No. DA 07-0070 

No. DA 07-0071 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

2007 MT 127N 

 ____________________________________ 

IN THE MATTER OF THE CUSTODY AND 

PARENTAL RIGHTS OF M.A. and J.A., 

 Youths In Need of Care. 

 ____________________________________ 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, Cause Nos. BDJ 06-111-Y 

and BDJ 06-112-Y 

 The Honorable Julie Macek, Presiding Judge. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

 For Appellant: 

Jim Wheelis, Chief Appellate Defender; Joslyn Hunt, Assistant Appellant 

Defender, Helena, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Mark W. Mattioli, Assistant Attorney 

General, Helena, Montana 

Brant S. Light, Cascade County Attorney; Sarah Corbally, Deputy County 

Attorney, Great Falls, Montana 

 ____________________________________ 

Submitted on Briefs: May 16, 2007 

Decided: May 31, 2007 

Filed: 

_____________________________________________ 

Clerk 
Justice Brian Morris delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal 

Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be 

cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme 

Court and its case title, Supreme Court cause number and disposition shall be included in 

this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and 

Montana Reports. 

¶2 W.K. appeals from the decision of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade 

County, denying her motion for a continuance of her termination hearing and the court’s 

order terminating her parental rights to her children, M.A. and J.A. We affirm. 

¶3 The Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) petitioned for 

emergency protective services regarding M.A. and J.A. on March 16, 2006. The 

Department alleged that W.K. had attempted suicide by ingesting sixty Tegratol pills 

while the children had been sleeping. W.K. stipulated at the show cause hearing on April 

25, 2006, that probable cause existed for the Department’s petition. The District Court 

adjudicated the children as youths in need of care. 

¶4 The court held the dispositional hearing on May 4, 2006, at which W.K. was 

present. W.K. agreed to a treatment plan. The court approved the treatment plan on May 

4, 2006, and ordered W.K. to complete it. 

¶5 The treatment plan called for, among other things, that W.K. address her mental 

health problems, that she obtain a chemical dependency evaluation and follow its 

recommendations, that she maintain a safe home and employment, that she attend and 

 2
complete anger management classes, that she attend parenting classes, and that she 

maintain contact with the children and her social worker during the dependency treatment 

plan. The Department petitioned for termination of W.K.’s parental rights in October 

2006. The court set a hearing on the Department’s petition for January 11, 2007. 

¶6 W.K. failed to appear for the termination hearing and her counsel moved for a 

continuance. W.K.’s counsel informed the court that he did not know why W.K. was not 

at the hearing, but speculated that W.K. may have been attempting to obtain an 

independent psychological evaluation. The District Court denied the motion and 

proceeded to the merits of the Department’s petition. 

¶7 The Department presented the testimony of a social worker and two mental health 

professionals. The District Court determined that W.K. had failed to complete nearly 

every portion of her proposed treatment plan and that the continuation of the parent-child 

legal relationship likely would result in continued abuse and neglect of the children due 

to W.K.’s failure to address and resolve her mental health issues. 

¶8 We review a denial of a motion for continuance under an abuse of discretion 

standard. State v. Walker, 225 Mont. 415, 419, 733 P.2d 352, 355 (1987). W.K. argues 

on appeal that the District Court’s denial of her motion for continuance constitutes an 

abuse of discretion in light of the fact that W.K. was in the process of obtaining an 

independent psychological evaluation. W.K. contends that she was having difficulty 

obtaining an independent psychological evaluation because of her financial constraints. 

¶9 We also review a district court’s decision to terminate a person’s parental rights 

under an abuse of discretion standard. In re Custody and Parental Rights of C.J.K., 2005 

 3
MT 67, ¶ 13, 326 Mont. 289, ¶ 13, 109 P.3d 232, ¶ 13. To satisfy the relevant statutory 

requirements for terminating the parent-child relationship, a district court must make 

specific factual findings. In re C.J.K., ¶ 13. We review a district court’s findings of fact 

to determine whether those findings are clearly erroneous. In re Custody and Parental 

Rights of M.A.D., 2003 MT 10, ¶ 12, 314 Mont. 38, ¶ 12, 62 P.3d 717, ¶ 12. We review 

the court’s conclusions of law with respect to those findings to determine whether the 

court correctly interpreted and applied the law. In re M.A.D., ¶ 12. 

¶10 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), of 

our 1996 Internal Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, that provides for memorandum 

opinions. It is manifest on the face of the briefs and record before us that the District 

Court did not abuse its discretion in denying W.K.’s motion for a continuance. It also is 

manifest on the face of the briefs and record before us that substantial evidence supports 

the District Court’s findings of fact. Finally, it also is manifest on the face of the briefs 

and record before us that settled Montana law clearly controls the legal issues and that the 

District Court correctly interpreted the law. 

¶11 We affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

 /S/ BRIAN MORRIS 

We Concur: 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY 

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART 

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON 

 4