FILED MAY 11, 2010 

TIMOTHY PIERRON, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v No. 138824 

KELLY PIERRON, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 

PER CURIAM. 

At issue here is whether a proposed change of school to one that is 60 miles from 

the child’s present school would modify the established custodial environment of that 

child and whether, absent a change in the established custodial environment, the trial 

court must, when considering an important decision affecting the welfare of the child, 

analyze each of the ‘best-interest’ factors articulated in MCL 722.23, even if a factor is 

not relevant to the immediate issue before the court. Under the facts of this case, we 

answer each of these questions in the negative and therefore affirm. 

Plaintiff-father and defendant-mother have two children from their marriage. The 

divorce judgment entered in 2000 granted the parties joint legal custody and established 

the children’s primary residence with defendant. Both parties and their children lived in 

Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Opinion Chief Justice: 

Marilyn Kelly 

Justices: 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

Diane M. Hathaway
2

Grosse Pointe Woods until 2007, when defendant relocated to Howell, which is 

approximately 60 miles away. When defendant tried to enroll the children in Howell 

public schools, plaintiff objected. At the conclusion of a six-day evidentiary hearing, the 

trial court ruled that the established custodial environment was with both parents and that 

defendant’s proposed change of schools would modify the children’s established 

custodial environment because plaintiff’s parenting time would be adversely affected by 

the 60-mile distance between the proposed schools and plaintiff’s home. Additionally, 

the trial court held that defendant had not satisfied her burden of proof under the ‘clear 

and convincing evidence’ standard to show that the change was in the best interests of the 

children. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order, holding that the trial court 

erred by concluding that the established custodial environment would be modified. 

Pierron v Pierron, 282 Mich App 222, 250-251; 765 NW2d 345 (2009). Moreover, the 

Court remanded the case for the trial court to reevaluate the change-of-school issue and 

determine whether defendant had demonstrated by a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ that 

the change was in the children’s best interests. Id. at 264. 

Under the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq., “all orders and judgments of 

the circuit court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact 

against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a 

clear legal error on a major issue.” MCL 722.28. Under this standard, a reviewing court 

should not substitute its judgment on questions of fact unless the factual determination 

“‘clearly preponderate[s] in the opposite direction.’” Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 
3

879; 526 NW2d 899 (1994), quoting Murchie v Std Oil Co, 355 Mich 550, 558; 94 

NW2d 799 (1959). 

The Child Custody Act “applies to all circuit court child custody disputes and 

actions, whether original or incidental to other actions.” MCL 722.26(1). The act 

provides that when parents share joint legal custody-- as the parties do here-- “the parents 

shall share decision-making authority as to the important decisions affecting the welfare 

of the child.” MCL 722.26a(7)(b). However, when the parents cannot agree on an 

important decision, such as a change of the child’s school, the court is responsible for 

resolving the issue in the best interests of the child. Lombardo v Lombardo, 202 Mich 

App 151, 159; 507 NW2d 788 (1993); see also MCL 722.25(1).1

 When resolving 

important decisions that affect the welfare of the child, the court must first consider 

whether the proposed change would modify the established custodial environment. The 

established custodial environment is the environment in which “over an appreciable time 

the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the 

necessities of life, and parental comfort.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). While an important 

decision affecting the welfare of the child may well require adjustments in the parenting 

time schedules, this does not necessarily mean that the established custodial environment 

will have been modified. Brown v Loveman, 260 Mich App 576, 595-596; 680 NW2d 

 1

 MCL 722.25(1) provides, “If a child custody dispute is between the parents, . . . 

the best interests of the child control.” 
4

432 (2004).2

 If the required parenting time adjustments will not change whom the child 

naturally looks to for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort, 

then the established custodial environment will not have changed. See id. The court may 

not “‘change the established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented 

clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.’” Id. at 585, 

quoting MCL 722.27(1)(c). 

Here, the trial court found that the proposed change of schools would modify the 

established custodial environment because the 60-mile distance between the proposed 

schools and plaintiff’s home “would . . . impinge on the father’s ability to provide 

educational guidance, discipline, and the necessities of life.” The Court of Appeals, 

however, concluded that the trial court’s ruling that the proposed change of schools 

would alter the established custodial environment was against the great weight of the 

evidence because the distance of the new schools from plaintiff’s home would only 

require relatively minor adjustments to plaintiff’s parenting time. We agree with the 

Court of Appeals. 

 2

Brown involved a change in residence of more than 100 miles, and a custodial 

environment in which “each parent had fifty percent parenting time.” Brown, 260 Mich 

App at 595-596. The dissent asserts that Brown stands for “the proposition that if a 

proposed move would relegate an ‘equally active’ parent to the more circumscribed role 

of ‘weekend’ parent, the parenting time modification would amount to a change in the 

established custodial environment.” Whatever the merits of that proposition, there is no 

evidence in the instant case that the allocation of parenting time between plaintiff and 

defendant was “nearly equal.” 
5

Although the testimony here established that plaintiff is conscientiously involved 

with his children’s education, there is no reason to believe from either the testimony or 

the trial court’s findings of fact that the change of schools will significantly modify the 

established custodial environment the children share with plaintiff. A review of the 

record indicates that the children visit plaintiff’s home approximately three weekends out 

of every four, from Saturday afternoon until Sunday evening. Before the instant action 

was filed with the trial court, the children did not visit overnight on weeknights during 

the school year.3

 The record also indicates that plaintiff occasionally picks the children 

up from tutoring and takes them out to dinner during the week. And, one week out of 

every seven, plaintiff takes the children out to lunch. 

Given this record, plaintiff’s weekend parenting time will be unaffected. With 

regard to weekdays, plaintiff is involved with the children during the daytime for only 

one week out of every seven because this is all that his work schedule allows. Although 

 3

 After the instant action was filed, the trial court entered an order regarding 

school district and parenting time, which required the children to attend Grosse Pointe 

schools. There is some testimony indicating that the children occasionally stayed 

overnight with plaintiff on some school nights after this order was entered, but only

presumably to reduce the amount of time that the children spent traveling between 

Howell and Grosse Pointe Woods. The dissent observes that the trial court found that 

“overnight visits on weeknights and first option parenting time for plaintiff would no 

longer be practical” if the children were enrolled in Howell schools. In context, the trial 

court was clearly referring to the parenting time provision in the judgment of divorce as 

part of its analysis of whether the established custodial environment would be modified. 

However, plaintiff, in fact, had not been engaged in weeknight, overnight parenting time. 

The parenting time provision, by itself, does not establish the actual custodial 

environment, Baker v Baker, 411 Mich 567, 579-580; 309 NW2d 532 (1981), and it was 

error for the trial court to consider the provision allowing weeknight, overnight visits 

without also considering that these visits were not occurring. 
6

the 60-mile distance is acknowledgedly more inconvenient for plaintiff, it is not so far 

that plaintiff cannot continue his occasional midweek activities with his children and his 

involvement in their education.4

 Moreover, the record reflects that the children spend the 

vast majority of their time in the established custodial environment of their mother, the 

defendant. In fact, plaintiff’s own testimony acknowledged that the children “spend most 

of their time” with “their mother.” From the children’s perspective, the changes in the 

 4

 The dissent seems to rely largely on the 60-mile distance itself, rather than on the 

actual impact that this distance has on the established custodial environment. For 

instance, the dissent provides several examples of how plaintiff’s midweek involvement 

with his children, much of which pertains to one-time events, may be hindered. 

However, even with respect to these events, plaintiff was able to attend his son’s 

graduation ceremony that was scheduled during plaintiff’s regular workday because the 

school was near plaintiff’s office; when Andrew truanted from school, both plaintiff and 

defendant dealt with the issue immediately; and when defendant attempted to register the 

children in the Howell schools, she listed plaintiff as the fourth person to contact in case 

of emergency, after herself, her sister, who lives closer, and another individual. There is 

nothing in the record to indicate that plaintiff will be unable to attend graduation 

ceremonies or other significant events, or to respond to discipline issues or emergencies, 

if the children attend Howell schools. More pertinently, however, none of these events 

alters to whom the children naturally look for “guidance, discipline, the necessities of 

life, and parental comfort.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). The dissent observes that plaintiff 

assisted his children with their weeknight homework assignments. According to the 

record, this occurred “sometimes” on the same evening that he took his children out to 

dinner. The dissent also observes that plaintiff conducted weekly science tutoring 

sessions for his son and worked on science projects in the basement. These sessions took 

place during a single school year, and it is unclear whether they occurred on a school 

night or during the weekend. Therefore, it is also unclear whether such sessions would be 

affected by the proposed change of school. Regardless, we do not take issue with the fact 

that plaintiff has been a good parent. Although the dissent feels the need to contrast 

defendant unfavorably with plaintiff, we merely believe that the additional 60-mile 

distance is not so far away that plaintiff cannot continue occasionally to take his children 

out to dinner and help them with their homework as he had sometimes done in the past. 
7

established custodial environment they share with plaintiff should be minor, if at all.5

 

This being the case, defendant’s 60-mile move to Howell does not legally effect a change 

in the established custodial environment the children share with either plaintiff or 

defendant. Therefore, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court’s 

determination that the proposed change of schools would alter the established custodial 

environment was against the great weight of the evidence. 

Because there is no change in the established custodial environment, the 

heightened evidentiary burden is not applicable, and defendant is required to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the proposed change of schools would be in the best 

interests of the children, using the best-interest factors identified in MCL 722.23. 

However, the best-interest factors are geared toward general custody determinations, and 

many of these factors are simply irrelevant to particular “important decisions” affecting 

 5

 In asserting that the established custodial environment would be modified if the 

children were to attend Howell schools, the dissent cites matters that are simply irrelevant 

in this case. For example, it asserts that the trial court’s finding that the proposed change 

of schools would modify the established custodial environment is supported by the fact 

that plaintiff suffers from multiple sclerosis, which limits his prospects of finding 

employment closer to Howell and which required plaintiff to use a wheelchair during a 

recent vacation with the children. While we share the dissent’s understandable solicitude 

for plaintiff and his handicap, there is no evidence to indicate that this handicap affects 

his custodial relationship with his children, and it has no bearing on the established 

custodial environment either as it is currently or as it would be if the children were to 

attend Howell schools. Finally, the dissent claims that defendant’s asserted 

“irresponsibility” as a parent “bolsters” the trial court’s finding that the proposed change 

of schools would modify the established custodial environment. While, if true, this may 

well constitute a relevant consideration in assessing whether the proposed change of 

schools would be in the children’s best interests, it is considerably less relevant in 

assessing whether the proposed change would modify the custodial environment. 
8

the welfare of a child. For instance, factor f, pertaining to the “moral fitness of the parties 

involved,” MCL 722.23(f), while highly relevant in making a custody determination 

between parents, has no discernible bearing on determining whether a proposed change 

of school is in a child’s best interests. 

The trial court itself expressed frustration with the best-interest factors because 

many of these factors had nothing to do with the issue at hand. Despite this, the trial 

court felt obligated to consider factors that were wholly unrelated to the change-of-school 

issue. For example, the court determined that factor c, pertaining to the “capacity and 

disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care 

or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of 

medical care, and other material needs,” MCL 722.23(c), favored plaintiff, focusing on 

the parties’ disparity of income. The trial court observed that defendant had failed to 

make any effort to obtain full-time employment even though she claimed that job 

prospects were better in Howell. While disparity of income between the parties and 

defendant’s asserted failure to secure full-time employment might be significant if the 

issue before the court involved a change of custody, these considerations have little or 

nothing to do with the change-of-school issue. The Court of Appeals addressed the scope 

of the best-interest factors in this context by concluding that “the court must narrowly 

focus its consideration of each best-interest factor on the specific ‘important decision[] 

affecting the welfare of the child’ that is at issue.” Pierron, 282 Mich App at 252-253. 

We agree with this conclusion. 
9

If a proposed important decision affecting the welfare of the child will not modify 

the established custodial environment, evaluating best-interest factors that are irrelevant 

to the particular issue before the court distracts from the proper focus of the proceeding 

and poses the risk that one parent’s preference will prevail even though that preference is 

not in the best interests of the child. 

Nevertheless, MCL 722.23 requires “the sum total of the . . . factors to be 

considered, evaluated, and determined by the court[.]” (Emphasis added.) In Parent v 

Parent, 282 Mich App 152; 762 NW2d 553 (2009), the Court of Appeals addressed this 

issue, also in the context of a dispute over a proposed change of school. Recognizing that 

even though each of the factors might not be relevant to the issue, MCL 722.23 requires 

consideration of “all” the factors, the Court held that “[t]he trial court must at least make 

explicit factual findings with regard to the applicability of each factor.” Id. at 157 

(emphasis added). We believe that this approach complies with MCL 722.23 and allows 

for the proper evaluation of whether an important decision is genuinely in the best 

interests of the children, in accordance with the Child Custody Act. Therefore, we hold 

that when a trial court is considering a decision that will not modify the established 

custodial environment, such as the change-of-school issue in this case, it must consider 

the applicability of all the factors. However, if the trial court determines that a particular 

factor is irrelevant to the immediate issue, it need not make substantive factual findings 

concerning the factor beyond this determination, but need merely state that conclusion on 

the record. 
10

We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court clearly erred on a 

major legal issue regarding factor i, “[t]he reasonable preference of the child, if the court 

considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference,” MCL 722.23(i). 

Although both children expressed a preference to attend Howell schools, it appears that 

the trial court refused to consider their preferences because neither child had ever 

attended a Howell school and, therefore, presumably lacked any factual basis on which to 

form a reasonable preference. Essentially, the trial court imposed a requirement of 

actual, firsthand experience, in this case with a Howell school, in order for the child’s 

preferences to be valid. However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that factor i does 

not “require that a child’s preference be accompanied by detailed thought or critical 

analysis” and that the “reasonable preference” standard merely “exclude[s] those 

preferences that are arbitrary or inherently indefensible.” Pierron, 282 Mich App at 259. 

The trial court did not indicate that the children’s stated preferences violated this minimal 

standard of reasonableness. 

To summarize, when considering an important decision affecting the welfare of 

the child, the trial court must first determine whether the proposed change would modify 

the established custodial environment of that child. In making this determination, it is the 

child’s standpoint, rather than that of the parents, that is controlling. If the proposed 

change would modify the established custodial environment of the child, then the burden 

is on the parent proposing the change to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

the change is in the child’s best interests. Under such circumstances, the trial court must 

consider all the best-interest factors because a case in which the proposed change would 
11

modify the custodial environment is essentially a change-of-custody case. On the other 

hand, if the proposed change would not modify the established custodial environment of 

the child, the burden is on the parent proposing the change to establish, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that the change is in the child’s best interests. In addition, 

under those circumstances, although the trial court must determine whether each of the 

best-interest factors applies, if a factor does not apply, the trial court need not address it 

any further. In other words, if a particular best-interest factor is irrelevant to the question 

at hand, i.e., whether the proposed change is in the best interests of the child, the trial 

court need not say anything other than that the factor is irrelevant. 

In this case, because we agree with the Court of Appeals that the proposed change 

of schools will not modify the established custodial environment,6

 we affirm the Court of 

Appeals’ decision to vacate the trial court’s order. However, even by a ‘preponderance 

of the evidence’ standard, this case presents a very close question with regard to whether 

attending Howell Schools is in the best interests of the children. It is clear that plaintiff is 

concerned about his children, is involved in their education, and provides guidance, 

structure, and discipline even when the children are not in his care. While the change of 

schools would not modify the established custodial environment, we recognize that the 

change of schools may, in fact, impair plaintiff’s ability to be readily accessible to 

 6

 We emphasize that we do not hold here that a proposed change of school will 

never modify an established custodial environment. Rather, we merely hold that, under 

the specific facts of this case, this particular change of schools does not modify the 

established custodial environment. 
12

provide guidance and structure. These facts, of course, are relevant to assessing where 

the interests of these children lie, and, on remand, we encourage the trial court to 

carefully consider all relevant factors when making this assessment. We remand to the 

trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.7

 Marilyn Kelly 

 Michael F. Cavanagh 

 Elizabeth A. Weaver 

 Robert P. Young, Jr. 

 Stephen J. Markman 

 Diane M. Hathaway 

 7

 We have considered defendant’s post-argument motion to “correct the record, 

strike the response oral argument [sic] and the response brief [sic] of the plaintiffappellant; to investigation [sic] into deception systematically perpretrated [sic] by the 

plaintiff-appellant; and for costs and sanctions against the plaintiff-appellant,” and it is 

denied. However, defendant’s motion contains over 25 specific allegations that 

plaintiff’s counsel has “lied,” “intentionally misled,” “deceived,” or been “manipulative” 

concerning the facts of this case. Additionally, defendant makes aspersions concerning 

the integrity of the attorney grievance process, and she has “noticed that the video tape of 

the oral argument in the State Bar’s web cite [sic] was cleaned up a bit and can not be 

relied upon for the full record.” We find all these allegations to be irresponsible and 

unsubstantiated. Therefore, costs of $250 are assessed against defendant’s counsel in 

favor of plaintiff under MCR 7.316(D)(1)(b) for filing this vexatious motion. 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

TIMOTHY PIERRON, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v No. 138824 

KELLY PIERRON, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

CORRIGAN, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

 I concur with the majority that when a trial court determines that an important 

decision affecting the welfare of a child would not modify the child’s established 

custodial environment, all 12 best interest factors in MCL 722.23 may not be relevant to 

the specific decision before the court. I agree further that in such cases the trial court 

nonetheless must consider the applicability of all the statutory best interest factors and 

state its factual findings and conclusions regarding each relevant factor on the record. I 

acknowledge that this approach comports with the applicable provisions of the Child 

Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq. 

I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s conclusion that the established 

custodial environment between plaintiff father and the two minor children will not be 

modified in this case. After a six-day evidentiary hearing spanning 1,136 transcript pages 

and at least 54 exhibits, the trial court found that an established custodial environment 

existed with both parents and that defendant mother’s unilateral decision to remove the 
2

children from Grosse Pointe Public Schools and enroll them in Howell Public Schools 

would alter the children’s established custodial environment with plaintiff. The record 

abundantly supports the trial court’s findings. After scrutinizing the record, I am 

mystified by the majority’s blanket endorsement of the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that 

the trial court’s finding was against the great weight of the evidence when the Court of 

Appeals failed to discuss what evidence clearly preponderated in the opposite direction. I 

am similarly perplexed by the majority’s resistance to reviewing the evidence adduced 

and its related assertion that much of the evidence on the lower court record—evidence 

that the majority deems unnecessary to discuss—is irrelevant. The majority essentially 

second-guesses the trial court’s findings regarding the existence of an established 

custodial environment with both parents and the destruction of the children’s established 

custodial environment with plaintiff. The majority concludes that the children “spend the 

vast majority of their time” with defendant, so adjustments were merely to plaintiff’s 

parenting time. I cannot join this distortion of the record before us. I further conclude 

that the result here does not conform to the highly deferential “great weight of the 

evidence” standard of review. 

Numerous witnesses testified about the quality of Grosse Pointe and Howell 

Public Schools. Only plaintiff and defendant, however, testified about the modifications 

to plaintiff’s parenting time and the established custodial environment as a result of the 

proposed school change. Defendant failed to squarely rebut plaintiff’s testimony in this 

regard. Further, the testimony of the children’s tutor, Deb Dixon, corroborated plaintiff’s 

testimony about his strong interest in the children’s education and his active involvement 
3

in their daily lives. Under the great weight of the evidence standard, a reviewing court 

defers to the trial court’s credibility determinations, and the trial court’s factual findings 

should be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction. 

Because the record does not reveal that the evidence before the trial court clearly 

preponderated in the opposite direction, I would reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision 

and reinstate the trial court’s order directing that the children remain enrolled in Grosse 

Pointe Public Schools. 

I have a firm conviction on the basis of my review of the record that the move to 

Howell will strip these children of two parents’ involvement in their education and 

discipline, thereby relegating them to the care of a single parent, defendant mother.1

 That 

 1

 The trial court expressed a similar concern about enrolling the children in Howell 

Public Schools. While issuing its opinion from the bench in regard to best interest factor 

j, the trial court found in pertinent part: 

[Plaintiff] repeatedly stated his strong conviction that children need 

both parents actively involved in their lives. He felt the move to the 

Howell school district would impede his ability to participate in their 

educational and every day lives. Without both parents in their lives on a 

daily basis, [plaintiff] feels the children face a higher potential for failure. 

This is especially true in his opinion because Andrew struggles 

academically. He wants to be there for his son to help guide his 

educational development. 

[Defendant] feels [plaintiff] can still participate adequately from 

Grosse Pointe, but she did not otherwise address his concerns nor the 

general philosophy of the need for two parents to raise their children 

actively and on a daily basis.

As the following sample of testimony from the record illustrates, there is no basis to 

disturb the trial court’s finding as against the great weight of the evidence: 
4

 

 In response to whether Grosse Pointe Public Schools afforded his children with the 

best opportunities that he could offer them, plaintiff responded, “Yes, it is. I think 

it is. Is the school system better? Yes. Is that all that matters? No, you need both 

parents. You need both parents working together. But honestly with one parent 

doing [sic] out in Howell is not going to work with them.” 

 In response to the potential impact of the children attending Howell Public 

Schools, plaintiff stated, “I’m vastly concerned about what these kids are going to 

do in school. Even if they are straight A students in Howell, I’m not sure if that’s 

going to be enough; but I honestly, I doubt they’ll be straight A students in 

Howell. They’re going to be even worse than they were in Grosse Pointe. With 

only Kelly doing it and not two parents, they’re going to fail. And that’s my 

biggest fear is they’re not what—that’s my biggest fear is they’re failing if they go 

to Howell.” 

 In response to whether enrolling Andrew in Howell Public Schools would ease the 

stress on plaintiff and Andrew’s relationship, plaintiff responded, “No. My 

assumption if he is going to attend Howell school[s], I will lose contact with him 

and it’s going to be heinous. Kelly raised Ian by herself. There was no other 

father for Ian there. And what happened to Ian? He flunked out. You’re going to 

take my kid and put him in Howell schools without a father. And Howell schools, 

we’re arguing this, but you know what, Howell schools is [sic] not better than 

Grosse Pointe schools. And so you’re going to take my child and put him in a 

school system that’s not as good and what’s going to happen to him? Ian is 

smarter than Andrew. And Ian flunked out. What’s going to happen to Andrew in 

Howell schools?” 

 In response to how attending Howell Public Schools would affect the children’s 

family relationship with plaintiff, plaintiff explained, “I will see them less. We 

cannot do the overnight visits. I will see them intermittently on weekends. When 

they’re living in Grosse Pointe around the block, I saw them routinely on 

weekends. Now I’m seeing them every once in a while and it takes a fight over 

the phone with Kelly.” 

 In response to whether plaintiff was willing to work for a relationship with the 

children’s friends in Howell, plaintiff stated, “I will do anything to keep my 

relationship with my kids. I don’t know if it’s going to be possible though 

because, if she is living in Howell, the friends are in Howell, how—as your 

example, how are you going to pick up their friends and drive the friends down for 

two hours to spend time with me, and then drive them back? . . . I don’t know 

how many parents are going to have their friends—their kids go to see—go spend 
5

parent seems quite inattentive to the children’s needs. Further, her proposal to enroll the 

children in a new school district appears to be based on her desire to relocate, and not 

what is in the children’s best interests. Modifying the status quo and enrolling the 

children in Howell Public Schools is a decision reflecting defendant’s best interests to be 

sure, but not the best interests of the parties’ two minor children. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 As the majority explains in part, plaintiff and defendant had two children during 

their marriage, Andrew (born 5/6/1994) and Madeline (born 1/25/99).2

 When the parties 

divorced in 2000, the judgment of divorce awarded joint legal custody. With regard to 

educational decisions, the judgment provided: 

As joint legal custodians, each parent shall have equal decisionmaking authority with respect to matters concerning . . . education. Both 

parents shall be fully informed with respect to the children’s progress in 

school and shall be entitled to participate in all school conferences, 

programs and other related activities in which parents are customarily 

involved. Both parents shall have full access to the children’s school 

records, teachers, counselors, and to their medical records and health care 

providers. 

 

a weekend at some other man’s house. In Grosse Pointe, I know the parents. I 

spend time with the parents. I see them at the PTA meetings. We have 

relationships.”

2

 Defendant also has a child from a previous relationship, Ian. The record does not 

establish Ian’s date of birth, but the testimony indicates that he was 18 years old at the 

time of the evidentiary hearing and resided with defendant while attending community 

college. 
6

Additionally, the judgment of divorce granted defendant primary physical custody but 

awarded plaintiff “reasonable and liberal parenting time . . . which shall include alternate 

weekends, alternate holidays, time during school and summer vacations, and as otherwise 

agreed between the parties.” In 2001, an amended judgment of divorce entered. 

Consistent with the original judgment of divorce, the amended judgment stated that “the 

parties shall have joint legal custody and shared parenting time” and that defendant’s 

residence “continues as primary residence.” The parenting time provision was modified 

to provide greater flexibility. It stated that plaintiff’s parenting time “shall include 

overnights and all mutually agreeable times, including first option of parenting time when 

and if [defendant] resumes and/or returns to full time employment or continued education 

that requires night classes.” 

 After the divorce, plaintiff, defendant, and the children lived in Grosse Pointe 

Woods, where the children had resided since birth. Defendant and the children lived less 

than six blocks from plaintiff’s home. The children’s paternal grandparents, with whom 

they share a close and loving bond, also resided in Grosse Pointe. Upon reaching school 

age, the children both attended Grosse Pointe Public Schools. Madeline’s elementary 

school was located 0.25 miles from plaintiff’s home and 1.1 miles from defendant’s 

home. Andrew’s middle school was located 1.4 miles from plaintiff’s home and 1.2 

miles from defendant’s home. 

Despite his demanding radiology practice, plaintiff played an active role in the 

children’s education: attending school concerts and ice cream socials, helping the 

children with homework on school nights, staying in contact with teachers, and arranging 
7

for a private tutor for the children when they struggled academically. In April 2005, 

plaintiff was forced to seek judicial intervention to obtain private tutoring for Andrew 

after defendant rejected the idea. Defendant was comparatively less involved in the 

children’s education even though she was essentially a stay-at-home parent who 

occasionally did upholstery work and taught figure skating.3

 Additionally, the children 

participated in various extracurricular activities in Grosse Pointe, including band, 

archery, figure skating, and dance. Plaintiff, defendant, and the children’s paternal 

grandparents assisted in transporting the children and encouraging their involvement in 

extracurricular activities. For certain extracurricular activities, including Madeline’s 

dance classes, plaintiff and the children’s paternal grandmother handled all the 

transportation. The children also attended church with plaintiff and their paternal 

grandparents. 

In April 2007, without notifying plaintiff, defendant offered to purchase a 

condominium in Howell.4

 At the time, the only individual whom defendant knew in 

Howell was her on-again, off-again boyfriend of five years.5

 After learning of 

 3

 Although defendant graduated from a four-year university with a degree in 

science and a certificate in social work, she stopped working when she married plaintiff. 

At the time of the evidentiary hearing, defendant confirmed that she did not have a job 

and that she no longer did upholstery work or taught figure skating. Defendant primarily 

subsisted on approximately $28,000 a year in tax-free child support from plaintiff. 

4

 Howell is located approximately 60 miles from Grosse Pointe Woods. 

5

 Defendant’s sister lived in Cohoctah Township and defendant’s mother lived in 

West Bloomfield. According to defendant, it took approximately 25 minutes to drive 

from the condominium in Howell to her sister’s home in Cohoctah Township. 
8

defendant’s actions, plaintiff proposed that defendant purchase his single family home in 

Grosse Pointe Woods for the same price that she offered for the condominium in Howell. 

Plaintiff’s proposal would have given defendant more than $100,000 in free equity. 

Plaintiff also attempted to negotiate a parenting time schedule with defendant. Defendant 

either rejected or did not respond to any of plaintiff’s proposals. In June 2007, defendant 

moved to Howell. Contrary to the terms of the judgment of divorce granting equal 

decision-making with regard to education, defendant enrolled the children in Howell 

Public Schools. In July 2007, plaintiff filed a motion opposing the proposed change of 

schools, asserting that the “unilateral decision to move the children more than an hour 

from [p]laintiff’s home and completely uproot them from their school district” would 

violate the judgment of divorce and modify the children’s established custodial 

environment.6

 Plaintiff offered to pay for a rental home for defendant and the children 

during the pendency of the proceedings, but defendant refused plaintiff’s offer. 

 During September and October 2007, the trial court conducted a six-day 

evidentiary hearing to determine whether the proposed change of schools was in the best 

interests of the children. At the conclusion, the court issued a 27-page opinion from the 

 6

 Since the proposed change of schools first became an issue, the record reveals 

steadily increasing levels of acrimony between the parties and their respective counsel. 

This acrimony is aptly illustrated in defendant’s post-argument motion to “correct the 

record, strike the response oral argument [sic] and the response brief [sic] of the plaintiffappellant; to investigation [sic] into deception systematically perpretrated [sic] by the 

plaintiff-appellant; and for costs and sanctions against the plaintiff-appellant.” I wholly 

concur with the majority’s decision to deny defendant’s motion and sanction defendant’s 

counsel pursuant to MCR 7.316(D)(1)(b) for filing a vexatious motion. 
9

bench with a detailed consideration of the evidence. The court noted the governing 

burdens of proof. The party seeking to implement a school change has the burden of 

establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the change is in the child’s best 

interests. If, however, the proposed school change will affect the child’s established 

custodial environment, the moving party has the heightened burden of persuading the 

court by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court found that both parents had an 

established custodial environment with their children. Because the trial court determined 

that the proposed school change would affect the parties’ agreed-upon parenting time 

schedule and modify the children’s established custodial environment “of flexibility and 

continued involvement” with plaintiff, defendant had the burden of persuading the trial 

court that the school change was in the children’s best interests. After a careful review of 

the evidence and discussion about all 12 statutory best interest factors, the trial court 

concluded that defendant had failed to establish that the proposed change was in the 

children’s best interests under either the clear and convincing evidence standard or the 

less rigorous preponderance of the evidence standard. Accordingly, the trial court 

ordered that the children remain enrolled in Grosse Pointe Public Schools. Soon 

thereafter, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration. 

 Defendant appealed by right, arguing that the trial court had applied the incorrect 

standard of review, misunderstood the applicable law, and made factual findings against 

the great weight of the evidence. Defendant also challenged the trial court’s findings 

regarding statutory best interest factor i (reasonable preference of the child). 
10

The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order, concluding that the trial court 

had erred by finding that the proposed school change would modify the children’s 

established custodial environment with plaintiff because “only minor modifications to 

plaintiff’s parenting time” would be required.7

 The Court further held that the trial court 

had made factual findings against the great weight of the evidence regarding statutory 

best interest factors a (love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the 

parties involved and the child) and h (home, school, and community record of the child). 

Additionally, the Court concluded that the trial court had committed clear legal errors 

regarding factors b (capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, 

affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or her 

religion), c (capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with 

food, clothing, medical care or remedial care, and other material needs), e (permanence, 

as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes), and i (reasonable 

preference of the child).8

 After opining that “defendant likely satisfied her burden of 

proof on the change-of-school issue in this case,”9

 the Court remanded the case for 

reevaluation of the proposed school change issue under the preponderance of the 

evidence standard. 

 7 Pierron v Pierron, 282 Mich App 222, 249; 765 NW2d 345 (2009). 

8 Id. at 253-260. 

9 Id. at 261. 
11

 Plaintiff then applied for leave to appeal in this Court. We granted plaintiff’s 

application and directed the parties to address whether (1) defendant’s decision to enroll 

the children in Howell Public Schools, which is 60 miles from their former school district 

and from plaintiff’s home, resulted in a change in the custodial environment; (2) the clear 

and convincing evidence standard or the preponderance of the evidence standard 

governed defendant’s burden of proof; (3) defendant demonstrated that the school change 

was in the children’s best interests; and (4) the children’s preference for Howell Public 

Schools was “reasonable.”10

II. RELEVANCE OF STATUTORY BEST INTEREST FACTORS 

I agree that in child custody disputes where the established custodial environment 

would not be modified, a trial court need not state its factual findings and conclusions 

regarding any statutory best interest factor that is irrelevant to the specific important 

decision under review. Further, I agree that requiring trial courts to evaluate best interest 

factors that are plainly irrelevant to a specific decision distracts from the overriding focus 

in any child custody dispute—namely, what is in the child’s best interest. Consequently, 

I concur with the general approach set forth by the majority, but I emphasize that this 

approach is limited to those cases in which the proposed important decision would not

modify the child’s established custodial environment.11

 10 483 Mich 1135 (2009). 

11 As the amicus curiae brief of the Family Law Section of the State Bar of 

Michigan observes, if the established custodial environment would be modified by the 

proposed important decision, the trial court, as a practical matter, could be addressing a 
12

An established custodial environment exists “if over an appreciable time the child 

naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the 

necessities of life, and parental comfort.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). The Legislature has 

instructed courts to consider “[t]he age of the child, the physical environment, and the 

inclination of the custodian and the child as to permanency of the relationship” in 

analyzing whether the custodian and child share an established custodial environment. 

Id. In child custody disputes between parents, “the best interests of the child control.” 

MCL 722.25; see Ireland v Smith, 451 Mich 457, 466; 547 NW2d 686 (1996) (“In all 

events, however, the best interests of [the child], not of [the parents], are central.”). The 

Legislature has stated that the “sum total” of 12 factors provides the basis for courts to 

consider, evaluate, and determine whether an important decision is in “the best interests 

of the child.” MCL 722.23.12 After carefully considering the whole situation, a trial 

 

possible change in custody, which would necessitate a full review of the child’s custodial 

placement pursuant to the best interest factors listed in MCL 722.23. 

12 Specifically, MCL 722.23 provides: 

As used in this act, “best interests of the child” means the sum total 

of the following factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the 

court: 

(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the 

parties involved and the child. 

(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the 

child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and 

raising of the child in his or her religion or creed, if any. 

(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide 

the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care 
13

court may determine that certain factors are plainly irrelevant to the particular decision 

before the court. In such cases, a trial court not only must state its factual findings and 

conclusions regarding each relevant best interest factor on the record, but it also must 

expressly state its conclusion regarding the irrelevance of any remaining factors. See 

Parent v Parent, 282 Mich App 152, 156-157; 762 NW2d 553 (2009). 

By distinguishing applicable and inapplicable best interest factors in child custody 

disputes where the established custodial environment would not be modified, a trial court 

can create a sufficient record for meaningful appellate review while focusing its analysis 

 

recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical 

care, and other material needs. 

(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory 

environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity. 

(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed 

custodial home or homes. 

(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved. 

(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved. 

(h) The home, school, and community record of the child. 

(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the 

child to be of sufficient age to express preference. 

(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and 

encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the 

child and the other parent or the child and the parents. 

(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was 

directed against or witnessed by the child. 

(l) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a 

particular child custody dispute. 
14

on the important decision at issue and how that decision will affect the welfare of the 

child. Accordingly, I concur with this aspect of the majority opinion. 

III. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD AS APPLIED 

Although I agree with the majority about the threshold applicability determination 

of the statutory best interest factors where the established custodial environment would 

not be modified, I disagree that the children’s established custodial environment with 

plaintiff would not be modified under these facts. The trial court properly found that the 

proposed school change from Grosse Pointe to Howell would modify the children’s 

established custodial environment with plaintiff.13 After scrutinizing this voluminous 

record, I conclude that plaintiff father was far more than a “weekend parent” and that 

defendant’s unilateral decision to enroll the children in a new school district 

approximately 60 miles from their lifelong school district and home would modify the 

established custodial environment that the children share with plaintiff.14 The evidence 

 13 I commend the trial court for doing an exemplary job in presiding over the 

convoluted evidentiary hearing before it. 

14 The majority seems to view the 60-mile distance between Howell and Grosse 

Pointe, which is less than 100 miles, as a presumptive basis to contravene the trial court’s 

factual finding that the children’s established custodial environment with plaintiff would 

be modified. The 60-mile distance itself did not preclude the trial court from finding that 

the children had an established custodial environment with both parents and that enrolling 

the children in Howell Public Schools would modify the established custodial 

environment with plaintiff. Moreover, contrary to the Court of Appeals, I do not read 

MCL 722.31(1) as implicitly providing that “a custodial parent may move a child’s 

residence by less than 100 miles without first obtaining permission from the court or 

consent from the other party.” Pierron, 282 Mich App at 245. Instead, the explicit 

statutory language is the best means to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s 

intent. MCL 722.31(1) provides in part that “a parent of a child whose custody is 
15

did not clearly preponderate against the trial court’s findings, and the Court of Appeals’ 

application of the great weight of the evidence standard constituted error requiring 

reversal. Consequently, I dissent from the majority’s endorsement of the Court of 

Appeals’ opinion in this regard. 

MCL 722.28 enumerates the three relevant standards of review in child custody 

cases.15 “Findings of fact are to be reviewed under the ‘great weight’ standard, 

discretionary rulings are to be reviewed for ‘abuse of discretion,’ and questions of law for 

‘clear legal error.’” Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 877; 526 NW2d 889 (1994). 

Under the great weight of the evidence standard, “a reviewing court should not substitute 

its judgment on questions of fact unless they ‘clearly preponderate in the opposite 

 

governed by court order shall not change a legal residence of the child to a location that is 

more than 100 miles from the child’s legal residence at the time of the commencement of 

the action in which the order is issued.” The Legislature has demonstrated its ability to 

include specific statutory presumptions in the Child Custody Act. See, e.g., MCL 

722.27a(1) (“It is presumed to be in the best interests of a child for the child to have a 

strong relationship with both of his or her parents.”). However, the Legislature did not 

draft a presumption in MCL 722.31(1) that when parents share joint legal custody, a 

relocating parent’s unilateral decision to move a child’s legal residence less than 100 

miles is presumed not to modify the child’s established custodial environment with his or 

her other parent. Consequently, I cannot conclude that the distance itself creates a 

presumption that a change in legal residence of less than 100 miles will not modify to 

whom the children look “for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental 

comfort.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). 

15 MCL 722.28 provides: 

To expedite the resolution of a child custody dispute by prompt and 

final adjudication, all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be 

affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the 

great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a 

clear legal error on a major issue. 
16

direction.’” Id. at 878, quoting Murchie v Std Oil Co, 355 Mich 550, 558; 94 NW2d 799 

(1959). Moreover, a reviewing court should defer to the trial court’s credibility 

determinations. Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). As 

Fletcher states, “[t]he great weight standard of review allows [for] a meaningful yet 

deferential review . . . .” Fletcher, 447 Mich at 878. 

After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that defendant’s proposal to 

enroll the children in Howell Public Schools, approximately 60 miles away from their 

current school district and plaintiff’s home in Grosse Pointe Woods, would affect the 

existing parenting time schedule and modify the children’s established custodial 

environment. The trial court found that if the children were enrolled in Howell Public 

Schools, overnight visits on weeknights and first option parenting time for plaintiff would 

no longer be practical.16 Further, the trial court concluded that the children’s established 

custodial environment with plaintiff was one “of flexibility and continued involvement” 

and that the testimony established that plaintiff “was involved on a continuing basis with 

[the] children’s education.” The trial court cited testimony establishing that plaintiff 

“visited the schools regularly, took the children to lunch on occasions, picked them up 

 16 The majority acknowledges that a review of the record reveals “some testimony 

indicating that the children occasionally stayed overnight with plaintiff on some school 

nights” after the instant action was filed, but the majority presumes that these weeknight 

overnight visits only occurred “to reduce the amount of time that the children spent 

traveling between Howell and Grosse Pointe Woods.” Nothing in the record supports 

this statement. In light of the majority’s concession that some weeknight overnight visits 

were occurring, I am perplexed by the majority’s related conclusion that “it was error for 

the trial court to consider the provision allowing weeknight, overnight visits without also 

considering that these visits were not occurring.” 
17

from tutoring, and saw them regularly despite the absence of a specific parenting time 

schedule.” 

The majority cites Brown v Loveman, 260 Mich App 576, 595; 680 NW2d 432 

(2004), for the proposition that “[i]f the required parenting time adjustments will not 

change who the child naturally looks to for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, 

and parental comfort, then the established custodial environment will not have changed.” 

Ironically, Brown concluded that the modification in parenting time in that case 

“necessarily would amount to a change in the established custodial environment, 

requiring analysis under the best interest factor framework.” Id. at 596. Other Court of 

Appeals decisions have cited Brown for the proposition that if a proposed move would 

relegate an “equally active” parent to the more circumscribed role of “weekend” parent, 

the parenting time modification would amount to a change in the established custodial 

environment. See Powery v Wells, 278 Mich App 526, 528; 752 NW2d 47 (2008). Such 

reasoning is equally instructive here because the proposed school change would alter the 

extent to which the children look to plaintiff “for guidance, discipline, the necessities of 

life, and parental comfort.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). 

The majority also describes the Court of Appeals as concluding that the trial 

court’s finding was against the great weight of the evidence because “the distance of the 

new schools from plaintiff’s home would only require relatively minor adjustments to 

plaintiff’s parenting time.” I am mystified by this holding on the record before us. 

Plaintiff testified in great detail about the modifications to his parenting time and the 

established custodial environment that would result from the proposed school change. 
18

Defendant failed to squarely rebut plaintiff’s testimony in this regard. Contrary to the 

Court of Appeals’ view, the salient issue is the impact of the proposed school change on 

plaintiff’s ongoing involvement with the children’s educational and everyday lives, not 

the distance between the school districts. See note 1 of this opinion. I find no basis to 

conclude that the trial court’s finding was against the great weight of the evidence. 

Instead, ample evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the children’s established 

custodial environment would be modified if the proposed school change occurred. 

To illustrate, without discussing contradictory evidence, the Court of Appeals 

summarily concluded, “[t]he mere 60-mile distance between Howell and Grosse Pointe 

Woods would not be a substantial barrier to plaintiff's continued parenting time, and the 

mere change of school districts would not necessarily alter or materially reduce plaintiff's 

opportunity to exercise visitation with the minor children.”17 The trial court, however, 

heard testimony about myriad ways in which the proposed school change would modify 

the children’s established custodial environment. I concur with the trial court’s finding 

that the distance factor would impinge on plaintiff’s ability to provide educational 

guidance and discipline for the children. 

Plaintiff, for example, testified in great detail about the proposed school change 

hindering his ability to see the children flexibly during and after school on weekdays. 

While the children attended Grosse Pointe Public Schools, plaintiff could take them to 

breakfast before school or to lunch during school depending on his work schedule. 

 17 Pierron, 282 Mich App at 250. 
19

Plaintiff routinely took the children out to dinner on Thursdays after he picked them up 

from tutoring. Further, plaintiff personally worked with the children on their weeknight 

homework assignments. At one point, plaintiff created a special weekly science tutoring 

session for Andrew during which Andrew and plaintiff did science projects in plaintiff’s 

basement. Plaintiff also described instances where he had been able to attend daytime 

school functions. For example, a graduation ceremony for Andrew was scheduled during 

plaintiff’s regular workday. Because the school was near the office where plaintiff’s 

radiology group practiced, he was able to attend. The move to Howell would impede this 

midday and weeknight availability. Additionally, plaintiff testified that his concern about 

remaining involved in his children’s daily lives led him to explore relocating to Howell 

and finding employment closer to the children, but his multiple sclerosis limited his 

ability to find a comparable position elsewhere.18 Although plaintiff stated that he had 

not taken a sick day in 10 years, plaintiff admitted that, because of his multiple sclerosis, 

he needed to use a wheelchair during a recent vacation with the children. The testimony 

about plaintiff’s efforts to relocate and his multiple sclerosis further supports the trial 

court’s finding that the children’s established custodial environment with plaintiff would 

be modified by the proposed school change. 

Further, defendant testified that she listed plaintiff as an emergency contact on 

forms filed with the Howell Public Schools. Yet, defendant listed plaintiff as the third 

 18 Plaintiff was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in 1993. 
20

emergency contact after defendant and two other individuals.19 In contrast, during the 

evidentiary hearing, both plaintiff and defendant immediately responded when Andrew 

truanted from school in Grosse Pointe. Defendant testified that it took about 90 minutes 

to travel from Grosse Pointe to Howell in rush hour traffic. When asked whether plaintiff 

would have problems being involved with the children’s education in Howell, defendant 

responded no. She suggested that plaintiff keep in touch over the computer or telephone. 

The evidence establishing plaintiff’s ongoing personal involvement with the children and 

their education in Grosse Pointe belies defendant’s suggestion. This testimony also 

supports the trial court’s finding that the proposed school change would modify the 

children’s established custodial environment with plaintiff. 

Additionally, the record reveals defendant’s troubling lack of personal 

responsibility for and interest in the children’s education. Defendant, for example, 

professed that she did not need to attend Andrew and Madeline’s parent-teacher 

conferences because she had attended conferences with her older son Ian. By contrast, 

plaintiff regularly attended parent-teacher conferences and was known by the school 

staff. Defendant also admitted that she received a letter from the school district when 

Madeline had amassed 27 tardy reports at school while living in her home. Although 

defendant stated that she had resolved the problem by taking away Madeline’s computer 

 19 On the same form, defendant identified herself as the children’s legal guardian, 

but she failed to mark either yes or no to identify plaintiff as the children’s other legal 

guardian. 
21

time, Madeline nevertheless went on to accrue a total of 72 tardy reports for the school 

year, which is remarkable since the average school year is about 180 days. 

Andrew had a similar problem, accumulating numerous reports of tardiness and 

absences. In one school year alone, Andrew amassed 90 absences from class and 28 

tardy reports. Plaintiff described an instance where he came to pick up Madeline from 

school only to be told by Madeline’s teacher that Madeline had not attended at all. When 

plaintiff called defendant, he spoke to Andrew. Andrew informed plaintiff that he had 

overslept in the morning, and, as a result, Andrew failed to wake defendant and Madeline 

so that the children could make it to school that day. The record reflects that Andrew, 

and not defendant, was responsible for the children’s morning routine. These incidents 

reflect defendant’s persistent inattentiveness to her children’s educational needs and the 

crucial role played by plaintiff in the children’s daily lives. 

After defendant forced plaintiff to obtain a court order to arrange academic 

tutoring for Andrew, plaintiff sought the services of Deb Dixon on the basis of the 

recommendation of Andrew’s teacher. Dixon testified that she had 11 years of 

experience working as an academic tutor with more than 150 students, in addition to her 

previous career experience as a German teacher and guidance counselor at a local high 

school. She confirmed that plaintiff paid for the twice-weekly tutoring sessions, first to 

help Andrew with reading and later to help Madeline with reading and phonics. 

Moreover, Dixon testified that plaintiff would consistently inquire about the children’s 

academic progress when he transported the children to and from tutoring, even calling 

Dixon periodically for updates. In contrast, defendant did not regularly speak to Dixon. 
22

Oftentimes, Dixon would go out to plaintiff’s vehicle to tell plaintiff how the children 

had done. According to Dixon, defendant canceled tutoring sessions and did not display 

the amount of concern about Madeline’s reading progress that one would expect of a 

parent. Defendant also suggested that her 18-year-old son Ian would be an appropriate 

math tutor for Andrew, even though Ian graduated from high school with a 1.8 grade 

point average and was not permitted to attend his high school commencement. 

Perplexingly, defendant also testified that “Ian is lazy, and he’s paid for it by going to 

community college instead of the college of his choice where his friends went.” Viewed 

together, the evidence regarding defendant’s demonstrable irresponsibility and lack of 

interest in the children’s education not only illustrates the importance of keeping plaintiff 

actively involved in the children’s education, but it also bolsters the trial court’s 

conclusion that the proposed school change would modify the children’s established 

custodial environment. 

The record supports the trial court’s finding that the children had an established 

custodial environment “of flexibility and continued involvement” with plaintiff and that 

the proposed school change would modify that environment. From the children’s 

perspective, their established custodial environment would be modified if they enrolled in 

Howell Public Schools. As a practical matter, plaintiff would be relegated to the role of 

“weekend parent.” Plaintiff specifically testified about the importance of the children 

needing two parents, stating that if defendant enrolled the children in Howell Public 

Schools, “it will truly be a single parent raising the kids.” Although the Court of Appeals 

attempted to minimize the impact of the proposed school change on the children’s 
23

established custodial environment with plaintiff, the Court of Appeals cited no evidence 

that clearly preponderated against the trial court’s finding. Because the trial court’s 

finding was not against the great weight of the evidence, I dissent. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

I concur in the principle that if a proposed change would not modify the 

established custodial environment, the trial court not only must determine the 

applicability of all 12 best interest factors, but it also must address each factor that is 

relevant to the specific issue before the court. With regard to this case, however, I 

conclude that the trial court’s finding that the proposed school change would modify the 

children’s established custodial environment with plaintiff did not violate the great 

weight of the evidence standard. Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals’ 

decision and reinstate the trial court’s order directing that the children remain enrolled in 

Grosse Pointe Public Schools. 

 Maura D. Corrigan