1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Daniel J. O’Connor, Jr., Bar No. 010081

Karen J. Stillwell, Bar No. 022711

Travis B. Hill, Bar No. 021133

O'CONNOR & DYET, P.C.

7955 South Priest Drive

Tempe, Arizona 85284

daniel.oconnor@occlaw.com

karen.stillwell@occlaw.com

travis.hill@occlaw.com

(602) 241-7000

Attorneys for Phoenix Defendants

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mussalina Muhaymin as Personal 

Representative of the Estate of 

Muhammad Abdul Muhaymin Jr.,

Plaintiff,

vs.

City of Phoenix, an Arizona Municipal

Corporation; Antonio Tarango; Officer 

Oswald Grenier; Officer Kevin 

McGowan; Officer Jason Hobe; Officer 

Ronaldo Canilao; Officer David Head; 

Officer Susan Heimbinger; Officer James 

Clark; Officer Dennis Lerous; Officer 

Ryan Nielson; Officer Steven Wong; and 

Doe Supervisors 1-5,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-cv-04565-PHX-SMB

DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF 

VIOLATIONS OF ARIZ. R. PROF. 

COND. E.R. 4.2 & 3.6, AND LOCAL 

RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 83.8

AND 

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

(TO BE FILED UNDER SEAL)

Assigned to the 

Honorable Susan M. Brnovich

Pursuant to Rule 26(c)(1)(A), Fed. R. Civ. P., and Rule 37(b)(2)(A), Defendants, by 

and through undersigned counsel, hereby provide Notice to the Court of Plaintiff’s 

Counsel’s blatant and intentional violations of E.R. 4.2 and 3.6, Ariz. R. Prof. Cond., as 

well as continued violations of LR Civ. 83.8.
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

This Court admonished and warned Plaintiff’s Counsel1 several times regarding 

their continued violations of discovery rules,2 rules related to filing motions, rules 

regarding extrajudicial statements, as well as Plaintiff’s Counsel’s continued violations of 

the Protective Order. Counsel’s continued disregard for this Court’s Rules, Arizona Ethical 

Rules, and this Court’s Orders is willful, intentional, and now, abhorrently unethical. 

Sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel are warranted and appropriate pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §636 and/or Rule 37(b)(2)(A), Fed. R. Civ. P.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. BACKGROUND

On May 10, 2019, pursuant to Rule 26(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., and upon stipulation of 

the parties, this Court entered an Order that provides for the protection of all confidential 

and “other non-public documents, information, and/or materials made available during 

discovery and disclosures in this matter.” See Dkt. No. 072. The Order defined 

“Confidential Information” as “any documents, evidence, testimony, materials, or other 

information, whether written or oral, exchanged, revealed, or presented in these 

proceedings, designated in good faith as ‘Confidential’ by any party,” including but limited 

to, “employment records” and “information and documents. . . not generally available to 

the public as well as any copies or summaries of such information or any materials that 

reveal the contents of such information.” Id. ¶4. The Order prohibits use of confidential 

information for any other purpose except litigation within the case. Id. ¶15. 

 

1 Plaintiff is represented by David Chami and Haytham Faraj. Mr. Chami is an attorney 

admitted to practice in the State of Arizona. Mr. Faraj is admitted to practice in Illinois, 

Michigan, California, and Washington, D.C. and was admitted to practice in this case 

pro hac vice. See Dkt. No. 10 and August 15, 2019 Text Entry. 

2 As this Court may recall, Plaintiff’s counsel has violated the Rules several times, 

including but not limited to: (1) contacting Defendants’ experts directly without notice 

or permission; (2) noticing depositions in violation of the Court’s Rules; (3) failing to 

properly file pleadings under seal; (4) filing full transcripts in violation of Court Rules; 

and (5) filing motions exceeding page limits without stipulation or Court permission.
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

a. Previous Court Orders Regarding Extrajudicial Statements

In June 2020, Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Faraj, created social media posts regarding 

the litigation, and included body camera videos from the incident which he altered to 

include his interpretation of what was being said in those videos. See Dkt. Nos. 79, 183. 

The Court denied Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order; however, the Court cautioned 

counsel on future statements, indicating, “because the Court finds no violations of any 

Court order or rule, it declines to issue an order that would act as a prior restraint. However, 

this does not mean that the Court would not do so if any counsel, whether for Plaintiffs or 

for Defendants violated Court rules in the future. The Court expects all counsel to exercise 

caution and restraint in all future statements, if any.” Dkt. No. 188 (emphasis added). 

On October 7, 2020, Defendants filed an Expedited Motion for Protective Order 

and Motion for Sanctions for Plaintiff’s Counsel’s violations of the Court’s Protective 

Order. See Dkt. No. 273. The Court found that Plaintiff’s Counsel violated the Court’s 

Order by publicly discussing confidential deposition testimony; however, the Court 

showed leniency and did not issue sanctions for violations of the Order based upon an 

ambiguity within the Court’s June Order. See Dkt. No. 271, p. 6. The Court again issued a 

stern warning regarding future violations of the Protective Order, and admonished, 

“Although the Court declines to issue a gag order, the Court will not hesitate to do so if 

counsel for either party violates this order or the protective order in the future or if 

counsel’s statements threaten to endanger the fairness of the proceeding. As previously 

stated, the Court expects all counsel to exercise caution and restraint in all future 

statements if any are made.” Id. pp. 6-7 (emphasis added). 

b. Plaintiff’s Previous Conduct Related to Professional Rules of Conduct.

In addition to their intentional violations of the Court’s Orders and discovery rules,

Plaintiff’s counsel has demonstrated a tendency to thwart the fundamental prohibition of 

communicating with parties represented by adverse counsel. Plaintiff’s counsel knows that 
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

undersigned counsel represents the City of Phoenix. See Exhibit A. In addition, during the 

deposition of Defendant Antonio Tarango, Mr. Faraj attempted to call Mr. Tarango’s 

supervisor, an employee of the City of Phoenix. Mr. Faraj was immediately stopped by 

undersigned counsel and reminded that he cannot communicate directly with employees of 

the City of Phoenix about this matter. See Exhibit B, pp. 41-47, ll. 11-6.

3 After an offensive 

conversation spurred by Mr. Faraj, he ultimately refrained from further contact. Id. 

Less than two weeks later, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a settlement demand, requesting 

it be forwarded to undersigned counsel’s clients, the City of Phoenix City Council and 

the City of Phoenix Mayor. See portion of letter attached as Exhibit C. On the same date, 

undersigned sent an email to both Plaintiff’s counsel stating, “[A]s we discussed during the 

depositions last week, I will remind you and ask that you confirm that you will not contact 

or communicate with any City of Phoenix former or current employees regarding this 

matter or regarding any issues related to this matter. If you do so, it is a violation of Ethical 

Rule 4.2. See also Lang v. Superior Court, 170 Ariz. 602.” See Exhibit D. Mr. Chami, 

responded, “Why do you keep asking us to repeat our agreement not to contact City 

employees? Our prior misunderstanding has long since been acknowledged.” Id.

c. Recent Contact With Media and Violation of Professional Rules of 

Conduct.

Despite the Court’s warnings and despite Plaintiff’s counsel’s acknowledgement of 

undersigned counsel’s scope of representation, on April 26, 2021,

4 Mr. Faraj directly 

emailed a letter to City of Phoenix Mayor and each of the Council Members, demanding 

 

3 Despite assertions by Plaintiff’s counsel during the deposition, the City of Phoenix has 

been a named Defendant since the day this lawsuit was filed and has not been dismissed. 

Plaintiff’s counsel, of all people, should know who they sued in this action. 4 On April 2, 2021, undersigned spoke with Mr. Faraj regarding his client’s demands. Mr. 

Faraj indicated his client was only interested in a monetary payment. Just like before, 

when Defendants did not meet Plaintiff’s demand, Plaintiff’s counsel engaged the media 

in an attempt to pressure Defendants and prejudice the jury pool. 
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

the termination and criminal prosecution of the individual officers in this case. See letter 

attached as Exhibit E. Plaintiff’s counsel not only failed to copy undersigned counsel, he 

did not give notice nor seek permission to contact anyone at the City directly.

This communication goes far beyond any authorized communication or policymaking as contemplated by the Rules. Instead, it is riddled with salacious accusations, false 

statements, and comparisons to the incident involving George Floyd, with specific 

reference to the recent guilty verdict against Derek Chauvin. Id. The letter also invades the 

attorney-client relationship between undersigned counsel and the City of Phoenix and its 

officials. In fact, Plaintiff criticizes the sealing of records before this Court, the amounts 

paid by the City of Phoenix for undersigned’s legal services and experts; discusses what

he believes Defendants’ experts will testify to at trial; and offensively claims that 

Defendants’ experts are financially motivated to justify the officers’ conduct. Id. 

As if this were not enough, both Mr. Faraj and Mr. Chami doubled down, appearing 

on ABC News 15 that same day, reiterating many of the same salacious accusations and 

false statements. Plaintiff’s counsel even provided a copy of the letter to the media as 

shown on the news report, and in addition to the extrajudicial comments made by Mr. Faraj, 

Mr. Chami disclosed that one of the officers had received a promotion, which could only 

be gleaned from the employment records (which were marked as confidential in this case). 

https://www.abc15.com/news/local-news/investigations/family-implores-phoenixcouncil-to-act-in-in-custody-death-of-muhammad-muhaymin. Plaintiff’s counsel went so 

far as to claim this case does not have the benefit of bystander video and if it did, Muhaymin 

would have been “George Floyd – just three years earlier.”5

 

5 As an example of Plaintiff’s misleading and false statements to the media, this ignores 

the fact that there are thirteen (13) body camera videos in this case, all of which were 

provided years ago to the Maricopa County Attorney for review.
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

According to the news reporter, Mr. Faraj and Mr. Chami gave the media interview 

before they sent the letter to the Mayor and City Council Members. Id. Plaintiff and 

Plaintiff’s counsel did not simply violate this Court’s Orders, Ariz. R. Prof. Cond. E.R. 4.2 

& 3.6, and Local Rule of Civil Procedure 83.8, they repudiated them.

II. ARGUMENT

In the Court’s June 5, 2020 Order, the Court noted that the timing of Mr. Faraj’s 

social media posts were concerning because they were made right after the incident 

involving George Floyd. Nonetheless, the Court did not believe the extrajudicial statements 

violated the Court’s Protective Order, Ariz. R. Prof. Cond. E.R. 3.6, A.R.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 

42, and Local Rule of Civil Procedure 83.8, because no trial date had been set. The Court 

noted the trial was likely a year away and the communications were not easily accessible 

to a major news outlet. See Dkt. No. 188, pp. 4-5.

Now, within days of the guilty verdict in the George Floyd matter, Plaintiff once 

again returned to the media. However, this time, a jury trial is scheduled to begin on

September 14, 2021 – just four months away. Now, more than ever, Plaintiff’s counsel’s 

conduct should not go unnoticed. Just this afternoon, it was discovered that Plaintiff and 

Plaintiff’s counsel gave yet another interview to media, this time addressing the upcoming 

Hearing on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Hearing Scheduled In Wrongful 

Death Case Against Phoenix Police | KJZZ; TUESDAY: Court Hearing on Lawsuit Over 

Phoenix Police Killing of Muhammad Muhaymin Jr. - Muslim Advocates, collectively 

attached hereto as Exhibit F.

Their continued disregard for professionalism, this Court’s Orders and Rules, and 

the Professional Rules of Conduct is inexcusable. Plaintiff’s counsel’s false statements and 

discussions about this case need to stop. Setting aside the impropriety of Plaintiff’s 

counsel’s behavior, each time they engage in such conduct and seek media attention, it 

“threatens the fairness of this proceeding.” In their most recent interviews with the media, 
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Mr. Faraj and Mr. Chami again falsely claim that no criminal investigation was conducted

and the officers’ conduct was not reviewed. See ABC 15 media coverage, supra. They are 

both well aware (and have been reminded several times), that Phoenix Police Department 

conducted internal and criminal investigations regarding this incident and the incident was 

reviewed by Maricopa County Attorney’s Office.6 Each of the Defendant Officers was

found to have acted within policy. Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, upon receipt of all 

reports and body camera videos, determined there was no criminal conduct by the 

Defendant Officers. There is simply no truth to Plaintiff’s counsel’s statements. If 

Plaintiff’s counsel’s actions before April 26, 2021 raised doubt whether Defendants would 

receive a fair trial, Mr. Faraj and Mr. Chami have now made certain they will not.

III. PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL VIOLATED PROFESSIONAL RULES OF 

CONDUCT

Ariz. R. Prof. Cond. E.R. 4.2 provides, “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not 

communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be 

represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other 

lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.” In the context of a client organization, Ariz. R. 

Prof. Cond. E.R. 4.2, “. . . the rule prohibits communication with three groups of 

individuals: (1) those having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization; (2) 

any person whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the 

organization; and (3) any person whose statement may constitute an admission on the part 

of the organization. Lang v. Superior Ct., In & For Cty. of Maricopa, 170 Ariz. 602, 604–

05, 826 P.2d 1228, 1230–31 (App. 1992). 

 

6 The incident was investigated by Phoenix Police Department’s Professional Standards 

Bureau and reviewed by Use of Force Board. The Phoenix Police Department’s Special 

Investigation Unit forwarded its investigation to Maricopa County Attorney for review.

Attached as Exhibit G are the Use of Force Review Board Findings for all Officers 

involved, as well as Maricopa County Attorneys’ letter advising of their opinion that the 

officers did not commit any act that warrants criminal prosecution. See Exhibit G. 
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

ABA Mod. R. Prof. Cond. 4.2 provides similar restrictions, “In representing a client, 

a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the 

lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the 

consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.”7 ABA Mod.

R. Prof. Cond. 4.2 applies to government employees and officials, “Rule 4.2 generally 

protects represented government entities from unconsented contacts by opposing counsel, 

with an important exception based on the constitutional right to petition and the derivative 

public policy of ensuring a citizen’s right of access to government decision makers. Rule 

4.2 permits a lawyer representing a private party in a controversy with the government to 

communicate about the matter with government officials having authority to take or to 

recommend action in the matter, provided that the sole purpose of the communication is to 

address a policy issue, including settling the controversy. In such a situation the lawyer 

must give government counsel reasonable advance notice of his intent to communicate with 

such officials in order to afford them an opportunity to seek advice of counsel before 

deciding whether to entertain the communication.” ABA Formal Opinion 97-408 (1997).

As addressed above, the letter sent by Mr. Faraj to the Mayor and Council Members 

goes well beyond the scope of addressing an issue of policy. Even assuming the vitriolic, 

blatantly false, and prejudicial letter was intended to somehow address policy, notice was 

required, and none was provided. This conduct squarely constitutes a violation of Ariz. R. 

Prof. Cond. E.R. 4.2, and serves as an additional basis for Defendants’ request for a 

Protective/Restraining Order and sanctions.

 

7 In the event Mr. Faraj claims ignorance of the Ethical Rules in Arizona, Mr. Faraj is also 

licensed by the Michigan and Illinois State Bars. Both states contain nearly identical 

language. Accordingly, Mr. Faraj’s conduct also violates the Illinois and Michigan Rules.
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IV. PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL VIOLATED THE COURT’S PROTECTIVE 

ORDER AGAIN.

Even ignoring the clear violation of Ariz. R. Prof. Cond. E.R. 4.2, Plaintiff’s counsel 

also violated the Court’s Protective Order by discussing confidential information relating 

to the employment files of the Defendant Officers, as well as details related to this 

litigation, including expert opinions and testimony. See Exhibit E. As previously briefed, 

the Court has authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636 to exercise contempt authority for violations 

of the Protective Order, which may be issued with or without a finding of civil contempt. 

Harmon v. City of Santa Clara, 323 F.R.D. 617, 622 (N.D. Cal 2108); see also In re DualDeck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 10 F.3d 695, 696 (9th Cir. 1993) (“civil 

contempt occurs when a party disobeys a specific and definite court order by failing to take 

all reasonable steps within the party’s power to comply”). “There is no question that 

procedural rules are important and that infractions of those rules should not be tolerated by 

the courts. Otherwise, the rules themselves will not be taken seriously, and eventually they 

may exist in name only, honored in the breach.” Kovilic Constr. Co., Inc. v. Missbrenner, 

106 F. 3d 768 (7th Cir. 1997). 

Violations of Court orders can also be addressed under Rule 37(b)(2), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure. Management Registry Inc. v. A.W. Companies, Inc., 2019 WL 5388488 

*13 (D. Minn. 2020). Rule 37 exists to ensure compliance with orders and to provide 

“adequate sanctions” to enforce compliance with orders. Id., citing Grimes v. City of San 

Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 240-41 (9th Cir. 1991). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A), 

the court may sanction the party through any one of the following means: 

i. Directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be 

taken as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims;

ii. Prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated 

claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence; 

iii. Striking pleadings in whole or in part;

iv. Staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed; 
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

v. Dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part; 

vi. Rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or 

vii. Treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order 

to submit to a physical or mental examination. 

“Instead of or in addition to” these sanctions, “the court must order the disobedient 

party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including 

attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other 

circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). Federal 

judges have inherent power to sanction parties and attorneys appearing before them for 

actions taken “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Goodyear 

Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1183–84 (2017); Chambers v. NASCO Inc., 

501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991). 

Under these circumstances, there can exist little doubt that the Court has the inherent 

authority and power to impose severe sanctions. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 

U.S. 752, 765, 100 S. Ct. 2455 (1980) (courts have inherent power to levy sanctions on 

parties who engage in abusive litigation practices); Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 

F. 2d 585, 589 (9th Cir. 1983) (courts have inherent power, including dismissal of an 

action, when a party has engaged in conduct utterly inconsistent with the orderly 

administration of justice). There can also be no doubt that Defendants have suffered 

prejudice as a result of Plaintiff’s actions. Henry v. Gill Industries, 983 F. 2d 943, 947 (9th

Cir. 1993) (“[a] defendant suffers prejudice if plaintiff’s actions impair the defendant’s 

ability to go to trial, or threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.”). 

“Rule 37(b) sanctions may serve either remedial and compensatory purposes or 

punitive and deterrent purposes,” but ultimately, “the imposition and selection of particular 

sanctions are matters left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Harmon, 323 F.R.D. 

at 626, citing Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F. 2d 770, 784 (9th Cir. 

1993). Civil contempt sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) and/or sanctions under 28 U.S.C. 
- 11 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

§ 1927 may be imposed regardless of whether or not the contempt was willful. Id., (citing 

In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 10 F. 3d at 695) (“civil contempt 

... consists of a party’s disobedience to a specific and definite court order by failure to take 

all reasonable steps within the party’s power to comply. The contempt need not be willful, 

and there is no good faith exception of the requirement of obedience to a court order.”). 

In this case, Plaintiff’s counsel has knowingly, intentionally, and repeatedly violated 

the Protective Order by releasing confidential information and materials to the media and 

public. This time they have gone so far as to attempt to poison the potential jury pool with 

false statements and attempts to discredit Defendants’ experts just months before the trial 

begins. These egregious violations of the Protective Order have resulted in extreme 

prejudice to Defendants, impaired Defendants’ ability to receive a fair trial, and threaten to 

interfere with a fair decision of this case. The Court has the inherent authority and power 

to impose the most severe sanctions against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel, including 

dismissal of the lawsuit. While the most severe sanction has been avoided by the Court for 

past infractions by Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel, Defendants respectfully request that

the Court exercise its authority, and meet their improper conduct with the appropriate level 

of sanction, which is dismissal. 

V. PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL VIOLATED ARIZ. R. PROF. COND. E.R. 3.6 

AND LOCAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 83.8 AGAIN.

Ariz. R. Prof. Conduct E.R. 3.6 enumerates, “A lawyer who is participating or has 

participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial 

statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means 

of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing 

an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.” The prohibition on extrajudicial statements is 

designed to ensure a fair trial and impartial jury. See Ariz. R. Prof. Conduct E.R. 3.6 cmt

1 (“Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the 

information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial 
- 12 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

by jury is involved.”). Dissemination of extrajudicial statements directly to the jury pool 

is especially troubling. See also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 109 

(2000) (“In representing a client in a matter before a tribunal, a lawyer may not make a 

statement outside the proceeding that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated 

by means of public communication when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know 

that the statement will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a juror or 

influencing or intimidating a prospective witness in the proceeding.”). District courts have 

not only the inherent authority, but also the duty and responsibility to supervise the conduct 

of attorneys who appear before them. See Radcliffe v. Hernandez, 818 F.3d 537, 541 (9th

Cir. 2016) (“[T]he district court has primary responsibility for controlling the conduct of 

attorneys practicing before it . . .”); see also Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 301 

(9th Cir. 1996); Trust Corp. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1983). The 

power of federal judges to impose sanctions for abuses of process is quite broad. Gas-ATron of Ariz. v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1976). The Court in that matter

quoted Richardson v. Hamilton International Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (1972) as follows:

Whenever an allegation is made that an attorney has violated his moral and 

ethical responsibility, an important question of professional ethics is raised. 

It is the duty of the district court to examine the charge, since it is that court 

which is authorized to supervise the conduct of the members of its bar. The 

courts, as well as the bar, have a responsibility to maintain public confidence 

in the legal profession. This means that a court may disqualify an attorney 

for not only acting improperly but also for failing to avoid the appearance of 

impropriety.

Id. at 1324-25. 

District judges have an “arsenal of sanctions” they can impose for unethical 

behavior. Erickson, 87 F.3d at 303. These sanctions include monetary sanctions, contempt, 

and the disqualification of counsel. Id. The Court may look to the Arizona Rules of 

Professional Conduct, which are equally applicable to members of the bar and any attorney 

permitted to practice pro hac vice. See LR Civ. 83.2(e)(“The ‘Rules of Professional 

Conduct,’ in the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona, shall apply to 
- 13 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

attorneys admitted or otherwise authorized to practice before the United States District 

Court for the District of Arizona.”).

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 83.8(a) requires:

A lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall not during its 

investigation or litigation make or participate in making an extrajudicial 

statement, other than a quotation from or reference to public records, which 

a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public 

communication, if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination 

will interfere with a fair trial and which relates to: (1) evidence regarding the 

occurrence or transaction involved; (2) the character, credibility, or criminal 

record of a party, witness or prospective witness; (3) the performance or 

results of any examination or tests or the refusal or failure of a party to submit 

to such; (4) an opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a party 

except as required by law or administrative rules; or (5) any other matter 

reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the action.

Plaintiff’s counsel intentionally and knowingly presented false statements to the 

media, including their assertion that “not a single county politician or person in power has 

seen fit to call for an investigation.” As stated above, this incident was investigated and 

reviewed by the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office years ago. Plaintiff’s counsel also 

provided false and salacious accusations related to the Medical Examiner’s findings, 

Muhaymin’s cause of death, and the purported lack of video evidence.

Simply put, Plaintiff’s counsel told potential jurors that Defendant Officers 

murdered Mr. Muhaymin and no one is willing to hold them responsible, unlike the murder 

of George Floyd. Nothing could be more prejudicial or violative of Ariz. R. Prof. Conduct 

E.R. 3.6. Furthermore, the public statements made by Plaintiff’s counsel violate all five 

enumerated areas upon which extrajudicial statements are prohibited. Unlike before, these 

statements were made directly to news media, and the trial begins on September 14, 2021

(just four months away). The remoteness of prejudicial effect is no longer present, as 

potential jurors were exposed to incredibly prejudicial and false information just months 

before selection. Thus, the greatest sanctions available to the Court should be applied here, 

which includes dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims in their entirety.
- 14 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

VI. A PROTECTIVE/ RESTRAINING ORDER IS NECESSARY.

In the event the Court is not inclined to dismiss this case for these additional and 

repeated violations, Defendants respectfully request that a restraining order be instituted. 

Good cause to restrict and prohibit Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel from any further 

discussions about this case with media is readily apparent. In its December 11, 2020 Order, 

the Court cautioned, “The Court is empowered to issue an order prohibiting trial participant 

from communicating with the media where ‘excessive trial publicity’ endangers the 

fairness of the judicial process.” Dkt. No. 271, p. 7 (citing to Mizioch v. Montoya, N. CV 

10-01728-PHX-JAT, 2011 WL 4900033, at *6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 14, 2011) (citing Levine v. 

United States District Court for the Central District of California, 764 F.2d 590, 600-601 

(9th Cir. 1985)). Plaintiff’s counsel must comply with the Court’s Orders and Rules and 

allow this matter to be litigated in the courtroom. A “gag order” perhaps will ensure that 

additional violations of the Court’s Order and Protective Order will not occur.

VII. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Defendants respectfully request the Court issue sanctions against 

Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel for violating this Court’s Protective Order, June 5, 2020 

Order, December 11, 2020 Order, E.R. 4.2 & 3.6, and Local Rule of Civil Procedure 83.8. 

At this point, and in light of Plaintiff’s counsel’s ongoing violations of the Rules, this 

Court’s Order, and complete disregard for the judicial process and this Court’s Rules, 

dismissal of this case, in its entirety, is warranted. 

Should the Court determine a dismissal is not appropriate, Defendants respectfully 

request other sanctions be issued, including but not limited to, removal of Plaintiff’s 

counsel as attorneys of record, monetary sanctions sufficient to deter such conduct in the 

future, a “gag order” to preclude any future communications and release of information to 

the media and public, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the Defendants associated 
- 15 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

with preparing and filing all pleadings to date related to Plaintiff’s counsel’s improper 

conduct. 

Dated: May 3, 2021. 

O’CONNOR & DYET, P.C.

By: /s/ Karen J. Stillwell

Daniel J. O’Connor, Jr.

Karen J. Stillwell

Travis B. Hill

Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 3, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing with the 

Clerk of the Court for the U.S. District Court, District of Arizona, using the CM/ECF 

System. A Notice of Electronic Filing will be served to the following registered 

participants:

David A. Chami

PRICE LAW GROUP, APC 

8245 N. 85th Way

Scottsdale, AZ 85258

Attorney for Plaintiff 

Haytham Faraj

LAW OFFICES OF HAYTHAM FARAJ 

1935 W Belmont Ave. 

Chicago, IL 60657

Attorney for Plaintiff

Brian J. Theut

THEUT, THEUT & THEUT

5150 North 16th Street

Phoenix, AZ 85016

Guardian Ad Litem and Statutory 

Representative for A. M. 

By: /s/Aly Shomar-Esparza