[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. King, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4715.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2019-O HIO -4715
C LEVELAND M ETROPOLITAN B AR A SSOCIATION v . K ING
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. King, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4715.] Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct— Indefinite suspension. (No. 2018-1762—Submitted May 21, 2019—Decided November 19, 2019 .)
O N C ERTIFIED R EPORT by the Board of Professiona l Conduct of the Supreme Court, No. 2017-002.

__________________ Per Curiam. {¶ 1} Respondent, Matthew Joseph King, of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0067189, was admitted to the practice of law i n Ohio in 1996. On July 18, 2016, we suspended King’s license to practice law on a n interim basis following his felony convictions for money laundering and attem pted money laundering. See In re King , 146 Ohio St.3d 1272, 2016-Ohio-4985, 56 N.E.3d 979. On December 21, 2016, we imposed a s eparate stayed six-month su spension basedS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 on King’s failure to inform two clients that he did not carry p rofessional-liability
insurance and his failure to c ooperate in the ensuing disciplin ary investigation. 1 Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. King , 148 Ohio St.3d 602, 2016-Ohio-8255, 71
N.E.3d 1082. {¶ 2} In a complaint certified to the Board of Professional Conduct o n January 13, 2017, relator, Clevela nd Metropolitan Bar Associati on, charged King with multiple ethical violations arising from his felony money- laundering convictions. The parties entered into stipulations of fact, mi sconduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors, and relator agreed to withd raw four of the alleged rule violations. After c onsidering those stipulations and the evidence adduced at a hearing before a panel of the board, the board iss ued a report finding that King committed the remainin g charged misconduct and recomm ending that he be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Ohio. Re lator objects to the
board’s recommended sanction and argues that King’s conduct war rants permanent disbarment. {¶ 3} For the reasons that follow, we overrule relator’s objection, a dopt the board’s findings of fact and mis conduct, and indefinitely suspe nd King from the practice of law.
Misconduct {¶ 4} In February 2014, King engaged in a recorded conversation with a confidential informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and a regional law-enforcement task force. King told the informant, who was posing as a drug dealer, that he would form a corporation for the purpose of laundering money derived from the informant’s pro fits in the drug trade. Shortl y thereafter, King accepted $20,000 in marked bills from the informant and told th e informant that he

1. The conduct that King was sanctioned for in 2016 occurred after the conduct at issue in this case.January Term, 2019

3 would deposit the money into his client trust account in amount s less than $10,000 to avoid federal currency -reporting requirements. {¶ 5} King never actually incorporated the proposed shell company or deposited the $20,000 in his client trust account. But over th e next several weeks, he complied with the informant’s multiple requests for cash. A fter King had returned the entire $20,000, he wrote and delivered two $2,000 checks to the informant from his personal account. The first check—made paya ble to the shell company that was never incorporated—was never cashed. The info rmant cashed the second check, which was payable to him, within several days of receiving it. According to King, the informa nt absconded with the $20,000 pro vided by the FBI and the $2,000 from King’s personal checking account. {¶ 6} King was charged with one count of attempted money laundering f or accepting $20,000 that had been represented to be the proceeds of drug trafficking and two counts of money laundering for issuing the two $2,000 c hecks. He rejected a plea bargain that would have r educed his sentence and require d him to surrender his law license, and a jury convicted him on all counts. King was sentenced to 44 months in prison, and his convicti ons were affirmed on appeal. King was released in August 2018 after serving just 22 months of his prison sente nce. At the time of his disciplinary hearing, he was under house arrest at his moth er’s home in Cuyahoga County and anticipated that he would be released on De cember 14, 2018, to serve three years of supervised release. {¶ 7} The parties stipulated and the board found that King’s criminal conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from committing an illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness) and 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer fro m engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and that his conduct is sufficien tly egregious to support a separate finding that h e violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adve rsely reflects on the lawyer’ s fitness to practiceS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 law), see Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker , 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 2013-Ohio-3998, 997 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 21. We adopt these findings of fact and miscondu ct.
Recommended Sanction {¶ 8} The parties stipulated that the following mitigating factors ar e present: King cooperated with relator’s i nvestigation following his rele ase from prison, other penalties or sanctions have been imposed for his criminal conduct, and he has completed other interim rehabilitation—namely, a rigorous alcoh ol-and-drug treatment program. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(4), (6), and (8). In addition, the board found that King had submitted eight letters from attorney s, former clients,
and others who have known him in a personal and professional ca pacity attesting to his good character and skills as a lawyer. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(5). {¶ 9} At his disciplinary hearing, King testified at great length abo ut his alcoholism and his success in completing—and in some instances leading— recovery programs during his in carceration. The parties also s ubmitted stipulated exhibits documenting King’s diagnoses with a psychological diso rder and an alcohol-use disorder, treatment recommendations and summaries, and successful completion of a residential drug -treatment program in prison. King reported that in addition to struggling with debilitating bouts of drinking a round the time of his criminal misconduct, he was dealing with his father’s significa nt health problems, a difficult divorce, and his estran gement from his teenage daug hter. {¶ 10} King also presented the testimony of Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Judge Peter J. Corri gan, who met King in law school , had known him in a personal and professional capacity, and had served as King ’s Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor since March 2015. The board found that Judge Corrigan gave compelling testimony about King’s past addiction and present so briety, that the judge emphasized King’s talent as an attorney and his ability t o resume the practice of law, and that the judge corroborated King’s testimony about the turmoil in his personal life around the time of his criminal conduct. Notwith standing thatJanuary Term, 2019

5 evidence, the board declined to accord mitigating effect to Kin g’s mental or alcohol-use disorders on the ground that he had not sufficientl y demonstrated that either disorder was causally related to his misconduct, see Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7). 2 We also note that King has not submitted a prognosis from a qualified healthcare professional that he will be able to retur n to the competent and ethical professional practice of law. {¶ 11} The parties stipulated and the board found that just one aggrav ating factor is present—King acted w ith a dishonest or selfish motive

. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2). Although King acknowledged that he was responsibl e for making poor decisions, the board characterized much of his testimony a s “an attempt to explain why he should not have b een [criminally] charged in the first place.” And the board recognized that the certified copy of King’s entry of conviction conclusively established his guilt with respect to those offens es. See Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. McNally , 154 Ohio St.3d 292, 2018-Ohio-3719, 114 N.E.3d 147, ¶ 18. Notably, however, the board did not interpret King’s tes timony as a refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. On the cont rary, the board found that he had “whole-heartedly embrace[d] the wrongness of his conduct and accept[ed] that he should be sanctioned even if he believes the re were technical flaws in the government’s case.” Significantly, the board foun d that it was undisputed that although King laid out a plan to launder the mo ney he had accepted from the informant, “he withdrew from the scheme before it was implemented.” The board also credited King for offering to assist the FBI in its effort to recover the funds stolen by the informant.

2. Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7) provides that for a disorder to quali fy as a mitigating factor, there must be (a) a diagnosis by a qualified healthcare professional, (b) a determination that the disorder contributed to the misconduct, (c) a sustained period of succes sful treatment, and (d) a prognosis from a qualified healthcare professional that the attorney will be able to return to the competent and ethical professional practice of law.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 {¶ 12} At the conclusion of King’s disc iplinary hearing, he argued tha t a two-year suspension is the appr opriate sanction for his miscond uct. Relator, in contrast, argued that King’s condu ct warrants permanent disbarm ent because it involved funds that were purportedly derived from the sale of i llegal drugs. Ultimately, the board recommended that King be indefinitely sus pended from the practice of law with no credit for the time he has served under his interim felony suspension and that he be require d to provide proof of his cont inued sobriety as a
condition of his reinstatement. Relator’s Objection {¶ 13} Relator objects to the board’s r ecommendation and argues that permanent disbarment is the appr opriate sanction for a lawyer w ho engages in a scheme to launder the purported proceeds of illegal drug traffi cking. Alternatively, relator argues that there is insufficient mitigating evidence t o justify the imposition
of a lesser sanction in this case. {¶ 14} In recommending that King be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, the board considered five cases propounded by relator. In two of
those cases— Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams , 66 Ohio St.3d 71, 609 N.E.2d 149 (1993), and Disciplinary Counsel v. Jones , 66 Ohio St.3d 74, 609 N.E.2d 150 (1993)—we permanently disbarred pa rtners of the same law firm w ho had pleaded guilty to single counts of cons piracy to launder more than $50, 000 that they believed to be the proceeds of illegal drug sales. Jones and W illiams had received more than $12,000 for the ir participation i n the scheme. Williams at 72. {¶ 15} In the three remaining cases, we indefinitely suspended attorne ys convicted of similar financial crimes. In Disciplinary Counsel v. Gittinger , 125 Ohio St.3d 467, 2010-Ohio-1830, 929 N.E.2d 410, we indefinitely suspended a title-insurance agent convicted of conspiracy to commit bank fr aud and money laundering for his role in falsi fying real-estate closing docum ents to defraud federally insured financial institutions of more than $400,000. In DisciplinaryJanuary Term, 2019

7 Counsel v. Bennett , 124 Ohio St.3d 314, 2010-Ohio-313, 921 N.E.2d 1064, we imposed an indefinite suspension on an attorney convicted of st ructuring financial transactions totaling approxima tely $125,000 to avoid federal r eporting requirements for case transactions exceeding $10,000. And in Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Kellogg , 126 Ohio St.3d 360, 2010-Ohio-3285, 933 N.E.2d 1085, we indef initely suspended an attorney convicted of two counts of money launderi ng, two counts of conspiracy to commit money launde ring, and two counts of conspi racy to obstruct proceedings before federal regulatory agencies. While serving as general counsel for a company owned by a childhood friend, Kellogg participated in a scheme to protect $14 million of the friend’s assets from a Federal Trade Commission investigation and antic ipated litigation. {¶ 16} In this case, relator urges us to distinguish Gittinger , Bennett , and Kellogg and to permanently disbar King on the ground that King, like t he attorneys
in Jones and Williams , provided material assistance to drug dealers. But we have never before distinguished Jones and Williams on that ground. Furthermore, when imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all rel evant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the aggr avating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13) , and the sanctions imposed i n similar cases. {¶ 17} For example, in considering the appropriate sanction in Kellogg , we noted that although this court had previously disbarred attorne ys who had engaged in money laundering and other financial crimes, we had not prev iously held that permanent disbarment is the pr esumptive sanction for money laun dering. Kellogg at ¶ 18. And we acknowledged that even if there were such a pr esumption, it could be rebutted by sufficient mitigating evidence. Id. As aggravating factors, we found that Kellogg had acted with a dishonest or selfish motive and e ngaged in multiple offenses. But we found that those factors were outweighed by m itigating evidence that included (1) Kellogg’s effo rts to rectify the consequences of his misconduct, (2) his cooperation in the disciplinary proceeding, (3) evidenc e of his goodS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 character and reputation, (4) th e criminal sanctions imposed fo r his misconduct, (5) his acceptance of responsibility and expressed remorse, and (6) the assistance he provided to the bankruptcy trustee in the trustee’s efforts to sell the company as a going concern. Id. at ¶ 15-16. {¶ 18} Here, the board found just one agg ravating factor and considere d a significant amount of mitigating evidence. In addition to the mitigating factors identified above, the board found that Judge Corrigan gave comp elling testimony that King was a talented attorney who made a horrible mistake, had taken significant steps to rehab ilitate himself, a nd had the potentia l “to regain his license and use this experience to help other people.” The board also credited King for his withdrawal from the money-laundering scheme before it was imple mented. Indeed, despite King’s representations to the informant that he would d eposit the dirty money into his client trust account and incorporate a shell cor poration to launder those funds, he took neither of t hose actions. He also rejecte d a plea agreement that had the potential to significantly reduce his criminal sentence because the agreement required him to surrender his law license. {¶ 19} There is no doubt that King engaged in a serious crime that inv olved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and mis representation or that his cr ime adversely reflects on his honesty, trustworthiness, a nd fitness to practice law. But based on the facts and significant mitigating evidence before us, we believe that King may be able to rehabilitate himself and once again establish that he possesses the requisite character, fitness, and moral qualifications to practice law. We therefore overrule relator’s objection and adopt the board’s recommended sanction. {¶ 20} Accordingly, Matthew Joseph King is indefinitely suspended from the practice of law with no credit for the time he has served u nder his interim felony suspension. In addition to the r equirements set forth in Gov.B ar R. V(25), upon petitioning this court for reinstatement to the practice of law , King shall be requiredJanuary Term, 2019

9 to demonstrate he has completed the term of supervised release imposed in his underlying criminal case. Costs are taxed to King. Judgment accordingly.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F RENCH , F ISCHER , D E W INE , P OWELL , and
S TEWART , JJ., concur.
S TEPHEN W. P OWELL , J., of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, sitting
for D ONNELLY , J.

_________________ Shapero & Green, L.L.C., Brian Green, and Michael I. Shapero; a nd Heather M. Zirke, Bar Counsel, a nd Kari L. Burns, Assistant Bar Counsel, for
relator. Law Office of Matthew D. Golish, L.L.C., and Matthew Golish, fo r respondent.

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