### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5 -00 767 -CV
Axel M. Sigm ar and Lu cia S. Sigmar , Appellan ts
v. Alan And erson and Jo El len Anderson , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 53RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN50137 9 , HO NORAB LE SCO TT H. JENK INS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
This case conce rns whethe r a ba nkruptcy court’s or d er ap proving a sale of re al proper ty fre e of claims, toge ther with the subsequent sale by the debtor, pr eclude s later state court litigation to deter

mine owner ship of and the right to use a portion of t hat property
. Axel M. S igma r and L ucia S. Sigmar fi l ed this suit ag ainst Alan Ande rson and Jo Ellen Anderson asse rting
owner ship of a strip of land betwee n their proper ty and the Ander sons’ platted lot along the shore of L ake T ravis. The Sigmar s also reque sted a decla ration that they had the rig ht unde r an e aseme nt to use ce rtain par

ts of the disputed are a for rec reational purposes. The Ande rsons soug ht summary judgme nt, contending that a bankr uptcy court orde r appr oving the sale of a lot out of a ba

nkruptcy
e state —in c lud in g

t h e a r e a i n d i s p ut e
— b a r r e d th e dis tr ic t c ourt

fr om c on sid e ri ngthe Sig mars ’ c la ims
. The Ande rsons argued that the Sig mars should have litigated any claims to the disputed are a in the2

bankruptc y

proce eding in which the bankr uptcy court a uthorized the sale of the proper ty out of the bankruptc y

estate f ree and cle ar o f competing c laims and interests. Ag ree ing that the bankruptc y court orde r bar

red t h e S igma

rs’ c laims in thi s case , the district court re ndere d a take -nothing
su mma ry jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f t he An de rs on s. On appe al, the Sigma

rs asser t tha t t h e court misconstrued a nd misapplied the bankruptc y

code, ba sed its judgment on insuff icient evidenc e, and e rrone ously found pre clusion of the ea sement cla im that was outside the scope of the ba nkruptcy court’s o rd er . We affir m the judgme nt r eg arding the Sigmar s’ challeng es to the owner ship of any part of the disputed are a, but
reve rse the judg ment with r espec t to the Sigmar s’ reque st f or dec laratory

relief relating to a c laimed
ease ment. We remand the cause for f urther pr ocee dings r elating to the asser tion of an ea sement. The Sig mars and the Ander sons both own land car ved fr om a larg er tra ct once owned by Geor g e K. Ma

rshall. The pa

rties boug ht their portions of the larg er trac t at dif fer ent times from di ff er en t s u b s equent owne rs. L and fr om the orig inal Marsha ll tract is subject to an inundation
ease ment below the 715- foot contour line in fa vo r o f t he L ower

Colorado River Authority for the water s of L ake T ravis. Mar shall subdivided h i s land in 1946. Parts of that orig inal trac t were replatted as par

t of Marsha ll’s H arbor and Mar shall’s Vista. The A ndersons own lots 27 and 28 of Marsha ll’s Vista. The dispute is ove r the boundary betwee n L ot 27 a nd the Sigmar s’ adjac ent land. The Sig mars boug ht their lot in 2000. Deeds to their prede cessor s in interest purport to convey an ea sement ac ross land ly ing be tween the ir lot and the waters of L ake T ravis to be use d for a boat dock a

nd other purpose s. L ike their pr ed ec essors in intere st, the Sigmars ma intained aAlthough the motion originally listed the lots proposed for sale to the Ander sons as lots 36 1 and 37, the de btors filed an a mended motion corr ectingthat mistake.

3 boat dock a

nchore d to land submerg ed in L ake Travis. I n 2003, the pl at for the adjacent Mar shall’s Vista subdivision was filed as Document Number 200300060 in T ravis County . The Sig mars filed an af fidavit of re al prope rty

owner ship with the Travis C o u n t y C lerk in which the y asser t that the 2003 plat wrong ly

includes par

t of their land within L ot 27 of Marsha ll’s V ista. I n the af fidavit, they
a lso de ny a g re e ingto r e plat, a

tta c h th e ir

pr e fe rr e d d e sc ri pti on

of the bo un da

ry , a nd a sse rt the ir
rea diness to enter into an a g ree ment with the owner of the adjac ent proper ty —then Marsha ll’s Vista, L td.—reg ardingthe cor

rec t boundary
. The a ffidavit wa s filed on September 24, 2003, as Doc ument N u mb e r 2 0 0 3 2 2 7 3 2 7 i nT r a v i s C o u n t y. The Ande rsons purcha sed L ot 27 after the Sigmar s filed th e af fi d avit and af

ter Ma rs h a l l ’ s V i s t a , L t d
. f

i l e d f o r b an kr u p t c y p r o t e c t i o n . T h e b an kr u p t c y p r o c e e d i n g r e l a t i n g to Marsha ll’s Vista, L td. was administere d jointly with that of fellow debtor Marsha ll’s Harbor , L td. I n October

2003, the debtors f

iled a motion re questing that the bankruptc y court approve nine sales of pr op e rt ie s in the ba

nk ru ptc y e state su

bje c t to e xec uto ry c on tr a c ts, inc lud ing tho se c ov e ri nglot s 27 and 28 to t he An de rs on s and

L ot 1 30 -F S to the Sig mars . I n their re sponse to this mot ion in the 1 bankruptc y

court, the Sig mars ra ised the issue of t h ei r d ispute reg ardingthe re cently platted bo un da ry be tw e e n th e ir

land and L ot 27
. Th e Sig mars pr op os e d a bo un da ry a g re e me nt t

hat w ou ld memorialize the “c orre ct leg al desc ri p t i o n ” o f t h e boundar y betwee n their land a

nd L ot 27. They reque sted “that the De btors be g iven authority to enter into the B oundary Ag ree ment as par

t of the transac tion to sell L ot 130-FS to the Sigma rs.”4 The ba nkruptcy court a pproved only

some of the pr oposed sales. A t the hear ing, the debtors withdre w their motion to approve the sales to the Sigma rs in both Marshall’s Vista and Mars ha ll’ s H arb or . T he Sig mars a lso wi thd re w t he ir re qu est to en te r i nto “ the thr e e se pa rate ag ree ments . . . until such t ime as we have an agr eeme nt as to the lots.” The ba nkruptcy court sig ned
an o rd e r a

pp ro vin gsa le s “ fr e e and

c le ar o f a ll l ie ns , c la ims, and int e re st p ur su ant t o 1 1 U .S. C. § 363(f) . . . .” An e x hibit to the order l ists the s ale of lots 27 and 28 to the Andersons among the five sale s approve d. The lots we re then sold by the debtor pur suant to the bankruptc y court orde r. The wa rra nty deed convey

ing the proper

ty from the bankruptc y estate to the Ander sons describe s the land sold to the Andersons as “L ot 27 and L ot 28, Ma rshall[’] s Vista Subdivis ion, acc ording to the
ma p o r p la t th e re of

; reco rded i n D oc ume nt N umb e r 2 00 30 00 60 , O ff ic ia l Pu bli c Re c or ds , T ra

vis County , T e xas. ” Th e c on ve y anc e wa s ma de su bje c t to “ any

and a ll r estr ic tio ns , c ov e na

nts , conditions and ea sements . . . [that] are still in effe ct, and shown of rec ord . . . .” The Sig mars filed this suit in 2005, see king c lear title to or a dec laration of their rig ht to use the ar ea that had bee n the subject of the bound ar y d ispute. The Ande rsons moved for summary judgme nt, asserting that the Sigmar s’ claims we re pr eclude d by the bankruptc y proce eding and sale by

the debtor, and were an improper collatera l attack on the bankruptc y court orde r. The district court g rante d the motion.

We r eview a summary judgme nt de novo. J oe v . Two Thirt

yNin e J oin t V e ntu re , 145 S.W .3d 150, 156 (Tex. 2004). At trial, the movant must show that no g enuine issue of materia l fac t exis ts and that it is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law
. See Provident Life & Acc ident Ins. Co.5

v . Kn ott , 1 28 S.W. 3d

21 1, 21 5- 16 (T e x. 20 04 ) (c iti ng Te x. R. Civ
. P. 16 6a (c ))
. Th e mov ant m us t establish his entitlement to summary judgme nt by

conclusively

proving all essential ele ments of an aff irmative def

ense a s a matter of

law. H a v l e n v . M

c D o uga ll , 22 S.W .3d 343, 345 (Tex. 2000). When review ing a

summary judgme nt, we take as true all evidenc e favor able to the nonmovant, and we indulg e eve ry rea sonable infe renc e and r esolve a ny doubts in the nonmovant’s favor
. Joe , 145 S
. W
. 3 d at 1 5 7 (c i t i n g Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. G rant , 73 S.W .3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002)). The Sig mars conte nd that the summary judgme nt was base d on the er roneous conclu s io n th a t th e b an kr u p tc y c o u rt’ s o r d e r a

p p r o v in g th e s a le p r e c lu d e d th e d is tr ic t c o urt from consideringtheir claims with respect to the boundar y dispute. They

argue that the ba

nkruptcy court’s approva l of the sale of

the lots free of any claims could not empower the debtor to sell the disput ed
are a to the Ande rsons bec ause the debtor did not own the disputed ar ea. Th e Sigma rs ar g ue, alternati v el y , t hat the summary judgme nt rec ord did not establish whether their asse rtion of the boundary d is p u te w a s w it

h dr aw nf r o m c o n s id e r a ti o nb e f

o r e th e b an kr

u p tc y c o u rt o r w a s r e s o lv ed by the bankr uptcy court’s or der a

pproving the sale. F inally , they contend that the bankr

uptcy court did no t a dju dic a te wh e the r t

he y ha d a ri g ht to use the land thr ou g h an e a se me nt g ra nte d in the ir c ha in of title, theref

ore, the ir reque st for a d ec l ar atory judgme nt was not prec luded by the bankr

uptcy court’s or der a

pproving the sale of

L ot 27. The Ande rsons’ summary judgme nt motion was based on the co n t en t i o n that the Sigmar s’ suit is an impermissibl e collate ral attack on the bankruptc y court order . A collater al attac k, unlike a dire ct attac k, does not attempt to secur e the rendition of a single, c orre ct judg ment in place6

of the for mer judg ment. H

e n d e r s o n v . Ch am be rs , N o . 0 3

- 0 4

- 0 0 5 9 9

- C V , 2 0 0 6 T e x . A p p . LE X IS 25 99 , at *7 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin Marc h 3 1, 20 06 , n o p e t.) ; Ramsey v. Ramse y , 19 S.W .3d 548, 552 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.). Rather, it is an att em p t t o av o i d the ef fec t of a judg ment in a pr oc e e din g no t in sti tut e d f or the purp os e of c or

re c tin g , modi fy

ing , or va c a tin g the jud g me nt, bu t in order to obtai n s o m e s p ecific relief which the judg ment curr ently stands as a ba

r ag ainst. See Hende rson , 200 6 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 25 99 , at * 7; see also Biaza v . Simon , 8 7 9 S. W. 2 d 3 4 9 , 3 5 3 ( T e x. App.—Housto n [14t h Dist.] 1994, writ denied) . Only void judgments c an be c ollatera lly attacke d. Browning v. Placke , 698 S.W .2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1985). J ud g ments are void if the court r ender ing judgme nt la cked jur isdiction over the par ty , proper ty , or subject matter , had no jurisdiction to enter the par ticular judg ment, or had no c apac ity to act. Id
. T h e r e is n o c o n te n ti o n in th is c a s e th a t t

he bankruptc y

court orde r is void. There fore , if the orde r stands as a bar to the Sig mars’ c laims, it cannot be collate rally

attacke d in this proceeding
. See H enderson, 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 2599, at *8. Whether the ba

nkruptcy court orde r and the subsequent sale pursuan t to that order sta nd a s a ba r to the Sig mars ’ cl a ims in thi s ca se imp lic a te s the do c tr ine of c la im p re c lus ion . Cl a im prec lusion is a defense that parties can asser t to preve nt litig ation of a claim or ca use of a ction that ha s b e e n f

ina lly a dju dic a te d, a s we ll a s re la te d ma tte rs that sh ou ld have be e n lit ig a te d in a pr ior su it. Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp. , 8 37 S.W. 2d 62 7, 62 8 ( Te x. 19 92 ); see also Browning v. Prostok , 165 S.W. 3d 33 6, 34 9 ( Te x. 20 05 ); Hende rson , 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 2599, at *17-*18. The doctrine require s proof of the following elements: (1) a prior f inal judgmen t o n t h e m er i ts by a cour t of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of par ties or those in privity with them; and (3) a second a ction7

based on the same c laims a s wer e raised or could have been raised in the first ac tion. Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp. , 919 S.W .2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996)
. We must determine whethe r the ba nkruptcy court’s
or de r a pp ro vin g the sa le of

L ot 2 7 to the An de rs on s p re c lud e s th e Sig mars ’ c la ims in t his su it. There is no dispute o v er w hether the first two ele ments of claim pre clusion are satisfied in this case. The bankruptc y order approvingthe conve y ance of L ot 27 to the Andersons pursuant to sec tion 363(f) on Nove mber 4, 2003, wa s not appea l ed and is final. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(f) (West 2004). The Sig mars and the And er s o ns had notice of the proc eedingin the bankruptc y

court, we re r epre sented by counsel at the hear in g, an d p u t t heir c laims relating to the bo un da ry dis pu te in iss ue . Th e qu e sti on wi th re g ard to c la im p re c lus ion

in t his c a se is w he the r t

his
su it i s b a se d o n th e same c la ims a s w e re or sh ou ld h a ve be e n r a ise d in the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt
. The Sig mars ar g ue that owne rship of the disputed ar ea w as not , in fac t, at issue in the bankruptc y

proce eding beca

use the disputed ar ea was not pa rt of the bankruptc y estate. The Sigmar s
con t en d that the debtor ha d no interest in the disputed ar ea be cause the Sigmar s owned it. The bankru p t cy es t ate c onsists of “all leg al or e quitable intere st of the debtor in prope rty as of the
commence ment of the c ase.” Se e id . § 54 1( a ) ( Wes t 20 04 ). Th e re fo re , a c c or din g to t he Sig mars , the ar ea in disput e n ev er be came part of the bankruptc y estate nor

subject to any

bankruptc y pr oc e e din g . H ow e ve r, the ho lde r o f o lde r t itl e fr om a c omm on so ur c e ho lds su

pe ri or ti tl e , unle ss a holder of l at er title shows that he acquir ed title as a bona fide purc haser

for va lue and without notice of a

n ear lier existi ng interest. W ells v. Kansas Univ. Endowment Ass’n , 825 S.W .2d 483, 486 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1992, pet. denied)
. At the outset of the ba nkruptcy proce eding , a8

plat filed in the Tra

vis County

rec ords showed that the debtor owne d the disputed are a. The re w as no showing that the debtor kne w of the dispute when acquiring title. Whether t hat title was infer ior to the Sigmar s’ title may have been a subject for

litigation. Cf. Can za no v . R agos a , 382 F.3d 51, 58- 59 (1st Cir. 2004) (portion of pr operty non-debtor c laimed under unproven a d

v e r s e p o s s e s sion theory was pa rt of t itle owner ’s bankr

uptcy estate) . The scope of the prope rty included in the bankr

uptcy estate is broa d. United States v. W h i t i n g Pools, Inc. , 4 62 U. S. 1 98 , 2 04 -0 5 ( 19 83 ); se e als o 11 U.S.C.A. § 541. After a

debtor files a bankruptc y proce eding , the deter mination of what constitutes proper ty of the e state is a cor e proc eedingover w hich the bankr uptcy court ha s exclusive jurisdiction. See 11 U. S.C. § 5 41 ; 28 U. S.C. §§ 15 7( b) , 1 33 4( e ); Manges v . Atlas , 167 B.R. 848 (B ankr. S.D. Te x 1 9 9 4 ) ( ci t i n g Slay W

arehousing Co. v. Modern Boats, Inc

. , 775 F.2d 619, 620 (5th Cir. 1985)). A party who has a

rival owne rship claim to proper ty and has notice of and part icipates in the bankruptc y

court proc eeding s leading to the sale of that property must assert its cl ai m d u ri n g that proce eding or it will waive its rig ht to assert that cla im. See Canzano , 3 82 F .3 d at 60 -6 2; se e als o 11 U.S.C.A §§ 363, 541.

The Sig mars also a

rg ue that their ow nership intere st was not bef ore the bankruptc y court be cause section 363(f ) of ba nkruptcy code doe s not c ontemplate the sale of the intere sts of nondebtor c o-owne rs, unlike sec tion 363(h). Com pa re 1 1 U. S
. C.A. § 363(f) with id . § 36 3( h) (We st 2004). Ho we v er , the debtor a nd the Sigmar s were not co-owne rs and the c ourt did not order the Sig ma r s t o s e l l t h e i r c l a i m t o t h e d i s p u t e d ar e a . I n s t e a d , t h e S i g m ar s an d t h e d e b t o r h a d , a t mo st, rival cla ims to ex clusive owne rship of the disput ed land. Consi stent with the debtor’s owne rship,9

ne ith e r t he or de r n or

the wa rr anty de e d to the An de rs on s me nti on s th a t th e Sig mars have an in te re st, much less purport to conve y titl e fr om the Sigmar s to the Andersons. Subsec tion (f), rather than
su bs e c tio n ( h) , is a

pp lic a ble to t his c la im. The proc edura l posture of the Sigmar s’ title claim in this proceedingrese mbles that of the plaintiffs’ fra

ud claims in Prostok
. See 16 5 S. W.3 d at 340 -4 4. I n th a t c a se , th e pla int if fs in the state c ourt ac tion had challeng ed a proposed Chapter 11 plan of reor g anization c laiming, among other thing s, that ce rt ai n as s ets in the plan wer e fr audulently underva lued. See id. at 341. The bankruptc y

court re jected the challeng e and ente red a n order confirmingthe plan of r eorg anization. See id. Th e pla int if

fs the n fi le d a state c ourt laws uit a lle g ing a va ri e ty of c a us e s o f a c tio n a g a ins t the fo rm e r o ff

ic ers, d ir e c tor s, and

fi na nc ia l a dv iso rs of

the c or po rate de bto r b a se d o n th e same conduct that ha d formed the basis of their c halleng e to the plan of reor g anization. See id. The Texas Supreme C ourt held t hat claims in the s tate cour t proce eding wer e a c ollatera l attack on the bankruptc y

c o u rt c o n f

ir mati o no r d e r

an d w e r e , th e r e f

o r e , b ar r e d f r o m b e in g r e li g it a te d

in the subsequent state c ourt lawsuit. See id. at 348-49. Although one of the primar y issues in Prostok was whe ther the state court fr aud cla ims were “i n t ri n sic” or “ extrinsi c” to the ba nkruptcy court fra ud claims, the Prostok court confirmed the rule that iss ues that either wer e or should have been lit ig a te d in

a pr ior jud ic ia l pro c e e din g , inc lud ing a ba nk ru ptc y pr oc e e din g , c ann ot b e re lit ig a te d in
a su bs e qu e nt p ro c e e din g tha

t w ou ld h a ve the e ff

e c t of a vo idi ng the pr ior

c ourt or de r o r j ud g me nt. See id.T h e d o c t r i n e o f s t r i p s an d

g o r e s i s e s s e n t i a l l y a

p r e s u mp t i o nt h a t , w h e na g r an t o r c o n v e ys 2 a l l l an d h e o w n s a d

j a c e n tt o a

n ar r o w s t r i p t h a tt h e r e b y c e a s e s t o b e u s e f u l t o h i m , h e a l s o c o n v e ys the narrow st rip unless he plainly and spec ifically

rese rves the strip f

or himself. Angelo v. Biscamp , 441 S.W .2d 524, 526 (Tex. 1969). 10

Her e, t h e Sigmar s had notice of the proposed sa le of L ot 27, raised the bounda ry dispute on L ot 27 with the bankruptcy court, a nd proposed to r es o l v e i t. The Sigma rs wer e repr esente d at the hear ing during which the sale of L ot 27 fre e of any claims inconsistent with the replatting of recor d was approved, but did not object to the sale . Sales approve d under subse ction (f) are “fr ee and cle ar of an yint e re st in such proper

ty of an e nti ty

oth e r th an theesta te , only if . . . such intere st is in bona fide dispute
. . . .” 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(f) (4) ( emphase s added) . The sale of L ot 27 by the debtor to the Andersons pursuant to the bankruptcy court orde r, memorialized by the November

18, 2003 war

ranty deed, convey ed L ot 27 as desc ribed in the 2003 plat fr ee a nd clea r of
a ll o the r c la ims and

int e re sts e xce pt “ any and a ll re str ic tio ns , c ov e na nts , c on dit ion s, and

e a se me nts

. . . still in effe ct, and shown of rec ord,” w hich wer e intere sts ex pressly excepted fr om the sale by the dee d. The S igma

rs’ ownership claim was in bona fide dispute at t he bankr uptcy court a nd thus
was e x tinguished by

the bankr uptcy court’s order approving the sale fre e of all cla ims, including the Sigmar s’ boundar

y claims, tog ether

with the deed convey

ing the proper

ty to the Ander sons free of
any su c h c la ims . T hu s, the Sig ma rs are pr e c lud e d fr om br ing ing the ir tr e sp a ss t o tr y tit le c la im i n this cause. Claim preclusion also def eats the Si g mars’ assertions of t itle based on the doctrine of strips and g ores and t h ro u gh ad v erse possession. Under both theor ies, the Sigma rs asser t an 2
owner ship inter est or claim that prec eded that of the debtor a nd the cour

t-order ed sale . Both theor ies should have be en ra ised in the bankruptc y court when the debtors soug ht to sell the prope rty and the11

Sigmar s asser

ted their title to the disputed are a. Both c laims were exti ng uished by the sale a pproved by the bankr uptcy court. See 11 U. S.C. A. § 3 63 (f ); see also Canzano , 382 F.3d at 60-61 (orde red
sa le c on ve y e d ti tle fr e e and c le ar o f a dv e rs e po sse ssi on cla im mad e by pa rt y wi th n oti c e of

sa le proceed i n g). Under

these c ircumstance s, where the Sigmar s were awa re of , had notice of

, and pa rt ic ipate d in

the ba nk ru ptc y pr oc e e din g to the po int of ra isi ngthe iss ue of

the dis pu te d p ro pe rt

y boundary , the Sigmar s are prec luded from c laiming they have title to t he disputed ar ea of L ot 27. They cannot c ollatera lly

attack in this cause the bankruptcy court orde r or the sa le pursuant to that order and urg e re alig nment of the bounda ry of L ot 27 s et b y t h e p l at and the wa rra nty deed to the An de rs on s. The Sig mars also c ontend that th e ir reque st for dec laratory

relief to the eff ect that they have a n ease ment is not precluded beca use it wa s not w ithin the sc ope of the bankruptc y court orde r or the sale pursuant to that orde r. They argue that the e aseme nt claim is disti nct bec ause, instea d of seekingtitle, they

seek a decla ration of their

rig ht to use a portion of L ot 27 to anchor their boat doc k and for other re cre ational purposes by ease ment. They

contend that ba

nkruptcy court a ction pursuant to section 363(f) does not exti ng uish easeme nts. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(f).

Although the bankruptc y court has the power to authorize a sale f

ree and cle ar of liens and other interests, at least one bankruptc y court has held s uch authoriz ation has “no impact on restric tions of record that run wit h the l and” suc h as ea sements. Sil v e rm an v . A nk

ar i , 1 96 B .R. 251, 255-56 (E.D .N.Y. 1996). H oweve r, t he re cord in this case does not requir e us to dec ide whethe r this is or will rema in an accur ate statement of federa l bankruptc y law. Eve n if we a ssume section12

363(f) g rants the ba

nkruptcy court powe r to order

sales fr ee of

interests such as ease ments, the rec ord contains no indication that t he easement iss ue was ever in dispute in the bankruptcy court, a nd the
war ranty deed to the A ndersons e x pressly excepts out and prese rv es an y ea sements pre dating the transfe r:
This c onvey ance is made and a cce pted subject to the followingmatters, to the extent same are in eff

ect at this time: (i) any

and all re strictions, covena nts, conditions and e a se me nts , if

any , r e la tin g to t

he Pr op e rt

y , b ut o nly

to t he e xten t th a t th e y

are sti ll i n eff ect, a nd shown of re cord in [Travis County , Texas]
. . . . Consequently , even if

the bankr

uptcy court orde r could be interpre ted as gra nting the de btor the power to convey L ot 27 fre e of easeme nts running w ith the land, the debtor did not, in fac t, convey the prope rty

in that manner. The Sigmar s attache d deeds to their r esponse to the motion for
su mma ry jud g me nt t

hat th e y a sse rt sh owthe e xiste nc e of e a se me nts . T he Sig mars a sse rt that th e ir
e a se me nts are in t

he ir c ha in o f t itl e and

pa rt of the Tr a vis Cou

nty re c or ds . T he y

a sse rt that th e ir prede cessor s in tit le wer e gra nted easements across lands adjac ent to theirs ly ing be tween the 715- fo ot c on tou

r l ine and the wate rs of

L a ke Tr a vis fo r b oat do c ks , r e c re a tio na l us e , a nd lake a c c e ss. Ba sed on the re cord be fore us, the bankruptcy proce eding did not involve or resolve the validity

of any ease ments, nor wer e t h e Sigmar s require d to raise suc h issues. The ea sement claim i s not prec luded bec ause it conc erns a rig ht that was not adjudicated by the bankr uptcy court and does not e ven purpor

t to be exti ng uished by the dee d under w hich the Ande rsons took titl e. The
e a se me nt c la im do es no t atte mpt to a vo id t he e ff e c t of the sa le or de r o r o ve rt

ur n it , n or do e s it attempt to obtain relief that is inconsist ent wit h the order approving the sale or the sale itself. The13

ease ment claim is, thus, not an impermissibl e collate ral atta ck o n t h e bankruptcy court orde r. Acco rd ing ly , s inc e the on ly ba sis fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt a sse rt e d b y

the An de rs on s w a s c la im prec lusion pursuant to the bankruptcy court order and debtor’s sale of the prope rty in question, we conclude that it was err or to g rant summ ary judgme nt on the Sigmar s’ re quest for de clar atory relief
re g ard ingthe ir

ri g ht t o u se po rt ion s o f L ot 2 7 p ur su ant t o a n e a se me nt. We reve rse the summar

y judgme nt reg ardingthe dec laratory judgme nt action base d on the asser

tion of an ea sement, and r emand that c laim for fur ther p ro cee dings. We a ffirm the jud g me nt i n a ll o the r r e sp e c ts.

G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Waldrop Affir med in Part; Reverse d and Remande d in Part Filed: Oc tober 27, 2006