on the Enchanted Valley property and use the rents from that property to 

pay the mortgage on the White Fir property. 1 

Shortly thereafter, Logan removed the funds from the jointly 

held CD and placed the funds in an account solely in her name. After 

using a majority of the funds to pay off the mortgage on the Enchanted 

Valley property, Logan failed to return the unused funds to an account 

jointly held by both she and Walker. Later, while Walker was in the 

hospital recovering from his knee replacement and surgery on a broken 

ankle, an injury sustained while in the hospital and under heavy 

narcotics, Logan was present when Walker deeded his interest in the 

White Fir property to Logan. Upon discovery of the transfer of his interest 

in the property, Walker reported Logan's actions to the police. At trial, 

Walker testified he had no recollection of agreeing to give his interest in 

the White Fir property to Logan or signing the deed in the hospital. 

Following a four-day jury trial, Logan was found guilty of two 

counts of exploitation of an older or vulnerable person. Her convictions 

stemmed from the conversion of the CD and Walker's interest in the White 

Fir property. Logan now appeals. 

'At trial, it was disputed whether Logan had the authority to use 

the entire $167,000 balance of the CD. Walker testified that Logan was 

only to use $110,000 in order to pay off the Enchanted Valley mortgage. 

In contrast, Logan testified that she also obtained Walker's permission to 

use additional funds from the CD to make certain repairs on the 

Enchanted Valley property. 

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2 
The issues on appeal are: (1) whether NRS 200.5092(2) is 

unconstitutionally vague because "normal influence" of one family member 

over another is not sufficiently defined in the context of "undue influence" 

for the purposes of establishing exploitation and (2) if NRS 200.5092(2) is 

determined to be constitutional, whether there is sufficient evidence to 

sustain the conviction. 2 

Constitutionality of NRS 200.5092 

As a preliminary matter, although the majority of Logan's 

arguments focus on the alleged unconstitutionality of NRS 200.5092(2)(a), 

we do not need to reach that issue. "It is well settled . . . that we should 

avoid considering the constitutionality of a statute unless it is absolutely 

necessary to do so." Sheriff v. Andrews,128 Nev. , 286 P.3d 262, 

263 (2012) (citing Anthony Lee R., A Minor v. State,113 Nev. 1406, 1417- 

18 n.6, 952 P.2d 1, 8 n.6 (1997) (refusing to reach a statute's 

constitutionality because principles of statutory construction resolved the 

issues)). Furthermore, in a case where multiple theories of guilt are 

presented to the jury and one is determined to be improper, we use a 

harmless-error analysis and may affirm the conviction if there is a "valid 

2Logan also argues that: (1) the district court erred in permitting the 

State to question Logan as to why the other witnesses did not tell the 

truth in their testimony; (2) the district court abused its discretion in 

precluding Logan from questioning Walker's attorney about the 

settlement amount requested in Walker's civil action against Logan; and 

(3) cumulative error warrants reversal of the judgment of conviction. We 

have reviewed these remaining contentions and conclude that they are 

without merit. 

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alternative basis upon which to rest a verdict." Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 

1013, 1025-26, 195 P.3d 315, 323 (2008). "[S]o long as the error at issue 

does not categorically `vitiat[e] all the jury's findings,' the error may be 

deemed harmless. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 61 (2008) (alteration 

in original) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 11 (1999)). 

In this case, the State presented two theories of guilt for the 

jury's consideration. One theory, based on NRS 200.5092(2)(a), is the 

basis for Logan's constitutional challenge—that Logan obtained control of 

Walker's property through undue influence. The second theory, based on 

NRS 200.5092(2)(b), is that Logan simply converted Walker's property. 3 

Even if the first theory of liability was unconstitutionally vague, the 

second theory of liability, which is not unconstitutionally vague, could be a 

valid basis for the jury's verdict convicting Logan pursuant to NRS 

200.5092(2). See Cortinas, 124 Nev. at 1025-26, 195 P.3d at 323. Because 

3In her opening brief, Logan argues that the unconstitutional 

portions of NRS 200.5092(2) deal with the vagueness of the words "undue 

influence" and "normal influence," neither of which are found in 

subsection (b). Only after the State submitted its opposition did Logan 

then contend that the unconstitutionally vague portions of the statute 

included the words "trust and confidence," as they appear prior to the 

subsections, which could then be applied to the conversion described in 

subsection (b). Because the conversion subsection was raised for the first 

time in Logan's reply brief, we conclude that any challenge to the 

constitutionality of subsection (b) is waived. See Weaver v. State, Dep't of 

Motor Vehicles, 121 Nev. 494, 502, 117 P.3d 193, 198-99 (2005) (stating 

that this court need not consider issues raised for the first time in an 

appellant's reply brief); NRAP 28(c). 

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the second theory of liability is valid, we decline to reach the 

constitutionality of NRS 200.5092(2). See Andrews, 128 Nev. at , 286 

P.3d at 263. 

Sufficiency of the evidence 

Logan contends that we should apply the rule of lenity and 

interpret NRS 200.5092(2) to require a defendant to use "criminal 

means[,] such as obtaining money under false pretenses, coercion, forgery, 

stalking or the like," in order to be convicted of exploitation under NRS 

200.5092(2) (emphasis omitted). 4She then states that because there was 

no evidence of the required criminal activity, the State did not prove each 

element of the crime and therefore the conviction cannot stand. The State 

responds by arguing that such an interpretation is unreasonable because 

the Legislature would not have enacted a new statute to criminalize 

actions that were already prohibited. 

Standard of review 

In order to determine "whether a verdict was based on 

sufficient evidence to meet due process requirements, [we] will inquire 

'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

4The rule of lenity requires that "'ambiguities in criminal statutes be 

liberally interpreted in the accused's favor." State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 

 , 249 P.3d 1226, 1230 (2011) (quoting Moore v. State, 122 Nev. 27, 

32, 126 P.3d 508, 511 (2006)). This rule, however, only applies to statutes 

‘'when other statutory interpretation methods, including the plain 

language, legislative history, reason, and public policy, have failed to 

resolve a penal statute's ambiguity." Id. NRS 200.5092(2) can be fully 

interpreted by considering its plain meaning. Therefore, we need not 

apply the rule of lenity in this case. 

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elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Mitchell v. State, 124 

Nev. 807, 816, 192 P.3d 721, 727 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Koza v. State, 100 Nev. 245, 250, 681 P.2d 44, 47 (1984)); see also Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We will not "reweigh the evidence or 

evaluate the credibility of witnesses because that is the responsibility of 

the trier of fact." Mitchell, 124 Nev. at 816, 192 P.3d at 727. 

There was sufficient evidence to support Logan's conviction 

The interpretation that Logan proposes that this court adopt 

is unreasonable and would create an absurd result. See Sheriff v. 

Burcham, 124 Nev. 1247, 1253, 198 P.3d 326, 329 (2008) (noting that an 

absurd result should always be avoided). Logan contends that in order to 

satisfy the elements of the crime of exploitation, as defined in NRS 

200.5092(2), the defendant must first be shown to have committed a 

separate crime. That is to say, Logan contends it is not enough for the 

state to show that the defendant has acted in a way to "[o]btain control, 

through deception, intimidation or undue influence . . . or . . . [to] [c]onvert 

money, assets or property of the older person or vulnerable person with 

the intention of permanently depriving [them] of the ownership, use, 

benefit or possession of his or her money, assets or property." NRS 

200.5092(2). 

Logan's interpretation, requiring that a defendant be first 

found guilty of some other theft crime before being able to be convicted of 

exploitation, ignores the plain language of the statute and creates an 

absurd result. See Burcham, 124 Nev. at 1253, 198 P.3d at 329. Further, 

it is presumed that by enacting a new statute, the Legislature seeks to 

substantially change the law. Cf. State v. Weddell, 118 Nev. 206, 213, 43 

P.3d 987, 991 (2002) ("When a statute is repealed, [the court] presume[s] 

6 
that the legislature intended a substantial change in the law."). At the 

time that the Legislature enacted NRS 200.5092(2) to prevent elder abuse, 

theft crimes were already in effect. Thus, by giving the statute Logan's 

interpretation, no new conduct would be prohibited and, as a result, no 

substantial change to the law would have occurred. We therefore review 

Logan's verdict to determine whether substantial evidence supported the 

State's second theory of guilt. 

In order to prove Logan guilty under its conversion theory, the 

State was required to prove the six elements of the crime, as listed in Jury 

Instruction No. 25: 

1. That Harold Walker was, at the time of the 

offense, an older person or a vulnerable 

person; 

2. that Yvonne Logan did obtain the trust and 

confidence of Harold Walker; 

3. that Yvonne Logan did any . . . act to 

convert[ ] 

4. Harold Walker's money, assets or property 

5. with the intention of permanently depriving 

Harold Walker of the ownership, use, benefit 

or possession of his money, assets or 

property[ ] 

6. in Washoe County, Nevada. 

Clearly, a rational trier of fact could have easily found beyond 

a reasonable doubt that the State had proved that: (1) Walker was an 

older person, as anyone 60 years of age or older is considered an "[o]lder 

person," NRS 200.5092(5); (2) Logan had Walker's trust and confidence, as 

both Logan and Walker testified that they had a very close and loving 

relationship up until the time that Walker went to live with his son; (3) 

the property illegally obtained by Logan from Walker was in Washoe 

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County, as the two properties are in Reno, and the CD was held in a Reno 

branch of Umpqua Bank; and (4) the White Fir property and the CD were 

money, assets, or property that originally belonged to Walker. 

The only two elements that are at issue are (1) whether Logan 

"did any act to obtain control, through deception, intimidation or undue 

influence AND/OR did any act to convert" and (2) whether she did so "with 

the intention of permanently depriving Harold Walker of the ownership, 

use, benefit or possession of his money, assets or property." 

First, as to conversion, the jury heard evidence that Walker's 

entire interest in the White Fir property was transferred to Logan, such 

that Walker retained no control over an asset that was originally his. 

Further, the evidence demonstrated that Logan withdrew the entire 

$167,000 balance of Walker's CD, spent the majority of it on the 

Enchanted Valley property, and then deposited the remaining amount into 

an account bearing only her name. Thus, Walker also lost all control of 

the CD's remaining funds. This evidence is sufficient to support the 

element of conversion. 

Turning now to the final element—the intent to permanently 

deprive. As to the White Fir property, the jury could have rationally found 

that the fact the deed transferred all of Walker's interest to Logan was 

circumstantial evidence of Logan's intent to permanently deprive Walker 

of his interest in the property. See Bolden v. State, 121 Nev. 908, 912, 124 

P.3d 191, 194 (2005) (concluding that a conviction may be rendered on 

solely circumstantial evidence), overruled on other grounds by Cortinas, 

124 Nev. 1013, 195 P.3d 315. The intent element of proving permanent 

deprivation was demonstrated by evidence that Logan sought Walker's 

cooperation with the property interest transfer while Walker was on heavy 

8 
narcotic pain medication that likely caused him to be temporarily unable 

to make significant legal decisions. Additionally, evidence was presented 

that Logan was good friends with the loan officer—implying that it was 

possible that the loan officer assisted Logan in her plan to convert 

Walker's interest in the White Fir property. It was within the purview of 

the jury to weigh the evidence in a way that favored Walker. See Estes v. 

State, 122 Nev. 1123, 1144, 146 P.3d 1114, 1128 (2006) (it is within the 

province of the jury to weigh the evidence and make credibility 

determinations). 

Similarly, Logan's decision to place the remainder of the CD, 

after paying off the Enchanted Valley property, into a bank account 

bearing only her name could also be circumstantial evidence of her intent 

to deprive Walker of those assets because there were still several available 

accounts bearing both Walker and Logan's names into which she could 

have deposited the remaining funds. See Bolden, 121 Nev. at 912, 124 

P.3d at 194. Further, if the jury weighed Walker's testimony higher than 

Logan's and found that Walker never intended that Logan use more than 

$110,000 to pay off the Enchanted Valley property, her use of excess 

amounts exhibits an intent to permanently deprive Walker of his money. 

Thus, weighing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, 

there was sufficient evidence presented that would allow a jury to find 

Logan guilty. See Mitchell, 124 Nev. at 816, 192 P.3d at 727. 

Independently, Logan's actions may not have risen to the level 

of criminal conduct but, looking at all of the transactions as a whole, a 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

9 
C.J. 

Pickering 

Gibbons 

J. 

Parraguirre 

Douglas 

C1\.1iLf'1 

J. 

J. 

J. 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, we conclude that there was 

sufficient evidence to support the verdict. 

We therefore, 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 5 

/ , J. 

Hardesty 

Saitta 

5We have reviewed Logan's remaining contentions and determine 

that they are without merit. 

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cc: Second Judicial District Court Dept. 8 

Richard F. Cornell 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Washoe County District Attorney 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

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