UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-1545

JEANNE BIGGS; CHARLES BIGGS, 

 Plaintiffs – Appellants, 

 and 

BORROWER NO. 0124854613, Mr. and Mrs. B., 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

EAGLEWOOD MORTGAGE, LLC; COUNTRYWIDE BANK, N.A., 

 Defendants – Appellees, 

MARIA ABREU, 

 Movant, 

 and 

SETTLEMENT SOLUTIONS; AURORA LOAN SERVICES LLC; LEHMAN 

MORTGAGE CAPITAL; LEHMAN BROTHERS; KEVIN DECKER; MIKE 

SWEENEY; DONALD CROWE; MICHAEL A. PERRY, 

 Defendants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District 

Judge. (8:07-cv-02768-PJM) 

Submitted: November 2, 2009 Decided: November 30, 2009 
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Mary E. Goulet, WHITHAM CURTIS CHRISTOFFERSON & COOK, PC, 

Reston, Virginia, for Appellants. Charles S. Hirsch, Glenn A. 

Cline, BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP, Baltimore, 

Maryland; Richard L. Miller, MONSHOWER MILLER & MAGROGAN, LLP, 

Columbia, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

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PER CURIAM: 

 Jeanne and Charles Biggs (“the Biggses”) appeal the 

district court’s order granting summary judgment to Appellees 

Countrywide Bank FSB and Eaglewood Mortgage, LLC, (collectively 

“Appellees”) on the Biggses’ action under the civil RICO 

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2006). On appeal, the Biggses assert 

that the district court erred in applying a reliance element to 

their claims of mail fraud; determining the Biggses had prior 

knowledge of the possibility of negative amortization; failing 

to view the facts in the light most favorable to the Biggses; 

and improperly deciding questions of the Biggses’ knowledge and 

reliance. We affirm. 

 We review de novo a district court’s order granting 

summary judgment and view the facts in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party. Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548, 555 

(4th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate when no 

genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c); Bogart, 396 F.3d at 555. Summary judgment will be 

granted unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party on the evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). 

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I. Reliance 

 RICO provides a private right of action and treble 

damages for “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by 

reason of a violation of section 1962” of the RICO’s criminal 

component. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006). Section 1962 contains 

RICO’s criminal prohibitions; pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), 

it is 

“[U]nlawful for any person employed by or associated 

with” an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate 

or foreign commerce “to conduct or participate, 

directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such 

enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering 

activity.” The term “racketeering activity” is 

defined to include a host of so-called predicate acts, 

including “any act which is indictable under . . . 

section 1341 (relating to mail fraud).” 

Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131, 2137-38 

(2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1)(B), 1962(c) (2006)). Mail 

fraud occurs when an individual, having devised a plot to 

defraud, uses the mail in order to further their plot. 18 

U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). “The gravamen of the offense is the 

scheme to defraud, and any mailing that is incident to an 

essential part of the scheme satisfies the mailing element, even 

if the mailing itself contains no false information.” Bridge, 

128 S. Ct. at 2138. Thus, RICO allows for a private civil 

action to any individual injured through a pattern of conduct 

constituting mail fraud. 

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 On appeal, the Biggses assert that the district court 

erred in requiring them to prove reliance on Countrywide’s 

alleged mail fraud. The Biggses contend this requirement 

contravenes the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bridge. This 

court reviews such questions of statutory interpretation de 

novo. See United States v. Pierce, 278 F.3d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 

2002). 

 In Bridge, the Supreme Court held that “no showing of 

reliance is required to establish that a person has violated 

§ 1962(c) by conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a 

pattern of racketeering activity consisting of acts of mail 

fraud.” Bridge, 128 S. Ct at 2139. Though the Supreme Court 

noted that a plaintiff would generally be unable to demonstrate 

causation without showing at least some form of reliance, “the 

fact that proof of reliance is often used to prove an element of 

the plaintiff’s cause of action . . . does not transform 

reliance itself into an element of the cause of action.” Id. at 

2144. 

 Though the district court was correct in determining 

that the instant situation was somewhat different from the facts 

in Bridge, it nevertheless erred by finding that “Bridge did not 

eliminate reliance as an element of a RICO claim predicated on 

mail fraud.” In so holding, the district court improperly 

distinguished Bridge from the instant case by citing to 

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footnotes and other dicta in which the Supreme Court expressed 

its view that it would be challenging to demonstrate proximate 

cause without also proving some kind of reliance. See, e.g., 

Bridge, 128 S. Ct. at 2143 n.6 (“Of course, a misrepresentation 

can cause harm only if a recipient of the misrepresentation 

relies on it), 2144 (“Of course, none of this is to say that a 

RICO plaintiff who alleges injury by reason of a pattern of mail 

fraud can prevail without showing that someone relied on the 

defendant’s misrepresentations”) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). Based on this language, the district court 

found that Bridge’s holding was limited to cases of third-party 

reliance. 

 However, contrary to the finding of the district 

court, such statements do not restrict Bridge’s holding. Though 

Bridge concerned a plaintiff who had been harmed by a thirdparty’s reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations, we do 

not read its holding as limited to this particular situation. 

The Supreme Court explained that, though common law fraud 

required a showing of reliance, “[n]othing on the face of the 

relevant statutory provisions imposes such a requirement.” 

Bridge, 128 S. Ct. at 2138. Instead, using the mail in 

furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a predicate act of 

racketeering under RICO, even if there is no reliance on the 

misrepresentation. Id. If the defendant has engaged in a 

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pattern of such behavior, he will be liable under RICO, without 

anyone actually relying on a fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. 

Therefore, we agree with the Biggses that Bridge’s holding 

eliminates the requirement that a plaintiff prove reliance in 

order to prove a violation of RICO predicated on mail fraud. 

 However, we may affirm a district court’s grant of 

summary judgment on any legal basis supported by the record; we 

need not rely upon the grounds asserted by the district court. 

See Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir. 

2002). Therefore, despite this error by the district court, we 

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 

Countrywide, as the Biggses failed to prove, or even allege, any 

fraudulent behavior on the part of Countrywide or Eaglewood. 

The Biggses allege three different purportedly fraudulent 

actions on the part of the Defendants: 

Existing homeowners were re-financed with payment 

option adjustable rate mortgage loans that were at 

least one of the following: unsuitable for the 

homeowner; less suitable than at least one other 

financing approach available to the homeowner; more 

costly to the homeowner than at least one other 

suitable financing approach available to the homeowner 

with the additional cost inuring to the benefit of the 

enterprise or a member or members thereof. 

In support of these conclusory allegations, the Biggses 

repeatedly state that the Defendants failed to tell them that “a 

fixed rate mortgage . . . was more suitable for [the Biggses] 

than [a] . . . payment option ARM.” Additionally, the Biggses 

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contend that the Defendants utilized various agents in order to 

“cloak the . . . payment option ARM with seeming legitimacy and 

safety,” making various statements to the Biggses about how a 

payment option ARM would benefit them. 

 However, despite these allegations, the Biggses still 

fail to demonstrate, or even allege, that they were misled about 

any particular loan term. The adjustable rate rider of each 

payment option ARM explicitly delineated the schedule for 

changes in the interest rate and the monthly payment amount, as 

well as the possibility of negative amortization. As noted by 

the district court, the Biggses were “active and continuous 

shoppers of mortgage financing” and “possessed obvious and 

extensive experience with both fixed-rate loans and ARM loans” 

as evidenced by the fact that, beginning in 2003, the Biggses 

refinanced their mortgage five times in a span of four years. 

This familiarity with multiple loan types, combined with the 

fact that each loan complained of explicitly put the Biggses on 

notice of the possibility of negative amortization, supports our 

conclusion that the district court did not err in granting 

summary judgment for the Defendants. 

II. Other Issues 

 Next, the Biggses contend that the district court 

“wrongly construed the 1997 mortgage as negatively amortizing.” 

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In effect, the Biggses argue that this improper construction led 

the district court to incorrectly determine that the Biggses 

understood the principle of negative amortization. However, as 

explained above, the possibility of negative amortization was 

explicitly delineated in the adjustable rate rider to each of 

the payment option ARMs of which the Biggses now complain. 

Therefore, regardless of whether the Biggses’ 1997 mortgage had 

the possibility for negative amortization, the Biggses were made 

aware of this possibility before entering into each of the ARM 

mortgages with Countrywide. 

 The Biggses also assert that “the district court erred 

by [fail]ing to identify reasonable inferences in Homeowner’s 

favor.” It appears that the Biggses assign error to the 

district court’s conclusion that they were experienced mortgage 

shoppers, as well as Countrywide’s alleged mischaracterization 

in its pleadings of the 2004 loan as having an interest rate of 

4.269 percent for the length of the loan. However, as 

previously explained, the fact that the Biggses refinanced their 

mortgage five times in a span of four years strongly supports a 

finding that the Biggses understood the terms of the mortgages, 

and were not innocent “victims” of a fraud scheme. 

Additionally, though Countrywide appears to have 

mischaracterized the 2004 mortgage as having a lifetime interest 

rate of 4.269 in its memorandum in support of its motion to 

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dismiss, the Biggses fail to demonstrate how this error in the 

pleadings had any bearing whatsoever on whether the Biggses 

understood the mortgages into which they entered.* Therefore, 

these contentions are without merit. 

 Finally, the Biggses assert that the district court 

erred in improperly deciding questions of “knowledge and 

reliance” when considering the Biggses’ claims of fraud and 

negligent misrepresentation, incorrectly relying on 

“Countrywide’s interpretation of what the undisputed evidence of 

record shows.” This contention is also without merit. The 

Biggses’ amended complaint is bereft of a single allegation of 

purposeful misrepresentation or reliance thereon. Moreover, as 

we have described, all the pertinent information regarding the 

loans, their adjustable interest rates, and the possibility of 

negative amortization was disclosed to the Biggses in the form 

of detailed adjustable rate riders. The Biggses initialed each 

 *

 Moreover, any such error is clearly the product of a 

clerical error and not evidence of Countrywide’s deceit or own 

misunderstanding of its loans. In the pleadings, Countrywide 

incorrectly described the loan as having an interest rate of 

4.269 percent, when in actuality this was the calculated APR of 

the loan appearing in the Truth-in-Lending-Disclosure-Statement 

(“TILDS”). The initial interest rate was 1.750 percent, 

adjusted monthly. This discrepancy is clearly explained in the 

“Definition” section of the TILDS, which states that the 

interest rate found in the rider is but one of several charges 

included in the APR, which results in an APR higher than the 

interest rate shown in the rider. 

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page of the adjustable rate rider for the first loan indicating 

their review of it, and the Biggses signed the final page of 

each of the three riders, each time indicating that they 

accepted and agreed to the terms delineated in the rider. 

Accordingly, because the Biggses fail to present any evidence, 

or even raise any serious possibility, of misrepresentation or 

their reliance thereon, we find that the district court 

correctly granted summary judgment as to their claims. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED