No. 84-153 

111 THE SUPREbE COURT OF THE STATE OF FIONTANA 

1985 

RICHARD C. LUSSY, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

H. V. DYE and the Law Firm 

of fiIILODRAGOVICH, DALE & DYE, 

P.C. , 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROPI: District Court of the Third Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Deer Lodge, 

The Honorable Mark Sullivan, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Richard C. Lussy, pro se, Seattle, Washington 

For Respondents: 

Worden, Thane & Haines, Missoula, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Jan. 10, 1985 

Decided: February 15, 1985 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. , delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

The respondents were counsel for the appellant in a debt 

action brought by First Security Eank of Deer Lodge. The 

bank obtained a favorable judgment or, December 1, 1.978, in 

Powel-I County and a judgment was filed in both Powell County 

and Deer Lodge County. The bank proceeded toward having the 

appellant's property sold at a sheriff's sale, however, the 

appellant satisfied the judgment prior to the sale. A notice 

of satisfaction of judgment was filed in Powell County on 

March 3, 1979, but no notice was filed in Deer Lodge County. 

On September 17, 1982 the appellant brought an action 

against the attorneys that had represented the bank in the 

debt action. The complaint in this action was subsequently 

amended to include the respondents, appellant's own attorneys 

in the debt action, as defendants on January 28, 1983. The 

appellant alleged that due to the respondents' and others' 

failure to file notice of satisfaction of judgment in Deer 

Lodge County, as was done in Powell County, the appellant was 

injured when a land sale failed due to the improper "cloud" 

on the title. 

The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on Fehruary 

28, 1983. The motion was based on the contention that the 

applicable statute of limitation barred the appellant's 

action. The motion was briefed by both parties and a heari.ng 

was held. On September 20, 1983 the District Court granted 

respondents ' motion and ordered the appellant's compl-aint 

dismissed as to respondents. On January 10, 1984, the 

appellant moved for relief from the order dismissing the 

complaint against the respondents. This motion was based on 
the contention that relief should be qranted because the 

applicable statute of limjtations did not bar the appellant's 

action against the respondents. The motion was briefed and a 

hearing was held. On February 24, 1984, the District Court 

denied the appellant's motion. This appeal followed. 

We affirm. 

This appeal concerns the application of Rule 60(b) (6) 

M.R.Civ.P. The issues on appeal are: 1.) whether the 

appellant had "arry other re?-son justifying relief from the 

operation of the judgment" so that Rule 60(b)(6) could be 

applied; and 2.) whether the appellant brought the Rule 

6O(b)(6) motion within the required reasonable time. 

The appellant contends that Rule 60(h) (6) applies 

because the District Court allegedly erred in ruling that the 

original complaint against the respondents was barred by the 

statute of limitations. Tn other words, the appellant 

attempted to apply Rule 60(b) (6) because the order from which 

relief was sought was allegedly erroneous. The proper avenue 

for seeking redress from an allegedly erroneous decision, 

solely on the basis that it is erroneous, is the appeal 

process. 

It is not the intent of Rule 60(b) (6) to be a substitute 

for appeal. The substance of a motion for relief under Rule 

60 (b) (6) must be something more than a request for rehearing 

or a request that the District Court change its mind. It 

must be shown that something prevented a full presentation of 

the cause or an accurate determination on the merits and that 

for reasons of fairness and equity redress is justified. 

It is important for the sake of the 1-itigants and for 

the judicial system that litigation will at some time be 

finally ended. When the time for appeal has elapsed and no 
grounds justify other relief the case is final as to all 

matters properly appealable. We find that the appel-lant's 

request for relief was grounded so1.el.y on the basis that the 

District Court order dismissing the respondents was 

erroneous, that such was properly appea-lable, and that the 

appellant has set forth no grounds that would justify the 

application of Rule 60 (b) (6) , M.R.Civ.P. We therefore hold 

that the District Court acted properly in denying the 

appellant's motion. 

The resolution of this issue renders a discussion on the 

issue of reasonable time unnecessary. The order of the 

District Court shall stand. 

Affirmed. 

We Concur: 

/ 

f Chief Justice