* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 96-11482

Summary Calendar

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

PAUL BURTON JONES,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(2:96-CR-23-2)

_________________________________________________________________ August 21, 1997

Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Paul Burton Jones appeal s his conviction and sentence for

conspiracy to transport, ship, receive, or distribute, by computer,

visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and for two counts of transporting

child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1). He

contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his

convictions on the substan tive counts; that the district court- 2 -

erred by admitting into evidence a photograph depicting a female

who had undergone an autopsy; and that the district court erred by

increasing his offense level for distribution of child pornography,

depictions portraying sadistic or masochistic conduct, and

obstruction of justice.

Jones’ challenge to the suffi ciency of the evidence fails

because the jury was entitled to reject the evidence supporting his

alibi defense. See United States v. Layne , 43 F.3d 127, 130 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied , 514 U.S. 1077 (1995).

Jones’ contention that admission of the autopsy depiction was

an abuse of discretion, because the Government did not prove that

the female depicted was a minor and that the depiction was not of

sexually explicit conduct, is without merit. Considering the

graphic nature of the numerous depictions of ch ildren engaged in

sexually explicit conduct, which were admitted into evidence, and

even assuming error, it was harmless. S ee United States v. Torres

,

114 F.3d 520, 525-26 (5th Cir. 1997).

The district co urt found that Jones exchanged child

pornography with others “with the hope of obtaining child

pornography himself in the process”. [5 R 66] Accordin gly, it

enhanced Jones’ offense level by five leve ls under U.S.S.G. §

2G2.2(b)(2), which provides that, “[i]f the offense involved

distribution, increase by the number of levels from the table in

§2F1.1 corresponding to the retail value of the material, but in no- 3 -

event by less than 5 levels.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(2). Jones

contends that the district court erred by applying the enhancement

because there was no evid ence of widespread distribution or

distribution for pecuniary gain.

Jones relies on the commentary, which provi des that

“‘[d]istribution,’ as used in this guideline, include s any act

related to distribution for pecuniary gain, including production,

transportation, and possession with intent to distribute.”

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, comment. (n.1). In United States v. Kimbrough

,

69 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied

,

___ U.S.

___, 116 S. Ct.

1547 (1996), our court affirmed a § 2G2.2(b)(2) enhancement where

the defendant had set up a bulletin board system designed to

distribute and receive child pornography, even though there was no

evidence that the defendant had engaged in commercial distribution.

Id

. at 734-35. And, in U nited States v. Canada

, 110 F.3d 260 (5th

Cir. 1997), our court affirmed an enhancement under § 2G2.2(b)(2),

where the purpose of the distribution was to entice a 13-year-old

into having sex with the defendant; but, we did not decide whether

distribution alone is enough to apply the enhancement or whether an

“additional element must be present”. Id . at 263 & n.4. We need

not d ecide that question in this case, either, because the

enhancement was not based on mere distribution. Jones’ distribution

of child por nography for the purpose of receiving other child- 4 -

pornography from the recipients is suff icient to trigger the

enhancement.

The district court did not clearly err by finding that a

depiction of a nude, blindfolded female, with bound legs, hanging

from the ceiling with handcuffs, was a depiction of a minor.

Accordingly, it d id not err by applying a four-level enhancement

under § 2G2.2(b)(3), for material portrayin g sadistic or

masochistic conduct.

Finally, the district court did not clearly err by enhancing

Jones’ offense level for obstruction of justice, under U.S.S.G. §

3C1.1, based on finding that Jones deleted pornographic depictions

from his computer after his co-defendant was arrested.

AFFIRMED