In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

Nos. 02-1351 & 02-1999

ELMER SANGLAP,

Plaintiff-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee,

v.

LASALLE BANK, FSB,

Defendant-Appellee/

Cross-Appellant.

____________

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 00 C 1663—John W. Darrah, Judge.

____________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 11, 2003—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2003

____________

Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit

Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Elmer Sanglap had a series

of epileptic seizures in the lobby of a LaSalle Bank branch,

which prompted the bank to close his savings account. In

these consolidated appeals we must decide (1) whether

the district court properly granted judgment as a matter

of law on Sanglap’s claim that by closing his account

LaSalle intentionally caused him emotional distress, and

(2) whether the court should have granted LaSalle’s request for attorneys’ fees. Because LaSalle did not intentionally or knowingly disregard a serious risk to Sanglap’s
2 Nos. 02-1351 & 02-1999

emotional health and because his claim is largely circumscribed by Illinois human rights legislation, we agree that

LaSalle was entitled to prevail on Sanglap’s tort claim. We

also conclude that the court properly declined to award

attorneys’ fees and thus affirm in both appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

In addition to epilepsy, Sanglap suffers from depression

and schizoid personality disorder. He lives in Skokie,

Illinois, with his twin brother and, by his own admission,

has a “limited social life.” Until 1998, his activities consisted largely of working at a local shoe store and banking at LaSalle’s Old Orchard branch across the street.

Entries in Sanglap’s passbook reflect that he visited the

bank frequently. From 1996 to 1998 he was in the Old

Orchard branch over 200 times, an average of twice a week.

In 1998, Sanglap had his first of several epileptic seizures at the bank. One day in January, while filling out

papers at a counter in the lobby, he loudly called out, “Help

me, please, help me.” Bank personnel rushed over, offered

a glass of water, and asked if he was all right. After two

or three minutes, during which Sanglap remained standing, he replied that he was fine, walked up to a teller, made

a transaction, and left. Sanglap had a similar seizure in

the lobby a few weeks later, followed by a third episode

on February 27 that was far more severe than the first

two. This time Sanglap collapsed (before he had always

remained standing) and began moaning and crying for

help. Dennis Cloud, the branch manager, called 911, and

an emergency team came and attended to Sanglap for

about twenty minutes before taking him to the hospital

by ambulance.

Despite having an unwritten policy not to terminate

accounts because of a customer’s medical condition, LaSalle

ended its relationship with Sanglap on March 20 when
Nos. 02-1351 & 02-1999 3

he had a fourth seizure in the Old Orchard branch. Ten to

fifteen minutes after the seizure occurred, Cloud approached Sanglap, who appeared to have recovered and

was in line to see a teller, and told him that the bank

was closing his account. A teller issued a check to Sanglap, and Cloud allegedly escorted him out to the parking

lot. Sanglap testified that although he was still dazed on

his way out, he heard a voice, which sounded just like

Cloud, tell him that LaSalle did not need his business

and that he “could go to another bank.”

Sanglap’s brother, Roland, met with Cloud the following

Monday and asked why the account had been closed and

whether Cloud knew that his brother had epilepsy. He

also demanded to know why paramedics were not summoned after his brother’s most recent episode. According

to Cloud, he told Roland that he was totally unaware of

his brother’s condition and then apologized and offered

to reopen the account. Cloud also testified that he had no

medical training and that to his knowledge he had never

seen someone suffer a seizure.

Roland described this encounter differently. He testified that Cloud became defensive when he described his

brother’s condition and did not discuss reopening the

account. According to Roland, Cloud said that he had

closed the account because the seizures were disturbing

the bank’s customers and made no apologies for his conduct. Cloud then allegedly offered to explain the situation

to Roland’s brother and walked off.

Sanglap recalled that a few weeks later he received

a letter from LaSalle offering him $1000 to reopen his

account. Insulted, he ignored the offer (which LaSalle

denies having made) and nearly two years later brought

this suit. The complaint alleges, among other things, that

by closing Sanglap’s account LaSalle intentionally caused

him emotional distress in violation of Illinois law and
4 Nos. 02-1351 & 02-1999

discriminated against him because of a disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). See 42

U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189. A jury awarded Sanglap $80,000

after a trial on his state law claim, and the district court

held a bench trial on the ADA claim (on which Sanglap

sought only equitable relief), which ended in a verdict for

LaSalle. The court then granted LaSalle’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on Sanglap’s state

law claim and denied the bank’s request for attorneys’ fees,

precipitating these appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Sanglap on appeal contests only the judgment as a matter of law on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. To prevail on this claim, Sanglap needed

to show (1) that reasonable people would consider closing his account to be “extreme and outrageous”; (2) that

LaSalle intended to cause him severe emotional distress

or knew to a high degree of probability that closing

the account would cause severe distress; and (3) that

he in fact suffered severe emotional distress. Doe v. Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498, 506 (Ill. 1994); see also Franciski v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 338 F.3d 765, 769 (7th Cir.

2003). The district court concluded that a reasonable

jury could not have found for Sanglap on any of these

elements, and we review that ruling de novo, taking the

facts in the light most favorable to Sanglap. See Reeves

v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149-51

(2000).

With respect to the first element, LaSalle contends that

its conduct was neither extreme nor outrageous because

it closed Sanglap’s account peaceably and for legitimate

reasons. LaSalle emphasizes that bank employees did

not touch Sanglap, raise their voices, or make threats—
Nos. 02-1351 & 02-1999 5

all actions that reasonable people might view as extreme

responses to the situation. See Pub. Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 360

N.E.2d 765, 768 (Ill. 1976). LaSalle also points out that

Sanglap’s seizures distracted the bank’s tellers and other personnel, providing at least some justification for

closing the account. See McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d

806, 810-11 (Ill. 1988) (defendants who reasonably believe that they are acting for legitimate reasons are less

likely to have acted outrageously); see also Johnson v. Fed.

Reserve Bank of Chicago, 557 N.E.2d 328, 331 (Ill. App. Ct.

1990).

We are not sure that these points alone entitle LaSalle

to prevail. Although conduct is outrageous only when it

is so atrocious as to transcend “all possible bounds of

decency,” Pub. Fin. Corp., 360 N.E.2d at 767 (quoting

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d), Illinois courts

recognize that context affects the inquiry. Here, for example, LaSalle apparently had control over Sanglap’s entire

savings—an asset of understandable importance to him.

See Kolegas v. Heftel Broad. Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 211-12

(Ill. 1992) (otherwise unobjectionable behavior may be

outrageous where the defendant has the power to affect the plaintiff’s interests). And Cloud plainly closed

the account in response to Sanglap’s spells, which a jury

might treat as a fairly callous way to handle the serious

medical condition of a longtime customer.

But we can put these considerations to one side because Sanglap’s claim fails for other reasons. First,

Sanglap presented no evidence that LaSalle intended to

cause him severe emotional distress or knew that such

distress was likely to result from closing the account.

Proof of this element can take two forms: The defendant’s

actions “by their very nature” may be likely to cause severe distress, or the defendant may know that the plaintiff is particularly susceptible to distress and that its

conduct thus is likely to cause emotional harm. Honaker
6 Nos. 02-1351 & 02-1999

v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 494 (7th Cir. 2001) (burning down

the plaintiff’s home poses an obvious risk of emotional

distress).

Sanglap does not argue that closing a savings account

without more is likely to cause emotional distress. Nor

does he contend that anyone told LaSalle’s employees that

he was particularly susceptible to emotional distress. See

Johnson, 557 N.E.2d at 330 (supervisors told not to

place “undue stress” on the plaintiff); Parker v. Bank of

Marion, 695 N.E.2d 1370, 1373 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (defendant aware that the plaintiff “valued his reputation

highly”). He instead observes that LaSalle must have

known that he had a serious medical condition because he

suffered four seizures in the bank’s lobby—one of which

knocked him to the ground and necessitated medical

intervention. From that information, Sanglap reasons,

LaSalle could have inferred that emotional distress would

likely result from closing his account. See Pavilon v.

Kaferly, 561 N.E.2d 1245, 1252 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Wall v.

Pecaro, 561 N.E.2d 1084, 1088 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).

Sanglap’s argument erroneously assumes that having

a medical condition of any sort implies susceptibility to

emotional distress. Not everyone who is sick is also prone

to psychic injury. And even if LaSalle should have inferred from Sanglap’s erratic behavior that he had epilepsy,

he points to no evidence that this particular condition

carries a heightened risk of emotional injury. We might

have a different case if LaSalle’s employees possessed

medical training or if they had known that Sanglap was

depressed or had another condition linked to emotional

fragility. But without such evidence a reasonable jury

could not conclude that LaSalle knew to a high degree

of probability that its conduct would cause serious injury

to Sanglap’s emotional well-being. See, e.g., Millers Mut.

Ins. Ass’n v. House, 675 N.E.2d 1037, 1045 (Ill. App. Ct.

1997).
Nos. 02-1351 & 02-1999 7

A deeper defect in Sanglap’s case, which the parties

oddly have ignored, arises because of the Illinois Human

Rights Act. See 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-101 to 5/10-103.

Under that statute intentional torts that are “inextricably

linked” to civil rights violations must be adjudicated before

the Illinois Human Rights Commission, see Maksimovic v.

Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21, 23 (Ill. 1997); Geise v. Phoenix Co.

of Chi., Inc., 639 N.E.2d 1273, 1277 (Ill. 1994), with only

deferential review of the agency’s ruling in court, 775 ILL.

COMP. STAT. 5/7-101.1(A), 5/8-111; Raintree Health Care

Ctr. v. Ill. Human Rights Comm’n, 672 N.E.2d 1136, 1141

(Ill. 1996). We held in Krocka v. City of Chi., 203 F.3d 507

(7th Cir. 2000), that the Commission is the proper forum

for claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress

where the distressing incidents reflect disability discrimination in the workplace. Id. at 516-17; see also Brewer v.

Bd. of Trustees, 791 N.E.2d 657, 664 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).

The statute also prohibits disability discrimination in services furnished by banks and other financial institutions,

775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-103(Q), 5/4-101(B), 5/4-102(A),

which means that Sanglap needed to proceed administratively to the extent that his tort claim is tied to LaSalle’s

obligations under the statute.

It is true that this allocation of subject matter jurisdiction does not block Sanglap’s claim entirely. Disability

discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional

distress are different wrongs, see Van Stan v. Fancy Colours

& Co., 125 F.3d 563, 571 (7th Cir. 1997), so Sanglap

was authorized to begin in court to the extent that his

tort claim does not depend on a civil rights violation. But

eliminating the civil rights component takes the air out

of the case. What is arguably outlandish here is the suggestion that Cloud, who had never before ordered anyone’s

account closed, had a “prejudice against customers with

medical conditions” and thus closed Sanglap’s account

to keep him out of the bank. Sanitized of the allegation
8 Nos. 02-1351 & 02-1999

that LaSalle treated him differently because of a disability, Sanglap is left to argue that closing a bank account

for any reason will support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress—a position that we are confident the Supreme Court of Illinois would reject.

B. Attorneys’ Fees

In its cross-appeal, LaSalle argues that the district

court committed an abuse of discretion by denying its

request for attorneys’ fees incurred defending against

Sanglap’s ADA claim. Fee shifting under the ADA, like

other civil rights statutes, is asymmetric: Fees should be

awarded to prevailing plaintiffs as a matter of course, but

prevailing defendants should recover only when forced to

litigate claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or pursued

in bad faith. Adkins v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 159 F.3d

306, 307 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Christiansburg Garment

Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978); Maynard v. Nygren,

332 F.3d 462, 471 (7th Cir. 2003). LaSalle insists that

Sanglap’s ADA claim meets that standard because he

pressed the claim when it was clear that the bank had

not learned of his epilepsy until after it closed the account. Because disability discrimination cannot occur if

the plaintiff’s alleged disability is unknown, Adkins, 159

F.3d at 307; see also Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75

F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996), LaSalle believes that

Sanglap needed to drop his ADA claim well before trial.

The problem with this argument is that liability for

disability discrimination does not require professional

understanding of the plaintiff’s condition. It is enough to

show that the defendant knew of symptoms raising

an inference that the plaintiff was disabled. See Miller v.

Nat’l Cas. Co., 61 F.3d 627, 630 (8th Cir. 1995); see also

Burns v. City of Columbus, 91 F.3d 836, 843-44 (6th Cir.

1996). As we explained in Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47
Nos. 02-1351 & 02-1999 9

F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1995), most people who observe someone suffer frequent seizures will assume that a disability

of some sort is to blame. Id. at 934. Likewise, although

LaSalle could not have been expected to know that Sanglap was particularly susceptible to severe emotional distress, bank employees did observe his seizures and could

have inferred from their observations that he had epilepsy

or another disabling condition. Sanglap’s pursuit of his

ADA claim therefore was not unreasonable, so the district court acted well within its discretion in denying

the request for fees.

III. CONCLUSION

The rulings on liability and fees are AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—9-30-03