In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

No. 07-17-00313-CR 

________________________

JAMES RICHARD OCANAS, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

 

On Appeal from the 108th District Court 

Potter County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 72,105-E; Honorable Abe Lopez, Presiding by Assignment 

 

September 6, 2018 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before CAMPBELL, PIRTLE, and PARKER, JJ. 

 

Appellant, James Richard Ocanas, was convicted by a jury of the offense of 

possession of a controlled substance, namely, methamphetamine, in an amount of one 
2

gram or more but less than four grams,1 enhanced by two prior felony convictions,2 and 

was sentenced to a period of incarceration for thirty years. By three issues he contends 

(1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the State failed to prove 

that he was the same person convicted in either of the two enhancement counts, and (3) 

the enhancement allegation alleging a conviction in Randall County was not supported 

by the evidence. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Appellant was arrested for the offense of possession of a controlled substance 

(methamphetamine, one to four grams) on May 6, 2016. His indictment alleged a single 

felony conviction as an enhancement—Conspiracy to Commit Murder, Cause Number

32,896-A, 47th District Court, Potter County, Texas, August 6, 1993. The State later filed 

a Notice of State’s Intent to Use Prior Conviction for Enhancement of Punishment alleging 

two felony convictions: (1) Conspiracy to Commit Murder, Cause Number 32,896-A, 47th 

District Court, Randall County, Texas, August 6, 1993; and (2) Possession of a Controlled 

Substance, Cause Number 16,005-C, 251st District Court, Randall County, Texas, June 

20, 2005.

On July 24, 2017, Appellant’s case was called for trial before the Honorable Abe 

Lopez, presiding by assignment. Prior to beginning voir dire, Judge Lopez introduced the 

parties to the venire panel, specifically identifying Appellant. Upon completion of voir dire, 

 

1 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(c) (West 2017). 

2 As enhanced the offense was punishable by confinement for any term of not more than 99 years 

or less than 25 years. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (West Supp. 2017)
3

the petit jury was duly sworn and Appellant entered a plea of “not guilty” to the indictment. 

The proceedings were recessed for the day.

The next morning, trial reconvened for the purpose of beginning presentation of 

testimony. Appellant, however, failed to appear. After some delay, Judge Lopez 

announced the trial would proceed and that Appellant would be tried “in abstentia.” During 

trial, Amarillo Police Officer Kavoza Robinson testified he stopped Appellant for an 

equipment violation on his vehicle. During that stop, Appellant verbally provided his 

name, date of birth, and social security number. An in-car video of the encounter was 

admitted providing visual and audio images of Appellant. Also admitted was a photo of 

Appellant sitting in the back seat of a patrol car taken by Officer Robinson on the night of 

the arrest. Testimony from a forensic scientist with the Texas Department of Public Safety 

established that material found in Appellant’s possession was 1.30 grams of a substance 

that contained methamphetamine. At the conclusion of testimony, the jury was duly 

charged and subsequently returned a verdict of guilty.

The court proceeded to the punishment phase of trial. As the prosecutor began to 

read the enhancement allegations, the court called counsel to the bench to discuss a 

discrepancy between the indictment and the notice of enhancement allegations 

concerning the correct county of conviction in Cause Number 32,896-A. The indictment 

alleged Potter County, while the notice alleged Randall County (ultimately, evidence 

would establish that the correct county was Potter County). A confusing discussion 

followed a bench conference, ending with the prosecutor stating: “We’ll make a trial 

correction to that Notice, Your Honor. In the August 6th, 1993, Cause Number 32,896-A, 

the 47th District, that should be Randall County, Your Honor, for the conspiracy to commit 
4

murder, instead of Potter County.” Judge Lopez then responded, “I’ve made the 

correction in the indictment . . . .” The record, however, reflects that no interlineation or 

change was ever made to the indictment or the notice. 

Defense counsel entered a plea of “not true” on behalf of Appellant. Evidence was 

presented, including two exhibits containing certified copies of multiple prior convictions. 

When the Court’s Charge on Punishment was presented to the jury, the jury was asked 

to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether Appellant had previously been 

convicted of “Conspiracy to Commit Murder in cause number 32,896-A of the 47th District 

Court of Potter County, Texas on the 6th day of August, 1993.” Finding both 

enhancement allegations to be true, the jury assessed Appellant’s sentence at thirty years 

confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. This 

appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the 

evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense the State is required 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 

912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to 

support a conviction, a reviewing court considers all the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict and determines whether, based on that evidence and reasonable 

inferences to be drawn therefrom, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 

622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). 
5

As to guilt or innocence, the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses 

and the weight to be given to their testimonies, and as a reviewing court we must defer 

to those determinations and not usurp its role by substituting our judgment for that of the 

jury. Id. (citing Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). The 

duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the evidence presented supports the 

fact finder’s verdict and that the State has presented a legally sufficient case of the offense 

charged. Id. When a reviewing court is faced with a record supporting contradicting 

conclusions, the court must presume the fact finder resolved any such conflicts in favor 

of the verdict, even when not explicitly stated in the record. Id. “Under this standard, 

evidence may be legally insufficient when the record contains no evidence of an essential 

element, merely a modicum of evidence of one element, or if it conclusively establishes 

a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Britain v. State, 412 S.W.3d 518, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2013)).

ANALYSIS

By his first issue, Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his 

conviction because there is no evidence identifying him as the person who committed the 

offense. Appellant contends his conviction should be reversed and an acquittal ordered 

because no one testified that he was the same person stopped by Officer Robinson on 

the night of May 6, 2016. Because Appellant does not contest any other elements of the 

offense, the only issue we must determine is whether a rational jury could have found, 

beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant was the defendant named in the indictment 

and that he was the person who committed the offense alleged.
6

The absence of a formal, in-court identification of the accused does not render the 

evidence insufficient to establish identity as a matter of law. See Adams v. State, 418 

S.W.3d 803, 810 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. ref’d) (defendant absented from 

courtroom, by order of the court, during presentation of testimony due to his disruptive 

conduct). Identity may be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence and the 

reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Id. 

While pretrial introductions and voir dire examinations are not evidence, the jury is 

not required to leave its common sense at the courthouse door when it reports for jury 

duty. Statements made during voir dire have been considered in analyzing the sufficiency 

of identifying evidence. See Purkey v. State, 656 S.W.2d 519, 520 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 1983, pet. ref’d). In Purkey, the Beaumont Court found that in the context of 

the trial as a whole, including consideration of voir dire, there could be no doubt but that 

in the minds of the jurors the witnesses were referring to the defendant in their 

testimonies, even though there was no in-court identification of the defendant as the 

perpetrator of the offense.

Here, Appellant was introduced to the jury panel by the trial judge and he entered 

his plea of “not guilty” before the petit jury. During this time, the jurors were able to 

observe him. At trial, they were presented with a video depiction of the defendant’s 

encounter with Officer Robinson and a photograph of him sitting in the back seat of the

patrol car. They also heard testimony about the defendant’s self-identification by name, 

date of birth, and social security number. Deferring to the jurors’ roles as the exclusive 

fact finders, we cannot say the record contains no evidence of identity, merely a modicum 

of evidence of that element, or that it conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt. 
7

Therefore, based on this record, we find a rational trier of fact could have found Appellant 

to be the defendant named in the indictment and that he was the person who committed 

the offense alleged. Issue one is overruled.

Similar to his first issue, in his second issue Appellant contends the State failed to 

prove that he was the same person convicted in either of the two enhancement counts 

which the jury found to be true. Appellant’s argument is simple—because the State 

offered no fingerprint identification of the defendant, it had no fingerprints to compare to 

pen packets offered into evidence. Appellant basically contends there is no evidence to 

prove that he was the same person whose judgments of conviction were admitted into 

evidence. 

Contrary to the position being taken by Appellant, for purposes of an enhancement 

allegation, the State is not required to prove through the use of fingerprints that the person 

named in a judgment of conviction is the same person as the person on trial. While that 

may be a convenient and common way of establishing that fact, by no means is it the only 

way of doing it. For purposes of an enhancement, the State is required to prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists and (2) the defendant on trial is linked 

to that conviction. Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). There 

is no “best evidence” rule in Texas that requires that a prior conviction be proven by any 

particular document or species of evidence. Id. 

Here, each pen packet introduced contained a copy of the judgment of conviction, 

photos of the defendant, and an identification card stating the defendant’s name, date of 

birth, and social security number. Based on the evidence presented at trial, a rational 
8

trier of fact could have found Appellant to be the same person convicted in both of the 

enhancement counts which the jury found to be true. Issue two is overruled.

By his third issue, Appellant contends the enhancement allegation alleging 

Appellant was convicted in Cause Number 32,896-A in Randall County, Texas, was not 

supported by the evidence. Appellant’s argument can only be explained as confusion 

created by a mistake on the prosecutor’s part, compounded by a confusing bench 

conference, further compounded by inadequate briefing, and ultimately resolved by the 

absence of any error in the first place. 

In the final analysis, the Court’s Charge on Punishment asked the jury to determine 

if Appellant had previously been convicted of “Conspiracy to Commit Murder in cause 

number 32,896-A of the 47th District Court of Potter County, Texas on the 6th day of 

August, 1993.”3 The evidence at trial showed that James Richard Ocanas, was convicted 

of Conspiracy to Commit Murder, in Cause Number 32,896-A, in the 47th District Court 

in and for Potter County, Texas, on August 6, 1993, and the jury answered that question 

in the affirmative in its verdict. There being no error as alleged, issue three is overruled.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Patrick A. Pirtle 

 Justice

Do not publish.

 

3 While there was a conflict between the indictment and the notice of enhancements, no objection 

to the Charge of the Court was made and no issue on that question has been raised.