UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 ) 

UNITED STATES, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) No. 99-cr-0286 (KBJ) 

 ) 

GAVÁTA FIELDS, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

 

On September 30, 1999, Defendant Gaváta Fields pled guilty to making 

counterfeit securities in violation of section 513 of Title 18 of the United States Code. 

Judge Ricardo M. Urbina sentenced her to prison time and restitution in the amount of 

$32,572.51. (See Min. Order of Dec. 9, 1999.) Fields was released on July 9, 2001 (see 

Def. s Mot. for Remission of Restitution ( Def. s Mot. ), ECF No. 25, at 1), and 

according to the government, she began making intermittent payments in September of 

2001 (Mem. in , ECF No. 27, at 4 n.1.) To date, a grand total of $13,924.74 has 

been credited toward her restitution obligation. (See id.) 

Before this Court is Fields pro se Motion for Remission of Restitution, which 

she filed on April 17, 2019. The government opposes Fields This Court will 

construe Fields

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k), or a motion for waiver of her restitution interest under 

18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(3). Because Fields fails to satisfy the burden of proof under either 

construction of her request, this Court will DENY her motion. 
2 

I. 

In her Motion for Remission of Restitution, Fields cites no authority that 

authorizes this Court to grant the relief she is now seeking. In her motion, Fields 

explains that, because of accruing interest, the restitution debt 

Def. s Mot. at 1.) Fields 

function as a single adult and be able to healthily pay my bills and continue to live a 

Id.) Therefore, Fields 

[.]

(Id.) In ascertaining the scope of its jurisdiction, this 

document filed pro se Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 

94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, the Court 

construes Fields motion as either (A) a motion for adjustment of her restitution 

sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k), or (B) a motion for waiver of the restitution 

interest under 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(3). 

A. 

In evaluating Fields requested relief, the Court first looks at the Mandatory 

See 18 U.S.C. 

United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 543 

(D.C. Cir. 2011). 

restitution, the statute expressly authorizes discretion in fashioning how a defendant is 

United States v. Armstrong, No. 09-cr-135, 2018 WL 

5923913, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
3 

To that end, a -

- nts at specified 

intervals and in- 18 U.S.C. § 

3664(f)(3)(A)-(B). 

defendants required to pay restitution under this act will be indigent at the time of 

sentencing . . . . [and that] many of these defendants may also be sentenced to prison 

terms as well, making it unlikely that they will be able to make significant payments on 

-179, at 21 (1996), reprinted in 1996 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 924. However, Congress also expressly asserted that 

not obviate 

and it made restitution mandatory nevertheless. Id. Indeed, the only 

concession that Congress made to ease the financial burden was to [] the court 

to order full restitution under a schedule of nominal payments in those instances where 

the defendant cannot pay restitution . . . . 

of material changes in economic circumstances. Id. 

The MVRA further 

corrected under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and section 3742 of 

chapter 235 of this title; (B) appealed and modified under section 3742; (C) amended 

under subsection 18 

U.S.C. § 3664(o)(1). And courts have generally interpreted section 3664(o)(1) as an 

exclusive list. See, e.g., United States v. Wyss, 744 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2014) 

(reversing dist the amount of restitution owed by a defendant on 
4 

the grounds that restitution may not be altered absent a showing of one of the 

§ 3664(o)(1) factors). 

Fields does not purport to contest her original sentence, nor does she argue that 

the sentencing court erred in any way, thus neither section 3742 nor Rule 35 provides a 

basis for correction or modification of her restitution order. Similarly, section 

3664(d)(5) does not apply, because that provision pertains only to amendments to 

restitution orders that result from a [some] losses in the 

initial claim for restitutionary relief[.] Thus, section 3664(k) is the only potentially 

applicable grounds for ing Field restitution sentence. Under this section, 

Court is authorized 

full, Id. § 3664(k). 

direct[s] that the doors of the district court should remain open to the defendant, and 

 and its purpose is to 

United States v. Dolan, 571 F.3d 

1022, 1032 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J.), , 560 U.S. 605 (2010). 

When seeking an adjustment under section 3664(k), [t]he petitioner bears the 

burden of proving that [her] circumstances have changed enough to warrant such a 

Hinton v. United States, No. 99-cv-211, 2003 WL 21854935, at *4 

(D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2003). The D.C. Circuit has not addressed the precise contours of what 

.
5 

objective comparison of a defend

United States v. Grant, 235 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding the material 

was unfrozen after sentencing). The Eleventh Circuit describes 

Cani v. United States, 331 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2003) 

(finding a defedant ion inadequate because supported only by 

documentation of restitution payments made). 

Fields has not established a basis for modifying her restitution order under either 

It is clear that this section is triggered only by 

 . . economic 

id. § 3664(k), and Fields motion does not allege any change in her 

financial conditions whatsoever. Rather, Fields makes conclusory allegations that it is 

hard for her to pay off the debt. See, e.g., Def. s Mot.

and 

single adult and be able to healthily pay [her] bills and continue to live a legitimate 

. That is not enough. What is more, even if Fields had 

demonstrated a material change in her ability to pay restitution, this Court is only 

economic circumstances of the defendant do not allow the payment of any amount of a 

restitution order, and do not allow for the payment of the full amount of a restitution 

id. § 
6 

3664(f)(3)(B). That is, the statute does not grant this Court the authority to order full 

remission of the restitution sentence, as Fields requests. 

B. 

Another possible statutory basis of authority for this Court to consider Fields

request is 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(3), which provides that, 

 on a fine or restitution, it may 

specific dollar amount; or (C) limit the length of the period during which interest 

 Liberally construed, Fields request might be deemed a motion to waive or 

limit the total interest due on her restitution under section 3612(f)(3), 

There has been some disagreement among federal courts as to whether section 

3612(f)(3) authorizes a district court to modify interest payments after sent encing. 

Compare United States v. Coleman (per curiam) 

-judgment, to waive or 

limit the payment of interest upon a finding that the defendant is unable to pa y 

with United States v. Brumfield, 125 F. Supp. 3d 648, 651 (W.D. Mich. 2015) 

 However, even 

assuming, in contrast with the government , that subsection 3612(f)(3) 

permits post-judgement relief,1 Fields request must be denied, because this statutory 

 

1

 As a purely textual matter, subsection 3612(f)(3) contains no temporal limitation on when a court may 

 all pertain to post-judgment collection matters. See, e.g., 18 

U.S.C. § 3612(a) (notification of payments); id. at § 3612(d) (e) (delinquency and default). Moreover, 

s provisions on 

probation administration and release from incarceration. 18 U.S.C. Ch. 229. 
7 

provision does not provide the Court with unlimited discretion to determine whether 

interest should be waived or limited. Congress only authorized reconsideration where 

 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(3). And Fields has made no claim that she does 

not have the ability to pay interest, much less provided any evidence to that effect. 

Therefore, the Court is unable to make any determination concerning ability to 

pay. 

II. 

Because Fields has failed to meet her burden to show that her economic 

circumstances have changed or that she is unable to make payments on her restitution, it 

is hereby 

ORDERED that Fields Motion for Remission of Restitution is DENIED. 

DATE: December 23, 2019 Ketanji Brown Jackson

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON 

United States District Judge