30456 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 116 / Friday, June 14, 1996 / Notices

1On September 19, 1994, NIRS sought relief,

pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206, regarding safety class

reactor internal components at Oyster Creek

Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS) on the

following premises: (a) the core shroud in General

Electric boiling water-reactors (BWRs) is vulnerable

to age-related deterioration; (b) 12 domestic and

foreign BWR owners have found extensive cracking

on welds of the core shroud; (c) only 10 of 36 U.S.

BWR owners have inspected their core shrouds and

9 of the 10 core shrouds had cracks at the time of

the NIRS Petition; (d) 19 of 25 selected BWR

internal components are susceptible to stress

corrosion cracking and 6 of 19 are susceptible to

irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking; (e) as

the oldest operating General Electric Mark I BWR

and the third oldest operating reactor in the United

States, OCNGS has been subjected for the longest

period to operational conditions that cause

embrittlement and cracking; (f) according to the

BWR Owners Group (BWROG), cracking of the core

shroud is a warning signal that additional safety

class reactor internals are increasingly susceptible

to age-related deterioration; (g) cracking of any

single part or multiple components jeopardizes safe

operation of that nuclear station; (h) Oyster Creek

did not inspect for core shroud cracking prior to the

current refueling outage and other safety-class

reactor internals have not been adequately

inspected for cracking; and (i) a safety analysis has

not been performed on the potential synergistic

effects of multiple-component cracking. The relief

sought in the Petition based upon these concerns

was denied in a Partial Director’s Decision issued

on August 4, 1995 (See General Public Utilites

Nuclear Corporation (Oyster Creek Nuclear

generating Station), DD–95–18, 42 NRC 67 (1995)).

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–277 and 50–278]

Peco Energy Company Peach Bottom

Atomic Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and

3; Issuance of Final Director’s Decision

Under 10 CFR 2.206

Notice is hereby given that the

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) has denied in part a

Petition, dated October 6, 1994,

submitted by the Maryland Safe Energy

Coalition (Petitioner). The Petition

requested that the NRC take action

regarding the Peach Bottom Atomic

Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3

(PBAPS). The Petition consisted of a

press release which was reviewed by the

NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206.

The October 6, 1994, Petition requests

the NRC to immediately shut down both

reactors at Peach Bottom and keep them

shut down until certain conditions are

corrected. Specifically, the Petitioner

stated that (1) the risk of fire near

electrical control cables due to

combustible insulation could cause a

catastrophic meltdown; (2) cracks were

discovered in the structural support

(core shroud) of the reactor fuel in

Peach Bottom Unit 3, indicating

possible cracks in other parts of the

reactor vessel; (3) the NRC discovered

that both reactors had no emergency

cooling water for an hour on August 3,

1994; and (4) other chronic problems

exist at Peach Bottom according to an

August 16, 1994, NRC report. The

Petitioner also indicated his support for

the demands from the Nuclear

Information Resource Service that (a) all

safety class component parts in both

reactor vessels, including the cooling

system, the heat transfer system, and the

reactor core, be inspected and (b) the

Peach Bottom operating license be

suspended until an analysis of the

synergistic effects of cracks in multiple

parts is conducted (incorporated into

Request 2).

The Director of the Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation has denied Requests

(2), (3) and (4) of the October 6, 1994,

Petition. The reasons for this denial are

explained in the ‘‘Final Director’s

Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206’’ (DD–96–

05), the complete text of which is

published elsewhere in this separate

part of the Federal Register, and which

is available for public inspection at the

Commission’s Public Document Room,

the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,

NW., Washington, DC, and at the local

public document room for the Peach

Bottom Atomic Power Station located at

the State Library of Pennsylvania,

(REGIONAL DEPOSITORY) Government

Publications Section, Education

Building, Walnut Street and

Commonwealth Avenue, Box 1601,

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 17105. A

Director’s Decision denying Request (1)

of the October 6, 1994 Petition was

issued under separate cover on April 3,

1996 (Director’s Decision DD–96–03).

A copy of this Final Director’s

Decision will be filed with the Secretary

of the Commission for review in

accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c). As

provided in that regulation, the Decision

will constitute the final action of the

Commission 25 days after the date of the

issuance of the Decision, unless the

Commission, on its own motion,

institutes a review of the Decision

within that time.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day

of June 1996.

William T. Russell,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 96–15150 Filed 6–13–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

[Docket Nos. 50–277 and 50–278 (10 CFR

2.206)]

PECO Energy Company, (Peach

Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit

Nos. 2 and 3; Final Director’s Decision

Under 10 CFR 2.206

I. Introduction

On October 6, 1994, the Maryland

Safe Energy Coalition (Petitioner) issued

a press release describing its concerns

with the operation of PECO Energy

Company’s Peach Bottom Atomic Power

Station (PBAPS). In the press release,

the Petitioner requested that the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

take action to address those concerns.

The Petitioner requested the NRC,

among other things, to immediately shut

down both reactors at Peach Bottom and

keep them shut down until certain

conditions are corrected. Specifically,

the Petitioner stated that (1) the risk of

fire near electrical control cables due to

combustible insulation could cause a

catastrophic meltdown; (2) cracks were

discovered in the structural support

(core shroud) of the reactor fuel in

Peach Bottom Unit 3, indicating

possible cracks in other parts of the

reactor vessel; (3) the NRC discovered

that both reactors had no emergency

cooling water for an hour on August 3,

1994; and (4) other chronic problems

exist at Peach Bottom according to an

August 16, 1994, NRC report.

The Petitioner seeks relief from the

risk of fire (Request 1) due to cable

insulation on the basis of a September

30, 1994, article in the Baltimore Sun

that described the indictment of

Thermal Sciences, Inc., on charges of

falsifying laboratory records related to

Thermo-Lag. Thermo-Lag is a material

used to insulate electrical cables and

other equipment from fire damage. The

Petition states that a fire in combustible

insulation near electrical control cables

could cause a catastrophic meltdown.

The Petition also seeks the correction

of cracks that were discovered in the

structural support (core shroud) of the

reactor fuel in Peach Bottom Unit 3,

indicating possible cracks in other parts

of the reactor vessel (Request 2). In

support of this request, the Petitioner

also references an earlier demand by the

Nuclear Information and Resource

Service (NIRS) 1 that all safety class

component parts in both reactor vessels,

including the cooling system, the heat

transfer system, and the reactor core, be

inspected and that an analysis be

conducted of the synergistic effects of

cracks in multiple parts. The Maryland

Safe Energy Coalition did not, however,

provide any information to support the

application of the NIRS Petition to

PBAPS.

The Petitioner also raises equipment

problems at PBAPS, stating that: (a) the

NRC discovered both reactors at PBAPS

had no emergency cooling water for

approximately one hour on August 3,
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 116 / Friday, June 14, 1996 / Notices 30457

2The Petitioner stated that the problems

described in the August 16, 1994, NRC report

included: cooling tower leaks, coolant injection

system vibration, injection valve failures, feedwater

vibrations and leakage, fuel pool hot spots, incore

probe failures, auxiliary boiler unreliability, valve

failures, air solenoid failure, and hydraulic leaks

and malfunctions.

3All Reactor Licensees with Installed Thermo-Lag

Fire Barrier Material, DD–96–03, 43 NRC (1996). In

addition to the Maryland Safe Energy Coalition,

Petitioners with concerns about the use of ThermoLag included the Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation

and the Nuclear Information and Resource Service,

the GE Stockholder’s Alliance and Dr. D.K.

Cinquemani, the Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy,

R. Benjan, B. DeBolt and the Oyster Creek Nuclear

Watch. In the Decision under 10 CFR 2.206, the

Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

determined that the Petitioners’ requests concerning

the use of Thermo-Lag should be denied.

1994 (Request 3), and (b) an NRC

inspection report dated August 16,

1994, which the Petitioner asserts

described numerous chronic problems

at PBAPS 2 (Request 4).

In a letter dated December 2, 1994, I

acknowledged receipt of the October 6,

1994, Petition and denied the

Petitioner’s requests for immediate

relief. In the acknowledgement letter I

informed the Petitioner that the

remaining requests were being

evaluated under 10 CFR 2.206 of the

Commission’s regulations and that

action would be taken in a reasonable

time.

The issues raised by the Petitioner

concerning the use of Thermo-Lag fire

barriers raised by Request 1 of the

October 6, 1994, Petition have been

previously considered. A Director’s

Decision (DD–96–03) (see attachment)

addressing this specific request as well

as the requests of other Petitioners with

concerns regarding the use of ThermoLag by reactor licensees, was issued on

April 3, 1996.3 The NRC staff’s review

of the issues related to cracking of

reactor internal components and

concerns regarding equipment problems

raised by Requests 2, 3 and 4 of the

October 6, 1994, Petition is now

complete. Accordingly, I am issuing a

Final Director’s Decision with regard to

Requests 2, 3, and 4. A discussion of the

Final Director’s Decision follows.

II. Discussion

A. Correction of Cracks in the Core

Shroud and Assertion of Possible Cracks

in Other Parts of the Reactor Vessel

(Request 2)

Nuclear power reactor licensees,

including PECO, are required by 10 CFR

50.55a to implement inservice

inspection programs that meet the

requirements set forth in the American

Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler

and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code).

The scope of the inservice inspection

programs for reactor pressure vessels

and their internal components are

prescribed by ASME Code, Section XI,

Division 1, Subsections IWA and IWB.

Licensees are also required by ASME

Code, Section XI, Article IWA–6000, to

submit the results of these inspections

to the NRC within 90 days of

completion. The NRC staff performs

periodic audits of licensee-implemented

inservice inspection programs to

determine compliance with applicable

codes and regulations. These audits are

documented in NRC inspection reports,

which are publicly available at the NRC

Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,

Washington, DC. Inspection reports

related to PBAPS are also available at

the local public document room for

PBAPS located at the State Library of

Pennsylvania (REGIONAL

DEPOSITORY), Government

Publications Section, Education

Building, Walnut Street and

Commonwealth Avenue, Box 1601,

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105.

The licensee’s inservice inspection

program contains provisions for the

periodic inspection of the PBAPS

reactor vessel internal components,

including such components as the top

guides, core shroud welds, shroud

support plate access hole covers, incore

instrument tubes, steam dryer drain

channels, core spray piping, and jet

pump assemblies. By letter dated April

8, 1986, the NRC found the Inservice

Inspection Program for the Second TenYear Interval at PBAPS Units 2 and 3 to

be satisfactory (September 1986–

November 1997 and December 1985–

August 1997, for Units 2 and 3,

respectively).

In addition to the ASME Code design

and inservice inspection program

requirements, the NRC provides

information to the nuclear power

industry on various emerging

phenomena that may potentially affect

the safe operation of nuclear power

plants. For example, intergranular stress

corrosion cracking (IGSCC) of BWR

internal components has been identified

as a technical issue of concern by both

the NRC staff and the nuclear industry.

The core shroud is among the internal

reactor components susceptible to

IGSCC. Identification of cracking at the

circumferential beltline region welds in

several plants during 1993 led to the

publication of NRC Information Notice

(IN) 93–79, ‘‘Core Shroud Cracking at

Beltline Region Welds in Boiling-Water

Reactors,’’ issued on September 30,

1993. Several licensees inspected their

core shrouds during planned outages in

the spring of 1994 and found cracking

at the circumferential welds. To

disseminate this information to nuclear

power plant licensees, the NRC issued

IN 94–42, ‘‘Cracking in the Lower

Region of the Core Shroud in BoilingWater Reactors,’’ on June 7, 1994, and

Supplement 1 to IN 94–42, on July 19,

1994, concerning cracking found in the

core shrouds at Dresden Unit 3 and

Quad Cities Unit 1. On July 25, 1994,

the NRC issued GL 94–03,

‘‘Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking

of Core Shrouds in Boiling Water

Reactors,’’ requesting that BWR

licensees inspect their core shrouds by

the next refueling outage and justify

continued operation until inspections

could be completed. The NRC has been

closely monitoring these inspection

activities. Additional examples of NRC

action regarding reactor vessel internal

component reliability issues are the

issuance of Bulletin 80–13, ‘‘Cracking in

Core Spray Spargers’’, on May 12, 1980,

after the detection of cracks in core

spray system sparger piping at several

operating BWRs and the issuance of IN

95–17, ‘‘Reactor Vessel Top Guide and

Core Plate Cracking,’’ issued on March

10, 1995, that concerned reactor vessel

top guide and core plate cracking.

Core Shroud Cracks

The licensee submitted letters dated

March 14, 1994, November 7, 1994 and

November 3, 1995, regarding the results

of its inspections of the PBAPS Unit 2

and 3 core shrouds. The inspections

revealed a moderate amount of crack

indications in the Unit 2 and Unit 3 core

shrouds, totaling 5 percent of the weld

length examined in Unit 2 and 12

percent of the weld length examined in

Unit 3. Along with the inspection

results, the licensee presented an

analysis of the impact of the crack

indications on the structural strength of

the core shrouds for Unit 2 and Unit 3.

For both the Unit 2 and Unit 3 core

shroud, the staff reviewed the licensee’s

analysis of structural loading of the asfound shroud weld which showed that

the loadings were less than ASME Code

allowable values. In a letter dated

February 6, 1995, the NRC staff issued

a safety evaluation of the 1994 Unit 2

core shroud inspection concluding that

sufficient structural margin remained in

the Unit 2 shroud to justify operation of

PBAPS 2 for another operating cycle

(current operating cycle 11 that ends in

September 1996) without modification

to the shroud. In a letter dated January

29, 1996, the NRC staff issued a safety

evaluation of the 1995 Unit 3 core

shroud inspection concluding that

sufficient structural margin remained in

the Unit 3 shroud to justify operation of

PBAPS 3 for another operating cycle

(current operating cycle 11 that ends in
30458 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 116 / Friday, June 14, 1996 / Notices

4Correspondence regarding these cracks,

including letters from PECO to the NRC dated April

29, 1982, May 11, 1982, June 4, 1982, and

November 8, 1985 are available in the local public

document room.

5The NRC staff’s review of the clamp design is

addressed in Inspection Report 50–277/95–18; 50–

278/95–18 and in a letter dated October 13, 1995.

September 1997) without modification

to the shroud.

Reactor Vessel Internals Cracking

In addition to the inspection of core

shrouds, PECO performs inspections of

the PBAPS Unit 2 and 3 reactor vessel

internals and other internal safetyrelated components in accordance with

the PBAPS inservice inspection

program, as set forth in 10 CFR 50.55a

and ASME Code, Section XI. By letter

dated January 17, 1995, PECO

submitted, in accordance with 10 CFR

50.55a(g)(3), a report on its inservice

inspection activities conducted during

the September 1994, Unit 2, refueling

outage. In the report PECO listed the

inspections performed and discussed

the disposition of indications in certain

components. In addition to the core

shroud flaws described above, the

licensee discovered some minor defects,

such as a crack in a jet pump assembly

restrainer adjustment screw tack weld,

and performed an engineering

evaluation to determine if a repair was

needed. In the case of the jet pump

restrainer adjustment screw tack weld

crack, a second existing weld was found

intact and no repair was necessary. The

NRC staff conducted an inspection of

the licensee’s inservice inspection

activities during the PBAPS Unit 2

refueling outage. The results of that

inspection are documented in

Inspection Report 50–277/94–28 and

50–278/94–28 (IR 94–28). The staff

concluded that PBAPS inservice

inspection programs and nondestructive

examination programs were well

planned, controlled, and executed for

both PBAPS 2 and PBAPS 3. Therefore,

the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a and

the ASME Code have been met in this

area, and the results confirm that

satisfactory material conditions exist for

the safe operation of both units.

The NRC staff has reviewed the

content and results of other licensee

inspection activities, as discussed

below.

NRC Bulletin 80–13, issued on May

12, 1980, requested that BWR licensees

visually inspect core spray piping inside

the reactor vessel at each subsequent

refueling outage. During inspections

conducted as requested by the staff in

Bulletin 80–13, PECO detected cracks in

core spray piping inside the reactor

vessel in Unit 2 and Unit 3 in 1982 and

1985, respectively. In both instances,

the licensee installed clamps on the

affected piping to mitigate the

consequences of the cracks. In letters

dated June 10, 1982, and November 21,

1985, the NRC staff reviewed the

licensee’s analysis of the crack

consequences and repair plans 4 and

found them acceptable for PBAPS Units

2 and 3, respectively.

In November 1993, during subsequent

inspections, PECO identified cracking in

the downcomer portion of the Unit 3

core spray piping. By letters dated

November 5 and November 10, 1993,

the licensee provided an analysis which

demonstrated that this downcomer

piping had sufficient structural integrity

to justify operation without repair for

the subsequent operating cycle. In a

letter dated November 16, 1993, the

NRC found PECO’s proposal to operate

for one operating cycle without

repairing the core spray downcomer

cracks acceptable. During the September

1995 refueling outage for PBAPS Unit 3,

PECO performed additional inspections

of the core spray piping within the

reactor vessel. As documented in its

letter dated October 9, 1995, PECO

stated that this inspection revealed

additional cracking. In its letter of

October 9, 1995, as supplemented by a

letter dated October 12, 1995, PECO

proposed to repair the core spray piping

by installing mechanical clamps over

the affected cracked welds. The NRC

staff reviewed the design of the

proposed clamps and found that the

clamps provided the required structural

integrity for the piping. The NRC staff

also approved restart of the Peach

Bottom Unit 3 based on PECO’s

installation of the clamps.5

Although cracking of the top guide

has not been detected at PBAPS, the

licensee has implemented a program to

inspect the top guide and has included

the top guide inspection into the PBAPS

inservice inspection program.

Analysis Regarding Synergistic Effects

of Cracking of Multiple Components

The Petitioner raises a concern about

the lack of an analysis of the synergistic

effects of cracks in multiple reactor

vessel components.

Most reactor internals are fabricated

from high-toughness materials such as

stainless steel and were designed with

significant margins on allowable

stresses. Cracking must be severe to

adversely impact plant safety. It is

unlikely that licensee inspections would

not find such severe degradation. In

fact, the PECO inspections, using

qualified inspectors and procedures,

have been effective in identifying and

sizing of the cracks in the Peach Bottom

Unit 2 and Unit 3 core shrouds. In

addition, after evaluating the results

from internals inspections performed to

date at PBAPS, the NRC staff has

concluded that ASME Code structural

margins have been maintained to meet

ASME design requirements. Thus, these

components will perform their function

in the safe operation of the plants.

Implementation of an effective

inservice inspection program serves to

detect cracking. Upon detection of

cracking, proper actions by the licensee

to maintain component integrity will

prevent cracks, large enough to affect

operability, from existing in multiple

components at the same time.

Nevertheless, the NRC has asked the

BWR Vessel Internals Project (BWRVIP),

an industry group, to develop an

assessment to address this unlikely

situation. A report from the BWRVIP on

this issue, ‘‘Reactor Pressure Vessel and

Internals Examination Guidelines

(BWRVIP–03; EPRI Report TR–105696,’’

dated November 10, 1995, is currently

under NRC staff review. In addition, the

NRC has undertaken a longer term

evaluation of the effects of cracking in

multiple internal components. This

evaluation will involve appropriate

probabilistic treatment of the key

variables (such as material

susceptibility, loading and

environment).

Moreover, the licensee is not required

by 10 CFR 50.55a or the ASME Code to

perform an analysis that addresses the

synergistic effects of cracking in

multiple safety-class components. Since

the NRC staff has found during reviews

of the initial plant design and reviews

of the licensee’s response to

subsequently identified cracks, as

described above, that each affected

component has been shown to meet the

ASME design margins; the NRC staff is

satisfied that these components will

perform their intended function in the

safe operation of the facilities. Because

of this and the inspection requirements

that pertain to reactor internals and the

results of the inspections performed to

date, the NRC staff does not consider the

lack of an analysis of the synergistic

effects of cracks in multiple reactor

components for PBAPS, to be a

substantial safety concern.

In summary, on the basis of the NRC

inspections and the evaluations of the

licensee inspections required by 10 CFR

50.55a and the ASME Code, the NRC

staff has concluded that the licensee has

taken appropriate actions to ensure the

structural integrity of the PBAPS reactor

vessel internal components. The NRC

staff, however, continues to overview

PECO’s inspections, evaluations, and
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 116 / Friday, June 14, 1996 / Notices 30459

6See footnote 2.

repairs as necessary to meet these

requirements. At this time, the NRC staff

has not found any reason to question the

safe operation of PBAPS. Therefore, the

NRC staff has concluded that the

Petitioner has not presented a

substantial health or safety issue to

warrant taking the actions requested in

the Petition.

B. Correction of Equipment Problems

Identified in Recent NRC Inspection

Reports (Requests 3 and 4)

Emergency Core Cooling

The Petition referred to a situation on

August 3, 1994, wherein the PBAPS

emergency service water (ESW) system

was placed in a degraded condition. The

Petitioner asserted that both reactors at

PBAPS had no emergency cooling water

for about one hour. The NRC resident

inspectors at the Peach Bottom site

conducted an inspection of this event

and documented their findings in

Inspection Report 50–277/94–24 and

50–278/94–24, dated September 29,

1994 (IR 94–24). In the report the NRC

inspectors concluded that the discharge

valve from the ESW system back to the

Susquehanna River was shut and left

unattended for approximately fifty

minutes after maintenance and testing

on the valve. In the report, the NRC staff

concluded that, if an accident requiring

the use of safety equipment (including

emergency diesel generators and

emergency core cooling equipment) had

occurred during that fifty minute

period, the operation of that safety

equipment could have been jeopardized.

By letter dated November 21, 1994,

the NRC issued a Notice of Violation

and Proposed Imposition of Civil

Penalty (EA–94–197) to PECO Energy

Company regarding the circumstances

surrounding the August 3, 1994, event.

The NRC staff cited the licensee for

failure to implement maintenance and

testing procedures that were adequate to

ensure that the ESW system could

perform its intended function while

maintenance activities were being

performed. The staff noted that since the

August 3, 1994, event, the licensee had

restored the ESW to its intended

configuration and had initiated steps to

assure that future maintenance activities

would not lead to a degraded ESW

system. Notwithstanding the specific

corrective actions implemented by the

licensee, the staff imposed a civil

penalty in the amount of $87,500. On

December 21, 1994, PECO Energy paid

the civil penalty.

Because appropriate NRC action has

been taken and the licensee has restored

the ESW system to its intended

configuration and has implemented

corrective actions to prevent recurrence

of the deficiencies that occurred on

August 3, 1994, no specific concern

about the ability of the ESW system to

perform its intended function currently

exists.

Chronic Equipment Problems

The Petition also referenced a list of

chronic equipment problems at PBAPS.6

The Petition referenced an NRC report

dated August 16, 1994 (NRC Inspection

Report 50–277/94–17; 50–278/94–17 (IR

94–17)), as the source of the chronic

problems.

In this inspection report the NRC

assessed the performance of the

licensee’s engineering and technical

support organization at Peach Bottom.

The NRC inspector reviewed various

facets of PECO’s engineering

department’s performance in order to

identify potential organizational

weaknesses and deficiencies. The NRC

uses the inspection findings to maintain

a close understanding of the licensee’s

performance in areas that can affect safe

plant operation. As such, the NRC

reviews the licensee’s program for

identifying, addressing, and resolving

recurring or ‘‘chronic’’ equipment

problems. At the time that IR 94–17 was

issued, the basis document for the

licensee’s program was the ‘‘Chronic

Equipment/System Problems’’ list. This

was a list of recurring problems for

which the licensee had either identified

the need for engineering department

review and action or had determined a

method for resolving the problem but

had not yet implemented the solution.

The ‘‘Chronic Equipment/System

Problems’’ list included equipment

problems with potential safety impact as

well as obvious non-safety-related

problems. In assessing the management

of recurring problems, the NRC

evaluates the licensee’s ability to

address and resolve problems in a

timely manner and the licensee’s ability

to evaluate the safety significance of

each problem. The existence of a list of

issues does not in itself indicate poor

engineering department performance.

As noted in IR 94–17, the licensee had

developed solutions for a number of the

problems on the list and had developed

plans to implement these solutions.

Further, the NRC staff assessed the

PBAPS Chronic Equipment/System

Problem list as a positive management

feature and a commitment on the part of

the licensee to improve overall plant

performance.

The NRC staff, including the resident

inspectors and the Region I inspection

staff, periodically reevaluate the

performance of the licensee’s

engineering department. In addition,

NRC inspectors continue to review the

licensee’s action on many of the

individual problems on the PBAPS

Chronic Equipment/System Problem

list. Accordingly, the NRC performed a

follow-up inspection to IR 94–17. In the

follow-up inspection, documented in

Inspection Report 50–277/94–21; 50–

278/94–21 (IR 94–21), dated November

4, 1994, the NRC staff examined the

safety significance of those items that

were on the Chronic Equipment/System

Problem List as of September 13, 1994.

The staff concluded that none of the

items on the list was a significant

current safety concern. The inspectors

concluded that the licensee had

initiated appropriate action to evaluate

and correct those items detailed in IR

94–21. The staff concluded that the

licensee used the Chronic Equipment/

System Problem list to appropriately

focus long-term engineering and

management attention to known

reliability problems.

In summary, the staff considers

proper management of recurring

equipment problems important to the

continued safe operation of a nuclear

power plant. Accordingly, the NRC staff

views positively the licensee’s activities

such as the formulation of the Chronic

Equipment/Systems Problem list, which

was cited in the Petition. On the basis

of the review efforts by the NRC staff, I

conclude that no substantial health or

safety issues have been raised by the

Petitioner.

IV. Conclusion

The institution of proceedings in

response to a request pursuant to

Section 2.206 is appropriate only when

substantial health or safety issues have

been raised. See Consolidated Edison

Co. of New York (Indian Point Units 1,

2, and 3), CLI–75–8, 2 NRC 173, 176

(1975) and Washington Public Power

Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project

No. 2), DD–84–7 19 NRC 899, 923

(1984). This standard has been applied

to the concerns raised by the Petitioner

to determine whether the action

requested by the Petitioner is warranted.

With regard to the specific requests

made by the Petitioner discussed herein,

the NRC staff finds no basis for taking

any additional actions. Rather, as

explained above, the NRC staff

considers that no substantial health or

safety issues have been raised by the

Petitioner. Accordingly, the Petitioner’s

requests for additional action pursuant

to Section 2.206, specifically requests 2,

3, and 4, are denied. Accordingly, no

action pursuant to Section 2.206 is

being taken in this matter.
30460 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 116 / Friday, June 14, 1996 / Notices

1The Petition submitted by the Maryland Safe

Energy Coalition expressed several concerns in

addition to the fire hazard issue. These other issues,

that is other than the fire hazard issue, will be the

subject of a separate Director’s Decision.

A copy of this Final Director’s

Decision will be filed with the Secretary

of the Commission for review in

accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c). This

Decision will become the final action of

the Commission 25 days after issuance

unless the Commission, on its own

motion, institutes review of the Decision

within that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day

of June 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

William T. Russell,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

William T. Russell, Director

In the Matter of: All Reactor Licensees

With Installed Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier

Material.

Director’s Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

I. Introduction

By letter dated September 26, 1994,

the Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation

and the Nuclear Information and

Resource Service (NIRS); by press

release dated October 6, 1994, the

Maryland Safe Energy Coalition; by

separate letters dated October 21, 1994,

the GE Stockholders’ Alliance and Dr.

D. K. Cinquemani; by letter dated

October 25, 1994, the Toledo Coalition

for Safe Energy; by letter dated October

26, 1994, R. Benjan; by letter dated

November 14, 1994, B. DeBolt; and by

letter dated December 8, 1994, NIRS and

the Oyster Creek Nuclear Watch (the

Petitioners), requested that the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

take action with regard to the use of

Thermo-Lag by reactor licensees and

that their letters be treated as Petitions

pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of

the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR

2.206).

The Citizens for Fair Utility

Regulation and NIRS requested that (1)

Texas Utilities Electric Company (TU

Electric), licensee of Comanche Peak

Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, perform

additional destructive analysis for

Thermo-Lag configurations in

proportion to the total installed amount

of Thermo-Lag to determine the degree

of ‘‘dry joint’’ occurrence, (2) the

licensee perform fire tests on upgraded

‘‘dry joint’’ Thermo-Lag configurations

for conduit and cable trays to rate the

barrier as a tested configuration in

compliance with fire protection

regulations, and (3) the NRC

immediately suspend the Comanche

Peak Unit 1 license until the above

corrective actions are taken. The

Maryland Safe Energy Coalition

requested immediate shutdown of both

reactors at the Peach Bottom plant until

the risk of fire near electrical control

cables due to combustible insulation is

corrected.1 Dr. Cinquemani and the

Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy

requested that the NRC immediately

shut down all reactors where ThermoLag is used until it has been removed

and replaced. The GE Stockholders’

Alliance requested shutdown of all

reactors where Thermo-Lag is used until

it has been removed and replaced with

fire-retardant material meeting NRC

standards. R. Benjan requested

immediate shutdown of all reactors

where Thermo-Lag is used. B. DeBolt

requested shutdown of all reactors in

which Thermo-Lag is used until it has

been removed and replaced. NIRS and

the Oyster Creek Nuclear Watch

requested that NRC immediately

suspend GPU Nuclear Corporation’s

(GPUN’s) operating license for Oyster

Creek Nuclear Generating Station

(OCNGS) until GPUN removes ThermoLag fire barrier material and replaces it

with a competitive product that meets

current NRC fire protection regulations.

As a basis for their requests

concerning Thermo-Lag 330–1 fire

barrier upgrades, the Citizens for Fair

Utility Regulation and NIRS Petitioners

stated that (1) the licensee’s records on

the original installation of Thermo-Lag

fire barriers on conduits and cable trays

indicate that its contractor followed

specifications for pre-buttering all

joints; (2) NRC Inspection Reports 50–

455/93–42 and 50–446/93–42 found,

based on destructive analysis

documents, that a concern did exist

where Thermo-Lag conduit joints fell

apart easily and did not appear to have

any residual material of a buttered

surface, indicative of a joint that had not

been pre-buttered; (3) the ‘‘dry joint’’

deficiency appeared in Room 115A and

other areas of the unit; (4) the licensee

directly contradicts an NRC inspector’s

findings that were determined in part by

destructive analysis; (5) the ‘‘dry joint’’

or absence of pre-buttering of ThermoLag panels can be determined only by

destructive analysis and cannot be

determined by a walkdown visual

inspection; (6) the findings reported in

the Comanche Peak Unit 1 Region IV

Inspection Reports 50–455/93–42 and

50–446/93–42, based on the limited

amount of destructive analysis

conducted at the unit, constitute a

substantial documentation of

installation deficiencies found in

Thermo-Lag fire barriers as documented

in NRC Information Notice (IN) 91–79,

‘‘Deficiencies in the Procedures for

Installing Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier

Materials,’’ December 6, 1991, and IN

91–79, Supplement 1, ‘‘Deficiencies

Found in Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier

Installation,’’ August 4, 1994; (7) neither

the NRC nor the industry, by its agent

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), nor a

utility, have conducted fire tests on dryfitted or ‘‘dry joint’’ upgraded

configurations of Thermo-Lag 330–1;

and (8) the presence of ‘‘dry joint’’

upgraded configurations in Comanche

Peak Unit 1 constitutes an untested

application of Thermo-Lag fire barriers.

As a basis for the requests concerning

Thermo-Lag 330–1 fire barrier upgrades,

the Maryland Safe Energy Coalition

stated that the manufacturer of the flame

retardant (Thermo-Lag insulation) was

indicted on criminal charges (of

falsifying tests of the effectiveness of the

insulation as a fire barrier), and fire near

the electrical control cables, due to

combustible Thermo-Lag insulation,

could cause a catastrophic meltdown.

As the bases for their requests, Dr.

Cinquemani, the Toledo Coalition for

Safe Energy, the GE Stockholders’

Alliance, and R. Benjan stated either

individually or collectively that (1) the

widespread use of Thermo-Lag in more

than 70 reactors presents a safety crisis;

(2) the NRC has known since 1982 that

Thermo-Lag fails NRC performance

standards for material that protects vital

electrical cables for ampacity rating and

fire resistance; (3) Thermo-Lag has

failed not only NRC tests, but almost all

other independent tests; (4) Thermo-Lag

is combustible, contrary to NRC

regulations, and is an ineffective fire

barrier; (5) the use of Thermo-Lag could

lead to shorts, to failure of the cables in

an emergency, and to fire; (6) ThermoLag is faulty in that fraudulent ampacity

ratings allowed utilities to use smaller

cable than permitted by design

requirements, causing the cable to

overheat and its insulation to

deteriorate; (7) the NRC has stated that

fire at some nuclear power plants can

contribute as much as 50 percent of the

risk to a core meltdown, and a typical

reactor will have three to four

significant fires during its licensed

lifetime; (8) Thermal Science, Inc. (TSI),

the manufacturer of Thermo-Lag, and its

President were indicted by a Federal

grand jury on seven criminal charges

related to conspiracy to defraud the U.S.

Government in regard to the

effectiveness of Thermo-Lag; and (9) the

hourly fire watches at the Davis-Besse
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 116 / Friday, June 14, 1996 / Notices 30461

Nuclear Power Plant operated by Toledo

Edison do not replace fire barrier

material and do not prevent fires.

As the bases for his request, B. DeBolt

stated that Thermo-Lag fails to meet

NRC regulations concerning

combustibility and that the

manufacturer of Thermo-Lag was

indicted for defrauding the Government

and the utilities. Among the many bases

for their request, NIRS and the Oyster

Creek Nuclear Watch stated that (1)

Southwest Research Institute (SwRI)

conducted fire tests on Thermo-Lag

330–1 specimens for GPUN and

reported that all specimens ignited

approximately 2 seconds after it was

inserted into the furnace and failed

specified criteria because of flaming

after the first 30 seconds of testing, an

outside temperature rise higher than 30

°C, and a weight loss of 50 percent; (2)

GPUN’s operation of OCNGS with

knowledge of the SwRI report is an

example of GPUN’s reckless disregard

for fire protection and public safety; (3)

in the event of fire, Thermo-Lag is likely

to fail its intended function of

protecting vital electrical cables running

from the control room to plant safety

systems used to shut down the reactor;

(4) current installations of Thermo-Lag

are likely to fail in less time than 1 hour

(when smoke detectors and automatic

sprinkler systems are present) or 3 hours

(when there are no fire detection and

suppression systems) that NRC

regulations require for fire barriers to

withstand fire; (5) the NRC Inspector

General issued a report in August 1992

condemning NRC’s handling of the

Thermo-Lag issue and documenting the

NRC staff’s failure to understand the

scope of the problem; (6) in April 1994,

Industrial Testing Laboratories and its

President pleaded guilty to five felony

counts of aiding and abetting the

distribution of falsified test data; (7) on

September 29, 1994, the U.S.

Department of Justice issued a sevencount indictment against the

manufacturer of Thermo-Lag and its

Chief Executive Officer for willful

violations of the Atomic Energy Act,

conspiracy to conceal material facts, and

making false statements to defraud the

United States in connection with $58

million in fire barrier material; (8)

GPUN has known since at least August

11, 1992, that Thermo-Lag 330–1 as a

structural base material is combustible

and that GPUN was in violation of

Appendices A and R to 10 CFR Part 50

and the NRC Standard Review Plan,

NUREG–0800; (9) GPUN failed to report

the SwRI test results in response to a

request for additional information

regarding Generic Letter (GL) 92–08

(‘‘Thermo-Lag 330–1 Fire Barriers’’) of

February 10, 1994, when asked to

describe the Thermo-Lag 330–1 fire

barriers installed as required to meet 10

CFR Part 50, Appendix R; and (10)

continued reliance on fire watches at

OCNGS is an unreasonable and

unnecessary hazard to the public health

and safety because of an inoperable fire

protection system for safe shutdown of

the reactor and installed combustible

material on the shutdown systems.

On November 7, 1994, I informed the

Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation and

NIRS that the request for an immediate

suspension of the Comanche Peak Unit

1 operating license was denied. On

December 2, 1994, I informed the

Maryland Safe Energy Coalition that the

request for an immediate shutdown of

the Peach Bottom plant and for an

immediate suspension of the Peach

Bottom license was denied. On

December 15, 1994, I informed the GE

Stockholders Alliance, Dr. D. K.

Cinquemani, the Toledo Coalition for

Safe Energy, and R. Benjan that the

immediate suspension of the operating

licenses of all reactors where ThermoLag is used was denied. On January 3,

1995, I informed NIRS and the Oyster

Creek Nuclear Watch that the immediate

suspension of the OCNGS operating

license was denied. On January 19,

1995, I informed B. DeBolt that the

request for immediate suspension of the

operating licenses of all reactors in

which Thermo-Lag is used was denied.

The decisions were based on the

following: (1) the staff is addressing

deficiencies in fire barriers constructed

with Thermo-Lag material as part of a

Commission-approved action plan and

has issued several bulletins and a

generic letter to the nuclear industry to

provide information and guidance, (2)

fire barrier systems constructed with

Thermo-Lag have been identified and

declared inoperable, and (3)

compensatory measures (fire watches)

approved by the NRC have been

instituted. Additionally in the above

correspondence, all Petitioners were

informed that the Petitions were being

treated pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 and

had been referred to this office for

action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the

Commission’s regulations and that

appropriate action would be taken

within a reasonable time.

For the reasons stated below, the

Petitions have been denied.

II. Background

The picture painted by the Petitioners

of inaction by the NRC staff in

responding to the issues presented by

the use of Thermo-Lag is at odds with

the facts. A review of the chronological

development of the issues shows that

the NRC staff has been working

diligently to resolve the issues and has

consistently sought to ensure that there

is adequate protection of the public

health and safety. It is also inaccurate to

contend that Thermo-Lag generic

deficiencies have been known since

1982. As can be seen from the following

information, the development of the

Thermo-Lag issue has been

evolutionary. Reports of problems

regarding Thermo-Lag began to surface

in the late 1980s when Gulf States

Utilities, the licensee for River Bend

Station, discovered some cracks and

wear damage due to installation

deficiencies (Licensee Event Report 87–

005, March 25, 1987) and declared the

material inoperable as a fire barrier. The

licensee further discovered that stress

skin was missing on all 3-hour ThermoLag fire barriers in the turbine building

as a result of an installation error. In a

series of plant-specific tests performed

by Gulf States Utilities in 1989, ThermoLag barriers failed to meet the fire

endurance test acceptance criteria. Gulf

States Utilities categorized all 1-hour

and 3-hour barriers as indeterminate

and implemented compensatory

measures in the form of fire watches.

Other isolated plant-specific fire

protection problems had been found

during NRC inspections at various

utilities as early as 1982 and had been

acted on by the NRC staff. These

problems were treated as plant-specific

issues and were not considered as

indications of generic problems.

In February 1991, the NRC received

allegations that Thermo-Lag did not

provide fire protection for electrical

cables as claimed by the vendor. In

response, in May 1991, the NRC visited

River Bend Station to review the

installation procedures and the failed

fire endurance tests and concluded that

a generic concern existed with 30-inchwide cable trays. The NRC alerted the

industry of the results of the test failures

in IN 91–47, ‘‘Failure of Thermo-Lag

Fire Barrier Material To Pass Fire

Endurance Test,’’ August 6, 1991.

In June 1991, the Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) established a

special review team to investigate the

safety significance and generic

applicability of technical issues

regarding allegations and operating

experience concerning Thermo-Lag fire

barriers. In its final report, which was

issued with IN 92–46, ‘‘Thermo-Lag Fire

Barrier Material Special Review Team

Final Report Findings, Current Fire

Endurance Testing, and Ampacity

Calculation Errors,’’ June 23, 1992, the

special review team reached the

following conclusions:
30462 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 116 / Friday, June 14, 1996 / Notices

• The fire-resistive ratings and the

ampacity derating factors for the

Thermo-Lag fire barrier system were

indeterminate.

• Some licensees had not reviewed

and evaluated the fire endurance test

results and the ampacity derating test

results used as the licensing basis for

their Thermo-Lag barriers to determine

the validity of the tests and the

applicability of the test results to their

plant designs.

• Some licensees had not reviewed

the Thermo-Lag fire barriers installed in

their plants to ensure that they met NRC

requirements and guidance, such as that

provided in GL 86–10, ‘‘Implementation

of Fire Protection Requirements,’’ April

24, 1986.

• Some licensees used inadequate or

incomplete installation procedures

during the construction of their ThermoLag barriers.

After the special review team

completed its charter, the NRC staff

prepared an action plan that provided a

process to resolve technical issues

identified with Thermo-Lag fire barrier

systems. The NEI, formerly the Nuclear

Management and Resources Council

(NUMARC), agreed to coordinate

industry efforts to resolve the issues.

In regard to the Petitioners’

allegations of NRC’s inaction in

responding to the issues presented by

the use of Thermo-Lag, the significant

progress made by the NRC staff and the

nuclear reactor licensees in resolving

Thermo-Lag issues speaks to the

contrary. The NRC staff has issued a

number of generic communications

related to Thermo-Lag, which include

the following: (1) two bulletins: BUL

92–01, ‘‘Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire

Barrier System To Maintain Cabling in

Wide Cable Trays and Small Conduits

Free From Fire Damage,’’ June 24, 1992,

and BUL 92–01, Supplement 1, ‘‘Failure

of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System

To Perform Its Specified Fire Endurance

Function,’’ August 28, 1992; (2) two

generic letters: GL 92–08, ‘‘Thermo-Lag

330–1 Fire Barriers,’’ December 17,

1992, and GL 86–10, Supplement 1,

‘‘Fire Endurance Test Acceptance

Criteria for Fire Barrier Systems Used

To Separate Redundant Safe Shutdown

Trains Within the Same Fire Area,’’

March 25, 1994; and (3) 12 information

notices: IN 91–47; IN 91–79; IN 91–79,

Supplement 1; IN 92–46; IN 92–55,

‘‘Current Fire Endurance Test Results

for Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Material,’’

July 27, 1992; IN 92–82, ‘‘Results of

Thermo-Lag 330–1 Combustibility

Testing,’’ December 15, 1992; IN 94–22,

‘‘Fire Endurance and Ampacity Derating

Test Results for 3-Hour Fire-Rated

Thermo-Lag 330–1 Fire Barriers,’’ March

16, 1994; IN 94–86, ‘‘Legal Actions

Against Thermal Science, Inc.,

Manufacturer of Thermo-Lag,’’

December 22, 1994; IN 95–27, ‘‘NRC

Review of Nuclear Energy Institute,

Thermo-Lag 330–1 Combustibility

Evaluation Methodology Plant

Screening Guide,’’ May 31, 1995; IN 95–

32, ‘‘Thermo-Lag 330–1 Flame Spread

Test Results,’’ August 10, 1995; IN 95–

49, ‘‘Seismic Adequacy of Thermo-Lag

Panels,’’ October 27, 1995, and IN 94–

86, Supplement 1, ‘‘Legal Actions

Against Thermal Science, Inc.,

Manufacturer of Thermo-Lag,’’

November 15, 1995.

The NRC staff, the nuclear industry,

and others have expended much time

and many resources to address and

resolve the Thermo-Lag issues. The NRC

staff developed comprehensive fire test

guidance and acceptance criteria and

worked with industry to improve

existing ampacity test procedures. The

NRC staff and industry performed about

100 fire endurance and ampacity

derating tests of Thermo-Lag fire barrier

materials and full-scale test assemblies.

The fire endurance tests established the

limitations and the true fire-resistive

capabilities of certain Thermo-Lag fire

barrier configurations, without relying

on the fire endurance test data supplied

by TSI, the manufacturer of ThermoLag. On the basis of some of these tests,

the NRC staff concluded that existing

Thermo-Lag barriers could be upgraded

with some additional Thermo-Lag

material to satisfy NRC regulations.

Precluding all use of Thermo-Lag

materials for current and future fire

barrier installations would remove a

realistic option for resolving safety

issues. Therefore, the NRC staff does not

object to the use of Thermo-Lag in

specific applications, where, through

upgrades, NRC requirements are

satisfied. The NRC staff issued three

requests for additional information

(RAIs) regarding GL 92–08 to each

licensee using Thermo-Lag to obtain

information on the specific Thermo-Lag

material installed at each plant. The

NRC staff reviewed and approved

comprehensive Thermo-Lag fire barrier

programs proposed by TU Electric for

Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station,

Unit 2, and by Tennessee Valley

Authority (TVA) for Watts Bar Nuclear

Power Plant, Unit 1, which attests to the

fact that Thermo-Lag barriers can meet

NRC fire protection guidelines and

requirements. The NRC staff completed

toxicity tests of Thermo-Lag material.

The NRC staff and the industry

completed chemical composition,

combustibility, and flame spread tests of

Thermo-Lag materials. Finally, the NRC

staff reassessed previous technical

conclusions to determine the extent to

which the NRC staff and industry relied

on information supplied by TSI to reach

these conclusions. The staff had

concerns about the reliability of

information and data supplied by TSI

that have been or could be used to make

judgments regarding Thermo-Lag

materials. The NRC staff identified and

categorized the issues and previous

conclusions and used the results of the

industry-wide testing program regarding

the chemical composition of ThermoLag, as discussed below, to determine if

the in-plant Thermo-Lag materials were

consistent. The results of this

reassessment indicated that previous

technical conclusions were valid

independent of the information

provided by TSI. The staff therefore

concluded that additional action to

reassess the issues or reverify the

previous conclusions was not needed.

The NEI testing program on the

chemical composition of Thermo-Lag

analyzed samples from 18 utilities

representing 25 nuclear power plants.

The samples represented Thermo-Lag

material manufactured between 1984

and 1995. NEI performed pyrolysis gas

chromatography evaluation of 169

samples to assess organic chemical

composition and performed energydispersive X-ray spectroscopy of 33

samples to assess inorganic chemical

composition. On the basis of the tests,

NEI concluded that (1) all of the

samples contained the constituents

identified by TSI as essential to fire

barrier performance; (2) the composition

of the samples was consistent; and (3)

the test results provided a basis on

which to close NRC questions about

chemical composition and product

consistency and for utility use of generic

test data relative to fire endurance

ratings, flame spread, heat release,

ampacity derating, and other material

properties.

The NRC staff test program on the

chemical composition of Thermo-Lag

was conducted by the National Institute

of Standards and Technology (NIST)

during 1992 and 1995. NIST analyzed

21 samples that were either collected by

the staff during site visits to plants and

test laboratories or provided by TVA,

Gulf States Utilities, Commonwealth

Edison Company, and NEI. The analysis

included elemental and ammonia

analysis, pyrolysis, gas chromatography,

mass spectrometry, and X-ray

fluorescence. These analytical

techniques indicated that all of the

samples were similar in their bulk

chemical composition. These results

were consistent with the results of the

NEI chemical testing program pertaining
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 116 / Friday, June 14, 1996 / Notices 30463

2The ‘‘defense-in-depth’’ concept is detailed in

the ‘‘NRC Standard Review Plan,’’ NUREG–0800,

Section 9.5.1, ‘‘Fire Protection Program,’’ page

9.5.1–10.

3NRC GL 91–18, ‘‘Information to Licensees

Regarding Two NRC Manual Sections on Resolution

of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and

Operability,’’ issued November 7, 1991, and NRC

Inspection Manual, Part 9900, ‘‘Resolution of

Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions,’’ issued

October 31, 1991.

4The fact that Thermo-Lag barriers, as installed,

will provide protection for some period of time is

supported by, among others, the fire endurance test

results documented in IN 92–55.

to the chemical composition and

uniformity of Thermo-Lag.

Industry-wide progress has generally

been commensurate with the

complexity of the plant-specific issues

and the amounts of Thermo-Lag

installed at the individual plants.

Several licensees have initiated

programs to replace Thermo-Lag and are

performing plant-specific tests of other

fire barrier materials such as Mecatiss

(Florida Power & Light for Crystal River

Unit 3) and Darmatt KM–1 (Carolina

Power & Light for Brunswick, IES

Utilities, Inc., for Duane Arnold Energy

Center, Commonwealth Edison

Company for LaSalle County Station,

and Northern States Power Company for

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant).

The NRC staff is reviewing the plantspecific fire endurance test programs

and has recently approved the plantspecific application of Darmatt KM–1

fire barrier at the LaSalle plant. The

remaining licensees have submitted to

the NRC staff detailed plans and

schedules for resolving the issues at

their plants. Most licensees are pursuing

a combination of such options as

upgrading existing Thermo-Lag fire

barriers to meet NRC fire barrier

requirements, replacing Thermo-Lag fire

barriers with another type of fire barrier,

reducing or eliminating reliance on

Thermo-lag fire barriers by relocating

equipment and cables and by post-fire

safe-shutdown reanalysis, installing

additional fire protection features such

as automatic sprinkler systems, and

requesting configuration-specific

exemptions when such exemptions are

allowed by NRC regulations and are

technically justified to provide a level of

safety equivalent to that prescribed by

the regulations. The NRC staff has

completed its review of the plans for

resolving fire protection issues that were

proposed by most of the licensees. As

with any issues as technically complex,

challenging, and resource intensive as

those presented by Thermo-Lag barriers,

some plant-specific questions remain.

However, the number of issues has

steadily declined. The NRC staff and the

licensees will continue to address the

residual questions on a case-by-case

basis as they arise, and the NRC staff

will continue to follow up with

individual licensees on their corrective

actions, as appropriate. Every licensee

with Thermo-Lag fire barriers will

continue to maintain NRC-approved

compensatory measures, such as fire

watches, until its permanent corrective

actions are implemented. Therefore, the

public health and safety are protected.

The NRC’s ‘‘defense-in-depth’’ fire

protection concept relies on protecting

safe shutdown functions by achieving a

balance among three echelons or levels

of protection, which are (1) fire

prevention activities; (2) the ability to

rapidly detect, control, and suppress a

fire; and (3) physical separation of

redundant safe shutdown functions.

Weaknesses found in one area may be

dealt with by enhancing the protection

capabilities of the remaining areas.2 The

NRC foresaw cases in which fire

protection features would be inoperable

and required licensees, through

technical specifications or approved fire

protection plans controlled by license

conditions, to provide compensation for

the deficient condition. The concept of

allowing alternative actions to

compensate for an inoperable condition

or component is used in various

programs associated with the operation

of nuclear power plants and has long

been an integral part of NRC regulatory

requirements.3

The fire endurance test results

contained in NRC BUL 92–01 and NRC

BUL 92–01, Supplement 1, confirmed

that certain Thermo-Lag fire barrier

configurations compromise one facet of

the fire protection defense-in-depth

concept. In response to NRC BUL 92–01

and its supplement, the licensees for

plants using Thermo-Lag fire barriers

established fire watches in accordance

with their technical specifications or

license conditions as a compensatory

measure. Fire watches are personnel

trained by the licensees to inspect for

the control of ignition sources, fire

hazards, and combustible materials; to

look for signs of incipient fires; to

provide prompt notification of fire

hazards and fires; and to take

appropriate actions to begin fire

suppression activities. Generally,

therefore, by providing additional fire

prevention activities through enhanced

detection capabilities to find fire

hazards and in the case of a fire,

augmented suppression activities before

a barrier’s ability to endure a fire is

challenged, fire watches compensate for

degraded fire barriers.

The NRC staff has carefully evaluated

the issues associated with continued use

of Thermo-Lag material, including the

use of fire watches to compensate for

any degradation in the effectiveness of

required fire barriers. Such

compensatory actions provide an

adequate level of fire protection without

an undue risk to the health and safety

of the public. Licensees have

established fire watches to compensate

for degraded and possibly inoperable

fire barriers. Also, licensees rely on a

defense-in-depth concept that

incorporates multiple safety measures.

Automatic fire detection and

suppression systems are provided in

most areas that have safe shutdown

equipment. Trained fire brigades are

required 24 hours a day at all plants. All

areas that have safe shutdown

equipment have manual fire

suppression features. Fuels that can feed

a fire and ignition sources to start a fire

are controlled. The combination of fire

watches and the defense-in-depth fire

protection features provides an adequate

level of fire protection until licensees

implement permanent corrective

actions.

Taken together, these factors represent

an adequate means of fire protection at

the plants using Thermo-Lag to ensure,

with margin,4 that operation can be

conducted without an undue risk to the

health and safety of the public.

Nevertheless, with these considerations

in mind, the NRC staff addressed below

the Petitioners’ specific concerns to

demonstrate that no substantial health

and safety issue has been raised.

III. Response to Specific Concerns

The Petitioners alleged that (1) the

NRC has been slow to enforce its own

regulations, (2) fire watches do not

replace fire barriers and continued

reliance on fire watches is an

unreasonable and unnecessary hazard to

the public health and safety because of

an inoperable fire protection system for

safe shutdown of the reactor and

installed combustible material on the

shutdown systems, (3) utilities are in

violation of NRC requirements because

Thermo-Lag is combustible and could

contribute to a fire instead of protecting

from it, and, in spite of the danger, the

NRC allows continued use of ThermoLag, (4) faulty ampacity ratings could

result in the use of inappropriate cables,

which, if undersized, could overheat

and cause its insulation to deteriorate,

(5) the licensee for Oyster Creek did not

report to the NRC its findings regarding

the combustibility of Thermo-Lag and,

(6) the Thermo-Lag barriers have been

improperly installed at Comanche Peak

Unit 1, which contributes further to the

poor performance of Thermo-Lag.
30464 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 116 / Friday, June 14, 1996 / Notices

5These statements could be interpreted as the

appearance of unwarranted favoritism toward the

manufacturer of Thermo-Lag and complicity with

utilities. Therefore, the Petitions were referred to

the NRC Office of the Inspector General.

6 In addition, there are a very limited number of

plants which commenced operation on or after

January 1, 1979, that are not subject to specific

license conditions but whose licensees have made

commitments to comply with NRC fire protection

requirements, including Section III.G. of Appendix

R. The NRC is elevating these commitments to

license conditions.

7 In instances in which fire protection programs

have been moved from technical specifications and

are now subject to license conditions, the NRC’s

approval of the fire protection programs subject to

license conditions provides the legal basis for the

implementation of fire watches as a remedial

measure.

The NRC staff acknowledged and has

stated that certain Thermo-Lag fire

barrier configurations have failed to

demonstrate the ability to perform their

fire resistance functions. In this regard,

the NRC staff, in BUL 92–01,

Supplement 1, has stated that ThermoLag fire barriers should be treated as

inoperable until licensees can declare

the fire barriers operable on the basis of

successful, applicable tests. Given the

foregoing deficiencies identified for

Thermo-Lag, the NRC staff concluded

that compensatory measures are

necessary until a licensee can declare

fire barriers operable on the basis of

applicable tests that demonstrate

successful barrier performance.

The Petitioners also asserted that (1)

the NRC should have protected the

public and not Rubin Feldman, the

President of the company

manufacturing Thermo-Lag, and (2)

public safety has been compromised by

NRC’s seeming complicity with

utilities.5

A. Regulatory Compliance

The NRC staff acknowledges that

certain fire endurance tests have

demonstrated that Thermo-Lag barriers

may not meet the fire endurance rating

criteria set forth in Section III.G. of

Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. This

acknowledgment does not mean,

however, that there no longer is

reasonable assurance of protection of

the public health and safety or that such

actions as the shutdown of all reactors

using Thermo-Lag and the suspension of

Comanche Peak, Peach Bottom, and

Oyster Creek operating licenses are

warranted.

It should first be noted that Appendix

R, which sets forth criteria for specific

fire protection features to protect safe

shutdown systems, is applicable only to

facilities that commenced operation

prior to 1979. Facilities commencing

operation on or after January 1, 1979,

although not bound by Appendix R,

generally are bound by licensing

commitments to follow the criteria set

forth in Appendix R through license

conditions.6

Even assuming that all of the plants

in which Thermo-Lag is installed and

that commenced operation prior to 1979

are not in compliance with Appendix R,

it does not follow that the failure to

comply with a regulation indicates the

absence of adequate protection. The

Commission has explained that—

[W]hile it is true that compliance with all

NRC regulations provides reasonable

assurance of adequate protection of the

public health and safety, the converse is not

correct, that failure to comply with one

regulation or another is an indication of the

absence of adequate protection, at least in a

situation where the Commission has

reviewed the noncompliance and found that

it does not pose an ‘‘undue risk’’ to the

public health and safety.

(Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, DPRM

88–4, 28 NRC 411 (1988).)

All the plants using Thermo-Lag have

instituted fire watches as required by

their action statements regarding

inoperable barriers contained in their

technical specifications or fire

protection programs subject to license

conditions. Generally, action statements

provide alternative remedial actions to

shutting down a plant when limiting

conditions for operation are not met.

Compliance with the required remedial

actions provides reasonable assurance

that the public health and safety is

protected notwithstanding the plant’s

continued operation and its failure to

meet the respective limiting condition

for operation. Here, since all of the

plants using Thermo-Lag have

implemented the required fire watches

in accordance with plant-specific

requirements, their continued operation

does not pose an undue risk to the

public health and safety.

The Petitioners assert that fire

watches do not replace fire barriers and

continued reliance on fire watches is a

hazard to public safety. The NRC staff

acknowledges that fire watches do not

replace fire barriers. However, as will be

discussed in greater detail later in this

Decision, fire watches are judged by the

NRC to be acceptable compensatory

measures and are legally sanctioned

remedial actions based on 10 CFR

50.36(c)(2).7

In sum, notwithstanding the failure to

have operable fire barriers meeting the

fire endurance rating criteria specified

by Section III.G. of Appendix R, a plant

is not necessarily unsafe to continue

operation. To the contrary, fire watches

are judged by the NRC to be adequate

remedial measures that provide

reasonable assurance that the public

health and safety is protected. By reason

of compliance by all facilities using

Thermo-Lag with their technical

specifications or fire protection program

action statements requiring the

implementation of fire watches,

protection of the public health and

safety is still reasonably ensured for

such plants. Because the Commission

has discretion regarding enforcement of

its regulations, and given the

circumstances here in which no

significant health and safety issues have

been raised, enforcement action of the

nature requested by the Petitioners is

not warranted.

B. Ability of Fire Watches To

Compensate for a Degraded Barrier

One of the Petitioners’ allegations is

that the measures taken by licensees to

compensate for degraded barrier

conditions, specifically fire watches, are

not adequate to protect the public health

and safety. The Petitioners have

questioned the continued reliance on

fire watches in the light of an inoperable

fire protection system for safe plant

shutdown and the combustibility of

Thermo-Lag. In addition, the Petitioners

claim that a fire watch does not replace

a fire barrier in that fire watches are not

preventive.

Despite the acknowledged

shortcomings identified with certain

Thermo-Lag fire barriers and after fully

considering the arguments presented by

the Petitioners regarding the ability of

fire watches to provide adequate

compensation, the NRC staff has

determined that compensatory measures

using fire watches are adequate and

acceptable to ensure public health and

safety until permanent corrective

measures are implemented.

The use of fire watches in instances

of degraded or inoperable barriers is an

integral part of NRC-approved fire

protection programs. In general, these

NRC staff-approved compensatory

measures specify the establishment of a

continuous fire watch or an hourly fire

watch in cases in which automatic

detection systems protect the affected

components. Although it is true that

Thermo-Lag is intended as a barrier and

fire watch personnel cannot act as

physical shields, a fire watch provides

more than simply a detection function.

Personnel assigned to fire watches are

trained by the licensee to inspect for the

control of ignition sources, fire hazards,

and combustible materials; to look for

signs of incipient fires; to provide

prompt notification of fire hazards and

fires; and to take appropriate action to

begin fire suppression activities. Fire

watch personnel are capable of
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 116 / Friday, June 14, 1996 / Notices 30465

8While Appendix R is applicable only to facilities

that commenced operation prior to January 1, 1979,

as discussed earlier in this Director’s Decision,

facilities commencing operation on or after January

1, 1979, are bound to satisfy the criteria of

Appendix R through license conditions or licensing

commitments.

determining the size, the actual

location, the source, and the type of

fire—valuable information that cannot

be provided by an automatic fire

detection system.

During a plant fire, compartment

temperatures are likely to be less severe

at the early stages. On the basis of

enhanced capabilities provided by fire

watches and notwithstanding that the

level of barrier-type protection may be

reduced, the NRC staff has determined

that there is an adequate margin of

safety to ensure protection in cases in

which fire watches are approved.

The goal of the NRC staff’s ThermoLag Action Plan is directed towards

restoring the functional capability of fire

barriers as soon as practicable. There is

not a time limit associated with the use

of fire watches as a compensatory

measure. Given the margin of safety a

fire watch brings to a fire protection

program, as discussed above, the NRC

staff has determined that continuing the

use of fire watches while barriers are

inoperable is acceptable. However, the

NRC believes that notwithstanding

interim reliance on compensatory

measures, appropriate actions must be

taken by licensees to restore operability

of Thermo-Lag barriers. Individual

licensees have provided schedules for

restoring operability and these are being

tracked by the NRC staff.

The NRC staff has carefully evaluated

the use of fire watches to compensate

for any degradation in the effectiveness

of required fire barriers and has

concluded that fire watches continue to

ensure protection of the public health

and safety. Therefore, the Petitioners’

assertion that the measures taken by

licensees to compensate for degraded

fire barrier conditions, specifically fire

watches, are a hazard is without merit.

C. Combustibility

The Petitioners alleged that, contrary

to NRC regulations, Thermo-Lag is

combustible.

The NRC staff recognizes that

Thermo-Lag is combustible. To assess

Thermo-Lag combustibility, the NRC

staff conducted a testing program at the

National Institute of Standards and

Technology (NIST) based on the

American Society for Testing and

Materials (ASTM) Standard E–136.

Under this testing standard, the material

is considered to be ‘‘combustible’’ if

three out of four samples tested exceed

the following criteria: (1) the recorded

temperature of the specimen’s surface

and interior thermocouples, during the

test, rises 54 °F (30 °C) above the initial

furnace temperature; (2) there is flaming

from the specimen after the first 30

seconds of irradiance; and (3) the weight

loss of the specimen, due to combustion

during the testing, exceeds 50 percent.

Of the four Thermo-Lag specimens

tested, all experienced a weight loss of

greater than 50 percent and flaming

continued in excess of 30 seconds. IN

92–82, which provided licensees with

the results of the E–136 tests and

confirmed the combustibility of

Thermo-Lag, restated the NRC fire

protection requirements of Section III.G.

of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 and

asked that licensees review the

information for applicability to their

facilities.

The NRC’s basic fire protection

regulation for commercial nuclear

power plants is Section 50.48 of 10 CFR

Part 50 ‘‘Fire protection.’’ Section 50.48

references General Design Criterion

(GDC) 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part

50, ‘‘Fire protection,’’ Appendix R to 10

CFR Part 50 ‘‘Fire Protection Program

for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating

Prior to January 1, 1979,’’ and various

NRC fire protection guidance

documents. Specifically, Section

50.48(a) states that each operating

nuclear power plant must have a fire

protection plan that satisfies GDC 3, and

Section 50.48(b) states that Appendix R

to 10 CFR Part 50 establishes fire

protection features required to satisfy

GDC 3 with respect to certain generic

issues for nuclear power plants licensed

to operate prior to January 1, 1979.8

These issues are addressed in Section

III.G, ‘‘Fire protection of safe shutdown

capability,’’ Section III.J, ‘‘Emergency

lighting,’’ and Section III.O, ‘‘Oil

collection system,’’ of Appendix R. Of

these three sections of Appendix R,

Section III.G addresses the use of fire

barriers to protect one train of systems

necessary to achieve and maintain hot

shutdown conditions in the event of a

fire and, therefore, is the regulation of

interest here.

Section 50.48(a) notes that fire

protection guidance for nuclear power

plants is contained in two NRC

documents. These are (1) Branch

Technical Position (BTP) Auxiliary

Power Conversion Systems Branch

(APCSB) 9.5–1, ‘‘Guidelines for Fire

Protection for Nuclear Power Plants,’’

for new plants docketed after July 1,

1976, and (2) Appendix A to BTP

APCSB 9.5–1, ‘‘Guidelines for Fire

Protection for Nuclear Power Plants

Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976.’’ These

two NRC documents specify preferred

methods for fire protection program

design including the use of fire barriers

to satisfy Section III.G of Appendix R.

Fire barriers that meet the criteria of

Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR

Part 50 and these NRC guidance

documents satisfy GDC 3. NUREG–0800,

‘‘Standard Review Plan,’’ (SRP) Section

9.5–1, ‘‘Fire Protection Program,’’

incorporates the guidance of BTP

APCSB 9.5–1 and Appendix A to BTP

APCSB 9.5–1 and the criteria of Section

III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

Therefore, fire barriers that meet the

guidelines of SRP Section 9.5–1 also

satisfy 10 CFR 50.48 and GDC 3.

As stated in 10 CFR 50.48(a), the

purpose of the fire protection plan is ‘‘to

limit fire damage to structures, systems,

or components important to safety so

that the capability to safely shut down

the plant is ensured.’’ In general, a fire

protection plan consists of

administrative controls and procedures,

personnel for implementing the plan

and for fire prevention and manual fire

suppression activities, fire detection

systems, automatic and manually

operated fire suppression systems and

equipment, and fire barriers.

Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR

Part 50 is the only part of the fire

protection regulations that addresses the

use of fire barriers. It addresses the use

of fire barriers to protect one train of

systems necessary to achieve and

maintain hot shutdown conditions in

the event of a fire. Fire barriers are

required to have either a 1-hour or 3-

hour rating depending on the specific

requirement. However, Section III.G

does not provide acceptance criteria for

fire barriers, nor does it address the

combustibility of fire barrier materials.

The criteria are set out in BTP APCSB

9.5–1, Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5–

1, and SRP Section 9.5–1. These NRC

documents do not preclude the use of

combustible materials for construction

of fire barriers required to have a 1-hour

or 3-hour rating. On March 25, 1994, the

staff consolidated and clarified in

Supplement 1 to Generic Letter (GL) 86–

10, the fire barrier criteria specified in

the BTPs and the SRP. This GL

supplement provides detailed staff

guidelines for assessing the

combustibility of fire barrier materials,

but it does not preclude the use of

combustible materials for fire barriers

required to satisfy a 1-hour or 3-hour

rating. In fact, the fire barrier criteria are

appropriately focused on the

performance of the fire barrier and its

ability to achieve its intended design

function, that is, its ability to limit

temperature rise within the barrier

enclosure and to prevent the passage of

flame or gasses hot enough to adversely
30466 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 116 / Friday, June 14, 1996 / Notices

affect the functionality of the safe

shutdown components (e.g., cables)

enclosed within the fire barrier.

Thermo-Lag 330–1 is a sacrificial

material. When it is exposed to elevated

temperatures, such as those experienced

during a fully-developed room fire, it

sublimes and transitions from a solid to

a vapor. The vapors go through an

endothermic decomposition process

(pyrolysis) which absorbs heat from the

fire. As a result of the pyrolysis, the

unreacted Thermo-Lag material is

replaced by an insulating char layer

which is composed of small

interconnecting cells having a large

surface area. The char layer re-radiates

energy and limits heat transfer through

the Thermo-Lag material. The low

thermal conductivity of the char layer

provides additional thermal insulation.

Therefore, even though Thermo-Lag is

classified as a combustible material

when testing in accordance with the

guidance of Supplement 1 to GL 86–10,

properly designed, qualified, and

installed Thermo-Lag can yield fire

barriers with a 1-hour or 3-hour rating

which will protect safe shutdown

components from the effects of the fire.

Therefore, such barriers can satisfy the

requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 and

GDC 3.

To provide reasonable assurance that

Thermo-Lag fire barriers installed in the

nuclear power plants can meet their

intended function, representative

Thermo-Lag fire barrier assemblies have

been subjected to full-scale

qualification-type fire endurance tests

conducted in accordance with the

guidance of Supplement 1 to GL 86–10.

This guidance provides standard and

uniform test methods and acceptance

criteria for assessing the fire-resistive

capabilities of these barriers. The staff

has found the use of Thermo-Lag

acceptable as a fire barrier material

when it is used in accordance with

existing NRC regulations and guidance

and where supported by appropriate

tests and analyses.

However, there are two types of

applications where the use of ThermoLag material is not appropriate. These

are (1) Enclosing combustible materials

(e.g., insulated cables) within ThermoLag fire barriers to eliminate the

combustible materials as a fire hazard

and (2) using Thermo-Lag as radiant

energy heat shields inside noninerted

containments.

Section III.G of Appendix R (and the

equivalent SRP guidance) specifies three

options for protecting redundant trains

of systems necessary to achieve and

maintain hot shutdown conditions

located within the same fire area outside

of containment. Two of the three

options (Sections III.G.2.a and c) rely on

the use of fire barriers with a 1-hour or

3-hour rating, as discussed above. The

third option, Section III.G.2.b, specifies

the separation of redundant safe

shutdown trains by a horizontal

distance of more than 20 feet with no

intervening combustibles or fire

hazards. (A typical example of

intervening combustibles is a cable tray

loaded with cables, because cable jacket

materials are combustible.) Therefore,

spacial separation, and not fire barriers,

are used to meet Section III.G.2.b.

However, to meet this requirement,

some licensees have enclosed

combustibles that are installed between

redundant shutdown trains within a fire

barrier. In theory, the fire barrier

prevents an exposure fire from igniting

the intervening combustible materials

and spreading along them from one

redundant train to the other. Thus the

fire barrier effectively eliminates the

intervening combustible as a fire hazard.

If the fire barrier itself is

noncombustible and the redundant safe

shutdown trains are separated by a

horizontal distance of more than 20 feet,

then the configuration meets Section

III.G.2.b of Appendix R. However, if the

fire barrier material used to enclose the

intervening combustibles is also

combustible, such as Thermo-Lag, then

the licensee has simply installed one

combustible material over another and

has not eliminated the intervening fire

hazard. In a limited number of cases,

licensees have enclosed intervening

combustibles within Thermo-Lag fire

barriers under the incorrect assumption

that the Thermo-Lag fire barrier would

eliminate the intervening combustibles

as a fire hazard. Corrective actions will

be required in these cases.

As an alternative to the three options

discussed above, Section III.G.2.f of

Appendix R (and the equivalent SRP

guidance) provides a fourth option for

noninerted containments, that is, the

separation of redundant safe shutdown

components with noncombustible

radiant energy heat shields. Thermo-Lag

is classified as a combustible material

when tested in accordance with the

guidance of Supplement 1 to GL 86–10.

Therefore, it does not meet the criteria

for radiant energy heat shields.

Licensees using Thermo-Lag in this

fashion will also be required to take

corrective action.

To assure that corrective actions are

taken in these cases, the NRC staff

issued IN 95–27. In that IN, the staff

addressed enclosing combustible

materials within Thermo-Lag fire

barriers in an attempt to eliminate the

combustible materials as a fire hazard

and using Thermo-Lag to construct

radiant energy heat shields inside

noninerted containments. The staff

identified such solutions for

reevaluating the use of Thermo-Lag for

these applications as: (1) Reanalyzing

post-fire safe shutdown circuits inside

containment and their separation to

determine if the Thermo-Lag radiant

energy shields are needed, (2) replacing

Thermo-Lag barriers installed inside the

containment with noncombustible

barrier materials, (3) replacing ThermoLag barriers used to create combustiblefree zones with noncombustible barrier

materials, (4) rerouting cables or

relocating other protected components,

or (5) requesting plant-specific

exemptions where technically justified.

One of the Petitioners also asserted

that subsection 5a(3) of Section 9.5–1 of

the SRP states that fire barrier designs

‘‘should utilize only non-combustible

materials.’’ This section of the SRP does

not apply to fire barriers which are used

to separate redundant safe shutdown

components located within a nuclear

power plant fire area. Rather, it applies

to fire barrier penetration seals, which

are typically installed in fire area

boundaries. Thermo-Lag 330–1 is not

used in such applications.

The principal consideration for 1-

hour and 3-hour rated fire barriers

installed to meet NRC fire protection

requirements and guidelines is that they

can achieve their intended design

function. That is, that they can limit

temperature rise within the barrier

enclosure and prevent the passage of

flame or gasses hot enough to adversely

affect the functionality of the safe

shutdown components enclosed within

the fire barriers. The fact that ThermoLag material is combustible does not

preclude Thermo-Lag fire barriers from

achieving the intended function of

preventing fire damage if the fire

barriers are properly designed,

qualified, and installed. The Petitioners’

contention that Thermo-Lag material

should not be used because it is

combustible is without basis.

D. Ampacity Derating

The Petitioners assert that ThermoLag could contribute to starting a fire

instead of protecting from it. They

further alleged that faulty ampacity

derating factors could result in the use

of inappropriate cables that, if

undersized, could overheat and cause

its insulation to deteriorate.

Ampacity derating is the lowering

(derating) of the current-carrying

capacity of power cables enclosed in

electrical raceways protected with fire

barrier materials because of the

insulating effect of the fire barrier

material. This insulating effect may
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 116 / Friday, June 14, 1996 / Notices 30467

9The test procedures and test configurations

differed among the testing laboratories. Therefore,

the results from the different ampacity tests may not

be directly comparable to each other.

The NRC staff is concerned that the ampacity

derating factors, as determined in UL tests for

Thermo-Lag barrier designs, are inconsistent with

TSI results for similar designs because different

times were allowed for the temperature to stabilize

before taking current measurements. Inconsistent

stabilization times would call into question the

validity of previous TSI results. The NRC also

noticed during the review of the Industrial Testing

Laboratories (ITL) test reports that ambient

temperature and maximum cable temperature were

allowed to vary widely for some tests. Therefore,

those tests in which the ambient and maximum

cable temperatures were not maintained within

specified limits may be questionable. Additionally,

a licensee discovered a mathematical error for the

ampacity derating factor published in an ITL test

report. A preliminary assessment of the use of a

lower-than-actual ampacity derating factor indicates

that higher-than-rated cable temperatures are

possible for Thermo-Lag installations. Higher-thanrated cable temperatures could accelerate the aging

effects experienced by the cable.

10 ICEA ampacity values include conservatisms to

compensate for skin and proximity effects and

shield and/or sheath losses which may or may not

apply in specific situations.

11 Generic Letter 92–08 requires licensees to

review the ampacity derating factors used for all

raceways protected by Thermo-Lag 330–1 (for fire

protection of safe shutdown capability or to achieve

physical independence of electrical systems) and to

determine whether the ampacity derating test

results relied upon are correct and applicable to the

plant design. Presently, the staff is conducting

reviews of followup actions to close out ampacity

derating concerns with licensees pursuant to GL

92–08.

reduce the ability of the cable insulation

to dissipate heat. If not accounted for in

the plant design, the increased cable

insulation temperature could lead to

premature insulation failure. Other

factors also affect ampacity derating,

including the extent of cable fill in the

raceway, cable type, raceway

construction, and ambient temperature.

The National Electrical Code, Insulated

Cable Engineers Association (ICEA)

publications, and other industry

standards provide ampacity derating

factors for open air installations. These

standards do not provide derating

factors for fire barrier systems. Although

a national standard test method is in the

process of being developed but has not

yet been established, ampacity derating

factors for raceways enclosed with fire

barrier material are determined by

testing for the specific installation

configurations.

TSI, the manufacturer of Thermo-Lag,

has documented a wide range of

ampacity derating factors that were

determined by testing, for raceways

enclosed within Thermo-Lag fire barrier

materials. On October 2, 1986, TSI

informed its customers that, while

conducting tests in September 1986 at

Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL), it

found that the ampacity derating factors

for Thermo-Lag barriers were greater

than previous tests indicated. However,

the cable fill and tray configurations

were different for each test than those

tested previously. In addition, the NRC

staff learned that UL performed a

duplicate cable tray test that resulted in

an even higher derating factor. The NRC

staff also learned of the determination of

other derating factors during its review

of other tests conducted at Southwest

Research Institute (SwRI).9

The NRC special review team

concluded that the ampacity derating

test results completed at the time of the

review, including the UL test results,

were indeterminate. This conclusion

was based on observed inconsistencies

in the derating test results of the various

testing laboratories. The special review

team found that there was no national

consensus test standard (e.g., Institute of

Electrical and Electronics Engineers

(IEEE) or American National Standards

Institute (ANSI)) for conducting these

tests, and that some licensees had not

adequately reviewed ampacity derating

test results to determine the validity of

the tests and the applicability of those

test results to their plant design. The

special review team recognized that, in

hypothetical cases, nonconservative

ampacity derating factors could have

been instrumental in the installation of

inappropriate cables, which as a result,

could suffer premature cable jacket and

cable insulation failures over a period of

time. However, since that time, the NRC

staff has determined that in practice the

ampacity derating factor resulting from

Thermo-Lag insulating properties

represents only one of many variables

used in determining the design

ampacity for power cable systems and

that, as discussed below, sufficient

margin exists in this area to preclude

any immediate safety concerns.

For actual installations, various

derating factors are typically applied to

the ICEA ampacity values provided for

each cable size. In general, the cables

typically used in actual installations

have higher current-carrying capacity

than the ICEA ampacity values.10 Also,

cables are sized based on full-load

current plus a 25 percent margin to

account for starting current

requirements of the load. Given the

short duration of typical equipment

starts, this margin is available to

compensate for any errors in ampacity

derating. Further, use of a cable size

larger than normal may be required as

a result of voltage drop considerations

for long circuit lengths. In typical

applications this also provides

additional current-carrying capacity.

Given these conservatisms inherent in

the design ampacity of cable systems

and in addition the fact that most power

cables required for safe shutdown are

not normally energized, but are

typically operated during surveillance

testing for short time periods, the

likelihood that cables could ignite as a

result of Thermo-Lag ampacity derating

errors has been judged by the NRC staff

to be unlikely. In addition, based on

these conservatisms and the currently

available information on existing plants,

ampacity design, and operating history,

the NRC staff believes that the ampacity

derating issue is not an immediate

safety issue but rather is an aging issue

to be resolved over the long term.11

E. Oyster Creek Failed To Report Test

Results on Combustibility to the NRC

The Petitioners requested that Oyster

Creek’s license be suspended based on

the following: (1) SwRI conducted fire

tests on Thermo-Lag 330–1 specimens

for GPUN, the licensee for Oyster Creek,

and reported that all specimens ignited

approximately 2 seconds after they were

inserted into the furnace and failed

specified criteria because of flaming

after the first 30 seconds of testing, an

outside temperature rise higher than 30

°C, and a weight loss of 50 percent; (2)

GPUN’s operation of Oyster Creek with

knowledge of the SwRI report is an

example of GPUN’s reckless disregard

for fire protection and public safety; (3)

in the event of fire, Thermo-Lag is likely

to fail its intended function of

protecting vital electrical cables running

from the control room to plant safety

systems used to shut down the reactor;

(4) current installations of Thermo-Lag

are likely to fail in less time than the 1

hour (when smoke detectors and

automatic sprinkler systems are present)

or 3 hours (when there are no fire

detection and suppression systems) that

NRC regulations require for fire barriers

to withstand fire; (5) the NRC Inspector

General issued a report in August 1992

condemning NRC’s handling of the

Thermo-Lag issue and documenting the

NRC staff’s failure to understand the

scope of the problem; (6) in April 1994,

ITL and its President pleaded guilty to

five felony counts of aiding and abetting

the distribution of falsified test data; (7)

on September 29, 1994, the U.S.

Department of Justice issued a sevencount indictment against the

manufacturer of Thermo-Lag and its

Chief Executive Officer for willful

violations of the Atomic Energy Act,

conspiracy to conceal material facts, and

making false statements to defraud the

United States, in connection with $58

million in fire barrier material; (8)
30468 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 116 / Friday, June 14, 1996 / Notices

GPUN has known since at least August

11, 1992, that Thermo-Lag 330–1 as a

structural base material is combustible

and that it was in violation of

Appendices A and R to Part 50 of Title

10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(10 CFR) and the NRC Standard Review

Plan, NUREG–0800; (9) GPUN failed to

report the SwRI test results in response

to GL 92–08 of February 10, 1994, when

asked to describe the Thermo-Lag 330–

1 fire barriers installed as required to

meet 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R; and

(10) continued reliance on fire watches

at Oyster Creek is an unreasonable and

unnecessary hazard to the public health

and safety because of an inoperable fire

protection system for safe shutdown of

the reactor and installed combustible

material on the shutdown systems.

Several of the issues listed above have

been addressed earlier in this decision.

Therefore, the NRC staff will only

address below the remaining plantspecific issues. As discussed earlier in

this decision, the NRC issued IN 92–82

to inform the industry of the results of

combustibility tests performed by NIST

in early August 1992. These tests

confirmed the combustibility of

Thermo-Lag. As a result of discussions

with the NRC staff on the subject of

Thermo-Lag combustibility, GPUN

decided to independently verify the

results of the E–136 tests performed by

NIST and contracted SwRI to perform

the E–136 tests. The results of these

tests, as documented by the telecopy

transmittal sheet submitted with the

Petition, confirmed the combustibility

of Thermo-Lag. Contrary to the

Petitioners’ allegations, the NRC staff

does not require that licensees report

the results of their independent testing.

It should be noted here that, prior to the

SwRI testing that confirmed

combustibility, the NRC was aware of

the combustibility of Thermo-Lag and

that the NRC was also well aware of the

results of the E–136 tests performed by

GPUN through telephone conversations

with GPUN personnel, even though

there was no requirement for GPUN to

report these test results.

The Petitioners also alleged that

GPUN did not report to NRC its findings

of the SwRI test results in its ‘‘Response

to Request for Additional Information

Regarding Generic Letter 92–08,

‘Thermo-Lag Fire Barriers,’ ’’ (RAI) dated

February 10, 1994.

The RAI quoted by the Petitioners did

not request that GPUN report to NRC its

findings of the SwRI test results and, in

addition, the NRC staff does not require

that licensees report the results of their

independent testing. Therefore the NRC

staff has concluded that, contrary to the

Petitioners’ allegation, GPUN did not

have to report to the NRC its findings of

the SwRI test results.

For the reasons stated above, the

suspension of Oyster Creek’s license, as

requested by the Petitioners, is not

warranted.

F. Dry-Joint Issue at Comanche Peak

Unit 1

The Petitioners requested that (a) the

Comanche Peak Unit 1 license be

suspended, (b) the licensee perform

additional destructive analysis for

Thermo-Lag configurations, and, (c) the

licensee perform fire tests on upgraded

‘‘dry-joint’’ Thermo-Lag configurations

based on the following: (1) the licensee’s

records on the original installation of

Thermo-Lag fire barriers on conduits

and cable trays indicate that its

contractor followed specifications for

pre-buttering all joints; (2) NRC

Inspection Report Nos. 50–445/93–42;

50–446/93–42 found, based on

destructive analysis documents, that a

concern did exist where Thermo-Lag

conduit joints fell apart easily and did

not appear to have any residual material

of a buttered surface, indicative of a

joint that had not been pre-buttered; (3)

the ‘‘dry joint’’ deficiency appeared in

Room 115A and other areas of the unit;

(4) the licensee directly contradicts an

NRC inspector’s findings that were

determined in part by destructive

analysis; (5) the ‘‘dry joint’’ or absence

of pre-buttering of Thermo-Lag panels

can be determined only by destructive

analysis and cannot be determined by a

walk down visual inspection; (6) the

findings reported in the Comanche Peak

Unit 1 Region IV Inspection Reports 50–

445/93–42 and 50–446/93–42, based on

the limited amount of destructive

analysis conducted at the unit,

constitute a substantial documentation

of installation deficiencies found in

Thermo-Lag fire barriers as documented

in NRC IN 91–79 and Supplement 1; (7)

neither the NRC nor the industry, by its

agent NEI, nor a utility, have conducted

fire tests on dry fitted or ‘‘dry joint’’

upgraded configurations of Thermo-Lag

330–1; and (8) the presence of ‘‘dry

joint’’ upgraded configurations in

Comanche Peak Unit 1 constitutes an

untested application of Thermo-Lag fire

barriers.

These allegations were based on the

Petitioners’ interpretation of NRC

Inspection Report 93–42 issued on

February 21, 1994. By letter of

November 29, 1994, TU Electric, the

licensee for Comanche Peak Unit 1, sent

a letter to the NRC staff responding to

the Petition.

The term ‘‘joint’’ refers to the interface

between two adjacent Thermo-Lag

surfaces. Comanche Peak Unit 1

installation procedures for Thermo-Lag

fire barriers specify that, during the

initial installation process, the joints

should be pre-buttered (or covered) with

Thermo-Lag trowel grade material

before the mating surfaces are joined to

ensure adhesion of the surfaces. The

term ‘‘dry joint’’ refers to the lack of

Thermo-Lag trowel grade material in a

joint. The failure to pre-butter a joint

with trowel grade Thermo-Lag could

result in a weakening of the joint during

a potential fire exposure and could

provide an exposure path in the fire

barrier envelope. The NRC performed an

inspection at Comanche Peak Unit 1 on

November 2–5, and 23–24, 1993, and

January 26–28, 1994, to compare the

Thermo-Lag test specimens with the

upgraded Thermo-Lag configurations on

site. The results of this inspection are

documented in NRC Inspection Report

93–42. The report stated that there

appeared to be a large number of

deficiencies with the installed fire

barriers and that an example of these

deficiencies involved dry joints on

conduit overlays installed on pedestal

hangers. The NRC inspector did not

personally observe the dry joints in

question. His statements were based on

observations made by TU Electric and

documented in an Operations

Notification and Evaluation (ONE) form.

However, the ONE form in question did

not identify a dry joint. Instead, the

ONE form identified a condition that

was conservatively reported as an

apparent dry joint. Upon further

evaluation of the ONE form, TU Electric

determined that the joint in question

had in fact been pre-buttered with

trowel grade Thermo-Lag. These facts

are discussed in more detail below.

On November 25, 1992, a speed memo

was written by a TU Electric contractor

identifying ‘‘apparent unsatisfactorily

conditions on Unit 1 commodities.’’

This memorandum identified ‘‘an

apparent’’ dry joint on an oversize

coupling section (on top of a pedestal

hanger). The speed memo also stated

that, ‘‘we have decided that the best

vehicle to call attention to these

apparent deficiencies would be a letter

to your attention for further evaluation

of the situation. * * *’’ The letter was

forwarded to the appropriate TU

Electric engineering section.

The cognizant TU Electric engineer

performed a walkdown of the described

areas and evaluated the commodities.

He conservatively initiated a ONE form

(the process used by TU Electric to

report problems and develop resolution

for the identified problems). A

comprehensive evaluation of this

condition determined that the joint had

been pre-buttered. Therefore, the
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 116 / Friday, June 14, 1996 / Notices 30469

12The jury returned a verdict of ‘‘not guilty’’ on

all counts of the indictment against TSI and Mr.

Feldman.

engineering resolution for this condition

was that ‘‘this is not a deficient

condition, and there are no generic

implications.’’

The originator of the speed memo

initially believed that the condition in

question was a dry joint because of the

appearance of the joint. During

alignment of Thermo-Lag panels, the

leading edge of one panel contacts the

outer edge of a preceding panel and

forces most of the trowel grade along the

initial contact edge toward the inside of

the Thermo-Lag envelope. Subsequent

shrinkage of the trowel grade in the joint

can give the appearance of a dry joint

because the trowel grade material is not

visible. Therefore, contrary to the

Petitioners’ allegation, there was no

‘‘dry joint’’ deficiency on the pedestal

hanger.

The Petitioners also alleged that dry

joints appear in other Thermo-Lag

installations at Comanche Peak Unit 1.

In response to the Petition, TU Electric

performed an electronic search of its

ONE form data base. The search did

identify additional ONE forms related to

dry joints. However, Thermo-Lag rework

crews and the quality control inspectors

at Comanche Peak Unit 1 have used the

term ‘‘dry joints’’ and ‘‘no visible trowel

grade material’’ synonymously. Upon

further investigation of these ONE

forms, it was determined that trowel

grade material had in fact been applied

to the joints in question. Therefore,

these ONE forms were also

dispositioned as ‘‘not a nonconforming

condition.’’ These findings support the

NRC staff’s conclusion that, contrary to

the Petitioners’ allegations, there is no

evidence of dry joints at Comanche Peak

Unit 1. The Petitioners’ allegations

regarding dry joints at Comanche Peak

Unit 1 are based on premises that are

faulty and contrary to the information

contained in Inspection Report 93–42.

In regard to the Petitioners’ request

that the licensee perform fire tests on

upgraded ‘‘dry joint’’ Thermo-Lag

configurations and additional

destructive analysis, the NRC staff has

reviewed the documentation provided

by the licensee in response to the RAIs

regarding GL 92–08 and concluded that

the licensee’s quality assurance program

gave adequate confidence that the asinstalled Thermo-Lag configurations at

Comanche Peak Unit 1 conform with

NRC specification requirements for both

material and installation attributes.

Accordingly, suspension of the

Comanche Peak Unit 1 license, as

requested by the Petitioners, is not

warranted.

G. Protection of Rubin Feldman

The Petitioners assert that, rather than

protecting the public, the NRC is

protecting Rubin Feldman, President of

the company that manufactures

Thermo-Lag.

As discussed earlier, the NRC

received allegations in 1991 that

questioned the adequacy of Thermo-Lag

fire barriers. In response (1) the Office

of the Inspector General (OIG) and the

Office of Investigations (OI) formed a

joint task force to investigate the

allegations and (2) the Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) established a

special team to review the safety issues

raised by the allegations. Throughout its

review, the special team gave expert

technical advice and assistance to the

OIG/OI task force. The Director of NRR

tasked the NRR staff to resolve the

technical issues raised by the special

team. The NRC staff continued to

cooperate fully with the investigative

task force. Further, the NRR staff carried

out a full-scale test program and

developed other technical data and

information for the investigative task

force. These NRC staff efforts

contributed significantly to a referral to

the Department of Justice of possible

wrongdoing by TSI. The referral

resulted in a seven-count criminal

indictment of TSI, the manufacturer and

supplier of Thermo-Lag fire barriers and

of its President, Rubin Feldman, by a

Federal Grand Jury. The NRC staff

continued to support the Department of

Justice throughout the criminal case.12

In addition, throughout the trial, the

NRC staff continued to pursue

corrective actions consistent with its

action plan for the resolution of the

Thermo-Lag issues. The above facts

contradict the Petitioners’ assertion that

the NRC was protecting Rubin Feldman.

H. NRC Seeming Complicity With

Utilities

The Petitioners also assert that there

is seeming complicity between the NRC

and the licensees and that licensees seek

to avoid costly replacement of the

Thermo-Lag.

In May 1991, the NRC Office of the

Inspector General performed an

inspection of the NRC’s staff

performance in regard to Thermo-Lag

barriers and found indications of

inadequate performance by the NRC

staff in the acceptance and review of

Thermo-Lag barriers. Subsequently, the

NRC staff initiated an aggressive

program of corrective actions to rectify

the deficiencies identified in the review

and response process, as summarized

earlier in this decision.

In addition, the staff has expended

considerable time and effort to address

and resolve Thermo-Lag issues to ensure

that licensees return to compliance with

existing NRC fire protection

requirements. The NRC staff issued

three requests for additional information

regarding GL 92–08 to each licensee

using Thermo-Lag to obtain information

on the specific Thermo-Lag material

installed at each plant, details about the

corrective actions each licensee

intended to take to return to compliance

with NRC fire protection requirements,

and schedules for the implementation of

these corrective actions. The response of

each licensee was evaluated by the NRC

staff. As a consequence of this

substantial NRC staff effort, a number of

licensees have already returned to

compliance with NRC requirements by

a variety of means which include

replacing, rerouting, or upgrading

existing Thermo-Lag barriers,

performing post-fire safe shutdown

reanalysis, and installing additional fire

detection and suppression features. All

of these measures involve some burden

on licensees. In addition, some licensees

have initiated costly programs to

perform plant-specific fire endurance

tests of other fire barriers with the

intention of replacing Thermo-Lag with

these barriers. All licensees who utilize

Thermo-Lag will need to expend

resources commensurate with their

reliance on Thermo-Lag to come into

compliance with NRC fire protection

requirements. NRC staff oversight will

ensure that this is the case.

The Petitioners’ assertion of seeming

complicity with utilities on the part of

the NRC staff is unfounded in the light

of the significant NRC staff efforts to

ensure that licensees expend the

resources necessary to return to

compliance with NRC requirements.

IV. Conclusion

The Petitioners request that the NRC

order the immediate shutdown of all

reactors using Thermo-Lag and the

suspension of Oyster Creek, Peach

Bottom Units 1 and 2, and Comanche

Peak Unit 1 operating licenses.

For the reasons discussed above, I

find no basis for taking such actions.

Rather, on the basis of the review efforts

by the NRC staff, I conclude that the

issues raised by the Petitioners are being

addressed by licensees in a manner

which assures adequate protection of

the public health and safety.

Accordingly, the Petitioners’ requests

for action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 are

denied.
30470 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 116 / Friday, June 14, 1996 / Notices

A copy of this Decision will be placed

in the Commission’s Public Document

Room, Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,

N.W., Washington, D.C., and at the

Local Public Document Room for the

named facilities. A copy of this Decision

will also be filed with the Secretary for

the Commission’s review as provided in

10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Commission’s

regulations.

As provided by this regulation, the

Decision will constitute the final action

of the Commission 25 days after

issuance, unless the Commission, on its

own motion, institutes a review of the

Decision within that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 3rd day

of April 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

William T. Russell,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 96–15149 Filed 6–13–96; 8:45 am]

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