### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Re m an de d by

T en ne sse e Su

pr em e Co urt F eb ru ar

y 26, 200 7
DWIGHT K. PRITCHA RD v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 3612 Cheryl Blackburn, Ju dge

No. M2007- 00413-CCA -RM -HC - F iled April 24, 2007

This appea l is before this Court after re mand by order of the Te nnessee Sup re m e C ourt. The Petitioner, Dwig ht K

. Pritchard, appea ls the summary dismiss al of his petition for a writ of habe as corpus. The Petitioner contends that the guilty p l eas he enter ed we re not knowingand voluntary bec au s e the sentence s imposed by the trial cour

t were illega l. A rec ent dec ision of the Tenne ssee Supreme Court compe ls our conclusion that summary dismiss al was prope r. The judg ment of the Davidson County

Criminal Court sum marily dismiss ing the petition is affirmed.
On Rem and B y Tennessee Sup rem e Court ; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J J ., joined. Dwig ht K. Pritchard, Pro Se.
Robe rtE. Co op er, J r., At to rney Gen eral andRe po rt er; Benj ami n A. Ball , As si sta nt Atto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Vi c tor S. Johns on , I I I , D ist

ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; a

nd B r e t Gu nn , A s s i s t a

nt Di str ic t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound When this appeal initially rea ched this Court, a majority of t his Court reve rsed the judg ment of the ha be a s c ourt summa

ri ly dis mis sin g the pe tit ion , ho ldi ng that our su pr e me c ourt ’s de c isi on

in McL aney v. Be ll, 59 S.W .3d 90 (T en n
. 2 0 0 1), re quired the a ppointment of counsel and a n e v id e n ti ar y h e ar in g
. Se e D w igh t K

. Pr it c h ar d v
. St a te , N o
. M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 5 9 4

- CC A

- R3

- H C, 2 0 0 5 WL 3487842, at *5 (Te nn. Crim. App., Dec. 16, 2005) (Ha y es, J., di ssenting) , perm. to appe al g rante d, (Tenn. F eb. 26, 2007). The State filed a n application for

permission to appea l with the Tennesse e Supreme Court pursua

nt to Rul e 11(a ) of the T ennesse e Rules of Appe llate Proce dure. O n Fe bruar y 26, 2007, the Tenne ssee Supre me C ourt g rante d the S tate’s application for the purpose of r emanding the ca se to this Court for rec onsideration in lig ht of Summers v. State, 212 S.W .3d 251 (Tenn. 2007)

.-2-

The re levant fa cts rema in the same:
The trial court in this habea s corpus pr ocee ding did not g rant the Petitioner’ s reque st for counse l, and the Petitioner is proce eding pro se on appea l. The re cord on appea l before thi s C o u rt co n tains only the petition and the trial c ourt’s orde r of dismiss al. The Petitioner attached to his petition co p i es of f ive judg ments of conviction, ea ch ente red on a plea of g uilty , rende red in the Criminal Court of Shelby County . In t h e habea s corpus pe tition fil ed in the trial c ourt, the Petitioner ar g ued th a t t h e s e g u il ty

p le a s w e r e n o t k

n o w in g an d

v o lu n ta r y b e c a u s e th e c o n c ur

r ent sentenc es imposed by

the sentenc ing c ourt as a r esult of the pleas we re i n direc t contraventi o n o f Ru le 32(c )(3) of the Te nnessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-20-111(b).
The c opies of the judgme nts provided by the P etitioner re flec t that he pleade d g u i l ty i nS h e l b y C o un ty o nS e p t e mb e r 2 4 , 1 9 9 8 , t o tw o c o un t s o f a g g r av a t e d

r o b b e r y, two counts of poss ession with intent to sell over 0.5 g rams of c ocaine , and one c ount of vanda lism. The judgments fur ther reflec t that the Petitioner rec eived ten year sentenc es for ea ch ag g ravated robbe ry and possession conviction and a two y ear sentenc e for

the vanda lism conviction, each se ntence order ed to be se rved
concur rently for an eff ective ten y ear sentenc e. The offe nse date for eac h conviction is differe nt. Accor ding to the Petitioner, afte r he w as cha rg ed with the first off

ense, ag g ravated robbe ry

(off ense date of November 16, 1996), he was rele ased on bail but was then subse quently

arr ested a n d ch arg ed with the sec ond offe nse of a g g ravated robber y (off ense date of F ebrua

ry 13, 1997). T h e P etitioner states that he was rele ased on ba il ag ain af ter t h e s ec o nd char g e but was, the rea fter, a rre sted and char g ed with posse ssion ( offe nse date of November 14, 1997). Th e P etitioner
a pp are ntl y wa s a g a in r e le a se d o n b a il b e fo re he wa s c ha rg e d w ithva

nd a lis m ( of

fe ns e date of Au gus t 30 , 1 99 7) . Fi na lly , the Pe tit ion e r state s that he wa s o n b a il ye t a g a in wh e n h e wa s arr e ste d a

nd c ha rg e d w ithpo sse ssi on

fo r t he se c on d tim e (o ff

e ns e date of Mar ch 24, 1998).

In its order of dismissal, the trial cour t rec ounted the Petitioner’s stateme nt of fa cts which we have attempted to summarize above. The court note d t hat the

“ Pe tit ion e r i s cor

re c t th a t se nte nc e s are to b e ru n c on se c uti ve ly

wh e n a de fe nd ant i s ‘sentenc e[d] for a

felony wher e the de fenda nt was re lease d on bail and the de fenda nt is c onvicted of both of

fense s.’” The trial court quoted the controlling languag e fr om T e n n e s s e e R

u l e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d

ur e 3 2 ( c ) ( 3 ) ( C ) , an d a l s o c i t e d o ur supr e me court’s opinion in McL aney v. Be ll, 59 S.W .3d 90 (Tenn. 2001). Howe ver, the court ultimately

denied ha

beas c orpus re lief to the Petitioner bec ause the Petitioner failed to provide the c ourt with sufficient d o cu m en t ation showing that he wa s indeed
re le a se d o n b a il whe n h e c omm itt e d th e su bs e qu e nt o ff

e ns e s.-3-

Pr itc ha rd , 2 00 5 WL

34 87 84 2, a t *1 . T he c a se is a g a in p ro pe rl y be fo re thi s Co ur

t.

AN AL YSI S Initially , we note that the determination of whether to g rant habeas corpus re lief is a question of law. Mc L aney , 59 S.W .3d at 92, ove rr u l ed i n p art by Summers, 212 S.W .3d at 262. The Tenne ssee Constitution guar antee s a convicted criminal defe ndant the rig ht to seek ha beas c orpus relief . See Te nn. Const. art. I , § 15. Howeve r, the g rounds upon which habe as cor pus relief will be g rante d ar e v ery

narr ow. Tay

lor v. State, 995 S.W .2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999) . A petition for habe as c or pu s r e lie f m ay

on ly be g ra nte d w he n th e jud g me nt i s sh ow n to be vo id, rathe r t ha n me re ly voidable. I d. A j udg ment is void only when it appea rs upon the face of

the judg ment or the re cord of the proc eedings u p o n which the judg ment is render ed that the c onvicting c ourt was without jurisdiction or authority to sentenc e a defe ndant or that a defe ndant’s sente nce ha s expi red. A rche r v. State, 851 S.W .2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993)

. A sentenc e imposed in direc t c ontrave ntion of a statute is illeg al and thus void. Stephenson
v. Carlton, 28 S.W .3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000) . On the other hand, a voida

ble judg ment or sentenc e is o n e wh i ch i s fac ially

valid and which r equire s evidenc e beyond the fa ce of the judg ment or the
rec ord of the proce eding s to establish its invalidi ty . Taylor, 995 S.W .2d at 83. A petitioner be ars the burde n of establishinga void judg ment or illeg al conf inement by

a pre ponder an ce of the evidenc e. Wy att v. State, 24 S.W .3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 2000) . Fur th er m o re, it i s permissible for a court to summarily

dismiss a habeas corpus petition, without t he appointment of c ounsel and without an evide ntiary hear ing, if

there is nothing on the fa ce of the re cord or

judgme nt to indicate that the convictions or sentences addresse d there in are void. Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
At the outset , we n ote that the Petitioner has substantially complied with the pleading require ments for filinga petition for a writ of habeas corpus relief

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21- 107. Relying on our supreme court’s ruling in M cL aney , as he did in the ha beas c ourt, the Petitioner advanc es t he same argument on appea l: his guilty pleas we re not knowingand voluntary beca use the
concur rent sente nces imposed by the sentenc ing c ourt as a r esult of the plea s were in direct contravention of the law

. As sumin g the Pe tit ion e r’ s fa c tua l alle g a tio ns are tr ue , th e se nte nc ingc ourt

wa s r e qu ir e d to impose consec utive rathe r t h a n concur rent sente nces. Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-20-111
mand a te s, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
In any case in which a defe ndant commits a felony while such def endant wa s rele ased on ba il in ac corda nce with the provisions of chapte r 11, part 1 of this title, and the de fenda

nt is convicted of both such of fense s, the trial j u d ge s h al l not have d iscretion as to whe ther the se ntence s shall run conc urre ntly or cumulatively , but
s h a l l o r d e r

th a ts u c hs e n t e n c e s b e s e r v e d c u mu l a t i v e l y.T he T enness ee R ul es of C ri m i nal P roce d ure have r ecentl y be en am end ed , s ai d changes beco m i ng ef f ect i ve 1 Jul y 1, 200 6. See C om pi l er ’ s N ot es , T enn
. R

. C r i m. P

. ( 20 06 )

. H owever , t he f i l i ng of t he pet i t i on, as wel l as t he order
o f sum m a ry d ism issa l, p re d a te the e ff e c tive d a te o f t h e se a m e n d m e n ts . T h e re fo re , w e w ill c ite to the p ro v isio n a s in ef f ect at t he t i me. -4- Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 20-111(b) . Fur thermore , Rule 32(c) (3) of the Rules of Criminal Procedur e pr ov ide s f

or c on se c uti ve se nte nc ingun de r t he fo llo wi ngc ir c ums tanc e s:
Where a defe ndant is c onvicted of multipl e offe nses from one trial or whe re the def endant ha s additio n al s en t en ces not y et fully serve d as the re sult of the convictions in the same or other court and the law require s consec utive sentenc es, the
se nte nc e sh a ll b e c on se c uti ve wh e the r the jud g me nt e xplic itl y so or de rs or

no t. T his
r u l e s h a l l a

p p l y: ( A ) T o a s e n t e n c e f

o r a f e l o n y c o m m i t t e d

w h i l e o np ar o l e f

o r a f e l o n y; (B ) To a se ntence for e scape or for a fe lony committed while on esca pe; (C) To a se ntence for a

felony wher e the defenda nt was re lease d on bail and the def endant is convic ted of both off enses; and (D) Any other g round provided by law. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)

. 1

The habeas court dismiss ed the petition in this case beca use the Petitioner fa iled to provide “suff icient documentation” fo r t he cour t “to make the de termination of whe ther Petitioner wa s actua lly convicted of

the offe nses that Petitioner was on bond f or whe n he alleg edly

committed the offe nses at issue in his inst ant petition.” The State c ontends that the habe as cour t properly dismiss ed the pe tit ion

summa ri ly be c a us e the Pe tit ion e r d id n ot p ro vid e fa c tua l do c ume ntatio n to su pp or t hi s argume nt. Al tho ug h th e Pe tit ion e r a tta c he d to his pe tit ion

c op ie s o f the She lby

County jud g me nts of c onvic tio n, the Pe tit ion e r did no t pre se nt any e vid e nc e to the tr ia l c ourt to e sta bli shthat he wa s, in fac t, on bail during the commission of the offe nses at issue.

In M c L ane y , o ur

su pr e me c ourt

c on c lud e d a s f

oll ow s:
The trial c ourt in this case, findingno clea r proof in the documents submitted with the petit ion that the s entenc e wa s void, dismi ssed the petition. Had Mc L aney been r epre sented by

counsel, we would find no err or in this dism iss al

. Had an attorney been a ppointed, if the re cord of

the under lying proce eding s clea rly showed that the latter r ape a

nd burg lary

offe nses wer e committed while McL ane y wa s on bail, appoint e d

c ounsel presuma

bly would have br oug ht those rec ords to the attention of t h e c o urt, an d

a d e te r mi n a ti o nw h e th e r

th e ju d g me n t w a s v o id

c o u ld h av e been resolved on the m erits. Indeed, McL aney filed a motion for a

ppointment of counsel-5-

and c le arl y ha d a ri g ht t o a pp ointe d c ouns e l if

the tr ia l c ourt

fo un d h im t o b e ind ig e nt. Te nn . Su p. Ct. R. 1 3, § 1 (d )( 4) ; T enn . Co de Ann. § 8 -1 4- 20 5 ( 19 97 ). Un de r t he se circ umstances, the tr ial court e rre d in failingto consider the motion for a ppointment of counse l prior to dismiss al of the c ase.

Mc L ane y , 5 9 S. W.3 d at 94 (f oo tno te omi tte d) . In M c L ane y , a s in thi s c a se , the pe tit ion e r s tate d h is claim in terms of voluntarine ss o f t h e plea; however , “[v] oluntariness of the ple a . . . has no rele vance in a habe as corpus proce eding .” Summers, 212 S.W .3d at 259 (citingArc her, 851 S.W.2d at 164.) “Instead, the deter minative issue is whether the plea ag ree ment included an illeg al sentenc e as a material e lement. I f s o , t h e i l l ega l sentence rende rs the guilty plea, includingthe conviction, invalid.” I d. (citingMcCon n el l v . State, 12 S.W .3d 795, 800 n.9 (Tenn. 2001) (noting that our supreme c ourt’s dec ision was consistent with decisions of other jurisdi ctions that have c onsidered the issue)). When a

Petitione r ra i s es an issue such a s this is sue in a pe tition for a writ of ha beas corpus pr ocee ding, “ a cour t is li mited to considering the fac e of the judg ment and the r ecor d of the proce eding s upon which the judg ment was re ndere d.” I d. (citingSmit h v. L ewis, 202 S.W.3d 124, 128 (Tenn. 2006) ).

Her e, the time betwe en the o f f e n s e s

— a g gr a

v a te d robber y on November

16, 1996; ag g ravated robber y on Fe bruar

y 13, 1997; vandalism on August 30, 1997; coca ine possession on November 14, 1997; a nd coca ine possession on Marc h 24, 1998—allows for the possibili ty that eac h offe nse wa s committed while the P etitioner was out on bail for the prior offense. Moreover , from the notation of pre trial jail cre dits on the judgments of c onvicti on, it can be c ircumstantially inferr ed that the Pe tit ion e r w a s o n b a il at the tim e he c omm itt e d s e ve ra l, i f n ot a ll o f, the of fe ns e s. We a

re un a ble to distinguish this case f

rom McL aney
. Howeve r, base d upon on our supreme court’s rece nt decision in Summ ers, we conclude that summary d i smissal predicate d on the g round that the Petitioner did not provide fa ctual documentation to support his contention that he was, in f act, on bail during the commission of the offe nses at issue wa s proper . See also Fr edric k L

. Br own, J r. v. Virg inia L ewis, Warden, No. E2005- 02549-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL529926, at *6 (Te nn. Crim. App., Knox ville, Feb. 22, 2007)

. In Summe rs , th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court ru le d a s f oll ow s:
For the re asons s t at ed herein, we overr ule McL aney

to the extent that it can be int e rp re te d to re qu ir e the a pp ointme nt o f c ouns e l and a he ari ngwh e ne ve r a

pr o s e habea s corpus pe tition allege s that an agree d s en t en ce is il leg al base d on fac ts not appar ent from the f

ace of the judgm en t. We hold that sum mary dismiss al may

be proper when, a s in this case , the petitioner fails to attach to the habea s corpus pe tition pe rt ine nt d oc ume nts fr om t he re c or d of the un de rl y

ingpr oc e e din g s to su

pp or t hi s fac tual asser

tions.S e e , e .g., L a rr y D o tso n v
. S ta te , N o . M 2 0 0 5 -0 0 4 3 6 -C C A -R 3 -H C , 2 0 0 6 W L 2 6 4 2 6 9 , at *3 (T e n n .C rim . A p p ., 2 N ashvi l l e, Jan. 31 , 2 0 0 6 ), p erm
. t o ap p eal grant ed , (T enn. Fe b

. 2 6 , 2 0 0 7 ); P ri t chard , 2 0 0 5 W L 3 4 8 7 8 4 2 , at * 4 ; G regory E i d son v. S t at e, N o
. M 2 0 0 5

- 0 0 1 5 0

- C C A

- R 3

- H C , 2 0 0 5 W L 1 3 5 3 3 1 0 , at * 4 (T enn . C ri m
. A p p
. , N ashvi l l e, June 8 , 20 0 5 ); An t h on y K. Good s v
. T on y Pa r k e r , W a r de n , No. W 20 03

- 02 91 4- CCA- R3- H C, 20 04 W L 23 09 90 1, a t * 3 ( T e n n
. Cr i m. A p p ., Ja c k so n , O c t. 1 3 , 2 0 0 4 ). (fo o tno te in o rig ina l).
-6- Summers, 212 S.W .3d at 254. The c ourt explained,

Al tho ug h we de c lin e
. . . to m od if y the ho ldi ngin M c L ane y

wi th r e sp e c t to the sc op e of

the re me dy

whe n habea s c or

pu s r e lie f i s g ra

nte d, we take thi s opportunity

to clarify

McL aney

with respect to the proce dural re quirements for
se e kin g su c h r e lie f. Mc L ane y has been r e a d to dic tate that w he ne ve r a pr o s e petitioner fa ils to attach to his habeas c orpus petition pertinent docume nts f rom the
rec ord of the unde rlying pr ocee dings, he must be aff orded the opportunity , with the assistance of counse l, to cure any defic iency in his filings. This rea ding of McL aney 2 is inconsistent with applicable statutes and pr ior d ecisions per mitti ng summary dis mis sa l, witho ut t

he a pp ointme nt o f c ouns e l, u nle ss t he a lle g e d il le g a lity

is appar ent from the pr o se petition and the doc uments attache d there to.
I d. at 259. Indeed, in this Court’s first opinion on this matter , we stated that, in c ases such as these , the trial cour

t arguably ruled a ppropriate ly under the g ener al principles of habea s corpus lawbut that th e h o ld in g in

M c L an e y

ma n d a te d a d if f e r e n t r e s u lt

. Se e Pr it c h ar d , 2 0 0 5 WL 3 4 8 7 8 4 2 , a t * 3

. We
no te that Mc L ane y him se lf wo uld no t be e nti tle d to re lie f un de r the ho ldi ng in Sum mer s b ecause there was “ no clea

r proof in the documents [McL aney] subm itted with the petition that the sentence was void . . . .” Mc L aney , 59 S.W .3d at 94. We now conc lude that, becau se the judg ments are

“ fa c ia lly va lid ” and the Pe tit ion e r “ fa ile d to su pp or t his fa c tua l a sse rt ion s w ithpe rt ine nt d oc ume nts from the r ecor d of the unde rlying pr ocee ding,” summary d i s m i s s al was pr oper. Summers, 212 S.W .3d at 262; see a lso Brown, 2007 WL529926, at *6.

CO NC LU SION F or the re a so ns stated here in, we c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ourt did no t e rr by summa ri ly dismiss ing the habea s corpus pe tition. The judgment is af firmed.

______________________________ DAVI D H. WEL L ES, J UDGE