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Paul J. Cambria, Jr. (NY 15873, admitted pro hac vice)

LIPSITZ GREEN SLIME CAMBRIA LLP

42 Delaware Avenue, Suite 120

Buffalo, New York 14202

Telephone: (716) 849-1333

Facsimile: (716) 855-1580

pcambria@lglaw.com

Erin E. McCampbell (NY 4480166, admitted pro hac vice)

LIPSITZ GREEN SLIME CAMBRIA LLP

42 Delaware Avenue, Suite 120

Buffalo, New York 14202

Telephone: (716) 849-1333

Facsimile: (716) 855-1580

emccampbell@lglaw. com

Attorneys fog Defendant Michael Lacey

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Michael Lacey, et al.,

Defendants.

NO. CR-18-00422-PHX-SPL (BSB)

DEFENDANT LACEY' S

MOTION FOR DISCLOSURE OF

DOCUMENTS RELATED TO CARL

FERRER' S VdAIVER OF PRIVILEGE AS

MATERIAL TO DISQUALIFICATION

(Oral argument requested)

Defendant Michael Lacey, by and through his undersigned attorney, hereby moves under

Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Crinunal Procedure for an order compelling the government to

produce all documents pertaining to Carl Ferrer's waiver of the attorney-client and work-product

privileges as material to resolution of the Government's Motion to Disqualify (Doc. 118), which

is pending before this Court. The record on disqualification is incomplete because defendants

and this Court lack material information to determine whether disqualification is necessary;

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namely, the extent to which Mr. Fearer has waived privilege. The government's disclosures thus

far indicate that Mr. Ferrer has waived privilege as to all communications for which he, alone,

can unilaterally waive by virtue of being the sole privilege holder. Further, the government has

indicated that it possesses additional documents material to a determination on the scope and

extent of Mr. Ferrer's waiver, which should be disclosed as vital to protection of Mr. Lacey's

Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. Because a combination of the government's

disclosures and statements makes it unclear whether any of Mr. Ferrer's corrui7unications remain

subject to privilege at this time, discovery on this issue is essential to Mr. Lacey's ability to

exercise his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.

It is expected that excludable delay under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) will occur as

a result of this motion or an order based thereon, as explained more fully below.

RESPECTFULLY SUBNIITTED this 28th day of June, 2018,

/s/ Paul.7. Cambria Jr.

LIl'SITZ GREEN SCIlVIE CAMBRIA LLP

Attorneys for Defendant Michael Lacey

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i' • 1 i 't 1 ~ 1 ~ i' 1

Defendant Michael Lacey respectfully moves this Court for an order compelling the

government to disclose all documents pertaining to Carl Ferrer's waiver of attorney-client privilege

in his personal capacity and in his official capacity as Chief Executive Officer of Backpage.com,

LLC ("Backpage") with respect to all of his former counsel, as well as all documents evidencing

waiver of attorney-work product privilege. As set forth in greater detail below, this discovery is

material to this Court's deternlination of the Government's Motion to Disqualify Davis Wright

Tremaine LLP ("DWT") and Henze Cook Murphy PLLC ("HCM") (Doc. 118), in which the

governrnnment has sought to interfere with Mr. Lacey's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.

Because disqualification is subj ect to potential abuse, and must be reviewed under "particularly strict

judicial scnttiny," Optyl Eyewea~ Fashion Intl Corp. v. Style Cos., Ltd., 760 F.2d 1045, 1050 (9th

Cir. 1985), a deternlination of disqualification without a complete record nuts the risk of violating

Mr. Lacey's constitutional right to counsel of choice for this prosecution.

I. The record on disqualification is incomplete because defendants and this Court lack

material information to determine whether disqualification is necessary.

Shortly after the government indicted Mr. Lacey and his co-defendants;the government

informed defense counsel fliat it intended to move to disqualify DWT and HCM from any further

representation of Mr. Lacey in this prosecution. According to the government, Mr. Ferrer was a

former client of those fim~s and because he pleaded guilty, entered a guilty plea on behalf of

Backpage.com, LLC (`Backpage"), and intended to testify as a government witness at trial, DWT

and HCM could not continue their representation of Mr. Lacey because there was the potential that

they would use privileged information to Mr. Ferrer's detriment in violation of Rule 1.9.

A primary question, pivotal to resolution of the government's theory of disqualification, is

whether any of the communications between Mr. Ferrer and his former counsel remained protected

3

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under the attorney-client orwork-product privileges.l Defense counsel knew that Mr. Ferrer and his

counsel had communicated with the government about his plea, and believed that Mr. Ferrer on his

own, or though counsel, might have waived privilege through communications with the

government. Consequently, on May 1, 2018, Michael L. Piccarreta requested that the government

produce several categories of documents relevant to the potential waiver of privilege by Mr. Ferrer.

(A true and correct copy of the May 1, 2018 Piccarreta Letter is attached hereto as Ex. A.)

On May 14, 2018, the government responded to defense counsel's discovery request,

declining to produce fl1e requested documents because the relevance of those documents to

disqualification was "unclear" to the government. (A true and correct copy of the Government's

May 14, 2018 Response is attached hereto as Ex. B.) However, the government provided defense

counsel with one document attached to its response—a copy of Mr. Ferrer's Proffer/Interview

Agreement. (A true and correct copy of the Proffer/Interview Agreement is attached hereto as Ex.

C.) Notably, file Proffer/Interview Agreernentstatedthat Mr. Ferrer "voluntarily waived] all claims

of attorney-client privilege, whether in his personal or official capacity as Chief Executive Officer

of Backpage.com, LLC as to communications with any attorney or law firm that represented

Backpage.coin, or any related entity, where such communications concerned or related to

Backpage.com or any related entity" except with respect to his cwrent counsel, "Nand Clarence,

Jonathan Baum and anyone working on their behalf." (Id. ¶ 2.) Further, Mr. Ferrer "voluntarily

agreed] to provide all documents and other material that may be relevant to the investigation." (Id.)

Ftu-ther, in response to a different letter from defense colulsel, the government disclosed a

Waiver of Attorney Client Privilege signed by Mr. Ferrer on April 5, 2018, in which he purported to

waive "all aspects of attorney-client privilege" on behalf of Backpage (and related entities) and with

respect to "communications,; documents and infomlation that" Mr. Ferrer or Backpage (and related

entities) "have provided to law enforcement or which law enforcement may already have in its

1 Arizona E.R. 1.9 is solely "for the protection of clients." Ariz. Ethics Op. 91-05. In

particular, the Arizona State Bar has opined that "[t]he duty of confidentiality is the only duty

owed by an attorney to a former client." Ariz. Ethics Op. 92-03 (emphasis added). Consequently,

disqualification is unnecessary when "confidential information ... is not in jeopardy." Id.

G~

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possession from other sources." (A true and correct copy of the Waiver of Attorney Client Privilege

is attached hereto as Ex. D.)2 He pwported to waive privilege with respect to communications

related to file "adult" advertisement sections of the Backpage website, communications concerning

Backpage's finances, and communications concerning the relationships between Backpage and its

related entities and the owners and former owners of those companies. (See id.) The waiver further

stated that it applied to "all communications" between counsel and Backpage (and related entities)

"at any time" and "all documents generated through their representation." (See id.) It also indicated

that it did not extend to "any aspect of [his] personal attorney-client relationship with attorneys who

have represented me in the past or who currently represent me in an individual capacity."3

Finally, defense counsel obtained copies of the plea agreements Mr. Ferrer executed in

criminal prosecutions pending in courts in the States of California and Texas. In the California Plea

Agreement, Mr. Ferrer agreed "to cooperate with the investigation ... by making hunself available

to the Attorney General's Office to assist in the investigation and prosecution, ttut~ifully recalling

and relating information regarding the case [and] providing ttuthfi~l testimony." (A true and correct

copy of the California Plea Agreement is attached hereto as Ex. E.) In the Texas Piea Bargain

Agreement, Mr. Ferrer promised to "give full, complete, and truthful evidence concerning my

knowledge of any and all offenses committed by any and all co-defendants" and was granted "`use

immunity' as to any statements made by him ... to Texas authorities." (A true and correct copy of

the Texas Plea Bargain Agreement is attached hereto as Ex. F.) Moreover, he promised to

"additionally give sworn written or recorded stateinent(s) detailing any additional facts if that is

z Critically, Mr. Lacey does not concede that Mr. Ferrer's waivers entitle the government to

access all communications with Backpage's counsel, as those communications are the subject of

joint privileges to which Mr. Lacey and Mr. Larkin (and the entities in which they hold ownership

interests) are parties. Mr. Lacey and Mr. Larkin have notified the government about this concern.

3 This disclaimer stands in contrast with the waiver he effected in the Proffer/Interview

Agreement, in which he waived privilege "in his personal or official capacity." (Ex. C (emphasis

added).} This confusion on the extent of his personal waiver underscores the need for review of

the statements he has actually made to the government because statements, alone, can constitute a

waiver, notwithstanding aformer reservation in a written waiver.

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requested by an attorney for Texas or California or federal Assistant U. S. Atttorney." (See id.) These

documents, too, indicate that Mr. Ferrer may have revealed privileged. information through

statements made to prosecutors or law enforcement officers in California or Texas.

In light of these disclosures, defense counsel continued to press the government for

disclosure of all documents related to Mr. Ferrer's waiver of the attorney-client and attorney-workproduct privileges because, if none of the communications between Mr. Ferrer and his former

counsel were subject to those privileges any longer, the government's proposed motion to disqualify

would be baseless. However, the government refused to provide any fiu-ther discovery into Mr.

Ferrer's waiver of those privileges.

On May 25, 2018, the government moved for disqualification of DWT and HCM on the

basis that DWT and HCM's continued representation of Mr. Lacey constituted a violation of Mr.

Ferrer's rights under E.R. Rule 1.9 because there was a risk that the firms would use privileged

information obtained from Mr. Ferrer to his detriment, particularly during cross-exau~lation of him

at trial. (See Doc. 118.) Although the parties have submitted legal memoranda to the Court on flus

issue, the record before this Court is incomplete. The government's motion to disqualify is founded

on the alleged hann to Mr. Ferrer's interests if his former counsel were to use privileged information

to his detriment in this prosecution as part of their representation of Mr. Lacey in this prosecution.

(See id.) Before this Court can make that determination, a more primary determination must be

made, namely, whether there ren~auls any information subject to the attorney-client and workproduct privileges at this trine or whether Mr. Ferrer has waived all such privileges through his

disclosures to the government and non-attorney third parties.

Additionally, discovery on this issue is relevant and material to this Court's resolution of the

Government's Motion to Resolve Attorney-Client Privilege Issues (Doc. 195). In that motion, the

government contends that it should have access to documents withheld by the filter team as protected

from government review on the basis of privilege because Mr. Ferrer "executed a written waiver of

the corporate attorney-client privilege possessed by Backpage and related entities" which "obviates

the need for the continued segregation of the withheld communications." (See id. at 2.) Critically,

D

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as will be set forth in greater detail in defendants' opposition to this motion, Mr. Ferrer was not the

sole privilege holder for Backpage and he lacked the authority to unilaterally waive privilege on

behalf of Backpage and related entities. Any documents indicative of flee extent to which Mr. Ferrer

purported to waive privilege on behalf of Backpage and related entities is essential to resolution of

this motion (in addition to resolution of the Government's Motion to Disqualify).

II. The government must disclose all documents relevant to Mr. Ferrer's waivers to allow

defendants (and this Court) to determine whether any of Mr. Ferrer's

communications remain subject to privilege, without which, disqualification under

E.R 1.9 is unnecessary.

Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Ciui~uial Procedure ("Rule 16"), "grants cri~l~ulal defendants

a broad right to discovery." United States v. Stever, 603 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2010). The

government must disclose "documents ... within the government's possession ... [that are] material

to preparing the defense." Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i). A defendant establishes materiality when

the defendant presents "facts which would tend to show that the Government is in possession of

information helpful to the defense." Stever, 603 Fad at 752; Stickler a Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280

("[E]vidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." (quotations

omitted)). In addition to Rule 16, courts have the inherent authority to order discovery that is

necessary for an effective defense. See United States v. W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 509-511

(9th Cir. 2008) (affirming order compelling the government to produce its witness list oneyear in advance of trial in a complex matter because district courts "have inherent power

to control their dockets").

Here, a deternlination on the extent to which Mr. Ferrer has waived privilege is not just

material to the defense, but is pivotal to this Court's analysis of the Government's Motion to

Disqualify. Documents necessary to protect Mr. Lacey's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of

choice are obviously material to preparing his defense. See United States v. Soto-Zuniga, 837 F.3d

992, 1000-02 (9th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that evidence necessary to support a suppression motion

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to protect Fourth Amendment rights is discoverable under Rule 16(a)(1)(E) and places the district

court "in a superior position to assess and decide the motion to suppress"). The discovery sought by

this motion will enable Mr. Lacey (and this Court) to deterniine whether the government can

establish the "extreme circumstances" requisite for disqualification of DWT and HCM, see

Alexander v. Sup. Ct.,141 Ariz. 157,161(1984), which the government will fail to establish if none

of Mr. Ferrer's communications remain subject to privilege at this time.

A. The government's disclosures sugest that Mr. Ferrer has waived privilege as

to all communications for which he, alone, can unilaterally waive by virh~e of

being the sole privilege holder.

The government's disclosures thus far undermine the government's claim that privileged

information is at risk for potential misuse. To claim that privileged communications exist, the party

invoking the privilege, here, the government purportedly on behalf of Mr. Ferrer, must demonstrate

that information subject to protection under the attorney-client privilege exists. See In ~e

Grand Jury Subpoenas, 803 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The burden is on the party

asserting the attorney-client privilege to demonstrate how the information sought fits

within it."). "One of the elements that the asserting party must prove is that it has not

waived the privilege." Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc. 647 F.2d 18, 25

(9th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). The Proffer/Interview Agreement and the Waiver ofAttomey

Client Privilege suggest that Mr. Ferrer has waived privilege as to all communications wifll any legal

counsel for which he was the sole privilege holder.4

Further, clients cannot disclose privileged communications or documents to the government

or third parties and then continue to assert that those communications or documents are privileged

as to other parties. The Ninth Circuit has resoundingly rejected the theory of "selective waiver" of

4 The government contends that none of the communications between Backpage and its

former counsel remain subject to privilege at this dine, because Mr. Ferrer has waived privilege

with respect to all such communications. (See Gov't's Mot. to Resolve Attorney-Client Privilege

Issues, Doc. 195.) The government is wrong and fails to understand that Mr. Ferrer lacked the

authority to unilaterally waive privilege on behalf of Backpage, as will be set forth in greater detail

in Defendants opposition.

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the attorney-client privilege. Instead, when a client discloses privileged colTununications or

documents to the Federal government, the client has waived the privilege as to those disclosed

communications or documents "as to the world at large." In re Pacific Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d

1121, 1127-30 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Given that Congress has declined broadly to adopt a new privilege

to protect disclosures of attorney-client privileged materials to the government, we will not do so

here."); Bittaker a WoodfoNd, 331 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that "once documents

have been turned over to another party voluntarily, the privilege is gone, and the litigant

may not thereafter reassert"); Ringelber^b v. Vanguardlnte~ilyProfessionals Nevada, Inc., 2018

WL 555694, at *5 (D. Nev. Jan. 24, 2018) ("[A] party may not selectively waive the attorney-client

privilege.... [V]oluntary disclosure to one waives the attorney-client privilege as to the world at

large."). Indeed, as one court explained, "[h]a~ing lowered the shield to foster an amicable

relationship with the government, [the privilege holder]'s attorneys may not then raise it against

parties injured by their disclosures." United States v. Reyes, 239 F.R.D. 591, 603 (N.D. Ca1.2006)

(rejecting "selective waiver" claim).

Moreover, "[e]ven when a party does not explicitly disclose the content of an attorney-client

communication, he may waive the privilege implicitly." United States v. Outland, 109 F.3d 539,

543 (9th Cir. 1997). Indeed, "[t]he privilege which protects attorney-client communications may

not be used both as a sword and a shield. Where a party raises a claim which in fairness requires

disclosure of the protected communication, the privilege may be implicitly waived." Id. (quoting

Chevron Corp. a Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992)) (emphasis in original).

Finally, the "attorney work-product privilege is not absolute and may be waived, for

example, when an attorney ...reveals it to an adversary." Reyes, 239 F.R.D. 591, 598 (N.D. Ca1.

2006); Hernandez a Tanninen, 604 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that the attorneyworkproduct privilege is waivable and finding that disclosure of protected work product to a thirdpartyconstituted waiver of the privilege as to that disclosure).

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Thus, the disclosures the government has provided to defendants suggest that Mr. Ferrer has

waived privilege to the extent he had the authority to waive privilege. His waivers suggest that there

is no opportunity for misuse of privileged information because none exists.

B. The government has indicated that it possesses additional documents material

to a determination on the scope and extent of Mr. Ferrer's waiver, which should

be disclosed as vital to protection of Mr. Lacey's Sixth Amendment rights.

Central to this motion, the government has indicated that its disclosure of discovery on the

scope of Mr. Ferrer's waivers is incomplete. For example, the government alluded to a "cooperation

addendum to Mr. Ferrer's plea agreement," which it has declined to provide the defense on the

ground that it is subject to a sealing order. (See Ex. B. at 2.) This document would assist this Court

to reach a fair and correct resolution on the Government's Motion to Disqualify because it indicates

the extent of Mr. Ferrer's waivers of privilege.

Additionally, disclosure of any documents suininarizing statements Mr. Ferrer made to the

government or third parties is material to determining the extent to which Mr. Ferrer has waived

communications in his personal capacity during proffer sessions with the government. Mr. Ferrer's

statements are material because the privilege can be waived through statements, alone. "It makes no

difFerence whether aprivilege-holder copies a written text, reads from a written text, or describes a

written text to an outside party. The purpose and effect is the same in all cases; the transmission of

privilege information is what matters, not the medium through which it is conveyed." Reyes, 239

F.R.D. at 604 (concluding that attorney-client and work-product privileges were waived by

voluntary disclosures to the government).

'The terms of the California Plea Agreement and the Texas Plea Bargain Agreement suggest

that Mr. Ferrer has made statements to law enforcement officers and prosecutors in those states (see

Exs. E, F), which may have involved revelation of privileged information.

Defendants have asserted that the language of the Proffer/Interview Agreement on Mr.

Ferrer's waiver is clear. Mr. Ferrer agreed to waive privilege as to all communications "in his

personal or official capacity' as C.E.O. of Backpage. (Ex. C. ~ 2.) However, the goverrunent insists

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that this waiver was limited to Mr. Ferrer's official capacity as C.E.O. of Backpage (see Gov't's

Repl. Mem. on Mot. to Disq. HCM, Doc.192 at 8), and that, even ifthe Proffer/Interview Agreement

could be interpreted as effecting a waiver of conununications made in his personal capacity, "[t]his

topic has never been broached during Ferrer's proffer sessions [and] [a]ccordingly, nothing has been

waived" (see id.). Neither Mr. Lacey nor ttus Court is required to accept the government's

description of the scope of the waiver that has been effected. "Our system of criminal justice relies

on an adversary system to help ensure t11at justice will be done." Soto-Zuniga, 837 F.3d at 1000

(reversing conviction because district court denied discovery on a suppression motion thereby

making its decision on suppression while "blindfolded, considering only one version of the

evidence"). As a matter of fundamental fairness, Mr. Lacey should be given discovery on all

statements Mr. Ferrer made to the government and documents provided to determine whether any

of his communications remain subject privilege such that DWT and HCM, counsel of choice for

Mr. Lacey, must be disqualified under E.R. 1.9. Discovery should not be withheld when a

defendant's constitutional rights are implicated.

Further, the government provided this Court with a declaration from Mr. Ferrer in connection

with its Reply on its Motion to Disqualify which underscores the need for discovery on Mr. Ferrer's

statements to the government. (See Ferrer Decl., Doc.193-9.) In that declaration, Mr. Ferrer asserted

that both DWT and HCM represented him in his personal capacity in addition to his official capacity

as a representative of Backpage. (See id.)5 Mr. Lacey has disputed the claim that DWT represented

Mr. Ferrer personally (see Defs.' Opp'n to Gov't's Mot. to Disq., Doc. 180 at 3-8), and intends to

oppose the goverrunent's contention that Mr. Ferrer had the authority to unilaterally waive privilege

on behalf of Backpage and related entities for all time. However, regardless of whether DWT

represented Mr. Ferrer solely in his official capacity as a representative of Backpage or additionally,

in his personal capacity as Mr. Ferrer claims, there can be no objective resolution of the extent of

5 As Mr. Lacey has explained, DWT represented Mr. Ferrer nominally, as a named

representative of Backpage, and as part of a combined representation of multiple parties pursuant

to a joint defense agreement, with each party having his own personal counsel distinct from DWT.

(See Defs.' Opp'n to the Gov't's Mot. to Disq., Doc. 180 at 3-8.)

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Mr. Ferrer's waiver without review of the doclunents which memorialize his statements to the

government. The government has indicated "that Mr. Ferrer made statements that impact the

determination of the extent of his waiver, and Mr. Lacey should have access to them to thoroughly

and effectively protect his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.

Based on the foregoing, the extent of Mr. Ferrer's waivers needs to be determined. Certain

documents suggest that he waived privilege as to all attorney-client communications (see Exs. C, D)

and has made statements to law enforcement officers or prosecutors (see Exs. E, F); however, the

government claims that the waiver is much more limited, and does not involve any information

conveyed by Mr. Ferrer in his personal capacity, and that Mr. Lacey and his co-defendants should

take the government's word for it that nothing further has been disclosed during Mr. Ferrer's proffer

sessions. To the contrary, the discovery sought in this motion is material to whether the government

has met its heavy burden in seeking disqualification and the defense is not bound by the prosecution's

claims asto the scope of Mr. Ferrer's waivers.

For all these reasons, Mr. Lacey respectfully requests an order from this Court compelling

the government to produce the following categories of documents to defendants:

• All documents evidencing corrllnunications with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District

of Arizona ("USAO") or any government authorities or third parties concerning legal

representation of Backpage and its related entities disclosed by Mr. Ferrer, his counsel, or

any other representative of Mr. Ferrer, including but not limited to FD-302 Foams;

• All documents including engagement letters, common interest or joint defense agreements

or related communications among counsel, parties or others related to joint representation or

defense of Backpage and its related entities fllat Mr. Ferrer, his counsel, ar any other

representative of Mr. Ferrer provided to, disclosed or referenced in communications with the

government;

• All notes or reports or transcripts of Mr. Ferrer's discussions with any third party, including

all government agents.

• All documents evidencing communications with the government about letters or other

communications sent to counsel, courts or any other parties about representation or putative

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conflicts of counsel, including all correspondence Mr. Ferrer, his counsel, or any other

representative of Mr. Ferrer has sent the government any exchanges of drafts or other

communications about such correspondence; and

• All documents evidencing the date when Mr. Ferrer, his counsel, or any representative of

Mr. Ferrer first had corrununications with the government related to a possible cooperation

or with the intention of exploring possible cooperation.

CONCLUSION

Because a combination of the government's disclosures and statements makes it unclear

whether any of Mr. Ferrer's communications remain subject to privilege at this time, discovery on

this issue is material and vital to Mr. Lacey's ability to exercise his Smith Amendment right to counsel

of choice. Mr. Lacey respectfully requests that this Court order the government to disclose

documents that are essential for resolution of the Government's Motion to Disqualify.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of June, 2018,

/s/ Paul J. Cambria J~.

LIl'SITZ GREEN SCIlVIE CAMBRIA LLP

Attorneys for Defendant Michael Lacey

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On June 28, 2018, a PDF version

of this document was filed with

Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF

System for filing and for Transmittal

Of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the

Following CM/ECF rebistrants:

Dominic Lanza, dominic.lanza@usdoj.gov

Kevin Rapp, kevin.rapp@usdoj.gov

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