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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

 

UNPUBLISHED 

In re BALLI, Minors. June 15, 2017 

No. 336103 

St. Joseph Circuit Court 

 Family Division 

LC No. 2016-000069-NA 

 

Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and BOONSTRA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Respondent appeals as of right the circuit court’s October 14, 2016 order terminating his 

parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). We affirm.1

 “A court may terminate a respondent’s parental rights if one or more of the statutory 

grounds for termination listed in MCL 712A.19b(3) have been proven by clear and convincing 

evidence.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). In this case, 

the trial court found that petitioner proved MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) by clear and convincing 

evidence. That statutory ground provides that a circuit court may terminate a parent’s parental 

rights if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that “[t]he parent, without regard to intent, 

fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that 

the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering 

the child’s age.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). The burden of proving this statutory ground is on the 

petitioner, and we review a circuit court’s decision as to whether that burden was satisfied for 

clear error. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 40. “A trial court’s decision is clearly 

erroneous ‘[i]f although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence 

is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’ ” Id. at 41, quoting In 

re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989) (alterations by the In re Olive/Metts Minors 

Court). 

 

1

 At the outset, we reject respondent’s argument that the guardian ad litem’s representation of the 

children in this matter constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. As he recognizes, this Court 

has previously held that a parent does not have standing to raise such an argument on behalf of 

the children, In re EP, 234 Mich App 582, 597-598; 595 NW2d 167 (1999), overruled on other 

grounds by In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 353; 612 NW2d 407 (2000), and we are bound by 

that decision, MCR 7.215(J)(1). 
-2- 

 In this case, respondent argues that petitioner did not prove MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) by 

clear and convincing evidence. We disagree. The children were removed from respondent’s 

care based on allegations that he had sexually assaulted a 13-year-old girl in the presence of at 

least one of his children. Respondent was arrested, and a subsequent search of respondent’s 

home resulted in the recovery of a hard drive that contained hundreds of videos and images 

containing child pornography. According to a police officer, some of the videos and images 

included adults engaging in sexual acts with children as young as approximately two years old.2 

Defendant was charged with numerous felonies related to the sexual assault and what was found 

on the hard drive, eventually pled guilty to several counts of possession child sexually abusive 

material, MCL 750.145c(4), and was sentenced to multiple years in prison. According to the 

children’s therapists, each child was diagnosed with adjustment disorder and anxiety as a result 

of respondent’s actions and incarceration. Both therapists opined that both children suffered 

emotionally and mentally as a result of respondent’s actions and incarceration, that both 

children’s well-being had significantly improved since they were removed from his care, that it 

was likely that the children would regress in the event that they were returned to respondent’s 

care, and that both children needed permanency at this point in their lives. We agree with the 

circuit court that this evidence reflects that respondent failed to provide proper care and custody 

for the children and that there was no reasonable expectation that he would be able to do so 

within a reasonable time considering the child’s age. Therefore, the circuit court’s conclusion 

with respect to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) was not clearly erroneous.3

 “Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that 

termination is in the child[ren]’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” In re 

Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 40; see also MCL 712A.19b(5). “In deciding whether 

termination is in the child’s best interests, the court may consider the child’s bond to the parent, 

the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the 

advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” Id. at 41-42 (citations omitted). 

Additionally, “the fact that a child is living with relatives when the case proceeds to termination 

is a factor to be considered in determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests.” 

Id. at 43, citing In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 164; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). “A trial court’s failure 

to explicitly address whether termination is appropriate in light of the children’s placement with 

relatives renders the factual record inadequate to make a best-interest determination and requires 

reversal.” Id., citing Mason, 486 Mich at 163-165; In re Mays, 490 Mich 993, 994; 807 NW2d 

307 (2012). 

 

2

 Additionally, the children’s biological mother testified that she had previously contacted law 

enforcement based on concerns about respondent frequently viewing child pornography as well 

as contacting minor children for inappropriate reasons on the internet. According to the mother, 

she observed respondent viewing child pornography as early as 2003. It does not appear that 

anything ever came of the mother’s original contact with law enforcement; however, this 

information was also included in the petition in this matter. 

3

 In light of this conclusion, we need not address the circuit court’s conclusion with respect to 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). See In re Laster, 303 Mich App 485, 495; 845 NW2d 540 (2013). 
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 In this case, respondent argues that reversal is required because the circuit court did not 

explicitly consider the fact that the children were placed in relative placement when analyzing 

the children’s best interests. We disagree. While it is true that the circuit court did not explicitly 

reference the fact that the children were placed with their biological mother when determining 

whether termination was in the children’s best interests, respondent’s argument fails to 

acknowledge this Court’s decision in In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 412-413; 890 NW2d 

676 (2016), where this Court held that a child’s biological mother is not a “relative” for purposes 

of MCL 712A.13a(1)(j).4

 We are bound by that decision. MCR 7.215(J)(1).5 Furthermore, 

while respondent does not challenge the circuit court’s best-interests determination on any other 

grounds, we would note that the record supports the circuit court’s determination for similar 

reasons as those discussed with respect to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Therefore, the circuit court’s 

conclusion with respect to the children’s best interests was not clearly erroneous. 

 

4

 This Court explained, in full, as follows: 

 Nevertheless, respondent argues that the trial court entirely failed to give 

any weight to [the child]’s placement with his biological mother. However, the 

trial court specifically acknowledged the “week on / week off custodial 

arrangement between the father and mother” in the process of determining that 

termination was in [the child]’s best interests. Moreover, MCL 712A.13a(1)(j) 

defines “relative,” and biological mother is not included in the definition. See 

MCL 712A.13a(1)(j). Therefore, because [the child]’s mother was not a 

“relative” for purposes of MCL 712A.19a, the trial court was not required to 

consider that relative placement. Respondent’s argument is misplaced. [In re 

Schadler, 315 Mich App at 412-413.] 

5

 We acknowledge that concluding that a child’s mother is not his or her relative is somewhat 

counterintuitive. However, such a conclusion does appear consistent with the plain and ordinary 

meaning of the statutory language at issue, which provides, in relevant part, as follows: 

“Relative” means an individual who is at least 18 years of age and related to the 

child by blood, marriage, or adoption, as grandparent, great-grandparent, greatgreat-grandparent, aunt or uncle, great-aunt or great-uncle, great-great-aunt or 

great-great-uncle, sibling, stepsibling, nephew or niece, first cousin or first cousin 

once removed, and the spouse of any of the above, even after the marriage has 

ended by death or divorce. A stepparent, ex-stepparent, or the parent who shares 

custody of a half-sibling shall be considered a relative for the purpose of 

placement. . . . [MCL 712A.13a(1)(j).] 

As our Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hen statutory language is as clear as it is here, it is 

outside our province to second-guess the Legislature . . . .” Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 

Mich 562, 579; 702 NW2d 539 (2005), quoting Lewis v DAIIE, 426 Mich 93, 107-108; 393 

NW2d 167 (1986). In any event, we are bound by In re Schadler, 315 Mich App at 412-413. 

MCR 7.215(J)(1). 
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 Affirmed. 

/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien 

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra