-1- 1 DE BR A ANN L I VI NGSTON, Circuit Judge , joined by ERI C N. VI TAL I ANO, District Judge , 2 co n cu rr i n g: 3 4 Ic on c ur

fu lly in t he ma jor ity ’s dis po sit ion

and anal y sis. I

wr ite se pa

rate ly to n ote my 5 disag ree ment with the district court’s c onclusion that the plaint iffs “do not c halleng e the 6 constitutionalit y

of the c onsent dec ree .” See Vivenzio v. Ci ty of Syracuse(Vivenzio I) , 545 F. Supp. 7 2d 241, 250 n.2 (N.D.N .Y. 2008). I believe that the plaintiffs do make such a challeng e, thoug h I 8 re a c h no c on c lus ion a s to wh e the r p la int if

fs a de qu ate ly

pr e se nte d it

be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt . I a lso 9 c on c lud e that th e me ri ts o f s uc h a c ha lle ng e , if

su ff ic ient ly argued , ne e d n ot b e a dd re sse d o n th is 1 0 appea l. Al lstateIn s. Co. v . S e rio , 2 6 1 F

. 3 d 1 4 3 , 1 5 0

- 5 1 ( 2 d Ci r . 2 0 0 1 ) ( “ I t is a xio mati c th at the 11 fe de ra l c ourt s sh ou ld, wh e re po ssi ble , avo id r e a c hin gc on sti tut ion a l qu e sti on s. ” ). Sho uld it b e c ome 12 ne c e ssa

ry on re mand , h ow e ve r, Ibe lie ve tha t th e dis tr ic t cour t sh ould a dd re ss t he pla int if

fs ’ 13 constitutional claims and deter mine whether they wer e sufficiently argued as to be preserve d, and 14 whether

any failure to preser

ve them should neve rtheless be excused. 15 The plainti ffs conce ded before the district court that “[a]t the t ime the C onsent Dec ree was 16 e nte re d, it c ompli e d w iththe c on sti tut ion a l r e qu ir e me nt t hat it be na rr ow ly ta ilo re d to me e t a 17 compellingg overnme ntal interest.” Vivenzio I , 5 45 F . Su

pp . 2 d at 25 0 n .2 (q

uo tin gPla int if

fs ’ M e m. 18 in Supp. of Sum m. J . at 14). At the same time, howeve r, they contende d that the Dec ree no longer 19 pa sse s c on sti tut ion a l mu ste r b e c a us e it i s n ot nownarr owly tailored to ser ve a c ompelling 20 g overnme ntal interest. Plaintiffs’ Mem. in Supp. of S umm. J . at 14. The district c ourt conc luded 21 that “[s] ince the te rms of the consent decr ee have not c hang ed since its inception and rac e-c onscious 22 a ff

ir mativ e a c tio n p lans sti ll mus t be na rr ow ly ta ilo re d to me e t a c omp e lli ng g ov e rnme nta l inte re st, 23 it would be illogica l to sug g est that the consent decr ee was constitutional then but n o t today .”-2- 1 Vivenzio I

, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 250 n.2. B ut this i s simply not the case

. 2 Both the Supre me Court and the Courts of Appe als have p ro n o u n ce drepe atedly on the 3 subject of strict sc rutiny in the context of voluntary aff irmative ac tion plans in the 30 y ear s since the 4 Co n s e n t D e c r e e h e r e w a s e n te red. S ee, e.g. , City of Richmond v. J.A . Croson Co. , 488 U.S. 469 5 (1 98 9) ; Edwards v. City of Houston , 3 7 F .3 d 1 09 7 ( 5th Cir . 1 99 4) . Ind e e d, it wa s n ot u nti l 19 89 , in 6 Croson , “ that th e Sup re me Court e xpre ssl y he ld t hat stri c t sc rutiny sh ou ld be us e d in eva luatin gstate 7 and loca l affir

mative action prog rams.” Erwin Chemerinsky , Constit utional L aw § 9.3 at 734 (3d 8 ed. 2006). It is possi ble that a decr ee that appea red to mee t the rele vant constitutional standards as 9 understood in 1980 may fail to satisfy curr ent prec edent – prec edent that has develope d since e ntry 10 of such a decr ee but that c ould w ell apply retroa ctively

. See Harper v. Va. Dep’ t of Taxation , 509 11 U.S. 86, 97 (1993). I t is thus not i llogica l to sugg est that a de cre e that appe are d to be constitutional 12 in light of the la

w in eff ect whe n it was enter ed is u n co n s t i tutional today . And it is certainly not 13 illogica l to argue that cir cumstance s arisingsince entry of the de cre e have rende red its cur rent 14 implementation unconstituti onal. See, e .g. , De an v . City of S hr e v e po rt , 4 38 F .3 d 4 48 , 4 55 -5 8 ( 5th 15 Cir. 2006) (notingneed to de termine, with reg ard to a 1980 consent dec ree , whether city continued 16 to have a

compellinginterest suff

icient to justify

a ra ce- conscious re medy ). 1 7 Be f

o r e th is Co urt –

an d w it h o u t a n y w a iv e r o b je c ti o nb y

th e a p p e ll e e s –

th e p la intif

fs 18 identified as a

question for d ec i s i o n “[w]hether the lower court improper ly

g rante d Summary 19 J udg ment to th e C i ty of Sy rac use whe re the 1980 Consent Decr ee f ails to survive strict scrutiny .” 20 Vivenzio-Wi lkinson Brief on Appea l at 4. The body of th ei r brief c ontains a subsec tion entitled: 21 “The Consent Decr ee is invalid b ec ause it i s not narrow ly tailored a

nd is thus unconstit utional 22 beca

use it fails revie w under

strict scrutiny .” Id. at 20

. Th is su bs e c tio n arg

ue s, amon goth e r t

hin g s,-3- 1 that the Consent Dec ree has bee n implemented er ratica lly over its 30-year

history . I t asser

ts that the 2 Dec ree has bee n rea d to e stablish a g oal of proportionate Afric an Americ an repr esentation in ea ch 3 firef

ighte r ra nk but t h at the only

tool the Decr ee makes ava ilable to achie ve this g oal – a r ace 4 conscious initial re cruitment hiring plan that impacts the highe r ranks only indirectly throug h trickle5 up a dv anc e me nt – is not na rr ow ly ta ilo re d an d “c ou ld . . . ser ve to al low the De c re e to c on tin ue in 6 perpe tuity .” Id. at 23. Fina l l y , t h e p laintiffs contend that the City of Sy rac use has f

ailed 7 c on tin

uo us ly to mo ni to r the De c re e ’s imp le me ntatio n: “ Th e fa c t th at th e City ha s atte mpt e d to 8 implement the Dec ree in such an arbitra ry manner supports Plainti ffs’ position that the De cre e lac ks 9 narr owly

tailored provisions to avoid the lea st p o s s i b l e h arm to t hose who have qualifie d to be 10 firef

ighte rs.” Id. at 24. 11 Iconclude that the plaintiffs do make a constit utional challeng e to the Consent Dec ree , 12 contra

ry to the deter

mination of the district court. Given the circ umstances of this case , Ibelieve the 13 district court should, if nec essar y , deter mine whether

plaintiffs’ constitutional challeng e wa s 14 sufficie ntly

develope d befor e it so as to be pre serve d and, if not, whether to e x cuse a ny waiver and 15 to seek de velopment of the r ecor d and additional brie fing as t o this challeng e. Cf. Ba k e r v . D av id 16 A l an Dorfman, P.L.L.C

. , 2 3 2 F

. 3 d 1 2 1 , 1 2 3 ( 2 d

Ci r . 2 0 0 0 ) ( r e ma

n d in gto th e d is tr ic t c o urt f or 17 consideration in the first instance of a n issue of “suf

ficient public importanc e” e ven thoug h neither 18 party

had ar g ued the issue be fore the district court or on a ppeal)

.