1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Paul J. Cambria, Jr. (NY 15873, admitted pro hac vice)

LIPSITZ GREEN SCIME CAMBRIA LLP

42 Delaware Avenue, Suite 120

Buffalo, New York 14202

Telephone: (716) 849-1333

Facsimile: (716) 855-1580

pcambria@lglaw.com

Erin E. McCampbell (NY 4480166, admitted pro hac vice)

LIPSITZ GREEN SCIME CAMBRIA LLP

42 Delaware Avenue, Suite 120

Buffalo, New York 14202

Telephone: (716) 849-1333

Facsimile: (716) 855-1580

emccampbell@lglaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant Michael Lacey

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

 Plaintiff,

vs.

Michael Lacey, et al., 

 

 Defendants.

NO. CR-18-00422-PHX-SPL (BSB)

DEFENDANT LACEY’S

REPLY IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF HIS 

MOTION FOR DISCLOSURE OF 

DOCUMENTS RELATED TO CARL 

FERRER’S WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE AS 

MATERIAL TO DISQUALIFICATION

(DOC. 202)

(Oral argument requested)

On June 28, 2018, Defendant Michael Lacey filed a Motion for Disclosure of Documents 

Related to Carl Ferrer’s Waiver of Privilege as Material to Disqualification (“Motion”) (see

Mot., Doc. 202), which the government has opposed (“Government’s Opposition”) (see Gov’t’s 

Opp’n to Mot., Doc. 216). Mr. Lacey submits the instant reply memorandum in further support 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 266 Filed 08/16/18 Page 1 of 12
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of his Motion.1 As set forth in greater detail below, the government has not provided this Court 

with any justification for denial of the Motion. 

ARGUMENT

I. The government’s submissions to this Court demonstrate that statements Mr. Ferrer 

made to the government evidencing his purported waiver of privileges are material 

and relevant to motions pending before this Court.

This Court should reject the government’s suggestion that the discovery sought—documents 

evidencing Mr. Ferrer’s purported waiver of the attorney-client or attorney-work-product 

privileges—is irrelevant to the issues before this Court. To the contrary, the government has filed 

two motions that turn on Mr. Ferrer’s purported claims of privileges and the extent to which he has 

waived or retained those privileges. (See Gov’t’s Mot. to Disqualify, Doc. 118 (moving for 

disqualification of DWT and HCM); Gov’t’s Mot. to Resolve Privilege Issues, Doc. 195 (moving 

for permission to review all documents seized from Backpage) (collectively, the “Government’s 

Motions”).) The government’s inconsistent position between these two motions as to whether 

waiver is or is not relevant, what has or has not been waived, and whether the waiver was in Mr. 

Ferrer’s personal or official capacity is confusing at best. And amid this confusion, the government 

seeks to interfere with and deprive Mr. Lacey of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. 

It is incredible (and fundamentally unfair) that the government now takes the position, after 

having placed Mr. Ferrer’s purported waivers before this Court, that Mr. Ferrer’s waivers are 

irrelevant to resolution of the Government’s Motions and, for that reason, Mr. Lacey’s Motion 

should be denied. First, Mr. Ferrer’s waivers are central to the disqualification motion. (See Defs.’ 

Mot. at 7-13.) As the Arizona Supreme Court has recognized, when “the client himself does not 

treat the particular communication as privileged, that communication will not be recognized as a 

confidence by this court.” Alexander v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 157, 163 (1984). The court further 

explained that by waiving the right to maintain confidences, the “substantial relationship test” of 

Rule 1.9(a) “is not applicable,” and thus no conflict would be found. Id. at 164; accord United States 

 1 All of the designations and abbreviations set forth in the Motion will be used herein.

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 266 Filed 08/16/18 Page 2 of 12
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

v. Almeida, 341 F.3d 1318, 1323-27 (11th Cir. 2003) (vacating conviction and holding that a 

defendant who was party to a joint defense agreement waived privilege when he turned state’s 

evidence, “thereby entirely removing the possibility of a conflict of interest” with counsel for the 

other defendant/party to the agreement). Because any waiver by Mr. Ferrer erodes the government’s

claim of a conflict, defense counsel must have the opportunity to review all documents evidencing 

Mr. Ferrer’s waiver.2

Second, because a decision to disqualify defense counsel interferes with a defendant’s 

constitutional right to counsel of choice, it should only be allowed upon demonstration of extreme 

circumstances and on a complete record on the need for such a drastic measure. Both of those factors 

are absent here. The government has failed to demonstrate the extreme circumstances requisite for 

disqualification. (See Docs. 176, 177, 180.) More important to the instant Motion, the record on the 

purported need for disqualification is incomplete because inconsistencies between the Government’s 

Motions have sowed confusion about Mr. Ferrer’s purported waiver and unless the discovery sought 

is produced, the record will be incomplete on this most significant of issues—Mr. Lacey’s Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel of choice. On the one hand, the government has stated that Mr. Ferrer 

has not disclosed (and purports to preserve) his “personal” privileges. (See Gov’t’s Mot. to 

Disqualify (Doc. 118).) On the other hand, the government claims that Mr. Ferrer has waived all 

privileges “relating to Backpage.” (See Gov’t’s Mot. to Resolve Privilege Issues (Doc. 195).) 

Defendants are not required to accept these contradictory positions on privilege at face value, 

particularly when a defendant’s ability to exercise the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice 

has been placed in jeopardy. 

 2 To the extent that the Government’s Opposition is based on the complaint that granting the 

Motion would give Mr. Lacey access to documents earlier than he would otherwise receive access 

to them under the Scheduling Order, the solution to this purported problem would be to hold the 

Government’s Motions in abeyance until the discovery sought is disclosed to Mr. Lacey under the 

Scheduling Order to enable the Court to resolve the Government’s Motions on the basis of a full 

and accurate record.

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 266 Filed 08/16/18 Page 3 of 12
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The determination on disqualification of defense counsel is one of the most significant 

decisions to be made in a criminal case and a full and accurate record on the need for disqualification 

is essential to that determination. The Supreme Court has made it clear that a faulty decision to 

disqualify a defendant’s counsel of choice has just one remedy—automatic reversal. See United 

States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146-18 (2006) (recognizing that when “the right to be 

assisted by counsel of one’s choice is wrongly decided” a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel of choice has been violated and any convictions obtained must be vacated). Because a 

determination on disqualification of defense counsel has such important consequences for both the 

defendant (deprivation of a constitutional right) and the government (because an incorrect 

determination on disqualification will result in reversal of any convictions obtained), the Ninth 

Circuit has emphasized the importance of the parties presenting district courts with complete and 

accurate evidence for the record: 

It is easy to express vague concerns about public confidence in 

the integrity of the judicial process. It is quite a different matter 

to demonstrate that public confidence will in fact be 

undermined . . . . We are unwilling to sacrifice a defendant’s 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice on such an 

unsubstantiated premise.

United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1986) (vacating conviction and 

remanding for reconsideration of the government’s motion for disqualification in light of the 

court’s evidentiary rulings); see also United States v. Feuchtener, 2016 WL 6561559, at *2 (D. 

Nev. Nov. 3, 2016) (“Specific facts must be alleged to support disqualification.”); United 

States v. Schafer, 2006 WL 3271290, at *9-10 (E.D.Cal. Nov. 12, 2006) (denying government’s 

motion to disqualify and noting that the government had presented “little evidence” in support 

of its motion). 

Here, Mr. Lacey needs access to all documents evidencing any waiver by Mr. Ferrer to 

understand whether there is any ground for the government’s continued insistence on interfering 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 266 Filed 08/16/18 Page 4 of 12
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

with Mr. Lacey’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. At this time, Mr. Lacey has 

nothing more than the government’s “unsubstantiated” claim that Mr. Ferrer has not waived his 

privileges in his personal capacity, yet it is entirely unclear what this supposedly means, and this 

claim appears to be at odds with the position the government has taken in its Motion to Resolve 

Privilege Issues. However, the Ninth Circuit has provided clear guidance in ruling that the 

government must provide more than “unsubstantiated premise[s]” when it seeks to interfere with 

a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. See Washington, 797 F.2d at 1466; 

see also United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 609 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting chief financial 

officer’s claim that he was personally represented by corporate counsel, noting that he “made no 

effort to identify with particularity which communications to the . . . attorneys are within his 

claim of privilege”). 

Third, the government’s contention that discovery is unnecessary to evaluate disqualification 

under Rule 1.9(a) is grounded upon authority that does not advance its argument. As an initial 

matter, the cases have remarkably different facts from this case. Critically, the government’s cases 

do not involve situationsin which parties entered into joint-representation agreementsthat contained 

advance conflict waivers. As Rule 1.9(a) expressly provides, disqualification is inappropriate when 

the former client has provided advance “informed consent, confirmed in writing” agreeing that 

counsel can continue to represent other parties. See Rule 1.9(a) (“A lawyer who has formerly 

represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a 

substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of 

the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.” (emphasis 

added)). None of the government’s cases address this aspect of Rule 1.9(a). As it has before, the 

government continues to ignore that Mr. Ferrer signed agreements for joint representation with 

Messrs. Larkin and Lacey, which expressly waived conflicts of interest and provided that Mr. Ferrer 

could not seek to disqualify counsel if he withdrew from the joint representation. (See infra., Point 

III.) The government’s reliance on cases that do not account for informed consent, confirmed in 

writing by the former client do nothing to defeat Mr. Lacey’s discovery requests. 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 266 Filed 08/16/18 Page 5 of 12
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The government’s cases are further distinguishable based on critical factual differences. The 

cases do not involve situations in which the counsel at issue—here HCM and DWT—will not serve 

as trial counsel and thus, would not be in a situation where they would need to make a decision about 

whether to use confidential and privileged information to the purported detriment of a former client 

or forego the opportunity to use such information to the detriment of their existing client. (See Docs. 

176, 177, 180 (indicating that HCM and DWT will not serve as trial counsel).) Additionally, the 

government’s cases do not involve blanket waivers of privilege by the former client. (See id.) This 

distinctions render the government’s opposition to discovery infirm. 

Further, the unfair position the government takes on discovery is tethered almost exclusively 

to civil cases that do not address the appropriateness of disqualification under Rule 1.9 when a 

criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice has been placed in jeopardy. The

government’s reliance on civil cases, which are steeped in absolutes and void of any analysis on the 

impact of disqualification on a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to counsel of choice, is 

“misplaced.” E.g., United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1071 (2d Cir. 1982) (concluding 

that the government’s reliance on “civil cases” was “misplaced” because in those cases “no Sixth 

Amendment rights were implicated,” which renders the analysis in those cases lacking with respect 

to the “constitutional dimension”—the pivotal issue in a criminal case). Instead, when the 

government seeks to disqualify counsel of choice for a criminal defendant, “the government bears 

a heavy burden of establishing that concerns about the integrity of the judicial process justify the 

disqualification.” Washington, 797 F.2d at 1465 (emphasis added); United States v. Diozzi, 807 

F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1986) (“[D]isqualification of defense counsel should be a measure of last 

resort.”). And a decision imposing requirements on defense counsel that fall short of 

disqualification is preferred because when evaluating a motion to disqualify defense counsel, 

“the fundamental deciding factor is defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to have counsel of his 

own choosing.” United States v. Pizzonia, 415 F. Supp. 2d 168, 186 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (denying 

government’s motion to disqualify defense counsel). 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 266 Filed 08/16/18 Page 6 of 12
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Fourth, the government’s civil authority is not as strong as it suggests. For example, the 

government leads its opposition to discovery with citation to Foulke v. Knuck, 162 Ariz. 517 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1989), suggesting that because Foulke states that Rule 1.9(a) mandates 

disqualification when an attorney’s representation of a current client conflicts with a former 

client, regardless of whether privileged of confidential communication was ever conveyed from 

the former client to the attorney, discovery on Mr. Ferrer’s purported waiver is irrelevant. (See

Gov’t’s Opp’n at 6-7.) However, the government fails to acknowledge that the Arizona Court 

of Appeal’s decision in Foulke is in tension with the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling in 

Alexander. In Alexander, the Supreme Court recognized that a client’s waiver of privileged or 

confidential information can erode the attorney-client relationship in such a significant way that 

the “substantial relationship test” for a Rule 1.9(a) determination “is not applicable.” Alexander, 

141 Ariz. at 164. Because the government has provided documents indicating that Mr. Ferrer 

has waived all personal privileges (except with respect to his current counsel), defense counsel 

must have access to the discovery sought to determine whether Rule 1.9(a) is applicable at this 

stage, as explained in Alexander. 

Equally troubling for the government, Foulke expressly provided for an exception to its 

holding, recognizing that disqualification under Rule 1.9(a) would be inappropriate when 

disqualification would pose a “hardship” to the current client. Foulke, 162 Ariz. at 523. The 

court indicated that factors indicative of an unacceptable “hardship” to the current client 

included: (1) counsel’s “specialized expertise”; (2) the long-term nature of the relationship 

between the attorney and current client; and (3) the complexity of the litigation. See id. Here, 

each of those factors weighs against disqualification (see Defs.’ Opp’n to Govt’s Mot. to 

Disqualify (Docs. 176, 177, 180), in addition to the fact that disqualification in this criminal 

prosecution would deprive Mr. Lacey of his constitutional right to counsel of choice. 

For all these reasons, defense counsel must have the opportunity to review the statements 

Mr. Ferrer made to the government. Those statements are material and relevant to the 

government’s demand for disqualification of defense counsel in a criminal prosecution and 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 266 Filed 08/16/18 Page 7 of 12
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

necessary to provide the requisite complete record to assess the government’s claims. Mr. Lacey 

respectfully requests that this Court grant his Motion, whether as a matter of the “broad right to 

discovery” that Rule 16 conveys criminal defendants, see United States v. Stever, 603 F.3d 747, 

752 (9th Cir. 2010), or as a matter of this Court’s exercise of its inherent authority, see United 

States v. W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 509-511 (9th Cir. 2008). 

II. Mr. Ferrer expressly waived privilege in his personal capacity.

The government’s contention that Mr. Ferrer has not waived his attorney-client privilege in 

his personal capacity (see Gov’t’s Mot. at 12-16) is indefensible. The plain language of the 

Proffer/Interview Agreement states that “Mr. Ferrer voluntarily waives all claims of attorney-client 

privilege, whether in his personal or official capacity.” (See Proffer/Interview Agreement attached 

as Ex. C to Def.’s Mot. (emphasis added).) The government, who is believed to be the drafter of this 

waiver, has admitted that the waiver is “not the model of clarity.” (See Gov’t’s Repl. to HCM’s 

Response to Gov’t’s Mot. to Disqualify (Doc. 192) at 8.) It does not matter that the government now 

contends that the waiver should have been written to pertain solely to Mr. Ferrer’s official capacity. 

(See Gov’t’s Opp’n at 13.) All ambiguities must be construed against the drafter. See United States 

v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 210 (1970) (holding that “a contract should be construed most 

strongly against the drafter, which in this case was the United States”); accord United States 

v. Lo, 839 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Because we construe plea agreements according to 

the principles of contract law, any ambiguities in the contract language are construed 

against the drafter, which in this case is the government.”). The waiver, on its own, supports 

a determination to deny the Government’s Motion for Disqualification because it suggests that there 

are no longer any privileged information with respect to Mr. Ferrer’s personal capacity. 

At the very least, Mr. Lacey should have access to the requested discovery to determine 

whether the government’s interpretation of Mr. Ferrer’s wavier is valid. Otherwise, the plain 

language of the waiver he signed will be overridden by the government’s “unsubstantiated premise” 

that the waiver does not mean what it actually says. 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 266 Filed 08/16/18 Page 8 of 12
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. The government has misstated DWT’s prior representations on matters concerning 

Backpage.

The Government’s Opposition is grounded on an inaccurate description of DWT’s prior 

representations on matters concerning Backpage.com. Critically, the government has made the 

misleading claim that DWT “represented Ferrer in his personal capacity” in various civil and 

criminal lawsuits “[s]ince 2010.” (Gov’t’s Opp’n at 3-4 (emphasis added).) This description is 

wrong for several reasons3 and only serves to further undermine the government’s position in 

opposition to this Motion and the government’s own motions because it demonstrates that the 

Government’s Motions, too, are based on demonstrably false premises. 

First, DWT did not begin its representations on matters concerning Backpage.com until 

2012. In 2012, Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC (“VVMH”), which at that time was the parent 

company to subsidiary Backpage, engaged DWT to bring a suit challenging a Washington State 

statute enacted to target Backpage by seeking to make the website criminally responsible for ads 

posted by third-party users.4

 Mr. Ferrer was not an officer, director or representative of VVMH. 

DWT had no involvement with Backpage or its employees or representatives prior to 2012, which

demonstrates that the government’s claim as to timing is false. 

Second, on occasion, as necessary to its representation of Backpage, DWT entered an 

appearance in a matter on behalf of Mr. Ferrer, when Mr. Ferrer was named as a nominal party or a 

representative of Backpage.com. The sole purpose of entering such an appearance was to carry out 

its representation of the corporate parties, Backpage.com, VVMH or both. For example, the United 

 3 A more detailed discussion of the history of DWT’s representations on matters concerning 

Backpage is found in Defendants’ Opposition to United States’ Motion to Resolve Privilege Issues 

and Cross-Motion to Obtain Discovery and Address Privilege Issues and is hereby incorporated 

by reference. (See Defs.’ Opp’n (Doc. 226) at 4-9.)

4 DWT successfully represented VVMH and Backpage in that suit and two successive cases 

concerning similar statutes, winning injunctions in all three cases: Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 

F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Wash. 2012); Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (M.D. 

Tenn. 2013); and Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *8 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 

2013). DWT continued to successfully represent VVMH and Backpage in other matters. (See

Defs.’ Opp’n (Doc. 226) at 5-7.)

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 266 Filed 08/16/18 Page 9 of 12
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations directed a subpoena to Mr. Ferrer in his 

representative capacity as CEO of Backpage.com in Senate Permanent Subcomm.on Investigations 

v. Ferrer, No. 1:16-MC-00621-RMC (D.D.C.). To represent Backpage.com in addressing and 

challenging the subpoena, DWT and other counsel (including Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld 

LLP) entered appearances on behalf of the representative of Backpage.com who had been served 

with the subpoena, which was Mr. Ferrer. 

No one asserted claims or charges against Mr. Ferrer in his personal capacity (or any other 

individual associated with Backpage) until October 2016. Then, the California Attorney General’s 

office arrested and jailed Mr. Ferrer, Mr. Lacey, and James Larkin, alleging that they had engaged 

in “pimping” under California Penal Code § 226h. Shortly thereafter, each defendant engaged 

counsel to represent them personally,5 while agreeing to be jointly represented by DWT to address 

common issues. Consequently, Messrs. Ferrer, Lacey, and Larkin entered into an engagement 

agreement with DWT, a Common Interest and Litigation Management Agreement (on behalf of 

themselves and their respective companies), and a joint defense agreement with all Defendants in 

this action and their respective counsel, which were provided to the Court in camera. (See Exs. A, 

B, C to the Declaration of James C. Grant (submitted in camera) in support of Defs.’ Opp’n to 

Govt’s’ Mot. to Disqualify (Doc. 180).) These agreements spelled out the parties’ undertakings to 

retain joint counsel, coordinate joint defenses, share confidential information, and waive potential 

conflicts of interest as to any claims—civil or criminal whether past, present or future. (See Grant 

Decl. ¶ 16.) Mr. Ferrer and the other parties agreed they would share privileged information with 

one another and with joint counsel, and would maintain and protect all privileges and confidentiality 

as to third parties. (See id. ¶ 18.) The agreements expressly acknowledged that the parties’ interests 

could diverge in the future, and so allowed that a party could withdraw from the joint representation 

but could not unilaterally waive privileges or seek to disqualify DWT from continuing to represent 

other parties. (See id. ¶¶ 19, 24.) Moreover, when Mr. Ferrer entered into the joint representation 

 5 Mr. Ferrer engaged Nanci Clarence of Clarence Dyer Cohen LLP as his personal counsel.

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 266 Filed 08/16/18 Page 10 of 12
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

agreements, he was separately represented by his own personal counsel and corporate counsel

(including Ms. Clarencewho separately signed the joint-defense agreement on behalf of Mr. Ferrer). 

(See id. ¶¶ 7, 10, 11, 21.)

In sum, the government description of DWT’s representation on matters concerning 

Backpage.com contains inaccuracy on top of inaccuracy and does nothing to advance the 

Government’s Opposition to the discovery sought in the Motion (or the relief the government has 

sought in the Government’s Motions).

CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, Mr. Lacey respectfully requests that this Court order the government 

to disclose documents requested in the Motion because those documents are essential for resolution 

of the Government’s Motion to Disqualify(as well as the Government’s Motion to Resolve Privilege 

Issues), and the government should not be permitted to interfere with Mr. Lacey’s Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel of choice on the basis of an incomplete and unsubstantiated record. 

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of August, 2018, 

/s/ Paul J. Cambria, Jr. 

LIPSITZ GREEN SCIME CAMBRIA LLP

Attorneys for Defendant Michael Lacey

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 266 Filed 08/16/18 Page 11 of 12
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On August 16, 2018, a PDF version

of this document was filed with

Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF

System for filing and for Transmittal

Of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the

Following CM/ECF registrants:

Dominic Lanza, dominic.lanza@usdoj.gov

Kevin Rapp, kevin.rapp@usdoj.gov

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 266 Filed 08/16/18 Page 12 of 12