[Cite as Story v. Story, 2021-Ohio-2439.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JIMMY STORY, : 

 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 109850 

 

 v. : 

 

VERONICA STORY, : 

 

 Defendants-Appellee. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 15, 2021

 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Domestic Relations Division 

Case No. DR-07-318250 

 

Appearances: 

Jimmy Story, pro se.

Veronica Story, pro se. 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Charlie Wu, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee Cuyahoga County Office of Child 

Support Services. 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J.: 

Plaintiff-appellant Jimmy Story (“Father”) appeals, pro se, from the 

trial court’s judgment entry approving and adopting a magistrate’s decision that 
modified his child support obligation for his minor child, L.S. Father contends that 

the trial court’s judgment should be reversed because (1) there is no legal basis for 

imposing any child support obligation upon him, (2) the child support order is void 

due to the state’s pecuniary interest in imposing and enforcing child support 

obligations under Title IV-D and (3) he was denied due process. Father requests 

that his child support payments be terminated and that he be granted restitution, 

including reimbursement of “all money taken from him for child support.” For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court. 

Procedural and Factual Background 

On October 10, 2007, Father filed a complaint for divorce in the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas against his wife, appellee Veronica PriceStory (“Mother”). At that time, the couple had three minor children — B.S. (d.o.b. 

11/26/98), A.S. (d.o.b. 03/19/00) and L.S. (d.o.b. 01/31/02). The final judgment 

entry of divorce was entered on February 25, 2009. Parental rights and 

responsibilities were allocated primarily to Mother, and Father was ordered to pay 

$903.25 a month1 (plus 2 percent processing fee) in child support for the three 

children. 

B.S. graduated from high school on June 2, 2017. On October 18, 

2017, the trial court modified Father’s child support obligation, and Father was 

1 The child support figures referenced herein are the amounts due when private 

health insurance is provided by a party. 
ordered to pay $994.96 a month in child support (plus 2 percent processing fee) for 

his two remaining minor children, effective June 3, 2017. 

A.S. graduated from high school on June 2, 2018. On July 18, 2018, 

Mother filed a motion to modify child support. On August 10, 2018, Father filed a 

motion for recalculation of support, a motion to dismiss modification for support 

and his own motion for modification of support. On August 22, 2018, the trial court 

joined appellee Cuyahoga County Office of Child Support Services (“OCSS”) as a 

party defendant and ordered it to provide a certified receipt calculation and child 

support payment history for the case. 

A hearing on the parties’ child support motions was held before a 

magistrate on March 4, 2019, April 8, 2019 and May 13, 2019. The magistrate issued 

a written decision on August 13, 2019 and an amended decision on August 15, 2019, 

correcting certain clerical errors. 

The magistrate found that (1) Father’s child support obligation should 

be modified to reflect the emancipation of A.S., (2) a substantial change in 

circumstances had occurred and (3) an upward deviation of $200 per month from 

the “presumed correct monthly child support obligation,” calculated using the child 

support worksheet, was warranted after considering the relative financial resources 

of the parties, the disparity in the parties’ incomes and a comparison of L.S.’s current 

standard of living with what her standard of living would have been had her parents 

remained married. The magistrate also found, based on the certified receipt 
calculation and payment history provided by OCSS, that Father had an overpayment 

of $300.83 on his child support obligation. 

The parties filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. No transcript 

of the hearing was filed with the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court was limited 

to reviewing the parties’ legal arguments. The trial court overruled the parties’ 

objections and approved and adopted the magistrate’s decision. On June 26, 2020, 

the trial court entered a judgment entry ordering Father to pay a modified monthly 

child support obligation of $497.48 (plus 2 percent processing fee) effective June 3, 

2019 through July 17, 2019 and a modified monthly child support obligation of 

$976.50 (plus 2 percent processing fee) effective July 18, 2019. 

Father appealed, raising the following three assignments of error for 

review: 

Assignment of Error 1: The trial court erred, abused its discerption 

[sic], violated state/federal rules and due process (or any which apply) 

by issuing orders for child support when there is no legal right to child 

support and must void orders and case. 

Assignment of Error 2: The trial court erred, abused its discerption 

[sic], violated state/federal rules and due process (or any which apply) 

by issuing orders for child support not based on law of an article 3 court 

but based on a personal contract they [sic] personally benefit from. 

Assignment of Error 3: The trial court erred, abused its discerption 

[sic], violated state/federal rules and due process (or any which apply) 

by issuing order[s] which violate the constitution, due process and 

restitution is required. 
Law and Analysis 

Father’s Legal Obligation to Pay Child Support 

In his first assignment of error, Father argues that the trial court’s 

child support order is void because there is “no child support law” and “no legal right 

to child support” under Ohio law. Father’s argument is meritless. 

As the Ohio Supreme Court explained in In re Adoption of B.I., 157 

Ohio St.3d 29, 2019-Ohio-2450, 131 N.E.3d 28, ¶ 27, there are “two statuses of 

parental obligation” under Ohio law: (1) the general obligation of parents to support 

their children imposed by law in R.C. 3103.03 and (2) the specific child support 

obligation imposed by judicial decree pursuant to R.C. 3109.05 and R.C. Chapter 

3119 that “supersedes the general obligation once the court issues its decree.” 

R.C. 3103.03 sets forth a parent’s general obligation to support his or 

her children in the absence of a child support order. R.C. 3103.03(A) states, in 

relevant part: “The biological or adoptive parent of a minor child must support the 

parent’s minor children out of the parent’s property or by the parent’s labor.” 

‘“Under R.C. 3103.03, all parents, whether married or not, have a duty to support 

their minor children; it follows logically from this that all children have a right to be 

supported by their parents, regardless of the parents’ marital status.” In re Adoption 

of B.I. at ¶ 21, quoting In re Dissolution of Marriage of Lazor, 59 Ohio St.3d 201, 

202, 572 N.E.2d 66 (1991). R.C. 3103.03 “subsumes” a parent’s common-law duty 

to support his or her minor children. In re Adoption of B.I. at ¶ 20, 26 (‘“The 
common-law duty to support one’s minor children has been replaced by R.C. 

3103.03.’”), quoting Nokes v. Nokes, 47 Ohio St.2d 1, 5, 351 N.E.2d 174 (1976). 

In addition, R.C. 3109.05 ‘“sets forth the power of the trial court to 

make child support orders when a marriage terminates.”’ In re Adoption of B.I. at 

¶ 22, quoting Meyer v. Meyer, 17 Ohio St.3d 222, 223, 478 N.E.2d 806 (1985). 

Pursuant to R.C. 3109.05(A)(1), “[i]n a divorce, dissolution of marriage, legal 

separation, or child support proceeding, the court may order either or both parents 

to support or help support their children.” See also R.C. 3109.05(A)(3) (“The court 

shall comply with Chapters 3119, 3121, 3123, and 3125 of the Revised Code when it 

makes or modifies an order for child support under this section.”). Once issued, the 

child support order determines the parent’s child support obligation. In re Adoption 

of B.I. at ¶ 26. 

The trial court also has the ability to modify a child support order 

when a change in circumstances requires it under R.C. 3119.79. See, e.g., In re 

Adoption of B.I. at ¶ 24 (‘“It has long been recognized in Ohio that a court retains 

continuing jurisdiction over its orders concerning the custody, care, and support of 

children * * *. A child affected by such an order is considered a ward of the court, 

which may always reconsider and modify its rulings when changed circumstances 

require it during the child’s minority.’”), quoting Singer v. Dickinson, 63 Ohio St.3d 

408, 413-414, 588 N.E.2d 806 (1992); see also R.C. 3119.79. 

In support of his contention that there is “no legal right to child 

support” under Ohio law, Father cites Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 117 S.Ct. 
1353, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997), Wehunt v Ledbetter, 875 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir.1989), 

Mason v. Bradley, 789 F. Supp. 273 (N.D.Ill.1992), and Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 

566 A.2d 719 (D.C. 1989). Father’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. None of 

these cases relied upon by Father in challenging the trial court’s child support order 

supports his position 

 In Blessing, a group of Arizona mothers whose children were eligible 

for state child support services under Title IV-D filed suit against the director of the 

state child support agency, alleging that the agency had failed to take adequate steps 

to obtain child support payments for them. 520 U.S. at 332-333, 337, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 

137 L.Ed.2d 569. The United States Supreme Court held that Title IV-D did not give 

individuals a federal right to force a state agency to “substantially comply” with Title 

IV-D. Id. at 333, 343-344. 

Similarly, in Wehunt, the Eleventh Circuit held that Title IV-D did not 

“create any enforceable right” because “it was not enacted for the ‘especial benefit’ 

of AFDC families.” 875 F.2d at 1565. In Mason, the United States District Court for 

the Northern District of Illinois held that a welfare recipient did not have a private 

right of action under Title IV-D because the statute did not specifically require that 

all applicants be provided with prompt child support services by the state agency. 

789 F. Supp. at 276-277. In Fitzgerald, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 

held that child support guidelines adopted by the District of Columbia Superior 

Court were “invalid” because they “change[d] substantive law.” 566 A.2d at 732. 
Based on R.C. 3103.03, 3109.05(A)(1) and the substantial case law 

interpreting and applying those provisions, it is clear that a parent has a legal 

obligation to support his or her minor children under Ohio law. In this case, Father’s 

child support obligation was properly set forth in the trial court’s child support order 

imposed under R.C. 3109.05(A)(1), and later modified, in accordance with R.C. 

Chapter 3119. Accordingly, Father’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

Father’s Claims Based on the Uniform Commercial Code and Title 

IV-D 

In his second assignment of error, Father argues that child support is 

a matter of contract, “governed by the UCC,” and that because he is not a party to 

any contract for child support and has “never knowingly agreed to pay or signed 

anything,” he has no enforceable child support obligation under sections 2-106, 2-

205, 2-206, 2-207, 2-208, 2-302 and 2-319 of the Uniform Commercial Code 

(“U.C.C.”). Father also contends that the trial court’s child support order is void 

(and that all court orders imposing child support are void) because the state has a 

pecuniary interest in imposing and enforcing child support orders under Title IV-D 

and judicial enforcement of child support orders is part of a fraudulent, “moneymaking” scheme by the state to maximize the funding it receives under Title IV-D. 

Once again, Father’s arguments are meritless. 

As stated above, a parent’s legal obligation to pay child support is not 

a matter of contract. “An obligation to pay child support arises by operation of law 

and is a personal duty owed to the former spouse, the child, and society in general. 
It does not arise out of any business transaction or contractual agreement.” Cramer 

v. Petrie, 70 Ohio St.3d 131, 135, 637 N.E.2d 882 (1994). 

The Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) applies to contracts 

involving the sale of goods and other commercial transactions. Child support is not 

governed by the U.C.C. Cf. State v. Collins, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-703, 2018-

Ohio-2606, ¶ 11 (observing that “the UCC does not apply to nonsupport of 

dependents” and that the trial court, therefore, “properly concluded that evidence 

regarding the applicability of the UCC was not relevant to appellant’s failure to 

provide support for his child, under Evid.R. 401, or admissible under Evid.R. 402 

and 403”); see also In re Lucius H., Tenn.App. No. M2016-00534-COA-R3-JV, 2016 

Tenn. App. LEXIS 817, 11 (Oct. 31, 2016) (“[T]he Uniform Commercial Code only 

applies to various types of commercial contracts and transactions. Issues of * * * 

child support are not governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.”). Accordingly, 

Father’s arguments relating to the application of the U.C.C. are misplaced and do 

not provide a basis for reversal. 

With respect to Father’s arguments related to Title IV-D, “Title IV-D” 

is a ‘“shorthand reference to those provisions enacted by the “Social Services 

Amendment of 1974” to Title IV of the Social Security Act.”’ In re Z.M., 12th Dist. 

Butler No. CA2018-04-070, 2019-Ohio-1192, ¶ 12, quoting Blankenship v. 

Blankenship, 4th Dist. Adams No. 528, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 6279, 7 (Dec. 8, 

1992). Title IV-D requires states to provide various child support services, including 
services related to the establishment, modification and enforcement of child support 

obligations, in exchange for receiving certain federal funds. See 42 U.S.C. 651-669b. 

In Cramer, the Ohio Supreme Court explained the history and role of 

Title IV-D as it relates to the imposition and enforcement of child support 

obligations as follows: 

Ohio * * * elected to participate in the Aid for Dependent Children 

(“ADC”) program established by Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 

42 U.S.C. 601 et seq. As a condition to receiving federal funding for 

ADC, the state is obligated to obtain and enforce child support orders 

against noncustodial parents. 

In 1975, Congress removed the child support program from Title IV-A 

and created a separate child support program in Title IV-D of the Social 

Security Act. Section 651 et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code (88 Stat. 2351). 

Title IV-D allows states, including Ohio, to receive federal financial 

assistance if they operate efficient and cost-effective child support 

enforcement programs. Ohio is periodically audited by the Secretary 

of the United States Department of Health and Human Services to 

determine whether it has complied with the numerous requirements of 

Title IV-D, requirements that have as their goal the enforcement of 

child support orders. If the audit reveals that Ohio has not met the 

federal requirements, federal financial assistance is decreased, thereby 

indirectly increasing the state’s financial burden. 

In addition, Ohio has a direct financial interest in the enforcement of 

child support orders. Families receiving ADC are required to assign 

their interests in child support to the state. * * * 

70 Ohio St.3d at 134, 637 N.E.2d 882. The Twelfth District further explained 

in In re Z.M.: 

“This legislation appropriates federal funds for the benefit of 

states which implement carefully tailored programs to, among other 

things, enforce child support obligations.” Blankenship at 8. “The 

Ohio General Assembly has, in turn, enacted legislation which 

designates the Department of Human Services, Division of Child 

Support, as the state body which shall administer programs necessary 
to comply with the title IV-D requirements for enforcement and 

collection of support orders.” Id. “Moreover, each county is required 

to designate a child support enforcement agency which shall operate a 

program for child support enforcement in compliance with the title IVD requirements.” Id. Under Title IV-D, states are required to provide 

child support enforcement services to families that receive ADC 

benefits as well as families that do not. See Carelli v. Howser, 923 F.2d 

1208 (6th Cir.1991). 

State programs under Title IV-D are designed for the purpose of 

enforcing the support obligations owed by absent parents to their 

children. Cuyahoga Cty. Support Enforcement Agency v. Lozada, 102 

Ohio App.3d 442, 446, 657 N.E.2d 372 (8th Dist.1995). “As stated in 

Title IV-D, the overriding concern of this program is to ensure 

optimum results in helping parents secure the proper amount of child 

support from the absent parents of their children.” Id. at 448. * * * 

[T]he state has a strong interest in improving and ensuring the 

enforcement of child support obligations because the public fisc is at 

stake. [Cramer at 134-135]. 

In re Z.M. at ¶ 17-18. 

Father argues that because “[s]tates can earn more money according 

to the [Title IV-D] contract by reaching child support arrearages and child support 

enforcement quotas,” judges who rule on child support matters (whose salaries are 

paid, at least in part, by the state) have a conflict of interest comparable to “[w]hen 

a judge receives a bribe * * * and is seen as a trespasser of the law and all orders are 

voided.” 

The Twelfth District recently rejected a similar argument in In re Z.M. 

In that case, a father argued that because the salary of the hearing officer who 

imposed the original administrative child support order relating to his minor child 

was paid in whole or in part from federal funds received under Title IV-D, the 

hearing officer had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case and, therefore, 
the original administrative child support order and all subsequent administrative 

orders and juvenile court orders imposing child support were void. In re Z.M., 2019-

Ohio-1192, at ¶ 12. In rejecting the father’s argument, the Twelfth District stated: 

The fact that Ohio has a direct financial interest in the 

enforcement of child support orders owed by absent parents to their 

children, and that, as Father asserts, a hearing officer’s salary is paid 

partially or wholly from federal funds received from the department of 

health and human services in exchange for state agencies to establish 

and enforce child support orders under Title IV-D, does not mean the 

hearing officer was biased or that the officer had a pecuniary interest in 

the outcome of the case. We note that in addition to issuing an 

administrative child support order, the CSEA is empowered to 

administratively review existing child support orders and may 

recommend that the child support obligation be reduced or terminated. 

* * * Father's contention that the hearing officer was disqualified 

because of pecuniary interest is not tenable * * * because the hearing 

officer’s salary is not dependent upon whether a child support order is 

established in the first instance or upon the amount of child support 

ordered. 

Id. at ¶ 19-23. A similar conclusion is warranted in this case. 

 

There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court’s decision 

to modify Father’s child support obligation in this case was the product of any fraud, 

bias, impartiality, pecuniary interest or any other conflict of interest on the part of 

the magistrate or the trial court judge. A trial court that enters a child support order 

retains continuing jurisdiction over child support matters. See, e.g., J.E.M. v. 

D.N.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109532, 2021-Ohio-67, ¶ 31, 35. Father does not 

dispute that the magistrate or trial court judge fully complied with the requirements 

of R.C. Chapter 3119 in determining (1) that Father’s child support obligation should 
be modified and (2) determining the amount of his modified child support 

obligation. 

Father’s second assignment of error is overruled.

Father’s Alleged Due Process Violations 

In his third assignment of error, Father reiterates several of the 

arguments made in support of his prior assignments of error and further argues that 

trial court’s judgment should be reversed because he was denied “due process.” 

Father does not identify any specific “due process” violations he contends occurred 

below other than to assert that (1) he was “never served in his current case or in 

previous past cases multiple times,” (2) the trial court denied his requests for a 

“denovo [sic] hearing” and a “video recording hearing for fairness,” (3) the trial court 

“refus[ed] to answer questions” he had asked, (4) the trial court dismissed “various 

motions” without a hearing and (5) the trial court “refused to accept” 31 exhibits he 

had offered into evidence at the child support hearing. 

 Father has not shown that any due process violations occurred in 

this case. First, although the trial court found that Father had not been served with 

Mother’s motion to modify support and that he had refused to waive service of the 

motion, the trial court also found that Father also filed his own motions for 

modification and/or recalculation of child support and appeared and participated in 

the hearing on the parties’ child support motions without raising a defense of 

insufficiency of service of process. Thus, Father clearly invoked the trial court’s 

continuing jurisdiction, subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and 
waived any defense based on insufficiency of service of process related to Mother’s 

motion. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Sweeney, 2016-Ohio-1384, 63 N.E.3d 542, ¶ 25 (8th 

Dist.) (“Where a party appears in court, fails to object to improper service * * * and 

defends on the merits of the case, that party will be deemed to have waived the issue 

of improper service.”), citing Bedi-Hetlin v. Hetlin, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-14-08, 

2014-Ohio-4997, ¶ 26, and Huston v. Huston, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 

2013CA0030, 2014-Ohio-5654, ¶ 37; see also Longshore v. White, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 66363, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2185, 3-6 (May 19, 1994) (although 

plaintiff improperly served defendant by ordinary mail, defendant waived any 

objection to the trial court’s exercise of continuing jurisdiction where he submitted 

numerous pleadings and attended the hearing on the motion without contesting 

jurisdiction). Father does not dispute that he had notice of and a full and fair 

opportunity to appear and defend against Mother’s motion to modify child support 

and a full and fair opportunity to present evidence in support of his own child 

support motions at the hearing. 

Second, Father’s brief contains no citations to the record and no 

citations to relevant, supporting legal authority. An appellant’s brief must include 

“[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each 

assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the 

contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on 

which appellant relies.” App.R. 16(A)(7). An appellate court may disregard an 

assignment of error presented for review if the appellant fails to identify in the 
record the error on which the assignment of error is based, fails to cite to any legal 

authority in support of an argument or fails to argue the assignment separately in 

the brief, as required under App.R. 16(A)(7). See App.R. 12(A)(2); Johnson v. New 

Direction IRA F.B.O. King C. Lam, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106628, 2018-Ohio4608, ¶ 10. Father’s generalized assertions that his due process rights were violated 

— without any explanation, citation to the record or citation to supporting legal 

authorities — do not satisfy Father’s obligations under App.R. 16(A)(7). 

Without proper citations to the record, we are unable to discern under 

what circumstances Father allegedly made, and the trial court allegedly refused, 

Father’s requests for a “de novo” hearing and a “video recording hearing,” what 

motions Father contends were improperly dismissed without a hearing and what 

“questions” Father allegedly asked the trial court that it “refused to answer.” An 

appellate court is “not obliged to construct or develop arguments” to support an 

appellant’s assignment of error and “will not ‘guess at undeveloped claims on 

appeal.”’ State v. Jacinto, 2020-Ohio-3722, 155 N.E.3d 1056, ¶ 56 (8th Dist.), 

quoting McPherson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 9th Dist. Summit No. 21499, 

2003-Ohio-7190, ¶ 31. ‘“If an argument exists that can support this assigned error, 

it is not this court’s duty to root it out.”’ Strauss v. Strauss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

95377, 2011-Ohio-3831, ¶ 72, quoting Cardone v. Cardone, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 

18349 and 18673, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2028, 22 (May 6, 1998). 

Further, although the record reflects that a recording was made of the 

child support hearing held on March 4, 2019, April 8, 2019 and May 13, 2019, Father 
did not order a transcript of the hearing. As such, this court must presume regularity 

in the trial court’s proceedings. See, e.g., Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio 

St.2d 197, 199, 400 N.E.2d 384 (1980) (“When portions of the transcript necessary 

for resolution of assigned errors are omitted from the record, the reviewing court 

has nothing to pass upon and, thus, as to those assigned errors, the court has no 

choice but to presume the validity of the lower court’s proceedings, and affirm.”). 

Finally, although Father claims that the trial court “refused to accept” 

31 exhibits he had offered into evidence at the child support hearing, the record 

reflects otherwise. The magistrate’s decision indicates that these exhibits “were 

admitted into evidence without objection.” 

Father’s third assignment of error is overruled. 

Motion to Have Father Declared a Vexatious Litigator 

On January 15, 2021, OCSS filed a motion to find Father a vexatious 

litigator pursuant to Loc.App.R. 23.2 

Under Loc.App.R. 23(A), this court may impose “appropriate 

sanctions” on a person who signs an appeal or motion that is “frivolous or is 

prosecuted for delay, harassment, or any other improper purpose.” Loc.App.R. 

23(B) further provides that if a person “habitually, persistently, and without 

reasonable cause” engages in frivolous conduct under Loc.App.R. 23(A), this court 

2 OCSS’ motion to find Father a vexatious litigator was joined with a motion to strike 

Father’s appellate brief. On January 26, 2021, this court granted the motion in part, 

striking the attachments to Father’s brief. OCSS’ request that Father be found a vexatious 

litigator was referred to the merit panel. 
may declare the person to be a vexatious litigator and impose various “filing 

restrictions” upon them. 

OCSS argues that Father should be declared a vexatious litigator due 

to (1) Father’s filing, in this case, of a meritless appellate brief, 11 motions with this 

court and “about 34 motions” with the trial court, (2) his filing of “multiple pro se 

motions before retaining counsel” when appealing from the parties’ divorce decree 

in 2009 and (3) his conduct during the trial proceedings (including his filing of 

“about 60 motions in a span of about two years”) and appeal (including his filing of 

“more than 20 motions and a 41 page[ ] brief” in another divorce case in 2018. 

Based on the record before us, we cannot say that Father has 

“habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause” engaged in “frivolous 

conduct” so as to warrant a declaration that he is a vexatious litigator. Compare, 

e.g., State ex rel. Newell v. Court of Common Please Cuyahoga Cty., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 110215, 2021-Ohio-1197, ¶ 6 (party who filed 14 appeals and five 

original actions declared a vexatious litigator where he attempted to relitigate issues 

and several of his appeals were not reasonably grounded in fact or warranted by 

existing law); State ex rel. McGee v. Russo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109207, 2020-

Ohio-497, ¶ 6, 8, 10 (party declared a vexatious litigator pursuant to Loc.App.R. 

23(A) where original action and 16 of the 18 appeals party filed alleged the same 

facts and issues); State ex rel. McGrath v. McClelland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

97209, 2012-Ohio-157, ¶ 6-7 (party declared vexatious litigator pursuant to 

Loc.App.R. 23(A) where he had “continually taxed the limited resources of [the] 
court” through the filing of 23 appeals and 13 original actions over 10 years and 

refiled appeals and original actions premised on the same arguments previously 

rejected by the appellate court). However, we caution Father that continued filing 

of appeals, motions or original actions that are not reasonably grounded in fact or 

warranted by law could result in his being declared a vexatious litigator pursuant to 

Loc.App.R. 23(B). 

OCSS’ motion to have Father declared a vexatious litigator is denied. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cuyahoga County Common 

Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and 

LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR