Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Harrison v. Deere & Co., 2014 IL App (3d) 130497

Appellate Court 

Caption

ANDRE HARRISON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEERE AND 

COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-13-0497

Filed August 8, 2014

Held

(Note: This syllabus 

constitutes no part of the 

opinion of the court but 

has been prepared by the 

Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of 

the reader.)

Plaintiff’s claims based on the termination of his employment by 

defendant for alleged sexual misconduct with subordinate employees 

were properly dismissed on the ground that the claims were barred by 

the res judicata effect of the decisions in two earlier lawsuits he 

brought involving the same claims, and his request for relief under the 

Illinois Personnel Record Review Act for defendant’s alleged failure 

to send him a copy of the investigative report supporting his discharge 

within the required 7 days was properly denied due to the lack of any 

legal consequences.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island County, No. 10-L-75; 

the Hon. Lori R. Lefstein, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
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Counsel on

Appeal

Stephen T. Fieweger and Nicholas Cibula (argued), of Katz, Huntoon 

& Fieweger, P.C., of Moline, for appellant.

Nina G. Stillman and Christopher J. Boran (argued), both of Morgan, 

Lewis & Bockius, LLP, of Chicago, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion. 

Justices Carter and Schmidt concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 The plaintiff, Andre Harrison, filed three separate lawsuits, including this one, in response 

to the termination of his employment by the defendant, Deere & Company.

¶ 2 Harrison’s first litigated case was filed in Illinois state court against several of Deere’s 

managers involved in the investigation of Harrison’s alleged sexual misconduct with 

subordinate employees and the decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment. After two 

earlier amendments to the complaint, the third amended complaint alleged that Deere’s 

managers had defamed Harrison and intentionally interfered with his employment. Harrison v. 

Addington, 2011 IL App (3d) 100810 (hereinafter Addington). The trial court ruled in favor of 

Deere’s managers and the judgment was affirmed on appeal. Id. The appellate decision 

included a thorough recitation of the facts relating to all of the issues raised by Harrison as well 

as several entries noting that the managers’ actions during the investigation were in accord 

with their job duties. Id. ¶ 75. The court further stated that the appeal was totally devoid of 

merit. Harrison’s employment was terminated because his interactions with the subordinate 

employees violated company policy. Id. His actions “created a risk of workplace violence as 

well as a risk of financial liability for [the defendant].” Id. ¶ 83. His claims of racial 

discrimination or retaliation were found to be unsupported. Id. ¶ 79. There was no supreme 

court review of that decision.

¶ 3 Harrison’s second case alleged an intentional racial discrimination violation under 42 

U.S.C. § 1981 in federal court. The district court concluded and the Seventh Circuit affirmed 

that the case was barred by res judicata. Harrison v. Deere & Co., 533 F. App’x 644 (7th Cir. 

2013) (hereinafter Deere). Addington had already determined that the issue of race 

discrimination was without merit against Deere’s managers and those managers were shown to 

be in privity with Deere. Id. No writ of certiorari has been granted in that case.

¶ 4 In this, the third case, Harrison claimed violations by Deere of the Illinois Personnel 

Record Review Act (the Act) (820 ILCS 40/2, 9 (West 2008)) when Deere assembled an 

investigative record of his associations, communications, and nonemployment activities 

prohibited by section 9 and failed to provide him a copy of the investigative report supporting 

his discharge within the seven days required by section 2 for production. He alleges that these 

activities were racially motivated, constituted an invasion of his privacy and resulted in his 

wrongful termination.
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¶ 5 Deere prevailed in the trial court and Harrison appeals the following rulings of the trial 

court: (1) the granting of Deere’s motion to reconsider and the determination that defendant’s 

conduct did not rise to the level of bad faith and willfulness within the meaning of section 2 of 

the Act (820 ILCS 40/2 (West 2008)); (2) the finding that Harrison’s claim pursuant to section 

9 of the Act (820 ILCS 40/9 (West 2008)) was barred under the doctrine of res judicata, as well 

as prior grants of Deere’s motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s invasion of privacy and wrongful 

termination claims; and (3) the denial of Harrison’s posttrial motion for leave to file a third 

amended complaint seeking to add a race discrimination claim.

¶ 6 SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS

¶ 7 On or around August 30, 2009, Deere initiated an investigation concerning allegations that 

Harrison had engaged in sexual misconduct with subordinate employees. Despite being 

advised that the interaction was consensual, Deere continued its investigation of the nature and 

extent of Harrison’s relationships with the employees. Deere terminated Harrison’s 

employment on September 3, 2009, citing violations of its policy prohibiting managers from 

engaging in sexual relationships with subordinate employees.

¶ 8 On September 10, 2009, Harrison sent an email to Deere formally requesting a copy of his 

personnel file. Deere’s September 11 response advised that Sherri Martin (Martin), its human 

resource director, would be the contact person for the matter. Also on September 11, Martin 

received the investigative report (report) setting out the facts disclosed through the 

investigation. This report was used in determining that Harrison should be discharged.

¶ 9 On September 14, Martin mailed the plaintiff documents contained in his personnel file, 

but the report was not included. When Harrison received the documents on September 17, he 

notified Martin via email of the missing information. Martin responded with an email stating 

she had given him everything that was in his personnel file.

¶ 10 On September 24, the plaintiff emailed Martin, for the second time, requesting a copy of 

his personnel file including the information related to his discharge and stating that such 

information was needed for his adequate legal representation. Martin advised Harrison on that 

same day that further communication should then be by counsel and provided him with 

Deere’s attorney’s email address. On September 28, Harrison emailed Martin that his attorney 

had not been able to reach Deere’s attorney. He further specified that his benefit information 

needed for his settlement proposition could be sent to Deere’s attorney, who could then share

the information with his attorney.

¶ 11 On October 5, Deere resent the file, this time including the report, to Harrison’s attorney.1

Harrison filed his complaint seeking enforcement of section 2 of the Act (820 ILCS 40/2 (West 

2008)) with the Department of Labor on October 24. His original civil complaint seeking 

enforcement of section 2 of the Act (820 ILCS 40/2 (West 2008)) was filed on June 16, 2010.

¶ 12 During trial, Martin testified that she was familiar with Deere’s “Human Resource Policy 

and Guidance Statement 203,” which required compliance with Illinois law in responding to 

requests pursuant to the Act. She, however, had never read the Act and she had never asked for 

legal assistance in determining her compliance with the Act.

 

1Harrison later complained about this delivery, asserting that he had not hired counsel to assist him 

in securing the investigation report.
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¶ 13 Martin acknowledged that documents concerning disciplinary actions can be human 

resource documents. However, she stated that she had never seen investigatory documents in 

human resource files and stated that such reports are not typically part of personnel files. She 

did not believe that the report should be part of Harrison’s personnel file because it did not 

discuss any disciplinary action and she did not consider the report to be disciplinary in nature.

She conceded that there was no written procedure for personnel files established for Harrison’s 

unit of employment as recommended by Deere’s human resource policy.

¶ 14 Harrison testified at trial that in his various managerial capacities he had seen reports in the 

files of several of his former employees. However, he had never personally placed such a 

report in a personnel file.

¶ 15 ANALYSIS

¶ 16 I. Propriety of Granting Motion to Reconsider

¶ 17 On appeal, Harrison first argues that the court erred in granting Deere’s motion to 

reconsider and in finding that Deere did not commit a “willful and knowing violation” of 

section 2 of the Act (820 ILCS 40/12(d)(2) (West 2008)). Deere concedes its actions were in 

violation of section 2 of the Act, but again asserts that the actions were not willfully and 

knowingly in violation of section 12(d)(2) (820 ILCS 40/2, 12(d)(2) (West 2008)).

¶ 18 The standard of review of a grant of a motion to reconsider is abuse of discretion. Robidoux 

v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 347 (2002). However, a trial court’s order may be affirmed for any 

valid reason supported by the record, regardless of the reasoning used by the trial court. Bank 

of America, N.A. v. Luca, 2013 IL App (3d) 120601. To the extent this issue also presents a 

question of statutory interpretation, it is subject to de novo review. County of Du Page v. 

Illinois Labor Relations Board, 231 Ill. 2d 593, 603 (2008). Our primary objective in 

interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. 

Zimmerman, 239 Ill. 2d 491, 497 (2010). We not only look to the plain and ordinary meaning

of the words in the statute but interpret those words in light of other relevant provisions in the 

statute. Id.

¶ 19 In general, the administration of section 2 and enforcement by section 12 are designed to 

facilitate an employee’s personnel file review request. Section 2 of the Act requires: “Every 

employer shall, upon an employee’s request *** permit the employee to inspect any personnel 

documents which are, have been or are intended to be used in determining that employee’s 

qualifications for *** discharge or other disciplinary action ***.” 820 ILCS 40/2 (West 2002). 

This section also requires that the “employer shall provide the employee with the inspection 

opportunity within 7 working days after the employee makes the request.” Id.

¶ 20 Here, Deere concedes that its agent, Martin, did not provide Harrison with all of the 

information in his personnel file, including the report, within the seven-day time frame 

required of the statute. However, Deere provided these documents to Harrison on October 5, 

2010, well before Harrison filed his Department of Labor complaint on October 24. Though 

Harrison asserts in his Department of Labor complaint and subsequent administrative hearing 

that the documents were improperly sent to his attorney and not directly to him, he failed to 

acknowledge the effective acquiescence in his email on September 28 to “counsel only” 

communication. That email further stipulated that sensitive documents, like his pension plan, 
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could be transferred to him through the attorneys. It thus appears that Deere complied with the 

request albeit not within the seven working days.

¶ 21 Harrison contends that because Deere did not comply with the time frame required by 

section 2 (820 ILCS 40/2 (West 2008)), Deere should suffer the penalty imposed by the statute. 

Section 12(d)(2) of the Act provides that “the court shall award an employee prevailing in an 

action pursuant to this Act the following damages: *** For a willful and knowing violation of 

this Act, $200 plus costs, reasonable attorney’s fees and actual damages.” 820 ILCS 

40/12(d)(2) (West 2008). We fail to see how this section is actually applicable to the claims 

Harrison asserts.

¶ 22 In the factual context of this case, this issue is without legal consequence. The only 

significance of whether Deere’s violation was willful is the availability of attorney fees, if 

reasonable. Review of section 12 of the Act in its entirety discloses procedures available for an 

employee whose employer has persisted in its failure to comply with the requirements of other 

parts of the Act. Specifically, section 12(c) provides:

“(c) If an employer violates this Act, an employee may commence an action in the 

circuit court to enforce the provisions of this Act, including actions to compel 

compliance, where efforts to resolve the employee’s complaint concerning such 

violation by conference, conciliation or persuasion pursuant to subsection (b) have 

failed and the Department has not commenced an action in circuit court to redress such 

violation. The circuit court for the county in which the complainant resides, in which 

the complainant is employed, or in which the personnel record is maintained shall have 

jurisdiction in such actions.” 820 ILCS 40/12(c) (West 2008).

¶ 23 Immediately following this section is what Harrison refers to as the penalty that Deere 

should be made to suffer. He overlooks, however, that the statute imposes the penalty for the 

employer’s “[f]ailure to comply with an order of the court.” 820 ILCS 40/12(d) (West 2008).

¶ 24 Harrison is not eligible for attorney fees for two reasons: first, because the court did not 

compel, has not compelled, and cannot compel Deere to comply with the statutory 

requirements to produce the report for inspection because Deere had already produced the 

documents prior to Harrison’s filing of the complaint with the Department of Labor and the 

complaint with this case. Second, Deere complied without any need for Harrison to hire 

counsel. Supra n.1. Thus, nothing related to the violation would make his attorney fees 

reasonable or invoke the application of this section of the statute.

¶ 25 Because of Deere’s conceded technical violation of the statute’s time frame requirement, 

section 12(e) of the Act is the only applicable portion of the administration and enforcement 

section of the Act. That section states that “[a]ny employer or his agent who violates the 

provisions of this Act is guilty of a petty offense.” 820 ILCS 40/12(e) (West 2008). Deere did, 

in fact, violate a provision of this Act by providing Harrison with all of his personnel file 

documents in 25 working days rather than the statutorily required 7 days. Thus, Harrison’s 

only relief on this count of his complaint is the acknowledgement that Deere committed a petty 

offense.

¶ 26 II. General Applicability of Res Judicata

¶ 27 Next Harrison argues that the trial court erred in granting (1) Deere’s motion for summary 

judgment on his claims based on section 9 of the Act and (2) Deere’s motion to dismiss his 
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wrongful termination and invasion of privacy claims. He further argues that the trial court 

erred in denying his motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. Deere counters that all 

of these claims are barred by res judicata.

¶ 28 When reviewing a case decided on summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, our standard 

of review is de novo. See Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 30. De novo consideration affords 

this court the opportunity to analyze the facts and issues independently and without deference 

to the trial court. Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 408 Ill. App. 3d 564, 578 (2011).

¶ 29 In the instant case, the trial court granted Deere’s summary judgment motion, finding 

Harrison’s section 9 claim barred by res judicata. Based on the following analysis, we agree 

with that finding and further find that Harrison’s invasion of privacy and wrongful termination 

claims are also amendable to dismissal on res judicata grounds.

¶ 30 Res judicata applies when: “(1) there was a final judgment on the merits rendered by a 

court of competent jurisdiction, (2) there is an identity of cause of action, and (3) there is an 

identity of parties or their privies.” River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 

302 (1998). “ ‘[T]he doctrine of res judicata extends not only to every matter that was actually 

determined in the prior suit but to every other matter that might have been raised and 

determined in it.’ ” Deere, 533 F. App’x at 648 (quoting Torcasso v. Standard Outdoor Sales, 

Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 484, 490 (1993)). Each res judicata factor will be addressed in turn.

¶ 31 A. Final Judgment

¶ 32 The Addington court held that the information acquired by Deere’s managers concerning 

the plaintiff’s relationships with subordinate employees was the reason for the plaintiff’s 

termination under the defendant’s company policy. Addington, 2011 IL App (3d) 100810, 

¶¶ 64, 73. The federal court in Deere held that Harrison’s issue of race discrimination was 

barred by res judicata because not only were Deere’s managers (defendants in Addington) in 

privity with Deere, the cause of action had already been addressed in Addington using the same 

set of operative facts. Deere, 533 F. App’x at 649. No supreme court review in either case has 

been had or is pending.

¶ 33 Therefore, there are two “final judgments on the merits” that have been issued by “courts 

of competent jurisdiction” satisfying the first element of res judicata.

¶ 34 B. Identity of Parties or Their Privies

¶ 35 We agree with the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning as to why the defendants in Addington and 

Deere meet the “identity of parties or their privies” element for res judicata.

¶ 36 The defendants in Addington were eight managers working for Deere, while the defendant 

in this case is Deere itself. The eight managers operated within the scope of their employment 

when they investigated Harrison’s sexual misconduct and decided to terminate his 

employment. See Addington, 2011 IL App (3d) 100810, ¶¶ 43-81. Because the managers were 

acting as agents for Deere, the Illinois Appellate Court observed that Deere “would have been 

liable for all of the actions taken by its employees” when they terminated Harrison’s 

employment. Id. ¶ 51. Additionally, the managers’ interests were aligned with Deere’s 

interests because Harrison’s conduct “created a risk of workplace violence as well as a risk of 

financial liability for Deere.” Id. ¶ 83. The eight managers and Deere shared an interest in 

preventing such violence and liability. Therefore, because the managers were acting as Deere’s 
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agents and they all had closely aligned interests, Addington and this case meet the “identity of 

parties or their privies” element for res judicata. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deere,

533 F. App’x at 649.

¶ 37 DeFlon v. Sawyers, 2006-NMSC-025, 139 N.M. 637, 137 P.3d 577, relied on by Harrison, 

actually works against him. In that case, the court found that the named managers were not in 

privity with their company in its previous litigation with DeFlon because in their case they 

were being charged with acting outside of the scope of their employment. Id. ¶ 10. However, in 

the instant case, the situation is reversed. In Addington, the defendant’s managers were found 

to be acting within the scope of their employment and thus the defendant would have been 

liable for their actions. Addington, 2011 IL App (3d) 100810, ¶¶ 64, 73. Because of that closely 

aligned interest, there is privity.

¶ 38 Harrison argues that the identified agent in his section 9 cause of action, Martin, is not one 

of the parties identified in Addington and thus privity is severed. However, Harrison apparently 

failed to actually look at his complaint in Addington. Martin is, in fact, a named party in that 

case. Addington, 2011 IL App (3d) 100810.

¶ 39 The Seventh Circuit has already outlined why the parties in Addington are in privity with 

Deere, thus satisfying the second element of res judicata.

¶ 40 C. Identity of Cause of Action

¶ 41 Though a bit out of the outlined order, the last factor we consider is “identity of cause of 

action.” We find that the facts used in Addington and later in Deere constitute the same “single 

group of operative facts” that Harrison is once again using to substantiate his claims. 

Addington, 2011 IL App (3d) 100810; Deere, 533 F. App’x at 649.

¶ 42 Illinois’s “transactional test” for identity of cause of action for res judicata provides that 

“the assertion of different kinds or theories of relief still constitutes a single cause of action if a 

single group of operative facts give rise to the assertion of relief.” Baird & Warner, Inc. v. 

Addison Industrial Park, Inc., 70 Ill. App. 3d 59, 64 (1979).

¶ 43 Harrison has essentially conceded that the facts he used in Addington are the same facts he 

is using to establish his rights to relief on his current causes of action. In Addington, facts 

provided by Harrison and Deere concerning the investigation and termination of Harrison’s 

employment were used to determine if the named employees defamed or intentionally 

interfered with Harrison’s employment. Addington, 2011 IL App (3d) 100810. Such facts 

included the premier reason for gathering information about Harrison’s personal relationships 

by Deere’s employees, how the information was gathered, what information was gathered, and 

the management discussion and decisions supported by that information. Id. ¶¶ 64, 73-74. The 

actions used to gather and the decisions based on these facts were determined to have been 

within the scope of the responsibilities of Deere’s employees and not for any discriminatory or 

retaliatory purposes. Id. ¶¶ 73, 75. The factual information was properly acquired for the 

plaintiff’s termination. Id. ¶ 74.

¶ 44 1. Section 9 of the Act

¶ 45 Harrison claims that Deere violated section 9 of the Act by “gather[ing] or keep[ing] a 

record of [his] associations[,] *** communications [and] nonemployment activities.” 820 

ILCS 40/9 (West 2008). He asserts that he was unable to bring this issue in Addington because 
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(1) the court refused to consider his section 9 claim, and (2) he had not received his “right to 

sue” letter from the Department of Labor prior to the trial court’s denial of his motion to extend 

the time for amendment of pleadings. He effectively concedes that the facts he uses here to 

argue this issue are the same ones relied on in Addington, but he claims that privity is an issue. 

Harrison’s privity argument has already been addressed. This court has already found in 

Addington that Deere would have been liable for the actions of its managers, including Martin,

under the statute if a violation had been found. Addington, 2011 IL App (3d) 100810, ¶ 51.

¶ 46 Nonetheless, the Addington decision was not the reason why Harrison could not assert the 

alleged violation of section 9 of the Act before the court. Res judicata applies not only to issues 

that were previously litigated but also to those that could have been litigated but were not. 

Deere, 533 F. App’x at 648. Harrison had multiple options for bringing this specific issue 

before the court during the Addington litigation.

¶ 47 The Addington court declined to address Harrison’s section 9 claim in his appeal because it 

was not properly before the court. Addington, 2011 IL App (3d) 100810, ¶ 73. Harrison had 

waived the issue by failing to argue it in his opening brief. Id. Nonetheless, res judicata still 

applies.

¶ 48 With regard to his “right to sue” letter, Harrison could have asked the Addington trial court 

to stay proceedings until he received his “right to sue” letter. The plaintiff petitioned and was 

granted the right to amend his complaint several times. It is not unfair to presume neither 

Harrison nor the trial court would have had a problem with a stay of proceedings pending 

receipt of the “right to sue” letter. Yet, no stay was requested.

¶ 49 While Harrison does point to the Addington court’s denial of his motion for leave to amend 

the case management order on March 26, 2010, he fails to indicate why he needed such an 

amendment. He acknowledges that at the time he made the motion, he was not aware that the 

Department of Labor had also issued its “right to sue” letter on that same day. Thus, this would 

not have been a consideration in the court’s denial of the leave to amend the case management 

order.

¶ 50 Additionally, Harrison could have motioned for leave to file a supplemental amendment or 

amendments generally. Given the anticipated “right to sue” letter, such amendment would 

have been in the interest of justice. Harrison, however, chose to attempt to file yet another 

lawsuit based on the same operative facts in lieu of that or any of the other aforementioned 

options.

¶ 51 2. Invasion of Privacy

¶ 52 The facts Harrison points to in his invasion of privacy argument are the same operative 

facts that the Addington court found to be appropriate actions of Deere’s managers. Addington, 

2011 IL App (3d) 100810, ¶ 74. Harrison argues that questioning other employees directly 

about his private life was worse than the actions of the defendant in Johnson v. K mart Corp., 

311 Ill. App. 3d 573 (2000) (hiring of private detectives to pose as employees to gain 

information about the private lives of employees). However, these are the same facts and 

essentially the same argument Harrison used in counts X, XI, and XII in Addington. There the 

court noted that “[O]nce the company was aware of appellant’s involvement in this other 

potentially inappropriate employee related relationship, additional investigation was 

appropriate.” Addington, 2011 IL App (3d) 100810, ¶ 74.
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¶ 53 3. Wrongful Termination

¶ 54 Finally, Harrison’s wrongful termination argument is couched in the trial court’s finding 

that he did not sufficiently argue the employer’s retaliatory conduct. However, a central 

finding in Addington is that the actions of Deere’s managers and Harrison’s subsequent firing 

were not based on a retaliatory motive. Addington, 2011 IL App (3d) 100810, ¶¶ 43, 58, 64, 76, 

81. The nonemployment activity that Harrison argues should not have been used for his 

termination is his personal relationships, which the Addington court found to be in violation of 

Deere’s company policy and thus the grounds for Harrison’s employment termination. Id.

¶ 74.

¶ 55 The facts used in Addington are the same operative facts the plaintiff is using in the present 

claims. The purpose of res judicata is to prohibit such “duplicative” litigation. Hudson v. City 

of Chicago, 228 Ill. 2d 462, 482 (2008). Thus Harrison’s claims of a violation of section 9 of 

the Act, invasion of privacy, and wrongful termination are barred by res judicata.

¶ 56 III. Denial of Leave to File Another Amended Complaint

¶ 57 We also affirm the trial court’s finding that Harrison’s motion for leave to file an amended 

complaint concerning race discrimination is barred by res judicata. The standard of review for 

cases involving denial of a motion for leave to file an amended complaint is abuse of discretion 

by the trial court, which is found only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted 

by the trial court. Keefe-Shea Joint Venture v. City of Evanston, 364 Ill. App. 3d 48, 61 (2005).

We point to the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Deere finding “an identity of cause of action.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deere, 533 F. App’x at 648. The same race discrimination 

claim attempted here was resolved in Addington and barred from relitigation in Deere. Id. We 

reject Harrison’s attempt to relitigate this issue and affirm the trial court’s decision that it 

cannot be litigated again.

¶ 58 CONCLUSION

¶ 59 We affirm the trial court’s denial of Harrison’s request for relief under section 12 of the Act 

because the issue is without legal consequence and further hold that Harrison’s other claims 

are all barred by res judicata.

¶ 60 Affirmed.