IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15–1413

Filed December 9, 2016

Amended February 21, 2017

RESIDENTIAL AND AGRICULTURAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, LLC,

an Iowa Limited Liability Company; MATT MESCHER; ALLAN R. 

DEMMER; CATHERINE DEMMER; WAYNE AMESKAMP; SHARON 

AMESKAMP; VERNON BOGE; DONALD BOGE; MARY ANN RUBLY; 

JOHN R. RUBLY; DOLORES THIER; LARRY THIER; GARY BURKLE; 

CINDY BURKLE; WAYNE VORWALD; LINDA VORWALD; JEFF PAPE; 

GERALD WOLF; and JOANNE WOLF,

Appellants,

vs.

DYERSVILLE CITY COUNCIL, MAYOR JAMES A. HEAVENS, MIKE 

ENGLISH, MARK BREITBACH, ROBERT PLATZ, MOLLY EVERS, and 

DAN WILLENBORG,

Appellees.

Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, 

Thomas A. Bitter, Judge.

Community members filed petitions for writ of certiorari 

challenging city council’s decision that rezoned agricultural land to 

commercial land. The district court annulled the writs. DECISION OF 

DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED; WRITS ANNULLED.

Susan M. Hess and Philip F. Jensen (until withdrawal) of Hammer, 

Simon & Jensen, P.C., East Dubuque, Illinois, for appellants.

Jenny L. Weiss and Douglas M. Henry of Fuerste, Carew 

& Sudmeier, P.C., Dubuque, and Nicholas C. Thompson of Cottingham 

& Butler, Inc., Dubuque, for appellees.
2

ZAGER, Justice.

The Dyersville City Council voted to rezone the area containing the 

Field of Dreams movie site from A-1 Agricultural to C-2 Commercial in 

order to facilitate the development of a baseball and softball complex. 

Community members filed two writs of certiorari, now combined, 

challenging the rezoning. The district court annulled both writs. The 

community members appealed the decision of the district court arguing

that, since the city council acted in a quasi-judicial function, the actions 

of the city council in passing each of the ordinances was invalid for a 

number of reasons. They also argued there was sufficient opposition to 

the rezoning to trigger a unanimous vote of the city council contained in 

the Dyersville city code. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision 

of the district court and annul the writs.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The 1989 Field of Dreams movie was filmed primarily at the 

Lansing farm now located in Dyersville, in rural Dubuque County.1 Due 

to the popularity of the film, Donald and Rebecca Lansing kept the 

baseball field and their white farmhouse intact for visitors and tourists. 

The house and baseball diamond were a popular destination, and 

thousands of tourists visited the Lansing property each year. In recent 

years, however, tourist numbers have been declining.

The City of Dyersville has a comprehensive plan for the city that 

has been in place for many years. In the early 1960s, the city enacted a 

plan that included Dyersville City Zoning Ordinance No. 285, which 

states purposes for rezoning, one of which includes:

1At the time the movie was filmed, the Lansing farm was not yet annexed into 

the City of Dyersville.

 
3

WHEREAS, the City Council of City of Dyersville, Iowa deems 

it necessary in order to lessen congestion in the streets; to 

secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers; to promote 

health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and 

air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue 

concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate 

provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, 

and other public requirements; to conserve the value of 

buildings and property; and to encourage the most 

appropriate use of land throughout the City with reasonable 

consideration, and in accordance with a comprehensive plan.

Dyersville, Iowa, Zoning Ordinance No. 285 (1962).

The comprehensive plan also states that any zoning regulations 

enacted by the council “shall be made with reasonable consideration” as 

to concerns such as the character of the area, the suitability of the area 

for certain uses, the conservation of buildings and values, and the 

encouragement of the most appropriate use of the land throughout the 

city. Dyersville, Iowa Planning & Zoning Comm’n, Comprehensive Plan 

for Dyersville, Iowa 91 (1962) [hereinafter Comprehensive Plan] (quoting 

Iowa Code § 414.3 (1962)).

In 1974, Dyersville enacted a comprehensive development plan

that included goals for future land use. The development plan included 

key policy goals and recommendations specific to commercial and 

business development. One of the goals was to “discourage proliferation 

of scattered commercial development throughout the residential 

community.” Dubuque Cty. Metro. Area Planning Comm’n, Dyersville 

Area Comprehensive Development Plan 51 (1974). Another 

recommendation was to encourage the expansion of the already-existing 

central business district through a coordinated design scheme. Id. at 52. 

The plan also noted that the city should encourage businesses to be 

located only in those areas that were easily accessible for water and 

sewage services. In 1975, the city supplemented the plan with a 
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requirement for a detailed evaluation of water, sewage, and waste 

systems. See Dyersville, Iowa, Planning & Zoning Comm’n, Dyersville 

Area Comprehensive Development Plan Supplemental Section, Intro 

(1975).

In 1991, the city drafted a community builder plan. This plan 

expressly addressed the impact of the Field of Dreams movie on the city’s 

tourism and concluded that the main concern was that “Dyersville must 

become much more aggressive in guiding and encouraging its own 

growth.” Dyersville, Iowa, Community Builder Plan: A Five Year Strategic 

Plan, Intro 2 (1991) [hereinafter Community Builder Plan]. The 1991 

plan listed twelve opportunities for growth in the city, one of which was 

“continued (national/international) attention for Field of Dreams and 

other tourist attractions.” Id. at 5. It also identified eleven threats to the 

city’s growth, one of which was “loss of Field of Dreams or other major 

tourist attraction.” Id. The plan concluded that, without any changes, 

Dyersville’s three main tourist attractions would continue to attract a 

consistent number of tourists. Id. at 6. In 1997, the city supplemented 

the community builder plan to evaluate which goals had been met and 

how to pursue the remaining goals. Dyersville, Iowa, Community Builder 

Plan (1997).

In 2003, the City of Dyersville drafted a future annexation plan 

that identified areas of nearby land that were likely to be annexed into 

the city in the future. The annexation plan grouped areas of land into 

those likely to be annexed within five years, five to ten years, or ten to 

twenty years. At that time, the Field of Dreams property was not 

included in any of these annexation estimates.

In 2010, the Lansings listed their property for sale. Their property 

included the baseball diamond and white farmhouse, and an additional 
5

193 acres that are used as farmland. Ultimately, the Lansings signed a 

purchase agreement with Mike and Denise Stillman. The sale was

contingent upon the property being rezoned for commercial use, among 

other things. The Stillmans intended to create All-Star Ballpark Heaven 

on the land, a baseball and softball complex with up to twenty-four fields

to be used for youth baseball and softball. They intended to continue to 

maintain the farmhouse and original baseball diamond as a tourist

attraction.

The Dyersville City Council met on November 21, 2011. One of the 

action items on the agenda was “Authorize City Administrator to Sign IIW 

Proposal for Professional Services for Field of Dreams Utilities Extension 

Feasibility Study 2011.” The proposal provided that the City of Dyersville 

would pay IIW Engineering approximately $9625 to prepare a utilities 

extension feasibility study. This study would determine the cost and 

logistics of providing water and sewer services to the Field of Dreams site. 

The feasibility study was discussed for approximately nineteen minutes, 

with the mayor,2 the city administrator,3 and various city council 

members weighing in. Jacque Rahe, the director of the Dyersville 

Economic Development Corporation (DEDC) also discussed how to 

secure funding for the project so the city could avoid any taxpayer 

burden. She discussed talking to state officials to secure funding and a 

future meeting with the Governor. The motion to approve the study was 

passed unanimously by the city council. On December 5, the city 

council held a special meeting immediately following the regular city 

council meeting. The sole agenda item for the special meeting was a

2The mayor of Dyersville at the time of the meeting was James Heavens.

3The city administrator of Dyersville at the time of the meeting was Michael 

Michels.

 
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presentation by the Stillmans, entitled “Future Development of Field of 

Dreams.”

In December, the Stillmans organized a bus trip to Des Moines for 

the purpose of meeting with legislators and other state officials to discuss 

financing the All-Star Ballpark Heaven project. The mayor and two city 

council members joined the Stillmans on the bus trip to Des Moines, and 

they also attended a group dinner. A member of the planning and zoning 

commission also participated in the bus trip to Des Moines. The 

Stillmans presumably funded both the bus trip and the dinner. The 

purpose of the trip and the dinner was to begin lobbying state officials for 

financial assistance in developing the project.

In early 2012, the Strategic Economics Group from Des Moines 

completed an economic and fiscal impact study report regarding the 

proposed project. The report analyzed the proposed project, the general 

Dubuque County area, and the potential economic impact of the project. 

The report predicted the project would result in the creation of 1400 new 

jobs by its eighth year of operation. The report also estimated $34.1 

million in additional payroll and $102 million in additional goods and 

services for the State of Iowa, in addition to increases in local tax 

revenue. 

The city council met again on February 20, 2012, and one of the 

agenda items was the “Field of Dreams Extension.” A number of the 

petitioners and other community members attended the meeting and 

were able to speak about the proposed All-Star Ballpark Heaven complex. 

Petitioner Wayne Vorwald expressed concerns about having open-range 

cattle in the area if the project were completed because of the 

juxtaposition of urban and farming areas. Petitioners Jeff Pape and 

Wayne Ameskamp mentioned concerns with runoff into the nearby creek
7

and flooding. Ron Oberbroeckling was worried about the project 

interfering with deer hunting in the area. A number of community 

members talked about growing up on family farms and wanting to 

maintain those farms and values for their own families. Petitioner Matt 

Mescher discussed traffic concerns because one of the most dangerous 

intersections in the state is located in Dyersville. He also stated that his 

“neighbors do not want ball fields in the middle of their cornfields.” 

Petitioners Mescher and Vorwald both proposed moving the project to the 

Dyersville business park.

Denise Stillman and several community members spoke in favor of 

the proposed project. Jacque Rahe stated that the DEDC supported the 

project because its mission is to make Dyersville “a better place to live, 

work and play.” She also expressed concern about being left out of 

neighborhood meetings about the project and urged the community to 

include the DEDC.

At the April 2 city council meeting, an engineer from IIW 

Engineering introduced his conceptual water and sewer evaluation report 

and discussed the details of how to provide water and sewer services to 

the Field of Dreams area. The report estimated it would cost 

approximately $1.1 million to run water to the complex and 

approximately $2.9 million to provide sewer service. Council members 

and at least one community member asked questions about the report. 

One nearby resident expressed concerns she and her neighbors had 

about the impact on their wells.

At the May 7 city council meeting, council member Molly Evers 

expressed concerns about how the project would affect the community 

and requested more information about the timeline. She also mentioned 

she had received a number of phone calls and other correspondence from 
8

community members about the project. She urged them to speak up and 

asked when the council would hold a public hearing in order to permit 

members from the community to speak. Two other council members 

agreed that they wanted to know what the citizens of Dyersville were 

thinking, and stated that they had also heard from a number of 

community members about the proposed project.

On May 21, the council met again and one of the agenda items was 

to receive a file and presentation by Joe Scherrman in support of the AllStar Ballpark Heaven project. Scherrman operates a business near 

Dyersville. He opined that the best way to preserve the original movie 

site was to expand and build extra fields around it. Council member 

Evers again expressed concern about input from the community and 

asked when a public hearing would be set. At least one of the petitioners 

was present at the meeting. Petitioner Ameskamp expressed concerns 

about flooding, water runoff, and traffic. He also asked what would 

happen to the land if the project failed and there were not enough kids in 

and around Dyersville to support twenty-four new baseball and softball 

fields. He was also concerned about the impact the project would have 

on his ability to hunt on his own land.

At the June 4 city council meeting, one of the council members 

moved to table Resolution 31-12. The resolution was an application by 

the Lansings and several other Dubuque County property owners who 

were seeking to voluntarily annex their property into the City of 

Dyersville.4 The annexation of the Lansing property into the city was one 

of the conditions of the Stillmans’ purchase agreement for the Lansing 

4The property owners who were seeking to annex their property into Dyersville 

were Donald L. Lansing, Rebecca L. Lansing, Gerald Deutmeyer, Alice M. Deutmeyer, 

John E. Rahe, Nicole Rahe, Keith G. Rahe, Jacque K. Rahe, and Dorothy Meyer.

 
9

farm. Because the application still needed the signature of one of the 

property owners, the resolution was tabled.

On June 11, a special meeting of the Dyersville City Council was 

held with the mayor and all council members present. A number of 

community members spoke about the proposed project, both in favor of 

and against. A number of community members continued to express 

concerns about traffic, water runoff, hunting, and rural family values. 

Several members of the public who spoke were undecided, but were 

upset with some of the false information that was being spread by 

community members who were opposed to the project. A handful of the 

community members present expressed a desire for a referendum or vote 

on the issue of the proposed project and any necessary zoning change. 

The council members also discussed Resolution 31-12 and unanimously 

voted to set the date to consider the annexation request for July 2.

On June 18, the city council met in a regular session to discuss 

Resolution 35-12, which was a resolution requesting approval of a 

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the City of Dyersville 

and Go the Distance Baseball, LLC.5 The MOU was signed by the mayor 

and the developers. It set forth components that were key to the 

anticipated development agreement to create the All-Star Ballpark 

Heaven. The key points were

I) Annexation

The City will put forth its best effort to annex all of the 

property the Company has under contract (the “Property”) in 

Dubuque County into the city limits by October 1, 2012. 

The Company will provide reasonable assistance that shall 

not require out-of-pocket costs to meet this goal.

5Go the Distance Baseball, LLC is a limited liability company in Iowa. Denise 

Stillman is a part owner of Go the Distance, and Go the Distance is the company that 

would complete and manage the proposed All-Star Ballpark Heaven.

 
10

II) TIF and Zoning

The City will put forth its best effort to undertake the process 

of adding the Property to the Urban Renewal Area, 

establishing the Property as a tax increment financing 

district. Furthermore, the City agrees to use its best efforts 

to rezone the Property to commercial use or other 

appropriate use to allow the Company to use it for its 

intended purpose.

III) Infrastructure Project

The Company agrees to construct the Infrastructure Project 

to connect the Property to the city’s water and sewer services 

for an estimated cost of $2.48M and in accordance with the 

specifications of the City. The Infrastructure Project shall be 

completed by no later than December 30, 2014.

IV) Fund Obligation and Payments

The City will undertake the authorization of a development 

agreement under which the City would agree to make 

economic development payments (the “Payments”) to the 

Company for a period not to exceed 15 years. The amount of 

Payments to be made under the agreement will be subject to 

future negotiation amongst the parties. The City anticipates 

funding Payments in an amount equal to the actual costs of 

the Infrastructure Project without annual appropriation 

contingencies. Furthermore the City anticipates considering 

the provision of additional Payments provided that such 

payments are made subject to annual appropriation by the 

City Council. In any event all Payments will be funded 

exclusively from incremental property tax (TIF) revenues 

received by the City which are attributable to the Property.

During this meeting, the city attorney for Dyersville was asked to explain 

the MOU. He explained that it merely contained the intention of the 

parties so both parties would know that they were “headed in the same 

direction and that there’s no road blocks that somebody may throw up.” 

He further explained that the vote on the resolution would simply allow 

the council to take a vote on annexation, rezoning, and approval of the 

development agreement. If any of those items failed a vote, then the 

project would be done.
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A number of residents spoke at the June 18 meeting, both in 

support of and in opposition to the project. Denise Stillman also spoke 

at the meeting and discussed the possibility of creating a dome over the 

fields for year-round play and a dormitory building for coaches and 

players to stay during tournaments. The council unanimously voted to 

approve the resolution.

On July 2, the council met to discuss the resolution regarding the 

voluntary annexation of property into the City of Dyersville. The mayor 

and all five city council members were present, in addition to the city 

attorney. A number of community members were present. A few 

community members, some of whom are petitioners in this case, 

appeared at the meeting with their attorney, Susan Hess. A television 

crew from KCRG Channel 9 news was present at the meeting. 

Stillman spoke first in support of the project. She then introduced 

Ron Kittle, a former professional baseball player. He spoke about the 

impact of baseball in his life and the benefits the project could bring to 

Dyersville. The council then opened the meeting up to community 

members who spoke against the proposed project. Petitioner Mescher 

spoke about funding concerns and the impact on taxpayers. He also 

spoke about growing division in the small community and how the 

council should be taking noise and pollution into account in addition to 

economic benefits. Jack Mescher, son of petitioner Mescher, also spoke 

against the annexation. He said the city had not done the requisite 

hydraulic, traffic, or pollution studies. Attorney Hess stated that the 

citizens of Dyersville wanted to vote on the issue.6

6The city attorney responded that the application for voluntary annexation was 

considered by the council, not a public vote, under Iowa Code section 368.7.

 
12

Director of the DEDC, Jacque Rahe, spoke in support of the 

voluntary annexation. She pointed to the reports that estimated the 

project would provide twenty-four full time, year-round jobs for the 

citizens of Dyersville. Eric Schmechel from the Dubuque Soil and Water 

Conservation District spoke to address concerns about watershed 

management. The council members asked him questions about storm

water and watershed management practices. He opined that, if done 

correctly, the project could actually improve the location’s water runoff 

problems. When the motion came to a vote, the council voted 4–1 to 

approve the resolution. Evers was the sole council member voting no. 

The council also voted on Resolution 38-12, which was a 

resolution to refer the rezoning of the property from A-1 Agriculture to C2 Commercial to the planning and zoning commission. The city 

administrator explained that the proposal for rezoning was for 

conditional use 

for the preservation of the existing white farmhouse with 

wrap-around porch overlooking the Field of Dreams, the 

preservation of the existing Field of Dreams, and the creation 

and construction of All-Star Ballpark having a complex 

featuring 24 baseball and softball fields targeted for 

competition and training for youth 8 to 14 and incidental 

uses thereof.

The city council unanimously voted to send the resolution to the zoning 

commission. On July 3, the zoning commission sent a notice to 

interested property owners about the public hearing it would hold 

regarding the proposed rezoning.

On July 8, the zoning commission hosted a work session at the 

Dyersville Social Center. The agenda listed the work session as a 

“community overview meeting” regarding the project, which would 

include a presentation followed by an opportunity for the community 
13

members to ask questions. The overview was provided by Denise 

Stillman.

The zoning commission met the following day to discuss rezoning 

the Field of Dreams property from agricultural to commercial. The city 

administrator began by providing an overview to the zoning commission 

about the proposed rezoning. He described the area to be rezoned, which 

included a 200-foot buffer zone on three sides of the area that would 

remain agricultural. He explained that the buffer zone was “created to 

protect adjoining property owners” and would prevent concerns about 

children playing baseball right up against the adjoining property lines. 

He also described how the buffer zone would allow the adjacent farms to 

continue to spread manure and engage in other farming activities 

without interrupting the baseball and softball facilities. He informed the 

zoning commission that the city council had looked into the impact on 

property values, storm water and drainage issues, and crime. 

A number of the petitioners also attended the meeting and were 

able to offer their opinions to the zoning commission. Petitioner Mescher 

expressed concerns that the proposed 200-foot buffer zone was designed 

to prevent the neighboring property owners from objecting, since the new 

commercial zoning area would not directly touch their land. His son also 

spoke about the buffer zone and concerns about the impact on water 

issues in the area. Several other community members had the 

opportunity to offer their opinions of the project, both in favor of and in 

opposition to the project.

Two members of IIW Engineering spoke about the study and report 

their group had completed. One engineer offered information about the 

wastewater study and how the generated wastewater would be used. 

Another spoke about the traffic concerns that had been raised by 
14

community members and how the roads would be affected by increased 

traffic to the baseball and softball complex. After everyone was offered 

the opportunity to speak, the zoning commission unanimously voted to 

approve a positive recommendation in favor of the proposed rezoning.

On July 16, the city council met to consider Resolution 47-12, 

which recommended setting a date for the council to consider the 

proposed rezoning. The city council unanimously voted to approve the 

resolution and set the date for August 6. On July 25, the council 

published a notice in the local newspaper. On August 3, the agenda for 

the meeting was posted in the directory at Dyersville City Hall and on the 

Dyersville city website. The agenda was also sent to the Cedar Rapids 

Gazette, the Telegraph Herald, and the Dyersville newspapers. The 

agenda was additionally provided to the Dyersville Police Department and 

two radio news stations, KDST and KMCH. 

The agenda listed the first action item as a public hearing “to 

approve the rezoning of certain property from A-1 Agricultural to C-2 

Commercial.” The second item action was Ordinance 770, which 

included the legal description of the land to be rezoned as

SW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 22, Township 89 North, 

Range 2 West of the 5th Principal Meridian in Dubuque 

County, Iowa, except for the Northerly 200 feet thereof; 

SW 1/4 of the SW 1/4 of Section 23, Township 89 North, 

Range 2 West of the 5th Principal Meridian in Dubuque 

County, Iowa, except for the Northerly and Easterly 200 feet 

thereof;

NE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of Section 27, Township 89 North, 

Range 2 West of the 5th Principal Meridian in Dubuque 

County, Iowa, except for the South 200 feet of the West 200 

feet and the West 200 feet of the South 200 feet thereof;

NW 1/4 of the NW 1/4 of Section 26, Township 89 North, 

Range 2 West of the 5th Principal Meridian in Dubuque 

County, Iowa, except for the Southerly 200 feet of the East 

400 feet and the Easterly 200 feet thereof; 
15

Lot 1 of the SW 1/4 of the NW 1/4 of Section 26, Township 

89 North, Range 2 West of the 5th Principal Meridian in 

Dubuque County, Iowa, except for Southerly and Easterly 

200 feet thereof; and 

Lot 2 of Trinity Acres of the SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of Section 

27, Township 89 North, Range 2 West of the 5th Principal 

Meridian in Dubuque County, Iowa, except for the Southerly 

and Westerly 200 feet thereof.

At the August 6 city council meeting, attorney Hess spoke first. 

She urged the council to remain impartial and stated it was acting in a 

quasi-judicial manner and therefore was required to remain impartial. 

She noted concerns with the planning and zoning commission and 

opined that it had failed to remain impartial because the members

attended a work session presentation put on by the developer. She 

asked the council not to vote on the rezoning at the meeting and to table 

the topic for a later meeting. She also referred to a letter she wrote that 

she had been unsuccessful in delivering to the council earlier that day. 

The city attorney informed the council members that he would review the 

letter Hess wrote on behalf of a group of concerned Dyersville citizens. 

He also advised the council members that a unanimous vote was not 

required for the proposed rezoning. 

A number of the petitioners attended the meeting, in addition to 

other community members. There was approximately thirty minutes of 

discussion before the citizens at the meeting stopped volunteering to 

speak. Council member Evers moved to close the public hearing, which 

was seconded. She then moved to table the discussion of Ordinance 

770, but received no second. The city council voted to approve the first 

reading of the ordinance, and the motion passed in a vote of 4–1, with 

council member Evers voting no. Evers then read a written statement 

and expressed community concerns about the project. She stated that 

more members of the community opposed the project than favored it. 
16

The council moved to waive the second and third readings of the 

ordinance. The motions passed with votes of 4–1. Evers was the sole

council member voting no.

On September 4, 2012, the Residential and Agricultural Advisory 

Committee, L.L.C. and twenty-three other individuals7 (petitioners) filed a 

petition for writ of certiorari and a request for a stay and injunction 

against the Dyersville City Council, the mayor of Dyersville, and the 

individual city council members (city council). The petitioners resisted 

the rezoning of the Field of Dreams property from A-1 Agricultural to C-2 

Commercial. They argued the city council acted in violation of both Iowa 

law and Dyersville city ordinances; in excess of its authority; arbitrarily 

and capriciously; and against public safety, health, morals, and the 

general welfare. 

The district court set a one-hour hearing for September 25. After 

the hearing was set, Go the Distance filed a petition to intervene. Shortly 

thereafter, F.O.D. Real Estate, L.L.C.; Field of Dreams Movie Site, Inc.;

and Donald and Rebecca Lansing also filed petitions to intervene. On 

September 21, the city council filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It

claimed the Residential and Agricultural Advisory Committee lacked 

standing, and further, the city council had been acting in a legislative 

capacity and was immune from suit. The petitioners responded by filing 

a request to hold a later hearing because additional testimony and 

discovery was necessary “to determine the legality of the City Council’s 

action.” On September 25—the day the hearing was scheduled—the city 

council filed a second motion to dismiss, this time claiming the petition 

7Two of the individuals later dismissed their claims.

 
17

for writ of certiorari failed to state a claim. The petitioners resisted the 

city council’s motion to dismiss.

On October 9, the district court issued its order denying the 

petition for writ of certiorari. In the order, the district court concluded,

Clearly, the Dyersville City Council had jurisdiction to 

hear and decide the proposed rezoning of the property in 

question. The Defendants have complied with any and all 

procedural requirements pertaining to the rezoning of the 

property. Proper due process rights have been afforded the 

Plaintiffs. The Defendants heard and considered numerous 

issues and concerns associated with the rezoning of the 

property. The Zoning and Planning Commission voted 8–0 in 

favor of recommending the proposed zoning change. The 

Court finds no illegality in the rezoning of the property. The 

Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the 

merits.

The petitioners then filed an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion

to enlarge, amend, or modify the order. They claimed the district court 

should not have determined the legality of the rezoning at the hearing

because the hearing was only to determine whether a writ of certiorari 

should issue and not the merits of the case. The petitioners also argued 

the district court did not follow proper procedure for issuance of a writ of 

certiorari or consider all of the issues raised in the petition. The 

petitioners requested that the district court enter an order granting their 

request for additional testimony and discovery. The district court denied 

the 1.904(2) motion, and the plaintiffs appealed. We transferred the 

appeal to the court of appeals. 

While this appeal was pending, the council became aware that 

Ordinance 770 contained an error in the legal description of the land. 

The ordinance described part of the land as “SW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of 

Section 22, Township 89 North, Range 2 West of the 5th Principal 

Meridian in Dubuque County, Iowa, except for the Northerly 200 feet 
18

thereof.” (Emphasis added.) The correct description should have listed 

the property as “SE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 22, Township 89 North, 

Range 2 West of the 5th Principal Meridian in Dubuque County, Iowa, 

except for the Northerly 200 feet thereof.” (Emphasis added.) At the May 

6, 2013 city council meeting, the council voted 4–1 to approve Ordinance 

777, which corrected the description of the land contained in Ordinance 

770. The public was invited to speak on the issue, but no one 

volunteered. The city attorney classified the mistake as a typo and noted 

that the prior public hearing had given fair notice to the public and 

everyone knew which parcel of land was being discussed at the rezoning 

hearing.

Thereafter, a second petition for writ of certiorari was filed on May 

15, 2013. This second writ of certiorari was filed in response to the city 

council’s vote approving Ordinance 777 correcting the description of the 

rezoned land. The district court directed that this writ issue on May 23, 

and the writ was returned on June 10. Trial on the second writ was set 

to begin on January 6, 2014.

The court of appeals issued its decision on the first writ of 

certiorari on November 6, 2013.8 The court of appeals concluded that 

the district court had improperly decided the merits of the petition for 

writ of certiorari, rather than confine its decision to whether the writ 

should be issued. The court of appeals reversed the decision of the 

district court and remanded the case to the district court for further 

proceedings.

On November 8, the petitioners filed a motion to consolidate the 

two writs of certiorari and continue the trial. The district court granted 

8Residential & Agric. Advisory Comm., L.L.C. v. Dyersville City Council, 2013

WL5951191 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2013).

 
19

the motion to consolidate and set a hearing for January 6, 2014. On 

January 3, Go the Distance withdrew its motion to intervene.

The pending matters came before the district court for hearing on 

January 6. The district court heard four issues: (1) the city council’s 

motion to dismiss the individual city council members and mayor, (2) the

petitioners’ 1.904(2) motion, (3) the petitioners’ request for an injunction, 

and (4) the petitioners’ motion for discovery. The district court issued its 

order on January 21 and denied the motion to dismiss the individual city 

council members, the 1.904(2) motion, and the request for an injunction. 

The district court denied the motion to dismiss the individual council 

members because legislative immunity would only apply if the council 

acted in a legislative capacity, which it concluded was a question of fact. 

The district court denied the 1.904 motion because it raised arguments 

that petitioners were required to appeal to the Board of Adjustment, but 

had failed to do. The district court denied the request for an injunction 

to halt development because none of the named respondents owned the 

property, and therefore the injunction would be meaningless.9 The 

district court allowed the petitioners to continue with discovery. 

On May 1, the petitioners filed a motion for issuance of writ. The 

court of appeals decision from November 6, 2013, required the district 

court to either order a writ or take other action on remand. At the time 

the petitioners filed the motion, the district court had yet to issue a writ 

or take any other action on remand. The district court issued the writ on 

May 29, and the writ was returned on June 12. The district court set the 

consolidated cases for trial.

9Neither the Lansings nor the Stillmans were ever a party to the proceedings. By 

the time the district court issued this order, the closing had occurred and the Stillmans 

owned the Field of Dreams site.

 
20

Trial was held between February 16 and February 24, 2015. The 

district court issued its order on May 21, holding that the actions of the 

Dyersville City Council were sustained and the writs with respect to 

Ordinances 770 and 777 were annulled. Petitioners filed a motion to 

enlarge, which the district court denied on July 24. The petitioners filed 

an appeal, which we retained.

II. Analysis.

On appeal, the petitioners raise a number of issues. They argue 

the district court applied the incorrect standard of review to the city 

council’s rezoning of the land. They argue the council’s actions were 

quasi-judicial in nature rather than legislative, triggering a different 

standard of review. They allege Ordinance 770 is invalid for a number of 

reasons. They also argue there was sufficient opposition to the 

ordinance from adjacent landowners to trigger Dyersville Code section 

165.39(5). They assert Ordinance 777 is invalid because it purported to 

rezone property without following proper procedure. Last, they assert 

equal protection and due process violations. We address each issue in 

turn.

A. Correct Standard of Review of the City Council’s Actions. 

We must first address the proper standard of review in this action. The 

petitioners argue the district court applied the wrong standard of review 

to the city council’s actions in rezoning the Field of Dreams site. They 

argue the council’s actions were quasi-judicial in nature rather than 

legislative. The district court order concluded that, for purposes of 

determining whether certiorari was available, the council was acting in a 

quasi-judicial manner. However, the underlying decision to rezone was a

legislative function and the council was therefore not required to make 
21

findings of fact or provide for a more formal proceeding similar to a 

judicial proceeding. 

In chapter 335 of the Iowa Code, the legislature grants the county 

boards of supervisors the authority to determine zoning matters in the 

counties. Iowa Code §§ 335.1, .3 (2015); see also Perkins v. Bd. of 

Supervisors, 636 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Iowa 2001). This includes the power to 

designate areas into districts and to regulate the use of land within those 

districts. Iowa Code §§ 335.3, .4. “The board of supervisors shall 

provide for the manner in which the regulations and restrictions and the 

boundaries of the districts shall be determined, established, and 

enforced, and from time to time amended, supplemented, or changed.” 

Id. § 335.6.

Chapter 414 goes on to provide specific rules, powers, and duties 

related to city zoning. Iowa Code section 414.4 provides that the city 

council “shall provide for the manner in which the regulations and 

restrictions and the boundaries of the districts shall be determined, 

established, and enforced, and from time to time amended, 

supplemented, or changed.” Id. § 414.4. To do so, the city council must 

also follow proper procedure. Id. The council must give the community 

members published notice of the time and place of a public hearing with 

at least seven days’ notice. Id.; see also id. § 362.3. The council must 

hold a public hearing during which community members are offered the 

opportunity to offer opinions regarding the proposed zoning or rezoning. 

Id. § 414.4. Iowa Code section 414.5 provides specific voting rules for 

situations where an ordinance would change land from one zoning 

district to another. Id. § 414.5. In this situation, if twenty percent or 

more of the owners of property located within 200 feet of the proposed 

rezoning area file a written protest, the council is required to approve the 
22

rezoning ordinance by a vote of at least three-fourths of the members. 

Id. 

The statutory scheme set forth in the Iowa Code mirrors the 

general rule that zoning determinations are a legislative function of a city 

council or board of supervisors. 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning

§ 2, at 18–19 (2016). Likewise, we have long recognized that “[z]oning 

decisions are an exercise of the police power to promote the health, 

safety, order and morals of society.” Montgomery v. Bremer Cty. Bd. of 

Supervisors, 299 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Iowa 1980). A city council or board of 

supervisors exercises its delegated police power through zoning decisions 

so long as the decisions are “made in accordance with a comprehensive 

plan and designed . . . to encourage efficient urban development patterns 

. . . [and] to promote health and the general welfare.” Iowa Code § 414.3; 

id. § 335.5; see also Molo Oil Co. v. City of Dubuque, 692 N.W.2d 686, 691

(Iowa 2005). A zoning decision or regulation is an exercise of delegated 

police powers so long as it is

made with reasonable consideration, among other things, as 

to the character of the area of the district and the peculiar 

suitability of such area for particular uses, and with a view 

to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the 

most appropriate use of land throughout [the] city.

Iowa Code § 414.3(2). However, we have also recognized that there are 

some situations in which a zoning decision can take on a quasi-judicial 

nature that may necessitate a different standard of review than the 

normally limited standard of review we utilize when reviewing zoning 

decisions. See, e.g., Sutton v. Dubuque City Council, 729 N.W.2d 796, 

797 (Iowa 2006).

Some historical perspective helps in our analysis. In Buechele v. 

Ray, we laid out the test to determine whether an action is judicial or 
23

quasi-judicial, which we noted is a difficult determination. 219 N.W.2d 

679, 681 (Iowa 1974). The pertinent rule of procedure states “[a] party 

may commence a certiorari action when authorized by statute or when 

the party claims an inferior tribunal, board, or officer, exercising judicial 

functions, or a judicial magistrate exceeded proper jurisdiction or 

otherwise acted illegally.” Iowa R. Civil P. 1.1401; see also Buechele, 219 

N.W.2d at 681.10 The term “judicial functions” as utilized in this 

particular rule is not construed strictly or technically and can apply if 

the underlying act is quasi-judicial. Buechele, 219 N.W.2d at 681.

Other courts have found that a body that is not a court exercises a 

judicial function when “(1) the questioned act involves a proceeding in 

which notice and opportunity to be heard are required; or (2) a 

determination of rights of parties is made which requires the exercise of 

discretion in finding facts and applying the law thereto.” Id. While our 

analysis of judicial function is not as restrictive, we afford weight to the 

listed judicial attributes. Id. We also consider “whether or not the 

challenged act goes to the determination of some right the protection of 

which is the peculiar office of the courts.” Id. However, merely 

exercising judgment or discretion is not sufficient to constitute a quasijudicial act. Id.

In Buechele, we were asked to determine whether the State 

Executive Council’s decision to employ an attorney to defend a state 

representative in a slander action constituted a quasi-judicial act. Id. at 

680. The petitioners brought the action in a writ for certiorari. Id. The 

council argued on appeal that its act was not a judicial or quasi-judicial 

function, and therefore certiorari review was not appropriate. Id. at 681. 

10At the time the Buechele case was decided, the same rule was contained in 

Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 306.

 
24

We held that the council’s action was a discretionary, executive decision 

and not the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Id. at 682. 

In reaching this decision, we noted that none of the council’s actions had 

any of the attributes normally associated with judicial functions: the 

council was not required to give notice, hold a hearing, take evidence, 

engage in fact finding, or make legal conclusions. Id.

In Montgomery, perhaps the most analogous case to the one before 

us now, the board rezoned two parcels of land from agricultural to 

industrial after two rezoning petitions were filed. 299 N.W.2d at 691. 

Following the rezoning petitions, the board gave notice, held a public 

hearing, and heard from both proponents and opponents of the rezoning 

proposal. Id. The board unanimously approved both rezoning requests. 

Id. Opponents of the rezoning brought petitions for writ of certiorari in 

the district court, which were later combined. Id.

On appeal, we addressed the question of the proper scope of review 

for a certiorari proceeding challenging a board of supervisors’ rezoning 

decision. Id. at 692. We confirmed that a writ of certiorari was the 

proper procedure for challenging the board’s amendments to the 

rezoning ordinance. Id. We found that the zoning decision by the board 

was an exercise of its delegated police power and held that “the generally 

limited scope of review applicable to this case is to determine whether the 

decision by the Board to rezone is fairly debatable.” Id.

In Sutton, the city council passed an ordinance that amended the 

city’s existing zoning code. 729 N.W.2d at 797. The ordinance 

reclassified property from a commercial recreation district to a planned 

unit development (PUD) district. Id. The ordinance passed with a vote of 

four to three, and two objectors brought a challenge to the rezoning 

decision with a petition for writ of certiorari. Id. The action was 
25

dismissed as untimely, and the objectors then brought an action for 

declaratory judgment. Id. The city argued the claims were barred 

because certiorari was the exclusive remedy and the time limitation for 

bringing a certiorari challenge had already passed. Id. We ultimately 

held that the opponents of the rezoning decision were required to bring a 

writ of certiorari and therefore were precluded from bringing the 

declaratory judgment action. Id. at 799.

We also discussed the standards for determining whether a zoning 

decision has remained a legislative function or evolved into a quasijudicial function. Id. at 798. We expanded on the two-part test from 

Buechele by citing to factors identified by the Washington Supreme Court

in determining whether zoning activities are quasi-judicial in nature or 

legislative in nature:

(1) rezoning ordinarily occurs in response to a citizen 

application followed by a statutorily mandated public 

hearing; (2) as a result of such applications, readily 

identifiable proponents and opponents weigh in on the 

process; and (3) the decision is localized in its application 

affecting a particular group of citizens more acutely than the 

public at large.

Id.; see also Fleming v. Tacoma, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (Wash. 1972) (en 

banc)). While we cited these factors with approval, we had the 

opportunity to review the entirety of the Fleming case and did not choose 

to adopt the Washington court’s holding in that case that all public 

zoning hearings should be classified as adjudicatory.11 Sutton, 729 

N.W.2d at 798; see also Fleming, 502 P.2d at 331.

11While the Washington court held in Fleming that all zoning hearings should be 

classified as adjudicatory, the decision was later overruled in Raynes v. City of 

Leavenworth, following a legislative amendment. 821 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Wash. 1992) (en 

banc). In Raynes, the court held that the particular board decision amending a zoning 

ordinance was a legislative function. Id. at 1208.

 
26

The Sutton case dealt with a different situation than many of our 

previous zoning cases because it involved PUD zoning. Sutton, 729 

N.W.2d at 798. We noted that the “quasi-judicial character of municipal 

rezoning is particularly evident in matters involving PUD zoning.” Id. We 

discussed the distinction between traditional rezoning and PUD zoning:

[Creating] zoning districts and rezoning land are legislative 

actions, and . . . trial courts are not permitted to sit as 

“super zoning boards” and overturn a board’s legislative 

efforts.

. . . . 

The planned unit development concept varies from the 

traditional concept of zoning classifications. It permits a 

flexible approach to the regulation of land uses. Compliance 

must be measured against certain stated standards. . . .

. . . [S]ince the Board was called upon to review an 

interpretation and application of an ordinance . . . and the 

ordinance was not challenged per se, the Board’s decision 

was “clearly quasi-judicial.”

Id. (quoting Hirt v. Polk Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 578 So. 2d 415, 417 

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).

We find the situation we decide today to be much more analogous 

to the one we faced in Montgomery than in Sutton. In this case, the city 

council was acting in a legislative function in furtherance of its delegated 

police powers. The council was not sitting to “determin[e] adjudicative 

facts to decide the legal rights, privileges or duties of a particular party 

based on that party’s particular circumstances.” Montgomery, 299 

N.W.2d at 694. The city council decision to rezone was not undertaken 

to weigh the legal rights of one party (the All-Star Ballpark Heaven) 

versus another party (the petitioners). The council weighed all of the 

information, reports, and comments available to it in order to determine 

whether rezoning was in the best interest of the city as a whole. See, 
27

e.g., Iowa Code § 414.3(1) (describing the delegated police powers to 

include making decisions to promote health and the general welfare of 

the community). We therefore hold that the proper standard of review in 

this case is “the generally limited scope of review” we utilize in order “to 

determine whether the decision by the Board to rezone is fairly 

debatable.” Montgomery, 299 N.W.2d at 692.

Zoning regulations carry a strong presumption of validity. Molo 

Oil, 692 N.W.2d at 691. A zoning regulation “is valid if it has any real, 

substantial relation to the public health, comfort, safety, and welfare, 

including the maintenance of property values.” Id. (quoting Shriver v. 

City of Okoboji, 567 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Iowa 1997)). If the reasonableness 

of a zoning ordinance is “fairly debatable,” then we decline to substitute 

our judgment for that of the city council or board of supervisors. Id. The 

reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is “fairly debatable” when 

for any reason it is open to dispute or controversy on 

grounds that make sense or point to a logical deduction, and 

where reasonable minds may differ; or where the evidence 

provides a basis for a fair difference of opinion as to its 

application to a particular property.

Id.; see also Neuzil v. City of Iowa City, 451 N.W.2d 159, 163–64 (Iowa 

1990).

B. Validity of Ordinance 770. The petitioners allege Ordinance 

770 is invalid for a number of reasons. They assert the city council was 

not impartial; the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable; 

the rezoning was contrary to the city’s comprehensive plan; and the 

ordinance constitutes illegal spot zoning. We discuss each of the 

petitioners’ arguments in turn.

1. Partiality of the city council. The decision to rezone the Field of 

Dreams site was subject to fair debate. See Molo Oil, 692 N.W.2d at 691. 
28

Members of the community came to multiple public hearings and 

multiple council meetings. A number of community members—not 

limited to the petitioners in this case—were against the rezoning. 

However, other community members were unsure whether they 

supported the rezoning and requested more information. Still others 

expressed support for the rezoning and the new baseball and softball 

complex. While it is true that several council members viewed the 

rezoning and the project as an opportunity for the city, each council 

member attended all meetings, read reports, listened to citizens speak for 

and against the project, asked questions, and investigated issues 

regarding water, sewage, crime, traffic, and other issues. Further 

demonstrating that the issue was subject to fair debate is the final vote 

on the decision to rezone. The final vote was 4–1, with one council 

member voting against rezoning.

There is nothing in the record that demonstrates that any council 

member or the mayor had any family or financial interest in the project.

The petitioners claim that members of the city council and mayor could 

not be impartial or unbiased due to the mayor signing the MOU with the 

developers, and several members participating in an economic 

development bus trip to Des Moines to discuss the project with 

legislators and state officials. We disagree. The mere participation in 

such activities for the potential benefit of the city does not establish 

partiality or bias. Rather, this is more akin to the council members 

upholding their public duty by performing their due diligence in 

determining what state aid might be available to help with the project 

before any formal action was undertaken. The city council made its

decision based on what it believed was best for the community after a full 
29

and open discussion of the issues over many months. We agree with the 

district court that the city council was impartial in its rezoning decision. 

2. Arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The party attacking the 

validity of a zoning regulation carries the burden of demonstrating the 

zoning is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory. Id. A 

regulation is arbitrary and unreasonable when it is not authorized by 

statute or is contrary or unsupported by the facts. Baker v. Bd. of 

Adjustment, 671 N.W.2d 405, 413 (Iowa 2003).

The city council’s decision to rezone the Field of Dreams site was 

supported by the facts and was not arbitrary, capricious, or 

unreasonable. The city council made its decision after a full and lengthy 

consideration of the overall welfare of the city. The city council

investigated water, sewage, traffic, crime, and water runoff. It received 

economic reports detailing increased jobs and revenue for the state and 

city. Each member of the city council attended meetings, read reports, 

asked questions, participated in public hearings, listened to the opinions 

of community members, and considered the economic benefits and 

impact on the city.

The petitioners also contend it was unreasonable for the mayor to 

enter into the MOU. We have generally analyzed challenges to these 

types of agreements to determine whether they are unreasonable, 

arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory. See, e.g., Blumenthal Inv. Trusts 

v. City of West Des Moines, 636 N.W.2d 255, 266 (Iowa 2001). While the 

council members considered the MOU, they were not bound by it. See, 

e.g., Marco Dev. Corp. v. City of Cedar Falls, 473 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 

1991). The MOU was simply an agreement whereby the council agreed 

to consider a rezoning proposal partially due to the incredibly unique 

circumstances surrounding the Field of Dreams land. Given the unique 
30

parcel of land and the juxtaposition of agriculture and commercial land

that already existed, it was not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious for 

the city to agree to consider the possibility of rezoning the area.

3. Relationship to the city’s comprehensive plan. Iowa Code section 

414.3 requires that any zoning regulations adopted by a city council or 

board of supervisors “shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive 

plan.” Iowa Code § 414.3. The party challenging a zoning decision on 

the basis that it was not made in accordance with the city’s 

comprehensive plan carries a heavy burden that requires the party to 

counter the “strong presumption of validity accorded zoning decisions.” 

37 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 383 (1996 & Supp. 2016), Westlaw 

(database updated Dec. 2016). This requirement was adopted to prevent 

haphazard zoning. Wolf v. City of Ely, 493 N.W.2d 846, 849 (Iowa 1992). 

The purpose of the comprehensive plan requirement is to ensure a board 

or council acts rationally in applying its delegated zoning authority. Id.

at 849.

In the context of rezoning, we have held that “compliance with the 

comprehensive plan requirement merely means that zoning authorities 

have given ‘full consideration to the problem presented, including the 

needs of the public, changing conditions, and the similarity of other land 

in the same area.’ ” Iowa Coal Min. Co. v. Monroe County, 494 N.W.2d 

664, 669 (Iowa 1993) (quoting Montgomery, 299 N.W.2d at 695). A 

board’s zoning decision is not static, and the fact that a board or council 

may have failed to predict that an area of land could be rezoned for a 

different use is not enough to demonstrate that it acted without 

considering the comprehensive plan. See, e.g., Montgomery, 299 N.W.2d 

at 695.
31

The district court found that the rezoning was passed in 

accordance with and in furtherance of the comprehensive plan, despite 

none of the council members expressly linking their votes to the plan. 

We agree. The council members gave full consideration to “the needs of 

the public, changing conditions, and the similarity of other land in the 

same area.” Id. The council held multiple meetings and the appropriate 

public hearing during which community members were able to offer 

differing viewpoints. All council members attended these meetings, 

listened, and asked questions. The city council requested and reviewed 

reports about water, sewage, water runoff, traffic, crime, and increased 

economic benefits. The council considered the unique nature of the Field

of Dreams site and potential tourism benefits.

The city’s comprehensive plan notes that rezoning should be made 

with consideration of the unique character of the area, the suitability of 

the land for the proposed use, the conservation of buildings or values, 

and the encouragement of the most appropriate use of the land. 

Comprehensive Plan at 91. All of these goals were considered by the 

council. The Field of Dreams site is a unique parcel of land unlike any 

other land in that area. The council considered the distinctiveness of the 

land and whether the proposed rezoning would be the best use of the site 

for the benefit of the community, including its impact on tourism. The 

council considered whether the proposed rezoning would be for the 

overall health and welfare of the community as a whole, and whether it

would preserve the property for the benefit of its citizens. The city 

council concluded that it would be consistent with its comprehensive 

plan.

The city’s community builder plan also specifically addresses the 

importance of preserving the Field of Dreams site in order to maintain 
32

and increase tourism. The plan stated that a main concern for the city 

was to “become much more aggressive in guiding and encouraging [the 

city’s] growth.” Community Builder Plan at 2. It identified the loss of 

tourism to the Field of Dreams site as one of the main threats to the city’s 

growth. Id. at 5. We hold that the petitioners did not meet their burden 

of demonstrating that the rezoning did not meet the requirements of the 

city’s comprehensive plan.

4. Spot zoning. “Spot zoning is the creation of a small island of 

property with restrictions on its use different from those imposed on 

surrounding property.” Perkins, 636 N.W.2d at 67. Not all spot zoning is 

illegal, however, and we have created a three-prong test for determining 

whether spot zoning is valid. Id. Under this test, we consider

(1) whether the new zoning is germane to an object within 

the police power; (2) whether there is a reasonable basis for 

making a distinction between the spot zoned land and the 

surrounding property; and (3) whether the rezoning is 

consistent with the comprehensive plan.

Id.; see also Little v. Winborn, 518 N.W.2d 384, 388 (Iowa 1994). When 

there is spot zoning, “there must be substantial and reasonable grounds 

or basis for the discrimination when one lot or tract is singled out.” 

Perkins, 636 N.W.2d at 67 (quoting Fox v. Polk Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 

569 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Iowa 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by

Sutton, 729 N.W.2d at 799).

As a preliminary matter, we acknowledge that the rezoning appears 

to constitute spot zoning. The property surrounding the new commercial 

area is agricultural land. The rezoning created a commercial “island” of 

property amidst land zoned as agricultural. See, e.g., Little, 518 N.W.2d 

at 388. However, that does not end our inquiry. The next step is to 

determine whether the spot zoning was valid. See id.
33

First, we have already determined that the rezoning was made 

within the scope of the city council’s general police power. The decision 

to rezone the area for the project was made in consideration of the 

general health and welfare of the community. Second, the council had a 

reasonable basis for its decision to rezone the land despite the 

surrounding property. The Field of Dreams property has been a unique 

site for years. The baseball field on the Lansing farm has been used in 

the community for baseball and softball games, in addition to local and 

national tourism. Part of the location’s charm is simply that it is a 

baseball field surrounded by farmland. The council made the decision to 

rezone and allow for more baseball fields to capitalize on this unique site 

and increase tourism for the City of Dyersville. Last, as we already 

concluded, the spot zoning is consistent with the overall comprehensive 

plan. The city’s community builder plan expressly mentions the 

necessity of maintaining the Field of Dreams site and increasing tourism 

for the city. We agree with the decision of the district court and hold that 

this was not illegal spot zoning.

C. Triggering of Dyersville Code. The petitioners allege that 

there was sufficient opposition to the proposed rezoning contained in 

Ordinance 770 to trigger a unanimous vote under Dyersville Code of 

Ordinances § 165.39(5). The code section provides,

Council Vote. If the [Zoning and Planning] Commission 

recommends against, or if a protest against such proposed 

amendment, supplement, change, modification or repeal is 

presented in writing to the Clerk, duly signed by the owners 

of twenty percent (20%) or more either of the area of the lots 

included in such proposed change, or of those immediately 

adjacent in the rear thereof extending the depth of one lot or 

not to exceed two hundred (200) feet therefrom, or of those 

directly opposite thereto, extending the depth of one lot or 

not to exceed two hundred (200) feet from the street frontage 

of such opposite lots, such amendment, supplement, 
34

change, modifications, or repeal shall not become effective 

except by the favorable vote of all members of the Council.

Dyersville, Iowa, Code of Ordinances § 165.39(5) (2011). Based on this 

code section, the petitioners contend that a unanimous vote of the 

council was required for the rezoning.

On the day of the hearing on the rezoning, the petitioners’ attorney 

faxed a letter to the city clerk purporting to include the signatures of the 

required twenty percent of landowners needed to trigger the unanimous 

council vote. The opposition letter included the signatures of a number 

of individuals; however, only two of the signatories owned small amounts 

of property adjacent to the property to be rezoned. The petitioners did 

not provide a letter that included the requisite twenty percent of adjacent 

land owners at the time of the meeting, nor did they provide a letter or 

other document at trial. Accordingly, there was no formal or valid 

protest which would invoke the requirement of a unanimous vote.

D. Use of 200-Foot Buffer Zone. The ordinance that rezoned the 

Field of Dreams property included a 200-foot buffer zone of agricultural 

land that surrounded the property that was rezoned to commercial. The 

petitioners challenge the use of this 200-foot buffer zone. They argue 

that the buffer zone was put in place in order to prevent the nearby 

property owners from objecting to the project under the procedure 

outlined in Iowa Code section 414.5. The council asserts that the 

purpose of the 200-foot buffer zone was to address some of the concerns 

raised about manure spreading, farming activities, and children playing 

baseball up against the property line of adjoining owners. 

At first blush, the 200-foot buffer zone can appear to be unfair, as 

it limits the number of adjacent landowners who can object to the 

rezoning. However, it does provide a benefit to adjacent landowners by 
35

addressing their expressed concerns with the rezoning. A number of 

petitioners raised concerns about hunting, spreading of manure, and 

grazing if their farming property was directly adjacent to the new 

ballfields. The buffer zone provides a solution to those concerns.

Additionally, a number of other courts have held that a council 

may avoid a supermajority vote requirement by creating a buffer zone 

between the property to be rezoned and the land of adjacent property 

owners. See, e.g., Schwarz v. City of Glendale, 950 P.2d 167, 170 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the use of buffer zones is the majority 

approach and upholding the use of a 150-foot buffer zone to avoid the 

triggering of a supermajority vote); St. Bede’s Episcopal Church v. City of 

Santa Fe, 509 P.2d 876, 877 (N.M. 1973) (upholding a 100-foot buffer 

zone utilized to avoid the triggering of a supermajority vote); Eadie v. 

Town Bd. of Town of N. Greenbush, 854 N.E.2d 464, 467–68 (N.Y. 2006) 

(upholding a 100-foot buffer zone used to avoid triggering a 

supermajority vote); Armstrong v. McInnis, 142 S.E.2d 670, 679 (N.C. 

1965) (upholding a buffer zone of 101 feet that avoided triggering a 

statutory supermajority vote). Some courts require a finding that the 

imposition of a buffer zone was for the town’s general welfare and was 

not made for arbitrary or capricious reasons. See, e.g., Town of Beech 

Mountain v. Genesis Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc., 786 S.E.2d 335, 345 (N.C. 

Ct. App. 2016) (noting it was proper for the district court to allow factual 

evidence regarding the question of whether a 200-foot buffer zone was 

arbitrary or capricious).

Nevertheless, even if the petitioners had established the 

requirement of a supermajority vote under Iowa Code section 414.5, the 

requirement was met. The statute requires the pertinent ordinance to 

pass by a vote of three-fourths of all members of the council, or seventy-
36

five percent. Iowa Code § 414.5. The rezoning of the Field of Dreams site 

passed by a vote of 4–1, or eighty percent.

E. Validity of Ordinance 777. While the first appeal was 

pending, it was determined that Ordinance 770, and the corresponding 

notices regarding the rezoning, contained an incorrect legal description. 

In an attempt to correct the incorrect legal description, the city council 

passed Ordinance 777, which rezoned the subject property with the 

correct legal description. The petitioners allege Ordinance 777 is invalid 

because it rezoned property without the appropriate notice, public 

hearing, and due process requirements of Gorman v. City Development 

Board, 565 N.W.2d 607 (Iowa 1997).

In Gorman, the Roemig family requested the voluntary annexation 

of approximately 120 acres of their property into the City of Cedar 

Rapids. Id. at 608. The Roemigs erred in describing their property,

which resulted in the description they provided to the city including forty 

acres of land owned by a neighbor and leaving out eighty acres owned by 

the Roemigs. Id. The city followed the proper notice protocols, but 

included the incorrect legal description. Id. The city council held a 

public meeting and unanimously adopted a resolution approving the 

annexation of the Roemig property. Id. The Linn County Board of 

Supervisors approved the annexation and, at the same time, corrected 

the error in the legal description. Id. A resident of Cedar Rapids, 

Gorman, sought judicial review. Id. We ultimately held that the 

Roemigs’ application for voluntary annexation did not substantially 

comply with the statutory requirements because the applicable statute 

required a legal description of the property. Id. at 610.

We reached this conclusion for a number of reasons. First, the 

statute required the legal description of the property. Id. Second, the 
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statute required published notice, and we found that this implied a 

requirement that the property be legally descripted. Id. Last, the 

description was relied upon throughout the proceedings and therefore 

did not provide proper notice to the public or other potentially interested 

parties regarding which property was meant to be annexed. Id. at 611.

Failing to comply with every word of a statute is not fatal in every 

situation. Id.; see also City of Des Moines v. City Dev. Bd., 473 N.W.2d 

197, 200 (Iowa 1991). What we require is substantial compliance, which 

we have defined as “compliance in respect to essential matters necessary 

to assure the reasonable objectives of the statute.” Gorman, 565 N.W.2d 

at 610 (quoting Burnam v. Bd. of Review, 501 N.W.2d 553, 554 (Iowa 

1993)). We noted that, when we determine “whether the erroneous 

description satisfies the requirement of substantial compliance, we 

consider the impact of the error upon the proceedings.” Id. at 610. The 

error in this case was significant because two-thirds of the property the 

Roemigs intended to annex into the city was not included in the legal 

description and forty acres were included that were never owned by the 

Roemigs. Id. at 611–12.

We have also decided other cases that included errors in the legal 

description of property. In Incorporated Town of Windsor Heights v. 

Colby, the legal description was listed as “Walnut Creek” when the 

proper description should have been “North Walnut Creek.” 249 Iowa 

802, 804–05 89 N.W.2d 157, 158 (1958). We held this was a “technical 

misdescription” and was not substantial. Id. at 806–07, 89 N.W.2d at 

159. The error did not mislead any of the parties. Id. In Wall v. County 

Board of Education, a lengthy description of a parcel of real estate 

included one typographical error. 249 Iowa 209, 221–22 86 N.W.2d 231, 

238–39 (1957). We held that the error did not mislead and did not 
38

adversely affect the reorganization of school districts at issue. Id. 

Generally, substantial compliance requires that a statute or rule “has 

been followed sufficiently so as to carry out the intent for which it was 

adopted.” Bontrager Auto Serv., Inc. v. Iowa City Bd. of Adjustment, 748 

N.W.2d 483, 488 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Brown v. John Deere Waterloo 

Tractor Works, 423 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Iowa 1988)). Thus, we must 

determine whether the purpose of the statute or rule has been 

accomplished. Id.

In this case, neither the Iowa Code nor the Dyersville City Code of 

Ordinances require notice of the legal description of property. Iowa Code

§ 414.4 (requiring hearing and a notice of the time and place of the 

hearing but not requiring any particular description of the land); id.

§ 414.5 (noting that the same notice requirements apply equally to 

changes and amendments, and not requiring a legal description); id.

§ 414.6 (establishing a zoning commission responsible for recommending 

boundaries, but not requiring a legal description before a public hearing);

Dyersville, Iowa, Code of Ordinances § 165.39(1) (requiring a clear 

description of the land, but not a legal description). Further, none of the 

members of the public were misled about the property the council voted 

to rezone. The intent of the notice statute requires a public hearing 

during which concerned citizens may be heard. Iowa Code § 414.4. The 

statute provides a procedure for providing published notice of a time and 

place of a public hearing, which was followed by the city council. Id.

Many members of the community came to the public hearing and voiced 

their concerns about the rezoning of the Field of Dreams site. Many of 

the notices contained maps and drawings regarding the proposed 

property to be rezoned. There was no reasonable confusion regarding the 

property which was being considered for rezoning under ordinance 770. 
39

Likewise, after the correction was included in ordinance 777, the city 

counsel provided notice to the public. No community members spoke at 

the city counsel meeting during which ordinance 777 was discussed and 

passed. We agree with the decision of the district court and find that the 

proceedings before the city council substantially complied with the 

statutory requirements. Ordinance 777 is valid.

F. Equal Protection and Due Process. The petitioners assert 

that the rezoning violated the equal protection and due process clauses 

of the Iowa Constitution. For purposes of the equal protection clause, 

they argue that all of the surrounding neighbors of the rezoned area are 

similarly situated, but the 200-foot buffer surrounding three sides of the 

area prevented those neighbors from exercising the same right to object 

as the neighbors whose property does not have a buffer. For purposes of 

procedural due process, they assert that they were not provided a 

meaningful opportunity to be heard.

The Iowa Constitution guarantees “[a]ll laws of a general nature 

shall have a uniform operation; the general assembly shall not grant to 

any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the 

same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Iowa Const. art. I, 

§ 6. In practice, this means that “laws treat alike all people who are 

‘similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purposes of the law.’ ” 

McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 830 (Iowa 2015) (quoting 

Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 882 (Iowa 2009)). Zoning and land 

use ordinances that do not impact a suspect classification must only 

meet the rational relationship test. 16C C.J.S. Building and Zoning 

Regulations § 1590, 160–61 (2015); see also Blumenthal, 636 N.W.2d at 

268.
40

We generally consider the federal and state equal protection 

clauses to be “identical in scope, import, and purpose.” War Eagle Vill. 

Apartments v. Plummer, 775 N.W.2d 714, 719 (Iowa 2009) (quoting State 

v. Bower, 725 N.W.2d 435, 441 (Iowa 2006)). The Supreme Court has 

succinctly articulated the rational basis test under the Federal 

Constitution as a “question [of] whether the classifications drawn in a 

statute are reasonable in light of its purpose.” Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 

N.W.2d 577, 580 (Iowa 1980) (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 

184, 191, 85 S. Ct. 283, 288, 13 L. Ed. 2d 222, 228 (1964)). We use this 

test as a guiding principle in our analysis of the rational basis test under 

the Iowa Constitution. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald (RACI), 

675 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2004) (“It was this enunciation of the rational 

basis test that our court said in Bierkamp was appropriate for analyzing 

a claim based on the Iowa equality provision found in article I, section 6 

of the Iowa Constitution.”); Bierkamp, 293 N.W.2d at 580 (“We have long 

found a standard similar to that of McLaughlin to flow from Article I, 

section 6.”).

Based on the principles of the federal test, we have developed a

three-part framework to assist our analysis when we evaluate whether 

the rational-basis test has been met under the Iowa Constitution. See, 

e.g., McQuistion, 872 N.W.2d at 831; Horsfield Materials, Inc. v. City of 

Dyersville, 834 N.W.2d 444, 458–59 (Iowa 2013); RACI, 675 N.W.2d at 7–

8. First, we must determine whether there was a valid, “realistically 

conceivable” purpose that served a legitimate government interest. 

McQuistion, 872 N.W.2d at 831 (quoting RACI, 675 N.W.2d at 7); see also 

Horsfield, 834 N.W.2d at 458. To be realistically conceivable, the 

ordinance cannot be “so overinclusive and underinclusive as to be 

irrational.” Horsfield, 834 N.W.2d at 459 (quoting State v. Mitchell, 757 
41

N.W.2d 431, 439 (Iowa 2008)). Next, we decide whether the identified 

reason has any basis in fact. McQuistion, 872 N.W.2d at 831. Last, we 

evaluate whether the relationship between the classification and the 

purpose for the classification “is so weak that the classification must be 

viewed as arbitrary.” Id. (quoting RACI, 675 N.W.2d at 8).

We also recognize that the rational-basis test is a deferential test. 

Horsfield, 834 N.W.2d at 458; Ames Rental Prop. Ass’n v. City of Ames, 

736 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Iowa 2007). Under the rational-basis test, we 

presume that the ordinance is constitutional unless the challenging 

party is able to meet its burden to “negat[e] every reasonable basis that 

might support the disparate treatment.” Horsfield, 834 N.W.2d at 458 

(quoting Ames Rental Prop. Ass’n, 736 N.W.2d at 259). We will not 

declare something unconstitutional under the rational-basis test unless 

it “clearly, palpably, and without doubt infringe[s] upon the constitution.” 

RACI, 675 N.W.2d at 8 (quoting Glowacki v. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 

501 N.W.2d 539, 541 (Iowa 1993)).

The rezoning decision here clearly meets the rational-basis test. 

The council made the decision to rezone the Field of Dreams site in 

consideration of the best interests of Dyersville. It considered the 

economic impact of increased tourism and investigated any water, 

sewage, traffic, and crime issues the rezoning could create. The decision 

was made with the overall zoning scheme of the city in mind, as one of 

the main goals of the comprehensive plan is to expand tourism to 

Dyersville via the Field of Dreams site. There was a “realistically 

conceivable” purpose for the rezoning that served a legitimate 

government interest, because the council believed the rezoning could 

increase tourism to the city. See, e.g., McQuistion, 872 N.W.2d at 831. 

The council’s determination that the ballpark could increase tourism to 
42

the city and could lead to more jobs and to the tax base of the city was 

based on facts presented to and considered by the council. See, e.g., id. 

The council ordered studies done regarding the financial impact on the 

city and listened to the opinions of multiple community members. 

Additionally, the use of the 200-foot buffer zone was a reasonable 

solution to the concerns of the community members and was not 

arbitrary or capricious. Last, as we determined above, the reason for the 

rezoning was not arbitrary. See, e.g., id. There was no equal protection 

violation in this case.

The due process clause commands that “no person shall be 

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Iowa 

Const. art. I, § 9. “The requirements of procedural due process are 

simple and well established: (1) notice; and (2) a meaningful opportunity 

to be heard.” Blumenthal, 636 N.W.2d at 264; see also Aluminum Co. of 

Am. v. Musal, 622 N.W.2d 476, 479 (Iowa 2001) (“The two fundamental 

principles of due process are (1) notice and (2) the opportunity to 

defend.”).

We have held that procedural due process does not require a 

formal evidentiary hearing before the city council in the context of 

rezoning. Montgomery, 299 N.W.2d at 693. “Even if we assume that 

neighbors to a rezoned area have a life, liberty or property interest which 

requires some type of hearing, the statutorily required commentargument hearing . . . is sufficient to meet due process.” Id. The

petitioners were given adequate notice of the parcel of land that was 

proposed to be rezoned and adequate notice of the time and place of city 

council meetings and hearings. Further, they were actually heard on 

numerous occasions, as a number of the petitioners attended both 

regular city council meetings and the public hearing on the issue of 
43

rezoning. All community members in attendance who wished to speak 

were allowed. The petitioners in this case were afforded procedural due 

process.

III. Conclusion.

We conclude that the district court was correct in annulling the 

writs of certiorari. The city council acted in its proper legislative function

when it rezoned the Field of Dreams property. Both ordinances were 

validly passed, and no procedural or substantive errors affected the 

decisions of the city council in its rezoning decisions.

DECISION OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED; WRITS

ANNULLED.

All justices concur except Wiggins, J., who concurs specially.
44

#15–1413, Residential & Ag. Advisory Comm. v. Dyersville City Council

WIGGINS, Justice (concurring specially).

I concur with the majority decision. Our decision does not mean 

that the actions of the city council are not beyond the reach of the 

persons they were elected to serve. At the next election, the council’s 

actions are subject to review by the electorate. Under the separation-ofpowers doctrine, “electoral control [is] an important restraint on 

legislative conduct.” Teague v. Mosley, 552 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Iowa 

1996).