J-S32045-18

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

TERI L. EYLER 

Appellant

v.

PAUL GLADHILL AND LORRAINE 

GLADHILL

 Appellees

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1965 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered December 13, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County 

Civil Division at No.: 2015-4718

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., NICHOLS, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED AUGUST 03, 2018

Appellant, Teri L. Eyler, appeals from the order granting the motion for 

summary judgment of Appellees, Paul Gladhill and Lorraine Gladhill, in this 

landlord-tenant negligence action. Specifically, she claims that the trial court 

erred when it held that the evidence did not establish that Appellees had 

breached a duty of care owed to Appellant. We affirm.

We take the factual and procedural history in this matter from our 

review of the certified record. On March 25, 2015, Appellant fell down the 

basement stairs of the residence that she rented from Appellees. Appellant 

had observed the condition of the stairs during her initial walkthrough of the 

premises prior to leasing it, and had used them often prior to the fall while 

living in the home. (See Appellant’s Deposition, 4/20/17, at 15, 18). On 

December 31, 2015, Appellant filed a complaint alleging that Appellees 
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negligently breached their duty as landlords to maintain the basement stairs

in a safe and usable condition with adequate lighting and handrails. 

The parties completed discovery, and, on September 14, 2017, 

Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the evidence did 

not establish that they had breached a duty of care owed to Appellant. The 

trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on December 13, 

2017. This timely appeal followed.1

Appellant raises one question on appeal: “[Whether] genuine issues of 

material fact exist as to whether [Appellees] owed [Appellant] a duty of care 

and breached that duty causing [Appellant’s] injuries?” (Appellant’s Brief, at 

3) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

In her issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in granting 

Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. (See id. at 8-11). She concedes 

that generally out of possession landlords are not liable for injuries suffered 

by their tenant, but claims that Appellees should nevertheless be liable 

because they had reason to know of the defect. (See id. at 8-9). We 

disagree.

Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is well 

settled.

As has been oft declared by this Court, summary judgment 

is appropriate only in those cases where the record clearly 

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1 Pursuant to the trial court’s order, Appellant filed her statement of errors 

complained of on appeal on January 4, 2018. The trial court entered its 

opinion on January 23, 2018. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court 

must take all facts of record and reasonable inferences therefrom 

in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. In so doing, 

the trial court must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a 

genuine issue of material fact against the moving party, and, thus, 

may only grant summary judgment where the right to such 

judgment is clear and free from all doubt.

On appellate review, then, an appellate court may reverse 

a grant of summary judgment if there has been an error of law or 

an abuse of discretion. But the issue as to whether there are no 

genuine issues as to any material fact presents a question of law, 

and therefore, on that question our standard of review is de novo. 

This means we need not defer to the determinations made by the 

lower tribunals. To the extent that this Court must resolve a 

question of law, we shall review the grant of summary judgment 

in the context of the entire record.

High v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 154 A.3d 341, 345 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal 

denied, 171 A.3d 1287 (Pa. 2017) (citations omitted).

The elements necessary to plead an action in negligence are: (1) 

the existence of a duty or obligation recognized by law; (2) a 

failure on the part of the defendant to conform to that duty, or 

breach thereof; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's 

breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage 

suffered by the complainant. [See] Orner v. Mallick, 515 Pa. 

132, 135, 527 A.2d 521, 523 (1987).

In Pennsylvania, a landlord out of possession, in most 

instances, is not responsible for injuries suffered by third parties 

on the leased premises. However, as this Court has previously 

stated, this rule is subject to several exceptions.

A landlord out of possession may incur liability 

(1) if he has reserved control over a defective portion 

of the demised premises; (2) if the demised premises 

are so dangerously constructed that the premises are 

a nuisance per se; (3) if the lessor has knowledge of 

a dangerous condition existing on the demised 

premises at the time of transferring possession and 

fails to disclose the condition to the lessee; (4) if the 
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landlord leases the property for a purpose involving 

the admission of the public and he neglects to inspect 

for or repair dangerous conditions existing on the 

property before possession is transferred to the 

lessee; (5) if the lessor undertakes to repair the 

demised premises and negligently makes the repairs; 

or (6) if the lessor fails to make repairs after having 

been given notice of and a reasonable opportunity to 

remedy a dangerous condition existing on the leased 

premises.

Henze v. Texaco, Inc., [508 A.2d 1200, 1202 (Pa. Super. 

1986)]. Our Supreme Court has elaborated on exception number 

three as follows.

A landlord out of possession is liable for 

resulting injuries if, when he leases premises, he 

conceals an existing dangerous condition on the land 

which he has reason to believe the tenant will not 

discover. The liability of . . . [the landlords], 

therefore, is limited to hidden or concealed 

defects. . . .

Dorsey v. Cont’l Assocs., 591 A.2d 716, 718-19 (Pa. Super. 1991), appeal 

denied, 612 A.2d 985 (Pa. 1992) (most citations omitted; emphasis in 

original).

In the instant case, Appellees did not retain control of the premises and 

thus were landlords out of possession. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 6; Trial Court

Opinion, 12/13/17, at unnumbered page 4). The evidence also demonstrated 

that the condition of the basement stairs, the lack of a handrail, and the 

limited lighting, existed during Appellant’s initial walkthrough of the house 

before she leased it and moved into the property. (See Appellant’s 

Deposition, at 15). Appellant has not set forth, nor has our review revealed, 

any evidence that Appellees concealed any defect. See Dorsey, supra at 

719.
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Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err or abuse its 

discretion when it held that the evidence did not establish that Appellees 

breached a duty of care owed to Appellant. See High, supra at 345. Because

Appellees were landlords out of possession, and because they did not conceal 

any defects from Appellant when she leased the property, Appellees, as a 

matter of law, are not liable for injuries caused by the condition of the stairs, 

the lack of a handrail, or the limited lighting. See Dorsey, supra at 718-19. 

Therefore, we agree that Appellees are entitled to summary judgment.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 08/03/2018