MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions

Decision: 2016 ME 104

Docket: Ken-15-339

Argued: April 7, 2016

Decided: July 12, 2016

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and 

HUMPHREY, JJ.

MARC G. MOSHER

v.

STATE HARNESS RACING COMMISSION

HUMPHREY, J.

[¶1] Marc Mosher appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court 

(Kennebec County, Mullen, J.) affirming the denial by the State Harness Racing 

Commission of his application for licensure as a driver/trainer for horse harness 

racing in Maine. The Commission denied his application based on its conclusion 

that the reciprocal disciplinary action provision of the harness racing licensing 

statute, 8 M.R.S. § 283 (2015), prohibited the issuance of a Maine license because 

he had previously been denied a license in New York, despite the fact that New 

York had subsequently rescinded that license denial. We conclude that the 

Commission erred, vacate the judgment, and remand for further proceedings. 
2

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The following facts are undisputed. On April 11, 2014, Mosher 

applied to the Commission to renew his driver/trainer license.1 On his application, 

Mosher indicated that he had been suspended or barred by a racing authority in 

New York. In a letter dated May 28, 2014, the Commission informed Mosher that 

it was preliminarily denying his application because he had previously submitted 

an application to the New York State Racing and Wagering Board that had been 

denied in 2011. The Maine Commission quoted title 8 M.R.S. § 283, which 

provides:

Reciprocal disciplinary action

The department [of Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry] shall 

obtain current listings from other jurisdictions of persons in harness 

racing occupations regulated by the commission who have been 

refused a license or who have had their license revoked or suspended. 

The commission shall refuse to license or shall suspend the license of 

any person who has been refused a license or who has had that 

person’s license revoked or suspended in another jurisdiction until 

notification from the jurisdiction that refused to license or suspended 

or revoked the license of the person that the person is again eligible 

for licensing in that jurisdiction.2

 1

 The record does not disclose what types of licenses are issued by the State Harness Racing 

Commission or provide any information as to the technical differences between or among the various 

licenses.

2

 The Commission also quoted Chapter 17, Section 21, of the Harness Racing Rules, Penalties of 

Other Jurisdictions Enforced, which states, “All penalties imposed by any Racing Commission in any 

racing jurisdiction shall be recognized and enforced by this Commission unless application is made for a 

hearing before this Commission wherein the applicant must show cause as to why such penalty should not 

be enforced against him/her in this state.”
3

[¶3] On June 4, 2014, Mosher’s counsel sent the Commission a letter asking 

it to reconsider the preliminary denial and enclosing a letter to Mosher from the 

New York State Gaming Commission, the successor agency to the New York State 

Racing and Wagering Board, dated March 25, 2014, which states:

Your appeal of the New York State Gaming Commission’s 

denial on December 16, 2011 of your New York 2011 groom license 

application has been pending for a substantial time, as you know. An 

appeal hearing has been scheduled, adjourned, rescheduled and 

cancelled on multiple occasions. 

The Commission has determined, in light of this and the 

lengthy passage of time since you last applied to participate in New 

York racing, simply to rescind its license denial and to dismiss your 

appeal. 

Please be advised that this administrative action . . . shall not 

prevent the Commission from taking action against you for any 

misconduct subsequent to such license denial, and does not infer or 

imply the future outcome with respect to any newly filed occupational 

license application. 

(Emphasis added.)

[¶4] In a letter dated July 7, 2014, the Maine Commission again 

preliminarily denied Mosher’s application, citing section 283. Mosher appealed 

the preliminary denial and requested a hearing before the Commission. 

[¶5] On August 14, 2014, the Commission met in public session to hold a 

hearing on Mosher’s application, pursuant to 8 M.R.S. § 279-A (2015) and 

Chapter 21 of the Commission rules. The Commission’s Executive Director 

testified that, upon receiving Mosher’s application and following normal 
4

procedures, he consulted the website of the United States Trotting Association and 

learned that New York had denied Mosher’s application for a groom’s license. 

The Commission also proffered, and the hearing officer admitted, exhibits showing 

that Mosher applied for a groom’s license in New York in 2011 and that his 

application was denied. Mosher testified that his appeal of this decision led to a 

protracted appeal process and, eventually, the March 25, 2014, letter rescinding the 

license denial and dismissing the appeal.

[¶6] Mosher also testified to the following. His license as a driver/trainer 

was suspended in New York for two years in 2001 after he failed to report the 

death of a horse. He never re-applied as a driver/trainer in New York. In 2004, he 

became licensed as a groom in New York. In 2006, he was caught improperly 

transferring medication from a veterinarian to a trainer and was convicted of a 

misdemeanor. His groom’s license was not suspended based on this incident, but 

he did not renew the license in New York. He applied for re-licensure as a groom 

in 2011.3 Despite this testimony, the Commission’s deliberations focused on the 

2011 license denial rather than on any other aspects of Mosher’s character or 

licensing history. 

 3

 Neither Mosher nor the Commission presented any evidence concerning the standards and 

procedures governing licensure and suspension of grooms and driver/trainers in New York.
5

[¶7] The quorum of Commissioners in attendance unanimously voted to 

deny Mosher’s application. In an order dated August 29, 2014, the Commission 

found (1) that Mosher “was refused licensing by the State of New York,” and 

(2) that he “did not introduce evidence sufficient to demonstrate that he is or was 

eligible for licensing in the State of New York subsequent to their 

December 16, 2011 refusal to license him.” The Commission stated, “Once 

refused a license an applicant must affirmatively show that they are or were 

subsequently eligible to be licensed by the entity that refused to license them,” 

even if the license refusal subsequently “went away.” Therefore, the Commission 

concluded, “[b]ased on the New York State license refusal and the insufficiency of 

evidence showing that [Mosher] has been found eligible to be licensed in the State 

of New York, licensing under [§ 283] is not permissible.” Mosher filed a timely 

appeal with the Superior Court pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 80C, 

and the court upheld the Commission’s decision. Mosher timely appealed to us. 

II. DISCUSSION

[¶8] We review the Commission’s decision directly, without deference to 

the Superior Court’s ruling. See Anderson v. Me. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 

2009 ME 134, ¶ 2, 985 A.2d 501. “In interpreting a statute, our single goal is to 

give effect to the Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.” Dickau v. Vt. Mut. 

Ins. Co., 2014 ME 158, ¶ 19, 107 A.3d 621. Although we ordinarily defer to an 
6

agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers, see Passadumkeag Mountain 

Friends v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2014 ME 116, ¶ 12, 102 A.3d 1181, we must always 

consider whether a given interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent and 

avoids absurd, illogical, or inconsistent results, see FPL Energy Me. Hydro LLC v. 

Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2007 ME 97, ¶ 12, 926 A.2d 1197.

[¶9] Section 283’s plain language, as well as the legislative history,

indicates the Legislature’s intent that the Commission treat an applicant similarly 

to how he or she has been treated by other jurisdictions. See Black’s Law 

Dictionary 1461 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “reciprocal” as “1. Directed by each 

toward the other or others; MUTUAL . . . 3. Corresponding; equivalent”); see also

Testimony of Catharine Damren, Maine Association of Agricultural Fairs, on L.D. 

622 before the Joint Standing Committee on Agriculture, Conservation and 

Forestry (Mar. 21, 2013) (stating that “[t]hose persons who are suspended or 

barred from participation [in harness racing] by another jurisdiction should not be 

licensed to participate in Maine until such time as all suspensions and revocations 

are cleared or served to the satisfaction of the jurisdiction where the suspension or 

revocation was issued”).

[¶10] The Commission acknowledged the March 25, 2014, letter and did 

not dispute that the New York Commission’s decision to rescind its license denial 
7

meant that the “license refusal went away.”4 In this light, the Commission’s 

interpretation that the licensing statute requires it to deny a license application

based on a license denial in another jurisdiction that has been subsequently 

rescinded is contrary to the legislative intent of ensuring that an applicant is treated 

similarly in all jurisdictions. 

[¶11] Because the Commission appears to have relied entirely on New 

York’s rescinded denial, which we have determined cannot form the basis for its 

licensing decision, we must vacate the decision and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

The entry is:

Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior 

Court with instructions to vacate the Commission’s

decision and remand to the Commission for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

On the briefs:

William H. Childs, Esq., Childs, Rundlett, Fifield & Altshuler, 

LLC, Portland, for appellant Marc G. Mosher

Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Ronald O. Guay, Asst. 

Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for 

appellee State Harness Racing Commission

 4

 Because we discern no functional difference between a “license refusal” and a “license denial” in the 

present context, we use the terms interchangeably, as did the parties.
8

At oral argument:

William H. Childs, Esq., for appellant Marc G. Mosher

Ronald O. Guay, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee State Harness 

Racing Commission

Kennebec County Superior Court docket number AP-2014-69

FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY