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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Benjiman C. Reed, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Universal Health Systems, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-18-00101-TUC-RCC

ORDER 

 Pending before the court is Plaintiff Benjamin Reed’s (“Reed”) second application 

for in forma pauperis (“IFP”) certification (Doc. 8). The court denied Reed’s first 

application for IFP certification because he provided conflicting information about his 

monthly income and failed to provide other information requested in the form 

application. Doc. 7. In so ruling, the Court permitted Reed to refile his application. Id. 

On June 12, 2018 Reed filed his second application for IFP certification. Doc. 8. For the 

following reasons, Reed’s second application for IFP certification is denied. 

 The federal IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, is intended to benefit those too poor to 

pay or give security for costs of litigation. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989) 

(citing Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342–43 (1948)). The 

Supreme Court has noted that, in its general terms, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) prevents federal 

courts from denying a person the opportunity to commence, prosecute, or defend a civil 

or criminal action solely because their poverty makes it impossible to pay or secure the 

costs of litigation. Id. The individual seeking IFP certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915, however, must submit an affidavit of indigency or poverty that sufficiently 

demonstrates his/her inability to both provide themselves with the necessities of life and 
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pay the costs of litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339–40. IFP 

certification “is a privilege, not a right” and permission to so proceed is committed to the 

discretion of this Court. See Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1963). 

 Based upon the information provided in his original (Doc. 2) and second (Doc. 8) 

IFP applications, this Court cannot verify Reed’s assertion of indigency. See United 

States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir.1981) (per curiam) (affiant must state 

facts in support of poverty with “some particularity, definiteness and certainty” (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted)). Though he attests his yearly income falls below 

the national poverty threshold, see Doc. 8 at 5, Reed’s reported assets and expenses do 

not support a finding that he would be unable to pay the costs of these proceedings 

without depriving himself of life’s necessities. See Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, 506 

U.S. 194, 203 (1993) (an affidavit under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is sufficient if it shows the 

person cannot pay court costs and “still be able to provide himself and dependents with 

the necessities of life” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Doc. 8; Doc. 2. 

This is not to say that the Court would require an IFP applicant, such as Reed, to 

demonstrate penniless destitution, or that an applicant must forego sufficient food, 

shelter, clothing, or support for dependents in order to pursue his case. See Neitzke, 490 

U.S. at 324; Adkins, 335 U.S. at 342-43 (1948). To the contrary, no man should be 

forced to go hungry to maintain his case, otherwise he himself may become a public 

charge and contravene the very purpose of the federal IFP statute. Id.. Nevertheless, 

something more than a mere statement of poverty is necessary before the Court will 

confer IFP status. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339-40. 

 Here, Reed reports a monthly gross income of $1,000, $3,000 in personal bank 

accounts, and $400 in a business account for a business he classifies as “dormant.” See

Doc. 8. In his original application, Plaintiff also listed personal assets valued at $20,000. 

See Doc. 2. The Court further observes that Reed’s reported monthly expenses are 

limited to $100 for food, $100 for transportation, $200 for recreational expenses, and $30 

for a credit card installment payment. Id. Although Reed also lists a $200 monthly 
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expense for taxes, he failed to specify the nature of the payments as directed and, as such, 

the Court will not consider that amount in calculating his monthly expenses. See Doc. 8 

at 4. Even if it did consider the reported monthly “taxes,” the Court would nonetheless 

find Reed has not demonstrated he is entitled to IFP certification. Accordingly, 

. . . 

. . . 

. . . 

. . . 

. . . 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Reed’s Application to Proceed IFP (Doc. 8) is DENIED. 

2. Reed must pay the filing fee associated with this matter on or before sixty (60) 

days from the date of this order. If Reed timely pays the filing fee associated with this 

matter, he is warned he shall be responsible for obtaining the necessary summons from 

the Clerk of the Court, serving the Defendant in accordance with the Rules of Civil 

Procedure, and, thereafter, adhering to the requirements for practice and procedure set 

forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in our Local Rules of Practice for the 

District of Arizona (collectively “the Rules”). The Rules and other information helpful to 

self-represented litigants are available online at: 

http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/proceeding-without-attorney. As a self-represented civil 

litigant, Plaintiff might also consider scheduling an appointment with the Free Federal 

Court Self-Service Clinic for the District of Arizona in Tucson by contacting Mary Ann 

O’Neil, our federal court librarian, at (520) 205-4661 or 

MaryAnn_O’Neil@LB9.uscourts.gov. Information about this program is available at: 

http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/federal%20court%20self%20s

ervice%20clinic%20tucson.pdf. 

3. If Reed fails to tender payment as ordered, the Clerk of the Court is ordered 

to immediately enter judgment dismissing this matter, without prejudice, and to 
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close its file in this matter. 

 Dated this 20th day of June, 2018.