[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-15187

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-20392-KMW-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

VASKA CLAUDE ANDERSON,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(July 21, 2016)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, JORDAN, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Vaska Claude Anderson pleaded guilty to four counts: (1) illegal reentry 

after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2); (2) making a false 

claim of United States citizenship, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1015(e); (3) making 

a false statement in an application for a United States passport, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1542; and (4) aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1028A(a)(1). The district court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 56

months as to counts 1, 2, and 3, followed by a mandatory consecutive sentence of 

24 months as to count 4, for a total sentence of 80 months. On appeal, Anderson 

contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than 

necessary to achieve the sentencing purposes laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 

creates an unwarranted sentencing disparity, and fails to take into account his 

personal history and characteristics. 

We review the reasonableness of a sentence only for an abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Jordan, 582 F.3d 1239, 1249 (11th Cir. 2009). The party 

challenging a sentence bears the burden of establishing that it is unreasonable. 

United States v. Valnor, 451 F.3d 744, 750 (11th Cir. 2006). We will vacate a 

sentence as substantively unreasonable only if “we are left with the definite and 

firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in 

weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range 

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of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 

612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). 

Anderson has not shown that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. His 

56-month sentence as to counts 1, 2, and 3, is below his guidelines range of 70 to 

87 months. Because we ordinarily expect a within-guidelines sentence to be 

reasonable, see United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008), it stands 

to reason that a below-guidelines sentence fosters an even greater expectation of 

reasonableness. His sentence is also “well below the total statutory maximum,” 

which is “another indicator of reasonableness.” United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 

1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016). 

We are unconvinced by Anderson’s argument that his sentence created an 

unwarranted sentencing disparity. He cites to a number of illegal reentry cases 

involving purportedly similar conduct in which this Court upheld as reasonable 

sentences that were lower than the sentence in this case. An unwarranted 

sentencing disparity can exist, however, only among individuals who are similarly 

situated. See United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009). 

Individuals with different backgrounds and criminal histories are not similarly 

situated. See United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1118 (11th Cir. 2011). 

Anderson does not argue, nor could he, that the backgrounds and criminal histories 

of the defendants in those cases were similar to his own. Not only that, he 

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acknowledges that the sentences in the cases he cites “were within the 

recommended guidelines range[s],” while he received a sentence below the 

recommended guidelines range. 

Anderson also argues that his sentence “fails to credit [his] history and 

characteristics . . . as revealed in the numerous letters from family and friends.” 

That assertion, without more, is not enough to show that the district court made a 

clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. 

Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (“We will defer to the district 

court’s judgment regarding the weight given to the § 3553(a) factors unless the 

district court has made a clear error of judgment and has imposed a sentence that 

lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.”)

(quotation marks omitted). 

AFFIRMED.

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