Exhibit B 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 627-3 Filed 06/01/19 Page 1 of 15
903 Calle Amanecer, Suite 350, San Clemente, CA 92673 

___________________________________________________________________________________________ 

CalEdison Building: 601 W. 5th Street, Suite 720, Los Angeles, CA 90071 

May 23, 2019 

Via E-Mail 

Reginald E. Jones 

Assistant U.S. Attorney 

E-Mail: reginald.jones4@usdoj.gov 

Kevin Rapp 

Assistant U.S. Attorney 

E-Mail: kevin.rapp@usdoj.gov 

Re: United States v. Lacey, et al., No. 18-CR-00422-PHX-SMB 

Dear Counsel: 

In the April 23, 2019 status conference, you represented that the government will provide 

data from the Backpage.com servers and systems upon Defendants’ request regarding what 

they need. See 4/23/19 Hearing Transcript at 24 (“Your Honor, but we went a step further. 

We said, hey, can you articulate to us what else on these servers that you would like extracted 

and we can look for it and provide it to you.”); see id. at 25 (“We’ve asked them repeatedly, 

hey, is there anything that we haven’t provided[?]”); see also 5/10/19 Letter from R. Jones at 

2 (“What the government has repeatedly asked Defendants ... is to provide it specific server 

data ... that you believe is material to your defense.”). 

We appreciate the government’s position, as Defendants need to obtain specific materials 

the government believes supports its charges as well as exculpatory information in the 

government’s possession. This is particularly important here, because the government alone 

has the information technology (“I.T.”) systems, servers, and databases that ran the 

Backpage.com website. The government’s case ultimately must be premised on actual ads 

and data, not generalized characterizations or selected out-of-context quotes from emails. 

At the same time, Defendants are entitled to obtain and present evidence about what 

Backpage.com actually did regarding publication, blocking, editing, or other moderation of 

third-party ads, and who was involved (and not involved) in these activities. Indeed, we 

believe the evidence of Backpage.com’s actual practices – in screening and blocking ads, in 

cooperating with law enforcement, and in other respects – is exculpatory information the 

government is required to produce under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

What Defendants most need is access to the Backpage.com I.T. systems, servers, and 

databases, functioning as they existed at the time of the government’s seizures. As you 

know, the Backpage.com systems contained and connected a number of different servers 

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and databases, which, along with operating and administrative software, enabled the 

functionality and user-interface of the website and allowed for payment processing, 

moderation, administrative, and other tasks. The I.T. systems, servers, and databases, as they 

existed, enabled review, collection, and analyses of data in numerous ways and with relative 

ease. Obtaining access to the functioning version of the date-of-seizure Backpage.com 

website and systems is crucial, as Defendants need the ability to query the systems to search 

for information pertinent to their defense. 

More generally, and in accordance with the government’s commitment to extract and 

provide data from the Backpage.com servers and systems as articulated by Defendants, we 

provide the following list of data and information Defendants request and need. We think 

the importance of this information is apparent and disagree with the government’s assertions 

that Defendants must prove materiality in order for the government to produce data and 

information it holds. See, e.g., 4/23/19 Trans. at 25 (Mr. Jones asserting that Defendants 

should be required to show materiality).1 Nonetheless, to avoid objections or further backand-forth that would delay Defendants from obtaining the information they need, we have 

included brief explanations of some of the ways the requests are material to the defense of 

the charges the government has lodged. 

Under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the government must disclose any 

information that “is material to preparing the defense.” The Ninth Circuit has continuously 

and repeatedly emphasized that “Rule 16 . . . grants defendants a broad right to discovery.” See 

United States v. Doe, 705 F.3d 1134, 1150 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Stever, 603 F.3d 747, 752 

(9th Cir. 2010) (same). Information is material if it is relevant to a possible defense, id., and 

includes both inculpatory and exculpatory information, United States v. Muniz-Jaquez, 718 F.3d 

1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Information that is not exculpatory or impeaching may still be 

relevant to developing a possible defense.”). Even information that merely “causes a 

defendant to completely abandon a planned defense and take an entirely different path” must 

be disclosed under Rule 16’s broad discovery right. United States v. Hernandez-Meza, 720 F.3d 

760, 768 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Ninth Circuit held in 

United States v. Soto-Zuniga, “[t]he test is not whether the discovery is admissible at trial, but 

whether the discovery may assist [the defendant] in formulating a defense.” 837 F.3d 992, 

1003 (9th Cir. 2016). In Soto-Zuniga, the Ninth Circuit also reiterated that “it behooves the 

government to interpret the disclosure requirement broadly and turn over whatever evidence it 

has pertaining to the case.” Id. (quoting Hernandez-Meza, 720 F.3d at 768) (internal quotations 

omitted). 

 

1

 These requests are without prejudice and in addition to other requests Defendants have made for 

complete production of the Backpage servers, Brady and Jencks materials, and other information. 

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Page 3

Accordingly, and mindful of footnote 1, Defendants request and need: 

A. Backpage.com Website Generally 

1. Full read-only access to the Backpage.com I.T. systems, servers, and databases, as 

they existed and functioned on the date of the government’s seizures, with 

accompanying software and interconnections to enable queries, searches, collection, 

and analyses of data. 

Explanation: As noted above, this is Defendants’ highest priority in terms of data 

disclosures from the government. 

2. Data reflecting, by month, the numbers of ads run on Backpage.com within each 

category of the website (e.g., “buy/sell/trade,” “jobs,” “rentals,” “adult,” etc.) and for 

each subcategory within the “adult” category (e.g., “escorts,” “massage,” “dating,” 

etc.).2

3. Data reflecting total revenues, by month, for ads within each category and 

subcategory of the Backpage.com website. 

Explanation: Defendants seek this data to show that Backpage.com was a general purpose 

classified ad website, only a fraction of ads were posted in the adult 

categories, and the site earned many millions of dollars from non-adult ads. 

4. All ads Backpage.com reported to the National Center for Missing and Exploited 

Children (NCMEC) or other law enforcement (along with all administrative data and 

information regarding such ads) and data reflecting the numbers of ads reported, by 

month. 

Explanation: The government has alleged that Backpage.com’s referrals to NCMEC were 

“artificially limit[ed]” and not made in good faith. See Superseding 

Indictment (referred to herein as the “Indictment” and cited as “SI”) ¶ 14. 

Defendants need to obtain all such referrals to demonstrate how extensive 

Backpage.com’s efforts were. Defendants also believe the government is 

aware that NCMEC complained that Backpage.com was making too many 

 

2

 All of the requests set forth in this letter encompass all data within Backpage.com’s databases and 

systems as they existed at the time of the government’s seizures and wherever located, including 

servers and systems hosted by Backpage.com affiliates or vendors, such as DesertNet (including data 

and communications from Mantis), Amazon Web Services, or others. They cover the whole of the 

period of time for which the government has asserted charges, 2004 - April 2018, and any and all 

such data within the Backpage.com databases and systems.

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Page 4

referrals, and data of the numbers of referrals by month will show 

Backpage.com’s response to NCMEC’s request to limit referrals. 

5. All documents and data reflecting Backpage.com’s cooperation with law enforcement 

authorities in investigations or prosecutions, including (a) responses to subpoenas, 

warrants, and/or other government requests about ads or users; (b) communications 

relating to such responses; and (c) testimony or other evidence provided by 

Backpage.com personnel in criminal proceedings or trials. 

Explanation: Defendants believe the government is aware that law enforcement 

authorities repeatedly commended Backpage.com for its cooperation and 

assistance in investigations and prosecutions and for blocking (or not 

blocking) ads and users at the request of authorities (including, e.g., a May 

2011 commendation by FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, and scores of other 

communications from DOJ thanking Backpage.com or its personnel for 

their support and assistance). Defendants seek this information, as well, to 

respond to the government’s accusations that testimony of Backpage.com 

personnel supporting law enforcement allegedly reflected knowing 

participation in prostitution activities of users. See SI ¶¶ 71, 92. 

6. All documents quoted or mentioned in the Indictment, identifying the paragraphs in 

the Indictment where each document is quoted or mentioned, and providing all other 

communications relating to each such document (e.g., all emails in a chain). 

Explanation: Defendants asked for this information in my April 25, 2019 letter, and the 

government responded by providing document Bates ranges of over 2,200 

pages of materials without any indication of which paragraphs of the 

Indictment refer to which documents. See 5/10/19 Letter from R. Jones, 

at 1. As noted before, searching through thousands of pages of documents 

to attempt to line them up to the allegations in the Indictment is an 

arduous, burdensome, and time-consuming task that Defendants should 

not have to do, because it is information known to the government, which 

could be readily disclosed. 

B. Moderation

7. Data reflecting the numbers of ads, by category and month, that Backpage.com 

blocked or prevented from running (whether before or after the ads went live on the 

website) and the reasons the ads were blocked or prevented from running. 

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8. Data reflecting the numbers of ads, by category and month, for which Backpage.com 

revised or edited any text in an ad, identifying the numbers of ads revised/edited by 

(a) automated filters and (b) human moderators. 

9. Data reflecting the numbers of ads, by category and month, that Backpage.com 

edited to remove images, identifying the number of ads with images removed by (a) 

automated filters and (b) human moderators. 

10. Data reflecting the numbers of ads, by category and month, that Backpage.com 

edited in a manner other than as set forth in categories 7 and 8 above (e.g., to remove 

links to potential malware or spam), identifying the number of ads edited by (a) 

automated filters and (b) human moderators 

Explanation: It is important to show Backpage.com’s actual moderation practices to 

respond to and rebut mischaracterizations (i.e., to show that Backpage 

actually blocked and removed tens of millions of ads; did not edit ads to 

promote any illegal conduct; enforced the website’s terms of use; and 

undertook screening and removal practices customary among websites). 

The government has alleged that Backpage.com routinely edited ads to 

remove terms so as to facilitate prostitution. See SI ¶¶ 11, 68. Defendants 

believe the data regarding Backpage.com’s actual practices will reflect that 

this is patently false. For example, Defendants believe the data concerning 

Backpage.com’s actual practices will reflect that the website blocked and 

removed approximately 1,000,000 ads per month in all categories for a 

variety of different reasons (e.g., violations of the site’s terms of use, 

offensive content, possible malware, spam, scams, etc.). Defendants also 

believe the government is aware that, to the extent ads on Backpage.com 

were “edited” to remove text, this occurred only for a brief period, ending 

many years before the indictment. Defendants also believe the data will 

show that such editing occurred almost entirely through use of automated 

filters – which are commonly used by websites – and, after automated 

filtering, Backpage had additional layers of review by human moderators to 

determine if ads should be blocked or removed altogether. 

11. All ads the government alleges Backpage.com revised to “remov[e] particular terms 

that were indicative of prostitution,” SI ¶ 68, including all administrative data and 

information regarding such ads, and identifying (a) the ads as they were submitted by 

users; (b) the ads as they ran on the website; (c) the specific edits made to the ads; (d) 

how and/or by whom each ad was edited; (e) all data about whether each ad was 

blocked or removed; and (f) the dates of the ads. 

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12. All iterations of lists of prohibited terms or phrases for ads on Backpage.com in a 

complete and searchable format (i.e., spreadsheets as they existed on the systems and 

not merely images of spreadsheets) including the dates each list was in effect and how 

the list was applied to different categories on the website (e.g., the differences in 

standards for ads posted by users in the dating subcategory as opposed to the escort 

subcategory). 

Explanation: Defendants believe the government is aware that Backpage.com’s policies 

and instructions to moderators – at all times – were to block and remove any 

ads that offered sex for money. It is unclear what the government may 

believe are terms “indicative of prostitution,” as alleged in the Indictment. 

To be able to respond to the government’s claim that Backpage.com 

allegedly edited ads to promote or facilitate specific instances of advertised 

prostitution, Defendants need to see all ads the government contends are 

evidence of such instances. In addition, Defendants seek evidence reflecting 

that Backpage.com’s screening searched for more than 26,000 terms, 

phrases, URLs, and addresses and blocked over 1,000,000 user submissions 

per month as a result. See Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 

814 (M.D. Tenn. 2013). 

13. All ads the government alleges Backpage.com edited to remove terms such as 

“Lolita,” “New In Town,” “young,” “amber alert,” “teen,” “fresh,” “tight,” “high 

school,” “rape,” “teenage,” “little girl,”, “innocent,” or “school girl” including all 

administrative data and information regarding such ads, and identifying (a) the ads as 

they were submitted by users; (b) the ads as they ran on the website; (c) the specific 

edits made to the ads; (d) how and/or by whom each ad was edited; (e) all data about 

whether each ad was blocked or removed; and (f) the dates of the ads. 

Explanation: The government has alleged that Backpage.com omitted these terms from 

user-submitted ads to promote known instances of sex trafficking. See, e.g., 

SI ¶¶ 13, 85, 95, 104, 116 see also 4/23/19 Hearing Transcript at 65 (AUSA 

Rapp stating, “They don’t respond to our arguments about the moderation 

practices where they removed terms indicative of child sex trafficking, like 

Lolita, Amber Alert, Sweet Young Thing, New in Town, and then continue 

to post the ads. They don’t respond to that.”). Defendants are not aware of 

any instances when this occurred, and therefore need to obtain all ads the 

government contends were so edited, as well as all other information about 

such ads (e.g., the context of the terms as used in given ads, whether the ads 

were blocked or removed entirely by human moderators, and whether the 

ads were reported to NCMEC or law enforcement authorities). 

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C. “Aggregation”

14. All ads that the government alleges concerned prostitution and were posted on 

Backpage.com through the process of “aggregation,” see SI ¶¶ 35-44, including all 

administrative data and information regarding such ads, identifying (a) the websites 

on which the ads previously appeared; (b) the ads as they appeared on the other 

websites and on Backpage.com, respectively; (c) the categories/subcategories in 

which the ads ran on Backpage.com; and (d) the dates of the ads. 

Explanation: Defendants believe the government is aware that Backpage.com employed 

“aggregation” efforts (i.e., contacting individuals who had posted ads on 

other websites such as Craigslist.org to ask if they wanted to run the same 

ads on Backpage.com) in the adult categories in the United States only for a 

short time early in the website’s history and ceased this marketing effort for 

the adult categories on its U.S. website many years ago. See, e.g., SI ¶¶ 37-42 

(alluding to emails about aggregation only in 2007-2008). Defendants 

further believe the ads posted to Backpage.com through these efforts were 

primarily located via Google searches. 

15. Data reflecting the numbers of ads, by category and month, that Backpage.com 

posted through the process of “aggregation.” 

16. All data and documents reflecting that, in such aggregation efforts, “Backpage 

employees ... identif[ied] prostitutes advertising,” SI ¶ 36, and each ad posted on 

Backpage.com through “aggregation” that the government alleges was, on its face, an 

ad for prostitution. 

Explanation: Defendants believe the government is aware that Backpage.com personnel 

solicited ads of many types, including for jobs, therapeutic massage, 

sporting goods, local places, and pet sales, as well as (for a period of time 

many years ago) escort ads. These efforts were similar to marketing done 

for newspaper classified advertising sales for many years. Defendants also 

believe the government is aware that Backpage.com’s policies for these 

marketing efforts forbade soliciting any ads that appeared to be for illegal or 

improper services and that the actual ads posted will reflect that this policy 

was followed. 

D. “Reciprocal Link and Affiliate Programs”

17. All banner ads or other ads run by Backpage.com on theeroticreview.com, and 

documents and data reflecting the dates of each such ad. 

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18. All banner ads or other ads run by theeroticreview.com on Backpage.com, and 

documents and data reflecting the dates of each such ad. 

19. All contracts or agreements between Backpage.com and theeroticreview.com 

(whether directly or through affiliated entities) referring or relating to “a reciprocal 

link program” or a “business arrangement.” See SI ¶¶ 45, 46. 

20. All documents reflecting that any Defendant had knowledge that theeroticreview.com 

was a notorious “prostitution website.” See SI ¶ 54. 

Explanation: The government alleges Backpage.com entered into a “business 

arrangement with [theeroticreview.com to] post reciprocal ads on each 

other’s websites,” SI ¶ 45, but has not identified or provided any 

documents reflecting what the supposed agreed arrangement was, or what 

ads actually appeared on the respective websites. Defendants also believe 

the government is aware – and data from the website will reflect – that such 

arrangements for banner ads were discontinued many years ago. See, e.g., SI 

¶¶ 48-52 (reflecting that alleged arrangements were in place in 2007-2008). 

The government also has not provided any data or information for the 

period when the banner ads appeared reflecting that any Defendant had any 

knowledge that theeroticreview.com supposedly was a known “prostitution 

website.” 

21. All data and documents reflecting Backpage.com policies and practices to preclude or 

block references to theeroticreview.com in user-submitted ads, including all ads 

Backpage.com blocked or removed on this basis. 

22. All ads posted on Backpage.com that contained references to theeroticreview.com 

and that the government contends related to unlawful prostitution, including all 

administrative data and information regarding such ads and identifying (a) the 

categories/subcategories in which the ads ran on Backpage.com; (b) the content on 

theeroticreview.com to which the ads referred; and (c) the dates of the ads. 

Explanation: The Indictment alludes generally to banner ads run by theeroticreview.com 

and Backpage.com in 2007-2008, but does not mention Backpage.com’s 

policies and practices disallowing references to theeroticreview.com in usersubmitted ads, which Defendants believe were imposed and in effect from 

2011 onward. 

23. All documents reflecting that the individual “known as ‘Dollar Bill’” was “known to 

be involved in the prostitution industry,” SI ¶ 59, and (a) who affiliated with 

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Page 9

Backpage.com the government alleges knew of this (and when); (b) who had dealings 

with “Dollar Bill” (and when); and (c) whether any Defendant ever had any dealings 

or involvement with “Dollar Bill.” 

24. All ads posted on Backpage.com by “Dollar Bill,” including all administrative data 

and information regarding such ads, and identifying (a) the categories/subcategories 

in which the ads ran on Backpage.com; and (b) the dates of the ads. 

25. All ads posted on Backpage.com by “Dollar Bill” that Backpage.com blocked or 

removed, including all administrative data and information regarding such ads, and 

identifying (a) when and why the ads were blocked or removed; (b) whether and 

when they were restored or reposted; (c) who was responsible or involved in 

blocking, removing, restoring, or reposting the ads; and (d) whether each Defendant 

had any knowledge or awareness of or involvement with the ads. 

Explanation: The Indictment alludes to “Dollar Bill,” but offers no basis for asserting 

that he was “known to be involved in the prostitution industry,” SI ¶ 59, 

much less any showing that any Defendant had any knowledge or 

awareness of this. See SI ¶¶ 59-67 (alleging that Ferrer had all contacts and 

dealings with “Dollar Bill”). In terms of fact allegations, the indictment 

only mentions that Backpage.com blocked or removed ads posted by 

“Dollar Bill,” see SI ¶¶ 61, 64, 66, 67, not that Backpage.com knew of, 

promoted, or allowed any improper content. Defendants believe that data 

and documents concerning actual practices will reflect that “Dollar Bill” 

posted ads for massage businesses, and that Backpage.com enforced its 

terms of use and policies regarding ads posted by “Dollar Bill” as it did for 

other users. 

E. Ads That Are Alleged Predicates for Charges 

26. All ads from Backpage.com’s systems and databases that are or relate to the alleged 

“victims” identified in the Indictment, see SI ¶¶ 160-176, 201, including all ads 

submitted by, on behalf of, or for the individuals referenced in the ads (collectively, 

the “alleged victim ads”). 

Explanation: The government has asserted that it has produced the alleged victim ads 

from Backpage.com’s databases and systems. See 4/23/19 Trans. at 23 

(“we have also extracted, you know, all of the ads that were on 

Backpage.com and given them to the defendants”); id. at 24 (we [have] 

given them the ads that were referenced in our superseding indictment”). 

In fact, however, the ads produced by the government apparently come 

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from the Internet Archive Wayback Machine (https://archive.org), see, e.g., 

DOJ-BP-0004719487, or are merely captures of the text from ads (but not 

the ads as they appeared on the website), see, e.g., DOJ-BP-0004719353, or 

appear to be image copies of subpoena responses provided by 

Backpage.com, see, e.g., DOJ-BP-0004719354-69. On March 15, 2019, the 

government provided a disk purportedly containing “sample ads,” but 

which actually consisted of spreadsheets with some information about 

given ads (but not the text of the ads), and a separate collection of images 

from ads. This information is grossly incomplete and provided in a format 

that is all but useless. To be clear, Defendants seek the alleged victim ads 

and related ads as they appeared in Backpage.com’s systems and databases 

when they were operational, along with all administrative data and 

information about the ads (discussed further below). 

27. All ads posted using the same (a) email addresses; (b) IP addresses; (c) telephone 

numbers; (d) credit card numbers; (e) images; or (f) other identifying cross-references 

associated with the alleged victim ads (referred to here as “related ads”). 

Explanation: As Defendants believe the government is aware, Backpage.com routinely 

identified these categories of information from its systems and databases in 

response to law enforcement subpoenas (ordinarily responding in less than 

24 hours), and used the information to block and remove ads as requested 

by law enforcement authorities (or to maintain ads on the website when 

requested by law enforcement). Defendants need to obtain this 

information about the alleged victim ads and related ads to address the 

government’s accusations about the ads (e.g., to show that the ads were not 

facially unlawful) and to show how Backpage.com actually dealt with the 

ads. 

28. All administrative data and information regarding the alleged victim ads and related 

ads, including (a) credit card and/or other payment information; (b) editing or 

revision of ads by users; (c) editing or revision of ads by Backpage.com automated 

filters or moderators (and whether such revisions ever happened); (d) whether such 

ads were posted on Backpage.com through “aggregation” efforts; (e) all persons who 

reviewed, moderated, approved, revised or blocked such ads; (f) blocking or removal 

of any such ad by Backpage.com; (g) reporting of any such ad to NCMEC or law 

enforcement authorities; and (h) all cooperation of and information provided by 

Backpage.com to law enforcement or other authorities related to such ads and the 

individuals involved with the ads. 

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Explanation: This too is information available in Backpage.com’s systems and databases, 

which Backpage.com often collected and provided in response to requests 

from law enforcement authorities. To be clear, Defendants seek all data 

and information in Backpage.com’s systems and databases including in the 

“object editor,” “adref,” and “cardref” portions of the systems (i.e., 

reflecting all actions taken with regard to ads, payment information, and all 

other backend data collected and retained by Backpage.com about ads). 

Defendants strongly suspect that none of the alleged victim ads were edited 

by Backpage.com and none were posted through “aggregation” efforts. 

Defendants further believe Backpage.com cooperated with law 

enforcement with respect to some or many of the alleged victim ads and/or 

blocked or removed the ads or users. Defendants also seek information 

about review and moderation of the alleged victim ads and related ads to 

show that Defendants had no involvement. 

29. For each ad on Backpage.com that the government alleges provides a basis for 

criminal charges against any Defendant, provide (a) all data and information regarding 

all persons who reviewed or moderated such ads, and any data or information 

reflecting whether any Defendant (b) saw the ad before publication; (c) approved the 

ad for publication; (c) edited or revised the ad before publication; or (d) saw the ad or 

had any knowledge of it before the government disclosed the original indictment on 

or about April 6, 2019. 

Explanation: Defendants believe the government is aware that Defendants had no 

knowledge or awareness of or involvement with any of any of the thirdparty ads on Backpage.com that the Indictment alleges as the bases for 

charges against Defendants. Administrative data about the ads from 

Backpage.com’s systems and databases will reflect this. 

* * * * * 

Given the case schedule as it stands, it is important for Defendants to obtain this data and 

information as soon as possible. We recognize that extracting and providing some of the 

categories of data may take more time than others, and we are willing to discuss prioritizing 

the list. Also, if the government can provide prompt access to a functioning version of the 

Backpage.com systems and databases, we may be able to limit certain of categories of data to 

be extracted. In all events, however, we need to move forward to obtain the actual data and 

information about the Backpage.com website and its operations, and we therefore ask for a 

response to these requests by May 24, 2019. 

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Very truly yours, 

BIENERT KATZMAN, PC

Whitney Z. Bernstein 

Thomas H. Bienert, Jr. 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 627-3 Filed 06/01/19 Page 13 of 15
1

Whitney Bernstein

From: Whitney Bernstein

Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2019 9:32 PM

To: Rapp, Kevin (USAAZ); Jones, Reginald (CRM)

Cc: Tom Bienert; Toni Thomas

Subject: RE: 18cr0422-PHX-SMB Letter re Disclosure of Data

Hi – We request the information by May 31, 2019, not by tomorrow.  Apologies for that typo and thank you again for 

your prompt attention to this matter. 

Thank you, 

Whitney 

Whitney Z. Bernstein | Attorney

Bienert | Katzman PC 

Tel.: (949) 369-3700 

www.bienertkatzman.com 

From: Whitney Bernstein  

Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2019 7:23 PM 

To: Rapp, Kevin (USAAZ) <Kevin.Rapp@usdoj.gov>; Jones, Reginald (CRM) <Reginald.Jones4@usdoj.gov> 

Cc: Tom Bienert <tbienert@bienertkatzman.com>; Toni Thomas <tthomas@bienertkatzman.com> 

Subject: 18cr0422‐PHX‐SMB Letter re Disclosure of Data 

Hi Kevin and Reggie, 

Please see attached. 

Best, 

Whitney 

Whitney Z. Bernstein 

Attorney 

Bienert | Katzman PC

903 Calle Amanecer, Suite 350 

San Clemente, CA 92673 

Main (949) 369-3700 

Website: www.bienertkatzman.com 

*Please note my new email address: wbernstein@bienertkatzman.com

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 627-3 Filed 06/01/19 Page 14 of 15
2

The foregoing message is confidential and intended for the designated recipient only. The foregoing information may be protected by attorney-client

and/or work product privileges. Accordingly, if you have received this message in error, please contact BIENERT | KATZMAN PC at (949) 369-3700 

immediately, and delete the message without reviewing, copying, or making further use of the information contained herein.

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 627-3 Filed 06/01/19 Page 15 of 15