IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

September 11, 2007 Session

ROBERT J. YOUNG COMPANY v. NASHVILLE HOCKEY CLUB

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

A Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 05-1271 II The Honorable Carol McCoy, Chancellor

No. M2006-2511-COA-R3-CV - Filed March 26, 2008

This case arises from a contract dispute between the parties. The Appellant herein, Nashville

Hockey Club, entered into a “Sponsorship Agreement” with the Appellee herein, Robert J. Young

Company. Subsequently, the parties agreed to change their agreement. As a result, the parties

entered into a subsequent “Letter of Agreement.” When a players’ strike occurred, Appellee wished

to cancel the contract. Appellant claimed that the “Sponsorship Agreement,” and particularly the

force majeure clause contained therein, were not superseded by the “Letter of Agreement.” The trial

court granted summary judgment against Appellee and, following a hearing on Appellant’s counterclaim, granted judgment in favor of Appellant but did not award damages based upon its finding that

Appellant had mitigated all of its damages. Appellant appeals on the issue of damages. Appellee

appeals on the issue of what, if any, agreement exists between the parties. Finding that the plain

language of the “Letter of Agreement” supports a finding that same supersedes the “Sponsorship

Agreement,” we reverse and remand.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed and

Remanded

W. FRANK CRAWFORD,J. delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S.

and JEFFREY STEWART, SP.J., not participating.

Robert J. Walker and John L. Farringer IV of Nashville, Tennessee for appellant, Nashville Hockey

Club Limited Partnership

Ralph W. Mello of Nashville, Tennessee for Appellee, Robert J. Young Company

OPINION

The material facts of this case are undisputed. Robert J. Young Company (“RJY,” or

“Appellee”) and the Nashville Hockey Club Limited Partnership (“NHC,” or “Appellant”) first

discussed entering into a sponsorship agreement in 1997. On February 20, 1998, the parties entered
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into a “Letter of Intent.” Thereafter, on September 1, 1998, the parties entered into a “Sponsorship

Agreement.” By its own terms, the “Sponsorship Agreement” was to run from July 1, 1998 until

June 30, 2001. Under the “Sponsorship Agreement,” RJY agreed to purchase fourteen season

tickets to Predator hockey games and to pay an annual sponsorship fee (paid in six equal

installments) for two dasher-board panels. The NHC, in turn, agreed to pay for certain office

equipment and related services from RJY. Section Eleven of the “Sponsorship Agreement” contains

a force majeure clause, which reads as follows:

11. FORCE MAJEURE.

In the event compliance with any of the parties’ obligations

under this Agreement is impractical or impossible due to any

emergency, including, but not limited to, player strikes, management

lockouts, labor disputes, embargoes, flood, earthquake, storm,

lightning, fire, epidemic, acts of God, war, national emergency, civil

disturbance or disobedience, riot, sabotage, terrorism, threats of

sabotage or terrorism, restraint by court order or order of public

authority, failure of machinery or equipment or any other occurrence

beyond the parties’ reasonable control (each such occurrence being

an “Event of Force Majeure”), then the time for performance of such

obligations shall be extended for a period equal to the duration of the

event of Force Majeure.

The parties also agreed, in Section Thirteen of the “Sponsorship Agreement,” to arbitrate any

disputes arising out of the agreement, and for payment of reasonable attorneys’ fees and other

expenses for the prevailing party.

Within a short period of entering into the “Sponsorship Agreement,” RJY approached the

NHC to consider changing the terms of the “Sponsorship Agreement.” Specifically, RJY wanted

to trade in its season tickets for one of the luxury suites at the Gaylord Entertainment Center (the

“Arena”). RJY also proposed the creation of a business center for use by the luxury suite owners

at the Arena that would be named the “Robert J. Young Business Center.” In addition, RJY asked

to be named the official sponsor of the Predators for a ten-year-term–a title it could advertise on its

trucks, website, and marketing materials.

Following negotiations, in late October 1998, the parties entered into a “Letter of

Agreement.” The “Letter of Agreement” reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

The suite is listed at $100,000 per year. We agreed to the following

compensation structure:

• Term: 10 years, 1998-2008

• Annual Escalation: 3% increase commencing in

year four.

• Compensation: $75,000 in year one.
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• Trade In: R.J. Young will return four

club seats and 10 upper level

season tickets ($25 seats).

• Barter Agreement: R.J. Young to provide the

following equipment over the

term of the agreement

1. Copier fax for the business

center,

2. A high speed copier,

3. A high speed digital copier/printer.

* * *

I. Sponsor Agrees to Provide Club:

Suite Licensing Fee Sponsorship Fee

Year 1, 1998-99 $ 75,000.00 $ 125,000.00

Year 2, 1999-2000 75,000.00 128,750.00

Year 3, 2000-2001 75,000.00 132,812.50

Year 4, 2001-2002 77,250.00 136,591.00

Year 5, 2002-2003 79,568.00 140,689.00

Year 6, 2003-2004 81,955.00 144,910.00

Year 7, 2004-2005 84,414.00 149,257.00

Year 8, 2005-2006 86,949.00 153,735.00

Year 9, 2006-2007 89,554.00 158,347.00

Year 10, 2007-2008 92,241.00 163,097.00

In exchange, the NHC agreed to pay RJY for certain office equipment, leasing, and service for ten

years. 

The parties performed consistent with the terms of the above “Letter of Agreement” from

1998 until 2004. RJY was provided Suite C-15, the business center on the main suite level at the

Arena was named the “Robert J. Young Business Center,” and the NHC paid for the agreed-upon

copy equipment and services from RJY. 

The Predators’ 2004-2005 season was delayed and eventually canceled as a result of work

stoppage arising from the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement between NHL players

and NHL owners. In response to the work stoppage, by letter of December 7, 2004, RJY informed

the NHC that it was “canceling” the contract. By letters dated January 11, 2005 and January 26,

2005, the NHC informed RJY that the NHC believed that RJY had no legal basis to terminate the

contract. Specifically, the NHC raised the force majeure clause of the “Sponsorship Agreement.”

In response, RJY took the position that the October 1998 “Letter of Agreement,” supra, superseded

the “Sponsorship Agreement,” and that this “Letter of Agreement” contained no force majeure
 In this Complaint, RJY also names the Nashville Predators, L.LC. as a defendant. In response, the Predators

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filed a motion to dismiss, which motion was granted by Order of August 9, 2005. Consequently, the NHC is the sole

appellant in this appeal.

 On June 20, 2005, RJY filed its “First Amended Complaint.” RJY filed its “Second Amended Complaint” 2

on October 19, 2005. In the “Second Amended Complaint,” RJY seeks to avoid its contractual obligation on theories

of frustration of commercial purpose, failure of consideration, lack of mutual assent, and breach of contract on the part

of NHC.

 RJY also filed a motion for summary judgment, which motion was subsequently denied by Order of August

3

9, 2005.

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clause. Consequently, RJY contends that, because the players strike had frustrated the purpose of

the contract, it was justified in ceasing performance.

On May 18, 2005, RJY filed suit against the NHC. In its Complaint, RJY seeks rescission 1

of the October 1998 “Letter of Agreement” due to alleged “frustration of commercial purpose.” On 2

July 8, 2005, the NHC filed its Answer and Counterclaim. In its Answer, the NHC denies the 3

material allegations of the Complaint. In its Counterclaim, the NHC alleges breach of contract on

the part of RJY, and cite to the force majeure clause of the original “Sponsorship Agreement.”

Following entry of RJY’s “Second Amended Complaint,” see fn. 2, the NHC filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment on July 14, 2006, seeking judgment on all of RJY’s claims. The NHC’s

motion was granted by Order of September 13, 2006, thereby leaving only the counterclaims

asserted by the NHC. These issues were tried by the court, sitting without a jury, on September 11

and 12, 2006. On October 11, 2006, the trial court entered its “Final Order and Judgment,” which

reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

For the reasons set forth in the transcript, the Court finds as follows:

(i) There was an enforceable and sufficiently definite agreement

between R.J. Young and Hockey Club.

(ii) R.J. Young materially breached the parties’ agreement.

(iii) R.J. Young’s breach would have caused the Hockey Club to

incur damages but for the Court’s finding on mitigation infra.

(iv) The Hockey Club is therefore the prevailing party but the Court

declines to award the Hockey Club its attorneys fees because the

provision of the parties’ agreement that calls for an award of

attorneys fees to the prevailing party references an arbitration

proceeding, and these proceedings arose from a lawsuit filed by R.J.

Young and the compulsory counterclaims asserted by the Hockey

Club in response.
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(v) Although it is the prevailing party, the Court declines to award the

Hockey Club any damages because the Court holds that the Hockey

Club mitigated all of its damages. The basisfor this determination is

set forth on pages 106 to 109 of the attached transcript, which is

incorporated by reference.

In its ruling from the bench, which is incorporated into the above Order, the trial court

specifically found that “the parties conducted themselves as though terms of both agreements [the

original “Sponsorship Agreement” and the subsequent “Letter of Agreement”] were in effect, and

the Court does not find that the language that the [“Letter of Agreement”] will supersede the

previous Letter of Agreement resulted in a cancellation or an avoidance of some of the provisions

of the [“Sponsorship Agreement”].” In addition, the trial court reviewed the material evidence

concerning mitigation of damages and concluded, as set out in its Order, that the NHC’s was not

entitled to damages. Furthermore, concerning attorneys fees, the trial court interpreted the

“Sponsorship Agreement” to contain only a provision for attorneys fees in the case of arbitration.

Because this case arose out of a cross-suits filed by the parties, arbitration did not occur and,

consequently, the trial court concluded that neither party is entitled to its fees and costs.

The NHC appeals and raises four issues for review, as stated in its brief:

1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the [NHC] was

entitled to no damages despite its holding that R.J. Young breached

the parties’ Sponsorship Agreement.

2. Whether the trial court erred in charging the [NHC] with failure to

mitigate the barter portion of their damages resulting from R.J.

Young’s breach of the parties’ Sponsorship Agreement when

acceptance of R.J. Young’s barter would have precluded the [NHC]

from otherwise mitigating their damages.

3. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the [NHC] had fully

mitigated the cash damages resulting from R.J. Young’s breach of the

parties’ Sponsorship Agreement by entering into a materially

different sponsorship agreement with a third party.

4. Whether the trial court erred in failing to award the [NHC] their

attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Sponsorship Agreement.

In the posture of Appellee, RJY raises the following additional issues for review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that there was an

enforceable agreement between the parties.
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2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the undated Letter

Agreement amended rather than super[s]eded the prior Sponsorship

Agreement.

3. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Appellant was the

prevailing party.

Because RJY’s issues involve the threshold consideration of what, if any, enforceable

agreement exists between the parties, it is necessary for us to first address this question before

reviewing the award of damages issues raised by the Appellant herein. Appellee’s issue necessarily

involves the question of whether summary judgment on RJY’s counterclaim was proper.

It is well settled that a motion for summary judgment should be granted when the movant

demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party moving for summary

judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Bain

v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn.1997). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must take

the strongest legitimate view of evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable

inferences in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. See id. In Byrd v. Hall,

847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn.1993), our Supreme Court stated:

Once it is shown by the moving party that there is no genuine issue

of material fact, the nonmoving party must then demonstrate, by

affidavits or discovery material, that there is a genuine, material fact

dispute to warrant a trial. In this regard, Rule 56.05 provides that the

nonmoving party cannot simply rely upon his pleadings but must set

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material

fact for trial.

Id. at 211 (citations omitted).

Summary judgment is only appropriate when the facts and the legal conclusions drawn from

the facts reasonably permit only one conclusion. See Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26

(Tenn.1995). Because only questions of law are involved, there is no presumption of correctness

regarding a trail court's grant or denial of summary judgment. See Bain, 926 S.W.2d at 622.

Therefore, our review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo on the record before

this Court. See Warren v. Estate of Kirk, 954 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tenn.1997).

The language used in a contract must be taken and understood in its plain, ordinary, and

popular sense. Bob Pearsall Motors, Inc. v. Regal Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 578

(Tenn.1975). In construing contracts, the words expressing the parties' intentions should be given

the usual, natural, and ordinary meaning. Ballard v. North American Life & Casualty Co., 667

S.W.2d 79 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983). If the language of a written instrument is unambiguous, the Court

must interpret it as written rather than according to the unexpressed intention of one of the parties.

Sutton v. First Nat'l Bank, 620 S.W.2d 526 (Tenn.Ct.App.1981). A contract is not ambiguous
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merely because the parties have different interpretations of the contract's various provisions,

Cookeville Gynecology & Obstetrics, P.C. v. Southeastern Data Sys., Inc., 884 S.W.2d at 462

(citing Oman Constr. Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 486 F.Supp. 375, 382 (M.D.Tenn.1979)),

nor can this Court create an ambiguity where none exists in the contract. Cookeville P.C., 884

S.W.2d at 462 (citing Edwards v. Travelers Indem. Co., 201 Tenn. 435, 300 S.W.2d 615, 617-18

(1957)). The interpretation of a written contract is a matter of law and not of fact, see Rainey v.

Stansell, 836 S.W.2d 117 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992). Consequently, construction of the contract is

particularly suited to disposition by summary judgment. Id. at 119. Therefore, we review the trial

court’s finding concerning the agreement between these parties de novo upon the record with no

presumption of correction accompanying the trial court’s conclusions of law. See Tenn. R. App. P.

13(d); Waldron v. Delffs, 988 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Sims v. Stewart, 973 S.W.2d

597, 599-600 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

The contention between these parties involves the question of whether, as RJY asserts, the

“Letter of Agreement” supersedes the “Sponsorship Agreement,” or whether, as the NHC argues,

the “Letter of Agreement” merely revises or amends certain terms of the “Sponsorship Agreement.”

17B C.J.S. Contracts §§ 434 and 435 (1999) provide guidance concerning subsequent agreements

made by parties to a contract, and the effect of the subsequent agreements on the original agreement,

to wit:

§ 434. Discharge by new contract

A contract may be discharged or abrogated by a new contract

with the effect of altering the terms of the original or of rescinding it

altogether.

Subsequent to the execution of a written contract, it is

competent for the parties, by a new contract, not necessarily in

writing, either to abandon, waive, or annul the prior contract. The

parties to an agreement may also agree to terminate it by expressly

assenting to its rescission while simultaneously entering into a new

agreement dealing with the same subject matter. However, making

subsequent contracts that deal with the same subject matter as the

earlier contracts does not abrogate the previous instruments unless

the subsequent contract either explicitly rescinds the earlier

instruments or deals with the subject matter of those instruments so

comprehensively as to be complete within itself...

* * *

§ 435. Subsequent inconsistent agreement; Substituted contracts

A contract complete in itself will be conclusively presumed

to supersede a prior one between the same parties and concerning the
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same subject matter where the terms of the two are so inconsistent

that they cannot subsist together.

If the parties to a prior agreement enterinto a subsequent contract that

completely covers the same subject, but the second agreement

containsterms that are inconsistent with those ofthe prior agreement,

and the two documents cannot stand together, the later document

supersedes and rescinds the earlier agreement.... When the parties

intend a new contract to replace all the provisions of an earlier

contract, the new contract is termed the substituted contract.... 

However, deviations or changes in a contract do not

necessarily abrogate it or imply its abandonment, and where it is

claimed that by reason of inconsistency between the terms of a new

agreement and those of the old the old one is discharged, the fact that

such was the intention of the parties must clearly appear.

17B C.J.S. Contracts §§ 434 and 435 (1999) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

From the above authority, it is the intent ofthe parties that controls the question of abrogation

by subsequent agreement. And, as noted above, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained,

whenever possible, from the usual, natural, and ordinary meaning of the words used by the parties

in their agreement. See Ballard v. North American Life & Casualty Co., 667 S.W.2d 79

(Tenn.Ct.App.1983). 

As set forth in the fact section above, the parties entered into a “Letter of Intent” on February

20, 1998. Thereafter, on September 1, 1998, the parties entered into the “Sponsorship Agreement.”

In October of 1998, the parties renegotiated certain terms of the “Sponsorship Agreement” and

entered into an undated “Letter of Agreement.” This “Letter of Agreement,” which was drafted by

the NHC, reads, in relevant part, as follows:

Outlined below is the revised sponsorship agreement that includes

the luxury suite in the Nashville Arena, Suite C-15. This agreement

will supersede the previous Letter of Agreement between Robert J.

Young and the Nashville Predators. Please review the terms and

conditions and if the information contained in this document is

accurate, please sign and return the executed copy to the Predators.

* * *

Please note that this Letter Agreement will act as a contract by and

between the Predators and Robert J. Young. Therefore, please

acknowledge your acceptance of the terms of this Letter Agreement

by executing the copy enclosed herewith and returning it to the

Nashville Hockey Club Limited Partnership.
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(Emphasis added).

As discussed above, the trial court determined that this “Letter of Agreement” amended, but

did not supersede, the “Sponsorship Agreement.” On appeal, RJY contends, inter alia, that the

“Letter of Agreement” did supersede the “Sponsorship Agreement,” thereby abrogating the force

majeure clause contained therein. Upon initial review, the “Letter of Agreement” certainly changes

the terms of the “Sponsorship Agreement.” These new terms are very specifically enumerated in the

“Letter of Agreement.” Consequently, we find that the “Letter of Agreement” (as far as the

obligations of the respective parties) is specific and clear enough to stand alone and independent of

the “Sponsorship Agreement.” Nonetheless, we must determine whether this reading fairly and

accurately depicts the parties’ intentions.

The “Letter of Agreement” makes only one reference to the sponsorship agreement–in the

first sentence where the document purports to be “the revised sponsorship agreement.” Applying

the plain and ordinary meaning, these words appear to indicate that this is a new, and separate,

agreement–i.e. the revised sponsorship agreement. The parties do not state that the “Letter of

Agreement” (or any portion thereof) revises the “Sponsorship Agreement,” or that the “Letter of

Agreement” contains revisions, or amendments, or changes to the “Sponsorship Agreement.”

Rather, the parties state that the contents of the “Letter of Agreement” constitute “the revised

sponsorship agreement.” In legal parlance the adjective “revised” usually signifies a different, and

separate, document that stands alone. For example, a “revised statute” is defined as a “body of

statutes which have been revised, collected, arranged in order, and re-enacted as a whole.” Black’s

Law Dictionary (6 ed. 1990). Likewise, and as an additional illustration, an “amendment” to a th

complaint merely modifies an original complaint, which complaint remains before the court as

modified. However, an “amended complaint” is complete in itself without adoption or reference to

the original, and has the effect of superseding or abrogating the original as a pleading. See, e.g.,

Louisville & N.R.Co. v. House, 56 S.W. 836 (Tenn. 1900). Although use of “revised sponsorship

agreement” does not definitively prove the parties’ intent to have the “Letter of Agreement” replace

the “Sponsorship Agreement,” it does provide some evidence for that finding. 

Moving to the second sentence of the “Letter of Agreement,” the parties indicate that “[t]his

agreement will supersede the previous Letter of Agreement....” As discussed above, the trial court

specifically stated that it “does not find that the language that the agreement will supersede the

previous Letter of Agreement resulted in a cancellation or an avoidance of some of the provisions

of the Sponsorship Agreement.” We are troubled by this finding for two reasons. First, the parties

clearly state that the “Letter of Agreement” “supersedes” a previous agreement, which they refer

to as the “previous Letter of Agreement.” There is no ambiguity in this term–“supersedes.”

Consequently, in order to give effect to the intent of the parties, we must interpret the “Letter of

Agreement” to supersede some prior agreement between the parties, so long as we can determine

which document the parties intended to supersede. This brings us to our second concern–that being

that there is, in fact, no “previous Letter of Agreement” between these parties. As set out above,

there is an initial “Letter of Intent,” the subsequent “Sponsorship Agreement,” and then the current

and disputed “Letter of Agreement.” We first note that, from a logical standpoint, there was no need

to supersede the original “Letter of Intent,” because same was inferentially abrogated by the parties’

“Sponsorship Agreement.” In reviewing a trial court’s decision to resolve a contract dispute by the
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mechanism of summary judgment, we must allow all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn.1997). Furthermore, any ambiguities in

a contract are to be construed against the drafter. Vantage Tech. LLC v. Cross, 17 S.W .3d 637, 650

(Tenn.Ct.App.1999) (citing Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528, 531

(Tenn.1991)). Here, the drafting party is the NHC. Moreover, as discussed above, we know, from

the use of the plain, and unambiguous term “supersedes,” that these parties intended the “Letter of

Agreement” to, in fact, replace some previous agreement between them. Because the “Letter of

Intent” was, for all intents and purposes, abrogated by the “Sponsorship Agreement,” the logical

inference to be drawn from the “previous Letter of Agreement” language is that the parties intended

to supersede their previous agreement as set out in the “Sponsorship Agreement.” 

In addition, the last paragraph of the “Letter of Agreement” indicates that this “Letter

Agreement will act as a contract by and between the [NHC] and [RJY]. Therefore, please

acknowledge your acceptance of the terms of this Letter Agreement....” From the plain language

used, the parties agree that the “Letter of Agreement” (referred to as the “Letter Agreement”) will

serve as a contract between them. Again, there is no reference to the “Sponsorship Agreement,” nor

any indication that this “Letter of Agreement” outlines only the changes thereto. Because it is

incumbent upon this Court to consider the entire contract in determining the meaning of any or all

its parts,” see, e.g., Cocke County Bd. of Highway Commissioners v. Newport Utilities Bd., 690

S.W.2d 231, 237 (Tenn.1985), we cannot overlook the fact that the parties use the term “Letter

Agreement” to refer to this “Letter of Agreement,” which the parties state is their contract.

Returning to the language “previous Letter of Agreement,” supra, based upon the language

contained in the “Letter of Agreement,” it is logical to infer that the use of “previous Letter of

Agreement” refers to a previous contract. Because the only previous contract between the parties

is the “Sponsorship Agreement,” when the “Letter of Agreement” is viewed as a whole, we conclude

that the parties intended to supersede their “Sponsorship Agreement” by entering into the subsequent

“Letter of Agreement.”

Turning briefly to the trial court’s finding that the actions of the parties indicate that both the

“Sponsorship Agreement” and the “Letter of Agreement” were in effect, we disagree. From our

review of the record, it appears that the parties actually operated under the terms of the “Letter of

Agreement” until the players’ strike. At that point, the contention arose as to whether the “Letter

of Agreement” superseded the “Sponsorship Agreement.” In short, the parties did not draw upon

the terms of the “Sponsorship Agreement” until the NHC asserted the force majeure clause. At that

time, RJY claimed that the “Sponsorship Agreement” was abrogated. Moreover, as discussed

above, we find that the terms of the “Letter of Agreement,” including suite licensing fee and

sponsorship fee schedules, are sufficiently definite to uphold the contract. Accordingly, we find that

the “Letter of Agreement” constitutes the contract between these parties as same supersedes the

“Sponsorship Agreement.” Consequently, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment on RJY’s claims. Based upon our holding that the “Sponsorship Agreement” is no longer

in effect, we also find that the trial court erred in its damages analysis and in its finding of fault in

this case. 

Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s Order of September 13, 2006

dismissing RJY’s claims by summary judgment. We also reverse the trial court’s Order of October
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11, 2006, same being based upon an erroneous finding that the “Sponsorship Agreement” was in

effect at the time of the alleged breach. The matter is remanded for such further proceedings as may

be necessary, including, but not limited to, RJY having the opportunity to prove its claims, as well

as any damages arising therefrom. Costs of this appeal are assessed one-half to the Appellant,

Nashville Hockey Club, L.P., and its surety, and one-half to the Appellee, Robert J. Young

Company.

__________________________________________

W. FRANK CRAWFORD, JUDGE