United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-50140

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Luis Guillermo Castillo-Rubio, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:11-CR-303-2

Before King, Jones, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:

Luis Guillermo Castillo-Rubio, also known as El Pariente, was a highranking member of the notorious Juarez Cartel between 2000 and 2011. He 

was convicted of three counts of conspiracy to import marijuana, cocaine, 

and heroin and three counts of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 

the same. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846, 963, 952(a), 960(a)(1), 

960(b)(1). He received a life sentence on each count. He challenges his 

conviction and his sentence, raising six issues on appeal. We affirm.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 13, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 21-50140 Document: 00516318159 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/13/2022
No. 21-50140

2

I.

The Juarez Cartel, also known as La Linea or the Vicente CarrilloFuentes Drug Trafficking Organization, had networks of conspirators in 

Mexico and the United States trafficking drugs. In addition to corrupt law 

enforcement, military, and political contacts throughout Mexico, the cartel 

employed assassins to kill, kidnap, and torture disloyal members and rivals. 

It also formed an alliance with the Barrio Azteca, another criminal gang. The 

cartel funded its extensive payroll through a “piso,” or tax, which was a 

percentage of all the marijuana, cocaine, and heroin trafficked through its 

territory.

Collecting the piso and other drug proceeds was Castillo-Rubio’s job. 

But he was more than a bagman. For the 11-year period covered by the 

indictment, Castillo-Rubio was the point of contact between corrupt Mexican 

law enforcement and the Juarez Cartel, eventually replacing his boss and 

serving as Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes’s right-hand man. At trial, the jury heard 

testimony about how Castillo-Rubio directed the cartel’s enforcement arm, 

authorizing murders, kidnappings, car bombings, and other violent acts in 

furtherance of the drug conspiracy.

At trial, Castillo-Rubio’s defense was that he was not El Pariente. He 

argued that the seven witnesses identifying him as El Pariente were lying in 

exchange for money, reduced sentences, and immigration benefits for their 

families. The jury convicted Castillo-Rubio of all six counts, and the district 

court imposed six concurrent life sentences and concurrent five-year terms 

of supervised release. Castillo-Rubio appealed.

II.

Castillo-Rubio raises six issues challenging his conviction and 

sentence. We address each in turn.

Case: 21-50140 Document: 00516318159 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/13/2022
No. 21-50140

3

A. The Anonymous Jury

First, Castillo-Rubio contests the district court’s decision to empanel 

an anonymous jury and impose safety measures. The court’s order (1) limited 

the names of the jury members to the government and defendant’s counsel; 

(2) assigned jurors numbers and required numbers to be used throughout 

trial; (3) required both parties to return jury lists after jury selection “and 

retain no other documentation of the members of the venire panel’s names”; 

(4) limited knowledge of juror residence to “their residence zip codes”; 

(5) prohibited jurors from revealing the names and addresses of their 

employers; and (6) ordered precautionary instructions be given to jurors to 

minimize prejudice.

We review a district court’s decision to empanel an anonymous jury 

for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1426 (5th 

Cir. 1995). “[T]he use of anonymous juries will be upheld where evidence at 

trial supports the conclusion that anonymity was warranted.” Id. at 1427. We

“may refer to evidence elicited at trial, in addition to evidence presented 

before trial.” United States v. Portillo, 969 F.3d 144, 162 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. 

denied, 141 S. Ct. 1275 (2021).

Anonymous juries are “constitutional when needed to ensure against 

a serious threat to juror safety, if the courts also protect the defendants’

interest in conducting effective voir dire and maintaining the presumption of 

innocence.” Krout, 66 F.3d at 1427 (citations omitted). To assess whether 

using an anonymous jury was appropriate, we examine five factors:

(1) the defendants’ involvement in organized crime; (2) the 

defendants’ participation in a group with the capacity to harm 

jurors; (3) the defendants’ past attempts to interfere with the 

judicial process or witnesses; (4) the potential that, if 

convicted, the defendants will suffer a lengthy incarceration 

and substantial monetary penalties; and, (5) extensive publicity 

Case: 21-50140 Document: 00516318159 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/13/2022
No. 21-50140

4

that could enhance the possibility that jurors’ names would 

become public and expose them to intimidation and 

harassment.

Ibid. Our review considers the “totality of the circumstances.” United States 

v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 724 (5th Cir. 1996). “A lesser showing” on some 

factors “might be adequate where specific evidence exists linking the 

defendant to organized crime.” Krout, 66 F.3d at 1427 n.7.

The district court found that the factors supported its limited 

anonymity procedures. It reasoned that the first, second, and fourth factors 

supported those procedures, and that the third and the fifth could support 

them. We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision.

First, the indictment charged Castillo-Rubio with serving at the 

highest level of an organized criminal cartel. Trial testimony established that 

the Juarez Cartel trafficked drugs from Mexico, bribed law enforcement, 

military, and political officials, and employed assassins to kidnap, torture, 

and murder those in their way. Castillo-Rubio eventually gained control of 

the cartel’s operations in Chihuahua and directed ranking cartel members 

within his territory. This evidence specifically linked Castillo-Rubio to 

organized crime, satisfying the first factor. See Portillo, 969 F.3d at 162-63.

Moreover, the cartel’s notorious propensity to use violence to maintain its 

drug trafficking operation amply supports the district court’s finding that the 

cartel “has a well-known capacity to harm others,” thus satisfying the second 

factor. And the fourth factor, the potential for a lengthy sentence and large 

monetary penalties, “was easily met here” given that Castillo-Rubio faced 

and received six life sentences. See id. at 163.

As to the other factors, the district court did not abuse its discretion 

by concluding that the cartel’s bribes to law enforcement, military, and 

political officials demonstrated past attempts to interfere with the judicial 

process. See ibid. For example, testimony that a Mexican military Humvee 

Case: 21-50140 Document: 00516318159 Page: 4 Date Filed: 05/13/2022
No. 21-50140

5

with a manned machine gun crossed the Texas-Mexico border and prevented 

United States law enforcement from seizing a drug runner established that 

the Juarez Cartel would resort to violence on American soil to further its 

goals.

Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by concluding the trial 

might have drawn extensive media interest. While Castillo-Rubio argues that 

there was no actual media attention at trial, testimony about the cartels’ war 

was expected to draw media interest, and two drug seizures involved

Mexican military incursions into the United States. As the government 

correctly argues, “the potential for publicity was not fanciful.” The ultimate 

lack of media coverage does not outweigh the other factors supporting the 

district court’s decision, particularly given the lesser showing that is required 

given the evidence linking Castillo-Rubio to organized crime. See Krout, 66 

F.3d at 1427 & n.7; see also United States v. Herrera, 466 F. App’x 409, 424 

(5th Cir. 2012) (upholding anonymous jury procedures where all factors save

the third were met).

Castillo-Rubio’s argument challenging the implementation of the 

anonymity procedures also fails. In similar situations, we have found the 

defendant’s inability to fully question panelists about their family’s 

employers and the court’s failure to explain the use of anonymity procedures 

were insignificant. See Krout, 66 F.3d at 1426. Here, the record likewise 

shows the district court’s anonymity procedures balanced the protection of 

the jury with Castillo-Rubio’s rights. Castillo-Rubio has therefore failed to 

demonstrate an abuse of discretion. See id. at 1426-28.

B. Extraneous Offense Evidence

Castillo-Rubio contends the district court erred in allowing testimony 

that linked him to crimes outside the indictment. As he concedes, our review

is for plain error. See United States v. Ceballos, 789 F.3d 607, 617 (5th Cir. 

Case: 21-50140 Document: 00516318159 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/13/2022
No. 21-50140

6

2015). When the challenged evidence is “intrinsic” to the offenses charged, 

the limitations in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) on admission of 

extraneous offense evidence do not apply, and the evidence is generally 

admissible. United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 2005).

Castillo-Rubio complains that Jose Acosta-Hernandez was permitted 

to testify that the Juarez Cartel had killed 1,500 people, that AcostaHernandez had killed people while working for the cartel, that he was present 

when people were being tortured, and that the Barrios Aztecas also 

committed murders. Despite Castillo-Rubio’s assertion that no evidence 

linked him to these crimes, there was ample evidence that the Juarez Cartel 

employed networks of assassins and formed an alliance with the Barrios 

Aztecas, all to further the drug conspiracy. Acts committed in furtherance of 

the charged conspiracy are themselves part of the act charged, not “other 

acts” within the meaning of Rule 404(b). United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 

682 (5th Cir. 1997).

Next, Castillo-Rubio complains about Irvin Enriquez’s testimony 

describing the war between the Juarez Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel 

culminating in the notorious “wedding murders.” But this testimony showed 

the immediate context of Castillo-Rubio’s actions—here, ordering 

murders—in furtherance of the charged conspiracy. See United States v. 

Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 175 (5th Cir. 1998). There was no error in 

allowing the testimony, plain or otherwise.

C. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Castillo-Rubio claims two types of prosecutorial misconduct: leading 

questions asked by the prosecutor throughout trial, and specific questions 

that he contends were intended to elicit a hearsay response. Because CastilloRubio did not object to any of these questions during trial, our review is for 

plain error. United States v. Williams, 620 F.3d 483, 488-89 (5th Cir. 2010).

Case: 21-50140 Document: 00516318159 Page: 6 Date Filed: 05/13/2022
No. 21-50140

7

As to the first claimed error, although the prosecutor repeatedly asked 

leading questions, Castillo-Rubio has not shown that such questioning “cast 

serious doubt on the jury’s guilty verdict.” United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 

320, 338 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

As to the second claimed error, Castillo-Rubio complains about 

hearsay testimony from six witnesses: (1) DEA Agent Omar Arrellano, (2) El 

Paso Police Officer Sal Silex, (3) Border Patrol Agent Juan Espino, (4) Border 

Patrol Agent Oscar Pinon, (5) Hudspeth County Deputy Sheriff Joe 

Tamman, and (6) DEA Agent Todd Brackhahn.

As to the first four witnesses, even assuming they testified to 

impermissible hearsay, Castillo-Rubio does not argue or attempt to 

demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for their testimony, the jury 

would have acquitted him. See United States v. Oti, 872 F.3d 678, 693 (5th 

Cir. 2017). He therefore fails to show that any error affected his substantial 

rights. See Williams, 620 F.3d at 488-89. Deputy Sheriff Tamman’s 

testimony described how he eventually located the drug-running SUVs and 

why the officers were conducting surveillance. But his testimony was not 

offered to prove that the SUVs drove a specific route and did not directly 

inculpate Castillo-Rubio. Because this testimony was not offered to prove the 

truth of the matter asserted, there was no error in admitting it, plain or 

otherwise. See United States v. Kizzee, 877 F.3d 650, 656 (5th Cir. 2017). 

Lastly, Agent Brackhahn’s testimony was cumulative of other testimony

(Hector Lopez’s) and so could not constitute reversible error. See United 

States v. Hall, 500 F.3d 439, 444 (5th Cir. 2007). Nor did Brackhahn’s 

testimony violate Castillo-Rubio’s rights under the Confrontation Clause 

because Lopez testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. See 

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004).

Case: 21-50140 Document: 00516318159 Page: 7 Date Filed: 05/13/2022
No. 21-50140

8

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

We do not consider Castillo-Rubio’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims. As is usually the case, the record is not sufficiently developed to allow 

us to assess trial counsel’s conduct, whether any claimed deficiencies were

permissible trial strategy, or whether they affected the outcome. See United 

States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014). As for his claim that counsel 

failed to file objections to the presentence report, the record is also not 

sufficiently developed. See ibid. We therefore decline to consider these claims 

without prejudice to collateral review.

E. Procedural Reasonableness

Castillo-Rubio contends for the first time on appeal that his sentence 

is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately 

explain the sentence and failed to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors by 

not addressing his arguments for a variance. But even assuming arguendo that 

there was plain error, Castillo-Rubio cannot show any effect on his 

substantial rights. He has not demonstrated, and the record does not show, 

that the district court would have imposed a lower sentence had it provided 

a more thorough explanation or more specifically addressed his arguments. 

See United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 365 (5th Cir. 2009). 

And his argument that the insufficient explanation affected his substantial 

rights because it has deprived this court of meaningful appellate review is 

foreclosed by circuit precedent “so far as within-Guidelines sentences are 

concerned.” Ibid.

Castillo-Rubio’s argument in his counseled brief that the district court 

plainly erred by treating the guidelines as mandatory and presuming the 

guidelines range was reasonable is entirely conclusory and therefore waived 

as inadequately briefed. See United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 446-47 

(5th Cir. 2010).

Case: 21-50140 Document: 00516318159 Page: 8 Date Filed: 05/13/2022
No. 21-50140

9

F. Substantive Reasonableness

Finally, Castillo-Rubio challenges the substantive reasonableness of 

his sentence as “arbitrary” because it was not based on his individual 

circumstances and because the district court failed to provide a reasoned 

basis for the sentence imposed. “[W]e will presume a sentence within the 

current version of the Guidelines to be reasonable, and the defendant must 

rebut that presumption to demonstrate substantive unreasonableness.” 

Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d at 367. 

Castillo-Rubio has not rebutted the presumption of reasonableness we 

give his within-guidelines sentence. He fails to show that his sentence does 

not account for a factor that should receive significant weight, gives 

significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or represents a clear 

error of judgment in balancing sentencing factors. See United States v. Cooks, 

589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 2009). His arguments are no more than a

disagreement with the applicable guidelines range and the sentence imposed, 

which is insufficient to demonstrate that his life sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. See United States v. Ruiz, 621 F.3d 390, 398 (5th Cir. 2010). 

Castillo-Rubio has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by 

imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. See United States v. DelgadoMartinez, 564 F.3d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 2009).

III.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Case: 21-50140 Document: 00516318159 Page: 9 Date Filed: 05/13/2022