NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SYED NAZIM ALI, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

APPLE, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-17264 

D.C. No. 3:18-cv-03945-RS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Richard Seeborg, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 3, 2020**

Before: MURGUIA, CHRISTEN, and BADE, Circuit Judges. 

Syed Nazim Ali appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing 

his employment action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 9 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-17264 

affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Ali’s discrimination and retaliation 

claims under Title VII and the California Fair Employment Housing Act (“FEHA”) 

because Ali failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (a plaintiff fails to show he is entitled to relief if 

the complaint’s factual allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the 

mere possibility of [the alleged] misconduct”); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 541 

(9th Cir. 2006) (elements of a Title VII retaliation claim); Costa v. Desert Palace, 

Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 847-48 (9th Cir. 2002) (the protected characteristic must be a 

motivating factor for the employment decision for a Title VII discrimination 

claim); Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 294 P.3d 49, 66 (Cal. 2013) (the protected 

characteristic must be a substantial motivating factor for the employment decision 

for a FEHA discrimination claim); Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 81 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 406, 428 (Ct. App. 2008) (elements of a FEHA retaliation claim). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ali leave to file a 

second amended complaint because leave to amend would have been futile. See 

Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of 

review and factors for determining whether to grant leave to amend); Metzler Inv. 

GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he 

district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where 
3 18-17264 

plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Ali’s state law 

claims rather than remanding his state law claims to state court. See Satey v. 

JPMorgan Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth 

standard of review and explaining that the district court has discretion to retain 

supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims even if the federal law claims are 

dismissed).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). 

AFFIRMED.