### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ugus t 9, 200 5 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. CL AU DE FR AN CIS G AR RET T
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 92-B-961 Seth Nor m an, Jud ge

No. M2004- 02089-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Dece m ber 1, 2005

The de fenda nt, Claude Franc is Gar rett, appeals hi s Davidson C ounty Criminal Court jury conviction of first d egr ee felony

murder, w hich re sulted in a sentenc e of life imprisonment. On appea l, he claims that (1) the convicting evidenc e was insufficient; (2) thr ee pr osecution witnesses pr esente d fa lse te sti mon y ; ( 3) the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in a dmi tti ng e xpe rt te sti mon y ; (4 ) the tr ia l c ou rt e rr on e ou sly ins truc te d th e jury

on va ri ou s p oin ts o f l a w; (5 ) the tr ia l cou rt e rr e d in fa ili ng to r e qu ir e a wi tne ss t o answe r def

ense c ounsel’s questions on cross- examination; (6) t h e t ri al court erre d in deny ing the de fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n f

or the pa y me nt o f t

ra ve l e xpe ns e s f

or a non-re sid e nt w itn e ss; (7 ) the state withheld exculpatory

evidenc e; and ( 8) he w as denie d due proc ess of law . Following our re view,
we a ffirm the c onviction.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J J ., joined.

Dw ig ht E . Sc ott , N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lla nt, Claud e F ranc is G arr e tt.

Paul G

. Summers, A ttorney Gene ral & Reporter ; Preston Shipp, Assi stant Attorney Gene ral; Victor S. J ohnson, I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and Jon Seaborg and Na ncy Kim, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

The c onviction results from a c harg e that, in the ea rly -morning hours of F ebrua ry 24, 19 92 , th e de fe nd a nt s tart e d a fi re in the Da vid so n Co un ty ho me in whi c h h e a ndthe 24 -y e ar- old victim, L ori L ance , wer e residing. After the fire fig hters’ e ntry into the smoldering house , they found the victim ly ing pr one in a utility room in the rea

r of the sma ll house. The utilityroo m d o o r was closed, a nd the victim lay under a n aluminum lawn chair and some toy s. The victim died of smoke and g as inhalation.James Co op er , an ag ent of t he Federa l B ur eau of

Al cohol , T ob acc o, and Fi r ear ms, t es t i f i ed i n t he hea r i ng t hat 1

t h e M e t r o p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t a s k e d h i m t o a s s i s t t h e m i n t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e f i r e t h a t c a u s e d t h e v i c t i m ’ s d e a t h

. He col l ec t ed s ome mat er i al s ampl es f r om t h e f

l oor be n ea t h t h e bas eboa r d of t h e f r on t room i n t h e h ou s e. W e g l ea n f r om t he ev i d en ce p rese nted at t rial t ha t A ge nt C o o p er’s co l l ec t ed sam p l es w ere given t o D etec tiv e M i l l er a nd t ha t t he se
s amp l es wer e t he ones del i ver ed t o t he T B I l aborat ory by D et ect i ve M i l l er

. Ap pare nt l y , t he C oo per/ M i l l er s amp l es y i el ded p osi t i v e t es t r es ul t s for pet r ol eum di s t i l l at es wh i l e t he P ort er s amp l es y i el ded neg at i ve r es ul t s

. T he C oo per/ M i l l er
sa m p le s w e re no t d e stro ye d a n d w e re p re se n te d a s e v id e n c e in the trial n o w un d e r re v ie w

. -2- The trial pr esently

under r eview is the de fendant’s second trial o nth ec h a r g e d o f f e nse. The fir st trial resulted in a first deg ree murder conviction that was va cate d by this court on appea l in the defe ndant’s post-convic tion p ro ce eding. Se e Cla ud e Fr an c is G ar re tt v . S tat e , No. M1999-00786-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashvill e, Mar. 22, 2001) (vacating the conviction and orde ring a new trial on the basis of the state’s withholding of exculpatory

information).

Prior to the second trial, the court held an evidentiary hearing upon the def endant’ s motion to di smiss t he indictment. I n his moti on, the def endant cl aimed that the state had lost or destroy ed phy sical evide nce, inc luding c rime-sc ene photog raph s

. Inth eh e a rin g , a T e n n e ssee B ureau of I nvestig ation (TB I ) fore nsic ana ly st testified that she ana ly zed material samples taken fr om the burned house by

fire inve stigator Kenne th Porter, i ncluding soil from under the house, liquid from the drivew ay , wood from the f loor inside the front door , and a te n-g allon plastic container outside the house. She a lso analy zed material samples submitted by Metro police de tective Da vid Mill er. Her analy sis was desig ned to determine the pre sence of any petroleum distillate in the samples.

I nvestig ator Porter

testified in the hea

ri n g t h at he took the sa mples of soil and of
wo odfr om the fl oo r ne ar the fr on t do or be c a us e he tho ug ht that th e fl oo r i n th a t are a of the ho us e was th e po in t o f or igi n o f t he fi r e

. H e del iv ered hi s s amp les to , an d ret ri eved th em f rom , t he T BI laboratory . L ater , following the def endant’ s conviction in his first trial, Mr. Porte r d es troy ed the
sa mpl e s. 1

Re g ina

Dr ape r, a n inve sti g a tor wi th the dis tr ic t atto rn e y g e ne ra l’ s off ic e , tes tif ie d in the hea ring that, in Aug ust 1993, she ch ec k ed out 38 crime-sce ne photog raph ne g atives fr om the police property room, delivere d them to an assistant district attorney g ener al, and did not take the m back to the p o l i ce depar

tment. She testified that the neg atives we re not in the district attorne y g ener al’s file a nd that she had no know ledg e of the ir wher eabouts.

Following the hearing, the trial court ruled that the prese nce of Mr. Porter ’s phy sical samples wer e unnec essary to assuring a fair trial bec ause the defe ndant could re ly upon laboratory analy sis of the samples that showed that they contained no pe tro l eu m d i s tillates. The trial court opined t hat t he defenda nt failed to e stablish that the photogr aph neg atives we re not the ne g atives of ph otogra ph s in tr od uc e d in to e vid e nc e in the de fe nd a nt’ s f ir st t ri a l a ndthat he , th e re fo re , f a ile d to show that they

wer e unavailable.
Also, prior to the s econd trial, the court conducte d a hearing upon the def endant’ s challeng e of A g ent J ames Cooper as a n ex p ert witness on the cause of the fatal fire in the pr esent-3-

case

. I n t h e hea

ring , Ag ent Cooper testified a bout his backg round and training a s an ar son investigator, and the tria l co u rt ru l ed that the witness was qualified to re nder his opinion on the orig in of the fire

.

The de fenda nt’s second trial beg an on J uly 21, 2003. The victim ’s mother, Sandra L ee Jones, testified t hat s he was conce rned about the vi ctim’s safe ty in the hous e that she oc cupied wi th the d efen dant be c a us e the ho us e ha d n o r e ar e xit a ndwa s h e a te d b y a ke ro se ne he a te r. Ms. Jone s expla ine d tha t, y e ars be fo re the vic tim ’s de a th, sh e a nd he r fa mil y ha d w itn e sse d a fi re in the ir
n e i g h b o rh o o d t h a th a d k i l l e d a c h i l d , a n d a s a

r e s u l t , M s

. J o n e s h a d s tr e s s e d f i r e s a f e t y t o h e r f a m i l y, including the victim. She testified that the victim had installed a smoke ala rm in the kitchen, a nd Ms. J ones noticed the alarm on the kitchen wa ll thre e day s befor e the fire. Ms. Jones testified that the victim ha d boug ht a fire exti ng uisher a wee k befor e the f ire. She testified that, when she w ent to the ho sp ita l fol low ing the fi re , the de fe nd a nt he ld up his ba nd a g e d h a nd s to he r, sa id h e wa s b urnt,
a ndsa id n oth ing abo ut thevic tim

. On c ro ss- e xami natio n, Ms. Jone s tes tif ie d tha t sh e didno t r e c a ll wh e the r the vic tim

ha d s a id anythi ng abo ut the de fe nd a nt p a int ing th e ki tchen , b ut M s. Jone s d id
rec all seeing paint buckets in the kitche n three day s befor e the f ire.

Michae l Alcorn testifi ed t h at h e lived ac ross the stree t from the victim and the de fe nd a nt. On the mornin g of F e br uary 24 , 19 92 , his w if

e wo ke him

a ndtol d h im that th e ho us e a c ro ss the str e e t wa s on fir e . M r. Al c orn te sti fi e d th a t he pu t ontr ou se rs a ndran a c ro ss the str e e t. He testified, “I noticed Mr. Gar rett stumped [si c] dow n by a tree when I first came o u t

. ” The defe ndant was 25 or

30 fee t away

from the burning house

. Mr. Alcorn testified that, when he cr ossed the stree t, the defe ndant jumped up, g rabbe d a lawn chair , started to brea k the windows on t he side of the house, and holl ere d for the victim. The defenda nt broke out eac h bedroom window a nd then beg an striking the ply wood that cove red the bathroom window with an a x e. The d ef en d ant then beg an spray ing the front room with a g arde n hose. Mr. Alc orn opined that the f irst fire truc k arrived wi thi n fi ve to t e n mi nu te s. Th e fi re fi g hte rs e xtra c te d th e vic tim fr om the ho us e a ndpla c e d h e r i n an ambulanc e.
The de fenda nt was in the Alcorn home when Mr. Alcorn returne d from work at 5:30
or 6:0 0 p .m. on F e br

ua ry 24 , 1 99 2. Mr . A lc orn tes tif ie d th a t hi s w if

e inf orme d h im that th e vic tim had died. The defe ndant spent the nig ht in a car in the Alcorns’ y ard, and Mr. Alcorn saw him the next morning

. Mr. Alcorn testified that the def endant ne ver me ntioned the victim in Mr. Alcorn’s prese nce.
On cr oss-examination, Mr. Alcorn disag ree d that during and following the fire fig ht the defe ndant was in a state of panic. Although the defe ndant scre amed “L ori” at eac h window, Mr. Alcorn opine d that t h e defenda nt’s emotional state wa s “so-so.” Mr . Alcorn a g ree d that the defe ndant had burns on his ha nd and that his f acia l hair was singe d. Mr. Alcorn had smelled a lcohol on the defendant but could not say that the defendant was intox icated. Mr. Alcorn acknow ledg ed that, in his prior statement, he did not mention the def endant’ s squatting be side the tree

.-4- B ob by Al c orn, Mic ha e l A lc orn’ s so n, te sti fi e d th a t he wa s 1 7 y e ars olda t th e tim e of the fi re . A t app ro xima te ly 5:0 0 on the mornin g of F e br ua ry 24 , 19 92 , he wa s pr e pa ri ng to g o to school and he ard his dog barking and a “ kind of bang ” that sounded “like a shotg un.” Within a few min ute s, he he ardhis mothe r s c re a min g that th e de fe nd a nt’ s h ou se wa s o n f ir e . H e loo ke d a c ro ss the stree t, saw the fir e, and sa w the de fendant “kind of squatted down by a tre e.” B obby

Alcorn testified that when his father ran acr oss the street, the de fendant rose, took a law n chair , and broke a window in the house

. The defe ndant used an a x e to attac k the ply wood cove ring on the bathroom window bef

ore g iving the ax e t o Bo b b yAlcorn. B obby Alcorn ove rhea

rd the de fendant telling Michae l Alcorn that he did not believe the victim would have g one to the utilityroom.

Bobby Alcorn stay ed home f

rom school that da y to be with his mother, who was distraug ht about the fire and the victim’s de ath. During the day , he talked w ith the defe ndant and
a ttribu te d th e fo llo wi ng state me nt t o th e de fe nd a nt:

[“] I know they

think I done it,[ ”] and he was ref erring to the police

. An d he sa id, [“]I kn ow the y thi nk I do ne it. I f I

wo uldha ve do ne it, I ’d have to go a

round bac k and g et a g asoline ca n, g o to the car and syphon it out, and then I ’d had to pou r i t ar o u n d on the love seat, I
mean on the couch and around the door fa cing and I would have ha d to light it.[ ”]

B ob by Al c orn te sti fi e d th a t du ri ng the da y of F e br ua ry 24 , the de fe nd a nt ne ve r s po ke of the vic tim ; the def endant wa s “nervous” and “ac ted diffe rent.” He testified that the defe ndant would pee p out the wi n d o ws of the Alc orn home a nd would retre at to the bathroom if someone turned into the driveway

. On cr oss-examinati o n , Bobby Alcorn a cknowledg ed that in his prior statement, he did not mention the defenda nt’s squatting be side the tree

.

The for ensic pathologist who per formed an au t o p s yon the victim testified that the victim died from inhaling smoke and nox ious g ases, probably succumbing within 10 to 30 mi nutes afte r she be g an to breathe smoke. The victim’s blood alcohol level wa s .06 perc ent. The phy sician testified that the victim had burns on he r hea d and lef t arm and that the burns probably resulted f rom heat b u il d

- u p in th e u ti li ty r o o m w h e r e th e v ic ti m w a s f o u n d

. O th e r

th a n th e b u r n s , th e v ic tim’s bo dy ha d s uf fe re d n o o the r t

ra uma

. Th e ph y sic ia n opin e d tha t f ir e vic tim s w ill fr e qu e ntl y re tr e a t to
a room a way

from the f

ire a nd have be en known to burr ow under objects to protec t themselves.

The d o ctor visited the crime scene and looked at a bar latch on the outside of the uti lit y ro om d oo r. She te sti fi e d th a t the vic tim wa s fi ve fe e t, six inc he s ta ll, we ig he d 1 35 po un ds

. She opined that had the vic tim been inside the utilityroom with the latch e ng ag ed, she should have been a ble to brea

k throug h the latch f

rom the inside of the utility room.-5- Otis J enkins testified that he w as a Me tro fire d ep artment captain in 1992 and responde d to the fire at the victim’s and the def endant’ s h o u s e. He “ came upon a door that had a locking mecha nism of som e sort on it, g ot the door open, [and] went inside.” He rec alled that the door “r esisted” a nd that he had “to work it.” He f ound the victim in the room behind the door; she was ly ing on the floor betwe en the wa s h i ng machine and the wall. On c ross-examination, Mr. Jenkins te sti fi e d th a t th e do or wa s “ la tc he d or loc ke d. I do n’ t r e c a ll e xac tly

wh a t.” He didno t r e c a ll telling De tective Miller that the door was not l atche d, maintaining that he had a lway s believed that the door w as l at ch ed whe n he discove red it. He testified that althoug h he wor e thick g loves, he worke d the mechanism on the lat ch t o open the door . Be cause the alarm on Mr. J enkins’ selfc on ta ine d b re a thi ng un it s ou nd e d, he le ft it to oth e r fi re fi g hte rs to r e mov e the vic tim . L a te r, wh ile
ou tsi de , h e sa w the de fe nd a nt t ry to e nte r the ho us e be fo re be ing e sc orte d a way by tw o f ir e fi g hte rs

.
Terry Nickens, a nother Metr o fire de partment captain, t estified that he arrived at the fire sc ene at 5:15 a.m. When he hea rd that a pe rson re mained inside the house, he acc ompanied firef ighte r Patrick Hunt on a

sear ch and resc ue mission inside the house. When the victim was found ins ide the uti lit y ro om, Mr . Nic ke ns e nte re d the ro om. Th e vic tim ’s le g s w e re ta ng le d intr ic y c le s, toy s, and other obje cts. Mr. Nicke ns and Mr. Hunt c arried the victim o u t o f t h e h ouse at approximately

6:03 a.m. Mr. Nicke ns noticed t h at the def endant “ [s] eeme d rathe r ca lm for the situation at hand.”

Patrick Hunt testified that he was a firef ighte r and an emer g ency

medical tec hnician in 1992 when he arrive d at t he fire s cene , wher e he saw hea vy smoke and fla mes coming from the front door. The def

endant a pproac hed him and told him that his girlfrie nd was inside the house . The fi re fi g hte rs we re able to “ kn oc k d ow n” the fi re qu ic kly , a ndMr . H un t be g a n s e arc hin g fo r the vic tim

. B e fo re the vic tim

wa s f ou nd , M r. Hu nt’ s b re a thi ng un it b e c a me de ple te d o f air , a nd he re turne d to the fi re truc k f

or a ne w o ne

. Th e de fe nd a nt app ro a c he d him a g a in a nd sa id, “ I kn ow wh e re sh e ’s a t. She’s in the bac k of the house thr oug h a door in the kitchen.” Mr. Hunt re -ente red the house, and he and Mr . Nickens w ent to the utilityroom door that Mr. Jenkins had just opened. The victim was ly ing pr one on the floor under a folding chair and som e toy s. She had no life si g ns. He opined that he a ndMr . N ic ke ns re mov e d the vic tim a t abo ut 5:4 2 a .m. He re c a lle d that Mr . Jen kin s h a d to ld h im that Jen kin s h a d to un la tc h the uti lit y ro om do or

. He a c kn ow le dg e d on c ro ss- e xami natio n th a t it is not uncommon for someone being suffoc ated to re treat and burrow under obje cts.

Another Me tro fi re de partment c aptian, Willi am McCormick, testified that he supervised the fire sc ene and did not enter the house . During the firefig ht and re scue ope ration, the defe ndant went to the front of the house and looked into the windows. Mr. McCormick a nd another firef ighte r esc orted the de fenda nt away from the house

. The defe ndant told Mr. McCormick that the p er s o n i n s i d e t h e h o u s e w as h i s s i s t er

. T h e d ef en d an t wa s agi t at ed an d s m el l ed o f a l co h o l , al t h o u gh his spe ech was not slurr ed, and he did not stag g er. When the victim wa s place d in the ambulance , the def endant c limbed o n t o the running board and tried to look inside the ambulance . Mr. McCormick ag ree d that Mr. J enkins had told him that the utili ty ro o m d o o r was latched whe n he found it.-6- David Miller testified that he investigated the fire in his capa city as a Metro homicide detec tive. He a nd Detec tive Mike Roland arrived at the sc ene at 6:20 a. m

. on Fe bruary 24, 1992. After Kenne th Porte r told him that the fire w as starte d with an ac cele rant, Mr. Miller me t with the defe ndant, obtained the de fenda nt’ s clothing, and reque sted the def endant to re nder a

hand-swa

b sample, which the defe ndant dec lined.

That evening , afte r obtaining a sear ch war rant, Mr. Miller ac companied A g ent J ames Cooper in recovering material samples from the burned house. He testified that in the kitchen, they found a bedspre ad on the floor, ly ing beneath the refrig erator and “all the way around out towa rds the [uti lityroom] door.” He te stified that the bedsp re ad ap p eared to be soa ked in some kind of
acc eler ant, that he c ould smell an acc eler ant, and that he found a plastic containe r nea

rly full of what appea red to be kerose ne on the f loor nea r the utilit y room door. He testified that Otis J enkins had told him t hat the utilityroom door wa s latched. Mr

. Miller testified that he teste d the latch by g oing inside the utilit y

room and be ing una

ble to p u s h h i s way

out throug h the door a fter A g ent Cooper
e xpe ri me nta lly

e ng a g e d th e la tc h. Mr . M ill e r a c kn ow le dg e d, ho weve r, that he didno t “ pu t hi s sh ou lde r i nto it. ” Mr . M ill e r fo un d a smo ke de te c tor

ly ing on e ith e r the wa sh e r o r dry e r i n th e uti lit y room. The de tector ha d neither a covering nor

b at t er i es . Mr. Miller testified that Mr. Cooper collecte d materia l samples and g ave the m to him, t hat he placed them inside airtig ht metal container s, and that later

he deliver ed them to the TB I laboratory

. Mik e Rol a ndte sti fi e d th a t, a s a ho mic ide de te c tiv e , h e ass is ted Da vidMil le r i n inv e sti g a tin g the vic tim ’s de a th. He ini tia lly int e rv ie we d me mbe rs of the Al c orn f

a mil y to “ g e t a g rasp” of th e s itu a ti o n a n d le ar n e d f r o m th e m th a t th e y h a d h e ar d a n e xp lo s io n a n d h a d s e e n the defe ndant running around the house y elling and perhaps t ry ing to g et i nto the hous e. Mr. Miller then interviewe d t h e d ef

endant a fter the fire and rec ounted that the def endant sa id that in the evening be fo re the fi re , th e de fe nd a nt andthe vic tim ha d b e e n o ut dri nking , th e y ret urn ed ho me , a ndfe ll
a sle e p in the liv ing ro om b e fo re re tiring to the be dr oo m. Mr

. Rol a nd te sti fi e d that the de fe nd a nt t old him that he had aw akene d, smelled smoke, y elled for the victim, and st arte d out of t he house. The defe ndant said that he notice d the victim heading for the kitchen. In a later interview, the defe ndant told Mr. Roland that he was leading the victim out of the bedroom by the hand whe n she jerke d away and we nt toward the kitche n. Mr. R o l an d prese nted audiotape s and transc ripts of the def endant’ s state me nts

. On cr oss-examination, Mr. Roland testified that the victim appear ed to have be en dresse d for be d. He rec alled that the defe ndant’s hair was sing ed and that one hand wa s bandag ed. After the fire , the def

endant did not appe ar to be upset or intox icated. Mr . Roland acknow l ed ged that befor e the of

fice rs collec ted evidenc e on the e veni n g o f Fe b ruary 24, the fire department had clea ned the f

loor in the house with a booster hose. He reme mbere d that water stood in the kitchen floor. When, in ref

ere nce to a photogra

ph, Mr. R oland was asked about a clean blue ciga rette lig hter that appea

red out of pla ce on the char red dr esser

in the bedroom, he ag ree d that someone must have le ft the lig hter t here afte r thefi re a ndthat it s p re se nc e c ou ld s ig nif y c on ta min a tio n o f the c ri me scene

.T he se i t em s had be en co l l ect ed by M r. C o o p er and t rans p o rt ed t o t he l ab o rat o ry by D avi d M i l l er. 2

A p p a re n tly , t hes e we r e t he i t ems col l ect ed by M r

. Ro l and, wh o as s i s t ed M r

. M i l l er i n i nv es t i gat i ng t he cas e. 3

-7- The TB I analy st who tested the material samples collec ted by Kenne th Porter and J ames Cooper

testified that a section of the be dsprea d and the plastic c ontainer f rom the kitchen, the smoke detec tor, and living room debris c ollected f rom nea r the fr ont door tested positively for the pre sence of a ke rosene rang e di s t i l l at e. The de fendant’s trousers a nd shirt contained no 2 distil late. 3

On cr oss-examination, the TBI analy st testified th at s h er e c e iv e d f r o m Ke n n eth Porter a soil sample taken from beneath the suspected point of fire orig in in the front room floor , a piec e of carpet taken from the s ame location on the front room floor, a te n-g allon plastic ca n found behind the house, and liquid collected fr om the driveway . None of these samples c ontained any chemica l distil lates. A sample of

wood flooring taken by Mr. Porter f rom bene ath the fr ont door sill revea led the pr e se nc e of

te rp e ne s, but th e a na ly st e xpla ine d th a t th e pr e se nc e of thi s c he mic a l pr ob ably resulted from the use of wood prese rvative on the door or the wood floor. T h e w o o d s ampl es c on ta ine d n o k e ro se ne rang e dis til la te . T he anal y st a c kn ow le dg e d th a t ke ro se ne rang e dis til la te prese nce on some of Mr. Miller’s sa mples could have resulted from tra nsfer ence by handling by

the office rs. She admitted that kerose ne could have been prese nt in some of the samples for an extended period of time.

J ames Cooper testified that he ha d retire d as an a g ent of the U nited States Depa rtment of Tre asury

Bur eau of

Alcoho l , T o b ac co an d Fire arms (A TF) . As an ATF ag ent, he ha d been a
certified fire investigator an d a fire -cause and origin spe cialist. Be cause local authorities had reque sted that he a ssist i n investigating the f ire that killed the victim, he inspec ted the house on the evening of Februa

ry 24, afte r t he fire department had washed t he flooring with a boost er hose . He opined that the washing did not obstruct or hamper his observation of the burn pattern. H e conc lu d e d th a t th e f

ir e b e g a n in th e f

r o n t r o o m. H e f

o u n d n o e v id e n c e o f

a n e le c tric a l o r

o th er acc idental cause of the fire. A kerose ne heate r found in the bedroom was not the cause of the fir e. He discove red a

saturation of kerosene in the ki tchen. The utilityroom door wa s closed during the fire. Mr. Cooper testified that Otis Jenkins told him that he had “had to use two hands to slide the bolt on the latch to the other side to ope n the door.”

Mr. Cooper testified that he collec ted material fr o m b e n e ath th ebaseboa

rd in the fr ont room bec ause liquid spilled in the floor would typically run under a base board and beca use the flooring beneath the baseboa rd wa s fre e of f

oot traff ic occ urring during and after the firef ight. Also, he found a

“V” pattern on the baseboa rd, which to him was “l i k e a re d flag waving at y ou,” indicating an ac cele rate d fire. Mr . Cooper pre sented a number of pict u re s an d s l i d es of the f ire
scene

. H e o p in e d , “ [T ]h is w a s a d e li b e r a te ly s e t f ir e , ar s o n

. So me b o d y w e n t in to th e h o use, and the ir de s i g n , t h e i r

i n t e n t , w a s t o s p r e a d t h e f i r e f r o mt h e f r o n tr o o mt o t h e b a c k

w h e r e t h e v i c t im was.”-8- Def ense c ounsel eng ag ed Mr. Cooper in a rigor ous cross-e x amination, during which the witness testified that the kitche n floor conta ined “[q]ui te a bit of water,” that a p o rt i o n of the liquid on the bedspread was water , and that he relied upon Detec tive Miller’s re port of his interviews of the fir efig hters and did not intervie w them per sonally other than to talk with Otis J enkins. Mr. C o o p er d id not see the house be fore the booster- hose cle ansing and did not see the front-r oom furniture in its pre-fire position. He insisted, howe ver, that the flooring in the front room e vinced a “pour pattern,” indicating that a liquid ac cele rant had been pour ed in the floor. H e admitted that poly ester f

rom furniture could melt onto the floor and simulate a pour pattern but maintained that he could disting uish a pour patter n from a poly ester me l t d o wn

. He a dmitted that one photogr aph showed that the latch bar was dark, as if it wa s coate d in car bon, which mig ht indicate that the ba r was not inserte d into the latch housing during the fire

.

Fire investigator Kenne th Porter testified for the defe ndant. He arrived on the sce ne of the fir e at 6:30 a.m. on F ebrua ry 24, 1992. He de termined that the point of orig in w as in the floor at t he front door and that the fire was started via a liquid ac cele rant. He opined that the pour pattern
cover ed 60 or 75 pe rce nt of the front room floor . The be dsprea d was not mentioned in Mr. Porter ’s report. He testified that a smell of kerose ne in the house could have emanated f ro m t h e k er osene heate r. He collecte d samples of soil be neath, and car pet from, the front room floor at the suspe cted po int of orig in, a ndhe c oll e c te d a wo odsa mpl e fr om u nd e r the fr on t do or sil l. He su bmi tte d th e se samples to the TBI

but destroy ed them whe n he re tired fr om the fire ma rshall’s off

ice. He testified that as a me ans of e nhancing his investigation , h e had the f ront room furniture , which had be en remove d during the fire fig ht, returne d t o i t s pre- fire position in the front room. He testified that radia nt heat can sometimes simul ate a pour pattern on a wood f loor.
Ruby Alcorn, the wi fe of Michae l Alcorn, testified that she was a wake ned on the morning of the fir e by

a commotion outside “like someone holler i n g. ” S h e did not hear an explos io n

. Sh e lo o k e d o u ts id e a n d s a w f lame s e man a ti n g f

r o m th e f r o n t d o o r a n d w in d ow of the h o u s e a cr o s s t h e s tre et

. T h e d ef en d an twa s s t an d i n g b y a t re e, j u m p i n g u p an d d o wn an d s cr ea m i n g, “L ori.” Ms. Alcorn y elled for her husba nd, who g ot up, donned his trousers, a nd ran a cross the street. He r son, B obby , followed his fathe r. On c ross-examination, she testified that the de fendant stay ed in the Alcorn home during the day of the fire. She attributed to him a statement very simil ar to that rec ounted by

Bobby Alcorn that the defe ndant knew the police suspec ted him of arson, followed by

his detailing w hat he would ha ve had to ha ve done to se t the fire. She also ag ree d that during the day , whene ver someone came t o t h e Alcorn home, the de fendant would go to the ba ck of the house. A t one point, he spent a long time in the bathroom, wher e he sha ved his fac ial hair, leaving a mess for

her to c lean up. She opined, “ He didn’t wor ry about any

body but himself.”
Metro police of

fice r John M urphy

testified t hat he was inst ructe d to secur e the f ire
scene and ar

rived at 9:30 a.m. on Febr uary 24. He wa s told to leave – and did leave – at 11:00 or 11:30 a.m. He did not re call whe ther other office rs ar

rived to sec ure the scene

.B y the ti m e o f t ria l, M s. D ra p e r h a d m a rr ie d a n d w a s id e n tif ie d a s R e g ina B e e n e

. 4

-9- Reg ina Dra

per B eene testified that in her c apac ity as an investigator for the district

4 attorney g ener al’s off

ice, in Aug ust 1993, she obtained 3 8 n eg atives of pictur es take n by Offic er J ames Goodman. She delivere d the neg atives to an a ssistant dist rict attorne y g ener al but never retrie ved them. She testified that she attempted to locate them but was unable to do so. She ag ree d that some of the pictur es off ere d into evidence in the defe ndant’s first trial had been t aken by J ames Goodman and c ould have be en produc ed fr om any number of the 38 neg atives.

J ames Goodman t estified that as a Metro police of

fice r he took photog raphs of the fire sc ene but ne ver r eviewe d the photog raphs.

Be tty Satterfield, the defe ndant’s mot her, te stified that she lived in Kansa s in 1992 and that whe n she lea

rned that the defe ndant had been burned, she sent for him to come to her home. When he ar

rived, he had burns on his fa ce and hands.

R.J . Corbin testified that as a firef ighte r, he arrived on the fire sc ene at 5:08 a.m. on Fe bruary 24, 1992. Upon hi s arrival on the first t ruck to re spond, the defe ndant hammer ed on the truc k d oo r and sai d th e re wa s a wo ma n in sid e the ho us e . M r. Cor binte sti fi e d th a t app ro xima te ly 40 minutes after

he ar rived, he had to esc ort the def endant a way

from the f

ront of the house

. Stewart B ay ne testified f

or the de fendant as an e x per t i n fi re investigation and fire scienc e. He acknow ledg ed that he did not visit the s cene of the fir e until after the house ha d been restore d but maintained that he ha s testified in other ca ses despite be ing una ble to persona lly

inspect the fire scene . I n the pre sent ca se, he studied the r ecor ds from the fi rs t trial, interviewe d the firef ighte rs, and e x amined the pictur es. He testified:

Th is f ir e was a Cla ss Afu e le d w ith pa pe r andpla sti c fa

bric s, acc idental natura l gr owing , meaning u nacc eler ated by a petr oleum
c omp ou ndty

pe fi re . Se c on dly , a na ly sis of the bu rnpatte rn s on Ms

. L anceand Mr. Garrett proved that Ms. L ance and Mr. Ga rre tt were expo s ed t o t h at fire at the same point in time with the fire . . . . F urthe rm or e , th e re are bu rnpatte rn s in dic a tin g a dir e c tio n q ua lit y

to the fire , and a he ight in the r oo m t o the fire . My finding s included that this fire was not fueled by kerose ne, the point of orig in was not on the floor, r ather

it was in the love seat. An d t h e ignition source was the c are l essly

dropped c iga

rette f rom an intox icated, w asted a s it were , person.

Mr. B ay ne elabor ated that based upon the medical r eports, the victim and the de fendant sustained burns on their fa ces and left arms as a result of be ing e x posed to the flame s in the living room at the same time. He opined that bec ause the b u rns wer e on the uppe r portions of the victim and the defe ndant, the fire did not originate i n t he floor. H e believe d that the burns on the c ouple wer eT he defendan t un derw ent a vo i r d i re e x ami n at i on by t h e t r i al j u dg e an d cou n s el t h at v al i dat ed h i s dec i s i on n ot 5

to tes tif y.
-10- c on sis te nt w ith the m try ing to re a c h the fr on t door a nd wi th the de fe nd a nt’ s sta te me nt to h im that, afte r a nig ht of drinking , the couple r etu rn ed h o m e an d smoked cig are ttes, with the victim falling aslee p on the love seat and the def endant f alling a sleep on the c ouch.

Mr. B ay ne opined that the f uel load in the fr ont room, including the furniture and the wood pane ling c overing the shee trock wa lls, ex plained the f ire g rowth. He opined that the defe ndant did not rece ive his burns from ig niting ker osene and that it was “impossible” for the victim to have
rec eived he r burns fr om inside the utili ty room. He dismissed the burn pattern on t h e fr o nt room floor as r esulting f

rom radia nt heat or “ flash over .”

Mr. B ay ne testified that the utilit y room door edg e had scuff marks which indicated that the door stuck in the door fra me. He testified that the defe ndant confirme d to him that the door tended to stick. Mr. B ay ne opined that the latch bar was “ very

car bonized.”

On cr oss-examination, Mr. Bayne testified that in re aching hi s conclusions, he ignor ed O ti s Je n k in s ’ c laim th a t th e u ti li ty r o o m d o o r h a d b e e n latc h e d

. H e d e c li n e d to sayhow much time elapse d b etween the deposit of a lit ciga rette in the love seat a nd the onset of a blaze, althoug h he sug g ested that the proce ss c ould ta ke minutes or hours. He opine d that the pre sence of the plastic conta iner of ke rosene in the kitchen wa s irrele vant to the cause of the fire. He conjec tured that beca use the c ontainer ha d three holes in the top, the fire fig hters o r i nvestig ators could ha ve sloshed some of the ke rosene onto the bedspre ad.

The de fenda nt did not testi fy in the case

. 5
I. Sufficiencyof the Evidenc e
The de fenda nt claims that the evidenc e is insufficient to support a c onviction of felony murder be cause the state failed to prove a ll of the elements of a rson, the fe lony

upon which the fe lony murder c onviction is based.

As an appe ll a te c o u r t r e v ie w in g th e s u f f ic ie n c y o f th e c o n v ic ti n g e v id e n c e , we essentially

view a dif

fer ent evidentiary

mosaic than did the trier of fac t. We se e the sa me tesser ae as did the trier

of fa ct, but on appea l the full mosaic has been alter ed: Diffe rent hue s emanate from the fa c t trie r’ s inf

e re nc e s and c re dib ili ty sh a din g s, a nd fr om theapp e llate pe rs pe c tiv e of the ov e ra ll i mag e, we see in hig hlight the f eatur es most favora

ble to the state. S e e S ta te v . Cabbage , 571 S.W. 2d 83 2, 83 6 (T e nn

. 19 78 ) (s ta tin g that on app e a l, the state is e nti tle d to the str on g e st l e g iti ma te view of the evidenc e and all reasonable or leg itimate infere nces w hich may be dra wn there from). Our re view of the evidentiary mosaic, thus highlig hted, is aimed at de termining whether any rational trier of fac t could have f

ound the essential e lements of the crime bey ond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. C ri m. P . 1 3( e ); J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. C t. 2781, 2782 (1979).-11- A jury ’s ver dic t of

g uil ty re mov e s th e pr e su mpt ionof inn oc e nc e a ndraise s a pres u m p t i o n o f guilt on appeal. State v. Grac e , 493 S.W .2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973) . The jury ’s g uiltyverdic t, approve d by the trial judg e, ac cre dits the testimonyof the witnesses for the state a nd resolves a ll factua l conflicts in favor of t he theory of t he state. Sta te v . H atc he tt , 560 S.W .2d 627, 63 0 ( Te nn . 1 97 8) ; State v. Townsend , 525 S.W .2d 842, 843 (Tenn. 1975) . On appe al, the def endant has the burden of overc oming the presumption of g uilt. Sta te v . B ro wn , 551 S.W .2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1977).

A crime may be esta blished by

direct evidenc e, cir cumstantial evidenc e, or a combination of the two. State v. Tharpe , 726 S.W .2d 896, 899-900 (Te nn. 1987). B efor e an a ccuse d may be convic ted of a

criminal off

ense ba sed upon circ umstantial evidence , the fa cts and the circ umstances “ must be so strong and cog ent as to exclude eve ry other re asonable hypothesis save the guilt of t he defenda nt, and that bey ond a re asonable doubt.” Sta te v . Cr awf or d , 225 Tenn. 478, 482, 470 S.W .2d 610, 612 (1971). “ A web of g uilt mus t be woven a

round the de fendant from which he c a nn ot e sc ape a nd fr om wh ic h fa c ts andc ir c ums ta nc e s th e jury c ou ld dra w n o o the r r e a so na ble infere nce sa ve the g uilt of the defe ndant bey ond a re asonable doubt.” Id. at 484, 470 S.W.2d at 613.

Fo r p u rp o s es o f t h e p re s en tca s e, fe l o n y m u rd eri s co m m i t t ed b y

o n e w h o kills another in the perpe tration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any a rson, Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-202( a)( 2) (2003) , and arson is c ommitt ed by one who knowing ly damag es any structure by

means of a

fire or explos ion “[w]i thout the consent of all parties who have a possessory , proprieta ry or sec urity

interest ther ein,” id. § 3 9- 14 -3 01 . T he de fe nd a nt p os its that th e state faile d to e sta bli sh that the ho us e a ndits c on te nts
wer e dama g ed with ou t the c on se nt of all persons having a possessory or propriety interest ther ein.
We disag ree . The e vidence showed that the de cea sed victim resided w ith the de fe nd a nt i n th e fi re -d a ma g e d h ou se . T he e vid e nc e a lso re ve a le d th a t th e ho us e c on ta in e d h ou se ho ld furnishing s and other pe rsonalty

. A phot og raph de picted smoke-damag ed bedr oom furniture w here the vic tim a nd the de fe nd a nt s le pt. Al l in a ll, the c ir c ums ta nti a l e vid e nc e wa s su ff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh that th e vic tim

ha d at le a st a

po sse sso ry

int e re st i n th e ho us e a ndfu rn ish ing s.

W e h o l d t h at t h e ev i d en ce al s o ci rc u m s t an t i al l y s u p p o rt s a fi n d i n g t h at t h e d am age wa s c a us e d w ith ou t th e vi cti m’ s con se nt. On e c omp on e nt o f the e vid e nc e that c ir c ums ta nti a lly established that the de fenda nt set the fire is that the defe ndant place d the victim in the utili ty room a ndla tc he d th e do or fr om the ou tsi de be fo re se tti ng the fi re

. Th is c omp on e nt a lso se rv e s to e sta bli sh an abse nce of the victim’s c onsent. We a re confide nt the re is no rea sonable basis for theorizi ng that the victim consented to setting fire to a house in which she was tra pped and doome d to die by inh a lin g no xious g a se s.

Acc ording ly , we conclude that the evidence sufficiently supports the jury ’s finding that the def

endant committed f

elony murder based upon its finding that the victim’s de ath re sulted from the de fenda nt’s perpe tration of ar son.-12- II. False Testimony

Th e de fe nd a nt arg ue s th a t th e state sp on so re d f a lse te sti mon y

fr om thr e e wi tne sse s, Bobby Alcorn, James Cooper, a nd Dav i d M i l l er . Specifica lly , the def endant a lleg es that ea ch of these witnesse s testified at the instant trial diffe rently than they testified at his first trial and that the differ ence s in the witnesses’ testimonies wer e detrimental to him.

Th e state ma y no t kn ow ing ly pr e se nt fa lse te sti mon y a ndha s a n a ff

ir ma tiv e du ty

to
corr ect the f

alse testimony

of its witnesses. See G iglio v. United States , 4 05 U. S. 1 50 , 15 4, 92 S. Ct

. 76 3, 76 6 ( 19 72 ); State v. Spurlo ck , 874 S.W .2d 602, 617 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) . The state’ s failure to corre ct fa lse testimony of a w itness violates due proce ss of law a s g uaranteed by the United S t at es an d T en n essee constitutions. Gi gli o , 4 05 U. S. at 15 3- 54 , 9 2 S. Ct. a t 76 6; Spurlock , 874 S.W .2d at 618. I n order to obtain a new trial, the ac cused must establish t hat the prose cution knowing ly

prese nted fa lse testimony that was mate rial. State v. Cureton , 38 S.W .3d 64, 74-75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) . I n deter m i n i n g the materiality of the testimony , the inquiry become s whether a re asonable likelihood ex ists that the false test i m o n ycould have aff ecte d the jury ’s judgme nt. Se e Gi gli o , 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S. Ct . at 766.

A. B obby

Alcorn

The de fe n d ant asserts that by comparing the following colloquies from the defe ndant’s first a nd second tria ls, this court should conclude that Bobby Alcorn te stified falsely

at the de fe nd a nt’ s se c on d tria l.

The following is an ex cer

pt from Bobby Alcorn’ s direc t examination testimonyat the de fe nd a nt’ s f

ir st t ri a l:
Q: Okay

. What was the first thing y ou saw whe n y ou went out of y our house?

A: Fire was hovering around the door fac ing and th e w i ndow fac ing, I mean, just like this right he re, shwissssssh.
Q: An d wh at wa s M r. Ga rr et td o i n g?

A: Well, w h en I

g ot there – I

took off running acr oss the road and my Dad wa s to the sidewalk, and he picked up some thing
a ndbu ste d o ut that wind ow

. An d by the tim e my Da d g ot t o that one he’d take off

to the next one. MyDad busted out that window. I

mean, he busted – [the defendant] busted out that wi nd ow a ndthe n my

Da d w e nt ove r the re a ndwa s try ing to l i s t en t o s ee i f h e c o u l d h ea r a n y t h i n g, h ea r h erh o l l er i n g.-13- Q: L et m e back up just a mi nute. What’s the very first thing y ou saw Claude G arr ett do when y ou came up on the sce ne?

A: Well, he was at the w indow

. I seen him pick up something and he buste d out the window.
Q: Was it a lawn cha ir?

A: Some type of c hair.
Q: He wa s picking it up?

A: Yeah.

. . . . Q: Okay . You see med to b e i m ply ing be fore that he broke the wi nd ow ou t wi tho ut lis te nin g to s e e if a ny bo dy wa s g oin g to
re sp on d, or

a nythi ng . Wa s th a t w hat y ou we re sa y ing or no t?

A: No. ‘Cause see, w hen my dad – whe n he – when I

come out of the ho us e a nd I se e n that fi re a nd I we nt ba c k up in to my room and g ot dressed, r

un acr oss the street a nd by then he g ot
– a s I wa s g e tti ng a c ro ss the str e e t he wa s p ic kin g up a c ha ir or something , I ’m pretty

sure it was a

chair

.

. . . . Q: Okay . L et me bac k up just one more time. You first looked
ou t th e wi nd ow be fo re y ou g ot dr e sse d a ndy ou sa w the ho us e on fire? . . . Did y ou see Mr. Gar rett at that time? Or just the house?

A. I can’ t remembe r. Q O k a y.
A: All I

reme mber is that house on fir e. Q: Okay . You told me that he wa s, when y ou g ot over ther e y ou said he wa s scre aming and hollering and running around the house, bre aking out windows, is that what y ou told me?-14- A: No, I

said he wa s busting out windows. . . .

The de fendan t al so prese nts this porti on of B obby Alcorn’ s cross-e x amination testimonyfrom the f

irst trial for the c ourt’s consider ation:
Q: All rig ht, well, did y ou see him st anding out in the y ard watching it burn?

A: No.
Q: Th e wh ole tim e y ou sa w h im he wa s ru nn ing aro un d try ing to g e t in a ndpu t it

ou t?

A: No , h e wa sn ’t

try ing to g e t in . H e wa sn ’t makin g no pr og re ss to ge t in.
Q: He wa s ju st b re akin g ou t th e wi nd ow s?

A: He wa s b us te d [si c ] out the wi nd ow s.
The de fenda nt a

rg ues that the following excerpt of B obby Alcorn’ s second tria l testimonycontains f a l s e t e s t i m o n y:

Q: When y ou looked outside, when y ou first look ed o u tside, what did y ou see?

A: J ust a firerea lly

blaz i n g out the front of the house. And I seen [the defe ndant], he was kind of squatted down by a tre e.

. . . . Q: No w w he n y ou g ot out sid e the ho us e , de sc ri be e xac tly a g a in what y ou saw a s far

as what w as g oing on acr oss the street[.]

A: Th e fr on t do or

a ndthe tw o fr on t wind ow s w a s ju st b la zing , it was rolling up, the fire wa s just rolling up the fr ont. And rig ht there by

wh er e i t say s chest or w hateve r, kind of diag onal of the h ouse is wher e the tre e wa s where I seen squatted down on side D.
Q: So y ou’re indicating on the left c orner of side A.-15- A: Yeah.
Q: An d s o th a t’ s th e sid e wh e re y ou sa w w hat?

A: Where I

seen [the def

endant] squatted down.
Q: And ca n y ou demonstrate fo r the jury , if y ou can ste p out of y our w it n e s s b o x f

o r a mo me n t, a n d d e mo n s tr a te h o w y ou saw him by

the tree ?

A: (Whereupon w itness complies.)
Q: Okay

. Ok ay

. Thank y ou. Did y ou eventua lly g o to where [ t h e d ef en d an t ] wa s s t an d i n g o r s q u at t i n g?

A: He wa s standing by the time I

g ot over ther e. Q: An d d id y ou se e n h im d o a nythi ng e lse a t th a t po int ?

A: I seen my dad, whe n my

dad g ot over ther e, whe n my dad g ot about to the sidewa lk and he g ot up and gra bbed the chair, a lounge chair

I think it was, and busted out a window.

The de fenda nt asserts that B obby Alcorn’ s first and sec ond trial testimonies conflict beca use B obby Alcorn testified at the first trial that the defe ndant was bre aking windows and y elling for the vic tim when he first saw him but testi fied at the second trial that the def endant wa s “squatted down” by a tre e while his house was burning when he first saw the de fendant. The def endant f urther
asserts that the state knew or should have know n that it was soliciting fa lse testimony from B obby Alcorn. T h e state c ounters that B obby Alcorn’ s testimonies are not contr adictory and that the a lleg ed inc on sis te nc y

is the re su lt of the wi tne ss’ s r e sp on se to t wo dif fe re nt q ue sti on s. Spe c if

ic a lly , th e state
asserts that at the defe ndant’s first trial, whe n asked, “ What was the first thing y o u s aw Claude Gar rett do whe n y ou came upon the sce ne? ”, Mr. Alcorn responde d that the defe ndant was “ at the wi nd ow ,” br e akin g it. At the se c on d tria l, M r. Al c orn c lari fi e d th a t w hil e he wa s sti ll a t his ho us e befor e he c rossed th e s t re et to the defe ndant’s house, he looked ac ross the stree t and saw the de fe nd a nt squ a tti ng by a tr e e . We a g re e wi th the state that th e dif fe re nc e in the tw o te sti mon ie s is primarily attributable to the defe ndant’s response s to dif fer ent questions. We recog nize, however , that in the first trial, B obby Alcorn te sti fi ed that whe n he first view ed the de fendant’s house fr om inside his house, he re ported see ing the house on fire but did not refer to seeing the def

endant sq uatti ng by

a tr e e . We c on c lud e that th is d isc re pa nc y may repr esen t more of a sh if t in e mph a sis than an a ctual contr adiction, and at any rate , there is no indication that the second tria l testimonywas false or that the state pre sented testimony that it knew to be fa lse.B y the ti m e o f t h e d e fen d a n t’s sec o n d trial, J a m e s C o o p e r h a d re tire d a s a n A T F sp e c ia l ag e n t. 6

-16- B. James Cooper

Next, the defenda nt complains that J ames Cooper, who was a spec ial ag ent with the Bur eau of Alcohol, Tobac co, and F irea rms (ATF ) and w ho investigated the instant crime, testified 6 falsely at his second trial that he int ervie wed a firef ighte r about whether the door to the utilityroom wher e t h e v i ct i m was found w as latche d when the f irefig hters ente red the house. The de fenda nt pr e se nts the fo llo wi ng te sti mon y in s up po rt

of his arg ume nt:
[F ro m th e fi rs t tria l:]

Q: Did y ou talk with the fire department to determine how much of the house they tore up, and how much was like t hat alre ady , and how much the fire mig ht have done [? ] C an y ou jus t te ll f ro m lo oking a t it

wh a t the fi re de pa

rt me nt tor e ou t?

A: I did not t al k t o anyfiref

ighte rs that ac tually

suppressed the fi re. Again , the y

we re n’ t th e re a t th e sc e ne a ndI wa s ju st there to determine the cause and orig in of the fire . I f they ’re normall y there , y es, we would interview the m, ag ain, how they attacke d the fire and so forth.
Q: So y ou didn’t ask anybody specific ally , did y ou kick this or .

A: No, sir.
Q: . . . did that sprea d g et pus hed up there by the fire department
or wa s that where it was all the time?

A: I didno t in te rv ie w the fi re fi g hte rs in r e fe re nc e to that.
[F ro m th e se c on d tria l:]

Q: During the cour se of y our coming to a conc lusion, or opinion, in th is s itu a ti o n , d idy o u a tt e mp t t o in te r v ie w a n y o f the fireme n that [si c] were there ?

A: I did interview the f

iremen. I

was pa rticularly concer n ed about the latch sy stem on the door whe re Ms. L ance was found behind.
Q: Do y ou reme mber who y ou spoke to?-17- A: I talked to the ca

ptain. Ba sically

– I made obse rvations that if the door wa s locked that door w o uldn’t be standing there

. I n other wor ds, they

would have ta

ken that door down wit h a fire a x . They

alre ady know [si c] that we have Ms. L ance back there somewher e in the house. They are g oing in ther e to do
a re sc ue

. So, the y kn ow the re is a hu ma n be ing ba c k th e re , s o they ’ve g ot to ge t there. Time is c rucia l. But, if it was locked the door would ha ve bee n taken of f.

I talked to Captain Jenkins. . . .
[L a te r i n M r. Coo pe r’ s te sti mon y , th e fo llo wi ng c oll oq uy tr a ns pir e d:]
Q: So what is y our under standing of the position of that when Ms. L ance was found? W as it latched or unlatched?

A: Ag a in, ta lki ng to Captain Jenkins , it wa s la tc he d. He ha d to use two hands to unlatch –

Th e de fe nd a nt p os its that th e se te sti mon ie s r e ve a l th a t Mr . Co op e r t e sti fi e d f a lse ly when he reported that he inter viewed Ca ptain J enkins and that the state sponsored what it knew or should have known w as fa lse testimony . The state c ounters that the two testimonies do not conflict beca use in th e f

ir s t tria l, M r

. Co o p e r te s ti f ie d th a t h e d id n o t in te r v ie w a n y f ir e f ig h te r s who suppre s s ed the fire and may have damag ed the house , wher eas in the se cond trial, Mr. Cooper testified that he inter viewed Ca ptain J enkins reg arding whether the ut ilityroom door wa s latched. Captain J enkins’s role at the fire w as to locate the victim, ra t h er t h an exti ng uish the fire. Acc ording ly , the state a

rg ues that the two testimonies are consistent. We conclude that when view ed as a whole, the t rial t ransc ripts do not conclusively demonstrate that Mr. Cooper testified f alsely at the s e c o n d tr i a l

. A c c o r d i n g l y , w e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s n o t d e m o n s tr a t e d t h a t t he sta te k n o w i n g l y i n tr o d u c e d f

a l s e t e s t i m o n y b y i n tr o d u c i n g M r

. C o o p e r ’ s t e s t i m o n y.
C. David Miller

Finally , the def

endant a rgu es t hat Dete ctive Da vid Mill er te stified falsely at the
se c on d tria l, a s r e ve a le d b y the inc on sis te nc ie s b e tw e e n h is f ir st andse c on d tria l te sti mon ie s. Specifica lly , the def

endant notes that Detec tive Miller testified at t h e first trial that the kerosene

soaked be dsprea d was “ lay ing long way s . . . in front of the utility room door,” where as at the second trial, Dete ctive Miller testified that the be dsprea d drape d from the e dg e of the ref rig erator to the door betwee n the kitchen a nd the living r oom, forming the basi s for his conc lusion that the arsonist’s intent was to sprea d the fire from the fire’ s orig in in the front room to the kitchen. The defe ndant further asserts that in the first trial, Detec tive Miller testified t hat he collecte d evidenc e under Mr. Cooper’s dire ction and that this statement was supported by Detec tive Mike Roland’s testimony that Detec tive Miller was “ doing the actua l coll ection of evidence ” at the c rime sce ne. The defe ndant-18-

asserts that this testimony from the f irst trial contradic ts Mr. Cooper’s testimony at the sec ond trial that he wa s collecting evidenc e, not Dete ctive Miller. The defe ndant pre sents the following te sti mon y of Mr . Co op e r i n s up po rt

of his arg ume nt:
[F ro m th e se c on d tria l:]

Q:

. . . y ou took a sample of kerosene from that jug and y ou put it i nto a lit tle via l?

A: A vial. Yes, sir.
Q: Ho w d id y ou do that?

A: Very

car efully , without spil ling on the be dsprea d.
Q: Th a t vi a l is abo ut that bi g , is n’ t it ?

A: Ye s, sir . A g a in, I wa s a ble to p ut s ome in the via l.
Q: How?

A: I didn’t pick the jug up and pour it in. No, sir. Ag ain, I don’t know – I am try ing to r emember . Did I open the mouth and stick it – Idon’t reme mber.
Q: I t is melted shut. You couldn’t g et the lid open.

A: I a m te sti fying , s ir , I do n’ t re me mbe r. B ut I wa s v e ry c are fu l. I do re me mbe r I too k a sampl e ou t of that f ive g a llo n p la sti c container [] containing kerose ne and put it in a vial. I do
reme mber that, sir. And I was very conscious of not spilling it on the bedsprea d.
Q: An d h ow did y ou c oll e c t th e be ds pr e a d s a mpl e ? Di d y ou us e a p ai r o f s cis sors? Did y ou use a knife ? How did y ou g et that?

A: I had a knif

e . . . .

. . . .-19- Q: . . . You have alre ady been show n t h at sample of de bris that y ou took out of t he li ving room, that y ou said y ou took from the base board?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And y ou took a piece of the ba seboar d?

A: Some of the base board. Y es, sir.
Q: An d y ou too k o th er deb ri s – wh e re didthe re st o f the de bris come f rom? That whole can is full of debris. W here did that oth e r s tuf f c ome fr om?

A: Sir, I

took that – that was up ag ainst the baseboa rd. I did not want to dist u rb t h e base board w here the V-pattern, wa s, the small V-pattern, then y ou have that wi d e V-pattern on the baseboa rd.
Q: Uh-huh.

A: I went ahe ad and c ollect ed what wa s ag ainst the baseboa rd, pu t i t i n t h e c a n , t h e n , I t o o k s o m e o f t h e b a s e b o a rd my se lf and put it in the can.

The de fenda nt asserts that this testim ony demonstrates an inconsistency betwee n the first and sec ond trial testimonies, specifica lly a d i s cr ep an cy

about who collec ted evidenc e at the crime sc ene, D etec tive Miller or Mr. Cooper

.

I n reg ard to the de fendant’s assertion tha t Detec tive Miller testified fa lsely at the second tria l about t he placement of the kerosene- soaked bedsprea d, the s tate responds that Detec tive Miller testified at both trials that the bedspr ead w as located in front of the ref rig erator and that he
never contra dicted himself on this point. Rega rding the def

endant’ s assertion that De tective Miller pe rj ur e d h ims e lf

by te sti fying a t the se c on d tr ia l th a t Mr . Co op e r c oll e c te d th e e vid e nc e a t th e c ri me scene wher eas he testified at the first trial that he c ollected the e vidence himself, the state a rg ues that the two testimonies are consistent b ec au s e Detec tive Miller clarified at the se cond trial that Mr. Coo pe r a c tua lly

c oll e c te d th e e vid e nc e a ndthat he a ssi ste d M r. Coo pe r i n h is c oll e c tio n p ro c e du re s. Furthermore , the state a

rg ues that any discrepancy in the testimonies c an be attributed to the eff ect that the eleve n-y ear

passag e of time may

have h ad o n De t ective Mill er’ s memory of the e vidence collection.

We c on c lud e that th e de fe nd a nt h a s n ot d e mon str a te d that th e state kn ow ing ly prese nted fa lse testimony by offe ring Mr. Cooper’ s testimonyat the sec ond tr i al that he c ollected-20-

evidenc e at the c rime sce ne. The testimonyprese nted by the def endant in support of his ar g ument does not definitively

demonstrate the falsity

of Mr. Cooper ’s testimony , and we hold that any dis c re pa nc y be tw e e n the tw o te sti mon ie s is no t in dic a tiv e of pe rj ury bu t r a the r m a y

be a ttribu te d to an inac curate re collection er oded by the sig nificant pa ssag e of time betwee n the crime and the instant trial. See, e .g., State v. Charles E. Robinson , No. M 2004-01163-CCA-R3-CD, sl ip op. at 6 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. , Na sh vil le , Aug . 17, 20 05 ) (h old ing that the de fe nd a nt f a ile d to de mon str a te that th e state knowing ly

prese nted fa lse, as opposed to inac curate, testimony and noti ng that “[t] he pre sentation of ina c c ur a te te sti mon y by a state ’s wi tne ss do e s no t e qu a te to a sh ow ing that th e state kn ow ing ly sponsored fa lse testimony ”).

III . Admission of Expert Testimony

The de fenda nt complains that the trial court errone ously allowed Mr. Cooper to offe r expert te s t i m o n y reg arding the “pour pattern” of ac celler ants that he de duced by examining the defe ndant’s house. Spec ifically , the def endant a rg ues that the trial court should have require d Mr. Coo pe r t o d e mon str a te a

sc ie nti fi c a lly

re a so na ble stand ard f

or hi s c on c lus ion that th e fi re wa s a result of arson and, spec ifically , that a “pour pattern” exis ted on his front room floor prior to being allowed to testify

befor e the jury

. T h e d efendant asse rts that the trial court did not conduct the requisite re view to d e termi n eth etrustworthiness of Mr. Cooper ’s method of disce rning pour patterns and that Mr. Cooper offe red no scientific evidenc e in support of his c onclusions that a pour pattern e xi s t e d

. T h e s t a t e c o u n t e r s t h a t t h e tr i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d M r

. C o o p e r a s a n e xp e r t w itn e ss based on his extensive training and experienc e in fi re ca u s e and origin investig ation and that Mr. Cooper off

ere d sufficie nt e vidence to support his conclusion of the exis tence of a pour pattern in the defe ndant’s fr ont room floor.

All ev i d en ce, including e x pert testimony , must be relevant. Tenn. R. Evid. 402. Relevant e vidence is evidence “having any tendenc y to make the e x istence of any fac t that is of conseque nce to the de termination of the a ction more proba ble or l es s p ro b ab l e than it would be without the evidence .” Te nn. R. Evid. 4 0 1

. R eleva nt evidence may be excluded if its probative value is “substantially

outweig hed” by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice. T enn. R. Evid. 403.

The a dmissibi lityof expert testimony is gove rned by

Rules 702 and 703 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Evide nce. McD aniel v. CSX Transp., Inc ., 95 5 S.W.2 d 257 (T e nn . 199 7) . Ru le 70 2 a dd re sse s th e ne e d f

or e xpe rt te sti mon y

a ndthe qu a lif

ic a tio ns of

the e xpe rt :

I f s c ie nti fi c , te c hn ic a l, o r o the r s pe c ia lize d k nowl e dg e wi ll
su bs ta nti a lly

a ssi st the tr ie r o f f

a ct to un derst a ndthee vid e nc e or to deter mine a

f a c t i n is s u e , a

w it n e s s q u a li f

ie d a s a n e xp e r t by knowledg e, skill, ex perie nce, tr aining , or educ ation may testify in the form of a n opinion or otherwise.

T e n n

. R

. E v i d

. 7 0 2

. It s c o u n t e rp ar t , R u l e 7 0 3 , f o c u s e s o n t h e r e l i ab i l i t y o f e x p e r to p i n i o n t e s t i m o n y:-21- The fa cts or data

in the particula

r ca se upon which an expert bases a n opinion or i nfer ence may be thos e perce ived by or made known to the expert at or befor e the hearing. I f of a type rea sonably relied upon by experts in the particular

field in forming opinions or infere nces upon the subject, the fac ts or data need not be admissible in evidenc e. The court shall disallow testimony in the form of an opini on or infer ence if the under ly ing f

acts or data indicate la ck of trustworthiness.

Tenn. R. Evid. 703.

Gene rally , the admissibilit y of expert testimony

is a matter e ntrust ed to the sound d i s cr eti on of the trial c ourt, and ther e can be no re versa l on appea l absent cle ar a buse of that discretion. Sta te v . B all ar d , 855 S.W .2d 557, 562 (Tenn. 1993)

. As emphasized by

the def endant, the trial court had a duty to r eview the basis for Mr. Cooper’s opinion and de termine its trustworthiness. The tria l court must “determine whether the
rea soning or

methodology underlying the scientific evidence is sufficiently valid and re liable, and whether it can prope rly

be applied to the f

acts at issue.” McD aniel , 955 S.W .2d at 258. The c ourt must be satisfied that the expert “opinions are based on r eleva nt scientific methods, proc esses, a nd data, a nd not upon an expert’s mere speculation.” Id. at 265.

The re cord does not reve al t hat t he trial c ourt abused its discre tion in acce pting Mr. Cooper as a n expert and allowing him t o o ff er h i s conclusions re g arding the pre sence of a pour patter n i n the front r oom of the def endant’ s house. The de fendant arg ues that Mr. Cooper ’s testimonyfailed to e stablish a reliable scientific ba sis for his opinion that a pour pattern exis ted on the floor of

the front r oom in the defe ndant’s house. H oweve r, wh en v i ewing Mr. Cooper ’s testimony as a whole, we find that the court had a sufficie nt ba sis f or allowing Mr. C o o p er ’s testimony and acc ording ly did not abuse its discr etion by admitting it. Mr. Coope r testified that he had bee n extensivelytrained in fir e investig ation, had investigated betwee n 150 and 200 fire s, and had instructed othe rs in fire inve stigation. Mr. Cooper based his c onclusion on his observation that the front r oom had suffe red f ire da mag e, whe rea s the other r ooms in the house had only suffe red smoke and he at damag e. More over, Mr . Cooper dete rmined t he ex istence of a pour pattern in the front room based upon his experience of ex amining nume rous fire scene s. He opined that radiant he a t dama g e is o ft e n mi sta ke n f or a po ur patte rnby

le ss e xpe ri e nc e d f

ir e inv e sti g a tor s b ut that hi s extensive ex perie nce a llowed him to make that distinction and definitively identify the exist ence of a pour pattern in the defe ndant’s fr ont room. At trial, Mr. Cooper e laborated that he e x amined the baseboa rds in the def

endant’ s front room bec ause an acc ellerant will usually run under a base board. Under one base board he discover ed a “ V pattern,” which is c aused by an ac celler ated f

ire. Mr. Cooper testified that these individual conclusions formed the ba sis for his o p i n ion that the de fe nd a nt’ s h ou se fi re ha d b e e n d e lib e rate ly se t.

As noted ea

rlier in this opinion, defe nse counsel subjected Mr. Cooper to a rig orous cross-e x amination, in which he e licited, int e r a lia , that Mr. Cooper did not interview many of thePur s u an t t o Bur ns , an o ff e n se is l e sse r-inc lud e d if : 7

(a) al l of i t s st at ut o ry el em ent s are in c lud ed wi t hi n t he st at ut o ry el em ent s o f t he of fen s e ch ar g ed; or
(b ) i t f ail s t o m ee t t h e d e finit i o n in p art (a) o nly i n the re sp ec t t ha t i t co ntains a st at ut o ry el em ent or el em ent s est ab l i shi ng
( 1) a di f fer en t me n t al s t at e i n di ca t i n g a l es s er k i n d of c u l pabi l i t y ; a n d/ or
(c o n tinu e d ...)
-22- wi tne sse s p e rs on a lly

de sp ite his ass ert io n that wi tne ss o bs e rv a tio ns play e d a c ru c ia l r ole in h is analy sis of a fire scene , that Mr. Cooper did not observe the defe ndant’s house befor e the booster

ho se c le a nin g , a ndthat he didno t se e the fr on t f urnitur e in i ts p re -f

ir e po sit ion . D uring c ro ssexamination, Mr. Cooper conce ded that a pour pattern c ould be mimicked by a poly ester me ltdown, althoug h Mr. Cooper insisted that he could disti ng uish betwee n the two. Moreove r, the de fendant pr e se nte d th e te sti mon y

of his ow n e xpe rt , Stew art B a y ne , who te sti fi e d th a t th e fi re wa s a c c ide nta l, unaided by

acc ellera nts.
Thus, we c onclude that ther e wa s a sufficient indicia of reliability to support the trial
c ou rt ’s de c isi on to a llo w M r. Coo pe r’ s e xpe rt te sti mony a ndthat de fe ns e c ou ns e l’ s a rt fu l c ro ssexamination of Mr. Cooper couple d with the defe ndant’s pre sentation of a competing version of the fire’ s cause throug h the testimony of his ow n expert witness g ave the jury ample opportunity

to rejec t M r

. C o o p e r ’ s t e s t i m o n y. IV. Jury Instructions

The ne x t issue that the defe ndant ra ises on appea l presents a compendium of complaints about the jury instructions that w ere and wer e not g iven at his trial. Be fore addre ssing these c omplaints, we beg in with a brief ove rview of this case.

The offe nse for which the de fendant stands convicted oc curr ed in 1992. At that time, first deg reefelony

murder w as def

ined as a “re ckless killing of another committed in the perpe tration of, or attempt to perpe trate” an enumer ated felony

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202( a)( 2) (1991) . The de fe nd a nt f

ir st s too d tria l in 19 93 , at wh ic h ti me the te st f or de te rm ini ng wh e the r an o ff e ns e is
n e c e s s ar i l y i n c l u d e d i n a n o t h e r o f f e n s e w a s c o n tr o l l e d b y Ho war d v . S tat e , 578 S.W .2d 83 (Tenn. 1979).
Subsequently , the def endant’ s conviction was vacated in 2001 by this c ourt on appe al from the de nial of post-convic tion relief. Se e Cla ud e Fr an c is G ar re tt v . S tat e , No. M1999-00786- CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Mar. 22, 2001). The de fendant was then re tried in 2003,
a t w hic h time the te st f

or de te rm ini ng wh e the r an o ff e ns e is n e c e ssa

ri ly inc lud e d in a no the r o ff

e ns e w a s c o n tr o l l e d b y Sta te v . E ly , 48 S.W .3d 710 (Tenn. 2001) , and State v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d 453 (Tenn. 1999). 7(

. . . con t i n u ed) 7 (2 ) a les s se ri o u s h a rm o r risk o f ha rm to the sa m e p e rs o n , p ro p e rty o r p u b lic i n t er es t ; or
( c) i t c on s i s t s of
(1) f aci l i t at i o n of t he o f fense charged o r o f

an off ense t hat other wi se meets t he def i n i t i on of

l es s er

- i n cl u ded of

fen s e i n pa r t ( a) or ( b) ; or
(2) s o l i ci t at i o n t o co m m i t t he o f fense charged or an o f

fense t hat other wi se meets t he d ef i ni t i o n of l ess er- i ncl ud ed off ense i n pa rt (a) or (b).

6 S. W

. 3d a t 466- 67.

-23-

The trial c ourt, at t h e defenda nt’s second tria l, instructed the jury on first deg ree

“ re c kle ss” fe lon y mur de r a nd inc lud e d ins truc tio ns on se c on d de g re e mur de r a nd cri mi nally
ne g lig e nt h omi c ide a s le sse r i nc lud e d o ff e ns e s.
A. I nstruction on Second De g ree Murder

The defe ndant complains that it was pre judicial err or for

the trial court to charg e the jury on second de g ree murder be cause second de g ree mu rd er was not a le sser include d offe nse of felony murder, a s it ex isted in 1992 at the time of t he homi cide in this case . The state a g ree s that the
c ha rg e sh ou ld n ot h a ve be e n g ive n b ut i ns ist s th a t th e e rr or wa s h arm le ss. Prior to the filing of Burns in 1999, the law wa s settled that second deg ree murder, a “know ing” k il li n g , w a s n o t a le s s e r in c lu d e d o f f e n s e o f “ r e c k le s s ” f

e lo n y mu r d e r

. A s th e court explained in State v. Gilliam , 901 S.W .2d 385 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) ,

“Rec kless” is a lesser inc luded mental state of “knowing ”. See Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 39-1 1- 30 1( a )( 2) (1 99 1) . Wh e n a c tin g re c kle ssl y est ab li s h e s a n e le me n t, th a t e le me n t is a ls o e s ta b li s h e d if the defe ndant ac ted knowing ly

. Id . Co nv e rs e ly , w he n a c tin g kn ow ing ly establishes an e lement, that eleme nt is not established if the de fendant acte d only

rec klessly

. See I

d. There fore , in or der to find a defe ndant g uil ty of se c on d- de g re e mur de r, a n e le me nt n ot c on ta ine d in fi rs t-deg re e fe lon y

mur de r ( the me nta l e le me nt o f “ kn ow ing ” ) mus t be established. It follows that, under Ho war d , second- deg ree murder is not a lesser include d offe nse of fi rs t-deg ree felony murder. T he only lesser included offe nses of first-deg ree felony murd er are re c kle ss h omi c ide , Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 39 -1 3- 21 5 [ ], a ndc ri min a lly neg lige nt homicide, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-212 (1991)

.-24-

901 S.W .2d at 390-91 (f ootnotes omitt ed). The sam e re s u l t h as been rea ched w hen ana ly zed
acc ording to Burns

. Se e Sta te v . B e n Mill s , No. W1999-01175-CCA-R3-CD ( Tenn. Cr i m

. App., J ac k s o n , M ay3 , 2 0 0 2 ) ( ap p l y i n g Burns to a “pipeline” case and conc luding “ second de g ree murder, which re quired a

showing of the ‘know ing’ mental state, would not hav e b ee n a lesser included of fe ns e of fe lon y mur de r a s it

e xiste d in 19 95 ” ). A c on tr ary re su lt, ho we ve r, app e ars mos t r e c e ntl y in W il li a mG le nn W

iley v. State, No . M 20 03 -0 06 61 -C CA R3- PC ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. , N a sh vil le , Se pt. 23, 2004), perm. app. gr anted (Tenn. F eb. 28, 2005 ) . The c ourt in that case applied Burns retroa ctively

in a post-convicti o n case when the de fendant’s notice of a ppeal f rom his orig inal jud g me nt w a s f

ile d th e sa me da y

that Burns was de cided, a nd the court concluded:

Ba sed upon Burns , we c onclude se cond deg ree murder w ould be a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e of “ re c kle ss” fe lon y mu rde r a s th a t of fe ns e was de fined prior

to J uly 1, 1995, just as it is under f elony murder a s it is define d for of

fense s committed on or afte r Jul y 1, 1995. Se e El

y , 48 S.W .3d at 721-22. In El y , second deg ree murder was found to be
a le sse r- inc lud e d of

fe ns e of fe lon y mur de r un de r the c ur re nt s ta tut e b as ed u p o n p art (b) of Burns

. Id . T he a dd iti on a l mens rea of
rec klessness in the prior statute w ould not eliminate second de g ree murder a s a lesser -included of fense of fe lony murder under the rationale of El

y
.
W illiam Glenn W

iley , slip op. at 10. Notably , then, in W illiam Glenn W

iley , this court a

pplied Burns to a pre -Jul y

1, 1995 homicide as a

predic ate f

or holding that the “r eckle ss” form of first deg ree felony murder inc luded the lesser offe nse of se cond deg ree murder. Apply ing this rule , the trial court in the prese nt case did not err.

I n th e e ve n t , h o w e v e r , t h e l a w d e v e l o p s t h a t s e c o n d d e g r e e m u r d e r i s n ot a lesser- included off

ense of “re ckless” f

elony murder a s that offe nse wa s defined prior to J uly 1, 1995,
we are c on fi de nt that th e ins truc tio na l in c lus ionof se c on d d e g re e mur de r i n th is c a se wa s h arm le ss err or. The jury did not convict the de fendant of second de g ree murder, and the jury reje cted both that offe nse and the char g ed lesser included off

ense of criminally

neg lige nt homicide.

Secondarily , the def

endant is ag g rieve d of t he cha rg e g iven for se cond deg ree murder be c a us e the ins truc tio n miss ta te d th e c or re c t mens rea
. The trial court instructed the jury that to find the defen d a n t g u il ty

o f s e c o n d d e g r e e mu r d e r

th e s tate mu s t h a v e p r o v e n th a t th e d e f e n dant unlawfully

killed the alleg ed victim and “that the killing was done rec klessly

. ” We ag ree that the tr i a l c o u r t m i s s t a t e d t h e l a w a n d s u b s t i t u t e d t h e p r o p e r m e n t a l e l e m e n t o f “ k n o w i n g ly ” wi th “re cklessly .” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210( a)( 1) (1991). Even so, the error, is harmless. The jury did not convict the def endant of second de g ree murder, and we a re at a loss to glean how such
e rr or wo uldha ve wo rk e d to the de fe nd a nt’ s d e tr ime nt.-25-

B. Rec kless Homicide

The de fenda nt complains that the t rial court failed to g ive an ins truc tio n f or re c kle ss h o m i ci d e a s a l es s e r i n c l u d e d o ff en s e o f f el o n y m u rd er

. T h i s co m p l ai n tn ee d n o td et ai n u s l o n g. Reckless homicide did not exist as a statutory offe nse in 1992, when the de fendant performed the acts lea ding to his indictment. Reckless homicide, codified at Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-215, wa s enac ted in 1993. See 1993 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 306 § 2, at 482-83. The ref ore, the trial court c ommitt ed no er ror by failing to char g e re ckless homicide a s a lesser included off

ense.

Re g a rd ing reck les s h om ici de, we n ot e th at b ot h t he d efen dan t and the sta temis ta ke nly relied upon the following passag e in Gilliam : “The o nly lesser inc luded offe nses of fir st-deg ree felony murder a re r eckle ss homicide, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-215 ( 1991), and c riminally neg lige nt homicide, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-212 (1991).” Gilliam , 9 01 S.W. 2da t 39 1. Th a t st a te me nt i s incorre ct inasmuch a s 1991 Replace ment Volume 7 did not contain code se ction 39-13-215; rather, it f ir st a pp e are d in the 19 94 po c ke t- pa rt Sup ple me nt to 1 99 1 Re pla c e me nt V olu me 7. Ho we ve r, in footnote 6, the Gilliam court did cor rec tly observe that t h e d ef

en d ant “cannot be c onvicted of
rec kless homicide bec ause the statute became effec tive on May 12, 1993, afte r the c ommissi on of the instant offe nse.” Id . at 391 n.6.

C. D e fi nit ion s o f Inte nti on a lly , K no wi ng ly , a ndRe c kle ssl y

T h e d e f e n d a n tn e x t a s s a i l s t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s i n s tru c t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n s o f

i n t e n t i o n a l l y, knowing ly , and recklessly

. To place his arg uments in perspec tive, we be g in by revie wing the jury char g e g iven in this case. B efor e p roviding the jury with instructions on the charg ed off ense of felony murder, the trial court g ave the following preliminary definitions of the terms “ rec klessly ,” “knowing ly ,” and “ criminally neg lige nt”:

Def initions of terms used in this cha rg e. Recklessly

means that a

person a cts re ck l essl y

when the person is aw are o f but consciously disreg ards a

substantial and
un jus tif ia ble ri sk that th e a lle g e d vic tim wi ll be kil le d. Th e ri sk mus t be of su c h a nat ure a ndde g re e that it s d isr e g ardc on sti tut e s a g ro ss de viat ion fr om the sta nd ardof c are that a n o rd ina

ry pe rs on wo uld exercise unde r all the c ircumstance s as viewe d fr o m t he ac cused pe rs on ’s sta nd po int

. Th e re qu ir e me nt f

or re c kle ssl y

is a lso estab lis he d if

it [is ]
s h o w n t h a tt h e D e f

e n d a n ta c t e d i n t e n t i o n a l l y o r k n o w i n g l y.

I nte nti on a lly

me a ns that a

pe rs on a c ts i nte nti on a lly wh e n it is the per son’s co n s ci o u s objective or de sire to cause death of the
a lle g e d v ic tim

.-26- Knowing ly

means that a person a cts with an aw are ness that his c onduct is r easona

bly certain to c ause the death o f t h e a lleg ed vic tim

. Th e re qu ir e me nt o f kno wi ng ly is a ls o e sta

bli sh e d if it i s s h o w n t h a tt h e D e f

e n d a n ta c t e d i n t e n t i o n a l l y.
Crimina l ly

neg lige nt means that a pe rson ac ts with criminal neg lige nce w hen the pe rson oug ht to be awa re of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the alleg ed victim will be kil le d. Th e ri sk mus t be of su c h a natur e a ndde g re e tha

t th e failu re to p e rc e ive it constitutes a g ross deviation fr om the standard of car e that an ordinary person would e x erc ise under a ll the circ umstances as viewed fr om the a c c us e d p e rs on ’s stand po int

. Th e re qu ir e me nt f

or c ri min a l ne g lig e nc e is a lso e sta bli sh e d if it is s h o w n th a t th e D e f e n d a n t a c te d in te n ti o n a ll y , k n o w in g ly or r e c k l e s s l y.
The trial c ourt then proc eede d to instruct t h e j u ry o n the cha rg ed off ense of felony murder.

I

sh a ll n ow pr oc e e d to e xpla in t o y ou wh a t in la w i t ta ke s to
con s titute the offense of first deg ree murder a s char g ed in the indictment in this case

. First degree murder. A ny person who c ommits first deg ree murder is g uiltyof a c rime.

F or y ou to f

indthe De fe nd a nt g uil ty

of thi s o ff e ns e , th e Sta te must have proven be y ond a re asonable doubt the exis tence of the fo llo wi ng e sse nti a l e le me nts :
On e , th a t th e De fe nd a nt un la wf ull y kil le d the a lle g e d v ic tim ; and
Two, that the killing wa s committed in the perpetr ation of or the attempt to pe rpetrate the alleg ed arson. That is, that t h e k i l ling
was c losely

connec ted to the a l l eged arson and w as not a sepa rate , distinct and independe nt event; and-27- Three , that the Def

endant intended to c ommit th e a l l eged arson; and

Four , that the Def

endant act ed intentionally . Ex cuse me , a c t e d r e c k l e s s l y.
The trial c ourt at that point restate d the def initions of re cklessly , intentionally , and knowing ly

g iven ea rlier, a nd it concluded with the f ollowing instruction re g arding arson:
To establish that the De fendant committed the underly ing of fe ns e of ars on , th e State mus t ha ve pr ov e n b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t th e e xiste nc e of

the fo llo wi ng e sse nti a l e le me nts : One, that the D efe n d ant, bymeans of f ire or e x plosion, damag e[d any

structure ], and
Two, that the De fendant did so with t he intent to destroy or damag e the struc ture for

any unlawful purpose , and

T h r e e , t h a tt h e D e f

e n d a n ta c t e d k n o w i n g l y.
Th e int e nt t o c omm it the un de rl y ing fe lon y mus t e xist prior to
or conc urre nt with the c ommissi on of the a ct causing the death of the vic tim

. The de fenda nt acknowle dg es that the trial c ourt’s instructions comport with State v. Page , 81 S.W .3d 781, 790-92 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (c oncluding that first deg ree preme ditated
mur de r, a kn ow ing se c on d d e g re e mur de r, vo lun tary mans laug hte r, r e c kl e s s h o m i c ide a ndc ri min a lly
ne g li g e n t h o mi c id e ar e “ r e s u lt

- o f

- c o n d u c t o f

f e n s e s ” ; A p p e n d ix o f

a p r o p e r ju r y c h ar g e included). He, ne verthe less, insists that the Page ins truc tio ns app ly on ly to o ff e ns e s c omm itt e d o n o r a ft e r Jul y 1, 1995; theref

ore, he maintains, the instructions are err oneous. We disag ree

. The statutory

definitions of rele vant culpable mental states appe ar in Code se ction 39-11-302. These definitions have not chang ed si nce their ena ctment as pa rt of the c omprehe nsive 1989 revision of Te nnessee ’s Criminal Code. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302( a) - (d) (1991 & 2003). The trial court in this case obviouslypatterne d its inst ructions re l at i v e to culpable mental states af ter the e x ample set forth in Page , for whic h we f ind no error . Admittedly

the sug g ested jury instructions set forth in Page are stated to apply to “Fir st Deg ree Murder

(Premeditate d Killing) ( For Offe nses Commit ted on or a fter July1, 1995).” 81 S.W .3d at 790. The de fendant, however , was not char ged wi t h p reme ditated first deg ree murder; his indicted off ense w as first deg ree felony murder, and even thoug h both premedi t at ed fi rst deg ree murder and felony murder w ere revised eff ective July1, 1995, Page focuse d on the prope r mens rea a nd its ap pli c ab le c on du c t e le me nts for-28-

c ri min a l of

fe ns e s. Th e st atu tory

de fi nit ion s o f r e le va nt c ulp able me nta l st a te s d id n ot c ha ng e in 1995.

The de fenda nt also maintains, without any supporting authority , that the trial court should not have instructed t he jury that the requirement of “knowing ly ” is established if shown that the def endant a cted “ intentionally ” and that the require ment of “r eckle ssly ” is established if shown that the def

endant a cted “ intentionally ” or “ knowing ly .” Those instruc tions, however, w ere approve d in Page a ndfi nd direc t su pp ort in Cod e se c tio n 3 9- 11 -3 01 (a )( 2) , w hic h p ro vid e s in
re le va nt p art : (2 ) Wh e n th e la w p ro vid e s th at

. . . re c kle ssn e ss s uf fi c e s to
e sta bli sh a n e le me nt, that e le me nt i s a lso e sta bli sh e d if a pe rs on a c ts int e nti on a lly

or kn ow ing ly . Whena c tin g kn ow ing ly su ff ic e s to establish to an eleme nt, that element is also est ab l i s h ed if a person
a c t s i n t e n t i o n a l l y.

Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 11 -3 01 (a )( 2) (1 99 1 & 20 03 ). Th e de fe nd a nt’ s a rg ume nt mus t f

a il.

I n a re lated ar g ument, the def endant f urthermor e insists that via t he instruction g iven fo r “ int e nti on a lly ,” th e tr ial cou rt “ c on str uc tiv e ly a me nd e d” the ind ic tme nt t o c ha rg e him wi th preme ditated murder when, in f act, he was c harg ed with a r eckle ss homicide perpe trated during the commission of arson. This arg ument is unavailing . Evidently the def endant is under

the er roneous imp re ssi on that on ly a re ckless homicide will suff ice to pr ove felony murder. H oweve r, a c onviction may be obtained e ven thoug h the proof show s that the killing w as intended. See State v . Frank W hit mo re , No. 03C01-9404-CR-00141, slip op. at 13 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxvill e, June 19, 1997).

Yet anothe r complaint that the de fendant reg isters is that the trial court pr ovided the ju r y w ith a n e rr o n e o u s a n d mi s le a d in g in s tr u c ti o n a n d d e f

in it io n o f th e mens rea e le me nts of fi rs t deg ree “re ckless” f

elony murder and the und er l y i n g felony of ar son. I n terms of the mens rea element of rec klessly , the defendant ag ain claims that the i nstructional l ang uag e taken from the Page decision is inadequate, and we ag ain re ject that conte ntion.
Although the defe ndant’s arg ument reg arding the mens rea element of arson is not
e nti re l y c l e ar , w e g l e a n t h a t i t f o c u s e s o n t h e c o n d u c t e l e m e n t t i e d t o t h e m e n t a l s t a t e re qu ir e d to pr ov e ars on . A s r e le va nt t o th is c a se , a n in div idu a l c omm its the of fe ns e of ars on “ wh o kno wi ng ly damag es any

structure by

means of a f

i re o r explosion . . . [ w]it h intent to destroy or dama g e any structure . . . for any unlawful purpose.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-301( a)( 2) (1991 & 2003). The offe nse re quires an a ct to be done “ knowing ly ,” which can ref er to a ll three c onduct eleme nts: (1) nature of conduct, (2) c ircumstance s surrounding conduct, and (3) r esult of conduc t. See id . § 39-11- 30 2( b) (“ ‘Kno wi ng ’ r e fe rs to a pe rs on wh o a c ts kn ow ing ly wi th r e sp e c t to the c on du c t or to circ umstances surr ounding the conduct when t he person is awa re of the nature of t he conduct or that the circ umstances e x ist. A person ac ts knowingly with res pect to a r esult of the per son’s conduc t-29-

wh e n th e pe rs on is a wa

re that th e c on du c t is reason ably c e rt a in t o c a us e the re su lt. ” ); Page , 81 S.W .3d at 787.

I n Sta te v . G e ne Sh e lto n R uc k e r, J r. , No

. E2 00 2- 02 10 1- CCA -R 3- CD (T e nn . Crim. Ap p

. , Kn o x ville, Dec. 9, 2004) , perm. app. de nied (Tenn. 2005) , this court considere d whether
a g g ra vate d a

rs on is a re su lt- of

- c o n d u c t of fe ns e . Re ly ing on the su pr e me c ou rt ’s de sc ri pti on of re su ltof-c onduct offe nses in State v. Duc ker , 27 S.W .3d 889, 895-96 (Te nn. 2000), we rea soned,

Under our ar son statute s , a per son commits agg ravated ar son “who commits arson” unde r additi onal, s pecif ied circ umstances ne cessa ry to elevate the ar son into ag g ravated a rs o n

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-302( a)( 1), (2) (2003). Simple arson is define d in terms of a person “ who k

no win glydamag es any

structure by means of a fire or explos ion.” Id . § 39-14-301( a) ( 2003) (e mphasis added)

. Gra mmatically

speaking , the w o r d

“ kn o w in g ly” modifies “damag es,” whi c h r e f e r s to th e r e s u lt o f th e p e r s o n ’ s c o n d u c t. N o n e th e le ss, the
ars on statut e do e s no t f

oc us pu re ly

on the re su lt –

that is , d a ma g e to a structur e. I nstead, the nature of the conduct – cr ea t i n g a fire or explos ion – that cause s the damag e to the structur e is conseque ntial and centr al to the offe nse. Measur ed acc ording to the parameters se t forth in Ducker , arson a nd ag g ravated ar son, theref ore, a re not result-of- conduct of

fenses; they

do not require that a def endant a ct wi th an a war e ne ss that se tti ng a fi re or c re a tin g a n e xplos ion is
rea sonably

certain to cause damag e to a struc ture.

Ge ne Sh e lto n R uc ke r, J

r. , slip op. at 12.

T h e trial c ourt in the instant case did not define the mens rea e l e m e n to f ar s o n in te rm s o f n a tur e of the de fe nd a nt’ s con du c t. T he c ou rt ’s c ha rg e in this c a se de fi ne d “ kn ow ing ly ” on ly wi th r e fe re nc e to the re su lt o f the de fe nd a nt’ s c on du c t; that is, “a c t[in g ] wi th an a wa re ne ss that hi s conduct is re asonably certain to c ause the death of the alleg ed victim.” Consequently , in our opinion, the jury was incorre ctly instructed on the “ knowing ” ele ment of ar son. The question then be comes wh e the r the ins truc tio na l e rr or wa s h arm le ss.
“The misstatement of an e lement in jury in s t ru ct i ons is subject to constituti onal harmless e rror

analy sis.” State v. Faulkne r , 1 5 4 S

. W

. 3 d 4 8 , 6 0 (T en n

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Po pe v . I lli no is , 481 U.S. 497, 501-03, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987)). L ikewis e, “[ t ]he failure to instruct the jury on a materia l element of a n offe nse is a constitutional err or subject to harmles s er ro r analy sis.” Id

. Re g ard le ss w he the r the e rr or in this c a se is c la ssi fi e d a s a mis state me nt or a n omis sio n of an e le me nt, the e rr o r q u a li f

ie s a s c o n s ti tu ti o n a l in n a tu r e

. T h a t s a id , in o u r v ie w th e in s tr u c ti o n a l e rr o r

was ha rm le ss b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t.-30- By defining the mens rea element of arson solely in terms of re sult-of-conduc t, the trial court did not lessen the state’s burden of proof. On the contra ry , the instruction inc rea sed the state ’s bu rd e n by

re qu ir ing pr oo f b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t th a t th e de fe nd a nt w a s a wa re that hi s conduct was rea sonably certain to c ause de ath. Se e id . at 59 (i nc lus ionof “ su pe rf luo us la ng ua g e in the ‘knowing ly ’ def

inition di d not lessen the burde n of proof beca use i t did not relieve the State of proving bey ond a re asonable doubt that the defe ndant ac ted knowingly ”). Furthermore , the essenc e o f t h e d efense theory

was that the f

ire ig nited acc idently

and wa s not fueled by

a che mical
a c c e lle rator . T hu s, c a us a tio n a ndno t th e de fe nd a nt’ s mens rea was the centr al issue. See P age , 81 S.W. 3da t 78 9 ( su g g e sti ng a n e rr on e ou s mens rea i n s tru c t i o n w o u l d l i k e l y b e h ar m l e s s w h e n i d e n t i t y, no t mens rea , was the disputed issue at trial).

Th e de fe nd a nt’ s f

ina l mens rea ins tr

uc tio na l e rr or

is that th e jury

wa s perm itt e d to presume that the death of the alleg ed victim supplied the intentional and knowing elements of the
un de rl y ing ars on . H ow e ve r, we are sa tis fi e d t hi s di d no t occ ur . T he tria l c ou rt wa s c are fu l to ins truc t th e jury

that th e int e nt t o c omm it the un de rl y ing fe lon y mus t e xist p ri or

to o r c on c ur

re nt w ith the c omm iss ion of

the a c t c a us ing the de a th o f the vic tim

.
D. Un la wf

ul P ur po se
Acc ording to the defe ndant, it was pre judicial err or for the t rial court to fail to define the “unlaw ful purpose” element of the underly ing offense of arson. We are not awa re of any such instructional require ment, and the defe ndant certainly cites no authority for this arg ument; nor does he ind ic a te ho w the te rm

sh ou ld ha ve be e n de fi ne d oth e r than su g g e sti ng that a n u nla wf ul p ur po se “denote s an intended r esult of a violation of furt h er [ s i c] s t atute or or dinance .” I nasmuch a s the state’s theory

was that the d ef

en d an t s et fire to the residenc e to kill the victim who was locked or trappe d in the laundry room, we believe it se lf-evide nt that the defe ndant’s purpose wa s “unlawf ul.”
E. Expert W itness I nstruction

The de fenda nt assails the trial court’s expert-witness instruction g iven in this case. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

c ha rg e d th e jury

in p art , The rule s of evidenc e provide t hat if scientific , technica l or other spec ialized knowledg e mi gh t as sis t the jury in understanding the evidenc e or in determining a fac t in issue, a witness qualified a s an expert by

rea son of spec ial knowledg e, skill or experience may testify and state his opinions co n ce rn ing suc h matters and g ive
r e a s o n s f o r h i s t e s t i m o n y. (Emphasis adde d).

Be cause Tenne ssee Rule of Evidence 702 speaks of an expert testify ing if scientific, technica l, or other spe cialized knowledg e will “substantially assist” the trier of fac t, T enn. R. Evid.-31-

702, the def

endant pr oposes that the trial court e rrone ously instructed and invited the jury to consider Ag ent Cooper’ s testimonyby a lower standard of

scrutiny – “mig ht assist.”

Our re view of the rec ord shows that the de fendant filed an orig inal motion for new trial and five subsequ ent amendme nts that added a dditional gr ounds seeking a new trial. The tria l court’s e x pert-w itness instruction is not among the cited g rounds. This issue acc ording ly has bee n waived. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 (e ) ( “ in a ll c a se s trie d b y a jury , n o is su e pr e se nte d f or re vie w s ha ll be pre dica t ed u p o n err or in the admission or exclusion of evidence , jury instructions gr anted or ref used, misconduct of juror s, parties, or c ounsel, or other action commit ted or occur ring during the tr ia l of the c a se , o r o the r g ro un d upo n whi c h a new tr ia l is so ug ht, un le ss the sa me wa s sp e c if ic a lly stated in a motion for ne w trial”) ; 36(a) ( “Nothing in this rule shall be construe d as re quiring relief be g rante d to a

pa rt y re sp on sib le fo r an e rr or or wh o f a ile d to take wh a te ve r a c tio n w a s r e a so na bly available to preve nt or nullify the harmful eff

ect of an error.” ). Even if

not waived, the issue a ffor ds the def endant no r elief. Evide nce Rule 702 addre sses the ad mi ssi bil ity of expert testimony and the trial court’ s role in considering w hether such testimony may be prese nted to the jury

. The rule does
no t in str uc t th e jury

ho w to c on sid e r the e xpe rt te sti mon y , a ndthe tr ia l c ou rt wa s c are fu l in thi s c a se t o a d v i s e t h e j u r y:

Mere ly beca use an e x pert witne s s has expressed a n opinion does not mean, how ever , that y ou are bound to ac ce p t this opi nion. The same as with any

other witness, it is up to y ou to decide w hether y ou be lie ve thi s te sti mon y a ndc ho os e to r e ly

up on it.
V. Confrontat ion and Compulsory Process Issues

A. Cross-examination of David Miller

Th e defe nd a nt c la ims that th e tr ia l c ou rt de nie d h im the c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o c on fr on t a dv e rs ary

wi tne sse s wh e n D a vidMil le r “ re fu se d to a ns we r q ue sti on s p ro po un de d to him by the def ense

. ” T he def

endant r efe rs to Mr. Miller’s re sponses to three que stions asked during
cross-e x amination. To a que stion about how Ag ent Cooper c ollected a piece of the be dsprea d, Mr. Miller responde d, “I would pref er that to be Mr. Cooper’s a nswer, sir.” When asked a bout Ag ent Cooper’s c ollection of liquid from a jug of kerose ne, Mr. Miller responde d, “You’ ll ha ve to ask Mr. Cooper, sir.” F inally , Mr. Miller said, “Y ou will have to a s k Special Ag ent Cooper” when a sked about Ag ent Cooper’ s collection of e vidence from under a baseboard. The de fendant ascribe s to the witness and the prosecution sinister motives in responding in the above f ashion, based upon the de fe nd a nt’ s c la im that, i n th e fi rs t tria l, M r. Mil le r t e sti fi e d th a t he collecte d t h e t h re e samples of evidenc e.
Th e state c ou nte rs that th e de fe nd a nt h a s w a ive d a p p e l l at e re vie w o f the iss ue be c aus e the def endant f ailed to object to the witness’ claimed evasion and failed to seek c ontemporane ous redr ess from the trial court. We ag ree

.T h is issu e w a s ra ise d in the trial c o u rt v ia the d e fen d a n t’s f ift h a m e n d m e n t t o his m o tio n fo r n e w trial. 8

-32- On e c a n in fe r f

ro m Mr . M ill e r’ s re sp on se s c ite d by the de fe nd a nt that th e wi tne ss’ knowledg e on the su b

j ects presented w as inade quate f or informative answe rs. I n our view, the defe ndant’s belief

that the re sponses wer e in conflict with prior testimony was subjec t to ex ploration via cr oss-examination. See Te nn

. R. Ev id. 61 3. Hi s c la im that th e re sp on se s w e re e va siv e lik e wi se could have been expl ored by cross-e x amination, but if the defendant wishes to claim on appea l that the witness’ e vasion equated to a denia l of his rig ht of confr ontation, we think more wa s require d than to mere ly allow the witness to e vade. See D elaware v. Fe nsterer , 4 74 U. S. 1 5, 20 , 1 06 S. Ct

. 292, 294 (1985) ( “[T] he Confr o n tation Clause g uarantees a n op po rtu nit y fo r e ff e c tiv e c ro sse xami nati on , [ bu t] no t c ro ss- e xami natio n th a t is e ff e c tiv e in w hate ve r w a y

. . . . ” ) ( e mph a sis in orig inal).

Th e de fe nd a nt s ho uldha ve e sta bli sh e d th a t th e c la ime d ev a sio n wa s tantamou nt t o a denia l of the rig ht of confr ontation by objecting and see king the court’s aid in compelling the witness to respond. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 17(a) (providing that subpoena pow er e mbrac es powe r to c omm an d

w i t n e ss t o “ g ive te sti mon y ” ); id. 17 (g ) ( “ Re fu sa l by a ny pe rs on wi tho ut a de qu a te e xcu se to obey a subpoena

. . . may b e d ee m ed a contempt of the c ourt . . . .”); Te nn. R. Evid. 611 (empowe rs trial court to “exercise a ppropriate control over

the pre sentation of evide nce and conduct of the trial”). I n the absence of a cha lleng e to the witness’ r esponses, we cannot disce rn whe ther the response s were mere ly

g rounded in lac k of knowledg e or w ere evasive to the point of deny ing the d ef en d an tt h e o p p o rt u n i t y

fo r e ff ec t i v e c ro s s -e x am i n at i o n

. M o re i m p ortantly , the fa ilure to challen ge the re sponses by

objection or by a request t hat t he trial court employ its contempt power to compel
a re sp on se pr e c lud e d the op po rtun ity of the tr ia l c ou rt a s a n ob se rv e r of the wi tne ss’ de me a no r t o pass on the issue. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 6( a ) ( “ [R]el ie f m a y no t be grant ed [ on app e a l] in
c on tr a ve nti on of

the pr ov inc e of

the tr ie r o f f

a c t.” ). Ac c or din g ly , in the c a se pr e se nte d to us , w e ho ld tha t t h e d e f

e n d a n tw a i v e d t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r M r

. M i l l e r ’ s e v a s i v e n e s s d e n i e d t h e d e f e n d a n th is rig ht of confr ontation.

VI. W itness Expense for Testimony at Hearing on Motion for New T rial

I n a re la te d is su e , th e defe nda nt r e qu e ste d th e tr ia l c ou rt to a pp ro ve a n e xpe ns e disbursement to cove r the c ost of David Miller trave ling to D avidson County from F lorida to testify in the h ea ri ng on the motion new trial. The de fendant now claims in a supplemental brief that the trial court’ s denial of this reque st w as err or. I n his brief, the defe ndant arg ues that Da vid Mill er’ s 8 testimonyin the motion for new trial hearing was nece ssary and materia l be cause , in the hearing, Mr

. Miller “would have been c ompelled to answe r the que stion under o ath as to how [the] evidence [t aken f rom the floor ne ar the baseboa rd] was collec ted.” The defe ndant assert ed i n his brief that Mr. Miller testified in the first trial that he collecte d this mate rial sample, that Cooper testified in the
se c on d tria l th a t Co op e r h a d c oll e c te d th e sa mpl e , a nd that in the he ari ng on the mot ionfo r n e w t ri a l, Mr. Miller “should have been c ompelled to answe r questions under cross-e x amination as to who wa s telling t h e t rut h and who wa s committi ng perjury .” The defe ndant ar g ues that the de nial of the witness-expense funding was a denial of due proce ss of law.-33- The trial c ourt , h o we ver, de nied the motion on the g rounds that (1) Mr . Miller’s prese nce in the motion for new trial hearing was unne cessa ry , (2) the de fense did not seek to compel Mr . M ill e r’ s r e spon se s d uring his tr ia l te sti mon y , a nd(3 ) the tr ia l c ou rt ha d n o s ta tut ory

auth ority t o ap p rove f

unding f or the attendance of an out-of -state witness at a hea

ring on a motion for new trial. Predictably , the state posits that the trial court was cor rec t as to any

and all o f i t s b as es for deny ing the motion.

First, we dispose of the constitut ional basis for c iting as e rror the denial of

the funding motion. The defe ndant cited to this court no authority for the pr oposition t hat th e d enial of the motion deprived hi m o f d u e proc ess of law . Tenne ssee Court of Criminal Appe als Rule 10(b)
ma nd a te s th a t, i n th is situ a tio n, the iss ue “ wi ll be tr e a te d a s w a ive d inthi s c ou rt .” Te nn . Ct . Crim. App. R. 10(b).

Second, the de fenda nt has offe red no arg ument based upon statute, rule, or c asela w that the tr ial cou rt err e d in de nying the mot ion . T he re fo re , h is c la im i s w a ive d p ur su a nt t o Ru le 10 (b ), a s w e ll. At

a ny rate , T e nn e sse e Rul e of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e du re 17 (b ) p ro vid e s:
The court shall order at any time that a subpoena be issued for service
on a named witness upon an ex parte application of a def endant upon a satisfactory showi ng that the def endant is financ ially unable to pay the fe es of the w itness and tha t th e pr esen ce o f th e witn e ss i s
ne c e ssa ry to a n a de qu ate de fe ns e
. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 17(b) (empha ses adde d). The trial court re cited as one of its bases for deny ing the motion that the defenda nt had not shown that Mr. Miller’s testimony was nece ssary

. As an a side,
we a g ree with the trial court th at t h e sig nificanc e of Mr . Miller’s proposed te stimonyis counterindicated by

the def endant’ s failure to elicit further testimony from Mr. Mil ler whe n it had him on the witness stand at trial. The bottom li ne is, howeve r, that the de fendant has made no showing that the trial court a

bused its discretion in disallowing f unds to facilitate Mr. Miller’ s testimonyin the h ea ri n g See T e n n

. R

. C r i m

. P

. 3 3 ( c ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t t h e tr i a l c o u r t “ m a y i n its discretion allow testimonyin open court on issues raised in the motion for ne w trial”) (empha sis added).
VII. Brady Violation

The defe ndant ar g ues that the state w ithheld an exculpatory statement in which Captain J enkins informed Mr . Cooper that the utility room door in the def

endant ’ s home was latc hed, not locked, and t h at t h e wi thholding of this information is reve rsible er ror pur suant to Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. C t. 1194 (1963). The state counte rs that the stateme nt is neither exculpatory

nor material and ther efor e not a Brady violation.

I n Brady , th e Un ite d St a te s Su prem e Co urt h e ld that th e pr os e c uti on ha s a constitutionald u ty

to furnish an a ccuse d with exculpatory evidenc e pertaining to e ither the a ccuse d’s g uilt or innocenc e and the puni shment that may be im posed. Failure to re veal e x culpatory evidenc e-34-

violates due proc ess when the evidenc e is material either to guilt or punishment, irre spective of g ood faith or bad faith of the prose cution. Id. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196-97. I n Strickler v. G reene , 5 27 U. S. 263, 119 S. Ct . 1936 (1999), the Court e num er at ed t h re e compone nts of a Brady violation: “The
e vid e nc e a t issu e mus t be fa vo ra ble to the a c c us e d, e ith e r be c a us e it is excu lpatory , or be c a us e it i s i m p e a c h i n g ; t h a te v i d e n c e m u s th a v e b e e n s u p p r e s s e d b y t h e S t at e , e i t h e r w i l l f u l l y o r i n a d v e r t e n t l y; and pre judice must have e nsued.” Id. at 281-82, 119 S. Ct. at 1948.

I n United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 105 S. C t. 3375 (1985), the Supre me Court
e xpla ine d th a t c on sti tut ion a l e rr or re su lts in the wi thh old ing of “ ma te ri a l” e vid e nc e , a ndma te ri a lit y exis ts when “ther e is a rea sonable probability that, had the e vidence been disc losed to the defe nse, the re sult of the proce eding would have be en diffe rent.” Id. at 682, 105 S. Ct. at 3383.

The “materiality ” of suppressed, favora ble evidenc e wa s discussed at leng th in Kyles v. W hitley , 514 U.S. 419, 115 S. C t. 1555 (1995), and J oh ns on v . S tat e , 38 S.W .3d 52 (Tenn. 2001)

. F o u r a s p e c t s ar e h i g h l i g h t e d i n t h o s e c a s e s

. F i r s t , m a t e r i a l i t y d o e s n o td e m a n d a s h o w i n g b y a preponde ranc e that the suppressed evidence would have resulted in the def endant’ s acquittal. Kyles , 51 4 U. S. a t 43 4, 11 5 S. Ct . at 15 66 ; Johnson , 38 S.W .3d at 58. Second, mate riality is not an evid en ce- sufficie ncy

test. Kyles , 5 14 U. S. at 43 4, 11 5 S. Ct. a t 15 66 ; Johnson , 38 S.W .3d at 58. Third, once constitutional error ha s been f ound, there is no need for further harmless e rror revie w. Kyles , 5 1 4 U

. S

. a t4 3 5 , 1 1 5 S

. C t

. a t1 5 66 ; Jo hnson , 38 S.W .3d at 63. L ast, the “suppr essed evidenc e [is to be] considere d collectively , not item by item” to g aug e materiality

. Kyles , 5 14 U. S. at 436, 115 S. Ct. at 1567. P lainly stated, estab l i s h i n g m aterialityrequire s a “showing that the fa vo ra ble e vid e nc e c ou ld r e a so na bly be take n to pu t th e wh ole c a se in su ch a di fferent lig ht a s to undermine c onfidenc e in the ver dict.” Id. a t 43 5, 11 5 S. Ct. a t 15 66 ; see J ohnson , 38 S.W .3d at 58.

The de fenda nt contends that the st ate should have informed him that Mr. Cooper
wo uldte sti fy

that a ft e r i nv e sti g a tin g the c ri me sc e ne , Ca ptain Jenkins inf

orme d him that th e uti lit y room door wa s la t ch ed, not l ocked. While testify ing, Mr . Cooper explained that Captain Jenkins conclude d that if the utility room door had be en locke d during the fire , the fire fig hters sea rching for the vic tim

wo uldha ve us e d a

fi re a xe to br e ak th e do or do wn , w hic h th ey di d no t do. Ca ptain Jenkins re po rt e d th a t w he n h e ins pe c te d th e do or , it w a s latc he d, re qu ir ing him to u se bo th h a nd s to unlatch it. As noted ea

rlier in this opinion, this court reve rsed the de fendant’s first deg ree murder conviction af

ter his first trial bec ause the state had w ithheld Detec tive Miller’s re port indicating that the utilit y room door wa s not locked. Se e Cla ud e Fr an c is G ar re tt v . S tat e , No. M1999-00786-CCAR3-PC, sl ip op. at 15- 20 (Tenn. Crim. App., Na shville, Mar. 22, 2001). This court rea soned that the information was ex culpatory and material beca use i t neg ated the state’s theory that the def

endant ha d purposef ully locked the vic tim in t he utilityroom and then se t the house on fire. See id. C o n v e r s e l y, the inf orma tio n r e la y ed to Mr. C oo pe r d oe s n ot n e g a te a the ory that th e de fe nd a nt d e lib e rate ly
c o n f i n e d t h e v i c t i m i n t h e u t i l i t y r o o m ; r a t h e r , i t c l ar i f i e s h o w t h e v i c t i mw a s c o n f i n e d

. A c c o r d i n g l y, we do not find that the state’s failure to sha re this information with the defendant is a violation of the def endant’ s due proc ess rig hts pursuant to Brady

.-35- VIII . State Misconduct

Th e de fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t th e stat e e ng a g e d in pr os e c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t w he n it elicited fa lse testimony

from B obby

Alcorn and J ames Cooper , that this false testimony prejudice d him, and that acc ording ly

he is entitled to a new trial. Howe ver, e arlier in this opi nion we addr essed the def endant’ s claim that these witnesse s testified false ly during his se cond trial, and we de termined that the def

endant ha d not demonstrated that a ny claimed c ontradictions in these tes timonies are attributable to perjury

. Acc ording ly , we similarly conclude that the def

endant ha s not demonstrated that th e pr e se ntatio n o f the se te sti mon ie s w a s p ro se c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t.

I n related issues alleg ing state misconduct, the def endant a dvance s two issues for the fi rs t time on app e a l, spe c if ic a lly that he wa s den ie d his pr e su mpt ion of inn oc e ns e by re fe re nc e s to his fir s t t r ia l d u rin g h is s e c o n d tria l, in c lu d in g o n e r e f e r e n c e b y th e p r o s e c u to r

d u r in g c losing
arg ume nts , a ndthat th e state a dv anced inc on sis te nt f a c ts andthe orie s d uring the tw o tria ls o f this
case , t here by

violating his due pr ocess rights. How ever , an appe llate issue may not be pre dicated upon an alleg ed er

ror at tr i al unless that issue was a lso presente d by the def endant in his or her motion for new tria l. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e) . Acc ording ly , the defendant ha s waived the se issues for c onsideration on appea l, and we are unpersua ded – and the defe ndant does not a rg ue – that either issue constitutes plain error nece ssitating our r eview.

IX. Conclusion We have disce rned no r eversible err or in the trial court’s proce eding s and,
a c c or din g ly , w e a ff

ir m th e c ou rt ’s jud g me nt.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE