IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 9, 2012

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ARTHUR LEE JAMISON, JR.

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2010-A-473 Cheryl A. Blackburn, Judge

No. M2012-00184-CCA-R3-CD - Filed February 6, 2013

The appellant, Arthur Lee Jamison, Jr., was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County

Criminal Court of selling less than .5 grams of a substance containing cocaine within 1,000

feet of a drug-free school zone, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant to

ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges

the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed.

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JERRY L. SMITH and

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JJ., joined.

James O. Martin, III (on appeal) and Karl Pulley (at trial), Nashville, Tennessee, for the

appellant, Arthur Lee Jamison, Jr.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter, Sophia S. Lee, Senior Counsel; Victor

S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General; and Pamela Anderson, Assistant District Attorney

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

At trial, Officer Josh Walters of the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department

(Metro) testified that in October 2009, he was working with the Crime Suppression Unit

which enforced street level crimes such as narcotics dealing and prostitution. He stated that

he often performed undercover drug purchases. Officer Walters said that to perform

undercover drug purchases, he had grown a beard, had longer hair, wore dirty clothes, and
tried to look like a “street person.” He said that while he worked undercover, he was

equipped with a listening device so detectives who were following him could monitor events

visually and audibly to ensure his safety and to make an arrest after a transaction was

complete.

Officer Walters stated that on October 28, 2009, he was driving a “buy car,” which

was an older model, unmarked car that was designed to “blend in” and look like a vehicle a

drug user would drive. He drove in areas of suspected drug activity. When Officer Walters

drove by the intersection of Murfreesboro Road and Paris Avenue, he saw the appellant

standing on the corner. Officer Walters pulled his car up beside the appellant and asked,

“[H]ey, have you got a ten,” which meant he wanted $10 worth of crack cocaine. Officer

Walters stated that “a ten” generally weighed .1 to .2 grams and could get a user high for

approximately thirty minutes. The appellant indicated yes and got in the passenger seat of

Officer Walters’ car.

The appellant instructed Officer Walters to drive to the Shell station on Lafayette

Street. When they parked, the appellant asked Officer Walters for $10 because he intended

to go into the store to exchange the money, which indicated to Officer Walters that the

appellant was familiar with the police practice of buying drugs with previously photocopied

money. Officer Walters refused the appellant’s request, telling him that he did not want to

give the appellant money without first seeing the drugs.

At that point, the appellant told Officer Walters to drive to another area. While they

traveled, the appellant constantly looked in the side and rear-view mirrors. The appellant had

Officer Walters park on the side of the road at the corner of Robertson Street and Fairfield

Avenue. When Officer Walters parked the vehicle, he could see Napier Elementary School.

The appellant made a call on his cellular telephone and told the person who answered, “I

need a dime,” which was slang for $10 worth of crack cocaine. After the call, the appellant

instructed Officer Walters to drive to the corner of Claiborne Street and Lafayette Street.

When they arrived, the appellant told Officer Walters to give him a $10 bill. The

appellant left his cellular telephone with Officer Walters as collateral and went into a

residence at 522 Claiborne Street, which was located within 1,000 feet of Cameron Middle

School. Five minutes later, the appellant exited the residence, got in the car, and told Officer

Walters that he could not get the drugs because “he saw the vice out.” Officer Walters told

the appellant to return his money. The appellant handed him a “wadded up” bill. Officer

Walters “uncrumpled” the bill and saw that it was a $1 bill, not a $10 bill. Officer Walters

accused the appellant of trying to “rip [him] off,” and the appellant said, “[M]an, I got it, I

got it, just go.” The appellant directed Officer Walters toward the intersection of Lafayette

Street and Wharf Avenue. While Officer Walters was driving, he saw the appellant get out

-2-
a small piece of paper. When the appellant opened the paper, Officer Walters saw rocks of

crack cocaine inside.

The appellant told Officer Walters to stop at 1st Avenue and Chestnut Street, which

was located within 1,000 feet of Johnson School and Cameron Middle School. The appellant

handed Officer Walters the rocks of crack cocaine, and Officer Walters gave the takedown

signal. Within seconds, other officers arrived and arrested the appellant. Officer Walters

said that Detective Khanthasith Phothirath field tested the rocks and confirmed that they

contained cocaine. Afterward, Detective Dills submitted the rocks to the evidence lockup

at Metro. Officer Walters also took the appellant’s cellular telephone as evidence. Officer

Walters said that police never recovered the $10 bill he used as buy money.

On cross-examination, Officer Walters acknowledged that when he first encountered

the appellant, he was not in a school zone. He further acknowledged that he initiated the

transaction, not the appellant. Officer Walters explained that “[t]he only reason [the

appellant] was targeted is because of that location and our history with the crime there.”

Officer Walters stated that the transaction was not recorded. He said that at the Shell station,

he thought there was a possibility that the appellant was trying to “rip [him] off” by taking

his money without giving him drugs in return. Officer Walters stated that he did not search

the appellant and did not see him with drug paraphernalia.

Metro Detective Jacob Pilarski testified that on October 28, 2009, he was a member

of the takedown team that was following and monitoring Officer Walters while he made

undercover drug buys. Detective Pilarski said they were working around the intersection of

Murfreesboro Road and Paris Avenue, which was known for narcotics sales.

Detective Pilarski stated that the appellant was standing on the side of the road in the

area, and Officer Walters asked him for “a dime or a ten,” an amount commonly purchased

for personal use. The appellant got into Officer Walters’ vehicle and said, “I can get you

what you need.” He directed Officer Walters to a Shell gas station and asked for the money.

Detective Pilarski explained that frequently people try to get money and leave without

providing drugs. However, Officer Walters refused to give the appellant money until he

obtained the crack cocaine. The appellant relented and told Officer Walters to drive to

Robertson Street and Fairfield Avenue so he could make a call. Detective Pilarski said that

the takedown team moved closer “because it seemed like he was just trying to get the money

and run.”

Detective Pilarski overheard the appellant make a call and ask for “a ten.” The

appellant then directed Officer Walters to 522 Claiborne Street. The appellant walked away

then returned and informed Officer Walters that he could not get the drugs. The appellant

-3-
gave Officer Walters something, and Detective Pilarski heard Officer Walters say, “[T]hat’s

not [a] ten, that’s a one.” The appellant capitulated, telling Officer Walters, “I got it, just

drive.” Following the appellant’s directions, Officer Walters stopped near 1st Avenue and

Chestnut Street. Thereafter, Officer Walters gave the takedown signal, and the takedown

team took the appellant into custody.

On cross-examination, Detective Pilarski said that the unit is normally comprised of

six or seven people. Detective Pilarski acknowledged that Officer Walters initiated contact

with the appellant, which was “very typical of street level narcotics.” He recalled that the

transaction occurred around 9:00 p.m. Detective Pilarski stated that at 522 Claiborne Street,

he saw someone peeking out of the back door. He also saw someone else enter then exit the

residence. Detective Pilarski never saw the appellant exchange anything with anyone.

Isaac Martinez testified that he was employed in the Property and Evidence Division

of Metro and that the rocks of crack cocaine and the appellant’s cellular telephone were

submitted to the property room after the appellant’s arrest. Martinez delivered the drugs to

the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) for testing. Afterward, the drugs were returned

to the Metro property room.

Agent Laura Adams, a forensic scientist with the TBI, testified that she tested the

rock-like substances and determined that the rocks weighed .03 grams and were cocaine base,

which was a “smokable form of cocaine.” She stated that cocaine was a Schedule II

substance.

The appellant did not testify or present proof in his defense.

The jury found the appellant guilty of selling less than .5 grams of a substance

containing cocaine within 1,000 feet of a drug-free school zone. He was sentenced as a

Range I, standard offender to ten years, eight years of which were to be served at 100%. On

appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.

II. Analysis

On appeal, a jury conviction removes the presumption of the appellant’s innocence

and replaces it with one of guilt, so that the appellant carries the burden of demonstrating to

this court why the evidence will not support the jury’s findings. See State v. Tuggle, 639

S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). The appellant must establish that no reasonable trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e).

-4-
Accordingly, on appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the

evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom. See State v.

Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). In other words, questions concerning the

credibility of witnesses and the weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all

factual issues raised by the evidence, are resolved by the trier of fact, and not the appellate

courts. See State v. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990).

The appellant argues that no reasonable jury could have found him guilty of selling

crack cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt. He maintains that, at most, he was guilty of casual

exchange.

Our criminal code provides that it is a Class C felony for a defendant to knowingly

sell less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. Tenn. Code Ann. §

39-17-417(a)(3) and (c)(2)(A). However, if the transaction occurs within 1,000 feet of a

school zone, it is a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-432(b)(1). In the light

most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that Officer Walters, who was working

undercover, told the appellant he wanted to purchase $10 worth of cocaine. The appellant

agreed to help and got into Officer Walters’ car. The appellant first tried to exchange the buy

money at a store, in an apparent attempt to prevent police from possibly later identifying

previously photocopied buy money. When Officer Walters thwarted his efforts to evade

subsequent detection, the appellant made a call and asked for a “dime.” The appellant then

directed Officer Walters to a house. The appellant went inside the house then returned to the

car. The appellant told Officer Walters that he could not get the drugs because of “vice.” He

returned a $1 bill to Officer Walters instead of the $10 bill he had been handed by Officer

Walters. When Officer Walters protested, the appellant told him that he had the drugs. The

appellant directed Officer Walters to a location within 1,000 feet of a school zone. There,

the appellant handed Officer Walters .03 grams of crack cocaine. This proof sufficiently

establishes the sale of a controlled substance.

Regarding the appellant’s claim that he was guilty of casual exchange instead of the

sale of cocaine, we note that casual exchange generally “contemplates a spontaneous passing

of a small amount of drugs, for instance, at a party. Money may or may not be involved.”

State v. Copeland, 983 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). This court has previously

explained that

“[w]hether a transfer is a casual exchange is to be determined

from all the facts and circumstances of the case. Facts and

circumstances indicating that the transaction is not a casual

exchange include a lack of evidence that the defendant gave the

drugs to the buyer out of friendship or as a friendly gesture, no

-5-
evidence reflecting anything other than a pecuniary motive for

the transfer of the drugs, no prior relationship between the

defendant and the buyer, and no reason for the defendant and the

buyer to be together, other than for the buyer to purchase drugs.”

State v. Bernard Miguel Wallace, No. W2004-02124-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 16315, at *4

(Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Jan. 3, 2006) (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Donald L.

Haynes, No. E2000-00672-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 416729, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. at

Knoxville, Apr. 24, 2001)). In the instant case, there was no proof of a friendship or friendly

relationship between the appellant and Officer Walters, and there was no proof of a motive

for the transfer of drugs that was not pecuniary. Moreover, the jury was instructed on casual

exchange. The jury, acting in its purview, reviewed the evidence and found the appellant

guilty of the sale of crack cocaine. This issue is without merit.

III. Conclusion

In sum, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the appellant’s

conviction. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

_________________________________

NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE

-6-