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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Anne Prafada, individually on her own 

behalf and as Guardian Ad Litem of M. a 

minor, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Mesa Unified School District, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-18-00718-PCT DGC 

ORDER 

 Defendant Mesa Unified School District1 moves to dismiss pro se Plaintiff Anne 

Prafada’s complaint. Doc. 51. The motion is fully briefed, and oral argument will not 

aid the Court’s decision. Docs. 57, 61. Defendant also moves to strike two of Plaintiff’s 

filings (Docs. 63, 64, 65; Docs. 66, 68), and Plaintiff moves for a preliminary injunction 

and three-judge panel (Doc. 58). For the following reasons, the Court will grant 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss and deny all other motions as moot.2

I. Background. 

 The Court takes the allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint as true for purposes of a 

motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Plaintiff’s son, M., is 

eligible for special education services and attends or attended one of Defendant’s schools. 

 

1

 Defendant’s official name is Mesa Unified School District No. 4. Doc. 51 

at 1 n.1. 

2

 Plaintiff’s response repeatedly asserts Defendant’s motion is untimely. See, e.g., Doc. 57 at 13. It is not. 
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Doc. 25 at 10-11, 15. M. has been diagnosed with several conditions and manifests 

various behaviors, including depression, anxiety, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, 

poor concentration, outbursts, and a need for repeated redirection. Id. at 15-16. On 

March 6, 2018, Plaintiff sued individually and on behalf of M., alleging Defendant 

violated her rights and M.’s right to a free appropriate public education, discriminated 

against M. and Plaintiff, and retaliated against M. and Plaintiff with threats of criminal 

prosecution. Id. at 10, 16-17. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 A successful motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) must show either that the 

complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege facts sufficient to support its 

theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A 

complaint that sets forth a cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss as 

long as it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when “the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id., 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556). 

III. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff may not assert claims on behalf of M. because she 

is pro se and, as a non-attorney, she may not represent her son. Doc. 51 at 5. Defendant 

also argues Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief. Id. at 1. 

 A. Plaintiff’s Claims on Behalf of M. 

“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own 

cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted 

to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. The website for the U.S. 
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District Court of Arizona, to which the Court directed Plaintiff, states the relevant local 

rule: 

The right to appear pro se in a civil case in federal court is contained in a 

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Thus, anyone can appear pro se, and anyone 

who appears before the Court without an attorney is considered pro se. 

There are, however, certain limitations to self-representation, such as: . . . A 

non-attorney parent may not appear pro se on behalf of a child, except to 

appeal the denial of the child’s social security benefits. 

Proceeding Without an Attorney, United States District Court, District of Arizona (Oct. 2, 

2018), http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/proceeding-without-attorney. Under the rules in this 

district, Plaintiff may not appear on M.’s behalf because she is not appealing a denial of 

social security benefits. See Doc. 25. 

 During a conference with the parties on May 3, 2018, the Court directed Plaintiff 

to identify authority which permits her to represent her son as a pro se litigant.3

 

Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s motion does not address 28 U.S.C. § 1654 or the local 

rule. See Doc. 57 at 13-17. Rather, Plaintiff cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) 

and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rule 17(c) lists which “representatives may sue or defend on 

behalf of a minor or an incompetent person.” It does not contradict 28 U.S.C. § 1654 or 

authorize Plaintiff to sue pro se on behalf of her son. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, “a 

non-attorney parent must be represented by counsel in bringing an action on behalf of his 

or her child.” Johns v. Cty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997); see also 

Davis v. Walker, 745 F.3d 1003, 1310 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The purpose of Rule 17(c) is to 

protect an incompetent person’s interests in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit.”); cf.

C.E. Pop Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 695, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The 

Trusts’ reliance on [Rule 17(a)] is also misplaced. Rule 17(a) authorizes a trustee of an 

express trust to sue on behalf of the trust, without joining persons ‘for whose benefit the 

action is brought;’ the rule does not warrant the conclusion that a nonlawyer can maintain 

 

3

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such a suit in propria persona.”). Plaintiff does not explain how 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

authorizes her pro se representation of M. (Doc. 57 at 13), and nothing in the statute 

addresses pro se representation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint states she “brings this case on behalf of her 

son, M.,” and cites Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007). Doc. 25 at 

10 ¶2. Winkelman held that “[p]arents enjoy rights under [the Individuals with 

Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (“IDEA”)]; and they are, as a result, 

entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf.” Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 535. 

But granting a parent the right to sue on her own behalf does not authorize her to 

represent her child in court. The Supreme Court expressly declined to reach the question 

of “whether IDEA entitles parents to litigate their child’s claims pro se.” Id. 

 Plaintiff is not licensed to practice law. She may not represent her son in this case. 

The Court accordingly will dismiss all claims Plaintiff asserts on M.’s behalf. See

Doc. 57. 

 B. Plaintiff’s Individual Claims. 

Plaintiff’s response repeatedly refers to her “supplemental pleading.” See, e.g., 

Doc. 57 at 5. At the conference on May 3, 2018, the Court told Plaintiff that she could 

not amend her complaint again before Defendant filed its motion to dismiss her second 

amended complaint. “In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court 

may not look beyond the complaint[.]” Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 

1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). Thus, while the Court will apply 

less stringent pleading standards to Plaintiff, see Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 

1205 (9th Cir. 2007), the Court will not consider her allegations in other documents. 

Rule 8 requires that a complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). Rule 8(d)(1) 

requires pleading averments to be “simple, concise, and direct.” Plaintiff’s sixty-four 

page complaint fails to comply with Rule 8. Plaintiff cites dozens of state and federal 

statutes and cases with interwoven factual allegations, making difficult Defendant’s and 
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the Court’s task of identifying her claims. See Doc. 25. The Court will discuss the 

claims Defendant identifies in its motion and claims Plaintiff identifies in her response, 

but the Court will not write Plaintiff’s complaint for her. Hearns v. San Bernardino 

Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir.2008) (“The court may dismiss a complaint 

for failure to satisfy Rule 8 if it is so confusing that its ‘true substance, if any, is well 

disguised.’”); see also McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir.1996) 

(“Something labeled a complaint but written more as a press release, prolix in evidentiary 

detail, yet without simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to whom plaintiffs are suing for 

what wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a complaint.”); Nevijel v. N. 

Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir.1981) (“A complaint which fails to 

comply with rules 8(a) and 8(e) may be dismissed with prejudice[.]”). 

 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

 Plaintiff’s complaint refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 several times. See, e.g., Doc. 25 at 

7, 25. Section 1983 provides: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial 

officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, 

injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was 

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 

To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that an individual acting under 

color of state authority violated her constitutional rights or a federal law. Additionally, a 

local governmental entity cannot be liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. 

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Plaintiff must show a policy, 

practice, or custom of Defendant which permitted the alleged constitutional violation to 

occur. See Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1999). Alternatively, 

Plaintiff can show that the government official: “(1) had final policymaking authority 
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concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory 

violation at issue and (2) was the policymaker for the local governing body for the 

purposes of the particular act.” Cortez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff alleges no policy, custom, or practice of Defendant 

that violated her constitutional or statutory rights, nor does she allege any other facts to 

support a § 1983 claim. Doc. 51 at 3. Plaintiff does not counter Defendant’s argument, 

nor does she point to specific allegations in her complaint which state a claim for relief 

under § 1983. Doc. 57 at 7-10. Instead, Plaintiff cites an inapposite book on civil 

procedure, makes factual assertions the Court cannot consider, and refers to the First 

Amendment. Id. The Court cannot discern the basis for Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, and she 

fails to satisfy the Monell pleading standard for municipal liability. The Court will 

dismiss her § 1983 claims. 

 2. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. 

Plaintiff refers to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”). 

Doc. 25 at 25. She states: “The School District[’s] egregious procedur[e] of falsifying, 

misrepresenting information and facts show[s] deliberate indifference clearly indicating 

intentional discrimination.” Id. at 26. But as Defendant notes, Plaintiff does not clearly 

allege that Defendant discriminated against her. And in any event, “FERPA’s 

nondisclosure provisions fail to confer enforceable rights.” Gonzaga Univ v. Doe, 536 

U.S. 272, 287 (2002). Plaintiff’s response points to no authority or allegations supporting 

her FERPA claim. Doc. 57 at 13-14. The Court will dismiss the claim. 

 3. Disability Claims. 

 Plaintiff refers to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1400 et seq. (“IDEA”) throughout her complaint. See, e.g., Doc. 25 at 15-17, 19, 26. 

States covered by the IDEA must provide a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) 

to all eligible students with disabilities, and provide those students with special education 

and services according to that student’s individualized education program. Endrew F. v. 
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Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 993-93 (2017). Before a parent may sue under 

the IDEA, she must exhaust the act’s administrative process by engaging in preliminary 

mediation and a due process hearing. Id. at 994; 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e), (f)(1)(B)(i), 

§§ 1415(f)(1)(A), (g), § 1415(i)(2)(A). Plaintiff fails to allege that she exhausted her 

administrative remedies before filing this suit. See Doc. 25. The Court will dismiss the 

claim. 

 Plaintiff cites the Rehabilitation Act § 504 and the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”) throughout her complaint. But the administrative exhaustion requirements of 

§ 1415(I) of the IDEA also apply to claims seeking relief for the denial of a FAPE under 

the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(I); Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 

137 S. Ct. 743, 752 (2017). As noted, Plaintiff fails to plead administrative exhaustion. 

She also fails to plead any claims not encompassed within the IDEA. Plaintiff’s response 

to Defendant’s motion on this point is difficult to follow. She cites A.R.S. § 15-802, 

defines tolling of limitations, fails to respond to Defendant’s arguments, and identifies no 

allegations in her complaint which plead exhaustion. Doc. 57 at 11-13. The Court will 

dismiss these claims. 

 4. Title IX. 

Plaintiff cites, without explanation, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 

1972. Doc. 25 at 46. Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on 

the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 

subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 

financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Plaintiff fails to allege Defendant 

discriminated against her on the basis of sex within the meaning of the statute. The Court 

will dismiss this claim. 

 5. Due Process. 

“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against 

deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural 

protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake. A liberty interest may 
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arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty,’ or 

it may arise from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson 

v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s reference to the 

Fourteenth Amendment appears under a heading asserting that Defendant violated M.’s 

rights. Doc. 25 at 46-47. To the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a due process claim on 

her behalf, she fails to plead a violation of a liberty or property interest, or any 

substantive due process right. The Court will dismiss this claim. 

 6. Title VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act. 

 Plaintiff’s complaint cites Title VII. Doc. 25 at 36. “Title VII prohibits 

employment discrimination on account of race, sex, religion, and national origin.” Gay v. 

Waiters’ & Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, Local No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1982) 

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). Title VII provides, in pertinent part, that: “It shall be an 

unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire . . . any 

individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To “establish a prima facie case of discrimination[,] . . . the 

plaintiff must show that (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the 

position; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated 

individuals outside her protected class were treated more favorably.” Chuang v. Univ. of 

Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)); see Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 

1061 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant employed her and 

discriminated against her. The Court will dismiss this claim. 

 Plaintiff’s complaint also refers to Title VI. Doc. 25 at 8, 15, 36-37. The first two 

references are mere citations without explanation. The third reference alleges that on 

February 2, 2016, M. “complained about being racially discriminate[d against].” Id. at 

36. Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 

color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 

be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
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assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. To plead a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege that 

the defendant is an entity engaging in racial discrimination and receives federal funding. 

Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir.1994), overruled in 

part on other grounds by Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131 

(9th Cir.2001)). Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to plausibly establish Defendant 

discriminated against her within the meaning of Title VI. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Court will dismiss this claim and decline to address 

Defendant’s statute of limitations argument. 

 7. 42 U.S.C. § 1985. 

 Plaintiff asserts “a cause of action under [42 U.S.C.] § 1985 for a conspiracy to 

deprive her of equal protection.” Doc. 25 at 62. But “[t]he absence of a viable section 

1983 claim necessarily precludes a section 1985 conspiracy claim predicated on the same 

allegations.” Warden v. Coolidge Unified Sch. Dist., No. CIV–07–2273–PHX–MHB, 

2008 WL 5235165, at *5 (D. Ariz. Dec. 16, 2008) (citing Caldeira v. Cty. Of Kauai, 866 

F.2d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 1989)). Because Plaintiff has failed to assert a viable § 1983 

claim, she cannot state a claim under § 1985. The Court will dismiss this claim. 

 8. Criminal Statutes and Fraud. 

 Plaintiff’s response recognizes that her complaint includes various inapplicable 

criminal claims. Doc. 57 at 14-15. The complaint refers to or asserts claims under 18 

U.S.C. § 242, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, and the Sixth Amendment. Doc. 25 at 46. These 

statutes and the Sixth Amendment are inapplicable in this civil case. 

 Finally, Plaintiff’s response makes passing reference to Rule 9(b) and asserts she 

has alleged with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud. The Court cannot 

discern cognizable allegations of fraud in Plaintiff’s complaint and will dismiss this 

claim. 

C. Dismissal Without Leave to Amend.

The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s second amended complaint without leave to 

amend. “Leave to amend need not be given if a complaint, as amended, is subject to 
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dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where Plaintiff has 

previously been permitted to amend her complaint. Sisseton–Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. 

United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). Failure to cure deficiencies by previous 

amendment is one of the factors to be considered in deciding whether justice requires 

granting leave to amend. Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. 

Plaintiff has made three efforts at crafting a viable complaint and has failed to do 

so despite specific instruction from the Court. The Court will therefore dismiss 

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint without leave to amend. 

 D. Defendant’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees. 

Defendant requests attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) for its defense 

of Plaintiff’s “frivolous” claims. Doc. 51 at 9-10. Section 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–

5(k).2 “give a court the discretion to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in 

certain civil rights lawsuits if the court finds that the plaintiff’s action is ‘frivolous, 

unreasonable, or without foundation.’” Miller v. Los Angeles Cty. Bd. Of Educ., 827 F.2d 

617, 619 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment 

Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (Title VII case)); see also Hughes v. 

Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-16 (1980) (per curiam) (applying Christiansburg to 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 case). “The strict nature of the Christiansburg standard is premised on the need to 

avoid undercutting Congress’ policy of promoting vigorous prosecution of civil rights 

violations under Title VII and § 1983.” Id. (citing Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14-15; 

Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422). This is particularly true when the plaintiff is pro se. 

Id. at 620. The Court is mindful of Defendant’s costs in defending against this action. 

And at the parties’ conference on May 3, 2018, Defendant’s counsel represented that 

Plaintiff has filed as least two other lawsuits. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit directs the 

Court to recognize that pro se plaintiffs “cannot simply be assumed to have the same 

ability as a plaintiff represented by counsel to recognize the objective merit” of their 

claims. Id. The Court will deny Defendant’s request for attorneys’ fees. 
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 IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 51) is granted. Plaintiff’s complaint 

is dismissed with prejudice. 

 2. Defendant’s request for attorneys’ fees is denied.

 3. Defendant’s motions to strike (Docs. 63, 66) are denied as moot.

 4. Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and three-judge panel 

(Doc. 58) is denied as moot. 

 Dated this 22nd day of October, 2018.