Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) 1 

Per Curiam 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

MICHIGAN v. JEREMY FISHER 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF 

APPEALS OF MICHIGAN

No. 09–91. Decided December 7, 2009 

PER CURIAM. 

Police officers responded to a complaint of a disturbance

near Allen Road in Brownstown, Michigan.* Officer Christopher Goolsby later testified that, as he and his partner 

approached the area, a couple directed them to a residence 

where a man was “going crazy.” Docket No. 276439, 2008 

WL 786515, *1 (Mich. App., Mar. 25, 2008) (per curiam)

(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Upon

their arrival, the officers found a household in considerable chaos: a pickup truck in the driveway with its front 

smashed, damaged fenceposts along the side of the property, and three broken house windows, the glass still on 

the ground outside. The officers also noticed blood on the 

hood of the pickup and on clothes inside of it, as well as on

one of the doors to the house. (It is disputed whether they 

noticed this immediately upon reaching the house, but 

undisputed that they noticed it before the allegedly unconstitutional entry.) Through a window, the officers could 

see respondent, Jeremy Fisher, inside the house, screaming and throwing things. The back door was locked, and a 

couch had been placed to block the front door. 

The officers knocked, but Fisher refused to answer. 

They saw that Fisher had a cut on his hand, and they

asked him whether he needed medical attention. Fisher 

ignored these questions and demanded, with accompanying profanity, that the officers go to get a search warrant. 

—————— 

*We have taken the facts from the opinion of the Michigan Court of 

Appeals. Except where indicated, the parties do not dispute the facts. 
2 MICHIGAN v. FISHER 

Per Curiam 

Officer Goolsby then pushed the front door partway open 

and ventured into the house. Through the window of the

open door he saw Fisher pointing a long gun at him.

Officer Goolsby withdrew. 

Fisher was charged under Michigan law with assault 

with a dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm

during the commission of a felony. The trial court concluded that Officer Goolsby violated the Fourth Amendment when he entered Fisher’s house, and granted 

Fisher’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a 

result—that is, Officer Goolsby’s statement that Fisher 

pointed a rifle at him. The Michigan Court of Appeals

initially remanded for an evidentiary hearing, see Docket

No. 256027, 2005 WL 3481454 (Dec. 20, 2005) (per curiam), after which the trial court reinstated its order. The 

Court of Appeals then affirmed over a dissent by Judge 

Talbot. See 2008 WL 786515, at *2; id., at *2–*5. The 

Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, but,

after hearing oral argument, it vacated its prior order and

denied leave instead; three justices, however, would have

taken the case and reversed on the ground that the Court

of Appeals misapplied the Fourth Amendment. See 483 

Mich. 1007, 765 N. W. 2d 19 (2009). Because the decision 

of the Michigan Court of Appeals is indeed contrary to our

Fourth Amendment case law, particularly Brigham City v. 

Stuart, 547 U. S. 398 (2006), we grant the State’s petition 

for certiorari and reverse. 

“[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment,” 

we have often said, “is ‘reasonableness.’” Id., at 403. 

Therefore, although “searches and seizures inside a home

without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable,” Groh 

v. Ramirez, 540 U. S. 551, 559 (2004) (internal quotation

marks omitted), that presumption can be overcome. For 

example, “the exigencies of the situation [may] make the 

needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable.” Mincey v. Ari-
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) 3 

Per Curiam 

zona, 437 U. S. 385, 393–394 (1978). 

Brigham City identified one such exigency: “the need to

assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened 

with such injury.” 547 U. S., at 403. Thus, law enforcement officers “may enter a home without a warrant to

render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to 

protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Ibid. This 

“emergency aid exception” does not depend on the officers’ 

subjective intent or the seriousness of any crime they are 

investigating when the emergency arises. Id., at 404–405. 

It requires only “an objectively reasonable basis for believing,” id., at 406, that “a person within [the house] is in

need of immediate aid,” Mincey, supra, at 392. 

Brigham City illustrates the application of this standard. There, police officers responded to a noise complaint

in the early hours of the morning. “As they approached 

the house, they could hear from within an altercation

occurring, some kind of fight.” 547 U. S., at 406 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Following the tumult to the 

back of the house whence it came, the officers saw juveniles drinking beer in the backyard and a fight unfolding 

in the kitchen. They watched through the window as a 

juvenile broke free from the adults restraining him and 

punched another adult in the face, who recoiled to the

sink, spitting blood. Ibid. Under these circumstances, we 

found it “plainly reasonable” for the officers to enter the

house and quell the violence, for they had “an objectively 

reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult 

might need help and that the violence in the kitchen was

just beginning.” Ibid. 

A straightforward application of the emergency aid 

exception, as in Brigham City, dictates that the officer’s 

entry was reasonable. Just as in Brigham City, the police

officers here were responding to a report of a disturbance. 

Just as in Brigham City, when they arrived on the scene 

they encountered a tumultuous situation in the house— 
4 MICHIGAN v. FISHER 

Per Curiam 

and here they also found signs of a recent injury, perhaps

from a car accident, outside. And just as in Brigham City, 

the officers could see violent behavior inside. Although

Officer Goolsby and his partner did not see punches

thrown, as did the officers in Brigham City, they did see 

Fisher screaming and throwing things. It would be objectively reasonable to believe that Fisher’s projectiles might 

have a human target (perhaps a spouse or a child), or that

Fisher would hurt himself in the course of his rage. In 

short, we find it as plain here as we did in Brigham City

that the officer’s entry was reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment. 

The Michigan Court of Appeals, however, thought the

situation “did not rise to a level of emergency justifying

the warrantless intrusion into a residence.” 2008 WL 

786515, at *2. Although the Court of Appeals conceded 

that “there was evidence an injured person was on the 

premises,” it found it significant that “the mere drops of 

blood did not signal a likely serious, life-threatening injury.” Ibid. The court added that the cut Officer Goolsby 

observed on Fisher’s hand “likely explained the trail of

blood” and that Fisher “was very much on his feet and 

apparently able to see to his own needs.” Ibid. 

Even a casual review of Brigham City reveals the flaw 

in this reasoning. Officers do not need ironclad proof of “a 

likely serious, life-threatening” injury to invoke the emergency aid exception. The only injury police could confirm 

in Brigham City was the bloody lip they saw the juvenile 

inflict upon the adult. Fisher argues that the officers here

could not have been motivated by a perceived need to

provide medical assistance, since they never summoned 

emergency medical personnel. This would have no bearing, of course, upon their need to assure that Fisher was 

not endangering someone else in the house. Moreover, 

even if the failure to summon medical personnel conclusively established that Goolsby did not subjectively be-
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) 5 

Per Curiam 

lieve, when he entered the house, that Fisher or someone 

else was seriously injured (which is doubtful), the test, as

we have said, is not what Goolsby believed, but whether 

there was “an objectively reasonable basis for believing”

that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in 

danger, Brigham City, supra, at 406; Mincey, supra, at 

392. 

It was error for the Michigan Court of Appeals to replace that objective inquiry into appearances with its

hindsight determination that there was in fact no emergency. It does not meet the needs of law enforcement or 

the demands of public safety to require officers to walk

away from a situation like the one they encountered here. 

Only when an apparent threat has become an actual harm 

can officers rule out innocuous explanations for ominous

circumstances. But “[t]he role of a peace officer includes 

preventing violence and restoring order, not simply rendering first aid to casualties.” Brigham City, supra, at 

406. It sufficed to invoke the emergency aid exception

that it was reasonable to believe that Fisher had hurt 

himself (albeit nonfatally) and needed treatment that in

his rage he was unable to provide, or that Fisher was

about to hurt, or had already hurt, someone else. The 

Michigan Court of Appeals required more than what the 

Fourth Amendment demands. 

* * * 

The petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment of

the Michigan Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is

remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with

this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) 1 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

MICHIGAN v. JEREMY FISHER 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF 

APPEALS OF MICHIGAN

No. 09–91. Decided December 7, 2009 

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR 

joins, dissenting. 

On October 31, 2003, Jeremy Fisher pointed a rifle at

Officer Christopher Goolsby when Goolsby attempted to

force his way into Fisher’s home without a warrant. 

Fisher was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon

and possession of a dangerous weapon during the commission of a felony. The charges were dismissed after the

trial judge granted a motion to suppress evidence of the 

assault because it was the product of Goolsby’s unlawful 

entry. In 2005 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that 

the trial court had erred because it had decided the suppression motion without conducting a full evidentiary

hearing. On remand, the trial court conducted such a 

hearing and again granted the motion to suppress. 

As a matter of Michigan law it is well settled that police 

officers may enter a home without a warrant “when they

reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.” People v. Davis, 442 Mich. 1, 25, 497 N. W. 

2d 910, 921 (1993). We have stated the rule in the same 

way under federal law, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 

392 (1978), and have explained that a warrantless entry is 

justified by the “‘need to protect or preserve life or avoid 

serious injury,’” ibid. The State bears the burden of proof

on that factual issue and relied entirely on the testimony

of Officer Goolsby in its attempt to carry that burden. 

Since three years had passed, Goolsby was not sure about 

certain facts—such as whether Fisher had a cut on his 

hand—but he did remember that Fisher repeatedly swore 
2 MICHIGAN v. FISHER 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

at the officers and told them to get a warrant, and that

Fisher was screaming and throwing things. Goolsby also

testified that he saw “mere drops” of blood outside Fisher’s 

home, No. 276439, 2008 WL 786515, *2 (Mich. App., Mar.

25, 2008) (per curiam) (summarizing Goolsby’s testimony),

and that he did not ask whether anyone else was inside.

Goolsby did not testify that he had any reason to believe 

that anyone else was in the house. Thus, the factual 

question was whether Goolsby had “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that [Fisher was] seriously injured 

or imminently threatened with such injury.” Brigham 

City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 400 (2006). 

After hearing the testimony, the trial judge was “even

more convinced” that the entry was unlawful. Tr. 29 (Dec.

19, 2006). He noted the issue was “whether or not there 

was a reasonable basis to [enter the house] or whether 

[Goolsby] was just acting on some possibilities,” id., at 22, 

and evidently found the record supported the latter rather

than the former. He found the police decision to leave the

scene and not return for several hours—without resolving

any potentially dangerous situation and without calling 

for medical assistance—inconsistent with a reasonable 

belief that Fisher was in need of immediate aid. In sum, 

the one judge who heard Officer Goolsby’s testimony was 

not persuaded that Goolsby had an objectively reasonable 

basis for believing that entering Fisher’s home was necessary to avoid serious injury.

The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding

that the State had not met its burden. Perhaps because

one judge dissented, the Michigan Supreme Court initially 

granted an application for leave to appeal. After considering briefs and oral argument, however, the majority of

that Court vacated its earlier order because it was “no 

longer persuaded that the questions presented should be

reviewed by this Court.” 483 Mich. 1007, 765 N. W. 2d 19 

(2009). 
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) 3 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

Today, without having heard Officer Goolsby’s testimony, this Court decides that the trial judge got it wrong.

I am not persuaded that he did, but even if we make that 

assumption, it is hard to see how the Court is justified in

micromanaging the day-to-day business of state tribunals

making fact-intensive decisions of this kind. We ought not 

usurp the role of the factfinder when faced with a close 

question of the reasonableness of an officer’s actions,

particularly in a case tried in a state court. I therefore 

respectfully dissent.