J. A04002/16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

MONE PARKER, : No. 1428 WDA 2014

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, July 30, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0003487-2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., AND SHOGAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 20, 2016

Mone Parker appeals from the judgment of sentence entered by the 

Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County as a result of her conviction for 

aggravated assault -- serious bodily injury, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1).

Matthew Rabinowitz, Esq., the Commonwealth’s attorney, summarized 

the facts at appellant’s guilty plea hearing:

This occurred on February 22, 2013, at the 

[appellant’s] residence . . . in McKees Rocks. The 

victim, Jonesha Huggins, would have testified that 

she was the daughter of the [appellant]. She would 

testify that she received a phone call from the 

[appellant], her mother, asking her to come over to 

the mother’s residence . . . .

She would testify that when she got there she went 

up the stairs and her mother basically pushed her 

into a bedroom and pulled out a gun and put her 

against . . . had her up against a wall on her knees, 

more or less up against a wall, and she would testify 
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that at some point her mother pulled out a gun and 

held it to her head and began threatening her 

regarding some money that she believed 

Ms. Huggins [had] stolen from her. She would 

testify that she moved her head and just as she 

moved her head a shot was fired. It grazed her ear 

and she then ran out of the house. That is the sum 

of the facts.

The McKees Rocks police would testify that they 

found a firearm, a bullet and a shell casing in the 

room where this occurred. That is the sum and 

substance of the case.

Notes of testimony, 1/15/14 at 5-6.1

On January 15, 2014, appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault. The

Commonwealth withdrew the other charges. The trial court accepted the 

plea. Sentencing was deferred pending the preparation of a pre-sentence 

investigative report (“PSI”).

At the sentencing hearing, Courtney Michele Blackwell (“Blackwell”), 

whose godson was appellant’s grandchild, testified in support of appellant 

and stated that when her mother left when she was 16 years old, appellant 

“stepped up and became that motherly figure that I needed. She’s guided 

me back to school and to keep my life on track.” (Notes of testimony, 

4/8/14 at 5.) Kennie Shantel Bryant, appellant’s 21-year-old daughter, 

 

1

In addition to aggravated assault, appellant was charged with criminal 

attempt at criminal homicide, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a); discharging a firearm 

into an occupied structure, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2707.1(a); unlawful restraint, 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2902(a)(1); two counts of endangering the welfare of 

children, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1); and three counts of recklessly 

endangering another person, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.
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testified on her mother’s behalf. Appellant testified that she was “adamantly 

remorseful about the situation that transpired.” (Id. at 8.) Appellant 

explained that she made a bad decision but since then had completed 

domestic violence counseling. She also saw a therapist and attended anger 

management. (Id. at 8.)

Jonesha Huggins (“Huggins”), the victim, testified on behalf of the 

Commonwealth that as a result of the incident, she entered a state of 

depression where she started drinking and that she did not believe the trial 

court should show appellant any mercy. (Id. at 12.)

The trial court sentenced appellant to a term of four to eight years’ 

incarceration followed by five years of probation.

Appellant moved for reconsideration of the sentence. At the hearing 

on the post-sentencing motion, Blackwell again testified in support of 

appellant. Also testifying on appellant’s behalf were Richard O’Shea, the 

brother of a disabled individual for whom appellant provided care; 

Gary Walker, a neighbor of the disabled individual; and Jacqueline Freeman 

and Melissa Ann Caldwell, friends of appellant.

The trial court denied the motion. The trial court explained its 

reasoning for the sentence:

The record reflects that the Court reviewed the 

presentence report and the sentencing guidelines as 

well as defense counsel’s request that the Court 

deviate from the guidelines. The Court noted that 

while the victim did not sustain a permanent injury, 

she had been put in fear of serious bodily injury and 
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could be expected to suffer from post-traumatic 

stress from having a gun placed to her head. The 

Court then imposed a sentence within the standard 

range of the guidelines. At the hearing on the 

motion for reconsideration on July 28, 2014, the 

Court again noted: “She put a gun to somebody’s 

head.” (Post-Sentence Transcript at page 3). The 

Court further stated: “A loaded gun . . . and shot 

her in the ear. An inch the other way, you got a 

dead person.” (Post-Sentence Transcript at page 4). 

. . . .

The Court sentenced Parker in the standard range of 

the Sentencing Guidelines. The sentence is not 

clearly unreasonable and is based upon the facts of 

this particular case. Parker called her own child to 

her house, accused her of stealing money, placed a 

gun to her head and pulled the trigger. Only by the 

grace of God did the victim not die or suffer serious 

bodily injury. Had the Commonwealth pursued it, 

Parker would have been facing a mandatory 

minimum sentence of incarceration of five (5) years 

for a crime committed with a firearm. A sentence 

that is less than the mandatory minimum that could 

have been applied in this case is clearly a reasonable 

sentence.

The Court considered all relevant factors in the 

presentence report, the testimony presented on 

Parker’s behalf, the fact that Parker had no prior 

record as well as the facts of the case in fashioning 

an appropriate sentence. No abuse of discretion 

exists in this matter and the judgment of sentence 

imposed upon Parker should be affirmed.

Trial court opinion, 5/29/15 at 2-4.

Appellant raises the following issue for this Court’s review:

I. Did the trial court fail to adequately consider 

and apply all of the relevant sentencing 

criteria, including [appellant’s] character and 

rehabilitative needs, the gravity of the offense 
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as it relates to Huggins and the community, 

and the protection of the public, as required 

under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) (sentencing 

generally)?

Appellant’s brief at 5 (capitalization omitted).

[T]he proper standard of review when 

considering whether to affirm the sentencing court’s 

determination is an abuse of discretion. . . .[A]n 

abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of 

judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have 

abused its discretion unless the record discloses that 

the judgment exercised was manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill-will. In more expansive terms, our Court 

recently offered: An abuse of discretion may not be 

found merely because an appellate court might have 

reached a different conclusion, but requires a result 

of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so 

as to be clearly erroneous.

The rationale behind such broad discretion and the 

concomitantly deferential standard of appellate 

review is that the sentencing court is in the best 

position to determine the proper penalty for a 

particular offense based upon an evaluation of the 

individual circumstances before it.

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 169-170 (Pa.Super. 2010) 

(citation omitted).

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing 

do not entitle an appellant to review as of right. 

Commonwealth v. Sierra, [752 A.2d 910, 912 

(Pa.Super. 2000)]. An appellant challenging the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke 

this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to 

determine: (1) whether appellant has 

filed a timely notice of appeal, see
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Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the 

issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider 

and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 

[720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has 

a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed 

from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9781(b).

Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (citation omitted).

Here, we begin our analysis by determining whether appellant has 

complied with the procedural requirements of challenging her sentence. 

First, appellant timely filed her notice of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 902 

and 903. Second, she properly preserved the issue in a motion for 

modification of sentence which was filed on April 10, 2014. The trial court 

denied appellant’s motion on July 30, 2014.

Third, appellant included a Rule 2119(f) statement in her brief, in 

which she avers that “the Trial Court did not consider Ms. Parker’s 

rehabilitative needs, the protection of the public, or the gravity of the 

offense in relation to the impact on the community. Rather, the Trial Court 

considered only the offense’s impact on Huggins.” (Appellant’s brief at 20.) 

A substantial question is only raised on a sentence within the 

guidelines when there are circumstances in which “the application of the 

sentencing guidelines would be clearly unreasonable.” Commonwealth v. 
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Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1270 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 91 A.3d 161 

(Pa. 2014), quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2).

In determining whether a substantial question exists, 

this Court does not examine the merits of whether 

the sentence is actually excessive. Commonwealth 

v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987). 

Rather, we look to whether the appellant has 

forwarded a plausible argument that the sentence, 

when it is within the guideline ranges, is clearly 

unreasonable. Concomitantly, the substantial 

question determination does not require the court to 

decide the merits of whether the sentence is clearly 

unreasonable.

Dodge, 77 A.3d at 1270. Here, appellant alleges that the trial court failed 

to consider her rehabilitative needs when crafting its sentence. Appellant 

also alleges that the sentence did not take into account the protection of the 

public or the gravity of the offense in relation to the impact on the 

community. This court has held that such a combination constitutes a 

substantial question. Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780 (Pa.Super. 

2012). We, therefore, find that appellant has raised a substantial question, 

and will consider her appeal on its merits.

Where the sentencing court had the benefit of a 

presentence investigation report (“PSI”), we can 

assume the sentencing court “was aware of relevant 

information regarding the defendant’s character and 

weighed those considerations along with mitigating 

statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 

Pa. 88, 101-02, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (1988). See also 

Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 368 

(Pa.Super. 2005) (stating if sentencing court has 

benefit of PSI, law expects court was aware of 

relevant information regarding defendant’s character 

and weighed those considerations along with any 
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mitigating factors). Further, where a sentence is 

within the standard range of the guidelines, 

Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code. See Commonwealth 

v. Cruz-Centeno, 447 Pa.Super. 98, 668 A.2d 536 

(1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 653, 676 A.2d 

1195 (1996) (stating combination of PSI and 

standard range sentence, absent more, cannot be 

considered excessive or unreasonable).

Moury, 992 A.2d at 171.

[W]hile a sentence may be found unreasonable after 

review of Section 9781(d)’s four statutory factors, in 

addition a sentence may also be unreasonable if the 

appellate court finds that the sentence was imposed 

without express or implicit consideration of the 

general standards applicable to sentencing found in 

Section 9721, i.e., the protection of the public; the 

gravity of the offense in relation to the impact on the 

victim and the community; and the rehabilitative 

needs of the defendant.

Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 964 (Pa. 2007).

Appellant argues that the mitigating evidence here was extensive and 

compelling such as to render the sentence unreasonable. She also argues 

that the trial court disregarded the force of the evidence when it relied on 

Huggins’s testimony which was in stark contrast to the testimony of the 

other witnesses and which focused in part on events of the past which 

indicated past problems between appellant and Huggins.

Here, the trial court indicated on the record that it read appellant’s 

PSI. (Notes of testimony, 4/8/14 at 17.) Because the trial court reviewed 

appellant’s PSI, it is presumed that the trial court was aware of appellant’s 

rehabilitative needs as well as any other mitigating factors. Devers. The 
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trial court further stated that it reviewed all of the factors in the case before 

it and sentenced appellant to a term of four to eight years’ incarceration. 

(Id. at 17-18.) The trial court did not indicate that it relied on Huggins’s 

testimony concerning the alleged treatment of her by appellant when 

Huggins was a child. At the post-sentencing hearing, appellant’s counsel 

acknowledged that the sentence was within the standard range of the 

sentencing guidelines. (Notes of testimony, 7/28/14 at 5.) Because the trial 

court sentenced appellant within the standard range and stated on the 

record that it reviewed the PSI, the guidelines, and all of the factors with 

respect to sentencing before it, this court, therefore, finds that the sentence 

imposed is appropriate under the Sentencing Code, and appellant’s 

contentions are without merit.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/20/2016