alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.37  EXHIBIT A
 RCN CORPORATION
2005 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN
Restricted Stock Unit Award for Director
 RSU DEFERRAL ELECTION FORM
   ALL ELECTIONS MUST BE RECEIVED BY THE COMPANY NO LATER THAN SEPTEMBER 1, 2009.
 Director Name
 I. AMOUNT OF DEFERRAL
  (Please Choose One)
 o
    
    I elect to defer 50% of the number of RSUs subject to the RSU Award.
 o
    
    I elect to defer 100% of the number of RSUs subject to the RSU Award.
  II. TIMING OF PAYMENT
  (Please Choose One)
 o
    
    I elect to defer payment until (A) the fifth (5th) anniversary of the date of the RSU Award
or (B) the termination of my service as a member of the Board, if earlier.
 o
    
    I elect to defer payment until (A) the tenth (10th) anniversary of the date of the RSU
Award, or (B) the termination of my service as a member of the Board, if earlier.
 o
    
    I elect to defer payment until the date of my termination from service as a member of the of the Board.
  Acceleration Events
  Federal Income Taxes




---



##### 



EXHIBIT A
 Director Signature
  DIRECTOR
 Signed:
    
    
    
    Date:
 ALL ELECTIONS MUST BE RECEIVED BY THE COMPANY NO LATER THAN SEPTEMBER 1, 2009.
#### Clarence R. LINCOLN, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, State of Missouri, Appellant.

No. WD 48538.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

March 28, 1995.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., James A. Chenault, III, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Mo. Dept, of Revenue, Jefferson City, for appellant.

James D. Boggs, Kansas City, for respondent.

Before ULRICH, P.J., and KENNEDY and BERREY, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM:

Appeal from decision of the Circuit Court of Platte County setting aside the Director’s suspension of driving privileges.

Affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
----

|   | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Dated: May 10, 2011 | By:    | /s/ Robert Kite                                          |
|---------------------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
|                |   | Robert Kite                                                   |
|                |   | Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer               |
|                |   | (Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer) |

----
#### Alfreda SIMS, et al., Appellants, v. ARVIN INDUSTRIES, et al., Respondents.

No. WD 40957.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

April 25, 1989.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied May 30, 1989.

Stanley L. Wiles, Kansas City, for appellants.

John F. Murphy, Robert T. Adams, Kansas City, for Arvin Industries.

Before KENNEDY, C.J., and LOWENSTEIN and GAITAN, JJ.

KENNEDY, Chief Judge.

Alfreda Sims as plaintiff ad litem brought suit against Arvin Industries and 39th Street Home Center for the wrongful death of her five-year old grandson, Alphonso Sims, in a fire on November 4, 1984. The fire, according to the petition, was caused by a portable heater manufactured by Arvin Industries and sold by 39th Street Home Center.

The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the plaintiff ad litem was not entitled to bring the wrongful death action under Section 537.080, RSMo 1986, since decedent was survived by parents who under the statute were entitled to bring any wrongful death action for the child’s death. The plaintiff ad litem has appealed.

*712The trial court was correct in his ruling and the judgment of dismissal is affirmed. The trial court’s appointment of a plaintiff ad litem was not conclusive, as the plaintiff ad litem claims it was, on the question of the proper party to bring the action. Such appointment does not stand in the way of a later dismissal of the petition upon a determination that the plaintiff ad litem is not so entitled.

The parents of a decedent are in the first of three descending categories of persons who are entitled to bring a wrongful death action. Section 537.080(1), RSMo 1986. A plaintiff ad litem is in the third category. Section 537.080(3), RSMo 1986. A person in any authorized category may bring a wrongful death suit only if there are no persons in a prior category “entitled to bring the action”. Section 537.080, RSMo 1986; *Schiles v. Gaertner,*659 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Mo.App.1983); *Malone By and Through Alexander v. Jackson,*652 S.W.2d 170, 171-72 (Mo.App.1983); *State ex rel. Research Medical Center v. Peters,*631 S.W.2d 938, 946 (Mo.App.1982).

Plaintiff ad litem claims that the parents were not “entitled to bring the action” because the child had been removed from their custody by the juvenile court because of the parents’ neglect and placed in the custody of the grandmother. Even delinquent parents, however, are entitled to bring a wrongful death action for the death of their child, and the legal entitlement of Alphonso Sims’ parents to bring the action foreclosed the plaintiff ad litem’s entitlement to bring the suit. *Glaseo v. Fire and Casualty Insurance Company,*709 S.W. 2d 550, 554 (Mo.App.1986); *Malone,*652 S.W.2d at 171 n. 3; *see also Higgins v. Gosney,*435 S.W.2d 653, 658 (Mo.1968).

Judgment affirmed.

All concur.
#### STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Stanley A. LANE, a/k/a Charles E. Brown, Appellant.

No. WD 39848.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Oct. 4, 1988.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Nov. 29, 1988.

Application to Transfer Denied Jan. 17, 1989.

Sean O’Brien, Public Defender, and David S. Durbin, Asst. Public Defender, Kansas City, for appellant.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, and Philip M. Koppe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Kansas City, for respondent.

Before KENNEDY, C.J., and BERREY and FENNER, JJ.

ORDER

PER CURIAM:

Appeal from conviction upon jury-tried case of robbery in the second degree, section 569.030, RSMo 1986, and sentence of eight years’ imprisonment.

Judgment affirmed. Rule 30.25(b).
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 121 (Friday, June 21, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Page 31943]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-15971]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------


FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Board of Governors; Sunshine Act Meeting

Agency Holding the Meeting: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.

Time and Date: 10:00 a.m., Wednesday, June 26, 1996.

Place: Marriner S. Eccles Federal Reserve Board Building, C Street 
entrance between 20th and 21st Streets, NW., Washington, DC 20551.

Status: Open.

Matters to be Considered:
    Summary Agenda: Because of its routine nature, no discussion of the 
following item is anticipated. This matter will be voted on without 
discussion unless a member of the Board requests that the item be moved 
to the discussion agenda.
    1. Publication for comment of (a) proposed rescission of Regulation 
R (Relations with Dealers in Securities Under Section 32 of the Banking 
Act of 1933), and (b) proposed removal of a Board interpretation 
regarding the application of section 32 prohibitions to bank holding 
companies.

    Discussion Agenda:
    2. Proposed 1997 Federal Reserve Board budget objective.
    3. Any items carried forward from a previously announced meeting.

    Note: This meeting will be recorded for the benefit of those 
unable to attend. Cassettes will be available for listening in the 
Board's Freedom of Information Office, and copies may be ordered for 
$5 per cassette by calling (202) 452-3684 or by writing to: Freedom 
of Information Office, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Washington, DC 20551.

Contact Person for More Information: Mr. Joseph R. Coyne, Assistant to 
the Board; (202) 452-3204.

    Dated: June 19, 1996.
Jennifer J. Johnson,
Deputy Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 96-15971 Filed 6-19-96; 10:05 am]
BILLING CODE 6210-01-P
★

H. Res. 692 

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

October 1, 2009. 

Whereas Tay-Sachs disease is a rare, genetic disorder that 

causes destruction of nerve cells in the brain and spinal 

cord due to the poor functioning of an enzyme called 

hexosaminidase A; 

Whereas there is no proven treatment or cure for Tay-Sachs 

disease, which is usually fatal in children; 

Whereas the disorder was named after Warren Tay, an ophthalmologist from the United Kingdom, and Bernard 

Sachs, a neurologist from the United States, both of 

whom contributed to the discovery of the disease in 1881 

and 1887, respectively; 

Whereas Tay-Sachs disease often affects families with no 

prior history of the disease; 

Whereas approximately 1 in 27 Ashkenazi Jews, 1 in 30 

Louisianan Cajuns, 1 in 30 French Canadians, 1 in 50 

Irish Americans, and 1 in every 250 people are carriers 

of Tay-Sachs disease; 

Whereas approximately 1,500,000 Americans are carriers of 

Tay-Sachs disease; 

Whereas these unaffected carriers of the disease possess the 

recessive gene that can trigger the disease in future generations; 
2 

•HRES 692 EH1S 

Whereas if both parents of a child are carriers of Tay-Sachs 

disease, there is a 1 in 4 chance that the child will develop Tay-Sachs disease; 

Whereas a simple and inexpensive blood test can determine 

if an individual is a carrier of Tay-Sachs disease, and 

screening for this disease should be available when clinically indicated; and 

Whereas heightened awareness and public-private partnerships to find a treatment are effective ways to combat 

this horrific disease: Now, therefore, be it 

Resolved, That the House of Representatives supports 

the goals and ideals of Tay-Sachs Awareness Month and supports a public-private partnership for education and research 

efforts with respect to Tay-Sachs disease. 

Attest: 

Clerk.
EX-10.1





Exhibit 10.1


[                    ] AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


[Executive’s Name]


          [                    ] AMENDMENT dated as of February 26, 2009 (this “Amendment”) to EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT dated as of February XX, 2003, as amended (the “Agreement”) by and between [TRW
Automotive Inc.] (the “Company”) and                      (“Executive”).




          WHEREAS, in clarification of the manner in which the Company determines Executive’s Annual
Bonus, Executive and Company desire to amend the Agreement as set forth below;




          In consideration of the premises and mutual covenants herein and for other good and valuable
consideration, the parties agree as follows:




          1. Defined Terms. Capitalized terms used herein but not defined shall have the
meanings assigned to them in the Agreement.




          2. Amendment to Section 4 of the Agreement. The second sentence of Section 4 of the
Agreement shall be amended to read in its entirety as follows: “In addition, up to fifty percent
of the Target Annual Bonus will be based on additional factors determined to be relevant by the
Compensation Committee, which may include industry-specific and general economic conditions as well
as strategic factors.”




          3. No Other Amendments; Effectiveness. Except as set forth in this Amendment, the
Agreement is ratified and confirmed in all respects. This Amendment shall be effective as of the
date hereof.




          4. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance
with the laws of [                    ], without regard to conflicts of laws principles thereof.




          5. Counterparts. This Agreement may be signed in counterparts, each of which shall be
deemed to be an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same agreement.




     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have duly executed this Amendment as of the day and
year first above written.



[TRW Automotive Inc.]




	 	 	 
	 

	 	 
	By:

	 	[Executive]
	Title:
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21
- 7716

LINWOOD WHITEHEAD , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. MS. ROOKS, Correction Officer , Defendant

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Norfolk

. Raymond A. Jackson , District Judge. ( 2:19

- cv - 00326

- RAJ

- RJK )

Submitted : March 29, 2022 Decided: April 1, 2022

Before HARRIS, QUATTLEBAUM, and HEYTENS , Circuit Judges.

Remanded by un published per curiam opinion

. Linwood Whitehead, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 21-7716 Doc: 9 Filed: 04/01/2022 Pg: 1 of 22 PER CURIAM: Linwood Whitehead seeks to appeal the district court’s order d ismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to prosecute . In civil cases, parties have 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court e xtends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). The district court’s order was entered on July 27, 2021. Whitehead filed his notice of appeal on December 10, 2021. Therefore, Whitehead’s notice of appeal is untimely. However, under R ule 4(a)(6), the district court may reopen the time to file an appe al on a party’s motion if: (1) the moving party did not receive notice of entry of judgment within 21 days after entry; (2) the motion is filed within 180 days of entry or within 14 days after the moving party receives notice from the court, whichever is earlier; and (3) no party would be prejudiced. In his notice of appeal , Whitehead indicated his desire to appeal and stated that he had not received the district court’s final order until a few days before filing his notice of appeal. We construe the not ice of appeal as a motion to reopen the appeal period under R ule 4(a)(6). Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court for the limited purpose of determining whether Whitehead is entitled to a reopening of the appeal period. The record, as supp lemented, will then be returned to this court for further proceedings.
REMANDED USCA4 Appeal: 21-7716 Doc: 9 Filed: 04/01/2022 Pg: 2 of 2
formofrestrictedstock.htm


    
      

    


    Exhibit 10.25

     

    

    



    AMENDMENT
TO RESTRICTED STOCK UNIT AWARD AGREEMENTS

    


    This
Amendment is made this ____ day of December 2008, by and between Compass
Minerals International, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“Company”), and
_____________________ (“Executive”).

    


    WHEREAS,
Company and Executive are parties to certain Restricted Stock Unit Award
Agreements dated prior to the date hereof (the “Agreements”) which grant to
Executive restricted stock units pursuant to the Company’s 2005 Incentive Award
Plan (the “Plan”); and

    


    WHEREAS,
the parties intend that the payment of such restricted stock units shall satisfy
the “short term deferral” exception under Section 409A of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended, and Treasury Regulation 1.409A-1(b), and the parties
now desire to make certain clarifying changes to the Agreements consistent with
such intent;

    


    NOW,
THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the premises and the mutual covenants and
agreements contained herein, Company and Executive agree that the Agreements are
amended as follows:

    


    A.           The
last sentence under the first paragraph of such Agreements is amended to read as
follows:

    


    Capitalized
terms not defined herein shall have the same meaning as used in the Plan, as
amended from time to time, unless otherwise superseded by any other agreement
between the Company and Grantee.

    


    B.           Clause
(ii) under the third paragraph of Section 5 is amended by striking the words
“any reduction in Grantee’s annual base salary . . .” and by inserting the
following in lieu thereof:  “. . . any material reduction in Grantee’s
annual base salary . . .”

    


    C.           Clause
(iv) under the third paragraph of Section 5 is amended to read as
follows:

    


    (iv)  any
material breach of this Agreement.

    


    D.           The
fourth paragraph of Section 5 is amended to read as follows:

    


    Notwithstanding
the foregoing, Grantee must provide notice of termination of employment to the
Company within 90 days of Grantee’s knowledge of an event constituting Good
Reason or such event shall not constitute Good Reason under this
Agreement.  The Company shall have a period of 30 days to cure any
such event without triggering the obligations under this Agreement.

    


    IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment as of the day and year
first written above.

    


    COMPASS
MINERALS INTERNATIONAL,
INC.                                                                                                EXECUTIVE

    


    By:                                                                                                            ____________________   Date:
12/22/08

                            Executive
Signature

    Title:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

RALPH MARTIN CONSTRUCTION AND

LACKAWANNA AMERICAN INSURANCE

COMPANY

v.

MIGUEL CASTANEDA

- ESCOBAR (WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD)

PETITION OF: MIGUEL CASTANEDA

ESCOBAR :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 216 EAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the

Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 15th day of February, 2023

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED

.
EXHIBIT 31.1
 CEO CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE
SARBANES  OXLEY ACT OF 2002
      a)
    
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused
such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,
to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b)
    
    designed such internal control over financial reporting, or
caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our
supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of
financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external
purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;c)
    
    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andd)
    
    disclosed in this report any change in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants
most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case
of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting;
and
  a)
    
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; andb)
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting.
  By:
    
    /s/ Alan StockAlan StockChief Executive Officer
#### Richard Allen BEEBE, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. WD 50423.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

June 20, 1995.

Emmett D. Queener, Office of the State Public Defender, Columbia, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Christine M. Kocot, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before ULRICH, P.J., and LOWENSTEIN and ELLIS, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Movant, Richard Beebe, entered a plea of guilty on charges for theft of a truck. He sought to set aside, under Rule 24.035, his plea on the basis it was involuntary. The motion court, without holding an evidentiary hearing denied. Affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Agustin Calderon v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01-18-00422-CR

Trial court case number: 15CR3346

Trial court: 10th District Court of Galveston County

On August 16, 2018, we abated this appeal, remanded the case to the trial court, 

and directed the trial court to appoint counsel, at no expense to appellant, to represent 

him on appeal. The trial court clerk has filed a supplemental clerk’s record that includes 

the trial court’s August 20, 2018 “Notice of Appointment,” appointing Joel H. Bennett to 

represent appellant on appeal. Accordingly, we REINSTATE the case on the Court’s 

active docket.

Appellant’s brief is due to be filed in this appeal no later than 30 days from the 

date of this order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(a), (d).

Appellant’s pro se “Motion to Extend Time to File Appeals Brief” is dismissed as 

moot. 

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Russell Lloyd

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: September 11, 2018
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed March 30, 2022

. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D 2 1

- 19 0 5 Lower Tribunal No. 1 9

- 17 006

________________
Daniel Guenni , Appellant,

vs. Advance Business Capital LLC, etc. , Appellee.

An Appeal from the C ircui t Court for Miami

- Dade County, Alan Fine , Judge. Ricardo E. Pine s, P.A., and Ricardo E. Pines , for appellant

. Rennert Vogel Mandler & Rodriguez, P.A., and Thomas S. Ward; Ullman & Ullman, P.A., and Michael W. Ullman and Jared A. Ullman (Boca Raton) , for appellee.

Before SCAL ES , MIL L E R and GORDO , JJ.2 PER CURIAM

. Appellant Daniel Guenni challenges a September 20, 2021 final judgment rendered by the trial court after it conducted a bench trial. In the final judgment, the trial court determined, under Texas law, that appellee Advance Business Capital , LLC , d/b/a Triumph Business Capital (“Triumph”) was a third

- party beneficiary of a Guaranty agreement between Guenni and TBK Bank . Pursuant to the Guaranty, Guenni agreed to guarant ee payment obligations that his company, Vika Logistics, LLC, owed to TBK Bank and the Bank’s “affiliates.” The trial court ruled that , under Texas law, Triumph had standing to enforce the Guaranty against Guenni and thereby recover monies owed by Vika to Triumph. We agree with the trial court that Triumph is an “affiliate” of TBK B ank, that Guenni and TBK Bank intended to secure a benefit for Triumph in the Guaranty , and that Guenni had entered into the Guaranty directly for Triumph’s benefit

. First Bank v. Brumitt , 519 S.W. 3d 95, 102 (Tex. 2017) (“Specifically, a person seeking to establish third

- party

beneficiary status must demonstrate that the contracting parties ‘intended to secure a benefit to that third party’ and ‘entered into the contract directly for the third party’s benefit.’” (quoting Stine v. Stewart , 80 S.W. 3d 586, 5 89 (Tex. 2002)) )

. Affirmed.