Opinion filed August 30, 2013

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-11-00358-CR

__________

CARLOS CHAPARRO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 132,333

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The jury convicted Carlos Chaparro of a Class B misdemeanor offense of 

driving while intoxicated. The trial court assessed Appellant’s punishment at 

confinement for 180 days and a fine of $1,000. The trial court suspended the 

imposition of the sentence and placed Appellant on community supervision for two 

years. We affirm.
2

The facts are undisputed. On November 8, 2010, Appellant was driving an 

18-wheeler on Interstate 20 in Midland County. Corporal Jayden Perkins of the 

Midland County Sheriff’s Office stopped Appellant. Department of Public Safety 

Trooper Chad Matlock responded to the scene. The officers arrested Appellant for 

driving while intoxicated and placed him in handcuffs. The officers did not give 

Appellant Miranda1 warnings. Trooper Matlock placed Appellant in his patrol car. 

Trooper Matlock read Appellant the DIC-55 statutory warnings and asked 

Appellant whether he would give a blood sample. Appellant responded, “Yes, sir.” 

Testing of Appellant’s blood sample showed that it contained, among other things,

diazepam, hydrocodone, and carisoprodol.

At trial, Appellant moved to suppress evidence of any questions that the 

officers asked him after he was arrested, any statements he made to the officers 

after he was arrested, and the results of his blood test. Appellant argued that this 

evidence was inadmissible because the officers did not give him Miranda

warnings. The State agreed that, because the officers did not give Appellant 

Miranda warnings, any questions that constituted custodial interrogation and 

Appellant’s responses to those questions were inadmissible. However, the State 

asserted that the law required the officers to give Appellant the DIC-55 statutory 

warnings and to ask whether Appellant would provide a blood or breath specimen 

and that, therefore, Appellant’s consent to provide a blood specimen and the results 

of the blood test were admissible.

The trial court ruled that “all custodial interrogation subsequent to 

[Appellant] being placed under arrest, save and except for the DIC warnings and 

the acknowledgment of the blood tests and the approval of the blood tests from 

[Appellant], are suppressed.” The trial court stated that evidence that related to the 

blood test would not be suppressed, and the trial court admitted such evidence.

 1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3

In a single appellate issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it failed to suppress evidence of the DIC statutory warnings, of his 

consent to give a blood specimen, and of the results of his blood test. In his brief, 

Appellant acknowledges that relevant case law does not favor his position. 

Appellant states that he is making his argument simply to preserve error.

Appellant cites Rodriguez v. State, 631 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982), 

and McCambridge v. State, 778 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). In Rodriguez, 

the court held that the taking of a breath test is not a testimonial communication 

and that Miranda warnings need not be given before administering the test. 631 

S.W.2d at 517. In McCambridge, the court held that a right to counsel does not 

attach to a decision of whether to submit to a requested breath test when the 

request is made before the “critical stages” of a criminal proceeding arise. 778 

S.W.2d at 72. We are bound by existing precedent. The trial court did not abuse 

its discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion to suppress the blood test 

evidence. Appellant’s issue is overruled.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

TERRY McCALL

JUSTICE

August 30, 2013

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Willson, J.