THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Respondent, 

v. 

Ronnie Carrol Tucker, Defendant, 

Bail Out Bonding (Surety), Appellant. 

Appellate Case No. 2017-002599 

Appeal From Pickens County 

Perry H. Gravely, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5796 

Heard October 14, 2020 – Filed January 27, 2021 

AFFIRMED 

Kenneth Clifton Gibson, of The Law Office of Kenneth 

Gibson, of Greenville, for Appellant. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior 

Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch, 

Jr., both of Columbia, for Respondent. 

KONDUROS, J.: In this bond estreatment case, Bail Out Bonding (Surety) 

appeals the decision of the circuit court ordering a partial estreatment of Ronnie 

Carrol Tucker's bond. Surety contends Tucker's entry into a pretrial intervention 

(PTI) program was a "deferred disposition" pursuant to section 17-15-20(B) of the 

South Carolina Code (2014), thereby releasing it from liability. Tucker failed to 
 

complete PTI and failed to appear for trial. The circuit court partially estreated the 

bond. We affirm. 

FACTS 

Tucker was charged with two counts of unlawful conduct towards a child. The 

circuit court authorized Tucker's release from custody pursuant to an appearance 

recognizance bond in an order filed on September 29, 2014, specifying the 

conditions of Tucker's release. The order mandated: 

[Tucker] be released from custody on the condition that 

he will personally appear before the designated court at 

the place, date and time required to answer the charge 

made against him and do what shall be ordered by the 

court and not depart the State without the permission of 

the court and be of good behavior. 

Tucker signed the order indicating he agreed he was obligated to be present at his 

trial. Surety also signed the order establishing its obligation to the State in the 

amount of $10,000 "should [Tucker] fail in performing the conditions of this 

[o]rder." Thereafter, the solicitor allowed Tucker to participate in PTI; however, 

Tucker did not successfully complete PTI.1 After Tucker failed to appear for trial 

for the criminal charges pending against him, the circuit court issued a bench 

warrant on February 16, 2016. The court then ordered Surety to appear in court 

and held a hearing on December 15, 2017, to address the bond. 

At the bond estreatment hearing, Surety argued Tucker's referral to PTI qualified as 

a "deferred disposition" pursuant to section 17-15-20(B), discharging the bond and 

ending Surety's liability on the bond. In opposition, the State argued entry into PTI 

did not constitute a deferred disposition under the statute and the charges against 

Tucker were still pending. The State asserted it sent bond cards to Surety on three 

separate dates; Surety denied receiving the cards. 

The circuit court ordered the estreatment of twenty-five percent of the $10,000 

bond $10,000, which amounted to $2,500. This appeal followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

1

 The Record does not contain a copy of the PTI agreement between Tucker and 

the solicitor's office. 
 

"The trial court's estreatment of a bond forfeiture will not be set aside unless there 

has been an abuse of discretion." State v. Policao, 402 S.C. 547, 552, 741 S.E.2d 

774, 776 (Ct. App. 2013). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court's 

ruling is based on an error of law." Id. (quoting State v. Lara, 386 S.C. 104, 107, 

687 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2009)). 

An appellate court reviews the circuit court's ruling on 

the forfeiture or remission of a bail bond for abuse of 

discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the 

circuit court's ruling is based upon an error of law, such 

as application of the wrong legal principle; or, when 

based upon factual conclusions, the ruling is without 

evidentiary support; or, when the circuit court is vested 

with discretion, but the ruling reveals no discretion was 

exercised; or when the ruling does not fall within the 

range of permissible decisions applicable in a particular 

case, such that it may be deemed arbitrary and capricious. 

State v. McClinton, 369 S.C. 167, 170, 631 S.E.2d 895, 896 (2006) (citation 

omitted). 

LAW/ANALYSIS 

Surety contends entry into PTI is a "deferred disposition" under section 17-15-

20(B) of the South Carolina Code (2014), thereby discharging the bond and 

relieving the surety of its obligation. We disagree. 

Section 17-15-20 establishes the obligations of a person under a bond agreement 

and when a bond is discharged. The statute sets forth, in part: 

(A) An appearance recognizance or appearance bond 

must be conditioned on the person charged personally 

appearing before the court specified to answer the charge 

or indictment and to do and receive what is enjoined by 

the court, and not to leave the State . . . . 

(B) Unless a bench warrant is issued, an appearance 

recognizance or an appearance bond is discharged upon 

adjudication, a finding of guilt, a deferred disposition, or 
 

 

as otherwise provided by law. 

Id. 

The Pretrial Intervention Act, found in sections 17-22-10 to -170 of the South 

Carolina Code (2014 & Supp. 2019), authorizes each circuit's solicitor to establish 

and supervise a PTI program: 

(A) Each circuit solicitor shall have the prosecutorial 

discretion as defined herein and shall as a matter of 

such prosecutorial discretion establish a pretrial 

intervention program in the respective circuits. 

. . . 

(C) A pretrial intervention program shall be under the 

direct supervision and control of the circuit solicitor; 

however, he may contract for services with any 

agency desired. 

S.C. Code Ann. § 17-22-30. 

A person accepted into the PTI program must: 

(1) waive, in writing and contingent upon his successful 

completion of the program, his right to a speedy trial; 

[and] 

(2) agree, in writing, to the tolling while in the program 

of all periods of limitation established by statutes or rules 

of court . . . . 

S.C. Code Ann. § 17-22-90. 

The PTI statutory provisions specifically mandate the solicitor and the defendant 

shall enter into an agreement, including a timeframe by which the solicitor will 

decide to dismiss the charges or to pursue a conviction. 

In any case in which an offender agrees to an 

intervention program, a specific agreement must be made 

between the solicitor and the offender. This agreement 
 

shall include the terms of the intervention program, the 

length of the program and a section stating the period of 

time after which the prosecutor will either dismiss the 

charge or seek a conviction based upon that charge. 

S.C. Code Ann. § 17-22-120. 

Section 17-22-150 establishes the opportunity available to a defendant upon a 

successful completion of the PTI program and the result of unsuccessful 

completion. 

(a) In the event an offender successfully completes a pretrial 

intervention program, the solicitor shall effect a 

noncriminal disposition of the charge or charges pending 

against the offender. Upon such disposition, the offender 

may apply to the court for an order to destroy all official 

records relating to his arrest and no evidence of the 

records pertaining to the charge may be retained . . . . 

(b) In the event the offender violates the conditions of the 

program agreement: (1) the solicitor may terminate the 

offender's participation in the program, (2) the waiver 

executed pursuant to [section] 17-22-90 shall be void on 

the date the offender is removed from the program for 

the violation[,] and (3) the prosecution of pending 

criminal charges against the offender shall be resumed by 

the solicitor. 

§ 17-22-150. 

We note our supreme court has confirmed the solicitor, not the court, makes the 

decision to admit a defendant into PTI. 

[T]he judge cannot overrule the solicitor's objection to an 

applicant's admission to PTI without running afoul of our 

constitutional provision requiring a separation of powers. 

A circuit judge is a member of the judicial department 

and cannot constitutionally exercise the function of a 

member of the executive department. The solicitors and 

Attorney General are members of the executive branch of 
 

government. 

State v. Tootle, 330 S.C. 512, 515, 500 S.E.2d 481, 482 (1998) (citations omitted). 

An analysis of the issue on appeal must include a review of not only subsection (B) 

of section 17-15-20, but also subsection (A). Section 17-15-20(A) establishes: 

An appearance recognizance or appearance bond must be 

conditioned on the person charged personally appearing 

before the court specified to answer the charge or 

indictment and to do and receive what is enjoined by the 

court, and not to leave the State, and be of good behavior 

toward all the citizens of the State, or especially toward a 

person or persons specified by the court. 

(emphases added). 

Thus, the bond requires the defendant to appear and to do what the court requires. 

We note that the solicitor, not the court, authorizes and contracts with a defendant 

to participate in PTI, and if the defendant violates its agreement with the solicitor, 

"the prosecution of pending criminal charges against the offender shall be resumed 

by the solicitor." S.C. Code Ann. § 17-22-150(b)(3) (emphases added). Tucker 

did not receive a resolution from the court of the charges against him at the time he 

entered PTI. Rather, he entered into an agreement with the solicitor only. Section 

17-15-20(A) mandates that a bond is conditioned on the defendant's actions 

towards the court, not the solicitor's office. 

This court's decision in State v. Firetag Bonding Service is impactful. 345 S.C. 54, 

545 S.E.2d 838 (Ct. App. 2001). In that matter, a surety added to the back of a 

bond agreement, "NOTICE: NO CONTINUANCE WITHOUT PRIOR CONSENT 

FROM BONDING COMPANY." Id. at 55, 545 S.E.2d at 839. When the 

defendant failed to appear for trial, the court estreated the bond. Id. On appeal, the 

surety argued because the court did not notify the surety the matter was continued 

to a later date, the trial court erred by estreating the bond. Id. This court, however, 

affirmed the trial court, explaining section 17-15-20(A) establishes an appearance 

recognizance bond requires a defendant to personally appear and "to do and 

receive what shall be enjoined by the court." Id. at 56, 545 S.E.2d at 839 

(emphasis by court) (quoting § 17-15-20). Our court further stated: 

As is readily apparent, nothing in this section authorizes 
a surety . . . to set the conditions of an appearance 

recognizance regarding when and where the defendant 

must appear. "What" a defendant must "do and receive," 

i.e., the conditions of the appearance recognizance, are 

those things "enjoined by the court," not the surety. The 

stamped notation on the back of the appearance 

recognizance at issue that seeks to limit the magistrate's 

authority to continue the defendant's case constitutes, 

therefore, an unauthorized condition. As such, the 

notation is nothing more than mere surplusage and in no 

way affects the validity of the appearance recognizance 

itself. 

Id. 

The statutory directive requiring a defendant to do what the court enjoins is 

applicable here as well. Tucker's entry into PTI—the opportunity the solicitor gave 

him—was not "those things 'enjoined by the court.'" Id. Rather, the condition of 

the bond required Tucker's appearance in court, and the court did not err in 

estreating the bond when Tucker failed to appear. 

We now address subsection (B) of section 17-15-20, which allows for the 

discharge of a bond under certain circumstances. "Unless a bench warrant is 

issued, an appearance recognizance or an appearance bond is discharged upon 

adjudication, a finding of guilt, a deferred disposition, or as otherwise provided by 

law." Id. The statute provides, therefore, for specific instances in which a bond is 

discharged. Surety contends entry into PTI is one of those circumstances. We 

disagree. 

We turn to our jurisprudence for instances in which the disposition of charges 

against a defendant may be addressed at a later time. We note precedent indicates 

a court may choose to suspend a rendered sentence to allow a defendant to 

participate in the system known as "drug court." In State v. Perkins, our supreme 

court described the opportunity available to a defendant for drug court: 

The Thirteenth Circuit Drug Court Program (hereinafter 

"Drug Court Program" or "Program") is a voluntary 

therapeutic program which may be offered to a defendant 

that is charged with a drug abuse offense within the 

thirteenth circuit jurisdiction. The defendant pleads 
 

guilty to the charge and agrees with the solicitor to enter 

the Program. As a result, the trial court imposes a 

sentence on the defendant, but suspends the sentence, 

conditioned upon the successful completion the Program. 

The participant agrees to abide by certain terms and 

conditions of participation and may be sanctioned or 

ultimately terminated for failure to comply with the terms 

of the Program. 

378 S.C. 57, 59, 661 S.E.2d 366, 367 (2008). 

Another example of the court's authority to defer a complete resolution of charges 

was discussed in State v. Campbell, 376 S.C. 212, 656 S.E.2d 371 (2008), in which 

the defendant planned to testify against a codefendant. While the issue on appeal 

in Campbell is not relevant here, the supreme court referenced the common 

practice of an abated sentence as an incentive for testimony: "We note the typical 

procedure in this situation is that a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea 

agreement and then the defendant's sentencing is held in abeyance until after the 

defendant has cooperated at the co[]defendant's trial." Id. at 217, 656 S.E.2d at 

373-74. 

Surety contends Tucker's entry into PTI was similar to other forms of deferred 

resolution of charges against a defendant. We disagree. 

Surety specifically argues Tucker's entry into PTI is similar to a conditional 

discharge in section 44-53-450(A) of the South Carolina Code (2018). However, 

that statute establishes the court's authority to place a defendant on probation, after 

a determination of guilt, and require the defendant to participate in a drug 

treatment program: 

Whenever any person who has not previously been 

convicted of any offense under this article or any offense 

under any state or federal statute relating to marijuana, or 

stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic drugs, pleads 

guilty to or is found guilty of possession of a controlled 

substance, . . . the court, without entering a judgment of 

guilt and with the consent of the accused, may defer 

further proceedings and place him on probation . . . , 

including the requirement that such person cooperate in a 

treatment and rehabilitation program . . . . Upon 
 

 

violation of a term or condition, the court may enter an 

adjudication of guilt and proceed as otherwise provided. 

Upon fulfillment of the terms and conditions, the court 

shall discharge the person and dismiss the proceedings 

against him. 

Id. 

We recognize multiple examples in our jurisprudence of the deferred and abated 

disposition of criminal matters but find them dissimilar to entry into PTI. The 

solicitor's invitation to a defendant to enter into PTI allows a solicitor, not the 

court, to hold pending charges in abeyance during the pendency of PTI. The 

disposition of the outstanding charges against the defendant are not addressed by 

the court until PTI is successfully completed or the pending charges are resumed 

because a defendant does not complete PTI. Further, upon entry into PTI, the 

defendant has not pled guilty. Thus, the characteristics of PTI are unlike other 

matters in which a court defers disposition of charges against a defendant. 

Tucker did not plead guilty, was not found guilty, and was not placed on probation 

by the court. The circuit court did not render a decision regarding the charges 

against him. Rather, the solicitor and Tucker entered into an agreement to allow 

Tucker an opportunity to participate in PTI. The PTI statute clearly establishes 

criminal charges remain pending during the intervention program and the offender 

will be prosecuted if he does not successfully complete PTI. As such, entry into 

the PTI program does not qualify as a deferred disposition under section 17-15-

20(B). 

In addition to finding entry into PTI is not a deferred disposition and the charges 

against Tucker were still pending upon entry into PTI, we also find Surety is 

obligated on the bond pursuant to contract law. Our jurisprudence indicates a 

surety bond is a contract, subject to the rules of contract interpretation: 

We have held that the State's right to estreatment or 

forfeiture of a bail bond issued in a criminal case arises 

from the contract, i.e., the bail bond form signed by the 

parties. The parties to such a contract typically include 

the defendant; the person or company which acts as 

surety for the bond, if any; and the state and local 

government entities identified on the bond form. We 
 

 

routinely have applied contract principles to resolve 

various issues arising in bond forfeiture cases. 

State v. McClinton, 369 S.C. 167, 171, 631 S.E.2d 895, 897 (2006). "The State's 

right to estreatment is governed by contract." State v. Cochran, 358 S.C. 24, 27, 

594 S.E.2d 844, 845 (2004). 

If the bond agreement is breached, the liability of the surety is established, unless 

the court orders otherwise. Pride v. Anders, 266 S.C. 338, 341, 223 S.E.2d 184, 

186 (1976). "Since it was undisputed that the condition of the recognizances had 

been breached by the failure of the defendants to appear, the recognizances were 

forfeited and the liability of appellant-surety to pay the amount of the penalty then 

became fixed, unless relieved or exonerated by action of the court." Id. at 340, 223 

S.E.2d at 185. 

"The obligation of a surety is not to the State to produce the defendant, but is rather 

'an obligation to answer, to the extent of the penalty, for the default of the 

defendants, as principals.'" State v. Mitchell, 421 S.C. 365, 372, 807 S.E.2d 193, 

196 (2017) (quoting Pride, 266 S.C. at 341, 223 S.E.2d at 186). 

Under the terms of the bond agreement, Surety agreed to indebt itself to the State 

in the amount of $10,000 "should [Tucker] fail in performing the conditions of this 

[o]rder." When Tucker failed to appear for trial, "the liability of the surety became 

fixed." 266 S.C. at 340, 223 S.E.2d at 185. "Since it was undisputed that the 

condition of the recognizances had been breached by the failure of the defendants 

to appear, the recognizances were forfeited and the liability of appellant-surety to 

pay the amount of the penalty then became fixed, unless relieved or exonerated by 

action of the court." Id. (emphasis added). 

We also find it noteworthy the Firetag decision indicated defendant's failure to 

appear alone was sufficient to authorize the court to estreat the bond. "Indeed, 

[defendant's] failure to appear on August 16, 1999, was alone a sufficient basis for 

the magistrate to forfeit the amount of the appearance recognizance, 

notwithstanding the stamped notation." 345 S.C. at 56, 545 S.E.2d at 839. Surety 

contracted to be indebted to the State in the amount of $10,000 should Tucker fail 

to appear for trial. The principles of contract law dictate Surety was bound by its 

obligation. Because the circuit court did not act to relieve Surety of its promise, 

Surety remained liable. 

CONCLUSION 
We find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by its partial estreatment of 

the bond. Tucker's acceptance into PTI by the solicitor was not a deferred 

disposition by the court; the PTI statutory provisions establish the charges 

remained pending; and, because Surety was contractually liable for the failure of 

Tucker to appear for trial, the court did not err in estreating the bond. Accordingly, 

the circuit court's decision is 

AFFIRMED. 

LOCKEMY, C.J., and MCDONALD, J., concur.