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Peter Kristofer Strojnik, State Bar No. 026082 

pstrojnik@strojniklaw.com 

THE STROJNIK FIRM LLC 

A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

Esplanade Center III, Suite 700 

2415 East Camelback Road 

Phoenix, Arizona 85016 

Telephone: (602) 510-9409 

Facsimile: (602) 773-0370 

Attorneys for Plaintiff THERESA BROOKE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

THERESA BROOKE, a married woman 

dealing with her sole and separate claim, 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. 

DAWN LLC, an Arizona limited liability 

company dba Mainstay Suites, 

 Defendant. 

Case No: 

VERIFIED COMPLAINT 

(Jury Trial Demanded) 

Plaintiff alleges: 

1. Plaintiff Theresa Brooke is a married woman currently residing in Pinal 

County, Arizona. Plaintiff is and, at all times relevant hereto, has been legally disabled, 

confined to a wheel chair, and is therefore a member of a protected class under the 

ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), the regulations implementing the ADA set forth at 28 CFR 

§§ 36.101 et seq. Plaintiff ambulates with the aid of a wheelchair due to the loss of a 

leg. 

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2. Defendant, Dawn LLC, owns and/or operates and does business as the 

hotel, Mainstay Suites located at 851 North Henness Road, Casa Grande, Arizona. 

Defendant’s hotel is a public accommodation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A), 

which offers public lodging services. 

3. Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 42 

U.S.C. § 12188. 

4. Plaintiff’s claims asserted herein arose in this judicial district and 

Defendant does substantial business in this judicial district. 

5. Venue in this judicial district is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) 

in that this is the judicial district in which a substantial part of the acts and omissions 

giving rise to the claims occurred. 

6. In early December 2017, Plaintiff and her husband went to Defendant’s 

hotel to book an ADA accessible room for the night. Plaintiff resides twenty minutes 

from Casa Grande, and she and her husband wanted a night out over night in Casa 

Grande. 

7. Defendant’s hotel is located off of the “main drag” in Casa Grande, which 

is where many hotels, restaurants and shops are located. 

8. Plaintiff and her husband went to Defendant’s hotel to book a room prior 

to going to dinner. When Plaintiff arrived, she encountered that the lobby loading zone 

at Defendant’s hotel had a six-inch curb precluding Plaintiff from entering the lobby of 

the hotel. The loading zone did not have a car-length access aisle as required by Section 

503 of the 2010 Standards. 

9. Determined, Plaintiff and her husband looked for a way to access to the 

lobby. There were disabled parking spots next to the loading zone, which did have 

access aisles to the sidewalk that led to the lobby. However, the disabled parking spots 

were taken. 

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10. Consequently, the loading zone was the sole access route to the lobby, but 

the barrier precluded Plaintiff from accessing the lobby from the loading zone. As a 

result, Plaintiff did not book a room at Defendant’s hotel. 

11. Plaintiff visited at least four other hotels that evening, and each of them 

were either booked for the night or were not accessible. Frustrated, Plaintiff and her 

husband simply ate dinner in Casa Grande and drove home the same night. 

12. Plaintiff has personal knowledge of a barrier related to her disability, that 

is, lobby facilities at Defendant’s hotel are inaccessible to her by virtue of her 

confinement to a wheel chair, and is currently deterred from returning to Defendant’s 

accommodation by this accessibility barrier. 

13. Without a lobby loading zone that complies with Section 503, e.g. a carlength access aisle, Plaintiff’s disability prevents her from equal enjoyment as ablebodied persons have. 

14. Plaintiff has frequented Casa Grande in the past and intends to travel there 

again in the near future for pleasure. If she receives notice that Defendant removes the 

barriers at issue in this case, she will lodge at Defendant’s hotel when she next returns 

to Casa Grande. 

15. As a result of Defendant’s non-compliance with the ADA, Plaintiff, 

unlike persons without disabilities, cannot equally access Defendant’s lobby. 

16. Plaintiff and other disabled persons have been injured by Defendant’s 

discriminatory practices and failure to remove architectural barriers. These injuries 

include being deterred from using Defendant’s hotel due to the lack of access to the 

lobby facilities. 

17. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and others will continue to be unable to 

independently use Defendant’s hotel lobby facilities in violation of her rights under the 

ADA. 

18. Other potential violations and barriers to entry at Defendant’s hotel may 

be discovered through an expert inspection of the hotel property pursuant to Rule 34. So 

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as to avoid piecemeal litigation to ensure full access to the entirety of the property at 

issue, Plaintiff will amend her complaint to allege and all additional barriers discovered 

during the Rule 34 inspection. Doran v. 7-Eleven, 524 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2008). 

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violation of Title III the Americans with Disabilities Act) 

19. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations heretofore set forth. 

20. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and others in that it has 

failed to make its public lodging services fully accessible to, and independently usable 

by, individuals who are disabled in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) and § 

121282(b)(2)(iv) and the 2010 Standards, as described above. 

21. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff in that it has failed to 

remove architectural barriers to make its lodging services fully accessible to, and 

independently usable by individuals who are disabled in violation of 42 U.S.C. 

§12182(b)(A)(iv) and the 2010 Standards, as described above. Compliance with the 

2010 Standards would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s lodging 

services nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 

22. In violation of the 2010 Standards, Defendant’s hotel passenger loading 

zone does not have a disability access aisle as required by Section 503 of the Standards. 

23. Compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) and the 2010 Standards, 

as described above, is readily achievable by the Defendant. Id. Readily achievable 

means that providing access is easily accomplishable without significant difficulty or 

expense. 

24. Conversely, the cessation of compliance with the ADA law is also readily 

achievable. Therefore, injunctive relief should issue irrespective of Defendant’s 

potential voluntary cessation pursuant to the Supreme Court’s announcement in Friends 

of the Earth case1. 

 1 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 

693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000): 

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25. Defendant’s conduct is ongoing, and, given that Defendant has never fully 

complied with the ADA’s requirements that public accommodations make lodging 

services fully accessible to, and independently usable by, disabled individuals, Plaintiff 

invokes her statutory right to declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as costs and 

attorneys’ fees. 

26. Without the requested injunctive relief, specifically including the request 

that the Court retain jurisdiction of this matter for a period to be determined after the 

Defendant certifies that it is fully in compliance with the mandatory requirements of the 

ADA that are discussed above, Defendant’s non-compliance with the ADA’s 

requirements that its passenger loading zone be fully accessible to, and independently 

useable by, disabled people is likely to recur. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant as follows: 

a. A Declaratory Judgment that at the commencement of this action 

Defendant was in violation of the specific requirements of Title III of the 

ADA described above, and the relevant implementing regulations of the 

ADA, in that Defendant took no action that was reasonably calculated to 

ensure that all of its passenger loading zone is fully accessible to, and 

independently usable by, disabled individuals; 

b. Irrespective of Defendants “voluntary cessation” of the ADA violation, if 

applicable, a permanent injunction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) 

 

It is well settled that a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged 

practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the 

legality of the practice. If it did, the courts would be compelled to leave the 

defendant free to return to his old ways. In accordance with this principle, 

the standard we have announced for determining whether a case has been 

mooted by the defendant's voluntary conduct is stringent: A case might 

become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the 

allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. The 

heavy burden of persuading the court that the challenged conduct cannot 

reasonably be expected to start up again lies with the party asserting 

mootness. 

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and 28 CFR § 36.504(a) which directs Defendant to take all steps 

necessary to bring its passenger loading zone into full compliance with 

the requirements set forth in the ADA, and its implementing regulations, 

so that the passenger loading zone is fully accessible to, and 

independently usable by, disabled individuals, and which further directs 

that the Court shall retain jurisdiction for a period to be determined after 

Defendant certifies that its passenger loading zone is fully in compliance 

with the relevant requirements of the ADA to ensure that Defendant has 

adopted and is following an institutional policy that will in fact cause 

Defendant to remain fully in compliance with the law; 

c. Irrespective of Defendants “voluntary cessation” of the ADA violation, if 

applicable, payment of costs of suit; 

d. Irrespective of Defendants “voluntary cessation” of the ADA violation, if 

applicable, payment of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205, 28 

CFR § 36.505 and other principles of law and equity and in compliance 

with the “prevailing party” and “material alteration” of the parties’ 

relationship doctrines2; and, 

e. Nominal damages pursuant to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s 

recently decision in Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., Ninth Circuit 

case no. 15-15287 (June 26, 2017) (for publication); and, 

f. Order closure of the Defendant’s place of public accommodation until 

Defendant has fully complied with the ADA; and 

g. The provision of whatever other relief the Court deems just, equitable and 

appropriate. 

 2

 As applicable to ADA cases, see Coppi v. City of Dana Point, Case No. SACV 11-

1813 JGB (RNBx) (February, 2015) 

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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Negligence) 

27. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations heretofore set forth. 

28. Defendant had a duty to Plaintiff to remove ADA accessibility barriers so 

that Plaintiff as a disabled individual would have full and equal access to the public 

accommodation. 

29. Defendant breached this duty. 

30. Defendant is or should be aware that, historically, society has tended to 

isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, 

such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a 

serious and pervasive social problem. 

31. Defendant knowingly and intentionally participated in this historical 

discrimination against Plaintiff, causing Plaintiff damage. 

32. Discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in the use and 

enjoyment of critical public accommodations. 

33. Defendant’s knowing and intentional persistence indiscrimination against 

Plaintiff is alleged, causing Plaintiff damage. 

34. Individuals with disabilities, including Plaintiff, continually encounter 

various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the 

discriminatory effects of architectural, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make 

modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards 

and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, 

jobs, or other opportunities. 

35. Defendant’s knowing and intentional discrimination against Plaintiff 

reinforces above forms of discrimination, causing Plaintiff damage. 

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36. Census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that 

people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are 

severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally. 

37. Defendant’s knowing and intentional discrimination has relegated 

Plaintiff to an inferior status in society, causing Plaintiff damage. 

38. The Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to 

assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic selfsufficiency for such individuals. 

39. Defendant’s knowing and intentional discrimination has worked counter 

to our Nation’s goals of equality, causing Plaintiff damage. 

40. Continued existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and 

prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis 

and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous, and 

costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from 

dependency and nonproductivity. 

41. Defendant’s knowing and intentional unfair and unnecessary 

discrimination against Plaintiff demonstrates Defendant’s knowing and intentional 

damage to Plaintiff. 

42. Defendant’s breach of duty caused Plaintiff damages including, without 

limitation, the feeling of segregation, discrimination, relegation to second class citizen 

status the pain, suffering and emotional damages inherent to discrimination and 

segregation and other damages to be proven at trial. 

43. By violating Plaintiff’s civil rights, Defendant engaged in intentional, 

aggravated and outrageous conduct. 

44. The ADA has been the law of the land since 1991, but Defendant engaged 

in a conscious action of a reprehensible character, that is, Defendant denied Plaintiff his 

civil rights, and cause him damage by virtue of segregation, discrimination, relegation 

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to second class citizen status the pain, suffering and emotional damages inherent to 

discrimination and segregation and other damages to be proven at trial 

45. Defendant eitherintended to cause injury to Plaintiff or defendant 

consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing that it created a substantial risk of 

significant harm to Plaintiff. 

46. Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for punitive damages in an amount to be 

proven at trial sufficient, however, to deter this Defendant and others similarly situated 

from pursuing similar acts. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant as follows: 

a. For finding of negligence; and 

b. For damages in an amount to be proven at trial; and 

c. For punitive damages to be proven at trial; and 

d. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 

 Plaintiff demands a jury trial. 

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of December, 2017. 

 

 THE STROJNIK FIRM L.L.C. 

 

 

 

 Peter Kristofer Strojnik (026082) 

 2415 East Camelback Road, Suite 700 

 Phoenix, Arizona 85016 

 Attorneys for Plaintiff 

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VERIFICATION COMPLIANT WITH R10-3-405 

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 

DATED this 12th day of December, 2017. 

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