Filed 9/18/24

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re J.S., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

2d Juv. No. B336233

(Super. Ct. No. 2019028014)

(Ventura County)

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.S.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

The Court of Appeal does not reweigh evidence on appeal. 

The Court of Appeal does not substitute its discretion for that of 

the trial court on appeal. In an amended, 18-count petition filed 

pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, the 

People alleged that J.S. committed murder (Pen. Code, § 187), as 

well as 17 other serious felony offenses.1 (See pp. 2-3, post.)

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise stated. 
2

After a hearing, the juvenile court ordered appellant transferred

to adult criminal court. (§ 707, subd. (a).) Appellant contends 

the order is not supported by substantial evidence, and the 

juvenile court abused its discretion by misapplying the statutory 

requirements. These contentions are, in essence, an invitation to 

retry and reweigh the evidence and “second guess” the trial 

court’s sound discretion. We affirm.

Factual Predicate

In 2018 and 2019, appellant engaged in a series of crimes. 

He was 16 years old when some of the offenses occurred and 17 

when others occurred. Appellant committed seven “street

robberies” in which he and his cohorts approached random

individuals and demanded their cell phones, jewelry, and cash. 

In April and June 2019, he committed a burglary at an

apartment leasing office and a house. In June 2019, he 

attempted to rob Charles Barber. When Barber resisted, 

appellant struck him several times and stabbed him in the head

with a knife, killing him. Two days after the murder, appellant

drugged a 14-year-old girl in a motel, sexually assaulted her with 

another male, and filmed himself having sex with the girl while 

she was unconscious.

Section 602 Petition 

In a fourth amended petition, the People charged appellant 

with violations of the Penal Code, including: murder (§ 187, subd. 

(a)(1), count 1), with the special allegation that he personally 

used a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)); second degree robbery (§ 211, 

counts 2-5), with special allegations that he personally inflicted 

great bodily injury (§ 12022.7) as to count 3, and personally used 

a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) as to count 4; rape and other crimes 

against a single victim (§§ 261, subds. (a)(3), (a)(4), 289, subds. 
3

(d), (e), 287, subds. (f), (i), 286, subds. (f), (i), counts 6-13); first 

degree residential burglary (§ 459, counts 14 and 18); and second 

degree robbery (§ 211, counts 15-17), with the special allegation 

that appellant personally used a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) as to 

count 15. 

The People filed a motion to transfer appellant to adult 

criminal court. The probation department filed a report in 

support of transfer. After extensive briefing, the juvenile court 

conducted the transfer hearing. 

Appellant’s Family and Social History

Appellant’s mother was the victim of prolonged domestic 

abuse by appellant’s father, including while she was pregnant 

with appellant. When appellant was five years old, his mother 

left his father. When appellant was 13 years old, his mother 

became pregnant by another man, who moved into the family 

home. Over the next several years, Child Protective Services 

investigated reports of physical abuse and neglect. The family 

experienced food insecurity and homelessness at one point.

When appellant was 15 years old, he began visiting his 

paternal family. His mother noticed he was more distant after 

the visits. Around the same time, appellant began experimenting 

with Xanax, alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine and developed an 

addiction to Xanax.

Appellant’s Conduct in Custody

Appellant has been detained at the juvenile detention 

center since August 2019. Since that time, he has received two 

major incident reports for fighting and possession of contraband. 

He has also received 69 minor incident reports as of April 2021. 

In September 2023, appellant was involved in a physical

fight in the juvenile detention center. Probation Officer Clemente 
4

Andrade intervened and separated appellant from the other 

individual. 

Appellant participated in social and rehabilitation 

programming and graduated from high school with his diploma. 

He also participated in the Providence Scholars program, which 

allowed him to enroll in college courses. Additionally, appellant 

received mental health treatment and therapy.

Expert Testimony

Dr. Blake Carmichael, a clinical psychologist retained by 

the People, opined that it would be “very difficult” for appellant to 

be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s 

jurisdiction. He identified several “risk factors” to appellant’s 

rehabilitation. These included appellant’s drug use while in 

custody, likely risk for violent recidivism, gang involvement, and 

his consistent pattern of rule violations during his detention. Dr. 

Carmichael also testified that he did not see any evidence that 

appellant’s crimes were triggered by prior trauma. He opined it 

was “possible” but not “probable” that appellant could be 

rehabilitated prior to age 25.

Probation Officer Vredenburgh, testified about the 

rehabilitative programming available to juveniles through the 

SYTF, including: Moral Reconation Therapy, Dialectic Behavioral 

Therapy, Youth Mentor Counseling, Interactive Journaling 

Workbooks, Healthy Lifestyles, Word on the Street, Poetry, 

Tablet programs on Master Plan Work and Money Essentials, 

Visual Arts and Mural, Music in Society, Substance Treatment 

Services, Youth Sex Offender Treatment, Anger Management, 

Passport to Manhood, Money Matters, Alpha Leadership, and 

Behavioral Health. 
5

Probation Officer Andrade testified about the incident that 

occurred in September 2023 while the transfer hearing 

proceedings were pending. Appellant and two other minors 

approached A.A. as he played soccer in the yard. Appellant said 

to A.A., “‘I heard you regulate this unit’.” Officer Andrade viewed 

this as a challenge to exert authority. When A.A. tried to put his 

arm around appellant, appellant pushed him away and said, 

“[Y]ou’re a bitch.” Officer Andrade intervened as appellant 

shouted obscenities at A.A., gave the command to “take it down” 

multiple times, and had to deploy his olserium capsicum (OC)

spray before appellant fully complied.

Doug Ugarkovich, a juvenile justice consultant, testified on 

behalf of appellant. He opined that appellant was amenable to 

rehabilitation in the 47 months remaining until the expiration of 

the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. 

Dr. Stephanie Marcy, a clinical psychologist, interviewed 

appellant and reviewed reports. She also examined appellant

using the Million Clinical Multiaxial Inventory and Adverse 

Childhood Experience checklist. Dr. Marcy testified the test 

results showed appellant was responding positively to the 

therapeutic interventions he had received while in programming. 

Dr. Marcy opined there was a “very strong potential” for 

appellant to continue to rehabilitate over the next four years. On 

cross-examination, Dr. Marcy acknowledged that planning ahead 

to commit a crime would be a sign of criminal sophistication. 

The Juvenile Court’s Order

In March 2024, the juvenile court issued its ruling, finding 

that the People had met their burden on four of the five transfer

criteria. In its ruling, the juvenile court found, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that appellant was not amenable to 
6

rehabilitation while under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and 

ordered the matter transferred to adult criminal court.2

Discussion

We review the juvenile court’s determination to transfer a 

minor to criminal court for abuse of discretion. (J.N. v. Superior 

Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 714 (J.N.); In re Miguel R.

(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 165 (Miguel R.).) “The court’s factual 

findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and its legal 

conclusions are reviewed de novo. [Citation.] A decision based on 

insufficient evidence or the court’s ‘“erroneous understanding of 

applicable law”’ is subject to reversal. [Citation.]” (Kevin P. v. 

Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 187.) But, as 

indicated, we do not reweigh the evidence and we do not 

substitute our discretion for the discretion exercised by the trial

court. The rules attendant to these standards were explained in 

detail by this court in Estate of Gilkison (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th

1443, 1448-1449, citing inter alia Brown v. Newby (1940) 39 

Cal.App.2d 615, 618.

Our opinion “. . . is not a controversial tract, much less a 

brief in reply to the counsel against whose views we decide.” 

(Holmes v. Rogers (1859) 13 Cal. 191, 202.) Thus, we do not view 

the trial court’s contemporaneous remarks, which appellant 

seizes upon, as impeaching its ruling. (E.g., People v. Gibson

(1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 841, 853.) It is not determinative that the 

trial court mistakenly said that the case originated in the 

criminal court. (See also Davey v. Southern Pacific Co. (1897) 116 

Cal. 325, 329.)

2 The juvenile court found that the People had not carried 

their burden as to “previous juvenile court attempts to 

rehabilitate.” (See discussion, at pp. 11-12, post.)
7

The ultimate question for the juvenile court in a transfer 

petition is whether a minor is amenable to rehabilitation before

the juvenile court’s jurisdiction expires. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3); In re 

E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416.) To order a minor’s transfer 

to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the juvenile court must “find by 

clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to 

rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” 

(§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) 

In making that determination, the juvenile court must 

consider five specific factors: (1) “[t]he degree of criminal 

sophistication exhibited by the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i)); 

(2) “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the 

expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction” (id., subd. 

(a)(3)(B)(i)); (3) “[t]he minor’s previous delinquent history” (id., 

subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)); (4) “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the 

juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor” (id., subd. (a)(3)(D)(i)); 

and (5) “[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in 

the petition to have been committed by the minor” (id., subd. 

(a)(3)(E)(i)). 

The statute also sets forth a nonexhaustive list of relevant 

factors for the juvenile court to consider with respect to each of 

the five criteria. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), 

(E)(ii).) If the juvenile court orders a transfer to criminal court, it 

must “recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon 

the minutes, which shall include the reasons supporting the 

court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation 

while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Id., subd. 

(a)(3).)

Sufficiency of the Evidence/Abuse of Discretion

Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion 

in ordering him transferred to the superior court because the 
8

prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to prove he was 

not amenable to rehabilitation prior to the expiration of the 

juvenile court’s jurisdiction. He contends Dr. Carmichael’s 

opinion that “it was possible, but not probable” he could be 

rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s 

jurisdiction, is not “clear and convincing” evidence. This is 

especially so, appellant contends, given that two defense experts

testified he could be timely rehabilitated, and he had been 

participating in his programming at the “‘Excellent Level.’” But 

the juvenile court was not required to credit the testimony of the 

defense experts. As trier of fact, it was free to discredit such 

testimony. Phrased otherwise, any trial court is not bound by an 

expert’s testimony and opinion. (See People v. Johnson (1992) 3 

Cal.4th 1183, 1231-1232; People v. Engstrom (2011) 201 

Cal.App.4th 174, 187.)

A juvenile court can retain jurisdiction over a minor as 

described in section 602 for the offense of murder until he or she 

attains 25 years of age, or upon the expiration of a two-year 

period of control, whichever occurs later. (§§ 607, subd. (c), 1769, 

subd. (b).) In determining whether the minor can be 

rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s 

jurisdiction, “the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant 

factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow 

and mature.” (§ 707, subd. (A)(3)(B)(ii).) “Expert witnesses may 

testify on the issue of the availability of treatment programs in 

the juvenile court system and the amenability of the minor to 

those programs.” (J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 721.) 

Here, the juvenile court concluded “there is not enough 

time for the Minor to rehabilitate.” In so concluding, the juvenile 

court considered all of the evidence presented, including expert 
9

testimony. In its written ruling, the juvenile court expressly 

noted, “[t]he serious nature of the charged crimes – murder, 

sexual assault, robbery and burglary, and the Minor’s conduct 

before and after incarceration clearly indicate his needs are 

complex and require prolonged treatment and supervision beyond 

what the juvenile court[‘s] jurisdiction can offer.” 

This is consistent with Dr. Carmichael’s conclusion that it 

would be “very difficult” and “unlikely” that appellant could 

achieve rehabilitation prior to age 25. Indeed, Dr. Carmichael 

explained he would have anticipated seeing “a greater trajectory 

towards progress.”

Application of Section 707 Transfer Criteria

Appellant next contends the juvenile court did not properly 

apply the section 707 transfer criteria. As we have indicated, we 

need not reply to these “sub-arguments.” (See ante, p. 7.) But, 

we elect to treat with two of them, sophistication and previous 

history. Appellant contends the factors the juvenile court 

considered as to criminal sophistication and previous delinquent

history were insufficient to justify transfer under the heightened 

clear and convincing evidence standard.

When evaluating the degree of criminal sophistication 

exhibited by the minor, section 707 requires the juvenile court to

“give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, 

the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, 

mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; 

the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and 

consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or 

peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s 

family and community environment; the existence of childhood 

trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster 
10

care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human 

trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor’s 

criminal sophistication.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) 

Appellant contends he presented “significant evidence” of 

these factors, including evidence of childhood trauma and 

favorable evidence of his therapeutic growth while in custody. 

According to appellant, the juvenile court did not acknowledge 

this evidence.

But the juvenile court expressly stated in its written ruling 

that it had considered “the arguments of counsel, the reports and 

exhibits admitted into evidence, and the testimony of all 

witnesses,” which necessarily included evidence of appellant’s 

social, emotional, and intellectual history.

After considering all of the evidence, the juvenile court 

opined that appellant’s charged conduct involved violence and

had progressed from robbery to robbery with a knife to murder 

with a knife. The crimes were not spontaneous or impulsive but 

were indicative of deliberation. The victims were vulnerable, 

elderly, or minor victims. There was little to no indication 

appellant suffered from any intellectual deficits. While in 

custody, he was able to finish high school and had taken college 

level courses. During an interview with law enforcement, 

appellant was “evasive,” and denied any involvement in the 

murder but later discussed attempts to conceal evidence.

Indeed, even appellant’s expert witness, Dr. Marcy, 

acknowledged that planning ahead to commit a crime would be 

indicative of criminal sophistication. 

When evaluating the minor’s previous delinquent history, 

section 707 requires the juvenile court to “give weight to any 

relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of 
11

the minor’s previous delinquent history and the effect of the 

minor’s family and community environment and childhood 

trauma on the minor’s previous delinquent behavior.” (Id., subd. 

(a)(3)(C)(ii).) 

As to this criterion, the juvenile court recounted appellant’s

previous contact with law enforcement, including bringing a knife 

to school, trespassing, robbery, theft, and failing to fulfill the 

terms of his probation. The juvenile court also noted appellant’s 

“significant school delinquency” history starting in the seventh 

grade, including poor behavior, suspensions, and multiple 

attempts by school officials to rehabilitate appellant. This

previous delinquent history supported transfer to adult court. 

(Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) 

Disposition

The juvenile court’s order transferring this matter to the 

superior court is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.
Gilbert A. Romero, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Claudia Y. Bautista, Public Defender, Thomas Hartnett, 

Snr. Deputy Public Defender, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Chung L. Mar, David E. Madeo, and 

David Glassman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.