Exhibit 15.3  TRADUCCIÓN PÚBLICACERTIFIED TRANSLATION  Commercial Court No. 4, Clerks Office No. 8  Multicanal S.A. s/Acuerdo Preventivo Extrajudicial. Record No. 83658  Buenos Aires, May 16, 2005.  1.             By means of the filing on page 19822/37, State Street
Bank and Trust Co. (Huff) raised a series of matters in connection with the
potential publication of the official notices set forth in the order approving
the APE (section 4.C) and which is final in all respects.  Specifically, it requested the suspension of such
procedural act for the reasons therein stated, to which I will refer shortly.  Multicanal
S.A. answered as set forth in the presentation previously attached.  It required the rejection of all matters so raised by
the creditor, as well as the prompt publication of the above referred official
notices.  2.             (i) In the first place it must be pointed out that,
although the Court has previouslyin its prior compositionrequired a series of
reports and explanations with the issue of the order on pages 19036/8, which
have been answered by Multicanal S.A. on pages 19043/307 and by Huff on pages
19310/773, the truth is that the question giving rise thereto, i.e., in a short
summary, the effects of filing the recurso de queja(petition
in error) before the highest court of the Nation, the point to be considered in
such opportunity has become abstract, having been rejected in the above
referred appeal (see pages 19.781), which is so declared.  Notwithstanding the above, it should be highlighted
that in this opportunity the Court will decide on the presentation made on
pages 19822/37 after considering all the elements gathered in the process, in
view of the characteristics thereof and considering the interest of the parties
in introducing them, to the extent of the documents presented in this record.  For that reason, I will explain below the reasons for
the correct interpretation of the dispute, without analyzing all presentations
(Rulings 302:478, 299 and 220; arg. cpr: 386:2).  (ii) It is worth noting in this case that
reliability, as a principle of ethical content, imposes on the parties the duty
to honor the expectations encouraged; and the nonperformance thereof means
contradicting the bases of all judicial organizations (Rezzonico, Juan Carlos Principios Fundamentales de los Contratos, Ed. Astrea,
Buenos Aires, 1999, page 376/7).  1


For
all the above this Court considers that, having resorted to another
jurisdiction, when the acuerdo preventivo extrajudicialwas pending in this Court is close
to a transgression of contractual good faith and in any case it was a clear
demonstration that Huff contravened it own prior conduct.  As you know, the estoppel theory is a consequence of
the principle of good faith.  And such principle requires a reliable and loyal
conduct in legal relations.  Huffs procedural acts implied, finally, a change
which reveals a conduct not compatible with the reliability that the debtor
promoted with its prior acts  It stated that having exhausted all challenging
possibilities in this process, it decided to resort to the courts of a foreign
country, where a series of contradicting events took place which then it
intended to introduce in this record, when the truth of the matter is that the
judgment confirming the APE was already final (although the petition in error
had not been rejected, but not approved either, not having therefore any
staying effects upon the possibility of publishing official notices),  delaying as a result thereof the prompt
performance of the confirmed agreement.  You must remember that the basic rule of contract law
(that being the nature of the confirmed proposal) is that same must be executed, interpreted and performed in good
faith (civ:1188); whereas the acknowledged contractual freedom
must be exercised with mutual loyalty and be objectively considered taking into
account what two honorable and reasonable parties would have done in that case
(Com:B, 11.24.99 Molinari, Antonio Felipe c/Tarraubella Compañía
Financiera S.A., JA review No. 6235 of 2.28.01 and corporate
doctrine. Ed. Errepar, Volume 9, page 905).  That has been said after having seen that contractual
good faith is related to the duty of cooperation with the other partys
interests, which is characterized by the loyalty to the contractual relation
and the efforts to satisfy the legitimate expectations of the other party.  Having said that, we must dismiss the procedural
policy undertaken by Huff upon including in the new call all the bondholders
that voted to accept the proposal, there being stated in the confirming order
of 04.14.04 that such call must be limited to those who voted no or who
abstained from voting, as well as to those who were absent or whohaving voted
and having the cash option as single proposal, after the final confirming
order, are in the same rank as the others.  Or, in other words, and for the relevant purposes, the
proposal shall be supplemented or adapted in connection with U.S. retail
holders that have already voted when the legal situation thereofprior to the
confirming resolutionwas different.  2


To interpret
another thing would imply re-editing already concluded stages, i.e. return to
the situation contemplated in Section 75 of the Argentine Bankruptcy Law, which
is prohibited in our general procedural system.  That does not alter the already confirmed proposal;
the possibility of U.S. retail holders to access to the par and combined
options is a matter concerning the form in which Multicanal shall comply with
the proposal, as it has been confirmed.  To what we have expressed above in connection with
the estoppel theory, we must add the fact that in our procedural system, that
theory is accepted by the estoppel principle (principio de
preclusión). This means that contenders must not adopt positions
which contradict those assumed during the process in already concluded stages,
except if such change benefits the contender of such party (Com:B 12.13.94 Tirendi Héctor c/Mohadile Moisés s/sumario).  Huffs procedural attitude as a matter of fact
violates such principle, as upon opposing confirmation of the proposal, it
alleged it was discriminatory, because it purportedly did not put all financial
creditors on the same footing, whereas in this instanceand certainly
untimelyand when the U.S. Bankruptcy Court suggests putting retail holders on
the same rank as the rest of creditors, it considers that to be an offense.  In this context, the above referred estoppel theory
is applicable to procedural law to the extent there is a lack of coherence in
behavior, a manifest inconsistency between the conduct generating a certain
factual and legal statement and a later conduct contesting it, in accordance
with the estoppel principle, which in one of its senses so determines (Com:B,
03.16.99 Aseguradores Industriales S.A. Cía. Arg. de Seguros
c/Federico Claps Automotores S.R.L. s/ordinario); which estoppel is
contemplated by the Argentine Bankruptcy Laws regulations in Section 286.  It is understood that those retail holders to whom
the call will be extended are, in general, geographically
discriminateddepending on the characteristics of the issuerand in general
have become holders of the notes not by their own decision, but by
recommendation of financial agents and in general they do not have their own
opinion on the debtors crisis, its origins and the possibilities of solving
it, do not have a personal criterion regarding the final destination of the
exploitation and usually followto make their decisionthe advice of the same
agent that induced them to make the investment (Vitolo, Daniel Roque Bonistas y títulos emitidos en serie en el régimen de la ley 25.589,
Revista de las Sociedades y Concursos. Ed. Ad-Hoc, No. 21, March/April 2003,
page 29).  Regarding the mention of the existence of a
discriminatory payment proposal in respect of U.S. retail holders, it must be
pointed out that none of them filed any objection when dueArgentine Bankruptcy
Law, Section 75against the treatment received; the matter was analyzed and
resolved on its own motion by this Court in use of the powers that the legal
system confers to the Judge, as director of the process, and in order to
discourage potential abuses; all of which convinces me  3


that
the fact of resorting to foreign courts and afterwards using the decisions
therein issued, here, has proved to be not only contradictory, but contrary to
the above referred good faith principle.  As a matter of fact, it had already been clarified in
such opportunity that Huffs challenging presentation became abstract, having
obtained the clarifications made by Multicanal in the preceding document (see
page 18392), referring to the presentation of pages 18348/50.  It was then clear that for this Court there is no
discrimination, as it is understood by Huff, as all creditorsthose who voted yes
or no and even those who were absent at the bondholders meetingwere in the
same rank, according to the judgment confirming the APE, which is already
final.  The only thing left was, then, to simply hear the
decision of those who, having been heard in the meeting contemplated in Section
45 bis of the Argentine Bankruptcy Law, after confirmation of the agreement
acquired the right to select among all the options.  On the other hand, it was stated there that regarding
the strictness that must prevail upon analyzing the payment proposal, samein
the context of the crisis described by the debtor and other elements presented
in the case, duly checked by the partiesdoes not seem to be abusive or
fraudulent, and no rights seem to be injured. It is clear then that there has
been no discrimination, in accordance with the explanations provided by the debtor
in the preceding presentation, where it has been clarified that the inclusion
of non accepting creditors in each of the three options contemplated by the
proposal to bondholders is voluntary (sic. See pages 18.396/7).  The matter is decided based on the above, rejecting
then Huffs allegations.  (iii) Finally, I add that in connection with the
attitude of Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch, for the reasons herein stated, I
reject the allegations made in its presentation of pages 19785/8 where such
banking entity simply outlined an objection, without making any specific
petition, as set forth in item V.2 of page 19788, which expression does not
contain any specific petition.  3.             As a result of all the aforesaid, the elements gathered
and the information provided by the parties, I HEREBY
RESOLVE TO:  (i) Dismiss the presentation made by the creditors.
Court costs will be borne as generated, this being an innovative matter in
respect of which there is no precedent allowing verification of a solid current
of case law on the point being analyzed.  (ii) Provide, with no other formality being required
(being the order confirming the APE final), for the publication of official
notices therein ordered in the above described form.  4


Therefore, those who being present at the
meeting held on December 10, 2003 on the terms of Section 45 bis of the
Argentine Bankruptcy Law voted no or abstained from voting, as well as those
who were absent, are hereby summoned to select among any of the three options
and they are hereby warned that if they do not express their options, their
credits will be pro rated among available options as set forth in the order
confirming the APE.  U.S.
retail holders that being present in the act of December 10, 2003 were only
allowed to select the cash option are hereby also summoned, so that they are
able to select any of the two remaining options and they are hereby warned that
if they do not express their option, the already voted cash option will be
ratified.  Such
options must be expressed within a term of 30 days after the last publication
of the official notice, to be made for the term and at the places set forth for
the meeting under Section 45 bis of the Argentine Bankruptcy Law, and so that
the remaining creditors exercise the option right they have obtained, as stated
above, and before the debtor itself.  HÉCTOR HUGO VITALE Surrogating Judge   I hereby certify that the above
is a true translation into English of the original document in Spanish. Buenos
Aires, May 16, 2005.  [FOR CERTIFICATION PURPOSES
ONLY]  Es traducción fiel al inglés (en
5 páginas) del documento original en castellano. Buenos Aires, 16 de mayo de
2005.   Signature:
  /s/ Maria Jose Garcia-MataStamp:
  Maria Jose Garcia-MataPublic TranslatorEnglish Language  Stamp:
  Association of Public
  TranslatorsCorresponds to the Probate
  Nr. 2484/2005/T5Silvia Edith Leouona  5