alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
First Amendment to Deferred Compensation Plan



 Exhibit 10.33 
 FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE 
 OWENS CORNING 
 DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN 
 WHEREAS, Owens Corning (the
“Company”) maintains Owens Corning Deferred Compensation Plan, effective as of January 1, 2007 (the “Plan”); 
 WHEREAS, the Company wishes to amend the Plan to reflect the application of transition relief provisions of IRS Notice 2007-86 under the Plan. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue and in exercise of the amending power reserved by Sections 7 and 9 of the Plan and designated to the undersigned officer of the Company by resolution of the Company’s Board of Directors,
the Plan is hereby amended as follows: 
 1. Effective as of January 1, 2008, Section 1.8 is amended to add the following provision
at the end thereof: 
 Notwithstanding the foregoing, deferral elections shall be permitted to be modified only to the extent permitted under
Section 409A of the Code and pursuant to and consistent with the transition rules under IRS Notice 2007-86. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the
aforementioned amendment is executed by the undersigned duly authorized officer this 22nd day of December, 2008. 
  

			
	Owens Corning
		
	By	 	 /s/ Joseph C. High

		 	Joseph C. High
		 	Senior Vice President – Human Resources
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

February 8, 2021

LISA M. AAZAD v. JOHNEY B. AAZAD

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Knox County

No. 149026 Gregory S. McMillan, Judge

___________________________________

No. E2020-01020-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

The Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant, Lisa M. Aazad, stated that appellant was 

appealing the judgment entered on July 30, 2020. As the July 30, 2020 order does not 

constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J.; D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J.; AND KRISTI M. DAVIS, J.

Lisa M. Aazad, Maryville, Tennessee, pro se appellant.

Johney B. Aazad, Knoxville, Tennessee, pro se appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Pursuant to the requirements of Rule 13(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, the Court directed the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be 

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after it became clear that there was no final 

judgment from which an appeal as of right would lie. “A final judgment is one that resolves 

 

1 Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals provides:

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may 

affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion 

when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided 

by memorandum opinion it shall be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” 

shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in any 

unrelated case,

02/09/2021
- 2 -

all the issues in the case, ‘leaving nothing else for the trial court to do.’” In re Estate of

Henderson, 121 S.W.3d 643, 645 (Tenn. 2003) (quoting State ex rel. McAllister v. Goode, 

968 S.W.2d 834, 840 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). This Court does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal as of right if there is no final judgment. See Bayberry 

Assocs. v. Jones, 783 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tenn. 1990) (“Unless an appeal from an 

interlocutory order is provided by the rules or by statute, appellate courts have jurisdiction 

over final judgments only.”). The appellant failed to respond to our show cause order. 

 

Specifically, the notice of appeal filed on August 4, 2020, states that the appellant,

Lisa M. Aazad, is appealing the judgment entered on July 30, 2020. The July 30, 2020 

order, however, does not appear to be a final appealable judgment as it reserved for trial a

“show cause.”

“Except where otherwise provided, this Court only has subject matter jurisdiction 

over final orders.” Foster-Henderson v. Memphis Health Center, Inc., 479 S.W.3d 214, 

222 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015). As the July 30, 2020 order does not constitute a final appealable 

judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is hereby 

dismissed. Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellant, Lisa M. Aazad, for which execution 

may issue. 

PER CURIAM
Order entered August 21, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-12-01488-CR

No. 05-12-01489-CR

JUAN RAMON HERNANDEZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. F12-19054-H, F12-19055-H

ORDER

The Court ORDERS the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine why appellant’s 

brief has not been filed. In this regard, the trial court shall make appropriate findings and 

recommendations and determine whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeals, whether 

appellant is indigent, or if not indigent, whether retained counsel has abandoned the appeals. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(b). If the trial court cannot obtain appellant’s presence at the hearing, the 

trial court shall conduct the hearing in appellant’s absence. See Meza v. State, 742 S.W.2d 708 

(Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) (per curiam). If appellant is indigent, the trial court is 

ORDERED to take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation, which 

may include appointment of new counsel.
We ORDER the trial court to transmit a record of the proceedings, which shall include 

written findings and recommendations, to this Court within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this 

order.

The appeals are ABATED to allow the trial court to comply with the above order. The 

appeals shall be reinstated thirty days from the date of this order or when the findings are 

received, whichever is earlier.

/s/ DAVID EVANS 

JUSTICE
UN PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17
- 6876

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. RAY ALLEN DICKS, JR. , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Alexandria

. Liam O’Grady , District Judge. ( 1:14

- cr - 00015

- LO

- 2 ; 1:16

- cv - 00628

- LO )

Submitted : November 16, 2017 Decided: November 21, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and KEENAN , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Ray Allen Dicks, Jr. , Appellant Pro Se. Patricia T. Giles, Assistant U nited S tates Attorney , OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY , Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee

. Unpublished opinions are not binding p recedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Ray Allen Dicks, Jr. , seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealabil ity. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutio nal right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Dicks has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument beca use the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT**

**PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Roderick Bartlett, Chief Financial Officer of TransAct Energy Corp., (the “Company”), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to the best of my knowledge:

 

(1)the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, of the Company for the fiscal quarter ended June 30, 2020 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78 o(d)); and 

 

(2)the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

 

Dated: August 7, 2020

 

*/s/ Rod Bartlett***

Rod Bartlett

Chief Financial Officer 

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been furnished to TransAct Energy Corp. and will be retained by TransAct Energy Corp. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 118 (Tuesday, June 18, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Page 30862]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-15371]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------


DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Notice of Intent To Prepare a Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement (DEIS) for Projects and Activities Associated With Future 
Programs at Yuma Proving Ground

AGENCY: Department of the Army, DOD.

ACTION: Notice of intent.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with Public Law 91-190, the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement (DEIS) being prepared to evaluate environmental implications 
of future decisions regarding operation of Yuma Proving Ground. The 
DEIS will focus on impacts of planned future activities at Yuma Proving 
Ground, development alternatives for the installation Master Plan, 
development potential of the installation in terms of environmental 
carrying capacity, and specific concerns regarding risk. Issues to be 
considered in the proposed action include acceptance of those new 
programs projected for the installation, modernization or removal of 
outdated facilities, and improvements to infrastructure, utilities and 
service necessary to accommodate the new missions and changes in 
existing test and evaluation missions. All missions on the installation 
will be considered. The Army will conduct a scoping workshop (exact 
date, time, and location to be determined) prior to preparing the 
Environmental Impact Statement. The first step will be to determine the 
appropriate scope of issues, activities and alternatives to be 
addressed. Among the anticipated areas to be evaluated are public 
health risks and public safety, noise, shock and vibration, water 
quality, air quality, hazardous material management and disposal, 
biological resources including threatened and endangered species, 
social and economic effects, and historical and archaeological 
resources. Agencies having regulatory interest and special expertise 
will be asked to participate in the scoping process.

DATES: Written public comments and suggestions can be submitted by no 
later than July 18, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Commander, U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground, ATTN: STEYP-ES-C 
(Junior D. Kerns), Yuma, Arizona 85365-9107.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mr. Junior D. Kerns, (520) 328-2148.

Raymond J. Fatz,
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Environment, Safety and 
Occupational Health) OASA (IL&E).
[FR Doc. 96-15371 Filed 6-17-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3710-08-M
**EXHIBIT
        32.1**
  **CERTIFICATION**
  Pursuant
        to the requirement set forth in Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange
        Act of
        1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of
        Title 18 of the United States Code (18 U.S.C. Section 1350), Steven R.
        Springsteel, Chief Executive Officer of Chordiant Software, Inc. (the “Company”)
        and Peter S. Norman, Chief Executive Officer and Principal Accounting Officer
        of
        the Company, each hereby certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:
  1.
        The Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended September 30,
        2006, and to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the “Annual
        Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
        Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and
  2.
        The information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material
        respects, the financial condition and the results of operations of the Company.
  IN
        WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have set their hands hereto as of the 9th
        day
        of February, 2007.
 
 /s/
                  STEVEN R. SPRINGSTEEL**Steven
                  R. Springsteel, Chairman, President, and**
                **Chief
                  Executive Officer**/s/
                  PETER S. NORMAN**Peter
                  S. Norman, Chief Financial Officer and**
                **Principal
                  Accounting Officer**
 
  This
        certification accompanies the Form 10-K to which it relates, is not deemed
        filed
        with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated
        by
        reference into any filing of Chordiant Software, Inc. under the Securities
        Act
        of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the date of the Form 10-K),
        irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1058 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1058

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reduce the tax on beer to 
              its pre-1991 level, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 14, 2009

     Mr. Udall of Colorado (for himself, Mr. Bennet, Mr. Bond, Mr. 
   Chambliss, Mr. Crapo, Mr. Tester, and Mr. Vitter) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                                Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reduce the tax on beer to 
              its pre-1991 level, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Brewers Excise and Economic Relief 
Act of 2009''.

SEC. 2. REPEAL OF 1990 TAX INCREASE ON BEER.

    (a) In General.--Paragraph (1) of section 5051(a) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to imposition and rate of tax on beer) 
is amended by striking ``$18'' and inserting ``$9''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3. TAX RELIEF FOR SMALL BREWERIES.

    (a) In General.--Subparagraph (A) of section 5051(a)(2) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to a reduced rate of tax for 
certain domestic production) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``$7'' in the heading and inserting 
        ``$3.50'', and
            (2) by striking ``$7'' in the text and inserting ``$3.50''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHU XIONG DONG,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-74954

Agency No. A095-448-360

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 26, 2012** 

Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

Shu Xiong Dong, a native and citizen of China, petitions pro se for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen. 

Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of

FILED

JUL 18 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-74954

discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen. Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981,

984 (9th Cir. 2009). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Dong’s motion to reopen as

untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the entry of the agency’s

final administrative order and Dong failed to show changed circumstances in China

in order to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii); Lin, 588 F.3d at 988-89 (record did not show material

change in enforcement of family planning laws sufficient to establish changed

country conditions and excuse an untimely motion to reopen); He v. Gonzales, 501

F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (a change in personal circumstances does not

establish changed country conditions).

We decline to address Dong’s contention that he suffered past persecution in

China because it was not addressed by the BIA and Dong does not argue that the

BIA erred. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (review is

limited to actual grounds relied upon by the BIA).

We lack jurisdiction to review Dong’s claims regarding humanitarian relief

and extreme hardship because he failed to exhaust these claims before the BIA. 

See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 117 (Monday, June 17, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Page 30614]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-15303]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
[Dkt. C-3643]


The Dannon Company, Inc.; Prohibited Trade Practices, and 
Affirmative Corrective Actions

AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission.

ACTION: Consent order.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In settlement of alleged violations of federal law prohibiting 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices and unfair methods of 
competition, this consent order prohibits, among other things, a New 
York-based frozen yogurt manufacturer from misrepresenting the amount 
of fat, calories, or cholesterol in any frozen yogurt products. The 
consent order requires the respondent to pay $150,000 to the U.S. 
Treasury. This action settles allegations stemming from nutritional 
claims made in advertisements for Dannon's Pure Indulgence frozen 
yogurt.

DATES: Complaint and Order issued March 18, 1996.\1\

    \1\ Copies of the Complaint and the Decision and Order are 
available from the Commission's Public Reference Branch, H-130, 6th 
Street & Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20580.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Peter Metrinko, FTC/S-4302, Washington, DC 20580, (202) 326-2104.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On Tuesday, December 12, 1995, there was 
published in the Federal Register, 60 FR 63715, a proposed consent 
agreement with analysis In the Matter of The Dannon Company, Inc., for 
the purpose of soliciting public comment.
    Interested parties were given sixty (60) days in which to submit 
comments, suggestions or objections regarding the proposed form of the 
order.
    A comment was filed and considered by the Commission. The 
Commission has ordered the issuance of the complaint in the form 
contemplated by the agreement, made its jurisdictional findings and 
entered an order to cease and desist, as set forth in the proposed 
consent agreement, in disposition of this proceeding.

(Sec. 6, 38 Stat. 721; 15 U.S.C. 46. Interprets or applies sec. 5, 
38 Stat. 719, as amended; 15 U.S.C. 45, 52)
Donald S. Clark,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 96-15303 Filed 6-14-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6750-01-M
#### Tamara S. BRADDUM, d/b/a Amera-Kora Ent., Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Lawrence ROSENBLATT, d/b/a L. Rosen and Assoc., Defendant/Respondent, and Barb and Trey Schaffer, d/b/a Mo. School of Dog Grooming, Defendants.

No. 65390.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

Aug. 23, 1994.

Tamara S. Braddum, party acting pro se.

Before REINHARD, P.J., and GARY M. GAERTNER and CRAHAN, JJ.

*733
      *ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals from the circuit court’s dismissal, for failure to prosecute, of her claim against defendant Rosenblatt. We affirm. We have reviewed the record and find the claim of error to be without merit; no error of law appears. An extended opinion would have no precedential value. The parties have been furnished with a memorandum for their information only, setting forth the reasons for this order affirming the judgment pursuant to Rule 84.16(b).
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Israel G. Torres (#020303)

James E. Barton, II (#023888)

Saman J. Golestan (#031710)

TORRES LAW GROUP, PLLC

2239 West Baseline Road

Tempe, Arizona 85283

480.588.6120

James@TheTorresFirm.com

Saman@TheTorresFirm.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

David R. Schwartz (#009264)

Kimberly R. Davis (#030210)

UDALL SHUMWAY

1138 North Alma School Road

Suite 101

Mesa, Arizona 85201

480.461.5300

das@udallshumway.com

krd@udallshumway.com

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Rogers, an individual 

Plaintiff,

vs.

Maricopa County Community College 

District, et al,

Defendants

No. CV-18-00605-PHX-GMS

Status Report

(Hon. G. Murray Snow)

Pursuant to this Court’s April 9, 2018, Order, the Parties jointly file this brief status 

report. Service of the Complaint in this matter was effected on March 9, 2018. On March 23, 

Case 2:18-cv-00605-DWL Document 12 Filed 04/11/18 Page 1 of 2
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2018, Plaintiff consented to a roughly two-week extension for Defendants to file their responsive 

pleadings. Defendants intend to file their responsive pleadings on or before April 16, 2018.

For this reason, a motion for default would not be appropriate in this case. Having filed 

this status report as ordered, the Parties move the Court to not terminate the matter on April 16, 

2018—that is, seven days from the date of the Order. 

Dated this 11th of April, 2018 

_/s/ James E. Barton II_____________

James E. Barton II

Torres Law Group, PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

_/s/ David R. Schwartz (with permission)_

David R. Schwartz

Udall Shumway 

Attorneys for Defendants 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on April 11, 2018 I electronically filed the attached document using ECF 

for filing and Transmitted the document through ECF to the following registered ECF users: 

David R. Schwartz (#009264)

Udall Shumway, PLC

1138 North Alma School Road 

Suite 101

Mesa AZ 85201

das@udallshumway.com

Attorneys for Defendant

/s/ Monse Vejar____________

-2-

Case 2:18-cv-00605-DWL Document 12 Filed 04/11/18 Page 2 of 2