[Cite as State v. Hinton , 2013-Ohio-3381.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY STATE OF OHIO : : Appellate Case No. 25634 Plaintiff-Appellee : : Trial Court Ca se No. 12-CR-738 v. : : CHRISHANDA L. HINTON : (Criminal Appeal from : ( Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant : :

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 2nd day of August, 2013.

. . . . . . . . . . . MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MATTHEW T. CRAWFORD, Atty. Reg. #0089205, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appe llate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee LUCAS W. WILDER, Atty. Reg. #0074057, 120 West Second Street, Suite 400, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . . FAIN, P.J. {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Chri shanda L. Hinton appeal s from her conviction and sentence, following a no-contest plea, for Po ssession of Heroin, in an amount equaling or 2

 exceeding one gram, but less than five grams, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fourth degree. Hinton contends that the tria l court erred by overrulin g her motion to suppress evidence, upon the ground that it was obtained as th e result of an unlawful search and seizure. {¶ 2} We conclude that the trial court di d not err in overruling Hinton’s motion to suppress evidence. Accordingly, the judg ment of the trial court is Affirmed.

I. The Stop, Search and Seizure {¶ 3} Dayton Police Officer Mark Spiers wa s clearing a house alarm that had been triggered at 725 Homewood, in Dayton, at 1:30 p.m., at the end of February, 2012. Spiers was a 32-year police veteran, with 29 years on the Dayton Police Force, and 3 years on the Centerville Police Force before that. He had served in a drug unit for 81⁄2 years during his time on the Dayton Police Force. Spiers was a uniformed police sergeant, supervising uniformed patrol officers. He wa s alone in his marked cruiser. {¶ 4} A man pulled up in a vehicle alongside Sp iers in his cruiser, and told Spiers that a drug transaction was taking place on Richmond Avenue, about 11⁄2 blocks from the intersection of Richmond and Ha mmond. Spiers’s current locati on was about “three or four doors” from that intersection. The man told Sp iers that he had seen the same individual making numerous drug transactions in the past, and had reported it several times, but that every time uniformed police had arrived to investigate, the person was either gone, or back inside the house. {¶ 5} The man described the seller as “a black female, short, but te nds to dress as a male, short hair,” “wearing a white tee shirt and baggy jeans.” The man said she was making 3

 a deal with “occupants of a gray minivan.” {¶ 6} Spiers did not wait to get the inform ant’s name and identifying information, because he wanted to get to the scene of the susp ected drug transaction in time to investigate and take appropriate ac tion. After calling for backup, Spiers dr ove to the intersection and turned onto Richmond. {¶ 7} As soon as Spiers turned onto Richmond, he could see a van about a block and a half down the street, matching the description, and he could s ee a person, later identified as Hinton, matching the description of the drug seller, with her hands inside the vehicle. The van was about five feet away from the curb, and Hint on was at the driver’s window, so that she was standing at about the middle of th e street. Spiers testified that “all of it,” meaning taking the report from the informant until he was in a positi on to see Hinton and the van, “took less than 30 seconds or so.” {¶ 8} As Spiers approached Hinton, she looke d in his direction, saw him coming up the street, and immediately walked to ward the sidewalk on the other side of Richmond from the van. The van pulled away. Later, however, the van returned. {¶ 9} Spiers told Hinton to stop. He told he r that he wanted to talk to her about standing in the middle of the street, a minor misdemeanor, and about a drug complaint. {¶ 10} Spiers recognized Hinton, with whom he had dealt in the past on “drug activity type complaints.” Spiers d ecided to pat Hinton down for wea pons. He described the pat-down as follows: I just use the palm of my hands. I don’t manipulate anything. I just pat the outer side of her clothing to make su re there’s no bulges, anything that could 4

 feel like it could be a weapon that could be used against me. Just to make sure that she had nothing in her wa istband or her pants pockets. {¶ 11} Spiers started the pat-down with Hinton’ s front pockets. He felt a baggie. At “about the same time,” Hinton told Spiers, “it’s just weed,” referri ng to the baggie in her right front pocket. {¶ 12} Spiers finished the pat-down, and then went to retrieve the baggie of marijuana. He described what happe ned next as follows: Started to retrieve the marijuana. As I’m retrieving the marijuana from her pocket, there’s a small co in pocket just above the ri ght front pocket. During the pat-down, I didn’t notice it. But as I was removing the bag of weed, I felt a hard irregular shaped object. I immediat ely recognized that to be chunked up illegal drugs, probably heroin. {¶ 13} Spiers testified that he had made arrests with heroin before. On cross-examination, Spiers testif ied that the object in Hinton’s coin pocket was the size of a marble. {¶ 14} After seizing the heroin, Spiers arrest ed Hinton and advised her of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

II. The Course of Proceedings {¶ 15} Hinton was charged by indictment with one count of Possessi on of Heroin (one to five grams), in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the fourth de gree, and one count of Possession of Marijuana, in viol ation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a misdem eanor of the first degree. 5

 She moved to suppress the evidence, contending th at it was obtained as the result of an unlawful search and seizure. {¶ 16} Following a hearing, the trial court overruled Hinton’s motion to suppress. Thereafter, she pled no contest to Possession of Heroin, and the Possession of Marijuana charge was dismissed by the State. The trial c ourt imposed community control sanctions, and suspended her driver’s license for six months. {¶ 17} From her conviction and sentence, Hinton appeals. The trial court stayed the execution of the sentence, pending appeal.

III. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Overruling Hinton’s Motion to Suppress {¶ 18} Hinton’s sole assignment of error is as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING HINTON’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

A. Spiers Had a Reasonab le, Articulable Suspicion Justifying a Brief Investigative Stop {¶ 19} Hinton first argues that Spiers l acked a proper basis for stopping Hinton. {¶ 20} The trial court found Spiers’s testimony to be “entirely credible.” The only other witness called at the suppressi on hearing was Antoinette Young , who was called by Hinton. Young testified that she was the driver of the va n. She testified that sh e and her sister were talking with Hinton in front of Hinton’s house. She had wanted to give Hinton some money and then leave. When Young saw the police cruiser approaching, she decided to turn the van around 6

 and park properly on the other side of the str eet, which she did, because no parking was allowed on the side of Richmond that she was on. She testified that she gave Hinton about $1,670. She witnessed the pat-down, seizur e, and arrest of Hinton. {¶ 21} Taking Young’s testimony at face value, and assuming that her interaction with Hinton was innocent, it is irrelevant. The issue is whether Spiers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Hinton was selling drugs, not whether Hinton was, in fact, selling drugs. {¶ 22} Hinton argues that the information Spiers received from the man who told him that a person matching Hinton’s de scription was presently involved in a drug transaction less than two blocks away is entitled to little or no weight, because it wa s an anonymous tip. But an anonymous tip provided to a police officer face-to -face has greater inherent trustworthiness than an anonymous tip provided ove r the telephone, as held in Henness v. Bagley , 644 F.3d 308, 318 (6th Cir.2011): There is a difference, however, betw een anonymous tips provided over the telephone and those given face-to-face with a police officer. An in-person tip gives the officer an opportunity to obs erve the informant's demeanor and credibility. See United States v. Palos–Marquez , 591 F.3d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir.2010); United States v. Griffin , 589 F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir.2009); United States v. Heard , 367 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir.2004); United States v. Romain , 393 F.3d 63, 73 (1st Cir.2004). The in-person informant risks being held accountable for false information. Palos–Marquez , 591 F.3d at 1275; Griffin , 589 F.3d at 152; Romain , 393 F.3d at 73. Additionally, an in-person informant's proximity in time and space to the repor ted criminal activity indicates the 7

 reliability of the tip, because it reflects th at the informant acquired the information firsthand. See United States v. Chapman , 305 F.3d 530, 534 (6th Cir.2002). {¶ 23} See also cases cited in 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 796, fn. 517, Section 9.5(I) (5th Ed.2012). {¶ 24} In the case before us, Spiers’s informan t would not likely have assumed that he was protected by anonymity from any adverse cons equences that might follow from his making a false accusation. Spiers might already have reco gnized him; Spiers might at some subsequent time recognize him; and Spiers might have noted and recorded his license plate number. {¶ 25} The information provided to Spiers was co rroborated, at least to some extent, by what Spiers observed 30 seconds later. He saw a person, Hinton, standing in the middle of the street with her hands in the driver’s window of a minivan. When Hinton noticed the police cruiser approaching, she walked away, and the va n took off. Spiers testified concerning his conclusion: Q. After receiving the complaint a nd rounding the corner and observing what you observed, did you – in your expe rience and with your education, did you believe that a drug transaction was taking place?
A. Yes. Q. Can you tell me why? A. Just based upon my experience. This was the type of things we would normally see. Based on my experience and making drug buys, 1 normally, once they see the police approaching, it’s a quick – break contact fairly qui ck, and the car normally takes off. The dealer

1 Spiers had testified that he had made drug buys in the past, while working undercover. 8

 normally walks away when they see a marked cruiser. So it’s just from my experience and what I have witnessed persona lly. It appears that it could have been a drug transaction, yes. {¶ 26} Spiers also testified as to the nature of that area: Q. And have you patrolled in that particular area before? A. The majority of my 29 years have been involved in the Fifth District either as uniformed officer, uniformed se rgeant, or as a detective sergeant in the drug unit. Q. What kind of area is it? A. Unfortunately, this is a high crime area. We have a lot of drug transaction [sic], a lot of assaults. So I would classify it as a very high crime area. There’s a lot of abandoned houses in that particular area and rental properties. Q. And have you personally – as a police o fficer, have you personally dealt with those types of crimes in th at particular area?
A. Yes. {¶ 27} From the totality of the circumstances, includi ng the information Spiers received from the man who pulled up alongside him, his personal familiarity with the area, his experience with illegal drug transactions, and his observation of Hi nton and the van, we conclude that Sp iers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was observing a drug transaction in progress, jus tifying a brief investigative stop.

B. Spiers Had a Reasonable Basis for a Pat-Down Search for Weapons {¶ 28} Spiers was unable to identify a basis fo r his concern that Hinton might be armed beyond the fact that she was likely involved in a drug transaction: Q. Did you – what – did she do anythi ng specific that made you think that 9

 she was armed and dangerous?
A. Yes. Q. What was that? A. Any time somebody is engaged in possible drug activity, you have to consider that they’re possibly armed. Q. Okay. Anything else? A. Twenty-nine years of experience tells me that drugs and weapons go hand in hand. No, nothing else. {¶ 29} Hinton cites State v. Page , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21638, 2007-Ohio-671, for the proposition that: “A frisk for weapons cannot be justified merely becau se an investigative stop for suspected drug dealing is legitimate under Terry [ v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)].” The State cites State v. Martin , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20270, 2004-Ohio-2738, 2 for the proposition that: “An officer’s fear of violence when investigating drug activity is a legitimate c oncern that will justify a pat-down sear ch for weapons.” Our holdings in Page and Martin are difficult to reconcile. {¶ 30} Terry v. Ohio , itself, suggests a possible way to reconcile Page and Martin . In Terry , the Supreme Court of the United States opined that “it is reasonable to assume” that a daylight robbery “would be likely to involve the use of weapons.” Terry at 28. Thus, the Supreme Court recognized that persons who are reasonably suspect ed to be involved in certain criminal occupations – the daylight robbery of a st ore being one of them – are inherently likely to

2 The State actually cites State v. Dickerson , 179 Ohio App.3d 754, 2008-Ohio-6544, 903 N.E.2d 697 (2d Dist.), which in turn cites Martin . In Dickerson , however, there was an independent basis for suspecting that the defendant might have been attempting to conceal a weapon. Id. at ¶ 18. 10

 be armed, justifying a pa t-down search for weapons. {¶ 31} In State v. Page , the defendant was standing in a public place near a known drug dealer. The known drug dealer was seen approach ing the defendant “stea lthily,” and had a brief conversation. Id. at ¶ 7. The defendant was handcuffed and subjected to a pat-down search. Id. Thus, the facts in Page suggest that the defendant was at most a customer, or prospective customer, of the drug dealer – a “retail” purchaser of illegal drugs. {¶ 32} In Martin , the defendant had entered a susp ected crack house while police were inside investigating. Because the defendant had entered wit hout knocking, there was reason to believe that he was invol ved in the criminal drug sales that we re suspected to have taken place in the house. In other words, there was reason to be lieve that he was not a “retail” purchaser of illegal drugs, but someone involved in the enterprise of selling illegal drugs. {¶ 33} In the case before us, Hinton was reasonably suspected of being a seller of illegal drugs, not merely a retail purchas er for her own use. As with daylight robbers of stores in Terry , we conclude that persons reasona bly suspected to be involved in the criminal enterprise of drug trafficking (as opposed to mere pur chasers of drugs for their own us e) are sufficiently likely to be armed to justify a pat-down search fo r weapons. Thus, we conclude that State v. Page , upon which Hinton relies, is distinguishable. {¶ 34} We conclude that Spiers had a reasona ble concern that Hinton might be armed and dangerous, justifying a pat-down search for weapons.

C. The Seizure of the Marijuana and Heroin from Hinton’s Person Was Justified by the Plain-Feel Doctrine 11

 {¶ 35} When Spiers encountered the baggie c ontaining marijuana, during his pat-down search, Hinton volunteered that: “It’ s just weed.” This justified Spiers in concluding that the baggie he felt in Hinton’s pocket was marijuana, since “weed” is common slang for marijuana. Spiers was therefore justified in seizing it. {¶ 36} Hinton contends that it is not credible th at Spiers could have concluded that the hard, irregular-shaped, marb le-sized object he felt in Hinton’s coin pocket, while he was seizing the marijuana, was an illegal drug. She cites State v. Woods , 113 Ohio App.3d 240, 680 N.E.2d 729 (2d Dist.1996) for that proposition. {¶ 37} In Woods , the object in the defendant’s coin pocket was less than one gram, the size of a “pebble,” and the trial court failed to credit the officer’s testimony that it was immediately obvious to him that th e object was crack cocaine. We agreed with the defendant in that case that “the trial court was in the best position to weigh the credibility of [the officer].” Id. at 244. {¶ 38} In the case before us, the trial court f ound Officer Spiers’s testimony to be “very credible.” The weight of the chunk of heroin was between one and five grams, and it was the size of a marble. We agree with the State that this case is distinguishable from Woods

. {¶ 39} We have held that the pl ain-feel doctrine announced in Minnesota v. Dickerson , 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), requires only that, based upon the police officer’s sense of touch, the criminal character of the object felt be probable, not certain, State v.
Dunson , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22219, 2007-Ohio-6681, ¶ 20: Under the “plain feel” doctrine, the physical features of the article which are revealed to the officer through his sense of touch must cause the identity of the 12

 article, and from that its criminal character, to be immediately apparent to the officer. However, it need only be probable – that is, more likely than not – that the article possesses that criminal character. {¶ 40} Based upon Officer Spiers’s testimony, wh ich the trial court found credible, we conclude that his seizure of bot h the marijuana and the heroin wa s justified under the plain-feel exception to the warrant requirement. {¶ 41} Hinton’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

IV. Conclusion {¶ 42} Hinton’s sole assignment of error having been overruled, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . HALL and WELBAUM, JJ., concur. Copies mailed to: Mathias H. Heck, Jr. Matthew T. Crawford Lucas W. Wilder Hon. Steven K. Dankof