UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE DI STRI CT OF COLUMBI A

____________________________________ ) VAL ERI E A. THOMPSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 10-2075 ( PL F) ) HSBC B ANK, USA, N.A ., ) ) Def endant. ) ____________________________________)
OPI NI ON This matter is befor e the Court on the motion of def endant, HSB C Bank, U SA, N.A., to dismiss t he ame nded complaint of pro se plaintiff Vale rie A. Thompson unde r Rule 8 and Rule 12(b) (6) of

the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e. Upon c onsideration of the parties’ paper s, the rele vant leg al authorities, and the entire r ecor d in this case, the Court will g rant HSBC’s motion to dism iss. 1
I . BA CKGROUND

Valer ie A. Thompson, proc eeding pro se , has filed this lawsuit ag ainst HSBC Ba nk USA, N.A. She alleg es that HSBC owe s her $382,500 plus intere st and damag es. See A m. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 12. Although the basis of that alleg ation is not entirely clea r fr om the fac e of Ms.
The pa pers r eviewe d in connec tion with the pending motion include: def endant’ s 1 notice of r emoval (“Notice” ) [Dkt. No. 1] , containingas Exhibi t A plaintiff’s ame nded ver ified complaint (“A m. Compl .”) [Dkt. No. 1-1]; defenda nt’s motion to di smiss (“Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 4]; plaintiff’s opposition to defenda nt’s motion to di smiss (“Opp.”) [Dkt. No. 5] ; and def endant’ s reply memorandum in fur

ther support of its motion to dism iss plaintiff’s complaint (“Reply”) [Dkt. No. 6]
.Thompson’s amende d complaint, it appear s that ultim ately this case a

rises out of a mor

tga g e loan, executed in Jul y

of 2005, that Ms. Thompson secur ed ag ainst her r esidential prope rty
. Ms. Thompson attached to he r ame nded complaint var ious ex hibits, i ncluding , amongother thing s, the Note a nd Dee d of Trust on her

2005 residential mortg ag e loan, with a loan re fer ence number of 691004832. See Am. Compl., Ex . E, Note at 1, J uly 19, 2005; Am. Compl., Ex . F, De ed of Tr ust at 1, J uly

19, 2005. As set forth in the Note and De ed of Tr ust, on J uly 19, 2005 Ms. Thompson borrowed $382,500 f rom Option One Mortg ag e Corporation by a mortg ag e loan se cure d ag ainst her r esidential prope rty , located at 4512 13th St ree t N.W. in t he District of Columbia. See Note at 1-2; Dee d of Trust at 1- 7. Acc ordingto the terms of that loan, Ms. Thompson ag ree d to repa y the $382,500 with interest. See N ote at 1; Dee d of Trust at 1. As HSBC explains, Ms. Thomps on’s loan with Option One subseque ntly was sec uritiz ed and pla ced into a trust for which H SBC is the trustee. See Mot. at 2 n.2.

By J une 11, 2010, Ms. Thompson alleg edly defa ulted on her mortg ag e loan a nd
rec eived a

notice of f

orec losure sale on her pr operty . See Am. Compl., Ex . B, N otice of For eclosure Sale of Rea l Property or Condominium Unitat 1-2, June 11, 2010. Two wee ks later, on J une 24, 2010, Ms. Thompson filed a la wsuit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbi a, namingas the de fenda nt the fore closure tr

ustee who initiated the f

orec losure proce eding s. See Dkt. No. 3 at 2-5, Docke t of Procee dings in Thompson v. B eirman, Civil Action No. 10-4715 ( D.C. Super. Ct.). On Octobe r 15, 2010, that complaint wa s dismis sed with leave to amend, see id. at 3, and on Nove mber 12, 2010, Ms. Thompson filed an a mended verifie d complaint ag ainst HSBC. See id. at 2; see also Mot. at 1-2. On De cembe r 7, 2010,

2HSBC re moved the ca se to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. See Notice at 1-2; see a lso Mot.

at 1-2. In her a

mended c omplaint, Ms. Thompson allege s that on J uly 19, 2005 she executed a “NOTE SECURED B Y DEED O F TRUST,” A m. Compl . ¶ 6, and c ites a loan ref ere nce numbe r of 691004832, id. ¶ 15 — the same loan r efe renc e number on the Note a

nd Dee d of Trust attac hed as e x hibits t o her a mended c omplaint. See Note at 1; De ed of Tr ust at 1. Notwithstanding the textof the Note and De ed of Tr ust, however , Ms. Thompson alleg es that the Note did not in fac t repre sent a loan of money to her. See Am. Compl. ¶ 6. I nstead, Ms. Thompson alleg es that the Note constituted a transf er of $382,500 from Ms. Thompson to HSBC — that is, she alleg es that she is the lende r and H SBC is the borrowe r. See id.

Ms. Thompson alleg es that the Note is “an a sset-base d neg otiable instrument” that confe rre d a monetar

y benef it upon HSBC. Am. Compl . ¶ 15. As Ms. Thompson descr ibes it, she deposited $382,000 with HSB C, id. ¶ 6, and HSBC since has unlawf ully taken, r etained, a

nd used her Note without ever

paying f or it. See id. ¶ 15. Consequently , in this l awsuit Ms. Thompson seeks to rec over the value of her mortg ag e plus interest a nd damag es fr om HSBC. See id. ¶¶

12, 19, 25. She makes thre e cla ims ag ainst the bank in her amende d complaint: (1) a c laim for “mone y lent,” id. ¶¶ 11- 13; (2) a c laim for bre ach of contra ct, id. ¶¶ 14- 20; and (3) a

claim for violation of the Truth in L endingAct (“ TI LA”) , 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq . Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-26.

Reg ardingher c laim for “mone y lent,” Ms. Thompson makes the f ollowing
asser tion:

3Def endant owe s Plainti ff f

or the Note , i.e., $382,500.00, plus interest for

the use of Plaintiff’ s money , plus damag es consistingof all sums Pl aintiff er

roneously paid Def endant f or Plaintiff’s lendingDef

endant Plaintiff’s money , plus other compensatory damag es as the c ourt may decide , plus reasona

ble attorne y ’s fe es. Am. Compl. ¶ 12.

As for the second c laim, Ms. Thompson allege s that HSBC brea ched its contra ct with her by

“taking , reta ining, a

nd using [her] Note, an a sset-base d neg otiable instrument, and
never paying f or use of [t he] Note,” whic h, she conte nds, was the sourc e of f unds for he r loan. I d. ¶ 15. She fur

ther a lleg es that she owe s HSBC no debt, “since [HS BC] made [her] no loan[ .]” I d. ¶ 16. In her f

inal claim, Ms. Thompson alleg es that HSBC violated the TI LA bec ause HSBC did not disclose to her that she is “ the ac tual lender ” who owe s nothing to HSBC, a nd that HSBC owes Ms. Thompson for its use of her N ote. I d. ¶ 23. B eca use of this alleg ed violation, Ms. Thompson declar es that the “ note and mortg ag e agree ments . . . are null and void on the basis of non-disclosure ,” and she also seeks da mag es ag ainst HSBC for suc h nondisclosure. I d. ¶¶ 25- 26. HSBC has filed a motion to di smiss Ms . Thompson’s amende d complaint under Rules 8 and 12(b)( 6) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure. H SBC argues that Ms. Thompson’s amende d complaint is so convoluted and unintelligible that it viol ates Rule 8 and should be dismissed. See Mot. at 3-4. I f not dismissed under Rule 8, the bank c ontends that dismiss al of Ms. Thompson’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate bec ause Ms. Thompson fails to state any valid claim. See Mot. at 4-8. F inally , HSBC asser ts the aff irmative

4defe nse of statute of limit ations: the bank ar gues that eve n if Ms. Thompson could state a c laim for money

lent, brea ch of c ontrac t, or violation of TI LA, all three claims are time-barr ed. See id. 2
I I . L EGAL

STANDARD A. Failure to State a Claim Ms. Thompson is proceeding pro se . The Court there fore “re views [her] filings under le ss stringe nt standards than f ormal plea dings [or leg al brief s] drafted by

lawyers.” Koch v. Schapiro, 699 F . Supp. 2d 3, 7 (D.D.C. 2010) (quotations omitted) (a lteration in orig inal). Although the Court will “rea d a pro se plaintiff’s complaint libera lly ,” the pro se complaint
never theless must present a

claim on which the Court c an grant re lief. Chandler v. Roche, 215 F
. Supp. 2d 166, 168 (D.D.C. 2002) (c iting Crisafi v. Holland , 655 F.2d 1305, 1308 ( D.C. Cir. 1981)). Rule 12(b)(6) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure a llows dismi ssal of a complaint if a plaintiff f

ails “to state a c laim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d.” F E D . R. C I V . P. 12(b)( 6). “F eder al Rule of Civil P roce dure 8( a)( 2) re quires only ‘a shor t and plain statement of the claim showingthat the pleade r is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘ g ive the def endant f air notice of what the . . . claim is and the g rounds upon which it re sts[ .]’” Be ll Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see
In its mot ion to dism iss, HSBC reque sts oral argument. See Mot. at 1. The Court 2 has conc luded that ora l argument would not assist itin resolvingthe pendingmotion and there fore , in its di scre tion, will deny HSBC’s re quest for or al ar gument. See L O C . C I V . R. 7(f). In its reply

paper s HSBC reque sts that the Court strike Ms. Thompson’s opposition si nce it wa s untimely filed. The Court de clines to strike the opposition and has considere d it in ruling on HSBC’s motion to dismis s.
5also Erickson v. Par dus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). Althoug h “deta iled fac tual alleg ations” ar e

not nece ssary

to withstand a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dism iss, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, the complaint “must contain suff icient fa ctual matter , acc epted a s true, to ‘state a cla im to relief that is plausible on its face .’” A shcrof t v. I qbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotations omitted).

The Court “must ac cept a s true all of the fac tual alleg ations contained in the complaint.” Eric kson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94; see a lso Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Tw ombly , 550 U.S. at 555. The c omplaint “is construed libera lly in the [pl aintiff’s] favor

, and [the Court should] g rant [the plaintiff] the benefit of a ll inferenc es that ca n be der ived from the f

acts alleg ed.” K owal v. MCICommc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D .C. Cir. 1994). Never theless, the Court need not a cce pt infere nces dr awn by the plaintiff if those infe renc es ar e unsupported by fac ts alleg ed in the complaint, nor must the Court ac cept the pla intiff’s leg al conc lusions. S ee id. at 1276; Br owningv. Clint on, 292 F.3d 235, 242 ( D.C. Cir. 2002). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12( b)(6) , the Court “may consider the fac ts alleg ed in the complaint, documents attac hed to the complaint as e x hibits or incorporate d by ref ere nce, a nd matters about which the [C] ourt may

take judicial notice .” Cole v. B oeingCo., Civi l Action No. 11-1494,

--- F. Supp. 2d --- -, 2012 WL661967, at *4 (D.D .C. Mar. 1, 2012) ( citing A bhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 1059 ( D.C. Cir. 2007)).

B. Affirmative Defe nse of Statute of Li mitations The a ffirmative defe nse of statute of limit ations may

be ra ised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12( b)(6) “whe n the fa cts that g ive rise to the de fense are clea r fr om the fac e of the c omplaint.” Kiwanuka v. Ba kilana, Civil Action No. 10-1336, --- F. Supp. 2d --- -, 2012

6WL593065, at *3 (D.D .C. Feb. 24, 20120) (citingSmit h-Ha y nie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 578 ( D.C. Cir. 1998)). “B eca use, howe ver, statute of

limit ations issues often turn on contested que stions of fact, the Court should hesitate to dismiss a complaint on statute of limit ations g rounds base d solely on the fa ce of

the complaint.” I d. (citingFire stone v. Fire stone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 ( D.C. Cir. 1996)). Ther efor e, the Court should g rant a motion to di smiss on the g round of statute of

limit ations only

if “‘no r easona

ble per son could disag ree on the date’ on which the c ause of

action ac cure d,” id. (quotingSmit h v. Br own & Wil liamson Tobacc o Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1473, 1475 (D.D .C. 1998)), and “ the complaint on its face is conclusivelytimebarr ed[.] ’” Tur

ner v. A fro- Americ an Ne wspape r Co., 572 F. Supp. 2d 71, 72 (D.D .C. 2008) (quotingDePippo v. Chertoff, 453 F . Supp. 2d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2006)); see Reddingv. District of Columbi a, Civil Action No. 10-1811, --- F. Supp. 2d --- -, 2011 WL6225222, at *3 (D.D .C. Dec . 15, 2011) (dismissal on statute of limitations grounds appr opriate only if complaint on its fac e is conc lusively

time-barr ed); see also Ander son v. U.S. Safe De posit Co., 552 A.2d 859, 862 (D.C. 1989) (no e rror

in gr antingmotion to di smiss because la wsuit was “plainly

barr ed” by applicable statute of limitation”).
I I I . DI SCUS SI ON

Ms. Thompson appear s to alleg e that she obta ined a loan f rom HSBC in J uly

of 2005, see A m. Compl . ¶ 6, and that the loan is invalid beca use HSBC did not fund the loan w ith its own money , but rather used her promissory

note of $382,500 a

nd lent it back to her

in the form of c redit. I d. ¶¶ 15- 18. She alleg es that she is, in eff ect, the a ctual lende r of the $382,500 and that HSB C is the true rec ipient of the loan made in 2005. I d. ¶¶ 7- 8, 16. Ms. Thompson there fore contends that HSB C owes her for the va lue of the note — the alleg ed “mone y lent,” id. 7at 2 — plus “intere st for the use of [her] m oney” as w ell as “da mag es consistingof all sums [s he]
err oneously

paid” HSB C. I d. ¶ 12. She fur ther c ontends that HSBC bre ache d its contract with her by “using[her] Note, an asset-ba sed neg otiable instrument, and neve r pay ing f or [its ] use[ .]” I d. ¶ 15. F inally , Ms. Thompson alleg es that HSBC violated the TI LA by not disclosing “mater ial fac ts” about the true nature of her loan. I d. ¶ 23. Ms. Thompson’s state law c laims — claims one and two — a re g overne d by District of Columbia law. See, e .g ., Dennis Jos lin Co., L L C v. Robins on Br oad. Corp., 977 F
. Supp. 491, 494 n.3 (D.D.C. 1997). Ms. Thompson’s third claim, brought under the TI LA, is g overne d by

fede ral law . The Court conc ludes that all three of Ms. Thompson’s claims must be dismiss ed under

Rule 12(b)(6) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure. Conseque ntly , the Court will gr ant HSBC’s motion and will dismiss Ms. Thompson’s amended c omplaint. A. Money

Lent Ms. Thompson makes a c laim for “mone y lent.” Am. Compl. at 2. This ty pe of claim essentially

is one of unjust enrichme nt: “money lent . . . . basica lly

require s proof that [a defenda

nt] has bee n unjustly

enric hed at [a plaintiff’s] expense by rec eivingmoney

from him [or her] which in equity

and g ood conscie nce should be returne d.” B arlow v. Mc L eod, 666 F
. Supp. 222, 229 (D.D.C. 1986) (c iting Hilly ard v. Smither & May ton, Inc., 76 A.2d 166, 167 (D.C. 1950)). Aclaim for mone y lent “re quires proof

that [t he def

endant] is indebted to [ the] plaintiff in the amount claimed.” I d. (citingEllis v. W are , 102 A.2d 756 (D.C. 1954)) ; see a lso News World Commc’ns, Inc. v. Thompsen, 878 A.2d 1218, 1222 ( D.C. 2005) (“ Unjust enric hment occur s when: (1) the plaintiff conf err ed a be nefit on the de fenda nt; (2) the def

endant

8reta ins the benef it; and (3) under

the circ umstances, the de fenda nt’s rete ntion of the bene fit is unjust.”). In support of her claim for mone y

lent, Ms. Thompson alleg es that Def endant owe s Plainti ff f

or the Note , i.e., $382,500.00, plus interest for

the use of Plaintiff’ s money , plus damag es consistingof all sums Pl aintiff er

roneously paid Def endant f or Plaintiff’s lendingDef

endant Plaintiff’s money , plus other compensatory damag es as the c ourt may decide , plus reasona

ble attorne y s’ fe es. Am. Compl. ¶ 12. Although the Court must “ac cept a s true all of the fac tual alleg ations contained in the c omplaint,” Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94; see a lso Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, the alleg ation that HSBC somehow owe s Ms. Thompson for the mortg ag e note is expressly contra dicted by

the Note a

nd Dee d of Trust themselve s — which Ms. Thompson refe renc ed in her amende d complaint and attac hed as Exhibits E and F to her amende d complaint. As set forth in the Note and De ed of Tr ust, Ms. Thompson promis ed to pay $382,500 to the lender , Option One, in re turn for the loan that she re ceive d. Note at 1; De ed of Trust at 1. The Court ther efor e agree s with HSBC that Ms. Thompson’s factua l assertion that HSBC somehow is indebted to her — an ele ment of a c laim for money lent, see B arlow v. McL eod, 666 F . Supp. at 229 — is directly contra dicted by

her own complaint and ca nnot be
acc epted a s true in this case. See Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d at 1276. Ms. Thompson’s claim for mone y lent there fore must be dismis sed. 3

HSBC also ar gues that Ms. Thompson’s claim for money lent is “almost cer

tainly 3 barr ed by the three -y ear

statute of limitations for such ac tions.” Mot. at 5. The Court nee d not rea ch this argument. 9B. Breac h of Contract Ms. Thompson makes a c laim for bre ach of contra ct. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-20. Under District of Columbia law, a c laim for bre ach of contra ct includes four

elements: “‘ (1) a valid contra ct betwe en the pa rties; (2) a

n obligation or duty

arisingout of the contra ct; (3) a brea ch of that duty ; and (4) da mag es ca used by brea ch.’” Iheber eme v. Capital One , N.A., 730 F
. Supp. 2d 40, 47 (D.D.C. 2010) (quotingTsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009)). Aplaintiff bea rs the burde n of alleg ing a ll four eleme nts of such a c laim. See Ba nze v. America

n Int’l Ex ps., Inc., 454 A.2d 816, 817 ( D.C. 1983). “Obviously , one ca

nnot brea ch a c ontrac t without breac hing a particula r obligation created under

the contra ct, and thus, ‘in the a bsence of a c ontrac tual obligation . . . [ a] defe ndant could not have brea ched [a] contrac t.’” Iheber eme v. Capital One , N.A., 730 F . Supp. 2d at 47 (quotingSchoen v. Consumers United Gr oup, Inc., 760 F . Supp. 367, 378 (D.D.C. 1986)). In order

for a valid contra ct to exis t, there must be both (1) an agree ment betwee n the parties a s to all material ter ms; and (2) the intention of the pa rties to be bound. Ge org etown Entm’t Corp. v. District of Columbia, 496 A.2d 587, 590 (D.C. 1985)).

Ms. Thompson alleg es that her brea ch of c ontrac t claim arises f rom “De fenda

nt” — presumably , HSBC — “taking , reta ining, a nd using Plaintiff’s N ote, an a sset-base d neg otiable instrument, and neve r pay ing f or use of Plaintiff’s Note.” Am. Compl . ¶ 15. As HSB C points out, however , Ms. Thompson cites the loan re fer ence number 691004832 in support of he r alleg ation that a contr act e x isted, and that loan number matches the loan number on the Note and Dee d of Trust attac hed to her amende d complaint. See Mot. at 5-6; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 15; Note at 1; De ed of Tr

ust at 1. As the Note a

nd Dee d of Trust cle arly

show, Ms. Thompson
10borrowe d $382,000 from Option Onein a mortg ag e loan. Ms. Thompson neither makes a ny fac tual alleg ation, nor sets for th any explanation reg ardinghow HSBC, as truste e of the loan, brea ched a

mortg ag e contr act be tween Ms. Thompson and O ption One. Consequently , since Ms. Thompson has failed to a lleg e suff icient fa ctual matter

that would support the exist ence of a valid contra ct with HSBC , Ms. Thompson’s brea ch of c ontrac t claim must be dismis sed. 4
C. Trut h in Lending Act Ms. Thompson alleg es that HSBC ha s violated the TI LA. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21- 29. As she desc ribes it:

The [TI LA], 12 CFR 226.17(c)(1) , require s g ood faith and f ull disclosure in all re tail contrac ts; neither the text of Note, nor the textof the mortg ag e disclosure , nor the text in t he dee d of trust, nor the text of any

other doc ument provided by Def endant r e Alleg ed L oan, discloses the ma

terial fa cts that 1) the a ctual lende r re Alleg ed L oan is Plaintiff, i.e., the sourc e of the funds used for fundingAlleg ed L oan consists of Plaintiff’s Note; 2) Def endant lent Plaintiff nothing of D efe ndant’s, i.e., no va luable consideration sufficient for supporting a

simple contrac t; 3) Plaintiff owes De fenda nt no debt re A lleg ed L oan; and 4) De fenda

nt owes Plaintiff for Plaintiff’s de posit of 382,500.00 and intere st for De fenda

nt’s use of Note
. Am. Compl. ¶ 23.

“In passingTI LA, Cong ress soug ht to ensure the a ccur ate a nd meaning ful disclosure of material ter

ms to consumers in cre dit transactions.” Solomon v. Fa lcone, 791 F
. Supp. 2d 184, 188 (D.D.C. 2011) (c iting 15 U.S.C. § 1601). Under TI LA a c reditor must disclose
HSBC also ar gues that Ms. Thompson’s brea ch of c ontrac t claim is barre d by the 4 three -y ear statute of limitations applicable to such cla ims. S ee Mot. at 6. The Court nee d not rea ch this argument. 11the annua l perc entag e rate, the method of de terminingthe financ e char g e and the balanc e upon which a financ e cha

rg e will be imposed, the amount of the f inance char g e, the amount to be financ ed, the total pay

ments, the number a

nd amount of pay

ments [and] the due dates or per iods of pay ments scheduled to r epay the indebtedness[.] 15 U.S.C. § 1602(v); see Solomon v. Falc one, 791 F . Supp. 2d at 188. These disclosure s must be made “ clea

rly and conspic uously

in writing, in a

form the c onsumer may

keep.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a) (1). L ender s “also must provide two copie s of a notice of the borr ower ’s rig ht to
resc ind the transac tion within t hree business day s after a tra nsaction has be en consummate d.” Solomon v. Falcone, 791 F . Supp. 2d at 189 (citing15 U.S.C. § 1635(a)).

To state a c laim under TI LA, a “ plaintiff must show either that she did not re ceive the re quired disclosure s or that the disclosure s provided we re not c lear and conspic uous.” Solomon v. Falcone, 791 F . Supp. 2d at 189 (citing15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-32). “TI LA allows borrowe rs to bringtwo ty pes of c laims: (1) claims for sta tutory damag es under

section 1640 and (2) c laims for re scission of a tra nsaction under

section 1635.” I d. “‘A ffirmative actions [for damag es] under TI LA ar e g ener ally require d to be brought within one y ear of the violation . . . and ac tions for resc ission mus t be brought within three day s after consummation of the transac tion, or in the event the r eleva nt disclosures wer e neve r made , within three year s after consummation.’” Ge org e v. B ank of A m., N.A., Civil Action No. 10-1359, --- F. Supp. 2d --- -, 2011 WL5304054, at *2 (D.D .C. Oct. 31, 2011) (quotingIn re D awson, 411 B .R. 1, 19-20 (B ankr. D .D.C. Apr. 9, 2008)) ; see Ha ncock v. H omEq ServicingCorp., Civil Action No. 05-0307, 2007 WL1238746, at *12 (D.D .C. Apr. 27, 2007).

12Although Ms. Thompson asse rts that she is entitled to damag es and r escission

under TI LA, see Am. Compl. ¶ 25, she has fa iled to alleg e what disclosures required by TILA she did not rece ive. Compare Am. Compl . ¶ 23 (a lleg ing tha t mortga g e loan, Note , and De ed of Trust failed to disclose that “1) the a ctual lende r re Alleg ed L oan is Plaintiff, i.e., the sourc e of the funds used f

or fundingAlleg ed L oan consists of Plaintiff’s Note; 2) Def endant lent Plaintiff nothing of

Def endant’ s, i.e., no valuable consideration sufficient for supporting a

simple contra ct; 3) Plaintiff owes De fenda nt no debt re A lleg ed L oan; and 4) Def endant owe s Plainti ff for Plaintiff’s de posit of 382,500.00 and intere st for De fenda nt’s use of Note ”), w ith 15 U.S.C
. § 1602(v) ( cre ditor must dis close “ the annua l perc entag e rate, the method of de terminingthe financ e cha

rg e and the balanc e upon which a financ e cha

rg e will be imposed, the amount of the financ e cha

rg e, the a mount to be finance d, the total pay ments, the number a

nd amount of pay ments, [and] the due dates or per iods of pay ments scheduled to r epay the indebtedne ss”). Moreove r, Ms. Thompson’s TI LA claim — whe ther for damag es or f

or re scission — conclusively

is tim e-ba

rre d. Ms. Thompson’s amended c omplaint and attache d exhibi ts expressly acknow ledg e that the loan a g ree ment was sig ned on Jul y 19, 2005. See Am. Compl. ¶ 6 (“ On the date 7/19/05, Pl aintiff deposited 382,000.00 w ith Defe ndant[.] ”); see Note at 1- 3 (executed on July

19, 2005); Dee d of Trust at 7 ( executed on Jul y 19, 2005). Ther efor e, eve n assuming that Option One, and somehow , by extension, HS BC, fa iled to make re quired disclosures, Ms. Thompson was re quired to bringher TI LA claim, at the la test, within three year s afte r the c onsummation of the loan agree ment — that is, by J uly 19, 2008. See Ge org e v. B ank of Am., 2011 WL5304054, at *2; Hanc ock v. HomEq Servic ing Corp., 2007 WL 1238746,

13at *12. B eca use Ms. Thompson did not bring he r TI LA claim until 2010, the Court concludes that it is conclusively

time-barr ed.
I V. CONCLUSI ON For the fore g oing r easons, the Court will g rant HSB C’s motion t o dismiss Ms. Thompson’s amended c omplaint [ Dkt. No. 4]. An Order consistent with this Opini on shall issue this same day
.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ PAULL . FRI EDMAN DATE: Mar ch 27, 2012 United States District J udg e

14