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Paul J. Cambria, Jr. (NY Bar No.1430909, admitted pro hac vice)

Erin McCampbell Paris (NY Bar No. 4480166, admitted pro hac vice)

LIPSITZ GREEN SCIME CAMBRIA LLP

42 Delaware Avenue, Suite 120

Buffalo, New York 14202

Telephone: (716) 849-1333

Facsimile: (716) 855-1580

pcambria@lglaw.com

emccampbell@lglaw.com

Attorneys for Michael Lacey

Gary S. Lincenberg (CA Bar No. 123058, admitted pro hac vice)

Ariel A. Neuman (CA Bar No. 241594, admitted pro hac vice)

Gopi K. Panchapakesan (CA Bar No. 279856, admitted pro hac vice)

BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT, NESSIM,

DROOKS, LINCENBERG & RHOW PC

1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor

Los Angeles, California 90067-2561

Telephone: (310) 201-2100

Facsimile: (310) 201-2110

glincenberg@birdmarella.com

aneuman@birdmarella.com

gpanchapakesan@birdmarella.com

Attorneys for John Brunst

Additional counsel listed on next page

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

 Plaintiff,

vs.

Michael Lacey, et al., 

 

 Defendants.

NO. CR-18-00422-PHX-DJH

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A NEW 

TRIAL

(Oral Argument Requested)

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Eric Kessler

KESSLER LAW GROUP

6720 N. Scottsdale Rd., Suite 210

Scottsdale, AZ 85253

Telephone: (480) 644-0093

eric@kesslerlawgroup.com

Attorney for Scott Spear

Bruce Feder (AZ Bar No. 004832)

FEDER LAW OFFICE PA

2930 E. Camelback Road, Suite 160

Phoenix, Arizona 85016

Telephone: (602) 257-0135

bf@federlawpa.com

Attorney for Scott Spear

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Defendants Michael Lacey, Scott Spear, and John Brunst file this reply in support of their 

motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 33.

1. The Government’s Failure to Make Required Disclosures. 

The government says its inexplicable (and unexplained) failure to timely produce Carl 

Ferrer’s emails with Lyndon Versoza does not justify a new trial, claiming the disclosures related 

only to the forfeiture phase and were not material. But evidence showing the government allowed

Ferrer to use a four million dollar retainer to defend himself in civil and criminal actions over the 

last nearly six years was an enormous and largely undisclosed benefit provided by the government 

to Ferrer that Defendants could have used on cross-examination to show Ferrer’s bias and 

interest in the case. Defendants knew that Ferrer had a retainer and was permitted to use it, but 

had no idea of the magnitude of the retainer or that it vastly exceeded the amounts previously 

disclosed, until after the government’s untimely disclosure (which occurred despite Defendants’ 

numerous pre-trial demands for disclosure of all benefits given to Ferrer.) Defendants would 

have taken a very different approach to questioning Ferrer about the retainer if they’d known its 

size—but they had no idea because of the government’s disclosure failure. Ferrer may not have 

prepared the spreadsheet tallying the various retainers, but, given his obligation to fully and 

truthfully disclose information to the government, his forwarding of that spreadsheet to the 

government adopted the statement. 

The government’s arguments with respect to the Western District of Washington 

investigation are duplicitous, at best. The government claims Defendants merely “speculate

about what that investigation ‘determined,’ and assert, without support, that unspecified materials 

from the investigation are ‘plainly exculpatory and impeaching.’” Doc. 2022 at 2:1-3. As the 

government well-knows, as early in this case it produced two memos to the defense that 

summarized the factual findings of that investigation. Judge Logan ultimately allowed the 

government to “claw back” the memos as inadvertently produced work product and, at the 

government’s request, also prohibited the defense from using information from the memos at trial 

or in these proceedings. Docs. 343 at 16:19-22 and 449-1 at 7. Defendants and their counsel 

have complied with the order, but are familiar with the memos from before the claw back. Judge 

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Logan decided that the memos themselves did not constitute Brady or Gigilio material that would 

supersede any claim of attorney work product privilege,1 but Judge Logan never ruled that the 

factual materials underlying the memos, which are the subject of this motion, were not Brady or 

Giglio material. Id. at 4. Likewise, after the mistrial, this Court “decline[d] to make a ruling as to 

the relevancy or materiality of the WDWA documents at th[at] juncture” (Doc. 1444 at 14:8-11), 

but this Court also has never addressed whether the factual materials underlying the memos are

Brady or Giglio material. 

The government claims an “avalanche of additional evidence that emerged after the 

investigation” (Doc. 2022 at 2:10-15), making the factual information in the memos nonexculpatory and immaterial, but the factual information summarized in the memos contradicts

the testimony of numerous government witnesses, particularly Ferrer, and the government’s 

closing argument on key issues. Indeed, the government pointed to the WDWA investigation 

during Ferrer’s testimony as “notice” evidence regarding the content on the site; that testimony 

alone renders the factual material underlying the investigation relevant. 09/13/23 AM Tr. at 

80:5-8 (referencing a 2012 prostitution investigation). Given Judge Logan’s order, Defendants 

provided no specifics in their new trial motion, nor will they do so here, but the government filed 

the memos under seal with a collection of the documents it sought to claw back, so the memos 

are readily available for the Court’s review to assess whether the factual information the 

government has refused to disclose is material, exculpatory, and relevant in light of the case the 

Government put on at trial. 

2. The Government Elicited False/Misleading Testimony from Carl Ferrer. 

The government doubles down on its trial misconduct and makes the inconceivable claim 

that Carl Ferrer personally exchanged emails with Pamela Robinson. Before addressing the 

specifics of the testimony, it will be helpful to recount Ferrer’s testimony relating to the 

1

 Judge Logan ruled before the memos were published by news media on the Internet. Elizabeth 

Nolan Brown, Secret Memos Show the Government Has Been Lying About Backpage All Along, 

Reason.com (Aug. 26, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/08/26/secret-memos-show-thegovernment-has-been-lying-about-backpage/. The fact that the memos are freely available on 

the Internet undermines any claim the government might assert to keep the factual portions of 

the memos themselves secret. Cf. United States v. Sanmina Corp. & Subsidiaries, 968 F.3d 1107, 

1125 (9th Cir. 2020).

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carl@backpage.com address. Ferrer testified that carl@backpage.com was not his email address, 

but an email address used for marketing. 10/10/23 Tr. at 104:6-10. Once a quarter, Ferrer 

would write an email that would be sent to “hundreds of thousands” of inactive Backpage users

in an attempt to have them post more ads. 9/14/23 p.m. Tr. at 89:9-18; 89:23-90:6; 97:5-10. 

The emails would be sent as bulk email to a list of email addresses Ferrer pulled from Backpage’s 

database. 9/14/23 p.m. Tr. at 89:9-14; 97:2-4. Any emails responding to carl@backpage.com 

went not to Ferrer, but to his staff. 10/10/23 Tr. at 104:3-23. Ferrer’s staff sometimes would 

bring emails to the carl@backpage.com email address to his “attention if they needed some help” 

and emails from the carl@backpage.com email address could have been “responded to by several 

people.” Id. 

The government claims Ferrer testified that he personally exchanged these emails with 

Pamela Robinson and that he remembered doing so,2 but the government’s characterization of 

Ferrer’s testimony simply cannot be squared either with the prosecutor’s questions to Ferrer or 

Ferrer’s responses, which make clear that Ferrer was not a party to those email exchanges. In 

Exhibit A, Defendants have juxtaposed the government’s characterization of Ferrer’s testimony 

with his actual testimony, highlighting the key testimony and comment on it. The transcript 

excerpts in Exhibit A demonstrate several things. First, most, but not all, of the references to 

email exchanges between Robinson and the carl@backpage.com email address (rather than with 

Ferrer/you) came from the prosecutor—demonstrating that he was aware that 

carl@backpage.com was not Ferrer’s email address. (In contrast, over the course of several 

thousand pages of the prosecutor’s examination of Ferrer, he never once asked Ferrer a question 

about an email from or to Ferrer’s personal email addresses using the email address instead of 

using Ferrer’s name or a personal pronoun.) Second, on several occasions the prosecutor started 

to ask a question saying “you,” but then switched to saying “carl@backpage.com,” demonstrating 

that the awkward phrasing of those questions was intentional. Likewise, on two occasions, Ferrer 

pivoted after the prosecutor asked a question using “you” (rather than “carl@backpage.com”)

2

 Ferrer testified that he remembered the emails, but plainly testified he remembered drafting 

the template emails that a bulk email provider used to send to hundreds of thousands of emails 

to inactive users each quarter—not the emails to Robinson in particular.

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and answered using “carl@backpage.com” or by saying the email was “another marketing email.” 

That strongly suggests that the prosecutor and Ferrer had coordinated this testimony before the 

trial. Third, the prosecutor’s tortured questions and awkward use of the carl@backpage.com 

email address point to the conclusion that the prosecutor sought to convey the misimpression 

that Ferrer was personally involved in these email exchanges, while leaving plausible deniability 

to a charge that he was knowingly eliciting false or misleading testimony. If Ferrer personally 

received Robinson’s emails and personally prepared the responses, what possible explanation 

could there be for the manner in which this examination was conducted? Ferrer could have 

testified that the emails came into his staff, that his staff brought them to him, that he prepared 

the responses, and his staff sent the responses he prepared—but there was no such testimony, 

on direct or redirect. 

This is not a case where Ferrer simply testified inconsistently. This is a case where the 

government knowingly elicited testimony that was at least misleading on an issue that could have 

affected the judgment of the jury. That is a constitutional violation requiring reversal. United 

States v. Kabov, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 18214, at *2 (9th Cir. July 18, 2023). The government tries 

to downplay the serious nature of its misconduct, but the lengthy and legally erroneous arguments 

it advances cannot change the fact that Ferrer’s misleading testimony was central to the 

government’s case. 

3. The Government Repeatedly Made Improper Arguments. 

A. Convicting Based on a Legally Insufficient Conspiracy Object. 

The government now argues that the “conspiracy to violate the Travel Act had only one 

object—to make money through the promotion of business enterprises involving prostitution 

offenses” (Doc. 2019 at. 9:14:17), but the indictment said just that “[t]he object of the conspiracy 

was to obtain money” (Doc. 230, ¶ 197) and the government told the jury the conspiracy had 

multiple objects, but one object was “to make money. And they did.” 10/27/23 a.m. Tr. at 6:22-

23. The government subsequently said in rebuttal summation that Defendants “are not charged 

with making money,” but with making money “off the backs of people engaged in illegal 

prostitution enterprises.” 11/1/23 Tr. at 40:12-21. That too missed the mark, as “making money 

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off the backs of off the backs of people engaged in illegal prostitution enterprises” also is not a 

federal crime. Count 1 of the Superseding Indictment is legally deficient and should be dismissed; 

alternatively, as the government twice told the jury it could convict Defendants of conspiracy on 

legally insufficient grounds, the Court should grant a new trial. 

B. Convicting Based on an Impermissible Boundless Conspiracy. 

The government now claims for the first time that it charged a “chain” conspiracy, not a 

“hub and spoke” conspiracy, saying that solves the deficiencies raised by Defendants. Not so. 

The conspiracy claimed by the government, allegedly involving Defendants, Ferrer, Hyer, other 

Backpage.com employees, David Elms, Dollar Bill, and every pimp or prostitute who ever posted 

an ad on Backpage.com, hardly can be described as a single “chain.” Just as a single hub and 

spoke conspiracy would fail here due to the lack of a rim connecting the spokes, the government’s 

proposed single chain conspiracy fails because David Elms, Dollar Bill, and every pimp or 

prostitute who ever posted an ad on Backpage.com were not all interdependent and because their 

activities were not part of a unified scheme, whether among themselves, Backpage.com, or 

Defendants, much less all of them. 

The essential element of a chain conspiracy—allowing persons unknown to each 

other and never before in contact to be jointly prosecuted as coconspirators—is 

interdependence. The scheme which is the object of the conspiracy must depend 

on the successful operation of each link in the chain.... The rationale falls apart, 

however, where the remote members of the alleged conspiracy are not truly 

interdependent or where the various activities sought to be tied together cannot 

reasonably be said to constitute a unified scheme.

United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 901 (5th Cir. 1978). The chain conspiracy rationale “applies 

only insofar as the alleged agreement has a common end or single unified purpose.” Id.; cf. United 

States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1979) (trial court erred in failing to provide jury 

instructions on multiple conspiracies in drug distribution case where government alleged a single 

chain conspiracy). Just as the government presented no evidence of any rim connecting the 

spokes for a hub and spoke conspiracy, it presented no evidence of a unified chain with all alleged 

conspirators interdependent upon the others and constituting part of one unified scheme. 

C. Convicting for “Promoting Prostitution.” 

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If the government put on a case establishing Defendants intentionally took actions to 

cause the publication of each of the fifty charged ads with actual knowledge that the persons 

posting them were engaged in prostitution offenses, its repeated claims that the jury could convict 

Defendants for “promoting prostitution” might be an error requiring no remedy, but the 

government did no such thing. Rather, knowing that it could not put on such a case, from the 

start of the trial until the very end, the government told the jury that Defendants were charged 

with and guilty of “promoting prostitution” and that the jury should convict them on that basis. 

In the absence of any evidence showing Defendants’ knowledge of the charged ads or 

Defendants’ intent to facilitate the business enterprises allegedly associated with those ads (and 

with the government disclaiming any obligation to prove either), the jury seemingly accepted the 

government’s suggestion to convict Defendants for operating the website despite knowing 

people used it commit prostitution offenses, which is not a crime. 

D. Telling the Jury It Could Convict Without a Showing of Specific Intent.

The government says the Court should presume the jury followed the jury instructions, 

citing United States v Reyes, 660 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 2011). There generally is a presumption 

that a jury followed the trial court’s instructions, but the presumption applied in Reyes because 

the court found “the evidence the Government presented was not false” and the defense “failed 

to show that the Government made any false or misleading statements.” Id. at 463 and 468. The 

Court should not apply the usual presumption here, because the government both elicited 

testimony that was at least misleading and made numerous inaccurate or misleading statements 

to the jury, including telling the jury it could convict on legally insufficient grounds:

The prosecutor’s job isn’t just to win, but to win fairly, staying well within the rules. 

It is improper for the government to present to the jury statements or inferences 

it knows to be false or has very strong reason to doubt. It ... is decidedly improper 

for the government to propound inferences that it knows to be false, or has very 

strong reason to doubt, particularly when it refuses to acknowledge the error 

afterwards to either the trial court or this court and instead offers far-fetched 

explanations of its actions. Faithful adherence to these principles is particularly 

important because a prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government 

and making false or misleading assertions may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment 

rather than its own view of the evidence.

Reyes, 660 F.3d at 62 (emphasis added).

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The government says direct evidence of wrongful intent is rarely available and claims 

“intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence,” citing United States v. Kirst, 54 F.4th 610, 

623 (9th Cir. 2022), but the government’s argument misses the mark. First, in Kirst the only

evidence the defendant intended to obstruct an investigation under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 by his own 

false statements was in his head. Here the government had two cooperators at the center of the 

supposed fourteen-year conspiracy, who testified for weeks about minutiae from numerous 

meetings, phone calls, and emails over those fourteen years, but provided no direct evidence of 

an agreement to violate the law or of an intention to facilitate the unlawful prostitution businesses 

associated with ads underlying the Travel Act counts. Indeed, the government presented no such 

evidence even as to its cooperators (precluding Pinkerton liability). The government’s failure to 

present direct evidence of specific intent was not because the evidence was not available to the 

government, but because it did not exist. 

The government was obligated to prove that each Defendant had the specific intent to 

facilitate the specific, unlawful business enterprise associated with each Travel Act count. The 

government not only failed to present any such evidence, but, in its final summation, expressly 

disclaimed any obligation to establish even that any Defendant had any knowledge of the fifty 

charged ads, pointing instead to “the millions of ads.”3 11/01/23 a.m. Tr. at 50:6-14. The 

government essentially claims that it can prove specific intent by establishing general intent—

that is, a general intent to facilitate (or at least indifference towards) prostitution through the 

operation of Backpage.com—but the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gibson shows that is insufficient. 

United States v. Gibson, 507 F.2d 446, 450-51 (9th Cir. 1975). 

In Gibson, the defendant out-of-state manufacturers sold to distributors in Montana 

gambling implements (punchboards and pulltabs) the government alleged were unlawful for 

anyone to possess in Montana. In affirming the dismissal of the charges, the Ninth Circuit 

assumed the defendants knew the text of the pertinent Montana statutes and the accuracy of the 

3

 The government also failed to present any evidence of the critical element of a Travel Act 

violation that a Defendant “performed an act that did promote or facilitate the promotion, of 

any business enterprise involving prostitution offenses, specifically, by publishing on 

Backpage.com the ads listed in Counts 2-51 of the indictment.” Doc. 1998 at 30:9-11. 

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government’s construction of the statutes. Id. at 451. Several things are notable about the Ninth 

Circuit’s ruling. First, the Ninth Circuit said that its “research has revealed no cases where a 

remote seller, uninvolved in an actual gambling operation, has been successfully tried and 

convicted under the travel act.” Id. at n.9. Defendants believe Gibson remains the only reported 

Travel Act decision in which the defendants were not principals in the underlying criminal 

enterprise, excepting this prosecution.4 Second, the Ninth Circuit rejected the notion that the 

government could establish specific intent by proving that the defendants sold punchboards and 

pulltabs to Montana residents knowing that the purchasers of those implements would violate 

Montana law just by possessing the punchboards and pulltabs (here, the analogue would be 

Backpage.com selling ads to persons it knew were committing prostitution offenses). The Court 

held that Travel Act’s specific intent requirement meant the government “must show that the 

manufacturer in some significant manner associated himself with the purchaser’s criminal venture for 

the purpose of its advancement,” because any lesser standard would cause the Travel Act “be 

plagued by the very overexpansiveness which Congress sought to rule out by inclusion of an 

express mens rea requirement.” Id. at 449 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit remarked that 

it was “as likely as not that a vendor similar to the defendants in this proceeding is totally 

indifferent to the actions of his purchaser,” while also commenting that “the prosecution has 

baldly conceded in two of the stipulations that the defendants have no financial interest in or 

control over the Montana distributorships to which the punchboards and pulltabs were sold.” 

Id. at 450 and n.8. The defendants in Gibson arguably intended to facilitate unlawful gambling, as 

they repeatedly sold punchboards and pulltabs to people whose mere possession of those 

implements was a gambling offense, but the Ninth Circuit held that was insufficient to establish 

that they made those sales with the intent to advance their purchasers’ illegal businesses.

5

 

4

 The government asserts that Ninth Circuit decisions after Gibson have construed the Travel 

Act to require only “specific intent to promote or facilitate prostitution” (Doc. 2022 at 16:18-

26), but those subsequent cases involved the prosecution of defendants who were principals in the 

underlying offenses (e.g., pimps, madams, or prostitutes involved in prostitution offenses), so 

those defendants necessarily had associated themselves with the criminal ventures for the purpose 

of their advancement. Here, the government has not alleged, much less proved, that Defendants 

were principals in any prostitution crimes. 

5

 The government’s citation to United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), 

is entirely inapposite, as that case fits squarely within both the First Amendment exception 

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The government may have substantial leeway in argument, but that leeway did not extend 

to repeatedly urging the jury to convict Defendants on legally insufficient grounds. Defendants 

complain not about “oratorical flourish,” but inaccurate or misleading assertions aimed at 

convincing the jury to convict Defendants on grounds not allowed by the law. 

E. Convicting for Publishing Ads Protected by the First Amendment.

The government defends its “not on solid ground” comment, but fails to address the 

constitutional problems with urging the jury to convict Defendants because Backpage.com 

published adult ads associated with prostitution (including based on ads not introduced in 

evidence at trial), with urging the jury to convict Defendants for failing to shut down the 

Backpage.com adult section after repeated demands to do so, with urging the jury to convict 

Defendants for failing to shut down Backpage.com despite knowing that ads used code words 

and the supply of code words was unlimited, etc.—all untethered from proof that specific ads 

proposed illegal transactions and in complete disregard of the constitutional presumption that 

Backpage.com’s publication of ads was protected by the First Amendment unless the 

government proved otherwise. Prosecutor Rapp repeatedly argued in his closing that the failure 

to shutter the Backpage adult section after notice of prostitution was grounds for a conviction, 

without a single mention of the First Amendment or its requirements. Defendants incorporate 

by reference Mr. Spear’s reply supporting his Rule 29 motion.

4. The Government Improperly Used Not for the Truth Evidence.

The government admits its improper use of the inflammatory Amber Lyons video in its 

closing, while downplaying that misconduct saying the video “tracked” other testimony, but the 

government’s misuse of the Amber Lyons video was a drop in the bucket. The government used 

the N.A.A.G. letters, the David Vigilante letter, the letters from banks, the Seattle police 

department reports, the letter from Maryland law enforcement, the AIM Group press release, an 

recognized in Pittsburgh Press and the specific intent framework set out in Gibson. Ulbricht’s 

website had facially unlawful categories inviting ads for the sale of narcotics and thousands of 

ads proposing facially unlawful sales of narcotics, and he participated in those illegal drug sales 

by acting as an escrow agent and taking an 8-15% commission on every narcotics sale. United 

States v. Ulbricht, 13-mj-02328 (S.D.N.Y.), Sealed Complaint, Doc. 1. The government’s citation 

to plea agreements is even more far-fetched, as the government’s charges were not tested in court 

and pleas have no precedential value. 

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email from the Wall Street Journal, a New York Times article, a New Times article, and numerous 

TER reviews for their truth, with virtually all argued for their truth during closings. The

inadmissible hearsay was highly prejudicial, requiring a new trial. 

5. The Prejudicial Timing of Material Changes to the Jury Instruction.

The government seeks to trivialize the impact that the dramatic shift in two foundational

jury instructions had on the defense. The issue was not just the defense’s inability to account for 

the changes in the closings, but its inability to structure its openings, to cross-examine the 

government’s witnesses, and to select and present defense witnesses based on the law given to 

the jury. The defense would have put on a very different case if the Court’s proposed jury 

instructions last summer had not undermined several key defense theories. The government says 

notice evidence remained “salient” under the final First Amendment instruction, but Judge 

Brnovich’s pre-trial rulings on notice evidence directly conflicted with the Court’s final First 

Amendment instruction. 

6. Inadequate Jury Instructions Allowed Conviction on Invalid Grounds. 

As discussed above, the government’s arguments on specific intent are without merit. 

While United States v Hansen, 599 U.S. 762 (2023), dealt with an unrelated statute, the pertinent 

holding addressed general principles of statutory construction for statutes using criminal terms 

of art. As such, Hansen’s holding, and interpretation of “facilitate,” apply squarely to the Travel 

Act, compelling the same construction of the Travel Act as in Gibson. Finally, the government’s 

claim that the jury instructions did not allow the jury to “mix and match” elements, etc. is belied 

by the jury’s verdict and the government’s argument that Defendants can be convicted of the 

Travel Act counts absent knowledge of the ads or the advertisers and absent proof of any overt 

act by a Defendant relating to the publication of a charged ad. Defendants also adopt the 

arguments in Scott Spear’s reply in support of his Rule 29 motion. 

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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of January, 2024.

Paul J. Cambria, Jr.

Erin McCampbell Paris

LIPSITZ GREEN SCIME CAMBRIA LLP

By: /s/ Paul J. Cambria, Jr. 

Paul J. Cambria, Jr.

Attorneys for Michael Lacey

Pursuant to the District’s Electronic Case Filing Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual (Jan. 2020) 

§ II (C) (3), Paul J. Cambria hereby attests that all other signatories listed, and on whose behalf this filing is 

submitted, concur in the filing’s content, and have authorized its filing.

Gary S. Lincenberg

Gopi K. Panchapakesan

BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT, NESSIM,

DROOKS, LINCENBERG & RHOW, P.C.

By: /s/ Gary Lincenberg

Gary Lincenberg

Attorneys for John Brunst

Eric W. Kessler

KESSLER LAW OFFICE

By: /s/ Eric W. Kessler

Eric W. Kessler

Attorneys for Scott Spear

Bruce Feder

FEDER LAW OFFICE, P.A.

By: /s/ Bruce Feder

Bruce Feder

Attorneys for Scott Spear

On January 16, 2024, a PDF version of this document was 

filed with Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF System 

for filing and for Transmittal of a Notice of Electronic 

Filing to the to the CM/ECF registrants who have 

entered their appearance as counsel of record

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 2031 Filed 01/16/24 Page 13 of 13