during the marriage and the decedent was 

### receiving annuity payments therefrom at the time 

### ofhis death. (6) 

### Property conveyed by the decedent during the marriage and 

### within one year 

### of his death to 

### the extent that the aggregate amount so 

### conveyed to 

### each donee exceeds $3,000, 

### valued at the time 

### ofconveyance. In 

### construing this 

### subsection, a 

### power in the 

### decedent to 

### withdraw income or 

### principal, or a 

### power in any 

### person whose interest is 

### not adverse to the 

### decedent to 

### distribute to or use 

### for the benefit 

### ofthe decedent any income or 

### principal, shall be 

### deemed to be 

### a power in 

### the decedent to 

### withdraw so 

### much 

### ofthe income or principal as is 

### subject to such power, 

### even though such income or 

### principal may be 

### distributed only for support or other particular purpose or only in limited periodic amounts. 

### (b) 

### Property not subject to 

### election.--The

### provisions 

### ofsubsection (a) 

### shall not be 

### construed to include any 

### ofthe following except to the 

### extent that they pass as 

### part 

### ofthe decedent's estate to his 

### personal representative, heirs, legatees or 

### devisees: (1) Any conveyance made 

### with the express consent or

### joinder 

### ofthe surviving spouse.

6(2) The 

### proceeds 

### ofinsurance, including accidental death benefits, on 

### the life 

### of

# '- the decedent. (3) 

### Interests under any broad-based

### nondiscriminatory pension, profit sharing, stock bonus, deferred compensation, disability, death benefit or other such plan 

### established by an 

### employer for the 

### benefit 

### ofits 

### employees and their beneficiaries. (4) 

### Property passing by the decedent's exercise or 

### nonexercise 

### ofany 

### power 

### of appointment given by someone other than the decedent. (e) 

### Nonapplicability.--Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 3323(d.1) 

### (relating to 

### decree 

### ofcourt), this section shall 

### not apply in the event a 

### married person domiciled in this 

### Commonwealth dies 

### during the course 

### ofdivorce 

### proceedings, no 

### decree 

### ofdivorce 

### has been entered pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 3323 and 

### grounds have been established as 

### provided in 23 

### Pa.C.S. § 3323(g). 20 Pa. Stat. 

### and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2203 (West). In 

### that Decedent died testate with a Last Will and 

### Testament which did 

### not mention Respondent, 

### ifwe were to find that Respondent entered into a 

### valid marriage with Decedent and that 

### Respondent's conduct has not barred her from 

### reliefunder the doctrine 

### ofunclean hands, then Respondent would be 

### entitled to 

### either 

### one-half 

### ofDecedent's estate pursuant to 20 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 

### 2507(3) and 20 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2102(4), or her elective share 

### pursuant to 20 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2203. 

### I) Void 

### Marriage Petitioner urges us to find the marriage between Decedent and Respondent void pursuant to 23 

### Pa.C.S.A. § 

### 3304(a)(3), and, as set forth in 

### Petitioner's proposed conclusions 

### oflaw, 

### additionally asserts the theory that since the 

### marriage 

### between Decedent and 

### Respondent is alleged to have been 

### entered into for the purpose 

### ofcontravening federal immigration law, 

### than it must be deemed void 

### ab initio. We will address each 

### ofthe 

### theories Petitioner asserts as a basis for 

### finding the marriage between Decedent and Respondent void.

a. 23 

### Pa.C.S.A. 4 

### 3304(0(3) Under 23 Pa. Stat. 

### and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3304(a)(3):

7

### (a) 

### General rule.--Where there has been no 

### confirmation by 

### cohabitation following the removal 

### ofan 

### impediment, the supposed or alleged marriage 

### ofa 

### person shall be 

### deemed void in the 

### following cases: (3) Where 

### either party to such marriage was incapable 

### ofconsenting by 

### reason 

### of insanity or serious mental disorder or otherwise lacked capacity to 

### consent or did not intend to 

### consent to the marriage. 23 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 

### 3304(a)(3) (West). 

### "There is the 

### presumption 

### of sanity and the 

### presumption 

### ofthe legality 

### ofthe marriage, which presumptions can be overcome only by 

### presentation 

### ofclear evidence that defendant was not capable at the 

### time 

### ofthe marriage ceremony to understand the nature 

### ofthe 

### marriage contract and its 

### consequent effect." DeMedio

v. DeMedio, 215 Pa. Super. 255, 269, 

### 257 A.2d 290, 298 (1969). 

### "The burden 

### ofovercoming such 

### presumption is 

### upon the party attacking the validity 

### ofthe 

### marriage." Id. (internal 

### citation omitted). 

### "The general rule is 

### that a 

### marriage valid where contracted is 

### valid everywhere and this rule has long 

### been upheld in this 

### state." Com. v. 

### Custer, 145 Pa. Super. 535, 539, 21 A.2d 524, 526 (1941). 

### Under 23 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 

### 3304(a)(3), 

### "a marriage [is] 

### void only where one 

### ofthe 

### parties lacked capacity to consent or did not intend to assent to the marriage."3 In 

### Interest 

## of Miller, 301 Pa. Super. 511, 

### 524-25, 448 A.2d 25, 

### 31-32 (1982) (internal 

### citations and 

### quotation marks omitted)." "The 

### reason or 

### motive underlying the decision to marry is 

### not relevant to a 

### finding 

### ofthe 

### [i]ntention to 

### marry." In 

### re Gower's Estate, 445 Pa. 554, 557, 

### 284 A.2d 742, 744 (1971). In In 

### Interest 

### ofMiller, 301 Pa. Super. 511, 

### 524-25, 448 A.2d 25, 

### 31-32 (1982), the Superior Court shed light on the 

### high bar for voiding a 

### marriage pursuant to 23 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 

### 3304(a)(3). The Superior Court held that where "[t]he record here

3 Although in In Interest of Miller, 301 Pa. Super. 511, 524-25, 448 A.2d 25, 31-32 (1982) the Superior Court of Pennsylvania was specifically referencing the former statute on the issue, 23 P.S. § 204, it should be noted that 23 23 P.S. § 204(a)(3) and 23 Pa. Stat, and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3304(a)(3) are essentially identical. See Jeffco v. Jeffco, No. 402 WDA 2013, 2014 WL 10988175, at *5 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 14, 2014) ("While Miller cited to former section 205(b) ofthe Divorce Code, the present section 3305 contains similar language."). 8establishe[d]

. . . [the 

### couple's] intention to 

### many[,] [t]he fact-

. 

### that [the 

### couple's] motive was
to 

### avoid prosecution could not render invalid 

### their otherwise valid

. . . 

### marriage." In 

### Interest 

### of Miller, 301 Pa. Super. 511, 521, 448 

### A.2d 25, 

### 29-30 (1982) (emphasis original). In 

### establishing that an 

### improper motive will not be 

### used as grounds to 

### collaterally invalidate an otherwise 

### proper marriage, the 

### Superior Court stated that "[t]he lower court's finding 

### that [the 

### husband's] sole purpose was to 

### practice a fraud upon 

### this Court and upon [the wife] 

### does not bring the 

### marriage within [what is now Section 

### 3304(a)(3)1" Id. The Superior Court emphasized that 23 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 

### 3304(a)(3), "makes a 

### marriage void only where one 

### ofthe parties 

### 'lacked capacity to 

### consent or did 

### not intend to 

### [consent]' to the 

### marriage[, and] [s]ince [] 

### neither party lacked capacity and both intended to 

### assent, the section [was] 

### inapplicable." Id. In the 

### instant case, the record does not support a finding that the marriage between 

### Decedent and 

### Respondent is 

### void pursuant to 23 Pa. Stat. 

### and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3304(a)(3). The record is 

### completely devoid 

### ofany evidence speaking to either 

### Decedent's or 

### Respondent's mental capacity or status at 

### the time 

### oftheir marriage in 

### Nepal. To the contrary, 

### there is evidence in the 

### record indicating that both Decedent and Respondent had the 

### present intent and capacity to 

### consent to 

### their marriage. Decedent expressed a desire to be 

### married to Respondent. See N.T. 

### 9/29/15, p. 126. 

### Prior to 

### marrying Respondent in Nepal, Decedent informed his 

### mother that he intended to marry 

### Respondent, and also told 

### his sister about Respondent. See N.T. 9/29/15, pp. 130-131, 161-162. 

### Respondent testified regarding her 

### intention to marry Decedent, and her reasons for 

### doing so. See N.T. 7/15/16, pp. 10-11. 

### Further, given the 

### general rule that a 

### "marriage valid where 

### contracted is valid 

### everywhere," and 

### given the fact that Decedent and 

### Respondent entered into a 

### valid marriage under Nepalese law, 

### Respondent and 

### Decedent enjoy "the 

### presumption 

### of sanity and the

9

### presumption Elfthe legality

### -ofthe 

### marriage." Com. v. 

### Custer, 145 Pa. Super. 

### 535;539, 21-A.2d 524, 526 (1941); DeMedio v. DeMedio, 215 Pa. Super. 255, 269, 257 

### A.2d 290, 298 (1969). 

### These presumptions bestowed upon Decedent and 

### Respondent with respect to 

### their marriage "can be overcome 

### only by presentation 

### ofclear evidence that [they were] not capable at the time 

### ofthe marriage ceremony to understand the nature 

### of the 

### marriage contract and its 

### consequent effect," and the burden 

### ofestablishing such evidence "is upon 

### the party attacking the validity 

### of the marriage." DeMedio v. DeMedio, 215 Pa. Super. 255, 269, 257 

### A.2d 290, 298 (1969). In 

### this case, the 

### record is 

### devoid 

### ofany medical evidence that would suggest 

### that either Decedent or 

### Respondent was 

### incapable 

### ofconsenting to and understanding the 

### consequences 

### oftheir marriage. Further, as 

### demonstrated in In 

### Interest 

### ofMiller, 

### even 

### ifDecedent and 

### Respondent did 

### enter into 

### their marriage for an 

### allegedly fraudulent purpose, as 

### asserted by Petitioner, the 

### fact that the "sole 

### purpose was to practice a 

### fraud

. . . does not 

### bring the marriage within [what is 

### now Section 

### 3304(a)(3)1" In 

### Interest 

### ofMiller, 301 Pa. Super. 511, 521, 448 

### A.2d 25, 

### 29-30 (1982). 

### Just as in In 

### Interest 

### ofMiller, the record in this case clearly establishes 

### Decedent's and 

### Respondent's intention to marry, and 

### even 

### iftheir motive in 

### getting 

### married was questionable, their motive alone cannot invalidate an 

### otherwise valid marriage under 23 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 

### 3304(a)(3). Accordingly, we 

### find 

### Petitioner's argument that the marriage 

### between Decedent and 

### Respondent should be deemed void pursuant to 23 Pa. Stat. 

### and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 

### 3304(a)(3) lacks merit

. b. 

### Illegal 

### Contract In 

### Petitioner's Proposed Findings 

### ofFact and 

### Conclusions 

### ofLaw as 

### to Lakpa 

### Sherpa's Unclean Hands and Void Marriage, Petitioner raises the 

### additional argument that the 

### marriage

10

### between Decedent and Respondent should be deemed 

### void ab initio due to the fact 

### that it was allegedly an illegal 

### agreement which violates a 

### provision 

### ofa 

### statute, namely the federal immigration law codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1325(c). 

### "In Pennsylvania, marriage is a civil contract made between 

### parties with the capacity so to 

### contract." In 

### re 

### Garges'Estate, 474 Pa. 237, 240, 378 

### A.2d 307, 308 (1977). 

### "Proving the existence 

### of a 

### marriage contract, except where it is 

### entered into 

### ceremonially, is 

### difficult, because it is 

### likely to 

### arise in an informal setting, where records are not 

### kept." In 

### re 

### Garges' Estate, 474 Pa. 237, 

### 240-41, 378 

### A.2d 307, 309 (1977). There is a 

### "general rule that an 

### agreement between parties which violates a 

### provision 

### ofa statute, or which 

### cannot be 

### effectively performed without violating said statute, is illegal, unenforceable, and 

### void ab 

### initio." Gramby v. Cobb, 282 Pa. Super. 183, 188, 422 A.2d 889, 892 (1980). It has 

### been elaborated: Where a 

### contract is 

### found to be against public policy it cannot, 

### under any circumstances, be made the 

### basis 

### of a 

### cause 

### of action. The law 

### when appealed to will have nothing to do with it, but will leave the 

### parties

### just in the 

### condition in 

### which it finds them. 

### Ifthey have fully 

### executed their unlawful contract, 

### the law 

### will 

### not disturb them in the possession 

### of what each has 

### acquired under it. 

### Ifone has 

### executed in 

### whole or in 

### part, the lawturns a 

### deaf ear when he pleads for its aid to compel the 

### other to do as much. Id. (internal 

### citations omitted). Under federal law, it is a crime to enter into a 

### marriage for the purpose 

### of evading federal 

### immigration laws, with 8 

### U.S.C.A. § 1325(c) stating: (c) 

### Marriage fraud Any 

### individual who knowingly enters into a 

### marriage for the 

### purpose 

### ofevading any provision 

### ofthe immigration laws shall be 

### imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or fined 

### not more than $250,000, or both.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1325(c) (West). However, 

### "kimmigration is a 

### matter 

### ofexclusive federal jurisdiction." Ruiz v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. 

## of Review, 911 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. Commw. Ct.

112006). With regard to

### judicial determinations under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1325(c), 

### federal immigration law establishes: The district courts 

### ofthe United States shall have

### jurisdiction 

### ofall causes, civil and 

### criminal, 

### brought by the United States that arise 

### under the 

### provisions 

### ofthis subchapter. 

### It shall be the duty 

### ofthe United States attorney 

### ofthe 

### proper district to 

### prosecute every such suit 

### when brought by the United States.

. . . 8 U.S.C.A. § 1329 (West). In 

### assessing 

### Petitioner's argument that Decedent and 

### Respondent's marriage should be deemed 

### void because it was an illegal agreement to 

### circumvent federal 

### immigration law, 

### initially

we find 

### that 

### Petitioner's invocation 

### of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1325(c) as 

### a basis for 

### invalidating the 

### marriage 

### between Decedent and Respondent raises

### jurisdictional concerns. Federal 

### immigration law vests the federal 

### district courts with 

### exclusivejurisdiction 

### of all 

### determinations under 8 

### U.S.C.A. § 1325(c),4 

### which is in line 

### with 

### the general principle that 

### "[i]mmigration is a 

### matter 

### of exclusive federal

### jurisdiction." See 8 

### U.S.C.A. § 1329 (West); Ruiz v. Unemployment Comp. 

### Bd 

### of Review, 911 

### A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006). We believe, 

### therefore, that ruling on this basis in the 

### present case 

### would infringe on the federal

### judiciary's exclusive

### jurisdiction over 

### immigration matters.5 Further, 

### we see fundamental flaws in 

### Petitioner's illegal 

### contract argument. First, 

### we find that the record does not support the theory that the marriage was 

### entered into for the purpose 

### ofcircumventing federal immigration law. Additionally, the principle cited by 

### Petitioner, i.e.

It should be noted that ifwe were to accept Petitioner's theory that the marriage between Decedent and Respondent was nothing more than a contract between them to violate U.S.C.A. § 1325(c), then we would thereby in practicality be making the determination that Decedent and Respondent did in fact violate U.S.C.A. § 1325(c). Further, we also note that as a criminal statute, such a finding ofculpability under U.S.C.A. § 1325(c) would require the higher burden ofproofofbeing proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See UnitedStates v. Islam, 418 F.3d 1125, 1127 (10th Cir. 2005) (On appeal the issue was "whether a reasonable jury could have found Defendant guilty ofmarriage fraud beyond a reasonable doubt."). In this context Petitioner almost exclusively cites to federal cases, the majority ofwhich involve prosecution by the United States government. See Petitioner's Proposed Findings ofFact and Conclusions of Law as to Lakpa Sherpa's Unclean Hands and Void Marriage, pp. 42-44. 12"an agreement 

### between 

### parties which violates a 

### provision 

### ofa statute, 

### or which cannot be effectively performed 

### without violating said statute, is illegal, 

### unenforceable, and void ab initio," naturally applies when 

### an agreement itself violates a statute or 

### performance 

### ofsuch would cause violation 

### ofa statute. 

### Gramby v. Cobb, 282 Pa. Super. 183, 188, 422 

### A.2d 889, 892 (1980). However, to 

### accept 

### Petitioner's theory 

### ofreliefwithin the context 

### ofmarriage, we would have to accept the 

### argument that the agreement to marry, i.e. an 

### agreement between two 

### consenting adults to 

### take one another as each 

### other's spouse, can in 

### itselfbe a 

### violation 

### ofa statute. We would not dispute 

### that an agreement between two people to become 

### married solely in 

### order to 

### circumvent federal 

### immigration law 

### could be held 

### void ab initio as an illegal 

### contract and would not be enforceable; 

### however, this must be 

### distinguished from the agreement to 

### marry itself. Here, we are not only 

### aided by the fact that the marriage between Decedent and Respondent was 

### "entered into 

### ceremonially," but the record also 

### supports a 

### finding that there was an 

### agreement between Decedent and Respondent to 

### take one another as 

### each 

### other's spouse, an 

### agreement which in 

### itselfcannot be 

### said to 

### amount to a 

### violation 

### of any 

### statute or established law. 6 In 

### re Gargesi Estate, 474 Pa. 

### 237, 

### 240-41, 378 A.2d 307, 309 (1977). Based on the 

### totality 

### ofthe foregoing, we do not find 

### Petitioner's argument, that the 

### marriage between 

### Decedent and 

### Respondent should be 

### deemed void 

### ab initio due to the fact that it was 

### allegedly an 

### illegal agreement, to be a valid basis to 

### deny recognition 

### ofthe marriage. 

### II) Unclean 

### Hands Petitioner raises two arguments in asserting 

### that Respondent should be 

### denied her spousal share due to the 

### doctrine 

### ofunclean hands: (1) 

### Respondent's hands are 

### unclean due to her allegedly 

### committing marriage fraud and (2) 

### Respondent's hands are 

### unclean due to her making

6 We further note that the record does not establish the existence of any agreement between Decedent and Respondent to enter into their marriage solely for the purpose of aiding Respondent in evading immigration laws. 13

### "willful and 'material 

### representations regarding the bona fides 

### ofher alleged marriage to 

### the Decedent, 

### which clearly shows she is acting deceitfully regarding the matter in 

### controversy." "In the 

### exercise 

### ofthe limited

### jurisdiction conferred on it by statute, 

### it is 

### plain that the Orphans' Court must apply the rules and principles 

### ofequity[,] [t]hus, the familiar equity maxim `he who comes into a court 

### ofequity 

### must come with clean 

### hands' applies to 

### matters within the Orphans' Court's 

### jurisdiction." In 

### re Estate 

### ofPedrick, 505 Pa. 530, 543, 

### 482 A.2d 215, 222 (1984) (internal 

### citations omitted). "The maxim 

### itself is derived from the 

### unwillingness 

### ofa court to give 

### reliefto a 

### suitor who has so 

### conducted 

### himselfas to 

### shock the moral sensibilities 

### of the

### judge, and it has 

### nothing to do with the rights or 

### liabilities 

### ofthe parties." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

### "[T]he clean hands 

### doctrine does not bar 

### reliefto a party 

### merely because his 

### conduct in 

### general has been shown not to be 

### blameless; the doctrine only applies where the 

### wrongdoing directly affects the 

### relationship subsisting between the parties and is directly 

### connected with the matter in 

### controversy." 

### Id "It does not apply to 

### collateral matters not directly affecting the equitable relations which exist between the parties." 

### Id Further, the 

### unclean hands doctrine "necessarily gives wide range to the equity court's use 

### ofdiscretion," and the court 

### "is free to 

### refuse to apply the doctrine 

### ifa 

### consideration 

### ofthe entire record convinces [it] 

### that an 

### inequitable 

### result will be 

### reached." Shapiro v. 

### Shapiro, 415 Pa. 503, 507, 204 A.2d 266, 268 (1964). We find 

### Petitioner's assertion that Respondent should be found to have 

### unclean hands due to the 

### allegations 

### ofher 

### committing marriage fraud to 

### lack merit. In 

### addition to the reasons discussed above for not finding the marriage void, we do 

### not believe there is 

### sufficient evidence
to invalidate the 

### marriage between Decedent and Respondent based upon 

### Petitioner's allegations 

### ofimmigration fraud. Although the record indicates that the marriage in 

### question was not

14

### traditional in many respects, the 

### retard is replete with evidence that 

### there undisputedly was a 

### marriage between Decedent and 

### Respondent within the eyes 

### ofthe law. There was 

### testimony that Decedent wanted to 

### marry Respondent, and wanted to do so for 

### companionship. N.T. 

### 9/28/16, pp. 53-54, 86, 168-169; N.T. 9/29/15, p. 126, 161-162. 

### There was also 

### testimony that Respondent wanted to 

### marry Decedent for stability, support, and 

### companionship. N.T. 

### 7/15/16, pp. 10-11. Further, there was no 

### testimony establishing an 

### agreement between Decedent and 

### Respondent to marry for the sole 

### purpose 

### ofhelping Respondent 

### circumvent federal 

### immigration laws. We also note 

### that there 

### was no 

### evidence presented establishing 

### that a 

### federal agency ever concluded that the marriage between Decedent and 

### Respondent ran afoul 

### offederal immigration law. 

### Accordingly, we do not believe it would be an appropriate use 

### ofour discretion to deny 

### Respondent's spousal share claim due to allegations 

### ofmarriage fraud in 

### light 

### ofthe 

### totality 

### of the record. 

### Petitioner also asserts 

### Respondent's conduct throughout the course 

### ofthis 

### litigation as a 

### basis to 

### deny 

### Respondent's spousal share claim under the 

### doctrine 

### ofunclean hands. In support 

### ofthis 

### position, Petitioner largely restates her overarching theory 

### ofthe case and asserts allegations 

### ofmisconduct, in 

### many instances without citing to the record to 

### substantiate said allegations. See 

### Petitioner's Proposed Findings 

### ofFact and 

### Conclusions, pp. 51-54. She 

### further urges the 

### Court to infer nefarious 

### intent simply due to the 

### unconventional nature 

### ofthe marriage. See 

### Petitioner's Proposed Findings 

### ofFact and Conclusions, pp. 51-54. 

### While the Court does 

### recognize that Respondent was by 

### no means a flawless 

### party throughout the course 

### ofthis litigation, 

### "[t]he clean hands 

### doctrine [] does not require that a [party] be 

### denied equitable 

### relief merely because his 

### conduct has been shown not to have been 

### blameless." Stauffer v. Stauffer, 465 Pa. 558, 575, 351 

### A.2d 236, 244 (1976). We find that 

### Respondent's conduct throughout the

15

### course 

### ofthis case does 

### not rise to a level 

### which bars Respondent on 

### equitable grounds from exercising her right to 

### her statutorily entitled spousal share. 

### CONCLUSION Based upon the reasons stated herein, we 

### find that 

### Petitioner's request to (1) 

### annul the marriage between 

### Decedent and Respondent on the basis 

### of Petitioner's allegations 

### that the marriage 

### between Decedent andRespondent was a 

### "sham" in 

### order to

### perpetrate immigration fraud

or (2) strike 

### Respondent's claim for 

### her elective share 

### ofthe 

### Decedent's estate via the doctrine 

### of unclean hands, 

### should be denied. Accordingly, we issue 

### the attached Decree denying and dismissing 

### Petitioner's Petition to (1) Strike Lakpa 

### Sherpa's Claim to be 

### Recognized as 

### Decedent's Surviving Spouse 

### because the Alleged Marriage between Lakpa Sherpa and Decedent is 

### Fraudulent and 

### therefore Void under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(3)[,] and (2) Strike Lakpa 

### Sherpa's Claim Against 

### Decedent's Estate Pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2507(3) because 

### Decedent's Last Will and 

### Testament was 

### Drafted in Contemplation

# fhis 

### Future Marriage to Lakpa Sherpa; 

### and 

### Petitioner's "Order to 

### Show Cause" requesting that the Court strike 

### Respondent's spousal share claim with prejudice 

### pursuant to 

### her allegation that 

### Respondent is in 

### violation 

### of the doctrine 

### of unclean hands.

BY 

### THE COURT: 

# , jiCA-73, Date C. 

### THEODORE FRITSCH,

### X-ADMN. J.


### N.B. it is 

### your responsibility to notify all interested parties 

### of the above action.

16Circulated 04/10/2018 02:27 PM

IN THE COURT OF 

### COMMON PLEAS OF BUCKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

### ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION

In re: ESTA'T'E OF GENE B. ROSMARIN, : Deceased : No. 2014-0441



### OPINION Appellant, 

### Barbara Nolan, Executrix 

### ofthe Estate 

### ofGene Barclay Rosmarin, (hereinafter, "Appellant"), has filed an appeal to the Superior Court ofPennsylvania from this Court's March 3, 2017 Decree denying 

### Appellant's Petition to (1) Strike Lakpa 

### Sherpa's (hereinafter "Appellee") Claim to be Recognized as Gene B. 

### Rosamarin's (hereinafter "Decedent") Surviving Spouse pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(3); (2) Strike 

### Appellee's claim against 

### Decedent's estate pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2507(3), and (3) 

### Appellant's "Order to Show Cause" requesting that the Court strike 

### Appellee's spousal share claim pursuant to the doctrine 

### ofunclean hands. This Opinion is filed 

### pursuant to 

### Pennsylvania Rule 

### ofAppellate Procedure 1925(a). SUBSEQUENT PROCEDURALBACKGROUND On March 7, 2017, this Court issued a Decree and Memorandum Opinion that denied Appellant's Petition to (1) annul the marriage between Decedent and his second-wife, Appellee Lakpa Sherpa, (2) strike 

### Appellee's claim for 

### her elective share 

### ofthe 

### Decedent's estate under the doctrine 

### ofunclean hands, and (3) 

### Appellant's "Order to Show Cause" requesting that the Court strike 

### Appellee's spousal share claim 

### pursuant to the doctrine 

### ofunclean hands. On March 23, 2017, Appellant filed a 

### post-trial 

### motion pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 227.1 requesting this Court reconsider our ruling 

### denying Appellant's "Order to Show Cause." By Order issued March 29, 2017, we denied 

### Appellant's post-trial motion.CONCISE 

### STATEMENT OF MATTERS COMPLAINED OF ON APPEAL Appellant filed a statement of matters complained 

### of on appeal (hereinafter "concise statement" or "Rule 1925(b) Statement") on or about April 24, 2017, approximately twenty-four days after filing his 

### Notice 

### ofAppeal and twenty days after our April 3, 2017 Order directing her
to file and serve the concise statement. Preliminarily, we 

### observe that an appellant may waive all issues complained 

### ofon appeal, when an appellant files a concise statement containing a voluminous number 

### oflengthy issues in

an effort to overwhelm and 

### confuse the trial court. Tucker v. R.M. Tours, 2007 PA Super 352, 939 A.2d 343 (2007), 

### affd 602 Pa. 147, 977 A.2d 1170 (2009). Such a voluminous concise
statement may indicate a deliberate attempt to circumvent the meaning and purpose 

### of Pennsylvania Rule 

### ofAppellate Procedure 1925 and to overwhelm and frustrate the court system. Jiricko v, Geico Ins. Co., 2008 PA Super 63, 947 A.2d 206 (2008). We further 

### recognize that "[t]he extreme action 

### of dismissal should be imposed by an appellate court sparingly, and clearly would be inappropriate when there has been substantial compliance with the 

### rules and when the party [moving 

### for quashal 

### ofthe appeal] has suffered no prejudice." In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) quoting Stout v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 421 

### A.2d 1047, 1049 (Pa. 1980)). In 

### Appellant's concise statement, she raises twenty-seven (27) issues in a case involving the basic questions 

### of whether a marriage should be deemed valid and whether the surviving spouse should be permitted to take a spousal share 

### ofa 

### decedent's estate. The great majority 

### of the issues raised appear to address, seriatim, virtually every conclusion that we reached in our sixteen-page Memorandum Opinion. As such, we perceive that 

### Appellant's concise statement is overly broad and all 

### encompassing, and suggest that this appeal could be dismissed due to the

2voluminous nature 

### ofthe statement itself. Assuming 

### arguendo that Appellant's concise statement does not warrant dismissal due to its voluminous nature, we will address Appellant's allegations 

### of error as stated in her concise statement, which we set forth verbatim, as follows:

1. The Court 

### of Common Pleas 

### of Bucks County, Orphans' Court, erred in its legal conclusion that "[u]nder 23 Pa. C.S.A. §3304(a)(3), 

### 'a marriage [is] void only where one 

### ofthe parties lacked capacity to consent or did not intend to assent to the 

### marriage.' In Interest 

### of Miller, 301 Pa. Super. 511, 524-25,448 A. 2d 25, 31-32 (1982)(internal citations and quotations omitted)[]", which was entered in derogation 

### of well-settled principles 

### of statutory construction and was based on improper application 

### of statutory interpretation and the plain meaning 

### of 23 Pa. C.S.A. §3304(a)(3). 2. The 

### Orphans' Court erred in its legal conclusion that 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 3304(a)(3) does not 

### function to annul marriage undertaken solely to defraud United/ States Citizenship and Immigration Services (UUSCIS) based upon lack 

### of capacity to consent to a marriage void for illegality. 3. The Orphans' Court erred in its reliance on In Interest 

### ofMiller, 301 Pa. Super. 511, 448 A. 2d 25 (1982) to modify the plain language 

### of 23 Pa. C.S.A. §3304(a)(3), the holding 

### of which related to the interpretation 

### of a prior statute concerning voidable marriages and not a void marriage. 4. The Orphans' Court erred in its legal conclusion that In Interest 

### ofMiller, 301 Pa, Super. 511, 448 A. 2d 25 (1982), stands for the proposition that a marriage entered into to defraud United Sates Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) does not render invalid a marriage that followed the formal trappings 

### of a marriage contract but could not constitute a valid marriage by reason 

### of the illegal purpose 

### ofthe marriage contract. 5. The Orphans' Court erred in its legal conclusion that a party can consent to enter into a contract 

### ofmarriage for an unlawful purpose.
6. The 

### Orphans' Court erred in its legal conclusion that 

### "Even if Decedent and Respondent did enter into their marriage for an allegedly fraudulent purpose, as asserted by Petitioner, the fact that the 

### 'sole purpose was to practice a 

### fraud...does not bring 

### the marriage within [what is now Section 3304(a)(3).Th In Interest 

### of Miller, 301 Pa. Super. 511, 521, 448 A. 2d 25, 29-30 (1982)."
7. The 

### Orphans' Court erred in its legal conclusion that "even 

### iftheir motive in getting married was questionable, their motive alone cannot invalidate an otherwise valid marriage under 263 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. ann. § 3304(a)(3)."

38. The 

### Orphans' Court committed reversible error when it went against the weight 

### of the evidence to conclude that the record does not support the theory that the marriage was entered into for the purpose 

### of circumventing federal immigration law when an IRS-enrolled agent testified Decedent admitted the marriage was undertaken 

### solely to defraud USCIS.
9. The Orphans' Court erred in its legal conclusion the marriage between Decedent and 

### Respondent should not be deemed void 

### ab initio despite the fact that the marriage was an illegal agreement, reasoning an illegal agreement to marry is not
a valid basis to deny recognition 

### ofthe marriage.
10. The 

### Orphans' Court erred in ruling that it could not render a decision on whether the marriage was 

### void because it was an illegal agreement undertaken to circumvent federal 

### immigration law because such a decision would infringe on the federal 

### judiciary's exclusive

### jurisdiction over immigration matters.
11. Whether the 

### Orphans' Court erred when 

### it went against the weight 

### ofthe evidence to hold that 

### there was insufficient evidence to invalidate 

### the marriage between Decedent and 

### Respondent based upon Petitioner's evidence 

### ofimmigration fraud.

12. The Orphans' Court erred in rendering the conclusion 

### of law based on improper application 

### of statutory interpretation that there undisputedly was a marriage between

### Decedent and Respondent within 

### the eyes 

### ofthe law, in derogation 

### ofwell- settled principles 

### ofsquatty construction.
13. The Orphans' Court clearly abused its discretion in holding 

### that there was "no testimony establishing an agreement between Decedent and Respondent to marry 

### for the sole 

### purpose 

### of helping Respondent circumvent immigration laws[]" when there was substantial testimony admitted into the record without objection that Decedent and Respondent married for the sole purpose 

### of circumventing federal immigration laws. 14. The Orphans' Court abused its discretion by failing to deny 

### Respondent's spousal share claim based on the doctrine 

### of unclean hands when Respondent called witnesses, such as Ang Chokpa Sherpa, who perjured 

### herself in order to testify in support 

### ofthe 

### marriage and admitted that Respondent shared information with her prior to her 

### prior [sic] to having testified, in violation 

### ofthe Court's sequestration Order. 15. The Orphans' Court abused its discretion in denying 

### Petitioner's Petition to strike 

### Respondent's spousal share claim based on unclean hands when Respondent called her cousin, 

### Ang Chokpa Sherpa, to testify in support 

### ofher alleged marriage and 

### Mg Chokpa 

### Sherpa's testimony was false and was 

### plainly contradicted by documents entered into evidence on the record, including 

## Mg Chokpa Sherpa's claim that she was not in Nepal for Decedent and 

### Respondent's wedding, which wascontroverted 

### by a letter written by Ang. Chokpa Sherpa and submitted to USCIS stating that she as a witness to the wedding. 16, The Orphans' Court Order and Decision went againstthe weight 

### ofthe documentary evidence showing that Decedent made false representations to immigration about the bona fides 

### of the alleged marriage, 

### Respondent's family made false 

### representations to immigration about the alleged union, and 

### Decedent's tax preparer testified that Decedent admitted he had committed marriage fraud to help his girlfriend, 

### Mg Chokpa Sherpa, obtain immigration statute for her cousin, Respondent, and is clear error. 17. The 

### Orphans' Court erred inrelying upon In re 

### Manfredi'sEstate, 399 PA. 285, 291, 159 

### A.2d 697, 700 (1960), for the proposition that marriage in Pennsylvania is a civil 

### contract by which a man and a woman take each other for Husband [sic] and wife, but failing to acknowledge that a civil contract in 

### the Commonwealth 

### of Pennsylvania for an illegal purpose is void.
18. The 

### findings 

### offact made buy the Orphans' Court went against the weight 

### of the evidence and the Court relied primarily on hearsay testimony from Resporident's friends and cousin, rather the documentary evidence that the Court admitted into evidence and which controverts Respondent's claim. Therefore, the Orphans' court made clear error. 19. The 

### Orphans' Court erred by asserting the 

### position that a 

### party's reason or entering into a marriage, including in order to circumvent immigration laws, is 

### not relevant to the findings 

### of whether there was an intention to 

### many and ruling upon In re 

### Gower's Estate, 445 Pa. 554, 557, 284 

## Aid 742, 744 (1971) in support 

### of that erroneous position. 20. The 

### Orphans' Court erred in holding that 

### Petitioner's argument that the marriage 

### between Decedent and Respondent should be deemed void 

### ab initio because it was an illegal agreement, is not a valid basis to deny recognition 

### ofa marriage because an 

### agreementto marry cannot in 

### itselfbe a violation 

### of a statute. 21. The 

### Orphans' Court erred in holding that Respondent had clean hands because there was ample evidence that Respondent was lying about material issues and calling witnesses to lie on her behalf, which directly affected the relationship subsisting between the parties to the litigation. 22. 

### The Orphans' Court erred in failing to apply 

### the doctrine 

### of unclean hands after finding the 

### Respondent was "by no means a flawless party throughout the course 

### of this litigation", and when the evidence admitted into the record established that 

### Respondent and 

### her cousin, Ang Chokpa Sherpa, lied under oath, thus directly affecting the relationship subsisting between the parties. 23. The 

### Orphans' Court erred in denying 

### Petitioner's request to (1) annul 

### the marriage

5 'between Decedent and Respondent on the basis 

### ofPetitioner's allegations that the marriage 

### between Decedent and Respondent was a 

### "sham" in order to perpetrate 

### immigration fraud, and (2) strike Respondent's claim for her elective share 

### ofthe 

### Decedent's estate via the doctrine unclean hands, 24. The 

### Orphans' Court erred in denying Petitioner's October 26, 2016 request to admit into evidence affidavits prepared by 

### Respondent's mother, daughter, cousin, Ang Chokpa Sherpa, and the Decedent. On Page 21-22 

### ofthe October26, 2016 transcript, 

### Respondent acknowledge [sic] that the Immigration Application previously admitted into evidence was authentic, but objected to 

### these affidavits. These 

### additional affidavits were produced by Detective John Koretzky, who obtained an official 

### copy 

### ofRespondent's Immigration Application from USCIS (pg. 35) during 

### the course 

### ofhis investigation and these should have been admitted as I was a more 

### complete 

### version 

### of the immigration packet. Further, these affidavits evidenced material misrepresentations by Respondent and her cousin, Ang Chokpa Sherpa, and were 

### therefore highlyprobative and the denial 

### ofsame prejudicial to Petitioner.
25. The 

### Orphans' Court abused its discretion by failing to find 

### that Lakpa Sherpa had 

### unclean hands when Detective Koretzky testified 

### on October 26. 2016 that Lakpa Sherpas fraudulent activity was uncovered by Homeland Security and that the 

### Decedent's affidavit was written in broken 

### English-the Decedent being a natural 

### born citizen 

### ofthe United States. 26. The 

### Orphans' Court erred in sustaining 

### Respondent's objection to the testimony 

### of Lynne Jones on July 13, 2016 as hearsay (page 11-12 

### oftranscript), whichtestimony went to 

### Cathy Bassiouni's then existing state 

### ofmind 

### prior to testifying in this case 

### that the alleged marriage was not bona fide. 27. 

### Petitioner respectfully requests that the Order entered on Macli 3, 2017 be Vacated [sic] 

### andthat the matter be remanded for a newtrial consistent with the ruling 

### ofthe Superior Court. DISCUSSION From 

### the onset, we believe that the majority 

### ofthe issues Appellant raises were directly
addressed in our 

### Memorandum Opinion 

### ofMarch 7, 2017. To the extent that Appellant's concise

statement raises 

### issues that were not directly addressed by the Memorandum Opinion, we will
address them 

### separately below. 

### For ease 

### of discussion we classify these issues into three topics: (1) claims 

### that are 

### too vague to warrant review, (2) the non-admission 

### of affidavits prepared by Appellee's mother, daughter, cousin, and the Decedent, and (3) the sustaining 

### of Appellee's

6objection to the testimony 

### of Lynne Jones because such testimony was hearsay that did not fall within the then existing 

### state 

### of mind hearsay exception. With respect to the remainder 

### of Appellant's claims, we 

### attach our March 7, 2017, Memorandum Opinion hereto in support 

### ofour decision. Vague Issues We suggest that 

### certain issues raised by Appellant in her 1925(b) Statement 

### of Errors Complained 

### of on Appeal are too vague and unspecific to merit review. This circumstance ultimately leaves the Court to guess as to what the issues are Appellant wishes to raise on appeal. Pennsylvania Rule 

### ofAppellate Procedure I 925(b)(4) reads, in relevant part: (4) 

### Requirements; waiver. (i) The Statement [of errors complained 

### of on appeal] shall set forth only 

### those rulings or errors that the appellant intends to challenge. (ii) 

### The Statement shall concisely identify each ruling or error that the 

### appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for the

### judge. Thejudge shall not require the citation to authorities; however, appellant may choose to include pertinent authorities in the Statement. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(6)(4). "[T]he question 

### ofwhat constitutes a sufficient 1925(b) statement [has been considered]

on many occasions, and 

### it is well-established that [an] [a]ppellant's concise statement must properly specify the error to be 

### addressed on appeal." In re A.B., 2013 PA Super 43, 63 A.3d 345, 350 (2013) quoting 

### Commonwealth v. Hanslev, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa.Super.2011), 

### appeal denied,
613 Pa. 642, 32 A.3d 1275 (2011)). 

### "'The Rule 1925(b) statement must be specific enough for the trial court to identify and address the issue an appellant wishes to raise on 

### appeal,' and a court "may find waiver where a 

### concise statement is too vague." Id. 

### "'When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is 

### appealing, that is not enough for meaningful 

### review.' Id (qubting

7 'Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686 (Pa.Super.2001)). 

### Further,' [a] Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent 

### ofno Concise Statement at 

### all.'" Id. The Rule 1925(b) statement must be sufficiently detailed enough so that a

### judge may write an opinion. Burgoyne v. Pinecrest Cmty. Ass'n, 2007 PA Super 132, 924 A.2d 675, 678 (2007) citing Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa.Super.2006)); 202 Island Car Wash, L.P. v. Monridge Const., Inc., 2006 PA Super 362, 913 A.2d 922, 925 (2006) quoting Commonwealth v. Lemon, 804 A.2d 34, 38 (Pa.Super.2002)). Here, Appellant raises numerous vague issues that preclude meaningful review. In particular, issues 

### twelve', fourteen2, eighteens, twenty-one4, and twenty-twos lack the requisite specificity to enable this Court to conduct a thorough analysis. What Appellant provides are merely conclusory accusations that are neither specific in subject matter nor in identifying where in the record such issues are found. In particular, issue twelve accuses this Court 

### of improper statutory interpretation. Appellant does not cite a specific statute or explain 

### how this Court specifically misapplied said statute. Issue eighteen alleges that this Court made findings 

### offact that went against the weight 

### of the evidence in relying on hearsay testimony rather than

I Issue 12 alleges, "Mile Orphans' Court erred in rendering the conclusion oflaw based on improper application of statutory interpretation that there undisputedly was a marriage between Decedent and Respondent within the eyes of the law, in derogation of well-settled principles of squatty construction." 2 Issue 14 alleges, "[t]he Orphans' Court abused its discretion by failing to deny Respondent's spousal share claim based on the doctrine ofuncleah hands when Respondent called witnesses, such as Ang Chokpa Sherpa, who perjured herselfin order to testify in support of the marriage and admitted that Respondent shared information with her prior to her prior [sic] to having testified, in violation ofthe Court's sequestration Order." 3 Issue 18 alleges, "[t]he findings offact made by the Orphans' Court went against the weight of the evidence and the Court relied primarily on hearsay testimony from Respondent's friends and cousin, rather the documentary evidence that the Court admitted into evidence and which controverts Respondent's claim. Therefore, the Orphans' court made clear error."
4 Issue 21 alleges, "[t]he Orphans' Court erred in holding that Respondent had clean hands because there was ample evidence that Respondent was lying about material issues and calling witnesses to lie on her behalf, which directly affected the relationship subsisting between the parties to the litigation." 3 Issue 22 alleges, "[t]he Orphans' Court erred in failing to apply the doctrine of unclean hands after finding the Respondent was "by no means a flawless party throughout the course of this litigation", and when the evidence admitted into the record established that Respondent and her cousin, Ang Chokpa Sherpa, lied under oath, thus directly affecting the relationship subsisting between the parties." 8documentary evidence. 

### Appellant does not identify what specific hearsay evidence this Court allegedly erroneously 

### relied upon. Issues fourteen, 

### twenty-one, and twenty-two all allege that witnesses perjured themselves.
In making such 

### allegations, Appellant neither specifically identifies the specific portion 

### of the testimony that is suspect 

### nor cites to the record. Ifthe Court were to attempt to write an opinion
based on 

### Appellant's vague perjury allegations, we would be forced to guess the specifics 

### of such claims. Ostensibly, we 

### would be drafting arguments on 

### Appellant's behalf. We suggest that the aforementioned issues 

### Appellant raises are so vague as to be deemed waived. The Affidavits Issue 

### twenty-four 

### of Appellant's Rule 1925(b) Statement alleges that we erred in denying Appellant's request to 

### admit affidavits prepared by 

### Appellee's mother, daughter, cousin, and Decedent. Appellant 

### argues that these affidavits offered a more complete version 

### of the immigration applications 

### that were already admitted into evidence. Appellant also argues that the affidavits created by 

### Appellee and Ang Chokpa Sherpa would have evidenced that both Appellee and Ang Chokpa 

### Sherpa made material misrepresentations throughout the course 

### of the proceedings. We 

### suggest that denying Appellant's requestwas proper. Under 

### Pennsylvania law, the standard 

### ofreview governing evidentiary issues is settled. The decision to admit or 

### exclude evidence is committed to the trial court's sound discretion, and evidentiary rulings will 

### only be reversed upon a showing that a court abused that discretion. A finding 

### of abuse 

### of discretion may not be made "merely because an appellate court might have reached a different 

### conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or 

### or such lack 

### of support so as to be clearly erroneous." Commonwealth

v. Koch, 630 Pa. 374, 

### 383-84, 106 A.3d 705, 710-11 (2014) 

### quoting Commonwealth v. Laird

9605 Pa. 137, 988 A.2d 618, 636 (2010); See also Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 614 Pa. 1, 36 A.3d 24, 48 (2011). Matters 

### within the trial court's discretion are reviewed on appeal under a deferential standard, and any such 

### rulings or determinations will not be disturbed short 

### of a finding that the trial court "committed a 

### clear abuse 

### of discretion or an error 

### oflaw controlling the outcome 

### ofthe case." Commonwealth v. 

### Chambers 602 Pa. 224, 980 A.2d 35, 50 (2009) (jury instructions). Furthermore, hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 

### ofthe matter asserted. Commonwealth

v. Watley 2016 PA Super 311, 153 A.3d 1034 (2016) citing Pa. R. Evid. 801(c). The admissibility 

### of out

### -of -court statements by an unavailable witness turns, not upon the presence or absence 

### of indicia 

### of reliability, 

### but upon a determination 

### of whether the statements are testimonialfor nontestimonial in nature. In re N.C., 2013 PA Super 229, 74 A.3d 271 (2013), 

### affd, 629 Pa. 475, 105 A.3d 1199 (2014). In the instant case, the affidavits at issue could not be properly authenticated. The affidavits

were also testimonial in nature. Trial testimony revealed that Detective Koretzky received the affidavits from another 

### governmental agency. Detective Kortetzky could neither establish the affidavits' veracity nor could he indicate what specific material misrepresentations the affidavits might contain. N.T. 10/26/16 pp 35-42. Appellant also sought to introduce these affidavits on the last day 

### of hearings 

### without providing Appellee sufficient notice to evaluate the affidavits. Moreover, the affidavits 

### themselves constitute inadmissible hearsay as Appellant would have the
court admit these affidavits for the truth 

### of the content they assert. This court is aware 

### of no hearsay exception that would have permitted the affidavit to become part 

### of the record. Accordingly, we suggest that it was proper to deny Appellant's request to admit into evidence the affidavits 

### ofAppellee's mother, daughter, cousin, and the Decedent.

10

### Appellee's objection to the testimony 

### ofLynne Jones
Issue twenty-six in 

### Appellant's Rule 1925(b) Statement alleges that this Court erred in sustaining Appellee's 

### objection to the testimony 

### of Lynne Jones because such testimony was admissible under the then state 

### of mind hearsay exception. We suggest that 

### Appellant's position
lacks merit. Under Pennsylvania law, the rule against hearsay evidence does not preclude statements concerning the 

### declarant's then-existing state 

### ofmind. Pa.R.B. 803. Under this rule:
"A statement 

### of the declarant's then-existing state 

### of mind (such as motive, intent
or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain,
or bodily health), but not including a statement 

### ofmemory or 

### belief to prove the fact 

### remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms 

### of the declarant's 

### will." Pa.R.E. 803. There are ordinarily 

### three instances in which the state 

### of mind exception to the hearsay rule is applicable: (1) to prove the declarant's state 

### ofmind when that state 

### ofmind is an issue directly
related to a claim or defense in the case; (2) to demonstrate that a declarant did a particular actthat

was in conformity with his or her statement after having made the statement; and (3) an out 

### of

court statement related to 

### the person's memory 

### or beliefis admissiblein the limited instance where


### it relates to the execution, revocation, identification or terms 

### of the declarant's will. Schmalz v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 2013 PA Super 52, 67 A.3d 800 (2013) citing Pa. R.E. 803. 

### "[The determination 

### of whether out

### -of-court statements are admissible under the state 

### of mind exception to the hearsay rule is within the sound discretion 

### ofthe trial court and will be reversed only upon an abuse 

### of that discretion." Commonwealth v. Begley, 566 Pa. 239, 780 A.2d 605,
623 (Pa,2001). In the instant case, a careful review 

### ofthe trial record indicates that it was proper to sustain Appellee's objection. 

### Appellant sought to introduce the contents 

### ofa telephone conversation by

11and between Lynne Jones and Cathy Bassiouni. N.T, 07/13/16. pp. 10-13. Ms. Bassiouni, as the declarant, was 

### allegedly commenting on the circumstances 

### ofthe marriage between Appellee and the Decedent. 

### Accordingly, it would be improper to admit content 

### of the conversation under the

state 

### ofmind hearsay 

### exception because the declarant's state

### ofmind is not an issue directly related

to a claim or defense in the case. Bassiouni was not making a statement that revealed her mental

state or a statement that conveyed an emotional, sensory, or physical condition. The telephone conversation was also 

### not proffered to demonstrate that the declarant engaged in a particular act in conformity with the statement, Furthermore, the 

### Decedent's will with respect to its execution, revocation, identification, or terms were not an issue in the case. It is clear that Appellant sought

to use the then 

### existing state 

### ofmind exception as a conduit to admit the telephone conversation's

contents which 

### Appellant hoped to be admitted as substantive evidence. The rule against hearsay strictly prohibits such 

### conduct as Appellant would have this court permit the use an out

### -of-court
statement for the truth 

### of the matter asserted where no hearsay exception applies. We therefore suggest that sustaining 

### Appellee's objection was proper. CONCLUSION Based 

### upon 

### the foregoing and for the reasons previously set forth in our attached Memorandum Opinion 

### ofMarch 7, 2017, we suggestthat 

### the present appeal should be dismissed.



# 5 /at= 

### 10.611 DATE

N.B. It is your responsibility to notify all interested parties of the above action. 12 BY THE COURT:

C. THEODORE FRITSCH, 

### JR., ADMIN. J