SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5488-16T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. 

JEFFREY J. JONES, a/k/a 

JEFF JONES,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted October 17, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Fuentes and Vernoia. 

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 15-03-0513.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Laura B. Lasota, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Joseph D. Coronato, Ocean County Prosecutor,

attorney for respondent (Samuel J. Marzarella, Chief 

Appellate Attorney, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 13, 2018
2

A-5488-16T3

Defendant Jeffrey J. Jones applied for admission to Pretrial Intervention 

(PTI) after he was charged in an indictment with third-degree receiving stolen 

property, a shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7, third-degree unlawful possession of a 

shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)(1), and third-degree possession of a controlled 

dangerous substance, heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1). The Ocean County 

Prosecutor's Office (OCPO) rejected the application. Defendant appealed the 

rejection and the Law Division denied his appeal. Defendant pleaded guilty to 

third-degree unlawful possession of a shotgun and received a one-year 

probationary sentence.

1

 Defendant appeals from the order denying his appeal 

from the OCPO's rejection of his PTI application. We affirm.

The pertinent facts are set forth in the OCPO's October 27, 2015 letter 

rejecting defendant's request for admission to PTI. A confidential informant

reported to the Manchester Township Police Department that an individual, later 

identified as Gerard Pasqualini, sold heroin from a local motel room. The 

confidential informant made two undercover heroin buys from Pasqualini in the 

presence of other individuals in the motel room. The confidential informant 

advised the police that Pasqualini had recently obtained access to a shotgun.

 

1

 When defendant pleaded guilty, he was also separately charged in a complaint 

with third-degree unlawful possession of heroin with intent to distribute,

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1).
3

A-5488-16T3

Following the issuance of a search warrant, the police entered the motel 

room where they found Pasqualini, defendant and another individual, and seized 

a quantity of heroin. The investigation further revealed defendant possessed 

heroin on his person and lived in another room at the motel. The police obtained 

consent to search that room from defendant's brother, Francis M. Jones

(Francis),

2 who also occupied that room. The police found a shotgun under 

defendant's bed. Francis told the investigating officers the shotgun belonged to 

defendant. It was later determined the shotgun had been stolen from a police 

officer's vehicle. 

According to Francis, defendant claimed he bought the shotgun for $450. 

Francis also said he saw defendant put the shotgun under the bed. Pasqualini

told the investigating officers he received the shotgun from Adam Sanchez and

sold it to defendant for $450. 

Another motel resident, Francis J. Juliano, consented to a search of his

room. The police found a quantity of heroin and currency. Juliano explained 

that he and defendant bought heroin together and shared the cost. When asked 

about a shotgun, Juliano "guess[ed]" it was in defendant's motel room. Juliano 

 

2

 Because defendant and Francis M. Jones share a surname, we refer to the latter 

as "Francis" for clarity and ease of reference. We intend no disrespect in doing 

so.
4

A-5488-16T3

told the police he had seen defendant "walk[] over to the bed" in defendant's 

motel room "and pull[] a shotgun out." 

An Ocean County Grand Jury returned a twenty-five count indictment 

separately charging Sanchez (counts one through nine), Pasqualini (counts ten 

through seventeen), Francis (counts eighteen through twenty), defendant (counts 

twenty-one through twenty-three), and Juliano (counts twenty-four through 

twenty-five), with various controlled dangerous substance, burglary, theft and 

weapons offenses. Defendant applied for admission to PTI. 

In its October 27, 2015 letter rejecting defendant's application,

3

the OCPO 

determined defendant was not an appropriate candidate for PTI based on the 

nature of the offenses charged, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(1), the facts of the case,

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(2), the motivation and age of defendant, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

 

3

 The record does not show that the Criminal Division Manager reviewed and

made a recommendation concerning defendant's PTI application as required by 

Rule 3:28-3(d). The determination of a defendant's suitability for PTI requires 

compliance with the applicable rules, guidelines and statutes, State v. Rizzitello,

447 N.J. Super. 301, 311 (App. Div. 2016), and judges considering appeals from 

prosecutors' PTI application decisions must ensure such compliance. We do not 

address the effect of the Criminal Division Manager's apparent failure to make 

the required recommendation here only because defendant does not contend the 

failure requires reversal of the court's decision, and we otherwise conclude the 

court correctly found the prosecutor's rejection of defendant's PTI application is 

supported by the record and does not constitute a patent and gross abuse of 

discretion. 
5

A-5488-16T3

12(e)(3), the needs and interests of the victim and society, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

12(e)(7), the value of supervisory treatment would be outweighed by the public 

need for prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(14), defendant's participation would 

adversely affect the prosecution of Francis, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(16), and the 

harm done to society by abandoning criminal prosecution would outweigh the 

benefit to society, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(17). The prosecutor afforded "positive 

weight to the fact that defendant does not have any convictions" and was not 

charged with "a crime of violence," but determined they were "outweighed by 

the reasons against admission."

The Law Division denied defendant's appeal from the OCPO's rejection 

decision, finding defendant did not establish the decision constituted a patent 

and gross abuse of discretion. This appeal followed. 

Defendant presents the following argument:

POINT I

THE PROSECUTOR'S REJECTION OF 

DEFENDANT'S PTI APPLICATION CONSTITUTED 

A PATENT AND GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION 

BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR FAILED TO 

CONSIDER ALL OF THE RELEVANT FACTORS 

AND CONDUCT AN INDIVIDUALIZED 

EVALUATION OF DEFENDANT, RESULTING IN A 

CLEAR ERROR OF JUDGMENT WHICH 

SUBVERTED THE GOALS UNDERLYING THE PTI 

PROGRAM.
6

A-5488-16T3

"PTI is a 'diversionary program through which certain offenders are able to 

avoid criminal prosecution by receiving early rehabilitative services expected to 

deter future criminal behavior.'" State v. Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 621 (2015) 

(quoting State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 240 (1995)). In determining whether to 

admit a defendant into PTI, a prosecutor must "make an individualized assessment 

of the defendant considering [the defendant's] amenability to correction and 

potential responsiveness to rehabilitation." Id. at 621-22 (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). "A determination for suitability and participation in 

the PTI program must be made 'under the Guidelines for PTI provided in Rule

3:28, along with consideration of [the seventeen non-exhaustive] factors listed 

in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e).'" Rizzitello, 447 N.J. Super. at 311 (quoting Roseman,

221 N.J. at 621). 

However, "PTI is essentially an extension of the charging decision, [and] 

therefore the decision to grant or deny PTI is a 'quintessentially prosecutorial 

function,'" Roseman, 221 N.J. at 624 (quoting State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576,

582 (1996)), over which a prosecutor exercises "broad discretion," State v. K.S.,

220 N.J. 190, 199 (2015). "Prosecutorial discretion in this context is critical for 

two reasons. First, because it is the fundamental responsibility of the prosecutor 

to decide whom to prosecute, and second, because it is a primary purpose of PTI 
7

A-5488-16T3

to augment, not diminish, a prosecutor's options." Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 246 

(quoting State v. Kraft, 265 N.J. Super. 106, 111 (App. Div. 1993)).

A court's review of a prosecutor's decision denying a defendant admission 

into PTI is "severely limited." State v. Negran, 178 N.J. 73, 82 (2003). Reversal of 

a prosecutor's decision is limited to only "those cases where needed 'to check [ ] 

the most egregious examples of injustice and unfairness.'" State v. Lee, 437 N.J. 

Super. 555, 563 (App. Div. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

Negran, 178 N.J. at 82). 

"Trial courts may overrule a prosecutor's decision to accept or reject a PTI 

application only when the circumstances '"clearly and convincingly establish that 

the prosecutor's refusal to sanction admission into the program was based on a patent 

and gross abuse of . . . discretion."'" Roseman, 221 N.J. at 624-25 (citations 

omitted); see also R. 3:28-6(b)(1). To establish a patent and gross abuse of 

discretion, a defendant must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the 

prosecutor's rejection decision: 

(a) was not premised upon a consideration of all 

relevant factors, (b) was based upon a consideration of 

irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c) amounted to a 

clear error in [judgment]. . . . In order for such an abuse 

of discretion to rise to the level of "patent and gross," it 

must further be shown that the prosecutorial error 

complained of will clearly subvert the goals underlying 

Pretrial Intervention.
8

A-5488-16T3

[Rizzitello, 447 N.J. Super. at 313 (quoting Roseman,

221 N.J. at 625).] 

A defendant must establish that the prosecutor's decision "has gone so wide of 

the mark sought to be accomplished by PTI that fundamental fairness and justice 

require judicial intervention." State v. Watkins, 193 N.J. 507, 520 (2008) (citation 

omitted). 

Measured against this standard and based on the record, we discern no abuse 

of discretion in the prosecutor's rejection of defendant's PTI application, let alone a 

patent and gross abuse of discretion. See Roseman, 221 N.J. at 625. We are 

therefore convinced the court correctly rejected defendant's challenge to the 

prosecutor's decision denying defendant admission into PTI.

Defendant argues the OCPO's decision constituted a patent and gross abuse 

of discretion because it was not based on an individualized assessment of defendant 

and his personal factors demonstrating his amenability to rehabilitation. Defendant 

argues that although the OCPO relied on seven of the statutory factors enumerated 

in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e), its decision constituted a patent and gross abuse of 

discretion because it "based its decision predominately on the nature and facts of the 

case."

The OCPO is "expected, in the appropriate exercise of [its] discretion over 

PTI that is subject to judicial review, to examine all pertinent facts and evidence
9

A-5488-16T3

presented bearing on the PTI criteria, including the 'nature of the offense,' N.J.S.A. 

2C:43-12(e)(1), and the 'facts of the case,' N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(2)." Lee, 437 N.J. 

Super. at 568. The OCPO fulfilled that expectation here. We find no abuse of 

discretion in the OCPO's reliance on the circumstances surrounding defendant's 

commission of the crimes, or the nature of his offenses, to support its determination 

that the value of supervisory treatment was outweighed by the need for prosecution,

the harm to society by abandoning criminal prosecution outweighed the benefit to 

society of supervised treatment and the needs of the victim and society required 

prosecution. The weighing process required to assess these factors is necessarily 

dependent on the facts surrounding the commission of defendant's crimes, as well as 

the nature of the charges against him. Those facts included defendant's possession 

of a stolen police officer's shotgun in a motel where heroin was distributed and

defendant purchased and used heroin. The OCPO properly considered that 

defendant unlawfully possessed a stolen weapon under those circumstances to 

support its rejection of his PTI application. See, e.g., State v. Motley, 369 N.J. Super. 

314, 321-23 (App. Div. 2004) (finding law enforcement policy concerning need to 

prosecute individuals possessing unlawful assault weapons under circumstances 

permitting their use or misuse supports decision denying PTI admission). 
10 A-5488-16T3

In addition, the OCPO did not rely exclusively on the facts of the case or the 

nature of the offensesin its finding and analysis of the factors supporting its decision. 

For example, in its assessment of the motivation and age of the defendant, N.J.S.A. 

2C:43-12(e)(3), the OCPO noted defendant's history of substance abuse and 

multiple admissions to a treatment center "for short periods of treatment," but 

found defendant lacked motivation because he failed to comply with "the latest 

recommendation" that he "attend and complete" a Salvation Army program,

"and the State has no documentation of defendant doing so." 

Defendant argues the OCPO's reliance on his purported lack of motivation 

is contradicted by evidence showing he participated in drug treatment 

subsequent to his arrest and took other steps, including removing himself from 

the living situation he contends resulted in his criminal conduct. As noted,

however, the OCPO acknowledged defendant participated in multiple short-term 

treatment programs, but found he lacked motivation because he failed to follow

the most recent recommendation for treatment. Defendant did not dispute the 

recommendation was made or that he failed to comply with it. OCPO's reliance 

on defendant's lack of motivation as a factor is therefore fully supported by the 

record. 
11 A-5488-16T3

Defendant also argues the OCPO could not properly rely on the possible effect 

of his admission to PTI on the prosecution of Francis as a factor under N.J.S.A. 

2C:43-12(e)(16) supporting its rejection decision. He claims his admission to PTI 

could not affect Francis's prosecution because Francis was admitted to PTI and "was 

not prosecuted." The claim is undermined by the record. 

Defendant and Francis were each charged with third-degree theft by receiving 

stolen property and third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon based on the 

shotgun recovered from their motel room. Defendant's admission to PTI prior to the 

resolution of Francis's charges would have permitted defendant to claim sole 

possession of the shotgun without fear of any further prosecution, thereby adversely 

affecting the State's ability to pursue its theory of culpability against Francis—that 

he and defendant jointly possessed the shotgun. 

Francis's 2017 PTI admission occurred almost two years after the 2015 

rejection of defendant's PTI application and his guilty plea and sentencing. Thus,

when the OCPO rejected defendant's PTI application, it was actively prosecuting 

Francis and, as noted, defendant's admission into PTI would have adversely affected 

that prosecution. The OCPO's reliance on the factor enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

12(e)(16) is supported by the record.
12 A-5488-16T3

We reject defendant's contention the OCPO failed to consider all of the 

relevant factors. Where, as here, the prosecutor provides a written statement of 

reasons for its decision, it is presumed the prosecutor considered all of the 

relevant factors, absent proof by the defendant to the contrary. Wallace, 146 

N.J. at 584. "That presumption makes it difficult to reverse a prosecutor's 

decision," State v. Baynes, 148 N.J. 434, 444 (1997) (citations omitted), and 

defendant makes no showing to overcome the presumption. To the extent 

defendant's argument may be construed to challenge the OCPO's weighing of 

the various factors, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor, and not the court,

to "weigh the various factors and to reach a determination." Wallace, 146 N.J. at 

586. 

Defendant has not satisfied his heavy burden of showing the OCPO's decision 

could not have been reasonably made upon a weighing of the relevant factors. See

Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 254. He does not demonstrate the OCPO failed to consider the 

relevant factors, considered irrelevant or inappropriate factors or that its rejection 

decision constituted a clear error in judgment, a patent and gross abuse of discretion 

or is "so wide of the mark sought to be accomplished by PTI that fundamental 
13 A-5488-16T3

fairness and justice require judicial intervention." Wallace, 146 N.J. at 582-83

(citation omitted).

Affirmed.