SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3718-16T2

MICHAEL STANTON,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

_____________________________

Submitted December 19, 2018 – Decided May 20, 2019

Before Judges Nugent and Reisner.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of 

Corrections.

Michael Stanton, appellant pro se.

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher Josephson, 

Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this 

opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Appellant, Michael Stanton, a prison inmate, appeals from the final 

disciplinary action taken against him by the Department of Corrections (DOC). 

We affirm. 

Stanton was an inmate at Bayside State Prison when the events underlying 

this appeal occurred. According to the record of the disciplinary proceedings, 

on a February afternoon in 2017, two corrections officers who were attempting 

to locate the source of a strong odor of something burning entered a cell 

occupied by Stanton and another inmate. Stanton initially complied with an 

officer's order to stand up, place his hands on his head, and face the cell window, 

but he then moved his hands toward his waist. He disobeyed an order to return 

his hands to his head and instead reached toward or into his waistband while 

turning toward the officer. The officer sprayed Stanton with a spray called O.C. 

spray. With the assistance of several other officers who had responded to a call 

for assistance, the officer who had sprayed Stanton restrained him, as he had

become combative. During the struggle, an officer dislodged from Stanton's left 

hand a four-inch brush handle. The handle had been sharpened to a point on one 

end and had a shoelace through a hole on the other end. The incident caused a 

delay of approximately one hour in prison movements. 
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The DOC charged Stanton with three of the acts prohibited by N.J.A.C.

10A:4-4.1: *.202, possession or introduction of a weapon, *.306, conduct which 

disrupts or interferes with the security or orderly running of the institution, and 

*.708, refusing to submit to a search. Following a hearing, the hearing officer 

found Stanton guilty of the charges. The sanction for the *.202 charge was 365 

days of administrative segregation, 365 days loss of commutation time, thirty 

days loss of recreation time, and confiscation of the weapon. The sanctions for 

the *.306 and *.708 charges were "combined" with the sanctions for the *.202 

charges. 

Stanton filed an administrative appeal, and the Assistant Superintendent 

upheld the hearing officer's decision. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Stanton raises the following points:

POINT I

DHO RALPH SHOWED PREJUDICE BY NOT 

ALLOWING STANTON TO ASK PERTINENT 

QUESTIONS REGARDING SCO. PEREZ'S 

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH D.O.C. STANDARDS 

OF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, WHICH 

WOULD PROVE HIS MALICIOUS INTENT & 

EXPOSE THE FALSIFIED CHARGES & 

STATEMENTS. AS WELL AS TAKE INTO 

CONSIDERATION PEREZ WASN'T IN 

COMPLIANCE WITH DOC STANDARDS.
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POINT II

DHO VIOLATED STANTON'S DUE PROCESS 

RIGHTS BY ALLOWING POSTPONEMENT TO 

EXCEED BEYOND THE ALLOTTED TIME TO GO 

ON A VACATION INCLUDED IN 10A 4-9.7(A)2.

POINT III

INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS MADE BY ALL 

OFFICERS DURING THE CONFRONTATION 

DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FABRICATED 

CHARGES AGAINST STANTON. IT EXPOSE[S]

THE LIES TOLD BY THE OFFICERS IN ORDER TO 

COVER UP THE TRUTH.

POINT IV

VIDEO EVIDENCE PURPOSELY DESTROYED TO 

COVER UP ALL THE FABRICATED LIES BY ALL 

REPORTING OFFICERS TO JUSTIFY THE 

PHYSICAL ATTACK AGAINST STANTON AND 

SETTING HIM UP WITH A WEAPON THAT 

WOULD'VE PROVED BEYOND A SHADOW OF A 

DOUBT IT WASN'T HIS. A CRIME OF THE 

FOURTH DEGREE. 2C:28-6. 

Our scope of review is narrow. Generally, we will not disturb the DOC's

final administrative decision imposing disciplinary sanctions upon an inmate

unless the inmate demonstrates that the decision is arbitrary or capricious, or is 

unsupported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Henry v. Rahway 

State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980). Evident from a careful consideration 

of the record is that the DOC's final decision is supported by substantial 

evidence. See McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 195 (1995); N.J.A.C. 10A:4-
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9.15(a) ("A finding of guilt at a disciplinary hearing shall be based upon 

substantial evidence that the inmate has committed a prohibited act."). 

The arguments Stanton raises in his first and third points reflect little more 

than his disagreement with the hearing officer's factual determinations and 

credibility findings. The questions he says he was precluded from asking were 

mostly irrelevant or objectionable for security or other reasons, and his argument 

that the statements of all officers were inconsistent represents nothing more than 

his disagreement with the weight the hearing officer gave to those statements.

The record also demonstrates the disciplinary proceedings were conducted 

in a manner that afforded Stanton the due process to which he was entitled. See

Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975). Most of the delays in the hearing 

were attributable to Stanton's requests, such as his requests that statements be 

obtained from two inmates and his request to confront seven corrections officers. 

His request for video surveillance footage was denied not because it was 

purposefully destroyed, as he alleges, but because the video system stored only 

five days of recordings. 

In short, the DOC's final decision is supported by sufficient credible 

evidence on the record on the whole. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). Stanton's arguments 

lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
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Affirmed.