UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DAVID DIVIOIS RICHARDSON, 

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF WAYNE, a Municipal Corporation,

WAYNE COUNTY PAROLE OFFICER JOYCE

MAHANDI, individually, WAYNE COUNTY

DETECTIVE JACKIE LOVING, individually,

CITY OF ANGOLA, INDIANA, a Municipal

Corporation, CITY OF ANGOLA, INDIANA

SERGEANT TIMOTHY M. CROOKS,

individually, CITY OF ANGOLA POLICE CHIEF

JON W. PARRISH, in his Individual and Official

Capacity, STEUBEN COUNTY INDIANA, a

Municipal Corporation, STEUBEN COUNTY

SHERIFF RICHARD L. LEWIS, in his Individual

and Official Capacity, STEUBEN COUNTY

OFFICER D. HOSTETTER, individually, and

STEUBEN COUNTY OFFICER DALE MURRAY,

individually, 

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 08-14248

HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS CITY OF ANGOLA, 

 INDIANA, SERGEANT TIMOTHY M. CROOKS, AND CITY OF ANGOLA 

 POLICE CHIEF JON W. PARRISH’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK 

OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND DISMISSING AS MOOT 

 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR IMPROPER VENUE 

OR FOR TRANSFER OF VENUE

Pending before the Court are Defendants City of Angola, Indiana, Sergeant Timothy

M. Crooks, and City of Angola Police Chief Jon W. Parrish’s (hereinafter Angola

Defendants) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. No. 27) and Motion

to Dismiss for Improper Venue (Doc. No. 25). The Court heard oral argument on May 1,

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2009, and at the conclusion of the hearing, took these matters under advisement. For the

reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal

Jurisdiction and DISMISSES as moot Angola Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Improper

Venue or for Transfer of Venue.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In November 2006, Detective Sergeant Crooks, employed by the City of Angola

Police Department, was investigating several forged check crimes. See Angola’ Defs.’ Ex.

A. According to his Affidavit, in January 2007, the suspected forger fled a Meijer store in

Angola, Indiana, leaving behind a check and a driver’s license. Angola Defs.’ Ex. B.

Crooks discovered the driver’s license had been obtained with a birth certificate issued in

Detroit under the name David Diviois Richardson. Id. ¶ 4. Crooks conducted a Law

Enforcement Information Network (LEIN) check and learned that the individual identified

on the license was on probation in Michigan. Id. ¶ 6. He subsequently contacted

Defendant Mahandi, Richardson’s probation officer, and learned that Richardson had

absconded. Angola Defs.’ Ex. A. Crooks e-mailed Mahandi a copy of the driver’s license.

Id. ¶ 9. Mahandi confirmed the person pictured was Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 10. Thereafter, Crooks

determined that the same person involved in the January 2007 incident was involved in a

November 2006 incident. Id. He turned over his report and supporting documentation to

the Steuben County Prosecutor’s Office for review. Id. Ex. B at ¶ 12. On March 19, 2007,

an arrest warrant for Richardson was issued on charges of forgery and attempted forgery.

On July 5, 2007, Richardson was arrested on an unrelated probation violation in

Wayne County and incarcerated in the Wayne County Jail. Compl., ¶ 28. Wayne County

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Detective Jackie Loving discovered the outstanding felony warrant. After she verified that

Indiana law enforcement officials were willing to pick-up Plaintiff, Loving prepared and

submitted a formal extradition request to the Wayne County Prosecutor. Wayne Co. Defs.’

Exs. 4, 5. Although Plaintiff initially refused to waive his rights, after the Michigan court

authorized an extradition warrant, and Plaintiff was arraigned on the warrant, he waived his

right to a hearing, and signed the order of extradition. 

On September 11, 2007, Officer Hostetter of the Steuben County Sheriff’s

Department transported Richardson from Michigan to Indiana for incarceration in the

Steuben County Jail. Angola Defs.’ Ex. 5, Hostetter Aff., ¶ 3. Plaintiff was released on

March 20, 2008, after an investigation revealed that Plaintiff‘s brother committed the

offenses in Indiana. 

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed suit alleging, among other things, claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, against Crooks, the City of Angola and the Police Chief, as well as claims of gross

negligence, malicious prosecution, and false arrest and imprisonment against Crooks.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) challenges the sufficiency of the

jurisdictional facts regarding the existence of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. The

plaintiff has the burden of establishing the existence of personal jurisdiction. Chandler v.

Barclays Bank PLC, 898 F.2d 1148, 1151 (6th Cir. 1990). When a court decides whether

it has personal jurisdiction on the basis of written submissions alone, the plaintiff “may not

rest on his pleadings to answer the movant’s affidavits, but must set forth, by affidavit or

otherwise. . .specific facts showing that the court has jurisdiction.” Seras v. First

Tennessee Bank Intel Ass’n, 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1989). If a plaintiff’s pleadings

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and affidavits state the facts with sufficient particularity, a court must ignore contrary

assertions by a defendant. Id. at 1215. “Dismissal is proper only if all the specific facts

which the plaintiff. . .alleges collectively `fail to state a prima facie case for jurisdiction.”

Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991).

Because this Court is relying only on the pleadings and affidavits of the parties, the

plaintiff “need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction." Id. In the absence of an

evidentiary hearing, the “court will not consider facts proffered by the defendant that conflict

with those offered by the plaintiff." Id. The Court views the facts in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party. Seras, 875 F.2d at 1214.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Personal Jurisdiction

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not, by itself, confer nationwide service of process

or jurisdiction upon federal district courts to adjudicate claims, Rule 4(k)(1)(A) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure refers the court to the Michigan long-arm statute. Thus,

“[a] court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant is amenable to service

of process under the state’s long-arm statute, and if the exercise of personal jurisdiction

would not deny the defendant due process.” Michigan Coalition of Radioactive Material

Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 954 F.2d 1174, 1176 (6th Cir. 1992). 

Personal jurisdiction can be either general or specific, depending on the type of

minimum contacts. Third Nat’l Bank v. Wedge Group Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1089 (6th Cir.

1989). General jurisdiction depends on a showing that the defendant has continuous and

systematic contacts with the forum state sufficient to justify the state’s exercise of judicial

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The provision governing limited personal jurisdiction over corporations identifies

the same relationships. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.715.

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power with respect to any and all claims the plaintiff may have against the defendant. In

contrast, specific jurisdiction exposes the defendant to suit in the forum state only as to

those claims that “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s contact with the forum.

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984). 

1. General Jurisdiction

Plaintiff does not contend that general jurisdiction over these Defendants exists.

Therefore, the Court considers whether it may exercise specific jurisdiction as to each

Angola Defendant, given the facts of this case and claims asserted. 

2. Specific Jurisdiction

a. Long-arm statute

The Michigan long-arm statute specifies conditions under which Michigan courts

may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over nonresident individual defendants and

nonresident corporate defendants. Pursuant to applicable provisions, specific jurisdiction

exists when the plaintiff’s claim arises out of the defendant’s contact with the state. The

statute allows a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant who, among other

things, transacts “any business within” Michigan.1

 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.705(1). The

provision is interpreted broadly, and it includes even the “slightest” business contact. Sifers

v. Horen, 188 N.W.2d 623, 624 n.2 (Mich 1971). The statute also allows a court to assert

personal jurisdiction over a defendant and its agent who, among other things, does or

causes “an act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for

tort.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.705(2).

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In this case, the Court assumes for the purposes of analysis that Crooks transacted

business in Michigan and/or caused consequences to occur in Michigan resulting in an

action for tort. Although neither the City of Angola nor Parrish had contact with Michigan,

to the extent that Crooks acted as an agent for the City and Chief, the Court considers the

long-arm statute to be satisfied. Accordingly, the Court must next consider “whether the

exercise of limited personal jurisdiction violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Florists’ Transworld Delivery, Inc. v.

Fleurop-Interflora, No. 01-CV-70954, 2003 WL 21051089 (E.D. Mich. April 10, 2003) (citing

Michigan Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 954 F.2d 1174, 1176-

77 (6th Cir. 1992)).

b. Due Process 

 Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “[a] state court may

exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant so long as there exists

‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant and the forum State.” World-Wide Volkswagen

Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.

310 (1945)). “The proper focus for analyzing these contacts is whether they represent an

effort by the defendants to ‘purposefully avail [themselves] of the privilege of conducting

activities within Michigan, the forum state. If the defendant's activities create sufficient

minimum contacts, the court then considers “whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction

over the defendant offends ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ “ Id.

(quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)).

In the Sixth Circuit, such jurisdiction exists only when the following three conditions

are satisfied: “[f]irst, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting

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in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause of

action must arise from the defendant’s activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant

or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with

the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.”

Calphalon Corp. v. Rowlette, 228 F.3d 718, 721 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Southern Mach. Co.

v. Mohasco Indus., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968)). 

Because there has been no evidentiary hearing on the issue of personal jurisdiction,

the Court must limit its inquiry to whether Plaintiff has established a “prima facie showing

of jurisdiction.” CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996). The

Court must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all factual disputes in favor of

Plaintiff as the party invoking federal jurisdiction. See Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tryg

Int’l Ins. Co., 91 F.3d 790 (6th Cir. 1996). 

i. Purposeful availment

As to the first prong,“purposeful availment. . .is present where the defendant’s

contacts with the forum state ‘proximately result from actions by the defendant [itself] that

create a “substantial connection” with the forum State.’” Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen

Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 889 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). This purposeful availment requirement “ensures

that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’

‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts.” Calphalon, 228 F.3d at 722.

Here, Crooks contact with Michigan was limited in scope. He merely sought

confirmation that the individual on probation was the same person suspected of the forgery.

The contact also was limited in duration. It involved a phone call and e-mail. 

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Plaintiff relies on Onderik v. Morgan, 897 F.2d 204 (6th Cir. 1989), as support for the

exercise of jurisdiction over Angola Defendants. In Onderik, the appellate court affirmed

the lower court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant who only had telephone and

correspondence contact with Michigan. The facts of the case are distinguishable from the

facts in this case. 

In Onderik, the plaintiffs filed a wrongful termination suit naming two nonresidents

as defendants. The defendants had provided information to the plaintiffs’ employer, which

led to the plaintiffs’ termination. The information was relayed at a meeting in Michigan. Id.

at 208. Moreover, one of the defendants had conducted a Michigan-based investigation

by phone and by letter. The appellate court found the exercise of jurisdiction over these

nonresident defendants was proper. 

Onderik does not elevate the general proposition that telephone and

correspondence alone can be sufficient contact with the forum state to establish jurisdiction

to an immutable rule. The analysis turns on an examination of the facts of each case. One

case of telephone and correspondence as adequate contact with the forum state does not

necessarily mean the same result in all instances. In Onderik the telephone contact was

initiated to actively meddle in Michigan, the defendants had met in Michigan to discuss the

results of the investigation and issued an ultimatum that no further business would be given

to the plaintiffs’ employer if some action was not taken. Id. at 208. 

In contrast, in this case Crooks investigated a crime that occurred in Indiana, not

Michigan. The focus of his investigation involved store videotape, the legitimacy of the

check that the suspect sought to cash, and the driver’s license that was left behind by the

suspect. After he learned that the Indiana license was obtained with a Michigan birth

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certificate, he discovered that the suspect was on probation in Michigan. Crooks merely

used a Michigan contact to complete his investigation prior to submitting a criminal

complaint in Indiana. His Michigan contact was attenuated.

The Court is not persuaded to the contrary by Plaintiff’s reliance on the “effects test”

articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).

In Calder, a California entertainer brought a libel action against Florida residents who were

writers and editors of the National Enquirer, a Florida-based weekly newspaper with a

nationwide circulation. The Supreme Court held that California could assert jurisdiction

over the nonresident defendants because the defendants' intentional actions were aimed

at California, they knew the allegedly libelous articles “would have a potentially devastating

impact” on the plaintiff, and they knew the “brunt of the harm” would be suffered in

California. Based on those facts, the Supreme Court concluded the defendants could

“reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in California. 465 U.S. 783, 790 (quoting

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).

Calder is distinguishable for the same reason as Onderik. In this case, Crooks did

not aim his criminal investigation at Michigan. Moreover, the quality of Crooks’ contact

with Michigan does not support purposeful availment. Plaintiff was initially arrested in

Michigan for reasons unrelated to the Indiana investigation. Crooks caused a criminal

complaint and warrant to be issued for Plaintiff in Indiana. His contacts with Michigan

were fleeting and fortuitous. 

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ii. Does the cause of action arise out of Defendant’s

activities in Michigan?

The second prong, the requirement that the plaintiff’s cause of action arises from the

defendant’s activities in the forum state, should not be construed too strictly. If a

defendant’s contacts with Michigan are “related to the operative facts of the controversy,

then an action will be deemed to have ar[isen] from those contacts.” CompuServe, Inc. v.

Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1267 (6th Cir. 1996). In other words, so long as the cause of

action has “[a] substantial connection with defendant’s in-state activities,” it is not necessary

that it formally arise from defendant’s contacts with the forum. See Third Nat’l. Bank in

Nashville v. WEDGE Group, Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1091 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Mohasco,

401 F.2d at 384 n. 27).

Although the requirement is loose, here, the Court does not find that the requirement

is satisfied. The claims advanced against Crooks are not related to his contact with

Michigan. Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Federation, 23 F.2d 1110, 1119 (6th Cir. 1994)

(observing that an action does not rise from a defendant’s contacts with the forum state

when “they are unrelated to the operative facts of the controversy”) (citation omitted). The

claims against Angola Defendants are based on omissions in the Indiana investigation, and

incarceration in Indiana. Plaintiff has advanced claims against Michigan defendants for

claims occurring in Michigan. Although Plaintiff was innocent, and the forgery claim was

dismissed, his identification as the suspect turns on the Indiana driver’s license and store

videotape. 

The evidence, even viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, fails to

demonstrate that Crooks’ contact with Michigan is substantially related to the operative

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facts of the controversy. Richardson’s claims stem from his brother’s commission of a

crime in Indiana and his brother’s use of Plaintiff’s birth certificate to obtain a driver’s

license in Indiana. The claims against Crooks for gross negligence, deprivation of liberty

without due process, and unreasonable search and seizure, gross negligence, malicious

prosecution and false arrest and imprisonment, all arise out of Crooks’ investigation in

Indiana. The Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s contention that Crooks could have foreseen

being haled into court in Michigan for the blatant omissions in his police investigation. 

Accordingly, the second requirement is not satisfied.

iii. Reasonableness

Typically, if a plaintiff meets the first two prongs of the Constitutional test, an

inference arises that the third element has been met as well. See Bird v. Parsons, 289

F.3d 865, 875 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing CompuServe, Inc, 89 F.3d at 1268). To overcome this

inference, the defendant must present a “compelling case that the presence of some other

considerations render personal jurisdiction unreasonable.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.

The Court then must balance the “burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state,

and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of

California, 480 U.S. 102, 133 (1987). 

Here, the first two prongs of the test have not been satisfied, therefore, no inference

arises that the exercise of jurisdiction over Crooks would comport with traditional notions

of fair play and substantial justice. Although the Court is cognizant that the Sixth Circuit

has routinely upheld specific jurisdiction in cases where doing so forced the defendant to

travel to the forum state, see, e.g., Lanier v. Am. Bd. of Endodontics, supra, 843 F.2d at

911-12 (upholding jurisdiction in Michigan over Illinois defendant); Am. Greetings Corp. v.

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Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (6th Cir.1988) (allowing jurisdiction in Michigan over

California defendant), this is not a case where the exercise of jurisdiction comports with any

notion of fair play. An out-of-state telephone call placed by Crooks during the course of his

investigation to confirm a suspect’s identity was for the purpose of conducting business in

Indiana. In sum, the application of the three prong-analysis articulated by the Sixth Circuit,

compels a finding that Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie case for personal

jurisdiction as to Crooks, his employer, the City of Angola or his supervisor Chief Parrish.

B. Venue

Because the Court has determined that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Angola

Defendants, the motion to dismiss or transfer because of improper venue is moot.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES as moot, Defendants’

request for dismissal or transfer based on venue. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Marianne O. Battani 

MARIANNE O. BATTANI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Date: August 27, 2009

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A copy of this Opinion and Order was mailed and/or electronically filed to counsel of

record on this date.

s/Bernadette Thebolt 

Deputy Clerk

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