34460 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 128 / Tuesday, July 2, 1996 / Notices

event, (b) simulator alarms occur within 2–3

minutes of an SGTR event, contrary to control room

indications, (c) plant staff failed to fully respond to

assembly notification, (d) plant staff failed to

perform a formal evaluation of the safety

significance of an abnormal crack growth in the

Unit 2 SG.

28The licensee addressed the issues raised in the

AIT report by implementing the necessary

procedural changes and providing training. For

example, with regard to the AIT finding

(summarized by the Petitioners) regarding

differences between alarm response on the

simulator and in the control room, the staff’s safety

evaluation of August 19, 1993, stated that ‘‘the

simulator has been modified to more realistically

model the plant, particularly the response of the

radiation monitoring system to an SGTR.’’

29A letter from the NRC to Combustion

Engineering dated August 2, 1988, stated that,

‘‘pending NRC final review and approval, CE

facilities may base their plant-specific emergency

operating procedures on Revision 3 of CEN–152.

Should future NRC review reveal modifications to

Revision 3 to be necessary, CE facilities would be

expected to update their procedures to reflect the

identified changes. Schedules for such changes

should be based on perceived safety significance of

the changes.’’ The objective of the CEN–152 report

is to describe the CEOG emergency procedure

guidelines system. The report contains the

methodology used to develop and validate the

licensee’s emergency procedure guidelines and

information on the implementation of guidelines.

largely concern areas the staff reviewed

after the SGTR event on March 14, 1993.

Specifically, the Petitioners repeated

several of the procedural and operator

weaknesses that were described and

evaluated in the staff’s AIT report

(Inspection Report 50–529/93–14, dated

April 16, 1993).28 Specifically, the AIT

report stated that the use of a diagnostic

logic tree caused the operators to

misdiagnose the SGTR event twice and

subsequently enter a Functional

Recovery Procedure, contributing

substantially to the delay in isolating

the faulted steam generator. The staff

concluded in its safety evaluation of

August 19, 1993, that the licensee’s

modifications to the EOPs and the

subsequent operator training provide

sufficient enhancement for both

diagnosis and mitigation of various

SGTR scenarios.

Additionally, the licensee recently

revised its EOPs to make them

consistent with Combustion Engineering

Owners Group (CEOG) guidance (CEN

0152, Rev. 3 29). NRC Inspection Report

50–528/50–529/50–530/95–12, dated

July 27, 1995, documents the staff’s

observations on the ‘‘high intensity

team’’ training conducted for each crew

in preparation for implementing the

EOPs. In the inspection report, the staff

stated that the EOPs enhanced crew

performance and allowed for greater

flexibility in responding to events. As

an example, during the simulator-based

SGTR scenario, the crew was able to

isolate the faulted SG within 14 minutes

of the start of the event. In contrast,

during the March 1993 Unit 2 SGTR

event, operators took about 3 hours to

isolate the faulted SG, partly because of

restrictions in the EOPs in use at the

time. The staff will further evaluate the

effectiveness of EOPs during future

licensed operator examinations.

On the basis of its review of the

Petitioners’ request that the licensee

demonstrate that its EOPs for SGTR

events are adequate and that plant

operators are sufficiently trained in

EOPs, the staff has concluded that the

Petitioners have not presented a basis

for further NRC action.

III. Conclusion

The institution of proceedings in

response to a request pursuant to

Section 2.206 is appropriate only when

substantial health or safety issues have

been raised. See Consolidated Edison

Co. of New York (Indian Point, Units 1,

2, and 3), CLI–75–8, 2 NRC 173, 176

(1975), and Washington Public Power

Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project

No. 2), DD–84–7, 19 NRC 899, 923

(1984). This standard has been applied

to the concerns raised by the Petitioners

to determine whether the actions

requested by the Petitioners are

warranted. With regard to the specific

requests made by the Petitioners

discussed herein, the NRC staff finds no

basis for taking additional actions

beyond those described above.

Accordingly, the Petitioners’ requests

for additional actions pursuant to

Section 2.206, specifically Requests 1, 2,

3, 5, and 6 submitted in the Petitioners’

supplement dated July 8, 1994, are

denied. Accordingly, no action pursuant

to Section 2.206 is being taken in this

matter.

A copy of this Decision will be filed

with the Secretary of the Commission

for Commission review in accordance

with 10 CFR § 2.206(c) of the

Commission’s regulations. As provided

by this regulation, the Decision will

constitute the final action of the

Commission 25 days after issuance,

unless the Commission, on its own

motion, institutes a review of the

Decision within that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day

of June 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

William T. Russell,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 96–16878 Filed 7–1–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

POSTAL SERVICE

Specifications for Postal Security

Devices and Indicia (Postmarks)

AGENCY: Postal Service.

ACTION: Notice of proposed

specifications with request for

comments.

SUMMARY: Historically, postage meters

have been mechanical and

electromechanical devices that (1)

maintain through mechanical or

electronic ‘‘registers’’ (postal security

devices) an account of all postage

printed and the remaining balance of

prepaid postage, and (2) print postage

postmarks (indicia) that are accepted by

the Postal Service as evidence of the

prepayment of postage. Two proposed

specifications have been developed on

these subjects, and are entitled

‘‘Information Based Indicia Program

(IBIP) PSD Specification’’ and

‘‘Information Based Indicia Program

(IBIP) Indicia Specification.’’ The U.S.

Postal Service is seeking comments on

these specifications.

The Postal Service also seeks

comments on intellectual property

issues raised by the specifications if

adopted in present form. If an

intellectual property issue includes

patents or patent applications covering

any implementations of the

specifications, the comment should

include a listing of such patents and

applications and the license terms

available for such patents and

applications.

DATES: Comments on the two

specifications must be received on or

before September 30, 1996. Comments

addressing intellectual property issues

must be received on or before July 15,

1996. A general meeting on this subject

is being planned for mid-July in

Washington, DC. All persons who have

expressed an interest in the proposed

specifications will be invited to attend

the meeting. This meeting will focus

solely on technical aspects of the two

specifications. Interested parties may

submit questions by July 1, 1996 which

will be considered for incorporation

into the meeting presentations.

ADDRESSES: Copies of the Indicium and

Postal Security Device Specifications

may be obtained from: Terry Goss,

United States Postal Service, 475

L’Enfant Plaza SW, Room 8430,

Washington, DC 20260–6807. Mail or

deliver written comments to: Manager,

Retail Systems and Equipment, United

States Postal Service, 475 L’Enfant Plaza

SW, Room 8430, Washington, DC

20260–6807. Copies of all written

comments may be inspected and
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 128 / Tuesday, July 2, 1996 / Notices 34461

photocopied between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m.,

Monday through Friday, at the above

address.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Terry Goss at (202) 268–3757.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: There are

approximately 1.5 million postage

meters in use in the United States which

collectively account for approximately

$20 billion in postal revenue annually.

The manufacture and use of postage

meters is governed by Postal Service

regulations (see 39 CFR Part 501;

Domestic Mail Manual P030). For

several years USPS has been actively

proposing a solution of the problem of

inadequate postage meter security. To

respond to the threat of fraudulent use

of meters by physical tampering, USPS

intends to decertify and remove from

the market, in risk-driven phases, all

postage meters using mechanical

registers. Another problem USPS has

faced is that currently available meter

indicia are susceptible to counterfeiting.

The Postal Service is exploring using

current technology special purpose

units such as computers and

independent printers to provide prepaid

postage.

The Information Based Indicia

Program (IBIP) is a Postal Service

initiative supporting the development

and implementation of a new form of

postage indicia. This IBIP specification

is intended to address the counterfeiting

threat. USPS envisions that the new

indicium standard may eventually

support new or existing products and

services. Specific products and services

have not been determined. An ‘‘IBIP

indicium’’ substitutes for a postage

stamp or a postage meter imprint as

evidence of the fact that postage has

been paid on mailpieces. An ‘‘IBIP

Postal Secure Device’’ provides

cryptographic signature, financial

accounting, indicium creation, device

authorization, and audit functions.

The goal for IBIP is to provide an

environment in which customers can

apply postage through new technologies

that improve postal revenue security.

The IBIP indicia is expected eventually

to replace all metered postage imprints

that rely on letter press printing

technology. This requires a new form of

postage indicia and the adoption of

standards to facilitate industry

investment and product development.

The Postal Security Device will

provide security services to support the

creation of the new ‘‘IBIP indicium.’’

The PSD provides security-critical

functions for IBIP customers. The PSD

will be a hardware component for use

with either a computer-based or postage

meter-based host system. Each PSD will

be a unique security device. The PSD

core security functions are

cryptographic digital signature

generation and verification, and the

secure management of the registers that

track the remaining amount of money

available for indicium creation ( i.e.,

descending register) and the total

postage value used by the PSD ( i.e.,

ascending register). The PSD will be a

tamper-resistant device that may

contain an internal random number

generator, various storage registers, a

date/time clock, and other circuits

necessary to perform these functions.

The PSD will comply with Federal

Information Processing Standard (FIPS)

140–1 and will be validated through the

National Institute of Standards and

Technology (NIST) Computer Systems

Laboratory’s Cryptographic Module

Validation Program.

It is emphasized that this proposed

standard is being published for

comments and is subject to final

definition. In particular, evaluation of

alternative digital signing, printing

standards, and symbology is continuing.

Although exempt from the notice and

comment requirements of the

Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.

553 (b), (c)) regarding proposed

rulemaking by 39 U.S.C. 410 (a), the

Postal Service invites public comments

on the proposed specifications.

Stanley F. Mires,

Chief Counsel, Legislative.

[FR Doc. 96–15778 Filed 7–1–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7710–12–P

PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY

COMMITTEE ON GULF WAR

VETERANS’ ILLNESSES

Meeting

AGENCY: Presidential Advisory

Committee on Gulf War Veterans’

Illnesses.

ACTION: Notice of open meeting.

SUMMARY: This notice is hereby given to

announce an open meeting of a panel of

the Presidential Advisory Committee on

Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses. The panel

will discuss the biology and psychology

of stress and will receive comment from

members of the public. Dr. David A.

Hamburg will chair this panel meeting.

DATES: July 23, 1996, 9:00 a.m.–4:00

p.m.

PLACE: Omni Netherland Plaza, 35 W.

Fifth Street, Cincinnati, OH 45202.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The

President established the Presidential

Advisory Committee on Gulf War

Veterans’ Illnesses by Executive Order

12961, May 26, 1995. The purpose of

this Advisory Committee is to review

and provide recommendations on the

full range of government activities

associated with Gulf War veterans’

illnesses. The Advisory Committee

reports to the President through the

Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of

Health and Human Services, and the

Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Advisory

Committee members have expertise

relevant to the functions of the

Committee and are appointed by the

President from non-Federal sectors.

Tentative Agenda

Tuesday, July 23, 1996

9:00 a.m. Call to order and opening

remarks

9:10 a.m. Public comment

10:50 a.m. Break

11:10 a.m. Biology and psychology of

stress: general overview

12:15 p.m. Lunch

1:30 p.m. Stress-related findings of the

Department of Defense’s

Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation

Program

2:00 p.m. Stress-related findings of the

Department of Veterans Affairs’

Persian Gulf Health Registry

2:30 p.m. Break

2:45 p.m. Risk factors and protective

factors associated with differential

outcomes in a cohort of Gulf War

veterans

3:15 p.m. U.S. Army’s Human

Dimensions Research Program

3:40 p.m. Committee and staff

discussion

4:00 p.m. Adjourn

A final agenda will be available at the

meeting.

Public Participation

The meeting is open to the public.

Members of the public who wish to

make oral statements should contact the

Advisory Committee at the address or

telephone number listed below at least

five business days prior to the meeting.

Reasonable provisions will be made to

include on the agenda presentations

from individuals who have not yet had

an opportunity to address the Advisory

Committee. Priority will be given to

Gulf War veterans and their families.

The panel chair is empowered to

conduct the meeting in a fashion that

will facilitate the orderly conduct of

business. People who wish to file

written statements with the Advisory

Committee may do so at any time.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Michael E. Kowalok, Presidential

Advisory Committee on Gulf War

Veterans’ Illnesses, 1411 K Street, N.W.,

suite 1000, Washington, DC 20005–