1 

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09-21-00283-CV 

________________

IN THE INTEREST OF C.S.

_______________________________________________________________________ 

On Appeal from the 279th District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. F-238,543

________________________________________________________________________ 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mother appealed from an order terminating her parental rights to her 

daughters, Casey and Mary.

1 In her appeal, Mother argues that the evidence 

presented to the trial court was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial 

court’s findings terminating her parental relationship with Casey and Mary, 

including the trial court’s best-interest finding.2 Based on our review of Mother’s 

1 We use pseudonyms for the names of the minors and those of their family 

members to protect the minors’ identities. Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2) (allowing courts 

to protect the identities of minors in parental-rights termination cases).

2 The trial court terminated Mother’s rights on three predicate grounds, 

including condition endangerment and conduct endangerment. See Tex. Fam. Code 
2

arguments, we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the 

trial court’s findings as to endangerment and the children’s best interest; for those 

reasons, we will affirm.

I. Background

A. Pre-Removal Events and Initiation of Suit

Prior to filing suit Casey, then two and one-half years old, was found alone, 

outside, at Mother’s apartment complex. This event triggered an investigation into 

Mother’s apparent neglectful supervision of Casey, and Mother consequently agreed 

to Casey’s voluntary placement with M.A., Mother’s cousin. The following month, 

four-month-old Mary was determined to have been exposed to both marijuana and 

cocaine, and she, also, was placed with a maternal relative.

3

Mother eventually took a drug test and tested positive for both marijuana and 

methamphetamines; although Mother acknowledged her marijuana use, she denied 

Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The trial court further found that Mother had and 

continues to have a mental or emotional illness or a mental deficiency rendering her 

unable to provide for the needs of the children; this illness or deficiency was found 

likely to continue to prevent Mother from providing for the children’s needs until 

the children reached adulthood. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 161.003(a)(1), (2). The 

parental rights of Casey’s father and Mary’s father were also terminated, but neither 

of them appealed the termination order.

3 Evidence also revealed that Mary had tested positive for marijuana when she 

was born, indicating that Mother used and/or was exposed to marijuana while she 

was pregnant with Mary.
3

using either methamphetamines or cocaine, and therefore could not comprehend or 

explain the positive results for these substances in her and Mary’s drug tests.

Despite having agreed to permit the children to remain in their then current 

placement locations, three and one-half weeks later, Mother took the children, 

ostensibly because she inaccurately believed that the case was closed and that she

was permitted to do so. This event resulted in the Texas Department of Family and 

Protective Services (“the Department”) initiating this suit on December 29, 2020, 

with the goal of reuniting the family, or in the alternative, of terminating Mother’s 

parental rights. As a result, the trial court issued a Writ of Attachment to regain 

physical custody of the children. The removal affidavit attached to the Department’s 

petition referenced these previous incidents and others that reflected poorly on 

Mother’s fitness as a parent, and therefore sought Temporary Managing 

Conservatorship of both children.

In March of 2021, after the Department learned that Mother’s parental rights 

to another child, David, had been previously terminated, it sought and was granted 

a determination of aggravated circumstances.

4 This determination enabled the 

4 The appellate record contains extensive information about David and the 

circumstances of his removal from Mother’s care, but that information appears to 

have only minimal relevance to the matter currently before us, and therefore will not 

be discussed further.
4

Department to accelerate the pace of the suit while discontinuing payment for 

services that Mother otherwise would have received pursuant to her service plan.

After several continuances and changes of Mother’s legal representation, the 

trial court remotely conducted a trial on September 7, 2021. As a result of the 

evidence at that trial, the trial court issued an Interlocutory Order of Termination, 

and signed an Order of Termination on December 10, 2021.

B. Evidence at Trial

1. Testimony of Caseworker Kenya Holder-McCurley

Kenya Holder-McCurley, Child Protective Caseworker, described the reasons 

that Casey and Mary were removed from Mother’s care, as set forth above.

Following the children’s removal, the matter was transferred to Family Based Safety 

Services, and Mother was directed to follow all recommendations, including 

completing a twelve-week parenting class and a substance-abuse assessment, 

maintaining her mental health, and submitting to random drug screens. Despite the 

requirement that she remain drug free, Mother continued to test positive for 

marijuana. In Holder-McCurley’s opinion, Mother was making only a token effort 

to comply with her service plan, and it was in the children’s best interest that 

Mother’s parental rights be terminated.
5

2. Testimony of M.A.

M.A., Mother’s cousin and Casey’s caregiver, testified that Casey had thrived 

during the seventeen months that Casey had resided with her, and she planned to 

adopt Casey if Mother’s parental rights were terminated.

Having known Mother since childhood, M.A. was familiar with Mother’s 

mental health struggles, specifically depression, and with Mother’s misuse of her 

prescription psychotropic medication, which interfered with Mother’s ability to 

optimally parent her children.

M.A. also described her interactions with Mother regarding the particular 

events giving rise to this case and recalled that at the time of Casey’s venture outside 

the apartment, Mother stated that she (Mother) had gone to the store and had left 

Casey with a person who did not watch Casey closely, resulting in the child leaving 

the apartment on her own. As for the events of late December of 2020, when Mother 

took the children from their grandfather’s residence, M.A. stated that Mother “sped 

off” with the children. M.A. followed Mother’s vehicle, but Mother drove “very, 

very fast,” and was “weaving in and out of traffic[,]” in a clear attempt to prevent 

M.A. from following her and learning where Mother was taking the children. M.A. 

considered this situation dangerous for the children, noting that Mother’s erratic 

driving nearly resulted in an accident.
6

3. Testimony of Mother

Contrary to M.A.’s testimony, Mother testified that Casey got out of the 

apartment while she (Mother) was taking a nap. She further testified that she took 

the children in late December of 2020 because she erroneously believed that the case 

was closed and that she was authorized to do so. She acknowledged her evasive 

driving maneuvers but testified that her actions were justified because M.A. had no 

reason to keep the children from their own mother. She denied having been under 

the influence of marijuana at the time Casey got out of the apartment but did not 

specify whether she had or had not been using illicit drugs at the time she took the 

children in violation of their agreed placements.

As for the requirement that she complete a parenting class, an element of her 

service plan, Mother testified that the teacher stopped teaching her initial twelveweek class after only six weeks. Mother, herself, made the decision to discontinue 

attending her subsequently assigned parenting class because she disagreed with the 

teacher’s approach to the subject. Mother testified that she has faithfully attended 

AA/NA meetings, as required, and has obtained the necessary evidence of 

attendance, but it appears that that evidence was never provided to either the 

Department or the trial court. Mother has not, however, obtained a sponsor because 

she does not consider herself an addict. Mother also pointed to her two negative drug 

tests from February and March of 2021 and explained that her previous tests were 
7

positive because the marijuana she had used was working its way out of her system. 

Mother attempted to explain her inconsistent medication use by stating that she was 

working with her doctor to identify the medication that worked best for her but did 

not explain why she sometimes took too much of her prescribed medication, as M.A. 

testified. 

She further testified that she loved her children and did not want the court to 

terminate her parental rights.

II. Standard of Review

The decision to terminate parental rights must be supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b). Under the Family Code, 

“‘[c]lear and convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will 

produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of 

the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007; In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 

84 (Tex. 2005). The movant must show that the parent committed one or more 

predicate acts or omissions and that termination is in the child’s best interest. See 

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1), (2); In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d at 84.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a parental rights 

termination case, we must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief 

or conviction that the finding was true. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344-45 (Tex. 
8

2009) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). We assume the 

factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder 

could do so, and we disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have 

disbelieved. Id. In a factual sufficiency review, we “give due consideration to 

evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and 

convincing.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We must determine “‘whether the 

evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction

about the truth of the State’s allegations.’” Id. (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 

(Tex. 2002)). “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable 

factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a 

factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the 

evidence is factually insufficient.” Id.

III. Analysis

A. Statutory Grounds D and E

In her first two issues, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support termination of her parental rights under sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)

of the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). 

As to these subsections, Mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually 

insufficient because the evidence did not show that the children were harmed or 

endangered by either their living conditions or by Mother’s course of conduct. In her 
9

fourth point of error, Mother contends that the evidence was legally and factually 

insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that it was in the children’s best 

interest to terminate her parental rights.

We are required to consider the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant to 

Sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) if challenged. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 

235-36 (Tex. 2019). If the evidence is sufficient as to one of these, it will not be 

necessary to address the other predicate grounds because sufficient evidence as to 

only one ground in addition to the best interest finding is all that is necessary to 

affirm a termination judgment. See id. at 232-33. Because the evidence of statutory 

grounds D and E is often interrelated, we may consolidate our review of the evidence 

supporting these grounds. See In re J.L.V., No. 09-19-00316-CV, 2020 WL 

1161098, at *10 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 11, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 

Endangerment arises when a parent’s conduct jeopardizes the child’s emotional or 

physical health or to expose a child to loss or injury. See In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 

360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). 

Under subsection D, parental rights may be terminated if clear and convincing

evidence supports the conclusion that the parent “knowingly placed or knowingly 

allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the 

physical or emotional well-being of the child[.]” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 

161.001(b)(1)(D). Subsection E allows for termination of parental rights if clear and 
10

convincing evidence supports the conclusion that the parent “engaged in conduct or 

knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers 

the physical or emotional well-being of the child[.]” Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). 

Under subsection D, parental rights may be terminated based on a single act 

or omission by the parent. In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 925 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 

2015, no pet.) (citing In re A.B., 125 S.W.3d 769, 776 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, 

pet. denied)). Under that subsection, we examine the time before the children’s

removal to determine whether the environment of the home posed a danger to the 

children’s physical or emotional well-being. Id. at 925 (citing In re L.C., 145 S.W.3d 

790, 795 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2004, no pet.)). “A finding of endangerment under 

subsection E, however, may be based on conduct both before and after removal.” In 

re A.L.H., 515 S.W.3d 60, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) 

(citing In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 360). “‘[E]ndanger’ means to expose to loss or 

injury[.]’” In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d 358, 367 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) 

(quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)). 

Under subsection E, it is sufficient that the child’s well-being is jeopardized or 

exposed to loss or injury. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 367. 

“‘A child is endangered when the environment creates a potential for danger that the 

parent is aware of, but disregards.’” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 925 (quoting In re 

N.B., No. 06-12-00007- CV, 2012 WL 1605457, at *9 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 
11

8, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)). Generally, subjecting a child to a life of uncertainty 

and instability endangers the child’s physical and emotional well-being. See In re 

R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).

In addition, a pattern of drug abuse will support a finding of conduct 

endangering a child even if there is no evidence that such drug use caused a physical 

or actual injury to the child. Vasquez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 

190 S.W.3d 189, 196 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). A history 

of illegal drug use is conduct that subjects a child to a life that is uncertain and 

unstable, endangering the child’s physical and emotional well-being. See In re S.D.,

980 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); Dupree v. Tex. 

Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 87 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

1995, no writ). A parent’s drug use, criminal history, and employment and housing 

instability prior to and during the case create a course of conduct from which the 

factfinder could determine the parent endangered the child’s emotional and physical 

well-being. See In re M.C., No. 09-18-00436-CV, 2019 WL 1561824, at *6 (Tex. 

App.—Beaumont Apr. 11, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 

at 361-62 (parent’s drug use may qualify as a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious 

course of conduct endangering the child’s well-being); Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of

Family & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2009, pet. denied) (illegal drug use may support termination under subsection E 
12

because “it exposes the child to the possibility that the parent may be impaired or 

imprisoned[ ]”). A parent’s continued drug use when the custody of her child is in 

jeopardy supports a finding of endangerment. See In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 361-62

(citing Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d 

244, 253-54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)). 

The trial court, sitting without a jury, heard evidence of Mother’s relatively 

recent illicit drug use, both before and after the children were removed. Additional

evidence before the trial court indicated that Casey had tested positive for marijuana 

exposure, and Mary had tested positive for marijuana shortly after her birth; also,

Mary later tested positive for both marijuana and cocaine. Mother admitted to

marijuana use only and stated that she did not use cocaine. Even assuming, for the 

purposes of this case, that this statement is accurate, Mother’s testimony that she 

used marijuana is evidence that both Casey and Mary were exposed to marijuana, an 

illegal drug, while they were in Mother’s care. Because the applicable case law 

referenced above supports the proposition that Mother’s ongoing drug use 

endangered her children, regardless of whether the children sustained actual harm, 

and because the record contains clear and convincing evidence of Mother’s drug use

while her children’s custody was in jeopardy, we will not disturb the trial court’s 

well-supported conclusion that the children were endangered by their living 
13

environment that exposed them to marijuana and by Mother’s voluntary, deliberate, 

conscious course of conduct in her use of marijuana.

Although Mother testified that she was drug free at the time of trial, a 

statement that finds some support in the two negative drug tests performed earlier 

that year, such recent improvements in Mother’s lifestyle do not “‘conclusively 

negate the probative value of a long history of drug use and irresponsible choices.’” 

In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 316-17 (Tex. 2021) (quoting In re J.O.A., 283 at 346.

Mother’s attempt to characterize her drug use as having occurred in the “distant 

past,” and to invoke the logic of our sister court in Wetzel v. Wetzel, to urge reversal 

of the trial court’s decision misapplies Wetzel to the facts before us. 715 S.W.2d 387 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no writ). The Wetzel court observed that the parental 

misconduct in question took place four years prior to the termination proceeding and 

appeared unlikely to recur. Id. at 390. Under those unique circumstances, the court 

considered the evidence insufficient to warrant termination. In this matter, however, 

Mother repeatedly tested positive for illicit drugs during the pendency of the CPS 

investigation and did not test negative until seven months before her trial date. We 

therefore consider this case to be analogous not to Wetzel, but to In re A.M.M., No. 

04-20-00511-CV, 2021 WL 1394308 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 14, 2021, no 

pet.) (mem op.). In that case, the court affirmed the termination decision on the basis 
14

of evidence establishing that the mother had a long history of alcohol and drug abuse, 

as well as numerous presumptively positive tests. Id. at *4-5.

Mother’s contention that the evidence is insufficient to show endangerment 

because of the alleged lack of evidence causally connecting that behavior with 

conduct endangering a child misstates the law; endangering conduct, including drug 

abuse, need not be directed at the children in question, nor need the children sustain 

any injury, for the evidence to warrant the conclusion that the children have been 

endangered, as that term is used in the context of a parental rights termination. In re 

J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312 (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533). Mother’s reliance on 

In re L.C.L. likely is misplaced, because even though the Texas Supreme Court 

denied the petition for review, Justice Lehrmann’s concurrence implies that if 

presented with a “proper case,” the court probably would decide that no causal nexus 

between the drug use and the alleged endangerment would be necessary to find clear 

and convincing evidence of endangerment. 599 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet denied; 629 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2021).

Mother has correctly noted that In re A.H., stands for the proposition that 

conclusory testimony does not “amount[] to more than a scintilla of evidence[,]” and 

therefore is insufficient to support a termination decision. 414 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.). Mother also is correct in her observation that 

some of the witness testimony in this case was conclusory. The rationale of In re 
15

A.H. does not, however, justify a reversal of the trial court’s decision in the case at 

bar, because the evidence in each case is appreciably different. In In re A.H., the 

only evidence of the best interest element of the case consisted of the caseworker’s 

testimony that “termination of all parental rights was in the children’s best interest 

‘because the children need a loving family that will care for them and take care of 

their needs[.]’” Id. In the instant case, conversely, the record contains ample 

evidence that Mother used marijuana on an ongoing basis both before her children’s 

removal from her care and during the time that the Department was investigating the 

situation and working to reunite the family. Mother admitted to her marijuana use, 

and it is difficult to imagine evidence more clear and convincing than that admission.

Because the evidence of Mother’s ongoing marijuana use constitutes clear and 

convincing evidence of both condition endangerment and conduct endangerment, 

we will uphold the trial court’s findings as to sections (D) and (E) of § 161.001(b)(1).

We overrule Mother’s first and second issues.

1. Best Interest of the Children

In her last issue, Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the factfinder’s determination that terminating her parental 

rights was in the children’s best interest. Specifically, Mother argues the evidence is 

legally and factually insufficient to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence 

that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the children because 
16

the record is either silent as to the factors set forth in Holley v. Adams, or because 

the evidence on these factors favors Mother. 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976).

As Mother has argued, there is a strong presumption that the best interest of a 

child is served by keeping the child with his parent. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 

(Tex. 2006); In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2012, no pet.); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131(b). However, prompt and 

permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is also presumed to be in the 

child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a). The trial court is given 

“wide latitude in determining the best interests of a minor child.” Gillespie v. 

Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982) (citing Leithold v. Plass, 413 S.W.2d 

698 (Tex. 1967)). 

The Family Code outlines nonexclusive factors to be considered in 

determining whether a parent is willing and able to provide a safe environment for a 

child including: the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; whether 

there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who 

have access to the child’s home; the willingness and ability of the child’s family to 

seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and 

facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision; the willingness and ability of 

the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a 

reasonable period of time; whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate 
17

parenting skills, including providing the child with minimally adequate health and 

nutritional care, a safe physical home environment, and an understanding of the 

child’s needs and capabilities; and whether an adequate social support system 

consisting of an extended family and friends is available to the child. Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 263.307(b); see also In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 116. The Texas Supreme Court 

has articulated several additional factors that may be considered when determining 

whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child, including: 

the desires of the child, the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the 

future, the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future, the 

parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, the programs available to assist 

these individuals to promote the best interest of the child, the plans for the child by 

these individuals or by the agency seeking custody, the stability of the home or 

proposed placement, the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the 

existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and any excuse for the acts or 

omissions of the parent. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72 (setting forth the “Holley

factors” and noting “[t]his listing is by no means exhaustive[ ]”). No specific Holley

factor is controlling, and evidence of one factor may be enough to support a finding 

that termination is in the child’s best interest. See M.C. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & 

Protective Servs., 300 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. denied) 

(“Undisputed evidence of just one factor may be sufficient to support a finding that 
18

termination is in the best interest of a child.”). Because stability and permanence are 

important in a child’s emotional and physical development, termination of parental 

rights may be in the child’s best interest when a parent is unable to provide a stable 

environment or a reliable source for food, clothing, shelter, and emotional support. 

See In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 119-20 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no 

pet.); In re T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d 7, 17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no 

pet.). A parent’s past conduct is relevant to determining the parent’s present and 

future ability to care for a child. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (parent’s past 

performance as parent is relevant to determination of present and future ability to 

provide for child); In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, 

pet. denied) (factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by past conduct). The 

best-interest determination may rely on direct or circumstantial evidence, subjective 

factors, and the totality of the evidence. In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). If, in light of the entire record, no reasonable 

factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s

best interest, then we must conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to 

support termination. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

As for the children’s wishes, Mother’s brief contains only the bare, 

unsupported assertion that the children “want to be with their mother.” Other 

evidence indicated that the children were doing well in their respective placements. 
19

Also, because Casey and Mary were only four years old and twenty months old, 

respectively, at the time of trial, there was no evidence presented as to the children’s 

subjective desires. This factor does not weigh heavily in favor of or against 

terminating parental rights.

Regarding the children’s emotional and physical needs now and in the future, 

and the possible emotional and physical danger to them now and in the future, the 

record includes reports that the children were removed because of Mother’s drug use 

and her inadequate supervision of the children. Even if we were to accept Mother’s 

assertion that despite evidence to the contrary, she did not use either 

methamphetamine or cocaine, we are left with Mother’s acknowledgement of 

marijuana use during the pendency of this case. This evidence supports the trial 

court’s conclusion on the best interest element of the case. 

As to Mother’s parental abilities, the evidence showed that Mother has been 

diagnosed with depression and anxiety, and that she has not appropriately used her 

prescribed medication to manage these diagnoses. Not only has she sometimes taken 

too much of her medication, as M.A. testified, Mother’s own words reveal that she 

sometimes did not take her medication as directed. Although some of the evidence 

in the record indicates that Mother’s mental health symptoms were treatable, this 

evidence does not show, as in Wetzel, that Mother’s illness had been successfully 

treated, rendering it appropriate to relegate it to the realm of ancient history. Given 
20

the ongoing nature of Mother’s mental health issues and the lack of any indication 

that these issues can be prevented from recurring, the trial court correctly determined 

that Mother’s mental illness adversely affected Mother’s parenting abilities and

prevented her from properly providing for her children’s physical, emotional, and 

mental needs. Because of Mother’s substantially diminished parenting abilities, the 

children’s best interest is served by terminating Mother’s parental relationship with 

them.

Further addressing Mother’s parenting abilities, we observe that Mother’s 

service plan required her to complete a twelve-week parenting class. Her failure to 

complete her initial class may be excused by the teacher’s decision to discontinue 

the class. Her failure to complete her second class, on the other hand, cannot be 

excused by Mother’s disagreement with the teacher’s instruction methods. In fact, 

Mother’s decision to stop attending this second parenting class indicates that she was 

not even “checking [the] boxes[,]” to try to show compliance with her service plan.

Mother’s failure to present evidence of her AA/NA attendance further 

underscores the impression that she was not complying with her service plan. In In 

re D.R.A., as in this case, the evidence indicated that the parent did not have an AA 

sponsor, and that the Department was unable to confirm the parent’s AA attendance. 

374 S.W.3d at 535. The court stated that such evidence did “not weigh in [the 

parent’s] favor[,]” and affirmed the trial court’s termination of parental rights. Id. In 
21

In re N.A., the mother presented no evidence that she was “attending her services,” 

and provided apparently falsified evidence of her AA attendance. Nos. 02-13-00345-

CV, 02-13-00346-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 2377, at *28-29 (Tex. App.— Fort 

Worth 2014, no pet.) (mem op.). Although the In re N.A. court did not discuss the 

legal ramifications of this evidence, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision to 

terminate the mother’s parental rights, thus indicating that it took a dim view of the 

mother’s failure to provide any confirmation that she was complying with her service 

plan. Id. at 63. Here, as in In re N.A., Mother has failed to document compliance 

with her plan of service, and we share the In re N.A. court’s apparent perspective on 

this type of omission.

Another Holley factor particularly applicable to this case is the current and 

future physical and emotional danger to the children. 544 S.W.2d 367 at 372. 

Mother’s ill-advised decision to take the children in late December of 2020, and her 

admitted evasive driving maneuvers during that event, placed the children in 

physical danger. There is no indication that Mother would not repeat her actions if 

she were permitted to retain her parental status, and the physical danger posed by 

the improper operation of a motor vehicle cannot be overstated. See e.g., In re J.F.-

G., 627 S.W.3d at 308. Although Mother has offered an excuse for her driving, and 

although Holley requires that this excuse be considered, the trial court apparently did 

not consider that excuse persuasive, and we agree with that assessment of it. In 
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response to a question asking why Mother was “speeding away down the highway

when [she] saw [M.A.][,]” Mother testified that M.A. was “trying to pull me over to

get [the children] back[.]” Although Mother’s view of M.A.’s motives is accurate, 

as shown by M.A.’s testimony, it does not excuse the arguably reckless driving that 

put Casey, Mary, and others at risk of being injured in a collision.

The combination of Mother’s drug use, her ongoing mental health challenges, 

and her decision to drive dangerously while absconding with Casey and Mary,

support the proposition that it is in the children’s best interest to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights, lest Mother’s continued poor decisions place the children in further 

danger. We have weighed the evidence relevant to the best interest component of the 

case, and we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the children’s 

best interest would be served by terminating Mother’s parental rights. We overrule 

Mother’s last issue. 

IV. Conclusion

Given our conclusion that the evidence supports the trial court’s findings 

made pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and the trial 

court’s best-interest finding, we need not address Mother’s additional contention that 

the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that her mental illness had 

prevented and would continue to prevent her from adequately caring for her children 
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until the children reach adulthood. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.003; Tex. R. 

App. P. 47.1.

For this reason, the Order of Termination in trial court cause number F238,543 is

AFFIRMED.

 ________________________________

 CHARLES KREGER 

 Justice

 

Submitted on March 29, 2022

Opinion Delivered May 12, 2022

Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.