FILED MAY 11, 2010

TIMOTHY PIERRON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 138824 KELLY PIERRON, Defendant-Appellee.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
P ER C URIAM

. At issue here is whether a proposed change of school to one that is 60 miles from the child’s present school would modify the established custodial environment of that child and whether, absent a change in the es tablished custodial environment, the trial court must, when considering an important decision affecting the welfare of the child, analyze each of the ‘best-interest’ factors arti culated in MCL 722.23, even if a factor is not relevant to the immediate issue before th e court. Under the facts of this case, we answer each of these questions in the negative and therefore affirm. Plaintiff-father and defendant -mother have two children from their marriage. The divorce judgment entered in 2000 granted the parties joint legal custody and established the children’s primary residence with defendant. Both partie s and their child ren lived in Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 

# Opinion Chief Justice: Marilyn Kelly Justices: Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman Diane M. Hathaway2 Grosse Pointe Woods until 20 07, when defendant reloca ted to Howell, which is approximately 60 miles away. When defenda nt tried to enroll th e children in Howell public schools, plaintiff objected. At the conc lusion of a six-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that the established custodia l environment was with both parents and that defendant’s proposed change of schools would modify the children’s established custodial environment because plaintiff’s parenting time woul d be adversel y affected by the 60-mile distance between the proposed schools and plai ntiff’s home. Additionally, the trial court held that defendant had not sa tisfied her burden of proof under the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard to show that the change was in the best interests of the children. The Court of Appeals vacated the tr ial court’s order, holding that the trial court erred by concluding that the established cu stodial environment would be modified.
Pierron v Pierron , 282 Mich App 222, 250 -251; 765 NW2d 345 (2009). Moreover, the Court remanded the case for the trial court to reevaluate the cha nge-of-school issue and determine whether defendant had demonstrated by a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ that the change was in the child ren’s best interests. Id . at 264. Under the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq. , “all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or commi tted a palpable abus e of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue.” MCL 722.2 8. Under this standard, a reviewing court should not substitute its judgm ent on questions of fact unle ss the factual determination “‘clearly preponderate[s] in the opposite direction.’” Fletcher v Fletcher , 447 Mich 871,3 879; 526 NW2d 899 (1994), quoting Murchie v Std Oil Co , 355 Mich 550, 558; 94 NW2d 799 (1959). The Child Custody Ac t “applies to all circuit cour t child custody disputes and actions, whether original or incidental to other actions.” MC L 722.26(1). The act provides that when parents sh are joint legal custody-- as th e parties do here-- “the parents shall share decision-making auth ority as to the important d ecisions affecting the welfare of the child.” MCL 722.26a(7)(b). Howeve r, when the parents cannot agree on an important decision, such as a change of the child’s school, the cour t is responsible for resolving the issue in the best interests of the child. Lombardo v Lombardo , 202 Mich App 151, 159; 507 NW2d 788 (1 993); see also MCL 722.25(1). 1 When resolving important decisions that affect the welfare of the child, the court must first consider whether the proposed change would modify th e established custodial environment. The established custodial environment is the envi ronment in which “over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to th e custodian in that environmen t for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). While an important decision affecting the welfare of the child ma y well require adjustments in the parenting time schedules, this does not necessarily mean that the established custodial environment will have been modified. Brown v Loveman , 260 Mich App 576, 595-596; 680 NW2d

1 MCL 722.25(1) provides, “If a child custody dispute is between the parents, . . . the best interests of the child control.”4 432 (2004). 2 If the required parenting time adjust ments will not change whom the child naturally looks to for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort, then the established custodial envir onment will not have changed. See id . The court may not “‘change the established custodial envir onment of a child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.’” Id . at 585, quoting MCL 722.27(1)(c). Here, the trial court found that the propos ed change of school s would modify the established custodial environm ent because the 60-mile distance between the proposed schools and plaintiff’s home “would . . . im pinge on the father’s ability to provide educational guidance, discipline, and the ne cessities of life.” The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the trial court’s ru ling that the proposed change of schools would alter the established custodial enviro nment was against the great weight of the evidence because the distance of the new schools from plaintiff’s home would only require relatively minor adjustments to plain tiff’s parenting time. We agree with the Court of Appeals.

2 Brown involved a change in residence of more than 100 miles, and a custodial environment in which “each parent had fifty per cent parenting time.” Brown , 260 Mich App at 595-596. The dissent asserts that Brown stands for “the proposition that if a proposed move would relegate an ‘equally active’ parent to the more circumscribed role of ‘weekend’ parent, the parenting time modi fication would amount to a change in the established custodial environment.” Whatever the merits of that proposition, there is no evidence in the instan t case that the allocation of pare nting time between plaintiff and defendant was “nearly equal.”5 Although the testimony here es tablished that plaintiff is conscientiously involved with his children’s education, there is no re ason to believe from either the testimony or the trial court’s findings of fact that the change of schools will si gnificantly modify the established custodial e nvironment the children share with plaintiff. A review of the record indicates that the child ren visit plaintiff’s home appr oximately three weekends out of every four, from Saturday afternoon until Sunday evening. Before the instant action was filed with the trial court, the childre n did not visit overni ght on weeknights during the school year. 3 The record also indicates that pl aintiff occasionally picks the children up from tutoring and takes them out to dinne r during the week. An d, one week out of every seven, plaintiff takes the children out to lunch. Given this record, plaintiff’s weekend parenting time will be unaffected. With regard to weekdays, plaintiff is involved with the children during the daytime for only one week out of every seven becau se this is all that his work schedule allows. Although

3 After the instant action was filed, the trial court entered an order regarding school district and parenting time, which re quired the children to attend Grosse Pointe schools. There is some testimony indica ting that the children occasionally stayed overnight with plaintiff on some school nights after this order was entered, but only presumably to reduce the amount of time th at the children spen t traveling between Howell and Grosse Pointe Wood s. The dissent observes that the trial court found that “overnight visits on weeknights and first option parenting time fo r plaintiff would no longer be practical” if the children were enrolled in Howe ll schools. In context, the trial court was clearly referring to the parenting time provision in the judgment of divorce as part of its analysis of whether the establis hed custodial environment would be modified. However, plaintiff, in fact, had not been enga ged in weeknight, overni ght parenting time. The parenting time provision, by itself, does not establish the actual custodial environment, Baker v Baker , 411 Mich 567, 579-580; 30 9 NW2d 532 (1981), and it was error for the trial court to consider the provision allowing weekni ght, overnight visits without also considering that thes e visits were not occurring.6 the 60-mile distance is acknowledgedly more in convenient for plain tiff, it is not so far that plaintiff cannot continue his occasiona l midweek activities with his children and his involvement in their education. 4 Moreover, the record reflec ts that the children spend the vast majority of their time in the established custodial environment of their mother, the defendant. In fact, plainti ff’s own testimony acknowledged th at the children “spend most of their time” with “their mother.” From th e children’s perspective, the changes in the

4 The dissent seems to rely largely on the 60-mile distance itself, rather than on the actual impact that this distance has on th e established custodial environment. For instance, the dissent provides several examples of how plai ntiff’s midweek involvement with his children, much of which pertains to one-time events, may be hindered. However, even with respect to these events, plaintiff was able to attend his son’s graduation ceremony that was sc heduled during plaintiff’s re gular workday because the school was near plaintiff’s office; when A ndrew truanted from sch ool, both plaintiff and defendant dealt with the issue immediately; and when defendant attempted to register the children in the Howell schools, she listed plaintiff as the fourth person to contact in case of emergency, after herself, her sister, who liv es closer, and another individual. There is nothing in the record to indicate that plaintiff will be unable to attend graduation ceremonies or other significant events, or to re spond to discipline issues or emergencies, if the children attend Howell schools. More pertinently, however, none of these events alters to whom the children na turally look for “guidance, di scipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). The dissent observes that plaintiff assisted his children with their weeknight homework assignments. According to the record, this occurred “sometimes” on the same evening that he took his children out to dinner. The dissent also ob serves that plaintiff conduc ted weekly science tutoring sessions for his son and worked on science proj ects in the basement. These sessions took place during a single school yea r, and it is unclear whether they occurred on a school night or during the weekend. Therefore, it is also unclear whether such sessions would be affected by the proposed change of school. Regardless, we do not take issue with the fact that plaintiff has been a good parent. Alth ough the dissent feels the need to contrast defendant unfavorably with pl aintiff, we merely believe th at the additional 60-mile distance is not so far away that plaintiff ca nnot continue occasionally to take his children out to dinner and help them with their homew ork as he had sometimes done in the past.7 established custodial environmen t they share with plaintiff sh ould be minor, if at all. 5 This being the case, defendant’s 60-mile move to Howell does not legally effect a change in the established custodial environment the children share with either plaintiff or defendant. Therefore, we agree with th e Court of Appeals that the trial court’s determination that the proposed change of schools would a lter the established custodial environment was against the great weight of the evidence. Because there is no chan ge in the established cu stodial environment, the heightened evidentiary burden is not applicable, and defenda nt is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence th at the proposed change of schools would be in the best interests of the children, using the best-i nterest factors identified in MCL 722.23. However, the best-interest factors are geared toward general custo dy determinations, and many of these factors are simply irrelevant to particular “important decisions” affecting

5 In asserting that the established custodi al environment would be modified if the children were to attend Howell schools, the disse nt cites matters that are simply irrelevant in this case. For example, it asserts that the trial court’s finding that the proposed change of schools would modify the established cust odial environment is supported by the fact that plaintiff suffers from mu ltiple sclerosis, which limits his prospects of finding employment closer to Howell and which requi red plaintiff to use a wheelchair during a recent vacation with the childre n. While we share the disse nt’s understandable solicitude for plaintiff and his handicap, there is no eviden ce to indicate that this handicap affects his custodial relationship with his children, and it has no bearin g on the established custodial environment either as it is currently or as it would be if the children were to attend Howell schools. Finally, the dissent claims that defendant’s asserted “irresponsibility” as a parent “bolsters” the tr ial court’s finding that the proposed change of schools would modify the established custodi al environment. While, if true, this may well constitute a relevant consideration in assessing whether th e proposed change of schools would be in the children’s best intere sts, it is considerably less relevant in assessing whether the proposed change wo uld modify the custodial environment.8 the welfare of a child. For instan ce, factor f, pertaining to th e “moral fitness of the parties involved,” MCL 722.23(f), while highly relevant in maki ng a custody determination between parents, has no discernible bearing on determining whether a proposed change of school is in a child’s best interests. The trial court itself expressed frustrati on with the best-interest factors because many of these factors had nothing to do with the issue at ha nd. Despite this, the trial court felt obligated to consider factors that were wholly unrelated to the change-of-school issue. For example, the cour t determined that factor c, pertaining to the “capacity and disposition of the parties involv ed to provide the ch ild with food, clot hing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs,” MC L 722.23(c), favored plaintiff, focusing on the parties’ disparity of inco me. The trial court observed that defendant had failed to make any effort to obtain full-time employment even th ough she claimed that job prospects were better in Howell. While di sparity of income between the parties and defendant’s asserted failure to secure full-time employment might be significant if the issue before the court involved a change of custody, these considerations have little or nothing to do with the change-of-school issu e. The Court of Appeals addressed the scope of the best-interest factors in this context by concluding that “the court must narrowly focus its consideration of each best-interest factor on the specific ‘important decision[] affecting the welfare of the child’ that is at issue.” Pierron , 282 Mich App at 252-253. We agree with this conclusion.9 If a proposed important decisi on affecting the welfare of the child will not modify the established custodial enviro nment, evaluating best-interest factors that are irrelevant to the particular issue before the court distracts from the pr oper focus of the proceeding and poses the risk that one parent’s preference will prevail even though that preference is not in the best interests of the child. Nevertheless, MCL 722.23 requires “the sum total of the . . . factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the court[.]” (Em phasis added.) In Parent v
Parent , 282 Mich App 152; 762 NW 2d 553 (2009), the Court of Appeals addressed this issue, also in the context of a dispute over a proposed change of sch ool. Recognizing that even though each of the factors might not be relevant to the issue, MCL 722.23 requires consideration of “all” the factor s, the Court held that “[t]he trial court must at least make explicit factual findings with regard to the applicability of each factor.” Id . at 157 (emphasis added). We believe that this appr oach complies with MC L 722.23 and allows for the proper evaluation of whether an important decision is genuinely in the best interests of the children, in accordance with the Ch ild Custody Act. Th erefore, we hold that when a trial court is considering a de cision that will not modify the established custodial environment, such as the change-of-s chool issue in this ca se, it must consider the applicability of all the factors. However, if the trial court determin es that a particular factor is irrelevant to the immediate issue, it need not make subs tantive factual findings concerning the factor beyond th is determination, but need me rely state that conclusion on the record.10 We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court clearly erred on a major legal issue regarding factor i, “[t]he re asonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference,” MCL 722.23(i). Although both children expresse d a preference to attend Howell schools, it appears that the trial court refused to consider their preferences because ne ither child had ever attended a Howell school and, th erefore, presumably lacked any factual basis on which to form a reasonable preference. Essentially, the trial court imposed a requirement of actual, firsthand experience, in this case wi th a Howell school, in order for the child’s preferences to be valid. Howeve r, we agree with the Court of Appeals that factor i does not “require that a child’s preference be accompanied by detaile d thought or critical analysis” and that the “reasonable prefer ence” standard merely “exclude[s] those preferences that are arbitrary or inherently indefensible.” Pierron , 282 Mich App at 259. The trial court did not indicate that the children’s stated preferences violated this minimal standard of reasonableness. To summarize, when consider ing an important decision affecting the welfare of the child, the trial cour t must first determine whether the proposed change would modify the established custodial environment of that ch ild. In making this determination, it is the child’s standpoint, rath er than that of the parents, th at is controlling. If the proposed change would modify the established custodia l environment of the ch ild, then th e burden is on the parent proposing the change to esta blish, by clear and conv incing evidence, that the change is in the child’s be st interests. Under such circ umstances, the trial court must consider all the best-interest factors becaus e a case in which the proposed change would11 modify the custodial environment is essentia lly a change-of-custody case. On the other hand, if the proposed change would not modify the established custodial environment of the child, the burden is on the parent pro posing the change to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the change is in th e child’s best interests. In addition, under those circumstances, although the trial court must determine whether each of the best-interest factors applies, if a factor does not apply, the trial court need not address it any further. In other words, if a particular be st-interest factor is irrelevant to the question at hand, i.e., whether the proposed change is in the best interests of the child, the trial court need not say anything other than that the factor is irrelevant. In this case, because we ag ree with the Court of Appeal s that the proposed change of schools will not modify the es tablished custodial environment, 6 we affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision to vacate the trial court’s order. However, even by a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard, this case presents a very close qu estion with regard to whether attending Howell Schools is in the best interests of the children. It is clear that plaintiff is concerned about his children, is involved in th eir education, and provides guidance, structure, and discipline even when the children are not in hi s care. While the change of schools would not modify the established cust odial environment, we recognize that the change of schools may, in f act, impair plaintiff’s ability to be readily accessible to

6 We emphasize that we do not hold here that a proposed change of school will never modify an established custodial environm ent. Rather, we me rely hold that, under the specific facts of this case, this particul ar change of schools does not modify the established custodial environment.12 provide guidance and structure. These facts, of cour se, are relevant to assessing where the interests of these children lie, and, on remand, we encourage the trial court to carefully consider all relevant factors when making this assessment. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 7 Marilyn Kelly Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman Diane M. Hathaway

7 We have considered defendant’s post- argument motion to “c orrect the record, strike the response oral argument [sic] and the response brief [sic] of the plaintiffappellant; to investigation [sic ] into deception systematica lly perpretrated [sic] by the plaintiff-appellant; and for costs and sanctions against the plaintiff-appellant,” and it is denied. However, defendant’s motion cont ains over 25 specific allegations that plaintiff’s counsel has “lied,” “intentionally mi sled,” “deceived,” or been “manipulative” concerning the facts of this case. Additiona lly, defendant makes as persions concerning the integrity of the atto rney grievance process, and she has “noticed that the video tape of the oral argument in the State Bar’s web cite [sic] was cleaned up a bit and can not be relied upon for the full record.” We find all these allegati ons to be irresponsible and unsubstantiated. Therefore, costs of $250 are assessed against defendant’s counsel in favor of plaintiff under MCR 7.316(D)(1)(b) for filing this vexatious motion.S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N SUPREME COURT

TIMOTHY PIERRON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 138824 KELLY PIERRON, Defendant-Appellee.

C ORRIGAN , J. ( concurring in part and dissenting in part ). I concur with the majority that when a trial court determines that an important decision affecting the welfare of a child would not modify the child’s established custodial environment, all 12 best interest factors in MCL 722.23 may not be relevant to the specific decision before the court. I agr ee further that in such cases the trial court nonetheless must consider the applicability of all the statutory best interest factors and state its factual findings and conclusions rega rding each relevant factor on the record. I acknowledge that this approach comports w ith the applicable provisions of the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq

. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majo rity’s conclusion that the established custodial environment between plaintiff fath er and the two minor children will not be modified in this case. After a six-day eviden tiary hearing spanning 1,136 transcript pages and at least 54 exhibits, the trial court foun d that an established custodial environment existed with both parents and that defendant mother’s unilateral decision to remove the2 children from Grosse Pointe Public Schools and enroll th em in Howell Pu blic Schools would alter the children’s established custodia l environment with plaintiff. The record abundantly supports the trial court’s findi ngs. After scrutinizi ng the record, I am mystified by the majority’s blanket endorsement of the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the trial court’s finding was against the great weight of the evidence when the Court of Appeals failed to discuss what evidence clearl y preponderated in the opposite direction. I am similarly perplexed by the majority’s re sistance to reviewing the evidence adduced and its related assertion that much of the evidence on the lower court record—evidence that the majority deem s unnecessary to discuss—is irrele vant. The majority essentially second-guesses the trial court’s findings re garding the existence of an established custodial environment with both parents and the destruction of the children’s established custodial environment with plai ntiff. The majority conclude s that the children “spend the vast majority of their time” w ith defendant, so adjustments were merely to plaintiff’s parenting time. I cannot join th is distortion of the record be fore us. I further conclude that the result here does not conform to th e highly deferential “g reat weight of the evidence” standard of review. Numerous witnesses testified about th e quality of Grosse Pointe and Howell Public Schools. Only plain tiff and defendant, however, test ified about the modifications to plaintiff’s parenting time and the establis hed custodial environmen t as a result of the proposed school change. Defendant failed to sq uarely rebut plaintiff’s testimony in this regard. Further, the testimony of the childre n’s tutor, Deb Dixon, corroborated plaintiff’s testimony about his strong interest in the ch ildren’s education and hi s active involvement3 in their daily lives. Under the great weight of the evidence standard, a reviewing court defers to the trial court’s credibility determin ations, and the trial court’s factual findings should be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction. Because the record does not reveal that th e evidence before the trial court clearly preponderated in the opposite direction, I wo uld reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstate the trial court’s order directing that the children rema in enrolled in Grosse Pointe Public Schools. I have a firm conviction on the basis of my review of the record that the move to Howell will strip these children of two pare nts’ involvement in their education and discipline, thereby relegating them to the care of a single parent, defendant mother. 1 That

1 The trial court expressed a similar con cern about enrolling th e children in Howell Public Schools. While issuing its opinion from the bench in regard to best interest factor j, the trial court found in pertinent part: [Plaintiff] repeatedly stated his st rong conviction th at children need both parents actively involved in thei r lives. He felt the move to the Howell school district would impede his ability to participate in their educational and every day lives. With out both parents in their lives on a daily basis, [plaintiff] feels the child ren face a higher potential for failure. This is especially true in his opinion because Andrew struggles academically. He wants to be ther e for his son to help guide his educational development. [Defendant] feels [plaintiff] can still participate adequately from Grosse Pointe, but she did not othe rwise address his concerns nor the general philosophy of the need for two parents to raise their children actively and on a daily basis. As the following sample of testimony from th e record illustrates, th ere is no basis to disturb the trial court’s finding as agai nst the great weight of the evidence:4  In response to whether Grosse Pointe Pub lic Schools afforded his children with the best opportunities that he co uld offer them, plaintiff responded, “Yes, it is. I think it is. Is the school system better? Yes. Is that all that matters? No, you need both parents. You need both parents working together. But honestly with one parent doing [sic] out in Howell is not going to work with them.”

 In response to the potential impact of the children attending Howell Public Schools, plaintiff stated, “I’m vastly conc erned about what thes e kids are going to do in school. Even if they are straight A students in Howell, I’m not sure if that’s going to be enough ; but I honestly, I doubt they’ ll be straight A students in Howell. They’re going to be even worse than they were in Gro sse Pointe. With only Kelly doing it and not two parents, th ey’re going to fail. And that’s my biggest fear is they’re not what—that’s my biggest fear is they’re failing if they go to Howell.”

 In response to whether enrolling Andrew in Howell Public Schools would ease the stress on plaintiff and Andrew’s relations hip, plaintiff responded, “No. My assumption if he is going to attend Howell school[s], I will lose contact with him and it’s going to be heinous. Kelly rais ed Ian by herself. There was no other father for Ian there. And what happened to Ian? He flunked out. You’re going to take my kid and put him in Howell schools without a fath er. And Howell schools, we’re arguing this, but you know what, Howell schools is [sic] not better than Grosse Pointe schools. And so you’re going to take my child and put him in a school system that’s not as good and wh at’s going to happen to him? Ian is smarter than Andrew. And Ian flunked out. What’s going to happen to Andrew in Howell schools?”

 In response to how attending Howell Pub lic Schools would affect the children’s family relationship with plai ntiff, plaintiff explained, “I will see them less. We cannot do the overnight visits . I will see them intermitt ently on weekends. When they’re living in Grosse Pointe around the block, I saw them routinely on weekends. Now I’m seeing them every onc e in a while and it takes a fight over the phone with Kelly.”

 In response to whether plaintiff was willi ng to work for a relationship with the children’s friends in Howell, plaintiff stat ed, “I will do anything to keep my relationship with my kids. I don’t know if it’s going to be possible though because, if she is living in Howell, th e friends are in Ho well, how—as your example, how are you going to pick up their friends a nd drive the friends down for two hours to spend time with me, and th en drive them back? . . . I don’t know how many parents are going to have their friends—their kids go to see—go spend5 parent seems quite inattentive to the children’ s needs. Further, her proposal to enroll the children in a new school district appears to be based on her desire to relocate, and not what is in the children’s best interests. Modifying the status quo and enrolling the children in Howell Public School s is a decision reflecting defend ant’s best interests to be sure, but not the best interests of the parties’ two minor children.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY As the majority explains in part, plai ntiff and defendant had two children during their marriage, Andrew (born 5/6/ 1994) and Madeline (born 1/25/99). 2 When the parties divorced in 2000, the judgment of divorce awarded joint legal custody. With regard to educational decisions, the judgment provided: As joint legal custodians, each pa rent shall have equal decisionmaking authority with respect to matters concerning . . . education. Both parents shall be fully in formed with resp ect to the children’s progress in school and shall be entitled to par ticipate in all school conferences, programs and other related activitie s in which parents are customarily involved. Both parent s shall have full access to the children’s school records, teachers, counselors, and to their medical records and health care providers.

a weekend at some other man’s house. In Grosse Pointe, I know the parents. I spend time with the parents. I see th em at the PTA meetings. We have relationships.”

2 Defendant also has a child from a previous relationship, Ian. The record does not establish Ian’s date of birth, but the testim ony indicates that he was 18 years old at the time of the evidentiary hearing and resided with defendant while attending community college.6 Additionally, the judgment of divorce grante d defendant primary physical custody but awarded plaintiff “reas onable and liberal parenting time . . . which shall include alternate weekends, alternate holidays, time during school and summer vacations, and as otherwise agreed between the parties.” In 2001, an ame nded judgment of divorce entered. Consistent with the original judgment of divorce, the amende d judgment stated that “the parties shall have joint legal custody and sh ared parenting time” and that defendant’s residence “continues as primary residence.” The parenting time provision was modified to provide greater flexibility. It stated that plaintiff’s parenting time “shall include overnights and all mutually ag reeable times, including first option of parenting time when and if [defendant] resumes and/or returns to full time employment or continued education that requires night classes.” After the divorce, plaintiff, defendant, and the children lived in Grosse Pointe Woods, where the children had resided since bi rth. Defendant and th e children lived less than six blocks from plaintiff’s home. The children’s paternal gran dparents, with whom they share a close and loving bond , also resided in Grosse Poin te. Upon reaching school age, the children both attended Grosse Pointe Public School s. Madeline’s elementary school was located 0.25 miles from plain tiff’s home and 1.1 m iles from defendant’s home. Andrew’s middle school was locate d 1.4 miles from plai ntiff’s home and 1.2 miles from defendant’s home. Despite his demanding radiology practice, plaintiff played an active role in the children’s education: attending school con certs and ice cream socials, helping the children with homework on school nights, stay ing in contact with teachers, and arranging7 for a private tutor for the children when they struggled academica lly. In Ap ril 2005, plaintiff was forced to seek judicial interv ention to obtain private tutoring for Andrew after defendant rejected the idea. Defend ant was comparatively less involved in the children’s education even though she was essentially a stay-at-home parent who occasionally did upholstery work and taught figure skating. 3 Additionally, the children participated in various extracurricular acti vities in Grosse Poin te, including band, archery, figure skating, and dance. Plaintiff, defendant, and the children’s paternal grandparents assisted in transporting the chil dren and encouraging their involvement in extracurricular activities. Fo r certain extracurricular ac tivities, including Madeline’s dance classes, plaintiff and the children’ s paternal grandmother handled all the transportation. The children also attended church with plaintiff and their paternal grandparents. In April 2007, without no tifying plaintiff, defendant offered to purchase a condominium in Howell. 4 At the time, the only individual whom defendant knew in Howell was her on-again, off-aga in boyfriend of five years. 5 After learning of

3 Although defendant graduated from a fou r-year university wi th a degree in science and a certificate in social work, she st opped working when she married plaintiff. At the time of the evidentiary hearing, defe ndant confirmed that sh e did not have a job and that she no longer did upholstery work or taught figure skating. Defendant primarily subsisted on approximately $2 8,000 a year in tax-free ch ild support from plaintiff.

4 Howell is located approximately 60 miles from Grosse Pointe Woods.

5 Defendant’s sister lived in Cohoctah To wnship and defendant’s mother lived in West Bloomfield. According to defendant, it took approximately 25 minutes to drive from the condominium in Howell to her sister’s home in C ohoctah To wnship.8 defendant’s actions, plaintiff proposed that de fendant purchase his single family home in Grosse Pointe Woods for the sa me price that she offered for the condominium in Howell. Plaintiff’s proposal w ould have give n defendant more than $1 00,000 in free equity. Plaintiff also attempted to negotiate a pare nting time schedule with defendant. Defendant either rejected or did not resp ond to any of plaintiff’s propos als. In June 2007, defendant moved to Howell. Contrary to the terms of the judgment of divorce granting equal decision-making with regard to education, defendant enrolled th e children in Howell Public Schools. In July 2007, plaintiff f iled a motion opposing the proposed change of schools, asserting that the “unilateral decisi on to move the childre n more than an hour from [p]laintiff’s home and comp letely uproot them from th eir school district” would violate the judgment of divorce and modi fy the children’s established custodial environment. 6 Plaintiff offered to pay for a rent al home for defendan t and the children during the pendency of the proceedings, but defendant refused plaintiff’s offer. During September and October 2007, the trial court conducted a six-day evidentiary hearing to determine whether the pr oposed change of schools was in the best interests of the children. At the conclusion, the court issu ed a 27-page op inion from the

6 Since the proposed change of schools firs t became an issue, the record reveals steadily increasing levels of acrimony between the parties and their re spective counsel. This acrimony is aptly illustrated in defend ant’s post-argument mo tion to “correct the record, strike the response oral argument [sic] and the response brief [sic] of the plaintiffappellant; to investigation [sic ] into deception systematica lly perpretrated [sic] by the plaintiff-appellant; and for costs and sanctions against the plaintiff-appellant.” I wholly concur with the majority’s d ecision to deny defendant’s motion and sanction defendant’s counsel pursuant to MCR 7.316(D)(1)(b) for filing a vexatious motion.9 bench with a detailed consider ation of the evidence. Th e court noted the governing burdens of proof. The party seeking to im plement a school cha nge has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the change is in the child’s best interests. If, however, the pr oposed school change will affe ct the child’s established custodial environment, the moving party has the heightened burden of persuading the court by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court found that both parents had an established custodial environment with their ch ildren. Because the trial court determined that the proposed school change would affe ct the parties’ agreed-upon parenting time schedule and modify the childre n’s established custodial e nvironment “of flexibility and continued involvement” with plaintiff, defenda nt had the burden of persuading the trial court that the school change was in the children’ s best interests. After a careful review of the evidence and discussion about all 12 statutory best intere st factors, the trial court concluded that defendant had fa iled to establish that the proposed change was in the children’s best interests under either the clea r and convincing evidence standard or the less rigorous preponderance of the evidence standard. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that the children remain enrolled in Grosse Pointe Public Schools. Soon thereafter, the trial court denied defe ndant’s motion for reconsideration. Defendant appealed by right, arguing that the trial court had applied the incorrect standard of review, misunderstood the applic able law, and made factual findings against the great weight of the evidence. Defendant also challenged the trial court’s findings regarding statutory best in terest factor i (reasonable preference of the child).10 The Court of Appeals vacated the trial cour t’s order, concluding that the trial court had erred by finding that the proposed scho ol change would modify the children’s established custodial environment with plai ntiff because “only mi nor modifications to plaintiff’s parenting ti me” would be required. 7 The Court further held that the trial court had made factual findings agai nst the great weight of the evidence regarding statutory best interest factors a (love, affection, and other emotional tie s existing between the parties involved and the child) and h (home, sc hool, and community record of the child). Additionally, the Court concluded that the tr ial court had committed clear legal errors regarding factors b (capacity an d disposition of the parties invo lved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to co ntinue the education and raisi ng of the child in his or her religion), c (capacity and disposition of the parties involved to pr ovide the ch ild with food, clothing, medical care or remedial care, and other material ne eds), e (permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or propos ed custodial home or homes), and i (reasonable preference of the child). 8 After opining that “defendant likely satisfied her burden of proof on the change-of-sch ool issue in this case,” 9 the Court remanded the case for reevaluation of the proposed school change issue under the preponderance of the evidence standard.

7 Pierron v Pierron , 282 Mich App 222, 249; 765 NW2d 345 (2009).

8 Id . at 253-260.

9 Id . at 261.11 Plaintiff then applied for le ave to appeal in this Cour t. We granted plaintiff’s application and directed the parties to addre ss whether (1) defendant’s decision to enroll the children in Howell Public Schools, which is 60 miles from their former school district and from plaintiff’s home, resulted in a change in the custodial environment; (2) the clear and convincing evidence stan dard or the preponderance of the evidence standard governed defendant’s bur den of proof; (3) defendant demons trated that the school change was in the children’s best interests; and (4 ) the children’s preference for Howell Public Schools was “reasonable.” 10
II. RELEVANCE OF STATUTOR Y BEST INTEREST FACTORS I agree that in child custody disputes wh ere the established custodial environment would not be modified, a trial court need not st ate its factual findings and conclusions regarding any statutory best interest factor th at is irrelevant to the specific important decision under review. Further, I agree that requi ring trial courts to evaluate best interest factors that are plainly irrelevant to a specifi c decision distracts from the overriding focus in any child custody dispute—namely, what is in the child’s best in terest. Consequently, I concur with the general approach set forth by the majority, but I emphasize that this approach is limited to those cases in wh ich the proposed important decision would not modify the child’s established custodial environment. 11

10 483 Mich 1135 (2009).

11 As the amicus curiae brief of the Fa mily Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan observes, if the established custodial environm ent would be modified by the proposed important decision, the trial court, as a practical matter, could be addressing a12 An established custodial environment exis ts “if over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidan ce, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). The Legislature has instructed courts to consider “[t]he age of the child, the physical environment, and the inclination of the custodian and the child as to permanency of the relationship” in analyzing whether the custodian and child share an establis hed custodial environment. Id . In child custody disputes between parents, “the best interests of the child control.” MCL 722.25; see Ireland v Smith , 451 Mich 457, 466; 547 NW 2d 686 (1996) (“In all events, however, the best interests of [the child ], not of [the parents], are central.”). The Legislature has stated that the “sum total” of 12 factors provides the basis for courts to consider, evaluate, and determine whether an im portant decision is in “the best interests of the child.” MCL 722.23. 12 After carefully considering the whole situation, a trial

possible change in custody, which would necessi tate a full review of the child’s custodial placement pursuant to the best intere st factors listed in MCL 722.23.

12 Specifically, MCL 722.23 provides: As used in this act, “best interest s of the child” me ans the sum total of the following factors to be consider ed, evaluated, and determined by the court: (a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child. (b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or her religion or creed, if any. (c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, cl othing, medical care or other remedial care13 court may determine that certain factors are pl ainly irrelevant to the particular decision before the court. In such cases, a trial c ourt not only must state its factual findings and conclusions regarding each relevant best interest factor on the record, but it also must expressly state its conclusion regarding the i rrelevance of any remaining factors. See
Parent v Parent , 282 Mich App 152, 156-1 57; 762 NW2d 553 (2009). By distinguishing applicable and inapplicab le best interest fact ors in child custody disputes where the establishe d custodial environment would not be modified, a trial court can create a sufficient record fo r meaningful appellate review while focusing its analysis recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs. (d) The length of time the child ha s lived in a stab le, satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity. (e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes. (f) The moral fitness of the parties involved. (g) The mental and physical he alth of the parties involved. (h) The home, school, and community record of the child. (i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference. (j) The willingness and ab ility of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and co ntinuing parent-child re lationship between the child and the other parent or the child and the parents. (k) Domestic violence, regardle ss of whether the violence was directed against or witnessed by the child. ( l ) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute.14 on the important decision at i ssue and how that decision will affect the welfare of the child. Accordingly, I concur with th is aspect of the majority opinion.
III. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVID ENCE STANDARD AS APPLIED Although I agree with the majority about the threshold applic ability determination of the statutory best interest factors wher e the established custodial environment would

not be modified, I disagree that the childre n’s established custodial environment with plaintiff would not be modified under these fact s. The trial court properly found that the proposed school change from Grosse Pointe to Howell would modify the children’s established custodial envi ronment with plaintiff. 13 After scrutinizing this voluminous record, I conclude that plaintiff father wa s far more than a “weekend parent” and that defendant’s unilateral decision to enroll the children in a new school district approximately 60 miles from their lifelong sc hool district and home would modify the established custodial environment that the children share with plaintiff. 14 The evidence

13 I commend the trial court for doing an exemplary job in presiding over the convoluted evidentiary hearing before it.

14 The majority seems to view the 60-mile distance between Howell and Grosse Pointe, which is less than 100 miles, as a pres umptive basis to contravene the trial court’s factual finding that the children’s established custodial environment with plaintiff would be modified. The 60-mile distance itself did not preclude the trial court from finding that the children had an established custodial envi ronment with both pare nts and that enrolling the children in Howell Public Schools wo uld modify the established custodial environment with plaintiff. Mo reover, contrary to the Court of Appeals, I do not read MCL 722.31(1) as imp licitly providing that “a custodial parent may move a child’s residence by less than 100 miles without first obtai ning permission from the court or consent from the other party.” Pierron , 282 Mich App at 245. Instead, the explicit statutory language is the best means to asce rtain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. MCL 722.31(1) provides in part th at “a parent of a child whose custody is15 did not clearly preponderate ag ainst the trial court’s findings, and the Court of Appeals’ application of the great weight of the ev idence standard constituted error requiring reversal. Consequently, I dissent from the majority’s endorsement of the Court of Appeals’ opinion in this regard. MCL 722.28 enumerates the three relevant standards of review in child custody

cases. 15 “Findings of fact are to be review ed under the ‘great weight’ standard, discretionary rulings are to be reviewed for ‘abuse of discretion,’ an d questions of law for ‘clear legal error.’” Fletcher v Fletcher , 447 Mich 871, 877; 526 NW2d 889 (1994). Under the great weight of the evidence sta ndard, “a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment on questions of fact unless they ‘clearly preponderate in the opposite
governed by court order shall not change a legal residence of th e child to a location that is more than 100 miles from the child’s legal residence at the time of the commencement of the action in which the order is issued.” Th e Legislature has demonstrated its ability to include specific statutory presumptions in the Child Custody Act. See, e.g., MCL 722.27a(1) (“It is presumed to be in the best interests of a child for the child to have a strong relationship with both of his or her parents.”). Ho wever, the Legislature did not draft a presumption in MCL 722.31(1) that when parents share jo int legal custody, a relocating parent’s unilateral decision to move a child’s legal residence less than 100 miles is presumed not to modi fy the child’s established cust odial environment with his or her other parent. C onsequently, I cannot c onclude that the distance itself creates a presumption that a change in legal residenc e of less than 100 miles will not modify to whom the children look “for gui dance, discipline, the necess ities of life, and parental comfort.” MCL 722.27(1)(c).

15 MCL 722.28 provides: To expedite the resolution of a child custody dispute by prompt and final adjudication, all orders and judgm ents of the circuit court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judg e made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue.16 direction.’” Id . at 878, quoting Murchie v Std Oil Co , 355 Mich 550, 558; 94 NW2d 799 (1959). Moreover, a re viewing court should defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations. Berger v Berger , 277 Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). As Fletcher states, “[t]he great weight standard of review allows [for] a meaningful yet deferential review . . . .” Fletcher , 447 Mich at 878. After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded th at defendant’s proposal to enroll the children in Howell Public Schools, approximatel y 60 miles away from their current school district and plaintiff’s home in Grosse Po inte Woods, would affect the existing parenting time schedule and modi fy the children’s es tablished custodial environment. The trial court found that if the children were enro lled in Howell Public Schools, overnight visits on we eknights and first option paren ting time for plaintiff would no longer be practical. 16 Further, the trial court conclude d that the childre n’s established custodial environment with pl aintiff was one “of flexibility and continued involvement” and that the testimony established that plain tiff “was involved on a continuing basis with [the] children’s education.” The trial court cited testimony establishing that plaintiff “visited the schools regularly, took the childr en to lunch on occas ions, picked them up

16 The majority acknowledges that a review of the record reveals “some testimony indicating that the children occasionally stayed overnight with plaintiff on some school nights” after the instant action was filed, but the majority presumes that these weeknight overnight visits only occurre d “to reduce the amount of time that the children spent traveling between Howell and Gr osse Pointe Woods.” Nothing in the record supports this statement. In light of the majority’s concession that so me weeknight overnight visits were occurring, I am perplexed by the majority’s related conc lusion that “it was error for the trial court to consider the provision allowing weeknight, overnight visits without also considering that these vi sits were not occurring.”17 from tutoring, and saw them regularly despite the absence of a specific parenting time schedule.” The majority cites Brown v Loveman , 260 Mich App 576, 595; 680 NW2d 432 (2004), for the proposition that “[i]f the require d parenting time adjustments will not change who the child naturally looks to for guidance, discip line, the necessities of life, and parental comfort, then the established cu stodial environment will not have changed.” Ironically, Brown concluded that the modification in parenting time in that case “necessarily would amount to a change in the established custodial environment, requiring analysis under the best interest factor framework.” Id. at 596. Other Court of Appeals decisions have cited Brown for the proposition that if a proposed move would relegate an “equally active” parent to the mo re circumscribed role of “weekend” parent, the parenting time modification would amount to a change in the established custodial environment. See Powery v Wells , 278 Mich App 526, 528; 752 NW2d 47 (2008). Such reasoning is equally instructive here because the proposed school ch ange would alter the extent to which the children l ook to plaintiff “for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). The majority also describe s the Court of Appeals as concluding that the trial court’s finding was against the great weight of the evidence because “the distance of the new schools from plaintiff’s home would only require rela tively minor adjustments to plaintiff’s parenting time.” I am mystified by this holding on the record before us. Plaintiff testified in great detail about the modifications to his parenting time and the established custodial environm ent that would result from the proposed school change.18 Defendant failed to squarely re but plaintiff’s testimony in this regard. Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ view, the salient issue is the impact of the prop osed school change on plaintiff’s ongoing involvement with the ch ildren’s educational and everyday lives, not the distance between the school districts. See note 1 of this opinion. I find no basis to conclude that the trial court’ s finding was against the great weight of the evidence. Instead, ample evidence supported the trial cour t’s finding that the children’s established custodial environment would be modified if the proposed school change occurred. To illustrate, without discussing contra dictory evidence, the Court of Appeals summarily concluded, “[t]he mere 60-mile distance betwee n Howell and Grosse Pointe Woods would not be a substantial barrier to plaintiff's continued pa renting time, and the mere change of school district s would not necessarily alter or materially reduce plaintiff's opportunity to exercise visita tion with the minor children.” 17 The trial court, however, heard testimony about myriad ways in whic h the proposed school ch ange would modify the children’s established custod ial environment. I concur with the trial court’s finding that the distance factor woul d impinge on plaintiff’s ab ility to provide educational guidance and discipline for the children. Plaintiff, for example, testified in grea t detail about the proposed school change hindering his ability to see th e children flexibly during and after school on weekdays. While the children attended Gros se Pointe Public Schools, pl aintiff could take them to breakfast before school or to lunch during school depending on his work schedule.

17 Pierron , 282 Mich App at 250.19 Plaintiff routinely took the children out to dinner on Thursdays after he picked them up from tutoring. Further, plain tiff personally worked with the children on their weeknight homework assignments. At one point, plaintiff created a spec ial weekly science tutoring session for Andrew during which Andrew and plaintiff did science projects in plaintiff’s basement. Plaintiff also described instance s where he had been ab le to attend daytime school functions. For example, a graduati on ceremony for Andrew was scheduled during plaintiff’s regular workday. Because the sc hool was near the office where plaintiff’s radiology group practiced, he was able to atte nd. The move to Howell would impede this midday and weeknight availability . Additionally, plaintiff tes tified that his concern about remaining involved in his children’s daily lives led him to explore relocating to Howell and finding employment closer to the children, but his multiple sclerosis limited his ability to find a comparable position elsewhere. 18 Although plaintiff stated that he had not taken a sick day in 10 year s, plaintiff admitted that, beca use of his multiple sclerosis, he needed to use a wheelchair during a recent vacation with the child ren. The testimony about plaintiff’s efforts to re locate and his multiple sclerosi s further supports the trial court’s finding that the children’s establishe d custodial environment with plaintiff would be modified by the proposed school change. Further, defendant testified that she listed plaintiff as an emergency contact on forms filed with the Howell Pub lic Schools. Yet, defendant listed plaintiff as the third

18 Plaintiff was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in 1993.20 emergency contact after defendant and two other individuals. 19 In contrast, during the evidentiary hearing, both pl aintiff and defendant immediat ely responded when Andrew truanted from school in Grosse Pointe. De fendant testified that it took about 90 minutes to travel from Grosse Pointe to Howell in rush hour traffic. When asked whether plaintiff would have problems being involved with th e children’s education in Howell, defendant responded no. She suggested that plaintiff k eep in touch over the computer or telephone. The evidence establishing plaintiff’s ongoing personal involvement with the children and their education in Grosse Pointe belies defe ndant’s suggestion. This testimony also supports the trial court’s finding that the proposed school change would modify the children’s established custodia l environment with plaintiff. Additionally, the record reveals defe ndant’s troubling lack of personal responsibility for and interest in the childr en’s education. Defendant, for example, professed that she did not need to atte nd Andrew and Madeline’s parent-teacher conferences because she had a ttended conferences with her older son Ian. By contrast, plaintiff regularly attended parent-teacher conferences and was known by the school staff. Defendant also admitte d that she received a letter from the school district when Madeline had amassed 27 tardy reports at sc hool while living in her home. Although defendant stated that she ha d resolved the problem by taking away Madeline’s computer

19 On the same form, defendant identified herself as the children’s legal guardian, but she failed to mark either yes or no to identify plaintiff as the children’s other legal guardian.21 time, Madeline nevertheless went on to accrue a total of 72 tardy re ports for the school year, which is remarkable since the average school year is about 180 days. Andrew had a similar problem, accumula ting numerous reports of tardiness and absences. In one school year alone, Andr ew amassed 90 absences from class and 28 tardy reports. Plaintiff described an instan ce where he came to pick up Madeline from school only to be told by Madeline’s teacher that Madeline had not a ttended at all. When plaintiff called defendant, he spoke to Andrew . Andrew informed plaintiff that he had overslept in the morning, and, as a result, Andrew failed to wake defendant and Madeline so that the children could make it to school th at day. The record reflects that Andrew, and not defendant, was responsible for the ch ildren’s morning routine. These incidents reflect defendant’s persistent inattentiveness to her children’s educational needs and the crucial role played by plainti ff in the children’s daily lives. After defendant forced plaintiff to obta in a court order to arrange academic tutoring for Andrew, plainti ff sought the services of Deb Dixon on the basis of the recommendation of Andrew’s teacher. Dix on testified that she had 11 years of experience working as an academ ic tutor with more than 150 students, in addition to her previous career experience as a German teac her and guidance counselor at a local high school. She confirmed that plaintiff paid fo r the twice-weekly tuto ring sessions, first to help Andrew with reading and later to help Madeline with reading and phonics. Moreover, Dixon testified that plaintiff would consistently inquire about the children’s academic progress when he transported the ch ildren to and from tutoring, even calling Dixon periodically for updates. In contrast, defendant did not regularly speak to Dixon.22 Oftentimes, Dixon woul d go out to plaintiff’s vehicle to tell plaintiff how the children had done. According to Dixon , defendant canceled tutoring sessions and did not display the amount of concern about Madeline’s read ing progress that one would expect of a parent. Defendant also sugges ted that her 18-year-old son Ian would be an appropriate math tutor for Andrew, even though Ian graduated from high school with a 1.8 grade point average and was not permitted to attend his high school commencement. Perplexingly, defendant also testified that “Ian is lazy, and he’s pa id for it by going to community college instead of th e college of his choice where his friends went.” Viewed together, the evidence regarding defendant’ s demonstrable irresponsibility and lack of interest in the children’s education not only illustrates the importance of keeping plaintiff actively involved in the children’s education, but it also bolsters the trial court’s conclusion that the proposed school cha nge would modify the children’s established custodial environment. The record supports the trial court’s findi ng that the children had an established custodial environment “of flexibility and contin ued involvement” with plaintiff and that the proposed school change would modify that environm ent. From the children’s perspective, their established custodial envir onment would be modified if they enrolled in Howell Public Schools. As a practical matter, pl aintiff would be relegated to the role of “weekend parent.” Plaintiff specifically te stified about the importance of the children needing two parents, stating that if defe ndant enrolled the child ren in Howell Public Schools, “it will truly be a single parent rais ing the kids.” Although the Court of Appeals attempted to minimize the impact of the proposed school change on the children’s23 established custodial environm ent with plaintiff, the Court of Appeals cited no evidence that clearly preponderated against the trial court’s finding. Because the trial court’s finding was not against the great we ight of the evidence, I dissent.
IV. CONCLUSION I concur in the principle that if a proposed change would not modify the established custodial environment, the tr ial court not only must determine the applicability of all 12 best inte rest factors, but it also must address each factor that is relevant to the specific issue before the cour t. With regard to this case, however, I conclude that the trial court’s finding that the proposed school change would modify the children’s established custodial environment with plaintiff did not violate the great weight of the evidence standard. Accordingl y, I would reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstate the trial court’s order di recting that the childre n remain enrolled in Grosse Pointe Public Schools.

Maura D. Corrigan