alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Madrona Ventures Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-QSB for the period ending October 31, 2007 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Reese
Baglole, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of the
7th day of December, 2007.


/s/ Reese Baglole
------------------------------
Chief Financial Officer
#### The Taplin-Rice-Clerkin Co. *v.*Hower.

(No. 22785

Decided June 17, 1931.)

*124
      *Messrs. Slabaugh, Seiberling, Huber & Guinther,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. Lee J. Myers,*for defendant in error.

By the Court.

The sole question for determination in this case is whether or not the testimony of William Clerkin given before the grand jury in the *125investigation of the charges against John F. Iiower constituted privileged matter and the trial court erred in admitting the same.

This testimony of Clerkin before the grand jury was the cornerstone of the plaintiff’s case in the trial court, and it is admitted that if this testimony is privileged, and therefore excluded, the plaintiff in the malicious prosecution case must fail.

The trial court admitted this testimony in evidence upon the authority of *Kintz*v. *Harriger,*99 Ohio St., 240, 124 N. E., 168, 12 A. L. R., 1240. This court in *Erie County Farmers’ Ins. Co.*v. *Crecelius,*122 Ohio St., 210, 171 N. E., 97, decided that a libel action could not be founded on a defamatory statement made in a pleading in a court proceeding, where the statement was material and relevant to the issue. In *Buehrer*v. *Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co.,*123 Ohio St., 264, 175 N. E., 25, this court held that defamatory statements inserted in a «pleading are privileged, though untrue.

In the light of these cases decided by this court since the decision of *Kintz*v. *Harriger, supra,*and consistent with the later declarations, it becomes our duty to overrule the conclusions of *Kintz*v. *Harriger, supra,*and hold that testimony given before the grand jury is privileged, and, in a case for malicious prosecution, such as the case at bar, is therefore inadmissible. The case of *Vogel, Exr.,*v. *Gruaz,*110 U. S., 311, 4 S. Ct., 12, 28 L. Ed., 158, is a leading case recognizing this doctrine and has been frequently followed in both federal and state courts. The same rule also prevails in other jurisdictions. *McClarty*v. *Bickel, 155*Ky., 254, 159 S. W., 783, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.), 392; *Bazzell*v. *Illinois Central Rd.*
      *126
      *Co.,*203 Ky., 626, 262 S. W., 966; *Michael*v. *Matson,*81 Kan., 360, 105 P., 537; *Worthington*v. *Scribner,*109 Mass., 487, 12 Am. Rep., 736.

Finding that the testimony of Clerkin given before the grand jury should not have been admitted, upon the ground of privilege, and that without such testimony the plaintiff below had no case, we are compelled to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and render final judgment for the plaintiff in error, defendant below.

*Judgment reversed.*

Marshall, C. J., Jones, Day, Allen, Kinkade and Robinson, JJ., concur.
Exhibit
      32.1





CERTIFICATION
      OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT
      TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I,
      Mark
      Trimble, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
      Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of
      IntelliHome, Inc. on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2008
      fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Form 10-QSB fairly
      presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of
      operations of IntelliHome, Inc.





By:
            /s/
                Mark TrimbleName:
            Mark
                TrimbleTitle:
            Chief
                Executive Officer andChief
                Financial OfficerDated:
            June
                10, 2008
#### David Wayne BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

Nos. 13-92-398-CR, 13-92-401-CR and 13-92-402-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi.

Aug. 17, 1995.

A. Jay Condie, Houston, Marek & Griffin, Port Lavaca, for appellant.

Robert E. Bell, Criminal District Attorney, Edna, Jim Vollers, Austin, for appellee.

Before SEERDEN, C.J., and FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA, Jr., and RODRIGUEZ, JJ.

OPINION

RODRIGUEZ, Justice.

Appellant, David Wayne Brown, was convicted of three counts of indecency with a child. With five enhancement paragraphs, the jury assessed punishment at eighty (80) years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Department of Criminal Justice. The three convictions were consolidated for the purpose of appellant’s first appeal to this court. *See Brown v. State,*871 S.W.2d 852 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, pet. ref'd).

In that appeal, appellant challenged the trial court’s judgments by three points of error. Appellant’s first and second points of error challenging the sufficiency of evidence and adequacy of counsel were thoroughly addressed and remain overruled.

By his third point of error, appellant argued that sufficient evidence of his incompetency to stand trial was apparent before and during trial such that the trial judge erred in failing to order, on its own motion, a hearing to determine competency.

We agreed with appellant, abated his appeal, and remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether appellant’s competency at the time of trial could be ascertained after the passage of one and one-half years, and if so, to hold a retrospective competency hearing pursuant to Article 46.02, Section 2 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.1

We ordered that if the trial court determined that too much time had passed to hold a Section 2 hearing, it should grant a new trial. We further directed that if the trial court held a Section 2 hearing, it should take such further actions as are authorized by Article 46.02. Finally, we permitted appellant the opportunity to submit an additional brief after the competency determination to address any issues presented at the hearing.

The trial court properly conducted the Section 2 hearing and concluded that there was no evidence to support the finding of incompetency to stand trial. Appellant has not submitted any briefs challenging the hearing or the trial court’s conclusion.

In light of the trial court’s findings and our discussion in appellant’s first appeal, we AFFIRM the judgments of the trial court.

1

. The State challenged our disposition of the appeal by petition to the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition was refused by the court on August 19, 1994.
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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael R Ward,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Nathaniel Harris, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-18-00694-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

This case arises out of Plaintiff Michael R. Ward’s (“Plaintiff”) claims against 

various defendants under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 

Constitution. (Doc. 105 at 1). Broadly, he claims his rights were violated when prison 

personnel revoked his use of sunglasses, which he claims he needs to stave off myriad 

photosensivity-related symptoms. (Id. at 2–4). The case is currently set for trial on 

November 16, 2020, and Plaintiff now moves for appointment of counsel. (Doc. 106).

Although civil litigants do not enjoy a constitutional right to the appointment of 

counsel, this Court can appoint counsel in pro se and in forma pauperis proceedings when 

“exceptional circumstances” exist. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)). A finding of exceptional circumstances “requires at least 

an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and an evaluation of 

the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of the legal issues 

involved.’” Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 

Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.1986)).

Case 2:18-cv-00694-JAT Document 111 Filed 04/28/20 Page 1 of 2
- 2 -

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The Court finds no exceptional circumstances warrant appointing counsel at this 

stage in the litigation. The Court has referred this case to Magistrate Judge Michelle H. 

Burns to conduct a settlement conference, (Doc. 105 at 10), and believes that Plaintiff is 

fully capable of independently deciding whether to settle the case at that conference. Thus, 

the motion will be denied without prejudice to Plaintiff raising a later request for counsel 

if the settlement conference does not result in a settlement.

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 106) is 

DENIED without prejudice to Plaintiff raising a later request following the settlement 

conference.

Dated this 28th day of April, 2020.

Case 2:18-cv-00694-JAT Document 111 Filed 04/28/20 Page 2 of 2
#### STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. Brian D. HERRON, Defendant/Appellant. Brian D. HERRON, Movant/Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

Nos. 60564, 62993.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Four.

Aug. 10, 1993.

Brad B. Baker, Office of the State Public Defender, Columbia, for defendant/appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Rudolph R. Rhodes, IV, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff/respondent.

Before GRIMM, P.J., and CARL R. GAERTNER and AHRENS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was charged and convicted of first degree murder. Thereafter, he filed a motion for post conviction relief which was denied. Defendant appeals; we affirm.

No jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion. However, the parties have been furnished with a memorandum opinion for their information only, setting forth the facts and reasons for this order.

*861The judgments are affirmed in accordance with Rules 30.25(b) and 84.16(b).
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)

In connection with this Report on Form 10-Q for the three and six months ended March 31, 2012 (the Report) of
PennantPark Investment Corporation (the Registrant), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Arthur H. Penn, Chief Executive Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge,
that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                  
|------------------
|/s/ Arthur H. Penn
|Arthur H. Penn    
|May 2, 2012
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 117 (Monday, June 17, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Page 30615]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-15307]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
[Docket No. C-3645]


Johnson & Johnson; Prohibited Trade Practices, and Affirmative 
Corrective Actions

AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission.

ACTION: Consent order.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In settlement of alleged violations of federal law prohibiting 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices and unfair methods of 
competition, this consent order requires, among other things, a New 
Jersey-based manufacturer of health care products to divest, within 12 
months, the Cordis Neuroscience Business to a Commission-approved 
acquirer. If the transaction is not complete as required, then the 
Commission may appoint a trustee.

DATES: Complaint and Order issued March 19, 1996.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Copies of the Complaint and the Decision and Order are 
available from the Commission's Public Reference Branch, H-130, 6th 
Street & Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20580.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ann Malester, FTC/S-2308, Washington, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC 20580. (202) 326-2682.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On Tuesday, January 2, 1996, there was 
published in the Federal Register, 61 FR 66, a proposed consent 
agreement with analysis In the Matter of Johnson & Johnson, for the 
purpose of soliciting public comment. Interested parties were given 
sixty (60) days in which to submit comments, suggestions or objections 
regarding the proposed form of the order.
    No comments having been received, the Commission has ordered the 
issuance of the complaint in the form contemplated by the agreement, 
made its jurisdictional findings and entered an order to divest, as set 
forth in the proposed consent agreement, in disposition of this 
proceeding.

(Sec. 6, 38 Stat. 721; 15 U.S.C. 46. Interpret or apply sec. 5, 38 
Stat. 719, as amended; sec. 7, 38 Stat. 731, as amended; 15 U.S.C. 
45, 18)
Donald S. Clark,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 96-15307 Filed 6-14-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6750-01-M
H. Res. 77 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

March 3, 2009. 

Whereas, on March 14, 1908, Virginia Governor Claude A. 

Swanson signed into law legislation for the establishment 

of the new State Normal and Industrial School for 

Women at Fredericksburg, Virginia; 

Whereas in 1938, the institution was renamed Mary Washington College in honor of Mary Ball Washington, the 

mother of President George Washington; 

Whereas in 1970, the Virginia General Assembly approved 

full coeducational status for Mary Washington College, 

and men were enrolled as resident students for the first 

time; 

Whereas in 2004, the Virginia General Assembly approved 

university status to the institution, changing its name to 

the University of Mary Washington; 

Whereas the University of Mary Washington enrolls over 

5,000 students and employs over 1,000 full-time and 

part-time faculty and staff; 

Whereas in 2008, U.S. News and World Report ranked the 

University of Mary Washington as third among public, 

southern, master’s degree-granting schools; 

Whereas the University of Mary Washington has been led by 

eight presidents: Edward H. Russell (1908–1919), 
2 

•HRES 77 EH 

Algernon B. Chandler, Jr. (1919–1928), Morgan L. 

Combs (1929–1955), Grellet C. Simpson (1956–1974), 

Prince B. Woodard (1974–1982), William M. Anderson, 

Jr. (1983–2006), William J. Frawley (2006–2007), and 

Judy G. Hample (2008–); 

Whereas the University of Mary Washington offers 43 degree 

programs, including 32 undergraduate programs, 4 graduate programs, 7 education specialist programs; 

Whereas in its centennial year, the University of Mary Washington conferred more than 1,200 master’s and bachelor’s degrees; 

Whereas the University of Mary Washington Intercollegiate 

Athletic Program sponsors 23 NCAA Varsity Teams, and 

the student-athletes on these teams have won five Individual and Team National Championships, produced 245 

All-America Selections and more than 100 Academic AllAmericans, and won more Conference Championships 

than any other school in the Capital Athletic Conference; 

and 

Whereas in 2009, the University of Mary Washington begins 

a new century of academic excellence, service to the Commonwealth of Virginia, and leadership to the world in 

producing people of insight, wisdom, character, and accomplishment: Now, therefore, be it 

Resolved, That the House of Representatives congratulates the University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, 

Virginia, for more than 100 years of leadership and service 
3 

•HRES 77 EH 

to the Fredericksburg area, the Commonwealth of Virginia, 

and the United States. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

CARL G. STAMM, JR., DOC #230783, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D18-806

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

)

Opinion filed October 19, 2018.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas 

County; William H. Burgess, III, Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, 

and Clark E. Green, Assistant Public

Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Carl G. Stamm, Jr.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

KELLY and SALARIO, JJ., and CASE, JAMES, R., ASSOCIATE SENIOR JUDGE, 

Concur.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Michael Lacey, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CR-18-422-PHX-DJH

ORDER

Based on the United States’ Unopposed Motion to Extend Deadline for Responding

to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice (Doc. 1355) (First Request), and good 

cause appearing, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting the United States’ motion and setting

November 17, 2021 as the United States’ deadline for responding to Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss with Prejudice (Doc. 1355).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that excludable delay under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) is 

found to commence from ___________________ through _____________________. 

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1373-1 Filed 11/02/21 Page 1 of 1
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Scott Spear,

Defendant.

No. CR-18-00422-03-PHX-SMB

ORDER 

The Court having considered Defendant Spear’s Motion to Modify his Conditions 

of Release, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant Spear’s Motion to Modify his Conditions of 

Release (Doc. 1043).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED modifying Defendant Spear’s release conditions to 

reflect the removal of the condition requiring Mr. Spear to maintain or actively seek 

verifiable employment and provide proof of such to Pretrial Services.

Dated this 28th day of July, 2020.

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1045 Filed 07/29/20 Page 1 of 1
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Hector GONZALEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-41027.

Conference Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 20, 2003.

Before JONES, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.*

Court appointed counsel for Hector Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) has requested leave to withdraw from this appeal and has filed a brief as required by *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Gonzalez has received a copy of counsel’s motion and brief but has not filed a response. Our independent review of the brief and the record discloses no non-frivolous issues for appeal. Counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities, and the appeal is DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATIONS
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350)








In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Card Activation Technologies, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2008 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, William
P. Williams, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that:








(1)           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2)           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.







Date:
      May 12, 2008By:
      /s/ William P. WilliamsWilliam
      P. WilliamsChief
      Financial Officer






20
#### Harold BERGER, Claimant-Respondent, v. CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION, Employer-Appellant.

No. 64059.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.

Jan. 11, 1994.

Evans & Dixon, George T. Floras, St. Louis, for employer-appellant.

Susan K. Roach, St. Louis, for claimant-respondent.

*721Before SIMON, P.J., and PUDLOWSKI and KAROHL, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Appellant appeals from an adverse award of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission. It also filed a motion to remand for the taking of additional evidence with this court. Motion denied. The findings and conclusions of the Labor and Industrial Commission are not erroneous. An extended opinion would not have precedential value. Award affirmed in accordance with rule 84.-16(b).
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Radio One, Inc.
(the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:



(i) the accompanying amended Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(ii) the information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date: March 21, 2005



|       |  |                                                     
|------ |  | ----------------------------------------------------
|By:    |  | /s/ Scott R. Royster                                
|Name:  |  | Scott R. Royster                                    
|Title: |  | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Radio One, Inc. and will be retained by Radio One, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.