1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ELIZABETH A. STRANGE

First Assistant United States Attorney

District of Arizona

KEVIN M. RAPP (Ariz. Bar No. 14249, kevin.rapp@usdoj.gov)

MARGARET PERLMETER (Ariz. Bar No. 024805, margaret.perlmeter@usdoj.gov)

PETER S. KOZINETS (Ariz. Bar No. 019856, peter.kozinets@usdoj.gov) 

ANDREW C. STONE (Ariz. Bar No. 026543, andrew.stone@usdoj.gov)

JOHN J. KUCERA (Cal. Bar No. 274184, john.kucera@usdoj.gov) 

Assistant U.S. Attorneys

40 N. Central Avenue, Suite 1800

Phoenix, Arizona 85004-4408

Telephone (602) 514-7500

BRIAN BENCZKOWSKI 

Assistant Attorney General

Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice

REGINALD E. JONES (Miss. Bar No. 102806, reginald.jones4@usdoj.gov) 

Senior Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section 

950 Pennsylvania Ave N.W., Room 2116

Washington, D.C. 20530

Telephone (202) 616-2807 

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Michael Lacey, et al.,

Defendants.

CR-18-422-PHX-SPL (BSB) 

UNITED STATES’ REPLY IN 

SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 

ACCESS TO THE JOINT 

REPRESENTATION AND JOINT 

DEFENSE AGREEMENTS 

PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED BY 

DEFENDANTS MICHAEL LACEY 

AND JAMES LARKIN FOR IN 

CAMERA REVIEW (CR 354)

Preliminary Statement

The United States’ Motion for Access seeks copies of the Joint Engagement Letter 

dated December 12, 2016 (Engagement Letter), the Common Interest/Litigation 

Management Agreement dated December 31, 2016 (Joint Representation Agreement or 

JRA), and the Joint Defense Agreement dated June 2017 (JDA). (CR 180 at 6-8 (Exhibits

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 430 Filed 01/04/19 Page 1 of 12
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A-C, respectively, to the in camera Grant Declaration).) Despite recognizing “it may be 

difficult for the Government to understand what it cannot see,” the Court based its 

Disqualification Order on “express [conflict of interest waivers in] the JRA and JDA.” (CR 

338 at 7, 9.) Moreover, the Court based its Privilege Order on JDA terms that purportedly 

prevent Backpage.com’s CEO and 100% owner, Carl Ferrer, from waiving 

Backpage.com’s corporate attorney-client privilege. (CR 345 at 4.) While the Court stated 

that the government had not challenged the agreements’ “validity” (CR 338 at 7 n.5; CR 

345 at 4 n.3), the government presented a 45-paragraph declaration from Ferrer that 

vigorously disputed the validity and scope of any conflict of interest waivers in the 

agreements. (CR 193 at 6-9; CR 193-9, Ex. I (Ferrer Decl.).) Ferrer averred in detail that 

the waivers were not knowing, intelligent and voluntary—and did not validly waive the 

conflicts highlighted in the government’s disqualification motion. (Ferrer Decl. ¶¶ 23-44; 

see CR 118.) Cf. United States v. Caramadre, 892 F. Supp. 2d 397, 405-07 (D.R.I. 2012)

(applying conflict waiver where the government’s main cooperating witness confirmed in 

open court that he had knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived the conflict). 

Given the sharp divide between the Ferrer Declaration and the Court’s 

Disqualification Order, the government sought access to the agreements so that it could 

meaningfully evaluate and understand the basis of the Court’s rulings. As the Motion for 

Access demonstrates, Defendants Michael Lacey and Jim Larkin (Defendants) never met 

their burden of establishing that the agreements reveal confidential legal communications 

between a client and lawyer—or that any other basis for asserting privilege exists. (CR 

354 at 2-4.) In their Response, Defendants still have not met that burden – rather, they 

merely assert that some unidentified basis for privilege obtains. (CR 408 at 12.) Nor do 

Defendants contest that the agreements are highly relevant and material to understanding 

the Disqualification and Privilege Orders. Rather, the main theme of Defendants’ 

Response is that it’s too late to seek access to the agreements. As explained below, 

Defendants’ assertions miss the mark, and the Motion for Access should be granted. 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 430 Filed 01/04/19 Page 2 of 12
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Argument

I. DEFENDANTS’ PRELIMINARY ARGUMENTS LACK MERIT.

Defendants’ timeliness and waiver arguments should be rejected. (Doc. 408 at 6-

9.) If anything, the Court’s Orders underscore why disclosure is warranted now more than 

ever. The agreements’ conflict and privilege waivers formed the basis of the 

Disqualification and Privilege Orders. (CR 338 at 7, 9; CR 345 at 4.) The Court indicated

the government cannot meaningfully understand and assess the Orders without access to 

these materials. (See CR 338 at 9.) In other contexts, courts recognize that materials that 

form the basis of critical judicial decisions should be disclosed. See, e.g., Oregonian 

Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 920 F.2d 1462, 1465-66 (9th Cir. 1990) (plea agreements); 

Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006)

(dispositive motions and attachments); Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2002)

(agreements reflecting a federal judge’s input). The agreements are not privileged, see

Parts II-III, infra—and the Court’s reliance on them in deciding issues of acute importance 

justifies their disclosure.

United States v. Caramadre, cited on page 13 of the Response, further demonstrates

why the government’s Motion should be granted now. The court conducted an extensive 

inquiry into whether the government’s cooperating witness, Maggiacomo, had entered into 

a conflict waiver sufficient to defeat the government’s motion to disqualify his former 

attorney from representing the charged defendant. The court reviewed the cooperator’s 

written waiver in camera, and then confirmed—through questioning in open court—that 

the waiver was valid. Caramadre, 892 F. Supp. 2d at 400-01, 405-06. The court inquired 

of Maggiacomo “to ensure [he] understood the potential consequences of [his] waivers,” 

and he testified he was “making [a] knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver[ ] of the 

conflict.” Id. at 408. Significantly, the court noted the government had failed to provide 

“any evidence that Maggiacomo’s consent was involuntary or uninformed.” Id. at 406. 

Here, in contrast, the government presented extensive evidence—from Ferrer—that 

the waivers at issue were not knowing, intelligent or voluntary. Ferrer averred it was his 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 430 Filed 01/04/19 Page 3 of 12
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

understanding, after signing the Engagement Letter, “that if any of the individual 

defendants became adverse to one another, that DWT [Davis Wright Tremaine] would 

immediately cease representing all the previously represented individual defendants. I 

never agreed to waive all conflicts regarding such joint representation....” (Ferrer Decl. 

¶ 26.) He “did not consult with any independent lawyer before signing...and no DWT 

attorney ever recommended that I do so,” and he did not recall “ever discussing the nature 

of potential conflicts that may arise...before signing.” (Ferrer Decl. ¶ 27.)

Ferrer similarly did not provide informed consent regarding the JRA, which was 

sent to him with other documents as part of a larger re-negotiation of the debt he owed to 

Lacey and Larkin. (Ferrer Decl. ¶¶ 30-34.) He was given only 48 hours to review and 

sign, and felt he had “no choice but to sign” to avoid “financial ruin.” (Ferrer Decl. ¶¶ 30-

34.) He did not intend to waive future conflicts, especially those that could arise in criminal 

proceedings. (Ferrer Decl. ¶ 35.) Rather, “[t]he possibility of future conflicts of interest 

among the parties was never discussed before I signed,” and Larkin’s lawyer, Don Moon, 

discouraged Ferrer from discussing the JRA with his own personal lawyers “because he 

said that doing so would be a ‘waste of time.’” (Ferrer Decl. ¶¶ 36-37.) Cf. ER 1.0(e); ER 

1.7, comment 21 (requirements for informed consent to future conflicts); Roosevelt 

Irrigation Dist. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 810 F. Supp. 

2d. 929, 950-57 (D. Ariz. 2011) (waiver must address scenario that results in conflict). 

Ferrer also contested whether the JDA contained an advance conflict waiver 

regarding his personal attorneys (including DWT). He stated it was his understanding that 

the JDA “was formed to allow the lawyers for the individual targets and subjects to share 

materials and access a shared database of Backpage.com documents.” (Ferrer Decl. ¶ 40.) 

It was not his understanding that he “would be waiving any future conflicts of interest 

involving my own personal attorneys.” (Ferrer Decl. ¶ 41.) As far as he knew, DWT was 

not a party to the JDA. (Ferrer Decl. ¶¶ 42-43.) 

Where—as here—significant rulings are based on waivers that the signatory 

declares were invalid, the Court should at a minimum allow the government access to the 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 430 Filed 01/04/19 Page 4 of 12
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

pertinent provisions of the agreements so that it can meaningfully understand and assess 

the basis for the Court’s rulings. Without access, the government cannot evaluate whether, 

inter alia: (1) the agreements described the present conflicts sufficiently to allow Ferrer to 

have provided informed consent; (2) the agreements show Ferrer was afforded meaningful 

opportunity to obtain independent advice; (3) the conflict waivers apply to DWT 

representations predating this case and/or Ferrer’s execution of the agreements; and (4) the 

agreements restrict Ferrer, as Backpage.com’s CEO and 100% owner, from waiving 

Backpage.com’s corporate attorney-client privilege for communications generated at any 

time since the company’s founding in 2004.

This case is nothing like United States v. Murguia-Rodriguez, 815 F.3d 566, 573 

(9th Cir. 2016) (CR 408 at 7-9), which recognized the established rule that the government 

waives harmless error in an appellate brief when it makes no harmlessness argument, or 

merely “mentions” harmlessness without providing any supporting argument. In its 

disqualification briefing, the government expressly requested access to the JRA, argued the 

agreement was not privileged, and provided a declaration demonstrating why the 

agreement is not privileged and should be disclosed. (CR 193 at 7; Ferrer Decl. ¶¶ 28-38.) 

The government also quoted the Engagement Letter, which stated that “[i]f an incurable 

conflict were to arise among the three of you [Ferrer and Defendants Lacey and 

Larkin]...DWT will withdraw from representing each and all of you individually....” (CR 

118 at 2, n.1; CR 193 at 6-7.) More generally, the government vigorously contested the 

validity and applicability of any conflict waivers in the agreements (see CR 193 at 3, 6-9; 

Ferrer Decl. ¶¶ 27-37, 42).1

Nor is this case anything like United States v. Hoffman, 2015 WL 5604419 (E.D. 

 

1 The government also repeatedly cited United States v. Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (CR 192 at 5, 10; CR 193 at 7; CR 194 at 3), which recognizes that JDAs 

generally are not privileged. 246 F. Supp. 2d at 1078 (quoting United States v. Hsia, 81 F. 

Supp. 2d 7, 11 n.3 (D.D.C. 2000) (“expressing doubt that ‘either the existence or the terms of a [joint defense agreement] are privileged’”)). While Stepney ordered in camera

submission (so the court could review the agreements to ensure they protected the co- defendants’ rights), the court was not presented with a request by the government for 

access. Id. at 1072-73.

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 430 Filed 01/04/19 Page 5 of 12
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cal. Sept. 23, 2015) (CR 408 at 6-9). In Hoffman, the court had given the government 

three months to file its oppositions to the defendants’ dismissal motions, but the deadline 

came and went with no opposition briefs filed. 2015 WL 5604419 at *1. By the time of 

the motion hearing, the government had failed to file anything—not even an extension

request. Id. Based on such “demonstrated apathy” for the court’s deadlines, the court 

declined to consider the government’s late-filed arguments. Id. at *3. In contrast, the 

government here filed its disqualification motion at the earliest possible stage – within a 

month of Defendants’ indictments. (CR 118.) The government timely filed detailed replies

(CRs 192, 193, 194) that conscientiously addressed a waterfront of arguments presented in 

four responses. (CRs 174, 176, 177, 180.) The government promptly filed its Motion for 

Access within two weeks of the Disqualification Order. Hoffman is inapposite. 

Alternatively, even if waiver applies, the Court retains discretion to consider the 

government’s access arguments. Hoffman, 2015 WL 5604419, at *2. The Court should 

consider those arguments because the government diligently briefed and argued the 

disqualification and privilege motions, promptly filed the Motion for Access after receiving 

the Disqualification and Privilege Orders, and demonstrated why the agreements are not 

privileged and should be disclosed. (See generally CR 345.) Moreover, as explained 

supra, given the contrast between the Ferrer Declaration (which is not discussed in the 

Disqualification or Privilege Orders) and the waivers that formed the basis of the Court’s 

rulings, the government has an abiding interest in reviewing the in camera submissions so 

that it may make fully informed decisions about subsequent litigation (if any) regarding 

these issues. 

Defendants’ assertion that any related motions or appeals would force them “to bear 

extra costs” is misplaced. (CR 408 at 10.) As explained infra, the law is clear that these 

materials generally are not privileged. Rather than consent to disclosure or offer redacted 

copies, Defendants filed a lengthy Response that does nothing to meet their burden of 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 430 Filed 01/04/19 Page 6 of 12
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

showing that the agreements are privileged.

2

 Moreover, Defendants cannot insist on 

representation by “an attorney who has a previous...relationship with an opposing party, 

even when the opposing party is the Government,” Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 

159 (1988), and courts have chastised the government for not raising at the earliest possible 

stages precisely the types of conflicts of interest posed by DWT’s (and HCM’s) 

representation of Defendants in view of their extensive prior representations of Ferrer. (See

CR 118 at 13-14, citing United States v. Iorizzo, 786 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1986) (reversing and 

ordering new trial).) The costs of a new trial—for Defendants, the government, the Court 

and the public—would far exceed any costs associated with limited additional motion 

practice involving the agreements underlying the Disqualification and Privilege Orders. 

Simply put, the government wants to get this right—and trusts Defendants share that goal. 

II. THE AGREEMENTS ARE NOT PRIVILEGED.

The attorney-client privilege protects from discovery “confidential communications 

between attorneys and clients, which are made for the purpose of giving legal advice.” 

United States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 2011). The privilege is “narrowly and 

strictly construed,” and the party asserting it bears the burden of proving that it applies. 

Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 2011 WL 1599646, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 

2011). See also Clarke v. Am. Commerce Nat’l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(“The burden of establishing that the attorney-client privilege applies to the documents in 

question rests with the party asserting the privilege,” and “blanket assertions of the 

privilege are ‘extremely disfavored’”; upholding district court’s requirement that privilege 

proponent justify “each requested redaction”); In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 

359, 362 (9th Cir. 1982) (party asserting privilege should submit documents “in camera

 

2 Defendants Lacey and Larkin also assert that they their litigation budget has been affected by “extensive seizures of defendants’ assets and attorney retainers.” (CR 408 at 10.) 

However, the government has repeatedly offered that Defendants could request a hearing 

pursuant to United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989), or submit financial statements 

in camera to the Court, if they believed that they are having any difficulties with defense 

costs. Defendants have not availed themselves of this invitation.

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 430 Filed 01/04/19 Page 7 of 12
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

for the court’s inspection, providing an explanation of how the information fits within the 

privilege”) (emphasis added); In re Horn, 976 F.2d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1992) (same). 

“The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held retainer agreements are not protected by the 

attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine.” Gusman v. Comcast Corp., 298 F.R.D. 

592, 599–600 (S.D. Cal. 2014); see also CR 354 at 3 (citing cases). Similarly, joint defense 

agreements generally are not considered privileged. See, e.g., Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d at

1078 (“To the extent that joint defense agreements simply set forth the existence of 

attorney-client relationships—implied or otherwise—between various attorneys and 

defendants, the contents of such agreements do not fall within the attorney-client 

privilege.”); see also CR 354 at 4 (citing cases). 

Defendants assert—without support and in entirely circular fashion—that the 

agreements are privileged “because they contain the types of information the Ninth Circuit 

has recognized as privileged....” (CR 408 at 12.) Defendants claim these “types of 

information” include: 

(1) any document reflecting “the client’s ultimate motive for litigation or for 

retention of an attorney”; (2) “[c]onfidential communications between attorney and client made in order to obtain legal assistance”; (3) “correspondence between attorney and client which reveals the client’s 

motivation for creation of the relationship or possible litigation strategy”; and 

(4) documents that “reveal the nature of services provided.”

(CR 408 at 12, quoting In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d at 362.) Yet Defendants 

have made no showing that the agreements contain any of these categories of information. 

For instance, Defendants have not demonstrated that any of the agreements reveal 

confidential communications between a client and a lawyer transmitting legal advice. The 

JRA consists of a 10-page, single-spaced contract between Lacey, Larkin, Ferrer, and 

entities they respectively controlled; it is not a communication between a client and a 

lawyer. (Ferrer Decl. ¶¶ 28-29.) The JDA memorializes the terms of the parties’ 

information-sharing arrangements. (See CR 345 at 4.) Defendants have not shown that 

the documents disclose the contents of confidential legal advice transmitted between 

lawyer and client, specific litigation strategies or theories, or descriptions of legal services 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 430 Filed 01/04/19 Page 8 of 12
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

performed. Accordingly, the agreements are not privileged and should be disclosed. 

The cases Defendants cite provide instructive counter-examples showing why the 

government’s request is reasonable. (See CR 408 at 12-13.) Unlike In re Horn, 976 F.2d 

at 1319, which involved a grand jury subpoena “seek[ing] the widest possible range of 

privileged information...by and between a large number of entities...over 61⁄2 years,” or In 

re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d at 361, which concerned subpoenas for attorney 

time records describing services performed and retainer contracts spanning a 6-year period, 

the government here seeks only three specific documents. (CR 345 at 1.) As explained 

above, none of the documents sought are privileged. (See also CR 345 at 3-4.)

Moreover, unlike Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 184 (9th Cir. 1965), 

which involved communications between co-defendants and their attorneys concerning a

defendant’s intent to plead guilty to “clear” the other defendant (his wife), or Eisenberg v. 

Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787-88 (3d Cir. 1985), which concerned the disclosure of 

correspondence between a co-defendant and an attorney regarding a case-related fact and 

a proposed trial strategy to deal with that fact, the United States does notseek the disclosure 

of any similar co-defendant communications. 

The United States does not contend that in camera procedures are unavailable when 

a party seeks to submit materials it contends are privileged. (Cf. CR 408 at 13-14.) Nor 

does the government seek to intrude on Defendants’ attorney-client privilege or gain “any 

hint” of defense strategies. Rather, the United States seeks the disclosure of the contractual 

provisions (conflict and privilege waivers, and any related terms) that informed the 

Disqualification and Privilege Orders. Defendants have not shown, and cannot show, that 

these materials are privileged and protected from disclosure.

III. ANY PRIVILEGE HAS BEEN WAIVED.

The government incorporates by this reference its argument that Defendants 

impliedly waived any privileges or protections applicable to the agreements. (See CR 354 

at 8-10.) The Response does not meaningfully contest this argument. Instead, Defendants 

point to the unremarkable fact that in camera submissions are permitted in disputes 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 430 Filed 01/04/19 Page 9 of 12
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

involving allegedly privileged materials. (CR 408 at 13-14.) Defendants cite no cases in 

which a signatory to the conflict waivers at issue testifies that the waivers were not

knowing, intelligent and voluntary. 

For all the reasons discussed above, the Court should order disclosure of the three 

agreements at issue. Alternatively, if the Court concludes that the agreements contain any 

privileged categories of information, the government respectfully requests that the Court 

order Defendants to redact the agreements and disclose the following:

(1) the conflict of interest waiver provisions in the Engagement Letter, JRA and 

JDA, along with any supporting provisions that may indicate if (a) Ferrer was afforded the 

opportunity to obtain independent legal advice, (b) likely future conflict scenarios were 

explained to Ferrer before he signed, (c) notice was provided Ferrer of the parties, lawyers 

and/or law firms covered by the waivers, and (d) the waivers applied to DWT 

representations predating this case and/or Ferrer’s execution of the agreements; and 

(2) the provisions of the JDA on which the Court relied in finding that “the plain 

text of the JDA” prevented Ferrer from waiving Backpage.com’s corporate attorney-client 

privilege without “first obtain[ing] the written consent of all parties who may be entitled 

to a claim of privilege over the materials,” and JDA provisions that “set forth other 

protections for information and communications exchanged between [the] parties” (CR 

345 at 4) and/or indicate that the JDA includes all Backpage.com privileged 

communications generated since the company’s founding in 2004. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the government respectfully requests that the Court: (1) 

order Defendants Lacey and Larkin to provide the government copies of the agreements 

attached as Exhibits A-C to the Grant Declaration (see CR 180 at 6-8); and (2) continue 

the deadline for seeking reconsideration of the Disqualification and Privilege Orders to 14 

days after service of the agreements. (CR 354-1.) 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 430 Filed 01/04/19 Page 10 of 12
- 11 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Respectfully submitted this 4th day of January, 2019.

ELIZABETH A. STRANGE

First Assistant United States Attorney

District of Arizona

s/ Peter S. Kozinets

KEVIN M. RAPP

MARGARET PERLMETER

PETER S. KOZINETS

ANDREW C. STONE

JOHN J. KUCERA

Assistant U.S. Attorneys

BRIAN BENCZKOWSKI 

Assistant Attorney General Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice

REGINALD E. JONES

Senior Trial Attorney

U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division

Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 430 Filed 01/04/19 Page 11 of 12
- 12 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on this date, January 4, 2019, I transmitted the foregoing under-seal 

document for filing to the Clerk of the United States District Court and sent a copy via electronic mail to: Paul J. Cambria Jr. Esq. and Erin e. McCambpell, Esq., Lipsitz Green 

Scime Cambria, LLC, 42 Deleware Ave, Suite 120, Buffalo, NY 14202, 

pcambria@lglaw.com and emccampbell@lglaw.com, Thomas H. Bienert, Jr., Esq., Anthony R. Bisconti, Esq., Kenneth M. Miller, Esq., and Whitney Bernstein, Esq., Bienart, 

Miller & Katzman, PLC, 903 Calle Amanecer, Suite 350, San Clemente, CA 92673, 

tbienert@bmkattorneys.com, tbisconti@bmkattorneys.com, kmiller@bmkattorneys.com, wbernstein@bmkattorneys.com; Mike Piccarreta, Esq., Piccarreta Davis Keenan Fidel, PC, 2 East Congress Street, Suite 1000, Tucson, AZ 85701, mlp@pdlaw.com; Jim Grant Esq., Davis Wright Termaine, LLP, 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200, Seattle, WA 98101, jimgrant@dwt.com; Michael D. Kimerer, Esq. and Rhonda Elaine Neff, Esq., 1313 E. Osborn Road, Suite 100, Phoenix, AZ 85014, MDK@kimerer.com and rneff@kimerer.com; Steve Weiss Esq., Karp & Weiss, PC, 3060 North Swan Rd., Tucson, AZ 85712, sweiss@karpweiss.com; Robert Corn-Revere 

Esq., Davis Wright Termaine, LLP, 1919 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Suite 800, 

Washington, D.C., 20006, bobcornrevere@dwt.com; Bruce Feder, Esq., 2930 East Camelback Road, Suite 160, Phoenix, AZ 85016, bf@federlawpa.com; Gary Linenberg, Esq., Ariel Neuman, Esq., Gopi K. Panchapakesan, Esq., Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C., 1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor, Los 

Angeles, CA 90067, glincenberg@birdmarella.com, aan@birdmarella.com, gkp@birdmarella.com.

s/ Angela Schuetta_____

Angela Schuetta

U.S. Attorney’s Office

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 430 Filed 01/04/19 Page 12 of 12