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Timothy J. Eckstein, 018321

Joseph N. Roth, 025725

Sarah P. Lawson, 036436

OSBORN MALEDON, P.A.

2929 North Central Avenue, 20th Floor

Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2793

(602) 640-9000

teckstein@omlaw.com

jroth@omlaw.com

slawson@omlaw.com

Attorneys for James Larkin

Additional counsel on following page

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Michael Lacey, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:18-cr-00422-PHX-DJH

DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN 

SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 

DISMISS SUPERSEDING 

INDICTMENT

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Paul J. Cambria, Jr. (NY 15873, admitted pro hac vice)

Erin E. McCampbell (NY 4480166, admitted pro hac vice)

LIPSITZ GREEN SCIME CAMBRIA LLP

42 Delaware Avenue, Suite 120

Buffalo, New York 14202

(716) 849-1333

pcambria@lglaw.com

emccampbell@lglaw.com

Attorneys for Michael Lacey

Bruce S. Feder (AZ 004832)

FEDER LAW OFFICE PA

2930 E. Camelback Rd., Suite 160

Phoenix, Arizona 85016

(602) 257-0135

bf@federlawpa.com

Eric Walter Kessler

KESSLER LAW OFFICE

6720 N. Scottsdale Rd., Suite 210

Scottsdale, Arizona 85253

(480) 644-0093

Eric.kesslerlaw@gmail.com

Attorneys for Scott Spear

Gary S. Lincenberg

Ariel A. Neuman

Gopi K. Panchapakesan

BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT, NESSIM,

DROOKS, LINCENBERG & RHOW P.C.

1875 Century Park E., Suite 2300

Los Angeles, California 90067

(310) 201-2100

glincenberg@birdmarella.com

gpanchapakesan.@birdmarella.com

aneuman@birdmarella.com

Attorneys for John Brunst

David S. Eisenberg

DAVID EISENBERG PLC

3550 N. Central Ave., Ste. 1155

Phoenix, Arizona 85012

(602) 237-5076

david@eisenbergplc.com

Attorneys for Andrew Padilla

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Joy Malby Bertrand

JOY BERTRAND ESQ LLC

P.O. Box 2734

Scottsdale, Arizona 85252

(480) 656-3919

joyous@mailbag.com

Attorneys for Joye Vaught

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In its Response, the government does not contest the key premises of Defendants’ 

Motion: (1) “[t]he phrase ‘promote or facilitate,’ as used in the Travel Act, is equivalent to 

‘aid or abet,’” Doc. 1557 at 4, Doc. 1557-1 at 45–46; and (2) aiding and abetting requires 

both the commission of an offense and that a defendant “intend[ed] to facilitate that 

offense’s commission.” Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 76 (2014). The Response does 

not identify any allegation in the Superseding Indictment (Doc. 230, “SI”) from which the 

grand jury could have determined that any Defendant’s actions constituted aiding and 

abetting a prostitution offense associated with any of the 50 charged ads. Because all the 

allegations in the indictment that purport to show Defendants’ knowledge and intent are 

untethered to the publication of the ads forming the basis of the Travel Act charges, or any

associated prostitution offenses, the indictment alleges, at most, that Defendants agreed to 

facilitate “a ‘possibility,’ or a criminal wish[,] which simply isn’t a crime.” United States v. 

Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 178 (6th Cir. 1992).

No prior order has decided the narrow issues presented here. The arguments raised 

are new and are prompted by the government’s recent assertions in the Woodhull appeal. 

Deferring these issues until trial only invites error.

A. The government does not dispute that “promote” and “facilitate” as

used in the Travel Act equate to aiding and abetting, and cannot evade 

alleging the elements of aiding and abetting.

The government does not dispute that, for a non-principal, a charge of “promoting” 

or “facilitating” under the Travel Act is an aiding and abetting offense. See Doc. 1557-1 at 

45–46. Nor does the government dispute the elements of aiding and abetting: someone else 

committed an offense, the defendant acted with intent “to facilitate that offense’s 

commission,” and the defendant’s intent went “to the specific and entire crime charged.” 

Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 75–76; Doc. 1557 at 10. Seeking to salvage its defective indictment, 

the government contends (at 9) that the elements of aiding and abetting are not “essential 

elements” required in the indictment and that “whether an underlying state offense is ever 

accomplished is irrelevant under the Travel Act.” These arguments fail.

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First, the elements of aiding and abetting are “essential elements.” The Superseding 

Indictment does not charge Defendants with violating the Travel Act as principals, but with 

“the crime[] of facilitating prostitution.” SI ¶¶ 17; 196a (count 1, conspiracy to violate “18 

U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)(A) (Travel Act – Facilitate Prostitution”); SI ¶ 200 (describing Counts 2-

51 as “Travel Act – Facilitate Prostitution”). Regardless of what would be required for a 

principal, for these charges, the government cannot merely parrot the Travel Act to state an 

offense because the words “promote” and “facilitate” by themselves do not “fully, directly, 

and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to 

constitute the offence intended to be punished,” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 113, 117 

(1974) (citation omitted). The government admits as much in Woodhull, when it explains that 

“whatever meaning ‘promote’ or ‘facilitate’ might have in everyday speech,” they are “terms 

of art” that “invoke[] traditional principles of accomplice liability” and “denote aiding-andabetting liability under traditional principles of criminal law,” and, as such, “bring[] the old 

soil with it.” Doc. 1557-1 at 46, 58.

A valid indictment for promoting or facilitating another’s violation of state law under 

the Travel Act must therefore “assert facts which in law constitute” the essential elements of 

aiding and abetting, Superior Growers, 982 F.2d at 177. See also United States v. Omer, 395 F.3d 

1087, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2005) (failure to allege materiality was a “fatal flaw requiring 

dismissal,” as materiality was an essential element because bank fraud statute “incorporates 

the well-settled common-law meaning of fraud”). 

None of the cases the government cites here (Doc. 1577 at 9 (collecting cases))

involves defendants alleged only to have “facilitated” the unlawful activity of others. In

United States v. Tavelman, 650 F.2d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 1981), for example, the defendant was 

charged as a principal drug trafficker, not as a facilitator of another’s trafficking offense.

Second, contrary to the government’s assertion that the commission of a state-law 

offense is irrelevant, the Ninth Circuit “require[s] that the specific elements of the underlying 

law that constitute the unlawful activity be found as elements of the Travel Act offense.” 

Myers v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 2018). See also United States v. Hiatt, 527 F.2d 

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1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 1975). As discussed in the Motion (Doc. 1557 at 13), these cases are 

consistent with the government’s Woodhull concession.

The government contends (at 10) that Hiatt is distinguishable because it does not hold

that a state law violation “must be alleged” to “survive a motion to dismiss,” and that Myers

can be ignored because it does not discuss directly “the pleading requirements for Travel Act 

indictments.” But in each case, the Ninth Circuit unequivocally states that the Travel Act 

requires, as an element, an actual state law violation. That the permissible scope of Travel 

Act liability was addressed in contexts other than a pre-trial motion to dismiss does not alter 

their Travel Act holdings or their application to an argument for pre-trial dismissal.

Moreover, the cases the government cites (at 9–10) shed little light on the question at 

hand, as each involved Travel Act (or related) charges against principal offenders who either 

committed (or attempted) the underlying state law offenses.1 As they concern only principal 

liability, those cases do not support the argument that a non-principal could be indicted for 

facilitating “unlawful activity” without alleging aiding and abetting elements.

More fundamentally, the Response fails to explain how the government can square 

its contention here that a state law violation is “irrelevant” with its position in Woodhull that 

“promote” or “facilitate” means aiding and abetting, as aiding and abetting (1) aligns with 

the text of the Travel Act, and (2) requires as “an essential element . . . the occurrence of the 

underlying crime.” Superior Growers, 982 F.2d at 178.

B. The government fails to show that the Superseding Indictment alleges 

the elements of aiding and abetting.

The government cannot credibly contend that the indictment alleges the key elements 

of aiding and abetting as it fails to allege, for any of the Travel Act counts, that someone 

1 See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 641 F.2d 1281, 1283–85 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendants used 

phones to bribe Nevada Gaming Commissioners); United States v. Stafford, 831 F.2d 1479, 

1480 (9th Cir. 1987) (defendant traveled to bribe a witness to prevent him “from informing 

the FBI” of federal crimes); United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1086 (10th Cir. 2003) 

(alleging defendants orchestrated scheme to bribe Olympics Committee officials in violation 

of state law); United States v. Montague, 29 F.3d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1994) (charges against 

operator of escort businesses engaged in prostitution); United States v. Palfrey, 499 F. Supp. 2d 

34, 37–38 (D.D.C. 2007) (same).

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committed a prostitution offense, that each Defendant acted with intent “to facilitate that 

offense’s commission,” or that each Defendant’s intent went “to the specific and entire crime 

charged.” Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 75–76. Instead, the Response argues: (1) aiding and abetting 

is always implied; (2) the indictment alleges the state law offense of “offering” or “soliciting” 

prostitution; and (3) the indictment alleges intent by asserting “Defendants knew the vast 

majority of” Backpage’s “‘adult’ ads were for prostitution.” Each of these arguments fails.

1. Although aiding and abetting is implied in indictments alleging 

substantive offenses, a valid indictment must still allege an 

offense in the first place.

This motion does not dispute that the elements of aiding and abetting are implied 

when a defendant is indicted as a principal of a substantive federal offense. However, where, 

as here, a defendant is charged as a promoter of someone else’s offense, the indictment must 

“assert facts which in law constitute” the essential elements of aiding and abetting. Superior 

Growers, 982 F.2d at 177.

2. The indictment does not allege any underlying prostitution 

offenses.

The government argues (at 11) that it adequately alleges prostitution offenses, if one 

accepts that each charged ad actually was associated with illegal prostitution.

That is not so. The mere placement or publication of a facially lawful ad could not 

violate, for instance, Arizona’s statute making it a crime to knowingly “offer[] to engage in 

sexual conduct under a fee arrangement with any person for money or any other valuable 

consideration,” A.R.S. § 13-3214(A).

Only one of the 50 charged ads contains anything close to an “offer[] to engage in 

sexual conduct.” See SI ¶ 201 (Count 23) (listing prices for specific sex acts). “Sexual 

conduct” does not mean “sexual” activity in general, but rather specific sex acts: “fondling” 

or “manipulating” the “genitals, anus or female breast,” “sexual intercourse, oral sexual 

contact or sadomasochistic abuse.” A.R.S. § 13-3211(8), (9). At the same time, advertising 

for a wide range of sexual services, including for escort/dating services, stripping, live adult 

shows, or other adult services, is lawful and First Amendment protected. See A.R.S. § 13-

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1422 (defining lawful “adult oriented businesses”); A.R.S. § 9-500.10 (expressly allowing 

escort and escort agency ads). An ad stating “girlfriend experience” or “GFE” (see Counts 

27-51) is not an “offer” to exchange money for “fondling” or “sexual intercourse.”2

3. The indictment does not allege that Defendants knew about or 

intended any specific prostitution offense.

Glaringly absent from the Superseding Indictment is any allegation that any 

Defendant knew of any charged ad, knew of any exchange for “sexual conduct under a fee 

arrangement” associated with any charged ad, or knowingly acted to facilitate such an act of 

prostitution. Instead, the government (Doc. 1577 at 12) falls back on its global allegations 

that “Defendants knew the vast majority of [Backpage’s] ‘adult’ ads were for prostitution.” 

The indictment does not allege which of these fifty are among the “vast majority,” or with 

respect to any of the charged ads, that any Defendant had a “state of mind” that “extend[s] 

to the entire crime,” or an intent “to facilitate that offense’s commission,” or even knew 

about an offense’s commission. Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 75–76. The indictment’s failure to 

allege the “essential elements” of “knowledge of the underlying crime and intent to further 

it” compel dismissal. Superior Growers, 982 F.2d at 179-80.

The government’s reliance (Doc. 1577 at 12) the willful ignorance doctrine is utterly 

misplaced. The classic application of that doctrine is in a drug smuggling case where a 

defendant “was aware of a high probability that [e.g., drugs were in the defendant’s 

automobile]” See Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions at 4.9; United States v. Jewell, 

532 F.2d 697, 702 (9th Cir. 1976) (involving drugs sealed in a secret compartment of a 

2 The government does not cite a single case where a person has been charged, must less 

convicted, of solicitation based only on an ad (even one proposing a necessarily unlawful 

act). Instead, the government cites (at 11) two cases for the proposition that ads for “the 

sale of adults for sex” and “soliciting” are illegal. See Coyote Pub., Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592 

(9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting legal brothels’ challenge to restrictions on prostitution advertising); 

Erotic Serv. Provider Legal Educ. & Research Project v. Gascon, 881 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(rejecting constitutional right to solicit and perform “sex for hire”). Those cases concern 

whether a state may restrict explicit prostitution ads, not whether someone could commit 

“solicitation” with a facially lawful advertisement of sexual, adult-oriented services.

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car). But a Travel Act charge is a specific intent crime that requires more than mere 

knowledge. United States v. Gibson Specialty Co., 507 F.2d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1974).

Even if the willful ignorance doctrine applied, it would apply only as to the 50 ads, 

as this Court has already ruled that “[Defendants] were not indicted for facilitating the 

amorphous notion of ‘prostitution.’ They were indicted for facilitating (via publishing ads) 

on fifty distinct occasions where prostitutes, prostitution-related businesses, or other groups 

were involved in the business of prostitution.” Doc. 946 at 13. There is no allegation 

(implied or otherwise) that Defendants ignored these particular 50 ads. Rather, the 

government’s theory is that Defendants’ knowledge of any particular ad is irrelevant because 

these are 50 instances among millions, and Defendants knew the “vast majority” were for 

prostitution—a theory directly contrary to the traditional concepts of accomplice liability. 

The doctrine of willful ignorance cannot cure the failure to allege an essential element of the 

offense and the government does not cite any case to the contrary.

The government’s assertion that knowledge can be imputed to all Defendants because 

Backpage’s business practices made “the publication of ads...reasonably foreseeable”

likewise cannot save its deficient indictment. First, whatever benefit Pinkerton liability may 

afford the government with respect to its conspiracy charge, it has absolutely no application 

to the Travel Act charges nor can it substitute for alleging the essential Travel Act elements. 

Second, as to the conspiracy charge, although, under Pinkerton, a conspirator may be liable 

for a co-conspirator’s reasonably foreseeable substantive crimes committed in furtherance 

of the conspiracy, the indictment does not allege that any “co-conspirator” (i.e., any of the 

six defendants, Carl Ferrer, or Dan Hyer) was the principal here -- the person who posted 

any of the fifty charged ads. Thus, whether as to one of the Defendants or a co-conspirator, 

there is no allegation of “knowledge of all elements of the underlying crime.” United States v. 

McDowell, 498 F.3d 308, 315–16 (5th Cir. 2007) (reversing aiding-and-abetting conviction that 

relied on “patently insufficient” “inference upon inference”).

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4. The government cannot distinguish Superior Growers.

At bottom, the Superseding Indictment fails for the same reasons the indictment in

Superior Growers was dismissed—it “pil[ed] inference upon inference” to fashion “a dragnet 

to draw in all substantive crimes.” 982 F.2d at 179. See Doc. 1557 at 15–16. The government

is simply wrong when it claims (at 12–13) that the cases “could not be more different” 

because Defendants, unlike those in Superior Growers, “purposefully developed their website 

into a massive online marketplace for prostitution ads,” “assisted prostitutes and pimps” in 

placing ads, and had reason to believe the “adult ads were overwhelmingly for prostitution.”

The indictments in both cases allege broad aiding-and-abetting conspiracy to use 

business practices (the sale of ads here; the sale of hydroponic and other growing equipment 

there) to make money by facilitating others’ illegal acts (prostitution here; marijuana growing 

there). In Superior Growers, the government alleged that defendants advertised in marijuanarelated publications, marketed their growing equipment for the cultivation of marijuana, 

educated customers about marijuana cultivation, sold that equipment to customers who used

it to grow marijuana, knew that their customers would use it to grow marijuana, and 

sometimes took payment in the form of illegal marijuana. See 982 F.2d at 175. The 

indictment thus contained numerous allegations that the defendants knew that some (if not 

the vast majority) of their customers would use their products for illegal purposes, yet the 

Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the indictment. Id. at 176–78.

Critically, the Superior Growers indictment did not allege that defendants knew that their 

cultivation instructions “were given with defendants’ knowledge that a particular customer

was planning to grow marijuana, and with defendants’ intent to assist that customer in 

the endeavor.” Id. at 178 (emphasis added). In other words, the government’s allegations 

that defendants knew the sale of their products would help some (even the “vast majority”) 

of their customers violate the law were insufficient. The government had to allege both that 

defendants knew that particular customers intended to violate the law and that defendants 

intended to assist those customers do so. Failing that, the indictment alleged only a

conspiracy “to aid and abet a ‘possibility’ or a ‘criminal wish[,]’ which simply isn’t a crime.” 

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Id.3 Superior Growers is the only case identified in which the government asserted a theory like 

the Travel Act charges in this case, the S.I. has the same failures as in Superior Growers, and 

Superior Growers compels dismissal.

Tellingly, the government leans on United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 556 

(S.D.N.Y. 2014), the prosecution against the creator and operator of the dark-web Silk Road 

marketplace. Doc. 1557 at 13. That case demonstrates exactly what is missing here: 

defendant’s direct involvement in criminal transactions by taking commissions on explicit 

narcotics sales, and even hiring hitmen to further his control over Silk Road. Ulbricht 31 F. 

Supp. 3d at 549. The government also points to guilty pleas for prosecutions against 

myRedBook.com and RentBoy.com. Those untested guilty pleas do no more than the guilty 

plea against Backpage to validate the government’s unprecedented Travel Act theory. See

Doc. 1099, 12/4/2020 Tr. at 38 (“And I think one of the key things in my reason for denying 

the recusal is that this case is not about Backpage. Backpage was prosecuted in a separate 

case, entered a plea in a separate case. This case is about these individual defendants and 

whether they had specific knowledge of these ads as facilitating illegal activity.”).

C. The Court should not defer until trial dealing with the issues raised here.

1. The issue presently before the Court has not been decided.

Relying on Docs. 793, 840, and 946, the government (at 7–8) contends that prior 

orders act as a “law of the case” bar to the pending motion to dismiss, but those orders don’t 

address the pending issue: given the government’s recently adopted position that “promote”

and “facilitate” under the Travel Act mean “aid” and “abet,” whether the indictment

sufficiently alleges that Defendants aided and abetted specific state law prostitution offenses.

3 Cf., e.g., United States v. Sliwo, 620 F.3d 630, 636–37 (6th Cir. 2010) (reversing conviction 

when evidence “arguably shows that Defendant was engaged in a scheme with some sort of 

criminal purpose” but “fails to demonstrate that Defendant knew that this conspiracy” 

involved the specific crime charged); United States v. Perez-Melendez, 599 F.3d 31, 43–44 (1st 

Cir. 2010) (same).

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2. The government created a legal issue that this Court must 

address by taking in Woodhull and Hansen a position opposite 

to the one it had taken in this case.

The government created the need for this motion when it argued in November 2022 

that “promote or facilitate” under the Travel Act means “aid and abet.” Doc. 1557-1 at 45. 

The government reasserted at the January 11, 2023, oral argument before the D.C. Circuit

that the terms promote or facilitate “invoke core concepts of aiding and abetting liability, 

and one of those core concepts, of course, is taking an actus reus that would in fact facilitate 

or promote the commission of the crime.” Doc. 1557-1 at 147, 150. The government 

reconfirmed this framing in a March 2023 oral argument before the Supreme Court in United 

States v. Hansen.4 Ex. A, Hansen Transcript, at 7:13-20 (asserting that a statue criminalizing 

the encouragement of an offense uses words that—like promote or facilitate here—“connote

aiding . . . and abetting” which “bring the old soil with them.”)5

The government’s positions in Woodhull and Hansen are irreconcilable with what it has 

repeatedly argued here -- that it need not prove “the intent to violate the state prostitution 

offense before [Defendants are] found guilty.” Doc. 1216-3 at 147; see also, e.g., Doc. 1216-3 

at 104 (asserting that there is no need for Defendants to have intended to violate the state 

prostitution offense). Indeed, the government still insists (at 12) it is enough that 

“Defendants knew the vast majority of their ‘adult’ ads were for prostitution and took steps 

to intentionally facilitate that activity.” As explained above, § B.3, the government’s view of 

the required intent here does not suffice under the traditional concepts of aiding and abetting.

The government urges (at 15–16) the Court to disregard its statements in Woodhull 

because the statute at issue there (FOSTA) is not identical to the Travel Act, despite its 

explicit argument that “the phrase ‘promote or facilitate,’ as used in the Travel Act, is 

equivalent to ‘aid or abet,’” and that “FOSTA uses the phrase ‘promote or facilitate’ in the 

same way . . . to denote aiding-and-abetting liability under traditional principles of criminal 

law.” Doc. 1577-1 at 45–46 (emphasis added).

4 The Court heard argument on March 27, 2023. The Court’s decision is pending.

5 A transcript of the oral argument before the Supreme Court is attached as Exhibit A.

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The different procedural postures of this case and Woodhull are of no significance. 

The government has stridently argued in Woodhull what “promote” and “facilitate” mean for 

non-principals under the Travel Act. Under the Fifth Amendment, that principle -- that a 

non-principal defendant must have facilitated a particular principal’s commission of a 

particular state law offense -- applies with equal force to an indictment or a facial challenge 

to a statute like FOSTA. See also New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001) (noting 

possible consequences for party taking “clearly inconsistent” positions in litigation).

Finally, this is the “proper vehicle for determining . . . the definitions of ‘promote,’ 

‘facilitate,’ or other Travel Act terms.” Doc. 1577 at 15. In Hansen, the government argued 

at trial and before the Ninth Circuit that intent should be broadly defined, see United States v. 

Hansen, No., 17-10548, 2022 WL 424827, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2022), only to reverse course 

before the Supreme Court, conceding that the jury instructions it requested failed to 

incorporate “the same old soil [that] comes with” a “traditional aiding-and abetting statute,”

causing error requiring remand and retrial. Ex. A, Hansen Transcript, at 10:19-23, 11:6-13. 

The government invites the Court to make a similar error here.

3. The Government’s Remaining Arguments are Non-Responsive.

Double Jeopardy. Although the government posits (at 16-17) that it cannot re-indict 

Defendants using 50 more “distinct occasions,” it fails to cite to a single point of law or court 

order that actually supports this position, effectively conceding that, on the government’s 

theory of the case, Defendants have no protection against being tried for 50 different ads.

Money Laundering. The pleas of Carl Ferrer, Dan Hyer, and Backpage to various 

conspiracy offenses are of no consequence, as those pleas do not establish that the specific 

funds the government alleges were laundered were proceeds. Likewise, even though 

Defendants could, theoretically, be convicted of money laundering without having 

committed the offense that generated the subject proceeds (Doc. 1577 at 17), Defendants 

cannot have laundered money without either engaging in an offense or knowing that the 

subject monies resulted from a criminal offense.

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Grand Jury. The government seeks (at 18) to obfuscate, arguing about the disclosure 

of transcripts, but Defendants have not asked for transcripts to be disclosed—only that the 

Court review the instructions previously produced for in camera review to confirm the 

deficiencies in the government’s instructions to the grand jury. And, putting aside the dicta 

the government cites from United States v. Kenny, 645, 1323, 1347 (9th Cir. 1981), as to whether 

it must instruct a grand jury, there is no question that, once instructions are provided, they 

must correctly state the law. United States v. Navarro, 608 F.3d 529, 539 (9th Cir. 2010).

DATED this 12th day of May, 2023.

OSBORN MALEDON, P.A.

By s/ Joseph N. Roth

Timothy J. Eckstein

Joseph N. Roth

Sarah P. Lawson

2929 North Central, 20th Floor

Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2794

Attorneys for James Larkin

LIPSITZ GREEN SCIME CAMBRIA LLP

By s/ Paul J. Cambria, Jr. (w/permission)

Paul J. Cambria, Jr. (pro hac vice)

Erin E. McCampbell (pro hac vice)

42 Delaware Avenue, Suite 120

 Buffalo, New York 14202

Attorneys for Michael Lacey

FEDER LAW OFFICE PA

By s/ Bruce S. Feder (w/permission)

Bruce S. Feder

2930 E. Camelback Road, Suite 160

Phoenix, Arizona 85016

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KESSLER LAW OFFICE

By s/ Eric W. Kessler (w/permission)

Eric W. Kessler

6720 N. Scottsdale Rd., Suite 210

Scottsdale, Arizona 85253

Attorneys for Scott Spear

BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT,

NESSIM, DROOKS, LINCENBERG & 

RHOW P.C.

By s/ Gary S. Lincenberg (w/permission)

Gary S. Lincenberg

Gopi K. Panchapakesan

Ariel A. Neuman

1875 Century Park E., Suite 2300

Los Angeles, California 90067

Attorneys for John Brunst

DAVID EISENBERG PLC

By s/ David S. Eisenberg (w/permission)

David S. Eisenberg

3550 N. Central Ave., Ste. 1155

Phoenix, Arizona 85012

Attorneys for Andrew Padilla

JOY BERTRAND LAW 

By s/ Joy M. Bertrand (w/permission)

Joy M. Bertrand

P.O. Box 2734

Scottsdale, Arizona 85252

Attorneys for Joye Vaught

Case 2:18-cr-00422-DJH Document 1585 Filed 05/12/23 Page 15 of 15