[J-102-2014][M.O. – Todd, J.] 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

HARLEY-DAVIDSON MOTOR COMPANY 

v. 

SPRINGETTSBURY TOWNSHIP, 

CENTRAL YORK SCHOOL DISTRICT 

AND YORK COUNTY BOARD OF TAX 

ASSESSMENT APPEALS 

APPEAL OF: CENTRAL YORK SCHOOL 

DISTRICT 

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No. 82 MAP 2014 

Appeal from the Order of the 

Commonwealth Court dated 10/30/13, 

reconsideration denied 12/27/13, at No. 

159 CD 2013 which 

affirmed/vacated/remanded the order of 

the York County Court of Common 

Pleas, Civil Division, dated 1/8/13 at No. 

2004-SU-1832-Y08 

ARGUED: November 18, 2014 

CONCURRING OPINION 

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: September 29, 2015 

I agree with the following conclusions reached by the majority: a cost-to-cure 

approach is inapposite in the present circumstances; the trial court erred in failing to 

multiply the market value by the common-level ratio; a potential buyer’s environmentalremediation responsibilities and limitations on use should be taken into account when 

calculating the property’s market value; and the five-percent stigma reduction is 

adequately supported in the record.1

 

1

 As I read the record, requiring separate reductions for stigma and remediation costs is 

consistent with the expert’s representation as reflected in his report. See Appraisal 

Report at 55 (2010), R.R. 528a (explaining that any stigma “has an additional impact 

upon real estate above and beyond the cost of [environmental] cleanup or 

remediation”). 
[J-102-2014][M.O. – Todd, J.] - 2 

With that said, I have difficulty with the majority’s analysis concerning whether 

Mr. Camins reached his valuation figures by assuming the property was already in a 

proposed, hypothetical state – a practice disapproved by Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. 

v. Lehigh County Board of Assessment Appeals, 720 A.2d 790 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998), and 

Craftmaster Manufacturing, Inc. v. Bradford County Board of Assessment Appeals, 903 

A.2d 620 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). On this question, the present focus is mainly on whether 

the expert assumed the land had already been subdivided. The majority quotes four 

sentences from Mr. Camins’ 2006 appraisal report suggesting that there is a “potential” 

for subdivision, or that subdivision “could” occur, and concludes from such statements 

that the expert did not value the property as if it had already been subdivided. See

Majority Opinion, slip op. at 18. To my mind, these types of expressions do not speak 

directly to the contested issue of whether Mr. Camins ultimately valued the property by 

using figures reflecting a hypothetical subdivision. I believe that the calculations used 

by the expert are more probative of the question. 

These are shown elsewhere in the report. They reflect that each portion of the 

property was valued separately and the values were simply added together to arrive at 

the aggregate market value of the property as a whole. See Appraisal Report at 87 

(2006), R.R. 423a; see also Appraisal Report at 100 (2010), R.R. 551a (reflecting 

similar calculations involving a simple addition of the estimated valuation of separate 

portions of the parcel). Although Mr. Camins denied that he assumed the land was 

already subdivided for valuation purposes, see N.T., Jan. 24, 2011, at 354, R.R. 182a, 

his explanation was that he thought subdivision would be unnecessary to make the 

varying uses of the property as contemplated. See N.T., Feb. 1, 2011, at 24, R.R. 

266a; accord id. at 26, R.R. 267a. I am unable to see how this amounted to anything 

more than speculation on his part, however, as he never explained the basis for his 
[J-102-2014][M.O. – Todd, J.] - 3 

conclusion or stated that he investigated whether subdivision might be required. He 

also disclaimed any legal expertise in this arena. See N.T., Feb. 1, 2011, at 61, R.R. 

284a (reflecting his statement, “I am not a legal expert”). 

Notably, as well, the trial court stated in a conclusory fashion that “the property 

was viewed as a whole, and not as if it had been subdivided,” Harley-Davidson Motor 

Co. v. Springettsbury Twp., No. 2004-SU-1832-Y09, slip op. at 8 (C.P. York Jan. 8, 

2013) (finding of fact 45), but it made no findings on whether the use as envisioned was 

feasible absent subdivision of the property. See generally St. Margaret Seneca Place v. 

Allegheny Cnty. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals & Review, 536 Pa. 478, 483-84, 640 

A.2d 380, 383 (1994) (recognizing that a trial court’s findings of fact are binding, but 

only if supported by substantial evidence). This is relevant because the highest and 

best use of a property is understood by appraisers as “the most probable and 

foreseeable use to which a property can be put consistent with its physical 

characteristics, legally permitted uses, and market demand.” N.T. Jan. 24, 2011, at 

342; R.R. 176a (emphasis added); see Mark D. Savin, Highest and Best Use and the 

Challenges of the Market, SW019/SW020 ALI-CLE 1083 (Feb. 5-7, 2015) (“Highest and 

best use is the most profitable use the property will bring in light of its zoning, economic, 

environmental, legal, practical, social and physical characteristics[.]”); cf. Craftmaster, 

903 A.2d at 632 (criticizing an expert’s estimation of a property’s market value – which 

assumed that certain structures could be sold off as residences – on the basis that 

“[t]here was . . . no indication that the [p]roperty, which was located in an industrial 

zoning district, would or could be subdivided and rezoned residential”).2

 

2

 In a responsive footnote, the majority repeats the essential aspects of Mr. Camins’ 

testimony mentioned above, namely, that he: gave a single valuation for the property; 

stated the property “could” be subdivided or there was a “potential” for subdivision; and 

did not assume, contrary to Air Products and Craftmaster, that subdividion had already 

(continuedL) 
[J-102-2014][M.O. – Todd, J.] - 4 

In light of the foregoing, I would include in the remand order a directive to 

consider whether the fair-market valuation reached by Mr. Camins can be achieved 

absent subdivision in view of the uses that he contemplated for the excess land – and, if 

necessary, to undertake further factual development sufficient to resolve the question. 

 

Mr. Justice Eakin joins this concurring opinion. 

 

(Lcontinued) 

taken place. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 19 n.7. Respectfully, however, the 

majority’s response does not address the substantive points articulated above. In 

particular, and as noted, the single valuation consists of a mathematical sum of the 

values of the component parts, and Mr. Camins – a non-lawyer – supplied no basis to 

support his apparent assumption that the hypothetical multiple and varying uses of the 

property could all be realized simulataneously absent subdivision. Ascertaining whether 

such occurrence is reasonably possible appears, to me at least, as a logical prerequisite 

to any finding concerning the property’s fair market value based on a simple arithmetic 

sum of Mr. Camins’ component figures.