United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 23-3010

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Kylee Jade Starr, also known as Kylee Jade Knight

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of North Dakota - Western

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Submitted: April 8, 2024

Filed: August 2, 2024 

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Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

In October 2022, Kylee Starr pleaded guilty to three controlled substance

offenses. While awaiting sentencing, she was released into a sober living home that

provided mental health treatment and employment and addiction support services. 

In March 2023, the district court sentenced Starr to time served -- approximately

seven months -- and 48 months supervised release. Though subject to a mandatory
minimum five year sentence, the district court1

 found that Starr qualified for safetyvalve relief, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), and granted the government’s motion for a

substantial assistance downward departure, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); USSG § 5K1.1. 

On supervised release, Starr remained at a sober living home for nearly a year

but relapsed on fentanyl in June 2023 and was “unsuccessfully terminated” from the

placement. Starr’s Probation Officer filed a petition to revoke her supervised release. 

Starr admitted committing Grade C violations. The district court revoked supervised

release and, varying upward, imposed a revocation sentence of 24 months

imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release. Starr appeals the

prison term as substantively unreasonable. Reviewing the substantive reasonableness

of the court’s revocation sentence “under the same deferential abuse-of-discretion

standard that applies to initial sentencing proceedings,” we affirm. United States v.

Barber, 4 F.4th 689, 691 (8th Cir. 2021). 

I.

The sentencing record makes clear that Starr and her family have a long history

of substance abuse. The fentanyl relapse at issue was not the first since her initial

indictment for four drug offenses in December 2021: Conspiracy to Distribute and

Possess with Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances (Count 1); Possession with

Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine (Count 2); Possession with Intent to Distribute

Fentanyl and Fentanyl-Related Substances (Count 3); and Possession with Intent to

Distribute Ecstasy (Count 4).2 In February 2022, Starr was released from pretrial

custody to a recovery center for inpatient substance abuse treatment. She completed

1The Honorable Daniel M. Traynor, United States District Judge for the District

of North Dakota.

2A Superseding Indictment was later filed, which added a forfeiture allegation

that is not at issue.

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that sixty-day program and was discharged to a sober living home. A few months

later, she relapsed on fentanyl and was detained on a pretrial revocation warrant. 

Given a second chance at supervised release at the sober living home in July 2022,

Starr was terminated from that placement for behavioral issues and detained on a

pretrial revocation warrant until her guilty plea and sentencing.

At the revocation hearing in August 2023, the district court determined without

objection that Starr’s Grade C violations -- a mandatory condition prohibited

unlawful use of a controlled substance and a special condition required successful

residence at a sober living facility for 12 months -- combined with Starr’s Category

I criminal history resulted in an advisory guidelines revocation sentencing range of

3 to 9 months imprisonment. See USSG § 7B1.4(a). The government requested a 9-

month sentence followed by three years of supervised release, noting that Starr’s

violations were “significant and serious,” as she had been using fentanyl inside and

outside of the sober living residence, exposing other sober residents, their children,

and even her younger siblings to her drug use. “[I]t’s fairly clear here [Starr] needs

some time. She needs some time to sober up. She needs some time to get her head

together. To be safe and not to risk the health and safety of other people as well.” 

Defense counsel urged a 3-month sentence at the low end of the guidelines

range. Counsel emphasized Starr’s success at the sober living residence in the past

year, stating that counselors at the residence believed that “a significant period of

incarceration” would undermine Starr’s continued recovery by “creat[ing] a distance

between the progress that she’s made and her eventual reentry into the community.” 

Before imposing the sentence, the district court explained: “Ms. Starr has

shown . . . over and over again that she’s not willing to abide by court-ordered

conditions of community release or follow the rules of various sober living homes.” 

The district court acknowledged the advisory sentencing guidelines range and the

recommendations of both parties, but determined that even a 9-month sentence “is not

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sufficient to address the serious problems that [Starr] has repeatedly shown in various

actions throughout her addiction.” Starr’s “actions have put not only herself but other

women and children in danger of fentanyl exposure,” showing “a complete disregard

for the wellbeing of others.” After considering Chapter 7 of the Sentencing

Guidelines and the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court sentenced

Starr to an above-guidelines sentence of 24 months incarceration to be followed by

a three-year term of supervised release. Noting the continuing impact of her family’s

addiction problems, the court ordered as a special condition of supervised release that

Starr “have no contact with her parents or other family members unless they are

preapproved by the supervising probation officer.” 

On appeal, Starr argues the 24-month term of imprisonment is substantively

unreasonable. Our deferential review of sentencing terms presents a formidable

obstacle. “A district court abuses its discretion and imposes an unreasonable sentence

when it fails to consider a relevant and significant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factor, gives

significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or considers the appropriate

factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.” United

States v. Wilkins, 909 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). But a

district court is afforded “wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case

and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate

sentence.” Barber, 4 F.4th at 692 (quotation omitted). It is only “the unusual case

when we reverse a district court sentence -- whether within, above, or below the

applicable Guidelines range -- as substantively unreasonable.” United States v.

Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quotation omitted); see

generally United States v. Cain, 976 F.3d 778, 780 (8th Cir. 2020) (upholding

revocation sentence of 48 months imprisonment when advisory guidelines range was

5 to 11 months).

Starr argues the district court erred in weighing the relevant sentencing factors

because the court: (1) overemphasized her relapse while not according sufficient

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weight to her year of sobriety and the family circumstances which induced her

relapse; (2) gave too little weight to the advice of the sober home counselor to

minimize Starr’s incarceration; and (3) incorrectly concluded that Starr did not take

the residential treatment opportunities made available to her seriously without

properly focusing on her one year of successful supervised release following

conviction.3

We conclude the district court did not abuse its substantial sentencing

discretion by imposing an above-range revocation sentence. The court expressly

stated that it “considered the Sentencing Guidelines under Chapter 7, [and] the

sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. [§] 3553(a).” It explained that it was imposing

an upward variance based on Starr’s continued inability to adhere to the terms of her

supervised release, and the danger in which she had placed minors -- including her

minor relatives -- and other residents of the sober living home through her fentanyl

use. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (A court “shall consider . . . the need for the

sentence imposed . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.”);

United States v. Harris, 55 F.4th 1162, 1164 (8th Cir. 2022) (“We have repeatedly

upheld revocation sentences that varied upward from the advisory guidelines range

because the defendant was a recidivist violator of supervised release conditions.”)

(quotation and emphasis omitted). The court considered the advisory guidelines

sentencing range, noting that Starr received a downward departure to a sentence of

time served at her original sentencing. It concluded that 3 to 9 months imprisonment

was “not sufficient to address [Starr’s] serious problems.” When the original

sentence was the result of a downward departure, an upward departure may be

3This contention ignores Starr’s two prior revocations that occurred in June and

August of 2022, only a year before the supervised release violations at issue. The

district court properly took these pretrial release revocations into account. Cf. United

States v. Espinoza, 831 F.3d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir. 2016) (upholding above-guidelines

sentence that relied in part on defendant’s conduct in violating pretrial release).

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warranted. See USSG § 7B1.4, cmt. n.4; United States v. Boelter, 806 F.3d 1134,

1136 (8th Cir. 2015).

At the revocation hearing, the district court heard argument from counsel citing

Starr’s nearly one-year period of sobriety, her success at her sober living placement,

and her family history of substance abuse, as well as the sober home counselor’s

advice, the mitigating factors Starr argues on appeal. See United States v. Habib, No.

23-1594, 2023 WL 8924307, at *2 (8th Cir. Dec. 27, 2023) (district court did not fail

to consider mitigating factors that were discussed at the revocation hearing) (citation

omitted). Having presided over Starr’s original sentencing, the court was “aware of

[Starr’s] history and characteristics.” United States v. Franklin, 397 F.3d 604, 607

(8th Cir. 2005). The court did not abuse its discretion by not sentencing Starr in

accordance with the care provider’s recommendation. It noted Starr’s need for

substance abuse treatment and said it would “recommend that she participate in drug

and alcohol treatment.” See United States v. Jackson, 83 F.4th 1090, 1092 (8th Cir.

2023) (court not required to impose a sentence that provides treatment “in the most

effective manner”) (quotation omitted). The sentencing record makes clear the court

did not fail to consider the mitigating factors Starr raises. It simply afforded them

less weight than Starr would have preferred, which does not warrant reversal. See,

e.g., United States v. Long, 906 F.3d 720, 728 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.

464 (2019). 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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