Exhibit N 

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

Davis Wright Tremaine LLP

Scott R. Commerson (pro hac vice to be filed)

Brendan N. Charney (pro hac vice to be filed)

865 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2400

Los Angeles, CA 90017-2566

Telephone: (213) 633-6800

scottcommerson@dwt.com

brendancharney@dwt.com

Rusing Lopez & Lizardi, P.L.L.C.

Daniel J. Quigley (#011052)

Sarah S. Letzkus (#027314)

6363 North Swan Road, Suite 151

Tucson, Arizona 85718

Telephone: (520) 792-4800

dquigley@rllaz.com

sletzkus@rllaz.com

(Counsel Continued on Next Page)

Attorneys for Defendants 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sojourner Center,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Backpage.com LLC; et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:17-cv-00399-GMS

MOTION TO DISMISS AND 

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 

AUTHORITIES

(Oral Argument Requested)

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

Davis Wright Tremaine LLP

Robert Corn-Revere (pro hac vice to be filed)

Ronald G. London (pro hac vice to be filed)

1919 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 800

Washington, D.C. 20006-3401

Telephone: (202) 973-4200

bobcornrevere@dwt.com

ronnielondon@dwt.com

Davis Wright Tremaine LLP

James C. Grant (pro hac vice to be filed)

1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200

Seattle, WA 98101-3045

Telephone: (206) 622-3150

jamesgrant@dwt.com

Attorneys for Defendants

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES .................................................... 1

I. BACKGROUND................................................................................................ 2

A. Backpage.com ......................................................................................... 2

B. The Complaint......................................................................................... 4

C. Standard of Review. ................................................................................ 6

II. ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................... 6

A. Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Sue Backpage. ............................................. 6

B. Section 230 Bars Plaintiff’s Claims. ..................................................... 10

1. Section 230 Was Designed to Promote Free Speech Online. .... 10

2. The Three-Part Test for Section 230 Immunity is Satisfied 

Here........................................................................................... 10

3. Plaintiffs Cannot Evade Section 230 Through Artful 

Pleading. ................................................................................... 11

a. Backpage’s Editorial Choices Are Protected by 

Section 230...................................................................... 11

b. Notice Liability Cannot Defeat Section 230. .................. 14

c. Allegations of Conspiracy Cannot Overcome Section 

230................................................................................... 15

C. Plaintiff Also Fails to State a Claim on Its Various Causes of 

Action.................................................................................................... 17

1. The RICO Claim Fails. .............................................................. 17

a. There Is No “Pattern of Racketeering Activity.” ............ 18

b. Plaintiff Lacks Standing As A Remote Party Whose 

Claimed Injury Was Not Proximately Caused by 

Backpage......................................................................... 21

c. Plaintiff Does Not State A Claim For RICO 

Conspiracy. ..................................................................... 23

2. The Negligence Claim Fails....................................................... 24

3. The Nuisance Claim Fails. ......................................................... 24

III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 25

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig.,

471 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006)...........................................................................................8

In re Am. Exp. Co. S’holder Litig.,

39 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 1994)............................................................................................22

American Income Life Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc.,

2014 WL 4452679 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 8, 2014) ...............................................................11

Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Cmty. Servs. in Arizona,

148 Ariz. 1 (1985) .........................................................................................................25

ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,

490 U.S. 605 (1989) ........................................................................................................8

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009) ..................................................................................................6, 14

Ass’n of Washington Pub. Hosp. Districts v. Philip Morris Inc.,

241 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2001).......................................................................18, 21, 22, 23

Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper,

939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) ................................................................passim

Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart,

807 F.3d 229 (7th Cir. 2015)...........................................................................................3

Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman,

2013 WL 4502097 (D. N.J. Aug. 20, 2013)..................................................................11

Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna,

881 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Wash. 2012)............................................................3, 4, 11

Baldino’s Lock & Key Serv., Inc. v. Google, Inc.,

88 F. Supp. 3d 543 (E.D. Va. 2015)..............................................................................17

Barkhurst v. Kingsmen of Route 66, Inc.,

234 Ariz. 470 (Ct. App. 2014).......................................................................................24

Batzel v. Smith,

333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).................................................................................10, 17

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007) ............................................................................................6, 18, 23

Bowker v. Morton,

541 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1976).........................................................................................8

Carafano v. Metrosplash.com,

339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).......................................................................................15

Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civ. Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,

519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).....................................................................................7, 23

Dart v. Craigslist, Inc.,

665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009)...................................................................7, 11, 24

Davis v. Motiva Enterprises, L.L.C.,

2015 WL 1535694 (Tx. App. Beaumont Apr. 2, 2015)..........................................14, 17

Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com,

817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016) ....................................................................................passim

Doe v. AOL,

783 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2001).....................................................................................16, 19

Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC,

104 F. Supp. 3d 149 (D. Mass. 2015)..................................................................2, 11, 13

Doe v. Bates,

2006 WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006)....................................................2, 14, 15

Doe v. Roe,

958 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1992).........................................................................................22

Duquesne Light Co. v. E.P.A.,

166 F.3d 609 (3d Cir. 1999)............................................................................................7

Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp.,

28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ........................................................................................9

Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC,

521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008)...........................................................................10, 11, 16

Fulani v. Brady,

935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ..................................................................................7, 8

GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups,

429 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. App. Beaumont 2015).........................................................13, 14

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

Google v. Hood,

822 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2016)...........................................................................................2

Goren v. New Vision Int’l, Inc.,

156 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 1998).........................................................................................23

H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone, Co.

492 U.S. 229 (1989) ......................................................................................................21

Hebert v. Club 37 Bar,

145 Ariz. 351 (Ct. App. 1984).......................................................................................24

Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp.,

503 U.S. 258 (1992) ......................................................................................................22

Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC,

755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014).........................................................................6, 10, 11, 16

Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore,

87 Cal.App.4th 684 (2001)............................................................................................25

Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc.,

836 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 2016)...................................................................................2, 12

Knievel v. ESPN,

393 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2005).........................................................................................1

La Asociacion de Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. City of Lake Forest,

624 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2010).........................................................................................9

Levine v. Vilsack,

587 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2009)...........................................................................................8

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555 (1992) ........................................................................................................7

M.A. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC,

809 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011).........................................................1, 11, 13, 15

Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc.,

591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009)...............................................................................6, 14, 25

Nugget Hydroelectric, L.P. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.,

981 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1992)...........................................................................................1

Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-op. Ass’n,

965 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1992).........................................................................................22

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

People v. Ferrer,

2016 WL 7237305 (Cal. Super. Dec. 9, 2016)............................................10, 11, 16, 19

Peters v. LifeLock Inc.,

2014 WL 12544495 (D. Ariz. Sept. 19, 2014)..............................................................10

Pritikin v. Dep’t of Energy,

254 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2001)...........................................................................................7

Salinas v. United States,

522 U.S. 52 (1997) ........................................................................................................23

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,

473 U.S. 479 (1985) ......................................................................................................18

Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,

171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999)..........................................................................................22

United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Bldg. & Const. Trades Dep’t, 

AFL-CIO,

770 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2014).........................................................................................18

United States v. Ackerman,

831 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2016).......................................................................................4

United States v. Campbell,

977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1992).........................................................................................20

United States v. Sanders,

929 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1991).....................................................................................20

Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc.,

478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007) .............................................................................10, 11, 14

Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc.,

284 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2002)...........................................................................................1

Warth v. Seldin,

422 U.S. 490 (1975) ........................................................................................................7

Witkoff v. Topix, LLC,

2015 WL 5297912 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2015)........................................................25

Word of Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church, Inc. v. Sawyer,

90 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996).....................................................................................18, 21

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865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,

1998 WL 35298580 (D. Ariz. June 29, 1998)...............................................................25

Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.,

129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997)...................................................................................10, 14

Statutes

18 U.S.C.

§ 1591............................................................................................................................19

§ 1956............................................................................................................................20

§ 1956(a)(1)...................................................................................................................20

§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii)....................................................................................................21

§§ 1961-1968 (RICO) ............................................................................................passim

§ 1962............................................................................................................................21

§ 1962(a)....................................................................................................................6, 17

§ 1962(b) .........................................................................................................................6

§ 1962(c)..........................................................................................................................6

§ 1964(c)..................................................................................................................18, 21

§ 1964(d) .............................................................................................................6, 23, 24

§ 2251............................................................................................................................19

§ 2252............................................................................................................................19

§ 2422............................................................................................................................19

47 U.S.C.

§ 230 (Communications Decency Act) ..................................................................passim

§ 230(c)(1)...............................................................................................................10, 16

§ 230(e)(3).....................................................................................................................10

Rules

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1)............................................................................................................................1

12(b)(6)........................................................................................................................1, 6

Federal Rules of Evidence 201 .............................................................................................1

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. I.......................................................................................................1, 10

U.S. Const. art. III.................................................................................................................6

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865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

Other Authorities

Mark Latonero, The Rise of Mobile and the Diffusion of TechnologyFacilitated Trafficking, Nov. 2012 (USC Annenberg Ctr. on Commc’n 

Leadership & Policy Research Series on Tech. & Human Trafficking).........................9

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Defendants (collectively, “Defendants” or “Backpage”) move, under Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), to dismiss for lack of standing and failure to state 

a claim, including because Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act provides 

Backpage with complete immunity against liability arising from content created by website 

users and posted to Backpage.com, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”), and because the 

Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support any of the purported causes of action.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Plaintiff, a domestic violence shelter, alleges several of its clients were victimized by 

third-party criminals who involved the clients in sex trafficking by posting on the classified 

advertising website Backpage.com.1

 Plaintiff has not sued the criminals, but rather the 

owner and operator of the Backpage.com website, its CEO, and its former owners and 

executives, despite scores of decisions holding such online publication is protected by the 

First Amendment and immunized from suit and liability under Section 230. Plaintiff lacks 

standing to pursue its claims, which add nothing to well-trod ground establishing federal 

immunity, fail on their own merits as a matter of law, and should be dismissed.

Numerous courts have held the kinds of claims raised in this Complaint are contrary 

to constitutional law and foreclosed by federal policy, dismissing virtually identical claims 

alleged against Backpage based on Section 230’s command that “[n]o provider...of an 

interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 

provided by another information content provider.” In M.A. v. Village Voice Media 

Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1053-54 (E.D. Mo. 2011), the court rejected claims 

that Backpage was culpable for sex trafficking based on the website’s structure and 

operation, alleged editorial functions, and purported knowledge by Backpage of illegal acts. 

The First Circuit also affirmed dismissal of claims that Backpage’s policies sought to 

 1 Plaintiff references the website throughout the Complaint, see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 42, 48, 51, 

58-59, 65, and the Court may consider it in deciding this motion. Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002); Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 

2005). Judicial notice may be taken of court decisions about the site. Fed R. Evid. 201; see 

Nugget Hydroelectric, L.P. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 981 F.2d 429, 435 (9th Cir. 1992).

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(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

promote “illicit sex trade” and “trafficking of children”, holding its practices “[s]ingly or in 

the aggregate...amount to neither affirmative participation in an illegal venture nor active 

web content creation.” Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 104 F. Supp. 3d 149, 152, 157 (D.

Mass. 2015), aff’d, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 (2017).

The Complaint is peppered with conclusory assertions that Backpage somehow 

“conspired” with purchasers of ads on its site or “created” content via editorial practices. 

But, stripped of its conclusory verbiage, the Complaint’s factual averments about the ads 

involving Plaintiff’s clients show they were created and posted by third parties, not

Backpage. Compl. ¶¶ 115, 122, 129-132. The practices Plaintiff claims make Backpage a 

“conspirator” or “content creator” are editorial prerogatives uniformly held immune under 

Section 230. Such “artful” pleading cannot “skirt[]” Section 230—especially where 

Plaintiff does not make any factual allegations that Backpage created the specific ads at 

issue, but instead relies on conclusions and innuendo drawn from the general design and 

operation of the website. See Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 2016). 

Backpage by no means minimizes the grievous harms Plaintiff’s clients may have 

suffered. But Congress made a considered policy judgment that plaintiffs should hold the 

actual wrongdoers liable rather than cripple the Internet by imposing liability on websites 

that host third-party-created content. Courts similarly recognize “the importance of 

preserving free speech on the internet, even though that medium serves as a conduit for 

much that is distasteful or unlawful.” Google v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2016). 

Even in cases where facts are “highly offensive, Congress has decided that the parties to be 

punished and deterred are not the internet service providers but rather are those who created 

and posted the illegal material[.]” Doe v. Bates, 2006 WL 3813758, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 

27, 2006). In accord with those policy judgments, this case should be dismissed. Not only 

does Section 230 bar this action, Plaintiff lacks standing and it has failed to state a claim.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Backpage.com

Defendants are all allegedly the owners or operators of Backpage.com, or otherwise 

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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

associated with Backpage.com. Compl. ¶¶ 12- 32. Backpage.com is an online classified 

advertising service through which users can post ads in a variety of categories, including 

buy/sell/trade, automotive, musician, rentals, real estate, jobs, dating, and services. See

Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 813 (M.D. Tenn. 2013). The site is 

organized geographically, by state and municipality. See Compl. ¶ 42. Until January 2017, 

Backpage included a category for “adult” services (such as escort services), which—

following years of pressure from government actors, including a campaign the Seventh 

Circuit described as an unconstitutional effort to “crush Backpage,” Backpage.com, LLC v. 

Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 230 (7th Cir. 2015)—has now been shuttered. 

Millions of ads are posted every month, making Backpage.com the second-largest 

online classified ad service in the U.S., after Craigslist. See Backpage.com, LLC v. 

McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2012). Users create and provide all 

content for ads they post on the site (both text and images), using an automated interface; 

Backpage.com does not dictate or require any ad content. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 813

(“The website works by allowing users to post their own advertisements”). 

To prevent improper ads or misuse of the site, Backpage.com has terms and rules for 

posting ads. Users must affirmatively accept the Terms of Use to post ads in any category 

on the website. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 813-14. The Terms of Use expressly prohibit 

the posting or viewing of any adult content or explicit material by anyone under 18 years of 

age. Id.; Backpage.com Terms of Use ¶ 4(a)(ii), available at http://phoenix.backpage.com/ 

classifieds/TermsOfUse. The Terms of Use prohibit advertising illegal activities and nude 

or lewd photos. See id. ¶¶ 4(b), 5. In particular, they specifically forbid: “[p]osting any 

solicitation directly or in ‘coded’ fashion for any illegal service exchanging sexual favors 

for money or other valuable consideration,” (id. ¶ 4(c)); “[p]osting any material on the Site 

that exploits minors in any way” (id. ¶ 4(d)); “[p]osting any material on the Site that in any 

way constitutes or assists in human trafficking” (id. ¶ 4(e)); and posting “any ad for 

products or services, use or sale of which is prohibited by any law or regulation” (id. ¶ 5). 

Users are directed to “report any violations of these Terms to: abuse@backpage.com.” Id.

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

¶ 18; see also Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 814. 

When a user attempts to post an ad in the Backpage.com dating section (or, while it 

was active, the Adult Services section), a notice appears again warning the user not to post 

ads about illegal activities, ads that exploit minors, or ads with other harmful content. 

Commerson Decl. at ¶ 3, Exh. A. The notice includes a link to the “Cybertipline”—an 

online tool operated by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children 

(“NCMEC”), which helps law enforcement locate and rescue missing and exploited 

children. United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1294 (10th Cir. 2016). The site also 

contains numerous hyperlinks to a “User Safety” page with links to NCMEC and similar 

resources. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1266. Every ad contains a “Report Ad” button, and 

Backpage.com has an email address (abuse@backpage.com) for users to notify 

Backpage.com of any potentially inappropriate ads. See Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 814.

Backpage.com takes other measures to police user posts. See Compl. ¶¶ 54-56, 58-

59, 65, 67 (screening). “In addition to user reports, Backpage.com monitors...ad[s] through 

automated and manual reviews.” Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 814. By screening, 

Backpage.com blocks or removes posts and refers ads that may involve child exploitation to 

NCMEC. See McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1266-67; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 814. 

“Backpage.com also regularly works with local, state, and federal law enforcement officials 

by responding to subpoena requests, providing officials with Internet search tools, and removing posts and blocking users at the request of officials.” 939 F. Supp. 2d at 814.

B. The Complaint.

Plaintiff identifies itself as a shelter providing care to victims of domestic violence 

and claims that, because of Backpage, its mission has been “frustrated” as it has had to 

“divert” resources “from its mission” so it can care for trafficking victims. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 

116-120. The Complaint alleges several unidentified clients of Plaintiff were harmed by 

third-party criminals. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 121-128. The Complaint also makes allegations about 

purported “co-conspirators” of Backpage, apparently based on third parties posting ads on 

Backpage.com—but those allegations appear to have nothing to do with Plaintiff or any of 

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

its clients. Compl. ¶¶ 129-133. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants somehow “knowingly 

conspired” with traffickers to make trafficking “more efficient” by, among things, operating 

other websites—BigCity.com and EvilEmpire.com—aggregating content from 

Backpage.com. Compl. ¶¶ 90-97, 134. The Complaint is replete with claims about 

Backpage’s purported structure and editorial practices, but contains no plausible allegation 

that any of the Defendants created either the content of any ads posted concerning 

Plaintiff’s clients or the content of any ads Backpage.com reposted on other websites (much 

less that any reposted ads pertained to Plaintiff’s clients). See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 92 

(“EvilEmpire organizes and reposts ad[s] posted on Backpage.”). Plaintiff alleges 

Defendants’ website operation and acceptance of payment for ads constitute the RICO 

predicates of sex trafficking, exploitation, and money laundering. Compl. ¶¶ 134-147. 

Apart from conclusory allegations that one of the Backpage entities “owns, operates, 

designs, and controls the website,” id. ¶ 12, that “Defendants actively participate in the 

creation of” ads it hosts, id. ¶ 6, that Backpage somehow is “on notice” traffickers may use 

the website, id. ¶ 40, and “took no precautions to prevent [ ] misconduct” by third-party 

traffickers, id. ¶ 173, Plaintiff alleges no specific facts to support a claim that any 

Defendants either created or developed the content of ads at www.backpage.com or—even 

more importantly—created or developed any content in the ads that allegedly involved 

Plaintiff’s clients. See Compl. ¶¶ 129-133. The Complaint vaguely alleges Backpage 

“creates” and “develops” the content of certain “Sponsored Advertisements” by 

“enhanc[ing]” them, Compl. ¶¶ 50-52, but there is no claim that any ads concerning 

Plaintiff’s clients were “sponsored,” nor is there any attempt to connect other harms alleged 

in the Complaint to the ads concerning Plaintiff’s clients. See id.

Plaintiff’s other allegations rely on Backpage’s general editorial functions—as 

opposed to any claim that Backpage.com created the content of any particular ad. See, e.g., 

Compl. ¶¶ 53-69; see also id. ¶ 64 (Backpage.com uses filters to ban certain terms from ads 

posted by users); ¶ 65 (Backpage.com filters ads posted by “traffickers who attempt to 

advertise” a child under 18) (emphasis added); ¶ 173 (“traffickers used Backpage to post 

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MOTION TO DISMISS

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865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

advertisements”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff emphasizes Backpage.com’s editing and 

deletion of offending terms from ads, but takes care to avoid acknowledging the ads are 

written and posted in the first place by third-party users of Backpage.com. See id.

Plaintiff alleges six causes of action against all Defendants: 1) violation of RICO, § 

1962(c); 2) violation of RICO, § 1962(a); 3) violation of RICO, § 1962(b); 4) violation of 

RICO, § 1964(d);2 public nuisance, and negligence under Arizona state law.

C. Standard of Review.

Under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “The 

plausibility standard” requires more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully” and is met only when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, Section 230 immunity should be resolved at 

the earliest phase of litigation because it provides “immunity from suit rather than a mere 

defense to liability and it is effectively lost” if a case is improperly allowed to proceed. 

Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings 

LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 417 (6th Cir. 2014) (Section 230 “immunity...should be resolved at an 

earlier stage of litigation” given law’s purpose to protect “an open and robust internet”). 

II. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Sue Backpage.

Article III of the U.S. Constitution requires Plaintiff to show 1) a concrete and 

particularized “injury in fact;” 2) that is “fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the 

defendant, and not ... the result of the independent action of some third party not before the 

 2 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d) creates no cause of action; rather, it involves estoppel after a criminal 

conviction—a circumstance not present here. The substance of the allegations suggests 

Plaintiff intended to assert a cause of action for conspiracy under Section 1962(d).

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865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

court;” and 3) “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by 

a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Plaintiff cannot 

satisfy the requirements for standing.

First, Plaintiff cannot show Backpage caused Plaintiff’s injury. The requisite 

element of causation is lacking when a plaintiff brings an action “to change the defendant’s 

behavior only as a means to alter the conduct of a third party, not before the court, who is 

the direct source of the plaintiff’s injury.” Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 

1991) (internal citation omitted); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 506 (1975). In 

Warth, the Supreme Court held prospective town residents lacked standing to sue a town for 

alleged exclusionary zoning, because their difficulty finding housing depended on “the 

efforts and willingness of third parties to build low- and moderate-cost housing”; their 

claims thus “fail to support an actionable causal relationship between [the town’s] zoning 

practices and petitioners’ asserted injury.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 506-507 (emphasis added). 

In Fulani, the court held that a presidential candidate lacked standing to sue the IRS to 

challenge the tax-exempt status of a debate commission, because her claimed injury—

exclusion from the debate—arose from the Commission’s decision, not the IRS’ conduct in 

“facilitat[ing] the [commission] through tax-exempt funds[.]” Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d at 

1330. See also Pritikin v. Dep't of Energy, 254 F.3d 791, 798 (9th Cir. 2001) (denying 

standing where injury is “manifestly the product of the independent action of a third party” 

(quoting Duquesne Light Co. v. E.P.A., 166 F.3d 609, 613 (3d Cir. 1999)).

Here, the Complaint admits third parties created and posted the offending ads—not 

Defendants. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 54, 62, 65, 129-133; see also Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for 

Civ. Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (Craigslist 

did not “cause” publication of notice by a user, reasoning that “[d]oubtless craigslist plays a 

causal role in the sense that no one could post a discriminatory ad if craigslist did not offer a 

forum. That is not, however, a useful definition of cause”); see also Dart, 665 F. Supp. 2d 

at 969. Plaintiff’s lawsuit seeks to “end sex trafficking” by third parties, Compl. ¶ 128, by 

preventing what the Complaint characterizes as Backpage’s “enablement” or “facilitation” 

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

of their conduct—i.e., permitting these third parties to post ads on Backpage.com, see

Compl. ¶¶ 129-133, 172-173. In other words, Plaintiff targets Backpage to alter the 

conduct of traffickers who directly caused injuries to Plaintiff’s clients and allegedly injured 

Plaintiff. This does not confer standing. 

Nor can there be a plausible allegation the claimed “increase in sex trafficking” is 

because of Backpage, as the “causal chain is too long and has too many weak links for a 

court to be able to find that the defendants’ conduct harmed [Plaintiff].” In re African-Am. 

Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir. 2006). There, the Seventh Circuit 

held descendants of slaves lacked standing to sue companies involved in American slavery 

for injuries caused by their alleged facilitation of slavery because, among other things, “it is 

impossible to determine how much, if any, less slavery there would have been had the 

defendants not done business with slaveowners, [or] what effect a diminution of slavery 

would have had on bequests by ancestors of the class members.” Id. at 760. Similarly, 

here, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that Backpage’s alleged allowance of postings by 

third parties “caused the number of trafficking victims to increase” in an unspecified 

amount, causing Plaintiff to expend resources, see Compl. ¶ 11, is too attenuated to support 

standing. Trafficking existed long before Backpage.com began hosting online classified ads 

and trafficking will exist if Backpage.com no longer hosts classified ads. See Commerson 

Decl. at ¶ 4, Exh. B (“Sojourner Center ... has been providing services to people who have 

experienced human trafficking throughout its nearly 40 years in operation”); see also, e.g., 

Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 840 (when one site is shut down ads merely migrate elsewhere).

Second, and for similar reasons, the relief sought by the Complaint will not redress 

the harm suffered by Plaintiff and its clients, because traffickers, not Backpage.com, cause 

that harm. See Compl. ¶¶ 121-133; Fulani, 935 F.3d at 1331; see also ASARCO Inc. v. 

Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 614 (1989) (standing denied where redressability uncertain); Bowker 

v. Morton, 541 F.2d 1347, 1350 (9th Cir. 1976) (“the solution to plaintiffs’ problem 

depends upon decisions and actions by third parties who are not before the court and who 

could not properly be the subject of a decree directing the result sought by plaintiffs”); 

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MOTION TO DISMISS

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

Levine v. Vilsack, 587 F.3d 986, 995 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 

840 (law restricting advertising platform less effective than holding liable “those who post 

ad[s] for sex acts with minors”). Plaintiff’s pursuit of Backpage may be counterproductive

by making it harder for law enforcement to ferret out illegal trafficking, and thus is likely to 

hamper redress of the injuries caused by trafficking. See, e.g., Mark Latonero, The Rise of 

Mobile and the Diffusion of Technology-Facilitated Trafficking, Nov. 2012 (USC 

Annenberg Ctr. on Commc’n Leadership & Policy Research Series on Tech. & Human 

Trafficking), at 30 (“online classified ad sites like Backpage ... are visible, accessible, and 

well known to law enforcement staff,” and this helps investigations); id. at 26.

Third, while an organization suing on its own behalf can establish an injury when it 

suffers “both a diversion of its resources and a frustration of its mission” as a result of the 

defendant’s conduct, it “cannot manufacture the injury by ... choosing to spend money 

fixing a problem that otherwise would not affect the organization.” La Asociacion de 

Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. City of Lake Forest, 624 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citing Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 

1268, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (fair housing group’s choice to divert resources from one 

program to another in response to defendant’s actions did not constitute cognizable injury)). 

Here, Plaintiff identifies its mission to “create a world free from domestic violence,” 

Compl. ¶ 116, and claims an “increase in sex trafficking has frustrated this mission” 

because Plaintiff is required to “divert scarce resources from its mission to caring for 

trafficking victims” by, among other things, performing “a holistic assessment of its 

organization” to “adjust[ ]” “its services and training” so as to “care for trafficking victims 

as compared to victims of domestic violence.” Compl. ¶¶ 117-118, 170. But Plaintiff’s 

claimed institutional “harm is self-inflicted; it results not from any actions taken by 

[Defendants], but rather from [Plaintiff’s] own ... choice[ ]” to “adjust” its mission from a 

focus on domestic violence to care for trafficking victims. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 

1276. Plaintiff cannot choose to “adjust” its mission, and then cast its choice as an “injury” 

caused by Backpage. Thus, Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue its claims. 

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

B. Section 230 Bars Plaintiff’s Claims.

1. Section 230 Was Designed to Promote Free Speech Online.

Section 230 is a statutory embodiment of First Amendment principles for online 

speech. Congress designed Section 230 “to encourage the unfettered and unregulated 

development of free speech on the Internet,” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 

2003), “to promote the development of e-commerce,” id., and to encourage online providers 

to “self-police” for potentially harmful or offensive material by providing immunity for 

such efforts, id. at 1028. Congress sought to eliminate the “‘obvious chilling effect’” that 

imposing liability on online providers would cause, “‘given the volume of material communicated through [the Internet], the difficulty of separating lawful from unlawful speech, and 

the relative lack of incentives to protect lawful speech.’” Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. 

Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418-19 (1st Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). “[T]he protections 

afforded by the First Amendment were the motivating factors behind” Section 230. People 

v. Ferrer, 2016 WL 7237305, at *3 (Cal. Super. Dec. 9, 2016); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1028.

Section 230(c)(1) mandates that “[n]o provider...of an interactive computer service 

shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 

information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The statute “creates a federal 

immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information 

originating with a third-party user.” Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 

1997). Additionally, Section 230 expressly preempts all federal civil claims and all statelaw claims, whether civil or criminal, effectively barring any civil claims against an online 

publisher based on third-party content it publishes. Peters v. LifeLock Inc., 2014 WL 

12544495, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 19, 2014).

2. The Three-Part Test for Section 230 Immunity is Satisfied Here.

Section 230 immunity applies expansively, Lycos, 478 F.3d at 419, and “close cases 

... must be resolved in favor of immunity.” Jones, 755 F.3d at 408 (quoting Fair Hous. 

Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 

2008) (en banc)). Immunity must be granted where “(1) [defendant] is a provider or user of 

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865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

an interactive computer service, (2) the claim is based on information provided by another 

information content provider; and (3) the claim would treat [defendant] as the publisher or 

speaker of that information.” Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016) 

(quoting Lycos, 478 F.3d at 418); accord American Income Life Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 

2014 WL 4452679 at *7 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 8, 2014). At least six courts have held Section 

230 immunizes Backpage from liability. Doe No. 1, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 157-58, aff’d, 817 

F.3d at 20-22; Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097 at *8 (D. N.J. Aug. 20, 

2013); Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 823-25; McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1271-75; M.A., 

809 F. Supp. 2d at 1050-54; Ferrer, 2016 WL 7237305. 

The same conclusion holds here. First, “Backpage.com is the quintessential 

publisher contemplated by [Section 230.]” Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 823; see also Ferrer, 

2016 WL 7237305, at *6. Second, Plaintiff bases its claims on ads about its clients that 

third-party traffickers allegedly “listed” and “posted” on Backpage.com. See Compl. ¶ 130; 

see also id. ¶¶ 129, 131 (third-party trafficker “used Backpage.com”); ¶ 132 (third-party 

traffickers made promises of support to Plaintiff’s client “before advertising her for sexual 

services on Backpage”) (emphasis added). Such postings are the essence of “information 

provided by another content provider.” E.g., Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 17-21; M.A., 809 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1050-53. Third, Plaintiff’s claims treat Backpage.com “as the publisher or 

speaker” of the ads, as the factual allegations take Backpage to task for decisions about 

“whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content,” traditional editorial functions 

Section 230 protects. Jones, 755 F.3d at 407 (citation omitted); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 

at 1170-71 (“deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is 

perforce immune.”); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967-68 (N.D. Ill. 2009).

3. Plaintiffs Cannot Evade Section 230 Through Artful Pleading.

a. Backpage’s Editorial Choices Are Protected by Section 230.

Plaintiff cannot evade Section 230 by characterizing Backpage.com as “providing 

content, authoring text, deleting text, and editing information.” See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 6, 50-

57. In particular, Plaintiff points to Backpage.com’s alleged practices of: (1) “review[ing]” 

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865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

and “edit[ing]” ads through its filter and moderation processes, Compl. ¶¶ 53-57; and (2) 

“enhanc[ing]” “Sponsored Advertisements”, Compl. ¶¶ 50-52. Neither of these editorial 

practices, however, removes immunity under Section 230, because Backpage.com is not the 

originator or creator of the allegedly actionable content. The Complaint’s repetitive, 

conclusory allegations that Backpage.com “create[s],” or “author[s]” content based on 

general features of its website cannot suffice to evade Section 230, because a “plausible” 

claim that a website created content appearing to come from a user requires “specific 

alleg[ations]” of fact showing the defendant “created the content of the statements” at issue 

(the ads concerning Plaintiff’s clients). Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1268-1269. Here, the 

conclusory recitations of Backpage.com’s “authorship” are belied by averments 

underscoring that the content of the ads concerning Plaintiff’s clients was provided by 

third-party users. Compl. ¶ 65 (Backpage.com includes a “filter” that prevents posting of 

ads by “traffickers who attempt to advertise that the child being sold is under 18 years of 

age” (emphasis added)); id. ¶ 94 (“EvilEmpire organizes ad[s] based on the trafficker 

posting them” (emphasis added)). Most importantly, the Complaint does not allege the 

specific ads concerning Plaintiff’s clients were created by Backpage.com, nor does it 

connect Backpage.com’s purported editorial practices and website structure to those ads. 

See Compl. ¶¶ 121-128. This telling omission cannot be cured by amendment, because,

even if the Complaint claimed Backpage moderated, filtered, reposted, or otherwise edited 

specific ads about Plaintiff’s clients, Section 230 immunity still would apply.

Where “third-party content ... appears as an essential component of each and all” of 

Plaintiff’s claims—as it does here—the claims are barred by Section 230. Doe No. 1, 817 

F.3d at 22. There, the plaintiff similarly alleged Backpage had deliberately structured its 

website, selectively removed content, permitted anonymous posting, stripped metadata from 

photos, and otherwise tailored its posting requirements to facilitate sex trafficking in order 

to maximize profits. The district court found the alleged website features “amount to 

neither affirmative participation in an illegal venture nor active web content creation,” and 

noted “courts have repeatedly rejected this ‘entire website’ theory as inconsistent with the 

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

substance and policy of section 230.” Doe No. 1, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 152, 156-157, 162. 

The First Circuit affirmed, holding “Backpage’s decisions about how to treat [third-party] 

postings” were “editorial choices that fall within the purview of traditional publisher 

functions.” Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 21 (emphasis added). 

Likewise, in M.A., the court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments challenging general 

aspects of the site’s “construct and operation,” M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1050, holding a 

website is “immune under § 230 unless it ‘created the offending ads,’” and “however 

horrific the consequences to M.A ... the ads were created by [the pimp].” Id. at 1051. It 

was “immaterial” that Backpage allegedly “elicit[ed] online content for profit”; what 

matters is whether the website or third parties create the content at issue. Id. at 1050. 

Compare Compl. ¶¶ 1, 141. Where a plaintiff attempts to impose liability on a service 

provider based on allegations it “profited from the activity,” such complaints must be 

dismissed under Section 230. E.g., GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. 

App. Beaumont 2015). That is so even if it is alleged those posting content engaged in such 

illegal activity as child pornography, or obscenity. Id. at 760 (statute’s plain language 

“contemplates [] immunity from civil suit ...even when the posted content is illegal...or 

otherwise may form the basis of a criminal prosecution.”)

Plaintiff fares no better in trying to paint Backpage.com as a content creator for

certain “Sponsored Advertisements.” See Compl. ¶¶ 50-52 (alleging “Backpage creates, 

develops, and posts illegal content ... in the ‘Sponsored Ads’ part of the ‘Adult Services’ 

section of its website.”) Plaintiff does not allege its clients were the subject of Sponsored 

Ads. Moreover, the suggestion that Backpage.com itself is the originator and creator of

Sponsored Ads is refuted by Plaintiff’s own allegations, stating the alleged content creation 

actually involves nothing more than “enhanc[ing]” user-submitted ads by “rewriting” and 

“reorganizing” those ads (including “adding” and “summarizing” the submitted text)—in 

other words, editing. Compl. ¶ 50. The Complaint characterizes Backpage.com as 

“writ[ing] and design[ing] the text and layout of the advertisement,” but the same sentence 

makes clear it is the trafficker who “submits information to Backpage.” Compl. ¶ 51. 

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

Again, this simple fact undercuts the unfounded characterizations on which Plaintiff 

premises its claims. See Nemet, 951 F.3d at 255 (“legal conclusions, elements of a cause of 

action, and bare assertions” do not prevent dismissal) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

b. Notice Liability Cannot Defeat Section 230.

Nor can Plaintiff evade Section 230 by alleging Defendants knew (or should have 

known) third parties may misuse its website. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 40, 97, 135, 137, 173. 

First, these general claims of “knowledge” invoke traditional editorial functions that Section 

230 immunizes from liability as explained above. See supra I.A.1.a. Second, Plaintiff’s 

allegations of knowledge are pure conclusion, with no supporting facts tying Backpage’s 

purported knowledge to the ads concerning Plaintiff’s clients. The Complaint fails to 

explain how, from among Backpage.com’s millions of users and ads, Backpage may have 

acquired knowledge about the ads concerning Plaintiff’s clients. All allegations of 

“knowledge,” rather, are about Backpage’s alleged practices as a general matter. See, e.g.,

Compl. ¶¶ 39-40. The Complaint “does not contain facts alleging how [Backpage] received 

notice of [the alleged ‘co-conspirators’] conduct against [Plaintiff’s clients].” Davis v. 

Motiva Enterprises, L.L.C., 2015 WL 1535694, at *4 (Tx. App. Beaumont Apr. 2, 2015).

Moreover, “[i]t is ... well established that notice of the unlawful nature of the 

information provided is not enough to make it the service provider’s own speech.” Lycos, 

478 F.3d at 420. See Bates, 2006 WL 3813758, at *3, *6, *18 (immunity applied even 

where it was alleged Yahoo! “knew or had reason to know about the illegal nature” of the 

activities of its users). Any “contention that [Backpage] is not entitled to immunity from 

plaintiff[’s] state law claims” based simply on “the alleged...unlawful nature of the material 

posted on the website [] is without merit.” GoDaddy, 429 S.W.3d at 760-61. Indeed, even 

actual knowledge of illegal content posted on its site does not make an online provider 

liable if it fails to delete the content. See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331-332. That is because 

“[l]iability upon notice would defeat the dual purposes advanced by § 230.” Zeran, 129 F. 

3d. at 333. Thus, courts reject the same argument Plaintiff makes here—that Backpage 

should be denied immunity because it allegedly knows or should know “of minors being 

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

sexually trafficked on its website.” M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1050-51. Compare Compl. 

¶ 173 (“Defendants took no precautions to prevent [traffickers’] misconduct”). 

Plaintiff offers only conclusory, unfounded allegations of “conspiracy” in its attempt 

to connect particular ads or knowledge by Backpage to alleged unlawful conduct. Plaintiff 

refers to five alleged “co-conspirators”—third-party traffickers who allegedly posted ads on 

Backpage.com—but conspicuously fails to allege any facts showing Backpage created the 

content of those ads, or that these ads have anything to do with Plaintiff or its clients. See

Compl. ¶ 129-133. Instead, Plaintiff claims Backpage.com creates “efficiencies” rendering 

Backpage a “co-conspirator” with any user—trafficker or otherwise—who posts an ad. 

Compl. ¶ 134 (citing id. ¶¶ 103-113). These “efficiencies” refer merely to Backpage.com’s 

general editorial practices, see id., and the Complaint does not allege Backpage.com did 

anything different or in particular to the ads concerning Plaintiff’s clients. 

This is fatal to Plaintiff’s attempt to plead around Section 230, as the “the immunity 

analysis turns on who was responsible for the specific harmful material at issue, not on 

whether the service provider was responsible for the general features and mechanisms of 

the service or other content...that might have also appeared on the service.” Bates, 2006 

WL 3813758, at *17 (citing Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Specifically with respect to Backpage, the M.A. court agreed the relevant question was 

whether Backpage developed “the specific content that was the source of the alleged 

liability” and held Backpage was not liable for “content and consequences of the ads posted 

by [the pimp].” 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1051 (citation omitted). The same is true here. 

c. Allegations of Conspiracy Cannot Overcome Section 230.

Nor can Plaintiff evade Section 230 by recasting claims under “encouragement” or 

“conspiracy” theories, or by alleging Backpage “financially benefited” from trafficking by 

operating a website containing information posted by others. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 129-

132, 152(e). To be clear, Backpage works to prevent misuse of the website and to combat

sex trafficking. But even if the allegations were true, they would not salvage defective 

claims. Such attempts to impose liability “necessarily treat the website as a publisher or 

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

speaker of content provided by third parties and, thus, are precluded by section 230(c)(1).” 

Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 22 (emphasis added). Further, the practices Plaintiff claims 

“facilitate” or “assist” traffickers are general features of Backpage.com not specifically tied 

to any ads concerning Plaintiff’s clients. See Compl. ¶¶ 121-128.

In any event, websites cannot be sued on an “encouragement” theory because that 

would “eclips[e] the immunity from publisher-liability that Congress established.” Jones,

755 F.3d at 414. In many cases “a clever lawyer could argue that something the website 

operator did encouraged the illegality,” but such cases “must be resolved in favor of 

immunity, lest we cut the heart out of section 230 by forcing websites to face death by ten 

thousand duck-bites, fighting off claims that they promoted or encouraged—or at least 

tacitly assented—to the illegality of third parties.” Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174. In 

People v Ferrer, for example, the court dismissed charges against some of the defendants 

sued here, rejecting the knowing encouragement theory. 2016 WL 7237305 at *7; see also,

e.g., Doe v. AOL, 783 So.2d 1010, 1017 (Fla. 2001) (AOL immune from claims it 

knowingly hosted chat rooms where users violated child pornography laws).

The same applies to allegations that Backpage somehow “educates” or “coach[es]” 

traffickers on how to draft ads to avoid detection by law enforcement. See, e.g., Compl. 

¶¶ 61-69. This is pure speculation, contradicted by Backpage’s well-documented work to 

assist law enforcement. See Section I.A, supra. And Plaintiff’s allegation that Backpage 

“takes an active role in creating the content of...advertisements” by “educat[ing] traffickers 

on the best terms to use,” id. ¶ 61, merely characterizes in sinister language the fact that 

Backpage.com informs its users of its posting and moderation policies (which prohibit posts 

made by minors and posts for illegal activities) and generally does not ban or report a user 

simply for using a banned term or entering a wrong age. See also id. ¶¶ 58, 64, 65, 67. Nor 

can Plaintiff evade Section 230 by characterizing as “bad faith” design “features that are 

part and parcel of the overall design and operation of the website (such as the lack of phone 

number verification, the rules about whether a person may post after attempting to enter a 

forbidden term, and the procedure for uploading photographs)” because “[f]eatures such as 

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

these, which reflect choices about what content can appear on the website and in what form, 

are editorial choices” protected by Section 230. Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 21; see Compl. ¶¶ 

76-84. Ultimately, the Complaint’s allegations of “content creation,” “bad faith” website 

design, and “encouragement” are precisely the sort of allegations the court in Doe No. 1

held could not overcome Section 230 immunity. Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 20-21. Any other result 

would have the perverse effect of discouraging the self-policing Section 230 was 

specifically enacted to encourage. Davis, 2015 WL 1535694, at *4 (Section 230 “allows an 

interactive computer service provider to ‘establish standards of decency without risking 

liability for doing so’”) (citation omitted); see also Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027-28. 

C. Plaintiff Also Fails to State a Claim on Its Various Causes of Action.

1. The RICO Claim Fails.

Plaintiff characterizes Backpage.com and its publication of advertisements submitted 

by third parties as an alleged “Sex Trafficking Enterprise,” see Compl. ¶149, in violation of 

RICO, § 1962 subsection (a) (investing income from racketeering into an enterprise); (b) 

(using a pattern of racketeering to maintain an enterprise); (c) (participating in an enterprise 

through racketeering); and (d) (conspiring to violate the above subsections). 

These claims are barred by Section 230 because they are all founded on publication 

of content submitted by third parties. In Baldino’s Lock & Key Serv., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 

licensed locksmiths made claims—similar to those here—that Google and other directory 

websites are liable under RICO because they “facilitate” false advertising by unlicensed 

locksmiths who provided content to the website. 88 F. Supp. 3d 543, 546 (E.D. Va. 2015), 

aff’d, 624 F. App’x 81 (4th Cir. 2015). The court easily dismissed the plaintiff’s RICO 

claims, reiterating the well-established principle that “[b]y providing a platform for thirdparty users to publish information, Defendants have allowed locksmiths access to a portal to 

post information and the speech is not properly attributable to them. Absent an exception, 

Defendants are immune under Section 230 as the publishing website, despite their 

knowledge of the false information.” Id. at 547; see also Sections I.B, II.B.2, supra.

In addition to being barred by Section 230, the elements of a RICO claim are not 

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

adequately pled. To state a cause of action under the pertinent sections of RICO, Plaintiff 

must show “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering 

activity,” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985), and must also show that 

violation of RICO caused a cognizable injury to its “business or property” under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1964(c), Ass’n of Washington Pub. Hosp. Districts v. Philip Morris Inc., 241 F.3d 696, 

701 (9th Cir. 2001). The Complaint’s conclusory and hyperbolic allegations fail to 

establish these basic elements of a RICO claim, and the claims therefore must be dismissed.

a. There Is No “Pattern of Racketeering Activity.”

Most fatal to Plaintiff’s claims is that the Complaint fails to plausibly allege 

Backpage engaged in illegal “racketeering activity” at all. Where alleged RICO predicate 

acts are “part and parcel of a single, otherwise lawful transaction,” a “pattern of 

racketeering activity” has not been shown. Word of Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church, 

Inc. v. Sawyer, 90 F.3d 118, 123 (5th Cir. 1996) (dismissing RICO claim because “[t]he 

alleged acts were all part of a single, lawful endeavor—namely the production of television 

news reports concerning a particular subject”).

Here, the Complaint’s allegations, stripped of characterization and conclusory 

allegations of conspiracy, show that all of Backpage’s alleged conduct is “part and parcel of 

a ... lawful transaction”—Backpage.com’s editorial decisions and publication of third-party 

content on a website. The Complaint makes clear the alleged predicate acts of trafficking, 

exploitation, coercion and enticement, and money laundering are all founded on the 

allegedly wrongful conduct or content provided by third party sex traffickers, see Compl. ¶¶ 

129-147. The Complaint’s conclusory allegations of “conspiracy” between Backpage and 

third-party traffickers who posted ads to Backpage.com, see id. ¶¶ 129-133, do not make 

Backpage liable for third parties’ conduct, see, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 557, 564 (2007) (“conclusory allegation” will not save claim founded on conspiracy 

from dismissal); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Bldg. & Const. Trades 

Dep’t, AFL-CIO, 770 F.3d 834, 842 (9th Cir. 2014) (conclusory allegations of conspiracy 

with non-parties insufficient to support civil RICO claims founded on alleged extortion).

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

In particular, the Complaint does not adequately plead Backpage’s commission of 

the predicate offenses of sex trafficking (18 U.S.C. § 1591), see Compl. ¶ 135, or coercion 

and enticement (18 U.S.C. § 2422), see Compl. ¶¶ 141-142, because any trafficking or 

coercion or enticement of prostitution was committed by third parties whose only link to 

Backpage is the allegation they posted ads on Backpage.com, see Compl. ¶¶ 129-133. 

Generalized and conclusory allegations that Backpage knew traffickers posted on the site 

does not make Backpage liable for trafficking committed by others. See, e.g., People v.

Ferrer, 2016 WL 7237305, at *7. That is especially true here, where the Complaint 

includes no allegation that, out of the millions of posts and users on Backpage.com, 

Backpage specifically knew of the particular ads concerning Plaintiff’s clients, or interacted 

with the third parties who trafficked Plaintiff’s clients. See Complaint ¶¶ 121-133. Rather, 

Plaintiff’s allegations of knowledge are apparently founded on Backpage.com’s editorial 

decisions to remove certain objectionable content from postings, see Compl. ¶ 62; the way 

it structures its website, and, in particular, the fallacious inferential leap that because 

multiple ages (of majority) may be listed for a given poster, Backpage somehow knows the 

poster is a minor, see Compl. ¶ 97; and the unsupportable proposition that, because 

Backpage has been given “notice” by certain elected officials that some postings on the site 

may be connected to trafficking or prostitution, it is charged with knowledge as to every 

specific instance in which an advertisement is allegedly connected to trafficking or 

prostitution, see Compl. ¶ 40. These conclusory and illogical allegations of notice do not 

suffice to create liability. See, e.g., People v. Ferrer, 2016 WL 7237305, at *7. 

Nor does the Complaint plead that Backpage violated 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (sexual 

exploitation of children), Compl. ¶¶ 136-138, or 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (material involving the 

sexual exploitation of minors), Compl. ¶¶ 139-140, given that the alleged exploitation was 

done—and any depictions posted—by third-party users. See AOL, 783 So.2d at 1017. 

Moreover, there is no allegation that any of the content concerning Plaintiff’s clients on 

Backpage.com actually contained or involved a “visual depiction” of a minor engaging in 

sexually explicit conduct. See Compl. ¶ 140. Rather, the only specific allegations of visual 

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865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

depictions are that unidentified third-party traffickers posted an undescribed “picture” of 

one of Plaintiff’s unnamed clients, with no allegation about the client’s age at the time the 

picture allegedly was taken, see Compl. ¶ 122, and another alleged trafficker posted pictures 

of a minor, apparently not a client of Plaintiff, “in revealing clothing,” see Compl. ¶ 130. 

And, again, Plaintiff’s conclusory and generalized allegations of Backpage’s “knowledge” 

fail to plead facts showing Backpage knew any ad involved or offered sexually explicit 

conduct, or depictions of such conduct, by a minor, see Compl. ¶¶ 136-137. 

Finally, because Backpage’s conduct—online publication—was lawful, Plaintiffs 

cannot plead that Backpage engaged in money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956. See, 

e.g., United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466, 1472 (10th Cir. 1991) (rejecting “argument

that the money laundering statute should be interpreted to broadly encompass all 

transactions, however ordinary on their face, which involve the proceeds of unlawful 

activity”), abrogated on other grounds by Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997); see

Compl. ¶¶ 143-147. As discussed throughout this Motion, Plaintiff’s conclusory and 

generalized allegations that Backpage knew some users may be engaged in trafficking do 

not mean it knew the fee for any particular ad involved the proceeds of unlawful activity. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). Rather, “the statute requires actual subjective knowledge. [A 

defendant] cannot be convicted on what she objectively should have known ... or because 

she was negligent in failing to recognize what was occurring or even because she was 

reckless or foolish in failing to recognize what was occurring.” United States v. Campbell, 

977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1992) (actual knowledge or willful blindness found where 

nature of large under-the-table real-estate transaction was on its face “fraudulent”). Nor 

does the Complaint offer anything more than speculation or innuendo that any transaction 

“in fact” involved proceeds of unlawful activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). 

Backpage.com’s routine acceptance of fees for ads cannot be characterized as intended to 

promote unlawful activity, see Compl. ¶ 143, where (1) the only factual claim of intent is 

based on the claim Backpage was “on notice” that some unspecified users engaged in 

trafficking, see id. ¶ 40; and (2) the Complaint repeatedly acknowledges Backpage.com 

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865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

banned content advertising illegal or underage transactions from its site, id. ¶¶ 58, 65. 

Allegations of intent here boil down to a suggestion that, having received vague “notice” of 

potential trafficking, Backpage didn’t take Plaintiff’s preferred “precautions” to stop it —a 

claim that, even if true, at most would sound in negligence, not intent. Id. ¶¶ 40, 173. 

Finally, there can be no plausible allegation that a website’s ordinary acceptance of modest 

advertising fees from customers operates to “conceal” the funds’ source, or avoid a 

transaction reporting requirement—let alone Backpage knew customers’ routine payments 

were so intended. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii); Compl. ¶ 144.

Finally, to establish a “pattern” of racketeering activity, a plaintiff “must show the 

racketeering predicates are related, and they amount to or pose a threat of continued

criminal activity.” H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone, Co. 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989) 

(emphasis added). First, there is no pattern, as the conduct alleged against Backpage 

amounts to a “single, lawful endeavor”—running a website. See Sawyer, 90 F.3d at 123. 

Second, putting aside the legality of Backpage’s conduct, there is no “continuity” given as 

the Complaint admits Backpage.com closed its Adult Services section. Compl. ¶ 87. 

b. Plaintiff Lacks Standing As A Remote Party Whose Claimed 

Injury Was Not Proximately Caused by Backpage.

Plaintiff does not have standing to bring the RICO claim because the Complaint 

alleges activities that would have, at most, harmed third parties—victims of trafficking—

not Plaintiff. Any claimed injury to Plaintiff based on its treatment of such victims was not 

proximately caused by Backpage because of the lack of “direct relationship between the 

injury and the alleged wrongdoing.” Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris Inc., 241 

F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2001). 

A plaintiff has standing under RICO only if it has been “injured in [its] business or 

property by reason of a violation of section 1962.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Flowing from this 

provision is the “requirement that the alleged violations of the law be the ‘proximate cause’ 

of the injury suffered” by a plaintiff to have standing to sue. Wash. Pub., 241 F.3d at 705. 

Courts consistently hold that “a plaintiff who complained of harm flowing merely from the 

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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

misfortunes visited upon a third person by the defendant’s acts was generally said to stand 

at too remote a distance to recover.” Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. 

Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 932 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. 

Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)). The rationale for this rule is “(1) the more indirect the 

injury, ‘the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiff’s damages 

attributable to [defendant’s wrongdoing], as distinct from other, independent, factors’; (2) 

allowing recovery by indirectly injured parties would require complicated rules for 

apportioning damages; and (3) direct victims could generally be counted on to vindicate the 

policies underlying the relevant law.” Wash. Pub., 241 F.3d at 705 (quoting Holmes, 503 

U.S. at 268). Moreover, the “potential for duplicative recoveries created by granting 

standing to attenuated and indirect parties weighs against finding proximate causation.” In 

re Am. Exp. Co. S’holder Litig., 39 F.3d 395, 401 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding shareholders did 

not have standing to sue officers and directors for alleged RICO violations since the 

shareholders were “not the intended targets of the RICO violations” and only the “target 

and victim of the scheme” had standing to sue).

Here, similarly, there is a “fundamental defect” with Plaintiff’s claim: Plaintiff is 

“attempting to recover for harm that is derivative of personal injuries visited upon [its 

clients].” See Wash. Pub., 241 F.3d at 705. The injuries that Plaintiff’s clients allegedly 

suffered, Compl. ¶¶ 129-133, would not be cognizable under RICO because they are not 

injuries to “business or property.” See, e.g., Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-op. Ass’n, 965 F.2d 

783, 785–86 (9th Cir. 1992) (“it is clear that personal injuries are not compensable under 

RICO,” collecting cases), abrogated on other grounds by Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897, 899 

(9th Cir. 2005); Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 1992) (forced exaction of sexual 

services not cognizable under RICO where services are illegal under state law). Plaintiff 

cannot convert clients’ non-cognizable injuries into grounds for Plaintiff’s suit by claiming 

Plaintiff “diverted and drained” its resources to provide services to its clients. Compl. ¶ 

120; see also id. ¶¶ 114-119. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected attempts by 

hospitals and other service providers to premise RICO standing on costs spent to treat 

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

others. See, e.g., Wash. Pub., 241 F.3d at 705 (hospital districts lacked RICO standing to 

sue alleged source of injury to patients). For the same reason, Plaintiff here lacks standing.

As discussed above, Backpage was not the cause in fact of any injuries suffered by 

Plaintiff’s clients, see Chicago Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 671 (not a “useful definition 

of cause” to ascribe users’ activity to website); based on settled RICO principles, neither is 

it the proximate cause of any injuries Plaintiff suffered. The elements of proximate and infact causation under RICO are therefore absent, and the RICO claims should be dismissed.

c. Plaintiff Does Not State A Claim For RICO Conspiracy.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is premised on conclusory allegations of conspiracy between 

Backpage and third-party traffickers, but no allegation can be made there was any actual 

agreement between Backpage and any trafficker—let alone the particular traffickers who 

harmed Plaintiff’s clients. Because there was no agreement, not only is Backpage not 

responsible for the traffickers’ action, but Plaintiff’s RICO conspiracy claim fails. 

The “touchstone of liability under § 1962(d) is an agreement to participate in an 

endeavor which, if completed, would constitute a violation of the substantive statute.” 

Goren v. New Vision Int’l, Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 731–33 (7th Cir. 1998) holding modified by 

Brouwer v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 199 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added); 

see also Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997) (“The partners in the criminal plan 

must agree to pursue the same criminal objective”). Allegations of conspiracy under 

Section 1962(d) must be dismissed where there is no allegation of “either a specific 

agreement by these defendants to participate in the affairs of the enterprise or an agreement 

to the commission of two specific predicate acts.” Goren, 156 F.3d at 732. It is also “well 

established that a complaint may be dismissed if it contains only conclusory, vague and 

general allegations of a conspiracy.” Id. at 733; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 564.

Here, the Complaint does not plead any facts showing agreement between Backpage 

and any of the alleged conspirators—nor could it. See Compl. ¶¶ 97-102, 129-134, 165. 

Instead, the Complaint attempts to manufacture a conspiracy from conclusion and 

conjecture, positing that “aggregation features on BigCity and EvilEmpire” somehow 

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865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

“make it clear that Defendants know that they are conspiring with traffickers”—apparently 

because “sometimes” individuals are “listed multiple times as different ages.” Id. 97. This 

conclusory innuendo falls far short of plausible allegations of agreement, and the Section 

1962(d) claim must be dismissed for this independent reason.

2. The Negligence Claim Fails.

Plaintiff’s negligence claim is premised on a contradiction: on one hand, Plaintiff 

insists Backpage.com must take precautions to prevent the posting of “advertisements 

selling trafficked adults and children,” Compl. ¶ 173; on the other hand, Plaintiff castigates 

Backpage.com for imposing posting guidelines, moderation, and filters that remove the very 

terms that could advertise illegal services or conduct, Id. ¶¶ 53-60, 65-66. 

Putting aside the Catch-22 created by these allegations—as well as Section 230 

immunity—the negligence claim fails because the alleged harm was caused by third-party 

traffickers and Backpage had “no duty to prevent a third person from causing physical harm 

to another.” See, e.g., Barkhurst v. Kingsmen of Route 66, Inc., 234 Ariz. 470, 472–73 (Ct. 

App. 2014) (organization did not owe a duty to individual assaulted by third parties even 

though it sponsored event where plaintiff was injured and advertised location on its 

website). Even if Backpage had some duty to individuals depicted in ads—and it does 

not—it certainly owes no duty to Plaintiff, a shelter with no relationship to Backpage. 

Moreover, the actions of third-party criminals were intervening causes breaking the claimed 

chain of causation between Backpage and Plaintiff’s clients—and breaks the even more 

attenuated claimed chain of causation between Backpage and Plaintiff. See, e.g., Hebert v. 

Club 37 Bar, 145 Ariz. 351, 352 (Ct. App. 1984) (tavern owner not liable for negligence 

where drunk patron’s criminal act was intervening cause of victim’s murder, even though 

owner knew patron was intoxicated and kept gun in his car). The claimed organizational 

harm to Plaintiff’s mission is even more causally remote. The negligence claim thus fails.

3. The Nuisance Claim Fails.

First, courts do not hesitate to dismiss public nuisance claims arising from a 

website’s facilitation of posting of content by third parties. See, e.g., Dart, 665 F. Supp. 2d 

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865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

at 968 (nuisance claim alleging website facilitated prostitution); Kathleen R. v. City of 

Livermore, 87 Cal.App.4th 684 (2001) (nuisance claim arising from minor patron’s receipt 

of pornography through computers in city library); Witkoff v. Topix, LLC, 2015 WL 

5297912, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2015) (unpublished), as modified (Sept. 18, 2015) 

(nuisance and wrongful-death claims against website for operating webpages where users 

could post information concerning availability of controlled narcotics).

Second, even if Section 230 did not bar the nuisance claim, the Complaint does not 

plead that Backpage—as opposed to certain users—intentionally caused a significant 

interference with public rights. Backpage was not the proximate or factual cause of 

Plaintiff’s or its’ clients’ injuries. The Complaint instead attempts to hold Backpage was 

“on notice” some users might engage in trafficking. See Compl. ¶ 40. “[G]eneral 

warnings,” however, cannot establish Backpage intentionally caused a public nuisance. 

Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 1998 WL 35298580, at *16 (D. Ariz. June 29, 1998).

Finally, putting aside the above defenses, Plaintiff does not have standing to bring a 

nuisance claim founded on an interference that purportedly affects a common wrong to the 

public at large. See Compl. ¶ 169 (alleging that the interference affects “a large number of 

children and vulnerable adults” and “the surrounding communities as well”). Standing to 

bring a nuisance claim that involves an interference with the public at large is restricted in 

order to, first, “relieve defendants and the courts of the multiple actions that might follow if 

every member of the public were allowed to sue for a common wrong. Second, it was 

believed that a harm which affected all members of the public equally should be handled by 

public officials.” Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Cmty. Servs. in Arizona, 

148 Ariz. 1, 5 (1985). For the above reasons, the nuisance claim should be dismissed.

III. CONCLUSION

Consistent with Congress’ binding policy judgment in Section 230 that “plaintiffs 

may hold liable the person who creates or develops [the] unlawful content, but not the 

interactive computer service provider who merely enables that content to be posted online,” 

Nemet, 591 F.3d at 254, this Court should dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. 

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566

(213) 633-6800

Fax: (213) 633-6899

DATED: June 8, 2017 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP

Scott Commerson( pro hac vice to be filed)

Brendan N. Charney (pro hac vice to be filed)

James Grant (pro hac vice to be filed)

Robert Corn-Revere (pro hac vice to be filed)

Ronald London (pro hac vice to be filed)

Rusing Lopez & Lizardi, PLLC

Daniel J. Quigley

Sarah S. Letzkus

By: /s/ Daniel J. Quigley

 Daniel J. Quigley

Attorneys for Defendants 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that, on June 8, 2017, I electronically transmitted this document to the Clerk’s 

office using the CM/ECF System and copies were served on the parties by Notice of 

Electronic Filing generated and transmitted by the CM/ECF system of the District of 

Arizona.

/s/ Daniel J. Quigley

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Exhibit	A

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Exhibit	B

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SAFE Action Project - Sojourner Center https://www.sojournercenter.org/about-us/safe-action-project/

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