IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

In the Matter of the Estate of: No. 54614-1-II

DARLENE H. ANDERSON,

 Deceased.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

VELJACIC, J. — David R. Anderson, Ph.D., appeals the superior court’s final order on 

distribution and closure of Darlene H. Anderson’s estate (the Estate). Dr. Anderson appears to 

argue that the superior court erred in issuing the final order because: the court denied him an 

opportunity to present factual issues about the Estate’s assets; the court denied him an opportunity 

to counter alleged misrepresentations by the Estate at the hearing on closure of probate; and issues 

of fact remain about the value and distribution of assets regarding a separate, out-of-state probate, 

which affects the probate of the Estate at issue here. Dr. Anderson also argues that he is entitled 

to an award of attorney fees incurred below. The Estate requests attorney fees and costs incurred 

on appeal because it contends that Dr. Anderson’s appeal is frivolous. 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

March 1, 2022
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We decline to address Dr. Anderson’s assignments of error and issues pertaining thereto 

because he fails to present any meaningful analysis, fails to provide any citation to legal authority, 

and fails to provide any references to the record to support his contentions. We also deny Dr. 

Anderson’s request for attorney fees below. However, we award the Estate its attorney fees and 

costs incurred on appeal because Dr. Anderson’s appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm the 

superior court’s final order on distribution and closure of the Estate. 

FACTS

Darlene H. Anderson passed away on December 19, 2013. Darlene1 was survived by her 

four children, Cathryn J. Nova, Douglas H. Anderson, Michael F. Anderson, Dr. Anderson, and 

her grandson, Christopher S. Anderson. 

On July 25, 2013, Darlene executed her last will and testament (Will). Darlene appointed 

Nova to act as the personal representative of the Estate.2 Additionally, article II of the Will 

provided that, “My estate shall be administered by my personal representative without the 

intervention of any court and with all powers granted herein and by law to a personal representative 

acting with nonintervention powers, and I direct that such nonintervention powers be unrestricted.” 

Clerk’s Paper’s (CP) at 8.

Article III of the Will sets forth Darlene’s specific devises and bequests. Article III 

provides:

A. Bequest by List: I have contemporaneously executed or intend to 

execute a writing wherein I direct the disposition of certain tangible personal 

property therein described to the persons mentioned in such writing.

 

1 We use the decedent’s first name for clarity. No disrespect is intended.

2 The Will also states that Dr. Anderson would be appointed to act as the personal representative 

of the Estate should Nova be unable, unwilling, or removed from that role. 
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B. Gift to Grandson: I give the sum of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS 

($10,000[.]00) to my grandson CHRISTOPHER S. ANDERSON, provided he 

survives me.

C. Balance of Estate: The balance of my estate shall be distributed in equal 

shares, one share to each of my surviving children, one share to the surviving 

spouse of each deceased child, provided such spouse was married to and not 

separated from my child at the time of my child’s death, and one share to the 

descendants of each deceased child who does not leave a qualifying surviving 

spouse. 

CP at 9. 

Darlene, while the testator in our case, is also an heir to half of the Cathryn M. Andrew

Estate (the Andrew Estate).

3

 Cathryn Andrew passed away in 1993 with the Andrew Estate being 

probated in the State of Utah. Dr. Anderson served as the personal representative of the Andrew 

Estate. 

On January 29, 2014, Nova, in her capacity as personal representative of the Estate, 

petitioned Pierce County Superior Court to admit Darlene’s Will into probate. The court issued 

an order admitting the Will into probate and declaring that the administration of the Estate shall 

be completed without the intervention of the court. 

On June 4, Dr. Anderson filed a creditor’s claim against the Estate. Dr. Anderson claimed 

that he cared for Darlene during her illness with ovarian cancer and requested a payment of 

$48,368.75 from the Estate. The Estate rejected the claim.

Dr. Anderson then filed a separate action against the Estate in the superior court regarding 

his creditor’s claim. Nova, as personal representative, filed various counterclaims which, among 

other things, alleged that Dr. Anderson misused over $80,000 of the Andrew Estate to pursue and 

defend claims relating to the probate of the Estate in Washington. The record does not indicate 

whether this separate action has been resolved. 

 

3 The declarations of Douglas and Michael Anderson indicate that Andrew was their aunt. 
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On February 5, 2016, Nova, as personal representative of the Estate (which, again, was an 

heir to the Andrew Estate) filed a petition in the Utah state court to remove Dr. Anderson as the 

personal representative of the Andrew Estate. That petition was granted. Nova then filed a motion 

for an order compelling the return of the alleged misused funds discussed above. The Utah court 

found that, “As of December 31, 2014, the Andrew Estate had $82,629.83 in a Chase Bank 

account.” CP at 855. The Utah court also found that, “All $82,629.83 was depleted by [Dr.] 

Anderson, who used the money to fund an individual claim that was unrelated to his duties as 

personal representative of the Andrew Estate.” CP at 855. Accordingly, the court issued an order 

requiring Dr. Anderson to pay $82,629.83 to the Andrew Estate. 

On March 3, 2016, Dr. Anderson filed a motion to remove Nova as the personal 

representative of the Estate. In the same motion, Dr. Anderson requested, in the alternative, that 

the superior court revoke Nova’s nonintervention powers under the Will. The superior court 

denied the motion. However, the court ordered that “Nova’s non-intervention powers were limited 

as to [the] payment of attorney fees [and] distribution to heirs.” CP at 215. 

On May 24, Dr. Anderson moved to disgorge attorney fees that had already been paid by 

the Estate. Specifically, Dr. Anderson alleged that between August 2014 and January 2016, but 

before the court’s order limiting Nova’s nonintervention powers, the Estate paid its counsel 

$923.25 and $26,410.98. An additional payment was made on January 31, 2016, in the amount of 

$1,945. 

The superior court denied Dr. Anderson’s motion in part stating that, “the attorney’s fees 

previously paid in this matter in the amounts of $923.25, $26,410.98 and $1,945.00 are approved 

without prejudice to Dr. Anderson, remedy to challenge said fees at the close of the probate or 

interim request for attorney fees.” CP at 301. 
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Meanwhile, the Utah court judgment encompassing the $82,629.83 principle, discussed 

above, was filed in the Pierce County court against Dr. Anderson. The Pierce County clerk issued 

a writ of execution against Dr. Anderson’s claim in the creditor’s action, referenced above. The 

Pierce County sheriff executed two sales totaling $27,000, which reduced the Utah court judgment 

by that sum. Dr. Anderson’s creditor’s claim was dismissed on December 26, 2019. 

As of February 10, 2020, the Estate consisted of three assets: approximately $40,000 in 

cash, the remaining amount owed by virtue of the Utah court judgment against Dr. Anderson, and 

the Estate’s counterclaim against Dr. Anderson in the creditor’s action. On February 11, the Estate 

moved to distribute its remaining assets in accordance with Darlene’s Will and to close the Estate. 

The superior court heard the Estate’s motion on February 21. At that hearing, Dr. Anderson 

attempted to interject during the Estate’s argument: 

[THE ESTATE]: So then the estate essentially dismissed [Dr. Anderson’s 

creditor’s claim] by paying $10,000, dismissed that cause of action that [Dr.] 

Anderson was making against this.

THE COURT: In Grant Blinn’s court?

[THE ESTATE]: Yes.

[DR. ANDERSON]: That's not—

THE COURT: Wait.

[THE ESTATE]: That is correct.

THE COURT: And so now what are you asking for today?

[THE ESTATE]: Today we’re asking for a final distribution.

Report of Proceedings (Feb. 21, 2020) at 8 (emphasis added). The court then gave Dr. Anderson 

an opportunity to present argument. 

The superior court granted the Estate’s motion and ordered the distribution of the remaining 

assets and to close the Estate. Dr. Anderson appeals. 
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ANALYSIS

I. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Dr. Anderson appeals the superior court’s final order, which authorized Nova to distribute 

the Estate’s remaining assets and to close probate. Because Dr. Anderson fails to support his 

assignments of error and issues pertaining thereto with any meaningful analysis or citation to legal 

authority, we decline to address the merits of his appeal. 

A. Legal Principles 

As a pro se litigant, Dr. Anderson is held to the same standard as an attorney and must 

comply with all procedural rules on appeal. See In re Estate of Little, 9 Wn. App. 2d 262, 274 n.4, 

444 P.3d 23 (2019). In accordance with these rules, an appellant must provide “argument in 

support of the issues presented for review, together with citations to legal authority and references 

to relevant parts of the record.” RAP 10.3(a)(6). “Appellate courts need not consider arguments 

that are unsupported by pertinent authority, references to the record, or meaningful analysis.” 

Cook v. Brateng, 158 Wn. App. 777, 794, 262 P.3d 1228 (2010). Additionally, “we do not consider 

conclusory arguments that are unsupported by citation to authority.” Brownfield v. City of Yakima, 

178 Wn. App. 850, 876, 316 P.3d 520 (2014).

“It is not the responsibility of this court to attempt to discern what it is appellant may have 

intended to assert that might somehow have merit.” Port Susan Chapel of the Woods v. Port Susan 

Camping Club, 50 Wn. App. 176, 188, 746 P.2d 816 (1987). And “‘[p]assing treatment of an issue 

or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration.’” In re Guardianship 

of Ursich, 10 Wn. App. 2d 263, 278, 448 P.3d 112 (2019) (quoting Holland v. City of Tacoma, 90 

Wn. App. 533, 538, 954 P.2d 290 (1998)). 
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Here, Dr. Anderson’s entire argument section is limited to three sentences unsupported by 

any citation to authority or references to relevant parts of the record: 

A. Standard of Review

B. The court erred by not requiring the personal representative to provide an 

accurate and verified accounting of the DHA is assets.

C. Did not allow the heir to present evidence of misrepresentation by opposing 

counsel and personal representative Nova of 2 estates, one in Utah and one in 

Washington.

D. The personal representative has a fiduciary responsibility to account for assets 

of the estate and to protect the assets of the estate on behalf of the heirs.

Br. of Appellant at 6-7.

B. First Assignment of Error and Issues Pertaining Thereto4

Dr. Anderson argues that the superior court erred in its final order because it denied him 

an opportunity to present factual issues about the Estate assets to be distributed. Specifically, he 

appears to argue that the Estate’s accounting failed to include $29,279.23 in attorney fees which 

were ordered to be disgorged to the registry of the court. Anderson appears to argue so based on 

the superior court’s limitation of Nova’s nonintervention powers in a 2016 order. 

Here, Dr. Anderson fails to present any argument or citation to legal authority as to how 

the Estate’s failure to account for the attorney fees at issue requires reversal of the superior court’s 

final order. Regardless, Dr. Anderson’s factual assertion, that the superior court ordered the 

attorney fees at issue to be disgorged, is incorrect. As discussed above, the superior court approved 

the payment of those attorney fees on July 1, 2016. However, because Dr. Anderson failed to 

comply with RAP 10.3(a)(6), we decline to address his argument. 

 

4 This section addresses Dr. Anderson’s first assignment of error and issues one and three from his 

opening brief. 
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Dr. Anderson also appears to request sanctions of $100 a day from the date the superior 

court ordered the Estate to disgorge attorney fees. As discussed above, Dr. Anderson’s 

characterization of the 2016 order is incorrect. Additionally, he fails to provide any argument or 

citation to legal authority to support his claim for sanctions. Because such failures preclude 

appellate review, we decline to address the merits of Dr. Anderson’s claim regarding sanctions. 

Cook, 158 Wn. App. at 794; RAP 10.3(a)(6).

C. Second Assignment of Error and Issues Pertaining Thereto5

Dr. Anderson argues that the superior court erred in issuing the final order on distribution 

and closing the Estate because the court prevented him from objecting to alleged 

misrepresentations made by the Estate at the February 21, 2020 hearing. Specifically, Dr. 

Anderson appears to challenge the identity of the party who obtained his creditor’s claim from a 

sheriff’s sale in a separate cause of action, contending that “Sheriff’s records document that the 

creditor, [the Andrew Estate], not [] Nova on behalf of [the Estate], was the successful bidder of 

$10,000 at the auction.” Br. of Appellant at 4. 

Here, Dr. Anderson’s factual assertion, that the superior court denied him an opportunity 

to correct opposing counsel’s alleged misrepresentations, is incorrect. The record reflects that the 

superior court gave him an opportunity to correct opposing counsel’s alleged misrepresentations. 

Regardless, he fails to present any argument or citation to authority as to how the identity of the 

successful bidding party concerning his creditor’s claim in a separate cause of action would require 

reversal of the superior court’s final order in this case. Because Dr. Anderson fails to comply with 

RAP 10.3(a)(6), we decline to address the merits of his claim. 

 

5 This section addresses Dr. Anderson’s second assignment of error and second issue from his 

opening brief. 
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D. Third Assignment of Error and Issues Pertaining Thereto6

Dr. Anderson appears to argue that the superior court erred in issuing the final order 

because issues of fact remain about the value and distribution of assets of the Andrew Estate in 

Utah. Relatedly, Dr. Anderson also appears to argue that “[t]he court erred in drawing conclusions 

based [on] activities in Utah, specific details were not before the court yet the court made those 

decisions without specific knowledge.” Br. of Appellant at 3. 

Here, Dr. Anderson again fails to provide any argument or citation to legal authority as to 

how remaining issues of fact, if any, concerning the valuation and distribution of assets in the 

Andrew Estate would require reversal of the final order authorizing the distribution of assets of 

the Estate in this case.7 Because Dr. Anderson fails to present any argument or citation to authority, 

our review is precluded. Cook, 158 Wn. App. at 794; RAP 10.3(a)(6). Accordingly, we decline 

to address the issue. 

II. ATTORNEY FEES BELOW

Dr. Anderson argues that we should award him attorney fees and costs “for the attorneys 

that he has hired in this cause including the costs to address the issue of payment of attorney’s fees 

before [the superior court] in 2016-2021.” Br. of Appellant at 5, 7-8. We deny Dr. Anderson’s 

request. 

 

6 This section addresses Dr. Anderson’s third assignment of error and fourth issue from his opening 

brief. 

7 To the extent that Dr. Anderson argues that the superior court drew conclusions based on 

activities in Utah, the final order does not contain any such findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
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RAP 18.1(a) states that “[i]f applicable law grants to a party the right to recover reasonable 

attorney fees or expenses, . . . the party must request the fees or expenses as provided in this rule.” 

And RAP 18.1(b) states that “[a] party must devote a section of its opening brief to the request for 

the fees or expenses.” 

Here, Dr. Anderson fails to comply with RAP 18.1. He does not provide us with a legal 

basis to award attorney fees. Instead, Dr. Anderson asserts, without citation to authority, that he 

is entitled to an award of attorney fees dating back to 2016. Dr. Anderson also fails to devote a 

section of his opening brief in requesting attorney fees, as required by RAP 18.1(b). Because Dr. 

Anderson failed to comply with RAP 18.1, we deny his request for attorney fees.

III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

The Estate requests attorney fees and costs of appeal pursuant to RAP 18.9 because it 

contends that Dr. Anderson’s appeal is frivolous. We agree.

Under RAP 18.9(a), we may order a party who uses the rules for the purpose of delay, files 

a frivolous appeal, or fails to comply with the rules, to pay terms to any party who has been harmed 

by the delay or the failure to comply. “An appeal is frivolous when the appeal presents no 

debatable issues on which reasonable minds could differ and is so lacking in merit that there is no 

possibility of reversal.” Stiles v. Kearney, 168 Wn. App. 250, 267, 277 P.3d 9 (2012).

Here, Dr. Anderson presents no debatable issues on which reasonable minds could differ 

and his arguments are so lacking in merit that there is no possibility of reversal. Specifically, Dr. 

Anderson fails to present any meaningful analysis or citation to pertinent authority to support his 

contentions. In fact, the argument section of his brief only contains three conclusory, unsupported 

statements. By doing so, he completely fails to adhere to the rules of appellate procedure. His 

appeal is frivolous. See Stiles, 168 Wn. App. at 267. Accordingly, we award the Estate its attorney 
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fees and costs incurred on appeal under RAP 18.9(a). The amounts shall be determined by a 

commissioner of our court under separate order. 

We affirm the superior court’s final order on distribution and closure of the Estate. We 

also award the Estate its attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal under RAP 18.9(a). 

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

Veljacic, J.

We concur:

Glasgow, A.C.J.

Price, J.