IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-41641

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee 

v. 

RODERRETE DEWRAYNE MCCLURE, 

 Defendant - Appellant 

Appeals from the United States District Court 

 for the Eastern District of Texas 

Before BARKSDALE, GRAVES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. 

JAMES E. GRAVES, JR., Circuit Judge:

Roderrete Dewrayne McClure appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss 

his indictment for narcotics trafficking, contending that prosecution of the 

charges is barred by the terms of a 2012 plea agreement (the “2012 Plea 

Agreement” or “Plea Agreement”) he entered into with the Government. 

Pursuant to that agreement, McClure pled guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1), Felon in Possession of a Firearm. Information leading to that 

charge was obtained during the course of the Government’s investigation of 

McClure for public corruption and narcotics trafficking, which eventually gave 

rise to the charges in the challenged indictment. We agree with the district 

court that the instant charges are based on a separate and distinct course of 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 25, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-41641 Document: 00513966739 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/25/2017
`Case No. 15-41641

2 

conduct from the § 922(g)(1) offense to which McClure pleaded guilty. 

Therefore, we AFFIRM. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Federal Investigation of Public Corruption and Drug Trafficking 

Conspiracy 

Between August 2009 and August 2010, McClure conspired with then 

City Marshal of Tenaha, Texas, Fred Walker, to steal drugs on several 

occasions from the evidence room of the Tenaha Marshal’s Office in order to 

distribute them for sale. Dallas area resident Tracy Fortman later joined the 

conspiracy.1 Concerned about detection, McClure and Walker staged a 

burglary of the evidence room in August 2010, planting evidence to make it 

appear that members of a Mexican drug cartel had committed the burglary. 

They stole drugs and guns, but dumped the guns in a creek outside of Tenaha. 

Walker then notified an investigator with the Shelby County District 

Attorney’s Office about the burglary. Further investigation led authorities to

suspect the burglary was staged.

The FBI became involved after Walker in November 2010 forwarded to 

FBI Special Agent Stewart Fillmore two identical extortion letters he and 

McClure received at their respective residences. The letters were signed by 

“Jack Frost,” who purported to be a DEA agent and threatened to expose the 

theft and drug trafficking conspiracy unless Walker and McClure each gave 

him $70,000. Agent Fillmore began investigating and by the summer of 2011 

concluded that the letters had been written by Tracy Fortman.

 

1 Neither Walker nor Fortman were indicted for the conspiracy. 

 Case: 15-41641 Document: 00513966739 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/25/2017
`Case No. 15-41641

3 

After being confronted by authorities, Fortman admitted that he wrote 

the letters because he needed the money due to his lack of success in moving 

the drugs McClure and Walker provided him. Fortman provided details about 

the conspiracy and the staged burglary. In addition, he showed Agent Fillmore 

a photograph of a “well-stocked” gun cabinet in McClure’s home. By that time, 

Agent Fillmore knew that McClure was a convicted felon. 

Shortly before interviewing Fortman, Agent Fillmore also interviewed 

McClure about the alleged burglary of the Tenaha City Marshal’s office. 

During that interview, McClure, who ran a computer business in Tenaha, 

volunteered that, at Walker’s request, he had installed recording equipment at 

the Marshal’s Office and City Hall and that he kept copies of secret recordings 

on computers and hard drives in his home.

Based on this information, agents obtained a search warrant for 

McClure’s home on August 15, 2011. During execution of the warrant, agents 

seized several computers and other electronic devices, as well as 13 firearms, 

a body armor vest, and more than 1,000 rounds of ammunition. Upon 

questioning, McClure admitted his involvement with the narcotics trafficking 

scheme, including the staged burglary to cover up the theft of the drugs. 

B. The § 922(g) Case (“the Lufkin Gun Case”)

Two days later, on August 17, 2011, the United States Attorney’s Office 

for the Eastern District of Texas, Lufkin Division, obtained an indictment 

against McClure charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Felon in 

Possession of a Firearm. While the case was proceeding to trial, the 

Government filed a notice of intent to offer Rule 404(b) evidence of the guns 

stolen from the Tenaha Marshal’s Office, which McClure had admitted he and 

Walker disposed of in a creek outside Tenaha. At a hearing, the district court 

 Case: 15-41641 Document: 00513966739 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/25/2017
`Case No. 15-41641

4 

excluded the evidence on Rule 403 grounds, finding that it concerned “this 

other crime which is still under investigation” and was merely “peripheral” to 

the § 922(g) charge; thus the evidence was substantially more prejudicial than 

probative. 

Shortly thereafter, on February 14, 2012, McClure pleaded guilty to a 

single count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. In pertinent part, the

2012 Plea Agreement provided: 

8. GOVERNMENT’S AGREEMENT: The United States Attorney 

for the Eastern District of Texas agrees not to prosecute the 

defendant for any additional non-tax-related charges based upon 

the conduct underlying and related to the defendant’s plea of 

guilty. 

In conjunction with the agreement, McClure signed a factual resume 

describing his possession of 13 guns found in his home and his prior felony 

conviction. 

At the plea hearing, the court informed McClure that the agreement “is 

taking care of federal charges against you here in the Eastern District of 

Texas.” The court asked McClure whether there was “any other agreement or 

promise from the [G]overnment that’s not set out in this plea agreement.” 

McClure responded, “No, sir.” 

McClure was sentenced to imprisonment for 36 months and one day, 

which was a downward departure from the guidelines range. 

C. The Narcotics Trafficking Conspiracy Case (“the Tenaha Case”) 

Following resolution of the Lufkin Gun Case, the Government continued 

its investigation of the public corruption and narcotics trafficking conspiracy. 

In September 2012, the investigation was transferred from the Lufkin to the 

Tyler Division. On August 28, 2013, a federal grand jury for the Eastern 

 Case: 15-41641 Document: 00513966739 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/25/2017
`Case No. 15-41641

5 

District of Texas, Tyler Division, returned a five-count indictment against 

McClure, charging two counts of drug conspiracy; possession with intent to 

distribute and distribution of marijuana, cocaine, and prescription drugs; use, 

carrying, and possession of a firearm during and in furtherance of a drug 

trafficking crime; and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The 

firearms at issue in the last two counts of the indictment were not the same 

weapons that formed the basis of McClure’s 2012 Plea Agreement in the Lufkin 

Gun Case. 

McClure moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the 

Government’s prosecution of the new charges breached the 2012 Plea 

Agreement. The district court conducted an extensive motion hearing, at 

which it heard testimony from numerous witnesses, including the prosecutor 

and defense counsel in the Lufkin Gun Case and federal agents involved in the 

narcotics trafficking investigation. 

At the hearing, defense counsel in the Lufkin Gun Case, Lori Mack, 

testified that it was her understanding during plea negotiations that the plea 

agreement would preclude any charges related to the Tenaha narcotics 

investigation and that she advised McClure accordingly. When pressed for 

details regarding communications with the Government that led to her belief, 

however, she could not recall any specific conversation in which the Assistant 

U.S. Attorney (“AUSA”), Lisa Flournoy, indicated that the plea agreement 

would dispose of drug trafficking allegations still under investigation. 

Flournoy, by contrast, testified that she never suggested to Mack or 

anyone else that McClure’s pleading guilty in the Lufkin Gun Case would 

dispose of possible future charges related to the ongoing narcotics 

investigation. Mack also never asked whether the plea agreement would cover 

 Case: 15-41641 Document: 00513966739 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/25/2017
`Case No. 15-41641

6 

such charges. Flournoy further testified that Mack never received any 

discovery pertaining to the narcotics investigation, other than evidence related 

to the guns stolen from the Marshal’s Office, which were the subject of the 

Government’s Rule 404(b) notice (and the basis of the gun charges in the 

instant indictment).

After the district court denied McClure’s motion to dismiss, the 

Government filed a superseding one-count information charging McClure with 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute over 50 kilograms of marijuana 

and aiding and abetting. On March 6, 2015, McClure pleaded guilty to the

superseding information and was sentenced to 56 months of imprisonment, 

followed by three years of supervised release. The plea agreement reserved 

McClure’s right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. He timely noticed 

an appeal. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

“This court reviews a claim of breach of a plea agreement de novo, 

accepting the district court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous.” United 

States v. Elashyi, 554 F.3d 480, 501 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. 

Lewis, 476 F.3d 369, 387 (5th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotations omitted). 

B. No Breach of 2012 Plea Agreement 

“If a defendant pleads guilty as part of a plea agreement, the 

Government must strictly adhere to the terms and conditions of its promises 

in the agreement.” Elashyi, 554 F.3d at 501 (quoting United States v. Munoz, 

408 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotations omitted). “Furthermore, 

when a guilty plea ‘rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement 

of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or 

 Case: 15-41641 Document: 00513966739 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/25/2017
`Case No. 15-41641

7 

consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.’” United States v. Valencia, 985 

F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 

262 (1971)). The defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the Government breached a plea agreement. Lewis, 476 F.3d 

at 387. To assess a claim of breach, “this court considers whether the 

government’s conduct is consistent with the defendant’s reasonable 

understanding of the agreement.” Elashyi, 554 F.3d at 501 (internal 

quotations and citation omitted). “We apply general principles of contract law 

in order to interpret the terms of the plea agreement.” Lewis, 476 F.3d at 387. 

“Thus, when a [plea] contract is unambiguous, this court generally will not look 

beyond the four corners of the document.” United States v. Long, 722 F.3d 257, 

262 (5th Cir. 2013).

In the 2012 Plea Agreement, the Government agreed not to bring any 

additional charges “based upon the conduct underlying and related to the 

defendant’s plea of guilty.” The district court determined that this language 

was unambiguous and could be interpreted according to its plain meaning. It 

then resorted to Webster’s dictionary to construe the meaning of the two 

operative terms, defining underlying in relevant part as “to be at the basis of” 

and related to as “to bring into logical or natural association.”2 The court also 

observed that the two terms were joined together by a conjunction, although it 

 

2 See Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary 992, 1257 (1994). In United 

States v. Bevill, 611 F. App’x 180 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished), we also turned to the 

dictionary, there the Oxford English Dictionary (“OED”), to define these terms in similar 

fashion. See id. at 183 n.5 (noting OED defines underlying in part as “[l]ying under or 

beneath” and related to in part as “connected or having relation to something else”); see also 

OED Online, Oxford University Press 2017, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/211817 and 

http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/161808#eid25955656 (last visited March 30, 2017). 

 Case: 15-41641 Document: 00513966739 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/25/2017
`Case No. 15-41641

8 

noted that its conclusion that McClure did not meet his burden of proving a 

breach of the plea agreement would be the same if the terms were joined 

disjunctively. 

Accordingly, the district court concluded that, reasonably construed, 

[T]he Government agreed not to bring a very specific kind of charge 

against the Defendant . . . one that is based not only on conduct 

that forms the basis of (underlying) the Defendant’s plea of guilty 

to possessing firearms found in his home, but also is logically or 

naturally associated with (related to) Defendant’s plea of guilty to 

possessing the firearms found in his home. 

Applying this meaning to the facts, the district court found that the two 

cases involved separate and distinct courses of conduct. In the Lufkin Gun 

Case, the factual basis of McClure’s plea of guilty was his possession of the 13 

guns found in his home while he had a prior felony conviction. On the other 

hand, the Tenaha Case indictment charged that McClure engaged in a 

conspiracy to distribute drugs stolen from the Tenaha Marshal’s Office and 

that McClure possessed firearms stolen from the Marshal’s Office while 

trafficking drugs and while being a convicted felon. Further, all the alleged 

conduct in the Tenaha Case occurred from August 2009 to the end of 2010, 

months before the Government discovered the relevant conduct in the Lufkin 

Gun Case, on August 15, 2011. Therefore, the course of conduct underlying 

the charges in the Tenaha Case occurred at a different place and time than the 

conduct in the Lufkin Gun Case; it implicated different statutory violations; 

the firearms involved were unrelated to those found in McClure’s home; and 

Walker, an unindicted co-conspirator in the drug trafficking conspiracy, “is not, 

nor could he be, a co-conspirator in the Lufkin Gun Case.” Thus, the district 

court concluded that the charges in the Tenaha Case indictment were neither 

“underlying” nor “related to” the conduct to which McClure pleaded guilty 

 Case: 15-41641 Document: 00513966739 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/25/2017
`Case No. 15-41641

9 

through the 2012 Plea Agreement. Consequently, they were not barred by that 

Agreement. 

We agree with the district court’s reasoning and its conclusion. In other 

cases where the Government has brought additional charges against a 

defendant based on conduct that was both temporally and geographically 

distinct and involved different statutory violations and co-conspirators, we 

have found no breach of the plea agreement. See United States v. Wittie, 25 

F.3d 250, 263 (5th Cir. 1994) (no breach of plea agreement where “two distinct 

conspiracies were involved: they were separated by time; they involved 

different co-conspirators; they involved different statutory offenses; they 

included different overt acts in each offense charged; and they occurred in 

different geographical locations”), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Witte v. 

United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995); Lewis, 476 F.3d at 388 (no breach of plea 

agreement in serial prosecution for drug trafficking where new indictment 

pertained to larger drug trafficking conspiracy involving different coconspirators and acts committed over much broader time span). 

Two recent cases examining plea agreements with similar language 

further support this conclusion. In United States v. Ramirez, 555 F. App’x 315 

(5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished), the Government agreed not to prosecute a 

defendant for other charges “based on conduct underlying” his guilty plea to 

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Id. at 318. When the defendant 

was later prosecuted for a larger drug and money laundering conspiracy 

involving cocaine, he claimed the Government breached the agreement. Id. 

We determined there was no breach because the two conspiracies were distinct. 

Id. “Given the different time frames, co-defendants, controlled substances, and 

general locations of the two offenses, it would not be reasonable for [the 

 Case: 15-41641 Document: 00513966739 Page: 9 Date Filed: 04/25/2017
`Case No. 15-41641

10

defendant] to believe that his plea agreement in the methamphetamine case 

barred his prosecution for the instant cocaine offense.” Id. Then in United 

States v. Bevill, 611 F. App’x 180 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished), we interpreted 

language in a plea agreement identical to the pertinent language here. The

defendant had pleaded guilty to securities fraud in exchange for the 

Government’s promise not to bring any additional charges against him “based

upon the conduct underlying and related to [his] plea of guilty.” Id. at 180–81

(internal quotation marks omitted). When the Government subsequently 

charged him with wire fraud, securities fraud, and money laundering for

conduct occurring while he was on supervised release from his earlier 

conviction, the defendant argued that the Government had breached the plea

agreement because the two cases involved the same type of fraudulent scheme

and much of the conduct underlying the new indictment had taken place before

his guilty plea in the previous case. Id. at 182. We rejected this argument, 

determining that the conduct at issue in the two cases occurred at different 

times and involved different fraudulent entities and victims. Id. at 182–83. 

Thus, it was not reasonable for the defendant to interpret the Government’s 

earlier agreement as prohibiting a prosecution based on this separate and 

unrelated conduct. Id. at 183.

McClure does not deny that the two prosecutions involve different 

courses of conduct. Moreover, he concedes that the 2012 Plea Agreement is 

unambiguous on its face and, consequently, we generally would not look 

beyond the four corners of the document. See Long, 722 F.3d at 262. 

Nonetheless, he urges us to “take a more expansive view of the record” because, 

in his view, the circumstances surrounding the Plea Agreement render its 

scope ambiguous, such that he reasonably believed pleading guilty to the § 

 Case: 15-41641 Document: 00513966739 Page: 10 Date Filed: 04/25/2017
`Case No. 15-41641

11

922(g)(1) charge in the Lufkin Gun Case would foreclose future prosecution for 

his involvement in the Tenaha drug trafficking conspiracy. We are not 

persuaded.

First, McClure argues that because the two cases arose from the same 

Government investigation, they are “inextricably intertwined.”3 This 

argument misses the point. The focus of the Government’s promise not to bring 

any additional charges is on the conduct “underlying and related to” McClure’s 

guilty plea, not on the Government’s investigation of that conduct. Because 

the charges in the Tenaha Case were based on a separate and distinct course 

of conduct from McClure’s guilty plea in the Lufkin Gun Case, those charges 

were not barred by the terms of the Plea Agreement. 

Second, McClure contends that his case is akin to United States v. 

Elashyi, where we determined that the Government had breached a 

defendant’s plea agreement resolving charges of export violations arising from 

his computer-export business by subsequently prosecuting him for similar 

charges arising from his involvement in a separate export business. 554 F.3d 

at 501–02. But the language of the plea agreement in Elashyi was broader 

than the Plea Agreement here. In Elashyi, the Government agreed not to 

“seek, prefer or prosecute any further criminal charges against [the defendant] 

 

3 McClure points out that both cases were investigated under the same agency case 

number; investigators recommended that the cases be prosecuted together; the Government 

at one point expressed concern that the relatedness of the two cases would cause a possible 

conflict for the defense attorneys involved; the majority of the evidence at issue in both cases 

came about as a result of the same search warrant; the Government sought to introduce 

evidence relating to the offenses charged in the Tenaha Case at his trial in the Lufkin Gun 

Case; and the charges in the Tenaha Case indictment parrots language in the 2011 search 

warrant that led to the discovery of the firearms in McClure’s home.

 Case: 15-41641 Document: 00513966739 Page: 11 Date Filed: 04/25/2017
`Case No. 15-41641

12

arising out of the facts and circumstances known by the government at this 

time surrounding [the defendant’s] involvement in the crimes addressed in the 

. . . indictment.” Id. at 501. As we noted there, the phrase “arising out of” has 

typically been given a “very broad interpretation.” Id. Furthermore, in 

Elashyi, the later prosecution arose out of facts that were not only known to 

the Government at the time of the plea offer, but also were an integral part of 

the background to the preceding indictment. Id. at 501–02. Indeed, those facts 

were alleged and incorporated by reference in connection with every count in 

the preceding indictment. Id. By contrast, the indictment in the Lufkin Gun 

Case never mentions the drug trafficking conspiracy. McClure seizes on the 

fact that here, as in Elashyi, the Government knew of the facts and 

circumstances that formed the basis of the Tenaha Case indictment at the time 

of the plea offer. But in Elashyi, the Government’s knowledge was significant 

because the language in the plea agreement made it so. It expressly precluded 

“further criminal charges . . . arising out of the facts and circumstances known 

by the government at this time surrounding [the defendant’s] involvement in 

the crimes addressed in the . . . indictment.” Id. at 501 (emphasis added). 

McClure’s plea agreement contains no such language and the Government’s 

decision to wait to bring the instant charges until it completed its investigation 

is not otherwise a violation of the 2012 Plea Agreement. 

Third, McClure asserts that his subjective belief that he would avoid 

prosecution for his involvement in the drug trafficking conspiracy is reasonable 

because his attorney, Lori Mack, believed the same and advised him 

accordingly. The district court discredited Mack’s testimony because she 

lacked a concrete basis for her subjective impression that the plea would 

absolve McClure from any liability related to the ongoing Tenaha 

 Case: 15-41641 Document: 00513966739 Page: 12 Date Filed: 04/25/2017
`Case No. 15-41641

13

investigation. Mack could not recall any communication from AUSA Flournoy 

that led to her belief. Flournoy, on the other hand, testified that she never 

made any such promise. Nor did Mack ever ask whether the plea would 

conclude the Tenaha investigation as it pertained to McClure. In fact, 

everyone, including the Lufkin court, seemed to be operating under the 

understanding that the investigation would continue after the plea.4 Given 

the gravity of the allegations under investigation, it would be unreasonable to 

assume that the Government would decline to pursue future charges against 

McClure unless it expressly stated such an intention. Moreover, the 

Government sought no term of sentence beyond the guidelines range for the 

felon-in-possession offense and McClure, in fact, received a sentence below the 

guidelines range. These circumstances make it even less plausible that the 

2012 Plea Agreement was meant to cover the narcotics conspiracy, charges of 

which were not yet pending at the time of the plea offer. 

A defense counsel’s subjective belief that a defendant’s plea will preclude 

future prosecution related to an ongoing investigation, even if the defendant 

relied upon it, does not, without more, immunize him from prosecution. See 

United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1079–80 (5th Cir. 1987) (although 

defense counsel believed clients’ plea agreement with Western District of Texas 

would preclude indictment related to ongoing investigation in Southern 

 

4 For example, although McClure makes much of the Government’s Rule 404((b) notice 

of its intent to introduce evidence of the guns stolen from the Tenaha Marshal’s Office at his 

trial in the Lufkin Gun Case, the Lufkin court excluded the evidence of “this other crime 

which is still under investigation.” Other than that evidence, Flournoy testified that she 

never provided Mack with any discovery pertaining to the drug trafficking conspiracy, which 

made it difficult for the district court “to ascertain how [Mack] determined that two courses 

of conduct are related enough to be covered by the plea agreement in the Lufkin Gun Case.”

 Case: 15-41641 Document: 00513966739 Page: 13 Date Filed: 04/25/2017
`Case No. 15-41641

14

District of Texas and advised clients accordingly, government’s evidence 

supported trial court’s finding of no promise not to prosecute in Southern 

District), reh’g granted to different defendant, 828 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1987). 

Finally, McClure contends that the Government’s conduct in the Lufkin 

Gun Case implied that it would not prosecute him for charges related to the 

drug trafficking conspiracy. The district court did not find any support in the 

record for any promise other than those contained in the 2012 Plea Agreement. 

McClure nonetheless suggests that the Government should have informed him 

at the time of the plea offer that it intended to bring charges related to the 

Tenaha investigation and that its silence amounted to trickery intended to 

induce him to plead guilty. 

It is true that “when a guilty plea ‘rests in any significant degree on a 

promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the 

inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.’” Valencia, 985 

F.2d at 761 (quoting Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262). But the defendant bears the 

burden of proving that the Government made such a promise, and omissions, 

without more, rarely suffice. See, e.g., United States v. Pihakis, 545 F.2d 973, 

975 (5th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor’s failure to inform defendant of potential 

prosecution in another district did not constitute implied promise not to 

prosecute those charges); Feliciano v. United States, 914 F. Supp. 776, 779 

(D.P.R. 1996) (Government’s knowledge of offenses charged in second 

indictment when it filed first indictment and failure to inform defendant of 

future prosecution did not constitute implied promise absent evidence of any 

actual promise not to prosecute), aff’d sub nom. Rivera-Feliciano v. United 

States, 107 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997). 

 Case: 15-41641 Document: 00513966739 Page: 14 Date Filed: 04/25/2017
`Case No. 15-41641

15

During the plea hearing in the Lufkin Gun Case, the court asked 

McClure whether there was any other agreement or promise from the 

Government that was not set out in the Plea Agreement itself. McClure 

responded that there was not. We have previously held a defendant to his 

statements at the plea hearing where he indicated there was no promise 

outside of the written agreement. See United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 794 

(5th Cir. 1995) (affirming district court’s finding that Government made no 

implied promise not to prosecute based in part on defendant’s statement at 

plea hearing that no one had made any promise other than plea agreement 

that induced him to plead guilty), reh’g granted on other grounds and aff’d by 

an equally divided court, 105 F.3d 997 (5th Cir. 1997). We similarly see no 

reason here not to hold McClure at his word. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

 Case: 15-41641 Document: 00513966739 Page: 15 Date Filed: 04/25/2017