REVISED FEBRUARY 3, 2015

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-11242

CORDELL DAVIS, Individually; ANTOINETTE TURNER, as next friend for 

J.T.T., a minor, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

J. ROMER, in his individual capacity,

 Defendant - Appellee

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

LESLEE MARIE MARTIN, as next friend for C.T.T., Jr., a minor; ALICIA 

DE'SHON WHITE, as next friend for T.L.T., a minor; PATRICIA THOMAS, 

as next friend for D.M.G., a minor, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

J. ROMER, Individually and in His Official Capacity, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC Nos. 4:13-CV-198 & 4:13-CV-234

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 2, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 13-11242

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, BENAVIDES, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Fort Worth Police Officer J. Romer (“Romer”) was attempting to arrest 

Charal Thomas (“Thomas”), who was sitting in the driver’s seat of his vehicle. 

Although there was a warrant for his arrest, Thomas refused to exit his vehicle 

and submit to a lawful arrest. Romer reached inside the driver’s window, and 

Thomas suddenly began driving away. Romer then jumped on the vehicle’s 

running board and ordered Thomas to stop the vehicle, but Thomas ignored 

the order and continued to drive toward the entrance to the freeway. After 

Thomas refused to stop the vehicle, Romer, who was still standing on the 

running board of the fleeing vehicle, fatally shot Thomas. Thomas’s four 

children, three of whom were passengers in Thomas’s vehicle, and an unrelated 

passenger brought this suit against Romer, alleging, among other things, 

excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court 

granted summary judgment after determining that Romer was entitled to 

qualified immunity. Because we conclude that there was no constitutional 

violation in Romer’s use of deadly force, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 28, 2011, undercover officers observed Thomas leaving a 

house that was believed to be involved with drug trafficking. Those officers 

then observed Thomas committing traffic infractions while driving and called 

uniformed patrol officers to make a traffic stop. Thomas was driving his Ford 

Expedition in Fort Worth, Texas. His front seat passenger was Cordell Davis 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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(“Davis”), and three of Thomas’s minor children were seated in the second row. 

Officer Romer and Officer C.C. Drew (“Drew”) stopped Thomas based on the 

alleged misdemeanor traffic violations. While Thomas waited in the vehicle, 

the officers ran his driver’s license through the computer and discovered 

outstanding misdemeanor traffic warrants. 

Standing by the driver’s door, Drew informed Thomas that they were 

going to arrest him and asked him to exit his vehicle. Thomas refused, and 

Drew attempted to open the driver’s side door. Romer reached inside the 

vehicle through the driver’s side window in an attempt to unlock the door. 

With Romer’s arm inside the vehicle, Thomas starting driving to the left 

toward the exit of the parking lot and then onto the service road alongside the 

freeway. When the vehicle starting moving, Romer jumped on the running 

board. Although Romer and Davis were both shouting for Thomas to stop the 

vehicle, he continued driving. As the vehicle was traveling on the highway’s 

service road, Romer, who was standing on the vehicle’s running board, pulled 

his gun from the holster and fatally shot Thomas. Upon hearing the gunshots, 

Davis jumped out of the moving vehicle from the passenger side and was 

injured as he fell to the ground. The vehicle then came to a stop in the driveway 

of a residence along the service road. 

In 2013, Davis and Thomas’s four minor children (each acting through a 

next friend) brought suit against Romer, individually and in his official 

capacity as a police officer, and the City of Fort Worth. The plaintiffs alleged 

excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and various state law claims. 

Romer moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The 

district court agreed and entered summary judgment in favor Romer in his 

individual capacity. Additionally, the court sua sponte dismissed without 

prejudice all claims against Romer in his official capacity, stating that those 

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claims are considered by law to be claims against his employer, the City of Fort 

Worth. The court then determined that there was no just reason for delay and 

entered final judgment as to Romer. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). The plaintiffs 

now appeal that judgment. The district court subsequently granted the City 

of Fort Worth’s motion for summary judgment and that case is pending by 

separate appeal before this Court. Davis et al. v. City of Fort Worth, No. 14-

10759. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same standards as the district court. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. United Space 

Alliance, LLC, 378 F.3d 482, 486 (5th Cir. 2004). “A summary judgment 

motion is properly granted only when, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, the record indicates that there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

B. Qualified Immunity from Excessive Force Claim

Appellants contend that the district court erred in granting Romer 

summary judgment based on his defense of qualified immunity. “To determine 

whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, this Court engages in a 

two-pronged analysis, inquiring (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged a 

violation of a constitutional right and, if so, (2) whether the defendant’s 

behavior was objectively reasonable under clearly established law at the time 

the conduct occurred.” Hampton v. Oktibbeha Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 480 F.3d 

358, 363 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 462 (5th Cir. 

2006)). “If the plaintiff fails to state a constitutional claim or if the defendant’s 

conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law, then the 

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government official is entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. (citing Easter, 467 

F.3d at 462). “Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room 

to make reasonable but mistaken judgments,” and “protects all but the plainly 

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, __ 

U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “Once a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden shifts to 

the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available.” Kovacic v. Villarreal, 

628 F.3d 209, 211 (5th Cir. 2010). 

Appellants contend that Officer Romer violated the Fourth Amendment 

by using excessive force. The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be 

free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Here, 

it is undisputed that Romer’s use of deadly force against Thomas constituted a 

seizure. Accordingly, Appellants “need only show that the use of deadly force 

was excessive, and that the excessiveness of the force was unreasonable.” 

Thompson v. Mercer, 762 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2014) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). However, an officer’s use of deadly force is not 

unreasonable when the officer has reason to believe that the “suspect poses a 

threat of serious harm to the officer or others.” Id. (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). We must determine the reasonableness of the use 

of force “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than 

with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 

2012, 2020 (2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Appellants’ principal argument is that Romer’s conduct caused the 

dangerous encounter. Specifically, Appellants contend that “Romer’s life was 

in danger because of his own intervening actions of attempting not once but 

twice, to grab a hold of a moving vehicle when Romer had a choice not to do 

so.” Blue brief at 14. Appellants contend that the district court erred in 

interpreting this Court’s precedent to limit its analysis to the circumstances 

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existing at the moment Romer shot Thomas. Recently, this Court has rejected 

the same argument. In Thompson v. Mercer, an officer ended a two-hour highspeed chase by fatally shooting the suspect with an assault rifle. 762 F.3d at 

436. The Thompsons argued that the officers created the danger in their 

attempts to intercept the fleeing vehicle driven by the suspect. Id. at 439. This 

Court held that such an argument was “wholly without merit,” explaining that 

it had “consistently rejected similar reasoning.” Id. at 439–40. This Court 

explained that the “question is not whether the force would have been avoided 

if law enforcement had followed some other police procedures.” Id. at 440 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the Court explained 

that “regardless of what had transpired up until the shooting itself, the 

question is whether the officer [had] reason to believe, at that moment, that 

there was a threat of physical harm.” Id. (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted) (alteration in original). This Court concluded that it was the 

fleeing driver and not the officer “who intentionally placed himself and the 

public in danger by unlawfully engaging in the reckless, high-speed flight that 

ultimately produced the choice that [the officer] had to make.” Id. (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration added). Accordingly, this Court 

held that the officer’s shooting of the suspect did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment. Id. 

In Rockwell v. Brown, police officers were called because a mentally ill 

individual had threatened suicide and barricaded himself in his room. 664 

F.3d 985, 989 (5th Cir. 2011). The individual refused to leave the room, and 

the officers decided that because he was a threat to himself and his family, 

they were going to arrest him. Id. When the officers breached the bedroom 

door, the individual was wielding two eight-inch knives and rushed out of his 

room toward the officers. The officers fatally shot him. Relying on precedent 

from other circuits, the decedent’s family asked this Court to consider the 

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circumstances surrounding the breach of the bedroom door in determining the 

reasonableness of the officers’ use of deadly force. Id. at 992. This Court found 

the argument unavailing, explaining that at the time the officers used deadly 

force, the decedent was armed, and the officers had a reasonable belief that he 

posed an imminent risk of serious harm. Id. at 993. Indeed, this Court stated 

that “[w]e need not look at any other moment in time.” Id.; see also Harris v. 

Serpas, 745 F.3d 767, 772 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “any of the officers’ 

actions leading up to the shooting are not relevant for the purposes of an 

excessive force inquiry in this Circuit”).

Additionally, in Fraire v. City of Arlington, a police officer fatally shot 

the driver of a truck that was headed toward the officer. 957 F.2d 1268 (5th 

Cir. 1992). The plaintiffs alleged that the officer may not have followed 

established police procedure in identifying himself while in plain clothes. Id.

at 1275. The gist of their argument was that the officer’s failure to follow 

procedure “manufactured the circumstances that gave rise to the fatal 

shooting.” Id. This Court explained that “regardless of what had transpired 

up until the shooting itself, [the suspect’s] movements gave the officer reason 

to believe, at that moment, that there was a threat of physical harm.” Id. at 

1276. Thus, the force was not excessive and the officer was entitled to qualified

immunity.

Appellants recognize the above precedent and seek to distinguish it, 

stating that Davis and the minor children testified that Romer’s arm was not 

trapped in the window as Romer claims. Brief at 13. Appellants asserted at 

oral argument that Romer should have made the “better decision . . . to let 

[Thomas] go.” Appellants argue that Romer caused the danger by jumping on 

the running board of the vehicle. In other words, their argument is that 

instead of jumping on the vehicle Romer should have moved away from the 

fleeing vehicle. Appellants’ argument that the “officer[ ] could have moved 

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away from the car is, unfortunately, a suggestion more reflective of the ‘peace 

of a judge’s chambers’ than of a dangerous and threatening situation on the 

street.” Ramirez v. Knoulton, 542 F.3d 124, 130 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Elliott 

v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 643 (4th Cir. 1996)). Viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to Appellants, there is testimony that Romer removed his arm

from the window after Thomas began driving toward the service road. 

Nonetheless, this does not constitute a genuine issue of material fact because 

Appellants’ brief concedes that Romer’s arm was inside the vehicle at the time 

Thomas began driving away. Brief at 17. Moreover, the evidence, including 

Davis’s testimony, demonstrates that Thomas’s driving away with Romer’s 

arm inside the vehicle and Romer subsequently jumping on the vehicle’s 

running board occurred very rapidly. Under such chaotic, dangerous 

circumstances, Appellants have not shown that Romer’s conduct was 

objectively unreasonable. As previously discussed, the definitive question is 

whether Romer had a reasonable belief that Thomas posed a risk of serious 

harm at the time Romer used deadly force. Appellants have conceded that 

Romer was on the running board of the fleeing vehicle when he fired the fatal 

shots. We therefore conclude that at the time of the shooting, Romer had 

reason to believe that there was a serious threat of physical harm to him.1

Nonetheless, Appellants argue that Romer did not kill Thomas in an act 

of self-preservation. Instead, Appellants claim Romer’s “actions were 

motivated by a violent and sadistic rage to kill Charal Thomas when he left the 

scene of a traffic stop.” Id. at 10. However, the “reasonableness inquiry is 

objective: the question is whether the officers’ actions are objectively 

1 Appellants point out that Romer knew that Thomas was an amputee with only one 

leg and thus could not elude the officers once the vehicle was stopped. Brief at 16. However, 

that does not change the fact that Romer was at serious risk of harm when he used deadly 

force while traveling down the service road on the running board. 

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reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without 

regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Rockwell, 664 F.3d at 991 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Romer’s subjective 

intent is irrelevant to the reasonableness determination.

Appellants further attempt to distinguish the above-discussed 

precedent, stating that unlike those cases, in the instant case, Thomas was 

unarmed. The Supreme Court has held that it is constitutionally unreasonable 

to use deadly force on an unarmed suspect by shooting him while he was fleeing 

on foot. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). This is because the officer 

“could not reasonably have believed” that the suspect “posed any threat,” and 

the officer “never attempted to justify his actions on any basis other than the 

need to prevent an escape,” Id. at 21. That case is inapposite. Here, the 

testimony and the diagram of the scene demonstrate that Romer was standing 

by the driver’s door when Thomas suddenly drove to the left with Romer’s arm 

inside the vehicle. Moreover, it is undisputed that Romer was standing on the 

running board of the vehicle as it was being driven on the service road and 

headed toward the freeway. Clearly, Thomas’s actions put the officer in harm’s 

way, and there was a very real danger that Romer would sustain serious injury 

or death. Thus, unlike in Garner, Thomas’s actions were posing a threat to 

Romer at the time of the shooting. 

Additionally, Appellants contend that the force was unjustified because 

the warrants for Thomas’s arrest were for outstanding misdemeanor traffic 

violations and not for the commission of any felony. Brief at 16. This Court 

has rejected just such an argument, explaining that the important question is 

whether the suspect is “dangerous or benign” and “not whether the suspect is 

suspected of committing a felony or a misdemeanor.” Fraire, 957 F.2d at 1276 

n.29. Appellants also point to the fact that Romer fired 12 rounds as opposed 

to a single shot in self-defense. Blue brief at 13-14 (citing Fraire, 957 F.2d 

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1275). The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that an officer’s firing of 

15 rounds constituted excessive force because “if police officers are justified in 

firing at a suspect in order to end a severe threat to public safety, the officers 

need not stop shooting until the threat has ended.” Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at

2022.

Accordingly, because Romer’s use of force was objectively reasonable, 

Appellants have not shown a Fourth Amendment violation. Thus, Appellants 

cannot show that Romer’s use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable

under clearly established law at the time the incident occurred. Cf. Brosseau 

v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam) (holding that a police officer did 

not violate clearly established law when she fired at a fleeing vehicle to prevent 

possible harm to others in the immediate area). The district court properly 

granted summary judgment as to the Fourth Amendment claim based on 

qualified immunity.

C. Qualified Immunity from State Law Claims

The district court ruled that Romer was entitled to qualified immunity 

under Texas state law with respect to the state law claims. Romer asserts that 

Appellants have abandoned their state law claims by failing to address them 

in their opening brief.2 Appellants do not address the district court’s 

disposition of their state law claims in their brief. Thus, Appellants have 

abandoned any state law claims. Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1993).

2 Romer also asserts that Appellants’ claims against him in his official capacity have 

been abandoned because Appellants did not brief them. Red brief at 27. On October 15, 

2013, the district court sua sponte dismissed without prejudice the claims against Romer in 

his official capacity and stated that those claims are considered by law to be claims against 

his employer, City of Fort Worth. As previously mentioned, the separate appeal involving 

the City of Fort Worth is separately pending before this Court. Davis et al. v. City of Fort 

Worth, No. 14-10759. 

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D. Conclusion

For the above reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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