IV 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 698 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the fatal crash 

of an MV–22 aircraft on April 8, 2000, in Marana, Arizona, was not 

a result of aircrew human factors or pilot error. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 30, 2009 

Mr. JONES submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Armed Services 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that 

the fatal crash of an MV–22 aircraft on April 8, 2000, 

in Marana, Arizona, was not a result of aircrew human 

factors or pilot error. 

Whereas an MV–22 aircraft crashed on April 8, 2000, in 

Marana, Arizona, killing the pilot, Lieutenant Colonel 

John A. Brow, the co-pilot, Major Brooks S. Gruber, and 

17 other Marines aboard the aircraft; 

Whereas Lieutenant Colonel Brow and Major Gruber possessed excellent and unassailable records throughout their 

careers in the United States Marine Corps and gave their 

lives for the United States and the Marine Corps in the 

crash on April 8, 2000; 


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Whereas after the accident Lieutenant Colonel Brow’s commanding officer described him as a ‘‘highly regarded 

pilot, both in the C–130 and MV–22, and his expertise 

and recommendations lent a great deal to the MV–22 

program.’’; 

Whereas after the accident Major Gruber’s commanding officer described him as a ‘‘very highly regarded pilot, both 

in the CH–53E and MV–22, whose work with special operations gave unique insight to the MV–22 program.’’; 

Whereas numerous reviews and investigations following the 

accident document that the pilots of the aircraft involved 

in the accident were not provided with the necessary and 

critical knowledge of the potential for sudden loss of controlled flight in the MV–22 following Vortex Ring State 

(VRS) onset or the training to recognize, avoid, or recover from the extreme dangers of VRS in the MV–22; 

Whereas after the accident Naval Air Systems Command 

called for a thorough investigative flight test program to 

find the MV–22’s boundaries of VRS, characterize its 

handling qualities, and establish the basis for a new 

flight limitation, new pilot procedures, and a cockpit 

warning system, if warranted; 

Whereas, as a result of testing following the fatal accident, 

a visual and aural cockpit warning system was developed 

to alert the aircrew when the aircraft exceeded the Naval 

Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization 

(NATOPS) flight manual’s rate-of-descent limit; 

Whereas, on July 27, 2000, the Marine Corps announced in 

a press release that a combination of ‘‘human factors’’ 

caused the April 8, 2000, crash, stating that ‘‘deviations 

from the scheduled flight plan, an unexpected tailwind 


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and the pilot’s extremely rapid rate of descent into the 

landing zone created conditions that led to the accident.’’; 

Whereas the press release also stated the ‘‘although the report stops short of specifying pilot error as a cause, it 

notes that the pilot of the ill-fated aircraft significantly 

exceeded the rate of descent established by regulations 

for safe flight.’’; 

Whereas the press release issued by the Marine Corps also 

quoted Commandant General James L. Jones as saying 

that ‘‘the tragedy is that these were all good Marines 

joined in a challenging mission. Unfortunately, the pilots’ 

drive to accomplish that mission appears to have been the 

fatal factor.’’; 

Whereas the language of the press release is damaging and 

inaccurate because, at the time of the crash, adequate 

testing of the MV–22 in the High Rate of Descent 

(HROD) and the VRS regimes had not been conducted, 

the MV–22 did not have a VRS warning system, and the 

pilots did not have adequate knowledge of the potential 

for sudden loss of controlled flight in the MV–22 following VRS onset or the training to recognize, avoid, or 

recover from the extreme dangers of VRS in the MV–22; 

Whereas according to the investigation conducted pursuant to 

the Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN investigation), on April 8, 2000, Lieutenant Colonel Brow and 

Major Gruber were participating in an Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL) to determine the operational effectiveness and suitability of the MV–22 and to continue tactics 

development to support the promulgation of an Operational Tactics Guide; 


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Whereas an OPEVAL is to be conducted under realistic scenarios in day, night, and adverse weather; 

Whereas the OPEVAL of April 8, 2000, called for a longrange night Non-combatant Evacuation Operation exercise involving the insertion of a security and processing 

unit; 

Whereas, according to the Comptroller General, the Operational Test and Evaluation Force’s MV–22 report on 

the OPEVAL indicated that the MV–22 ‘‘Naval Air 

Training and Operating Procedures Standardization 

(NATOPS) manual lacked adequate content, accuracy, 

and clarity at the time of the accident. Additionally, because of incomplete developmental testing in the High 

Rate of Descent (HROD) regime, there was insufficient 

explanatory or emphatic text to warn pilots of hazards of 

operating in this area. The flight simulator did not replicate this loss of controlled flight regime.’’; 

Whereas the preliminary NATOPS manual and MV–22 

ground school syllabus provided insufficient guidance or 

warning as to high rate of descent airspeed conditions 

and the potential consequences of a rapid rate of descent; 

Whereas the officer conducting the JAGMAN investigation 

stated that ‘‘The fact that this aircraft not only found 

itself in a Vortex Ring State condition with no apparent 

warning to the aircrew, but also departed controlled flight 

is particularly concerning.’’; 

Whereas, based on this evidence, it is clear that the pilots of 

the aircraft involved in the accident on April 8, 2000, did 

not have the knowledge, warning systems, or training 

needed to avoid or recover from VRS onset at the time 

of the accident; 


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Whereas, on December 15, 2000, after a second crash of a 

MV–22 aircraft that year, then-Secretary of Defense Bill 

Cohen determined that the accident history of the MV– 

22 aircraft and other testing issues required an independent, high-level review of the program and therefore 

established a Blue Ribbon Panel to review the safety of 

the MV–22 aircraft and to recommend corrective actions; 

Whereas the Blue Ribbon Panel was briefed by the Comptroller General and the contents of this brief were incorporated into a subsequent Comptroller General report 

which cited concerns about the adequacy of development 

tests conducted prior to the MV–22 aircraft entering the 

operational test and evaluation phase, in particular that 

such developmental testing was deleted, deferred, or simulated in order to meet cost and scheduled goals; 

Whereas the original plan to test the flying qualities of the 

flight control system of the MV–22, including various 

rates of descent, speeds, and weights, would have provided considerable knowledge of the MV–22 flight qualities especially in areas related to the sudden loss of controlled flight following VRS onset; 

Whereas, to meet cost and schedule targets, the actual testing of the MV–22 conducted was less than a third of the 

testing originally planned; 

Whereas the MV–22 pilots involved in the accident did not 

understand the optimum use of nacelle tilt to recover 

from VRS onset; 

Whereas additional HROD and VRS developmental testing 

could have prevented the tragic accident on April 8, 

2000, in Marana, Arizona, by providing the pilots the 


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knowledge and training to either avoid or recover from 

VRS; 

Whereas the Comptroller General report also revealed that 

the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation of the Department of Defense stated that ‘‘while the possible existence of VRS in the V–22 was known when flight limits 

for OPEVAL were established, the unusual attitude following entry into VRS was not expected’’ and ‘‘thus, the 

first indication the pilot may receive that he has encountered this difficulty is when the aircraft initiated an 

uncommanded, uncontrollable roll.’’; and 

Whereas Lieutenant Colonel Brow and Major Gruber and 

their families are dishonored by the assertion that the 

aircrew was in any way responsible for this fatal accident: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep2 resentatives that— 

3 (1) the fatal crash of an MV–22 on April 8, 

4 2000, in Marana, Arizona, was not a result of air5 crew human factors or pilot error that can be attrib6 uted to the late Lieutenant Colonel John A. Brow or 

7 the late Major Brooks S. Gruber who performed 

8 their duties as United States Marine Corps aviators 

9 competently and professionally; 

10 (2) the fatal factor in the crash of an MV–22 

11 on April 8, 2000, was the aircraft’s lack of a Vortex 

12 Ring State (VRS) warning system and the failure to 

13 provide the pilots with the necessary and critical 


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1 knowledge and training regarding the extreme dan2 gers of VRS onset in the MV–22; 

3 (3) because of inadequate High Rate of Descent 

4 (HROD) and VRS developmental testing, the pilots 

5 of the MV–22 involved in the accident on April 8, 

6 2000, were not trained or able to recognize, avoid, 

7 or recover from VRS onset in the MV–22; and 

8 (4) had adequate HROD and VRS develop9 mental testing been conducted prior to the Oper10 ational Evaluation of April 8, 2000, and had a VRS 

11 warning system been installed in the aircraft, Lieu12 tenant Colonel Brow and Major Gruber would have 

13 been better able to avoid or recover from VRS. 

Æ 


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