### INTHE UNI TED S TATESCOU RT OFAPPEALS FORTHE FIFTH CIRCU IT

N o. 07- 60900

M A R IO VA S Q U E Z -M A R T IN E Z , a ls o k n o w n a s M a r io M a r tin e z V a s q u e z , P et i t i on er v. ERI C H H OLD ER, J R, U S ATTORN EY GE N ERA L R esp on d en t

P et i t i on f

or R evi ew of

an O rder of

t h e B oard of

I m m i grati on A pp eal s
B ef ore SM ITH , G A R Z A , an d C L E M E N T , C i rcui t Ju dg es. E M ILIO M
. G A R Z A , C i rcui tJu dg e. M ar i o Vas que z - M ar t i ne z ( “Vas que z - M ar t i ne z ” ) pe t i t i o ns f o r r e vi e w o f

t he Boar d o f

I m m i gr at i o n Appe al s ( “ BI A” ) di s m i s s alo f hi s a ppe alf

r o m t he Im m i grati on Ju dg e’ s ( “ IJ” ) deci si on f i n di n g h i m i n e li g i bl e f or c an cel l ati on of
r e m o v a l. F o r th e fo llo w in gre a s o n s , w e D E N Yth e P e tit io n fo r R e v ie w . I V asqu ez- M art i n ez i s a n ati ve of M exi co w h o w as adm i t t ed to t h e U n i t ed S t ates as a l aw f

u lperm an en t resi den t i n 199 2. I n 200 3, V asqu ez w as i n di ct ed i n a Te xa s s t at e c o ur t f o r “ i nt e nt i o nal l y and kno w i ngl y po s s e s s [ i ng] , w i t h i nt e nt t o de l i ver , a c ont r ol l ed s ubst ance , nam el y, C O C A I N E
. . . i n, on and w i t hi n 1, 000 fe e t of pr em i ses of a sch oo l
. . . ” S ee T EX . H EAL T H AND S A F E TY C O D E A NN . United States Court of App eals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D April 2, 2009 Cha rl es R. F ulb ru g e II I ClerkN o. 07- 60900

Section12 27(a)(2)(A)(iii) states that “[a]nyalienwho is co nvicted of an aggravated 1 felony at anyti me after admissio n is de portable .” S ection1 2 2 7 (a)(2 )(B)(i) r ea ds : 2 Any ali en who at anyti me after admissio n has bee n convicted of aviol atio n of (or acon spiracy or attempt t o vi ol at e) any law or re gulation of aState, th e Unit ed S tates, or aforeign countryrel atin g to a c ontroll ed substance (a s defined in sectio n 802of Title 21 ), other thana s ingle offen se involving possessio n for on e’ s o wnu seo f 3 0gra ms orl es s of mari j u a n a , isd ep ortab le
. 2 §481

. 112 ( a)

. V asqu ez- M art i n ez’ s j u dg m en t of convi ctio n stat es t h at V asqu ez pl ead ed gu i l t y t o p o ss e ss ion of a contr ol l ed su bstance i n a dru g- f ree zone. S i gn i fi ca n tl y, t h e j u d gm en t of con victi on om i tted th e w ord s “w ith in te n t t o del i ver . ” Vasquez

- M ar t i nez r ec ei ved a s ent enc e o f s i x ye ar s, w hi c h w as s us pe nde d t o s i x ye ar s o n pr o ba t i o n. I n 200 6, hi s pr o ba t i o n w as re vo ke d and he
w a s sen ten ced to t w o y ea rs of i m p ri son m en t. V as quez- M ar t i nez w as c harge d w i t h r em ovab i l i t y vi a a N ot i c e t o Appear ( “ N T A ” ) on t h e basi s t h at h i s T exas convic t i on consti t u t ed ( 1) a n “a ggrav ated fe lo n y ” p u r s u a n t t o th e I m m ig r a tio n a n d N a tio n a lity A c t (“ IN A ”), 8 U .S .C . § 1 2 2 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) (A) ( i i i) , a n d ( 2 ) a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e v i o l a t i o n p u r s u a n t t o 8 U. S

. C. 1 § 1 22 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B) o f t he s a m e s t a t ut e . At hi s r e m o v a l he a r i ng b e f o r e t he I J, 2 Vas qu ez- M ar t i ne z a dm i t t e d t he fac t uala l l e ga t i o ns i n t he N TA

. The I J f o und t h at V asqu ez- M art i n ez w as rem ovab l e f or hav i n g com m i t t ed a c o n trol l ed sub st an ce vi ol ati on , § 1227 ( a) ( 2) ( B ) , bu t d e t erm i n ed that t h e rec ord di d n ot sup port rem ovab i l i t y f or hav i n g been convic t ed of an “ agg ravated fel on y” u n der § 1 22 7( a) ( 2) (A) ( i i i) , a s t he j udg m e nto f c o nvi c t i o n s t at e d o nl y t hatV asqu ezM art i n ez w as g u il t y of “ possessi on ”

. Th e I J concl u ded t h at V asqu ez- M art i n ez w as not a n aggrav ated fel on an d thu s el i gi bl e t o app l y f or di scr et i on ary ca n ce ll a tion of re m o v a l u n d e r 8 U .S .C

. § 1 2 2 9 b (a ). Vas que z - M ar t i ne z f

i l e d a n a ppl i c at i o n f

o r c anc e l l at i o n of

r e m o va l , a nd t he IJ h el d a h eari n g on the m eri t s of tha t app l i cat i on . Th e G overnm en t contended t hat t he o m i ss i on o f

“ w i t h i nt entt o de l i ver” f r om t he j udgm entof

c onvi c t i on w asN o. 07- 60900

3 so l el y a t ypogr aphi c aler r or , and t hat t he r ec or d as a w h ole r ef l ec t ed t hat V asqu ez- M art i n ez w as convi ct ed of a n a ggrav ated fel on y an d t h u s i n el i gi bl e f or can cel l ati on of

rem oval. U l t i m atel y, t h e I J f ou n d ba se d o n t h e j u di ci alrec ord t hatVas que z - M ar t i ne z ha d b e e n c o nvi c t e d o f po s s e s s i o n o f

c o c ai ne w i t h i nt e nt t o de l i v e r , a nd was t hu s i ne l i g i b l e f o r c a nc e l l a t i o n o f r e m o v a l b e c a us e he had
co m m itted a n a g g ra v a te d felo n y . 8 U .S .C

. § 1 2 2 9 b (a )(3). V as quez- M ar t i nez appeal ed t o t he B I A

. Th e BIA agr ee d w i t h t he I J t hat Vas que z - M ar t i ne z ha d c o m m i t t e d a c o nt r o l l e d s ubs t anc e v i o l at i o n; ha vi ng de t e r m i ne d t hathe w as r e m ovab l e o n t hatb as i s , t he BI A di d no t r e ac h t he q u estion of w h eth er h e w a s rem ov a b l e for be i n g a n ag gr a va ted f elon
. T h e B IA di d, h ow ever, u ph ol d t h e IJ’ s concl u si on t h at V asqu ez- M art i n ez h ad b een convic t ed of

possess i on of

coc ai n e w i t h i n t en t t o del i ver, f i n di n g t h at t h e rec ord
e s t ab l i s he d t hatVas que z - M ar t i ne z w as c o nvi c t e d o f t he c r i m e as c har ge d i n t he in d ic tm e n t. T h e B IAa lso f

ou n d that V asqu ez- M art i n ez ha d n otm ethi s burd en of
es t abl i shi ng s t at ut or y e l i gibi l i t y f orr el i ef, as he had not pr ove n by a prepo nde r anc e o f

t he e vi de nc e t hatt he a gg r av at e d f e l o ny ba r t o e l i gibi l i t y for c a n c e ll a t io n o f r e m o v a l d id n o ta p p ly . T h e B I Ad is m is s e d V a s q u e z -M a r t in e z ’s
a p p e a l. H e tim e ly p e tit io n s fo rre v ie w . II T h e B IA a d d r e s s e d tw o is s u e s : firs t, w h e th e r V a s q u e z -M a r tin e z is
rem ovab l e; an d s econd , w h et h er h e i s sub j ectt o t h e st atutor y bar to can cel l ati on of rem oval u n der § 1229 b( a) ( 3)

. H ow ever, on l y t h e secon d i ssue i s i n di spu t e on t h i s p e t i t i o n f

o r r e v i e w. Th e BI A h e l d t h a tVa s q u e z - M a r t i n e z i s r e m o v a b l e p u r s u ant t o 8 U. S

. C. § 122 7(a )(2)(B ) ( i) , f

or hav i n g com m i t t ed a viol ati on rel ated t o a contr ol l ed
s ubs t anc e . Bec aus e t he BI A f o und Vas que z - M a r t i n e z r e m o va bl e o n t hi s g r o und,N o. 07- 60900

I ndee d, even if Vasqu ez-Martin ez were to pr ev ailon h is ar gu ment that h e was 3 convicted merelyfor possessio n of coc ain e, ratherth an possessionwithintentto delive r coc aine, he wouldstil l be rem ovable und er §1227 (a) (2) (B) (i)

. Though he argued bef orethe BIA that th e record was inconclu siveas to wheth er h e was convicted for po ssession of co cain e o r for po ssession of marij uan a (whichwoul d not subj ect him to r emov al), he does not make th at argument h ere. 4 i t pr et er m i tted t he i ss ue o f V as quez- M ar t i nez’ s r em ovab i l i t y f orbe i ng an ag gr av at e d f

e l o n. V a s q u e z -M a r tin e z d o e s n o t a p p e a r t o c o n te s t th e B IA ’ s fin d in gth a t h e is
r e m o v a b le fo r a v io la tio n u n d e r th e C o n tr o lle d S u b s ta n c e A c t. T h u s , th e o n ly 3 i ssue bef

ore us i s w h et h er t h e B IA erred i n h ol di n g t h at V asqu ez- M art i n ez i s not
e lig ib le fo r d is c r e tio n a r y ca n c e lla tio n o f r e m o v a l. III T h i s C ou rtha s j u ri sdi ct i on t o revi ew onl y l egal an d consti t u t i on ali ssues
r a i s e d p e r t a i n i n gt o r e m o v a lo r d e r s . Se eTole do

- Hernan d ez v. Mu ka sey , 521 F. 3d 3 3 2 , 3 3 4 (5t h C ir. 2 0 0 8 ); 8 U .S .C . § 1 2 5 2 (a )( 2 )( C )( r e m o v in ga p p e a ls c o u r t ’s j u r i s d i c tio n o v e r fin a l o r d e r s o f r e m o v a l); bu tse e 8 U
. S

. C

. § 1 2 5 2 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( D) (h ol di n g t h at notw i t h st an din g § 12 52(a) ( 2) ( C ) , j u di ci alrevi ew i s perm i t t ed of
c o n s tit u tio n a l c la im s a n d q u e s tio n s o f la w p r e s e n te d u p o n a p e tit io n fo r re v ie w .) The BI A’ s de t e r m i nat i o n t hata n a l i e n i s i ne l i gibl e f o r di s c r e t i o nar y r e l i e f i n t he f o r m o f c a n c e l l a t i o n o f

r e mo v a li s a q u e s t i o n o f l a w t h a t we r e v i e w de no vo , d e fe r r in gto th e B IA ’ s in te r p r e ta tio n o f th e s ta tu te s a n d r e g u l a tio n s it
a d m in is te r s . S ee D an so v. G on zal es , 4 8 9 F .3d 7 0 9 , 7 1 2 -1 3 (5t h C ir. 2 0 0 7 ); Marqu ez- Marqu ez v. G on zal es , 4 5 5 F .3d 5 4 8 , 5 6 1 (5t h C ir. 2 0 0 6 ). A T h e I N Ast ates t h at t h e A t t orney G en eral m ay c an cel rem oval i n t h e case of an al i en w h o is inad m i ssibl e or dep ort able f rom the U n i t ed S t ates i f t h e al i en h a s n o t be e n c o n v i c t e d o f a n y a g g r a v a t e d fe l o n y . 8 U. S

. C. § 1 2 2 9 b ( a ) ( 3 )

. An al i en appl yi ng f

or r el i ef f r om r em ovalhas t he bur den of pr oo f t o e st abl i sh t hatN o. 07- 60900

Th e C ourtdetermine d th at the docume ntationwas insufficient tosho wthat the 4 chargeto whichth e pe titio ner pled guilty w as the same a s that co ntaine d inth e co mplaint. Cisneros-P

erez , 46 5 F .3d at 393
. 5 h e is n o t a n a g g r a v a te d fe lo n a n d is t h e r e fo r e s ta tu to r ily e lig ib le fo r re lie f. S ee 8 U .S .C . § 1 2 2 9 a (c )( 4 ) (A ) ( i) . U n d e r th e r e g u la t io n s in t e r p r e t in gth e I N A ’s provi si on s f

or c an cel l ati on of

rem oval, i f

t h e evi den ce i n di cat es that one or m ore o f th e g ro u n d s fo r m a n d a to ry d e n ia l of th e a p p li ca tion for re li e f m ay ap pl y, t he al i en s hal lhave t he bur den of pr ovi ng by a pre ponder ance of t he evi denc e t hat
su ch gr ou n d s d o no t a p p l y. 8 C

. F
. R
. § 12 4 0
. 8 (d). A p p l yin g § 12 4 0
. 8 (d), the B IA h e ld th a t V a s q u e z -M a r tin e z h a d a d d u c e d in s u ffic ie n t e v id e n c e to ca r r y h is b u r d e n o f p r o v in gth a t h e w a s n o t a n a g g r a v a te d fe lo n . V a sq u ez -M a rti n ez f

i rst arg u es th a t t h e b u rd en i s o n the go ve rn m en t t o sub m i t evid e n ce t o i n di cat e t h at t h e m an da t ory st atutor y bar aga i n st
can cel l ati on of

rem oval ap pl i es. I n sup port of hi s argum en t , V asqu ez- M art i n ez c ite s a N in th C ir c u it c a s e , C i sneros- Pere z v. G on zal es , 451 F .3d 1 0 5 3 (9t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ), am e nded and s uper s e ded o n deni alof r e h’ g by , 4 6 5 F
. 3d 386 ( 9th C i r. 200 6) , t h at he argu es hol ds t h at t h e g overnm en t h as a h i gh b u rden of produ ct i on t o est abli sh th a t a n al i en com m i t t ed an aggrav ated fel on y an d i s t h u s barred fr o m ca n c e lla tio n o f r e m o v a l. C i sneros- Pere z i s i nap po s i t e . I n C i sn er o s-Perez , th e N in th C ir c u it h e ld t h at, gi ven t h e fa ctu alam bi gu i t y of t h e rec ord, t h e governm en t ha d n ot 4 pro vi ded e nough evi denc e t o sh ow th att he pet i t i oner ’ s c onvi c t i on w as f oran a gg ra va ted felon y. In this case , h ow ev er, w e h a ve lim i ted j u ri sd i cti on to consi der w h et h er t h e rec ord i s c on cl u si ve as t o t h e of fen se of convi ct i on , si n ce, a s a fa c t u a lq u e s t i o n f o r t h e B I A t o d e t e r mi n e , i t i s b a r r e d f r o m j u d i c i a lr e v i e w. 8 U
. S

. C

. § 125 2( a) ( 2) ( C ) (barri n g j u di ci al revi ew of f i n alorders of

rem oval w h ere th e a lie n is fo u n d re m o v a b le b a s e d o n , in tera lia , ha vi n g com m i t t ed a con t rol l ed subs t ance vi ol at i on)

. Th e B I Ahel d t hat t he r ec or d of c onvi c t i on e st abl i she s t hatN o. 07- 60900

The ju dgment of convictionreads, “It is therefor e conside red and adj udge by the Court 5 that th e Defe ndant i s guilty of th e offense of afelony , P OSS C S P G 1 >1G DRUG FR EEZ ONE as charge d in the indic tmen t
. . .”( E mp h a si s a dd ed .) Vasqu ez-Martin ez cites to the Ninth Circuit ca se San doval-L ua v. Gonzales , 49 9 F .3d 6 1121 (9t h Cir. 2007) , a s s u p p o r t forthe argum ent tha t wemay reviewwhet her Vas quezMartin ez was convicted for po ssession or p osses s ionwithintentto delive r. However , San doval-L ua is readily distin guishable , as the recor d in that case was notfa c t ua lly ambi gu ous as toth e offense of co nviction; rath er, the chargingdoc ument listed conduct th at did and did not c onstituteanaggravated felony, making itim p os sibl e toascertain the el em entso f th e of

fe n sef oun d b yth e j ury . San doval-L ua , 49 9 F.3 da t1 13 2. Bycontrast, Va sque z-Martine z asks us to r eview th e B IA’s evidentiary conclus io n t ha tth e j udgment of co nvictionr ef

le ct s th e co n ductch argedinth e in dic tm ent. As dis cu sse d, th e b ar of § 125 2(a)(2 )(c) doe s no t per mit u s to do so. § 125 2(a)(2 )(D) reads: “Nothing insub para graph (B) or (C), or in anyoth er p rovision 7 of this ch apter(o t her than this sectio n) whichli mits orelimin ates ju dicial r eview, sh allbe construed as pre clu ding revie wo f

c onstitutional clai ms or que stion s of law r aised upona

6 Vas que z - M ar t i ne z w as c o nvi c t e d of i nt e nt i o nal l y and kno w i ngl y po s s e s s i ng cocai n e w ith i n t ent t o del i veri n a dr ug f r e e z o ne , f

i ndi ng t hatl ang uag e o f t he i n di ct m en t w as i n corporat ed i n t o j u dg m en t of convic t i on by re feren ce, n o tw ith s ta n d in gth e p o s s ib le ty p o g r a p h ic a l e r r o r th a t w a s n o te d b y t h e I J
. T h is 5 is a fa c t u a l d e t e r m in a t io n , n o t a le g a l o n e . T h u s , w e m a y n o t r e v ie w th e B I A ’s
con cl u sion tha t V a sq u ez -M a rti n ez w a s con victe d o f p oss ess i on w i th i n ten t t o de l i ve r c o c ai ne a s o ppo s e d t o m e r e po s s e s s i o n. 6 S econd , nei t h er C i sneros- Pere z no r any c as e i n t hi s Ci r c ui t e s t ab l i s he s t he p r o p o s itio n th a t t h e in itia l b u r d e n o f p r o d u c tio n o f e v id e n c e th a t t h e a lie n is i n el i gi bl e f

or di scr et i on ary re li e f l i es w i t h t h e governm en t
. Su ch a concl u si on do e s no t f

l o w f r o m t he l ang uage of the s t at ut e o r t he c o nc o m i t antr e gul at i o n. S ee § 1 2 2 9 a (c)(4 )(A)(i); 8 C .F .R
. § 1 2 4 0 .8(d ). A ccept i n g t h e fact u alf i n di n g t h at V asqu ez- M art in e z w as convi ct ed of possessi on w i t h i n t en tt o del i ver, t h en , w e m ay sti l lrevi ew t h e B IA ’ s l ega l
c onc l usi on t hat t he c r i m e f or w hi c h V as quez- M ar t i nez w as c onvi c t ed “ m ay” have b e e n a n ag gr a va ted felon y th a t disqu a l i fi ed h i m f rom can cell a ti on of rem ov a l. S ee 8 U .S .C

. § 1 2 5 2 (a )(2)(D ). 7N o. 07- 60900

pe titionf

orr evie w f

il edwithan a pp ro priate co urt of a pp eals inacc or dancewiththisse ctio n .” For p urpose s of § 9 24(c)(2) th e crimes th e C ontroll ed S ubstances Act defin es a s 8 “felo nie s” ar e those cr im es t o which it assigns apu nish ment exceedingon e year' s im pris on me nt. Lopez v. Gonzales , 5 4 9U .S

. 4 7 , 5 6n .7(2 0 0 6). 7 B H avi ng es t abl i she d t hat t he bur den i s on V as quez- M ar t i nez t o s how t hat h e is e li g ib le fo r c a n c e ll a t io n o f r e m o v a l, a n d tr e a t in gV a s q u e z - M a r t i n e z ’s of fen se as possessi on of coc ai n e w i t h i n t en t t o del i ver, w e now l ook to w h et h er he has s at i sf

i ed t hat bur den, r evi ew i ng d e novo w het hert he o f fens e q ual i f

i es as a n a g g r a v a te d fe lo n y u n d e r th e IN A

. S e e O m a r i v . G o n z a le s , 419 F
. 3d 303, 306 (5 th C ir . 2 0 0 5 ). V asqu ez- M art i n ez argues that un der T exas l aw , t h e cr i m e of po ss e ss ion
w i t h i n t en tt o del i ver i s broad er t h an , an d thu s i n cl u des cond u ctt h at does not fa ll w ith in , th e d e fin itio n o f “a g g r a v a te d fe lo n y ” in th e IN A

.
“A ggr avat ed f

el ony” i s def

i ned as i ncl udi ng a “ drug traff i cki ng c r i m e ( as d efi n ed i n secti on 92 4 (c) of T i tl e 1 8 ). ” S m i t h v. G on zal es , 46 8 F
. 3 d 27 2 , 27 5 ( 5 th C i r. 200 6) ( qu ot i n g 8 U
. S

. C

. § 1001 ( a) ( 43)( B ) )

. “D rug t raf f i cki n g cri m e” is def

i n ed
as any f el ony puni shabl e undert he C ont r ol l ed Su bs t ance s A c t , ” 21 U
. S. C

. § 801
e t s e q . Id
. ( qu ot i n g 18 U
. S

. C

. § 924(c ) ( 2) )

. Th e C on t rol l ed S u bstances A ct 8 def i nes “ fel ony” as any “ fede r alors t at e of fens e c l as si f

i ed by appl i c abl e f

ede r al or sta te l a w as a felon y.” Id
. ( quo t i ng 21 U
. S. C. § 8 02 ( 13 ) )

. I n L opez v. G on zal es , 549 U
. S. 47, 60 ( 2006) , t he Su pre m e C our t hel d t hat an of fens e unders t at e l aw c o n s tit u te s a fe lo n y p u n is h a b le u n d e r th e C o n tr o lle d S u b s t a n c e s A c t o n ly if it pro sc r i bes c onductpuni shabl e a s a fel ony undert hat fede r all aw . Conseque nt l y, e v e n th o u g h T e x a s d e fin e s V a s q u e z -M a r tin e z ’ s cr im e a s a s ta te la w fe lo n y , it
m a y n o t q u a lify a s a n a g g r a v a te d fe lo n y u n d e r t h e C o n tr o lle d S u b s ta n c e A c t if i t consi st s of

condu ctt h at w ou l d be on l y a federal m i sdem ean or.N o. 07- 60900

“Delive ry”inth e fe deralstatute is define d as “the actu al, constructive , or attempte d 9 tran sfer of a controll ed substance or ali sted chemical, wheth er or not thereexists an agency re lation ship .” 2 1 U .S .C

. §8 0 2 (8). 8 Vas que z - M ar t i ne z w as c o nvi c t e d un de r Te xa s H e al t h a nd Sa fe t y Code § 4 8 1 .1 1 2 (a ), w h ic h re a d s : Exc e pta s a ut ho r i z e d b y t hi s cha pt e r , a per s o n co m m i t s a n o f fe ns e i f t he p erso n k n ow i n gly m a n u factu res, deli ve rs, or p oss ess es w i th i n ten t t o del i vera c ont r ol l ed s ubst ance l i st ed i n P enal t y G r oup 1.
T h e sta tu te d efi n es th e w ord “de l i ve r”:

“ D e li v e r” m ean s t o t ran sfer, act u al l y or c on st ructivel y, t o an ot h er a c ont r ol l ed s ubst ance , c ount er fei t su bs t ance , ordr ug par apher nal i a, regardl ess of

w h et h er t h ere i s an ag en cy rel ati on shi p. T h e t erm i n cl u des offeringto se ll a c o nt r o l l e d s ubs t anc e , c o unt e r fe i t s ubs t anc e , o r dr ug p a r a p h e r n a lia
. T EX . H E AL T H & S A F E TY C ODE A NN . § 4 8 1 .00 2 (8 ). (em p h a sis a d d e d ). V as quez- M ar t i nez ar gues t hat be c ause Texas l aw def i nes “ del i very ” as
e n c a p s u la tin g“o ffe r in gto s e ll”, it is b r o a d e r th a n th e d e fin itio n o f “d e liv e r y ” in t h e federal st atute, w h i ch does n o t incl u de of fers t o sel l
. Th u s, he contend s,

9 be c aus e t he Te xa s s t at ut e i nc l ude s c o nduc t t hatw o ul d no t b e c o ns i de r e d a fe l o ny u n der t h e federal st atute, a convi ct i on un der §481

. 112 ( a) cann otbe consi dered
an a g g ra vated fel on y f or t h e pu rposes of

di squ al i f

yi n g h i m f

or c an cel l ati on of
r e m o v a l. V as quez- M ar t i nez poi nt s t o t w o o f our c as es i n t he s ent enc i ng c ont extt hat he ar gues s upportf i ndi ng t hat pos se ss i on w i t h i nt entt o de l i ver i s notan ag gr av at e d f

e l o ny unde r t he Cont r o l l e d Sub s t an ces A c t
. I n Uni t e d S t at e s v. G on zal es , 4 8 4 F .3d 712 , 715

- 16 (5t h C i r. 200 7) , w e hel d that t h e st atutor y d efi n i ti on o f d eli ve ry o f a con troll ed s u b stan ce i n § 4 8 1
. 1 1 2 o f th e T ex a s H ea l th
an d S afet y C ode en com pa sses a ct i vi t y t h at does n otfal lw i t h i n the d ef i n i t i on of

“ dru g t raf

f i ck in g o ffen se” as setout i n § 2L 1. 2(b) ( 1) (A) ( i) of t h e U n i t ed S t atesN o. 07- 60900

Gonzales in turnrelied on our hol ding in United States v. Garza Lo pez , 41 0 F .3d 2 68, 10 274( 5thC ir.), in whichwe stated thatoffe rin g to se ll a c ontroll ed substance lies outsi de sectio n 2L 1.2' s definition of “drugtraffickin g offen se,” since se ction2L 1.2 “covers o nlyth e manufacture, i mport, expo rt, di stribution , or dispen sing of a c ontroll ed substance (o r possessionw ith theintent to do anyof thesethings).” Gonzales , 48 4 F .3d at 7 14-1 5 (quoting Garza-Lopez , 4 1 0F .3 d at 2 7 4). 9 S en ten ci n g G u i d eli n es, b eca u se th e sta te statu te i n cl u d es a n “o ffe r to sell”. 10 S i m i l ar l y, i n Un i t ed S t ate s v. Moral es- Mart i n ez , 496 F
. 3d 356 , 360 ( 5th C i r. 2 0 0 7 ), b e c a u s e th e T e x a s s t a t u t e d e fi n e s d e li v e r y m o r e b r o a d ly th a n § 2 L 1 .2 's de f i ni t i o n o f

a “ dr ug t r af

f i c ki ng o f

fe ns e , ” w e appl i e d t he “ c at e go r i c ala ppr o ac h”
o f T aylorv. Un i t ed S t ate s , 49 5 U
. S. 57 5 ( 19 90 ) a nd S h epard v. Un i t ed S t ate s , 544 U
. S

. 13 ( 200 5) to deter m i n e w h et h er t h e defen da n t ha d p l ead ed gu i l t y t o condu ct t hatfe l lw i t hi n t he a m bi to f t he fe de r alde f

i ni t i o n. I n Moral es- Mart i n ez , w e h e ld t hat nei t her t he c hargi ng doc um ent s nor t he fac t of c onvi c t i on e st abl i she d t hat t he def endant had c om m i t t ed a “ drug t r af f i c ki ng of

fens e” und er §2L1. 2, and t hat th e d is tr ic t cou rt ha d thu s erre d i n ap p l yin g th e se n ten ci n g e n h a n cem en t. Mo r al e s - Mart i n ez , 456 F
. 3d at 360

- 61. V asqu ez- M art i n ez urges us to f ol l ow t hes e c as es i n f

i ndi ng t hat , bec ause hi s c onvi c t i on und er §481. 112 c oul d h ave i m pl i cat ed cond u ctnot def i n ed as a “ dru g t raf

f i cki n g of

fen se, ” i t can n ot be u sed to tr ig g e r th e a g g r a v a te d fe lo n y b a r to ca n c e lla tio n o f r e m o v a l. T h e gover n m e n t re sp o n d s th a t V a sq u e z -M a rtin e z ’ s a rg u m en ti s f orecl osed byo urpr e c e de nti n Un i t ed S t ate s v. F ord , 5 0 9 F .3 d 7 1 4 , 7 1 7 (5 th C ir . 2 0 0 7 ), in
w h i ch w e hel d that a convi ct i on f orposse ssi on w i t h int ent t o del i ver und erTexas H e al t h a nd Sa fe t y Code §481

. 112 ( a) const i t u t es a “ control l ed s u bstance of fen se” f o r t he pur po s e s o f

a U
. S. S. G

. § 2K2. 1( a) ( 4) (A) s e nt e nc e e nhan c e m e nt
. W e f o und i n Ford th a t “po sse ssion w i th i n ten t to d eli ve r” u n d er §48 1
. 1 1 2 is i n di st i n gu i sha bl e f

rom “possessi on w i t h intent t o di st ribu t e, ” one of t h e of fen ses l i sted i n the S en ten ci n g G ui del i nes ’def i ni t i on of a “con troll ed su b stan ce offen se”. T h u s, w h i l e G on zal es and Moral es- Mart i n ezboth add ress ed conv i ct i on s f orN o. 07- 60900

As pre viouslystat ed, an “aggravated felony” for the purpose s of cancell atio n of 11 remov al is defin ed a s inclu ding “dru g-traffickin g crimes” as define d in18U.S.C . §9 24(c), an d drug traffickin g crimes are in turndefined as “anyfelonypu nish abl e under the Controll ed Sub st a nceAct .” I n Ford , th e C ourttre ated the Guideline s definitions of “c ontroll ed substance offense” 12 a n d “dru g tr aff

icki n g of

fe n se” a s id entical fo r it s purp os es . 5 0 9 F .3 d at 7 1 7 n.2. Vasqu ezMartin ez argues that th e minort ex t ua l differences b etweenth e two Guideline s definitions matters in this case because our precede nt estab lish es th at “offers to sell” do not fallwithin the definitio n of “drugtraffickin g offen ses . ” Th is ar gu ment does not c onvinc e u s, as it is irrel ev antto wheth er § 2K2 .1's definitionof a c ontroll ed substance offense corre late s with the de finitio no f “dru gtraff icki n gc ri me s”a s s eto ut inth e C ontrolle d Sub st a nce s Act
.

10 d el i very u n d er §4 8 1
. 1 1 2 , the G ov ern m en t con ten d s th a t For d c o n tr o ls th e re s u lt i n t he i nst ant c as e b ec ause i ti nvol ved t he e xac t c r i m e a t i ss ue her e, nam el y, posses si on w i t h i n t ent t o del i ver . F ord , 509 F. 3d at715. Vas que z - M ar t i ne z at t e m pt s t o di s t i ngu i s h For d f r o m G on zal es/Moral esMart i n ezb y ar gui ng t hatt he f o r m e rdo e s no t a ppl y be c aus e i t a dd re s s e d a

“ c o nt r o l l e d s ubs t ance off e ns e ” und e r § 2 K 2. 1 r at he r t han a “ dr ug t r af f i c ki ng of fen se” un der § 2L 1. 2 an d that t h e l att er def i n i t i on i s t h e operative on e here. H o w e v e r , th e G u id e lin e s d e fin itio n o f “c o n tr o lle d s u b s ta n c e o ffe n s e ” is n e a r ly i d en ti ca lto t h e def

i n i t i on of

condu ct d ef

i n ed as a fel on y u n der t h e C on t rol l ed S u bstances A ct
. U n der t h e G u i del i n es, t h e t erm “ control l ed su bstance of fen se” 11 in c lu d e s “p o s s e s s io n o f a co n tr o lle d s u b s ta n c e . . . w ith in te n t t o . . . d is t r i b u te .” U
. S

. S

. G

. § 4B 1. 2(b)

. U n der t h e C on t rol l ed S u bstances A ct , i t i s un l aw f u lf or “a n y p e r s o n k n o w in g ly o r in te n tio n a lly
. . . [to ] p o s s e s s w ith in te n t t o . . . di st ribu t e . . . a contr ol l ed su bstance.” 2 1 U
. S

. C

. § 841(a) ( 1)

. Th u s, V asqu ezM a rti n ez ’ s ar gu m en t t h a t For d doe s notappl y i n t hi s c ont exti s unavai l i ng. 12 W e r e c o gni z e t hatt he r e i s a t e ns i o n b e t w e e n G on zal es/M oral es- Mart i n ez and F ord , as toget h er they l ead to the st ran ge resul t tha t w h i l e t h e possess i on w i t h i nt e ntt o de l i ve r c o c ai ne und e r Tex as H e al t h a nd Sa fe t y Code §481. 112( a) i s a fe l o ny un d e r t he Co nt r o l l e d Su b s t a nc e s Ac t , d e l i v e r y un d e r t he s am e statu tory pr ov i sion i s n ot. H ow ev er, Ford co n tr ol s i n t hi s c as e, and abs entanN o. 07- 60900

11 e n b ancdeci si on t o rec on ci l e our case l aw , w e are boun d by t h e previ ou s pan el de c i s i o n. B ecau se un der F

ord , t he c r i m e f

orw h i ch V as quez- M ar t i nez w as c o nvi c t e d— possess i o n wi t h i nt e ntt o de l i ve r c o c ai ne — i s a fe l o ny unde rt he C on t rol l ed S u bstance A ct , t h e B IAdi d n oterri n hol di n g t h at V asqu ez- M art i n ez i s i ne l i gibl e f

o r c anc e l l at i o n o f r e m o va l unde r § 12 29 b( a) ( 3)

. W e t hus D EN Y t he P e t i t i o n f

o r R e v i e w.