[Cite as In re W.R., 2024-Ohio-2556.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

IN RE: W.R.

R.R.

C.A. Nos. 30951, 30952,

30982, 30983

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

ENTERED IN THE

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO

CASE Nos. DN 21 07 0529

DN 22 06 0519

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: July 3, 2024

FLAGG LANZINGER, Judge.

{¶1} Appellants Mother and Father appeal the judgment of the Summit County Court of 

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that terminated their parental rights to their two sons and placed 

the children in the permanent custody of Summit County Children Services Board (“CSB” or “the 

agency”). This Court affirms.

I.

{¶2} Mother and Father are married and are the biological parents of five children. The 

juvenile court involuntarily terminated their parental rights as to their three daughters, V.R., S.R., 

and I.R., placing those children in the permanent custody of CSB. This Court affirmed that 

judgment. See In re I.R., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 30500, 30501, 30502, 30529, 30530, and 30531, 

2023-Ohio-3044, ¶ 1. These cases involve the parents’ two younger sons, W.R., born November 

19, 2020; and R.R., born January 22, 2022.
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{¶3} CSB became involved with the family in 2021, after receiving a referral regarding 

unsafe, unsanitary, and neglectful conditions in the home. After further investigation, including 

disclosures by V.R. and S.R. that Father had engaged in sexual contact and conduct with them, 

CSB alleged that V.R., S.R., I.R., and W.R. were dependent, neglected, and abused children. R.R. 

was not yet born at that time. 

{¶4} At the adjudicatory hearing, Mother and Father waived their rights to a hearing and 

stipulated that all four children were dependent, neglected, and abused as alleged in the complaints. 

The complaints expressly alleged that Father had sexually abused the two older girls and that an 

Akron Children’s Hospital CARE Center professional found six-year-old V.R.’s disclosures were 

consistent with a child who had experienced sexual abuse.

{¶5} Thereafter, the parents also waived their rights to a dispositional hearing. They 

stipulated to the juvenile court’s orders placing the children in CSB’s temporary custody, 

prohibiting their visitation with the children, and adopting the agency’s case plan. Mother’s and 

Father’s case plan objectives addressed basic needs, including decluttering the hoarder-type 

conditions in the home and remedying the unsanitary and unsafe conditions therein; and mental 

health concerns. The agency later amended the case plan to add a requirement for Father to obtain 

a sexual offender evaluation and follow all recommendations.

{¶6} While the four siblings’ cases were pending, Mother and Father left Ohio for 

Pennsylvania where R.R. was born. The local child welfare agency removed the newborn and a 

juvenile court in Pennsylvania adjudicated him dependent and transferred the case to Summit 

County, Ohio, for consolidation with the siblings’ cases. Summit County Juvenile Court could not 

schedule an initial dispositional hearing within the statutory time limit, so CSB dismissed the case 

and refiled a complaint alleging R.R.’s dependency. The juvenile court adjudicated R.R. 
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dependent after a contested hearing. The parents appealed and this Court affirmed the trial court’s 

judgment. In re R.R., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 30553 and 30582, 2023-Ohio-2941, ¶ 1.

{¶7} Shortly after filing its complaint regarding R.R., CSB moved for permanent custody 

of V.R., S.R., I.R., and W.R. Three months later the agency moved for permanent custody of R.R. 

The juvenile court held a hearing regarding the four older siblings and granted the agency’s motion 

as to the three girls. The court granted a six-month extension of temporary custody as to W.R., 

however, to allow the agency to determine if a maternal aunt’s Interstate Compact for the 

Placement of Children (“ICPC”) assessment would approve placement of both W.R. and R.R. in 

her home. 

{¶8} The brothers remained in temporary custody while the various appeals in these 

cases were pending. CSB filed a renewed motion for permanent custody regarding W.R. and R.R. 

after the maternal aunt asserted that she and her husband no longer wished to be considered for 

placement. After this Court affirmed the involuntary termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental 

rights as to V.R., S.R., and I.R., CSB filed a motion for a reasonable efforts bypass determination 

that the agency was excused from engaging in further reunification services for the parents. After 

Mother and Father failed to respond to the agency’s motion, the juvenile court granted it, allowing 

the agency to bypass its obligation to use reasonable efforts to prevent the children’s continued 

removal from home and facilitate reunification with the parents.

{¶9} Prior to the final dispositional hearing, Mother moved for legal custody, with or 

without protective supervision by the agency. Father orally joined Mother’s motion at the hearing. 

The guardian ad litem joined CSB’s motion for permanent custody. At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the juvenile court granted the agency’s motion and terminated Mother’s and Father’s 
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parental rights to W.R. and R.R. Both parents timely appealed. The juvenile court issued a stay 

of its judgment upon Father’s request.

{¶10} Mother raises one assignment of error for review, while Father raises five. This 

Court consolidates some assignments of error and rearranges others to facilitate review.

II.

FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE PARENTS THEIR DUE-PROCESS 

RIGHTS GUARANTEED TO THEM BY THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO 

CONSTITUTIONS.

{¶11} Father argues that the juvenile court denied the parents their constitutional due 

process rights. This Court disagrees.

{¶12} Father cites Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965), and asserts that “[t]he 

fundamental requisites of due process of law in any proceeding are notice and the opportunity to 

be heard.” After recognizing the private interests of parents in the care and custody of their 

children, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000), he acknowledges that those interests “must 

be subordinated to the child’s interest in determining an appropriate disposition of any petition to 

terminate parental rights.” In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106 (1979). Nevertheless, 

Father asserts that “there was no fundamental fairness [and] [t]he parents were not afforded due 

process[,]” because they could not both work towards reunification by complying with case plan 

objectives while also protecting themselves from the threat of prosecution for sexual abuse crimes 

against their older children. 

{¶13} In support, Father cites Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), for the 

proposition that “due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 

situation demands.” The Morrissey court clarified that “consideration of what procedures due 
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process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the 

precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been 

affected by governmental action.” Id., quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 

367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).

{¶14} R.C. 2151.01 sets forth the dual purposes of the provisions of R.C. Chapter 2151 

as follows:

(A) To provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of 

children subject to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code, whenever possible, in a 

family environment, separating the child from the child’s parents only when 

necessary for the child’s welfare or in the interests of public safety; [and]

(B) To provide judicial procedures through which Chapters 2151. and 2152. of the 

Revised Code are executed and enforced, and in which the parties are assured of a 

fair hearing, and their constitutional and other legal rights are recognized and 

enforced. 

Accordingly, the emphasis is on child welfare while ensuring that the parties’, including parents’, 

rights are not violated.

{¶15} In this case, Father does not argue that the juvenile court did not notify the parents 

of the permanent custody hearing or provide them with the opportunity to be heard. In fact, Mother 

and Father attended the hearing and each testified in their own cases in chief. 

{¶16} Neither parent was compelled to testify as to any incriminating information. 

Nevertheless, they both chose in consultation with counsel to waive their hearing rights and 

stipulate to the allegations in the amended complaint regarding W.R. Those included V.R.’s report 

that Father had touched her private parts; her description of ejaculation; and that V.R.’s disclosures 

were found to be consistent with those of a child who had been sexually abused, as determined 

after an evaluation by the Akron Children’s Hospital CARE Center’s evaluation. 
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{¶17} The parents stipulated that W.R. was abused, neglected, and dependent. They were 

accordingly aware of the concerns underlying the children’s removal from home. CSB developed 

a case plan designed to address those concerns, including Father’s inappropriate sexual activity 

with at least one of his children. Understanding that the goal of the case plan was reunification 

and that the parents’ objectives were tailored to help them remedy those concerns, Mother and 

Father stipulated to the juvenile court’s adoption of the agency’s case plan at W.R.’s dispositional 

hearing.

{¶18} Although the parents contested R.R.’s adjudication, they later waived their rights 

to a dispositional hearing as to that child, again stipulating to the trial court’s adoption of CSB’s 

case plan. R.R.’s case plan also included a sexual offender objective for Father. 

{¶19} The crux of Father’s argument now is that, had he complied with this case plan 

objective, he would have been compelled to admit that he had sexually abused at least one of his 

biological children, exposing him to the possibility of criminal prosecution and incarceration. 

Father could have objected to the agency’s initial and amended case plans that included the sexual 

offender objective. See R.C. 2151.412(F)(2) (allowing parties to object and/or propose 

amendments to the agency’s case plan and request a hearing). Not only did the parents fail to 

exercise their statutory right to object, they stipulated to the juvenile court’s adoption of each 

child’s case plan.

{¶20} A review of the record demonstrates that Mother and Father were accorded 

procedural safeguards designed to protect their fundamental parental rights. They received notice 

of the proceedings and had the opportunity to appear and be heard. They waived their right to 

object to the agency’s case plan objectives. Accordingly, Father cannot now complain that those 
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very objectives deprived the parents of due process. Father’s second assignment of error is 

overruled.

FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE STATEMENTS OF TWO 

MINOR CHILDREN IN VIOLATION OF EVIDENCE RULES 803 AND 807.

{¶21} Father argues that the juvenile court erred by admitting the statements of V.R. and 

S.R. made to the Lighthouse Family Center professional who conducted their psychological 

assessments related to the girls’ disclosures of sexual abuse by Father. This Court disagrees.

{¶22} App.R. 16(A)(7) and Loc.R. 16(D) require an appellant to cite to the specific pages 

in the record on which he relies in making his argument. Father cites to eight specific pages in the 

hearing transcript that he asserts contain inadmissible hearsay, the juvenile court’s erroneous 

finding that the statements were made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, and the 

parents’ attorneys’ objections to the evidence. A review of the transcript indicates, however, that 

the pages cited do not support Father’s assertions of their substance. In fact, Father’s citations to 

the record correspond with pages in the permanent custody transcript relating to Father’s appeal 

from the judgment involving V.R., S.R., and I.R., not W.R. and R.R. Moreover, his assignment 

of error in this case is a verbatim recitation of an assignment of error from his appeal regarding the 

three older siblings. As Father has not cited to the record in this case, we decline to address his 

assignment of error. See Loc.R. 16(D) (“If a party fails to include a reference to a part of the record 

that is necessary to the court’s review, the court may disregard the assignment of error or 

argument.”) 

{¶23} In addition, as the transcript pages Father cites do not indicate that the parents 

objected to the assessor’s testimony, he is limited to arguing plain error. Father has not done so. 

This Court declines to create an argument on his behalf. In re L.T., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 28788 
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and 28789, 2018-Ohio-1487, ¶ 27, citing App.R. 12(A)(2). Father’s fourth assignment of error is 

overruled.

FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V

IN A PERMANENT CUSTODY CASE, A PARENT HAS A RIGHT TO 

CONFRONT HIS OR HER ACCUSERS, AND ANY FAILURE TO PERMIT 

SAME IS A VIOLATION OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CONTAINED 

IN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND SUCH 

PARENT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED.

{¶24} Father argues that the juvenile court violated his Confrontation Clause right to 

confront his accusers, specifically, V.R. and S.R., the children’s siblings who accused Father of 

sexual abuse. This Court disagrees.

{¶25} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, 

that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with 

the witnesses against him * * *.” The United States Supreme Court long ago held that “[t]he sixth 

amendment relates to a prosecution of an accused person which is technically criminal in its 

nature.” U.S. v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 481 (1896). Sixty years later, the highest court in the land 

considered various challenges to the investigative procedures of the Civil Rights Commission, but 

wrote as to the similar challenge in this case:

Although the respondents contend that the procedures adopted by the Commission 

also violate their rights under the Sixth Amendment, their claim does not merit 

extensive discussion. That Amendment is specifically limited to “criminal 

prosecutions,” and the proceedings of the Commission clearly do not fall within 

that category.

Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440 (1960), fn. 16.

{¶26} This Court previously addressed a similar argument in a case involving a child’s 

adjudication. In re Dukes, 81 Ohio App.3d 145, 151 (9th Dist.1991). The parents argued that the 

subject child’s out-of-court statements violated their Confrontation Clause rights. Id. We rejected 
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the argument, holding that the Confrontation Clause is only applicable to criminal trials, while a 

hearing to determine a child’s dependency, neglect, or abuse is not a criminal proceeding. Id. As 

a permanent custody hearing is also not a criminal trial, the same reasoning applies. Father’s fifth 

assignment of error is overruled.

MOTHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 

GRANTED PERMANENT CUSTODY TO [CSB] AS THE TRIAL COURT’S 

DECISION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING 

EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE.

FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS GRANT OF 

PERMANENT CUSTODY TO [CSB] AS SUCH DECISION WAS NOT 

SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST 

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

[CSB] DID NOT MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO FINALIZE A 

PERMANENCY PLAN FOR THE CHILDREN AND THE TRIAL COURT 

ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING A SIX-MONTH 

EXTENSION.

{¶27} Mother and Father argue that the juvenile court’s judgment awarding permanent 

custody of W.R. and R.R. to CSB is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Both parents 

argue that an award of legal custody to Mother was in the children’s best interest. This Court 

disagrees.

{¶28} As an initial matter, although Father’s third captioned assignment of error purports 

to address reasonable efforts and the denial of a six-month extension of temporary custody, the 

body of his argument merely asserts that the evidence demonstrated that Mother is currently able 

to provide a safe and stable home for the children. Accordingly, this Court addresses that argument 

under the umbrella of a manifest weight challenge.
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{¶29} In considering whether the juvenile court’s judgment is against the manifest weight 

of the evidence, this Court “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the 

credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder 

of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] 

must be reversed and a new [hearing] ordered.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) 

Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. When weighing the evidence, 

this Court “must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21.

{¶30} Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody 

of a child to a proper moving agency, it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs 

of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned; orphaned; has been in the temporary 

custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period; the child or another 

child of the same parent has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent three times; or that 

the child cannot be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(E); and 

(2) that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on 

an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(B)(2); see also In re 

William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 98-99 (1996). The best interest factors include: the interaction and 

interrelationships of the child, the wishes of the child, the custodial history of the child, the child’s 

need for permanence and whether that can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody, and 

whether any of the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) apply. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-

(e); see In re R.G., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 24834, 24850, 2009-Ohio-6284, ¶ 11. Clear and 

convincing evidence is that which will “produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or 

conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” (Internal quotations omitted.) In re Adoption 
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of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 (1985), quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), 

paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶31} As for its first prong allegations, CSB alleged that both children had been in the 

agency’s temporary custody for more than 12 months during the prior 22-month period pursuant 

to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), or alternatively that the children could not or should not be returned to 

the parents’ custody pursuant to subsection (B)(1)(a). As to the second allegation, the agency 

alleged that the parents had failed to remedy the concerns underlying the children’s removal 

pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1); that Mother’s and Father’s parental rights were previously 

involuntarily terminated as to other children pursuant to subsection (E)(11), and that the parents 

were unwilling to protect the children from neglect pursuant to subsection (E)(14). “Although the 

agency might allege alternative first-prong grounds in support of its motion for permanent custody, 

it need only prove one.” In re F.D., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 30410 and 30431, 2023-Ohio-706, ¶ 

38.

{¶32} The juvenile court found that W.R. had been in CSB’s temporary custody for more 

than 12 of 22 months, and that both children could not be returned to their parents’ custody based 

both on Mother’s and Father’s failures to remedy the underlying concerns as well as their prior 

involuntary terminations of parental rights as to S.R., V.R., and I.R. Mother and Father do not 

challenge the trial court's first prong findings, which are supported by the record. While the agency 

established each ground by clear and convincing evidence, we specifically note that CSB presented 

certified copies of the judgment entries awarding permanent custody of the three older siblings to 

the agency and terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. Accordingly, CSB proved by 

clear and convincing evidence the first prong ground alleged pursuant to R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(a)/(E)(11).
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{¶33} The agency further established that permanent custody was in the best interest of 

W.R. and R.R. The hearing took place over two days in October and December 2023, when the 

children were three and two years old, respectively. W.R. was in CSB’s custody from the age of 

seven months, while R.R. was removed at birth and spent his entire life in agency temporary 

custody.

{¶34} The children reside in the same foster home, where they share close bonds with 

each other and the foster family. They are comfortable during visits with Mother, although they 

do not appear to share a bond with her. The family support specialist from Help Me Grow who 

had been working with Mother for almost three years testified that Mother is not fully engaged 

with the children during visits. Both she and the CSB caseworker testified that Mother is sedentary 

during visits, allowing the children to play nearby. The agency visitation aide testified that Mother 

has difficulty dealing with both boys at the same time, tending to focus on the “busiest” child at 

the time, while leaving the other to play by himself. Father has no relationship with either child 

because the juvenile court precluded him from visiting based on concerns involving the sexual 

abuse of V.R. and S.R.

{¶35} The children require permanency that the parents are unable to provide. 

Notwithstanding the parents’ stipulations in W.R.’s case regarding sexual abuse by Father of at 

least one of the older children, Mother continued to deny that Father had done anything

inappropriate. Although Father obtained his required sexual offender evaluation very late in the 

case, the assessor testified that Father was “less than forthcoming with his disclosure of 

information[,]” denying the sexual abuse allegations to which he previously stipulated. The 

assessor found Father untruthful as to other issues as well, including his otherwise substantiated 

criminal history and use of drugs and alcohol. While Father initially told the caseworker he agreed 
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with the report generated by the assessor, he later wavered and claimed that the assessment was 

not accurate. Due to Father’s failure to acknowledge and address the agency’s concerns regarding 

child sexual abuse, coupled with Mother’s unrelenting support for Father, the professionals 

involved in these cases maintained that the children would not be safe in Mother’s care.

{¶36} Mother moved out of the home she shared with Father in the hope of reunifying 

with the children. Nevertheless, Mother maintained regular contact with Father, sharing meals 

and a cell phone, attending counseling together, and going on dates. Although Mother denied that 

Father was living with her, one month before the final hearing date, Father informed the police 

that he was living at Mother’s address when he reported a burglary at the parents’ prior home. 

{¶37} Both parents told the caseworker and guardian ad litem, and each also testified, that 

they do not plan to divorce. The caseworker testified that Mother and Father hope that their 

daughters V.R., S.R., and I.R. will eventually be returned to their joint care, even though this Court 

has affirmed the permanent custody judgments relating to the girls. The caseworker further 

testified that, because the parents are focused on the girls, they show little interest in engaging in 

services that might facilitate reunification with W.R. and R.R.

{¶38} While R.R. is developmentally on track, W.R. presents with various delays. When 

he came into care at seven months old, he was not sitting, crawling, or eating as expected of a child 

of that age. W.R. did not cry to indicate his needs. He was assessed to determine if his delays 

were genetic but the assessment discounted that basis, instead concluding that his developmental 

delays and failure to thrive arose out of situational neglect prior to his removal. W.R. still has 

speech deficits and participates in various therapies. Mother downplays the child’s delays.

{¶39} At visits, Mother continues to require redirection to engage with the children and 

keep them safe. She modifies some behaviors but rejects some guidance. For example, the family 
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support specialist testified that she suggested that Mother not let the two-year-old R.R. have a 

pacifier so he will start talking more. Mother refused, stating that the foster parents were working 

on R.R.’s speech development.

{¶40} A major concern for the professionals who observed Mother’s visits was her 

inattention to the children’s safety. Mother would leave the visitation room without informing the 

visitation monitor, leaving the toddlers unattended. The visitation aide, Help Me Grow specialist, 

and guardian ad litem each testified that they had to intervene to prevent a child from falling off 

furniture, out of a wagon, or over a baby gate because Mother had either left the area or was not 

paying attention. On one occasion a month prior to the final hearing date, Mother was allowing 

R.R. to play with small balls he kept putting in his mouth. The visitation aide testified she had to 

repeatedly urge Mother to take the small toys away from the child because they posed a choking 

hazard.

{¶41} Mother’s case plan compliance remained an issue up to the date of the hearing. The 

caseworker testified that she was satisfied that Mother had complied with her mental health case 

plan objective because she was consistently engaged in counseling. However, the caseworker and 

guardian ad litem testified that Mother had not demonstrated she could meet the basic needs of the 

children. Mother admitted that the home her parents bought for her was not yet habitable or safe 

for the children. Despite months of assertions by Mother that the home would be ready in a couple 

more weeks, at the time of the hearing, the house lacked flooring in some areas, doors had not been 

hung, the stairs lacked railings, and there was unfinished plumbing work. Mother testified that the 

contractor she had hired disappeared with the money she paid without completing the work. She 

admitted that she had no current suitable housing for the children.
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{¶42} Both parents refused access by the caseworkers and guardian ad litem to their 

homes throughout most of the proceedings. Father was being evicted from the home he earlier 

shared with Mother. The guardian ad litem testified that she had recently driven by each parent’s 

home. She observed sheets covering the front door of Father’s home and noted a significant 

amount of furniture and other items on Mother’s front porch. 

{¶43} Given the children’s young ages, the guardian ad litem spoke on their behalf. She 

testified that permanent custody was in the children’s best interest based on the ongoing unsafe 

condition of Mother’s home, Mother’s difficulty managing both boys at the same time, and the 

likelihood that Mother would be unable or unwilling to prevent Father’s access to the children. 

The guardian ad litem opined that the boys should remain together based on their strong bond. 

Both the caseworker and guardian ad litem testified that, while the foster parents initially did not 

want to adopt, they had recently become open to the idea because they were committed to ensuring 

that the children remained together. 

{¶44} Finally, R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) is applicable to these cases, as the juvenile court 

previously involuntarily terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights as to three siblings of 

W.R. and R.R.

{¶45} Based on a thorough review of the record, this is not the exceptional case in which 

the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice by terminating 

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and awarding permanent custody of W.R. and R.R. to CSB. 

Father did not seek custody of the boys. There was clear and convincing evidence that Mother 

was not in a position to provide a safe and stable home for the children. Mother’s sole assignment 

of error and Father’s first and third assignments of error are overruled. 
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III.

{¶46} Mother’s and Father’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the 

Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellants.

JILL FLAGG LANZINGER

FOR THE COURT

STEVENSON, P. J.

SUTTON, J.

CONCUR.
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APPEARANCES:

THOMAS C. LOEPP, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

JASON D. WALLACE, Attporney at Law, for Appellant.

ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and C. RICHLEY RALEY, JR., Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.

JOSEPH KERNAN, Guardian ad Litem.