United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 98-2626

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Valentin Estrada-Quijas, also known *

as Valentino Q. Estrada, also known *

as Valentin Estrada, also known as *

Angel Joel Estrada, also known as *

Angel Estrade, also known as *

Valentine Quijas, also known as *

Ricardo Magen Flores, also known * Appeal from the United States

as Leonel Coronado, also known as * District Court for the

Ricardo Flores, also known as Angel * District of Nebraska

Estrada, also known as Joel Estrada, *

Also known as Angel Joe Estrada, also *

known as Valentin Quijas, also known *

as Flores Ricordo, also known as *

Leonel Coronado Salazar, also known *

as Manuel Cantu, also known as *

Ricardo Rodriguez-Flores, *

*

Appellant. *

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Submitted: February 9, 1999

Filed: July 2, 1999

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1The Honorable William G. Cambridge, Chief Judge, United States District

Court for the District of Nebraska. 

2The district court ordered that the period of supervised release is subject to

appellant being deported, and that supervised release shall not constitute grounds for

withholding appellant's deportation. 

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____________

Before McMILLIAN, LAY and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Valentin Estrada-Quijas, a Mexican national, appeals from a final judgment

entered in the United States District Court1 for the District of Nebraska, finding him

guilty, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, of illegal reentry into the United States

without the permission of the Attorney General in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The

district court sentenced appellant to 77 months imprisonment and three years

supervised release.2 See United States v. Estrada-Quijas, No. 8: 97CR192-1 (D. Neb.

Apr. 27, 1998) (hereinafter "Order"). For reversal, appellant argues that the district

court erred in applying the immigration laws and sentencing guidelines requiring a 16-

level increase for having a prior conviction for an "aggravated felony" to his offense

level because his prior offense was not considered an "aggravated felony" when he

physically reentered the United States on February 21, 1991. For the reasons discussed

below, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

Jurisdiction in the district court was proper based upon 18 U.S.C. § 3231.

Jurisdiction on appeal is proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(b).
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BACKGROUND

On November 5, 1997, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents

discovered appellant during a raid on a restaurant in Omaha, NE, where appellant was

employed. Appellant admitted to the agents that he had entered the United States

illegally after having been deported, and the agents took him into custody. 

Appellant had previously been deported from the United States in February 1991

after serving a 16-month term of imprisonment for a 1987 California conviction for

corporal injury on a spouse. Appellant had originally been sentenced to three years

probation for the offense, but in 1990 his probation was revoked and he was sentenced

to 16 months imprisonment. Appellant admits that on February 21, 1991,

approximately two weeks after being deported, he reentered the United States without

the permission of the Attorney General, and the government stipulated that date as the

date of reentry. Since his reentry in February 1991, appellant has lived in the United

States, spending the three years before his discovery in Omaha, NE. In the three years

he lived in Omaha, appellant married, had no problems with the law, and was

consistently employed, mostly in the restaurant business. 

Appellant pled guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, pursuant

to a negotiated plea agreement in which the government stated it would consider

recommending a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. At the change

of plea hearing, the district court declined to accept the plea or plea agreement, pending

receipt of the pre-sentence investigation report (PSIR). The PSIR recommended a

three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, but also a 16-level increase

because one of appellant’s prior offenses--the 1987 California conviction--was an

aggravated felony under the 1997 version of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). The district court

adopted the findings of fact in the PSIR, and overruled appellant's objection to the 16-

level increase. See Order at 7. The district court determined that appellant had a total

offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of VI, and sentenced him to 77
3Subsection (b)(2), which provides for the harsher sentence for illegal reentry

subsequent to a conviction for aggravated felony, was first enacted as part of the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-70

(1988).

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months imprisonment--at the bottom of the guideline sentencing range of 77 to 96

months. See id. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

We review cases involving the legal interpretation of sentencing guidelines de

novo. See United States v. Cazares-Gonzalez, 152 F.3d 889, 890 (8th Cir. 1998)(citing

United States v. Eagle, 133 F.3d 608, 611 (8th Cir. 1998)).

Appellant argues that the district court's application of the 16-level increase was

an ex post facto violation because his 1987 California conviction was not considered

an aggravated felony when he violated § 1326 by illegally reentering the United States

without permission on February 21, 1991. He contends that changes in the law

subsequent to his physical reentry make the sentence entered by the district court

significantly more severe than the penalty in effect at the time he reentered illegally.

For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

The various provisions affecting appellant's sentence have evolved a great deal

since 1988 when Congress first established a harsher sentence for illegal reentry

subsequent to a conviction for aggravated felony.3 See, e.g., United States v. GomezRodriguez, 96 F.3d 1262, 1263 (9th Cir. 1996). At first, § 1326(b)(2) carried a

maximum sentence of 15 years imprisonment, but the definition of "aggravated felony"

(contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)) included only convictions for murder and certain

drug and gun offenses entered after the section's enactment. See Cazares-Gonzalez,

152 F.3d at 890. In 1989, the Sentencing Commission amended U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 to
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include a four-level increase for reentry subsequent to any felony conviction other than

a felony conviction for violation of immigration laws. See U.S.S.G. Amendment 193

(effective Nov. 1, 1989); see also U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). In 1990, Congress

amended §1101(a)(43) to define "aggravated felony" as any crime of violence for which

the offender was sentenced to at least five years, but this was only to be applied

prospectively. See Cazares-Gonzalez, 152 F.3d at 890. In 1991 the Sentencing

Commission amended § 2L1.2 to include a 16-level increase for illegal reentry after

conviction for an aggravated felony, and referenced §1101(a)(43) to define "aggravated

felony." See U.S.S.G. Amendment 375 (effective Nov. 1, 1991); see also U.S.S.G. §

2L1.2(b)(1)(B). In 1994, Congress again expanded the definition of aggravated felony,

redefining it as "a crime of violence . . . for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least

one year[.]" 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), Immigration and Nationality Technical

Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 1, 108 Stat. 4305 (Oct. 25, 1994).

In addition, Congress expanded the maximum sentence for illegal reentry subsequent

to conviction for an aggravated felony from 15 to 20 years. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326

(b)(2), Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title XIII, § 130001(b), 108 Stat. 2023 (Sept. 13, 1994).

In 1996, Congress once again expanded the definition of aggravated felony by

removing the prospective application limitation, thus including any conviction with a

term of imprisonment of at least one year, regardless of its age. See Cazares-Gonzalez,

152 F.3d at 890 (citing Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.

104-208, § 321(b), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-628 (1996)). Finally, in 1997 the Sentencing

Commission amended the definition of aggravated felony in § 2L1.2 to conform to §

1101(a)(43). See U.S.S.G. Amendment 562. 

When appellant physically reentered the United States on February 21, 1991, his

offense was not considered an "aggravated felony" under § 1326, §1101, or U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2. As such, had he been apprehended at that time, he faced a statutory maximum

sentence of five years under § 1326(b)(1), because the definition of aggravated felony

subject to the harsher §1326(b)(2) did not cover his 1987 conviction, and a possible
4

If he were sentenced under 1991 law, appellant would be subject to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(1), which applied to individuals with prior felony convictions that were not

"aggravated felonies." In 1994, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) was amended to apply to

individuals who had "three or more misdemeanors involving drugs, crimes against the

person, or both, or a felony (other than an aggravated felony)," and to increase the

maximum sentence for such individuals from 5 years to 10 years. See Pub. L. No. 103-

322, Title XIII, § 13001(b), 108 Stat. 2023. 

In February 1991, U.S.S.G. § 2L2.1 carried a base offense level of 8 and allowed

a 4-level increase for individuals convicted of a felony, other than a felony related to

immigration, prior to illegal reentry. See U.S.S.G. Amendment 193 (effective Nov. 1,

1989). 

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Guideline sentence of 30-37 months.4 In 1997, however, he was subject to the 16-level

increase and the 20-year statutory maximum sentence under § 1326(b)(2), and was

sentenced to 77 months. This disparity is the basis of appellant's ex post facto

argument. 

Appellant's argument fails because it assumes that appellant only violated § 1326

when he physically reentered the United States in February 1991. However, we have

previously held that the crime of reentry under § 1326 is an on-going offense that

continues until an individual is discovered by authorities. See United States v. DiazDiaz, 135 F.3d 572, 575 (8th Cir. 1998) (Diaz). An individual can violate § 1326 in

three ways: (1) by entering, (2) by attempting to enter, (3) or by being found in the

United States without permission from the Attorney General to reenter after previously

being deported. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2). When an individual is "found in" the

United States, the date he or she is found is generally considered to be the date he or

she violated § 1326. See Diaz, 135 F.3d at 575. ("being found in the United States

typically, though not necessarily, involves a surreptitious entry by the alien and is a

continuing violation that is not complete until he is discovered by immigration

authorities.")(citing United States v. Gomez, 38 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 (8th Cir. 1994));

accord, e.g., United States v. Whittaker, 999 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v.
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Gonzalez, 988 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1993). But see, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 38 F.3d

1031, 1037 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that the government "could have, through the

exercise of diligence typical of law enforcement authorities, discovered" the defendant's

illegal presence several years before it actually did find defendant and attempted to

prosecute him under § 1326).

Because the offense of illegal reentry is an on-going offense that ends only when

an offender is discovered, appellant violated § 1326 when he was found in Nebraska

in 1997. As such, the district court did not violate the ex post facto clause by applying

the Guidelines that were in effect in 1997.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.