2020 IL App (4th) 190701-U 

NO. 4-19-0701 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re L.P., a Minor

(The People of the State of Illinois, 

Petitioner-Appellee,

v. 

Kari P., 

Respondent-Appellant). 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Champaign County 

No. 18JA28 

Honorable 

John R. Kennedy, 

Judge Presiding. 

 

 JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Justices Cavanagh and Holder White concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court did not err in finding 

respondent unfit. 

¶ 2 In April 2018, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship with respect 

to L.P., the minor child of respondent, Kari P. The trial court made the minor a ward of the court 

and placed custody and guardianship with the Department of Children and Family Services 

(DCFS). In May 2019, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The 

court found respondent unfit and determined it was in the minor’s best interests to terminate

respondent’s parental rights. 

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme 

Court Rule 23 and may not be cited 

as precedent by any party except in 

the limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

February 26, 2020 

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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¶ 3 On appeal, respondent argues only that the trial court erred in finding her unfit. 

She does not challenge the trial court’s best-interests finding. Accordingly, we confine our 

discussion of the case to the finding of unfitness. We affirm.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 A. Proceedings on the Petition for Adjudication of Wardship 

¶ 6 In April 2018, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship with respect 

to L.P., born in March 2018, the minor child of respondent and an unknown father. The State 

alleged L.P. was neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 

(Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2016)) because she was in an injurious 

environment, as evidenced by (1) respondent’s failure to correct the conditions that resulted in a 

prior adjudication of parental unfitness regarding L.P.’s sibling and (2) the fact that the alleged 

injurious environment would expose L.P. to respondent’s substance abuse. The State’s petition 

indicated respondent was incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center.

¶ 7 From April 3, 2018, to April 5, 2018, the trial court conducted a shelter-care 

hearing. The trial court found probable cause to believe L.P. was neglected—because of

respondent’s (1) incarceration, (2) “long history” of substance abuse, and (3) prior adjudication 

of unfitness with respect to L.P.’s sibling—and placed temporary custody and guardianship with 

DCFS.

¶ 8 In June 2018, following an adjudicatory hearing, the court entered an order 

finding L.P. neglected. See In re L.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 180666-U, ¶¶ 8-26 (discussing the 

evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing and the trial court’s ruling). In September 2018, 

following a dispositional hearing, the court adjudicated L.P. neglected, made her a ward of the 

court, and placed custody and guardianship with DCFS. See id. ¶¶ 27-34 (discussing the 
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evidence presented at the dispositional hearing and the trial court’s ruling). We affirmed the trial 

court’s judgments. Id. ¶ 1.

¶ 9 B. Proceedings on the Motion to Terminate Parental Rights 

¶ 10 In May 2019, the State filed a motion to terminate respondent’s parental rights, 

alleging respondent was unfit because she failed to (1) make reasonable progress toward the 

minor’s return during the nine-month period from August 14, 2018, to May 14, 2019 (750 ILCS 

50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018)), and (2) maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or 

responsibility as to the minor’s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018)). 

¶ 11 On July 19, 2019, and August 9, 2019, the trial court conducted the fitness 

hearing. Erica Stobaugh worked for Children’s Home and Aid as a “Healthy Families home 

visitor.” Stobaugh was the case worker assigned to respondent’s case from July 2018 to May 

2019, and she indicated respondent was incarcerated throughout the duration of her time on the 

case. Stobaugh testified respondent’s service plan required her to complete substance abuse 

treatment and parenting classes. When Stobaugh last spoke to respondent, in May 2019, 

respondent “was on a waiting list for the substance abuse [program], but she was participating in 

[the prison’s] Women of Dignity program, which was four classes, which one of them did 

include parenting ***.” 

¶ 12 Meredith Brumfield worked as a case manager for One Hope United. Brumfield 

was assigned to respondent’s case on May 15, 2019, and she indicated respondent had been 

incarcerated for the entirety of the case. Brumfield testified respondent’s service plan required 

her “to be in a parenting class” and “a substance abuse program.” When Brumfield was assigned 

to respondent’s case, respondent had completed no substance abuse or parenting classes. 
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¶ 13 Respondent, at the time of the hearing, had been incarcerated for 22 months due 

to a possession-of-a-stolen-vehicle conviction. Originally, her projected release date was in June 

2020. However, due to enrollment in one of the prison’s educational programs, respondent 

believed her release date “should be the end of February, beginning of March [2020].” 

Respondent testified she had participated in several programs offered at the prison. In February 

2019, she completed “Life Smart for Women,” which “goes over like being healthy, going over 

health issues for women”; in March 2019, respondent successfully completed “Start Now,” a 

“reentry program” that “revolve[d] around talking about women’s issues, your drug abuse, 

trauma, PTSD”; she was also enrolled in a “Construction Occupations class” until July 2019, 

when she had to drop the class in order to participate in the prison’s drug treatment program 

because it “was more important.” Respondent testified she had been on the drug treatment 

program’s waiting list since she began serving her sentence. 

¶ 14 Following presentation of the evidence and recommendations of counsel, the trial 

court found the State proved respondent unfit for failing to make reasonable progress toward the 

minor’s return during the nine-month period from August 14, 2018 to May 14, 2019. (The court 

did find respondent had maintained a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as 

to the minor’s welfare.) With respect to its finding of unfitness, the trial court reasoned 

respondent had made no progress toward completion of substance abuse treatment or parenting 

classes during the relevant time period, as was required by her service plan. Although respondent 

had been on the waiting list for substance abuse treatment, she did not secure enrollment in the 

program until after the nine-month period had concluded. As for the parenting classes, the court 

acknowledged there was evidence respondent had completed a course “that had a session 

involving parenting education,” but ultimately found there was “not evidence of completion of 
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parenting education, certainly not in any form that would show requisite acquisition of skills to 

be able to parent this young child.” 

¶ 15 This appeal followed. 

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 Respondent argues the trial court’s finding of unfitness was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. We disagree.

¶ 18 Section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court Act sets forth a two-step process for the 

involuntary termination of parental rights. See 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2016). “First, the 

court must find, by ‘clear and convincing evidence, that a parent is an unfit person as defined in 

Section 1 of the Adoption Act.’ ” In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 337, 924 N.E.2d 961, 966 (2010) 

(quoting 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2008)). A finding of unfitness is accorded great deference 

on appeal—as the trial court has the superior opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct 

of the parties and witnesses—and we therefore will not disturb such a finding unless it is against 

the manifest weight of the evidence, meaning “ ‘the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent.’ ” 

In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 21, 77 N.E.3d 69 (quoting In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 354, 

830 N.E.2d 508, 517 (2005)). 

¶ 19 In this case, the trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, respondent 

was unfit for failing to make reasonable progress toward L.P.’s return during the nine-month 

period from August 14, 2018, to May 14, 2019. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018). 

¶ 20 “Reasonable progress” is an objective standard that “may be found when the trial 

court can conclude the parent’s progress is sufficiently demonstrable and of such quality that the 

child can be returned to the parent in the near future.” In re Janine M.A., 342 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 

1051, 796 N.E.2d 1175, 1183 (2003). “At a minimum, reasonable progress requires measurable 
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or demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification.” In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 

1052, 1067, 859 N.E.2d 123, 137 (2006). The benchmark for measuring whether a parent has 

made reasonable progress toward the child’s return “encompasses the parent’s compliance with 

the service plans and the court’s directives ***.” In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 216, 752 N.E.2d 

1030, 1050 (2001). 

¶ 21 Here, respondent’s service plan required her to complete (1) substance abuse 

treatment and (2) parenting classes. At the outset of the relevant nine-month period—August 14, 

2018—respondent had made no progress toward completion of either objective; by the end of the 

relevant period—May 14, 2019—nothing had changed. 

¶ 22 Erica Stobaugh, respondent’s case worker from July 2018 to May 2019, testified 

that, as of May 2019, respondent “was on a waiting list for the substance abuse [program], but 

she was participating in [the prison’s] Women of Dignity program, which was four classes, 

which one of them did include parenting ***.” Meredith Brumfield, the case worker assigned to 

respondent’s case in May 2019, testified respondent had completed no substance abuse or 

parenting classes when she was assigned to the case. Further, Brumfield noted in the bestinterests report that while some of the courses respondent took in prison “touched on *** 

parenting,” they did “not address the reasons her case came into care.” Accordingly, because 

respondent received no substance abuse treatment and took, at most, a single parenting class 

during the relevant nine-month period, we conclude the trial court’s finding of unfitness was not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 23 Respondent nonetheless argues she made reasonable progress toward L.P.’s return 

despite the limited services available to her due to her imprisonment. However, as the trial court 

found, imprisonment “does not toll the nine-month period ***.” In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d at 341; see 
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also In re F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 89, 19 N.E.3d 227 (“Time in prison is included in 

the nine-month period during which reasonable progress must be made.”). Although we 

recognize respondent’s incarceration presented additional challenges and we commend her for 

pursuing the services available to her, the fact remains that she was no closer to reunification on 

May 14, 2019, than she was on August 14, 2018. 

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 26 Affirmed.