1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

Thomas H. Bienert, Jr. (CA State Bar No. 135311, admitted pro hac vice) tbienert@bmkattorneys.com

Whitney Z. Bernstein (CA State Bar No. 304917, admitted pro hac vice) wbernstein@bmkattorneys.com

BIENERT KATZMAN, PLC

903 Calle Amanecer, Suite 350

San Clemente, CA 92673

Telephone: (949) 369-3700

Facsimile: (949) 369-3701

Attorneys for James Larkin

Gary S. Lincenberg (CA State Bar No. 123058, admitted pro hac vice) glincenberg@birdmarella.com

Ariel A. Neuman (CA State Bar. No. 241594, admitted pro hac vice) aneuman@birdmarella.com

Gopi K. Panchapakesan (CA State Bar No. 279586, admitted pro hac vice) gpanchapakesan@birdmarella.com

BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT, NESSIM,

DROOKS, LINCENBERG & RHOW, P.C.

1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor

Los Angeles, California 90067-2561

Telephone: (310) 201-2100

Facsimile: (310) 201-2110

Attorneys for John Brunst

Additional counsel listed on following page

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Michael Lacey, et al., 

Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:18-cr-00422-SMR

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

COMPEL DISCOVERY

Assigned to Hon. Susan M. Brnovich, Courtroom 506

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 1 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ii

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

Robert Corn-Revere (D.C. State Bar No. 375415, admitted pro hac vice) robertcornrevere@dwt.com

DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

1919 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 800

Washington, DC 20006-3401

Telephone: (202) 973-4225

Facsimile: (202) 973-4499

James C. Grant (WA State Bar No. 14358, admitted pro hac vice) jamesgrant@dwt.com

DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

920 Fifth Ave, Suite 3300

Seattle, WA 98104-1610

Telephone: (206) 757-8096

Facsimile: (206) 757-7096

Attorneys for Michael Lacey and James Larkin

Paul J. Cambria, Jr. (NY State Bar No. 1430909, admitted pro hac vice) pcambria@lglaw.com

Erin E. McCampbell (NY State Bar No. 4480166, admitted pro hac vice) emccampbell@lglaw.com

LIPSITZ GREEN SCIME CAMBRIA LLP

42 Delaware Avenue, Suite #120

Buffalo, NY 14202

Telephone: (716) 849-1333

Facsimile: (716) 855-1580

Attorneys for Michael Lacey

Bruce Feder (AZ State Bar No. 004832) bf@federlawpa.com

FEDER LAW OFFICE, P.A.

2930 E. Camelback Road, Suite 160

Phoenix, AZ 85016

Telephone: (602) 257-0135

Facsimile: (602) 954-8737

Attorneys for Scott Spear

David Eisenberg (AZ State Bar No. 017218) david@deisenbergplc.com

DAVID EISENBERG, P.L.C.

3550 N. Central Avenue, Ste. 1550

Phoenix, Arizona 85012

Arizona State Bar No. 017218

Telephone: (602.237.5076

Attorneys for Andrew Padilla

Additional counsel listed on following page

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 2 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

iii

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

Joy Bertrand (AZ State Bar No. 024181) joyous@mailbag.com

JOY BERTRAND, ESQ. 

PO Box 2734 

Scottsdale, Arizona 85252-2734 

Telephone: 602-374-5321 

Fax: 480-361-4694 

Attorneys for Joye Vaught

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 3 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT................................................................1

II. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 1

III. BACKGROUND......................................................................................................... 3

A. The Government’s Seizures of Backpage’s I.T. Systems, Servers, Databases, and Data. 3

B. Defendants Requested that the Government Preserve the Backpage I.T. Systems, 

Servers, Databases, and Data in a Fully Functional Format................................................. 4

C. The Government’s Production of “Imaged” Data. ....................................................... 5

D. Defendants Requested Specific Data from Backpage’s Servers and Databases.............. 7

E. The Government Refused to Provide Any Discovery in Response to Defendants’ 

Requests.............................................................................................................................. 8

IV. ARGUMENT............................................................................................................... 9

A. Defendants Are Entitled to Discovery of Information That May Be Material to Their 

Defense............................................................................................................................... 9

B. Access to the Actual Data and Databases from the Backpage Servers, in a Functional 

Format, is Unquestionably Material to the Defense............................................................. 9

1. Information Regarding Backpage’s Moderation Practices. ....................................... 10

2. Information Regarding the Alleged “Victim” Ads Referenced In the Indictment. ... 11

3. Information Regarding the Backpage Website Generally is Material to Preparing the

Defense......................................................................................................................... 13

4. Information Regarding Backpage’s Alleged Aggregation Practices........................... 14

5. Information Regarding Alleged “Reciprocal Link” Agreement. ............................... 15

C. The Government’s Purported Justifications for Denying Critical Discovery to 

Defendants Fall Flat.......................................................................................................... 16

V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 17

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 4 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 

 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (M.D. Tenn. 2013)............................................................................... passim

Brady v. Maryland, 

 373 U.S. 83 (1963).............................................................................................................................. 9 

Giglio v. United States, 

405 U.S. 150 (1972)............................................................................................................................. 9 

Strickler v. Greene, 

527 U.S. 263, 119 S. Ct. 1936 (1999)................................................................................................ 9 

United States v. Hernandez-Meza, 

720 F.3d 760 (9th Cir. 2013).............................................................................................................. 9 

United States v. Soto-Zuniga, 

837 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 1992).............................................................................................................. 9 

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 1952....................................................................................................................................... 1 

Rules

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i)................................................................................................................ 9 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 5 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Defendants have moved to dismiss the government’s Superseding Indictment, as it fails 

to allege crimes against Defendants under governing standards of the First Amendment and the 

Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952. See Dkt. 561 (Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss). Defendants 

believe that dispositive motion will obviate discovery issues in the case, as the case should be 

dismissed. However, the case is currently governed by a scheduling order that Defendants 

cannot meet, among other reasons, because the government has not met its discovery 

obligations. At its status conference on April 23, 2019, the Court suggested that changing the 

scheduling order because of discovery issues would be premature absent a motion to compel

missing discovery. The parties are appearing next week to discuss the scheduling order with 

the Court, and the government has still not remedied significant discovery issues. Thus, 

Defendants file the instant Motion to Compel Discovery. 

II. INTRODUCTION

The government has refused to provide Defendants with the most basic discovery at the

heart of the case, namely Backpage servers and the databases and material that existed on those 

servers, in a functional and operational format. The government seized Backpage.com’s I.T. 

systems – and all the servers, databases, and data they contained and that ran the website – at 

the outset of this case. Shortly after the seizures, Defendants notified the government of the 

importance of preserving the website systems and data intact. The government seized 106 

servers in all, and, to date, has produced only “images” of data from five of the servers while 

allowing Defendants to look at the outside of some of the other servers.1 However, what 

Defendants need (and have requested) is the databases and information on those servers, with 

all of the connections, software and systems operational so they can access, search, view, and 

analyze information about the website and its actual operations. 

This information is critical to Defendants’ ability to prepare their defense. The 

1 These figures relate to physical servers; a single physical server could (and did) host numerous 

virtual servers.

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 6 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

government acknowledged the materiality of this data in its warrant applications to seize the 

servers, but now denies Defendants any useful access to that data. The functioning databases 

provide ready access to backend information about any given ad, enable searches for related 

ads, reflect moderation for ads, provide payment information, and more. For example, where 

the government challenges particular user ads, the databases and systems can be used to display 

the ads, to determine if Backpage edited, blocked, or removed the ads, and to determine if 

Backpage reported the ads to authorities. While the government claims Backpage routinely 

edited ads to eliminate terms “indicative of prostitution,” the databases can be used to show 

that Backpage actually employed automated filters to screen the millions of ads posted each 

month for thousands of inappropriate terms, references, and links and for malicious content (as 

is customary for websites), and also blocked and removed large numbers of ads entirely. See 

Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 814 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (Backpage blocked 

and removed 1,000,000 ads per month as of April 2012). 

At the April 23, 2019 status conference, the government said it had asked Defendants 

to identify data they wanted to be extracted from Backpage’s servers and committed to provide 

such data. On May 23, 2019, Defendants sent the government a detailed letter identifying 

specific requests for information needed, while requesting, first and foremost, that the 

government provide access to the servers and databases with the same functionality and in the 

same condition and configuration as when they were seized, to enable Defendants to search, 

collect, and analyze information for themselves. See Exh. A. Contrary to its representations to 

the Court, the government responded with a blanket refusal, asserting that it had no obligation 

to extract data as requested by Defendants. Exh. B. As for Defendants’ request for access to 

the functioning servers, databases, and systems that ran the Backpage website, the government 

said nothing. 

Defendants therefore ask the Court to compel the government to provide Defendants 

access to Backpage’s systems, servers, databases, and data, functioning as they did at the time 

of their seizure, or, alternatively, to recreate the databases and systems to allow functional access 

to the data and information as it existed at the time of the government’s seizures. Defendants 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 7 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

further request that the Court compel the government to produce the data and information 

identified in Defendants’ May 23, 2019 letter, which is summarized (along with explanations for 

relevance of the respective requests) in Exhibit L. 

III. BACKGROUND

A. The Government’s Seizures of Backpage’s I.T. Systems, Servers,

Databases, and Data. 

The government began seizing Backpage servers and databases at the same time that it 

issued the first indictment in this case and arrested Defendants. On April 5, 2018, the 

government obtained a warrant from Magistrate Judge Willett of this Court to seize servers 

hosted by DesertNet for Backpage, located in Tucson, and the government apparently executed 

that warrant on April 6, 2018. See Exh. C at 1. The government reportedly seized the servers 

maintained by Backpage itself, located in Dallas, on or about April 11, 2018. The government 

has since made additional seizures of other servers hosted by another vendor in Amsterdam in 

June 2018, although it is apparently still awaiting receipt of most of the evidence seized. 

Altogether, the government has said it has 46 of Backpage’s servers – 5 from Dallas, 32 from 

Tucson; and 9 from Amsterdam. Exh. D at 1-2. 

In its April 2018 search warrant application regarding the servers hosted by DesertNet,2

the government represented that these servers “contain current and historical content of the 

ads that were posted on Backpage.” Exh. C at 11 (emphasis added). The application also stated 

that “[t]he servers contain all versions of an advertisement that a user attempts to post on 

Backpage. If an ad is stripped of certain words or if a photograph is removed, the server will 

maintain the original form of the ad. The server also maintains payment information.” Id. 

(emphasis added). The government further represented to the court that the servers would be 

“seized for an off-site search for evidence” and assured that copies of the servers would be 

preserved as necessary to preserve all evidence as it originally existed. Id.; see also id. at 11-12 

(“It is anticipated that mirror copies or images of such evidence will be made if the failure to 

do so could otherwise potentially alter the original evidence.” (emphasis added)). It was 

2 DesertNet was the primary domestic host for Backpage’s data and systems.

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 8 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

on that basis that the magistrate judge granted the government’s application to seize the servers.

The government recently reaffirmed its view of the materiality of the server databases. 

In its May 31, 2019 status report, the government reported that, working with Backpage’s 

former Chief Technology Officer, it had confirmed that the databases contained all underlying 

data relating to a given ad, including: any “filters that were applied to ads,” “[m]oderation 

changes or actions that would apply to all ads,” moderator action logs, “[i]mages that were 

deleted by a moderator,” and the original versions of ads posted to Backpage.com. See

Government Status Report, Dkt. 626-4 at 13-14. 

The government more recently revealed that it had seized 60 additional servers located 

in Amsterdam through the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (“MLAT”) process. Transcript of 

April 23, 2019 Hearing, Dkt. 577 at 23:19-23:24. Although the government’s representations 

about these servers have been inconsistent and confusing,3 it has said that they primarily contain

ad payment information. Id.; see also Exh. D. More specifically, that they housed a “Payment 

Processing Island,” (“PPI”) including, among other things: purchases of “Backpage credits that 

could later be used to pay for ads or upgrades” made via credit cards, prepaid debit cards, 

bitcoin, money orders, or gift cards; use of these credits to pay for ads; and direct payments for 

ads. Dkt. 626-4 at 17. 

At the April 23, 2019 status conference, the government stated that it would be receiving 

the remaining Amsterdam servers within six weeks, Dkt. 577 at 23:19-23:21, and in its May 31 

status report, the government indicated it would receive the servers last week. Dkt. 626 at 3-4. 

Defendants have been provided no further information about these servers and do not know if 

the government has even transferred them to the United States yet. 

B. Defendants Requested that the Government Preserve the Backpage I.T. 

Systems, Servers, Databases, and Data in a Fully Functional Format. 

The Backpage.com website was online until April 6, 2018, when the government began 

3 In a December 10, 2018 letter, the government represented that it had located 31 servers in 

Amsterdam, but said they “did not contain pertinent data.” Exh. E at 2. The government later 

reversed course, saying there were actually 60 servers in Amsterdam and they “contain payment 

processing data.” Exh. D at 2. 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 9 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

its seizures of servers and other evidence. The government, of course, could – and presumably 

did – disable the website by redirecting the D.N.S. servers for the website to a server controlled 

by the government and by disabling connections to the Internet, while preserving all the 

systems, servers, databases, and data intact. Indeed, as noted above, in obtaining the DesertNet 

warrant the government assured the Court that it would preserve all evidence on the servers. 

See Exh. C at 11-12.

At the outset of this case, Defendants advised the government that they believed the 

Backpage servers contained exculpatory information important to their defense, and that they 

would need access to databases and systems with the same functionality as when they were 

seized. Exh. F (“These items contain evidence which we believe is exculpatory to the 

defendants. It is critical when we gain access to these items that we are able to access the servers 

in the same condition and configuration as when they were seized. . . . Accordingly, we request 

whatever individual or entities are maintaining this evidence that they maintain it in the same 

condition as it was seized and received by the government and take all steps to maintain its 

integrity.”). 

C. The Government’s Production of “Imaged” Data.

Of the 106 servers seized by the government, it has produced “imaged” data from only 

five of them. The government made that production on March 8, 2019 – more than three

months after its Rule 16 deadline for disclosures, see Dkt. 131 at 1, by providing 56 disks 

containing over 69 terabytes of data. Dkt. 627 at 4. The government has not made clear what 

this production supposedly encompasses, except that it contains “imaged” data concerning ads 

from the Backpage.com website (e.g., it is unclear whether this contains only ads that were live 

on the website when it was seized; some or all of the archived ads Backpage held; or what, if 

any, other information that may have been contained on these servers). As regards the 41 other 

servers in the government’s possession, it has only allowed Defendants’ counsel to look at the 

unconnected, non-functioning server components sitting on tables in Pocatello, Idaho and 

Tucson, Arizona. See Dkt. 577 at 28:12-29:13. 

The “imaged” data of ads the government has produced is not what appeared on the 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 10 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

Backpage.com website. Websites are made up of data and images drawn from numerous 

interrelated databases connected by specific software, systems, and algorithms. See Exh. E 

(government’s explanation that one Backpage server contained “over 100 separate databases to 

house, organize, and store data” to run the website). Without the databases and software to 

connect and run the website, data from any page on a site – such as a user’s ad posted on 

Backpage – is just a pile of disconnected data. 

This is demonstrated by comparing the government’s produced “image” data for a given 

ad to the ad as it actually appeared on the website and in Backpage’s systems when they were 

operational. Exh. I is one version of an ad referenced in the government’s indictment, as it 

appeared on Backpage.com. See Superseding Indictment (“SI”) ¶ 201, Count 2 (Dkt. 230). 

Exhibit J is the government’s “imaged” data for this ad, consisting of a series of spreadsheets 

containing more than 500 data fields and cross-references to information and images contained 

in other files. Searching for and attempting to connect all the other linked data and images for 

the ad (assuming this is contained in the government’s production) would take inordinate effort, 

and still it would be all but impossible to recreate the ad as it actually appeared.4 

The government’s “image” production also does not provide connections to backend 

administrative data available and used within Backpage’s systems and databases when they were 

functional. Exhibit K illustrates this; it contains a screenshot of the administrator view for an 

ad on the website (also called the “ad object editor”), showing the dozens of data fields that 

were available in Backpage’s systems for each ad, including regarding whether an ad was edited, 

blocked, removed, or reported to NCMEC or other authorities. While the government’s 

“imaged” data for a given ad refers to these data fields, in the systems and databases as they 

existed before the government’s seizures, this information could be accessed for any ad by 

 4 The government has separately produced copies of ads cited in the indictment, but not from 

the Backpage servers and databases, which the government holds. Instead, the government has 

produced what appear to be partial copies of ads from cell phone screenshots, what appear to 

be partial copies of ads that appear to have been copied and pasted from the website, copies of 

ads from the Wayback Machine, www.archive.org, and copies of ads that were provided by 

Backpage when cooperating with law enforcement authorities. See, e.g., Exh. H. 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 11 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

clicking a hyperlink, rather than performing a complicated search through millions of records. 

Defendants do not know the current status of the Backpage systems, servers, databases, 

and data, but the government’s statements have underscored that its production of “raw 

database files cannot be simply reviewed or loaded into a viewer to reconstruct the data.” Exh. 

E at 2; see also Dkt. 626-4 at 17 (data from Amsterdam servers concerning payment transactions 

may not be connected to given ads or users). This has been confirmed by the “data images” 

produced by the government. The government’s production gives Defendants none of the 

functionality of the website or its databases and systems as they existed pre-seizure.

D. Defendants Requested Specific Data from Backpage’s Servers and 

Databases. 

At the April 23 status conference, the government represented that it had asked 

Defendants to identify information they wanted to be extracted from the Backpage servers, and 

the government committed to provide such requested information. The government’s counsel 

stressed this point. See Dkt. 577 at 24:18-24:21 (“Your Honor, but we went a step further. We 

said, hey, can you articulate to us what else on these servers that you would like extracted and 

we can look for it and provide it to you.”); id. at 25:5-25:7 (“We’ve asked them repeatedly, hey, 

is there anything we haven’t provided[?]”); see also Exh. G (“So if there is specific data . . . that 

you believe is material to your defense, please let us know and we will attempt to locate that data for 

you.” . . . “[W]e believe it would be most efficient for all parties if you could consult with 

Defendants and provide the government specific server data . . . that you believe is material to 

your defense.” (emphasis added)).

Shortly after that status conference, Defendants wrote the government and made

specific requests for data and information they needed to be extracted. Exh. A. The letter 

emphasized that “[w]hat Defendants most need is access to the Backpage.com I.T. systems, 

servers, and databases, functioning as they existed at the time of the government’s seizures.” 

Id. at 1; see also id. at 3 (request no. 1). The letter went on to specify 28 categories of information, 

along with explanations of the relevance of the requested information (although Defendants 

have no obligation to establish relevance). See Exh. A. For example, to respond to the 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 12 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

government’s allegations that Backpage supposedly edited ads to take out terms “indicative of 

prostitution,” Defendants sought information about Backpage’s actual moderation practices to 

block and remove ads entirely (and to show that Backpage did not edit the text of ads as the 

government has alleged). See id. at 4-5. Defendants also sought information related to the 

alleged “victim ads” referenced in the indictment to show, for example, that, far from promoting 

or facilitating any illegality, Backpage actually blocked ads and cooperated with law enforcement

authorities. Id. at 9-11.

E. The Government Refused to Provide Any Discovery in Response to

Defendants’ Requests.

On June 3, 2019, the Government responded to Defendants’ requests, refusing to 

produce any information in response to any request. The government provided several 

unfounded (and some blatantly false) reasons for its refusal, including that: (1) Defendants 

“waited over a year after the indictment and discovery” to make their requests, despite 

Defendants’ May 1, 2018 request to preserve databases and systems in a functional format, see 

Exh. F; (2) the government does not intend to inspect servers it believes contain no “unique”

data, despite having not examined the servers to know their contents; (3) the government has 

no obligation to analyze Backpage’s servers to determine whether the requested information 

exists, notwithstanding its commitment to extract and provide data if Defendants would identify 

what they needed; (4) it has no obligation to identify responsive material located on the servers 

or produce such material in a searchable format because this material was “provided to the 

government by the defense,” although all of this information was seized from Backpage and its 

vendors and none of it came from Defendants; and (5) rather than provide discovery in this 

case, the government insists Defendants should search for the information they seek from data 

and information relating to prior civil cases against Backpage (despite that Defendants were not 

parties to those cases when Backpage produced documents in them). Exh. B at 1-4. Concerning 

Defendants’ request for access to a functioning version of the Backpage systems, servers, and 

databases, the government said nothing. 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 13 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

IV. ARGUMENT

A. Defendants Are Entitled to Discovery of Information That May Be 

Material to Their Defense.

Federal Rule 16(a) requires the government to make available, upon a defendant’s 

request, documents and other materials “within the government’s possession, custody, or 

control” that are either “material to preparing the defense,” or that the government intends to 

use in its case-in-chief. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i). To obtain discovery under Rule 16, “[a] 

defendant needn’t spell out his theory of the case”; “[n]or is the government entitled to know 

in advance specifically what the defense is going to be.” United States v. Hernandez-Meza, 720 

F.3d 760, 768 (9th Cir. 2013). “The test is not whether the discovery is admissible at trial, but 

whether the discovery may assist [the defendant] in formulating a defense.” United States v. SotoZuniga, 837 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 1992) (“it behooves the government to interpret the 

disclosure requirement broadly”). Instead, all that is required is that the defendant make an 

initial showing of materiality, which is a “low threshold” satisfied by a presentation of facts that 

tends to show the government is in possession of information that may be helpful to the 

defense. Hernandez-Meza, 720 F.3d at 768. 

The government has a duty to disclose both exculpatory and impeaching evidence. Brady 

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); United States 

Attorneys’ Manual (“USAM”) § 9-5.001(B) (“Government disclosure of material exculpatory 

and impeachment evidence is part of the constitutional guarantee to a fair trial.”). Moreover, 

the government’s duty to disclose Brady material includes evidence “known only to police 

investigators and not to the prosecutor.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 

1948 (1999). “In order to comply with Brady, therefore, the individual prosecutor has a duty to 

learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in [a]

case, including the police.” Id. 

B. Access to the Actual Data and Databases from the Backpage Servers, in a 

Functional Format, is Unquestionably Material to the Defense. 

Access to the actual databases and data from the Backpage website, in the functional 

form that existed when the government seized the servers, is crucial to Defendants’ defense of 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 14 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

this case. In the indictment and its pleadings and arguments, the government does not provide 

copies of the ads about which it complains—but merely offers its characterizations of ads on 

Backpage.com and practices of the website.5 Defendants seek access to and disclosure of the 

actual databases, information, and ads to respond to the government’s mischaracterizations. 

This data and information are unquestionably material, as explained below.

1. Information Regarding Backpage’s Moderation Practices.

A central theme of the government’s indictment is its allegations that Backpage 

purposely edited ads to remove terms “indicative of prostitution” and then ran the ads. See SI 

¶¶ 11, 68. Defendants seek data from Backpage’s systems to show the website’s actual practices, 

which expressly prohibited ads for prostitution (or other illegal acts), used automated filtering 

to flag thousands of potentially offensive or inappropriate terms, phrases, URLs, etc. (as many 

websites do), employed upwards of 100 moderators to review ads, and blocked or removed 

approximately 1,000,000 ads per month. See Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 814. Among other 

things, Defendants seek discovery of the actual ads and data because, despite its broad 

allegations, the government has not identified any ads that were edited as the government 

alleges, while Defendants believe the data will show that Backpage regularly blocked improper 

ads outright. Defendants’ requests concerning moderation data are clearly relevant to the 

government’s allegations about Backpage’s practices. See Exh. L at 2-7 (requests nos. 7-13). 

In its June 3 letter, the government inexplicably responds that Defendants’ requests 

regarding moderation are “based on the false premise that each original ad is available in the 

database for review to determine what changes, if any, were made to it.” Exh. B at 6. The 

government’s position is entirely at odds with its prior representations. As noted above, when 

 5 Indeed, in many instances the government offers its characterizations of others’ 

characterizations of or accusations about Backpage. The government’s reliance on the report 

of the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations is an example, as that report 

contained numerous mischaracterizations of and inaccuracies regarding Backpage’s moderation 

practices, which the government now repeats and embellishes here. Of course, the Senate 

Report and its purported facts and conclusions clearly would not be admissible as part of the 

instant case.

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 15 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

the government sought permission to seize the Tucson servers, it told Magistrate Judge Willett 

that the servers contain “historical” content regarding ads posted on the website, “all versions 

of an advertisement,” the “original form” of an ad, the filters applied to ads, any “moderation 

changes or actions” made to a given ad, moderator action logs, and images deleted by a 

moderator. Exh. C at 11-12; see Dkt. 626-4 at 13-14. 

2. Information Regarding the Alleged “Victim” Ads Referenced

In the Indictment.

Defendants also seek access to a functioning version of the Backpage systems, servers, 

and databases to investigate and respond concerning the 50 alleged “victim” ads referenced in 

the Superseding Indictment. Exh. L at 9-11 (requests 26-29); see SI ¶¶ 160-176, 201. This, too,

is unquestionably material to the defense. As discussed at length in Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss (Dkt. 561), the government’s allegations that Defendants generally were aware that 

some ads for prostitution appeared on Backpage.com does not suffice to establish criminal 

liability. The government instead must prove Defendants’ mens rea as to specific ads, i.e., that 

Defendants knew in advance that a given ad was for an illegal act and participated in and

specifically intended to bring about the illegal act.

The government seems to think it is sufficient to produce some copies of these ads but 

not the underlying data about the ads or other related ads or Backpage’s actual actions 

concerning the ads. As discussed above, many of the copies of the ads the government has 

produced do not come from Backpage’s systems and databases, but are a hodge-podge of image 

captures from the Wayback Machine and other sources, along with copies of ads that Backpage 

appears to have previously supplied as part of Backpage’s extensive cooperation with law 

enforcement authorities in response to subpoenas or other requests.

Information such as this – i.e., that Backpage reported an ad to law enforcement or to 

the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (“NCMEC”) – is one of many pieces 

of data about any given ad within Backpage’s databases and systems as they existed when the 

government effected its seizures. As noted, this information was readily available within the 

functioning systems. See Exh. K, p. 3 (listing of fields within the “object editor”). But, more 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 16 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

than that, the databases and systems enabled searches about related ads, users and their conduct 

(e.g., users could be identified and cross-referenced by email addresses or credit card numbers), 

and Backpage’s actions (e.g., if Backpage blocked, removed or reported other ads). 

This information and functionality are crucial to allow the defense to address the 

government’s allegations that Backpage’s actions concerning given ads were supposedly 

criminal. The need for access to such data has been demonstrated in prior cases in which 

Backpage was able to refute allegations of government authorities and others. Examples 

include:

• In a case in Washington, the government offered an affidavit from a police detective 

claiming that Backpage had knowingly run ads concerning a girl after being notified 

she was underage. However, Backpage was able to show that it actually reported the 

initial ad to NCMEC, and removed and blocked other ads concerning the individual 

(making additional reports to NCMEC and blocking the email addresses used to post 

the ads). Backpage did not detect the other ads the detective identified (but had not 

reported to Backpage) because they were posted in another city using still another 

email address. 

• In another case, an investigator with the Cook County sheriff’s office claimed 

Backpage edited a “sting ad” he posted on the website to take out references that the 

individual featured in the ad was 14 years old. Based on information from its systems 

and the history of the ad, Backpage was able to show that the investigator actually 

edited the ad to include the 14-year-old age reference (users could edit their ads after 

they cleared Backpage’s moderation and appeared online), and Backpage had 

immediately reported the ad to NCMEC. 

• In a California civil case, the plaintiff alleged that traffickers posted ads about her 

and Backpage edited the ads “to make it less obvious that the ads were for sex.” 

However, using the databases and search tools then available, Backpage determined 

that none of the ads had been edited and three ads concerning the plaintiff were 

blocked by moderators within minutes of being posted, while a fourth ad remained 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 17 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

online as part of Backpage’s cooperation with law enforcement.6

In its June 3 letter, the government responds concerning Defendants’ requests about the 

predicate ads by stating only that it intends to have law enforcement officials and other witnesses 

testify regarding how the ads were obtained and that the screenshots of the ads are authentic. 

Exh. B at 7. That the government seeks to cut corners to put on its case is not a valid 

justification for denying the requested discovery and strangling Defendants’ constitutional right 

to defend themselves. 

3. Information Regarding the Backpage Website Generally is 

Material to Preparing the Defense.

Defendants have also requested access to the functioning databases and systems (or that 

the government extract information from the databases) to be able to show comparative and 

analytic information about the Backpage.com website and its practices as a whole. See Exh. L

at 3-4 (requests 2-6). This is important for a number of reasons. 

First, metrics regarding Backpage’s ads and ad revenues as a whole are relevant to show 

that Backpage.com was a general purpose classified advertising website and that it generated 

many millions of dollars in revenue from non-adult ads. The government has refused to 

produce such information, contending that this proposition is “to put it mildly, at odds with”

emails the government has collected and its claims and characterizations. Exh. B at 5. The 

government’s one-sided view of the evidence it hopes to present at trial is obviously not a reason 

to deny Defendants discovery that is material to assisting them in challenging that view.

Second, Defendants seek information regarding ads Backpage reported to NCMEC, as 

these reports show that Backpage sought to prevent misuse of the website and potential harm to 

youths. The government has alleged that Backpage’s referrals to NCMEC were not in good faith 

and were “artificially limit[ed].” See SI at ¶ 13. However, Defendants believe the government is 

aware that NCMEC and/or law enforcement complained that Backpage was making too many 

 6 Law enforcement authorities in many instances asked Backpage not to notify users of warrants 

or remove ads so as not to interfere with ongoing investigations, and Backpage complied with 

these requests as well. 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 18 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

such referrals (as many ads referred by Backpage ultimately were determined not to relate to 

minors), and yet Backpage continued to refer ads of concern (which the data about Backpage’s 

referrals will reflect). On this point, the government responded in its June 3 letter that it has 

produced interviews of NCMEC personnel and emails, adding that “you are free to conduct your 

own analysis of the servers’ data.” Exh. B at 6. But that is precisely the point: Defendants cannot 

meaningfully analyze server data unless it is provided in a functional, useable form. 

Third, Defendants seek information regarding Backpage’s cooperation with law 

enforcement (Backpage received literally hundreds of commendations, including one from FBI 

Director Robert Mueller), as they rebut the government’s allegations that Defendants “took 

pains to mislead . . . law enforcement officials.” SI ¶ 12. The government has refused to 

produce this information too, again contending that its view of the evidence precludes any 

obligation to do so. Exh. B. at 5 (“we obviously do not share your view that Backpage engaged 

in cooperation with law enforcement”). The government gets it backwards, as it implicitly 

admits when it states that “whether Backpage was sincerely cooperating with law enforcement 

is ultimately a jury question.” Id. The government’s confidence that its view of Backpage’s 

cooperation with law enforcement will prevail at trial is not a valid basis to deny discovery of 

information that allows Defendants to investigate and challenge that view.

Fourth, documents referenced in the indictment, including all emails regarding such 

documents, are manifestly material. To the extent such material exists and has not yet been

produced, the government should be required to produce this material immediately.

4. Information Regarding Backpage’s Alleged Aggregation Practices.

Defendants also seek information about the government’s allegations that Backpage 

supposedly “created” prostitution ads by contacting users who had posted ads on other websites 

(notably Craigslist.org) and asking if they wanted to run their ads on Backpage.com. See Exh. 

L at 7 (requests 14-16); see also SI ¶ 34. While the indictment alleges this sales technique (called 

“aggregation”) occurred only in the earlier years of the Backpage.com website, see, e.g., SI ¶¶ 37-

42 (citing emails from 2007-2008), the government has attempted to give the impression that 

this occurred throughout the time that Backpage was online. Regardless, Defendants believe 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 19 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

the government is aware marketing solicitations like this are not uncommon, that Backpage 

personnel solicited ads of many types (including for jobs, therapeutic massage, sporting goods, 

local places, and pet sales, as well as for adult ads), and that Backpage forbade soliciting any ads 

that appeared to be for illegal or improper services or offers. 

In this regard as well, Defendants seek discovery from the government of any ads that 

were actually posted on Backpage.com through aggregation, along with underlying data about 

these ads (e.g., the websites where ads appeared previously and how the ads appeared on those 

sites). Like the government’s broad and vague allegations that Backpage improperly edited ads, 

for which the government has provided no examples that this ever happened, the government 

has also shown no instance of an allegedly illegal ad posted to Backpage.com through 

“aggregation.” Without identification of and access to actual ads and data, Defendants cannot 

meaningfully defend the government’s aspersions. 

5. Information Regarding Alleged “Reciprocal Link” Agreement.

Another of the government’s central attacks is its allegation that Backpage had, for a 

time (in 2007-2008, see SI ¶¶ 48-52), a “business arrangement” with theeroticreview.com

(“TER”), to “post reciprocal ads on each other’s websites.” SI ¶ 45. Defendants also seek 

information and data from the Backpage servers and systems in this regard (e.g., any banner ads 

or other ads run by Backpage on TER and vice-versa, all contracts between Backpage and TER, 

and any ads posted on Backpage.com that contained references to TER). See Exh. L. at 7-9 

(requests 17-25). Again, the aim is to obtain and be able to show the actual agreements and ads, 

rather than merely accepting the government’s characterizations. 

The basis for the government’s refusal to turn over this information (or provide access 

to Backpage’s systems and databases so that Defendants can search for such information) is a 

familiar refrain: “[Y]ou will need to conduct your own analysis of the data.” Exh. B at 6. Under

the circumstances, this response is no response at all. How are Defendants supposed to conduct 

an analysis if they do not have access to functioning versions of Backpage’s systems, databases, 

and information? The government has and controls all of this information. The government’s 

response falls well short of its Rule 16 and Brady obligations.

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 20 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

C. The Government’s Purported Justifications for Denying Critical 

Discovery to Defendants Fall Flat.

The government’s assertions in its June 3 letter for refusing to produce the requested 

discovery must be rejected. First, the government’s contention that it is “struggling to 

understand” why Defendants “waited over a year after the indictment” to make their requests 

is disingenuous. Exh. B at 1. Defendants’ counsel raised concerns about the need to preserve 

the Backpage systems and data intact three weeks after this case began. Exh. F. The 

government did not begin to produce material from the Backpage servers until March 2019

(three months after its disclosure deadline), and it was then that Defendants learned of the 

government’s tack of producing disassembled “imaged” data but not any functioning or useable 

version of the Backpage databases and systems as they existed when they were seized. 

What Defendants are “struggling to understand” is why the government has not 

provided Defendants with meaningful access to any of Backpage’s I.T. systems and apparently 

waited until April 2019 to work “diligently” with the CTO of DesertNet (the third-party that 

hosted Backpage’s domestic servers) to gain an understanding of the data on the systems. Dkt. 

626 at 2-3; Dkt. 626-4 at ¶ 5. There can be no good faith reason for the government to have 

waited a year since its seizures to engage in this process. Nor has the government ever explained 

what it did to preserve the servers (and the data, databases and software they contain) to be able 

to access the Backpage website and backend operations as they existed and were available at the 

time of the government’s seizures. 

Second, the government’s assertion now that it is not obligated to identify or provide the 

data and information that Defendants seek is contradictory and disturbing. Exh. B at 2. The 

government’s counsel said plainly and repeatedly that they would extract and provide data and 

information from Backpage’s servers if only Defendants would identify what they need. Dkt. 577 

at 24-25; Exh. G. When Defendants made specific requests, the government refused to produce 

anything. It is not clear whether the government’s representations were a ruse intended to gather 

intel about potential defenses, or the government simply changed its mind, but its actions are not 

consistent with the obligations of Rule 16. 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 21 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

Third, the government’s position that it need not turn over the requested information in 

a usable format because “much of the evidence was provided to the government by the 

defense,” Exh. B at 3-4, is flat-wrong. Exh. B at 3-4. The Defendants are not Backpage, 

although the government tries to disregard or blur this fact when it suits the government’s 

purposes.7 Defendants did not produce these documents, nor can the government avoid its 

discovery obligations by pretending otherwise. It is similarly irrelevant that Backpage previously 

produced some documents in civil cases in which Defendants were not parties. Fundamentally, 

the government’s Rule 16 discovery obligations pertain to the data and information the 

government has obtained. If the government could avoid its obligations by asserting that 

Defendants should go elsewhere to try to understand the government’s claims and purported 

supporting evidence, Rule 16 and Brady would be nullities. 

V. CONCLUSION

Defendants respectfully urge the Court to compel the government to provide

Defendants access to Backpage’s systems, servers, databases and data, with the same 

functionality and in the same condition as they existed at the time of their seizure, or,

alternatively, in a format wherein the government restores the systems, servers, databases, and 

data so they are searchable and viewable as they existed at the time of the government’s seizures. 

Defendants further request that the Court order the government to provide the data and 

information requested in Exhibit L, except as disclosure of the Backpage servers, databases and 

systems may allow Defendants themselves to search, obtain, and collect the requested data.

 7 The government has taken contrary positions elsewhere, when doing that suited the 

government’s arguments. For example, in the pending appeal before the Ninth Circuit, where 

Defendants’ challenge the unconstitutionality of the government’s seizures of Defendants’ 

personal assets, the government has asserted that Defendants have no First Amendment rights 

because they “sold their shares in Backpage to Ferrer in 2015” and Backpage and Ferrer agreed 

to forfeit the company’s assets in 2018. See United States v. James Larkin, et al., No. 18-56455, 

Government’s Reply In Support of Motion for Remand, Dkt. 54 at 9 (9th Cir. filed April 5, 

2019). Yet, in this case, the government would have the Court believe that Defendants exerted 

control over Backpage at the time its servers were seized in April 2018, three years after

Defendants sold their interests in Backpage. Simply put, the government appears to be willing 

to contradict itself in an effort to deny Defendants whatever rights they seek to enforce. 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 22 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

DATED: June 19, 2019 Thomas H. Bienert, Jr.

Whitney Z. Bernstein 

BIENERT KATZMAN, PLC

By: /s/ Whitney Z. Bernstein

Whitney Z. Bernstein

Attorneys for James Larkin

DATED: June 19, 2019 Paul J. Cambria, Jr.

Erin E. McCampbell 

LIPSITZ GREEN SCIME CAMBRIA LLP

By: /s/ Paul J. Cambria, Jr.

Paul J. Cambria, Jr.

Attorneys for Michael Lacey

DATED: June 19, 2019 Robert Corn-Revere

James C. Grant

DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

By: /s/ James C. Grant

James C. Grant

Attorneys for Michael Lacey and James Larkin

DATED: June 19, 2019 Bruce Feder

FEDER LAW OFFICE, P.A.

By: /s/ Bruce Feder

Bruce Feder

Attorneys for Scott Spear

DATED: June 19, 2019 Gary S. Lincenberg

Ariel A. Neuman

Gopi K. Panchapakesan

BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT, NESSIM, 

DROOKS, LINCENBERG & RHOW, P.C.

By: /s/ Ariel A. Neuman

Ariel A. Neuman

Attorneys for John Brunst

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 23 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

DATED: June 19, 2019 David Eisenberg

DAVID EISENBERG, P.L.C.

By: /s/ David Eisenberg

David Eisenberg

Attorneys for Andrew Padilla

DATED: June 19, 2019 Joy Bertrand

JOY BERTRAND, ESQ.

By: /s/ Joy Bertrand

Joy Bertrand

Attorneys for Joye Vaught

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 24 of 25
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

4822-7462-6458v.1 3710078-000079

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this 19th day of June 2019, I electronically transmitted a PDF version 

of this document to the Clerk of the Court, using the CM/ECF System, for filing and for 

transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following CM/ECF registrants listed below. 

/s/ Whitney Z. Bernstein

Whitney Z. Bernstein

Anne Michelle Chapman, anne@mscclaw.com 

Erin E. McCampbell, emccampbell@lglaw.com 

Anthony R. Bisconti, tbisconti@bienertkatzman.com 

Ariel A. Neuman, aan@birdmarella.com 

Bruce S. Feder, bf@federlawpa.com 

James C. Grant, jimgrant@dwt.com 

Lee David Stein, lee@mscclaw.com 

Paul J. Cambria, pcambria@lglaw.com 

Robert Corn-Revere, bobcornever@dwt.com 

Ronald Gary London, ronnielondon@dwt.com 

Janey Henze Cook, janey@henzecookmurphy.com 

John Lewis Littrell, jlittrell@bmkattorneys.com 

Seetha Ramachandran, Seetha.Ramachandran@srz.com 

Thomas H. Bienert, Jr. tbienert@bienertkatzman.com 

Whitney Z. Bernstein, wbernstein@bienertkatzman.com 

Gary S. Lincenberg, glincenberg@birdmarella.com 

Gopi K. Panchapakesan, gpanchapakesan@birdmarella.com 

Michael D. Kimerer, mdk@kimerer.com 

Rhonda Elaine Neff, rneff@kimerer.com 

David S. Eisenberg, david@deisenbergplc.com 

Joy Malby Bertrand, joyous@mailbag.com 

John Jacob Kucera, john.kucera@usdoj.gov 

Kevin M. Rapp, Kevin.Rapp@usdoj.com 

Margaret Wu Perlmeter, Margaret.perlmeter@usdoj.gov 

Reginald E. Jones, reginald.jones4@usdoj.gov 

Peter Shawn Kozinets, Peter.Kozinets@usdoj.gov 

Andrew C. Stone, andrew.stone@usdoj.gov

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 643 Filed 06/19/19 Page 25 of 25