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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Greg Jarman,

Plaintiff,

v. 

American Family Insurance Company,

Defendant.

No. CV-18-00526-PHX-SMB

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Greg Jarman’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, 

Non-Taxable Expenses, and Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest. (Doc. 219.) Defendant, 

American Family Insurance Company (“American Family”), responded, (Doc. 224), and 

Plaintiff replied. (Doc. 227.) The Court has considered the pleadings and attached exhibits

and now issues this order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff files this motion after obtaining a $4.5 million jury verdict against 

American Family for insurance bad faith on September 4, 2020 after a seven-day trial. The 

verdict consisted of a $300,000 award for Plaintiff’s future medical needs and $4.2 million 

for Plaintiff’s pain and suffering. (Doc. 207.) The Court has since remitted the jury’s pain 

and suffering verdict to $2.5 million.1(Doc. 240.) Plaintiff accepted the remitter on April 

23, 2021. (Doc. 243.) Plaintiff has now brought this motion seeking $1,042,535 in 

attorneys’ fees and $74,008.24 in costs and expenses. (Doc. 219 at 14.) The motion seeks 

1 The total verdict, after remittitur, is $2.8 million. 

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attorneys’ fees on behalf of Mr. Chami, Mr. Shah, and Ms. Gerardy all of whom

represented the Plaintiff during this litigation and at trial. (Id. at 4.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. A.R.S. § 12-341.01

A federal court sitting in diversity applies state law in deciding whether to allow 

attorneys' fees because state laws regarding attorneys' fees are generally considered 

substantive law. Northon v. Rule, 637 F.3d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 2011). A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) 

allows courts to award the successful party its reasonable attorneys’ fees in any action 

arising out of breach of contract. An action alleging insurance bad faith is one “arising out 

of contract” withing the meaning of A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A). Sparks v. Republic Nat. Life 

Ins. Co., 647 P.2d 1127, 1142 (Ariz. 1982); Lange v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 

1175, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that the Arizona Supreme Court has upheld fee 

awards under A.R.S. § 12-341.01). Such an award “‘may not exceed the amount paid or 

agreed to be paid’” from the client to the attorney in the applicable fee agreement.

Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 694 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Ariz. 1985) (citing A.R.S. § 12-

341.01(B)). Useful factors to assist the trial judge in determining whether attorneys’ fees 

should be granted under the statute are:

1. The merits of the claim or defense presented by the unsuccessful party. 

2. The litigation could have been avoided or settled and the successful party’s 

efforts were completely superfluous in achieving the result.

3. Assessing fees against the unsuccessful party would cause an extreme 

hardship.

4. The successful party did not prevail with respect to all of the relief sought. 

5. The novelty of the legal question presented, and whether such claim or 

defense had previously been adjudicated in this jurisdiction. 

6. Whether the award in any particular case would discourage other parties 

with tenable claims or defenses from litigating or defending legitimate 

contract issues for fear of incurring liability for substantial amounts of 

attorney’s fees.

Associated Indem., 694 P.2d at 1184.

B. Lodestar Method

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A district court must calculate awards for attorneys’ fees using the “lodestar” 

method. Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2001); 

Defenbaugh v. JBC & Assocs. PC, No. 04-16866, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 19930, at *2-*3

(9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2006). “The ‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the number of hours 

the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.”

Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). “A 

district court should exclude from the lodestar amount hours that are not reasonably 

expended because they are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’” Van Gerwen 

v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hensley v. 

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). 

“Although in most cases, the lodestar figure is presumptively a reasonable fee 

award, the district court may, if circumstances warrant, adjust the lodestar to account for 

other factors which are not subsumed within it.” Ferland, 244 F.3d at 1149, n. 4. Thus, the 

district court may adjust the “lodestar” figure upward or downward taking into 

consideration twelve “reasonableness” factors:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions 

involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the 

preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, 

(5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time 

limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount 

involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability 

of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and 

length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in 

similar cases.

Evon, 688 F.3d at 1033 (quoting Morales, 96 F.3d at 363 n. 8). Because the lodestar amount 

is presumptively reasonable, an adjustment of the amount upward or downward should 

only occur in “‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ cases, supported by both ‘specific evidence’ on the 

record and detailed findings’...that the lodestar amount is unreasonably low or 

unreasonably high.” Van Gerwen, 214 F.3d at 1045 (citing Pennsylvania v. Delaware 

Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 

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465 U.S. 886 (1984)); Blum, 465 U.S. at 897; D'Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 

904 F.2d 1379, 1384, 1386 (9th Cir. 1990); Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 

F.2d 481, 487 (9th Cir. 1989)). When calculating fee award, the Court has an obligation 

“to articulate...the reasons for its findings regarding the propriety of the hours claimed or 

for any adjustments it makes either to the prevailing party's claimed hours or to the 

lodestar.” Ferland, 244 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 

(9th Cir. 1992)).

III. DISCUSSION

American Family argues that the Court should deny Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Attorneys’ Fees for three reasons: “(1) this Court’s Rule 54.2 bars the hearing of his 

motion, as he filed it without first attempting to confer about the reasonableness of his fees; 

(2) Mr. Jarman should not be entitled to fees in the first place; and (3) the amount of fees 

he seeks is excessive.” (Doc. 224 at 1.) The Court will address each of these arguments in 

turn. 

A. Failure to Comply with LRCiv 54.2

American Family first argues that the Court should deny Plaintiff’s fee application 

because Plaintiff failed to comply with LRCiv 54.2. Rule 54.2(d)(1), LRCiv, provides that 

“No motion for award of attorneys’ fees will be considered unless a separate statement of 

the moving counsel is attached to the supporting memorandum certifying that, after 

personal consultation and good faith efforts to do so, the parties have been unable to 

satisfactorily resolve all disputed issues relating to attorneys’ fees...” American Family 

urges the Court to deny Plaintiff’s motion, arguing, “Mr. Jarman’s counsel did not attempt 

to confer with American Family’s counsel at any time before filing the Application, nor 

does the Application claim that they did.” (Doc. 224 at 2.) In his reply, Plaintiff argues that 

he can “cure the inadvertent defect” and attaches an email conversation between himself 

and American Family’s in-house counsel, Chuck Ledbetter, where Plaintiff offered 

American Family a post-verdict settlement of $5.15 million, inclusive of attorneys’ fees. 

(Doc. 227 at 1, Ex. 1.) 

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While American Family cites cases where courts have denied motions for attorneys’ 

fees due to the lack of compliance with LRCiv 54.2(d)(1), Plaintiff cites cases where courts 

have overlooked the offense. The requirements of LRCiv 54.2 “are not advisory, but 

mandatory.” Societe Civile Succession Richard Guino v. Beseder Inc., No. CV 0301310-

PHX-MHM, 2007 WL 3238703, at *7 (D. Ariz. Oct. 31, 2007). However, “[c]ourts in this 

district may overlook such procedural shortcomings at their discretion, especially when 

doing so would not prejudice a defendant.” Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrocchi, No. CV 

05-2656-PHX-MHM, 2011 WL 1004945, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 22, 2011) (citing Hoskins 

v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CV-06-1475-PHX-FJM, 2008 WL 2328741, at *2 (D. Ariz. 

June 4, 2008)); In re Arb. Proceeding Between: Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 

No. CV-15-00671-PHX-PGR, 2016 WL 3951740, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 22, 2016) (“the 

Court concludes that an appropriate sanction for John Deere's failure to comply with Rule 

54.2(d)(1) is to deny its request for $2,002.00 in attorneys' fees it incurred in filing its fee 

application.”). 

Here, there is no question that Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of 

Rule 54.2(d)(1). Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to remedy this failure by attaching emails to 

his reply in which Plaintiff’s counsel discussed settlement with American Family’s inhouse counsel. (Doc. 227-1.) The emails do not satisfy the requirements of LRCiv 

54.2(d)(1). First, the rule requires personal consultation. LRCiv 54.2(d)(1) (emphasis 

added). “Personal consultation means personal contact, such as occurs in person, face-toface, or on the telephone, not communication by letters, faxes or emails.” Shupe v. Kroger 

Co., No. CV-17-00496-TUC-DCB, 2018 WL 9708467, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 6, 2018); see 

also Sandpiper Resorts Dev. Corp. v. Glob. Realty Invs., LLC, No. 2:08-CV-01360 JWS, 

2012 WL 2009965, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 5, 2012) (finding emails do not satisfy the 

requirement of personal consultation); Bustamante v. Graco, Inc., No. CV03-

182TUCJMR, 2005 WL 5976149, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 1, 2005) (“‘[P]ersonal consultation 

and sincere efforts’ require more than written correspondence; it requires in-person or 

telephonic consultation.” (citing Hunter v. Moran, 128 F.R.D. 115, 116 (D. Nev. 1989))). 

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Second, the rule requires the parties to discuss issues surrounding attorney’s fees, not 

settlement generally. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to comply with 

LRCiv 54.2(d)(1). While the Court will suspend the rule in this instance,2it will subtract 

Plaintiff’s proposed fee award for his preparation of the fee application as consequence of 

this failure (16.3 hours billed by Mr. Chami) and will decline to award any future fees for 

Plaintiff’s reply. 

American Family also points out that Plaintiff failed to attach his fee agreement to 

his fee application. (Doc. 224 at 3.) However, Plaintiff cured that defect when he produced 

the fee agreement in response to an order from this Court. (Doc. 241 (order); Doc. 242 

(notice and fee agreement).)

B. Plaintiff’s Entitlement to Fees Under A.R.S. § 12-341.01

American Family argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to fees under A.R.S. § 12-

341.01 for several reasons. First, American Family points out that, under A.R.S. § 12-

341.01, an attorney’s fee award “may not exceed the amount paid or agreed to be paid” by 

the client. However, because Plaintiff failed to attach the fee agreement to his motion, 

American Family contends that the Court cannot determine this amount.3(Doc. 224 at 4.) 

Second, American Family argues that Plaintiff waived any argument that his case merits 

an award of attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 341.01 by failing to argue or even cite the 

Associated Indemnity factors. See Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 694 P.2d 1181, 1184 

(1985). Third, American Family argues that the factors under Associated Indemnity do not 

2 The Court, under LRCiv 83.6, may exercise discretion to suspend the Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure in this district when appropriate. See In re Arb. Proceeding Between: Scottsdale 

Ins. Co. v. John Deere Ins. Co., No. CV-15-00671-PHX-PGR, 2016 WL 3951740, at *1 

(D. Ariz. July 22, 2016) (awarding attorneys’ fees despite non-compliance with LRCiv 

54.2(d) pursuant to LRCiv 83.6 and deciding that an appropriate sanction was denying 

request for attorneys’ fees incurred from preparing the application for attorneys’ fees); see 

also Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrocchi, No. CV 05-2656-PHX-MHM, 2011 WL 

1004945 (D. Ariz. Mar. 22, 2011) (calling the failure to comply with LRCiv 54.2(d) 

“regrettable and sloppy” but nonetheless awarding attorneys’ fees). 

3 As the Court states above, this defect was cured by the production of the fee agreement 

in response to this Court’s order. 

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weigh in Plaintiff’s favor. (Doc. 224 at 5.)

1. The Amount Agreed to be Paid by Plaintiff

Plaintiff agreed to a contingency fee of forty percent (40%) of “the gross amount 

collected or recovered (‘gross amount collected’ means the amount collected before any 

subtraction of expenses and disbursements).” (Doc. 242-1.) Forty percent of the $2.8 

million remitted verdict is $1,020,000. Thus, Plaintiff’s fee award cannot exceed this 

amount. 

2. Plaintiff’s Failure to Argue Associated Indemnity Factors

American Family next argue that Plaintiff “waived any argument that he deserves 

the fees under Associated Indemnity and its factors by failing to cite the case or the factors 

and failing to argue the point.” (Doc. 224 at 5.) A district court need not consider arguments 

not raised in a movant’s motion and raised for the first time in a reply brief. Zamani v. 

Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007). Nonetheless, the Court, in its discretion, will 

consider the Associated Indemnity factors relying on the facts of this case and on American 

Family’s arguments. 

3. Associated Indemnity Analysis

American Family argues that even if the Court does consider the Associated 

Indemnity factors, the factors weigh in favor of denying Plaintiff’s fee application. 

Specifically, American Family argues that factors 1, 4, 5, and 6 weigh against granting 

attorneys’ fees.

As to the first factor of the analysis, whether the merits of the unsuccessful party’s 

claim was meritorious, American Family argues that its defense had merit. See Tucson 

Ests. Prop. Owners Ass’n v. McGovern, 366 P.3d 111, 115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) 

(upholding the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees because the merits of the case were 

“equally balanced”). American Family further points out that it successfully defended 

against Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim. While American Family’s defense did have 

some merit, as explained in the Court’s order denying American Family’s Renewed Motion 

for Judgment as a matter of law, the evidence properly supported the jury’s verdict that 

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American Family engaged in insurance bad faith. (Doc. 240.) The Court finds this factor 

neither weighs for or against awarding fees in this case.

American Family does not address the second factor, whether the litigation could 

have been avoided or settled and the successful party’s efforts were completely superfluous 

in achieving the result. As Plaintiff mentions in his reply, Plaintiff’s fee application 

highlights that the parties participated in mediation and that the parties could not come to 

terms. (Doc. 219 at 7.) The Court is not familiar with the reasonableness of each parties’

position during settlement and will not speculate whether the claim could have been settled 

for a reasonable amount.

American Family also does not submit an argument on the third factor, whether 

assessing fees against the unsuccessful party would cause an extreme hardship. The Court 

can reasonably assume that assessing fees against American Family would not be a 

hardship. 

As to the fourth claim, whether the successful party did or did not prevail with 

respect to all of the relief sought, American Family argues that Mr. Jarman’s claims for 

intentional infliction of emotion distress and punitive damages failed. In addition, 

American Family highlights the fact that Plaintiff asked the jury for $11,200,000 in 

damages but only was awarded $4,500,000. While these are true statements, this seems to 

be a case where Plaintiff aimed for the moon and landed among the stars with the ultimate 

damages award. While he did not receive everything he asked for in the verdict, the jury’s 

award nonetheless was exceptionally high. Further, the verdict was based solely on 

Plaintiff’s bad faith claim which was the claim that sounded in contract.

The fifth Associated Indemnity factor asks whether the legal questions presented 

were novel and whether such claim or defense had previously been adjudicated in this 

jurisdiction. American Family argues that bad faith in the delay or denial of medical 

authorization causing injury is “widely” litigated in Arizona. This is true. Bad faith 

insurance claims are often litigated in Arizona. 

Lastly, as to the sixth factor, whether the award in any particular case would 

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discourage other parties with tenable claims or defenses from litigating or defending 

legitimate contract issues for fear of incurring liability for substantial amounts of attorney’s 

fees, American Family argues that this case would negatively impact bad faith litigation if 

fees were awarded. The Court does not accept American Family’s argument. The evidence 

at trial was sufficient for a jury to find that the insurer engaged in bad faith. (Doc. 240.) 

Accordingly, while it will have some deterrent effect for insurers, it is not because the 

evidence did not support liability on the claim. 

On the balance, the Court finds that the Associated Indemnity factors weigh in favor 

of awarding attorneys’ fees in this case. Accordingly, the Court will, in its discretion, award 

fees. 

C. The Amount of Fees under the Lodestar Method

American Family argues that even if the Court decides to award fees, “it should 

deny fees anyway because “the Application seeks a manifestly unreasonable amount of 

fees in a manifestly unreasonable way.” (Doc. 224 at 8.) American Family accuses Plaintiff 

of dumping a mound of paperwork on the Court for it to determine what is reasonable. The 

Court agrees that Plaintiff has engaged in a paper dump. Nonetheless, the Court will 

attempt to wade through the documents. 

1. Block Billing

American Family first takes exception with Plaintiff’s counsel’s practice of block 

billing. The practice of block billing violates Local Rule 54.2(e). Lexington Ins. Co. v. Scott 

Homes Multifamily Inc., No. CV-12-02119-PHX-JAT, 2016 WL 5118316, at *18 (D. Ariz. 

Sept. 21, 2016) (reducing the fee awarded for a block billed entry by 20%). “While not 

forbidden by caselaw, block-billing makes it nearly impossible for the Court to determine 

the reasonableness of the hours spent on each task.” Med. Protective Co. v. Pang, 25 F. 

Supp. 3d 1232, 1247 (D. Ariz. 2014) (stating the court would reduce the award accordingly 

where it could not distinguish between the times claimed for various tasks and subtracting 

33.7 hours from the lodestar calculation). 

Here, worse block billing practices can hardly be imagined. In a single entry titled 

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“trial prep” which includes at least three tasks, Mr. Shah records 201 hours from August 

12, 2020 to August 24, 2020, requesting a total of $100,500 in fees for this single entry. 

(Doc. 219-4 at 8.) On the next line, Mr. Shah includes an entry simply labeled “Trial –

includes after trial review of daily transcripts/preparing.” (Id.) For this single entry, Mr. 

Shah records 151 hours. (Id.) This is clearly an egregious example of block billing, leaving 

the Court unable to determine how much time was spent on specific tasks subsumed within 

each entry. Mr. Shah has essentially credited himself with an average of 15.5 hours per day 

for 13 straight days for “trial prep.” For trial, Mr. Shah credits himself with an average of 

13.7 hours per day billed for eleven straight days. These entries clearly run afoul of Rule 

54.2(e) of the local rules. This kind of egregious block billing is simply unacceptable. 

Therefore, the Court will reduce both entries. For Mr. Shah’s entry related to trial prep, the 

Court will reduce the entry to give Mr. Shah credit for 8 hours billed per day, which totals 

104 hours when multiplied by 13 days. For the 11 days of trial, the Court will give Mr. 

Shah credit for 11 hours per day, which reduces the total time spent at trial to 121 hours. 

This will reduce the total hours included in Mr. Shah’s fee award to 569.

4

2. Reasonableness of Time Spent for Support Staff

American Family next takes exception with Plaintiff’s failure to attach an affidavit 

for fees requested for Florence Lirato, James Dey, and Mallory Kay Crow. Local Rule 

54.2(d)(4) requires a fee application to be accompanied by an “affidavit of moving 

counsel” which sets forth (A) the background of each attorney for whom fees are claimed, 

(B) the reasonableness of the rate, and (C) the reasonableness of time spent and expenses 

incurred. LRCiv 54.2(d)(4). American Family points out that while Plaintiff attached such 

an affidavit for each of the three attorneys who worked on Plaintiff’s case, he failed to do 

so for each of the three support staff. Plaintiff states for the first time in his reply what the 

roles of the three individuals are. (Doc. 227 at 8.) Apparently two are paralegals and one is 

a law clerk, facts that are not listed anywhere else in Plaintiff’s pleadings or supporting 

4 Although American Family takes exception with several earlier entries from Mr. Shah

and Mr. Chami, the Court does not find the cited entries problematic enough to address.

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documents. Plaintiff argues that an affidavit is only required for attorneys under this rule.

American Family also argues that some of the tasks listed in Plaintiff’s fee 

application for the support staff are clerical in nature. Tasks which are clerical in nature are 

not recoverable. Pearson v. Nat’l Credit Sys., Inc., No. CV10-526-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL 

5146805, at *3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 13, 2010) (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288, n. 

10 (1989)); Schrum v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. CIV 04-0619-PHX-RCB, 2008 

WL 2278137, at *12 (D. Ariz. May 30, 2008) (“Some of the tasks for which primarily 

paralegal Murphy billed are secretarial or clerical in nature, and thus are not recoverable 

as part of a reasonable attorneys’ fee award.”). 

The Court finds that there are a few issues with Plaintiff’s fee request for the three 

support personnel. First, American Family correctly points out that without an affidavit for 

these three individuals, the Court is unable to determine whether the rates charged by the 

three were reasonable.5In fact, without affidavits, it is even unclear what firm these 

individuals worked with the exception of Florence Lirato whose entries are interspersed 

with those of Mr. Chami. (Doc. 219-2.) Next, some of the items billed by the three support 

personnel are clearly clerical in nature.6 Lastly, the entries from the support staff include 

several block billed entries, including one from James Dey where he credits himself with 

a 47-hour entry for the 11 days between the start to the end of trial.7(Doc. 219-6 at 2.) In 

light of these issues, the Court will exercise its discretion to decline to award fees for the 

three support staff. Thus, the Court will subtract $15,342.50 from the total fee award for 

the fees of James Dey, $10,875 for the fees of Mallory Crow, and $3,495 for the fees of 

Florence Lirato. 

3. Reasonableness of Fees Charged by Plaintiff’s Counsel

5

James Day charged $95 per hour, (Doc. 219-6), Mallory Crow charged $150 per hour, 

(Doc. 219-5), and Florence Lirato charged $150 per hour. (Doc. 219-2.) 

6 For example, Florence Lirato’s entries include time scanning and uploading, saving, 

filing, mailing, and printing. (Doc. 219-2.) 

7

In the entry, Mr. Dey credits himself or “taking care of our client.” (Doc. 219-6 at 2.) 

Presumably, this meant that Mr. Dey was taking care of Mr. Jarman. This is not a billable

task. 

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The lodestar method is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing 

party reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 

244 F.3d 1145, 1149, n. 4 (9th Cir. 2002). The fee applicant has the burden of producing 

“satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested 

rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of 

reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 

895 (1984). 

American Family argues that the fees charged by Plaintiff’s counsel are higher than 

reasonable. In support of its argument, American Family points out that Mr. Chami, Mr. 

Shah, and Ms. Gerardy do not provide evidence to support their fees besides citations to 

previous attorney fee awards that Mr. Chami received in consumer and employment

matters. It is true that this is the only evidence Plaintiff cites to besides his attorneys’ own 

affidavits despite the fact that Plaintiff concedes that he has the burden of producing 

evidence that his lawyers’ rates are in line with those prevailing in the community by 

lawyers of similar skill and experience. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 895. American Family also 

argues that the cases cited by Plaintiff to support the reasonableness of his counsels’ hourly 

rates are not comparable to this case because one was an employment case, one is a 

California consumer law case, and one involved fees for a discovery dispute in a consumer 

litigation matter. See Sullivan v. Salt River Project, 12-01810 (D. Ariz. Oct. 23, 2014)

(awarding Mr. Chami $400 per hour); Parker v. Peters & Freedman, LLP, No. SA CV 17-

0667-DFM, 2019 WL 174979 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2019) (awarding Mr. Chami $500 per 

hour); Gross v. Citibank, N.A., 18-02013 (D. Ariz. Nov. 13, 2019) (awarding Mr. Chami 

$500 per hour). In Parker, Mr. Chami submitted a letter from a California attorney 

experienced in consumer litigation who attested that $500 per hour for Mr. Chami’s rate 

was reasonable. Parker, 2019 WL 174979, at *3. Here, Plaintiff has not submitted a letter 

or affidavit from another attorney experienced in personal injury or bad faith insurance 

claims attesting that the rates charged by counsel are reasonable. American Family urges 

the Court to reduce Mr. Chami, Mr. Shah, and Ms. Gerardy’s fees to those rates listed in 

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the 2019 edition of the State Bar of Arizona’s Economics of Law Practice Report.8

In his reply, Plaintiff argues that a statewide survey does little to determine the 

appropriate billing rate for an attorney in Phoenix. See Kaufman v. Warner Bros. Ent. Inc., 

No. CV-16-02248-PHX-JAT, 2019 WL 2084460, at *12 (D. Ariz. May 13, 2019) (“the

statewide survey submitted by Plaintiff ‘does little to determine the appropriate billing rate 

for an attorney in Phoenix that is experienced in [intellectual property] litigation.’” 

(alterations original) (citing Jackson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV-13-00617-PHXSPL, 2015 WL 13567069, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 23, 2015))). The Court notes that Kaufman 

pointed out that the statewide survey had little application to Phoenix intellectual property

attorneys.

Plaintiff has failed to produce enough evidence of the reasonableness of his 

counsels’ fees. While Plaintiff does point to fees his counsel obtained in other cases, he 

fails to produce any other evidence, besides his counsels’ own affidavits, to prove that the 

rates charged by his attorneys are reasonable in this matter. This failure is relevant to the 

fifth lodestar factor, the customary fee charged in matters of the type involved. In Plaintiff’s 

analysis of this factor, he concedes that “[t]he hourly rate must be based on ‘customary 

fees in cases of like difficulty.’” (Doc. 219 (quoting Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & 

Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1986))). Nonetheless, Plaintiff failed to produce 

any such evidence. Thus, the Court has determined that this factor warrants a reduction in 

hourly rates. 

It is clear that Mr. Chami and Mr. Shah are quite experienced and have been 

successful considering their limited years of experience in the legal field. Thus, the Court 

does believe that they warrant fees that are higher than the average Arizona attorney with 

similar years of experience. Accordingly, the Court determines that a reasonable rate for 

Mr. Chami is $450 per hour and that a reasonable rate for Mr. Shah is $400 per hour. The 

8 The report lists the average and mediate hourly rate for a 10-19 year attorney as $308, 5-

9 year attorney as $288, and an attorney with less than 5 years of experience as $248. Mr. 

Chami had been licensed for roughly 10 years at the conclusion of the trial, Mr. Shah had 

been licensed for roughly 7 years, and Ms. Gerardy had been licensed for roughly 2 years. 

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Court will not reduce Ms. Gerardy’s hourly rate in light of the fact that it is comparable to 

that of an attorney with her same experience. The reduction in the hourly rate of Mr. Chami 

and Mr. Shah will reduce Mr. Chami’s total fee award from $556,210 to $456,165 (1013.7

hours9 multiplied by $450) and Mr. Shah’s total fee award from $284,500 to $227,600. The 

Court finds that these fees are reasonable in light of the remaining lodestar factors. 

American Family contends that although Mr. Chami claims that his rate changed 

from $500 per hour to $550 per hour on January 1, 2020, that Mr. Chami inexplicably asks 

this Court for $550 per hour from June 15, 2017 to November 2018. American Family is 

correct. Plaintiff appears to have made a clerical error in asking for $550 for these dates 

instead of $500. The Court has corrected this error by calculating his total fee by 

multiplying all of Mr. Chami’s hours billed by $450 per hour. 

4. Reasonableness of Time Spent on the Case

American Family next takes exception with Ms. Gerardy’s time entries, pointing 

out that most of her entries are rounded to the nearest half hour. Because of this, American 

Family contends that her entries “do not appear credible.” While many of her entries indeed 

are recorded in half hour increments, that is not the case for all her entries. The Court is 

unwilling to find that Ms. Gerardy’s entries lack credibility just because most of her billing 

was done in half hour increments. 

American Family argues that Mr. Chami billed over 12 hours on the case on 13 days 

between July 14, 2020 and August 20, 2020. All of these days were prior to the start of 

trial. The Court finds that the fees are not unreasonable simply because Mr. Chami billed 

over 12 hours a day for 13 days as he prepared for trial. American Family also complains 

that Mr. Chami billed 44 hours between March 14, 2019 to March 18, 2019 for three 

depositions that took only 7.5 hours combined. The Court is unwilling to find that this is 

unreasonable enough to warrant a reduction. 

American Family also argues that the fee application unreasonably seeks fees 

9 Above, the Court cut 16.3 hours from Mr. Chami’s hours for the time spent preparing the 

fee application for failing to confer with American Family.

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relating to dismissed Defendants Efficient Electric and Sedgwick Claims Management 

Services, Inc (“Sedgwick”). In Exhibit 1 to American Family’s response, American Family 

lists entries in which Mr. Chami, Mr. Shah, and Ms. Gerardy include time billed against 

Efficient Electric and Sedgwick. After reviewing the entries relating to Efficient Electric 

and Sedgwick, the Court finds that all three attorneys billed time that was solely attributable 

to the Efficient Electric and Sedgwick Defendants. Mr. Chami billed 11.9 hours, Mr. Shah 

billed 1.5 hours, and Ms. Gerardy billed one hour attributable to the dismissed Defendants. 

The Court will reduce the total fee award by these hours. 

American Family next argues that Plaintiff has not identified hours billed for the 

claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and its punitive damages claim. It is 

true that Plaintiff has failed identify which billing entries relate to these claims. However, 

since all claims were related to the same facts, the Court finds that it was not unreasonable 

to differentiate between different claims in billing entries. 

5. Costs and Expenses

American Family also urges the Court to disallow Plaintiff’s non-taxable costs and 

expense such as clothes for Mr. Jarman, a hotel stay for Mr. Jarman, and demonstrative 

exhibits. “Allowing a party to recover non-taxable costs under the guise of attorneys’ fees 

would undermine the legislative intent expressed in A.R.S. § 12-332.” Ahwatukee Custom 

Ests. Mgmt. Ass’n, Inc. v. Bach, 973 P.2d 106, 107 (Ariz. 1999) (finding that non-taxable 

costs and expenses are not recoverable as attorneys’ fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01). 

In its reply, Plaintiff states, “Mr. Jarman is confident this court can differential [sic] which 

costs with [sic] inadvertently included and which costs are properly recoverable in this 

case.” In other words, Plaintiff is hoping that the Court will do the hard work for him. A 

party requesting an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) has the 

burden of proving entitlement to such an award. Woerth v. City of Flagstaff, 808 P.2d 297, 

304 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). Even the LRCiv 54.2(e)(3) warns, “Failure to itemize and verify 

costs may result in their disallowance by the court.” It’s clear that Plaintiff’s costs and 

expenses contain non-taxable costs. The Court refuses to go through line-by-line and 

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analyze which ones are non-taxable.

10 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for $74,008.24 in 

costs will be denied in its entirety. 

D. Post Judgment Interest

Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to post judgment interest, starting from the date of 

the judgment. (Doc. 219 at 14.) In his motion, Plaintiff promised to “supply the court with 

the appropriate interest rate and daily calculator until the judgment is paid when his reply 

brief [was] filed.” However, Plaintiff failed to do so. The Court will resolve this issue by 

separate motion if one is submitted by Plaintiff.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court will award the following fees for Plaintiff’s counsel: 1,001.8 hours at 

$450 per hour for Mr. Chami; 567.5 at $400 per hour for Mr. Shah; and 434.65 at $250 per 

hour for Ms. Gerardy. The total fee awards for each attorney are as follows: $450,810 for 

Mr. Chami; $227,000 for Mr. Shah; and $108,662.50 for Ms. Gerardy for a total fee award 

of $786,472.50.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Non-Taxable 

Expenses, and Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest is granted in part and denied in part. (Doc. 

219.) Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees is granted with the reductions explained above. 

Plaintiff’s request for costs and expenses is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded $786,472.50 in attorneys’

fees to be paid by American Family pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01. 

Dated this 13th day of May, 2021.

10 “As the Seventh Circuit observed in its now familiar maxim, ‘[j]udges are not like pigs, 

hunting for truffles buried in briefs.’” Indep. Towers of Washington v. Washington, 350 

F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003).

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