1 Cite as: 55 8 U

. S. ____ (2009)

Per Curia m 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

MICHIGAN v. JERE MY FISHE R

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL S OF MICHIGAN

No. 09–9 1. Dec i ded Dec e mb er7, 2009

P ER C UR IAM

. Police officers responded to a complaint of a disturbance near Allen Road in Brownstown, Michigan. * Officer Chri s

topher Goolsby later testified that, as he and his partner approached the area, a couple directed them to a residence where a man was “going crazy.” Dock et No. 2 76439, 2008 WL 786515, *1 (Mich. App., Mar. 25, 2008) (per cu riam) (alteration and interna lquotation marks omit ted). Upon their arriva l, the officers found a household in consider

able chaos: a pickup truck in the driveway with its fro n t smashed, d a maged fenceposts alo n g the sideof the pro p

erty, and three broken house wi ndows, the glass still on the ground outside. The officers also noticedblood on th e hood of the pickup and on clothes inside of it, as well ason one of the doors to the house. (It i s disputed whether they noticed this immediat ely upon reaching the house, b u t undisputed that they n o ticed itbefore the allegedly uncon

stitutional entry.) Th rough a window, the officers could see respond e nt, Jeremy Fisher, inside the ho use, scream

ing and throwing things. The back door was locked, and a couch had been placed to blockthe front door. The officer s k n ock e d, but Fisher refused to answer. They saw that Fisher had a cut on his han d, and the y asked him whether he needed medical attention. Fish er ignored these question s and dema nded, with accompany

ing profanity, that the officers go t oget a search warran t

.

——————

* Wehav etaken the fac t s fr om the opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeal s. Exce pt where indicated, th e parti e s do not dispute the facts.2 MICHIGAN v. FISHER

Per Curia m Officer Goolsby then pushed the f r ont door partway open and ventured into the house. Through the window of th e open door he saw Fisher pointing a long gun at him. Officer Goolsby withd r ew. Fisher was charged u n der Michigan law with assault with a da ngerous weapon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The tri al court con

cluded thatOfficer Go olsby violat ed the Fourth Amend

ment when he entered Fisher’s house, and granted Fisher’s motion to su ppress the evidence o b tained as a result—tha t is, Office r Goolsby’s statement that Fish er pointed a rifle at him. The Mich igan Court of Appeals initially remanded for an evidentiary hearing, see Docket No. 256027 , 2005 WL3481454 (D ec. 20, 2005) (per cu

riam), afterwhich the t r ial court re instated its order. Th e Court of Appeals then affirmed o v er a dissent by Judge Talbot. See 2008 WL 786515, at*2; id., at *2–*5. Th e Michigan Supreme Court grante dleave to appeal, but, after hearing oral argu ment, itvac a ted its prior order and denied leave instead; three justices, however, would have taken the case and rev e rsed on the ground that the Court of Appeals misapplied the Fourth Amendment. See 483 Mich. 1007, 765 N. W. 2d 19 (2009 ). Because the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals is indeed contrary to our Fourth Am endment case law, part icularlyBri gham Ci tyv. Stuart , 547 U. S. 398 (2006), we grant the State’s petition for certiorari and rever s e. “[T]he ultimate touchstoneof the Fourth Amendment,” we have often said, “is ‘reasonableness.’ ” Id., at 403. Therefore, although “searches and seizures i n side a ho me without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable,” Groh

v. Ramirez
, 540 U. S. 551, 559 (2 004) (internal quotation marks omitted), that presumption can be overcome. For example, “the exigenci es of the si tuation [may] mak ethe needs of la w enforce ment so compelling that the war

rantless search is objectively reas onable.” Minceyv. Ari

-3 Cite as: 55 8 U

. S. ____ (2009)

Per Curia m

zona , 437 U. S. 385, 393–394 (1978). Brigh a m Ci ty identifie done such exigency: “the need to assist persons who a r e seriousl y injured or threatened with suchinjury.” 54 7 U. S., a t 403. Thus, law enforce

ment officers “may en ter a home without awarran tt o render emergency assistance to a ninjured occupant o r to protect an occupant from imminent injury. ” Ibid. This “emergencyaid exception” does not depend on the officers’ subjective intent or the seriousne ss of any crime they are investigating when the emergency arises. Id., at 404–405. It requires only “an objectively rea s onable bas is for believ

ing,” id., at 406, that “a person within [the house] is in need of im mediate aid,” Mincey
, supra, at 39 2. Brigh a m Cityillustrates the application of th is stan

dard. Ther e, police officers responded to a noise complaint in the early hours of the morning. “As the yapproach ed the house, they could hear from within an altercation occurring, s o me kind of fight.” 547 U. S., at 406 (internal quotation marks omit ted). Following the t u mult to the back of the house whence it came, the officer s saw juve

niles drinking beer in the backyard and a fight unfolding in the kitchen. Theywatched t h rough the window as a juvenile brok e free from the adults restraining him and punched another adult in the face, who recoiled to the sink, spitting blood. Ibid. Under these circumstances, we found it “plainly reasonable” for the officers to enter th e house and quell the violence, for they had “a n objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adul t might need help and that the violence in the kitchen wa s just beginning.” Ibid. A straightforward application of the emer gency a i d exception, as in Bri gh a m Ci ty , di ctates tha tthe officer’s entry was reasonable. Just as in Brigh a m Ci ty , the police officers here were responding to areport of adisturbance. Just as in Brigh a m Ci ty , when they arrived on the scene they encou n tered a tu multuous situation in the house—4 MICHIGAN v. FISHER

Per Curia m and here th ey also found signs of a recent injury, perha p s from a car accident, outside. And just as in Brigham Ci ty , the officers could se e violent beh avior insid e

. Although Officer Go olsby and his partner did not see punches thrown, as did the officers in Brigham City
, t h eyd i dsee Fisher screaming and throwing th ings. It would be objec

tively reasonable to believe t hat Fisher’s projectiles might have a hum an target (perhaps a sp ouse or a ch ild), or tha t Fisher would hurt himself in th e course of his rage. In short, we find it as plain here as we did in Br igha m City that the officer’s entry was reaso nable under the Fourth Amendment. The Michigan Court of Appeals, however, thought th e situation “d id not rise to a level of emergenc y justifyin g the warran tless intrusion into a residence.” 2008 W L 786515, at *2. Although the Cou rt of Appea l s conceded that “there was evidence an injured person was on the premises,” it found it signif icant that “the m e re drops of blood did not signal a likely serious, life-thr e atening in

jury.” Ibid. The cour t added that the cut Offi cer Goolsby observed on Fisher’s hand “likely explained the trail of blood” and that Fisher “was very much on his feet and apparently able to see to his own n eeds.” Ibid. Even a casual review of Brigham Cityreveal s the flaw in this reasoning. Officers donot need ironcl ad proof of “a likely serious, life-threatening” injury to invoke the emer

gency aid exception. The only inj u ry police could confirm in Brigh a m City was the bloody lip they saw the juvenile inflict upon the adult. Fisher argues that the officers here could not have been motivated by a perceived need to provide medical assistance, since they neve r summoned emergency medical personnel. Th is would have no b e ar

ing, of cour se, upon th eir need to assure thatFisher wa s not endangering someone els einthe house. Moreover, even if the failure to summon medical personnel conclu

sively established that Goolsby did not su bjectively b e

-5 Cite as: 55 8 U

. S. ____ (2009)

Per Curia m lieve, whenhe entered the house, that Fisher or someon e else was seriously injured (which is doubtful), the test, as we have said, is not what Goolsby believed, but whethe r there was “an objectively reasonable basis for believing” that medical assistance was nee d ed, or persons were in danger, Br i gham Ci ty, supra, a t 406; Mincey
, supra, at 392. It was er ror for the Michigan C o urt of Ap peals to re

place that objective inquiry into appearances with its hindsight determination that there was in fa ct no emer

gency. It does n o t me et the ne eds of law en forcement o r the demands of public safety to require officers to wal k away from a situation like the onethey encountered here. Only when an apparen tthreat has become an actual harm can officers rule out innocu ous explanations for ominous circumstan ces. But “[ t]he roleof a peace off i cer includes preventing violence an d restoring order, not simply ren

dering firstaid to cas ualties.” Brigham City
, supra , a t 406. Itsu fficed to invoke the emergency aid exception that it was reasonable to believe that Fisher had hurt himself (albeit nonfatally) and needed treatment that in his rage he was unable to provide, or that Fisher was about to h u rt, or had already h u rt, someone else. The Michigan Court of Appeals required more than what th e Fourth Am endment demands.
* * * The petition for certio r ari is gran ted. The j u dgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals is r e versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion

. It is so orde red.1 Cite as: 55 8 U

. S. ____ (2009)

S TEVENS , J., di s s e nting 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

MICHIGAN v. JERE MY FISHE R

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL S OF MICHIGAN

No. 09–9 1. Dec i ded Dec e mb er7, 2009
J USTICE S TEVEN S , with whom J USTICE S OTOMAYO R joins, dissenting. On October 31, 2003, Jeremy Fisher pointed a rifle a t Officer Chr i stopher Goolsby when Goolsby attempted to force his way in to Fisher’s home without a warra nt. Fisher was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon and possession of a dangerous weapon during the commis

sion of a felony. The charges were dismiss e d after th e trial judge granted a motion to s u ppress evidence of the assault bec ause it wasthe product of Goolsb y’s unlawfu l entry. In 2005 the M i chigan Court of Appe als held th at the trial court had err e d because it had decided the sup

pression motion without conducting a full evidentiary hearing. On remand, the tri al court cond ucted sucha hearing and again gra n ted the motion to suppress. As a matter of Michiga nlaw it i s well settledthat police officers may enter a home wi thout a warrant“when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of im

mediate aid.” People v. Davi s , 442 Mich. 1, 25, 497 N. W. 2d 910, 921 (1993). We have stat ed the rule in the sam e way under federal law, Minceyv. Arizona , 437 U. S. 385, 392 (1978), and have explained that a warrantless entry is justified by the “ ‘need to protect or pr eserve life or avoid serious inju ry,’ ” ibid

. The State bears the burden of proof on that factual issue and relied entirely on the testimony of Officer Goolsby in its attempt to carry that burden. Since three years had passed, Goolsby was no t sure about certain fact s—such as whether F i sher had a cut on his hand—but he did rem e mber that Fisher repeatedly swore2 MICHIGAN v. FISHER

S TEVENS , J., di s s e nting
at the officers and told them to get a wa rr ant, and th at Fisher was screaming and throwi ng things. Goolsby also testified that he saw “mere drops” of bl ood ou tside Fisher ’s home, No. 276439, 20 08 WL 786 515, *2 (Mich. App., Mar. 25, 2008) (per curi am)(summarizing Goolsby’s testimony), and that he did not a s k whether anyone els ewas insid e

. Goolsby did not testify that he ha d any reason to believe that anyon e else was in the house. Thus , the factu al question was whether Goolsby had “an objectively reason

able basis f o r believing that [Fisher was] seriously injured or imminently th reat ened with such injury .” Brigh a m Cityv. St uar t , 547 U. S. 398, 400 (2 006).

After hearing the testimony, the trial judge was “eve n more convinced” that the entry wa s unlawful. Tr. 29 (Dec. 19, 2006). He noted the issue was “whethe ror not there was a reasonable bas is to [enter the house] or whether [Goolsby] was just acti ng on some possibilities,” id. , at 2 2
, and evident l y found th e record su pported the latter rath er than the former. He found the police decision to leave the scene and not return for seve ral hours—witho u t resolving any potenti a lly dangerous situation and without calling for medical assistance—inconsistent with areasonable belief that Fisher was in needof i mmediate a i d. Insum, the one jud g e who hea r d Officer Goolsby’s testimony was not persua ded that Goolsby had an objective ly reasonable basis for believing that enteri ng Fisher’s home was neces

sary to avoid seriousinjury. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, concludin g that the State had not met its bu rden. Perh aps because one judge dissented, the Michigan Supreme Court initially granted an application for leave to appeal. After consider

ing briefs and oral argument , h o wever, th e majority of that Cour tvacatedit s earlier order because it was “n o longer persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.” 483 Mich . 1007, 765 N. W. 2d 19 (2009).3 Cite as: 55 8 U

. S. ____ (2009)

S TEVENS , J., di s s e nting Today, without having hear d Officer Goolsby’s testi

mony, this Court decid e s that the trial judge got it wron g. I am not persuaded that he did, b u t even if we make that assumption, it is hard to see h o w the Court is justified i n micromanaging the da y-to-day bu siness of st ate tribunals mak i ng fact-intensive d e cisions of th is k i nd. We ought n o t usurp the r o le of the factfinder when faced with a close question of the reasonableness of an officer’s actions, particularlyin a case tried in a state court. I therefore respectfullydissent.