In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 17-3565 

JOHN DOE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

PURDUE UNIVERSITY, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division. 

No. 2:17-cv-00033-PRC — Paul R. Cherry, Magistrate Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 18, 2018 — DECIDED JUNE 28, 2019 

____________________ 

Before SYKES, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Circuit Judge. After finding John Doe guilty of 

sexual violence against Jane Doe, Purdue University suspended him for an academic year and imposed conditions on 

his readmission. As a result of that decision, John was expelled from the Navy ROTC program, which terminated both 

his ROTC scholarship and plan to pursue a career in the 

Navy. 
2 No. 17-3565 

John sued the university and several of its officials, asserting two basic claims. First, he argued that they had violated 

the Fourteenth Amendment by using constitutionally flawed 

procedures to determine his guilt or innocence. Second, he argued that Purdue had violated Title IX by imposing a punishment infected by sex bias. A magistrate judge dismissed 

John’s suit on the ground that he had failed to state a claim 

under either theory. We disagree. John has adequately alleged 

violations of both the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX. 

I. 

We are reviewing the magistrate judge’s decision to dismiss John’s complaint for failing to state a claim. That means 

that we must recount the facts as he describes them, drawing 

every inference in his favor. See D.B. ex rel. Kurtis B. v. Kopp, 

725 F.3d 681, 682 (7th Cir. 2013). In other words, the story that 

follows is one-sided because the posture of the case requires 

it to be. Our task is not to determine what allegations are supported by the evidence but to determine whether John is entitled to relief if everything that he says is true. See McCauley 

v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011). 

John and Jane were both students in Purdue’s Navy ROTC 

program. They began dating in the fall of 2015, and between 

October and December, they had consensual sexual intercourse fifteen to twenty times. Jane’s behavior became increasingly erratic over the course of that semester, and she 

told John that she felt hopeless, hated her life, and was contemplating running away. In December, Jane attempted suicide in front of John, and after that incident, they stopped having sex. They continued dating, however, until January, when 

John tried to get Jane help by reporting her suicide attempt to 

two resident assistants and an advisor. Jane was upset at John 
No. 17-3565 3

for reporting her, and she distanced herself from him. Soon 

thereafter, she began dating someone else. 

For a few months, things were quiet between John and 

Jane. That changed in April 2016, which was Sexual Assault 

Awareness Month. During that month, Purdue hosted over a 

dozen events to promote the reporting of sexual assaults. 

Many of the events were sponsored by the Center for Advocacy, Response, and Education (CARE), a university center 

dedicated to supporting victims of sexual violence. CARE 

promoted the events on its Facebook page, along with posts 

containing information about sexual assault. One of its posts 

was an article from The Washington Post titled “Alcohol isn’t 

the cause of campus sexual assault. Men are.” 

During the first ten days of April, five students reported 

sexual assault to the university. Jane was one of them. She alleged that in November 2015, she was sleeping with John in 

his room when she woke to him groping her over her clothes 

without her consent. According to Jane, she told John that this 

was not okay, and John then confessed that he had digitally 

penetrated her while the two were sleeping in Jane’s room 

earlier that month. Jane told the university that John had engaged in other misconduct as well: she asserted that he had 

gone through her underwear drawer without her permission, 

chased her through a hallway while joking about tasering her, 

gone to her room unannounced after they broke up, and lost 

his temper in front of her. 

John learned about Jane’s accusations in a letter from 

Katherine Sermersheim, Purdue’s Dean of Students and a Title IX coordinator. Sermersheim informed John that the university had elected to pursue Jane’s allegations even though 

Jane had not filed a formal complaint. She outlined the 
4 No. 17-3565 

school’s disciplinary procedures and explained that two employees who reported to her, Erin Oliver and Jacob Amberger, 

would investigate the case. She also instructed John not to 

have any contact with Jane. After he received the letter, John 

was suspended from the Navy ROTC, banned from all buildings where Jane had classes, and barred from eating in his 

usual dining hall because Jane also used it. 

John submitted a written response denying all of Jane’s allegations. He asserted that he never had sexual contact with 

Jane while she was sleeping, through digital penetration or 

otherwise. He said that there was one night in December, after 

Jane’s suicide attempt, when he touched Jane’s knee while she 

was sleeping on a futon and he was on the floor next to her. 

But he denied groping her or engaging in any of the harassing 

behavior of which she had accused him. John also recounted 

evidence that he thought inconsistent with Jane’s claim of sexual assault: she texted and talked to him over the holidays, 

sent his family a package of homemade Christmas cookies, 

and invited him to her room when they returned to school in 

January. He also provided details suggesting that Jane was 

troubled and emotionally unstable, which he thought might 

explain her false accusations. 

Under Purdue’s procedures, John was allowed the assistance of a “supporter” at any meeting with investigators. In 

late April, John and his supporter met with Oliver and Amberger. As he had in his written response, John steadfastly denied Jane’s allegations. He provided the investigators with 

some of the friendly texts that he thought belied her story, as 

well as a list of over thirty people who could speak to his integrity. 
No. 17-3565 5

When the investigators’ report was complete, Sermersheim sent it to a three-person panel of Purdue’s Advisory 

Committee on Equity, which was tasked with making a recommendation to her after reviewing the report and hearing 

from the parties. Sermersheim called John to appear before 

the panel, but consistent with Purdue’s then-applicable procedures, she neither gave him a copy of the report nor shared 

its contents with him. Moments before his committee appearance, however, a Navy ROTC representative gave John a few 

minutes to review a redacted version of the report. To John’s 

distress, he learned that it falsely claimed that he had confessed to Jane’s allegations. The investigators’ summary of 

John’s testimony also failed to include John’s description of 

Jane’s suicide attempt. 

John and his supporter met with the Advisory Committee 

and Sermersheim, who chaired the meeting, for about thirty 

minutes. Jane neither appeared before the panel nor submitted a written statement. Instead, Monica Soto Bloom, the director of CARE, wrote the Advisory Committee and Sermersheim a letter summarizing Jane’s accusations. 

The meeting did not go well for John. Two members of the 

panel candidly stated that they had not read the investigative 

report. The one who apparently had read it asked John accusatory questions that assumed his guilt. Because John had not 

seen the evidence, he could not address it. He reiterated his 

innocence and told the panel about some of the friendly texts 

that Jane had sent him after the alleged assaults. The panel 

refused John permission to present witnesses, including character witnesses and a roommate who would state that he was 

present in the room at the time of the alleged assault and that 

Jane’s rendition of events was false. 
6 No. 17-3565 

A week later, Sermersheim sent John a perfunctory letter 

informing him that she had found him guilty by a preponderance of the evidence of sexual violence. She suspended John 

from Purdue for one academic year. In addition, she conditioned John’s reentry on his completion of a university-sponsored “bystander intervention training” and his agreement to 

meet with the Assistant Director of CARE during the first semester of his return. 

John appealed this decision to Alysa Rollock, Purdue’s 

Vice President for Ethics and Compliance, who instructed 

Sermersheim to identify the factual basis of her determination. Sermersheim sent a revised letter to John adding the following: 

Specifically, a preponderance of the evidence 

supports that: 

1. [Jane Doe] had fallen asleep on a futon with 

you on the floor beside her. She woke up and 

found that you inappropriately touched her 

over her clothing and without her consent by 

placing your hand above her knee, between her 

legs, and moved it up to her “crotch” areas; and 

2. On another occasion, while she was sleeping 

and without her consent, you inappropriately 

touched [Jane Doe] by digitally penetrating her 

vagina. 

As the basis for these findings, Sermersheim offered: “I find 

by a preponderance of the evidence that [John Doe] is not a 

credible witness. I find by a preponderance of the evidence 

that [Jane Doe] is a credible witness.” John appealed to Rol-
No. 17-3565 7

lock again, but this time, Rollock upheld Sermersheim’s determination of guilt and accompanying sanctions. A few 

weeks after his second appeal was denied, John involuntarily 

resigned from the Navy ROTC, which has a “zero tolerance” 

policy for sexual harassment. 

John sued Mitch Daniels, the President of Purdue University; Rollock, the Vice President for Ethics and Compliance; 

Sermersheim, the Dean and a Title IX coordinator; and Oliver 

and Amberger, the investigators, in their individual capacities, seeking monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 He sued 

these same defendants, along with the members of Purdue’s 

Board of Trustees, in their official capacities, seeking injunctive relief under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), to remedy 

the Fourteenth Amendment violation. And he sued Purdue 

University for discriminating against him on the basis of sex 

in violation of Title IX. 

The magistrate judge dismissed John’s § 1983 claims with 

prejudice, holding that the disciplinary proceedings did not 

deprive John of either liberty or property, so the Due Process 

Clause did not apply. He offered an additional reason for dismissing John’s § 1983 claim against Daniels: John’s theory of 

liability was based on Daniels’s role as supervisor, and there 

is no supervisory liability under § 1983. As for John’s claims 

for injunctive relief, the magistrate judge dismissed them 

without prejudice for lack of standing because John had not 

alleged that the violations posed any threat of future harm. 

 1 John’s complaint also asserted § 1983 claims against Purdue and all 

other defendants in their official capacities. Before us, he concedes that 

§ 1983 does not permit him either to assert official-capacity claims or to 

sue Purdue itself. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 

(1989). 
8 No. 17-3565 

And he dismissed John’s claims under Title IX with prejudice 

on the ground that John had not alleged facts sufficient to 

show that Purdue discriminated against him on the basis of 

sex. John appeals each of these rulings. 

II. 

We begin with procedural due process. According to John, 

he was punished pursuant to a process that failed to satisfy 

the minimum standards of fairness required by the Due Process Clause. He alleges the following deficiencies: he was not 

provided with the investigative report or any of the evidence 

on which the decisionmakers relied in determining his guilt 

and punishment; Jane did not appear before the Advisory 

Committee; he had no opportunity to cross-examine Jane; 

Sermersheim found Jane credible even though neither 

Sermersheim nor the Advisory Committee talked to her in 

person; Jane did not write her own statement for the panel, 

much less a sworn one; Sermersheim was in charge of both 

the investigation and the adjudication of his case; the Advisory Committee was blatantly biased against him; and the Advisory Committee refused to allow him to present any evidence, including witnesses. 

Yet John cannot recover simply because the procedures 

were unfair, even if they were. The Due Process Clause is not 

a general fairness guarantee; its protection kicks in only when 

a state actor deprives someone of “life, liberty, or property.” 

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The threshold question, then, is 

whether John lost a liberty or property interest when he was 

found guilty of sexual violence and punished. We address 

whether the procedures satisfied minimum constitutional requirements of fairness only if the answer to that question is 

yes. 
No. 17-3565 9

A. 

Our precedent involving due process claims in the context 

of university discipline has focused on whether a student has 

a protected property interest in his education at a state university. We have explained that “[a] college education—any 

education—is not ‘property’ in the usual sense of the word.” 

Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 2008); see also

Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 741 F.3d 769, 772 

(7th Cir. 2013) (“[O]ur circuit has rejected the proposition that 

an individual has a stand-alone property interest in an education at a state university, including a graduate education.”).2

Instead, “we ask whether the student has shown that he has a 

legally protected entitlement to his continued education at the 

university.” Charleston, 741 F.3d at 773 (emphasis in original).

High school students (and, for that matter, elementary school 

students) have a property interest in their public education 

because state law entitles them to receive one. Goss v. Lopez, 

419 U.S. 565, 573–74 (1975). The same is not true, however, of 

students at public universities—certainly, John has not contended that Indiana guarantees its residents a college education. 

 2 The First, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have recognized a generalized 

property interest in higher education. See Dalton Mott, Comment, The Due 

Process Clause and Students: The Road to A Single Approach of Determining 

Property Interests in Education, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 651, 659–60 (2017); see 

also, e.g., Flaim v. Med. Coll. Of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 2005) (asserting that “the Due Process Clause is implicated by university disciplinary decisions”). The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have assumed without deciding that such a property interest exists. See Mott, supra, at 663. The Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits join us in making a statespecific inquiry to determine whether a property interest exists. See id. at 

658. 
10 No. 17-3565 

In the context of higher education, any property interest is 

a matter of contract between the student and the university. 

Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 601 (7th Cir. 

2009) (explaining that the “basic legal relation between a student and a private university or college is contractual in nature” (citation omitted)). And to demonstrate that he possesses the requisite property interest, a university student 

must do more than show that he has a contract with the university; he must establish that the contract entitled him to the 

specific right that the university allegedly took, “such as the 

right to a continuing education or the right not to be suspended without good cause.” Id. at 601. Generalities won’t do; 

“the student’s complaint must be specific about the source of 

this implied contract, the exact promises the university made 

to the student, and the promises the student made in return.” 

Charleston, 741 F.3d at 773. 

John has not adequately alleged that Purdue deprived him 

of property because his complaint does not point to any specific contractual promise that Purdue allegedly broke.3 To be 

sure, John asserts that he had a property interest in his continued enrollment at Purdue. But as support for that proposition, 

his complaint states only that the right arose “from the express and implied contractual relationship” between John and 

the university. It points to no “identifiable contractual promise that the [university] failed to honor.” Bissessur, 581 F.3d at 

602 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 

His brief does only slightly better. In it, John insists that 

the Indiana state courts have held that a student enrolled in a 

 3 For simplicity’s sake, we will refer to the university and its officers 

collectively as “Purdue” or “the university.” 
No. 17-3565 11

public institution has a property interest in continuing his education. He cites Reilly v. Daly, in which an Indiana court said: 

“It is without question that a student’s interest in pursuing an 

education is included within the Fourteenth Amendment’s 

protection of liberty and property and that a student facing 

expulsion or suspension from a public educational institution 

is therefore entitled to the protections of due process.” 666 

N.E.2d 439, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). But John’s reliance on 

Reilly is misplaced. To begin with, this cryptic sentence—the 

sum of what the case says on the topic—does not specify 

whether university disciplinary proceedings implicate liberty 

or property interests. And to the extent that Reilly refers to 

property, it does not purport to identify a state-granted property right to pursue higher education. Instead, it appears to 

express a view about federal law that we have already rejected: that the Due Process Clause protects a generalized 

property interest in higher education, irrespective of any specific state entitlement. While Indiana is free to align itself with 

courts taking that view, see supra note 2, our position is clear 

and to the contrary, see Williams, 530 F.3d at 589 (rejecting “the 

bald assertion that any student who is suspended from college has suffered a deprivation of constitutional property”). 

John’s failure to establish a property interest does not 

doom his claim, however, because he also maintains that Purdue deprived him of a protected liberty interest: his freedom 

to pursue naval service, his occupation of choice. To succeed 

on this theory, John must satisfy the “stigma plus” test, which 

requires him to show that the state inflicted reputational damage accompanied by an alteration in legal status that deprived 

him of a right he previously held. See Mann v. Vogel, 707 F.3d 

872, 878 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708–

09 (1976); Hinkle v. White, 793 F.3d 764, 767–68 (7th Cir. 2015). 
12 No. 17-3565 

John argues that he has satisfied this test because he alleges 

that Purdue inflicted reputational harm by wrongfully branding him as a sex offender; that Purdue changed his legal status 

by suspending him, subjecting him to readmission requirements, and causing the loss of his Navy ROTC scholarship; 

and that these actions impaired his right to occupational liberty by making it virtually impossible for him to seek employment in his field of choice, the Navy. See Lawson v. Sheriff of 

Tippecanoe Cty., Ind., 725 F.2d 1136, 1138 (7th Cir. 1984) (“The 

concept of liberty in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence 

has long included the liberty to follow a trade, profession, or 

other calling.”); Townsend v. Vallas, 256 F.3d 661, 670 (7th Cir. 

2001) (Liberty interests are impinged when someone’s “good 

name, reputation, honor or integrity [are] called into question 

in a manner that makes it virtually impossible for ... [him] to 

find new employment in his chosen field.”).

Purdue insists that John has not adequately alleged 

“stigma,” much less the necessary “plus.” The university 

maintains that it has not and will not divulge John’s disciplinary record without his permission. The Navy knows about 

it only because John signed a form authorizing the disclosure 

after the investigation began. Because John permitted the disclosure, Purdue says, he cannot complain that Purdue stigmatized him. 

Purdue cites no cases in support of its position, but it is 

presumably trying to draw an analogy between John and a 

plaintiff who publishes damaging information about himself—because it is true that a plaintiff can’t himself spill the 

beans and then blame the defendant for ruining his reputation. Olivieri v. Rodriguez illustrates the point. 122 F.3d 406 (7th 
No. 17-3565 13

Cir. 1997). There, a probationary police officer asserted a procedural due process claim against his superintendent after he 

was fired for sexually harassing other probationers. Id. at 407. 

We observed that “the defendant [had not] disclosed to anyone the grounds of the plaintiff’s discharge.” Id. at 408. The 

plaintiff, however, insisted that the defendant’s silence didn’t 

matter because the plaintiff would have to tell potential employers why he was fired—and “[i]f he answers truthfully, he 

will reveal the ground of the termination as effectively as (actually more effectively than) if the Department had taken out 

a full-page ad in every newspaper in the nation announcing 

the termination of Felix A. Olivieri for sexually harassing female probationary officers at the Chicago police training 

academy.” Id. 

We rejected Olivieri’s claim, holding that a plaintiff who 

publicizes negative information about himself cannot establish that the defendant deprived him of a liberty interest. Id. As 

an initial matter, we noted that it was uncertain whether 

Olivieri’s prospective employers would ever find out why he 

was discharged. Id. at 408–09 (“A prospective employer might 

not ask him—might ask only the Chicago Police Department, 

which for all we know might refuse to disclose the grounds of 

Olivieri’s discharge; many former employers refuse to answer 

such inquiries, because of fear of being sued for defamation.”). In addition, we explained that “[t]he principle of selfdefamation, applied in a case such as this, would encourage 

[the plaintiff] to apply for a job to every police force in the 

nation, in order to magnify his damages; and to blurt out to 

each of the them the ground of his discharge in the most lurid 

terms, to the same end.” Id. at 409. 
14 No. 17-3565 

John’s case is different. He does not claim simply that he 

might someday have to self-publish the guilty finding to future employers. Instead, John says that he had an obligation 

to authorize Purdue to disclose the proceedings to the Navy. 

That makes John’s case more like Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 

493 (7th Cir. 2005), than Olivieri. In Dupuy, we held that the 

publication requirement of the stigma-plus test was satisfied 

when the plaintiffs were obligated to authorize a state agency 

to disclose its finding that they were child abusers to the 

plaintiffs’ current and prospective employers. 397 F.3d at 510. 

In contrast to Olivieri, where disclosure was voluntary and 

speculative, it was compelled and certain in Dupuy. And in 

Dupuy, unlike in Olivieri, the disclosure was not self-published—it came from the defendant, even if the plaintiff had 

been obligated to authorize it. So too here: Purdue, not John, 

revealed to the Navy that it had found him guilty of sexual 

violence, and John had a legal obligation to authorize the disclosure. 

Thus, if what John says is true, the university has stigmatized him by telling the Navy about the guilty finding. But the 

loss of reputation is not itself a loss of liberty, “even when it 

causes ‘serious impairment of one’s future employment.’” Hojnacki v. Klein–Acosta, 285 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2002) (alteration and citation omitted). John must also show that the 

stigma was accompanied by a change in legal status. In Paul 

v. Davis, for example, the Supreme Court held that the police 

did not trigger the Due Process Clause by posting flyers 

falsely asserting that the plaintiff was an active shoplifter. 424 

U.S. at 712. The flyers undoubtedly harmed the plaintiff’s professional reputation, but their posting did not alter his legal 

status. Id. at 708–12. Similarly, in Hinkle v. White, loose-lipped 

state police officers spread word that they were investigating 
No. 17-3565 15

the plaintiff for child molestation and that he might be guilty 

of arson to boot. 793 F.3d at 767. But the gossip did not alter 

his legal status—the plaintiff was not prosecuted, much less 

found guilty; nor did the county impose a consequence like 

firing him from his job as county sheriff. Id. at 768–69. Even 

though the rumors made it “virtually impossible” for him to 

change to a new job in his chosen field, the lack of a status 

change meant that he could not state a due process claim. Id.

at 768–70. 

John’s situation is unlike that of the plaintiffs in Paul v. Davis and Hinkle v. White because it is not a matter of state-spread 

rumors or an investigation that was ultimately dropped. After 

conducting an adjudicatory proceeding, Purdue formally determined that John was guilty of a sexual offense. That determination changed John’s status: he went from a full-time student in good standing to one suspended for an academic year. 

Cf. Mann, 707 F.3d at 878 (holding that the state deprived the 

plaintiff of occupational liberty when, after an investigation, 

it found that she had violated child-safety laws and suspended her ability to operate her daycare center); Doyle v. 

Camelot Care Ctrs., 305 F.3d 603, 617 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding 

that the state deprived the plaintiffs of occupational liberty 

when, after an investigation, it found that they had neglected 

a minor and informed their respective employers, who fired 

them). And it was this official determination of guilt, not the 

preceding charges or any accompanying rumors, that allegedly deprived John of occupational liberty. It caused his expulsion from the Navy ROTC program (with the accompanying loss of scholarship) and foreclosed the possibility of his reenrollment in it. John has satisfied the “stigma plus” test. 
16 No. 17-3565 

B. 

Having determined that John has adequately alleged that 

Purdue deprived him of a liberty interest, we turn to whether 

he has adequately claimed that Purdue used fundamentally 

unfair procedures in determining his guilt. 

When a right is protected by the Due Process Clause, a 

state “may not withdraw [it] on grounds of misconduct absent[] fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether 

the misconduct has occurred.” Goss, 419 U.S. at 574. Determining what is fundamentally fair is always a context-specific 

inquiry. See Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 

78, 86 (1978) (“[W]e have frequently emphasized that ‘[t]he 

very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible 

procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.’” (citation omitted)). Thus, for example, a university has 

much more flexibility in administering academic standards 

than its code of conduct. See id. (“[T]here are distinct differences between decisions to suspend or dismiss a student for 

disciplinary purposes and similar actions taken for academic 

reasons which may call for hearings in connection with the 

former but not the latter.”). And even in the disciplinary context, the process due depends on a number of factors, including the severity of the consequence and the level of education. 

A 10-day suspension warrants fewer procedural safeguards 

than a longer one, Goss, 419 U.S. at 584, and universities are 

subject to more rigorous requirements than high schools, 

Pugel v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 378 F.3d 659, 663–64 (7th Cir. 

2004). 

John’s circumstances entitled him to relatively formal procedures: he was suspended by a university rather than a high 

school, for sexual violence rather than academic failure, and 
No. 17-3565 17

for an academic year rather than a few days. Yet Purdue’s process fell short of what even a high school must provide to a 

student facing a days-long suspension. “[D]ue process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that 

the student be given oral or written notice of the charges 

against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his 

side of the story.” Goss, 419 U.S. at 581. John received notice 

of Jane’s allegations and denied them, but Purdue did not disclose its evidence to John. And withholding the evidence on 

which it relied in adjudicating his guilt was itself sufficient to 

render the process fundamentally unfair. See id. at 580 

(“[F]airness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights....” (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))). 

John has adequately alleged that the process was deficient 

in other respects as well. To satisfy the Due Process Clause, “a 

hearing must be a real one, not a sham or pretense.” Dietchweiler by Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2016) 

(citation omitted). At John’s meeting with the Advisory Committee, two of the three panel members candidly admitted 

that they had not read the investigative report, which suggests that they decided that John was guilty based on the accusation rather than the evidence. See id. at 630 (stating that a 

hearing would be a sham if “members of the school board 

came to the hearing having predetermined [the plaintiff’s] 

guilt”). And in a case that boiled down to a “he said/she said,” 

it is particularly concerning that Sermersheim and the committee concluded that Jane was the more credible witness—in 

fact, that she was credible at all—without ever speaking to her 
18 No. 17-3565 

in person. Indeed, they did not even receive a statement written by Jane herself, much less a sworn statement.4 It is unclear, 

to say the least, how Sermersheim and the committee could 

have evaluated Jane’s credibility. 

Sermersheim and the Advisory Committee’s failure to 

make any attempt to examine Jane’s credibility is all the more 

troubling because John identified specific impeachment evidence. He said that Jane was depressed, had attempted suicide, and was angry at him for reporting the attempt. His 

roommate—with whom Sermersheim and the Advisory 

Committee refused to speak—maintained that he was present 

at the time of the alleged assault and that Jane’s rendition of 

events was false. And John insisted that Jane’s behavior after 

the alleged assault—including her texts, gifts, and continued 

romantic relationship with him—was inconsistent with her 

claim that he had committed sexual violence against her. 

Sermersheim and the Advisory Committee may have concluded in the end that John’s impeachment evidence did not 

undercut Jane’s credibility. But their failure to even question 

Jane or John’s roommate to probe whether this evidence was 

reason to disbelieve Jane was fundamentally unfair to John. 

John also faults Sermersheim for being in charge of both 

the investigation and adjudication of his case. We have held, 

however, that blending these two functions in the university 

context does not necessarily render a process unfair. Hess v. 

Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 2016). To 

rebut the presumption that university administrators are 

 4 Citing a recent case from the Sixth Circuit, John also argues that he 

was entitled to cross-examine Jane. See Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 581 (6th 

Cir. 2018). Because John has otherwise alleged procedural deficiencies sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, we need not address this issue. 
No. 17-3565 19

“honest and impartial,” a plaintiff must “lay a specific foundation of prejudice or prejudgment, such that the probability 

of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Id.

This burden is “heavy indeed,” typically requiring evidence 

that “the adjudicator had a pecuniary interest in the outcome 

of the case, or that he was previously the target of the plaintiff’s abuse or criticism.” Id. (citations omitted). John has made 

no such allegation here. 

C. 

To this point, we have analyzed the due process claim 

without distinguishing between defendants. Now, however, 

we separate them. 

(1) 

We begin with John’s individual-capacity claim against 

Mitch Daniels, the president of Purdue. The magistrate judge 

was right to dismiss this claim. Section 1983 “does not allow 

actions against individuals merely for their supervisory role 

of others.” Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 574 (7th Cir. 

2000). To be liable, a supervisor “must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind 

eye.” Zentmeyer v. Kendall Cty., Ill., 220 F.3d 805, 812 (7th Cir. 

2000) (quoting Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 

1995)). John’s complaint asserts nothing more about Daniels 

than that “‘The Buck Stops Here’ with him.” There is no allegation that Daniels knew about the conduct, much less that 

he facilitated, approved, or condoned it. 

(2) 

The individual-capacity claims against Rollock, Sermersheim, Oliver, and Amberger present a different obstacle for 
20 No. 17-3565 

John: qualified immunity. For the reasons that we have already explained, John has alleged facts that amount to a constitutional violation. But because the defendants have asserted qualified immunity, John can recover damages from 

them only if his right to receive procedural due process in the 

disciplinary proceeding was clearly established. See Rainsberger v. Benner, 913 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2019). The magistrate judge did not address qualified immunity because he 

concluded that John had failed to state a due process claim. 

The defendants raised it below, however, and they press it 

again here as an alternative ground for affirmance. 

John insists that it would be premature for us to address 

the issue because we are reviewing the magistrate judge’s dismissal of his claims under Rule 12(b)(6). As he points out, 

qualified immunity is generally addressed at summary judgment rather than on the pleadings. See Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 

F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[A] complaint is generally not 

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity 

grounds.”); see also Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 765 

n.3 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he dismissal of a § 1983 suit under Rule 

12(b)(6) is a delicate matter.”). Thus, John argues, we should 

send the case back to the district court for discovery. 

There is no hard-and-fast rule, however, against resolving 

qualified immunity on the pleadings. The reason for deferring 

it to summary judgment is that an officer’s entitlement to 

qualified immunity often “depend[s] on the particular facts of 

a given case,” Jacobs, 215 F.3d at 765 n.3, and the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure do not require a plaintiff to include much 

factual detail in a complaint, see FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (providing 

that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of 

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). See 
No. 17-3565 21

also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 238–39 (2009) (“When 

qualified immunity is asserted at the pleading stage, the precise factual basis for the plaintiff’s claim or claims may be 

hard to identify.”). That said, the existence of qualified immunity is not always dependent on factual development—it 

is sometimes clear on the face of the complaint that the constitutional right invoked was not clearly articulated in the case 

law. In that circumstance, the existence of qualified immunity 

is a “purely legal question” that the court can address on a 

motion to dismiss. Jacobs, 215 F.3d at 765 n.3. 

That is the situation here. Qualified immunity is a high 

standard. It protects government officials from liability for 

civil damages as long as their actions do not violate “clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Figgs v. Dawson, 829 F.3d 

895, 905 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). While the general 

stigma-plus test is well-settled in our law, see Hinkle, 793 F.3d 

at 768, we have never applied it specifically in the university 

setting. Instead, our cases in this area have considered only 

whether students have a property interest in their public university education—and to this point, no student has successfully shown the requisite interest. Because this is our first case 

addressing whether university discipline deprives a student 

of a liberty interest, the relevant legal rule was not “clearly established,” and a reasonable university officer would not have 

known at the time of John’s proceeding that her actions violated the Fourteenth Amendment. We therefore affirm the dismissal of John’s individual-capacity claims against Rollock, 

Sermersheim, Oliver, and Amberger. 
22 No. 17-3565 

(3) 

That leaves John’s claims for injunctive relief, which he 

seeks to obtain by suing Daniels, Rollock, Sermersheim, Oliver, and Amberger in their official capacities. See Ex Parte 

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The magistrate judge dismissed 

this claim without prejudice on the ground that John lacked 

standing to bring it. In his complaint, John asked for “an injunction enjoining violations of the Fourteenth Amendment 

in the process of investigating and adjudicating sexual misconduct complaints.” But John doesn’t have standing to claim 

such relief. He has not alleged that he intends to re-enroll at 

Purdue, much less that he faces a “real and immediate threat” 

that Purdue would again investigate him for sexual misconduct, much less that any such investigation would violate due 

process. See City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (“That 

Lyons may have been illegally choked by the police on October 6, 1976, while presumably affording Lyons standing to 

claim damages against the individual officers and perhaps 

against the City, does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped for a traffic violation, or for any other offense, by an officer or officers who 

would illegally choke him into unconsciousness without any 

provocation or resistance on his part.”). What John really 

seeks to do is champion the rights of other men at Purdue who 

might be investigated for sexual misconduct using the flawed 

procedures that he describes in his complaint. That is a no-go: 

John plainly lacks standing to assert the Fourteenth Amendment rights of other students, even if he had alleged (which 

he didn’t) that the threat of injury to any one of them was “real 

and immediate.” Id. 
No. 17-3565 23

John also seeks to remove the conditions of re-entry imposed by Purdue as part of his discipline. John lacks standing 

here too. As we already noted, he has not alleged that he intends to return to Purdue—a necessary fact to demonstrate a 

cognizable injury from the barriers to re-entry. That said, the 

magistrate judge dismissed this claim without prejudice, so 

on remand John can seek to remedy his lack of standing by 

pleading the necessary facts, if he has them. 

In his response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and 

then again in his brief and at oral argument, John argued that 

he is also entitled to an injunction ordering university officials 

to expunge the finding of guilt from his disciplinary record. 

For this relief, John has standing: John’s marred record is a 

continuing harm for which he can seek redress. See, e.g., Flint 

v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 825 (9th Cir. 2007) (pursuing expungement of university records “serve[s] the purpose of preventing present and future harm”); Doe v. Cummins, 662 F. 

App’x 437, 444 (6th Cir. 2016) (seeking to “remove the negative notation from appellants’ disciplinary records” is “nothing more than prospective remedial action”); Shepard v. Irving, 

77 F. App’x 615, 620 (4th Cir. 2003) (an “F” grade and a plagiarism conviction “constitute[d] a continuing injury to the 

plaintiff” and an action to remove them was “prospective in 

nature”). And he claims that if the guilty finding is expunged, 

a career in the Navy may once again be open to him. 

Because John did not specifically request this relief in his 

complaint, the university officials object that it is too late for 

him to raise it now. But Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) 

states that “[e]very [] final judgment [other than default judgments] should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, 
24 No. 17-3565 

even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings.” That means that even though John may not have asked 

specifically for expungement, he may still be entitled to it. In 

Felce v. Fielder, for example, the plaintiff did not request injunctive relief but instead—using language similar to that in 

John’s complaint—asked for “other and further relief as the 

court may deem to be just and equitable.” 974 F.2d 1484, 1501 

(7th Cir. 1992). The district court in Felce had not reached the 

question of injunctive relief because it had held—as the magistrate judge did in John’s case—that the plaintiff had not alleged the necessary liberty interest. On appeal, we concluded 

that the plaintiff did have a liberty interest and instructed the 

district court to address the issue of injunctive relief on remand. Id. at 1502. We do the same here: having determined 

that John has pleaded a liberty interest, we instruct the court 

to address the issue of expungement on remand. 

III. 

John also asserts a claim against Purdue under Title IX, 

which provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, 

on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 

any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 

assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 281 (1998) (explaining that Title IX 

is enforceable through an implied private right of action). It is 

undisputed that Purdue receives federal funding and that 

John was “excluded from participation in [or] denied the benefits of ... [an] education program” when Purdue suspended 

him. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). The success of John’s claim depends 

on whether Purdue discriminated against him “on the basis 

of sex.” Id. 
No. 17-3565 25

Some circuits use formal doctrinal tests to identify general 

bias in the context of university discipline. For example, the 

Second Circuit channels such claims into two general categories. Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994). In 

what has come to be called the “erroneous outcome” category, the plaintiff must show that he “was innocent and 

wrongly found to have committed the offense.” Id. The other 

category, “selective enforcement,” requires a plaintiff to 

prove that “regardless of [his] guilt or innocence, the severity 

of the penalty and/or the decision to initiate the proceeding 

was affected by the student’s gender.” Id.; see also Plummer v. 

Univ. of Hous., 860 F.3d 767, 777–78 (5th Cir. 2017) (resolving 

the case by reference to the Yusuf framework); Doe v. Valencia 

Coll., 903 F.3d 1220, 1236 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e will assume 

for present purposes that a student can show a violation of 

Title IX by satisfying the ‘erroneous outcome’ test applied by 

the Second Circuit in Yusuf.”). The Sixth Circuit has added 

two more categories to the mix: “deliberate indifference” and 

“archaic assumptions.” See Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 

589 (6th Cir. 2018) (recognizing “at least four different theories of liability” in this context: “(1) ‘erroneous outcome,’ (2) 

‘selective enforcement,’ (3) ‘deliberate indifference,’ and (4) 

‘archaic assumptions’” (citations omitted)). 

We see no need to superimpose doctrinal tests on the statute. All of these categories simply describe ways in which a 

plaintiff might show that sex was a motivating factor in a university’s decision to discipline a student. We prefer to ask the 

question more directly: do the alleged facts, if true, raise a 

plausible inference that the university discriminated against 

John “on the basis of sex”? 
26 No. 17-3565 

John casts his Title IX claim against the backdrop of a 2011 

“Dear Colleague” letter from the U.S. Department of Education to colleges and universities. See United States Department of Education, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Civil 

Rights, Dear Colleague Letter (2011), 

https:/www2.ed.gov/print/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.html. That letter ushered in a more rigorous 

approach to campus sexual misconduct allegations by, among 

other things, defining “sexual harassment” more broadly 

than in comparable contexts, id. at 3, mandating that schools 

prioritize the investigation and resolution of harassment 

claims, id. at 4, and requiring them to adopt a lenient “more 

likely than not” burden of proof when adjudicating claims 

against alleged perpetrators, id. at 11. The Department of Education made clear that it took the letter and its enforcement 

very seriously. See Examining Sexual Assault on Campus, Focusing on Working to Ensure Student Safety, Hearing Before 

the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 113th 

Cong. 7 (2014) (statement of Catherine Lhamon, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.) (“[S]ome schools 

still are failing their students by responding inadequately to 

sexual assaults on campus. For those schools, my office and 

this Administration have made it clear that the time for delay 

is over.”). And it warned schools that “[t]his Administration 

is committed to using all its tools to ensure that all schools 

comply with [T]itle IX so campuses will be safer for students 

across the country.” Id. In other words, a school’s federal 

funding was at risk if it could not show that it was vigorously 

investigating and punishing sexual misconduct. 

According to John, this letter reveals that Purdue had a financial motive for discriminating against males in sexual assault investigations. To protect its federal funds, John says, 
No. 17-3565 27

the university tilted the process against men accused of sexual 

assault so that it could elevate the number of punishments imposed. The resulting track record of enforcement would permit Purdue to signal its commitment to cracking down on 

campus sexual assault, thereby fending off any suggestion 

that it was not complying with the Department of Education’s 

directive. Cf. Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 58 n.11 (2d 

Cir. 2016) (“A covered university that adopts, even temporarily, a policy of bias favoring one sex over the other in a disciplinary dispute, doing so in order to avoid liability or bad 

publicity, has practiced sex discrimination, notwithstanding 

that the motive for the discrimination did not come from ingrained or permanent bias against that particular sex.”). And 

because the Office of Civil Rights—a sub-agency of the Department of Education—had opened two investigations into 

Purdue during 2016, the pressure on the university to demonstrate compliance was far from abstract. That pressure may 

have been particularly acute for Sermersheim, who, as a Title 

IX coordinator, bore some responsibility for Purdue’s compliance. 

Other circuits have treated the Dear Colleague letter as relevant in evaluating the plausibility of a Title IX claim. For example, in Doe v. Miami University, the plaintiff alleged that 

“pressure from the government to combat vigorously sexual 

assault on college campuses and the severe potential punishment—loss of all federal funds—if it failed to comply, led Miami University to discriminate against men in its sexual-assault adjudication process.” 882 F.3d at 594. The Sixth Circuit 

held that this allegation, combined with others, “support[ed] 

a reasonable inference of gender discrimination.” Id.; see also

Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018) (explaining that 

the pressure of a Department of Education investigation and 
28 No. 17-3565 

the resulting negative publicity “provides a backdrop, that, 

when combined with other circumstantial evidence of bias in 

Doe’s specific proceeding, gives rise to a plausible claim.”); 

Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 58 (“There is nothing implausible 

or unreasonable about the Complaint’s suggested inference 

that the panel adopted a biased stance in favor of the accusing 

female and against the defending male varsity athlete in order 

to avoid further fanning the criticisms that Columbia turned 

a blind eye to such assaults.”). 

That said, the letter, standing alone, is obviously not 

enough to get John over the plausibility line. See Baum, 903 

F.3d at 586 (pressure from the Dear Colleague letter “alone is 

not enough to state a claim that the university acted with bias 

in this particular case”). The letter and accompanying pressure gives John a story about why Purdue might have been 

motivated to discriminate against males accused of sexual assault. But to state a claim, he must allege facts raising the inference that Purdue acted at least partly on the basis of sex in 

his particular case. See id. (the Dear Colleague letter “provides 

a backdrop that, when combined with other circumstantial 

evidence of bias in [a] specific proceeding, gives rise to a plausible claim”). 

John has alleged such facts here, the strongest one being 

that Sermersheim chose to credit Jane’s account without hearing directly from her. The case against him boiled down to a 

“he said/she said”—Purdue had to decide whether to believe 

John or Jane. Sermersheim’s explanation for her decision (offered only after her supervisor required her to give a reason) 

was a cursory statement that she found Jane credible and John 

not credible. Her basis for believing Jane is perplexing, given 

that she never talked to Jane. Indeed, Jane did not even submit 
No. 17-3565 29

a statement in her own words to the Advisory Committee. 

Her side of the story was relayed in a letter submitted by 

Bloom, a Title IX coordinator and the director of CARE. 

For their part, the three panelists on Purdue’s Advisory 

Committee on Equity were similarly biased in favor of Jane 

and against John. As John tells it—and again, we must accept 

his account as true—the majority of the panel members appeared to credit Jane based on her accusation alone, given that 

they took no other evidence into account. They made up their 

minds without reading the investigative report and before 

even talking to John. They refused to hear from John’s witnesses, including his male roommate who maintained that he 

was in the room at the time of the alleged assault and that 

Jane’s rendition of events was false. And the panel members’ 

hostility toward John from the start of the brief meeting despite their lack of familiarity with the details of the case—including Jane’s depression, suicide attempt, and anger at John 

for reporting the attempt—further supports the conclusion 

that Jane’s allegation was all they needed to hear to make their 

decision. 

It is plausible that Sermersheim and her advisors chose to 

believe Jane because she is a woman and to disbelieve John 

because he is a man. The plausibility of that inference is 

strengthened by a post that CARE put up on its Facebook 

page during the same month that John was disciplined: an article from The Washington Post titled “Alcohol isn’t the cause 

of campus sexual assault. Men are.” Construing reasonable 

inferences in John’s favor, this statement, which CARE advertised to the campus community, could be understood to 

blame men as a class for the problem of campus sexual assault 

rather than the individuals who commit sexual assault. And 
30 No. 17-3565 

it is pertinent here that Bloom, CARE’s director, wrote the letter regarding Jane to which Sermersheim apparently gave significant weight. 

Taken together, John’s allegations raise a plausible inference that he was denied an educational benefit on the basis of 

his sex. To be sure, John may face problems of proof, and the 

factfinder might not buy the inferences that he’s selling. But 

his claim should have made it past the pleading stage, so we 

reverse the magistrate judge’s premature dismissal of it. 

A final note: John seeks both money damages and injunctive relief for his claim under Title IX. Our earlier discussion 

of his entitlement to injunctive relief for his due process claim 

applies equally here. 

* * * 

John has pleaded facts sufficient to state a claim under 

both the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX. We therefore 

REVERSE and REMAND this case to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.