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Russell S. Thompson IV (029098)

Joseph Panvini (028359)

Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC

5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618

Mesa, AZ 85206

Telephone: (602) 388-8898

Facsimile: (866) 317-2674

rthompson@ThompsonConsumerLaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Aaleon Akins, on behalf of herself and all 

others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Seidberg Law Offices, P.C.,

Defendant.

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Case No. 

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND 

TRIAL BY JURY DEMAND

NATURE OF ACTION

1. Plaintiff Aaleon Akins (“Plaintiff”) brings this putative class action against 

Defendant Seidberg Law Offices, P.C. (“Defendant”) pursuant to the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated. 

JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND STANDING

2. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331. 

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3. Venue is proper before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), where 

the acts and transactions giving rise to Plaintiff’s action occurred in this district, where 

Plaintiff resides in this district, and where Defendant transacts business in this district. 

4. “In determining whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, both 

history and the judgment of Congress play important roles.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 

S. Ct. 1540, 1549, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016). Congress is 

“well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III 

requirements,” thus “Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries 

concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.’” Id. (quoting Lujan v. 

Defs of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)). 

5. “Without the protections of the FDCPA, Congress determined, the 

‘[e]xisting laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect 

consumers.’” Lane v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 15 C 10446, 2016 WL 

3671467, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2016) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b)). Thus, a failure to 

honor a consumer’s right under the FDCPA constitutes an injury in fact for Article III 

standing. See id. at *3 (holding that a consumer “has alleged a sufficiently concrete 

injury because he alleges that [Defendant] denied him the right to information due to him 

under the FDCPA”); see also Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., No. 15-15708, 2016 WL 

3611543, at *3 (11th Cir. July 6, 2016) (holding that consumer’s § 1692g claim was 

sufficiently concrete to satisfy injury-in-fact requirement). 

6. “The Supreme Court has held time and again that the violation of a 

statutory right to receive information one is entitled to receive creates a concrete injury 

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sufficient to confer standing on a plaintiff.” Zia v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 3d

1334, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2016).

7. “The FDCPA does create an informational right which did not exist prior to 

its enactment, and that right is tied to the harm which a consumer may suffer if not 

provided with that information. Consequently, the deprivation of that information is, in 

most cases, sufficient to confer Article III standing. That was the law before Spokeo, and 

that law was not based on an erroneous understanding of Article III like the one corrected 

by Spokeo, but by application of well-settled principles of standing jurisprudence 

which Spokeo did not change (and, in fact, upon which Spokeo relied).” Hagy v. Demers 

& Adams, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-530, 2017 WL 1134408, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2017).

8. “[N]umerous other courts, including courts in this circuit and from around 

the country, have rejected Spokeo-based standing challenges in the context of FDCPA 

violations.” Neeley v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. 115CV01283RLYMJD, 

2017 WL 3311045, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 2, 2017) (citing Pogorzelski v. Patenaude & 

Felix APC, No. 16-C-1330, 2017 WL 2539782, at *4, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89678, at 

*11 (E.D. Wis. June 12, 2017)) (collecting cases).

9. “[E]ven though actual monetary harm is a sufficient condition to show 

concrete harm, it is not a necessary condition.” Lane, 2016 WL 3671467 at *4 (emphasis 

in original). 

THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

10. Congress enacted the FDCPA in order to eliminate “abusive debt collection 

practices by debt collectors [and] to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from 

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using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.” Clark v. 

Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 

15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)). 

11. To protect consumers and ensure compliance by debt collectors, “the 

FDCPA is a strict liability statute.” McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, 

LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir. 2011).

12. Strict liability enhances “the remedial nature of the statute,” and courts are 

“to interpret it liberally” to protect consumers. Clark, 460 F.3d at 1176.

13. In addition, by making available to prevailing consumers both statutory 

damages and attorneys’ fees, Congress “clearly intended that private enforcement actions 

would be the primary enforcement tool of the Act.” Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 

775, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., Inc., 755 F.3d 

1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2014). 

14. Violations of the FDCPA are assessed under the least sophisticated 

consumer standard which is “‘designed to protect consumers of below average 

sophistication or intelligence,’ or those who are ‘uninformed or naïve,’ particularly when 

those individuals are targeted by debt collectors.” Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 

660 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Duffy v. Landberg, 215 F.3d 871, 874-75 

(8th Cir. 2000)). 

15. “An FDCPA Plaintiff need not even have actually been misled or deceived 

by the debt collector’s representation; instead, liability depends on whether the 

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hypothetical ‘least sophisticated debtor’ likely would be misled.” Tourgeman, 755 F.3d 

at 1117-18 (emphasis in original). 

16. “[B]ecause the FDCPA is a remedial statute aimed at curbing what 

Congress considered to be an industry-wide pattern of and propensity towards abusing 

debtors, it is logical for debt collectors—repeat players likely to be acquainted with the 

legal standards governing their industry—to bear the brunt of the risk.” Clark, 460 F.3d at 

1171-72; see also FTC v. Colgate–Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 393 (1965) (“[I]t does 

not seem unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of 

proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line.”) (internal quotations 

omitted).

PARTIES

17. Plaintiff is a natural person who at all relevant times resided in the State of 

Arizona, County of Maricopa, and City of Phoenix. 

18. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 

19. Defendant is an entity who at all relevant times was engaged, by use of the 

mails and telephone, in the business of attempting to collect a “debt” from Plaintiff, as 

defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).

20. Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

21. Plaintiff is a natural person allegedly obligated to pay a debt asserted to be 

owed or due a creditor other than Defendant.

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22. Plaintiff’s alleged obligation arises from a transaction in which the money, 

property, insurance, or services that are the subject of the transaction were incurred 

primarily for personal, family, or household purposes—namely, a personal automobile 

loan (the “Debt”).

23. Defendant uses instrumentalities of interstate commerce or the mails in a 

business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts.

24. Defendant regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, 

debts owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due, another.

25. In connection with the collection of the Debt, Defendant sent Plaintiff a 

letter dated January 8, 2018.

26. A true and correct copy of Defendant’s January 8, 2018 letter is attached to 

this complaint as Exhibit A.

27. Defendant’s January 8, 2018 letter was Defendant’s initial communication 

with Plaintiff in connection with the collection of the Debt. 

28. Defendant’s January 8, 2018 letter purported to provide the statements 

required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).

29. Among the rights provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) is a 30-day period 

from the consumer’s receipt of the initial communication in which the consumer may 

dispute the debt or request verification.

30. Defendant sent Plaintiff a subsequent letter dated January 29, 2018.

31. A true and correct copy of Defendant’s January 29, 2018 letter is attached 

to this complaint as Exhibit B.

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32. Defendant’s January 29, 2018 letter states, in part: 

We have tried to contact you in order to resolve the debt owed by you to 

our Client. We want to do so without the need for litigation, but 

unfortunately, we still have not heard from you and this matter remains 

unresolved.

Unless we hear from you now, we can only assume that you are refusing to 

voluntarily address this matter. While it is not our wish to do so, failing to 

hear from you, we will be compelled to sue.

Exhibit B.

33. Defendant’s January 29, 2018 letter further states: “I urge you to contact 

my Legal Collection Assistant . . . to make arrangements to pay. . . . Please call now.” Id. 

34. By threatening imminent legal action and urging Plaintiff to contact 

Defendant immediately to make payment arrangements, Defendant overshadowed 

Plaintiff’s right to dispute and request verification of the Debt within the 30 day time 

period.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

35. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all factual allegations above. 

36. Defendant’s January 29, 2018 letter is based on a form or template used by 

Defendant to send collection letters (the “Template”).

37. Defendant has used the Template to send collection letters to over 40 

individuals in the State of Arizona within the year prior to the filing of the original 

complaint in this matter.

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38. Defendant regularly sends collection letters based on the Template within 

30 days from the initial communication with a consumer, and has done so with respect to 

over 40 individuals in Arizona.

39. The Template overshadows the disclosures required pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692g(a) during the thirty-day dispute period in the same manner as Defendant did with 

Plaintiff above.

40. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly 

situated. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to represent the following class of individuals:

All persons with an Arizona address, to whom Defendant sent a letter based 

upon the Template, in connection with the collection of a consumer debt, 

within one year before the date of this complaint and within 30 days of 

having sent an initial communication to such person.

41. The proposed class specifically excludes the United States of America, the 

State of Arizona, counsel for the parties, the presiding United States District Court Judge, 

the Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Justices of 

the United States Supreme Court, all officers and agents of Defendant, and all persons 

related to within the third degree of consanguinity or affection to any of the foregoing 

persons. 

42. The class is averred to be so numerous that joinder of members is 

impracticable. 

43. The exact number of class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and 

can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery. 

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44. The class is ascertainable in that the names and addresses of all class 

members can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant. 

45. There exists a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law 

and fact involved that affect the parties to be represented. These common questions of 

law and fact predominate over questions that may affect individual class members. Such 

issues include, but are not limited to: (a) the existence of Defendant’s identical conduct 

particular to the matters at issue; (b) Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA; (c) the 

availability of statutory penalties; and (d) attorneys’ fees and costs. 

46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the class she seeks to represent. 

47. The claims of Plaintiff and of the class originate from the same conduct, 

practice, and procedure on the part of Defendant. Thus, if brought and prosecuted 

individually, the claims of the members of the class would require proof of the same 

material and substantive facts.

48. Plaintiff possesses the same interests and has suffered the same injuries as 

each class member. Plaintiff asserts identical claims and seeks identical relief on behalf 

of the unnamed class members. 

49. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class and has 

no interests adverse to or which directly and irrevocably conflict with the interests of 

other members of the class.

50. Plaintiff is willing and prepared to serve this Court and the proposed class. 

51. The interests of Plaintiff are co-extensive with and not antagonistic to those 

of the absent class members. 

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52. Plaintiff has retained the services of counsel who are experienced in 

consumer protection claims, as well as complex class action litigation, will adequately 

prosecute this action, and will assert, protect and otherwise represent Plaintiff and all 

absent class members. 

53. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) and 

23(b)(1)(B). The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class 

would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members of the class 

who are not parties to the action or could substantially impair or impede their ability to 

protect their interests. 

54. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class 

would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual 

members of the class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the 

parties opposing the classes. Such incompatible standards of conduct and varying 

adjudications, on what would necessarily be the same essential facts, proof and legal 

theories, would also create and allow the existence of inconsistent and incompatible 

rights within the class. 

55. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) in that 

Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, 

making final declaratory or injunctive relief appropriate.

56. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) in that the 

questions of law and fact that are common to members of the class predominate over any 

questions affecting only individual members.

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57. Moreover, a class action is superior to other methods for the fair and 

efficient adjudication of the controversies raised in this Complaint in that: (a) individual 

claims by the class members will be impracticable as the costs of pursuit would far 

exceed what any one plaintiff or class member has at stake; (b) as a result, very little 

litigation has commenced over the controversies alleged in this Complaint and individual 

members are unlikely to have an interest in prosecuting and controlling separate 

individual actions; and (c) the concentration of litigation of these claims in one forum 

will achieve efficiency and promote judicial economy.

COUNT I

VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b)

58. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each factual allegation contained above.

59. A key provision of the FDCPA is § 1692g, which requires a debt collector 

to send, within five days of its initial communication with a consumer, a written notice 

which provides information regarding the debt and informs the consumer of his or her 

right to dispute the validity of the debt, and/or request the name and address of the 

original creditor, within 30 days of receipt of the notice. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 

60. Congress adopted “the debt validation provisions of section 1692g” to 

guarantee that consumers would receive “adequate notice” of their rights under the 

FDCPA. Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Miller v. 

Payco–General Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991)).

61. This validation requirement is a “significant feature” of the law that aimed 

to “eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong person or 

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attempting to collect debts which the consumer has already paid.” See Hernandez v. 

Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing S. Rep. No. 

95-382, at 4 (1977)).

62. “The statute is not satisfied merely by inclusion of the required debt 

validation notice; the notice Congress required must be conveyed effectively to the 

debtor. It must be large enough to be easily read and sufficiently prominent to be 

noticed—even by the least sophisticated debtor.” Gostony v. Diem Corp., 320 F. Supp. 

2d 932, 938 (D. Ariz. 2003); (citing Ost v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 701, 703 

(D.N.D. 1980) (“communication must not be designed to ‘evade the spirit of the notice 

statute, and mislead the debtor into disregarding the notice’”).

63. To ensure debt collectors’ notices meaningfully convey consumers’ rights 

under § 1692g, Congress has further declared that “[a]ny collection activities and 

communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the 

disclosure of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of 

the original creditor.” Id.

64. If a consumer requests validation, “the debt collector shall cease collection 

of the debt . . . until the debt collector obtains verification” and mails such verification to 

the consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).

65. “More importantly for present purposes, the notice must not be 

overshadowed or contradicted by accompanying messages from the debt collector.” 

Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 148-49 (3d Cir. 2013). 

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66. One way in which a debt collection letter can overshadow the notice of 

rights under § 1692g is by threatening suit within the 30-day period.

67. While a debt collector may legally initiate suit before the expiration of the 

30-day period, a debt collection notice violates § 1692g where such threats would cause 

an unsophisticated consumer to overlook or ignore his or her rights. 

68. To assist debt collectors who wish to threaten suit in collection notices, 

Judge Posner has drafted “safe harbor” language—adopted by courts around the nation—

that explains the apparent contradiction between the consumer’s right to dispute within 

30 days and the debt collector’s right to bring suit before the expiration of that period, 

which reads, in relevant part, as follows:

The law does not require me to wait until the end of the 

thirty-day period before suing you to collect this debt. If, 

however, you request proof of the debt or the name and 

address of the original creditor within the thirty-day period 

that begins with your receipt of this letter, the law requires me 

to suspend my efforts (through litigation or otherwise) to 

collect the debt until I mail the requested information to you.

Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 502 (7th Cir. 1997).

69. Where a collection letter makes no effort to explain that the consumer may 

take advantage of his or her rights under § 1692g, notwithstanding the threat to file a 

lawsuit within the 30-day dispute period, the debt collector runs the risk of violating § 

1692g(b).

70. “Because the letter lacks any explanation of how the threats pressuring the 

consumer for immediate payment are consistent with the validation notice, the threats 

overshadow and contradict the notice, which therefore has not been effectively 

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conveyed.” Garcia-Contreras v. Brock & Scott, PLLC, 775 F. Supp. 2d 808, 819-21 

(M.D.N.C. 2011) (“Bartlett makes clear that although a debt collector has the right to sue 

a consumer during the statutory thirty-day period, it must tread carefully when leveraging 

this right in [a] collection letter to extract payment so as not to overshadow or contradict 

the consumer’s validation rights.”).

71. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) by overshadowing the disclosures 

required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a), during the thirty-day dispute period, including 

implicitly and explicitly threatening to take legal action against Plaintiff within the 30-

day dispute period without a clear explanation of how such threat comported with 

Plaintiff’s validation rights.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment, as follows: 

a) Determining that this action is a proper class action, certifying Plaintiff as a 

class representative under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

and designating this Complaint the operable complaint for class purposes;

b) Adjudging that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) with respect to 

Plaintiff and the class she seeks to represent;

c) Awarding Plaintiff and the class she seeks to represent actual damages 

pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1);

d) Awarding Plaintiff such additional damages as the Court may allow in the 

amount of $1,000, pursuant to § 1692k(a)(2)(B)(i);

e) Awarding all other class members such amount as the Court may allow, 

without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser 

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of $500,000 or one percent of the net worth of the debt collector, pursuant 

to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B)(ii);

f) Awarding Plaintiff and the class she seeks to represent, reasonable 

attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 

1692k(a)(3) and Rule 23; 

g) Awarding Plaintiff and the class she seeks to represent, pre-judgment and 

post-judgment interest as permissible by law; and

h) Awarding such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

TRIAL BY JURY

72. Plaintiff is entitled to and hereby demands a trial by jury.

Dated: March 27, 2018

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Russell S. Thompson IV

Russell S. Thompson IV (029098)

Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC

5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618

Mesa, AZ 85206

Telephone: (602) 388-8898

Facsimile: (866) 317-2674

rthompson@ThompsonConsumerLaw.com

s/ Joseph Panvini

Joseph Panvini (028359)

Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC

5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618

Mesa, AZ 85206 

Telephone: (602) 388-8875

Facsimile: (866) 317-2674

jpanvini@ThompsonConsumerLaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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