Gen. 269] 269

1

 The tract is now owned by the Maryland-National Capital Park and

Planning Commission.

2

 The agreements of the various parties are reflected in a Letter of

Intent dated December 3, 1995. The Letter of Intent is not itself legally

binding. The parties will be bound only after the deal is embodied in a

memorandum of understanding. 

TRANSPORTATION ) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ) BUDGETARY

ADMINISTRATION ) USE OF TRANSPORTATION TRUST FUND

FOR GRANT TO PAY ON-SITE INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS AT

REDSKINS STADIUM

February 15, 1996

The Honorable Chris Van Hollen, Jr.

Maryland Senate

You have requested our opinion whether funds from the

Transportation Trust Fund may be used as a grant to reimburse the

Washington Redskins or any other party for the construction of

parking lots or other on-site improvements for the proposed

Redskins Stadium.

Jack Kent Cooke, Inc., the owner of the Washington Redskins,

plans to build a new football stadium on a tract of land in Prince

George’s County known as the Wilson Farm property.1

 As part of

the inducement for Cooke to build the stadium, the State has agreed

in principle to pay for certain on-site infrastructure, including

parking lot construction.2 Your question is whether the

Transportation Trust Fund may be used to fund a grant for this

purpose.

Our opinion is as follows:

1. Subject to any restriction that might appear in the budget

bill, the Secretary of Transportation has authority to use

Transportation Trust Fund money for a grant to the Redskins or

another party for the construction of on-site roadways and related

infrastructure changes, like the rerouting of a sewer line required by

the road construction.
270 [81 Op. Att’y

3

 Because of the broad wording “[a]ny other person,” the Secretary

unquestionably may provide a grant to a private entity.

2. Whatever the budget bill might provide, the Secretary

does not have authority to use Trust Fund money for a grant to the

Redskins or another party for the construction of on-site

infrastructure, like water or sewer lines, that is needed because of the

stadium itself, not because of road construction. 

3. The Secretary would have authority to provide a grant for

the construction of on-site parking lots if the budget bill for fiscal

year 1997 expressly authorizes that use of Trust Fund money. 

I

Secretary of Transportation’s Grant-Making Authority

The Transportation Trust Fund may be used by the Department

of Transportation, after payment of debt service, “for any lawful

purpose related to the exercise of its rights, powers, duties, and

obligations.” §3-216(d)(1) of the Transportation (“TR”) Article,

Maryland Code. Under TR §2-103(i)(2), the Secretary of

Transportation has the authority to make grants “for any

transportation related purpose”:

To the extent permitted by the State

budget, the Secretary may make grants-in-aid

to:

(i) Any governmental transportation

agency in this State, including any county

agency, bi-county agency, multi-jurisdiction

agency, or municipal agency; or

(ii) Any other person for any

transportation related purpose.3

The phrase “transportation related purpose” is not defined; neither

is the term “transportation.” The language has not been construed

in any reported Maryland case. Nor has it been interpreted by

regulation or adjudicatory decision.
Gen. 269] 271

The text is not illuminated by the legislative history. When the

Department of Transportation was created in 1970, the Secretary

was granted authority to “apply for and receive ... grants in aid or

gifts to be used for transportation related purposes.” Former Article

41, §208(m). See Chapter 526 of the Laws of Maryland 1970. At

the time, the Secretary’s authority to make grants was limited to

“any governmental transportation agency within the State of

Maryland.”

In 1972, the Secretary’s grant-making authority was expanded

beyond governmental transportation agencies. As a result of

Chapter 17 of the Laws of Maryland 1972, the Secretary was

additionally authorized to make grants “to any person, corporation,

association, or other entity for any transportation related purpose.”

Former Article 41, §208(g). The 1977 enactment of TR §2-103(i)

carried forward this language without substantive change or

elaboration. See Chapter 13 of the Laws of Maryland 1977. 

If the term “transportation” were construed with primary

regard for its broad statutory context, the term would be taken to

refer to the goals and activities of the various components of the

Department of Transportation. The Department is the spine of an

organization that, through its modal administrations, renders

particular transportation services: mass transit, highways, airport

services, the Port of Baltimore, and the like. See TR §2-107.

“Transportation,” in other words, is what the parts of the Department

do, and what they do is provide the means by which people and

goods move from place to place. This concept of “transportation”

dovetails with the everyday definition of the term. See Random

House Dictionary of the English Language 2012 (2d ed. 1987);

Black’s Law Dictionary 1499 (6th ed. 1990). 

Under the everyday definition, and under any other

conceivable reading of the term “transportation,” at least one

component of the on-site infrastructure construction ) the

construction of roadways ) is unquestionably an object for which the

Secretary’s grants may be provided. A grant would also be

“transportation related” if it covered the cost of infrastructure work

caused by road construction ) if, for example, storm drains or sewer

lines had to be relocated.

Conversely, the Secretary may not provide a grant for

infrastructure work that is needed, not because of road construction,

but because a stadium will be built on the site in place of farm
272 [81 Op. Att’y

buildings. Presumably 78,000 people will impose quite a demand on

water and sewer lines; if the existing lines are inadequate, they will

need to be upgraded. That is not a “transportation related purpose”

and may not be the object of a grant from the Secretary.

Between these clear categories of what is allowed and what is

not fall parking lots. On the one hand, no component of the

Department is responsible for parking lots (except, of course, in

connection with a direct transportation service, like a park-and-ride

lot for mass transit). If “transportation related purpose” were

construed to mean only purposes related to the mission of the

Department’s administrations, a grant for parking lots to

accommodate fans at a football stadium would not be permissible.

On the other hand, we cannot say that the term “transportation

related purpose” bears no meaning other than this relatively narrow

one. To the contrary: Out-of-state authority suggests that the

provision of parking can itself fairly be regarded as a “transportation

related purpose,” because access to parking reduces potentially

hazardous road congestion.

In Miller v. Commonwealth, 498 A.2d 1370 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1985), the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation had

condemned some property for a highway easement. When the

highway was delayed, the property was leased to a private party for

use as a parking lot. Later, when the original highway design was

scaled down and the property was no longer to be part of a highway

interchange, the property was planned to be used as a parking garage

adjacent to the highway. The landowner objected to the taking for

this purpose, contending that the parking garage was not a

permissible objective of condemnation under a statute authorizing

condemnation for “transportation purposes.” The court rejected this

argument, holding that the term “transportation purpose” was broad

enough to include transportation-related activities, like the parking

garage, “which was designed as a integral part of the highway

project and was intended to mitigate the loss of existing surface

parking and minimize traffic congestion.” 498 A.2d at 1374. See

also Commonwealth v. E-Z Parks, Inc., 620 A.2d 712, 719-20 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1993) (Pennsylvania Department of Transportation had

discretion to conclude that leased land for a parking garage was a

“related transportation purpose”); E-Z Parks, Inc. v. Larson, 498

A.2d 1364, 1368 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985), aff’d, 503 A.2d 931 (Pa. 1986)

(public parking was a “highway related use”). 
Gen. 269] 273

These Pennsylvania cases, with their broad view of

“transportation,” are not unique. Other courts, in other contexts,

have taken a similar view of the term. For example, in Kennedy v.

Aerr Co., 833 P.2d 807 (Colo. App. 1991), the issue was whether a

“transportation” exclusion in an insurance policy excused an insurer

from liability for an accident caused by a parked piece of

construction equipment. The equipment spilled some oil while

being loaded onto a trailer, and the plaintiff was injured when her car

skidded on a patch of the oil. The court held that the

“transportation” exclusion applied: “Transportation includes a

process that is not limited to a moving vehicle, but also includes the

activities (processes) originating from or flowing from

transportation.” 833 P.2d at 809. Parking a vehicle is surely an

activity “originating from or flowing from transportation.” 

To summarize, the phrase “transportation related purpose” is

ambiguous. A conservative interpretation would limit parking

facility grants to those parking facilities that are directly related to

a programmatic mission of a component within the Department of

Transportation. A more expansive interpretation would allow a

grant for a parking facility that the Secretary might determine to be

needed to reduce the risk of gridlock on roads near the stadium as

fans park where they can.

In our view, the better approach to resolving the matter is to

construe this ambiguous statute in light of another legislative

enactment: the annual budget bill. 

II

Effect of Budget Bill Language

The annual budget bill is a law like any other law. To be sure,

it has certain unique features, deprived from the requirements of

Article III, §52 of the Constitution, the Executive Budget

Amendment. Nevertheless, the budget bill is subject to the

customary principles of statutory construction. 

One such principle is that laws on the same subject are to be

read together, to the extent reasonably possible, so as to create an

integrated body of law. See, e.g., Haskell v. Carey, 294 Md. 550,

556, 451 A.2d 658. “[L]egislative intent may be gleaned from a

statute’s ‘relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation.’” In re
274 [81 Op. Att’y

4

 The Consolidated Transportation Program is an annual list of

current and future projects. See TR §2-103.1(c).

5

 The Counsel to the Department of Transportation earlier gave the

(continued...)

Douglas P., 333 Md. 387, 393, 635 A.2d 427 (1994) (quoting

Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628

(1987)) (emphasis added). This principle would seem especially apt

here, given that TR §2-103(i)(2) expressly recognizes the role of the

annual budget bill in shaping grant-making practice: The statute

conditions the Secretary’s grant-making authority “[t]o the extent

permitted by the State budget ....” As the Court of Appeals recently

observed, “In examining the language, ... we cannot view individual

provisions in isolation, but must look at the entire statutory scheme.”

Ward v. Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services, 339

Md. 343, 351-52, 663 A.2d 66 (1995). 

For the current fiscal year, and for the past several years, the

budget of the Department of Transportation has contained the

following condition: 

It is the intent of the General Assembly

that funds dedicated to the Transportation

Trust Fund shall be applied to purposes

bearing direct relation to the State

Transportation program, unless directed

otherwise by legislation. To implement this

intent for the Department of Transportation in

FY 1996, no commitment of funds in excess

of $250,000 may be made nor may such an

amount be transferred, by budget amendment

or otherwise, for any project or purpose not

normally arising in connection with the

ordinary ongoing operation of the Department

and not contemplated in the budget approved

or the last published Consolidated

Transportation Program without review and

comment by the budget committees.4

This language, applied to TR §2-103(i)(2), would prevent a grant for

a parking lot for the proposed Redskins Stadium “without review

and comment by the budget committees.”5 The statement of intent
Gen. 269] 275

5

 (...continued)

Secretary of Transportation precisely this advice in a memorandum dated

November 9, 1995. He concluded that, given the language contained in

the budget bill, the Department should construe the term “transportation

related” in a conservative manner, so as not to permit grants to be utilized

for the construction of a parking lot. Memorandum from Assistant

Attorney General Edward R. K. Hargadon to Secretary David L. Winstead

(November 9, 1995).

in the first sentence of the budget condition, if applied rigorously by

the budget committees, would rule out such a grant, for it cannot be

said that the parking lot bears “direct relation to the State

Transportation program.” Yet, the very existence of this budget

restriction implies that the statutory authority of the Secretary is

broader. If the statutory authority were narrow, the budget condition

might not be needed. 

We understand that the Administration is considering language

in a supplemental budget bill that would retain the prior condition

but add language expressly authorizing Transportation Trust Fund

money to be used for the construction of a parking facility at the

proposed Redskins Stadium. In all likelihood, the language would

recognize the special problem of traffic congestion that would be

posed by a crowd at a football game if parking were not adequate at

the stadium itself. 

In our view, such budget bill language would resolve the issue

squarely in favor of recognizing that a grant for the parking lot is

permitted by the statute. Of course, budget bill language cannot

authorize a program to be “implemented in a manner contrary to

statute ....” Bayne v. Secretary of State, 283 Md. 560, 574, 392 A.2d

67 (1978). A budget bill is not a means by which the General

Assembly may enlarge the scope of a statute. So, for example, the

budget bill could not authorize Trust Fund money to be used for onsite water and sewer line construction not caused by road

construction.

But it is not impermissible “legislating in the budget” for the

budget bill to specify a use of funds that can reasonably be

encompassed by the ambiguous term “transportation related

purpose.” Because the statute itself recognizes that grants are to be

made “to the extent permitted by the State budget,” there is all the
276 [81 Op. Att’y

6

 Indeed, if the budget bill were enacted with language authorizing

the use of Trust Fund money for stadium parking lots, a court would likely

favor a broad interpretation of the statute, to avoid declaring the budget

bill language unconstitutional. A construction of a statute that avoids a

constitutional problem is to be preferred. See, e.g., Yangming Marine

Transport Corp. v. Revon Products U.S.A. Inc, 311 Md. 496, 536 A.2d

633 (1988).

more reason to harmonize the statute with an interpretation of it in

the budget bill.6

III

Conclusion

In summary, it is our opinion that Transportation Trust Fund

money may be used for a grant for on-site road construction and

related infrastructure work at the proposed Redskin Stadium. A

grant may also be made for parking lot construction if that use is

authorized in the budget bill. Trust Fund money may not be used for

a grant for on-site infrastructure work needed for reasons other than

road construction. 

J. Joseph Curran, Jr.

Attorney General

Jack Schwartz

Chief Counsel

Opinions and Advice