UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 17-1087 (TJK) SHAYN STEPHENS et al. , Plaintiffs ,

v. FARMERS RESTAURANT GROUP et al. , Defendants

.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiffs, eight current and for mer servers at five restaurant s operated by Defendants, claim that Defendants violated f ederal and state laws concernin g the minimum wage, overtime pay, and sick leave. In the instant motion, 1 Plaintiffs seek conditional certification of an opt-in collective action under federal and D.C. law. For reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion in part and deny it i n part. Conditional certificat ion will be granted, with the following limitations: First, the putative clas s is limited to servers. Second, conditional certification is not granted with respect t o the following factual allegations: (a) Plaintiffs’ “hom ework” allegations; (b) Plaint iffs’ allegations regarding uncompensated time at pre-shift m eetings insofar as they relate to the Founding Farmers Tysons restaurant in Virginia; and (c) Plaintiffs’ allegation that Def endants failed to aggregate hours worked at different restaur ants for overtime purposes.

1 ECF No. 13. In this Opinion, the “motion” means the foregoing motion unless otherwise specified. The parties submitted the following briefing on the motion: ECF No. 14 (“Pls.’ Br.”), ECF No. 22 (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), a nd ECF No. 24 (“Pls.’ Reply”). D efendants also moved for leave to file a surreply, see ECF No. 27; that motion will be d enied for reasons set forth b elow.2 Third, the putative class will be divided into three sub-classe s, one for each of the three relevant jurisdictions (the Dist rict of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia). Fourth, Defendants will be required to produce names, mailing a ddresses, and email addresses for notice purposes within the next twenty days but, absent a further order of the Court, will not be required to produce telephone numbers or to include notices with paychecks mailed to employees. The opt-in period wil l last sixty days from when notice is sent. Fifth, the Court does not approve Plaintiffs’ proposed form of notice (Pls.’ Br., Ex. A, ECF No. 14-1). Instead, the Court will order the parties to me et, confer, and submit to the Court a revised form of proposed notice consistent with this Opinion by February 9, 2018.
I. Background
A. The Amended Complaint Defendant Farmers Restaurant Gr oup operates five restaurants inthe D.C. metropolitan area: three in the District of Columbia (Founding Farmers DC, F armers Fishers Bakers, and Farmers & Distillers), one i n Maryland (MoCo’s Founding Farmers ), and one in Virginia (Founding Farmers Tysons). ECF N o. 5 (“Am. Compl.”) ¶ 3. Plai ntiffs allege that the two individual Defendants, Daniel Simons and Michael Vucurevich, ow n Farmers Restaurant Group.
Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiffs, eight current and for mer employees at the restauran ts, claim that Defendants’ conduct violated the minimum w age and overtime provisions of th e federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), 2 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45-59, the minimu m wage and overtime provisions of the D.C. Minimum Wage Act (“DCMWA”), 3 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60-74, the sick leave provisions of

2 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 3 D.C. Code § 32-1001 et seq.3 the D.C. Accrued Sick and Safe Leave Act of 2008 (“Sick Leave A ct”), 4 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 75-78, the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Maryland Wage and Hour Law, 5 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 79-94, and the payment requirem ents of the Maryland Wage Pay ment and Collection Law, 6 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 95-101. Plaintiffs have brought their case as a putative opt-in collective action under the FLSA and D.C. law, id. ¶¶ 10-15, and as a putative Ru le 23 opt-out class action under D.C. and Maryland law, id. ¶¶ 16-32. The instant motion r elates only to Plaintiffs’ prop osed collective action, and a ccordingly Plaintiffs’ Maryland-law cla ims are not relevant to the issues presently before the Court. Plaintiffs claim that Defendant s engaged in the following alleg edly improper employment practices:

 Defendants required employees t o use their own money “to purcha se uniforms including, but not limited to, specific denim chambray shirts, suspenders, black non-slip shoes, aprons, and bow ties,” id. ¶ 36, and “to clean, starch, and press their uniforms,” id. ¶ 38.

 Defendants required employees “to purchase equipment for use wh ile at work, including, but not limited t o, bottle openers, corkscrews , black lighters, and black click-top pens.” Id. ¶ 37.

 Defendants required employees “ to attend pre-shift meetings” be fore each shift that lasted “on average 15 t o 20 minutes,” and employees were not compensated for time spent at the meetings. Id. ¶ 39.

 Defendants required employees “to engage in close-out duties fo r 30 minutes to two hours per shift,” and such duties included witho ut limitation “rolling silv erware, resetting tab les, polishing sil ver, and cleaning and setting up the restaurants.” Id. ¶ 40. Similarly, Defendants required employees to spend time “sweeping, cleaning, and preparing the restaurants to open before their shifts.” Id. ¶ 49(d).

4 D.C. Code § 32-531.01 et seq. 5 Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-401 et seq. 6 Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501 et seq.4  Defendants “required plaintiffs to pool their tips and share ti p proceeds with staff who do not customarily and regularly receive tips an d gratuities, including their managers.” Id. ¶ 44.

 When employees worked at multiple restaurants within Farmers Restaurant Group, Defendants “counted the hours of work at eachlocation separately for purposes of cal culating overtime to avoid paying overtime.” Id. ¶ 41.

 Defendants generally failed to com pensate Plaintiffs “for all h ours worked over 40 in a workweek at the proper overtime rate.” Id. ¶ 43.

 Defendants failed to provide e mployees with sick leave. Id. ¶ 42.

 Plaintiffs allege that they we re paid using the “tip credit” fo r purposes of federal and state labor law. See id. ¶ 35. That is, employees were paid a small cash wage (which under fede ral law must be at least $2.13 ), with the remainder of the minimum wage made up by tips. See id. ¶ 51. Defendants allegedly applied th ese practices to the named Plain tiffs and to similarly situated employees, namely “servers, wait staff, and bartenders.” Id. ¶ 14. Since the Amended Complaint was filed, Plaintiffs have submitte d opt-in consents from five additional putative class me mbers that seek to participate in the action. See ECF Nos. 9, 25.
B. Plaintiffs’ Declarations Seven of the eight named Plain tiffs have submitted declarations in support of the motion. 7 The declarations explain that e ach Plaintiff either previously worked or still works as a “server” at one (or, in some cases, two) of the restaurants, with each P laintiff’s tenure beginning at some point since March 2015 and lasting f or various lengths of time. See Calvillo Decl. ¶ 1; Clark Decl. ¶ 1; Krohn Decl. ¶ 1; Pitt D ecl. ¶ 1; Stephens Decl. ¶ 1; Storey Decl. ¶ 1; Willig Decl. ¶ 1. Four named Plaintiffs worked at two restaurants, and each such Plaintiff claims that the same

7 Pls.’ Br., Ex. B, ECF No. 14-2 (“C alvillo Decl.”); Pls.’ Br., Ex. C, ECF No. 14-3 (“Clark Decl.”); Pls.’ Br., Ex. D, ECF N o. 14-4 (“Krohn Decl.”); Pls.’ Br., Ex. E, ECF No. 14-5 (“Pitt Decl.”); Pls.’ Br., Ex. F, ECF N o. 14-6 (“Stephens Decl.”); Pls .’ Br., Ex. G, ECF No. 14-7 (“Storey Decl.”); Pls.’ Br., Ex. H., ECF No. 14-8 (“Willig Decl .”). Plaintiff Austin Hall did not submit a declaration.5 policies applied at both restaurants. See Calvillo Decl. ¶¶ 1-2; Clar k Decl. ¶¶ 1-2; Pitt Decl. ¶¶ 1-2; Stephens Decl. ¶¶ 1-2. O nly Plaintiff Calvillo worked at the Maryland restaurant, MoCo’s Founding Farmers, see Calvillo Decl. ¶ 1, and only Pla intiff Storey worked at the Virginia restaurant, Founding Farmers Tysons, see Storey Decl. ¶ 1. The declarations attest to eac h Plaintiff’s knowledge of the al legedly unlawful practices at the restaurants. These declar ations track the allegations i n the Amended Complaint in most, but not all, respects.

 Plaintiffs declare that they wer e required to purchase “uniform s” generally similar to those described in t he Amended Complaint, and that t hey were required to launder the uniforms. See Calvillo Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; Clark Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; Krohn Decl. ¶¶ 3-4; Pitt Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; Stephens Decl. ¶ ¶ 4-5; Storey Decl. ¶¶ 3-4; Willig Decl. ¶¶ 3-4. The descriptions of the uniforms vary somewhat from plaintiff t o plaintiff. For example, while most Plaintiffs include “denim chambr ay shirts” when describing the uniform, e.g. , Calvillo Decl. ¶ 4, Plaintiff P itt includes “white oxford shi rts with non-French cuffs” instead, Pitt Decl. ¶ 4. Similarly, only two of the seven Plaintiffs mention suspenders in their descriptions, Calvillo D ecl. ¶ 4; Stephens Decl. ¶ 4, and the word “ suspenders” appears to have b een whited out in Plaintiff Pitt’s declaration, see Pitt Decl. ¶ 4.

 Plaintiffs declare that they wer e required to purchase equipmen t including “bottle openers, corkscrews, bl ack lighters, and click-top blac k ink pens” for work. Calvillo Decl. ¶ 6; Clark Decl. ¶ 6; Krohn Decl. ¶ 5 ; Pitt Decl. ¶ 6; Stephens Decl. ¶ 6; Storey Decl. ¶ 5; Willig Decl. ¶ 5.

 With two notable exceptions, Pla intiffs uniformly report that they were required to attend pre-shift mee tings lasting, “on average, 15 to 20 minutes each” and were prohibited from “clocking in” until the meetings were over. Calvillo Decl. ¶ 7; Krohn D ecl. ¶ 6; Pitt Decl. ¶ 7; Ste phens Decl. ¶ 7; Willig Decl. ¶ 6. However, Plaintiff Clark, who worked at both Farmers & Distillers and Foundi ng Farmers DC, mentions only Far mers & Distillers when stating that se rvers could not “clock in” befor e the meetings (remaining silent on whether this was the case at Foun ding Farmers DC). See Clark Decl. ¶ 7. A nd Plaintiff Storey explains that employees are prohibited from “clocking in” at Founding Farmers Tysons only if they do not “come in at l east 10 minutes early.” Store y Decl. ¶ 6.

 Plaintiffs also claim that th ey lacked the opportunity to earn tips during the pre-shift meetings. Calvillo Dec l. ¶ 7; Clark Decl. ¶ 7; Krohn Decl. ¶ 6; Pitt Decl. ¶ 7; Stephens Decl. ¶ 7; Storey Decl. ¶ 6; Willig De cl. ¶ 6.6 Plaintiffs similarly describe ha ving performed “30 minutes to t wo hours” after each shift of non-tipped close-out duties, such as “foldi ng linens, polishing silverware, bullets, a nd ramekins, cleaning the wait stations, removing trash, restocking the takeout and to go boxes, restock ing condiments, cleaning and restock ing beverage stations, polishin g wine glasses, and preparing table s.” Calvillo Decl. ¶ 8; see Clark Decl. ¶ 8; Krohn Decl. ¶ 7; Pitt Decl. ¶ 8; S tephens Decl. ¶ 8; Storey Dec l. ¶ 7; Willig Decl. ¶ 7. Once again, there are some variations among the duties described. For example, Plain tiff Clark does not report having polished silverware, and Plaintiffs Cla rk and Storey do not say that the y polished ramekins. See Clark Decl. ¶ 8; Storey Decl. ¶ 7.

 All Plaintiffs report having poole d their tips with other emplo yees, in most cases with “bartenders, bussers, runners, and stockers.” Calvi llo Decl. ¶ 9; Clark Decl. ¶ 9; Krohn Decl. ¶ 8; P itt Decl. ¶ 9; Stephens Decl . ¶ 9; Storey Decl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff Willig says that the tip pool includes “b ussers, runners, pastry workers, and stockers.” Willig Decl. ¶ 8.

 Only Plaintiff Stephens, who worke d at Farmers & Distillers and Farmers Fishers Bakers, reports that De fendants would “count the hours worked at each restaurant separately in or der to avoid” paying overtime. Stephens Decl. ¶ 11.

 Six Plaintiffs state that they w ere denied sick leave. Calvill o Decl. ¶ 12; Clark Decl. ¶ 10; Krohn Decl. ¶ 9; P itt Decl. ¶ 11; Stephens De cl. ¶ 13; Willig Decl. ¶ 10. Three Plaintiffs f urther specify that, when they requested sick leave, they were ordered to come in to work. Cl ark Decl. ¶ 10; Pitt Decl. ¶ 11; Stephens Decl. ¶ 13. Plaintiff Storey d oes not declare that she was denied sick leave. See Storey Decl.

 Six Plaintiffs’ declarations a lso include the allegation, absen t from the Amended Complaint, that their first two weeks of work involved a “training” period during which t hey were required to perform ho mework for “one to two hours” each workday. Calvillo Decl. ¶ 11; Kroh n Decl. ¶ 10; Pitt Decl. ¶ 10; Stephens D ecl. ¶ 12; Storey Decl. ¶ 10; Willig Decl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff Clark’s declar ation does not mention any such h omework. See Clark Decl.

 The cash wage that Plaintiffs earned varied by jurisdiction: $2 .77 in D.C., $3.63 in Maryland, and $2.13 in Virginia. See, e.g. , Calvillo Decl. ¶ 3; Storey Decl. ¶ 2. Plaintiffs report that these pr actices applied to “other server s” as well, with one exception: no Plaintiff states tha t Defendants’ alleged sick-le ave policies applied to employees other than the named Plaintiffs. See Calvillo Decl. ¶ 13; Clark D ecl. ¶ 11; Krohn Decl. ¶ 11; Pitt7 Decl. ¶ 12; Stephens Decl. ¶ 14; Storey Decl. ¶ 11; Willig Decl . ¶ 11. In addition, only Plaintiffs Calvillo, Stephens, and Storey say that they worked overtime, a nd each reports having worked overtime either a quarter or a third of the time. See Calvillo Decl. ¶ 10; Stephens Decl. ¶ 10; Storey Decl. ¶ 9.
C. Defendants’ Declarations Defendants filed four declarations, which accompanied their opp osition brief. 8 The declarations were filed b y (1) Defendant Simons, see Simons Decl., (2) the Director of Accounting Operations at Founding Farmers Group, see Guilford Decl. ¶ 1, (3) a former General Manager at MoCo’s Founding Farmers, see Smith Decl. ¶ 1, and (4) aService Manager at Farmers Fishers Bakers, see Garcia Decl. ¶ 1. Defendants’ declarations describe several differences among the restaurants that they assert assist them in defeati ng conditional certification. The y explain that each restaurant is owned by a separate limited liabi lity company with a different ownership structure, although Defendants do not appear to deny that Founding Farmers Group op erates the restaurants (presumably through those other entities). See Simons Decl. ¶ 3. Defendants also explain that the restaurants have “operationa l differences” that affect thei r wage and hour policies. See id. ¶ 4. For example, Defendants stat e that the restaurants have v arying volumes of work at different times of the year a nd different hours of the day, res ulting in different policies with respect to shifts, pre-shift meetings, and side work. See id. ¶¶ 5-7, 11. Defendants also state that the restaurants offer differen t types of food and service (for example, some offer brunch buffets while others do not). See id. ¶¶ 8-12. Defendants state that the ir clothing polic ies (which the y

8 ECF No. 22-1 (“Simons Decl.”); ECF No. 22-2 (“Guilford Decl.”) ; ECF No. 22-3 (“Smith Decl.”); ECF No. 22-4 (“Garcia Decl.”).8 describe as “style guides” rather than “uniforms”) vary among t he restaurants. See id. ¶ 13. They further state that there ar e variations in their policies regarding the tip credit and tip pooling, see id. ¶¶ 14, 17-18, and whether employees are required to roll and p olish silverware,
see id. ¶¶ 15-16. Defendants’ declarations also de ny several of Plaintiffs’ subst antive allegations. The declarations state that employ ees are not required to do homewo rk, see id. ¶ 19; that Defendants have paid employees straight-tim e and overtime pay as required, see id. ¶¶ 20-21; Guilford Decl. ¶¶ 3-4; that Defendants gave emp loyees paid time off to use as sick leave (and in some cases, paid employees for unused sick l eave at the end of their employ ment), see Guilford Decl. ¶¶ 5- 12; that pre-shift meetings wer e not held at MoCo’s Founding Fa rmers, see Smith Decl. ¶ 6; and that such meetings varied in len gth and frequency at Farmers Fi shers Bakers, see Garcia Decl. ¶¶ 6-9. Defendants’ declarations f urther state that employees are not eligible to begin taking sick leave until 90 days after they start their jobs, and that some employees work for fewer than 90 days or for not much longer than that. See Guilford Decl. ¶¶ 6- 9. Finally, the declarations state that at least two indi vidual managers, and some vendors, gave e mployees access to many of the tools that Plaintiffs claim th ey had to purchase (such as pens, “wine tools,” and lighters). See Smith Decl. ¶¶ 3-5; Garcia Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.
II. Legal Standard
A. Conditional Certification Under the FLSA The FLSA affords employees a pr ivate right of action for violat ions of the statute’s minimum wage and overtime provisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Coffen v. Wash. Conv. & Sports Auth. , No. 16-cv-1064 (RJL), 2017 WL 4279320, a t *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 25 , 2017). Employees may prosecute such a ctions “for and in behalf of . . . themselves and other employees9 similarly situated,” but unlike in a Rule 23 opt-out class acti on, any other employee seeking to join the action must affirma tively opt in by filing “consent in writing to become such a party.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Once such a “collective acti on” is filed, “the court has a managerial responsibility to oversee the joinder of additional parties to assure that the task is accomplished in an efficient and proper way.” Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling , 493 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1989). This responsibility incl udes ensuring that notice to p utative class members “is timely, accurate, and informative.” Id. at 172. “District courts enjoy ‘considerable discretion’ to d ecide whether and how collective ac tions should proceed and to fashio n procedures for ‘joining similarly situated employees in amanner that is both orderly a nd sensible.’” Galloway v. Chugach Gov’t Servs., Inc. , 263 F. Supp. 3d 151, 155 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Dinkel v. MedStar Health, Inc. , 880 F. Supp. 2d 49, 52 (D.D.C. 2012)). In the absence of guidance from our Court of Appeals, courts inthis Circuit have followed the lead of other federa l courts in adopting a “two-st age inquiry for determining when a collective action is appropriate.” E.g. , Ayala v. Tito Contractors , 12 F. Supp. 3d 167, 170 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Dinkel , 880 F. Supp. 2d at 52). At the firs t stage, the Court determ ines whether and how to notify putative class members. See id. While this stage is typically referred to as “conditional class cert ification,” no class is actually c reated, and the “procedural safeguards” that govern certifi cation of Rule 23 opt-out class actions do not apply. Galloway , 263 F. Supp. 3d at 154-55. Rather, pla intiffs must merely prop ose a class of “potential opt-in plaintiffs who may be ‘similarly situated’ to the nam ed plaintiffs with respect to w hether a FLSA violation has occurred.” Ayala , 12 F. Supp. 3d at 170 (quoting Myers v. Hertz Corp. , 624 F.3d 537, 555 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added)). If conditional cert ification is grante d, then the matter proceeds as a collective action through the close of discovery, at which time the defendant may10 move for “decertification,” promp ting a “more searching” inquiry into whether putative class members are in fact “similarly situated.” Id. ; see Galloway , 263 F. Supp. 3d at 155-56. Given the nature of conditional cer tification, the “bar for a p laintiff . . . is not high.” Ayala , 12 F. Supp. 3d at 170. Plaintiffs need only make a “modest f actual showing sufficient to demonstrate that [named] and poten tial plaintiffs together were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law.” Id. (alteration in ori ginal) (quoting Castillo v. P&R Enters., Inc. , 517 F. Supp. 2d 440, 445 (D.D.C. 2007)). This burden “may be satis fied based on pleadings and affidavits.” Blount v. U.S. Sec. Assocs. , 945 F. Supp. 2d 88, 93 (D.D.C. 2013). But “pure speculation” is not sufficient. Ayala , 12 F. Supp. 3d at 170 (quoting Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp. , 656 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d on other grounds , 569 U.S. 66 (2013)). Courts have denied condi tional certific ation, or cert ified a class narrower than the one proposed, where plaintiffs have f ailed “to produce any evidence that there was a common practice” covering the entire proposed class. Dinkel , 880 F. Supp. 2d at 55. Once plaintiffs have met their burden, defendants may not thwar t conditional certification merely by contradicting plainti ffs’ claims, even if defendants provide “voluminous documentation” purporting to show that no violations occurred. Bhumithanarn v. 22 Noodle Mkt. Corp. , No. 14-cv-2625 (RJS), 2015 WL 424 0985, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 1 3, 2015). Rather, “district courts should ordinar ily refrain from resolving factu al disputes and deciding matters going to the merits.” Dinkel , 880 F. Supp. 2d at 53. Moreover, “ [p]laintiffs need only sho w that their positions are similar, not identical, to the positions he ld by the putative class members.” Ayala , 12 F. Supp. 3d at 170 (quoting Grayson v. K Mart Corp. , 79 F.3d 1086, 1096 (11th Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, defendants cannot defeat conditional cert ification by pointing to immaterial variations in how the improper policies alleged by t he plaintiff were applied. See,11 e.g. , Blount , 945 F. Supp. 2d at 94-95. Conditiona l certification is also often appropriate despite differences among putative class members that go to damages, be cause a trial on liability may be followed by “individualized damages calculations.” Id. at 96. Nonetheless, conditional certification may be inappropriate where defendants’ liability to each putative class member turns on individualized questions. See, e.g. , Dinkel , 880 F. Supp. 2d at 54-55.
B. Conditional Certification Under the DCMWA and the Sick Leave Ac t D.C. law permits DCMWA and Sick Leave Act claims to be brought “[c]onsistent with the collective action procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Ac t,” in an opt-out class action, or in a collective action that is subs equently converted into a class action. D.C. Code § 32- 1308(a)(1)(C)(iii)-(v). 9 While D.C. law thus incorporates the FLSA’s procedural provis ions, D.C. law differs from the FLSA in that it provides a definitionof “similarly situated”: (2) For the purposes of this subsection, 2 or more employees ar e similarly situated if they: (A) Are or were employed by the same employer or employers, whether concurren tly or otherwise, at some point during the applicable sta tute of limitations period; (B) Allege one or more viol ations that raise similar questions as to liability; and (C) Seek similar forms of relief.

9 After a 2015 statutory amendment , decisions in this Circuit qu estioned whether employees still had the option to pursue an opt-i n collective action under the DCMWA. See Rivera v. Power Design, Inc. , 172 F. Supp. 3d 321, 330-31 (D.D.C. 2016); Eley v. Stadium Grp., LLC , No. 14-cv1594 (KBJ), 2015 WL 5611331, at *4- 5 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 2015). One decision held that the 2015 amendment did in fact foreclos e the bringing of opt-in col lective actions under the DCMWA. See Vasquez v. Grunley Constr. Co. , 200 F. Supp. 3d 93, 101-03 (D.D.C. 2016), superseded by statute , Wage Theft Prevention Clarific ation and Overtime Fairness Ame ndment Act of 2016, D.C. Law 21-266, sec . 2(f)(1), § 8(a)(1), 64 D.C. Reg. 2140, 2144 (Feb. 24, 2017) (codified at D.C. Code § 32- 1308(a)(1)). In 2017, the D.C. Cou ncil responded by revising the statute to make clear that co llective-action procedures are sti ll available. See D.C. Code § 32- 1308(a)(1)(C)(iii)-(v).12 (3) Employees shall not be considered dissimilar under this subsection solely because their: (A) Claims seek damages that differ in amount; or (B) Job titles or other mean s of classifying employees differ in ways that are unr elated to their claims. D.C. Code § 32-1308(a)(2)-(3). Plaintiffs cite this definiti on in their brief and describe it as a “similar standard” to the one governing the FLSA. Pls.’ B r. at 12. Because neither party has suggested that conditional certification should be decided di fferently under the FLSA and D.C. law, the Court assumes for purposes of this decision that th ere is no material difference between them. 10
III. Analysis As discussed below, Plaintiffs’ request for conditional certifi cation will be granted in part and denied in part. The Court will first address the substance of the conditional-certification analysis, then turn to the use of sub-classes, and finally addr ess how to proceed with notice to putative class members.
A. Conditional Certification To determine whether conditional certification i s warranted, th e Court will begin by considering Defendants’ contenti on that the proposed class is o verbroad insofar as it purports to include “servers, wait staff, a nd bartenders.” Next, the Court will address the particulars of Plaintiffs’ minimum wage, overtime, and sick leave claims, and Defendants’ responses. The

10 The factors listed in D.C. Code § 32-1308(a)(2) are similar to factors that federal courts have sometimes considered when determining whether employees are “si milarly situated.” See, e.g. , Hunter v. Sprint Corp. , 346 F. Supp. 2d 113, 119 (D.D.C. 2004). In addition, the two limitations set forth in D.C. Code § 32-1308(a )(3) appear to be at least ge nerally consistent with FLSA decisions. See, e.g. , Blount , 945 F. Supp. 2d at 96-97 (holding differences in damages amou nts did not suffice to defeat c onditional certification); Rivera , 172 F. Supp. 3d at 326 (holding job titles not relevant to conditional certification); Castillo , 517 F. Supp. 2d at 446 (similar).13 Court will then address the parties’ arguments regarding the si gnificance of interest among absent class members in joining the lawsuit. Finally, the Cour t will consider Defendants’ argument that the putative class period should be limited.
1. Job Types to Be Included in the Putative Class Plaintiffs seek to certify a cla ss that includes “servers, waitstaff, and bartenders.” Am. Compl. ¶ 14; Pls.’ Br. at 4. Butas Defendants correctly point out, Plaintiffs have submitted declarations only from servers , and those declarations describe Defendants’ allegedly improper policies only insofar as those pol icies relate to “other server s.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 25; see Calvillo Decl. ¶ 13; Clark Decl. ¶ 11; K rohn Decl. ¶ 11; Pitt Decl. ¶ 12 ; Stephens Decl. ¶ 14; Storey Decl. ¶ 11; Willig Decl. ¶ 11. Because Plaintiffs have made no showi ng that they are similarly situated to employees other than servers, the Court will limit the propo sed class accordingly. See Dinkel , 880 F. Supp. 2d at 55 (excluding empl oyees working at six hospi tals from the class where plaintiffs had not “present[ed] a ny evidence that there was a c ommon practice at those six hospitals”). Plaintiffs make two arguments i n support of certifying a class beyond servers. First, Plaintiffs suggest that Defendant s have identified only minor v ariations in job responsibilities between servers and other employ ees that should not defeat cond itional certification, citing Mendoza v. Mo’s Fisherman Exchange, Inc. , No. 1:15-cv-1427 (ELH), 2016 WL 3440007 (D. Md. June 22, 2016). See Pls.’ Reply at 6. But the plaintiffs in Mendoza submitted declarations from multiple employees who had worked in different roles (as d ishwashers, food preparation workers, and runners), and who each estimated “that between 75 and 100 employees . . . did not receive overtime wages.” Mendoza , 2016 WL 3440007, at *5; see id. at *5-9. The declarants in that case further reported havi ng personally spoken with employ ees at other restaurant locations,14 who alleged that similar misconduc t had occurred at those other locations. Id. at *14. In light of that evidence, the court granted conditional certification desp ite defendants’ contention that the class included employees whose job titles and pa y rates differe d from the declarants’. See id. at *17. By contrast, the declarations submitted in this case do n ot include any alleged misconduct directed toward any employees oth er than servers. Therefore, P laintiffs’ allegations regarding non-servers are the very sort of “pure speculation” that does n ot suffice to support conditional certification. Ayala , 12 F. Supp. 3d at 170 (quoting Symczyk , 656 F.3d at 193). Second, Plaintiffs argue that ba rtenders and servers are, in fa ct, similarly situated because both received tips from the same tip pools. See Pls.’ Reply at 6, 13. Defendants agree that bartenders and servers received tips from the same tip pools, b ut argue that they are nonetheless differently situated because serv ers contributed tips to the ti p pools while bartenders did not. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 22; Simons Decl. ¶ 18. 11 The Court agrees with Defendants because, under the statute governing tip pools, tip ped employees do not have a cla im arising from an invalid tip pool unless they contributed tips to the pool. The FLSA requires employees t o receive a minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C). Employ ees who qualify as “tipped employ ees” under the statute may be paid a lower cash wage (as lo w as $2.13 per hour), with the rem ainder of the minimum wage made up by the tips that such employees receive. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(m); Ventura v. Bebo Foods, Inc. , 738 F. Supp. 2d 8, 16 (D.D.C. 2010). The difference between the cash wage actually paid and the minimum wage is referred t o as the “tip c redit.” Ventura , 738 F. Supp. 2d

11 Plaintiffs also suggest that Defendants, by agreeing that bart enders and servers both receive tips from tip pools, have more broadly conceded that the same p olicies applied to bartenders and to servers. See Pls.’ Reply at 6. The Court disagrees, and notes that Defenda nts have in fact vigorously argued that Plaintiffs ’ proposed class is overbroad. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 25-26.15 at 16. In order to “take” the tip c redit (that is, to count ti ps toward an employee’s minimum wage), an employer must satisf y certain condit ions. In particu lar, the tip credit: shall not apply with respect to any tipped employee unless such employee has been informed by the employer of the provisions of this subsection, and all tips receiv ed by such employee have be en retained by the employee, except that this subsection shall not be construed to prohibit the poo ling of tips among employees who customarily and regularly receive tips. 29 U.S.C. § 203(m); see also D.C. Code § 32-1003(g) (containi ng a substantially identical provision). That is, to take th e tip credit toward an employee ’s wages, the employer must notify that employee of the tip-credi t provisions, and that employee must retain all the tips that she receives. See Ventura , 738 F. Supp. 2d at 16. If an employer fails to comply with t hese conditions, it cannot take the ti p credit toward the wages of t hat employee, who is then entitled to the difference between the minim um wage and the cash wage paid in damages (in addition to any other relief, such as liquidated damages, that might be availab le). See id. at 17-18. The statute contains an exception to the requirement that an em ployee being paid using the tip credit must retain all tips she receives. Under the ex ception, employees may be required to share their tips with other “employees who customarily and r egularly receive tips” as part of a tip pool. 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). If th e tip pool includes employ ees who do not customarily and regularly receive tips—as Pla intiffs allege in this case, see Am. Compl. ¶ 44—then the tip pool is invalid. See, e.g. , Arencibia v. 2401 Rest. Corp. , 831 F. Supp. 2d 164, 175 (D.D.C. 2011). But the mere fact that a tip pool is invalid does not necessarily m ean that each employee who received funds from the invalid tip pool has a claim. The tip- pool provision is not an independent obligation, but merel y an “exception from the tip-r etention requirement,” White v.
14051 Manchester Inc. , 301 F.R.D. 368, 387 (E.D. Mo. 2014) (quoting FLSA Opinion Let ter from DOL Wage & Hour D iv. (Nov. 4, 1997), 1997 WL 998047, at *2 ). Accordingly, so long as16 a given tipped employee retains all the tips that she received, the tip credit may still be taken toward that employee’s wages notwithstanding the invalid tip po ol. See Kubiak v. S.W. Cowboy,
Inc. , 164 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (“The existence o f a tip pool is relevant in the FLSA context only to the extent t hat it interferes with an empl oyee’s ability to retain all of the employee’s tips.”). The only tip ped employees with a claim wou ld be those who do not retain all the tips they received—that is, those who are required to contr ibute tips to the invalid tip pool. Here, Plaintiffs have asserted tha t both “[s]ervers and bartend ers . . . are required to contribute their hard -earned tips to a ti p pool that includes n on-tipped workers.” Pls.’ Br. at 7. Had Plaintiffs substantiated tha t assertion, they might have be en able to establish that bartenders and servers were similarly situat ed with respect to the alleged tip-pool policy. Instead, Plaintiffs’ declarations show only that server s contributed t o the allegedl y invalid tip pools, and are silent with respect to bartenders. Pla intiffs therefore have not show n that bartenders and servers have the same claim, much less that t hey are similarly situated. Ac cordingly, the class will be limited

to servers. 12
2. Minimum Wage Claim Plaintiffs claim that, as the result of the various practices t hey describe, they and similarly situated employees were paid le ss than the relevant minimum wag e. See, e.g. , Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51-55. The parties disagree on th e level of generality at w hich to analyze this claim for purposes of the motion. Plaintiffs argue the Court should cert ify their minimum wage claim as a whole without individually scru tinizing the “numerous factual a ssertions” in the Amended

12 Defendants sought leave to file a surreply in order to address a suggestion in Plaintiffs’ reply that the putative class includes “bussers.” See ECF No. 27 at 2. The Court’s ruling, by limiting the class to servers, has obvi ated any need for briefing on tha t issue, and theref ore the surreply motion will be denied.17 Complaint, which, according to Plaintiffs, “simply illustrate s ome, but not all, of the varying ways in which the defendants have failed to properly compensate their workers in violation of the FLSA and District of Columbi a law.” Pls.’ Reply at 5. However, the conditional-certif ication standard turns on whethe r plaintiffs have demonstrated that a “common polic y or plan that violated the la w” may have applied across the putative class. E.g. , Ayala , 12 F. Supp. 3d at 170 (quoting Castillo , 517 F. Supp. 2d at 445). That is, “class members in a col lective action ‘must share more than a common allegation that they were denied overtime or pai d below the minimum wage. The class members must put forth a common legal theory upon which each member is entitled to rel ief.’” Hunter v. Sprint Corp. , 346 F. Supp. 2d 113, 119 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting Sheffield v. Orius Corp. , 211 F.R.D. 411, 413 (D. Or. 2002)). In this case, Pla intiffs have not alleged a si ngle policy or legal theory, but a series of policies that allege dly caused, in different ways, vi olations of federal and state minimum wage laws. The Court wi ll therefore consider each poli cy separately. See, e.g. , Thedford v. Drive In of Evansville, Inc. , No. 2:14-cv-0390-SLB, 2014 WL 5520954, at *11-14 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 31, 2014) (analyzing each alleged policy separa tely for conditiona l-certification purposes). Those policies are: ( a) the alleged requirement tha t employees purchase and launder “uniforms”; (b) the alleged re quirement that employees purchase “tools of the trade”; (c) the alleged failure to compensate em ployees for required pre-shift meetings; (d) the alleged requirement that employees perform non-tipped pre- and post-shi ft work; (e) the alleged requirement that employees cont ribute to an i nvalid tip pool; a nd (f) the alleged requirement that employees spend uncompensated time doing “homework.”18 (a) “Uniforms” Policy Plaintiffs claim in their complai nt and declarations that Defen dants required them and other servers to purchase and c lean their uniforms, and that th ese costs caused t heir wages to fall below the minimum wage. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36, 38, 52; Calvillo Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, 13; Clark Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, 11; Krohn Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, 11; Pitt Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, 12; Step hens Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, 14; Storey Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, 11; Willig Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, 11. Defendants argue this sho wing is insufficient. They argue that variations among Plaintiffs ’ declarations and among the di fferent restaurants—such as the fact that some servers wore white shirts while others wore deni m chambray shirts, and some wore suspenders while others did not—show a lack of similarity among putative class members. Defs.’ Opp’n at 9-10. But such mi nor variations are, in and of themselves, not enough to defeat conditional certification. See Blount , 945 F. Supp. 2d at 94-95 (granti ng certification despite wide variations in “type, freque ncy, and impact of interruption s on the guards’ meal breaks” at issue). Rather, courts have tende d to grant cert ification desp ite some variability in uniforms, and to deny certification only in the face of more substantial vari ations. Compare Brown v. Consol. Rest. Operations, Inc. , No. 3:12-cv-788, 2013 WL 4804780, at *2-6 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 6 , 2013) (granting conditional certific ation where defendant had a commo n policy of requiring uniforms, despite variations at differe nt restaurant locations), with Williams v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA,
Inc. , No. 2:10-cv-7181, 2011 WL 3629023, a t *4-6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2011) (denying certification of uniform-cleaning claim where plaintiffs descri bed an “array of uniforms,” including a “military-style” uniform involving a bomber jacket and a “lobby look” involving a blazer, across hundreds of di fferent client sites). Defendants argue that these vari ations have additional legal si gnificance for two reasons. First, Defendants suggest that some of the alleged uniforms maynot, in fact, be “uniforms” at all19 under relevant law, meaning tha t liability will depend on a cas e-by-case basis analysis. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 10-11. But at thi s stage, Plaintiffs need only show that they and putative class members “ may be ‘similarly situated’ . . . with res pect to whether a FLSA viol ation has occurred.” Ayala , 12 F. Supp. 3d at 170 (quoting Myers , 624 F.3d at 555). The ultimate liability question is whether Defendants’ clothing policy in fact require d employees to purchase “a specific type and style of clothi ng to be worn at work” (which would constitute a “uniform”), or whether these “style guides” mer ely required “a general type of ordinary basic street clothing to be worn while working” with “vari ations in details of dress” (w hich would not be a “uniform”). Ayres v. 127 Rest. Corp. , 12 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting DOL Wage & H our Div., Field Operations Handbook § 30c12( f)). Plaintiffs’ declarations describe re quired clothing that is similar (though not identic al) across the five restaura nts. Defendants themselves have conceded that there were “style guides” in place at the restaur ants, although they assert that the guides were different at each location. See Simons Decl. ¶ 13. Given the se facts, it is at least possible that the foregoing lia bility question will have a sing le, classwide answer at summary judgment or trial. 13 Accordingly, Plaintiffs have ade quately demonstrated that the y may be similarly situated to putative cl ass members on this issue. Second, Defendants argue that var iations in the amounts paid fo r the uniforms may give rise to individualize d liability questions. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 11. Defen dants explain that uniform-related costs varied, and that the cash wage paid to ti pped employees varies by jurisdiction. Id. Therefore, Defendants argue, whether each employee can make o ut a claim will

13 This assumes, of course, that Pl aintiffs’ “uniform” allegation s make it to summary judgment. Defendants have challenged the s ufficiency of those allegations in their Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, E CF No. 23, and the Court is not rul ing on Defendants’ motion at this time.20 ultimately depend on an individualized inquiry into whether the cost of that employee’s uniform was enough to drive that employee’s cash wage below the federal minimum. See id. Plaintiffs argue that, because the employees are paid using the tip credit , any imposition of improper uniform costs would drive their wa ges below the minimum wage as a matter of law. See Pls.’ Reply at 11-12. The Court does not have to resolve this legal dispute, however, because even if Defendants are correct, their objection ultimately goes to dama ges and does not defeat conditional certification. See Blount , 945 F. Supp. 2d at 96-97. Flores v. Anjost Corp. , 284 F.R.D. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), is instructive. There, the c ourt considered a motion to certify pl aintiffs’ New Yo rk Labor Law c laims, including uniform claims, under Rule 23. See id. at 116, 119-20. The defendant in Flores advanced the same argument that Defendants make here: that the uniform claims sho uld not be certified because they turned on the individualiz ed question of whether the unifo rm costs caused individual class members’ wages to drop below the minimum wage. See id. at 127. The court granted class certification, finding that whether defendants had a common uni form policy was suitable for class treatment at trial, while the policy’s effect on individu al class members’ wages could be determined by a subsequent damages analysis. See id. at 128. Rule 23’ s “procedural safeguards” impose greater de mands on plaintiffs seeking certif ication (and, conve rsely, fewer demands on defendants opposing cer tification) than the “modest factual showing” standard governing FLSA conditional certification. Galloway , 263 F. Supp. 3d at 154-55. Given that Defendants’ argument failed in the Rule 23 context in Flores , it fares no better here. While Defendants may revisit the issue in a motion to decertify, Plai ntiffs have, at this stage, made a sufficient showing that they a re similarly situated to other se rvers with respect to the alleged uniform policy.21 (b) “Tools of the Trade” Policy Plaintiffs also claim in their Amended Complaint and declaratio ns that the requirement that they purchase “tools of the t rade” (such as corkscrews and pens) caused their and other servers’ pay to fall below the minimum wage. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37, 53; Calvillo Decl. ¶¶ 6, 13; Clark Decl. ¶¶ 6, 11; Krohn D ecl. ¶¶ 5, 11; Pitt Decl. ¶¶ 6 , 12; Stephens Decl. ¶¶ 6, 14; Storey Decl. ¶¶ 5, 11; Willig Decl. ¶¶ 5, 11. 14 Relying on their own declar ations, Defendants attempt to contradict these cla ims, arguing that “most if not a ll employees are not ‘required’ to purchase any of these ‘tools.’” Defs.’ Opp’n at 13. Alternati vely, Defendants suggest that there may have been variability regarding access to tools, see id. at 12-13, further contradicting Plaintiffs’ declarations, whic h describe an identical practice at each restaurant. This sort of “factual dispute” is inappropria te for resolution at conditiona l certification. See Dinkel , 880 F. Supp. 2d at 53. In addition, as they d id with respect to the a lleged “uniform” policy, Defendants argue that variations in the cos t of tools and the cash wage cr eate individualized questions regarding whether each putative class member actually earned an amount below the minimum
wage. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 13-14. The Court rejects this argument for th e same reasons set forth above relating to the “uniforms ” policy. Plaintiffs have thus met their burden with respect to the alleged “tools” policy.

14 In their Motion for Partial J udgment on the Pleadings, ECF No . 23, Defendants take the position that these items do not cons titute “tools” under relev ant law. Once again, the Court reserves judgment on that motion.22 (c) Uncompensated Pre-Shift Meetings Policy Plaintiffs also assert that Defe ndants required employees to at tend pre-shift meetings without compensation, potentiall y in violation of minimum wage laws. See Am. Compl. ¶ 39. 15
Most Plaintiffs’ declarations s upport the existence of such a p ractice affecting servers. See Calvillo Decl. ¶¶ 7, 13; Kr ohn Decl. ¶¶ 6, 11; Pitt Decl. ¶¶ 7, 12; Stephens Decl. ¶¶ 7, 14; Willig Decl. ¶¶ 6, 11. As Defendants c orrectly point out, there are t wo exceptions. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 16. First, Plaintiff Clark’s decl aration supports the existenc e of this practice at only one of the restaurants where she worked (Fa rmers & Distillers), not the ot her (Founding Farmers DC). See Clark Decl. ¶¶ 1, 7. This defect i s not fatal, however, becaus e Plaintiff Pitt worked at the same two restaurants and attests to the existence of the same policy at both. See Pitt Decl. ¶¶ 1, 7. More significantly, Plaintiff St orey, the only declarant who wo rked at the Founding Farmers Tysons restaurant in Vir ginia, describes an entirely di fferent policy. According to Plaintiff Storey, servers at the Virginia restaurant are not ne cessarily denied compensation for time spent in pre-shift meeti ngs, but merely have to arrive ten minutes beforehand to clock in.
See Storey Decl. ¶ 6. But the core el ement of Plaintiffs’ allegat ions regarding pre-shift meetings is that employees were not paid for their time. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39, 56; see also Pls.’ Br. at 6 (“During these pre-shift hour s, defendants pay no wages . . . . ”). In light of Plaintiff Storey’s

15 The Amended Complaint does not c learly assert a minimum wage c laim related to this alleged practice. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 52-55 (listing alleged minimum wage violations w ithout mentioning uncompensated pre-shift meetings). Rather, the Amen ded Complaint appears to categorize this practice as an overtime violation. See id. ¶ 56. However, it appears that a minimum wage claim could arise f rom this practice, if Plaintiff s were to show that the practice caused employees’ average hourly wage (calculated on a workweek basis) to fall below the minimum wage. See Freeman v. MedStar Health Inc. , 185 F. Supp. 3d 30, 35 & n.6 (D.D.C. 2016). Because both Plaintiffs and D efendants have assumed for purposes of this motion that Plaintiffs do assert a minimum w age claim related to pre-shift meetings, see Pls.’ Br. at 6; Defs.’ Opp’n at 15-17, the Court does the same.23 declaration, that element is la cking for the Virginia employees . Accordingly, conditional certification will not be grante d with respect to uncompensated pre-shift meetings at Founding Farmers Tysons in Virginia. Defendants’ remaining arguments are unconvincing. Defendants s eek once again to create issues of fact that are unfit for resolu tion at this sta ge, arguing that they did in fact pay employees for all hours worked, see Defs.’ Opp’n at 15 (citin g Simons Decl. ¶ 20), and that variations in pre-shift mee tings preclude certification, see id. at 16 (citing Smith Decl. ¶ 6; Garcia Decl. ¶ 7). Because Plain tiffs’ declarations clearly de scribe a uniform policy of requiring servers to attend pre-shift mee tings without compensation at th e D.C. and Maryland locations, such arguments are unavailing at this stage of the litigation. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have met their burden on the pre-shift m eetings policy at those location s. (d) Pre- and Post-Shift Work Policy The Amended Complaint and Plainti ffs’ declarations state that s ervers were required to perform a variety of non-tipped “cl ose-out” duties after their shifts, for which servers were allegedly not paid the min imum wage required by law. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40, 54; Calvillo Decl. ¶¶ 8, 13; Clark Decl . ¶¶ 8, 11; Krohn Decl. ¶¶ 7, 11; Pit t Decl. ¶¶ 8, 12; Stephens Decl. ¶¶ 8, 14; Storey Decl. ¶¶ 7, 11; Willig Decl. ¶¶ 7, 11. Plaint iffs also assert that they did not receive tips during the pre-s hift meetings discussed above. See Calvillo Decl. ¶¶ 7, 13; Clark Decl. ¶ 7, 13; Krohn Decl. ¶¶ 6, 11; Pitt Decl. ¶¶ 7, 12; Steph ens Decl. ¶¶ 7, 14; Storey Decl. ¶¶ 6, 11; Willig Decl. ¶¶ 6, 11. Defendants argue that certifi cation is unwarranted due to variations in Plainti ffs’ declarations, such as the fact that s ome Plaintiffs do not describe having rolled silverware or polished ramekins. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 14. Defendants also cite their own24 declarations, which explain that servers were not required to r oll silverware at all of the

restaurants. See id. (citing Simons Decl. ¶ 16). Once again, Defendants have point ed only to minor variations in the alleged policy of requiring Plaintiffs to perform non-tipped work, which appear o n their face to be insufficient to defeat conditiona l certification. See Blount , 945 F. Supp. 2d at 94-95 (gr anting conditional certification despite variati ons in meal breaks at issue). Def endants argue that these variations may be legally significant because Plaintiffs must plead that t hey were engaged in “dual jobs” under relevant Department of L abor regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 531 .56(e), and this analysis will depend on the exact nature of each class member’s post-shift du ties and hours. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 15. The Court is unconvince d. Defendants do not explain ho w the minor variations described—such as whether each Plaintiff rolled silverware—are likely to matter in the “dual jobs” analysis. Moreover, at th is stage, “[p]laintiffs need on ly show that their positions are similar, not identical, to the positions held by the putative c lass members.” Ayala , 12 F. Supp. 3d at 170 (quoting Grayson , 79 F.3d at 1096). Plaintiffs’ declar ations are similar enoug h to withstand scrutiny at this stag e. Of course, Defendants will h ave the opportunity to probe this issue further during discovery a nd to move for decertification if they believe it is warranted. 16 In support of their position, Defendants cite Diaz v. Electronics Boutique of America,
Inc. , No. 04-cv-0840E (SR), 2005 WL 2654270 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2005 ), but that case is distinguishable. In Diaz , a retail employee had allege dly been required to perform uncompensated post-shift work, often for over an hour per day. See id. at *2. The court declined to grant conditional certification because the employee had not established that any other stores

16 Here too, it is possible that this allegation may never reach the decertification phase, because Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF N o. 23, remains outstanding and challenges the sufficiency of Pla intiffs’ “dual jobs” allegatio ns.25 followed a similar practice. See id. at *5. By contrast, Plaintiffs in this case have made a showing, however modest, that a common policy of requiring serv ers to perform similar nontipped pre-shift and close-out work existed across all five res taurants. 17 Accordingly, Plaintiffs have met their burden with respe ct to the alleged policy of requiring servers to perform nontipped pre-shift and post-shift wo rk. Moreover, they have done so at all five restaurants. Thus, the pre-shift work at the Virginia restaurant is properly inclu ded in this claim related to nontipped work, even though—as disc ussed above—Plaintiffs have not met their burden on their claim that pre-shift work at the Virginia restaurant was uncomp ensated. (e) Tip-Pool Policy The Amended Complaint alleges tha t Plaintiffs were required to pool tips “with staff who do not customarily and regularly r eceive tips and gratuities, i ncluding their managers.” Am. Compl. ¶ 44. Six Plaintiffs’ decl arations contain the statemen t (which overlaps with, but is different from, the allegation i n the Amended Complaint) that P laintiffs and other servers pooled their tips with “bartenders, bu ssers, runners, and stockers.” Calvillo Decl. ¶¶ 9, 13; Clark Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11; Krohn Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11; Pitt Decl. ¶¶ 9, 12; Stephens D ecl. ¶¶ 9, 14; Storey Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11. In addition, Plaintiff Willig (w ho, like several of the other n amed Plaintiffs, worked at Farmers & Distillers), states that she and other servers shared tips wi th “bussers, runners, pastry workers, and stockers.” Willig Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11. Defendants argue that the discrepancy between Plaintiff Willig’ s and the other Plaintiffs’ declarations suffices to def eat conditional certification. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 21. The Court

17 In addition, several opinions have questioned the persuasive v alue of the Diaz decision. See, e.g. , Cohen v. Gerson Lehrman Grp., Inc. , 686 F. Supp. 2d 317, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that Diaz “seem[s] to be against the wei ght of authority” (alteration in original) (quoting Francis v. A&E Stores, Inc. , No. 06-cv-1638 (CS) (GAY), 2008 WL 4619858, at *3 n.3 (S.D.N. Y. Oct. 16, 2008))).26 disagrees. The declarations all agree that “bussers,” “runners ,” and “stockers” were included in the tip pool. The common inclusi on of “stockers” is particular ly significant, because at least one court has determined that stocke rs may be ineligible to partici pate in tip pools. See Schear v. Food Scope Am., Inc. , 297 F.R.D. 114, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ( declining to grant summa ry judgment for defendants on claim t hat “sushi chefs and stockers ” were improperly included in tip pool). Accordingly, to the extent that Defendants argue that p ossible variations in the makeup of the tip pool will result in individualized inquiries, see Defs.’ Opp’n at 21-22, that argument fails at this stage. Defendants also complain that Plai ntiffs are inconsistent in de scribing the size of their contributions to the tip pool. See id. at 22. But that variation is immaterial, because the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claim is the fact that tips were shared improperly—not the size of employees’ contributions to the pool. See Am. Compl. ¶ 55; see also Frebes v. Mask Rests.,
LLC , No. 13-cv-3473, 2014 WL 1848461, a t *3 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2014 ) (granting conditional certification despite varying s ize of contributions to tip pool ). Defendants also dispute the accuracy of Plaintiffs’ declarati ons on the size of these contr ibutions. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 22 (citing Simons Decl. ¶ 17). Once again, such factual disputes are not fit for res olution at this stage. Therefore, Plaintiffs ha ve met their burden with respec t to the alleged tip pool policy. 18

18 Defendants also argue in a foot note that Plaintiffs’ declarati ons deviate too widely from the Amended Complaint. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 21 n.10. It is tru e that Plaintiffs’ declarat ions have failed to support the allegation that tips were pooled with “ma nagers,” and so Plaintiffs may not include the alleged sharing of tip s with “managers” in their no tice to putative class members. It appears that Plaintiffs’ propose d notice already omits sharing with managers. See Pls.’ Br., Ex. A, ECF No. 14-1. Nonetheless, as explained above, Plaintiffs d o set forth facts that could potentially support an allegation that tips were pooled “with s taff who do not customarily and regularly receive tips and gratuities.” Am. Compl. ¶ 44.27 (f) “Homework” Policy Plaintiffs’ declarati ons state that they w ere required to perfo rm uncompensated daily homework during a “training” period that covered their first tw o weeks of work. See, e.g. , Calvillo Decl. ¶ 11. As Defendant s justifiably complain, this allegation is absent from Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 18. Plaintiffs’ “attempt to broaden the scope of this action through new allegations of misconduct raised for the fir st time in the declarations filed in support of conditional certificat ion is troubling, as ‘[i]t is patently unfair to expe ct a defendant to respond to a theory of liability t hat shifts with each response .’” Hart v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A. , No. 8:12-cv-470-T-27TBM, 2012 WL 6196035, at *2 n.8 (M.D. Fla . Dec. 12, 2012) (alteration in or iginal) (quoting Adair v. Wis. Bell, Inc. , No. 08-C-280, 2008 WL 4224360, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 11, 2008)). Plaintiffs’ response is, in esse nce, that they are obligated on ly to plead their general claim that they were denied a minimumwage, leaving them free to add whatever new facts and theories they wish at co nditional certification. See Pls.’ Reply at 14 n.3. Cour ts in this Circuit have been more demanding. For example, in Castillo , the plaintiffs’ complaint asserted that they were suing on behalf of a putative class of D.C.-based employee s. See 517 F. Supp. 2d at 446. At conditional certification, the Castillo plaintiffs sought to expand t his class to include employees in surrounding jurisdictions. See id. The court denied tha t request, holding the plaintiffs to their pleadings. See id. While Plaintiffs do not seek to expa nd the scope of the propose d class, they do seek to add a new and distinct factual th eory with little foundation in their operative complaint. Not only does the Amended Complaint f ail to assert any allegation r egarding “homework,” it also contains no description of the “training” period during which t he homework was allegedly28 assigned. To proceed as Plainti ffs propose would be unfair to Defendants, who have had no opportunity to test the sufficien cy of these new allegations at the pleading stag e. Accordingly, conditional certification will not be granted with respect to P laintiffs’ “homework” allegations. (g) Conclusion In summary, the Court will gran t conditional certification with respect to Plaintiffs’ minimum wage claim, except that certification is not granted wi th respect to (i) Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding uncompensate d pre-shift meetings at the F ounding Farmers Tysons restaurant in Virginia or (ii) the alleged “homework” policy.
3. Overtime Claim In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs have alleged two policie s underlying their overtime claim: (a) that Defe ndants counted hours worked at eac h restaurant separately to avoid paying overtime; and (b) that Defe ndants failed to compensate e mployees for pre-shift meetings, meaning that employees were deni ed overtime pay for those meeti ngs in weeks when they worked at least 40 hours. See Am. Compl. ¶ 56; Pls.’ Br. a t 7-8. In addition, Plaintiffs’ m otion papers assert a right to overtim e pay arising from Defendants’ alleged policy of not paying for time spent on homework. See Pls.’ Br. at 8. Once again, the Court will consider each alleg ed policy in turn. (a) Policy Regarding Aggregation of Hours Across Restaurants Among all the Plaintiffs who sub mitted declarations, only Plain tiff Stephens (who worked at Farmers & Distillers a nd Farmers Fishers Bakers) has confirmed the alleged policy of counting hours worked at differe nt restaurants separately. See Stephens Decl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff Stephens reports having worke d overtime approximately a quarter of the time. See id. ¶ 10. In addition, Plaintiff Stephens state s that other servers who work ed at those two restaurants were29 subject to that policy. See id. ¶ 14. Three other Plaintiffs a lso worked at more than one restaurant (in each case, a com bination of Farmers & Distillers and one other restaurant), but they fail to report any such po licy in their declarations. See Calvillo Decl. ¶ 1; Clark Decl. ¶ 1; Pitt Decl. ¶ 1. Defendants vigor ously deny Plaintiff Stephens’ allegations. They claim that they paid overtime to all employees as required by law. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 20 (citing Simons Decl. ¶ 21). They also claim that Plai ntiff Stephens worked overtime across both restaurants only once while employed there and receive d overtime pay for that week, p roperly taking into account all hours worked. See id. (citing Guilfor d Decl. ¶ 4). For this alleged policy, a caref ul reading of Plaintiff Stephen s’s declaration reveals that it does not provide more than “pure sp eculation” regarding the exi stence of similarly situated employees, which is insufficient. Ayala , 12 F. Supp. 3d at 170 (quoting Symczyk , 656 F.3d at 193). “[W]hen a plaintiff subm its only one affidavit, without corroboration, the l evel of detail in that affidavit becomes particul arly important in evaluating the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s showing.” Gomez v. Kitchenette 123 Inc. , No. 16-cv-3302 (AJN), 2017 WL 4326071, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2017). Here, i n conclusory fashion, Plainti ff Stephens states that “other servers” were subject to the sam e aggregation-of-hours policy, but does not detail whether that statement rests upon specific pe rsonal observations or conversa tions with other employees, or is simply a rumor. Moreover, the a ffidavit states only that other servers were “subject to” this policy, but not that those othe r servers actually had their ove rtime pay unlawfully reduced when the policy was applied to them. I n short, the affidavit contai ns nothing from which the Court can conclude that the asserted exi stence of similarly affected plai ntiffs is more than “pure speculation.” Under these circ umstances, and even in light of the low bar Plaintiffs must meet at this stage, this defi ciency is fatal. Courts have routinely de nied conditional certification where30 plaintiffs have advanced only one a ffidavit that speaks in only conclusory terms about the existence of other, similarly situated employees. See, e.g. , Munoz v. Big Valley Inc. , 915 F. Supp. 2d 46, 49-51 (D.D.C. 2013); Huertero-Morales v. Raguboy Corp. , No. 17-cv-2429 (JCF), 2017 WL 4046337, at *3 (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017); Medley v. S. Health Partners, Inc. , No. 1:17-cv-003, 2017 WL 3485641, at *6-8 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 15, 2017 ); Jin Yun Zheng v. Good Fortune Supermarket Grp. (USA), Inc ., No. 13-cv-60 (ILG), 2013 WL 5132023, at *5-7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2013). The court’s decision in Galloway provides a helpful counterpoint. There, a single declarant explained that she knew many other employees with the same job title and specifically described how they had been the vic tims of the same misconduct as she had. 263 F. Supp. 3d at 154. The court determined that th is declaration was “not entir ely conclusory” because it specifically attested to the declarant’s “personal knowledge” t hat other employees were affected.
Id. at 157. Thus, the court conclude d, the plaintiffs’ lone decla ration “barely” satisfied the standard for conditi onal certification. Id. As discussed above, Plainti ff Stephens’ declaration does not specify that the statement about other servers is base d on personal knowledge, and states only in conclusory terms t hat they were “subject to” the same policy. Moreover, unlike the declaration at issue in Galloway , it does not specifically say t hat the policy was applied to t hese other employees in such a way as to render them similarly situa ted by unlawfully reducing their overtime pay. It thus falls short of the declaration submitted in Galloway , which, as the court in that case emphasized, represents the bare minimum to merit cond itional certification. Finally, unlike the plaintiffs in Galloway , Plaintiffs here have submitted multiple declarations from oth er servers who were in a position to know about this alleged pract ice, but they fail to corroborate it. Plaintiffs have thus failed to est ablish that their evidence re sts on anything more than31 speculation, and so conditional cer tification will be denied wi th respect to the alleged aggregation-of-hours policy. (b) Uncompensated Pre-Shift Meetings Policy The Court has already analyzed P laintiffs’ allegations regardin g uncompensated pre-shift meetings in connection with their minimum wage claim, and concl uded that those allegations are fit for certification except as they relate to the Founding Farmers Tysons restaurant in Virginia. The Court sees no reason to reac h a different outcome in the ov ertime context. Defendants make the additional argument that Plaintiffs fail to allege how many hours they worked per week, and there fore “have not even stated a col orable claim that if they had been clocked in during these pre- shift meeting times (which the y only allege last 15-20 minutes), their hours would have gone into ov ertime during that week.” D efs.’ Opp’n at 17. That argument is better suited to a motion to dismiss than condition al certification, but in any event, it is meritless. “[T]o state a plausible FLSA overtime claim, a p laintiff must sufficiently allege 40 hours of work in a given workweek as well as some uncompensated time in excess of the 40 hours.” Lundy v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long Island Inc. , 711 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2013);
accord Akinsinde v. Not-For-Profit Hosp. Corp. , 216 F. Supp. 3d 33, 41-42 (D.D.C. 2016). Plaintiffs allege that the uncom pensated pre-shift meetings occ urred before “every shift.” E.g. , Calvillo Decl. ¶ 7. Taking that allegation as true, it must al so be true that, whenever an employee worked overtime in a given week, that employee also sp ent uncompensated time in excess of 40 hours at pre-shift m eetings during that week. Her e, three Plaintiffs have stated that they worked overtime a thir d to a quarter of the time. See Calvillo Decl. ¶ 10; Stephens Decl. ¶ 10; Storey Decl. ¶ 9. Those Plai ntiffs are similarly situate d to any other members of the putative class who worked overtime . Moreover, Defendants state that they pay overtime when it32 is required, implicitly concedi ng that some employees do work o vertime. See Simons Decl. ¶ 21; Guilford Decl. ¶ 3. Accordingly, th e Court will grant conditio nal certificati on of the overtime claim as it relates to pre-s hift meetings, except at Founding F armers Tysons. (c) Homework Policy As explained above in the context of Plaintiffs’ minimum wage c laim, the Court will not grant certification with respect to the alleged “homework” poli cy, because Plaintiffs did not include that policy in their Ame nded Complaint. The same resul t applies here. (d) Conclusion To summarize, the Court will gran t conditional certification wi th respect to Plaintiffs’ overtime claim only as it relat es to allegations regarding unco mpensated pre-shift meetings. Certification of the overtime cl aim is denied in all other resp ects, including with respect to Plaintiffs’ aggregation-of-hour s and homework allegations. As a result, the Court will not certify any overtime claim for employ ees who worked only at the Foundin g Farmers Tysons restaurant.
4. Sick Leave Claim The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants denied employees sick leave in violation of D.C. law, and threate ned to fire employees who did take sick leave or who complained about Defendants’ policy. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 42, 77-78. Six named Plaintiffs declare that they were denie d sick leave, and three expressly s tate that they were ordered to come to work when they requested s ick leave (although none reports h aving been threatened with termination). See Calvillo Decl. ¶ 12; Clark Dec l. ¶ 10; Krohn Decl. ¶ 9; Pitt D ecl. ¶ 11; Stephens Decl. ¶ 13; Willig Decl. ¶ 10. 19

19 The declaration of Plaintiff Storey, who did not work in any o f Defendants’ D.C. restaurants, is silent on Defendants’ sick leave policies.33 Defendants have pursued several l ines of attack, all of which a re unavailing at this stage. 20 Defendants, relying on their ow n affidavits, claim that emplo yees were afforded sick leave and, in many cases, were pa id out for sick leave when the ir employment ended. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 24 (citing Guilfor d Decl. ¶¶ 10, 12). Once again, Def endants’ attempt to raise a factual dispute is misplaced at this stage of the proceedings. Moreove r, Defendants’ claim that they paid out unused sick leave is not on point, because Plaintiffs’ alle gation is that employees were denied the opportunity to take sick leav e when they asked for it, not that Defendants failed to pay out unused sick leave. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 42, 77-78. Defendants also argue that Plai ntiffs have not made out a claim , because D.C. law does not require employers to grant sick leave during the first 90 d ays of employment, and Plaintiffs have not alleged when they requested sick leave. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 24. Defendants have cited no authority for the proposition th at Plaintiffs must plead the ir sick leave claim with this level of particularity. Rather, case la w suggests that such specificity is not required. See Alvarez-Soto v. B. Frank Joy, LLC , 258 F. Supp. 3d 615, 626 (D. Md. 2017) (accepting as sufficie nt allegations that the plaintiffs were eligib le for and denied sick leave, de spite failure to plead compliance with Sick Leave Act’s notice requi rement). Defendants will be free to revisit this argument at summary judgment.

20 As mentioned above, none of the de clarations states that other servers were subject to the same sick leave policy. See Calvillo Decl. ¶ 13; Clark D ecl. ¶ 11; Krohn Decl. ¶ 11; Pitt Decl. ¶ 12; Stephens Decl. ¶ 14; Willig Decl . ¶ 11. That may not necessari ly be fatal to cer tification of these claims; at least some courts ha ve granted certification based o n declarations from multiple employees affected by the alleged unlawful policy. See Nicks v. Koch Meat Co. , 265 F. Supp. 3d 841, 851-53 (N.D. Ill. 2017). Ultimately, the Court will not d eny certification of the sick leave claims on this ground, because Defe ndants have not raised this argument. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 24-25. “Ours is an adversary sys tem, and it is up to the party seeking relief to sufficiently develop his arguments.” United States v. Hughes , 514 F.3d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. South , 28 F.3d 619, 629 (7th Cir. 1994)).34 Finally, Defendants assert that the sick leave claim will requi re individualized determinations, because some employees (including one of the op t-in plaintiffs) did not work long enough to become eligible for s ick leave, while others may never have requested sick leave after the statute’s 90-day probation period. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 24-25 ( citing Guilford Decl. ¶¶ 7-9). The Court is not convin ced that such differences prec lude conditional certification, because the key issue is whether Defendants had a common policy of denying sick leave to eligible employees, not how indivi dual employees were affected. Cf. Blount , 945 F. Supp. 2d at 95 (granting conditional certificat ion with respect to allegedl y unlawful policy despite immaterial variations in how it was applied). Accordingly, con ditional certification will be granted with respect to the sic k leave claim. Of course, Defen dants may move for decertification after discovery if they believe that the differences among clas s members are too stark to permit classwide ad judication.
5. Interest from Other Putative Class Members Defendants argue in a footnote that a purported “lack of desire to join this lawsuit among putative collective action members” is sufficient basis for den ying Plaintiffs’ motion. Defs.’ Opp’n at 5 n.3. While the Court is not required to “address an argument raised only cursorily in a footnote,” Paleteria La Michoacana, Inc. v. Productos Lacteos Tocumbo S.A. de C.V ., 247 F. Supp. 3d 76, 101 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Armstrong v. Geithner , 608 F.3d 854, 858 n.** (D.C. Cir. 2010)), Defendants’ argument would be meritless even if itwere properly before the Court. The rule that Defendants cite, w hich requires plaintiffs to dem onstrate interest from absent putative class members prior to conditional cer tification, ulti mately derives from an Eleventh Circuit decision, Dybach v. Florida Department of Corrections , 942 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1991). No court in this Circuit a ppears to have adopted the Dybach rule, which has received a decidedly35 mixed reception in other courts. See, e.g. , Purdham v. Fairfax Cty. Pub. Sch. , 629 F. Supp. 2d 544, 549 (E.D. Va. 2009) (“It does not appear that any courts w ithin the Fourth Circuit have adopted this relativel y stringent test.”); Delaney v. Geisha NYC, LLC , 261 F.R.D. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]here is no re quirement in this circuit tha t a certain number of Covered Employees opt-in before a court can conditionally certify a cla ss.”); see also Galloway , 263 F. Supp. 3d at 157 (declining to requi re plaintiffs to produce aff idavits from absent class members who intend to join lawsuit). M oreover, even if the Dybach rule did apply, Pl aintiffs would have satisfied it because, in addition to the eight named Plaintiffs , five other employees have opted in.
See ECF Nos. 9, 25 (opt-in plaintiffs’ consents); cf. Tyler v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc. , No. 2:05- cv-33F(WO), 2005 WL 3133763, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2005) (f inding the Dybach rule satisfied where five potential plaintiffs had opted in, even th ough two had not worked at the employer during the relevant ti me period). Defendants cite onl y distinguishable cases where plaintiffs lacked any evidence (a part from conclusory statement s) that other employees were interested in joining. See, e.g. , Parker v. Rowland Express, Inc. , 492 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1165-66 (D. Minn. 2007). Therefore, t his argument fails. Plaintiffs also cite several cases from the Eleventh Circuit fo r the proposition that the filing of opt-in consents is sufficient to justify conditional certification. See Pls.’ Br. at 13-14. Plaintiffs misread these c ases, which, applying the Dybach rule, hold that a s howing of interest from putative class members is necessary but not sufficient to justify conditiona l certification. Rather, the Eleventh Circuit (lik e courts in this Circuit) requ ires named plaintiffs to show that they are similarly situated to absent class members. See, e.g. , Holt v. Rite Aid Corp ., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1269-75 (M.D. Ala. 2004). Therefore, these case s do not alter the analysis set forth above.36 6. Putative Class Period The statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ D.C.-law claims is t hree years. D.C. Code § 32- 1308(c)(1). The statut e of limitations for Plaintiffs’ FLSA cl aims is two years, which is extended to three years for willful violations (as Plaintiffs h ave alleged in this case). 21 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). The filing of the complaint does not toll the limita tions period for opt-in plaintiffs’ FLSA claims; the statute of limitations continues to run until they affirmatively join the action.
See 29 U.S.C. § 256(b); Galloway , 263 F. Supp. 3d at 158. Plaintiffs assume that the same is true for their D.C.-law claims. See Pls.’ Br. at 1-2. Defendants argue that, because no P laintiff worked at the resta urants before September 2015, they should not be able to repre sent a class that extends before that time. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 26 (citing Guilford Decl. ¶ 11). P laintiff Storey asserts i n her declaration that she began working at Founding Farmers Tysons at an earlier date, in March2015. See Storey Decl. ¶ 1. But regardless of the exact sta rt date, Defendants point to no authority holding that the named plaintiff in a collective acti on must have been employed throug hout the entire putative class period. By contrast, as Plainti ffs rightly point out, “dates o f employment” do “not necessarily create dissimilarity under the FLSA.” Hallissey v. Am. Online, Inc. , No. 99-cv-3785 (KTD), 2008 WL 465112, at *2 (S. D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2008); see also Viriri v. White Plains Hosp. Med.
Ctr. , 320 F.R.D. 344, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“[I]t makes little sense to hold that simply because there is no [temporal] overlap between the r epresentative plaintiff’s reco verable wages and the opt-in plaintiff’s recoverable wa ges that conditio nal certifica tion is inappropriate.”). That is particularly true here, where ne ither Plaintiffs’ declarations nor Defendants’ submissions contain

21 Defendants have not argued that Plaintiffs’ willfulness allega tions are implausible. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 26.37 any suggestion that the policies at issue changed from mid-2014 onward. Cf. Viriri , 320 F.R.D. at 353 (holding allegations of co mmon policy justified certific ation despite lack of temporal overlap between named plainti ff and putative class members). A ccordingly, any opt-in plaintiffs will be allowed to assert claims extending as far back in time as each relevant statute of limitations allows.
B. Sub-Classes Having addressed the substance of the conditional- certificationanalysis, the Court now turns to administrative matters , starting with the use of sub-c lasses. Sub-classes represent an appropriate tool in collective ac tions to manage classes that s pan multiple jurisdictions and involve claims under the laws of different states. See Dinkel , 880 F. Supp. 2d at 58. Here, Plaintiffs bring their claims on behalf of servers working in D .C., Maryland, and Virginia. Those claims arise under federal, D.C ., and Maryland substantive law. Each jurisdiction also has somewhat different procedural mechanisms. Moreover, as discuss ed above, servers who worked only in the Virginia restaurant a re not similarly situated to P laintiffs with respect to either the overtime claim or the minimum wage claim insofar as it relates to uncompensated pre-shift meetings. An overview of these di fferences suffices to show wh y establishing a separate subclass for each jurisdiction whe re employees worked is prudent f or case-management purposes:

 District of Columbia Sub-Class:

o Substantive Claims: Minimum wage, overtime, and sick leave claims under the FLSA and D.C. Law

o Procedural Aspects: FLSA collective action, D .C. collective action (with possible conversion i nto a D.C. class action)

 Maryland Sub-Class:

o Substantive Claims: Minimum wage and overtime claims under the FLSA and Maryland law38 o Procedural Aspects: FLSA collective action, Maryland putative class action

 Virginia Sub-Class:

o Substantive Claims: Minimum wage claim under the FLSA, with no claim relating to uncompensated pre-shift meetings

o Procedural Aspects: FLSA collective action These sub-classes likely overla p, because some putative class m embers may have worked in multiple jurisdictions. For example, Plaintiff Calvillo wor ked in D.C. and Maryland. See Calvillo Decl. ¶ 1.
C. Notice
1. Means of Notice The parties dispute the proper means of notifying class members , and how long the opt-in period should last. Plaintiffs s eek to discover the names, mai ling addresses, cell phone numbers, and email addresses of pot ential opt-in plaintiffs. See Pls.’ Br. at 21. Defendants argue that they should not have to provide ema il addresses and phone numbers, p articularly given that the matter has already received some publicity via traditional and social media. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 27. Decisions in this Circuit have reached different conclusions on whether email addresses and phone numbers are discoverabl e in connection with collectiv e-action notice procedures. Citing privacy concerns, some deci sions have denied requests fo r telephone numbers of putative class members, at least absent a showing of need. See Encinas v. J.J. Drywall Corp. , 265 F.R.D. 3, 7 (D.D.C. 2010); Blount , 945 F. Supp. 2d at 97 (denying discl osure of phone numbers in t he absence of “particularized need ”). Others have declined to pro vide email addresses absent a showing of need. See Galloway , 263 F. Supp. 3d at 159 (rejecting re quest that plaintiffs be given email addresses of putative cl ass members, but allowing parties to revisit the issue if authorized forms of notice proved insuffici ent). But some decisions have suggested that production of39 email and telephone contact infor mation is now “nearly as commo n” as production of names and mailing addresses. Eley , 2015 WL 5611331, at *3; see also Ayala , 12 F. Supp. 3d at 172 (requiring production of phone numbers where defendants “raise[ d] no special concerns” and many class members did “not speak English as a first language”) . The trend appears to be toward ordering the production of a t least some of this informa tion. See Freeman v. MedStar
Health Inc. , 187 F. Supp. 3d 19, 32-33 (D.D.C. 2016) (declining to order p roduction of phone numbers due to privacy concerns, bu t explaining that, with “res pect to dissemination by e-mail, the Court acknowledges that the a vailability and use of certain technological media has evolved since . . . four years ago,” and or dering the parties to meet a nd confer regarding the appropriate scope of email notice). Here, Plaintiffs’ primary argumen t is that electronic notice is better calcul ated to reach employees who may have moved, whic h they argue is especially li kely here given the itinerancy of many employees in the restaurant industry. See Pls.’ Br. at 10-11. Defendants have not shown that there are any unusually strong privacy interests in this case, although they do suggest that many class members alrea dy have received notice through ne wspapers or online. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 27. The Court agrees wit h Plaintiffs that some form o f electronic notice is justified in this case, particularly in light of the special characteristics of the restaurant industry. See
Bhumithanarn , 2015 WL 4240985, at *5 (granting use of notice by text messag e “given the high turnover characteristic of the r estaurant industry”). Nonethel ess, the Court is concerned that, even in the social-media era , unsolicited phone calls and text messages remain a significant intrusion on individuals’ privacy. See Freeman , 187 F. Supp. 3d at 32-33 (declining to allow notice by telephone for privacy reasons, despite recognizing th at technological change makes email notice appropriate); cf. Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co. , 768 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2014)40 (“[T]he nature of cell phones renders the res triction of unsoli cited text messaging all the more necessary to ensure [re sidential] privacy.”), aff’d , 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016). The Court will therefore order defendants to pr oduce the email addresses, but not telephone numbers, of putative class members at this time. Plaintiffs’ motion also requested that the Court order Defendan ts to send notice with employees’ paychecks. See ECF No. 13 at 2. Plaintiffs do not mention this request in th eir opening brief or their reply. Def endants oppose this request, which they claim would unnecessarily lend their imp rimatur to the lawsuit, see Defs.’ Opp’n at 27-28, and cite authority suggesting defendants should not or dinarily be saddled with the costs of mailing notice with paychecks, see Calderon v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co. , No. RWT 10-cv- 1958, 2011 WL 98197, at *8 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2011). Here, the Cou rt finds that Plaintiffs’ half-hearted (and perhaps abandoned) request is outweighe d by concern that this form of n otice “could imply Defendants’ endorsement of the Notice or lea d to situations in which Defend ants were the ones answering questions about the Notice or lawsuit.” Ayala , 12 F. Supp. 3d at 173. Accordingly, the Court will or der Defendants’ to produce the na mes, mailing addresses, and email addresses of members of the certified sub-classes (as limited by this Opinion) within twenty days of the date of entr y of this Order. Defendants are not required to produce telephone numbers or to send notice with pa ychecks. If Plaintiffs discov er as notice proceeds that the authorized forms of communicati on are inadequate, they may seek further relief from the Court. The parties also disagree over the length of the opt-in period. Plaintiffs initially proposed a ninety-day opt-in per iod, which they revised to sixty days in their reply. See Pls.’ Reply at 21. Defendants propose thirty days. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 27. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that thirty days is unreasonably short. See Cryer v. InterSolutions, Inc. , No. 06-cv-2032 (EGS), 200741 WL 1053214, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2007) (finding that a “ninety -day period is more in keeping with the time periods used in othe r similar class actions in th is Court than the defendants’ proposed thirty-day period”). The opt-in period will therefore last for sixty days.
2. Form of Notice Plaintiffs’ proposed form of no tice (Pls.’ Br., Ex. A, ECF No. 14-1) will plainly require revision to conform to the rulings set forth above. Therefore, the parties shall meet and confer regarding a revised form of notice. See, e.g. , Dinkel , 880 F. Supp. 2d at 59. The parties should carefully consider how to proceed in light of the sub-classes e stablished above, including whether a single form of notice for all class members remains f easible. The Court urges the parties to work expeditiously and c ooperatively to make a joint submission to the Court, but reminds the parties that the C ourt is available to assist in pr omptly resolving any disputes. The parties shall submit a revised f orm of notice by the deadline s et forth below.
IV. Conclusion and Order For the reasons set for th above, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ conditionalcertification motion (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as set forth in foregoing Opinion, and Defenda nts’ motion for leave to file a surreply (ECF No. 27) is
DENIED . It is FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall m eet, confer, and submit to the Court a revised form of notice consistent with the foregoing Op inion by February 9, 2018.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: January 31, 2018